

1. Crisis overview¹

4.7 / 5	18.2 million	11.2 million	\$2.7 billion	41.6%
INFORM Severity Index	People in need of humanitarian aid (Yemen HRP 2024)	People targeted in the response plan (Yemen HRP 2024)	Required to reach the target (Yemen HRP 2024)	Of the required funding secured (Yemen HRP 2023)
239 MSEK	-	16 MSEK	255 MSEK	
Initial allocation	Additional allocation	Flexible funding	Total Sida funding 2024	

The protracted humanitarian crisis in Yemen is due to deep rooted poverty, aggravated by now 10 years of destructive armed conflict between the internationally recognized government (IRG) in the south and the de-facto authorities (DFA=Ansar Allah/Houthis) in the north. Conflict, including military support to the warring parties from other countries, continued to worsen the conditions of two thirds of the population, pushing 4.5 million people into displacement and leading 17 million into food insecurity, with local economies and livelihoods severely disrupted. The conflict has had a major impact on access to basic services, including health, nutrition and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), depriving 17.4 million access to clean water and exposing 17.8 million to health risks. The severe and widespread needs across all sectors, combined with food insecurity, violence and abuse, is resulting in a major protection crisis where 16.4 million face protection risks.

There is a situation of a “no war, no peace”, with regular skirmishes along the frontlines, still impeding humanitarian access. Violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is a repeated element contributing to the crisis with all sides responsible but not held accountable. The most severe humanitarian needs are concentrated in Ma’arib, Al Jawf, Al Bayda, Shabwah, Ta’iz and Al Hodeida governorates. The Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs) of the past few years have not demonstrated dramatic shifts in people in need (PIN) as the number of people affected by acute malnutrition, food insecurity and protection risks are not subsiding. Given all this, the protracted crisis in Yemen is still one of the absolute worst crises in the world and will likely remain so throughout 2024 and many years to come.

2. Humanitarian needs & affected population

The conflict has led to loss of lives and the humanitarian situation has, in previous years, been aggravated by other factors, including communicable disease outbreaks, seasonal floodings, droughts, locust infestations, COVID-19, and a food security situation which has deteriorated further following global increases in food prices. The UN estimates that 377,000 persons have died since the conflict started and up until beginning of 2022, of which more than 60 per cent are estimated to be indirect casualties. This figure is likely even higher now, two years later. Food insecurity, acute malnutrition and lack of clean water contribute to high morbidity, wasting and stunting. The latest Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analysis shows an estimated 17 million people are acutely food insecure, of which 6.1 million are experiencing emergency levels of acute food insecurity.

Unfortunately, there is a negative trend currently in Yemen. Despite a de facto truce, a series of adverse economic events have had a significantly negative impact on Yemen's economy in 2023, which we can already see the effects of since there are now yet again people in Yemen in the highest severity need (level 5) in 6 districts. Further, recent figures from WFP (Feb 2024) show that the pause in food aid has led to a significant escalation in food insecurity; between Dec 2023 and Jan 2024 inadequate food consumption rose from 58% to 67% and severe food deprivation rose from 24% to 37% in the same period.

Since the outbreak of the conflict, over 4.5 million people are estimated to have been internally displaced, with children and women representing up to 79 per cent of the total IDP population. The situation for migrants, mainly from the Horn of Africa, has become particularly dire. The Muhamasheen, an ethnic minority that even prior to the conflict endured systematic discrimination, constitute a significant part of displaced persons living in sites. They have been under-served or sometimes outright excluded from humanitarian aid despite severe needs, due to issues of non-registration with authorities both in the south and the north. The Houthis continue to restrict accountable, efficient, and principled delivery of assistance. Gender-based violence (GBV) and protection risks are widespread, trauma and scarce economic resources drive domestic violence, child marriages, and recruitment as negative coping mechanisms.

Challenges, risks and threats in the humanitarian context in 2024 are many. Escalation of the conflict constitutes the most serious risk for further exacerbating needs and vulnerabilities, and the beginning of the year has seen just that with the Houthi attacks on international cargo ships in the Red Sea and the US and UKs military response to those on Yemeni soil. Even if an agreement is reached between Saudi Arabia, the Houthis and the Presidential Leadership Council, prospects for a comprehensive peace is depending on the management of local grievances and an inclusive process which has thus far been absent. It is thus likely that pockets of insecurity will remain, not the least in the south. Violations of IHL, such as attacks on civilians and health infrastructure, have posed a major challenge and are expected to continue in case conflict re-emerges. Oil cannot be exported from the south any longer, which further

exacerbates the economic meltdown and limits further the IRG's capacity to deliver basic services.

Across Yemen, international organisations work closely with local civil society and community-based organisations to deliver assistance. Local actors, whose role in the humanitarian architecture is fundamental both in the north and the south, work in highly exposed circumstances and under bureaucratic impediments and pressure by conflict parties, which hampers a broader rollout of the localization agenda. Conflict parties, local authorities and other actors of influence seek to benefit from humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian efforts in the southern parts are hampered by divisions, fuelled by competing political agendas of different political groups and entities. The complex and at times unpredictable environment from a security perspective, including from conflict partners and other armed actors and groups, affect the humanitarian space. Negative portrayal of humanitarian workers in the media and bureaucratic delays are impeding operations in both the northern and southern parts of the country. SCMCHA, established by the DFA in 2019, is supposed to coordinate humanitarian efforts in the northern parts of the country, is instead continuing to take several steps that impede humanitarian partners in delivering principled assistance.

3. The humanitarian response

The HRP for 2024 combines acute interventions with durable solutions, and aims to: 1) Decrease crisis-related morbidity and mortality through prioritized, targeted and integrated life-saving assistance and services; 2) Improve and maintain non-discriminatory access to basic services; 3) Improve the protection and dignity of the most vulnerable crisis-affected population. The 2022 and 2023 HRPs were funded only at 35-50 per cent, which has forced the humanitarian system in Yemen to prioritise even further in 2024 and aim for a smaller target, \$2.8 billion instead of \$4.3 billion and also a reduced PIN, even if the needs have not subsided. This in order to be more realistic in terms of what can be done with the likely funding volumes available. Among the critical sectors Shelter/NFI (22 per cent) and WASH (27 per cent) and Nutrition (37 per cent) were comparatively less funded than Food Security (55 per cent), Protection (57 per cent) and Health (66 per cent) in 2023. The total budgets for each sector differed, financing for food security, was greater than all the other sectors combined.

The humanitarian architecture in Yemen was evaluated by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE), commissioned by the UN. The IAHE states that while the Yemen operation has saved lives and prevented suffering it has "also struggled with quality, oversight, robust data collection and analysis, balancing the long-term and short-term competing priorities and preserving humanitarian principles." Strategically and Yemen-specific operational changes are needed to improve the response. Strategically, IAHE calls for preserving the critical sectors of the humanitarian response, while highlighting the need for structural solutions where feasible. Furthermore it calls for collective advocacy regarding flexible and predictable funding, remedy import restrictions, and strengthen the public sector. One year after the evaluation, the findings remain relevant and its recommendations still to be

implemented. Sweden will continue to push for concrete actions in our dialogue. Another critical and high-quality evaluation, conducted by HERE-Geneva, confirmed the IAHE findings about the lack of transparent discussions and strategic direction among agencies. The US has been the largest donor accounting for around 48 per cent of the HRP in 2023, supporting mainly WFP. Other key donors include ECHO, Germany, and Saudi Arabia. Other large donors are the World Bank, UK, Canada, Sweden and CERF.

4. Sida's humanitarian allocation

The initial allocation in 2024 will be SEK 239 million. A slight reduction compared to 2023 but not because of reduced humanitarian needs but instead because of a difference in the allocation methodology. The 2024 support is in line with the “Strategy for Sweden’s humanitarian aid provided through Sida 2021-2025”, and is protection-oriented while also focusing on Food Security, WASH, Health and Nutrition. Relevant sectors within the HRP that integrate food security, resilience and livelihoods will be included due to the protracted nature of the crisis, in line with the HRP. Based on field follow-up, previous experiences, and the partners’ priorities in the initial applications, the following allocation is proposed:

PARTNER	SECTOR	INITIAL ALLOCATION (SEK)	
		2024	2025
ICRC	Multi-sector	50,000,000	-
DRC	Protection	10,000,000	-
IRC	Health, GBV	21,000,000 ¹	21,000,000 ¹
NRC	Multi-Sector	22,000,000 ²	22,000,000 ²
Oxfam	Food Security, WASH, Protection	10,000,000	-
UNHCR	Multi-sector, Protection	40,000,000	-
UNICEF	Protection, WASH, Nutrition, Health	26,000,000	-
WFP	Food Security, Livelihoods, Nutrition	30,000,000	-
YHF	Multi-sector	30,000,000	-
TOTAL		239,000,000	43,000,000

¹ Already committed in 2023.

² Already committed in 2023.

5. Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus

Humanitarian assistance has become a major source of sustenance and its proportion visavi development support has unfortunately grown ever since 2014. Coping mechanisms have been severely affected, with an increasing dependency that risk strengthening vulnerabilities. Complementary interventions are critical in order to reduce this risk, for instance longer-term livelihoods and income opportunities; interventions that primarily are delivered by development partners. The conflict has led to a collapse of social services that are currently only provided by humanitarian and development partners. Longer-term support is needed for sustained support to staff, running costs, and systems strengthening in critical social sectors including healthcare, education, and water and sanitation infrastructure.

With an increased awareness of the need for a more sustainable and well-targeted assistance, where development assistance, including peacebuilding efforts, is strategically used to address root causes of humanitarian suffering, and consequently decrease the dependency on humanitarian assistance, the humanitarian and development community is increasingly looking at area-based planning and assistance delivery. A close partnership between humanitarian and development actors are needed in order to maximise complementarities between the two approaches. There are ongoing effort to strengthen development coordination, linking humanitarian, development and peace actors together, and bringing in both traditional and emerging donor partners. The Yemen Partners Group (YPG), supported by a Technical Team (YPTT) and sector groups constitute the operational elements of the coordination structure.

As there are risks of a politicising of humanitarian aid, not the least by conflict parties, but also humanitarian donors, Sweden has been vocal in stressing the need for a maintained, independent coordination mechanism, and a principled humanitarian space. It is consequently important that nexus programming, where development funding in some cases are strongly linked to political positions, does not have negative bearings on a humanitarian response.

Sweden has a small development cooperation support to Yemen, channelled through Sweden's Regional Development Cooperation Strategy for the MENA region 2021-2025. The strategy, covering inclusive dialogue, human rights and governance, and access to basic services constitute an important complement to Sweden's humanitarian assistance. Through interventions supported with development cooperation funding, accountability in relation to violations against international humanitarian law and human rights are supported, both for direct advocacy vis-à-vis conflict parties but also for a possible future accountability. Economic resilience and livelihoods interventions targeting the most vulnerable, in the areas with highest humanitarian needs, seek to reduce both needs and a dependency on humanitarian assistance.

A review of Sida's Multi-Dimensional Poverty Analysis (MDPA) for Yemen confirmed the current direction and form of support as being highly relevant, and in line with priorities as identified by humanitarian partners through the HRP. In 2023, Sweden has supported the RC/HC's office, allowing it to take a strong lead in nexus coordination, including in relation to the establishment and functioning of the YPG/YPTT/sector coordination structure, strengthen

efforts to engage on durable solutions, reinforce field capacity to improve effective coordination at the field level, and proactively engage on mine action.

Yemen also face various risks related to environment and climate change. The risk posed by the oil tanker, FSO Safer, has effectively been addressed through transferring the 1.1 million barrels of oil on board that risked leaking out, into a replacement tanker. While the imminent threat of a massive oil spill has been averted, efforts continue to complete this process by removing the FSO Safer and scrapping it. The presence of UXOs and mines have a direct impact on current livelihoods opportunities, including fishing and farming. Humanitarian demining remains a critical issue, both to access hard to reach areas, but also for durable solutions such as returns. Sweden's development portfolio is largely constituted by support to actors who have the institutional capacity to deliver both humanitarian and development support. While supported programmes are strongly linked to humanitarian interventions, Sida's development cooperation has stressed on the importance of a clear value added of activities that are systems strengthening, with a stronger sustainability, leading to sustainable reductions in vulnerabilities.

¹ The 2024 initial allocation of humanitarian funding is based on Sida's humanitarian allocation analysis methodology. The methodology was updated during 2023 to more clearly inform an allocation of funding that is proportional between crises, in line with Humanitarian and Good Humanitarian Donorship principles. Key changes in funding levels between the initial allocations for 2023 and 2024 for specific crises are therefore not only reflecting changes in the humanitarian situation but also changes in the analysis methodology. The analysis reflects the current humanitarian situation across crises and is being updated continuously with the latest available data, thereby allowing future allocations to be informed by how indicators have changed since previous allocations. The information in the HCA is based on reports, data, and information from partner organisations and other entities, as well as observations from field visits and dialogue with partners.