Sida Evaluation 2026:1
PEMconsult

Joint Nordic Evaluation of Contributions to Trust Funds

Annex



Sida Evaluation 2026:01

Authors: PEMconsult

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Date of final report: 2025-12-31

Published by Ljungbergs tryckeri, 2026

Art. no: sida62864en

urn:nbn:se:sida-62864en

This publication can be downloaded from: http://www.sida.se/publications

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Annex to Final Evaluation Report

Joint Nordic Evaluation of Contributions to Trust Funds

Date of submission: 3 July 2025

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Production: Evaluation, Learning and Quality Department,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, July 2024

Graphic Production: Kontrapunkt

ISBN:PDF: 87-94339-78-3

This report can be downloaded through the homepage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or directly from the homepage of the Evaluation, Learning and Quality Department http://evaluation.um.dk

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Responsibility for content and presentations of findings and recommendations rests with the authors.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AfDB	African Development Bank
AREF	Africa Renewable Energy Fund
ASRH	Adolescent Sexual and Reproductive Health
BETF	Bank-Executed Trust Fund
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CG	Consultative Group
CI	Continuous Integration
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DDP	Digital Development Partnership
DE4A	Digital Economy for Africa
DIB	Development Impact Bond
DKK	Danish Krone
DPPA	UN Department for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
EMG	Evaluation Management Group
EQ	Evaluation Question
ESF	Environmental and Social Framework
ESMAP	Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme
EU	European Union
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FIF	Financial Intermediary Fund
FMS	Federal Member States
FP	Family Planning
FY	Fiscal Year
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GIL	Gender Innovation Lab
GoU	Government of Ukraine
GP	Global Practice
GWSP	Global Water Security and Sanitation Partnership
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Rights
HRA	Human Rights Advocate
HRBA	Human Rights-Based Approach
HRDTF	Human Rights Development Trust Fund
HRIE	Human Rights Inclusion and Empowerment Trust Fund
HRM	Human Rights Mainstreaming Multi Donor Trust Fund
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IDA	International Development Association
IDEV	Independent Evaluation
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INFF	Integrated National Financing Frameworks
ITH	In their hands
JfYA	Jobs for Youth in Africa

JP	Joint Programme
JPHR	Joint Programme on Human Rights
JPLG	Joint Programme on Local Governance
JSC	Joint Steering Committee
JSDG	Joint Sustainable Development Goals Fund
LG	Local Government
LNOB	Leave No One Behind
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MPF	Multi-Partner Fund
MPTF	Multi-Partner Trust Fund
MPTFO	Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office
MSME	Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises
MTR	Mid-Term Review
MW	Megawatt
NBO	Nordic-Baltic Office
NC	Nordic Country
ND	Nordic Donor
NDEA	New Deal on Energy for Africa
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NTF	Nordic Trust Fund
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PC	Partnership Council
PGCD	Police Gender and Children's Desk
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PUNO	Participating UN Organisation
QA	Quality Assurance
QCPR	Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review
RC	Resident Coordinator
RCO	Resident Coordinator's Office
RETF	Recipient-Executed Trust Fund
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SDTF	Single-Donor Trust Fund
SEFA	Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa
SJF	Somalia Joint Fund
SRH	Sexual and Reproductive Health
SRHR	Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights
TA	Technical Assistance
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
TRC	Technical Review Committee
UFGE	Umbrella Facility for Gender Equality
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund

UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRMF	United Nations Human Rights Mainstreaming Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMPTF	United Nations Multi-Partner Trust Fund
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
URTF	Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund
USD	American Dollar
WB	World Bank
WBG	World Bank Group
YEI	Youth Entrepreneurship and Innovation

Glossary of Terms

Trust fund	A legal entity that holds and manages assets on behalf of a donor/donors in accordance with an agreement. There are different forms of trust funds, and they have different names according to the trustee: Trust funds in the World Bank (WB) distinguishes between: - Umbrella trust funds, an anchor trust fund for funding arrangements for an Umbrella programme (often previously a number of trust funds). - Standalone trust funds – the trust funds that are (still) not part of an Umbrella. - Multi-donor trust funds where multiple donors contribute to the same fund. They can be Umbrella or standalone. - Single-donor trust fund (SDTF) involving a contribution from one donor.[1] Trust funds in the context of the UN: - Multi-partner trust funds, which are multi-donor and multi-UN organisations. - Single-donor/single-agency trust funds. - Basket fund – typically multi-donor with UN organisation. The term pooled funds is used to refer to trust funds with multiple donors pooling their funds.
Multi-bi project	Donor term used in the context of OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) reporting. Originally to signal that this was bilateral funding used for funding multilateral activities, e.g., at country level. Multi-bi projects or multi-bi aid can be used for funding projects and programmes with multilateral organisations as well as multi-partner trust funds and joint programming.
Earmarking	According to the OECD DAC, earmarking is defined as the practice of designating or dedicating specific revenues to the financing of specific public services.

[1] World Bank: A Guide for Development Partners: Partnering with the World Bank through Trust Funds.

	Hard earmarking: The contribution is specified and will be followed up with separate reporting. Soft earmarking: The donor indicates a preference, and the multilateral will seek to provide evidence that the preference has been followed. There will be no separate reporting.
Trustee	Trustee refers to the organisation managing the trust fund – for the MDB trust funds it is the WB and the African Development Bank (AfDB), for the UN Multi-Parter Trust Fund (UNMPTF) it is the UNMPTF Office.
Preferencing	Primarily a term used in the Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) trust funds to indicate the option for a donor to express a non-binding preference for funding a specific theme/geography within a wider trust fund. Expressed preferences should be for a specific sector, theme, and/or geographic area that are already within the scope of the agreed programme for a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). Preferencing cannot be for a specific project or activity, type of execution (bank executed v recipient executed), or type of expenditure (staff costs, consultants, etc). Comparable to soft earmarking.

Annex 1 Terms of Reference

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF DENMARK
Danida

Terms of reference

Section A: Assignment Specific Conditions

Background

Multilateral contributions constitute an increasing share of development assistance from the Nordic countries[2], and a significant and increasing share of the multilateral contributions is earmarked and channelled through various multilateral trust funds, in particular within the World Bank and the UN. The trend to an increased use of multilateral trust funds has taken place for several decades[3], and a wide range of trust funds in terms of size, purpose, geographical focus and management structure exist today. It is envisaged that the increasing use of multilateral trust funds will continue in the future.

Research shows that there can be different reasons for channelling support through multilateral trust funds, including use of multilateral trust fonds to strengthen the multilateral system; to do 'burden-sharing' in fragile and post-conflict contexts; to fund global public goods within the sphere of development support, for instance in areas related to climate change; to provide assistance in humanitarian crises; and finally for various administrative or political reasons. It has also been argued that the donors' approach to trust fund engagement and management will depend on the specific characteristics of the trust funds and how they align with the strategic priorities of the respective donors[4].

An overview of Nordic support to trust funds in the World Bank 2004-2022 showed that Sweden had supported 283 trust funds, Norway 254 trust funds, Denmark 179 trust funds, Finland 117 trust funds, and Iceland 27 trust funds. The overview also found that more than 150 trust funds had received support from at least two Nordic countries, while 9 trust funds had been supported by all five Nordic countries. 27 trust funds had been supported by four of the Nordic countries, and 55 trust funds had been supported by three Nordic countries.

An overview covering the same period (2004-2022) showed that Sweden had supported 80 UN trust funds, Norway 79, Denmark 42, Finland 27 and Iceland 10. The overview found that five trust funds received support from all the five Nordic countries and more than 50 trust funds received support from more than two Nordic countries. A number of thematic trust funds, established around 2016 for a number of UN organisations (e.g. UNICEF, UNDP and UNFPA) have received support from Nordic countries, but with the need to focus the evaluation they have not been included.

The African Development Bank has made available an overview which show that Norway had supported 18 trust funds, Denmark 16, Sweden 14 and Finland 5. As it is expected that only few trust funds have been supported in the Asian Development Bank and in the Interamerican Development Bank, no further investigations have been made towards those two institutions.

The bilateral donors' use of earmarking and multilateral trust funds has been addressed in a few MOPAN reports[5], in a number of academic papers[6] and also in some evaluations[7], but often from the perspective

[2] See the Boesen et al. (2021).
[3] See, e.g., Graham (2017); Eichenhauer and Hug (2018).
[4] See, e.g., Reinsberg, Michaelowa and Knack (2017).
[5] See https://www.mopanonline.org.
[6] These papers include Dietrich et al. (2022); Eichenauer and Hug (2018); Reinsberg (2017); Reinsberg et al. (2017); Weinlich et al. (2020).
[7] See, e.g., IEG (2011); UN (2022a); UN (2022b).

of the multilateral organizations, while only few studies and evaluations have focused on the bilateral perspective on the use of trust funds. Exceptions are a Norwegian evaluation published in 2019 (Norad, 2019)[8], and a Danish evaluation to be published in the first half of 2023 (Danida, forthcoming).

None of the two evaluations had a joint or comparative perspective, and none of them covered issues related to coordination between the contributing bilateral donors and results/outcomes. With the increasing use of trust funds these issues are highly relevant for the Nordic donors. The purpose of the proposed joint evaluation would be to fill this gap of knowledge, including the practice and effects of Nordic trust fund support and coordination.

Objectives
The focus of the evaluation will be both accountability and learning. Based on DAC's evaluation criteria, the evaluation will assess the Nordic support to multilateral trust funds, including a comparative perspective and will in particular focus on the anticipated and achieved results of this support. In addition, the evaluation will provide recommendations on the use of this instrument in the future.

Outputs
The following outputs are envisaged:

- An Inception Report, including a suggested outline for the main report, a review of the evaluation questions (EQs) in an evaluation matrix and a detailed outline of the evaluation methodology and work programme (not exceeding 20 pages plus annexes)
- Short field trip reports (maximum 5 pages for each field trip)
- A Preliminary Findings Paper (maximum 15 pages)
- A draft Evaluation Report including Executive Summary (not exceeding 40 pages plus annexes)
- A final Evaluation Report including Executive Summary (not exceeding 40 pages plus annexes).
- The final approved evaluation report will also serve as the Completion Report, cf. Section 1.01 of the Agreement.

Scope of Work
The focus of the evaluation will be on the use of trust funds from a Nordic donor perspective with focus on the World Bank, the UNMPTF and the African Development Bank. This implies that the perspectives of the multilateral organizations and the recipient countries will only be addressed to the extent that they have direct implications for the perspective of the Nordic donors' support to multilateral trust funds.

The evaluation will contain a comparative perspective in which the engagement and management of the individual Nordic donors' support to the trust funds will be assessed. The approach to this comparison will be defined in more detail in the inception phase of the evaluation, but it is envisaged that the comparison will comprise both quantitative elements (e.g. absolute and relative size of support to trust funds, number of years the support has been provided, and composition of the trust fund support) and qualitative elements (e.g. issues related to management and administration of the trust fund support and engagement in the management of the trust funds).

The evaluation will also assess to which extent the Nordic donors coordinate their financial support and overall engagement in multilateral trust funds, and at which coordination strategies are applied. In addition, it will be explored whether the approach to coordination differs between different multilateral organizations and different types of trust funds. The evaluation will also explore if the trust funds are relevant to Nordic development priorities, to which extent there is documentation about results and how it is reported and if the administration of the funds is cost efficient.

A comparative perspective will also be applied on the various kinds of trust funds. The specific scope of this comparison will be finally decided during the inception phase of the evaluation, but it may encompass

[8] The Norad evaluation contains an assessment of Norway's contribution to 120 partnerships during the period 2007–2016. See also Riksrevisjonen (2021).

comparisons between organizations, between different types of trust funds, including trust funds with different thematic, sectorial and/or geographical focus.

The evaluation will comprise three parts:

- A descriptive part which will cover the whole multilateral trust fund portfolio of the Nordic donors. The descriptive part will provide an overview of the total Nordic support to multilateral trust funds in the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the UNMPTF, including different types of trust funds with which the Nordic countries have engaged (e.g. small and large trust funds; single-donor and different multi-donor trust funds). To the extent information is available, the overview will cover support provided since 2004 and will address questions like overall trends, distribution across multilateral organizations and sectors and similarities and comparisons of the Nordic countries use of trust funds.
- A part which will include an assessment of a sample of jointly supported multilateral trust funds by Nordic donors. This will comprise multilateral trust funds in the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the UNMPTF, which have received support from at least three Nordic Donors (for AfDB it will be at least two donors) since 2013. Based on this sample of multilateral trust funds, which is expected to comprise app. 100 trust funds this part of the evaluation will address questions like differences in governance and management structures, types of earmarking, donor composition, anticipated and achieved results, and comparison and coordination between the Nordic donors.
- A third part with an in-depth assessment of a limited number of trust funds among the jointly supported trust funds mentioned above. This part of the evaluation will, similar to the second part, cover the last 10 years. The methodology for selection of trust funds for this part of the evaluation will be defined during the inception phase of the evaluation, and it is envisaged that selection criteria will be for instance thematic, trust fund type and/or sectorial (e.g. humanitarian, peace and transition and/or climate trust funds[9]), based on the analytical approach. This part of the evaluation will go more in depth in addressing issues related to Nordic management of and engagement in multilateral trust funds, including coordination issues and anticipated and achieved results, the trust funds monitoring and evaluation systems, trust fund administration and management issues.

The evaluation will require visits to the Nordic capitals (Copenhagen, Stockholm, Oslo, Helsinki and Reykjavik) as well as Washington DC, New York and Abidjan.

It will be determined in the inception phase to which extent the third part of the evaluation will require additional field visits to those mentioned above. In Appendix 3, the Client has determined a fixed budget of DKK 700,000 net of VAT to cover for the reimbursable expenses related to such additional field visits. With the inception report, the Consultant will include an updated Appendix 3 with a breakdown of the reimbursable expenses related to the additional field visits for the Client's approval.

Evaluation Questions

The evaluation questions (EQs) to be addressed in the evaluation are outlined below:

EQ1: What are the overall trends and relevance of Nordic support to multilateral trust funds since 2004?

The evaluation will consider the following sub-questions:

- What are the trends in the composition of multilateral trust funds supported by the Nordic countries?
- To which extent are there similarities in the multilateral trust fund support from the Nordic countries?
- To which extent have Nordic donors adjusted their multilateral trust fund support to changing multilateral strategies and priorities?

[9] For various perspectives on multilateral trust funds and climate finance, see, e.g., Michaelowa et al. (2020), Lee et al., (2023), and Skovgaard et al. (2023).

- To which extent have the Nordic donors adjusted their support to policy priorities and signals from the multilateral system such as those outlined in the UN Funding Compact?

EQ2: Which criteria do the individual Nordic donors use when they decide to support, continue and exit multilateral trust funds?

- The evaluation will consider the following sub-questions:
- To which extent and why has greater reliance on multilateral trust funds been a strategic choice of the Nordic countries?
- To which extent are the features of the trust funds (e.g. size; management and administration, number and composition of contributing donors) determining for Nordic support?
- Is support from other Nordic donors a determining factor?

EQ3: How are the Nordic donors influencing the multilateral trust funds priorities and management?

The evaluation will consider the following sub-questions:

- What are the engagement strategies of the Nordic donors?
- To what extent do Nordic donors engage non-financial support to trust funds?
- To which extent and how do the Nordic donors coordinate their engagement in multilateral trust funds?
- To which extent do the characteristics (e.g. size, number of contributing donors, including Nordic donors, sector or thematic focus) of the trust funds facilitate Nordic donor influence in the multilateral trust funds?

EQ4: What is the effectiveness and efficiency of the Nordic support for multilateral trust funds?

The evaluation will consider the following sub-questions:

- How is the quality of the multilateral trust funds' monitoring and evaluation systems?
- To which extent have anticipated (including by Nordic donors) results of the trust fund support been realized?
- To which extent can multilateral trust funds supported by the Nordic countries document results?
- To which extent and how do supported multilateral trust funds meet Nordic principles of local ownership and focus on beneficiaries in their engagement with recipient countries?
- To which extent are there differences in the way the Nordic donors administrate their support to multilateral trust funds and how can these differences be explained?
- To which extent are there differences in the way the Nordic donors administrate their support to multilateral trust funds and how can these differences be explained?
- Is the Nordic multilateral trust fund support cost effective in terms of number of supported trust funds and size of support (e.g. strategic focus vs. proliferation of the Nordic support, transaction costs etc.)?
- Are the administrative costs (overhead costs) of the multilateral trust funds reasonable?
- Is the transparency of administrative and management procedures satisfactory?

EQ5: What lessons can be learned for future Nordic support to multilateral trust funds?

The evaluation will consider the following sub-questions:

- Which trust fund features are required in order to best advance on Nordic development priorities?
- How can Nordic donors best organize and ensure coordination in their support for multilateral trust funds?
- Which strategies should Nordic donors apply in view of the characteristics of the trust funds and opportunities for synergies?

Approach and Methodology

The evaluation must be carried out in accordance with the MoFA/Danida evaluation guidelines (January 2018)[10] and be based on DAC's evaluation criteria and quality standards[11]. The following evaluation criteria will in particular be applied in the evaluation: relevance, coherence, effectiveness and efficiency, while sustainability and impact will be given less emphasis.

A number of methods will be applied in the three parts of the evaluation, including literature and document reviews, quantitative analyses, and interviews with representatives from both the Nordic donors and the multilateral trust funds as well as with other stakeholders. The risk of positive bias should be considered in selection of interviewees, and in the use of interview information, triangulation of data sources etc. It is expected that interviews will be conducted as a combination of physical and virtual interviews. Physical interviews will take place in the Nordic capitals, and in New York, Washington DC and Abidjan. Other interviews and potential follow-up interviews may be virtual. It may also be considered to make surveys as in the Norwegian evaluation from 2019.

All three parts of the evaluation will contribute to addressing the five evaluation questions. It is expected that the first and second part of the evaluation will rely on available data and document reviews, while the third part of the evaluation covering the small sample of multilateral trust funds will also collect various kinds of quantitative and qualitative data, including conducting interviews with various stakeholders.

The evaluation will not make separate evaluations of the individual trust funds but will, as far as possible, rely on existing reviews and evaluations of the funds. This will also apply for assessments of results, which will be based on available monitoring and evaluation information as well as supplementary interviews. Similarly, it is not expected that the evaluation will make in-depth assessments of the administration of each fund, but rather to assess the administrative costs in light of contextual factors and the transparency of management processes, based on information available.

The assessment of the Nordic engagement in multilateral trust funds will also, where relevant, draw on international experience and academic literature.

Timing and Reporting

A tentative schedule for the preparation and implementation of the evaluation is as follows:

Activity	Date/period	Responsible
Contract signed	December 2023	ELK and ET (Evaluation Team)
Inception phase	January–March 2024	ET
Draft Inception Report for discussion with EMG and ERG	Beginning April 2024	ET, EMG, and ERG
Final Inception Report	End April 2024	ET
Main evaluation phase	May–July 2024	ET
Preliminary findings paper for discussion with EMG and ERG	August 2024	ET, EMG, and ERG
Draft Evaluation Report submitted for discussion with EMG and ERG	October 2024	ET, EMG, and ERG
Final Evaluation Report	November 2024	ET

The final approved evaluation report will also serve as the Completion Report, cf. Section 1.01 of the Agreement.

Management

Danida's Department for Evaluation, Learning and Quality (ELK) will coordinate and manage the evaluation in collaboration with the other Nordic evaluation departments.

[10] See: Evaluation Guidelines (Danida/MFA, 2018), http://www.netpublikationer.dk/UM/evaluation_guidelines_january_2018/Index.html
[11] http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm

It is envisaged that an Evaluation Management Group (EMG) will be established with the evaluation departments of the five Nordic countries as members. It will also be considered to establish an External Reference Group (ERG), which could include international experts, staff members of Nordic multilateral missions and multilateral departments. The ERG will have an advisory role.

Evaluation management (ELK, EMG)
The ELK will

- Have the overall responsibility for the management of the Agreement.
- and Manage the evaluation process and coordinate with the other Nordic evaluation departments.
- Organise and chair the meetings of the EMG and ERG. The EMG and ERG will work with in person meetings, e-mail communication and/or video-conferencing.
- Facilitate the dissemination of the evaluation after its completion.

The EMG will:

- Have the overall responsibility for the management of the evaluation and is expected to follow the various steps of the evaluation process.
- Provide oral and written feedback to the various deliverables of the evaluation, including the draft Inception Report, field visit reports, preliminary findings, and the draft Evaluation Report.
- Approve all deliverables of the evaluation, including all final reports.

Evaluation Team (ET, the Consultant)
The Evaluation Team (ET) will carry out the Assignment based on the Agreement and will:

- Prepare and carry out the evaluation according to the terms of reference, the approved Inception Report, the OECD-DAC Evaluation Quality Standards and the Danida Evaluation Guidelines.
- Be responsible to the management for the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation.
- Ensure that quality assurance is carried out and documented throughout the evaluation process according to the Consultant's own Quality Assurance Plan (as described in the tender).
- Report to ELK regularly about progress of the evaluation.
- Organize and coordinate meetings and studies, and other key events, including debriefing sessions and/or validation workshops if relevant.

<u>Composition of ET</u>
The ET must consist of a core team of consultants:

- Team Leader, international senior evaluation specialist;
- Senior Specialist on evaluation of bilateral and multilateral development assistance;
- Specialist on evaluation of bilateral and multilateral development assistance.

Additional subject matter specialists may be attached to the team.

The Team Leader is responsible for the organization, quality assurance and reporting of the work of the team. The Team Leader will participate in meetings of the ERG and in one dissemination workshop.

Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) (to be determined)
The ERG will:

- Provide oral and written feedback to the various deliverables of the evaluation,
- Other key stakeholders may be consulted at strategic points in time of the evaluation either through mail correspondence or through participation in stakeholder meetings/workshops.

Budget
The budget shall include all fees and reimbursable expenses required for the performance of the Services, including surveys, field trips, participation in ERGs and one final dissemination workshop. The budget

shall include that the team leader will travel to Copenhagen to participate in three meetings (discussions of draft inception report, preliminary findings paper and draft evaluation report) and in the final dissemination workshop.

The Client has determined a fixed budget of DKK 700,000 net of VAT to cover for the reimbursable expenses related to the additional field visits that the Client and Consultant determine in the inception phase

Scope of Work
It is the responsibility of the Consultant to ensure that the products and outputs specified above, and all other tasks specified (by the Client or the Consultant) are performed within the framework of the financial proposal.

The cost of quality assurance (QA) must be included in the Consultant's overhead.

ELK will cover the expenditures incurred for preparing the final Evaluation Report for publication.

Eligibility
The OECD-DAC evaluation principles of independence of the Evaluation Team will be applied. In situations where conflict of interest occurs, candidates may be excluded from participation, if their participation may question the independence and impartiality of the evaluation. In other words, any firm or individual consultant whose independence and impartiality may be questioned will be excluded from participation in the tender.

Tenderers are obliged to carefully consider issues of eligibility for individual consultants and inform the Client of any potential issues relating to a possible conflict of interest.[12]

Requirement for home office support
The Consultant's home office shall provide the following, to be covered by the Consultant's overhead:

- General home office administration and professional back-up.
- QA of the Services in accordance with the quality management and quality assurance system described in the tender. Special emphasis should be given to quality assurance of draft reports prior to the submission of such reports. ELK will request documentation for the QA undertaken in the process.

[12] See: Evaluation Guidelines (Danida/MFA, 2018), annex 1. http://www.netpublikationer.dk/UM/evaluation_guidelines_january_2018/Index.html.

Annex 2 Methodology

Evaluation approach – The evaluation was guided by a theory-based approach and was informed by the following evaluation questions (EQs) derived from the terms of reference, with the caveat that the team has split the original EQ4 on effectiveness and efficiency into two:

- EQ1: What are the overall trends and relevance of Nordic support to multilateral trust funds since 2004?
- EQ2: Which criteria do the individual Nordic donors use to decide to support, continue, and exit multilateral trust funds?
- EQ3: How are the Nordic donors influencing the multilateral trust funds' priorities and management?
- EQ4: What is the effectiveness of the Nordic support for multilateral trust funds?
- EQ5: What is the efficiency of the Nordic support for multilateral trust funds?
- EQ6: What lessons can be learned for future Nordic support for trust funds?

A simple reconstructed highly synthesised ToC based on a general appreciation of the Nordic countries' policies and priorities can be described as follows:

If the Nordic countries provide financial inputs (EQ1), and non-financial support (including policy inputs in terms of ideas and demands regarding effectiveness, efficiency, transparency in delivery, and secondments) for the multilateral trust funds (EQ2 and EQ3)

then the multilateral organisations will have:

- improved financial capacity and improved capacity to leverage additional funds to deliver at scale (EQ4),
- improved capacity to develop and test policies to deliver the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in accordance with Nordic priorities (EQ4),
- a stronger and better multilateral system based on more funding (EQ4),
- improved effectiveness and efficiency in country delivery to deliver the SDGs (EQ4 and EQ5),

then the Nordic countries will have

- influenced the multilateral organisations' agendas with their policy priorities as well as management priorities related to results management, cooperation, and transparency (EQ4),
- provided funding at scale that they could not have provided by working bilaterally (EQ4),
- a better and stronger multilateral system as it can deliver more (EQ4),
- effective and efficient country delivery also drawing on country capacity and country delivery systems that the Nordic countries do not otherwise possess (EQ4 and EQ5)

Assumptions:

- The Nordic countries are capable of influencing the trustees and the trust funds (EQ4),
- The policy-influencing impact and financial impact is wider than the trust funds and stretches to the multilateral organisation (EQ4),
- Contributions to trust funds strengthen the multilateral system rather than undermine the system (EQ4),
- The multilateral organisations are capable of using the funds effectively and efficiently at country level in support of development objectives (EQ4 and EQ5).

The evaluation was utility/learning focused, implying close engagement with key stakeholders. Attention to the joint Nordic priority related to gender equality was included throughout the evaluation.

Evaluation framework – The following table presents the EQs with a rationale, linkage to the OECD DAC criteria, as well as a brief reference to the methods that are proposed to collect evidence for answering the question. The evaluation used different types of case studies to gain greater insight.[13] A full evaluation matrix with detailed judgment criteria and indicators is presented in Annex 3.

[13] **Nordic country case studies** – case studies of the five different Nordic donors to shed light on how they engage with trust funds: Annex 4. **Trustee case studies** – case studies of the three organisations managing the trust funds (the AfDB, the UNMPTF Office, the WB), Annex 5. **In-depth trust fund case studies** – case studies of a sample of individual trust funds (from a long list of 17), see Section 5.3 below.

Table 1: Evaluation Questions

Evaluation question ***OECD DAC criteria***	**Brief overview of purpose and methodology**
EQ1: What are the overall trends and relevance of Nordic support to multilateral trust funds since 2004? Relevance and coherence	**Rationale:** The purpose of the question was to create an overview of trends in Nordic trust fund support through the UNMPTF, WB, and the AfDB. Trends were analysed with a view to assessing similarities and differences between Nordic countries, as well as the relevance and coherence of trust fund contributions with Nordic Countries' policies, incl. with regard to thematic areas. **Methodology, sources, and data**: The methodology included a portfolio analysis of relevant data using OECD DAC data for overall analysis of aid trends for each of the Nordic countries, whereas the analysis of the trends in trust fund contributions was based on data from the multilateral organisations. The main sources of information were Nordic country case studies complemented with interviews with key people responsible for multilateral policies in the Nordic countries and in the trust fund partner administrations in the respective multilateral organisation.
EQ2: Which criteria do the individual Nordic donors use to decide to support, continue, and exit multilateral trust funds? Relevance and coherence	**Rationale**: With this question, the evaluation went deeper into the analyses of decisions with regard to criteria for choices concerning funding or not of trust funds. Based on the findings in EQ1, the question further addressed the extent to which the increase in the contributions to trust funds was i) a strategic choice and then analysed the strategic drivers for the choices in various contexts; or ii) a choice based on other considerations including related to the trust fund features or internal management considerations by Nordic countries. Specifically, the question determined whether the presence of other Nordic donors was a determining factor for the decision to support or not support. **Methodology, sources, and data**: The main sources of information for this question were the Nordic country case studies complemented with information from trustee case studies of the general features of various types of trust funds and comparisons. To cover a wide range of trust funds, the evaluation conducted a survey[14] to staff in the Nordic countries. More specific information regarding the choice of funding of specific trust funds was included in the detailed analysis of support for a limited number of trust funds (the long list of 15 in-depth trust fund case studies presented below.).
EQ3: How are the Nordic donors influencing the multilateral trust funds' priorities and management? Coherence and effectiveness	**Rationale**: This question was about the engagement strategies of the Nordic countries and their ability on their own and as a group to exert influence on trust funds to which they contribute, in terms of influencing policies, priorities, and promoting improved management of the trust funds. The question addressed the wider influence on policies and operations of the multilateral organisation that manages the trust fund. The question assessed how and through what means the Nordic countries have exerted influence. It examined the engagement strategies of the individual Nordic countries and where there was Nordic coordination, the engagement strategy of the joint Nordic approach. **Methodology, sources, and data**: The main sources of information were the Nordic country case studies for each of the Nordic countries and the comparative analysis based on these case studies as well as the comparison of the features of different kinds of trust funds (making use of the trustee case study). In-depth trust fund case studies provided additional information on the engagement strategies of the Nordic countries. These studies were complemented with additional structured interviews with key informants, including trust fund managers and representatives in the trustee organisations (i.e., the WB, the AfDB, UNMPTF), and interviews with peer development partners, as well as the survey of staff and trust fund managers.
EQ4: What is the effectiveness of the Nordic	**Rationale**: The question considered several dimensions: 1. Results in terms of policy influencing in the trust fund and wider influencing as reflected in the policies, strategies, and operations of the multilaterals; 2. Managing for results with an assessment of the overall quality of monitoring and

[14] The survey is presented in greater detail in Annex 5.

support for multilateral trust funds? Effectiveness	evaluation systems employed by multilateral trust funds, focusing on their ability to effectively capture, communicate, and ensure the clarity and transparency in the reporting of achievements, outcomes, and impacts; 3. Results in terms of multilateralism (multilateral goals, leveraging, etc.) and tapping into country delivery, incl. whether the trust funds are effective in their cooperation with local partners and have the capacity to develop local ownership and engage beneficiaries. Where there were external evaluations available, for the assessment of the degree to which the country delivery rationale for supporting trust funds has been achieved, the evaluation was complemented by evidence on the attainment of the development-related trust fund results. **Methodology, sources, and data:** The main data sources and analysis were joint portfolio analysis, the trustee case studies regarding the features of trust funds, surveys of Nordic countries' staff and trust fund managers, the in-depth trust fund case studies, as well as key informant interviews, reporting of development-related results from those trust funds that are part of the field visit, and available evaluations of concrete trust funds as well as MOPAN assessments of the capacities of the organisations with regard to development-related results management and implementation.
EQ5: What is the efficiency of the Nordic support for multilateral trust funds? Efficiency	**Rationale**: This question concerned the efficiency related to 1) Nordic countries' efficiency in the management of the trust funds. The question assessed guidelines for managing trust funds and the staff inputs into managing and administering the funds.; and 2) the efficiency of trust funds management, including the overhead and value addition provided by the trust fund and by various implementing partners in the implementation chain, as well as coordination with other multilateral partners (particular for the UN within the UNMPTF). **Methodology, sources, and data**: The analyses of the efficiency of the Nordic countries' management and administration of the trust funds were based on the portfolio analyses regarding the spread and size of trust funds complemented with assessment of management tools and guidelines, interviews with key staff in charge of trust funds supplemented with a survey to reach a wider group of staff. The assessment of the trust fund's administrative costs drew on previous evaluations, including MOPAN, and research related to this issue as well as analyses of efficiency in the context of a limited sample of projects as part of the in-depth trust fund case studies, complemented with interviews with key staff in the Nordic countries and the multilateral organisations.
EQ6: What lessons can be learned for future Nordic support for trust funds?	This question drew upon the analyses and findings to the previous questions to provide lessons learned, incl. with regard to approaches by Nordic countries (individually and jointly) as well as the implications from trust fund features, results, and efficiency that all impact on the overall effectiveness of Nordic trust funds support.

The full evaluation matrix looks as follows.

Table 2: Evaluation matrix

EQ1: What are the overall trends and relevance of Nordic support to multilateral trust funds since 2004?					
JC	Indicator	Data	Methods	Validity and reliability	Link to ToR
1.1 Trends Use of trust funds has increased	Trends in the use and composition of multilateral trust funds supported by each of the Nordic countries and jointly by the Nordic countries. Trends in number of trust funds and size (also for EQ5). Similarities in the multilateral trust fund support from the Nordic countries?	Data sources OECD DAC data on Nordic countries' contributions to the multilateral system Data on Nordic paid-in contributions to the UNMPTF, the WB and the AfDB.	Data analyses Portfolio and trend analyses, incl. volume, themes, sectors, geographies, joint funds/not joint funds, comparisons between Nordic countries and between Nordic countries and non-Nordic. Trends in size and number of trust funds.	High level of validity and reliability. The data provided by the OECD DAC and the trustees allow for comparisons between donors.	What are the trends in the composition of multilateral trust funds supported by the Nordic countries? To which extent are there similarities in the multilateral trust fund support from the Nordic countries?
1.2 Policy adjustment Nordic countries adjusted their support to trust funds to adapt to new policy priorities and signals	The degree to which Nordic donors adjusted their multilateral trust fund support (in terms of choice and volume of trust fund support as well strategy for engaging with trust funds) to changing multilateral strategies and priorities. The degree to which Nordic donors adjusted their support to policy priorities and signals from the multilateral system such as those outlined in the UN Funding Compact.	Documentation 2013–2023 – emphasis on recent years • Nordic Development cooperation strategies/Multilateral strategies, • Documents on UN reforms, and WB trust fund reforms, • Nordic views and influence on reforms from position papers, meeting resumes. Stakeholder perspective through interviews and survey • Nordic MFA/Sida/Norad staff	Desk review • Analysis of Nordic strategies to delineate time segments of policy continuity • Analyses of trust fund reforms in the WB/AfDB and analyses of UN reforms • Analysis of documents in chosen time segments • Comparison of changes in policies and priorities and	**Data availability –** policy and advocacy strategies are only sporadically available (a potential finding in itself). Turnover of staff, especially for earlier period, will reduce access to interview data. **Validity –** policies and strategies have changed over time. To mitigate this, time segments of policy continuity will be delineated. Due to data constraints, there will be focus on current and recent policies and Nordic reactions to reforms.	To which extent have Nordic countries adjusted their support to trust funds to adapt to new policy priorities and signals? To which extent have Nordic donors adjusted their multilateral trust fund support to changing multilateral strategies and priorities?

		in capital constituency offices/UN missions • Survey	changes in funding trends Interviews • semi-structured individual/focus group discussions Survey • Nordic donors – adjustment of strategies and rationales for use of trust funds and changes in trust funds • Impact on Nordic policies from trust fund reforms and the UN Funding Compact Triangulation Desk review, interviews, and survey will test answers.	**Reliability** – largely reliable after triangulation.	
EQ2: Which criteria do the individual Nordic donors use when they decide to support, continue, and exit multilateral trust funds?					
JC	Indicator	Data	Methods	Validity and reliability	Link to ToR
2.1 Strategic choice Greater reliance on multilateral trust funds has been a strategic choice of the Nordic countries	The degree to which actual criteria for support are clear and actual trust fund practice reflects policy and strategy papers. The degree to which there are similarities/differences in	Documentation: Nordic policy documents and strategies, reports to parliaments • Nordic appropriation/programming documents (Deep dive sample) • Research on Nordic countries' use of trust funds	Desk review • Analysis of Nordic strategies to delineate time segments of policy continuity • Analysis of documents in chosen time segments	**Data availability –** policy and advocacy strategies are only sporadically available (a potential finding in itself). Research may not be evenly available across countries. Turnover of staff especially for the	To which extent and why has greater reliance on multilateral trust funds been a strategic choice of the Nordic countries?

	the criteria used by each of the Nordic countries. The degree to which there are signs of strategic decisions at entry and exit. Other factors in the Nordic countries that influenced the greater reliance on trust funds.	Stakeholder perspective • Management in Nordic countries MFAs/Sida/Norad • Nordic policy responsible • Nordic trust fund officials [all + deep dive sample] • Other stakeholders/researchers in Nordic countries • Survey	• Analysis of appropriation notes and rationale/criteria for support • Use of the EQ1 portfolio analysis and policy analysis to determine changes explained by policy changes/and other changes • Comparative analysis of similarities/differences between Nordic countries Interviews • Semi-structured individual/focus group discussions Survey • Nordic donors – criteria for use of trust funds Triangulation Desk review, research, interviews, and survey will test answers.	earlier period will reduce access to interview data. **Validity –** policies and strategies have changed over time. To mitigate this, time segments of policy continuity will be delineated. Due to data constraints, there will be focus on current and recent policies and Nordic reactions to reforms. It is not always easy to refer policy decisions to specific events as they often depend on a variety of impulses. And different interviewees may remember/attach different importance to different events. **Reliability –** largely reliable depending on the availability of information on other factors that can actually be triangulated (does not only rely on interviews and peoples' perceptions).	
2.2 Trust fund features Features of the trust funds (e.g., governance, earmarking	The degree to which trust fund features played a role in the decision to fund (influence, multilateralism, and country delivery).	Documentation Trust fund documentation, incl. policies and guidelines. Nordic countries' inputs/influence into the trust fund reforms/UN Funding	Desk review • Analysis of trust fund features with the main emphasis on features that have implications for trust fund decisions	Data availability Availability of information on Nordic countries' inputs into reforms may not be available during the full	To which extent are the features of the trust funds (e.g., size, management and administration, number, and composition of contributing donors)

opportunities, opportunities for scaling policies, management and administration, number and composition of contributing donors, complementarity in terms of staff and knowledge) influence decision on Nordic support.	The degree to which features related to transparency and accountability influenced decisions to fund.	Compact to enhance donor influence, multilateralism, transparency, and accountability. **Deep dive sample:** Appropriation notes. Documentation of follow-up work, incl. participation in governing bodies, in relation to trust funds. Stakeholder views • Nordic policy responsible • Nordic trust fund officials [all + deep dive sample] • Trustees and trust fund managers (deep dive) • Survey	• Analysis of changes in trust fund features – and potential implications for the use of trust funds • Comparative analysis of trust fund features between the trustees • Linking this comparison to the variations in rationale for the use of trust funds with different trustees Interviews • Semi-structured individual/focus group discussions Survey • Nordic donors – features of importance for use of trust funds Triangulation Desk review, interviews, and survey will test answers.	period – in which case attention will be on the most recent years. Turnover of staff, especially for the earlier period, will reduce access to interview data. Considerations regarding trust fund features may not in all cases be apparent from appropriation notes. **Validity –** largely valid but there might be a tendency for donor countries to provide reasons for supporting trust funds that make sense now but were not the original reasons for support. **Reliability –** largely reliable after triangulation – depending on the availability of information, incl. on reform efforts and reflections of features in the deep dive sample appropriation notes.	determining for Nordic support?
2.3 Nordic jointness Support from other Nordic donors is a determining factor.	The degree to which cooperation with other Nordic countries /presence of other Nordic countries played a role in trust fund decisions.	Documentation Minutes of Nordic meetings **Deep dive sample:** Appropriation, appraisal, and rationales indicate Nordic jointness as influential – similarities/differences between Nordic countries.	Desk review Analyses of documentation with a view to finding references to Nordic cooperation Interviews	Data availability Availability of information on Nordic countries' inputs into reforms may not be available during the full period – in which case attention will be on the	Is support from other Nordic donors a determining factor?

	The degree to which there are similarities/differences between Nordic countries in the role played in trust fund decisions by the level of cooperation and presence of other Nordic countries.	Stakeholder views • Nordic policy responsible • Nordic trust fund officials [all + deep dive sample] • Survey	• Semi-structured individual/focus group discussions Survey • Nordic donors Triangulation Desk review, interviews, and survey will test answers.	most recent years. Turnover of staff, especially for the earlier period, will reduce access to interview data. Considerations of Nordic cooperation may not be apparent in the appropriation notes.	
EQ3: How are the Nordic donors influencing the multilateral trust funds' priorities and management?					
JC	Indicator	Data	Methods	Data availability, validity, and reliability	Link to ToR
3.1 Engagement strategy Nordic donors have a strategy and means for influence	The degree to which Nordic strategies aim at influencing trust fund priorities and management (similarities and differences). The degree to which non-financial support is used for influencing (staff secondment, policy dialogue, earmarking, active participation at board meeting). The degree to which an advocacy strategy is present, monitored, and reported on.	Documents from 2013 • Nordic policy documents • Nordic appropriation documents • Nordic advocacy strategies and monitoring & reporting • Nordic coordination meeting notes • Nordic board meeting minutes /return to office notes [deep dive sample] • Trust fund documents, board meetings [deep dive sample] Stakeholder perspective (who) • Nordic policy responsible • Nordic trust fund officials [all + deep dive sample] • Trust fund managers [deep dive sample] • Other donors to trust funds [deep dive sample] • Survey	Desk review • Analysis of Nordic strategies to delineate time segments of policy continuity • Analysis of documents in chosen time segments • Statistical analysis of Nordic representation/participation in trust fund governance • Statistical analysis and assessment of other non-financial tools used by Nordic donors Interviews • Semi-structured individual/focus group discussions Survey • Nordic donors – availability, adequacy, and application of strategy and tools	**Data availability –** policy and advocacy strategies are only sporadically available (a potential finding in itself). A slight overprogramming of sample cases will be made to ensure that data-rich cases are also captured. Turnover of staff, especially for the earlier period, will reduce access to interview data. **Validity –** policies and strategies have changed over time. To mitigate this, time segments of policy continuity will be delineated which might be only partly correct as there might be other factors such as personality influence (itself also a potential finding). Influence does not necessarily have to be recorded or explicitly traceable. There is	What are the engagement strategies of the Nordic donors?

			• Trust funds – advocacy messages, tools used, comparison within Nordic and with others Triangulation • Desk review, interviews, and survey will test answers to the same topics.	also a tactic of low-profile support to create trust fund ownership. An opportunistic rather than planned approach also needs to be picked up. Due to data constraints, there will be focus on current and recent approaches. **Reliability –** The grading scale of intervention will be informed by criteria to increase the reliability.	
3.2 Nordic coordination Nordic donors coordinate their engagement in multilateral trust funds	Common agenda at trust fund or trustee level. Evidence of follow up and monitoring of effect.	Documents • Nordic coordination meeting notes and any monitoring/reflection • Nordic board meeting minutes/return to office notes [deep dive sample] • Trust fund documents, board meetings [deep dive sample] Stakeholder perspective • Nordic constituency offices • Nordic trust fund officials [all + deep dive sample] • Trust fund managers [deep dive sample] • Other donors to trust funds [deep dive sample • Intermediaries and final beneficiaries [deep dive sample] • Survey	Desk review • Analysis of documents in chosen time segments (perhaps by head of Nordic constituency?) • Statistical analysis of Nordic participation in board meetings + grading of cooperation Interviews • Semi-structured individual/focus group discussions • Intermediaries and final beneficiaries [deep dive sample] Survey • Nordic donors – degree of coordination based on list of criteria	**Data availability –** as above, field work will depend on how scattered the trust fund activities are. **Validity –** largely valid although there is likely to be many co-factors to policy implementation not just Nordic coordination. However, a joint and active coordination will be taken as sufficient evidence that coordination was working, and if policy results occurred in line with the advocacy, that it came about through a joint approach. (If corroborated by for example trust fund officials that joint approach had an effect.)	To what extent do Nordic donors engage non-financial support to trust funds?

		Field visit • In-depth evidence of policy influence	• Trust funds – evidence of intention and effect on advocacy Triangulation • Desk review, interviews, and survey will test answers to the same topics. Field work will provide a solid basis for confirmation or not.	**Reliability –** largely reliable depending on the quality of data on evidence of improved policy influence.	
3.3 Factors for Nordic influence Engagement strategy and trust fund characteristics facilitating Nordic influence	Size, number of contributing donors, including Nordic donors, Nordic coordination/financial and non-financial contributions	As above Note: for this JC 3.1-3.3, there is a trade-off between demanding too much from stakeholders and getting commitment to be interviewed. Interview and survey level: i) overall management (probably 1-3 people per trustee and per Nordic country) and ii) programme officer level entrusted with particular trust funds – at least those involved in the 17 desk sample cases and where possible more.	**As above –** focus on the survey and field visit on isolating the factors	Data availability – as above **Validity –** the chosen factors are reasonable and if others emerge, they will be added **Reliability –** largely reliable depending on the quality of data on evidence of improved policy influence.	To which extent do the characteristics (e.g., size, number of contributing donors, including Nordic donors, sector, or thematic focus) of the trust funds facilitate Nordic donor influence in the multilateral trust funds?
EQ4: What is the effectiveness of the Nordic support for multilateral trust funds?					
JC	Indicator	Data	Methods	Validity and reliability	Link to ToR
4.1 Managing for Results Extent to which trust funds effectively capture, communicate, and ensure the	Quality of the multilateral trust funds' monitoring and evaluation systems (e.g., established result framework with SMART indicators, annual reporting of results, risks, and assumption monitoring, reporting	Documents (from 2013) • Nordic board meeting minutes/return on reporting system [deep dive sample] • Nordic monitoring reports on trust funds	Desk review • Analysis of documents Interviews • Semi-structured individual/focus group discussions	Data availability – Validity – and Reliability are part of the assessment for this indicator. Maybe a bias, as Level 2 analysis considers joint multi-Nordic contribution trust funds. For single	• How is the quality of the multilateral trust funds' monitoring and evaluation systems?

clarity and transparency of reported achievements, outcomes, and impacts	requirements are clear to intermediaries/beneficiaries)	• Trust fund monitoring and evaluation reports [deep dive sample] • MOPAN assessments Stakeholder perspective (who) • Nordic trust fund officials [all + deep dive sample] • Trust fund managers [deep dive sample] • Intermediaries and beneficiaries [deep dive sample]	Survey • Nordic donors – availability and adequacy of the trust fund monitoring reports to steer the decision to fund, track, and report results • Trust funds – factors affecting the quality of the monitoring system Triangulation • Desk review, interviews, and survey will test answers to the same topics.	Nordic donor trust fund, the quality of the monitoring system may be challenged by less resources.	
	Degree of compliance with result reporting requirements by multilateral trust funds (e.g., adherence to reporting frequency, timeliness, and comprehensiveness of documenting results)	Documents (from 2013) • Nordic Trust Fund (NTF) contribution documents and operational guidelines [deep dive sample] • Nordic monitoring reports on Trust Funds • Nordic board meeting minutes /return on reporting system [deep dive sample] • Trust fund monitoring and evaluation reports [deep dive sample] • MOPAN assessments Stakeholder perspective (who) • Nordic trust fund officials [all + deep dive sample]	Desk review • Analysis of documents Interviews • Semi-structured individual/focus group discussions Survey • Nordic donors – compliance of trustees with reporting requirements • Trust funds – factors affecting the compliance with results reporting Triangulation	**Data availability –** mainly based on the stakeholders' perspectives. Interviews and survey at Level 2 will enable a broad database. **Validity –** the chosen indicators are reasonable and if others emerge, they will be added. **Reliability –** Maybe a bias, as Level 2 analysis considers joint multi-Nordic contribution trust funds. For single Nordic donor trust fund, the quality of monitoring system may be	• To which extent can multilateral trust funds supported by the Nordic countries document results?

		• Trust fund managers [deep dive sample] • Intermediaries and beneficiaries [deep dive sample]	• Desk review, interviews, and survey will test answers to the same topics.	challenged by less resources.	
4.2 Effectiveness of the contributions to trust funds Multilateralism Nordic Countries' support of trust funds contributed to supporting multilateralism	1) Evidence of multilateral principles such as inclusivity, and equity[15] being adopted at trust fund level 2) Examples at trustee level that indicates wider replication of these principles 2) Nordic countries' funding level (portfolio) 3) Leverage effect of Nordic countries' start-up of a Trust Fund [deep dive sample] 4) Crowding in effect [deep dive sample] 5) Evidence of UNMPTF trust fud contributions leading to enhanced UN agency cooperation	Portfolio analysis • Distribution of single versus multi-donor trust funds. (Level 1) • Number of donors contributing to the trust fund and the proportion of funds pooled from multiple sources. (Level 1) • Thematic priorities of TFs (Level 2) Documents (from 2013) • Nordic documents on Trust Fund funding decisions/Contribution documents/Appropriation Note [deep dive sample] • Nordic coordination meeting notes and any monitoring/ reflection [deep dive sample] • Nordic board meeting minutes [deep dive sample] • Nordic monitoring reports on trust funds • Trust fund documents, board meetings [deep dive sample] • Trust fund monitoring and evaluation reports [deep dive sample]	Desk review • Analysis of documents Interviews • Semi-structured individual/focus group discussions Survey • Nordic donors – evidence of intention of diffusion of these principles and expected effects • Trust fund managers – evidence of adoption of these principles at Trust Fund level and examples beyond the Trust Fund Triangulation • Desk review, interviews, and survey will test answers to the same topics.	**Data availability –** Nordic documented monitoring or tracking of their intent to support multilateralism may not be systematically available. **Validity –** the analysis at trustee level will rely on the knowledge of the trust fund staff. It is acknowledged that other donors share common goals in promoting multilateralism and that results lie in collective support rather than uniqueness. **Reliability –** largely reliable, through mixing different types of indicators and triangulation.	• To which extent have anticipated (including by Nordic donors) results of the trust fund support been realised?

[15] Transparency and accountability are considered under JC 4.1 Managing for Results and EQ 5 Efficiency.

		Stakeholder perspective (who) • Nordic policy responsible • Nordic trust fund officials [all+ deep dive sample] • Trust fund managers [deep dive sample]			
4.3 Effectiveness of the contributions to trust funds Influence Nordic Countries support of Trust Funds contributed to Nordic policies priorities being adopted	1) Evidence of Nordic policies priorities being adopted at trust fund level 2) Examples at the trustee level that indicate wider replications of Nordic policies priorities.	Documents (from 2013) • Nordic documents on Trust Fund funding decisions/Contribution documents/Appropriation Note [deep dive sample] • Nordic coordination meeting notes and any monitoring/ reflection [deep dive sample] • Nordic board meeting minutes [deep dive sample] • Nordic monitoring reports on Trust Funds • Trust fund documents, board meetings [deep dive sample] • Trust fund monitoring and evaluation reports [deep dive sample] Stakeholder perspective (who) • Nordic policy responsible • Nordic trust fund officials [all+ deep dive sample] Trust fund managers [deep dive sample]	Desk review • Analysis of documents Interviews • semi-structured individual / focus group discussions. Survey • Nordic donors - evidence of intention on Nordic policy priorities diffusion and expected effects • Trust funds managers - evidence of adoption of Nordic policies priorities at Trust Fund level and examples beyond Trust Fund Triangulation • Desk, interviews and survey will test answers to the same topics.	**Data availability –** Nordic documented monitoring or tracking of their influence may not be systematically available. **Validity –** the analysis at trustee level will rely on the knowledge of the trust fund staff. It is acknowledged that many of the Nordic country policy priorities are shared by others including the trustees themselves. The Nordic values are stronger when shared and when Nordic support in solidarity with these values. We are not looking for uniqueness. **Reliability –** largely reliable, through triangulation	• To which extent have anticipated (including by Nordic donors) results of the trust fund support been realized?
4.24 Effectiveness of the contributions to trust funds	1) Ownership – Evidence that trust funds actively involve country stakeholders in decision-	Documents (from 2013)	Desk review • Analysis of documents	**Data availability –** Here the data availability will depend on the quality of the	• To which extent and how do

Country delivery Extent to which supported multilateral trust funds delivered expected results	making processes [deep dive sample] 2) Ownership – Evidence that trust funds prioritise the needs and perspectives of beneficiaries [deep dive sample] 3) Capacity – Evidence of strengthened capacities of country stakeholders [deep dive sample] 4) Results – (meta evaluation of achievement of the results of the deep dive sample, where ME reports are available)	• Trust fund project proposals, agreements, structure, and strategies [deep dive sample] • Trust fund monitoring and evaluation reports [deep dive sample] • Existing meta evaluation reports Stakeholder perspective (who) • Nordic trust fund officials [all + deep dive sample] • Trust fund managers [deep dive sample] • Beneficiaries [deep dive sample]	Interviews • Semi-structured individual/focus group discussions Triangulation • Desk review and interviews will test answers to the same topics.	trust fund monitoring and evaluation reports. **Validity –** the results are only for the few trust funds that have meta evaluation, and an inference cannot be made for all trust funds in general and nor is this the intention. Instead, a link will be made between results and the factors of ownership and capacity for those trust funds looked at in depth. **Reliability –** Largely reliable, through triangulation	support multilateral trust funds meet Nordic principles of local ownership and focus on beneficiaries in their engagement with recipient countries? • To which extent have anticipated (including by Nordic donors) results of the trust fund support been realised?

EQ5: What is the efficiency of the Nordic support for multilateral trust funds?					
JC	Indicator	Data	Methods	Validity and reliability	Link to ToR
5. 1 The efficiency and cost effectiveness of the management of trust funds by the Nordic countries Extent to which there are	The degree to which Nordic country guidelines and management procedures promote transparent management of the trust funds. The degree to which trust fund support is cost effective in terms of number of supported	Documentation • Aid management guidelines and other guidelines for all Nordic countries • Financial management procedures and support for staff to promote financial transparency in trust fund management • Portfolio data on the spread of Nordic trust per country (number	Desk analyses • Analyses of documentation at institutional level – with a view to promoting transparency in trust fund management. • Analysis of trust fund data (level 1) – trends in number and size of trust	Data availability and validity Guidelines and financial management guidelines may have changed over time. Here the focus is on the existing guidelines. High degree of reliability and validity of documentation and data.	To which extent are there differences in the way the Nordic donors administrate their support to multilateral trust funds and how can these

differences in the way the Nordic donors administrate their support to multilateral trust funds and how these differences can be explained	trust funds and size of support. The degree to which staff input for the management of trust funds in the Nordic countries is sufficient and adequate. Similarities and differences between Nordic countries – factors explaining differences.	of trust funds, size, transaction costs, at each level) Deep dive • Evidence of follow-up with trust fund manager on issues related to management and administration • Trust fund agreements • Documentation of staff input • Previous studies of flow of funds carried out by Nordic countries Stakeholder perspective (who) • Nordic policy responsible/management • Nordic countries financial staff • Nordic trust fund officials [all + deep dive sample] • Survey	funds/trends in joint Nordic trust funds • Few selected projects: Analysis of flow of funds from the overall grant level to implementing partner and possibly end beneficiaries. Interviews • Semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders Survey • Staff input into administration and management, guidance with regard to financial management Triangulation • Desk analyses, interviews, and survey will test answers to the same topics.	Reliability Findings from interviews can have a variety of biases.	differences be explained? Is the Nordic multilateral trust fund support cost effective in terms of number of supported trust funds and size of support (e.g., strategic focus vs. proliferation of the Nordic support, transaction costs, etc.)?
5.2. The efficiency and cost effectiveness of trust fund administration by the multilateral organisations	The degree to which the overheads/costs by multilaterals at each level of implementation can be justified by value added for the implementation of the operation. Transparency of administration and management is satisfactory, incl. link between results	Documentation Overall cost structures and rationale for the cost structure provided by the trustee (level 2) Financial reporting at trust fund level (level 3) Budgets, financial reporting, and results frameworks (level 3) Deep dive Trust fund agreements	Data analysis • Analysis of overall cost structure (level 2) • Analysis of transparency in the financial reporting incl. the clear linkages between budgeting, results frameworks, and financial reporting (level 3 delivery) • For a few selected projects: Analysis of flow of funds from the overall	Data availability Difficulties with access to financial data must be expected. The projects for deeper scrutiny will have to be chosen with regard to availability and willingness to share financial and other data along the implementation chain. Variances between organisations in the	Are the administrative costs (overhead costs) of the multilateral trust funds reasonable? Is the transparency of administrative and management

	framework, budget, and expenditure.	For a few selected projects: agreement between the trust fund and implementing partners through the chain of implementation. Financial accounts and relevant guidelines for the cases. MOPAN studies related to trustees' management and administration. Previous studies of flow of funds carried out by Nordic countries (Norad) Stakeholder views Interviews with • Trustees/trust fund managers • Implementing partners • End-beneficiaries (if possible) for level 3 and for the few selected projects.	grant level to implementing partner and possibly end beneficiaries. Analyses of the value added at each layer in the implementation chain. Interviews • Semi-structured interviews with implementing partners – operations and financial controllers - at the respective levels, incl. implementing partners. Triangulation • Desk analyses, cost analyses/flow of funds analyses, and interviews will test answers to the same topics.	implementation chain in their definition of cost categories can challenge comparison – within the same project. Validity Different interests competing for the same funds can challenge reliability of findings through interviews, as implementing partners further down the chain do not always see the same value added by input from funders as the funders themselves. Triangulation of data can enhance reliability and validity.	procedures satisfactory?

Overview – Mixed Methodological Approach

The evaluation looked at the questions at three levels:

- ***Level 1 – Strategic level***: This level included an assessment of the trust fund portfolio of each of the Nordic donors as well as comparisons between them, stretching, where data allowed, back to 2004. It also included an assessment of the strategies, policies, and rationale for the use of the trust fund modality by the Nordic donors, as well as the importance of Nordic cooperation in this regard. The analysis at this level informed EQs 1 and 2. An important aspect examined here was the number of trust funds funded by the Nordic countries, the volume and duration of support, and the comparison of the degree of fragmentation that Nordic countries might have contributed to (e.g., through starting up new trust funds that only one or a few other donors joined, or that were considered to overlap with other trust funds)
- ***Level 2 – Institutional level***: This level included analyses and comparison of the Nordic countries' management and administrative approaches, focusing on the years since 2013 and on trust funds with funding from three or more Nordic countries (or two in the case of the AfDB trust funds, also because Iceland is not a member of the AfDB). It also included analyses of trust fund features at the trustee level, including governance, types of earmarking accepted, development-related results frameworks, monitoring, and reporting systems. The limited role of the UNMPTF in the management and implementation of trust funds was complemented with additional analysis of the specific arrangements for various types of trust funds under its purview, including UN agencies. This level of analysis provided input for EQs 2 and 3, and, to a lesser extent, EQs 4 and 5.
- ***Level 3 – Trust fund level***: This level involved in-depth case studies of selected, jointly supported trust funds, where 'jointly' referred to trust funds with three or more Nordic donors through the UNMPTF Office and the WB, and two or more Nordic donors in the AfDB. Based on the portfolio analysis of joint Nordic trust funds (volume of support and number of funds, Annex 6), the Level 2 information on trust fund features, and the criteria defined with input from the EMG, 17 trust funds were initially selected and then reduced to 15: 8 WB trust funds, 5 UN trust funds, and 2 AfDB trust funds. The sampling criteria and the sample of 15 trust funds are presented below. The Level 3 assessment of the selected trust funds provided input for EQs 2, 3, 4, and 5.

A combination of quantitative methods (portfolio analysis, surveys) and qualitative methods (document, and literature review, interviews, field visits, focus group discussions) was used to build a robust base of evidence and to triangulate evidence. These methods are described below.

- **Portfolio review and analysis:** The main findings relating to Nordic contributions to trust funds are presented in the main report with more detail provided in Annex 6.
- **A strategy, policy, evaluation, and literature review:** The review encompassed the Nordic countries' policies and strategies regarding multilateral assistance and the use of the trust fund modality, including guidelines for multilateral support, risk guidelines, and financial management guidelines; trust fund policies, and guidance by the trustees. Relevant studies, literature, and research were reviewed, including DAC Peer Reviews for each of the Nordic countries and MOPAN studies for the multilateral partners as well as evaluations of trust funds conducted by the Nordic countries and peers. Evaluations of the 17 trust funds selected for case study were an important source of information.
- **Nordic Country analysis:** For each of the Nordic countries, a portfolio review was carried out and added to the overall portfolio analyses. Information on policies and strategies concerning multilateral development cooperation in general where available was gathered as well as information regarding the management and administration of trust funds.
- **Trustee analysis**: These provided an analysis of the different kinds of trust funds offered by each trustee as well as features in terms of governance, management structure, earmarking, development-related results monitoring, etc. The emphasis was on analyses of aspects that have implications for donor influencing and the ability of trust funds to deliver effectively and

efficiently to donor expectations, including development-related results management and reporting against the agreed development-related results framework.

- **In-depth trust fund case studies:** These in-depth case studies of a sample of 15 trust funds were carried out with a focus on answering each of the evaluation questions: analysing the rationales for trust fund contributions, the engagement strategies, the results with regard to the rationales, and for the eight trust funds visited, additional analysis was made to assess effectiveness and efficiency of country delivery, focussing on contributions to capacity building and ownership.
- **Field visits:** The purpose of field visits was to complete the data collection and contribute to answering the evaluation questions at the level of the trustee and the recipient country. Visits also served to validate or revise the preliminary hypothesis formulated around the evaluation questions and sub-questions during the desk phase. The field phase was not intended to conduct an in-depth assessment of the implementation of individual trust fund interventions but to examine the evaluation questions through the lens of selected interventions, not least with regard to effectiveness and efficiency in delivering in countries.
- **Focus groups:** Interviews were complemented with focus group discussions with the Nordic countries in the context of country visits to discuss specific complex issues where there may be different ideas and approaches.
- **Staff surveys:** A survey of Nordic country staff involved with trust funds at headquarters (HQ), mission, and country level was carried out to get a wider input and to validate/dismiss emerging findings and hypotheses. In addition, a survey of trust fund managers of joint Nordic trust funds was done to get their view on Nordic influencing and cooperation. The survey is explained in greater detail below.
- **Validation of interim findings** – frequent communication during the evaluation and presentation and discussion of preliminary findings with the EMG.

A summary overview of the levels of analysis and case studies is given in the figure below:

Figure 1: Summary overview of the level of analysis and case studies



In-depth trust fund case studies

A simplified contribution analysis was chosen as the methodology for analyses at trust fund level. Such analyses were meant to uncover the contribution of Nordic countries to change based on the rationales that the Nordic countries have developed for trust fund contributions. All selected trust funds went through a desk review in five steps based on the following outline. Of the 15 trust funds, eight trust funds were analysed in greater detail at country level. The findings that emerged from these analyses informed EQs 2 to 5 and provide input for EQ6. Throughout these analyses, attention was given to similarities/variations between Nordic countries and between the trustees.

In-depth trust fund desk case studies (15)

1. Brief description of the trust fund (purpose, features) and the joint Nordic contribution – to support the answering of the evaluation questions.
2. The contribution of the Nordic countries' funding and non-funding activities related to trust funds and the factors that supported/hindered change:
    a. The rationales for the choice of the trust fund,
    b. The role of funding and non-funding inputs,
    c. The role of trust fund features (governance structure, earmarking/preferencing, Nordic countries' financial weight, development-related results frameworks, monitoring, and evaluation systems in place, etc.),
    d. The role of Nordic cooperation,
    e. The Nordic countries' management and administration of the trust fund – differences and similarities, and
    f. A few analyses of trust fund level management and transparency, incl. overhead costs.
3. Analysis of results with regard to the identified rationales: policy influencing, multilateralism, country delivery, and aid effectiveness.
4. Lessons learned concerning influencing, multilateralism, and effective country delivery, particularly concerning Nordic cooperation.

In-depth trust fund field case studies (8 of the 15)

5. In addition, for a smaller number of the selected trust funds, activities in Kenya, Somalia, and Tanzania were analysed to address in greater detail aspects related to effectiveness and efficiency related to country delivery. Here the trust fund level analysis was complemented by additional analyses of selected projects funded by the trust funds to assess factors related to effectiveness and efficiency;
    a. Clarity and feasibility of reporting requirements to ensure the quality of the monitoring system at trust fund level.
    b. Effectiveness in terms of ownership and focus on the beneficiaries (e.g., local stakeholder engagement in project formulation and execution), capacity development, and results (based on field confirmation of evaluations and trust fund results reporting).
    c. For two of those projects, analyses of the efficiency of the trust fund contribution through analysis of the implementation chain will be carried out.

This deeper analysis of selected projects at country level intended to draw out lessons about trust fund operations at country level that can support future Nordic management of trust funds not least concerning promoting effectiveness and efficiency. It was not possible based on the limited number of projects assessed to generalise about the effectiveness and efficiency of trust fund contributions in reaching beneficiaries and delivering change.

Based on the field work, a small number of contribution analyses was carried out to exemplify the impact of the trust fund.

Funding the UN, the WB, and the AfDB, and Glossary

Funding options	
Funding the UN	Assessed contributions: Assessed contributions are mandatory payments that all UN member states are required to make under the UN Charter. These contributions are calculated based on a country's capacity to pay, which is determined by factors such as gross national income, population, and debt levels. The assessed contributions provide a reliable source of funding for the core functions of the UN Secretariat incl. peacekeeping missions. Voluntary core contributions: Voluntary core contributions to UN funds and programmes that do not have assessed contributions such as the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA). Funds are co-mingled and used for the implementation of the policy and strategy of the organisations and for core administrative costs. Earmarked contributions that come with varying degrees of flexibility: • Multi-Partner Trust Funds (MPTFs) for inter-agency pooled funds – funds from donors are co-mingled and used to fund an inter-agency programme – options of soft earmarking • Projects and programmes: Often limited flexibility as funding is for a specific project/programme directly with/through a UN agency, fund, or programme.
Funding the WB	Capital contributions: The WB's capital base consists of paid-in contributions by member states – the share capital. The paid-in contribution and hence the shares by each member state in the bank reflect the size of the country economy. International Development Association (IDA) contributions: Negotiated contributions to the soft window of the WB. These paid-in contributions primarily by the developed countries and increasingly also larger middle-income countries allow the WB to provide soft loans (lower interest and longer maturity) to low-income countries. Trust funds: Typically grant funding to fund WB activities where the bank cannot fund itself – policy development, grants in fragile situations.
Funding the AfDB	Capital contributions: The AfDB's capital base consists of paid-in capital by member states. To ensure African ownership, the majority of shares must be held by the African regional members. African Development Fund (AfDF) contributions: Negotiated contributions to the soft window of the AfDB. These paid-in contributions primarily by the developed countries and increasingly also larger middle-income countries allows the AfDB to provide soft loans (lower interest and longer maturity) to low-income countries. Trust funds: Typically grant funds to fund activities that the AfDB cannot fund on its own.

Financial Intermediary Funds	Financial Intermediary Fund (FIF) – a multi-donor trust fund that pools resources from governments, and often private sector, civil society, and other entities to finance a variety of development projects and initiatives. FIFs are managed by international organisations, such as the WB, which act as trustees, providing financial management and oversight services.

Sampling for Case Studies – Criteria, Short Lists, and Long Lists for UNMPTF, the WB, and the AfDB

Criteria for sampling

In the inception phase, based on the preliminary discussions with EMG and members of the wider ERG, the following criteria were decided on which to base the level 3 selection of trust funds supported jointly by the Nordic countries – where jointly refers to trust funds with three or more Nordic trust funds for the WB and the UNMPTF but two or more Nordic donors for the AfDB.:

1. Ensuring a mix of the rationales for supporting trust funds as defined above:
   - Influence: Influence and advocacy for policy change.
   - Multilateralism: Support for a multilateral system that responds (at scale) to global challenges and needs and effectively delivers on the SDGs.
   - Effective country delivery: Accessing country knowledge and capacity that the Nordic countries themselves do not possess; and risk sharing.
2. Sampling across the main Nordic policy priorities: Human rights (HR) and gender equality, climate and environment, peace and stability, and socio-economic development/SDGs.
3. The number of trust funds in the sample should reflect the volumes and number of trust funds between the trustees.
4. A broad representation of all Nordic countries across trust funds.
5. Global and country levels incl. fragile situations.
6. Variation in trust fund features (governance and earmarking) within and between the trustees.
7. Variations in the weight of Nordic contributions in the total funding of the trust fund.
8. Priority to selections of funds for which there are evaluations/mid-term reviews.
9. Priority to a selection of several trust funds that are operating in East Africa with a view to the planned field visit.

For each of the three trust fund organisations, two lists of the jointly supported trust funds were developed: 1) a long list of all the jointly supported trust funds with information per the above criteria and 2) a short list of the selected trust funds for which additional information has been added. These lists are further below in Annex 2.

Rationale for funding through different trustees/trust funds varied – Interviews in the Nordic capitals clarified that the three rationales (influence, multilateral strengthening, country delivery) are important for funding decisions, but that the rationales carried different weight when deciding funding through the UNMPTF, the WB, and the AfDB. In the case of the UN, while policy influencing is a motivation, supporting the multilateral system to deliver generally carries the most weight. For example, for some Nordic countries, influence was not a consideration regarding funding for the Peacebuilding Fund, hence also the acceptance that the governance structure left little room for influence by donors. In other UN funds, policy influencing was a driving motivation. The overriding rationale for support through the WB trust funds is policy influencing – on the trust fund itself and through the trust fund on the WB and its lending operations to catalyse large-scale funding for the Nordic policy priority areas and use the WB convening power for global policy agenda influencing. This also implies a willingness to accept that a part of the trust fund contributions is used for internal WB policy development. There are similar rationales behind the support through the AfDB albeit on a more limited scale, where the AfDB's ability to push new policies in Africa through its network was found to be an important motivation for support. For all Nordic countries, the rationale related to effective country delivery was a motivation for all support. For the global funds, it was also the rationale that was most difficult to get insights into. When it comes to

country-level trust funds, the main motivation is effective country delivery, not least in crises and fragile settings. Hence, the analyses of the contributions to each trust fund must address all rationales, and these initial findings will have to be further analysed as part of the evaluation.

The depth of the analyses of the sampled trust funds: As indicated above, there are variations as to the depth of the contribution analyses carried out for the 15 trust funds. All trust fund contributions were analysed from the perspective of whether the contribution of the Nordic country led to the intended change concerning policy influencing, multilateralism, and improved country delivery. This latter aspect was only dealt with at the trust fund level based on an assessment of the results frameworks and reporting, and, where available, a trust fund evaluation.

For a smaller number of the sampled trust funds (eight) that are actively carrying out projects in Kenya, Tanzania and Somalia, the intention was to explore in greater depth, also at the project level, effectiveness at country level (in terms of development results by assessing ownership of the beneficiaries and contributions to capacity building of the beneficiaries), efficiency (in the management of the trust fund contribution by the Nordic countries as well as the trustee), and cost-effectiveness (for a small number of projects carry out an assessment of the cost and value added by the various layers of the implementation chain).

Kenya, Tanzania, and Somalia were chosen for these country level assessments. The choice of Africa follows from the priority attached to Africa by all Nordic countries. Kenya had been selected due to the possibility in one country to assess country delivery aspects based on a large variety of jointly supported trust funds covering development-related trust funds (climate and renewable energy, blue environment, digital development, SDG-related activities, jobs) as well as humanitarian/development trust funds related to a fragile country: Somalia. Tanzania is a long-term partner for most Nordic countries where many trust funds are also active and can complement/support verification of the analysis made in the Kenyan context. The trust fund sampling reflects these country choices – the Somalia trust funds and the Tanzania One UN trust fund. Specific projects/activities for the country visits were selected in cooperation with the missions and trust fund staff in the countries. Prior to the field missions, a simple mission preparation note was made outlining the schedule, people, and organisations to be visited and key topics to be discussed based on an exhaustive desk review.

In the period from 2013 to 2023, the Nordic countries jointly supported 82 trust funds. This figure does not include jointly supported FIFs. The selection of trust funds for in-depth analysis based on the above criteria was tested against the portfolio of jointly supported trust funds (i.e., trust funds supported by three or more Nordic countries/two for the AfDB between 2013 and 2024).

Table 3: Overview of volume and number of jointly funded trust funds 2013–2023 in total and the sample

Jointly supported TFs	WB	UNMPTF	AfDB
Volume million USD	2582	2232	192
Number of TFs supported by three or more Nordic countries (two for the AfDB) between 2013 and 2024	49	30	8
Sample volume million USD (for in-depth case studies)	698	898	131[16]
Sample number of TFs (for in-depth case studies)	8	5	2

Below is a graphic comparison of the aggregated volume of total trust fund contributions in comparison with the sample.

[16] UA translated to USD based on November 2024 exchange rates.

Figure 2: Total portfolio of NDs (three or more donors[17]) divided between trustees



Figure 3: Sample portfolio of NDs divided between trustees



Figure 4: Number of TFs with three or more NDs divided between trustees



Figure 5: Number of TFs in the sample divided between trustees



In terms of volume, the contribution through the UNMPTF is slightly overrepresented. This reflects the large contributions to a few key trust funds and the fund related to Somalia, which are representative of Nordic countries' priorities for funding through the UNMPTFs. Also, the AfDB is overrepresented due to the selection of the flagship fund for Sustainable Energy, which represents 65% of joint funding to the AfDB.

In comparison, the WB is somewhat slightly overrepresented when it comes to the number of trust funds included in the sample.

[17] Two or more for the AfDB.

Short List and Long List of Joint Nordic Contributions through the UNMPTF

The following five trust funds were analysed in greater detail. The long list of joint Nordic trust funds (three or more Nordic donors) is included below.
Rationale for choice of these specific trust funds:

1. The sample represents a mixture of rationales for the choice of trust funds:
   - Influence,
   - Multilateralism: support for a strengthened multilateral system, and
   - Country delivery: country knowledge, capacity, and risk sharing.
2. The sample cuts across themes that are prominently present among the joint Nordic trust funds. It is notable that addressing climate change and the environment through UN inter-agency pooled funds does not represent a strong choice. Rather the focus is on classical UN themes – peace, humanitarian assistance, and, more recently, follow-up to the SDGs.
3. The sample includes global and country MPTFs incl. fragile countries.
4. The sample includes different governance setups that are characteristic of UN Inter-agency pooled funds.
5. The sample includes funds where NCs dominates as well as funds where NCs are smaller contributors.
6. The sample mainly includes funds for which there are already evaluations.

Based on the above and the portfolio analysis, the sampling has been focused on peace/humanitarian MPTFs and SDG-related MPTFs. In addition, the Human Rights Mainstreaming Multi-Donor Trust Fund (HRM), operating in a high priority area for the Nordic countries, has been added. Within each of these themes there are global funds and country-level funds. With regard to the selection of country-level funds, attention has been paid to selecting funds in countries where also the WB and the AfDB are active, in order to focus the selection on a few countries to allow for country visits where all types of trust fund activities can be assessed.

Name of UNMP Trust Fund, NCs active	Nordic contribution USD million 2013–2023	Non-Nordic contribution USD illion	Theme	Geography/ fragile	Features governance/ earmarking	Evaluations, reporting	Rationale for choice Emphasis in the evaluation – order of priority
Peacebuilding Fund, D, F, I, N, S	327.4	945.6	Peace	Global	Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) under overall guidance by the GA Advisory group oversight on allocation of funds	https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund Established 2006, Independent review 2020–2024. Individual evaluations of projects.	**Influence** (NC 28% of funding), multilateral system, Countries: Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan East Kosovo, Moldova
	The Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund is the United Nations' leading instrument to invest in prevention and peacebuilding, in partnership with the wider UN system, national and subnational authorities, civil society organisations, regional organisations, and multilateral banks. The fund supports joint UN responses to address critical peacebuilding opportunities, connecting development, humanitarian, human rights, and peacebuilding pillars. The core principles of the fund are being timely, catalytic, and risk-tolerant, and facilitating inclusiveness and national ownership, integrated approaches, and cohesive UN strategies.						
HRM, D, F, N, S	39.7	1.8	Human Rights	Global	Steering committee of six UN organisations chaired by OHCHR. Annual strategic dialogue with partners	https://mptf.undp.org/fund/hrm00 Annual reports and thematic briefs	Influencing Multilateral system Countries incl. Kenya and East Africa
	The HRM supports UN Development System (UNDS) efforts to respond to the call by Member States for UNDS entities to assist countries in their efforts to respect and fulfill human rights obligations and commitments, including operationalising the 2030 Agenda pledge to leave no one behind. Leveraging opportunities presented by the UNDS repositioning, the fund enables the empowered, independent UN Resident Coordinators (RCs) and new generation United Nations Country Teams (UNCTs) to advance the values of the UN Charter and ensure that human rights are at the heart of implementing the 2030 Agenda through coherent, system-wide policies and coordinated inter-agency action at all levels.						
Joint SDG Fund (JSDG), D, N, S	118.0	182.0	Dev. SDG	Global	Strategic advisory group chaired by UNDSG and Chair UNDG facilitate stakeholder dialogue. Earmarking by S. No earmarking by D and N	Web: https://jointsdgfund.org/ Reporting Evaluation System-wide evaluation of the JSDG https://mptf.undp.org/fund/ips00	Influencing (39% of the funding) Multilateral system Projects East Europe and East Africa
	The JSDG is an innovative instrument to incentivise the transformative policy shifts and stimulate the strategic investments required to get the world back on track to meet the SDGs. The UN Secretary-General sees the JSDG as a key part of the reform of the UN's development work by providing the 'muscle' for a new generation of RCs and UNCTs to really accelerate SDG implementation. This means contributions to the fund are not entity-specific but aim to support broader UN system-level functions. In this way, it differs from restrictive earmarked funding, which can fuel competition and hamper cooperation among UN entities. (From the JSDG website).						
Somalia Joint Fund (SJF) incl. emphasis on the Joint	449.2	615	Development recovery	Somalia	SJF Management Group DSRSG/RCMIN of Finance SJF Partner Forum /Contributing Donors	Web https://mptf.undp.org/fund/4so00 2014 Annual reports	Country-level knowledge and risk sharing Influence at country level

Progamme on Local Government, D, F, N, F (as part of the JSDG)					Earmarking by contributing NC: D, F, N	JPLG: https://www.undp.org/somalia/projects/joint-un-programme-local-governance-jplg Reports Annual report Evaluation of Phase II https://www.undp.org/somalia/projects/joint-un-programme-local-governance-jplg	
	The SJF accelerates UN contributions to sustainable and peaceful development by providing a platform for joint policy and strategic dialogue that translates into high-quality and flexible programming across seven thematic funding windows: Inclusive Politics; Rule of Law; Human Rights and Gender; Climate and Resilience; Community Recovery and Local Governance, Economic Development, and Social Development. The SJF leverages its flexible funding to promote deeper UN integration, closer partnership with Government, and to facilitate evidence-based strategic dialogue with and alignment between donors informed by a portfolio of interlinked strategic programming. Doing so empowers stakeholders of the SJF to increase flexibility of UN programming to maximise the value of all investments and ensure the agility necessary in a highly dynamic context. The JPLG is one of the longest running joint UN interventions in Somalia, now in its third five-year phase.						
Tanzania One UN Fund, F, N, S	113.1	26.6	Development	Tanzania	Co-chair min Finance/UNRC of a Joint Steering Committee (UN, ministries, and local partners) Earmarking: N and S; No earmarking: F	2007 Progress reports No evaluation found Project level	Multilateral system Country level knowledge
	The United Nations System in Tanzania comprises 23 UN agencies that work closely with the Government and other stakeholders to support the achievement of national development priorities and the SDGs. The UN uses its comparative advantage to promote policy coherence, leverage partnerships, foster learning in development, and enable the provision of quality services for the poorest and most vulnerable.						

UNMPTF Long list

Name of UNMP Trust Fund, NCs active	Nordic contribution	Non-Nordic contribution	Theme	Geography/ fragile	Features governance/ earmarking	Evaluations, reporting	Rationale for choice Emphasis in the evaluation
Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund	144.6	821.5	Humanitarian	Fragile	Offie for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Country-based Pooled Fund Managed by the Humanitarian Coordinator and the UNRC in consultation with humanitarian Community/Advisory Board	2014 Reporting available No evaluations found	Country knowledge and delivery
Albania SDG Acceleration Fund, D, F, N, S	13.1	24.6	Dev. SDG	East	Government/UNCT committee No earmarking	Reporting	Multilateral system, country knowledge
CAR Humanitarian Fund	47.3	240.5	Humanitarian	Fragile	OCHA Country-based Pooled Fund	Established 2008 Reporting. No evaluation found	Country knowledge and delivery
Conflict-Related Sexual Violence MPTF, D, F, N, S	11.8	22.8	Peace, gender	Global/fragile	MPTF, Steering Committee Earmarking by D, F, N, S	Reporting Established 2019	Influencing Multilateral system Projects Ukraine and Africa
Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund	23.8	19.8	Peace, gender	Darfur/Fragile	MPTF, Steering Committee	Annual Report 2022	Multilateral system, country delivery

DR Congo Humanitarian Fund	127.4	490.3	Humanitarian	Fragile	OCHA Country-based Pooled Fund	Established 2006 Reporting No evaluation found	Country knowledge and delivery
Ebola Response MPTF	29.1	137.2	Development	Global	MPTF	Reporting Established 2014 Completed	
Elsie Initiative Fund, D, F, N	2.9	32.9	Peace Gender	Global/Fragile	Steering Committee headed by UN Women and Canada Contact group of donors No earmarking	Reporting Established. 2019	
HRM, D, F, N, S	39.7	1.8	Dev. gov	Global	Steering Committee: Six UN organisations chaired by OHCHR Annual Strategic dialogue with donors//No earmarking	Evaluation 2021[18]	Influence Multilateral system
Iraq UNDAF Trust Fund, D, F, I, N, S	3.3	11.1	Development	Iraq	HLC co-chaired UNSR/government No reference to donors in steering committee Earmarking from D, N, S, N earmarking F and I.	Reporting Established 2011 Completed – no final evaluation found	
JSDG, D, N, S	118.0	182.0	Dev. SDG	Global	Strategic advisory group chaired by UNDSG and Chair UNDG facilitate stakeholder dialogue. Earmarking by S. No earmarking by D and N	Reporting Evaluation [19]	Influencing Multilateral system Projects East and East Africa
JP Somalia Loc Gov & Decentral, D, N, S	18.5	25.1	Development	Somalia	No information No earmarking	Established 2008 Completed. No evaluation found	Country knowledge
Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, D, F, N	73.0	290.4	Dev. Gov.	Afghanistan	Steering Committee Under closure	Established 2018 No evaluation found	Country knowledge
Migration Compact Support MPTF	0.5	0.6	Dev. Migra	Global	DG IOM chair of Steering committee Consultative forum to decide direction	Completed	
Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund, D, N, S	8.4	39.9	Dev. migration	Global	Steering committee/four constituencies – 3 donor representatives Earmarking by D and N, No earmarking by S.	Start 2019. Annual reporting	Influencing in a new area Multilateral system Projects East Africa, Nigeria, Asia, LA, and MENA
Mozambique One UN Fund, I, S, N	0.05	13.0	Dev. SDG	Mozambique	One UN steering Committee Providing strategic leadership to UNCT Earmarking I, no earmarking N and S	2008 Results report 2008–2021 but no evaluation. Completed	Multilateral system Country knowledge
Partnership for Action on Green Economy,	14.3	48.0	Climate environment	Global	Management Board prim. consisting of UN organisations (UNEP, UNDP, ILO, UNIDO UNITAR. Donor Steering Committee	2013 – response to Rio+20 Evaluation 2023	Influence Multilateral system Primarily MICs Asia, LA and a few in Africa.

[18] United Nations Evaluation Group (2021): Evaluation of the UNSDG Human Rights Mainstreaming Multi-Donor Trust Fund 2011-2019.
[19] Executive Office of the Secretary-General, United Nations (2022, September): System-Wide Evaluation of the Joint SDG Fund. 2019-2022.

F, N, S							
Peacebuilding Fund, D, F, I, N, S	327.4	945.6	Peace	Global	PBC under overall guidance by the GA Advisory group oversight on allocations of funds	2006, Independent review 2020–2024. Individual evaluations of projects.	Influence, multilateral system Capacity of UN Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan East Kosovo, Moldova
Somalia Joint Fund, D, F, N, S	281.9	263.7	Development recovery	Somalia	SJF Management Group DSRSG/RCMIN of Finance SJF Partner Forum/Contributing Donors Earmarking by contributing NC: D, F, N	2014 Annual reports. No evaluation found	Influence, country-level knowledge and risk sharing
Somalia Humanitarian Fund, D, F, N, S	167.3	351.7	Humanitarian	Somalia	OCHA HC responsible – SHF advisory board chaired by the HC and participation of UN agencies, donors, NGOs, etc. No earmarking	2010 Reports Annual report	Country-level knowledge and risk sharing
Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan, D, F, I, N, S	116.4	87.5	Human needs, basic services	Afghanistan	Chaired by RC, Contributing donors through the MPTF Office Earmarking S, but D, F, I, N did not	2021 Annual reports	Country-level knowledge and risk sharing
Systematic Observations Financing Facility, D, F, I, N (NDF)	14.2	40.4	Climate	Global	Steering Committee provides strategic guidance. Members approve governance documents No earmarking	2021 Annual report	New area influencing Multilateral task?
South Sudan Humanitarian Fund	228.2	602.8	Humanitarian	South Sudan	OCHA Country-based Pooled Fund	Annual reporting No evaluation found	Country-level knowledge and risk sharing
South Sudan Recovery Fund	11.7	5.2	Development	South Sudan		Not found Completed?	Country level
Sudan Humanitarian Fund	133.8	442.6	Humanitarian	Sudan	OCHA Country-based Pooled Fund	Established 2006 Reporting No evaluation found	Country-level knowledge and risk sharing
Tanzania One UN Fund, F, N, S	113.1	26.6	Development	Tanzania	Co-chair Min. Finance/UNRC of a Joint Steering Committee (UN, ministries, and local partners) Earmarking: N and S; No earmarking: F	2007 Progress reports No evaluation found	Multilateral system Country-level knowledge
Trust Fund for Sustaining Peace in Colombia, S, N, F	81.0	117.7	Peace	Columbia	Steering committee joint chair of Gov. Columbia/UNRC with members of government, local partners, UN, WB, IDB and EU. No earmarking	2016	Country-level knowledge
UN Action Multi-Partner Trust Fund	17.5	16.6					
UN COVID-19 MPTF	41.8	44.5	Development Health	Global	Chair UNSDG Contributors meet with administrative agent No data on earmarking	Completed Report available	
UN Energy MPTF	2.7	5.3	Climate	Global	No data on earmarking	2012–2022 Completed	
Viet Nam One Plan Fund II,	5.5	21.0	Development	Vietnam	No earmarking	Viet Nam I 2008–2018 Viet Nam II 2018–2022	

F, N, S						Completed	
Women's Peace and Humanitarian Fund, I, N, S	14.5	142.5	Peace	Global	Funding Board provides a partnership platform (PP) – allocate resources, monitor progress Steering committees at country level Earmarking: I, N, S, no further NC donors.	2016– Annual reports	Influencing Multilateral system Countries: Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, East Moldova

Short List and Long List of Joint Nordic Contributions through the WB

The following eight trust funds were selected for analysis. The long list of joint Nordic trust funds (three or more Nordic donors) is included below.
This sample responds to the following criteria:

1. The sample represents a mixture of rationales for the choice of trust funds:
    - **Influence**: Influencing the WB comes with opportunities for influencing at scale through using the WBG convening power and influencing of WBG lending, leveraging Nordic priorities globally and at country level.
    - **Effective country delivery**: NCs draw on WB **country knowledge, ability to catalyse funding, and coordinate** large-scale operations, etc. This is of particular interest in large-scale crises and emergencies.
    - **Strengthen the multilateral system** and its response capacity to act on global challenges – primarily as a spin-off from the above.
2. The sample cuts across thematic policy areas where the Nordic countries have strived to influence the WB. These include the WB's ability to act in fragile contexts, human rights, and gender equality, as well as climate and the environment.
3. The sample includes global MDTFs as well as country MDTFs in fragile countries.
4. The sample includes trust funds with preferencing/or no preferencing.
5. The sample includes funds where the NCs dominate as well as funds where other donors are present.
6. The sample includes mainly funds for which there are evaluations/mid-term reviews or ongoing evaluations.

Based on the above, the sampling has been focused on two types of trust funds: 1) trust funds where the Nordic countries have intended to promote a policy agenda, and 2) trust funds in support of large-scale reconstruction efforts – the purpose for which the WB was originally created. In general, the 'policy influencing' trust funds are active in many countries and hence, it will be possible to also assess activities at country level for a limited number of these trust funds, incl. ownership of local partners and possible results related to capacity building in the context of a visit to, e.g., East Africa, also drawing on existing evaluations. The large contributions to trust funds in Ukraine have been added to explore Nordic cooperation and influence in the context of the development of large-scale reconstruction efforts.

Data on preferencing was based on data from the WB based on a manual review of trust fund agreements for a selection of trust funds.

World Bank Trust Fund	Nordic contribution 2013–2023	Non-Nordic contribution 2013–2023	Theme	Global/ Country	Features: Governance and preferencing	Evaluations/reporting	Rationale for choice
Human Rights, Inclusion and Empowerment Multi-Donor Trust Fund F, I, N, S	15.2	10.9	Human Rights, Democracy & Governance	World	Umbrella/Anchor Was preceded by the NTF N: preferencing disabilities	Website: Human Rights, Inclusion and Empowerment (worldbank.org) Progress reports 2009–2021 Completion report Nordic Trust Fund	**Influence** in the bank and on bank activities
	The World Bank Group's (WBG) **Human Rights, Inclusion, and Empowerment (HRIE) Umbrella** aims to increase and strengthen the understanding and application of human rights principles across the WBG's work. It does so through (i) funding human rights-focused, bank-executed grants, (ii) providing technical and analytical support to bank teams, and (iii) building the understanding and capacity of bank management and staff via human rights training, knowledge-sharing events, and guidance materials.						
Umbrella Facility for Gender Equality (UFGE) D, F, I, N, S	19.5	50.9	Human Rights, Democracy & Governance	World	Umbrella Partnership Council (PC) D: preference for the Sahel N: Mashreq Facility	Web: https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/umbrellafacilityforgenderequality Ongoing evaluation https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/ap_addressing_gender_inequalities.pdf	Nordic **influence in the bank** and on bank activities
	The UFGE enables better data and knowledge of what works (and what does not) to help governments and companies invest effectively to close gaps between women and men. Underpinned by the WBG's Gender Strategy, the UFGE leverages expertise across the bank and IFC to generate diagnostics, inferential research, pilot programmes, innovative interventions, and impact evaluations. As a global trust fund firmly anchored in regional and country priorities, the UFGE emphasises close collaboration with governments and the private sector to ensure new knowledge is put into action. Data and research produced under the UFGE are made publicly available to policymakers, development partners, researchers, and civil society around the world. The UFGE is the WBG's only umbrella multi-donor trust fund dedicated solely to strengthening awareness, knowledge, and capacity building to help bank staff and policy makers close gender gaps.						

Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP) Multi-Donor Trust Fund D, F, I, N, S	53.9	95.4	Climate, Environment & Renewable Energy	World	Umbrella Consultative Group of contributing donors D: Renewable energy and clean cooking in Africa N: Development of energy markets and connectivity in SSA S: Access to clean cooking, markets, and regional connectivity in SSA, renewable energy in Iraq	https://www.esmap.org/ Evaluation https://www.esmap.org/sites/default/files/Documents/ESMAP%20Final%20Evaluation%20Report_2March2020.pdf	Decades-long programme **Nordic influence** first related to energy access later climate influence in countries. Possibly knowledge and capacity building of partners, e.g., in a country (e.g., Kenya/Tanzania)
	For 40 years, ESMAP has collaborated with the WB and over 20 partners to assist developing and emerging-market countries in addressing their energy challenges. Supported by governments and foundations, ESMAP's team of more than 50 experts leads initiatives at the forefront of energy transformation. Climate change has made it urgent for the energy sector to transition to zero carbon emissions. New technologies, digital development, and declining costs of renewables and storage offer opportunities to accelerate the energy transition.						
Global Water Security and Sanitation Partnership (GWSP) Multi-Donor Trust Fund D, N, S	84.1	150.9	Social Development/ Climate	World	Umbrella/Anchor	Website: Global Water Security & Sanitation Partnership (GWSP) (worldbank.org) Evaluation 2021. https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/279f9a7ff51a5d3ef08913d13aadf90b-0320082021/original/Final-Report-External-Evaluation-of-the-Global-Water-Security-Sanitation-Partnership.pdf	Nordic Influence in the bank and wider Knowledge and capacity building in a country – Kenya/Ethiopia
	The Global Water and Sanitation Partnership (GWSP) primarily focuses on advancing knowledge and building capacity. It supports client governments to achieve the water-related SDGs through the generation of innovative global knowledge and the provision of country-level support, while leveraging WBG financial instruments and promoting global dialogue and advocacy with key partners and clients to increase reach and impact. This Partnership will provide new opportunities to test and scale-up innovations, build country capacity where needed, and influence client demand and WB operations.						
Global Program for the Blue Economy Multi-Donor Trust Fund D, I, N, S	79.4	106.1	Economic Development	World	Umbrella/Anchor (PROBLUE) D: Marine litter and pollution I: Marine litter and pollution N: Marine litter and pollution Integrated ocean management, fisheries governance.	Website: PROBLUE: The World Bank's Blue Economy Program Reports 2019–2023: Overview (worldbank.org) Evaluation ongoing https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/ap_making_waves_blue_economy.pdf 2023	Nordic influence Influence on bank operations Knowledge and capacity building in countries (Kenya)
	PROBLUE is a Multi-Donor Trust Fund, housed at the WB, that supports the development of integrated, sustainable, and healthy marine and coastal resources. PROBLUE contributes to the implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 14 (SDG 14) and is fully aligned with the WB's vision to create a world free of poverty on a livable planet. PROBLUE supports the WB's overall ocean portfolio.						
Somalia Multi-Partner Fund 2 D, F, N, S	89.3	14.2	Multiple sectors	Somalia Fragile	Umbrella S: Gender-related activities	Website: The Somalia Multi-Partner Fund (MPF) (worldbank.org) MPF Mid Term Review: https://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/638261591382785804/Somlia-MPF-Mid-Term-Review-September-2019.pdf https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/637941629489359167/the-multi-partner-fund-progress-report-july-december-2020	Influence And support for a trust fund with country knowledge and value added in the implementation. Although outside the scope of the evaluation – also possible to compare Nordic countries' rationales for selecting an UNMPTF and a WB MDTF in the same setting.
	The Multi-Partner Fund supports government-led state-building, economic growth, and urban development						
Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Multi-Donor Trust Fund (URTF) I, N, S	303.3	803.7	Peace, Stability & Reconstruction	Ukraine Fragile	Umbrella MPTF is an Anchor S: Energy-related activities	Website: New Multi-Donor Trust Fund Established to Channel Donor Support to Ukraine (worldbank.org)	Newly set-up Nordic influence and coordination in the context of a very large

							TF. Rationale for choice of this trust fund compared to other trust funds
	URTF: Supporting Ukraine's Recovery, Resilient Reconstruction, and Reform URTF is a key element of the WBG's **Multi-Donor Resources for Institutions and Infrastructure (MRII) for Ukraine collaborative platform.** It encompasses donor-funded initiatives of the WB, IFC, and MIGA, and is the Group's common forum to coordinate priorities and fundraising efforts. With a focus on strong government ownership and operational delivery, the URTF is channeling grant resources effectively to meet Ukraine's massive needs. The fund is organised around two pillars: • Help the Government of Ukraine (GoU) sustain its administrative capaTcity, deliver services, and conduct relief efforts. • Plan and implement Ukraine's recovery, reconstruction, and reform agenda.						
Digital Development Partnership (DDP) Multi-Donor Trust Fund D, F, N, S	20.3		24.4	Multiple sectors	World	Umbrella/Anchor	Website: Digital Development Partnership Annual report 2022: Digital Development Partnership	Newly established. Nordic influence in the trust fund setup and development
	The WB's new DDP helps operationalise the 2016 World Development Report on Digital Dividends and offers a platform for digital innovation and development financing. The DDP brings public and private sector partners together to catalyse support to developing countries in the articulation and implementation of digital development strategies and plans.						

Long list of trust funds with the WB

Note that a number of the trust funds consists of parallel trust funds; new trust funds are started up while the previous trust fund is still being implemented. Some trust funds consist of a main trust fund and then complemented with an implementation trust fund.

Over time, trust funds will all become part of a larger umbrella trust fund. This process is still not fully completed, so there are trust funds that do not appear as belonging to an umbrella in the data provided by the WB. See Annex 8 on Trustees as to the definition of different types of trust funds.

Name of WB Trust Fund, NCs active	Nordic contribution (Total 2013–2023)	Non-Nordic contributions	Theme	Geography/ fragile	Features/ governance	Evaluations, reporting
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, D, F, N, S	998.6	6,617	Peace, Stability & Reconstruction	Afghanistan Fragile	Umbrella/Anchor ARTF Steering Committee in Afghanistan WB is Administrator Now Afghanistan Resilience TF	Website & Reports: Afghanistan Resilience Trust Fund (wb-artf.org)
Financing for the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor Multi-Donor Trust Fund, D, F, N, S	2.3	15.5	Social Development	World	Associated with the consultative group to assist the poor	Report (2008): World Bank Document
State- and Peace- Building Multi-Donor Trust Fund, D, N, S	18.5	158.3	Peace, Stability & Reconstruction	World	Umbrella	Evaluation 2019: https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/940701568391812840-0090022019/render/VolIFinalEvaluationoftheStateandPeacebuildingFundFINAL.pdf Annual Reports 2009–2022 here: Publications (worldbank.org)
Multi Donor Nordic Trust Fund, D, F, I, N, S	15.4	1.9	Human Rights	World	Trust Fund preceded the HR, Empowerment, and Inclusion Multi-Donor Trust Fund	Completed: https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/838261570087406932/ten-years-of-building-knowledge-on-human-rights-in-the-world-bank-group ODI study: Nordic Trust Fund: Desk study on development, fragility and human rights | ODI: Think change
Multi Donor Trust Fund for Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP) in the Great Lakes Region	9.3	2.7	Peace, Stability & Reconstruction	Africa	Associated with the Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program	Limited information available on the web
ESMAP Multi-Donor Trust Fund, D, F, I, N, S	53.9	95.4	Climate, Environment & Renewable Energy	World	Umbrella	https://www.esmap.org/ESMAP_At_A_Glance Evaluation https://www.esmap.org/sites/default/files/Documents/ESMAP%20Final%20Evaluation%20Report_2March2020.pdf

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KP)/Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)/Baluchistan Multi-Donor Trust Fund, D, F, N, S	18.6	90.9	Multiple sectors	Pakistan	Unclear	Limited information available on the web
Technical and Administrative Support to the Joint Budget Support Framework in Uganda Multi-Donor Trust Fund, D, N, S	0.5	1.7	Governance	Uganda	Unclear	Limited information available on the web
Cooperation in International Waters in Africa (CIWA) Multi-Donor Trust Fund, D, N, S	25	40.1	Social Development	Africa	Umbrella	Reports: Cooperation in International Waters in Africa (CIWA) (worldbank.org) Mid-term Review 2015 https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/910601486731803672/pdf/112741-WP-P122345-PUBLIC-CIWAMTRFinalReportDec.pdf
Partnership for Market Readiness Multi-Donor Trust Fund, D, F, N, S	18.1	48.1	Climate	World	Associated (with the Partnership for Market Implementation Facility) This programme came prior to the Partnership for Market Implementation (further below)	Website of the Facility: Partnership for Market Implementation Facility | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET IMPLEMENTATION (pmiclimate.org)
Middle East and North Africa (MNA) Region-wide Technical Assistance Multi-Donor Trust Fund, D, F, N	6.03	7.9	Human Rights, Democracy & Governance	Middle East and North Africa	Associated (MNA Region Umbrella)	Website MNA: Middle East and North Africa Multi Donor Trust Fund (worldbank.org)
Umbrella Facility for Gender Equality (UFGE), D, F, I, N, S	19.5	50.9	Human Rights, Democracy & Governance	World	Umbrella	Website: English (worldbank.org) Annual report 2019: World Bank Document
Partnership for Infrastructure Development in the West Bank and Gaza Multi-Donor Trust Fund, D, F, N, S	98.6	8.8	Peace, Stability & Reconstruction	West Bank and Gaza Fragile	Trust Fund	Semi-annual report 2023: World Bank Document Semi-annual report 2021: World Bank Document
Debt Service Multi-Donor Trust Fund for the Palestinian Authority, F, N, S	8.8	15.3	Multiple sectors	West Bank and Gaza Fragile	Probably associated with the Palestinian Umbrella for Resilience Support to the Economy	PURSE-FY22-Annual-Report.pdf (worldbank.org)
Information for Development Program (InfoDev), F, N, S	13.4		Economic Development	World	Umbrella?	Reports: About InfoDev: A World Bank Group Program to Promote Entrepreneurship and Innovation
Lebanon Syrian Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Fund, F, N, S	17.2	54.9	Peace, Stability & Reconstruction	Lebanon Fragile	Unclear	Limited information available on the web
Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund, D, N, S	10.1	28.1	Peace, Stability & Reconstruction	Zimbabwe Fragile	Umbrella?	Website: Zimbabwe Reconstruction Fund (ZIMREF) (worldbank.org) Reports: Resources (worldbank.org)
Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Mainstreaming Disaster and Climate Risk Management in Developing Countries, D, N, S	12	69.1	Climate, Environment & Renewable Energy	World	Associated? (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction) – not the same Code	Limited information available on the web
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP V) Multi-Donor Trust Fund, D, N, S	7.1	30.6	Social Development	World	Umbrella	Website: CGAP: Transforming lives with financial inclusion Key documents: Key Documents (cgap.org)

Somalia Multi-Partner Fund, D, N, S	54.1	129.2	Multiple sectors	Somalia Fragile	Probably Umbrella	Website & Reports: The Somalia Multi-Partner Fund (MPF) (worldbank.org)
Kenya Devolution Partnership Facility, D, F, S	9	12.1	Human Rights, Democracy & Governance	Kenya	Unclear	Brief (2019): Kenya's Devolution (worldbank.org)
ESMAP Multi-Donor Fund – Successor to TF071401, D, F, I, N, S	90.6	201.2	Climate, Environment & Renewable Energy	World	Umbrella Successor to the first ESMAP?	See ESMAP
Somalia Multi-Partner Fund – Parallel Trust Fund of TF072285, D, F, N, S	82.6	194.9	Multiple sectors	Somalia Fragile	Umbrella	Website, Progress Reports + Mid-Term Review: The Somalia Multi-Partner Fund (MPF) (worldbank.org)
Knowledge for Change Program III – Parallel to TF072305, F, N, S	5.8	1.8	Multiple Sectors	World	Umbrella Following Knowledge for Change Program II	Completion Report: World Bank Document
GWSP Multi-Donor Trust Fund, D, N, S	84.1	150.9	Social Development	World	Umbrella/Anchor	Website: Global Water Security & Sanitation Partnership (GWSP) (worldbank.org) Evaluation 2021. https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/279f9a7ff51a5d3ef08913d13aadf90b-0320082021/original/Final-Report-External-Evaluation-of-the-Global-Water-Security-Sanitation-Partnership.pdf
State- and Peace- Building Multi-Donor Trust Fund – Parallel to TF071022, D, N, S	22.2	18.8	Peace, Stability & Reconstruction	World	Umbrella	Website: State and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF) (worldbank.org) Annual reports 2009-2022: Publications (worldbank.org)
Lebanon Syrian Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Fund – Parallel to TF072143, D, F, S	5.5	92.8	Peace, Stability & Reconstruction	Lebanon Fragile	Unclear	Limited information available on the web
Partnership for Infrastructure Development in the West Bank and Gaza Multi-Donor Trust Fund – Parallel to TF071900, D, F, N, S	93.9	77.8	Social Development	West Bank and Gaza Fragile	Umbrella	Semi-annual report 2023: World Bank Document Semi-annual report 2021: World Bank Document Mid-term review 2017: https://um.fi/documents/384998/0/Multi-donor_Trust_Fund_Palestine_MTE%2BTOR_2017.pdf/5ee386b5-41f5-d1e7-acdb-0da174b35323
Umbrella Facility for Gender Equality (UFGE) Multi-Donor Trust Fund – Parallel to TF071895, D, I, N, S	12.8	76.8	Human Rights, Democracy & Governance	World	Umbrella	Website: Umbrella Facility for Gender Equality (worldbank.org)
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) Multi-Donor Trust Fund, D, N, S	13	94.4	Social Development	World	Umbrella/Anchor	Website: CGAP: Transforming lives with financial inclusion Reports and Strategic Documents: Key Documents (cgap.org)
General Education Quality Improvement Program for Equity Multi-Donor Trust Fund, D, F, N	46	88	Social Development	Ethiopia Fragile		Ethiopia - General Education Quality Improvement Program for Equity (worldbank.org) Appraisal (2017): World Bank Document
Global Program for the Blue Economy Multi-Donor Trust Fund, D, I, N, S	79.4	106.1	Economic Development	World	Umbrella/Anchor (PROBLUE)	Website: PROBLUE: The World Bank's Blue Economy Program Reports 2019-2023: Overview (worldbank.org) Evaluation ongoing? https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/ap_making_waves_blue_economy.pdf
Human Rights, Inclusion and Empowerment Multi-Donor Trust Fund, F, I, N, S	15.2	10.9	Human Rights, Democracy & Governance	World	Umbrella/Anchor	Website: Human Rights, Inclusion and Empowerment (worldbank.org)

						Process reports 2009-2021: Resources (worldbank.org)
Somalia Multi-Partner Fund 2, D, F, N, S	89.3	14.2	Multiple sectors	Somalia Fragile	Umbrella	Website: The Somalia Multi-Partner Fund (MPF) (worldbank.org) MPF Mid Term Review: https://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/638261591382785804/Somlia-MPF-Mid-Term-Review-September-2019.pdf https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/637941629489359167/the-multi-partner-fund-progress-report-july-december-2020
Sudan Transition and Recovery Support Multi-Donor Trust Fund, F, N, S	36.9	486.2	Peace, Stability & Reconstruction	Sudan	Umbrella/Anchor	Report 2021: World Bank Document Report 2023: World Bank Document
ESMAP Umbrella 2.0 Multi-Donor Trust Fund, D, I, N, S	87.3	135.7	Climate, Environment & Renewable Energy	World	Umbrella/Anchor	Report 2021: World Bank Document Report 2020: World Bank Document
Partnership for Market Implementation Facility Multi-Donor Trust Fund, F, N, S	17.4	79.6	Climate, Environment & Renewable Energy	World	This programme succeeded the Partnership for Market Implementation	Website: Home | PARTNERSHIP FOR MARKET IMPLEMENTATION (pmiclimate.org)
Global Evaluation Initiative Multi-Donor Trust Fund, D, F, S	4.12	9.3	Multiple sectors	World		Report 2022: GEI Annual Report (shorthandstories.com) Report 2021: GEI Annual Report 2021 - 2022 (shorthandstories.com)
State and Peacebuilding Fund 2.0 Umbrella Anchor Multi-Donor Trust Fund, D, N, S	16.7	14.8	Peace, Stability & Reconstruction	World	Umbrella/Anchor	Website: State and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF) (worldbank.org) Annual Reports 2009-2022: Publications (worldbank.org)
Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Co-financing of the Ukraine Second Economic Recovery Development Policy Program, D, I, N	54.6	1,115.7	Peace, Stability & Reconstruction	Ukraine Fragile	Budget support for Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Multi-Donor trust fund2022	Financial Audit 2023 https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099535010192338985/pdf/IDU095eb7e2c0b340047fc0a91109faff5447576.pdf
Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Multi-Donor Trust Fund, I, N, S	303.3	803.66	Peace, Stability & Reconstruction	Ukraine Fragile	Umbrella	Website: New Multi-Donor Trust Fund Established to Channel Donor Support to Ukraine (worldbank.org)
Prototype Carbon Fund	-16.4	1.3				

Short List and Long List of Joint Nordic Contributions through the AfDB

Based on the criteria for selection of trust funds above, **the following trust funds were analysed**:

Name of trust fund, Nordic donors	Contribution 2013–2022	Non-Nordic contribution requested	Theme	Geography	Features	Evaluations/reporting	Rationale
Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa – SEFA, D, F, N, S	83,805,196		Climate/ Energy	Africa	https://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/sustainable-energy-fund-for-africa No info. on governance	No Projects evaluations?	Influence Country delivery Kenya
	The Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa (SEFA) is a multi-donor Special Fund managed by the AfDB. It provides catalytic finance to unlock private sector investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency. SEFA offers technical assistance and concessional finance instruments to remove market barriers, build a more robust pipeline of projects and improve the risk-return profile of individual investments. The fund's overarching goal is to contribute to universal access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy services for all in Africa, in line with the New Deal on Energy for Africa (NDEA) and SDG 7.						
Youth Entrepreneurship and Innovation Multi-Donor Trust Fund, D, N, S	14,760,133		Development	Africa	No information on governance	No success stories	Influence Country delivery Kenya
	The Youth Entrepreneurship and Innovation Multi-Donor Trust Fund (YEI MDTF) is a grant instrument exclusively designed to strengthen the African entrepreneurial ecosystem and create enabling environments for youth-led, particularly young women-led, start-ups, and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) to grow and create jobs. The trust fund is a crucial component of the AfDB's Jobs for Youth in Africa Strategy (2016–2025), which aims to create 25 million jobs and equip 50 million youths with employable and entrepreneurial skills by 2025. The trust fund's approach focuses on financing catalytic projects and facilitating the unlocking of funds for scaled job creation.						

AfDB Trust funds with two or more Nordic donors

Name of trust fund, Nordic donors	Contribution 2013–2022	Non-Nordic contribution requested	Theme	Geography	Features No information on earmarking	Evaluations/reporting	Rationale
Africa Water Facility, D, N, S	13,261,996		Development/water	Africa	Web: https://www.africanwaterfacility.org/ Estb 2004 B African ministers and hosted by the AfDB Governing Council (countries, donors, the AfDB and AU, UN Water)	No evaluations found No aggregate reporting	Country delivery
Agriculture Fast Track Trust Fund, D, N, S	5,115,934		Development/Agriculture Climate	Africa	https://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/agriculture-fast-track-aft-fund Established: 2013 Oversight committee of all donors and the AfDB	No	Country delivery Influence
Governance Trust Fund, D, F, N, S	(767,678)		Development/ Infrastructure and social services delivery	Africa	Completed	Not found	Influence
Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa – SEFA, D, F, N, S	83,805,196		Climate/ Energy	Africa	https://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/sustainable-energy-fund-for-africa No info. on governance	No Projects?	Influence Country delivery
Youth Entrepreneurship and Innovation Multi-Donor Trust Fund, D, N, S	14,760,133		Development	Africa	https://www.afdb.org/en/news-keywords/youth-entrepreneurship-and-innovation-multi-donor-trust-fund-yei-mdtf No info. on governance	No. Success stories	Influence
ZIMBABWE TRUST FUNDS, D, N, S	18,071,298		Development/Energy, water, and sanitation infrastructure	Zimbabwe	https://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/zimbabwe-multi-donor-trust-fund Initiated 2010 by donors to support recovery.	No	Influence Country delivery

Interviews and the survey

Interviews – A number of interviews was carried out in the inception and data collection phases after the desk study of available documentation was finalised. This means that interviews were targeted toward filling gaps in information, or determining where wider discussion was warranted. In general, interviews followed a short checklist drawn up in advance, depending on the interviewees and the nature of the findings at desk level that needed to be tested. The structure of the interview generally followed the evaluation matrix with a focus on evidence that informs the selected indicators. Summaries of the interviews were added into an excel sheet based on EQs and indicators to allow for all members of the team to have full access to all the information. Table 4 includes an overview of interview groups.

Table 4: Overview of interview groups

Where	Who (those currently working on trust funds and multilateral development and, where possible, staff that previously worked in these areas)	About
Nordic countries' capitals/online	• Management and staff dealing with multilateral development assistance. • Trust fund responsible staff • Technical support staff on subject matter, financial matters	Rationale for choice of trust funds, funding and non-funding inputs, and expectations as to outcomes, management and administration of trust funds, incl. development-related results reporting. Nordic cooperation
Nordic countries' posted staff dealing with trustees/online	• Staff responsible for policy towards the trustee • Staff responsible for trust funds	Cooperation with the trustee. Outcomes of trust fund contributions. Nordic cooperation at the posting
Nordic countries staff in Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia	• Management and staff responsible for the areas where trust funds are active	Involvement with trustees regarding trust fund cooperation Rationale seen from a country perspective Nordic cooperation
Trustees HQ/online	Management and staff dealing with the selected trust funds, incl. trust fund managers	The role of trust funds in the trustee Nordic influencing Trust fund management for development-related results, administration, cost recovery
Trustees at country level (for the trust fund case study sample)	Management and staff responsible for trust fund delivery	Country level delivery, management and administration of trust funds, costs. Nordic influence
Peers/online	Likeminded countries engaged in the same trust funds	Nordic influence Observations on the trust funds, rationale for support, management, and administration.

The surveys – Surveys were conducted to assess the relevance, coherence, effectiveness, and efficiency of Nordic donor support for trust funds. The evaluation matrix (Table 2) indicates how and for which indicator the survey was used. One survey targeted all staff from Nordic donor agencies presently (or very recently) involved with trust fund management in HQ, multilateral missions, and at country level. The other survey targeted trust fund managers in the multilateral organisations working with the 83 trust funds jointly funded by the Nordic countries. This latter limitation has been applied to avoid involving more than 1300 trust fund managers from the multilateral organisations. The survey drafts and results are presented in Annex 5.

A web-based platform facilitated easy access and data collection for the survey. The survey incorporated a mix of closed-ended and multiple-choice questions to enable statistical analysis, while also including a few open-ended questions to capture more nuanced insights from participants.

The data collected from the survey was analysed using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. Quantitative data from closed-ended and multiple-choice questions was statistically analysed to identify trends and relationships between variables. Qualitative data from open-ended questions was analysed thematically to gain a deeper understanding of participant experiences and perspectives.

The surveys took approximately 15 minutes to complete. The ERG facilitated the selection of persons that were surveyed in Nordic countries and distributed and followed up on invitations to ensure the highest possible response rate. On the trustee side, 83 trust funds managers received the survey.

The Nordic Donor Survey was circulated after the summer vacation period in 2024, whereas the survey directed to the trust fund managers was circulated in June and July 2024.

Field visits

The purpose of the field phase was to complete the data collection and contribute to answering the evaluation questions.
The following field visits were carried out:
Field visits to Kenya, Somalia, and Tanzania: These field visits were intended to provide more granular inputs on country delivery for the field part of the in-depth trust fund case studies for answering EQ4 and EQ5. The field visits to Kenya lasted a full week with a team of four international experts (including the financial expert) and one local consultant. The team visited Kenya from 7 to 11 October 2024. Two of the international team members travelled to Somalia from 9 to 11 October. The field visit to Tanzania took place in the period 2 to 7 September with a team of three international experts (including the financial expert) and one local consultant. The field visits included:

- Semi-structured interviews with Nordic posted staff, trustee stakeholders, and a few selected peers. The team used interview guides based on the preliminary desk findings and information gaps.
- Additional documentation/data collection, which was not received before and would be available in the countries, notably at the trust fund local offices and with regard to the specific projects.
- Joint workshop/focus group discussion with Nordic posted staff to discuss trust funds and Nordic cooperation.
- In addition, in Kenya and Tanzania: Meetings with country implementing partners, incl. public ministries/institutions, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), and the private sector.
- Site visits were organised to meet end-beneficiaries.

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Annex 4 People Consulted

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Norad		Margrete Leland	Senior Advisor	Norway
Norwegian MFA	Unit for Coordination. Coordinating response for Trust Funds	Vilde Rosen	Deputy Director, Norwegian MFA	Norway
Norwegian MFA	Department for Partnerships and Shared Prosperity Section for Multilateral	Alf Rasmus Bakke	Senior Adviser	Norway
Norwegian MFA	Department for Evaluation	Anne Mette Teigen Asselin de Williencourt	Senior Advisor	Norway
Norwegian MFA	Internal Audit and Investigations	Svend Thorleif Skjønsberg	Head of Section	Norway
Norwegian MFA	Embassy in Nairobi	Erling Hess Johnsen	Deputy Director	Norway
Norwegian MFA	Section for Multilateral Development Banks	Hege Bakke Sørreime	Senior Adviser	Norway
Norwegian MFA	Section for Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Regional Organisations	Britt Hilde Kjølås	Senior Advisor	Norway
Norwegian MFA	Section for Human Rights UNHRM	Lena Margrethe Hasle	Advisor	Norway
Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi		Kristina Svedberg	Senior Programme Manager	Norway

Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi		Camilla Ravnsborg Aschjem	Head of Cooperation, Kenya and Somalia	Norway
Norwegian Embassy in Tanzania		Kjetel Schiele	Head of Cooperation	Norway
EEA and Norway Grants		Steinar Ingi Matthíasson	Senior Country Officer	Norway
Sida		Cristina de Carvalho	Senior Policy Specialist	Sweden
Sida		Katarina Zinn	Senior Policy Specialist	Sweden
Sida	Department of Organisational Support (VERKSTÖD)	Birger Heldt	Evaluation Manager	Sweden
Sida	INTEM/DEMO	Claire Henneville-Wedholm	Senior Programme Manager, Gender Equality	Sweden
Sida	INTEM/DEMO	Charlotte Ståhl	Programme Director	Sweden
Sida	INTEM/GLOBEN	Kristian Holmberg	Programme Manager	Sweden
Sida	INTEM/GLOBEN	Ylva Schwinn	Programme Specialist, WaSH	Sweden
Sida	INTEM/GLOBEN	David Lymer	Senior Climate and Research Advisor	Sweden
Sida	EUROLATIN/Ukraina teamet	Sara Ulväng Flygare	Senior Advisor, Economic Development	Sweden
Sida	INTEM/GLOBEN	Emilie Anveden Hertzberg	Senior Advisor	Sweden
Sida	INTEM/DEMO	Louise Wahlström		Sweden
Sida		Maximilian Jönsson	Focal Point AfDB	Sweden
Sida		Maria Vink	Programme Manager	Sweden
Sida		Sara Ulvang Flygare	Senior Advisor, Economic development	Sweden
Swedish MFA	Embassy Nairobi/Somalia team	Anna Saleem Högberg	Counsellor/Deputy to Ambassador/Head of Cooperation	Sweden
Swedish MFA	Embassy Nairobi/Somalia team	Kalle Hellman		Sweden
Swedish MFA		Lorena Acevedo Narea	Desk Officer UN Reform	Sweden
Swedish MFA		Lina Palmer	Program Officer	Sweden

Swedish MFA	Embassy Dar es Salaam	Sandra Diesel	Head of Cooperation	Sweden
Swedish MFA	Embassy Dar es Salaam	Sophie Omoro	Program Officer	Sweden
Swedish Embassy in Nairobi		Annika Otterstedt	Head of Cooperation, Kenya	Sweden
Swedish Embassy in Nairobi		Sophie Omoro	Senior Programme Manager, Somalia	Sweden
Expert Group for Aid Studies	Expert Group for Aid Studies	Mats Harsmar	Department Managing Director	Sweden
Svenske Rigsrevision		Anna Petersson Backteg		Sweden
UNMPTF	Peacebuilding Fund	Tim Heine	Secretariat MandE	UNMPTF
UNMPTF	Peacebuilding Fund	Brian James Williams	Head of Secretariat	UNMPTF
UNMPTF	RCO Office Kenya Joint SDG Fund	Augustine Francis Ronny Karani		UNMPTF
UNMPTF		Grace Thuo		UNMPTF
UNMPTF	Responsible for the Social Protection Fund, Senior Advisor, Kenya, Joint SDG Fund	Arif Neki		UNMPTF
UNMPTF	Somalia Joint Fund	Peter Nordstrom	Senior Trust Fund Manager	UNMPTF
UNMPTF	Somalia Joint Fund	Mohamed Warsame	Programme Manager	UNMPTF
UNMPTF	Somalia Joint Fund	Ahmed Hashi	Programme Manager	UNMPTF
UNMPTF		Garikai Mabeza		UNMPTF
UNMPTF		Abdinasir Sharif		UNMPTF
UNMPTF		Shaila Khan		UNMPTF
UNMPTF	Peacebuilding Fund	Bushra Hassan	Senior Advisor, M&E Financing for Peacebuilding	UNMPTF
UNMPTF	UN Human Rights Mainstreaming Fund	Romina Sta Clara	Policy and Programme	UNMPTF
UNMPTF	UN Human Rights Mainstreaming Fund	Brianna Harrison	Head of Secretariat	UNMPTF
UNMPTF	Joint SDG Fund	Lisa Kurbiel	Head of Secretariat	UNMPTF
UNMPTF		Nenad Rava	Head of Programmes	UNMPTF
UNMPTF RCO Kenya		Shabnam Mallick	Head of RCO	UNMPTF

UNMPTF RCO Kenya	UNDP, (RCO office, Kenya, Joint SDG fund)	Zeinabu Khalif		UNMPTF
UNMPTF RCO		Kellen Muchira	Health Officer	UNMPTF
UNMPTF RCO Tanzania		Zhanara Bakauova		UNMPTF
UNMPTF RCO Kenya	Joint SDG Fund	Dr. Stephen Jackson	UN Resident Coordinator	UNMPTF
United Nations	Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO)	Raul de Mora Jimenez	Partnerships and Communication	UNMPTF
United Nations	Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO)	Clemence Nyamandi	Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist	UNMPTF
United Nations	Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO)	Diana Fajardo Ardila	Data Analyst, UN Climate	UNMPTF
United Nations	Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO)	Ilaria Carnevali	Deputy Coordinator, MTPF Office	UNMPTF
OHRHC	UN HRM Fund	Marcella Farvetto	Programme Advisor	UNMPTF
UNFPA		Kigen Korir	Sexual and Reproductive Health (SRH) and Youth Adviser	UNMPTF
WFP	Joint SDG Fund	Eunice Mailu		UNMPTF
UNICEF	Joint SDG Fund	Susan Momanyi		UNMPTF
FAO	Joint SDG Fund	Joy Mulema		UNMPTF
ILO	Joint SDG Fund	Shana Fabienne Hoehler		UNMPTF
United Nations	Joint SDG Fund	Korir Kigen		UNMPTF
UNMPTF	JPLG Mogadishu	Garikai Mabeza	Programme Manager	UNMPTF
World Bank	DFTPR	Praveen P Desabatla	Financial Officer	World Bank
World Bank	DFTPR	Stefan Agersborg	Senior Operations Officer	World Bank
World Bank	Donor Funds Management	Sridharan Srinivasavaradhan	Analyst	World Bank
World Bank	Donor Funds Management	Revikumar Reddy Podduturi	Analyst	World Bank
World Bank	Donor Funds Management	Ganesh Chandrasekar	Analyst	World Bank

World Bank	Trust Fund and Partner Relations Department in Development Finance (DFi)	Brice Jean Marie Quesnel	Manager, Trust Fund Policy and Partner Relation	World Bank
World Bank	Trust Funds and Partner Relations Department in Development Finance (DFi)	Mei Leng Chang	Manager, Financial Management	World Bank
World Bank	Trust Funds and Partner Relations Department in Development Finance (DFi)	Larissa Vovk	Operations Officer	World Bank
World Bank	Landsvirkjun	Elín Hallgrímsdóttir	Project Manager	World Bank
World Bank		Syliva Diez	Fund Manager	World Bank
World Bank		Sarah Nedolast	Fund Manager	World Bank
World Bank		Heewoong Kim		World Bank
World Bank		Kris Welsien		World Bank
World Bank		Pascaline Ndungu		World Bank
World Bank	Nairobi	Kristina Svensson	Country Manager Somalia	World Bank
World Bank	Nairobi Somalia MPF	Keiko Nagai	Trust Fund Manager	World Bank
World Bank		Valery R. Ciancio		World Bank
World Bank		Anna-Maria Eftimiadis		World Bank
World Bank		Tazeen Hasan		World Bank
World Bank		Brenda M. Manuel		World Bank
World Bank		Sarah Nedolast		World Bank
World Bank	WB MPF	Matthias Mayr	Responsible Somalia Trem ended 2024.	World Bank
World Bank	URTF	James P. Newman	Trust Fund Manager	World Bank
World Bank		Lorenzo Nelli-Feroci		World Bank

World Bank		Rutu Dave	Partnership with DK	World Bank
World Bank		ESMAP WB team		World Bank
World Bank		ESMAP WB country		World Bank
World Bank		Pieter Waalewijn		World Bank
World Bank		Paola Carolina Fajardo Heyward		World Bank
World Bank		Jon Exel	Senior Energy Specialist	World Bank
World Bank		John Morton	Senior Urban Development Specialist	World Bank
World Bank		Jane Kibasa	Senior Environmental Specialist	World Bank
World Bank		Fadhila Khatibu	Consultant, Environment	World Bank
World Bank		Wilberd Makene		World Bank
World Bank		Patrick Matandala	Consultant, Solid waste	World Bank
World Bank		Musa Naty	Consultant	World Bank
African Development Bank	Resource Mobilization and Partnerships (FIRM)	Divya Kapoor	Manager	African Development Bank
African Development Bank	Resource Mobilization and External Finance Department	Valerie Dabady	Manager	African Development Bank
African Development Bank	Executive Director	Mette Knudsen	ED	African Development Bank
		Lucy Debrion		African Development Bank
African Development Bank	SEFA	Joao Duarte Cunha	Fund Manager	African Development Bank
African Development Bank	SEFA	Abdelkader Benbrahim	Fund Manager	African Development Bank
African Development Bank		Haithem Ben Othman		African Development Bank
African Development Bank		Herve Neffo Pekam		African Development Bank

African Development Bank		Tao Malte Ask Andersen	AfDB Desk Officer	African Development Bank
Africa Go Green Fund		Laurene Aigrain		Other
C-19 Off-Grid Recovery Platform (CRP)		Alix Graham		Other
Africa Renewable Energy Fund II (AREF II)		Luka Buljan	Managing Director	Other
Berkeley Energy Corporate Solutions (BECS)		Nicholas Tatrallyay	Managing Director	Other
Berkeley Energy Corporate Solutions (BECS)		Morgane Martin	Investment Manager	Other
		Kevin Kimani	Photovoltaic (PV) Engineer	Other
		Victor Senkomo	Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Manager	Other
Ministry of Water in Kenya	Irrigation Secretary	Vincent Kabuti		Other
		Kennedy Ouma	Western Kenya Schemes Manager	Other
Kenya	Irrigation Water Users Association (IWUA)	David Odowo	Chairman	Other
Scheme Secretary		George Owade	Chairman Block A	Other
Scheme Secretary		Awelo Charles	Chairman Block F	Other
		Kevin Ochieng	Scheme Agronomist	Other
National Social Protection Secretariat		Jane Muyanga-Kitili	Director	Other
		Lucy Kaigutha	Programme Lead, Tiko	Other
AWOCHE Foundation		Everlyne Bowa		Other
		Marion Auma Onyango	Mobiliser	Other
		Claris Mitchelle Achieng	Friend (Beneficiary)	Other
		Ruth Awino Otieno	Friend (Beneficiary)	Other
		Sophie Oduor Awino	Friend (Beneficiary)	Other
		Iddah Akoth Ogutu	Mobiliser	Other

		Elizabeth Obanda	Tiko Ecosystem Coordinator	Other
		Maureen Waweru	Service Provider	Other
		Mary Nyokabi	Service Provider	Other
		Owino Quinter	Service Provider	Other
Somalia	Ministry of Justice,	Faisal Adan Hassan	Permanent Secretary	Other
Somalia	Ministry of Finance	Saleiman S Umar	Director General	Other
Somalia	Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development	Isak Hashi Jimale	Director General	Other
Ministry of Energy	Secretary Renewable Energy ESMAP Trust Fund	Eng. Isaac Kiwa		Other
Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy Agency	ESMAP Trust Fund	David Kitonga		Other
Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy Agency	ESMAP Trust Fund	Fred Ishugah		Other
Somaliland	UN Somaliland	Nikolai Rogosaroff	UN Coordinator in Somaliland	UNMPTF
Somalia	JPLG Mogadishu	Salah Dahir	Programme Manager	UNMPTF
Somaliland	JPLG Somaliland	Staff meeting with representatives from UNDP, UN-Habitat, UNICEF		UNMPTF
Geothermal Development Company	ESMAP	Paul K Ngugi	Managing Director and CEO	Other
Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority (Kenya)	ESMAP	Fenwicks Musonye	Deputy Director, Energy Efficiency	Other
Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority (Kenya)	ESMAP	Monicah Kitili	Assistant Energy Planner	Other
Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority (Kenya)	ESMAP	Ronald Ketter	Manager, energy Efficiency	Other

KenGen (Kenya Electricity Generating Company)	ESMAP	Eng. Peter Njenga	Managing Director and CEO	Other
President's Office, Regional Administration and Local Government Tanzania (PO-RALG)	PROBLUE	Eng. Nanai	Project Coordinator	Other
President's Office, Regional Administration and Local Government Tanzania (PO-RALG)	PROBLUE	Emanuel Manyanga	Project Coordinator	Other
National Environment Management Council (NEMC) – Tanzania	PROBLUE	Romanus Tairo	Senior Environmental Officer	Other
OpenMap Development Tanzania	PROBLUE	Emanuel Kombe	Project Manager	Other
Resilience Academy Tanzania	PROBLUE	Msilikale Msilanga	Project Manager	Other
Nipe Fagio (local NGO) Tanzania	PROBLUE	Thajaeli Masaki	Project Manager	Other
Nipe Fagio (local NGO) Tanzania	PROBLUE	Shishikaye Wilhjard	Project Coordinator	Other
Nipe Fagio (local NGO) Tanzania	PROBLUE	Fadhila Hemed	Project Coordinator	Other
Somialiland	Ministry of Finance Somaliland	Faisal Bookh	Director of Policy and Planning	Other
Somialiland	Ministry of Finance	Hamse Haji Mohamed	Coordinator of World Bank Projects	Other
Somaliland	Somaliland Civil Service Commission	Khalid Jama Qodax	Chairman	Other
Somaliland	Ministry of Planning and national development	Ahmed Mohamed Diriye	Minister	
Somaliland	Joint Programme Local Government	Abdikarim Ahmed Mooge	Mayor of Hargeisa	
Somaliland	Joint Programme Local Government	Abdishakur Mohamoud Hassan Iddin	Mayor of Berbera	

Somaliland	Joint Programme Local Government	Abdirashid Hussein	Director of Planning and Development, Hargeisa Municipality	
Somaliland	Joint Programme Local Government		Director Somaliland President Office Champions Programme	
Somaliland	Joint Programme Human Rights	G. X. Insaanka	Human Rights Commissioner	UNMPTF
Somaliland	Local Government Institute JPLG	Machadka Dawladdha Hoose	Head of LGI	UNMPTF

Annex 5 Survey (form & response)

Two surveys were carried out:

- a survey of trust fund managers responsible for manging trust funds for which there were three or more Nordic donors in the UN, incl. UNMPTF and implementing UN organisations, as well as the WB and the AfDB for which there were three or more Nordic donors; and
- a survey of Nordic staff in HQ, missions, and embassies engaged in trust fund management.

The surveys were structured based on the evaluation questions and the evaluation matrix in order for them to be directly applicable as inputs for answering the questions.

The survey results are intended to complement other data sources and are not meant to serve as a standalone data source. They are used to support evaluation findings derived from a combination of methods, including document reviews, interviews, field data collection, and observations. Hence the survey was not intended to provide an in-depth analysis or statistically robust findings.

Survey of trust fund managers from the UN, the WB, and the AfDB

Survey form for trust fund managers

Where are you employed? UNMPTFO UN org hosting the secretariat World Bank African Development Bank	Mandatory question Single answer
Where are you posted? Headquarters Country representation	Mandatory question Single answer
Time in position as responsible for the trust fund Less than 1 year Between 1 and 3 years More than 3 years	Mandatory question Single answer
Type of Trust Fund Global Regional Country specific	Mandatory question Single answer
Criteria – The Nordic countries' rationale and criteria for support to trust funds	Instructions setup

1. Which of the following rationales and criteria do you perceive played a role in the decision of Nordic countries to support/continue to support the trust fund?

Mandatory question
Multiple answers

Overall rationale	Sub-criteria	To a large extent	To some extent	To a limited extent	Not at all	I don't know
As a policy influencing instrument	Influence the global policy agenda	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Influence the policies of the trustee	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
To support the multilateral system	Promotion of a strong and well-capitalized multilateral system to implement SDGs and the	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

	Paris Agreement etc.					
	For UN - funds: Support for UN inter-agency cooperation and UN reforms	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
To enhance development delivery	Generate high-quality knowledge products	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Make use of multilateral organisations' special mandate or relationship with partners	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Catalyse additional funding for policy priorities, including funding from the private sector	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Capitalise on multilateral organisations' country knowledge and policy leverage	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Risk sharing in fragile contexts	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
To enhance aid effectiveness	Pool resources for impact and contributing to aid effectiveness	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Reduce administrative costs for the donor country	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Other	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

If "Other" selected, please specify

2. Which trust fund features do you perceive as being important for Nordic donors to support the trust fund?	Mandatory question Multiple answers

Trust Fund features	Extremely important	Important	Neutral	Not at all important	I don't know
Governance arrangements and decision-making processes within the trust fund allowed for donor engagement	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Opportunities for earmarking funds for specific areas or geographies	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Effectiveness and impact of the trust fund's interventions	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Transparency and accountability in fund management	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Accessibility of the secretariat	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Other	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

If "Other" is selected, please specify

Influence – Engagement strategies and ability to contribute to policy changes of the multilateral organisations | Instructions setup

3. To what extent were the following means of influencing used by the Nordic donors? | Mandatory question Multiple answer

Means of influence	To a large extent	To a limited extent	Not at all	I don't know
Policy dialogue at high level with the trustee	☐	☐	☐	☐
Policy dialogue with trust fund staff	☐	☐	☐	☐
Policy dialogue in the context of Trust Fund meetings (Steering committee/partnership council)	☐	☐	☐	☐
Alliances with other donors	☐	☐	☐	☐
Policy papers and studies	☐	☐	☐	☐
Earmarking/preferencing within the trust fund	☐	☐	☐	☐
Level of funding (biggest/big donor voice)	☐	☐	☐	☐
Staff secondment/technical expertise	☐	☐	☐	☐
Evidence from Nordic country bilateral country experiences	☐	☐	☐	☐
Other	☐	☐	☐	☐

If "Other" selected, please specify

Results – What is the effectiveness of the Nordic support (alongside other donors) for multilateral trust funds? | Instructions setup

4. Do you agree with the following statements? | Mandatory question Multiple answers

	Fully agree	Partly agree	Partly disagree	Disagree	I don't know
For UN funds: Nordic support to the trust fund promoted UN inter-agency cooperation and UN reforms	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nordic support to the trust fund catalysed	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

funding for policy priorities including funding from the private sector					
Nordic support to the trust fund promoted pooling donor resources for impact and contributed to aid effectiveness	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nordic support to the trust fund promoted knowledge generation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nordic support to the trust fund reduced administrative costs for the donor	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Nordic support to the trust fund increased fragmentation of funds and reduced core funds to UN/replenishments of the MDBs	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Other	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

If "Other" selected, please specify

5. Based on your experience, to what extent was the Nordic trust fund support successful in contributing to your organisation's policies within the below mentioned broad policy areas?

Mandatory question
Multiple answers

Policies priorities	Very successful	Successful	Moderately successful	Not successful	I don't know
Human rights	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gender equality	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poverty reduction	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Climate	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Environment	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Fragility and peace/conflict sensitivity	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Security and stability	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Migration	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Other	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

If "Other" selected, please specify

6. Please provide examples of policy changes by your organisation linked to the trust fund engagement of Nordic countries

Facultative question
Open answers

7. Please select the 3 main factors or success of Nordic countries' efforts to contribute to policy changes (1 being the most important factor and 3 the least important factor)

Mandatory question
Rating

Factors	1	2	3
Global agenda already moving within the policy area			
Conducive environment in the multilateral organisation for advancing the policy priority/priorities			
Alliance building with other like-minded donors			

Alliance building with recipients			
Policy dialogue at the high level			
Policy dialogue with trust fund staff			
Policy dialogue in the context of trust fund meetings			
Policy evidence provided by the donor(s)			
Secondments/technical support			
Earmarking			
Increased level of funding			
Other			

If "Other" selected, please specify

8. Overall, how would you assess the following statements about the performance of the trust fund that you are responsible for in delivering results at country level?

Mandatory question
Multiple answers

Areas of performance	**Highly satisfactory**	**Satisfactory**	**Moderately satisfactory**	**Not satisfactory**	**I don't know**
The trust fund					
UN: The trust fund activities leveraged policy dialogue and UN reforms at country level	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Partners at country level benefitted from knowledge products/ normative work developed by the trust fund	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Trust fund contributions are particularly effective in operationalising gender equality and leave no one behind policies	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Trust fund contributions are particularly effective in operationalising integration/ mainstreaming of climate action	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Trust fund contributions are an effective means to share operational risks	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The trust fund provided value for money – good results at a reasonable cost – in its country delivery	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

9. Overall, how would you rate the performance of the trust fund in delivering results related to ownership, capacity building and mainstreaming cross cutting issues at country level?

Mandatory question
Multiple answers

Areas of performance	Highly satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately satisfactory	Not satisfactory	I don't know
The trust fund actively involved country stakeholders in decision-making processes	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The trust fund prioritised the needs and perspectives of beneficiaries	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The trust fund operations strengthened capacities of national governments	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The trust fund operations strengthened capacities of national stakeholders beyond governments where relevant	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The trust fund included gender perspectives in the work	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The trust fund supported the mainstreaming of climate action into policies and activities	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Efficiency – What is the efficiency of the Nordic support for multilateral trust funds?

Instructions setup

10. Do you agree with the following statements:

Mandatory question
Multiple answers

Areas of efficiency	Fully agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Disagree	I don't know
Trust fund financial reporting provides good insight into the use of funds incl. administrative and operational costs	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
It is a core task of the trust fund manager/secretariat to provide oversight on cost effectiveness and value for money of trust fund contributions	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Reporting about the use of earmarking in the	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

fund/preferencing is adequate and clear						

Survey response

The survey was sent to a total of 88 recipients of which 39 responded, leading to a participation rate of 45%. Of the 39, one respondent is employed at the AfDB, 11 at the WB, and 28 at the UN (
Figure 6: Place of employment

Figure 7: Place of posting

). 63% of the respondents are posted at HQ, while 37% are posted at a country representation (Figure 7).
When looking at the profile of the respondents, it becomes clear that the majority of respondents have worked with the trust fund for more than three years already. 32% has worked in the position between one and three years and only one person has been there for less than one year (Figure 8). 55% of respondents are working with a global TF, 40% with a country-specific TF, and 5% with a regional trust fund(Figure 9).

Figure 6: Place of employment



Figure 7: Place of posting



Figure 8: Length of time in position as responsible for trust fund



Figure 9: Type of trust fund



When asked which rationales are important for NDs to decide on trust fundsupport, UNMPTF and MDB respondents are rather well aligned. Generally, all rationales were seen as important, more than 50% agreement on each of them. While making use of special mandates, pooling resources for impact and capitalising on the organisations' country knowledge were

the top three replies in both categories, slightly less priority was given to policy-related reasons, reduced administration costs, and risk-sharing in fragile contexts.

Figure 10: Trustee: UNMPTF – Rationale for trust fund support



Figure 11: Trustee MDBs – Rationale for trust fund support



With regard to the importance of trust fund features for the NDs, all of them were deemed mostly important, while both, UN and MDB respondents, deem earmarking opportunities less important.

Figure 12: UNMPTF – Importance of trust fund features



Figure 13: MDBs – Importance of trust fund features



All respondents agree that NDs mostly use trust fund meetings or bilateral dialogues with trust fund staff as the two most important means of influencing. Higher-level policy dialogue and alliances with other donors are also important, though judged more important for the UNMPTF than the MDBs. The less important means of influencing in both categories are policy papers and studies, evidence from bilateral country representations, and staff secondments/technical expertise. The latter is judged to be especially unimportant by the MDBs (almost 70% reply that it is not at all important, that is about 40% of the UNMPTF respondents).

Figure 14: UNMPTF – Nordic donor usage of means of influencing



Figure 15: MDBs – Nordic donor usage of means of influencing



Figure 16: All replies – Nordic donor usage of means of influencing



All respondents mostly agree with the statements they have been asked to agree or disagree with regarding the effectiveness of the TF. Nordic support to catalyse funding is deemed slightly less important within MDB responses compared to UNMPTF replies. However, both agree that Nordic support did not cause more fragmentation of funds or reduced core funds.

Figure 17: UNMPTF – Agreement with selected statements regarding effectiveness



Figure 18: MDBs – Agreement with selected statements regarding effectiveness[20]



Nordic countries were deemed successful in influencing in the areas of gender equality and human rights and to policy development in the area of conflict – particular WB respondents. UNMPTFs found policy influencing to be less successful in the area of migration. Overall, MDB respondents find that policy influencing by the Nordic countries was less succesful in certain results areas, e.g., 50% are unsure how successful the areas of environment, migration, and security are.

[20] One UN-specific statement is not presented here, as it is not relevant for this figure showing MDB responses.

Figure 19: UNMPTF – Extent of Nordic countries' success in contributing to policy development in selected areas



Figure 20: MDBs – Extent of Nordic countries' success in contributing to policy development in selected areas



Four factors stand out as important when it comes to success in policy changes regarding UNMPTFs. These include alliance-building with other donors, a conducive environment, the development of global agendas, and increased funding levels. While MDB respondents agree with some of them, they also deem it more important to hold high-level policy dialogues, which is deemed less important by UNMPTF staff. All agree that earmarking is not a very important factor.

Figure 21: UNMPTF – Important factors for success in policy changes



Figure 22: MDBs – Important factors for success in policy changes



All respondents believe that the TFs provide good value for money in the country delivery, and that TFs are a good means to sharing operational risks. While UNMPTF respondents agree that TFs are particularly effective when it comes to gender equality and leave no one behind policies, 20% of the MDB respondents do not see the same in their TFs. All respondents are more critical when it comes to the effectiveness in operationalising climate mainstreaming.

Figure 23: UNMPTF – Agreement with selected statements regarding trust fund results delivery at country level



Figure 24: MDBs – Agreement with selected statements regarding trust fund results delivery at country level



While UNMPTF respondents believe that TFs perform especially well in capacity-building of national stakeholders beyond governments, only 60% of the MDBs find this satisfactory. However, both agree that the TFs are successful when it comes to strengthening the capacities of national governments. The MDB TFs are judged more successful when it comes to including gender perspectives in their work compared to UNMPTFs. Other than that, most respondents agree that the TFs prioritise the needs and perspectives of beneficiaries.

Figure 25: UNMPTF – Assessment of the performance of TFs in delivering results at country level



Figure 26: MDBs – Assessment of the performance of TFs in delivering results at country level



Most respondents agree that financial reporting provides good insight into the use of TFs as well as that the trust fund manager/secretariat is responsible for providing oversight on cost effectiveness. However, fewer respondents believe that the reporting on earmarking is adequate.

Figure 27: UNMPTF – Agreement with selected statements



Figure 28: MDBs – Agreement with selected statements



Survey of trust fund managers from the Nordic Donors

Survey form

Where are you employed? Danish MFA Finnish MFA Icelandic MFA Norwegian MFA Norad Swedish MFA Sida	Mandatory question Single answer
Where are you posted? Headquarters Multilateral mission Embassy in partner country	Mandatory question Single answer
Time in position as responsible for the trust fund Less than 1 year Less than 3 years More than 3 years	Mandatory question Single answer
Number of Trust Funds that you are responsible for **1** **2** **3** **4 or more**	Mandatory question Open answer
Trustee UNMPTF World Bank AfDB	Mandatory question Single answer
Type of Trust Fund Global Regional Country specific	Mandatory question Single answer
Criteria – Which criteria do the individual Nordic donors use when they decide to support multilateral trust funds?	Instructions set-up
1. What are the reasons for your country's support to this trust fund?	Mandatory question Multiple answers

Overall purpose	**Sub-criteria**	**To a large extent**	**To some extent**	**To a limited extent**	**Not at all**	**I don't know**
Policy influencing instrument	Influence the global policy agenda	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Influence the policies of the trustee	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
To support the multilateral system	Promotion of a strong and well-capitalized multilateral system to SDGs and the Paris Agreement etc.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	For UN funds: Support for UN inter-agency cooperation	☐	☐	☐		

To enhance development delivery	Risk sharing in fragile contexts	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Make use of multilateral organisations' special mandate or relationship with partners	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Catalyse additional funding for policy priorities, including funding from the private sector	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Capitalise on multilateral organisations' country knowledge and policy leverage	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Generate high quality knowledge products	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
To enhance aid effectiveness	Pool resources for impact and contributing to aid effectiveness	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Collaboration and coordination with other Nordic donors	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Reduce administrative costs for the donor country	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	Other	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

If "Other" selected, please specify

2. To what extent are the following trust fund features important in your work with the trust fund?

Mandatory question
Multiple answers

Trust Fund features	Extremely important	Important	Neutral	Not at all important	I don't know
Governance arrangements and decision-making processes within the trust fund allowed for donor engagement	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Good dialogue with the secretariat	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Opportunities for earmarking funds for specific areas or geographies	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Engagement with other donors, including Nordic, in trust fund activities	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Effectiveness and impact of the trust fund's interventions	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Transparency and accountability in fund management	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Other	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

If "Other" selected, please specify.

3. Is the presence of other Nordic countries important for your country's support to the trust fund?

Mandatory question
Single answer

Extremely important
To a large extent
To a limited extent
Not at all
I don't know

Influence – Engagement strategies and ability to exert influence on the trust funds' policies as well as the trustees' policies

Instructions setup

4. Is there an advocacy strategy with a clear set of messages on policies and priorities in place and is it reported on?

Mandatory question
Single answer

Fully in place and reported on
Partly in place and reported on
Partly in place and not reported on
Not in place
I don't know

5. How do you collaborate with Nordic and other donors?

Mandatory question
Multiple answers

Coordination	To a large extent	To some extent	To a limited extent	Not at all	I don't know
Coordination of policy demands	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Pre-meetings ahead of meetings in the Trust Fund	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Produced joint policy papers/studies to influence the trust fund	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Information sharing	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Other	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

If other means and ways pls. specify:

Results – What is the effectiveness of the Nordic support for multilateral trust funds? | Instructions setup

6. In your judgement, to what extent does the trust fund's results framework and reporting live up to "good" practices? | Mandatory question Multiple answers

Reporting requirements	To a large extent	To some extent	To a limited extent	Not at all	I don't know
There was a sound participatory process for developing and adjusting the results framework	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
There is a robust results framework in place	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The reporting on the results framework is timely and of good quality	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The reporting is on outcomes and not just inputs and outputs	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Reporting was shared with the recipients (e.g. partner governments)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Other	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

If "Other" selected, please specify

7. Do you agree with the following statements? | Mandatory question Multiple answers

	Fully agree	Partly agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	I don't know
Our support to the trust fund promoted global policy influencing	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Our support to the trust fund promoted policy influencing on the trustee					
Our support to the trust fund contributed to a strong and well-capitalized multilateral system capable of accelerating the implementation of SDGs and the Paris Agreement etc.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
For UN: Our support to the trust fund promoted a rules-based world order	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
For UN funds: Our support to the trust fund promoted UN inter-agency cooperation and UN reforms	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Our support to the trust fund allowed us to capitalise on the multilateral organisation's country knowledge and policy leverage	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Our support to the trust fund catalysed funding for our policy priorities including from the private sector	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Our support to the trust fund promoted pooling	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

donor resources for impact and contributed to aid effectiveness					
Our support to the trust fund promoted knowledge generation that we brought into use	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Our support to the trust fund reduced our administrative costs	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Our support to the trust fund increased fragmentation of funds compared to core funding	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Our support to the trust fund supported the implementation of our development cooperation strategies – at global level	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Our support to the trust fund reduced risks at country level	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Other	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

If "Other" selected, please specify

Results in terms of influence

8. Based on your experience, to what extent was the trust fund contribution successful in influencing the multilateral organisation's policies within the below broad policy areas?

Mandatory question
Multiple answers

Policies priorities	Very successful	Successful	Moderately successful	Not successful	I don't know
Human rights	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Gender equality	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Poverty reduction	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Climate	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Environment	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Fragility and peace/conflict sensitivity	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Security and stability	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Migration	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Other	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

If "Other" selected, please specify

9. Pls. select the three most important factors for successful policy influencing.

Mandatory question
Rating

Factors	Most important	Second most important	Third most important
Global agenda already moving within the policy area			
Conducive environment in the trustee for advancing the policy priorities			
Alliance building with other like-minded donors			
Alliance building with recipients			
Policy dialogue at the high level			
Policy dialogue with trust fund staff			
Policy dialogue in the context of trust fund meetings			
Policy evidence provided by the donor (s)			
Secondments/technical support by the donor			
Earmarking			
Increased level of funding			
Other			

If "Other" selected, please specify

10. Overall, how would you assess the following statements about the performance of the trust fund in delivering results at country level?

Mandatory question
Multiple answers

Areas of performance	Fully agree	Partly agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Not relevant	I don't know
The trust fund activities leveraged policy dialogue and reforms at country level	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Partners at country level benefitted from knowledge products/normative work developed by the trust fund	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Our organisation benefitted from knowledge products/normative work developed by the trust fund	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Our organisation benefitted from the trust fund's country knowledge and policy reform support in delivering bilateral projects and programmes	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Our organisation benefitted from country knowledge specifically with regard to gender equality and leave no one behind	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Our organisation benefitted from country knowledge specifically with regard to	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

integration/ mainstreaming of climate action						
The sharing of operational risks was valuable for us	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The trust fund provided value for money – good results at a reasonable cost – in its country delivery	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Other	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

If "Other" selected, please specify

11. Overall, how would you rate the performance of the trust fund in delivering results related to ownership and capacity building at country level?

Mandatory question
Multiple answers

Areas of performance	Highly satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately satisfactory	Not satisfactory	I don't know
Trust funds staff actively involved country stakeholders in decision-making processes	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Trust fund staff prioritised the needs and perspectives of beneficiaries	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Trust funds strengthened capacities of national governments	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Trust funds strengthened capacities of national stakeholders beyond governments where relevant	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Trust funds always included gender perspectives in their work	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Trust funds supported the mainstreaming of climate action into policies and activities	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Other	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

If "Other" selected, please specify

Efficiency – What is the efficiency of the Nordic support for multilateral trust funds?

Instructions setup

12. Overall, how would you rate the efficiency of the management of the trust fund on the part of the donor?

Mandatory question
Multiple answers

Efficiency by the donor	Fully agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Disagree	I don't know
Trust fund guidelines and management procedures promote transparent financial	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

management of the trust funds					
The preparation process for trust fund contributions adds value to the donors' trust fund management	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Staff managing the trust funds have the right competences to drive policy influence and oversee operational and financial management	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The number and small size of trust funds reduces the efficiency and oversight of the donor	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

13. Do you agree with the following statements:

Mandatory question
Multiple answers

Areas of efficiency	Fully agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Disagree	I don't know
The trust fund financial reporting provides good insight into the use of funds incl. administrative and operational costs	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The trust fund managers are helpful in providing oversight as to the cost effectiveness/value for money of trust fund contributions	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
It is difficult to understand from the financial reporting how much of the trust fund contribution actually reaches the beneficiaries	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
We receive adequate information that the earmarking has been used in accordance with its defined purpose	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

14. Please provide lessons learned from working with the trust fund

Open answer

Survey results

The response rate of the survey is approximately 33%. This number is an approximate figure, as the real number of survey recipients was not possible to establish. For the purpose of establishing a response rate, it is assumed that the number is approximately 185, based on several factors, such as the number of active TFs since 2013 and the specifications provided by donor representatives. Of those, 61 staff members responded to the survey.

Of the respondents, Swedish staff is represented as the largest party with 39%, followed by the Danish MFA staff (21%), Finnish MFA staff (20%), Norwegian staff (15%), and Icelandic representatives (5%) (Figure 29).

64% are posted at HQ, 33% at representations abroad, and 3% at multilateral missions (Figure 30).

Based on Figure 31, 38% of respondents have worked as responsible staff member for the trust fund for more than three years, 44% between one and three years, and 18% for less than a year (Figure 31). The majority of respondents is responsible for only one TF, while 39% are managing multiple (Figure 32). Almost half of the TFs managed by the respondents are from the WB, 41% from UNMPTF, and 11% from the AfDB (Figure 33). Most TFs are country-specific followed by 39% of global and 10% of regional TFs (Figure 34).

Figure 29: Place of employment



Figure 30: Place of posting



Figure 31: Time in position as responsible for TF



Figure 32: Number of TFs the respondent is responsible for



Figure 33: Trustee of the TF, the respondent is responsible for



Figure 34: Type of TF



Among the most important reasons for donors to support TFs are the pooling of resources to achieve a greater impact, to capitalise on the partner's knowledge and policy leverage, and to make use of the partners' special mandate. Additionally, support to UN inter-agency cooperation is an important rationale for UNMPTFs. While fewer respondents from the UNMPTF side believe that generating knowledge products and catalysing additional funding are among the most important reasons, the staff working with MDB TFs find them more important than risk sharing in fragile contexts and reducing administrative costs for donors.

Figure 35: UNMPTF – Rationale for trust fund support



Figure 36: MDBs – Rationale for trust fund support



While TFs have many important features, such as effectiveness of the interventions, transparent management, and a good dialogue with the secretariat, engagement with the donors is deemed to be a bit more important for working with MDB TFs compared to UNMPTFs. However, the survey results suggest that opportunities for earmarking play a minor role compared to a number of other features.

Figure 37: UNMPTF – Importance of trust fund features



Figure 38: MDBs – Importance of trust fund Features



Both, the survey replies from staff working with UNMPTFs and MDB TFs suggest that donor presence for support on country level is important, although the majority of respondents do not deem it vital.

Figure 39: Importance of presence of Nordic countries for country support to TF



While advocacy strategies are at least partially in place for the majority of TFs, they are not always reported on. The survey suggests that only about 20% of TFs have a strategy fully in place for which there is also reporting.

Figure 40: Availability of and reporting on an advocacy strategy



The collaboration between donors is using various means, such as information sharing, producing joint knowledge products, coordinating demands, and having preparatory meetings. None of these means stand out as most important by a significant degree.

Figure 41: UNMPTF – Means of collaboration between donors



Figure 42: MDBs – Means of collaboration between donors



Figure 43: All replies – Means of collaboration between donors



When it comes to best practices in trust fund management, between 50% and 75% of all replies confirm that all best practices are being followed-through on. Reporting on outcomes is a bit weaker compared to other practices in both the UNMPTF and MDBs. In both categories, the survey suggests that the TFs have a good results framework in place and report on it.

Figure 44: UNMPTF – Extent to which the trust fund results framework and reporting live up to good practices



Figure 45: MDBs – Extent to which the trust fund results framework and reporting live up to good practices



Most survey respondents agreed on the following as the most successful results of the UNMPTFs: support to inter-agency cooperation and UN reforms, strategy implementation at global level, and pooling of donor resources. In comparison, less than 50% of respondents agree that the TFs have catalysed funding for policy priorities, promoted a rules-based world order, and global policy influencing. It stands out significantly that most respondents do not agree that the support to the trust fund has increased the fragmentation of funds.

Figure 46: UNMPTF – Agreement with selected statements regarding effectiveness



Equally to UNMPTF-specific replies, the staff working with MDB TFs does not agree that supporting their TFs has increased fragmentation of funds. Other than that, more than 60% of respondents agree with all other responses. The features where the TFs were deemed most effective, as agreed by most survey respondents, are regarding capitalising on the partner's country knowledge and policy leverage, and to promote knowledge generation.

Figure 47: MDBs – Agreement with selected statements regarding effectiveness



Most survey respondents suggested that Nordic countries were very successful or successful in influencing gender equality, followed by human rights and poverty reduction, but the numbers that assessed the Nordic influencing succesfully was much lower than among trustee repondents. At the other end of the spectrum, just over 10% of survey respondents found Nordic countries' influence on migration initiatives to be successful. While the Nordic countries are found to be more succesful in influencing in climate and environment in the WB, they are less succesful in the UNMPTFs and are viewed as more succesful in matters related to human rights, fragility, peace, and stability. For each of the categories, there is also a significant group of respondents who believe that the Nordic counteis have been only moderately successful or completely unsuccessful, between 15% and 40% per thematic area.

Figure 48: UNMPTF – Nordic countries' success in influencing within selected thematic areas



Figure 49: MDBs – Success in influencing within selected thematic areas



While donor staff believe that alliance-building with other like-minded donors is especially important for success, factors like policy evidence and technicall support are less useful. Regarding UNMPTFs, high-level policy dialogues are seen as important while policy dialogue in the context of trust fund meetings or with trust fund staff ranks low. For MDBs, all policy dialogue is given a medium priority. Other important factors for all trustees are alliance building with recipients and that the global agenda is already moving with the policy area. While UNMPTF-related responses suggest that increased funding is among the most important success factors, it is deemed significantly less important in relation to MDB TFs.

Figure 50: UNMPTF – Success factors for policy influencing



Figure 51: MDBs – Success factors for policy influencing



With regard to the MDBs, the most important results are related to knowledge products and normative work, whereas the UNMPTFs are seen to be more successful when it comes to sharing risks. While most agree that TFs from all trustees have provided value for money in its country delivery, the benefits resulting from country knowledge sharing are rated lowest, independent of the thematic areas.

Figure 52: UNMPTF – Performance of trust fund for delivering results at country level



Figure 53: MDBs – Performance of trust fund for delivering results at country level



While more than 50% of respondents working with MDB TFs find the results delivery in the various categories satisfactory or highly satisfactory, the responses for UNMPTFs are more mixed. While most respondents believe that gendered perspectives and those of beneficiaries are included to a satisfactory degree, less than 40% believe the same when it comes to mainstreaming climate action and strengthening the capacities of national stakeholders. More than 40% also do not find that the capacities of national governments were adequately strengthened.

Figure 54: UNMPTF – trust fund performance in delivering results regarding ownership and capacity building at country level



Figure 55: MDBs – trust fund performance in delivering results regarding ownership and capacity building at country level



The survey replies suggest that both MDB TFs and UNMPTFs have transparent financial management and competent staff. While 70% of respondents to the MDBs mostly agree that the preparation process for trust fund contributions adds value to the donors' trust fund management, the percentage of responses in agreement for UNMPTFs lies lower at 50%. About 25% of all participants agree that the number and small size of TFs reduce the efficiency and oversight of the donor, while more than 45% disagree with that notion.

Figure 56: UNMPTF – Efficiency of trust fund management by the donor



Figure 57: Efficiency of trust fund management by the donor



While more than 60% of all replies agree that the trust fund managers are helpful in providing oversight regarding the cost-effectiveness and that the financial reporting provides good insights, more than 60% also agree that it is difficult to follow how much of the trust fund contributions actually reach the beneficiaries from the financial reporting. About 50% of staff working with UNMPTFs and 30% of staff working with MDB TFs agree that they receive adequate information regarding earmarking.

Figure 58: UNMPTF – Agreement with selected statements



Figure 59: MDBs – Agreement with selected statements



Annex 6 Portfolio Analysis

The portfolio analysis presents the overall trends of Nordic contributions to Official Development Assistance (ODA) between 2009 and 2022 based on the OECD Data Explorer.[21] [22]

The portfolio analysis also presents the overall trends of Nordic contributions to i) UN Multi-Partner Trust Funds (UNMPTFs), ii) the World Bank (WB), and iii) the African Development Bank (AfDB) trust funds. It covers the period between 2004 and 2023 and provides an overview of Nordic contributions by thematic areas and geographies, with comparisons of the Nordic countries' use of trust funds. The data used for this analysis were provided by the three multilateral organisations. The data used pertain to disbursements. The UNMPTF data are accessible online.[23] The data from the WB and the AfDB were provided by each of the institutions.

Summary of main findings

The portfolio analysis showed the main overall trends:

- Norway's and Sweden's total ODA spending has increased over the years, while Finland and Iceland have seen slight increases, and Denmark's spending has decreased slightly. (Figure 60)
- Over the past 13 years, multilateral disbursements have grown in percentage of the total ODA across all NDs but have stagnated or even slightly reversed since 2020. (Figure 61)
- Comparison of overall ODA and multilateral aid showed a strong to moderate correlation between aid levels and support for the UNMPTFs among most Nordic countries, except for Denmark and Norway, which showed a weak correlation with overall ODA. In contrast, support for the WB's trust funds appeared less influenced by fluctuations in aid levels, except for Iceland. This suggests that UNMPTFs are funded more flexibly and tend to be prioritised when ODA levels increase, whereas WB trust funds receive more consistent funding. For most Nordic countries, there was a weak correlation between overall ODA, multilateral aid levels, and support for the AfDB. (Tables 5 and 6)

UNMPTF:

- Between 2004 and 2023, the five Nordic countries contributed to 133 UNMPTFs, for a total allocation of around USD 4.7 billion. (Figure 61)
- Since 2020/21, the Nordic UNMPTF contributions have declined due to a drop in humanitarian and peace funding. (Figure 62)
- Only five out of the 133 UNMPTFs are supported by all NDs, while 73 are supported by only one ND. (Figure 63)
- The Nordics contribute about 30% of the total contributions to the UNMPTFs, and D, N, and S are represented amongst the 10 largest donors. (Figure 64)
- The larger proportion of Nordic countries' contributions to UNMPTF was directed towards Peace and Humanitarian thematic areas, whereas climate received the smallest amount of funding. (Figures 65–67)
- The Nordic countries' support to UNMPTF was predominantly channelled towards country-level cooperation and within that to fragile and conflict-affected countries. (Figures 68–70)

World Bank:

- Between 2004 and 2023, the five Nordic countries contributed to 1,177 WB funds (including FIFs and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)/IDA TFs), for a total allocation of around USD 23.2 billion. (Figure 71)

[21] OECD (n/a): OECD Data Explorer.
[22] The USD values in the tables and graphs are in current terms (i.e., not adjusted for inflation).
[23] United Nations MPTF Office Partners Gateway (n/a): Fund contributions.

- Besides one significant peak in ND spending volume in 2005 (due to an overall higher number of active TFs and high contributions to Afghanistan), the Nordic contributions to the WB TFs have remained relatively stable at around 25% of the total donor contribution volume. (Figure 71)
- Sweden and Norway are the highest contributors to TFs, though it can be noted that Norway's contributions have varied significantly compared to the other Nordics. (Figure 73)
- The vast majority of Nordic contributions were directed towards TFs with only one Nordic donor. (Figure 74)
- Regarding the WB IBRD/IDA TFs, the NDs contribute mostly to development and fragility whereas climate and Environment is the smallest sector. However, significant funding for development and climate and environment is channelled through the FIFs. (Figures 75–78)
- Summarised from 2004–2023, support from Nordic countries was predominantly directed towards country-level cooperation. This trend is consistent across all Nordic countries, except for Iceland, who focusses more on global funds. (Figures 79 and 80)
- Most NDs focus on fragile countries, while Sweden also directs a larger share to non-fragile countries. (Figure 81)

AfDB:

- Between 2004 and 2023, the four Nordic countries contributed to 34 AfDB TFs, for a total allocation of around USD 468 million with Denmark as largest contributor. (Figures 84 and 85)
- The majority of Nordic contributions were directed towards AfDB TFs with only one Nordic donor. (Figure 86)
- Nordic countries' contributions to AfDB TFs were primarily directed towards development, climate, and environment thematic areas. (Figures 87–89)
- The NDs focus mainly on interregional AfDB TFs. (Figure 91)

Overall trends in Nordic ODA contributions

The overall trend in Nordic ODA contributions evolved over the period. Norway's and Sweden's total ODA spending has increased over the years, while Finland and Iceland have seen slight increases, and Denmark's spending has decreased slightly.

Figure 60: Trends in ODA for Nordic countries (total ODA incl. refugee costs in countries)



The proportion of aid provided by Nordic countries to multilateral organisations, compared to their total aid, has grown between 2009 and 2022. By the end of the period, each Nordic country had allocated the largest portion of its aid budget to multilateral organisations. Finland, in particular, directed 70% of its total aid to these organisations. (Figure 61)

Figure 61: Multilateral disbursement as percentage of total aid across the Nordic donors



When looking at the correlations[24] between the trust fund contributions of the NCs compared to the total ODA, it shows a mixed picture. Finland and Iceland exhibit a rather strong correlation for UNMPTF contributions, Iceland as well with regard to WB TFs. This indicates that Icelandic and Finnish contributions to the UNMPTF (and the WB) have increased or fallen with the overall spending of ODA. A similar picture is shown when comparing trust fund contributions with the total multilateral ODA. Norway and Sweden show similar trends in relation to the UNMPTF TFs, though the correlation is much stronger when comparing only multilateral ODA. There is close to no correlation between Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish spending and the WB TFs. Table 5 shows close to no correlation

[24] One limitation of the correlation analysis is the relatively small number of data points (n=14), which may reduce the reliability of the results. As such, the correlation coefficients should be interpreted with caution, recognizing that they may not fully capture the underlying relationships due to the limited sample size. Statistically significant correlations are marked in green.

between any of the NDs and the AfDB, except for Norway. When looking at multilateral ODA, there are some stronger trends, whereby Finland and Norway show a negative correlation, indicating that higher ODA spending results in comparatively lower contributions to the AfDB. Table 6 exhibits a moderate positive correlation between the AfDB and Sweden.
Overall, the correlations suggest that contributions to the UNMPTF increase with higher ODA levels. Consequently, when multilateral ODA decreases, the contributions do as well. This implies that the UNMPTF is funded more flexibly, and contributions are adjusted in line with the overall ODA levels. The UNMPTF is therefore prioritised when ODA levels rise.
The general low correlations between multilateral ODA and the WB trust fund contributions (except for Iceland) indicate the contributions are relatively stable, no matter the ODA fluctuations. This consistency implies that the WB may be considered a less flexible funding priority.
In the case of the AfDB, there was a weak correlation between overall ODA, multilateral aid levels, and support for the AfDB for most Nordic countries. There was a moderate negative correlation for Norway between overall ODA and support for the AfDB.

Table 5: Correlation matrix between trust fund contributions and total ODA (2009–2022)

	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
AfDB	-0.19	0.16		-0.50	0.01
WB IBRD/IDA[25]	0.04	0.06	0.74	0.02	-0.15
UNMPTF	-0.33	0.72	0.71	0.28	0.42

Table 6: Correlation matrix between trust fund contributions and total multilateral (bi- and multi-bilateral) ODA (2009–2022)

	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
AfDB	-0.01	-0.42		-0.34	0.31
WB IBRD/IDA[26]	0.02	0.16	0.72	0.10	-0.10
UNMPTF	0.69	0.58	0.83	0.73	0.76

Number of active trust funds

Table 7 shows the number of active trust funds per trustee and Nordic donor. The number of active UNMPTFs shows a declining trend from 2020 onward, particularly for Norway, but it is too early to conclude that this is a trend. Iceland is an exception. The numbers for the WB indicate that the Nordics have increasingly joined umbrella trust funds over the years, which aligns with the gradual introduction of these funds as part of the reform aimed at replacing standalone trust funds. The decline in the number of standalone trust funds over time reflects the broader trend within the WB, as many of these are being phased out in favour of umbrellas, though some standalone funds persist and new ones are established when justified. The numbers for all five countries show a move from standalone trust funds to Umbrella trust funds and a tiny decrease in the number of trust funds supported by the Nordics, the exception being Norway, reflecting the ongoing reform and broader trends within the WB. Regarding the AfDB, the overall trend is unclear, though there are indications of an increasing number of trust funds, except for Sweden.
There are a few limitations regarding the data presented in Table 7:
UNMPTF – Counting was done manually based on the annual financial contributions recorded in the UNMPTF database. A trust fund was considered active in the years between the first and last recorded contribution in the database. The reference period for the analysis was 2015-2024 to include trust funds initiated prior to 2019 but still active. The total allocation from Nordic donors was cross-checked, and trust funds that had not received their full allocation through disbursements by 2024 were classified as

[25] Excluding FIFs.
[26] Excluding FIFs.

active. Trust funds that received their full allocation were classified as closed in the year of the last disbursement, even though they may not have been officially closed by that time.
World Bank – the numbers for total, umbrella, and standalone trust funds for Denmark, Sweden, and Norway were provided by the WB. They may be on the higher end due to the inclusion of trust funds that no longer receive financial contributions from Nordic donors but have not yet been officially closed. For Finland and Iceland, the figures are based on annual financial contributions and the evaluation's judgement regarding active and closed trust funds, following the same logic applied to UNMPTFs. Data for 2019 were not received for Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, which is why the 2019 figures were excluded for Finland and Iceland as well.
AfDB – Counting was done manually, based on annual financial contributions as with the UNMPTFs. The reference period was 2015–2022. The lack of financial contributions for 2023 and 2024, along with the reliable data on full financial allocations, restricted the accuracy of the estimates, as some funds may have continued receiving financial support after 2022 but were counted as closed.

Table 7: Number of active trust funds per Nordic donor

UNMPTF					
Country	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Denmark	9	14	11	11	9
Sweden	35	38	38	38	37
Norway	32	32	32	28	22
Finland	7	11	10	7	7
Iceland	0	2	2	4	3
World Bank*					
Country		2020	2021	2022	2023
Denmark	Total	43	46	47	41
	Umbrella	12	14	15	15
	Standalone	26	26	26	21
Sweden	Total	66	67	68	64
	Umbrella	12	20	24	26
	Standalone	51	43	39	34
Norway	Total	73	71	74	74
	Umbrella	22	23	28	29
	Standalone	45	42	39	38
Finland	Total	12	11	8	7
Iceland	Total	5	6	6	7
AFDB					
Country	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Denmark	2	2	2	3	
Sweden	2	2	4	1	
Norway	2	2	2	3	
Finland	0	0	1	2	

*Umbrella programmes comprise one anchor TF. It includes associated TFs (if any), hence the total does not equal to umbrella + standalone trust funds.

United Nations Multi-Partner Trust Funds (2004–2023)

Between 2004 and 2023, the five Nordic countries contributed to 133 UNMPTFs, for a total allocation of around USD 4.7 billion.
Over the last two decades, the Nordic country contributions to UNMPTF have increased significantly. This increase was primarily driven by growing contributions from Norway and Sweden. However, since

2020/2021, a decline was observed, which is due to drops in humanitarian and peace funding (Figure 62) – but also due to the more general drop in the share of ODA for multilaterals.

Figure 62: Trends in Nordic Countries' Paid-in Contributions to UNMPTF (2004–2023)



The number of TFs with joint support has been modest. Most TFs were supported by one Nordic country only (73 out of 133), and only five TFs received contributions from all Nordic countries (Figure 63). Though in volume of contributions, most of the UNMPTF portfolio of Denmark, Finland, and Iceland was allocated to TFs with the participation of four or five Nordic donors, incl. the Peacebuilding Fund, Somalia Humanitarian Fund and Joint Fund, South Sudan Humanitarian Fund, and Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund.

Figure 63: Joint Nordic Support to UNMPTF/Number of trust funds supported by one or more Nordic donors (n=133) 2004–2023



The Nordics are amongst the largest donors to the UNMPTF in international comparison. Together, they contribute about 30% of the total contributions. (

Figure 64)

Figure 64: Nordic support to UNMPTFs compared to other DPs (2004–2023)



The larger proportion of Nordic countries' contributions to UNMPTF was directed towards Peace and Humanitarian thematic areas, which combined represent more than half of the Nordic countries' portfolio, whereas climate received the smallest amount of funding. (Figure 65)

Figure 65: Distribution of all Nordic countries' contributions to UNMPTF/thematic areas (2004-2023)



Finland and Iceland allocated most of their contributions to Peace (e.g., the Special trust fund for Afghanistan, the SJF, and the Peacebuilding Fund), and Denmark and Sweden contributed relatively

equally to both Peace (same as for Finland and Iceland) and Humanitarian (country humanitarian funds, such as Afghanistan, DR Congo, Sudan, and Somalia), while Norway as the only Nordic donor which contributed significantly to Climate and Environment (contributing mostly to the Central African Forest Initiative and the UN-REDD Programme Fund). (Figure 66)[27]

Figure 66: Distribution of all Nordic countries' contributions to UNMPTF/Country and thematic areas (2004–2023)



Support for all thematic areas increased, except for humanitarian aid, where Nordic contributions began to decrease, starting in 2014. It also reflected that increasingly OCHA has been organising its own country-level coordinated funds. The sharp decline in peace and humanitarian from 2021 to 2023 is in line with the overall drop in ODA of the NDs at the same time. (Figure 67)

Figure 67: Trends in all Nordic countries' contributions to UNMPTF/Thematic areas (2004–2023)



Overall, the Nordic countries' support to UNMPTF was predominantly channelled towards country-level cooperation with a sharp drop towards the end, somewhat related to less humanitarian aid being channelled through the MPTF. (Figure 68)

[27] The development thematic area encompasses a wide range of issues related to sustainable development such as poverty alleviation, education, health, economic growth, social inclusion, and gender.

Figure 68: Trends in all Nordic countries' contributions to UNMPTF/geographic focus (2004–2023)



Norway, Finland, and Iceland contributed more to global programmes than Sweden and Denmark did. (Figure 69)

Figure 69: Distribution of all Nordic countries' contributions to UNMPTF/country and geographic level (2004–2023)



Regarding country-level TFs, the Nordic countries' contributions were mainly targeted at fragile countries, also reflecting the MPTF focus. (

Figure 70)

Figure 70: Nordic support to UNMPTF/focus on fragile and conflict-affected countries



World Bank

Between 2004 and 2023, the five Nordic countries contributed to 1,177 WB funds (including FIFs and IBRD/IDA TFs), for a total allocation of around USD 23.2 billion. When the FIFs are taken out, the five Nordic countries contributed to 1,135 IBRD/IDA TFs), for a total allocation of around USD 11.3 billion.

Notwithstanding a peak in 2005, the share of Nordic contributions to trust funds has overall been stable since 2004, representing 20–30% of the total contributions to WB TFs. (Figure 71).

Figure 71: Share of all Nordic contributions to IBRD/IDA TFs (2004–2023)



Since the late 2000s, Nordic contributions to FIFs have increased compared to TFs. The peak in 2005 is related to a contribution to the high number of active funds, 2015 and 2020 correspond to specific contributions from Sweden to the Green Climate Fund. (

Figure 72)

Figure 72: Trends in total Nordic contributions to FIFs and IBRD/IDA TFs (2004–2023)



Sweden and Norway are the highest contributors to TFs, though it can be noted that Norway's contributions have varied significantly compared to the other Nordics, with large contributions to the Green Climate Fund in 2015 and 2020. The sharp rise in 2023 is due to large Norwegian contributions to Ukraine. (Figure 73)

Figure 73: Trends in all Nordic countries's contributions to IBRD/IDA TFs (2004–2023)



The vast majority of Nordic contributions were directed towards TFs with only one Nordic donor: specifically, 961 TFs. There are significantly less TFs with multiple Nordic donors (
Figure 74).

Figure 74: Distribution of IBRD/IDA TFs per number of Nordic donors (2004–2023)



The NDs contribute mostly to development and fragility. Climate and environment is the smallest sector. (Figure 75)

Figure 75: Sectoral distribution of all Nordic countries' contributions to IBRD/IDA TFs (left) (2004–2023)[28]



Iceland and Norway dedicate the largest share to climate and environment, while non-Nordic donors are focussing mainly on fragility, conflict and reconstruction. (Figure 76)

Figure 76: Distribution of all Nordic countries' contributions to thematic areas, excl. FIFs (2004–2023)



Overall, there was an increase in support for climate and environment as well as for development thematic areas, during the period. The peaks in contributions towards climate and environment in 2015 and 2020 correspond to specific contributions from Sweden to the Green Climate Fund. The observed peak in 2005 relates to trust funds in Afghanistan. (

[28] WB sectors under each category are: Climate and Environment (Climate Change, Energy and Extractives, Energy and Mining, Environment, Natural Resources and Blue Economy); Peace and Transition (fragility, conflict, and violence); Reconstruction (Reconstruction under self-made classification, includes country reconstruction funds (such as Haiti, Iraq, and Liberia) and emergency reconstruction funds (e.g., Emergency recovery and Reconstruction /ERRP); Multiple sectors are a category in themselves; all other categories (e.g., Education, Agriculture, Gender, Economics, Poverty) are summaried under Development.

Figure 77)

Figure 77: Trends in Nordic countries' contributions to thematic areas FIFs and WB/IDA trust funds.



When comparing

Figure 77 (with FIFs) and Figure 78 (without FIFs), it is visible that significant funding for development and climate and environment is channelled through the FIFs. The largest FiFs for development are hereby the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, and the Global Partnership for Education. For climate and environment, the largest FIFs are the Green Climate Fund and the Global Environment Facility.

Figure 78: Trends in Nordic countries' contributions to thematic areas WB/IDA trust funds.



Overall, support from Nordic countries was predominantly directed towards country-level cooperation. Nordic funds were allocated to regional programmes to a very limited extent. (

Figure 79)

Figure 79: Geographic distribution of all Nordic countries' contributions to IBRD/IDA TFs (2004–2023)



This trend is consistent across all Nordic countries, except for Iceland. It can be noted that Nordic countries contributed more to country programmes than other Development Partners (DPs). (Figure 80)

Figure 80: Distribution of all Nordic countries' contributions to WB IBRD/IDA TFs, country and geographic level (2004–2023)[29]



Cooperation at the various geographic levels remained relatively stable over the past 20 years. At country level, the high number of new trust fund agreements resulted in a sharp increase in 2005. More recently, the contributions to Ukraine marked an increase at country level. (Figure 81)

Figure 81: Trends in all Nordic countries' contributions to IBRD/IDA TFs (geographic focus 2004–2023)

[29] The column on the other DPs only includes TFs that NDs also contributed to and does not represent their total contributions.

Regarding country-level TFs, the NDs, equally to non-Nordic donors, mostly focus on fragile countries, while Denmark and Sweden also direct a larger share to non-fragile countries. (Figure 82)

Figure 82: Nordic support to IBRD/IDA TFs focus on fragile and conflict-affected countries (2004–2023)



The average contribution size ranges from USD 7 million to USD 130 million. Norway provides the largest average contributions per TF. (Figure 83)

Figure 83: Average contribution size per Nordic country



African Development Bank

Between 2004 and 2023, the four Nordic countries[30] contributed to 34 AfDB TFs, for a total allocation of around USD 468 million.[31] The overall trend in Nordic contributions to AfDB TFs is not as clear as for the UNMPT and the WB. Contributions were not consistently allocated on a yearly basis. (

[30] Iceland is not a member, and as such does not contribute to AfDB TFs.
[31] 1 XUA AfDB = 1.3291 USD (value of 21 March 2024).

Figure 84)

Figure 84: Trends in Nordic countries' contributions to AfDB (2004–2022)



At the overall portfolio level, Denmark is the primary contributor to AfDB TFs among the Nordic countries, accounting for 47% of the total portfolio supported by Nordic countries, followed by Norway at 29% and Sweden at 21%. (Figure 85)

Figure 85: Nordic support to AfDB/contributions across all Nordic countries 2004–2022

Most Nordic contributions were directed towards AfDB TFs with only one Nordic donor: specifically, 20 out of 34 TFs. (Figure 86)

Figure 86: Joint Nordic support to the AfDB/number of trust funds supported by one or more Nordic donors (n=34) 2004–2022



Nordic countries' contributions to AfDB TFs were primarily directed towards development, climate, and environment thematic areas, representing 52% and 47% of the total contributions, respectively. (

Figure 87)

Figure 87: Distribution of Nordic countries' contributions to the AFDB/thematic areas (2004–2022)



When considering the distribution across Nordic countries, the NDs focussed mainly on development and climate and environment. (Figure 88)

Figure 88: Distribution of Nordic countries' contributions to the AFDB/country and thematic areas (2004–2022)



Figure 89: Trends in Nordic countries' contributions to the AFDB/thematic areas (2004–2022)[32]



The average contribution size ranges from around UA 1 million to around UA 4.4 million, corresponding to USD 1.3 million and USD 5.8 million, respectively[33]. Denmark provides the largest average contribution per TF. (Figure 90)

Figure 90: Average contribution size per Nordic country 2004–2022

[32] As there is only one Swedish contribution to peace and transition in 2021, no trend can be shown and therefore, this sector is not represented in this figure.
[33] 1 XUA AfDB = 1.3291 USD (value of 21 March 2024).

The NDs focus mainly on interregional AfDB TFs.

Figure 91: Distribution of all Nordic countries' contributions to AfDB TFs/country and geographic level (2004–2022)



Denmark

Danish aid fell during the period. From 2018 aid is slowly recovering with growth in GNI. The share of multilateral aid increased to 60% in 2020 after which it declined again to 50% in 2022.

Figure 92: Share of multilateral aid as % of all Danish development aid



Figure 93 indicates the evolution in contributions to trust funds and FIFs – the latter is not covered by this evaluation (but jumps reflect contributions to GEF, GCF, and GPE. The evolution in the contributions to WB trust funds is impacted by contributions in specific crises situations – 2004-2006 relates to very large contributions to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Fund that then continued during the period, but at a lower level, and smaller peaks occur later in response to the Syrian crisis and most recently for country trust funds related to Somalia, Ethiopia and the Sahel. The support for UNMPTFs is quite stable over the past 10 years, mainly reflecting contributions to a limited number of trust funds incl. the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). Support for AfDB mainly reflects the support to SEFA.

Figure 93: Total Danish contribution to the WB/IDA, FIFs, UNMPTFs and AfDB TFs in the multilateral aid



The UN is by far the largest recipient of multilateral assistance (development and humanitarian) from Denmark, receiving close to 50% of multilateral aid. There has been a shift towards non-core contributions in the funding of the UN, increasing from a level of below 20% to more than 30%. The non-core contributions mainly consist of single-agency projects. The green bar reflects the weight of the EU in Danish multilateral aid. Contributions to FIFs make up less than 5% of aid in most years.

Figure 94: Core and Non-Core Contributions to the UN, the WB, and other



Contributions to UNMPTFs only took off from 2009 to 2010, when contributions to CERF were included. From 2023, CERF contributions are almost exclusively directly with OCHA. The main area of support is peace through the Peacebuilding Fund. In recent years, support for climate MPTFs increased.

Figure 95: Thematic distribution of the UN MPTF portfolio



Denmark mostly concentrates on country-level trust funds, though there is a shift towards more global trust fund level support in recent years.

Figure 96: Distribution of all Danish contributions to UNMPTF/country and geographic level (2004–2023)



The main thematic priority with the WB is support for multi-sector reconstruction and development, e.g., Afghanistan, and climate and energy transition. The high number of active TFs in 2005 corresponds with a large number of multisector funds.

Figure 97: Thematic distribution of the WB IBRD/IDA trust funds portfolio



Similarly to the UNMPTFs, Danish support to WB IBRD/IDA TFs focuses on country-level funds.

Figure 98: Distribution of Danish contributions to WB IBRD/IDA TFs/country and geographic level (2004–2023) (no FIFs)



Denmark supports the AfDB TFs with a mixture of climate and development funding.

Figure 99: Thematic distribution of the AFDB trust funds portfolio



Finland

Whereas the total Finnish ODA is declining slightly over the past 20 years, the percentage of multilateral spendings has risen from about 50% to 65%.

Figure 100: Share of multilateral aid as % of all Finnish development aid



The largest part of the sample looked at in this evaluation is directed through the WB. The FIFs thereby gain importance in the 2020s. The UNMPTF is also a relatively stable partner, while the AfDB receives more sporadic contributions in the past 10 years compared to the period from 2004 to 2013.

Figure 101: Total Finnish contribution to WB/IDA, FIFs, UNMPTFs, and AfDB TFs in the multilateral aid



The below graph illustrates the composition of Finland's ODA from 2013 to 2022, broken down into different funding categories and the share of non-core contributions. The share of non-core funding has fluctuated over the years, peaking around 2017 and gradually declining afterward. Core contributions generally dominate the funding structure, while non-core contributions represent a smaller proportion. The proportion dedicated to the WB and the UN has slowly declined, while the proportion of other funding channels has increased.

Figure 102: Core and non-core contributions to the UN, the WB, and other



Finnish funding to the UNMPTF portfolio is fluctuating, while focussing mainly on peace and transition in recent years.

Figure 103: Thematic distribution of the UNMPTF portfolio



Finland is shifting between country and global funds. In recent years, there was a stronger focus on country-level funds, while global funds were receiving more funding when the contributions to the UNMPTF portfolio were highest and then sharply declining.

Figure 104: Distribution of all Finnish contributions to UNMPTF/country and geographic level (2004–2023)



The sharp increase of funding to multiple sectors is in line with a high number of new trust fund agreements with small contributions to each. From 2008 onwards, Finland contributes mostly to the fragility, conflict, and reconstruction and development areas.

Figure 105: Thematic distribution of the WB IBRD/IDA trust fund portfolio



Finnish funding has consistently been mostly channelled through country-level funds, while a smaller proportion has been going through global funds. Sporadically, contributions go to regional funds.

Figure 106: Distribution of Finnish contributions to WB IBRD/IDA TFs/country and geographic level (2004–2023) (no FIFs)



While Finland has mostly focussed on development-related TFs, the most recent contribution was made to a trust fund operating in climate and environment.

Figure 107: Thematic distribution of the AfDB trust fund portfolio



Iceland

Iceland's total ODA has increased steadily since 2009. After a sharp jump in 2011, from 30% to 55%, Iceland's share of multilateral ODA has been increasing with a few reclines in between.

Figure 108: Share of multilateral aid as % of all Icelandic development aid



Iceland's funding to all three trustees has increased over the past 20 years, with a first contribution to the UNMPTF in 2011. There has been a sharp increase in 2023, mostly directed to the WB IBRD/IDA TFs due to support to the Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform MDTF.

Figure 109: Total Icelandic contribution to WB/IDA, FIFs, UNMPTF, and AfDB TFs in the multilateral aid



This graph shows the composition of Iceland's ODA from 2013 to 2022, categorised into core and non-core contributions to multilateral organisations. The stacked bars represent various funding components, while the lines display the percentage of non-core funding in total ODA and multilateral contributions. The share of non-core funding declined steadily from 2013 to 2017 but has risen slightly since, although core contributions have consistently formed the majority of Iceland's ODA. The largest share of Icelandic ODA has always been directed to the UN, though the WB and other trustees have gained importance since 2020.

Figure 110: Core and non-core contributions to the UN, the WB, and other



Iceland focusses its contributions to the UNMPTF mainly on peace, transition, and development.

Figure 111: Thematic distribution of the UNMPTF portfolio



While there is no clear trend visible when it comes to supporting country vs. global funds, country funds have been prioritised the past couple of years.

Figure 112: Distribution of Icelandic contributions to the UNMPTF country and geographic level (2004–2023)



While Iceland has mostly focussed on global funds when it comes to contributing to WB TFs, country-level funds have been most important for the past two years, due to large contributions to Ukraine.

Figure 113: Distribution of Icelandic contributions to the WB IBRD/IDA TFs/country and geographic level (2004–2023)



With only a few exceptions, Icelandic contributions to the WB have mainly supported efforts in climate and environment.

Figure 114: Thematic distribution of the WB IBRD/IDA trust fund portfolio



Norway

Both the total Norwegian ODA and the share of multilateral ODA have fluctuated, but an overall incline has been seen since 2009. Multilateral ODA reached a share of 60% in 2021 before dropping again in 2022.

Figure 115: Share of multilateral aid as % of all Norwegian development aid



The AfDB has been a constant but small partner to Norway, whereas the UNMPTF has increased steadily since 2004. WB contributions have fluctuated immensely, and both the IBRD/IDA and FIFs receive high levels of Norwegian funding.

Figure 116: Total Norwegian contribution to WB/IDA, FIFs, UNMPTFs, and AfDB TFs in the multilateral aid



The graph below illustrates the composition of ODA from 2013 to 2022, segmented into core and non-core contributions to multilateral organisations. The proportion of non-core funding has remained relatively stable over the years, with core contributions consistently forming a majority of Norway's ODA. The proportions of funding between the different partners have remained stable over the past years.

Figure 117: Core and non-core contributions to the UN, the WB, and other



While climate and environment has always been an important area of cooperation, peace and transition has gained importance over the past few years.

Figure 118: Thematic distribution of the UNMPTF portfolio



While global and country level TFs had a relatively stable equal share from 2009 to 2014, funding from global funds has been redistributed to regional TFs since 2015, in addition to an overall growth in contribution volume. Country-level funding has thereby remained relatively stable.

Figure 119: Distribution of Norwegian contributions to the UNMPTF/country and geographic level (2004–2023)



Norway has contributed with a relatively stable level of about USD 100 million to country-level funds from 2006 to 2022, and fluctuations in funding have been directed to global funds. 2005 and 2023 stand out as years with exceptionally high country-level funding.

Figure 120: Distribution of Norwegian contributions to the WB IBRD/IDA TF/country and geographic level (2004–2023)



Norway does not have a clear thematic focus for WB trust fund funding. In recent years, development-related funding was the highest, which was sharply overtaken by contributions to Ukraine-related activities.

Figure 121: Thematic distribution of the WB IBRD/IDA trust fund portfolio



Norway focusses mainly on development-related funding with some exceptions of large contributions to climate and environment.

Figure 122: Thematic distribution of the AfDB trust fund portfolio



Sweden

The total Swedish ODA and the share of Swedish multilateral ODA show corresponding trends, with both rising since 2009. One exception is 2015, when a reversed trend is seen. Total aid peaked and multilateral aid fell before immediately recovering the next year.

Figure 123: Share of multilateral aid as % of all Swedish development aid



While the FIFs have gained importance since 2015, with extraordinarily high funding peaks, the other WB funds and the UNMPTF stay at approximately the same levels. The AfDB receives the lowest amount of funding and is not a consistent partner.

Figure 124: Total Swedish contribution to WB/IDA, FIFs, UNMPTF, and AfDB TFs in the multilateral aid



Over the ten years from 2013 to 2022, the distribution of core and non-core contributions to the UN, the WB, and others has been relatively stable with the main changes being in the contribution to FIFs.

Figure 125: Core and non-core contributions to the UN, the WB, and other



Sweden does not concentrate on a specific issue, though peace and transition and development have been the most important sectors for the past few years. Before that, Swedish focus has been on humanitarian funding.

Figure 126: Thematic distribution of the UNMPTF portfolio



Sweden mainly contributes to country-level funds. However, global funds have gained importance since 2018.

Figure 127: Distribution of Swedish contributions to the UNMPTF/country and geographic level (2004–2023)



Sweden finances both, country and global WB funds with seemingly no specific trend.

Figure 128: Distribution of Swedish contributions to the WB IBRD/IDA TF/country and geographic level (2004–2023)



Sweden does not show strong thematic preferences when it comes to WB IBRD/IDA trust fund contributions. Overall, development seems to have dominated slightly since 2006, though fragility has gained importance since 2009. Its importance peaked in 2019 after which there was a steep decline in 2020 from which it has not regained its strength, even though it stated increasing again in 2023.

Figure 129: Thematic Distribution of the WB IBRD/IDA trust fund Portfolio



Thematically, Sweden has focussed on climate and environment since 2015. Before that, development was the most important sector for AfDB cooperation.

Figure 130: Thematic distribution of the AfDB trust fund portfolio



Annex 7 Summary of Trust Fund Case Studies

United Nations Joint SDG Fund (field study)

EQ	Summary findings
Criteria	• The main rationale for the Nordic funding of the Joint SDG Fund (JSDG) was dual: i) to support the UN reforms and ii) to support the objectives of accelerating the SDGs and mobilising finance through applying innovations to catalyse transformative policy change. • It was a strategic choice guided by higher political concerns, i.e., to support the UN secretary-general, the UN reforms and SDG framework rather than being based in an in-depth operational understanding of how the fund could work. One of the greatest challenges affecting the capacity of the JSDG in meeting its objectives was the shortfall in funding. Funding has been constrained from the Nordic and other donors for a number of reasons such as competition from COVID-19, lack of clarity in the value proposition, and few donors contributing. • The concept appears flawed in that it does not take account of: Dependence on reforms that are not sufficiently in place; Competition from other UN funding arrangements (in the case of Kenya there were MPTFO country programmes being set up); Gap between pledge and commitment (donors, especially non-Nordic are not committed); Gap between capacity of PUNOs to deliver (so funds tend to stay with UNDP and UNICEF); some UN observers have noted that the UN is undergoing an "identity crisis" as, compared to earlier times, it is less and less seen as the place for governments to go for support. • Support from other Nordic donors was not a determining factor for Nordic donors. The issue is rather support from the wider donor community.
Influence	• The main issue that affected the performance and success of the trust fund has been the lack of commitment from other donors. Nordic donors did not have an explicit strategy for how to support the trust fund in this fundraising task or how to come to an explicit conclusion that this is not possible or likely to be effective for bringing in others. • Nordic coordination was minimal, despite the Nordic countries financing close to 40% of the fund. A partial explanation is that, in contrast to the WB trust funds, there is not a Nordic constituency for coordinating Nordic support to the UN. Another explanation is that a Nordic-only grouping would be considered sub-optimal. • A limitation for influence is that the Nordic donors do not have the resources to engage in discussion and they have less access to information, which makes the discussion unequal. • Earmarking has become a tool/means for influence. Norway was originally earmarking for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the JSDG (via a separate window)[34] but then switched to newly created UNMPTF for IDPs; similarly, in Kenya there was earmarking for the country UNMPTF SDG fund. • A minor detail, but good to get it right.

[34] Clarification: The UN wanted to open a separate window in the Joint SDG Fund to support the work with IDPs at country level. The reason was that the funds had to go through and be coordinated at country level by the RCO (local representative's offices). This was changed during the preparation process by establishing a separate fund for this measure. Again, at the UN's own request. Thus, there was never any earmarking for IDP in the Joint SDG Fund.

Results	• Trust fund features that contributed to change: Anchorage with RC at country level; insufficient critical mass of resources (spread too thin among too many themes and countries and implementing agencies, and with insufficient time and resources for quality programme and implementation); Complexity and abstractness of the concept (as noted in the UN (2023) evaluation, there is a lack of understanding of the JSDG and especially the work of the Integrated National Financing Networks (INFF); Communication (the value proposition and fundraising among donors was not as strong as required). • Quality of results framework is considered robust at the global level and has been subject to adjustments. • At individual joint programme level, the quality of results is different (UN, Sept. 2022). The field visit found that the two programmes (one of which was independently evaluated) had results in line with expectations. • Reporting is timely but donors find that it is high-level reporting, which makes it difficult to attribute the results to the TF. • There is a sense that reporting and partner meetings are about showcasing, bringing in RCs to report on positive results, and selling the trust fund with a reluctance to admit mistakes. • The contribution to multilateralism is inherent in the trust fund's concept and design. But it is weaker in practice due mainly to non-Nordic donors not supporting the fund as well as a number of dilemmas, including core funding vs funding via trust funds; use of JSDG vs new MPTFs; visibility vs ownership; using earmarking to increase funding by aligning with donor priorities vs not accepting fragmentation but obtaining less funds. • Ownership is driven by the individual programme and varies accordingly. In Kenya there is reportedly high ownership for the social protection programme, in Tanzania there was very little ownership of the Leave No One Behind (LNOB) programme, although that was not a trust fund-related issue but one linked to the wider political environment. • Capacity is under tension between demonstrating results and the longer-term goal of building capacity and the need to minimise fiduciary risk on the one hand and using national systems and building capacity from within.
Efficiency	• The trust did have the effect of reducing transaction costs for the donors compared to trying to set up their own programme (also reduced the fiduciary risks) and ensured that once the funding stopped there was still an entity (a UN entity) with a permanent presence and mandate. • Like all other trust funds, the funds are audited and managed by the UN organisations using their financial management and procurement procedures that are judged acceptable. The ability of the UN agencies to manage fiduciary risks is one of the main reasons for Nordic (and other) donors to finance via the UN. Nevertheless, according to interviews, most donors find it difficult to judge the efficiency of individual trust funds or programmes financed by them and are dependent on evaluations, which themselves have it difficult to judge the efficiency, in part because the JSDG and its underlying programmes have high-level aims where it is not easy to establish a counterfactual or isolate the contribution of the fund. Interviews and field work conducted confirm the following main efficiency-related issues with the JSDG: o High ambition given the resources and time frame (aiming at catalytic and transformational impacts) o Too small a budget that is spread across many themes and countries o A short time scale meaning that there is not enough time for programme preparation and implementation o Not clear that the fund does not duplicate what others do o High transaction costs of collaboration of PUNOs (e.g., each having an M&E function on a programme)

Brief description of the trust fund – The JSDG was set up in 2017 and officially launched with core resource commitments in 2019 to support countries in their efforts to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in a coherent and integrated manner. It builds on the UN's ability to convene diverse stakeholders and help develop national capacity to work across policy domains in an integrated manner and to stimulate an enabling environment for SDG investments. The substantive focus of the JSDG reflects areas in which the UN, as a smart investor, expects to achieve the greatest impact by allocating its resources wisely. The Fund reflects the UN's financing approach, outlined in the UNDG companion piece, 'Funding to Financing', including the need to use limited UN resources as a catalyst to influence much larger financing flows. The JSDG is seen by the Secretary-General as a key piece of the reform of the UN development system. The JSDG will be a country-focused instrument, supporting priority inter-agency efforts towards joined up implementation on the ground.

The JSDG is not intended to replace regular, individual agency-specific, SDG-targeted and financed activities. Rather, the fund will complement these resources and activities by i) providing targeted resources for multi-agency initiatives that strengthen national capacities for integrated policy; ii) developing a country's SDG financing ecosystem; iii) implementing catalytic SDG programming and investments; iv) ensuring effective and sustainable development results at national and sub-national levels. The JSDG will complement other pooled funding instruments, in particular, the CERF and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and further strengthen and accelerate the path to sustainable development in weak and fragile states. A well-designed and fully capitalised JSDG is expected to reduce fragmentation of policy and financing efforts. In short, the overall aim of the fund is to incentivise integrated and transformative policy shifts, and to support the UN's key role in convening and creating SDG financing strategies, and to then make catalytic investments that enable countries to leapfrog in their development.

Trust fund objectives and strategy – The trust fund is a response to the recognition that UN's convening power should be better used for supporting integrated policy solutions and financing strategies. The UN should build on its role and experience as a neutral and credible partner to secure national ownership and leadership, and to facilitate capacity development of national governments as the main lever for achieving the SDGs. For this to happen, the UN has to change the way it works and promote more systemic and catalytic change. Despite improved collaboration across organisations and sectors, work at the country-level is often fragmented, with partners compartmentalising issues into 'silos' or competing for resources and access to policy arenas. This represents a challenge for UNTCs, which should instead be integrating programming and implementation, facilitating the development of integrated mechanisms, boosting the capacity of domestic stakeholders, and nurturing new and existing partnerships with traditional and non-traditional actors at global, regional, and local levels. To respond to the challenges and aspirations, the JSDG is working with three interwoven domains of change: i) unleashing policy accelerators to catalyse integrated, transformative policy change; ii) creating new SDG financing architecture, through developing investment strategies, plans, and piloting innovative financing instruments (with both public and private actors); and iii) catalysing SDG programming and investments. There are two overarching outcomes: 1) Integrated multi-sectoral policies to accelerate SDG achievements and 2) Additional financing leveraged to accelerate SDG achievements. The funding target was USD 290 million per year. The above reflects the fund's well-developed ToC at the global level.

A first call was made in 2019: integrated policy support with a focus on LNOB and social protection was launched in March 2019. With applications submitted by 114 RCs, this call will now channel USD 72.4 million to 36 countries by the end of 2019 for the start of the implementation of joint programmes (average of USD 2 million each) in 2020. A proposal from Tanzania was approved, and implementation was launched but not completed as the government pulled out. In Kenya there were a number of calls for proposals, including a social protection programme in 2019, which was independently evaluated in 2023; a LNOB programme in 2020 that was completed in 2023; and an Adolescent Sexual Reproductive Health programme aimed at developing an impact bond in 2023.

Trust fund institutional arrangement – The governance structure is show in the figure below. The strategic advisory group is composed of the five largest contributors to the fund, seven programme

country member states as well as observers from private sector, civil society, and the UN system, and will be chaired by a deputy Secretary-General of the UN. An operational steering committee chaired by a DCO director, supported by a secretariat, will oversee the development, implementation, and monitoring of joint programmes. The country RC will be responsible and accountable for the conception, strategic planning, and oversight of proposals and joint programmes funded through the JSDG. Access to the fund requires the involvement of at least two participating UN organisations (PUNOs). The fund is administered by the UNMPTFO as the administrative agent who will also ensure that donors obtain the relevant narrative and financial reporting against a results framework of three outcome indicators and 26 output indicators.



Nordic engagement

Figure 131 summarises the contributions from the Nordic countries:

Figure 131: Nordic countries' contributions to the JSDG





Funding (USDm)	Denmark	Norway	Other DPs	Sweden	Total
2017			3,052,814		**3,052,814**
2018	1,827,708	1,170,618	22,208,806	17,653,974	**42,861,106**
2019		13,926,768	24,056,086	17,476,980	**55,459,834**
2020	1,753,293		20,687,700	20,514,925	**42,955,918**
2021		2,265,006	55,683,593	21,331,437	**79,280,036**
2022			8,716,664	11,738,524	**20,455,189**
2023			47,554,407	8,371,820	**55,926,227**
Total	**3,581,001**	**17,362,392**	**181,960,071**	**97,087,660**	**299,991,124**



Results summary – delivering on the Nordic countries' rationales for supporting the trust fund:		
Policy influence	**Policy influence – globally-** (multi-country reach – including values and global public goods)	• **Moderately satisfactory –** Policy influence globally is most evident in the area of creating a better environment for financing of the SDGs.
	Policy influence – on the organisation	• **Moderately satisfactory –** The Swedish influence as one of the main donors is high at the global level. The main influence is around results framework and reporting and internal structuring. The influence at country and joint programme level is less as the embassies are not directly involved.
Multi-lateralism	**Strengthening the multilateral system** Delivering on the trustee mandate and SDGs	• **Moderately satisfactory –** Strong as an objective but weaker in practice due mainly to non-Nordic donors not supporting the fund.
	Strengthening the multilateral system (contributing to UN reforms, One UN, MDBs) Inter-agency cooperation	• **Moderately satisfactory –** Strong as an objective but weaker in practice due mainly to non-Nordic donors not supporting the fund and a number of dilemmas, including: • Core funding vs funding via trust funds • Visibility vs ownership • Earmarking vs fundraising to align with donor priorities.
Development delivery	**Development delivery –** Generate knowledge to enhance development impact	• **Moderately satisfactory –** Some knowledge gained on approaches to financing and raising funds for the SDGs, including mobilising the private sector.
	Development delivery – Scaling effects (national public resources, private sector, other donors)	• **Moderately satisfactory –** Modest scaling effects from cofinancing with PUNOs, other donors scaling was weak and weak evidence on government and private sector at least based on the sample, although some promising signs arising from the INFF and other JSDG-supported initiatives as noted by the secretariat.[35]
	Development delivery – Convening power and influence (national entities, other donors, civil society, private sector)	• **Satisfactory –** The continued presence of the UN entities and the fact that the programme is part of their long-term mandates means that they are able to follow up even when the programme ends or, in the case of the LNOB Tanzania, when it finishes early. This enables them to seek opportunities to intervene

[35] The Fund has leveraged private sector financing mainly through SDG investment vehicles/solutions it supports. For instance, in Uruguay, over USD 6 million have been committed by local commercial banks to the Renewable Energy Innovation Fund, where the Joint SDG Fund provided first-loss capital. Similar arrangements have been made in Zimbabwe, North Macedonia, and other countries, unlocking over USD 50 million to date from the private sector. Additionally, the fund has supported the launching and accountable management of a number of SDGs, sustainability, thematic (green/blue) bonds in Indonesia, Cabo Verde, and other countries, which have cumulatively raised over USD 5 billion. In Kenya, the Development Impact Bond raised approximately USD 5 million from the Bridge Outcome Partners (a UK-based social impact fund) as the initial investor, while the Children's Investment Fund Foundation participated with around USD 5 million as the outcome funder alongside the Joint SDG Fund.

			when the timing is better. Strong effects from the Kenya programme on social protection.
	Development delivery - Access to skills (mobilisation of high level of expertise)	•	**Satisfactory –** The use of PUNOs working within their mandates enables mobilisation of expertise. This was evidenced in the Kenya social protection programme where the WFP and others were able to draw on long-term experience.
	Development delivery – Access to country expertise (mobilisation of country experience/insight)	•	**Highly satisfactory –** The use of PUNOs with local presence enabled access to country experience and insight. This was evidenced in the Kenya social protection programme where the WFP and others were able to draw on long-term experience and good working relations with government and non-state actors.
Aid effectiveness	**Aid effectiveness – reducing fragmentation** (harmonisation of external support)	•	**Unsatisfactory –** Fragmentation was not reduced due to donors not funding via the JSDG. Top 5 donors finance over 80% of the budget.
	Aid effectiveness – collaboration with other Nordic donors	•	**Unsatisfactory –** Limited as there was not much Nordic cooperation, partly explained by the different ways the Nordic donors organise their engagement with the UN funds.
	Aid effectiveness – reduce costs for the donor	•	**Moderately unsatisfactory –** Sweden, by channelling a large volume of support through the fund, has gained aid efficiency. This is less so for Denmark and Norway as their setup and to some extent monitoring costs are fixed.

Results summary table – relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency	
Summary	**Moderately satisfactory**
Criteria	**Relevance:** Satisfactory, as concluded in the 2022 evaluation, although the high ambition in terms of transformative policy shifts and the shortfall in donor response would question its realism (the intention is relevant but perhaps not realistic). A distinctive value proposition was not strong enough (UN, 2022, p42), although there has been a re-prioritisation of the strategy of the fund since then. The focus on LNOB in many countries was a good starting point as it involves many SDGs. **Effectiveness:** Moderately satisfactory – although still quite early to tell also because the implementation period coincided with COVID-19, which meant that attention of governments was diverted towards the emergency measures. "*The joint programmes supported by the Fund are living up to the Fund's strategic intentions considering the complexity of its mission, the challenging contexts at the country level, and the adverse effects of the COVID-19 pandemic" (UN, 2022, pvi).* It is also noted that the fund has contributed to UN reforms through the pooling mechanism and collaboration of UN participating organisations. The thematic evaluation on the fund's SDG financing enabling environment noted "*positive engagement with fiscal planning, public finance management and collaboration with the private sector are observed in JPs to enhance SDG financing; however, their effectiveness is limited in some JPs that lack an overarching financing strategy, leading to a somewhat ad hoc sectoral approach to SDG financing."* (UN April 2024, pviii) However, there were weaknesses in country ownership and quality of programming (too rushed and spread too thin) and with relatively small budgets and short time frame times for highly complex tasks. There is significant variation between the country programmes with the LNOB programme in Tanzania failing due to political changes in the country. The social protection programme in Kenya was successful as judged by the external evaluation (UN, February 2023) **Efficiency:** Moderately unsatisfactory – There is not strong evidence of efficiency gains. The concept of working as one should create efficiency, but it also imposes transaction costs as each agency has its own operation and funding mechanisms (UN, 2022, p29). The evaluation of the social protection programme in Kenya noted that *"the Joint Programme contributed to efficiency, and reduced duplication, in two ways: first, by capitalising on the skills of all agencies involved; and second, through the active sharing of information on approaches taken and progress made. These approaches also served to reduce duplication within the UN Country Team in Kenya, which in turn served to reduce transaction costs*." But it is also noted that the programme had a short life cycle, and the sector is complex and would need a longer time to create change (UN, February 2023, pvii). Another more general point on

	efficiency is that use of multiple UN agencies leads to high transaction costs as each agency has its own M&E and accountancy and other staff so that a single programme involving several agencies becomes inefficient.
Sources of evidence (main sources)	• UN evaluations (2022, 2023, 2024 – at programme and trust fund level) • Trustee reporting (more than 10 documents) • Nordic donor reporting, appraisals, and decision documents (more than 10) • Interviews with the trust fund management, Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO), PUNOs, civil society and government focal points (more than 10 interviews) • Field observation – Kenya, Tanzania
Strength of evidence	**Triangulation:** Strong – There is a good level of triangulation with the key points that influence effectiveness (low level of funding, high ambition, fragmentation among agencies) confirmed by many sources. **Quality of results framework (**Satisfactory indicators, targets, reporting): The global results framework is robust and reported on. Some donors find that it is high-level reporting, which makes it difficult to attribute the results to the JSDG. "*You have to go out to the field to get an idea > we need more honest reporting*". "*The meetings with partners were really into showcasing bringing in the RCs and portraying all the positive results"* Some reports brought up lessons learned. There is a reluctance to admit mistakes. At individual joint programme level, the quality varies (UN, Sept. 2022). The Kenya Joint Programme (JP) has a complete results framework (baseline, targets, definitions) and is largely SMART but has a weakness because, as noted by the evaluation, the specific attribution of the programme to the key outcome indicators is not possible. The Tanzania LNOB reporting is incomplete (due in part to the projects stopping early).

Lessons learned

There are some dilemmas that have not yet been resolved:

- Core funding to UN vs supporting TFs: It has been increasingly clear that this type of general funding that is meant to work towards UN reforms is best when it is part of the core funding, because the funding is better safeguarded and the incentive effect appears to be greater. (Trust fund, Nordic donors, others)
- Visibility vs ownership: Also, the donors are withdrawing from core support as there is not enough visibility in core support, and it is difficult to attract political support, so that needs better communication from the UN. (Trust fund, Nordic donors, others)
- UN reforms vs internal and external forces pulling in another direction: The fund is undermined by the incompleteness of the reforms. The overall reform aim is not being achieved. The JSDG is seen as a source of new funding not as a mechanism for working together. The issue is overlap. UNHCR and the WB work well because they are complementary and do not overlap. This is a good example of working jointly. The reforms create new structures, but the old ones are not removed. For example, the agency financing systems and the incentives are for resource generation and that is what the UN agencies are measured on. PUNOs are meant to work together but they are competitors. A Norwegian delegation went to Uganda to see the RC and UNCT and they were frank that as long as funding is project orientated, they would not work together. The only exception was COVID-19 and core support. (Trust fund, Nordic donors, others)
- Donors are also a political body and subject to change in policy and direction and need to take account of internal considerations. (Evaluators)

Project Evaluation Case Study – Adolescent Sexual and Reproductive Health – Development Impact Bond (ASRH-DIB) in Kenya.

Project evaluation case study: Adolescent Sexual and Reproductive Health – Development Impact Bond – Kenya Trust fund: JSDG– United Nations global trust fund	Grant – UN Executed: USD 7 million (USD 5.125 million co-funding from Children Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF) Recipient: UN PUNOs (RCO, UNFPA, UNAIDS, and WHO) Date of visit: 11 October 2024

Challenges addressed and project purpose

1. Support scale-up of the world's first ASRH development impact bond in Kenya.
2. Leverage expertise from PUNOs (RCO, UNFPA, UNAIDS, and the World Health Organization (WHO)) to ensure public sector integration of the 'In Their Hands' (ITH) digital-based intervention into policies, laws, and practice.
3. Improve access to Sexual and Reproductive Health (SRH) and HIV services for adolescent girls in vulnerable contexts in Kenya.

Changes and absence of expected change

- ASRH-DIB has been implemented in 10 counties (Nairobi, Kisumu, Busia, Bungoma, Kakamega, Migori, Mombasa, Kisii, Homabay, Nyamira), in collaboration with private (245) and public (150) clinics and pharmacies to provide quality, youth-friendly SRH services to 15-19-year-old girls. (+ve)
- The DIB programme has provided services to approximately half a million girls, overshot the target for family planning (FP) services and reached the target for HIV services. (+ve)
- Public sector integration is still limited and constrained by sub-optimal services, e.g., stock-outs of free FP goods in public hospitals and lack of policies and laws that allow for FP services to be provided to adolescents under 18 years. For example, there is no DIB in public clinics in Mombasa, and some mobilisers were arrested in Migori for providing FP services to mature minors (15–17 years) as it is currently illegal. (-ve)
- Myths and misinformation also undermine the programme's effectiveness, e.g., "You cannot give birth after using FP products". (-ve)

Contributing factors

- The ASRH-DIB built on the existing ITH technology-based concept implemented by Tiko, which has demonstrated strong results in reaching high-multidimensionally poor adolescent girls with critical lifesaving SRH and HIV services in the private sector since 2017 and extended it to the public sector.
- The programme is incentive-based for adolescent girls, the participating clinics and pharmacies, retail shops, and mobilisers.
- QA provided by a team of evaluators that includes UN agencies enhances its credibility.

Trust fund influence

- Additional funding from the JSDG to upscale the programme and integrate the public sector.
- Technical support from UN agencies, e.g., by UNFPA, for the review of the National Sexual Reproductive Health Policy and for the activation of the National Family Planning Technical Working Group.
- Who is collating data and lessons learned from the ASRH-DIB to inform broader national and international policies and programming?

Lessons learned

- The programme is vulnerable to 'stop and go funding', e.g., there is no assured funding for continuation.
- Important role of policy advocacy to address disconnects between laws and the need for ASRH services among mature adolescents of 15–17 years, who are legally considered minors.
- The broad range of SRH services and products can attract a variety of actors and investors.

"We are able to access family planning services easily and discretely from Tiko clinics and pharmacies" Adolescent recipient of family planning services

"I am proud to be one of the service providers serving these young girls. We listen to them and provide them with services suited to their specific needs" Proprietor of participating pharmacy

"Through the 'Facility Incentivization Programme' we help public and private facilities to improve their services" Health Officer, Resident Coordinators Office-Sustainable Development Goal Partnership Platform (RCO-SDGPP)



Results summary at project or intervention level verified through field visit	
Project	Upscaling of the Adolescent Sexual and Reproductive Health Development Impact Bond in Kenya
Criteria	**Overall:** Highly satisfactory – Successful upscaling of ASRH services to reach more adolescents facing multidimensional poverty through private and public facilities in 10 counties.

	Relevance: Highly satisfactory – There is dire need for accessible family planning and HIV services, especially among vulnerable adolescent girls. **Effectiveness:** Satisfactory – Although there is enhanced access to ASRH, more outreach is needed to reach more girls who need the services. **Efficiency:** Satisfactory – The programme needs to attract more partners and co-funding, to elevate the quality and quantity of ASRH services offered in private and public facilities.
Source and strength of evidence	**Sources:** Interviews with RCO, UNFPA, Tiko, NGO, mobilisers, and adolescent beneficiaries, and field visit to a clinic, a pharmacy, and a participating retail shop in Kibera Informal settlement, Nairobi. **Strength of evidence:** Strong (evaluation report commissioned by UNFPA independently verified information from the Tiko Foundation).

Project Evaluation Case Study – Joint SDG Fund Social Protection Programme, Kenya – UN JSDG

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Project evaluation case study: Kenya Social Protection Programme Trust fund: JSDG – United Nations global trust fund	Grant – UN Executed: USD 2 million; (cofunding: UNICEF USD 650,000; WFP USD 600,000; RCO USD 50,000) Date of interviews: 10 and 11 September and 9 October 2024

Challenges addressed and project purpose

1. To support the UN reforms
2. To support the objectives of accelerating the SDGs and mobilising finance through applying innovations to catalyse transformative policy change.

Changes and absence of expected change

- The joint SDG programme laid the foundation for social protection and its universalisation and catalysed the development of progressive social protection policies, laws, programmes, and commitments from national and county governments. For example, at the social protection conference, the president committed to increase of Cash Transfer from 1.2 million households to 2.5 million. Wajir county enacted its disability policy and law and allocated 2% of the county's budget to support people with disabilities (PWD). (+ve)
- Development of the Enhanced Single Registry of vulnerabilities, with data from 35 counties entered and data collection from the remaining 12 counties ongoing. (+ve)
- Limited cohesion in social protection programming among UN and funding agencies. (-ve)

Contributing factors

- The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) graduated to become the joint UNSDG framework for child and social protection, which unfortunately has only received funding from Sida. Further support for UN-coordinated action on SDG achievement is being done through the SDG MPTF.

- The JSDG PUNOs had good collaboration with government social protection institutions, enhancing the effectiveness of capacity building of national and county governments in social protection.
- "Donors are not very disciplined", e.g., some donors fund individual UN agencies, undermining joint programming and resulting in the continued scattering of social protection programming among UN agencies.

Trust fund influence

- The JSDG enhanced collaboration among the PUNOs, providing them with opportunities to avail technical expertise in various aspects of social protection including those relevant to children (UNICEF), labour-based social programmes (ILO), with convening by the WFP and coordination by the RCO.
- Enhanced access to UN technical expertise for policy formulation at national and county level.
- Injection of additional funding to social protection from the JSDG and the resultant technical support produced results that attracted delegations from Gambia and Nigeria to learn from Kenya.

Lessons learned

- The Enhanced Single Registry, where data on all people experiencing vulnerability across the country is stored, is a tool that can facilitate the coordination of social protection in Kenya, which has a broad array of social protection schemes – from 1,018 in 2017 to 1,261 schemes in 2018.
- External shocks, such as droughts, locusts, floods and COVID-19, can destabilise social protection programmes and divert critical resources.
- Joint programming can be enhanced by having a clear framework for collaboration, including a convening agency, well-defined roles and areas of expertise, and a reporting structure that is not burdensome.

"We had very good collaboration between the government and the UN agencies" Head of the Social Protection Secretariat
"The UN agencies bring on board a range of technical skills and knowledge on social protection, including cash transfer schemes, labour-based social protection and school-based programmes" representative of the WFP, convener of the PUNOs
"PUNOs often find that the SDG fund gives them a lot of work for very little money" RCO officer

Project objectives

- To support the UN reforms, and
- To support the objectives of accelerating the SDGs and mobilising finance through applying innovations to catalyse transformative policy change.

Challenges faced

- UNDAF graduated to UNSDG Framework – joint programme for child protection and social protection but currently only Sida is putting funding into it, and
- Some donors provide funding to individual UN agencies, going against the joint programming framework for social protection.

Contributing factors

- The UNDAF graduated to become the joint UNSDG framework for child and social protection, and ultimately the SDG MPTF, and
- The JSDG PUNOs had good collaboration with the national and county social protection institutions.

Trust fund influence

- The JSDG enhanced collaboration among the PUNOs,
- Enhanced access, to national and county governments of technical expertise from UN agencies for policy formulation, and
- The programme attracted delegations from Gambia and Nigeria to learn from Kenya.

Significant change

- Enhanced Single Registry of vulnerabilities, with data from 35 counties reduces corruption and enhances service delivery, and
- Commitments to social protection from counties, e.g., Wajir county with the formulation of a disability law and commitment to put 2% of the county budget into the disability fund.

Absence of change

- Limited coordination between social protection programming across many schemes (1,261 in 2018), and
- Limited donor commitment to joint programming.

Results summary at project or intervention level verified through field visit	
Project	JSDG Social Protection Programme, Kenya
Criteria	**Overall:** Satisfactory – The programme laid the foundation for social protection and its universalisation in Kenya and enhanced collaboration among UN agencies. However, there was no follow-up funding for its continuation. **Relevance:** Highly satisfactory – the large number of social protection schemes require coordination, hence the importance of the Enhanced Single Registry and support for joint social protection programming. **Effectiveness:** Satisfactory – the collaboration among UN agencies and government enhanced technical support for policy formulation on social protection at the national and county levels. **Efficiency:** Satisfactory – Effective coordination by the RCO and the WFP, the convening agency, with each UN agency using their own reporting systems enhanced efficiency.
Source and strength of evidence	**Sources:** A number of interviews with representatives of the PUNOs, the RCO, and the head of the national social protection secretariat, and the review of the final evaluation report. **Strength of evidence:** Strong (there is a wide range of sources that point to the same findings.)

*Photograph from Social Protection Programme Final Evaluation Report cover page.
Supportive documentation: WFP (2023) Final Evaluation of the Joint UN SDG-funded Programme for Social Protection in Kenya: 2020–2022.
Kenya Social Protection Annual Report 2020 (socialprotection.go.ke).

Tanzania One UN Fund (field study)

EQ	Summary findings

Criteria	• Funding the UN One Fund was a strategic choice with a dual aim of enhancing the UN reforms and credibility as well as benefitting from the UN's convening power and contacts with government. • The possibility to earmark made it easier for both Sweden and Norway to align the support to their country cooperation strategies. Sweden earmarked thematically; Norway earmarked geographically. • The UN trust fund made it possible to pass on the fiduciary responsibility and support outcomes that required engagement with multiple partners. It also provided a flexible means of absorbing funds – "*the trust funds provide an accordion where the funding can be adjusted*". • It was not clear why the UNMPTF modality rather than single-agency implementation was used – given that the One Fund only financed 6% of the underlying UNDAP programme, which was otherwise single agency rather than pool implemented. • The presence of other donors was welcome and much missed in the second phase from 2016, but no special attention was placed on Nordic coordination.
Influence	• The main strategy for engagement was to provide funding and earmark it for areas that were closely linked to Nordic country strategies (although there does not seem to have been any explicit connection or synergy with other bilateral support). This provided more information and was a basis for discussing and deepening the understanding of the challenges and what was achieved. • The large proportion of Nordic funding (in later years 100%) meant that the Nordic donors had high influence. • There was little active Nordic cooperation. The difference in timing and also areas of earmarking made this impractical. • The earmarking was a key feature for facilitating the flow of information. Nordic influence was not so much from within the trust fund but effectively exercised by selecting the fund and then contributing substantial funding to earmarked areas.
Results	• The overall results framework is detailed and reported on. At individual joint programme level, the quality varies. The reporting is dominated by annual reports which tend to focus on annual activities and outputs rather than the long-term outcomes. Other than periodic evaluations there does not seem to be a reporting mechanism for capturing the outcomes. To some extent, the reporting underestimates the results because a cumulative presentation is missing or weak. • It is debatable how feasible a systematic and robust measurement of outcomes would be, at least in terms of isolating the contribution of the trust fund. The ToC is underutilised. • Supporting the multilateral system was an explicit aim of the Nordic support and achieved in the sense that without the Nordic support, the One UN fund would have collapsed. With five years of Nordic-only support, during a particularly difficult period, it is now ready for a new phase where there are signs that others will also support it and thus also the UN reforms. • Denmark supported the RCO system globally rather than this or the JSDG. Sweden supported funding of staff for the RCO in Tanzania. • One could argue that there was a strong Norwegian influence in the sense that Kigoma as a poor and refugee-hosting region was financed through earmarking Norwegian funds (although this could have been easily offset as One fund was only 6% of the UNDAP). Similarly, one could claim that the four outcome areas supported by Sweden were better financed than would otherwise have been the case and therefore, more attention was given to those areas. As a minimum, given that the UNDAP was underfunded, the Nordic support ensured that Nordic priority areas were still included in the overall work. • Country delivery – Results: Despite weakness in reporting outcomes, there are some areas of transformative change, e.g., 42% of local government authorities are now allocating resources for child protection systems (target was 35%), and in Kigoma there was a sharp

	rise (nearly 20-fold) in the reporting of incidents. The main issue is the degree to which UNDAP and the One UN fund have contributed. Based on the field work, it would be reasonable to accept that there has been a material funding and policy support contribution that was essential for the Joint Kigoma programme but more difficult to claim a particular level of contribution at the national level. • Country delivery – Ownership: Although the UNDAP and One UN Fund were aligned to government policy and programmes, ownership of the UN-supported programmes at central government has wavered over the years, with the period between 2016 and 2020 being particularly weak as evidenced through absence of joint steering committee meetings. Ownership at local government and among operational departments has been much higher. In Kigoma the programme was fully owned and largely controlled (although not conceived) by the local government authorities. • Country delivery – Capacity development: There have been training courses and institutional changes, provided it was confirmed that they have led to long term capacity development of the police academy and at local level in Kigoma. Around 50% of the funds were implemented through government and much was also implemented through NGOs, which served together to build local capacity for coordinated action. Most UN actions were implemented by local UN staff, which also built capacity in Tanzania. At local level, where capacity has been built, it has not been reliably measured, which is admittedly difficult and expensive to do.
Efficiency	• As the trust fund is a country-based one, the main donor engagement has been at the embassy level. It is clear that it would have been impossible or at least very expensive for the Nordic donors to carry out the same range of activities through a bilateral programme as, at least for a successful part of, the One Fund activities, which was in Kigoma, because that would have required a local presence and a wide range of technical expertise. • Measured against the volume of funds transferred, the management costs of the Nordic donors are low, even taking into account the 1% for the UNMPTFO and the 7% for the UN agencies. (Small ticket size is expensive) • The level of transparency in terms of receiving information on expenditure beyond the minimum required by the funding agreements was low. To some extent, a desire for more detailed reporting was also a partial reason for an increasing level of earmarking, which led to a micro-management level of funding one study at a time. • The UN was able to provide highly skilled resources and an in-country expertise, including local presence in Kigoma. • An independent evaluation found that the UNDAP II management and coordination setup was complex and overlapping which reduced efficiencies. The One UN Fund with its implementation by multiple partners led to duplication of roles such as monitoring on the same programme. Different UN agency systems of accounting and monitoring meant that data had to be transferred manually into a common system, which took time and introduced possibilities of error. • As much of the physical implementation is done by contracted NGOs, there is also a cascade of overheads that have to be paid from the UNMPTFO to the PUNOs to the NGOs.

Brief description of the trust fund

Trust fund objectives and strategy – The One UN Fund is the primary joint mechanism for coherent resource mobilisation for delivery of common results in Tanzania outlined in the UN Development UNDAP. Its main objective is to ensure a strategic focus on agreed outcomes and minimise transaction costs associated with resource management and delivery. The One UN Fund in Tanzania plays a critical role in promoting strategic focus, coherence, and efficiency in resource mobilisation and delivery. It supports the collective efforts of UN agencies and partners in achieving common results and advancing sustainable development in the country.

UNDAP II was designed to align with Tanzania's Development Vision 2025 and Zanzibar's Vision 2020. The outcomes are organised into four interconnected interdependent themes (inclusive growth, healthy nations, resilience, democratic governance, human rights, gender equality). Under these themes there are 12 programmatic outcomes. To ensure strategic focus on agreed outcomes, to reduce transaction costs, and to avoid duplications, the One Fund uses existing UN and government governance structures and planning processes. An evaluation in 2015 of UNDP's contribution to Tanzania noted "*UNDP's primary strengths over other partners were its policy influence, capacity development focus and leveraging of partnerships and networks.*" (UNDP 2015, p97)

Trust fund institutional arrangement – The PUNOs appointed UNDP as the administrative agent to serve as the administrative interface between donors and the PUNOs including monitoring and provision of annual consolidated financial and narrative progress reporting. The administrative agent is allocated a 1% fee to cover its costs (Sida, 2017a, p4). The PUNOs are allocated a fee of 7% to cover indirect costs (Sida, 2017a, p5). A secretariat function supports the administrative agent and in accordance with the agreed Terms of Reference (ToR), its budget is agreed on annually and expected to be within 3% of the fund (Sida, 2021, p13). A Joint Steering Committee (JSC), co-chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and Planning and the UN RC, provides strategic guidance to the achievement of UN results, including strategic leadership of the One UN Fund, and monitors the overall implementation. Selected lead development partners participate in the JSC. The administrative agent holds annual consultations with the PUNOs and donors to review the status of the fund. By 2022, 20 UN participating partners had received funds with the top five receiving 66% of the funds. Donors separately or together are free to evaluate and review the fund. Auditing and financial management systems follow the UN procedures.

The ToR for the One Fund, updated in 2021, allow for earmarking noting that *"in order to ensure focus on national priorities and allow the JSC the maximum flexibility for planning and fund allocation the preference is for un-earmarked funding. Nevertheless, earmarked funding will be accepted at the outcome level"* (Sida, 2021, p 9). A third phase of UNDAP with trust fund support has now been started, learning from earlier phases and branded as the SDG acceleration fund. So far, funding has come from Norway, Sweden, and Ireland, with Norway providing the largest amount.

Nordic engagement

Rationale for Nordic support – The main rationale set out by Sweden for their support is to enhance the UN system's coherence, coordination, and effectiveness at country level (Sida, 2017b). The trust fund also supports the results strategy for Sweden's international cooperation in Tanzania 2013–2019 where it is noted that the UNDAP supported by the trust fund contributes to four of the Swedish result areas. The possibility of earmarking ensured that the Swedish funding of the trust fund clearly supported its country strategy and was complementary to other Swedish support to Tanzania. It was noted that, as the partners in Swedish cooperation were mainly private sector actors and civil society, participating in the Tanzania One UN Trust Fund would "increase the Embassy's access and opportunities for dialogue with the government" (Sida, 2017b, p6). It is noted in the appraisal that justifies the funding of the trust fund that "*Development partners are invited and can to some extent influence the formation of UNDAP work plan together with governmental partners but without engaging directly. As being part of both the diplomatic, UN and donor communities, substantial Swedish support to the UN puts Sweden in an even stronger position to influence and choose our level of engagement"* (Sida 2017b, p6). There is also evidence that Sweden saw the UN with its normative mandate as an appropriate organisation promoting universal values "*The UN is well placed to focus on efforts to combat violence against women and children as this is an essential component of the UN's culturally appropriate, gender sensitive and rights-based approach to programming, in terms of both content and process*." (Sida 2017c, p12). This is borne out of the 2015 evaluation of UNDP in Tanzania where one of the conclusions was that "*By leveraging its strong relationship with the Government, UNDP played an important role in navigating policy discussions to support the country's development based on the human development perspective"* (UNDP, 2015, pxvi). Norway strongly signaled that its support for the trust fund was motivated by a policy to strengthen the UN system and promote UN reform. Norway earmarked their support to the Kigoma JP, which reflected the aim to support host communities in one of the poorest refugee-affected regions.

Financial support – The contributions from the Nordic countries are summarised in Figure 132 below.

Figure 132: Nordic and non-Nordic contributions to Tanzania One UN Fund



Source: UNINFO, 2016 -2020

NB, in later years of UNDAP II, there was a global change to the UNINFO system due to which we did not have a full set of compatible data spanning for all years of UNDAP II. Source: RCO office









Donor	2007-2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2007-2021
Finland	8.16	2.56	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	10.73
Norway	16.36	3.45	3.55	4.27	3.64	6.91	7.06	9.82	3.96	4.43	63.47
Sweden	6.19	0.00	14.44	8.58	0.00	10.55	9.92	8.80	4.70	6.40	69.56
Other donors	120.11	10.69	10.54	4.67	0.70	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	146.71
Total	142.65	14.14	28.53	17.52	4.34	17.46	16.98	18.62	8.66	10.83	279.75

Results summary table	
Summary	**Satisfactory–highly satisfactory at the local level (Kigoma JP)**
Criteria	**Relevance:** Highly satisfactory – There are results at policy level, which reflect the UN normative mandate. Results clearly relevant for national priorities and in areas of UN expertise, bearing potential for significant impact (Sida, 2023). Both Swedish and Norwegian support had a focus on Kigoma, one of the poorest regions in Tanzania. **Effectiveness:** Moderately satisfactory – (highly satisfactory at local level) – Good immediate results, high quality and progress in many areas but where longer term sustainability and continuity concerns are raised (Sida, 2023). Results were achieved despite difficulty of implementation in Tanzania. The results are more evident at the Kigoma JP. **Efficiency:** Moderately unsatisfactory at national level, Satisfactory at local level. Funding gaps led to inefficiencies in scale and se up costs and spread over too many areas; the multiple PUNO operations involved overlapping in staff and there were transaction costs in the cascade of implementing agents from the UN to NGOs. However, at the Kigoma JP, the programme actions were matched by the resources and as most PUNO operations were financed through the One Fund, there was little overlap.
Sources of evidence	• Field observations nationally with the police academy,and in Kigoma, visits to local government, Police Gender and Children's Desks (PGCDs), safe houses

	• Interviews of Nordic and other donors (Ireland), RCO, PUNOs, implementing NGOs, central and local government, police, final beneficiaries • Internal progress reporting by Sweden and Norway (conclusions on performance, statements on reports) • Decision and appraisal reporting by Sweden and Norway • Swedish statements on reports (multiple years) • Trust fund annual reporting (multiple years) • Midterm reviews and independent evaluation • Websites, impact stories, press releases by implementing parties, civil society and others
Strength of evidence	**Triangulation:** Strong (several diverse sources, high-quality reporting, and consistent views expressed over the years. **Quality of results framework:** Satisfactory (indicators, targets, reporting): The global results framework is robust and reported on. At the individual programme level, the quality varies. The UNDAP that the trust supports has a very detailed results frame. However, the reporting is at activity not outcome level (Norad, 2019, Sida completion, interviews #1,#2). A ToC approach to measuring outcomes and impacts is underutilised.
Examples of what worked	• Progress in DaO reform at the national level but limited due to individual agency differences. A 'ceiling' of joint programming was reached (Sida, 2017c). However, at the local level in Kigoma, it is evident that the UN is acting as one. • Some transformative changes are identified, e.g., 42% of local government authorities are now allocating resources for child protection systems (target was 35%); and with UN support, the Tanzania Police introduced gender and child protection as a new subject within all police academies. Although it was not always clear what the trust fund role was in these changes, except as a subset of the UNDAP I and II. • UN agencies have played, and will continue to play, a key role in assisting the implementation of the action plan. There is an important momentum and commitment from government to both build on gains already made (stronger legal and policy framework, setup of PGCDs, etc.) and to give more prominence and scale in addressing the problems – strong focus on the children, youth, and women. (Sida 2017c, p34) • The fact that UN advocacy for human rights, gender equality, and other issues has been institutionalised through the enactment of relevant national policies and legislation, for example, UN advocacy and support to the development of the NPA-VAWG, and the inclusion of CRC and CEDAW principles in the FYPD III, also suggests that UNDAP outcomes in those areas will be maintained. However, although some of the UNDAP II results have been institutionalised, their operationalisation and the monitoring of their implementation will be key to ensuring their sustainability. (Ittig, 2021, p8) • Nutrition, a key area of especially the Norwegian support, has improved with stunting falling from 44% in 2015 to 32% in 2018. (Norad 2019, p5) • Reports to PGCDs of gender-based violence surged from 159 cases in 2017 to 3,366 by July 2023. Between July 2022 and June 2023 alone, 652 cases (365 girls and 287 boys) were addressed and supported at the PGCDs. Through the One Stop Centers in Kasulu and Kigoma town, the programme assisted 341 survivors (270 children and 71 adults) from July 2022 to June 2023. Of these cases, 53 were sent to court with 11 wins, while 42 remain pending. (UN RCO 2023, p6) Training and capacity-building initiatives saw 92 additional PGCD Officers trained in 2022–2023, and 185 court officials equipped with knowledge and skills on legal services and awareness. Additionally, 43 law enforcement officers received training on handling and responding to cases of trafficking.) These results were confirmed during field visits. • The PGCDs have contributed to breaking "*the wall of silence and shame that exists around violence … with the aim to achieve zero GBV against women and girls by 2030 and a Tanzania in which every woman and child enjoys their right to live a life free of violence*" (UNFPA, 2024)
Examples of what did not work	• However high risks were noted for: inadequate ownership and failure to sustain results, particularly at the national level where resources were thinly stretched; limited capacity by strategic implementing partners; lack of government political will and financial and human resources and other areas. • Also noted that the geographic and thematic spread was quite broad. *Too many competing activities hamper performance and force constant choices between nationwide and more concentrated efforts."* (Sida 2017c; Norad 2020, review of Kigoma JP) • Although concrete results are noted (such as training in gender-responsive land use planning and certificates of customary rights of occupancy being issued to 2000 women in four villages; strengthening the One Stop Centre in Kigoma, and the Tanzania Police Force launched three

	PGCDs) there is not always a close connection to the transformative change and the prospects of scale-up. • There is a Swedish concern that for some of the results reported on the evidence of the contribution of the trust fund at the national level is not strong. For the Kigoma JP the trust fund is the main source of finance, and the results are attributable to the one fund.
Factors (+ve, -ve)	• Nationally: The ambition level is high compared to funds available, and activities are spread across many areas and across many UN institutions with less budget than planned. The programme was 40% underfunded (Ittig, 2021, p11) **(-ve)** • Locally: At the joint programme level, the results were stronger because: i) the programme came from a humanitarian context where the UN working together was the norm; ii) the programme was fully funded by the one fund and the main source of finance for the UN agencies; iii) the government was receptive and in need of support with a few other options; and iv) strong leadership by the national and regional RCO. (**+ve)** • Strong and systematic interaction by donors (Sweden), especially on the conclusions on performance. **(+ve)** • Difficulty in balancing the main role of the UN of policy influencing and the need to show and gain momentum for change by delivering implementation results – mainly at the national level. **(-ve)**

Lessons learned

- Delivery through multiple UN agencies rather than just one or two is beneficial in situations where there are humanitarian or nexus-related needs, or where the partner country is weak and requires comprehensive support across various sectors. However, in contexts where the government, civil society, and private sector are stronger, a more focused approach may be more effective. In such cases, addressing specific gaps through a single or dual agency, with overall coordination and potentially funded by the country's own resources or common pool funding, could be more appropriate.
- Where a topic requires support across a multiplicity of institutions (e.g., gender), the One UN or similar concepts are strong as they allow the trust fund, via the UN participating organisations, to support a programme which can capitalise on good relations and entry points across a wide range UN actors.
- Heavy earmarking is subject to offsetting or if not then distortion of priorities. However, unearmarked funding can mean that it is difficult for the Nordic donor to adhere to its strategy and avoid funding across too many areas.
- UN comparative advantage seems evident for sensitive value-driven areas such as human rights and gender.
- Trust funds that do not attract expected levels of funding can become inefficient as noted by the independent evaluation. (Ittig, 2021)

Hypothesis tested at field level

Hypothesis to be tested with post field analysis:

- **Nordic funding to trust fund had a limited contribution to UN reforms as other donors did not join, and the reforms were not yet complete enough**
  - At the national level, the One UN Fund only constituted 6% of the funding of the underlying UNDAP II programme. As a result, there was little incentive for UN agencies to work through the One UN Fund when the majority of funding was being provided agency by agency. There were instances (interviews with the Embassy of Ireland) where different UN agencies set up different committees on women and children and issued different T-shirts with their own logos, leading to duplication and an additional burden on the communities.
  - However, at the local level in Kigoma, the funding through the one fund was significant and amounted to the majority of the Kigoma JP. The main activities of the agencies were funded through the One Fund, and the UN was clearly acting as one with close coordination by the local area RCO. Within VAWC, the One Fund efforts were led by UNICEF with a focus on children complemented by UN women with a focus on women, complemented by UNFPA with a focus on the family, and IOM with a focus on the special issue of trafficking.

- In summary: the contribution to the UN reform for delivering as one through the trust fund was significant at the local level and much weaker and diffuse at the national level.

- **The UN's permanent mandate and convening power meant the trust fund was able to bridge a period of low ownership due to the political economy of Tanzania at the time (more difficult for the bilateral)**
  - The JSC did not meet at the national level, but much of the necessary coordination was done through technical meetings and the technical secretariat.
  - At the local level in Kigoma, the steering committee met as programmed and was able to provide the necessary governance and guidance over the programme, including mobilisation of national contributions
  - In summary: Although the political situation at the national level was difficult, the programme managed to continue because a pragmatic approach was adopted. At the local level there was high ownership, and the national political issues did not affect the operation of the governance and management arrangements.
- **Results were compromised by insufficient critical mass of resources – spread too thin, too many themes, too many implementing agencies with insufficient time and resources for quality programme and implementation**
  - At the national level, ambition was set high. The underlying UNDAP II was never fully funded and could not provide the level of local concentration that was possible in Kigoma. The One Fund with only 6% of the overall UNDAP II funding was even more stretched.
  - At the local level in Kigoma, the funding was close to what could be absorbed and well used by the government and other stakeholders. There were sufficient resources to both build PGCDs, as well as provide a safe house for survivors, train the police, and fund awareness campaigns and preventative measures.
  - In summary: The considerable funding available for the Kigoma JP through the One Fund ensured that cumulative results were achieved, whereas at the national level the funding was severely compromised by a shortage of funds and spread across many actors and themes.
- **There were outcomes that were transformative with evidence of replication beyond the programme**
  - National level: The One Fund has supported, over various phases, the Tanzanian Police Academy since 2007. Support has been given to the development of the curriculum, training materials, and training of trainers for VAWC. Courses were developed to cover the full training cycle for recruitment, promotion, and in-service training. UNDAP II supported the training of more than 5000 police officers and provided data management services and equipment for PGCDs. VAWC has been thoroughly integrated into current and future training. The effect is transformational and perpetual.
  - At the local level in Kigoma, a safe house and a number of PGCDs have been supported by the programme as well as long-term support to preventative and curative measures, including awareness campaigns and improvement in incident reporting and prosecution as well as support for survivors of violence against women and children. An increasing trend in reporting incidents indicates that the awareness and confidence of victims has improved. At the same time, a national household survey shows a declining trend in the occurrence of incidents in the same period of time.
  - In summary: At both national and local level there is strong evidence of transformational outcomes within VAWC.
- **Capacity was developed in Tanzania rather than just with UN organisations**
  - Approximately 50% of the UNDAP budget was transferred to the government and implemented using government systems. The One Fund in Kigoma supported government systems through joint planning and prioritisation. The operations of the UN fund were closely integrated and coordinated by the local government authorities in the Kigoma region.
  - The Kigoma JP, under the leadership of the local government authorities, supported the mobilisation and capacity development of the civil society and also the private sector in areas of economic empowerment.

Somalia Joint Fund, previously the UN Somalia Multi-Partner Trust Fund, incl. Joint Programme Local Governance (JPLG) (field study)

EQ	Summary findings
Criteria	• The main rationale for the Nordic funding of the UNMPTF/SJF was to support the implementation of the Somalia Compact in a coordinated way through the three trust funds established with respectively the UN, the WB, and the AfDB. Support for the UNMPTF has been strong in light of the UN mandate for peace and stability and its ability to work across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. For Norway and Sweden that continues to be a strong rationale for support. • Policy dialogue: The MPTF offered an important venue for policy dialogue – initially mainly between the UN and donors but increasingly as the role of the FGS is increased in the SJF managing structure, also with the government. • Alignment with country strategies guided by an overall concern of instability and under-development at the Horn of Africa, continuing war between clans, the presence of terror groups, piracy, recurrent famines, etc. and hence the need for a comprehensive approach to Somalia. • Support for UN systems reform and One UN. This is particularly a rationale that resonated with Norway and to some extent Sweden, where coherence across MFA/and Sida/Norad is an important issue. At the same time, the same countries also supported UN single-agency projects. • Finland ceased support, prioritising the good cooperation and alignment with UNPFA. Denmark presently decided not to continue funding due to dissatisfaction with costs and choice of other priority partners. • Support from other Nordic donors was not a determining factor for Nordic donors. Support from the wider donor community is an issue.
Influence	• The main avenue of influence has been through funding. As there was perpetual underfunding of the UN programme in Somalia, this led to earmarking as donors sought to fund the JPs of their priority. The recent reform of the MPTF led to a reduction from 17 programmes to seven strategic areas, with earmarking continuing at that level. Only Norway provided some of its most recent contribution as unearmarked. • Nordic countries wielded policy influence though dialogue, not least in the context of restructuring and streamlining the MPTF. A limitation for influence is that the Nordic donors do not have amble resources to engage in discussion, and they have less access to information which makes the discussion unequal. The Nordic donors do not have an explicit strategy as to what they in particular want to achieve through dialogue and in which areas they are trying to influence the UN or the JPs. They also did not always agree on how critical they should be – (JPLG, where Denmark is far more critical than Norway and Sweden). • Through earmarking and policy influencing, the Nordic donors left their mark on the strategies for the SJF. There is a general view among the donors that UN engages too much at the technical level as opposed to the political level. • UN influence with and ownership by the FGS and Federal Member States (FMS) was possibly influenced by the reluctance by the UN and by the donors for the UN to use national systems. The Funds in SJF are seen by the UN as funds for funding UN activities in Somalia rather than funding the government.
Results	• The MPTF/SJF gave the UN RCO/DSRSG funding and opportunity to show the One UN in action – but the share of funding channelled through the MPTF/SJF out of all funds to the UN in Somalia was less than 10%, underscoring a continued need for close coordination across the UN agencies. • There is no results framework at the SJF portfolio level, and results frameworks for JPs for a long time were underdeveloped. This is now improving. Reporting continued to be narrative

	with reporting based on the results framework only to take place at the end of a programme cycle. • Many results related to strengthening legal frameworks and capacity building at local level. Also, considerable results from the JPLG in terms of local government capacity and infrastructure development. This finding was confirmed during the field visit to Somaliland, underscoring the systems and capacities in place for delivering and expanding social services delivery one year after the closure of JPLG III. • But also, issues related to UN being stuck in its humanitarian modus operandi, requiring UN staff and UN oversight even as capacity was being built in more stable parts of the country leading to a very costly and unscalable way of working. It also led to more emphasis on technical aspects of building infrastructure than on developing local governments to do so themselves. • Due to the mode of operation and not using country systems, there is less ownership at FGS and FMS level compared to the WB MPF. There is strong ownership at the local level where the UN JPLG has been concentrated, and where the JPLG supported capacity development. • Tension between demonstrating results and the longer-term goal of building capacity. Also, the need to minimise fiduciary risk on the one hand and using national systems clashed with building capacity from within.
Efficiency	• The trust fund did have the effect of reducing transaction costs for the donors compared to trying to set up their own programme (also reduced the fiduciary risks) and ensured that once the funding stopped, there was still an entity (a UN entity) with a permanent presence and mandate. • The transaction costs were high, partly due to inefficiencies in the way some of the JPs were set up with managers and technical expertise in same areas by all participating agencies. This is now being rectified. For example, the JPLG has reduced the number of participating agencies to three (from five), and there is now only one manager. Also, the heavy use of consultants added to the cost inefficiencies. The JPLG operated with transaction cost at 30% of total funding. • Lack of transparency as FGS, Somaliland, and local municipalities were only informed about transfers for infrastructure investments and not for technical assistance and capacity building, leading to perceptions of the UN keeping funding to and for itself. • The high ambitions and large budgets that were then not funded led to the wrong conclusion that funds were underutilised.

Brief description of the trust fund – The SJF – from 2013 to 2021 known as Somalia Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) – was established in 2013 as part of the international community's support for the Somalia Compact. The Somalia Compact's aim was to galvanise the partnership between Somalia and its donor partners by focusing efforts on a Somali-led process of peacebuilding and state-building, creating the basis for long-term stability, rule of law, and sustainable economic and social development. The UN Somalia MPTF was the UN's joint contribution to these efforts alongside single-agency UN humanitarian and development contributions as well as contributions from other multilateral organisations, bilateral donors, and CSOs. The MPTF was structured around 17 joint programmes coordinated by the UN Somalia RCO and funded individually by various donors and administered by UNDP. The MPTF was updated in 2021–2022 to the SJF in response to the new UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework and considerable frustration among UN agencies and amongst donors as to workings of the fund, to a large extent linked to heavy earmarking of funds that made the MPTF inflexible and ill-suited for the everchanging political environment in Somalia and discussion as to the relevance and priority of some for the activities funded.[36]

The purpose of the SJF is to support a joint UN contribution to the Somalia recovery and investments plans as set out in Somalia and Somaliland National Development Plans based on the UN strategy and

[36] Norwegian Embassy of Kenya: Decision note on contribution to Projects under the MPTF/SJF: 27 July 2021
Interviews: UN, Nordic countries.

UN distinct comparative advantages in Somalia. The SJF should also serve as a platform for joint policy and strategic dialogue between donors and the Somali Government that is both translated into and informed by high quality and flexible programming. *The SJF will integrate the humanitarian-development-peace nexus across its portfolio to create synergies, leverage complementary expertise, and maximize collective impact through joint programmes and strategic partnerships*.[37] The ToR (2022) for the SJF outlines a focus of the SJF on the following seven areas: I. Inclusive Politics, II. Rule of Law, III. Human Rights and Gender, IV. Climate and Resilience, V. Community Recovery and Local Governance, VI. Economic Development, VII. Social Development. These priorities can be changed/closed by the SJF management group after consultation with the SJF Partner forum (see below). The SJF secretariat prepares strategy notes for each of the areas on which basis PUNOs can put forward proposals for joint programmes for funding. These seven areas cluster the previous 17 JPs and effectively imply continued earmarking, but at a higher strategic level.
Originally, only UN organisations were eligible for funding under the SJF with the option of subcontracting/passing through to other entities for implementation. For a period, the FGS had access to a national window – covering only a fraction of the funds, but this was terminated due to lack of donor support. To be eligible for funding, the proposals must be aligned to the UN strategy and the Somalia NDPs, they must include two or more UN recipient agencies, provide considerations of comparative advantages, transaction costs, and synergies between participating UN agencies though the presentation of a joint Theory of Change (ToC). Single-agency activities are allowed if developed in close consultation with UNSOM. Proposals go through a review process involving, among other things, government (federal and state level) line ministries, donors, CSOs, and UN thematic experts. To avoid unrealistic programming and budgeting, a programme cannot go ahead unless a substantial part of the programme funding is available. This has been complemented with a performance-based tranche system for the payout of funds. Risk management is key and must follow an adaptive fund-level risk management strategy related to both financial and operational risks with the dual aim of supporting adaptive programme management in Somalia's fluid environment and protecting donor resources.[38] The SJF will engage with the government led aid coordination in the context of the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Forum and with other trust funds, e.g., the WB MPF and the Somalia Stability Fund. Activities and funds are foreseen to be incorporated into the national government budgets – this has yet to happen.
Trust fund institutional arrangement – The governance balances the UN's commitment to partnership with the government and coordination with international partners and funders. The consultative and advisory Partner Forum co-chaired by the UN (development and humanitarian) includes donors and PUNOs. It discusses the overall strategy and priorities, while decisions on strategy and investments are managed by the SJF management group co-chaired by the UN and Somalia Ministry of Planning and with the participation of the Ministry of Finance and two rotating donors. Both the Forum and the Management Group are responsible for reviewing reporting and follow-up. The SJF secretariat is responsible for the daily management and preparation of meetings.

Nordic engagement

Rationale for Nordic support: The support for the UNMPTF was initially rooted in the support for the Somalia Compact 2012 and the international community's commitment to coherently support Somalia through three trust funds; UNMPTF, WB MPF, and the AfDB (the latter never gained much traction). Norway and Sweden find that the UNMPTF/SJF remains an important partner in Somalia and the UNMPTF/SJF an important channel for funding. This should also be seen in light of the global mandate of the UN and its legitimacy in fragile settings incl. its ability to work across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus.[39] For Norway, this is also the reason to provide un-earmarked funding going forward as the UN must have sufficient flexibility to support the political process when opportunity arises. The Nordic countries have supported a range of programmes – but this note focusses on the Joint Programme on Local Government (JPLG) and the Joint Programme on Human Rights (JPHR) as they received support from three Nordic donors (D, N, and S). The rationale for support for the JPLG was its support for building capacity of local authorities to deliver basic services, also in light of the slow progress at federal/state levels. The rationale for supporting the JPHR was to support improvements in

[37] UN Somalia Joint Fund. Terms of reference, Start 1 January 2014 and end 31 December 2030. No date but finalised in 2022. Page 3 Hence these are the updated ToR.
[38] UN Somalia Joint Fund. Terms of reference Start 1 January 2014 and end 31 December 2030. No date but finalised in 2022.
[39] Norway: Embassy of Kenya: Decision note on contribution to Projects under the MPTF/SJF: 27 July 2021.

HR as outlined in the NPDs incl. through support for Women and Human Rights Ministries at federal and state levels.

For Denmark, similar considerations of the relevance of the support to the MPTF have been prevalent until recently. But in the 2024–2028 Bilateral Development Programme for Somalia, it has been decided not to support the SJF except for a possible contribution to a project under the Climate and Resilience strategy at a later stage.[40] The background for this decision is based on recent years' negative assessment with regard to the effectiveness and efficiency of the UNMPTF, not least the JPLG.[41] It is recognised in the Danish MTR (2022) with regard to the JPLG that although other Nordic + donors in general would like to see greater progress, these donors do not share the overall negative views purported by Denmark, pointing to the many achievements of the JPLG.

The objectives of the SJF are aligned with the overall strategy of the Nordic countries in Somalia, incl. supporting the authorities' ability to deliver security, stability, and fundamental services to the population (hence support for the JPLG), improved governance, human rights, and women's participation (hence support for the JPHR and the Inclusive pillars programme). In recent years, climate change has come to the forefront as one of the root causes for continued instability and displacement of people, and hence support for the climate and resilience strategy is gaining more traction. The Nordic countries see the MPTF/SJF as supportive of the Somalia NDPs and state-building and expressed concern in funding documents that the UN was reluctant to channel funds directly through the country systems. At the same time, they were reluctant to accept that the UN systems were adequate to manage fiduciary risks, if country systems were used.[42] In general, donors were skeptical as to the UN' channeling of funding through country systems even where capacity had been built funded by the Nordic countries, partly undermining the very systems they themselves contributed to.

Nordic countries engaged through dialogue with the UNMPTF/SJF. They generally valued the coordination that cooperation entails with the FGS and the UN system. The Nordic countries (particularly Norway and Sweden) played an active role in designing and developing the SJF to make it more responsive to donor needs and to increase its flexibility.

For Norway, the value added of the fund mainly relates to the fund structure and one more avenue for dialogue with and ability to influence the UN and the Somali Government as well as the administrative efficiency as it would not be possible for Norway to enter into administrative agreements at the JP level.[43] This is the background for the decision to provide 75% of the coming years' funding as un-earmarked as this will allow the fund to become more flexible and capable of responding to opportunities as they arise.

Financial support: Since its inception in 2013, the Somalia MPTF/SJF received USD 558 million. The table in Figure 133 covers the period 2015–2023. Sweden provided about 25% of the total funding followed by the EU, Norway, Switzerland, and Denmark. The Nordic countries provided close to 50% of total funding. In the initial years about 30-40% increasing to over 70% in the latter years. Hence, early large contributors (the EU, Germany, and the UK) have in recent years withdrawn from the SJF, although the EU is expected to fund again. Generally, Norway aimed at only supporting the UN in Somalia through the MPTF/SJF. But due to a global HQ-led policy initiative on food security, there had been a contribution to the FAO, and there had also been an earmarking of a core contribution to UNDP for Somalia (that the Embassy was only informed about after the decision). Sweden did support other UN programmes alongside SJF, incl. the UNFPA country programme, the FAO and the WFP. Sida had a high degree of autonomy in deciding which partners to engage with. Denmark had a long-running cooperation with UNICEF that will continue. Finland's contribution to the MPTF was channeled to the UNFPA country programme. This option was no longer available, and Finland had decided to continue its bilateral engagement with the UNFPA, as this built on a long-term relationship and responded directly to the Finnish strategy in Somalia.

[40] Denmark MFA: Pre-Appraisal of the Somalia Bilateral Development Programme 2024–2028, April 2024.

[41] MFA: Mid-term review of the Somalia Country Programme final report, April 2022, and JPLG III Technical review (TR), June 2022. The MTR notes based on the TR: "All donors interviewed, bar Denmark and USAID, are pleased with the effectiveness of JPLG, and state that JPLG performs better than most UN agencies in Somalia". Said differently, the most paying JPLG donors are appreciative of the JPLG. The TR also notes that FGS, Puntland, and Somaliland stakeholders confirm this positive perception of the JPLG. The MTR team interviews with government stakeholders in Somaliland corroborated the latter.

[42] Norway: Embassy of Kenya: Decision note on contribution to Projects under the MPTF/SJF: 27 July 2021.

[43] Norway: Embassy of Kenya: Decision note on contribution to Projects under the MPTF/SJF: 27 July 2021.

Figure 133: Nordic countries' contributions to Somalia Joint Fund



Funding (USDm)	Denmark	Finland	Norway	Other DPs	Sweden	Total
2015	2,480,968		4,677,361	45,848,248	13,149,388	**66,155,964**
2016	9,664,070		5,337,319	38,487,563	7,527,852	**61,016,803**
2017	5,543,905		3,730,323	30,082,406	14,366,007	**53,722,642**
2018	2,849,950	2,283,000	9,192,028	37,724,012	38,323,997	**90,372,988**
2019	7,439,986	3,361,200	8,609,785	34,941,053	19,208,231	**73,560,255**
2020	6,917,826	6,670,246	7,409,334	35,072,228	14,705,414	**70,775,047**
2021		6,022,335	8,665,749	19,461,935	16,193,063	**50,343,082**
2022	4,228,468	6,824,262	9,697,455	12,492,276	13,067,005	**46,309,465**
2023	3,557,044	5,261,280	14,918,229	9,617,260		**33,353,813**
Total	**42,682,217**	**30,422,323**	**72,237,581**	**263,726,981**	**136,540,957**	**545,610,059**

Policy dialogue: The Nordic countries engaged with the UNMPTF/SJF on a regular basis, also outside formal meetings. Norway was a member for the SJF Management Group in 2023. Generally, the Nordic countries valued the alignment and harmonisation of support by the UN system and wider that is promoted by the MPTF/SJF and the opportunity for one more dialogue avenue with the FGS that cooperation in governing bodies entailed. The Nordic countries played an active role in designing and developing the SJF to make it more responsive to needs and to increase its flexibility – see above. Some of the issues related to the MPTF's siloed approach remain in the current structure of the seven areas, with donors emphasising the need for synergies and coordination amongst the seven programmes. [44]

Due to their engagement and large contributions, the Nordic countries, and in particular Norway and Sweden, were influential in the process that led to the redesign of the fund. At the same time, the Nordic countries were careful not to get entangled in what was described as internal politics between the UN organisations, e.g., in the context of design and implementation of the JPs when there is disagreement amongst implementing UN agencies, or when the stronger UN agencies push back against the SJF secretariat and their role, as well as discussions between the UN and the FGS.

The Nordic countries pushed for improved risks assessments and for follow-up by the UN and for the full implementation of the Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers, a methodology shared between UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and the WPF to assess the managerial, financial, and technical capacity of implementing partners. At the same time there was reluctance with regard to the UN implementing through national systems based on an assumption that the UN ability to track and ensure proper accountability and transparency for the use of the funds is insufficient.[45] Sweden specifically decided not to support the 'National Window' in the SJF as this is found too risky.[46]

It is the Nordic countries' assessment that the UN and the SJF are an effective platform to bring attention to HR and other rights issues with the government and that **in general** the UNMPTF/SJF has improved mainstreaming of gender and LNOB into programmes. Standard reporting requirements have played a role in this regard.[47] Nordic countries do not always find that the UN is active with regard to defending

[44] SJF Donor consultation Note on the Community recovery and Local Governance Strategy Note: 9 November 2023.
[45] Interviews with Nordic Embassies.
[46] Sida: Beredning af Indsats Support for UN MPTF III 2021.
[47] Norway: Embassy of Kenya: Decision note on contribution to Projects under the MPTF/SJF: 27 July 2021.

general human rights positions, which has led to lack of confidence in the cooperation, e.g, in the context of passing of bills that could effectively have legalised child marriage and acceptance of sexual offences and gender discrimination.[48]

Concerns also remain related to i) overemphasis on technical work rather than policy/political issues with the UN using its legitimacy with the Government sufficiently, ii) the One UN Agenda not followed through as UN agencies continued to prefer bilateral agreements with donors compromising the One UN agenda, also where there should be opportunity for collaboration. Sweden also raised the question of the large non-funders' (the US and the UK) involvement in the SJF steering mechanism as they, through their bilateral engagements with the UN, undermine the One UN agenda; iii) insufficient engagement with FMS rather than FGS, iv) the continued need for better reporting with regard to, among other things, results frameworks and risks assessments.

Secondment: None

Earmarking: High degree of earmarking at JP level and now strategy level. Norway was the only country to provide non-earmarked funds. Expectations in the UN and amongst donors that the new system of the SJF requiring agreement in the Partnership Forum before activities that are adequately funded can go ahead will be an important factor for more un-earmarked resources.

The Finnish contribution to the MTPF was a contribution to the UNFA country programme.[49]

Nordic cooperation: There was good cooperation between Norway and Sweden, with Finland less involved due to its more limited engagement. Denmark used to be part of the cooperation – now less so with the decision to disengage with the SJF (although this may be reviewed). The emphasis was on Nordic + also with a view to ensuring wider funding support for the SJF.

There were variances between Nordic countries with regard to follow-up on commitments in New York in support of the UN Funding Compact, with this being an increasing priority for Norway, whereas this was not a consideration for Denmark and Sweden as such. Denmark and Sweden were aware of the commitments but found that their role was to implement the country strategy for Somalia and pick the best partners to deliver against those objectives. This was also the rationale behind the recent decisions by Denmark to not fund the SJF but to continue to fund the long-term partnership with UNICEF.

Summary of results

Summary	**Moderately satisfactory/satisfactory**: As the MPTF functioned as a range of separate programmes, no attempt was made to summarise at programme level by the MPTF. In recent years, the MPTF/SJF has increasingly become more effective as a donor coordination platform incl. with the FGS: There were tangible results in a number of areas supported through the JPLG and the JPHR: laws, capacity building, and infrastructure. Questions were raised regarding effectiveness, cost efficiency, and sustainability (more below), due to heavy UN setups, overreliance of inputs from consultants, and limited attention to scalability in a country with immense development issues. JPLG delivered highly satisfactory results in Somaliland, where also a large part of the funding had been invested. Donors would have liked to see a larger part invested in the more fragile south.
Criteria	**Relevance: Highly Relevant**. The MPTF is highly relevant as a donor coordination and dialogue forum between donors and with the UN as a large actor on the H-D-P agenda in Somalia as well as with the FGS and state governments. With the changes to the SJF, it continues to be relevant and now better aligned with Somalia/Somaliland NPDs as also the FGS and state level has influence on the prioritisation and on which programmes go ahead. The relevance was impacted by its highly rigid fund structure based on earmarking that made it difficult for the MPTF to maintain relevance at all times. The relevance of each of the now seven strategies has been tested and agreed among the donors and aligned to NPDs. **Relevance of JPLG: Highly relevant.** Strengthening local government remains of central relevance to building a stable Somali state. The JPLG focus on (i) policy

[48] Norway: Embassy of Kenya: Decision note on contribution to Projects under the MPTF/SJF: 27 July 2021.

[49] MFA Finland: project proposal: Somalia UNFPA Somalia well-being of women and girls. 24-20-2020.

reforms; (ii) capacity of local governments; and (iii) gender and social inclusion remains highly relevant. The contextual differences between Somaliland and Puntland, where the JPLG is government led (but not government owned) and the 'light touch' in the South is not sufficiently calibrated.[50] Also The JPHR is found to be highly relevant and aligned to national and international human rights commitments and coherent with the mandates of the implementing PUNOs.

Effectiveness: Moderately satisfactory. There are many good results from many of the UN-funded activities with regard to strengthening legal frameworks and capacity building. Effectiveness is challenged due to i) disconnect between the political/policy level and the technical work with overemphasis on technical work, ii) lack of prioritisation in light of budget shortfall, iii) lack of monitoring and adaptation in a very fluid context.

JPLG: Overall satisfactory. But with large divergences between the more stable parts of Somalia and the less so. "The programme has made significant
progress promoting a role of Local Government (LG) across Somalia/Somaliland by developing adequate and appropriate laws, policies, and strategies; capacitating local governments and line ministries; creating awareness of citizens on role and responsibilities of local governments. Through its support, the programme has significantly enabled LGs to organise their functions better, mobilise own resources, provide quality basic services." "In the FMSs in the South, the programme adopted 'Light Touch Approach (LTA)' in the non-elected District Councils (DCs). This entailed capacity development and grants support to un-elected capital districts with sufficiently matured local authorities."[51] **In Somaliland**, there was strong evidence that one year after the closure of the project there were capacities in at least two of the eight municipal districts where the programme was implemented in terms of ability to plan and budget infrastructure investments, implement such investments and organise follow-up using the municipal systems for planning implementation, procurement, financial transfers etc. as supported by the JPLG. The programme was now being rolled out beyond the eight districts – to an additional three districts. The responsibility for primary health and education devolved to municipalities, but without additional funding. However, UNICEF (one of the three main UN organisations in the JPLG) continues to channel substantial funds outside the Somaliland budget for health and education through NGOs, in reality undermining the very system that JPLG put in place, incl. the virtuous circle of government/municipal contributions to social services based on revenues as a key to long-term sustainability of service delivery[52].

Drawback that hampers effectiveness: Slow to evolve the implementation approach, incl. use of government systems, to further support LG as capacity improved. Differences among UN agencies approached also undermined LG efforts. Reforms and capacities are also undermined by the UN, not offering capacity building through Local Governance Institutes but consultants; not enough attention to local governance, but more to infrastructure building.[53]

Considerable frustration at FGS level (Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Justice) with the lack of willingness by the UN to use country systems and to build capacity as a strategy (comparing to the WB where capacity building is the strategy and modus operandi).

JPHR: Moderately satisfactory. The presence of the UN is an important factor for HR activities in Somaliland. The Somaliland HR Commission receives technical support from the JPHR and the Human Rights Advocate (HRA) advisor in UNSOM

[50] UN: Report External Evaluation of the UN JPLG 2018-2023 March 2023.
[51] UN: Report External Evaluation of the UN JPLG 2018-2023 March 2023 Executive Summary.
[52] UNICEFs provides substantial support for health and education in Somaliland that is primarily channeled through NGOs and private contractors. Interview UNICEF Hargeisa 10.10.2024.
[53] UN: Report External Evaluation of the UN JPLG 2018-2023 March 2023.

that is highly appreciated and has been impactful. There is more openness about persecuting rape, a law is with the Parliament. Also, technical support for training of the police to investigate rape cases. Support for monitoring of HR violations, not least media freedom up towards the election was also an important contribution by the JPHR.[54]

Efficiency: Moderately satisfactory. Pooling of resources and supporting a number of programmes with one contribution enhances donor and recipient (FGS) efficiency. This potential efficiency for the donor was then undermined by earmarking at programme level and hands-on management. There was no evidence as to improved donor efficiency in the latter phase with less earmarking except where the donor chooses a hands-off approach (Norway to some extent). The main concern raised in the Danish Technical Review with regard to efficiency of the JPLG was the low level of implementation compared to budget. The Danish Technical Review concluded that "The staffing and probable overhead of JPLG is assessed to be comprehensive compared to similar decentralisation programmes in the Global South. This is partly a consequence of the joint UN approach, which means that there are double functions across the programme. To legitimise this, the outputs need to be of comparable quality with the enhanced staffing levels. It is not evident from the review findings that these unique cross-UN management arrangements and related additional staffing costs can be legitimised considering the outcome level results reported."[55]

The 2023 Evaluation noted that the JPLGs practice of overbudgeting creates a false impression of underperformance. The overall budget at inception was USD 153 million, but JPLG only managed to raise USD 78 million, approx. 50% of the budget. This large underfunding creates distortions in the full programme and misperceptions as large parts of the programme can never be implemented as there simply are no funds.[56]

The evaluation calculated the overhead costs at 32%

Table: JPLG overheads vs programme costs

	Funds received	Implemented		Total	Variance	% Overheads
FY		HR&OPS	Programme	Implemented	Recd vs Spent	
2018	13,217,934.12	1,752,876.96	2,083,705.26	3,836,582.22	9,381,351.90	45.69
2019	18,624,020.27	4,643,666.94	7,751,505.50	12,395,172.44	6,228,847.83	37.46
2020	6,558,295.87	5,517,083.04	11,157,037.58	16,674,120.62	- 10,115,824.75	33.09
2021	23,089,606.40	5,269,484.22	12,840,943.03	18,110,427.25	4,979,179.15	29.10
2022	17,149,373.38	6,868,451.03	15,948,539.97	22,816,991.00	- 5,667,617.62	30.10
Total	**78,639,230.04**	**24,051,562.19**	**49,781,731.34**	**73,833,293.53**	**4,805,936.51**	**32.58**

Source: UN: Report External Evaluation of the UN JPLG 2018–2023 March, page 36.

The 2023 evaluation noted that this was close to the level foreseen in the programme document (30%).[57] The 2023 Evaluation also noted the need for better division of labour between PUNOs and better and more use of country systems and suggested efficiencies. For example, the Project Financial Management Unit (PFMU) should have one set of technical mangers/experts (policy, gender, social inclusion, fiscal decentralisation, etc.) for the whole JPLG to reduce overlap and improve coherence.[58] Issues as to whether HR and operational cost were correctly registered were also raised (tendency to calculate programme staff as administration staff even if they contribute to capacity building, reducing costs for hiring external consultants – thus

[54] Interview Human Rights Commissioner, Hargeisa 09.10.2024.
[55] MFA: JPLG III Technical review June 2022.
[56] UN: Report External Evaluation of the UN JPLG 2018–2023 March 2023, page 35.
[57] UN: Report External Evaluation of the UN JPLG 2018–2023 March 2023, page 36.
[58] UN: Report External Evaluation of the UN JPLG 2018–2023 March 2023.

	overreporting on HR and underreporting on programme cost). The UN practice of only reporting funds for infrastructure projects (that were physically transferred) and not for technical assistance and capacity building to the municipalities, led to an impression amongst donors,the Somaliland Government, and the FGS that the UN was keeping funds for themselves. 2020 UN Office of Audits report of the UNDP Country office pointed to the need for enhanced efficiency of the use of funds, incl. through monitoring based on improved monitoring frameworks, addressing low implementation rates of projects, incl. streamlining of processes for approval and subsequent changes, enhanced oversight of projects, improved reporting, incl. coordination of programme oversight, QA and financial management to ensure linkages of outputs/outcomes with funding, improvement of procurement management, and improved risk management. Scoring 'partially satisfactory'.[59] **JPHR:** The programme design compares as a joint programme, with UNSOM and UNDP being the most active partners and a limited and unclear role for UNICEF. There were no fund manager reducing admin cost, but then this led to delays and other inefficiencies in the administration of the funds. Note: The JPLG is undergoing a transformation to take into account the points raised by the evaluation, the donors, and the audit. A new programme has been developed with only the three main agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, and UN Habitat), one manager and a streamlined setup. Considering the reduced financial contributions (from a level of USD 20 million a year to USD 5 million), the programme has been reformulated to primarily support capacity building. The final programme document has not been received.
Sources of evidence	**Results frameworks: Strength of the results framework: Moderately unsatisfactory**. There is no results framework for the MPTF nor the SJF. There are results frameworks (some still work in progress) for the strategies going forward. According to donors, results frameworks at JP level were improving over time. There continue to be limitations, mainly related to coherence, e.g., ToC and risks identified that are then not picked up in risks analyses and monitoring; weak link between outputs and outcomes;, and a continued tendency to unrealistic expectations as to the outcomes. **JPLG:** In general, it was not possible to assess whether the outputs achieved would lead to the desired outcomes in the medium term. **JPHR:** There were no outcome indicators, only output indicators at low level (counting only number of people trained).[60] Evaluations of the JPLG and the JPHR as referenced. Mid-term review by Denmark, reviews, and assessments in the appropriation notes for the next phase, Sida Performance review. Interviews: SJF, JPLG, Nordic donors, FGS, and LG in Somaliland, beneficiaries in Somaliland.
Strength of evidence	Strong regarding the JPLG and the JPHR: **Triangulation: Strong** Reporting: There is narrative reporting semi-annually and annually at SJF programme level. Only at project completion there will be a summary of results compared to the goals and objectives in the strategy note and the NDP and UN strategy. Efforts are made to strengthen portfolio level monitoring and evaluation. This is still work in progress as there is yet to be established a results framework for the SJF.
Examples of what worked	• Support for community-based resilience mechanisms inter- and intra-clan conflicts in Galmudug, Puntland, and Jubaland • Support for constitutional process and strengthening of federal and state level parliaments

[59] UNDP: Audit of the Country Office in Somalia: 23. April 2020 https://audit-public-disclosure.undp.org/view_audit_rpt_2.cfm?audit_id=2197
[60] Evaluations of the JPLG 2023 and the JPHR 2023.

- Support for HR and gender training of civil servants in line ministries and local government

JPLG: [61]

Policy development: Decentralisation policies, Local Government Laws, Participatory planning guidelines, LG Finance policy acts, Urban land management laws and planning laws, etc. They are operational, support decentralisation and clarify roles and responsibilities between government levels.

LG capacity development: In **Somaliland, Puntland, and BRA**, JPLG supported urban planning, local development planning, establishment of structures and systems for revenue collection, digitalisation of tax administration, in collaboration with the WB, introduced the Integrated Financial Management System in Somaliland and Puntland. Procurement procedures

District public works unit established and delivering services that are planned, designed, and implemented and supervised. Establishment of Local Government Institutes (LGIs) and LG associations.

Concrete results from Somaliland: Hargeisa Municipality: Total cost of the

Education; 2018–2024: Joint funding between Hargeisa Municipality, JPLG, and the Ministry of Education USD 4.4 million – 77% from the HM (taxes), 12% from JPLG, and 11% from the Somaliland Government.

Increase in the number of children attending school in Hargeisa 2018–2024: 51% of which 42% boys and 58% girls. Now a total of 22,919 boys and 19,051 girls attend public primary school. More staff and better pay for teachers and primary school head teachers. Garbage collection, water, and electricity to schools.

Health: 2018–2024: Joint funding between Hargeisa Municipality, JPLG, and the Ministry of Education USD 4.4 million – 80% from the HM (taxes), 11% from JPLG, and 9% from the Somaliland Government 16 new primary health centres built and 32 expanded, furbished with medical equipment. Salaries of 196 staff paid, and additional salaries for subordinate staff added. Consistent supply of drugs, water, electricity, and garbage paid. Recruitment and training of additional healthcare staff, (some funded by the WB programme under the MPF).

Infrastructure: USD 2.8 million spent on roads. New and upgraded roads, construction of bridges and culverts, as well as markets and firefighting.

Job creation: Construction and local governance.

Community engagement: Participatory planning, and accountability measures and citizens feedback organised.

New challenges as primary health and education are getting even further devolved to the municipalities. Funding shortfall from the Government foreseen.

JPHR:[62]

Capacity development of the duty bearer in the FGS: Interministerial task force to collect and analyse human rights data for reporting under international treaties and conventions. Capacity building of the Ministry for Women, Human Rights Development (MOWHRD) to promote the HR agenda, incl. training of staff, support for drafting of legislation, incl. the Disability Rights Act and the Child Rights Bill. Capacity support for Parliamentarians. Training of civil society to monitor and report on human rights issues.

The Somaliland HR Commission receives technical support from the JPHR and the HRA advisor in UNSOM that was highly appreciated. E.g. persecuting rape - a law with the Parliament, and technical support for training of the police to investigate rape cases. Support for monitoring of HR violations – not least media freedom towards the election.[63]

[61] UN: Report External Evaluation of the UN JPLG 2018–2023, March 2023.
[62] UN: Evaluation Report of Joint Programme on Human Rights in Somalia 2018–2020, March 2021.
[63] Interview Human Rights Commissioner, Hargeisa 09.10.2024.

Examples of what did not work	**JPLG:** Somalia: Fiscal decentralisation has been slow, owing partly to line ministries not wanting to send funds on to LG. There has been too great focus on local government providing services to the detriment of improved local governance. Despite many years of support, the level of capacity in LG generally remains low, except in Somaliland and Puntland. LGIs established but the training capacity remains low – also limited financial inputs from Puntland Government. In Somaliland, the municipalities funded the LGI house, and the government funded the running costs, but in 2024, the LGI came to a halt as the funding form 'JPLG IV' for trainings did not come. Now the government and the association of LG are trying to find a solution for funding the LGI trainings to underpin the implementation of the decision to decentralise primary health and education to the municipal level. Scaling is difficult as new incoming districts expect a full package comparable to JPLG but the governments are not willing to/able to make the finance available. Revenue collection administered differently between agencies and between locations. Gender mainstreaming is low across LG, e.g., few women represented in LG councils. **JPHR:** The Human Rights Commission (Federal level) not yet established (2020). Stalled in Parliament. The discussion in Parliament of the Child Act underscored the importance of 'doing no harm' as it nearly led to the acceptance of child marriage. Similarly with the Sexual Offences Act that was also significantly changed by the Parliament – neither of which was foreseen by the PUNOs. Lack of a standard monitoring system for CSO monitoring and reporting of HR has led to inefficiencies and made this work less useful. Also, the outreach has been limited.
Factors	+Stability is the main factor for success +JPLG started in 2008. The long-running programme has good results where there was political will to enact LG-related legislation and follow through with revenue collection (Somaliland and Puntland). Also meant there was some capacity to build on in JPLG III, when this programme started, in particular in Somaliland + Adaptation of the JPLG to changes in the situation, e.g., as capacity was built to make sure to expand on this by channelling funds through municipal systems + Political will to support decentralisation in Somaliland + Collaboration with the WB on the financial management part in Somaliland - The security situation made it difficult to expand the programmes outside Somaliland and Puntland - Continued unclear situation of delineation of powers between the various levels of government, FGS/FMS and lower levels, and the role of Somaliland leading to delays and political obstacles - Where there was a low level of capacity development for policy reform and implementation may be linked to low level of institutional anchoring brought about by extensive use of external high-paid consultants and a high level of UN agency ownership. Use of consultants for training at FMG level unstructured and ad hoc. - Lack of a coherent approach to revenue collection and administration costs amongst UN agencies. UNDP being government centric while the UNCEF worked with civil society - Overall, there appeared to be an overemphasis on infrastructure and less on systems and governance, civic engagement, transparency, integrity, and accountability of LG-elected and employed officials – also impacting scaling. But this was also connected to the security situation - UN inertia in changing to more cost-effective models and away from its humanitarian outlook **JPHR:** + Some progress in Somaliland where an HR commission has been active since 2010.

	- Too much emphasis on the technical aspect of law making rather than political dialogue, underestimating the deep-seated cultural and religious beliefs that made HR legislation more sensitive than anticipated by the PUNOs. Somali Human Rights Commission stalled in Parliament. - Lack or resources, lack of building of long-term capacity and institutions, and lack of planning for scalability, e.g. CSO monitoring, limits the scalability and reach of the JPHR. - The administration of the programmes also not efficient leading to delays in establishing programming management structures, recruiting people, and hence implementation.

The following table summarises the extent to which the rationales of Nordic countries for supporting the MPTF/SJF were fulfilled:

Table 2 Summary of the trust fund's fulfilment of NC rationales

Policy influence	**Policy influence – globally –** (multi-country reach – including values and global public goods)	**Satisfactory** – Nordic donors through their support promoted a model for UN engagement in fragile states, incl. the cooperation between the UN and IFIs. H-D-P approach supported to some extent. Combines UN policy influence with joint UN funding for key priority areas.
	Policy influence – on the organisation	**Satisfactory** – As large contributors to the fund, the Nordics wielded large influence on the setup, the coordination forums, as well as policies and strategies of the MPTF/SJF – also using extensive earmarking. In the last round, they also substantially influenced the reformulation of the JPLG by not providing immediate funding. Policy influence and Nordic donors' expectations of UN policy influence with the FGS not met, among other things, due to lack of UN focus on technical issues.
Multi-lateralism	**Strengthening the multilateral system** Delivering on the trustee mandate and SDGs	**Moderately satisfactory** – UN remains a very large actor in Somalia, although its role as a financier is falling with the WB picking up. The activities of the very large contributions by the UN systems as a whole, funded by, i.a., the Nordic countries, are major contributing factors to delivering the SDGs. In this context, the role of the MPTF/SJF is smaller (10% of UN funds), but provides an important avenue for dialogue and coordination with the FGS. The Nordic donors found that UN SJF could use its policy leverage better with the FGS/FMS. Role of RCO diminished due to small share of SJF in total UN funding.
	Strengthening the multilateral system (contributing to UN reforms, One UN, MDBs) Inter-agency cooperation	**Moderately satisfactory –** The Somalia MPTF and the SJF are promoted as a flagship mechanism by the UN for coordinated action in fragile states, incl. as a way to ensure Somali leadership for the activities in accordance with Somalian NDPs. At the same time, only a fraction of UN aid to Somalia (less than 10%) was disbursed through the MPTF/SJF, as donors focussed on alignment to country strategies rather than supporting One UN, reducing the incentive to work as One UN. There is very limited genuine pooling of funding as funding with the JPs tended to stay in siloes that were then coordinated (JPLG), whereas the simpler setup of the JPHR allowed for a genuine joint programming. UNICEF in particular expressed strong reservations regarding pooling of

		funds. The redesign of the JPLG, which will involve pooling of funding, has been a long time coming. Some Nordic donors (Sweden and Denmark) have a clear preference for choice of partners that help fulfil the objectives of country strategy, whereas Norway stressed coherence between donor activities at global level (UN Funding Compact) and country level.
Development delivery	**Development delivery** – Generate knowledge to enhance development impact – capacity development	**Satisfactory –** MPTF/SJF has over the years provided substantial inputs into the constitutional and democratisation process, delineation of powers between FGS, FMS, and lower levels, and relations between FGS and Somaliland. The JPLG delivered good results related to municipal service delivery in quieter parts of Somalia and Somaliland.
	Development delivery – Scaling effects (national public resources, private sector, other donors)	**Moderately satisfactory –** Scaling does not seem to be a major priority in the design of UN JPs. Emphasis on infrastructure rather than systems and reluctance to fund through national systems. There is some emphasis on scaling in Somaliland, incl. through enhancing public revenue collection. Rather the UN is more of an implementer itself. Policy influencing in FGS and FMS was found by donors to be somewhat of a missed opportunity.
	Development delivery – Convening power and influence (national entities, other donors, civil society, private sector)	**Satisfactory –** The UN SJF is an important forum for donor dialogue and coordination among donors and with the FGS/FMS.
	Development delivery – Access to skills (mobilisation of high level of expertise)	**Moderately satisfactory –** Expertise provided was impactful – it was not always value adding nor coordinated – low efficiency also compared to the costs.
	Development delivery – Access to country expertise (mobilisation of country experience/insight)	**Satisfactory –** The UN agencies could implement projects in Somalia. This implementation skill also used by the WB in the implementation of IDA activities where UN operated as a contractor for the government.
Aid effectiveness	**Aid effectiveness – reducing fragmentation** (harmonisation of external support)	**Satisfactory –** Support through the UNMPTF/SJF contributes to alignment and harmonisation of UN support for the Somalia NDPs. Unclear whether the RCO is capable of coordinating much beyond the SJF. SJF Partner Forum is an important venue for coordination, also beyond the UN with donors.
	Aid effectiveness – collaboration with other Nordic donors	**Satisfactory –** Despite variations in views as to whether to continue to fund the SJF, there appeared to be useful collaboration, but it did not extend above coordination of points of view and joint statements to, e.g., joint missions or joint programming. There was impactful cooperation between Norway and Sweden and the SJF on the redesign of the MPTF.

	Aid effectiveness – reduce costs for the donor	**Moderately satisfactory –** Investments in the SJF functioning, policy development, and priorities were large.

Lessons learned/dilemmas and other aspects to be covered during field mission:

The Nordic donors wielded considerable influence on the transformation of the MPTF into SJF. They were the largest remaining donors. This then becomes difficult to not fund.

Earmarking was the way to ensure influence on the MPTF. The new SJF and its organisational setup left more room for donor involvement at the strategic level. This potentially opened for more trust in the fund and less inclination to earmarking and micro-management.

UN disconnect between the political/policy level and the technical work with overemphasis on technical work, also impacting potential for scalability. This required a constant push for the donors to be more demanding of the Somali government and political structures.

There is a dilemma between the Nordic countries' focus on state building in their country strategies and then their lack of trust in the UN to adequately manage fiduciary risks sufficiently to provide funds through national systems that the UN itself helped built. The Nordic support for the systems and capacity building at local government level was then not followed up by actually using the systems to keep them alive.

Denmark, Sweden, and Finland made choices of partners in Somalia based on ability to deliver on national country strategy objectives. This might contradict with global goals of supporting One UN and UN inter-agency collaboration. At the same time, there was no clear articulation of when and for what purposes inter-agency-pooled funding represented added value compared to single-agency funding.

UN tendency to hold on to the humanitarian narrative and ways of operating, bringing it out of sync with progress in Somaliland and Puntland (JPLG), thereby risking to undermining results achieved. The role of the donors in supporting this transformation from humanitarian towards development was not well articulated – and it was difficult for the UN to make this shift by itself as it will imply less UN and UN staff and more country systems and country implementation.

Cost effectiveness is a recurrent theme. The factors behind the high cost were linked to overlapping functions between PUNOs, extensive use of external consultants, and lack of clear way of registering staff admin costs. Due to UN inertia and the unfinished One UN reforms related to harmonised systems for planning, programming, implementation, monitoring, and reporting, it took time and resources to deal with the issues.

Somalia Multi-Partner Fund (field study)

EQ	Summary findings: Emerging findings based on the desk case study
Criteria	• The main rationale for the Nordic funding of the Somalia Multi-Partner Fund (MPF) was to support the reengagement of Somalia with the international community in accordance with the Somalia Compact 2012. The objective of the MPF was to support the reengagement of the IFIs and what this brings in terms of access to debt restructuring/relief and then IDA funding. • There was alignment with Nordic countries' policies that was guided by an overall concern of instability and under-development at the Horn of Africa, continuing war between clans, the presence of terror groups, piracy, recurrent famines, etc. and hence the need for a comprehensive approach to Somalia. • Aid effectiveness: To ensure a coordinated approach by the international community, it was decided to channel a substantial part of the funds through three multi-donor trust funds with respectively the UN, the WB and the AfDB. • Policy dialogue: Support for the MPF was an important avenue for policy dialogue with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and with the WB and IFIs about reforms and state building. • As the first objective of integrating Somalia into the international community was achieved, the rationale for continued support shifted towards supporting the MPF as a venue for policy

	dialogue with the Government and an opportunity to influence the WB policies, strategies, and funding in Somalia.
Influence	• Influence was primarily sought through funding. In the current situation of IDA programming and funding, grant funds continue to be of importance to the WB to fund up-stream studies, policy inputs, as well as ensuring a more elaborate monitoring and fiduciary oversight system than is normally budgeted for in IDA engagements. Nordic donors now focus on influencing IDA programming. Finland and Sweden used soft earmarking. • The Nordic donors (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden) have a strong engagement with the MPF and seek to provide policy inputs through dialogue. A limitation for influence is that the Nordic donors do not have the resources to engage in discussion, and they have less access to information, which makes the discussion unequal. • The Nordic donors do not have an explicit strategy as to what they in particular want to achieve and in which areas they are trying to influence the WB. There are differences in view as to how much the donors should try to interfere/micro-manage the WB or whether to trust the WB to do the right thing. There is a view that the WB does not sufficiently leverage its policy influence on the FGS, e.g., in matters related to funding of both the FGS and the FMS, but no joint approach to addressing this. There is agreement that the WB should pay more attention to gender equality and HRBA.
Results	• There is agreement amongst Nordic donors that no other multilateral or bilateral donor could have achieved what the WB has achieved in terms of state building at the federal level over the past 10 years. Through support for capacity building in the main line ministries and the central bank, systems have been built and staff capacitated to fulfil key state functions related to public administration and public financial management. The results were based on the WB being able to bring into play its own capacities and experiences in this area as well as strong leverages in the form of access to development finance. • Ownership was strong by the federal line ministries as they see the long-term benefits of cooperation with the IFIs and the WB. They also valued the trust the WB placed in the systems built by channelling resources through these systems. Also, strong ownership to financial management, civil service, etc. reforms in Somaliland, but some frustration with regard to receiving too few funds. • Capacities were built at federal level and to some extent at state level. However, the operating model of the WB relying on recipient execution did not support the building of capacities at lower levels. And the WB had difficulties reaching far into the country for which they relied on implementing partners, including the UN. • In addition to state building, the MPF supported creation of an enabling environment for the private sector incl. integration of the Somali Banking system into the international system. Moving the support for Somalia towards development and less reliance of humanitarian aid by developing a unified register for targeting social safety transfers and more emphasis on climate resilience.
Efficiency	• Pooling resources enhanced donor efficiency and promoted results that they individually would not have been able to achieve. The Nordic donors spent some resources on the follow-up on their contributions, incl. dialogue with the WB, mostly so Denmark and Sweden, whereas Norway takes a more hands-off approach. • Providing grant funds for the WB provided additional grants for Somalia policy work (considered a public good), capacity building, and monitoring. Continued funding of the MPF allows the WB to continue to operate in a high-risk environment where additional monitoring and oversight is warranted. • Extensive use of project implementation units (PIUs) (approx. 450 across Somalia) Increasingly staffed by Somali/Somaliland civil service staff with small top-offs, to reduce the risks associated with PIUs and lack of ownership and capacity building. • The direct administrative costs of the fund are low (below 5%). This does not cover the substantial amount of funds used for monitoring and oversight (15%) and does not cover

implementation costs associated with reaching end beneficiaries, e.g., in the projects that seek to reach end beneficiaries.

Lessons learned/dilemmas:

- Policy influencing and Nordic cooperation: Nordic donors agreed that an important reason for supporting the MPF was to influence the WB. It was less clear in what areas the Nordic countries sought to influence and what the influencing strategy was. The Nordic countries had high expectations as to the WBs ability to influence the politics of the Somali government, incl. with regard to fiscal transfers between the FGS and FMS/Somaliland. The WB on its part wanted to work with the Nordic donors, the WB providing the data, and the donors providing the political arguments with the FGS. The WB pointed to successful influencing on behalf of the Nordics with regard to gender and inclusion.
- Despite the much larger sums involved if IDA is included, donors appeared much more confident in the WB's ability to manage fiduciary and programme risks (incl. environmental and social) related to using country systems than the UN.
- The extensive use of PIUs to reduce financial and programme-related risks represented a risk to ownership and long-term capacity building that the WB sought to mitigate by increasingly employing Somaliland civil service staff and reduced top-off. This came with other issues related to competition for staff with, e.g., the AfDB.

Brief description of the trust fund

Objectives and strategy – The MPF for Somalia was established in 2013 in support of the donor community's reengagement with the Somali Government in support of the Somalia Compact. The MPF was the primary source of funding for the reengagement of the WB into Somalia after two decades of disengagement due to arrears. The purpose of the MPF was from the beginning to support a process of normalisation of Somalia's relations with the IFIs to regain access to funding through building and strengthening core government institutions. This support has taken the form of advisory services complemented by specific projects to address capacity building of government institutions. The support was focused on 1) Strengthening Somalia's core governments institutions, incl. for social service delivery, 2) Supporting an enabling environment for inclusive private sector-led growth, and 3) Strengthening resilience through developing urban infrastructure. These areas remained valid over the 2013–2023 period. The MPF was instrumental in Somalia regaining access to IDA, first through IDA Pre Areas Clearance Grants and after 2020, when Somalia cleared IDA arrears, full access to IDA, and for Somalia reaching the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) decision point in 2023 involving substantial debt relief.

The role of the MPF is now changing as the MPF will increasingly be used to leverage IDA programming incl. through advisory services, piloting of new approaches, scaling into new geographical areas of Somalia and strengthened risk management, incl. through additional support for procurement, and project implementation and supervision (incl. third-party monitoring), and with regard to environmental and social safeguards and management of fragile state risks. Other areas of focus for the MPF going forward will be support for climate change adaptation, women empowerment, and youth.[64] [65] Hence, the objective of the present MPF is twofold: 1) to accelerate and enhance the delivery of WBG partnership framework, incl. by complementing the IDA portfolio, and 2) to provide a platform for coordinated financing using country systems in Somalia.

The MPF has received USD 641 million from 2013 to 2023, of which nearly all has been committed but only 65% has been disbursed. Approx. 70% of the disbursements have been for recipient-executed projects, 10% for bank-executed grants, and 15% for preparation and monitoring of activities, and 5% of the disbursed funds for administration and management. The new budget for the MPF 2023–2024 foresees a reduced fund, and the main share of the funding used for implementation support of IDA projects, incl. policy work and enhanced risk management. In 2023, the MPF was extended to 2028.

Trust fund institutional setup – The MPF is from 2023 under the Umbrella 2.0 trust fund Somalia Country Engagement. The MPF is so far the only trust fund under that heading. The Partnership

[64] Country Partnership Framework for the Federal Republic of Somalia for the period FY24-28 January 31, 2024.
[65] World Bank: Somalia Multi Partner Fund: Partnership Document. 30 November 2023.

document[66] sets out the new governance mechanism for donor engagement, incl. the PC chaired by the WB and a donor. The PC will meet at least once a year to discuss the pipeline and budget as well as other issues. The PC will be complemented by consultative groups (CGs) meeting regularly which does include other stakeholders from the international community (incl. the AfDB, the RCO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other major donors), with a focus on information sharing and policy dialogue and risk management in relation to the engagement in Somalia. This should all serve in complement to the dialogue to be held through the government-led architecture. It is underscored that the CG meetings are not substitutes for the government-led discussions.

The MPF has functioned and will continue to function as a platform for policy dialogue between the WB and the donors and for engaging with the FGS on development objectives, sector coordination, and discussions on the transition from humanitarian-focused assistance to longer term systems and institution building.

Nordic engagement

Rationale for Nordic support – The Nordic countries' main rationale for supporting the MPF has been to support the objective of the MPF to promote the reengagement of Somalia with the IFIs with all what this entails, including steps towards macro-economic stability, state building in key areas of financial management and provision of services, improved governance, and normalisation of Somalia's relations with the international community. Hence, the contributions to the MPF are well aligned with Nordic countries' strategies for their cooperation with Somalia, and with the prospects of increased stability in Somalia, also the Nordic countries' Africa strategies' focus on increased regional security and stability. [67] [68] Support through pooled funds is also seen as a contribution to ensuring joint support and donor coordination for implementation of international agreements on the engagement in Somalia. Given the low capacity of the Somali Government, pooled funds are a preferred mode of operation to promote aid effectiveness.[69]

In the most recent round of appropriations, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, in their decision documents, point to the importance of the MPF as a dialogue forum with both the WB (incl. an avenue for influencing WB operations in Somalia) and with the Somali government. At the same time, Nordic donors express concern that the WB is not using its leverage with the government to promote donor priorities nor promote what is seen as a prerequisite for long-term sustainability in Somalia, namely a more evenly distribution of funds between the FGS and the FMS. They also point to the complementarity with other pooled funds in Somalia (UN) and the value added of the MPF, in particular the support for state building by using country systems while at the same time building Somali capacities in the areas of financial management and governance, allowing for delivery of basic state functions. The advantages of this approach are acknowledged, compared to other similar pooled funds that mainly channel funds outside the national system, including the strong ownership and responsibility by the Somali government.[70] At the same time, considerable concern is raised about the fiduciary and other risks of this approach and the risk management and systems needed to ensure that this approach is viable. It is generally acknowledged that the WB has such procedures in place and is capable of managing risks, incl. through the additional Monitoring Agent function. In the most recent extension of the Swedish contribution for the MPF in 2024, Sida acknowledges progress in state building and the importance of supporting this approach for long-term sustainable development.[71]

Financial support – the financial contributions from Nordic countries for MPF II are summarised in Figure 134 below. Sweden is by far the largest donor in the past five years. During the lifespan of the MPF, the UK, the EU and Germany have been the largest contributors.

[66] World Bank: Somalia Multi Partner Fund: Partnership Document. 30 November 2023.
[67] Norway MFA and Norad Decision document WB Multi-partner Fund Somalia, 14.12.2022.
[68] Sida: Decision for contribution to the Somalia MPF, 3 November 2021.
[69] Danish MFA Somalia Country Programme 2015–2018, Approved 2 April 2015.
[70] There are at least four pooled funds operating in Somalia with somewhat overlapping objectives, incl. related to stability, delivery of social services, and private sector development: WB MPF, the UN Joint Somalia Fund, The UK-initiated Somalia Stability Fund, and the Somaliland Development Fund.
[71] Sida: Beslut om ändring af bidrag til Somalia MPF 2021–2022 – 24 April 2024.

Figure 134: Nordic countries' contributions to Somalia Multi-Partner Fund II



Funding (USDm)	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	Total
Denmark	7.51		10.88	3.03		**21.41**
Finland		3.81	3.72		1.50	**9.03**
Non Nordic	1.53	4.21	2.94	3.38	2.16	**14.21**
Norway					9.42	**9.42**
Sweden	8.31	20.48	8.25	9.12	3.25	**49.42**
Grand Total	**17.35**	**28.50**	**25.79**	**15.53**	**16.33**	**103.50**

Policy dialogue – As noted above, the MPF has functioned as a forum for dialogue between the WB, donors, and the Federal Government. The Somali Government has seen the MPF as their preferred option for support, as the FGS has been involved in the governance through co-chairmanship of working groups etc. Nordic countries have served as co-chairs of sector working groups at different times. The MPF platform has been an important forum for the Nordic donors to promote their policies with regard to Somalia, incl. security, human rights, gender, social services delivery, and increasingly climate change adaptation, to address root causes to the continued instability. With the normalisation of Somalia's relationship with the WB and the influx of IDA funding, the MPF platform has also increasingly been seen as a forum for influencing the WB engagement incl. the country partnership framework and the design of projects in Somalia ahead of discussions in the WBG Board. Nordic donors have used this in-road to promote a less Mogadishu-centric engagement of the WB in Somalia.[72]

The WB greatly valued the competences and pragmatism of the Nordic countries bringing in experience from other fragile settings where Nordic staff had been engaged. Despite being short staffed, Nordic countries had been important partners to test new ideas capable of balancing innovation and risks – much more so than larger representations with more staff and prefixed ideas. Norway in particular had been helpful with additional funding in certain instances.

There are notable variances in the way the Nordic countries approach the policy dialogue, which are linked both to policy and to staff availability. Norway tends to have a more hands-off approach, trusting the WB to do the right thing but focusing on a few important issues, e.g., the FGS/FMS split of funds. Norway then spends its staff resources on other important tasks in the context of Somalia, where Norway has some added value, e.g., oil and gas concessions, where they also work with the WB. Denmark appears to be more into micro-managing the fund with Sweden somewhat in between.

There is coherence among the Nordics to advocate gender equality and human rights. There is no evidence, e.g., in the form of reporting, as to what initiatives have been taken nor their impact. Finland also points to the importance of MPF supporting social sectors and states this as a specific objective for advocacy.[73]

Secondment – Sweden prepared for a gender specialist to be included in the team.

[72] Norway MFA and Norad Decision document WB Multi-partner Fund Somalia, 14.12.2022.
[73] MFA Finland: Project Proposal: Somalia Multi-Partner Fund 23.11.2018

Earmarking – Sweden earmarked for gender-related activities 2018–2021. Sweden also made a soft earmarking of the project Recurrent Cost and Reform Financing (RCRF) extension of 2021–2022 contribution to 2025.
Finland earmarked 2016–2019 contribution to 'Efficient and accountable government'.
Nordic Cooperation – There is good co-operation among donors to the fund, which are all like-minded. Among Nordic countries, there is emphasis on keeping all donors engaged, incl. the UK and the EU, to be able to also draw upon these donors' experiences with support to the complementary pooled funds, e.g., the UK that initiated the Somalia Stability Fund to which also Denmark and Sweden contribute. Finland, due to limited staff in Nairobi, has been less engaged.
Nordic countries' management – The contributions to the MPF are managed from Somalia missions/programme officers of Nordic countries in Nairobi. In particular for Denmark, Norway, and Sweden they are managed in a programmatic way as part of each country's overall engagement in Somalia and in conjunction with contributions through other pooled funds and other engagements. For example, for Denmark this implies that contributions to MPF is developed and assessed as part of the Danish engagement in Somalia, incl. the country programme that sets out all the Danish engagements in Somalia and the mid-term review of that programme.

Changes that occurred and results achieved
Overall – The original objective of the MPF – to support the engagement of Somalia with the IFIs – has been achieved in a much shorter timeframe than had originally been expected. The MPF was the primary source of funding for the WB until the arrears were cleared and therefore instrumental in building core government systems, expanding services, and creating capacity in key government areas, incl. with regard to public financial management. The current IDA finance is building on these achievements as well as the pilot projects financed by the MPF in social protection, governance, health, private sector, and urban development. Furthermore, the MPF continues to play a role in providing knowledge, piloting activities for further scale-up and ensuring additional oversight through the financing of the Monitoring Agent and additional risk mitigation to deliver on the extended WBG risk framework.[74] Factors in this success can broadly be referred to the strong partnership between the multilaterals and the willingness to work together, the strong ownership by shifting Somalia governments that over time had understood the need to abandon short-term differences and focus on long-term development goals, and the strong commitment by a handful of donors to whom the Nordics belonged. This being said, there were, of course, tremendous challenges still in Somalia that would require long-term engagement by the international community.[75]

The Independent Review of the MPF 2019: *The history of the Fund shows an appetite for programming risk and experimentation as well as adaptation in response to learning. The Fund is also driven by the principle of 'working with and through' Somalia's country systems, an approach on which it has amassed considerable experience, especially in the application of effective risk management techniques. As has been pointed out, the use of country systems has been notoriously absent from most international interventions but is axiomatic to sustainable state building.*[76]
Somalia is moving along the humanitarian–development continuum. This impacted multilateral cooperation and the roles of various institutions. There will continue to be a need for humanitarian fast responses by the UN in emergencies of drought, floods, and conflicts flaring up. But the gradual shift towards development implied a new kind of relationship between the FGS on the one hand and the UN, the WB/AfDB and the donors. The role of the UN is now smaller (as humanitarian support was falling), and the UN is in the process of adjusting to its new role from being a project holder to being an implementer of government funds (often delivered by the WB) as government capacity for implementation is low. As Somalia embarked on a normalised relationship with the WB, the relationship between the WB and the donors had also shifted. It was the WB's intention to keep the good relationship with key donors incl. through bi-weekly newsletters, incl. on knowledge products.[77]

[74] World Bank Group: Performance and Learning Review of the Country Partnership Framework for FR Somalia FY19–FY22. 23 September 2022.
[75] Interview World Bank, 11. September 2024.
[76] Aleph Strategies: MPF for Somalia Mid-term Review Report, September 2019.
[77] Interview World Bank, 11. September 2024.

Results Summary table	
Summary	**Highly satisfactory/Satisfactory**
Criteria	**Relevance: Highly relevant.** *MPF is found to be extremely relevant to the Somali context.* Together with FGS, the MPF has supported the fundamental macro-economic reforms and machinery of the state, clearing the way for reengaging Somalia with the international community. [78] **Effectiveness: Satisfactory.** The 2019 independent review of the MPF showed that the fund delivered against its objectives and was well managed. It even outperformed the global WB Portfolio.[79] This review points to results related to strengthening core Somali institutions and supporting an enabling environment for Somali businesses as well as progress in developing urban infrastructure. It also notes that to value the purpose of government, time has come to support delivery of services and infrastructure. Knowledge products and statistical work of a very high quality. The review also pointed to additional risk management to mitigate collusion and fiduciary risks. • There is very strong **ownership** to the MPF projects and activities by the FGS as underlined in interviews with government officials. The WB trusted Somalia and its intentions at an early stage that impacts the partnership now. • **Capacity** – the MPF built the capacity of the Somalia institutions – Ministry of Finance and Central Bank, in particular, and laid the groundwork for civil service education and public administration. Capacities remain weak, and it has been difficult to reach outside key economic ministries and tasks, e.g., attempts to train female health workers proved slower and more difficult than anticipated. • In Somaliland support for civil service reforms through support for the civil service commission that led to continued improvement of the functioning of the civil service commission, merits-based hiring, and promotion systems, getting rid of ghost workers, pay and grade reform, performance-based salaries, pension reforms initiated, etc. The Performance and learning review 2023 concluded that even if there was progress on all fronts, many of the initiatives had only recently been implemented and hence, it was too early to assess whether they were delivering as expected. The pension reforms were found to be embryonic.[80] Interviews with the Civil Service Commission underscored that they were continuing to work on the reforms (hiring, pay and grade implemented second year and were also continuing to fund expertise to support these efforts, e.g., pensions. • Currently the MPF funds 23 national and regional projects (end 2023).[81] **Efficiency: Satisfactory**. Pooling of resources enhances the efficiency for the donors and for the recipient country. The admin costs related to the MPF is low (less than 5%). The MPF funding for programming as well as risk monitoring and oversight of spending is high but justified in the environment of low capacity and high fiduciary risks of Somalia. Also considering that this work pertains to a number of IDA projects. There have been considerable delays and prolonged start-ups – sometimes linked to the stalling political processes (this is also reflected in the low disbursement ratio). The WB operating model involved PIUs (currently approx. 450 across Somalia/Somaliland). They are increasingly staffed by Somali/Somaliland civil service staff with small salary top-offs, to reduce the risks associated with PIUs: lack of ownership and capacity building of consultants rather than institutions. Interviews in

[78] Danish MFA: Somalia Country Programme 2019-2023 Mid-term Revie Report 13 July 2022 incl. Annex 6 on MPF.
[79] Aleph Strategies: MPF for Somalia Mid-term Review Report September 2019.
[80] Performance and learning review: Somaliland Civil Service Strengthening Project (2023).
[81] World Bank: MPF Lean Report July-December 2023.

	Somaliland Ministry of Finance underscored close attention to but also strong support for PIUs as a transitory mechanism. Staff was mainly recruited from within the ministries. Only in special cases, where staff internally with the right qualifications was not available would there be recruitment from outside Somaliland. Some level of dissatisfaction with WB insistence on a no-objection procedure for the hiring of staff.
Sources of evidence	Independent evaluation of the MPF, WB Performance and learning review, donors' assessments in appropriation notes, and conclusions on performance reports (Sida). Interviews with the WB, donors, and FGS, and Somaliland Ministry of Finance, Civil Service Commission.
Strength of evidence	**Triangulation: Strong.** **Strength of results framework 2022–2024: Satisfactory**. The ToC and results framework is relevant, clear, and concise. And the link between the outputs and outcomes clear, e.g., financing and training of human capital is key to the outcome of strengthened institutions. In capturing the full results of the MPF it will be necessary to also capture the result of the IDA projects that are being facilitated and supported by the MPF.
Examples of what worked	• Public administration improved – incl. government procurement and granting of concessions (oil and gas) • Public financial management systems in place and used for government budgeting and expenditure – funds channelled through; public procurement procedures used • Unified Social Registry with associated digital ID to allow for targeted cash transfers through the various programmes, incl. the IDA-funded Baxnaano and EU Safety nets • Improved fiscal relations between FGS and the federal level – with increased intra-governmental transfers • Financial Systems Initiative supports Somalia's reintegration into the global financial system and the integrity of the financial sector – facilitate flows of funds, incl. investments, and safeguards against terrorism financing • Improved revenue collection, although target not yet reached • Expanded healthcare, although training of female healthcare workers improved, but targets not reached [82] Knowledge products delivered – on macro, sectoral level incl. learning reviews. Data and statistics – incl. poverty and inequality analyses and a paper on Gender Landscape of Somalia. Civil service reforms in Somaliland.
Examples of what did not work	• Revenue collection, where targets were not met due to long start-up time • Health, where targets were also not met due to slow start-up and difficulties in recruiting female health staf
Factors	+ International community collaborating – based on comparative advantages and sending same messages to the Somalia partners + Strong Somalia ownership + WB leverage – funding and expertise - Limited Somali capacity and in particular implementation capacity – underestimating the time it takes to start up and go to scale - Continued political disagreements and security issues that need resolution – competition for funding between federal and state levels - Recurrent natural disasters, displacement, etc. destroying progress - Security situation in parts of the country impacting implementation and monitoring of what little gets implemented – WB low supervision capacity in the field

[82] World Bank MPF: MPF Lean report July-December 2023.

The following table summarises the extent to which the rationales of Nordic countries for supporting the MPT were fulfilled: A recurrent rationale for all Nordic countries has been the alignment with national strategies in Somalia. That this rationale has been delivered has been confirmed in interviews pointing specifically to:

- Supported macro-fiscal stability and reforms towards the HIPC completion point and the Financial Governance Committee, and the interstate financial committee that promoted fiscal cooperation between the federal entities
- Supported the state-building process through capacity building of institutions in areas such as public administration, public financial management, debt management, domestic resource mobilisation, inter-governmental financial management, and resource management for improving social service delivery
- Supported social safety nets for Somalia's most vulnerable people – including single mothers
- Supported the enabling environment for private sector-led growth

At another level, the MPF has provided important lessons as to working with and through FGS and FMS that only an institution with high leverage with FGS, as well as the capacity to manage fiduciary risks, build capacity, and monitor implementation, can provide. Norad concludes that "*The World Bank is deemed a competent actor with a high degree of implementation capacity in Somalia. The MPF is a strategically important investment.* Sida underlines: "*It is Sida's assessment that the World Bank as the MPF administrator is the best possible solution for building state capacity and core systems in a difficult high-risk context as Somalia. Sida assesses that overall Somalia has made substantial progress in economic reforms, manifested by the attainment of the HIPC decision point … These gains would not have been achieved without the engagement of the WB-MPF.*"[83]

In addition, working through multilateral partners is seen as risk mitigating as in particular the WB has a strong risk management framework attached to its development engagements.

Summary of the trust fund's fulfilment of NC rationales[84]		
Policy influence	**Policy influence – globally** (multi-country reach – including values and global public goods)	**Satisfactory –** Although not mentioned explicitly in the programme documents, the Somalia MPF experience and working with donors impacted the way that the WB developed its general approach to fragile states. Examples include PFM in an environment fraught with corruption, managing risks in a realistic way by bringing in competences on Fragility, Conflict, and Violence (FCV) and ESF, and the collaboration with the UN through liaison staff that proved to be a model.
	Policy influence – on the organisation	**Satisfactory** – The MPF was an avenue to influence the work of the WBG in Somalia over and above what was done through the NBO. There were differences in views among the Nordic countries as to the responsiveness of the WB to donor arguments. The WB pointed to that Nordic issues related to gender equality, inclusion, poverty focus (studies and targeting of social safety net) had been improved, also as part of the increased focus on these areas with the ESF. The Nordics also found that the WB could use its policy leverage better, e.g., with regard to the federal level/state level where the WB continues to have a technical approach to a highly political issue.

[83] Sida Beslut om insats Somalia Multi-Partner Fund 2021–2022. 4.11. 2021.

[84] This table summarises rationales and follow-up as presented in MPF funding documentation from Norway, Denmark, and Sweden as well as interviews with Finland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.

Multi-lateralism	**Strengthening the multilateral system** Delivering on the trustee mandate and SDGs	**Highly satisfactory –** The MPF played a pivotal role in the reengagement of the international community in Somalia that can support reforms and long-term funding at scale to address root causes of the conflict related to poverty, lack of opportunity, climate impact, and environmental degradation. The role of the MPF is now changing. The presence of grant funds allows the WB to carry out extended risk mitigations and allows for piloting new approaches and delivering data and analysis that no one else is capable of.
	Strengthening the multilateral system (contributing to UN reforms, One UN, MDBs) Inter-agency cooperation	**Highly satisfactory –** The initial setup of international support for the Somali Compact 2013 included the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility with the three distinct but coordinated pooled funds led by respectively the UN, the WB, and the AfDB. This ensured a joint approach by the international system. Developments in Somalia and the access to IDA changed the role for FGS and hence the relative weight of the multilaterals. The WB adjusted to this new role.
Development delivery	**Development delivery –** Generate knowledge to enhance development impact	**Satisfactory –** The MPF has provided knowledge products and will continue to do so. They are by the WB intended to serve as global public goods and intended to inform policy dialogues widely among donors and Somalia.[85] They are found to be of high quality and the only source of data about Somalia. Limitations to use has more to do with lack of capacity/time on the donor side. It was also noticed by FGS that rather than generating the knowledge and keeping it, the WB sought to build capacity for data collection and analysis.
	Development delivery – Scaling effects (national public resources, private sector, other donors)	**Highly satisfactory –** The MPF is co-financing USD 2.14 billion IDA financing.
	Development delivery – Convening power and influence (national entities, other donors, civil society, private sector)	**Satisfactory –** The MPF has functioned as a platform for coordination between the Somalia Government and the donors. This is now by the WB being pushed to the Somali Government aid coordination structures. The MPF also supports federal level coordination through the Finance Governance Committee.
	Development delivery – Access to skills (mobilisation of high level of expertise)	**Highly satisfactory** – Contributing through the MPF helped build capacity for reforms and establish governance systems that could not have been achieved at similar scale through bilateral programmes.
	Development delivery – Access to country expertise (mobilisation of country experience/insight)	**Satisfactory –** WB capacity and experience in PFM, public management, financial systems, and transfers to individuals, etc. widely recognised and donors are relying on the WB to set up these systems. WB capacity in the area of enabling environment and ability to also draw on IFC recognised.

[85] World Bank: Somalia Multi Partner Fund: Partnership Document. 30 November 2023 Annex 1. Programmatic scope and Theory of Change.

		WB lack of capacity with regard to reaching outside the ministries to lower levels recognised.
Aid effectiveness	**Aid effectiveness – reducing fragmentation** (harmonisation of external support)	**Satisfactory –** In particular in the earlier years, the MPF was part of the overall aid coordination architecture. In later years, the WB has supported the Somalia FGS aid coordination architecture. Despite its small amount compared to other funds, instrumental for aid coordination primarily by working with and through government. This in some instances led to donors feeling sidelined *"WB managing donor stakeholders rather than collaborating with donors."*[86]
	Aid effectiveness – collaboration with other Nordic donors	**Satisfactory –** Coordination with Nordic + no references to separate Nordic coordination feature in written material.
	Aid effectiveness – reduce costs for the donor	**Satisfactory –** Donor costs are reduced not least due to relying on the extensive risk management and monitoring funded by the MPF. Support through the MPF has opened for bilateral donors and the UN to use the Somali national systems to further strengthen state building.

Lessons learned/dilemmas:

Policy influencing and Nordic cooperation: Nordic donors agreed that an important reason for supporting the MPF was to influence the WB. It was less clear in what areas the Nordic countries sought to influence and what the influencing strategy was. The Nordic countries had high expectations as to the WB's ability to influence the politics of the Somali government, incl. with regard to fiscal transfers between the FGS and FMS/Somaliland. The WB on its part wanted to work with the Nordic donors, the WB providing the data and the donors the political arguments with the FGS. The WB pointed to successful influencing on behalf of the Nordics with regard to gender and inclusion.

Despite the much larger sums involved if IDA is included, donors appeared much more confident in the WB's ability to manage fiduciary and programme risks (incl. environmental and social) related to using country systems than the UN.

The extensive use of PIUs to reduce financial and programme-related risks represented a risk to ownership and long-term capacity building that the WB sought to mitigate by increasingly employing Somaliland civil service staff and reduced top-off. This came with other issues related to competition for staff with, e.g., the AfDB.

Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme Trust Fund (field study)

EQ	Summary findings
Criteria	• Key elements of the Nordic countries' rationale for their contributions include: alignment with their development policy priorities, the global significance of the fund, its long track record and achievements, and the WBG's current and future commitments to achieving SDG 7 by 2030, its convening and leverage power, recognising that a global response and accelerated implementation is necessary to catch up and achieve SDG 7 goals – *"The WB's partnership with the African Development Bank – Mission 300 – has committed to providing access to electricity to 300 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2030– it's music to our ears".* • Also, part of their rationale for support is their long-standing, generally positive experience with the fund and use of high-level knowledge products as well as the potential to exploit synergies and coherence of support to the ESMAP with the countries' bilateral portfolios – especially for Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. • Part of Iceland's rationale is the fund's coverage of geothermal energy where Iceland's expertise is strong and offered to the fund.

[86] Aleph Strategies: MPF for Somalia Mid-term Review Report September 2019 Independent Review.

	• Part of Sweden's rationale is the possibility of influencing the ESMAP's work at the country level through country windows, as it was done in Tanzania and Iraq.
Influence	• The Nordic countries pushed the envelope on clean cooking, an area where the WB had struggled for some time to attract sufficient financing. • In addition to substantial financing across multiple cycles, there is a high appreciation of Nordic expertise provided through secondments as well as knowledge exchange events organised by Norway and Iceland. • Nordic countries have contributed to improved results frameworks and reporting to focus on actual rather than expected results. • The consolidation of thematic windows for the new programming was also a result of feedback from donors, including the Nordics, who found the 29 windows too complex.
Results	• Overall, ESMAP-funded activities have made good progress toward achieving both project-specific outcomes and Results Framework outcomes, especially related to development finance. Multiple and/or successive grants in a country is a key factor affecting outcome achievement and sustainability. The ESMAP has influenced a substantial portion of the WB's lending in energy access, renewable energy, and energy efficiency, and this linking to WB lending operations represents a key pathway for ensuring sustainability of ESMAP results. • However, the ESMAP advisory services support broader energy policy reforms and regulations in client countries, which go beyond the WB direct lending operations, and the degree of effectiveness (and efficiency) of ESMAP to a high degree depends on the ability to apply analytics, policies, knowledge products, technical assistance and instruments produced by the upstream activities to generate and support downstream activities. It is less clear how this transition from upstream to downstream is supported by the ESMAP. The MOPAN study (2021/2022) also noted: *The Bank often does not demonstrate the contribution of its Advisory and Analytics to the achievement of development outcomes – there is room for more systemic uptake of these resources for operational learning.* • *Multilateralism* – The ESMAP contributes to strengthening multilateralism as it is closely linked to SDG 7 and is firmly placed in the mandate of the WB. The fund supports SDG 7 goals tracking tool. The trust fund supports and improves the quality of the WB lending and in doing so enhances the credibility of the bank as a multilateral institution in this sector. • *Influence* – Nordic finance supports global public goods and values related to accountability, environmental sustainability, and poverty reduction. It contributes to the energy practices of the WB. The ESMAP is fully integrated into the WB's global energy practice. The ESMAP informed USD 33 billion of WB lending, including USD 19.6 billion in climate co-benefits under the 2021–2024 programming. • *Country delivery – ownership* – The fund's demand-based approach for grant proposals is designed to foster a sense of local ownership. According to the two most recent evaluations of the ESMAP, the fund's activities demonstrate a high degree of local ownership because its programmes are demand driven. Countries must approach the fund before support is considered and dialogue is initiated. In Kenya, there is a strong sense of ownership of ESMAP activities for two main reasons: first, the country's significant potential for renewable energy makes government buy-in easier than in many other places. Second, the Government of Kenya actively initiates and engages in ESMAP-funded activities, and the linkage to loans further enhances this sense of ownership. • *Country delivery – capacity* – The ESMAP contributes to capacity improvements at individual, institutional, and enabling conditions levels. Examples include capacity building for stove providers in Rwanda, ministerial guidelines, a capacity-building workshop for financial institutions, and capacity building for Kenya Power. In Kenya, the ESMAP has supported enabling environment improvements in the energy sector, a draft regulation on mini-grids to bring clarity to operations, licensing, and dispute resolution, the development of a geospatial plan as part of the electrification strategy: "*The plan was a gamechanger, and without ESMAP, we wouldn't have accelerated the work to improve energy access rates at this pace.*" In addition, the WBG, though not directly through the ESMAP, contributed to sector restructuring and the consolidation of the energy efficiency mandate by expanding the Rural Electrification Agency's role to include energy efficiency, establishing a one-stop shop for energy efficiency investments in Kenya. • While the bank-executed grants offer quick gains and results – such as studies, assessments, and recommendations – concerns remain about their capacity-building potential. In Kenya, BEFTs provided quick gains, bypassing the slow national treasury procedures. Although this pragmatic

	solution achieved immediate results, it came at the cost of potential long-term capacity building within Kenya's energy sector. "*ESMAP is a quick help; we don't want to follow our slow national treasury procedures".* • The measurement of capacity development at various levels (individual, institutional, and enabling environment) remains a challenge. • Private sector investments are low.
Efficiency	• The ESMAP has maintained cost-effectiveness by keeping management costs flat despite a growing portfolio. In the new programming period, it has streamlined operations by reducing thematic windows and adopting a multi-phased programmatic approach. • Denmark and Sweden implement a thorough process when preparing and appraising their contributions to the ESMAP. Sweden is working to improve efficiency by streamlining and simplifying trust fund management across departments. The objective is to better balance the resources dedicated to assessing and appraising contributions with those used for follow-up and high-level dialogue.

Brief description of the trust fund

Trust fund objectives and strategy – The Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme (ESMAP) is a global, multi-donor technical assistance trust fund administered by the WB and supported by 20 partner organisations. It is designed to enable the energy transition required to reach SDG 7 goals: *Developing sustainable energy solutions to ensure access to affordable, reliable, modern, and sustainable energy for all by 2030*. The ESMAP's aim is to support low (through IDA) and middle-income countries (through IBRD) to reduce poverty and leverage economic development by incorporating sustainable energy solutions. To some extent, the ESMAP also contributes to SDG 13*: Climate Change*. The ESMAP's objectives are pursued through WBG lending operations that the ESMAP is designed to inform and support.

The ESMAP was implemented following a four-year business plan, incorporating four thematic pillars (Clean Cooking, Electricity Access, Renewable Energy, and Decarbonisation) and two cross-cutting thematic blocks (Foundations for Energy Transition and Energy Data and Analytics) under which a number of activities are carried out. The current business plan covers the period 1 July 2020-30 June 2024 (World Bank Fiscal Years FY 2021–FY 2024). The next business plan for 2025–2030 builds mainly on previous business plan setups and practices, but the period is increased from four to six years.

The ESMAP serves four core functions: (i) a think tank or incubator for innovative and cutting-edge knowledge sharing and advice, (ii) strategic advisor, providing grants and technical advice, (iii) market development for innovative catalytic solutions, providing grants for upstream analytics and technical cross support, and (iv) enabling blended finance through grants, climate finance, and concessional financing. The ESMAP's analytical and advisory services are fully integrated within the WB's country financing and policy dialogue in the energy sector, and the ESMAP functions as the umbrella trust fund programme of the WB's energy practice. The ESMAP's overview of all activities under disbursement as of 31 May 2024 comprises some 1,164 projects and programmes in 92 countries plus regional and global activities. *(Denmark PD 2024)*

Trust fund institutional arrangement – Since the ESMAP's establishment in 1983, the WB has made substantial internal rearrangements. After the adoption of the new strategy in 2013, focusing on two new goals: end extreme poverty by 2030 and promote shared prosperity for the bottom 40% of the population, the bank created the Energy & Extractives Global Practice (GP) that hosts the ESMAP. The ESMAP is overseen by a CG that includes representatives from contributing donors and is chaired by the Senior Director of the WB's Energy and Extractives Practice Group. The WB's Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) reviews and evaluates the performance of all WB Global Trust-Funded Programmes, including the ESMAP. The CG is advised by a Technical Advisory Group (TAG). The ESMAP's most recent independent evaluation concludes that the CG is effectively fulfilling its purpose and functions. This includes providing strategic direction for the use of programme resources, exercising appropriate management oversight, endorsing multi-year business plans, approving terms of reference for external evaluations and the TAG, and reviewing results achieved against business plan targets. The CG also provides strategic guidance to the ESMAP, and 'approves' the budget for the coming period. However, the CG is not a formal board with decision-making authority.

The ESMAP business plan has four inter-linked programmes which focus on Clean Cooking, Electricity Access, Renewable Energy, and Decarbonisation and is underpinned by two cross cutting programmes: on Foundations for the Energy Transition and Energy Data and Analytics (see Figure below).



As an umbrella programme, the ESMAP offers donors the opportunity to make additional targeted contributions to specific country/regional recipient-executed grants. These grants can be co-funded through the core ESMAP MDTF or through associated trust funds operating under the ESMAP umbrella, such as the Closing Gender Gap Fund.

Nordic engagement

Rationale for Nordic support – Key elements of the Nordic countries' rationale for their contributions include alignment with their development policy priorities, the global significance of the fund, its long track record and achievements, and the WBG's current and future commitments to achieving SDG 7 goals by 2030, its convening and leverage power recognising that a global response and accelerated implementation is necessary to catch up and achieve SDG 7 goals – *"Partnership with the African Development Bank – Mission 300 – has committed to providing access to electricity to 300 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2030 – it's music to our ears"*[87]. Also, part of their rationale for support is their long-standing, generally positive experience with the fund and use of high-level knowledge products as well as the potential to exploit synergies and coherence of support to the ESMAP with the countries' bilateral portfolios, especially for Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.

Although broadly similar, the rationale for some countries includes more specific and differentiating aspects. Part of Iceland's rationale is the fund's coverage of geothermal energy and other renewable energy sources where Iceland's expertise is strong and offered to the fund. Denmark finds ESMAP as the right place to influence the WB in greening its energy operations. The readiness of the fund's management to improve, following the evaluations of the fund, is also cited as a factor behind the choice to continue supporting the ESMAP in the period 2025–2030.[88] Part of Sweden's rationale is the possibility of influencing the ESMAP's work at the country level through country windows, as it has done in Tanzania and Iraq.

Financial support – ESMAP contributions have increased over the years, especially since 2019/2020. All Nordic countries have contributed to the ESMAP for the 2013–2023 period with a total of USD 231.7 million, representing 35% of total cumulative contributions. Norway's and Denmark's cumulative contributions are the highest among Nordic countries. A recurring theme in ESMAP reporting has been the fund's underfunding, overall and relative to programme planning – an imbalance between the overall programme and earmarked funds, leaving some thematic areas, such as clean cooking and electricity access, severely underfunded. The level of funding is also shaped by political priorities and influenced by global crises and shifts in development cooperation. Norway has indicated that, in principle, it cannot be

[87] Interview.
[88] Programme document 2024.

expected to increase its funding for the ESMAP given the current global situation, characterised by costly multiple crises.[89]

Figure 135: Nordic countries' contributions to the ESMAP

Funding (USDm)	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	Total
Denmark	8.74	8.93	8.36		9.92	4.33	7.12		14.14	17.63	3.18	**82.35**
Finland	0.79				0.14							**0.93**
Iceland	0.30	0.30	0.55	0.30	1.43	0.30	0.70	0.30	0.58	0.40	0.80	**5.97**
Non Nordic	13.59	30.45	26.82	22.14	21.59	33.73	71.47	49.23	49.44	54.53	59.31	**432.29**
Norway	3.75	6.45		4.00	3.58	4.17	3.55	23.80	12.81	11.36	10.01	**83.48**
Sweden	0.78	0.76		4.06	3.44	7.75	7.43	5.67	12.72	2.75	13.59	**58.96**
Total	**27.95**	**46.89**	**35.74**	**30.49**	**40.10**	**50.29**	**90.26**	**79.00**	**89.70**	**86.68**	**86.90**	**663.99**



Changes that occurred and results achieved

Ownership – The fund's demand-based approach for grant proposals is meant to ensure a sense of local ownership. According to the two most recent evaluations of the ESMAP, the fund's activities have a high degree of local ownership because its programmes are demand-driven, meaning that a country needs to approach the fund before support is considered and dialogue initiated. This was confirmed in Kenya, where there is a strong sense of ownership of ESMAP activities for two main reasons: first, the country's significant potential for renewable energy makes government buy-in easier than in many other places. Second, the Government of Kenya actively initiates and engages in ESMAP-funded activities, and the linkage to loans further enhances this sense of ownership. The evaluations also found that because of its significance and reputation, the ESMAP can establish programmes that go beyond country requests, offering innovative breakthroughs especially to trigger interests of private investors looking for new markets but that these new programmes are linked with a more established work on sector reforms. This highlights the importance of a balanced and gradual transition to green solutions that align with each country's priorities and capacity to adopt clean energy solutions. In Kenya, for example, before investing in energy efficiency, the WBG contributed to restructuring the energy sector and consolidating the energy efficiency mandate by expanding the Rural Electrification Agency's role to include energy efficiency, thereby establishing a one-stop shop for energy efficiency investments in the country.

Overall, the vast majority of the funds have been BEFTs, mainly pre-loan activities, which led to concerns about ownership. However, in Kenya, there was a strong sense of government ownership of ESMAP outputs due to the government's initiation and active engagement through feedback loops, as well as the recognition of the need for quick results to accelerate loan project preparation. This pragmatic solution to avoid delays associated with navigating government channels, came at the cost of potential capacity-building opportunities within Kenya's administration. There is a growing recipient-executed portfolio (REFT – part of the loan component): 38% in 2023 compared to 32% in 2022. The demand for REFT is on the rise, and a significant increase in REFTs is expected in the next programme (2025–2030) but ultimately this will depend on availability of donor funding and specific country demands.

Summary of capacity – The ESMAP contributes to capacity improvements at individual, institutional, and enabling conditions levels. Examples include capacity building for stove providers in Rwanda, ministerial guidelines, a capacity-building workshop for financial institutions, and capacity building for Kenya Power. In Kenya, the ESMAP has supported enabling environment improvements in the energy sector, a draft regulation on mini-grids to bring clarity to operations, licensing, and dispute resolution,

[89] CG meeting notes.

the development of a geospatial plan as part of the electrification strategy, "*The plan was a gamechanger, and without ESMAP, we wouldn't have accelerated the work to improve energy access rates at this pace."* In addition, the WBG, though not directly through the ESMAP, contributed to sector restructuring and the consolidation of the energy efficiency mandate by expanding the Rural Electrification Agency's role to include energy efficiency, establishing a one-stop shop for energy efficiency investments in Kenya. The ESMAP supported the development of a business plan for the Rural Electrification Agency, a roadmap for implementing their 2016–2020 Strategic Plan and fulfilling additional duties under their expanded mandate, as outlined in the then new Energy Bill.

While the bank-executed grants offer quick gains and results, such as studies, assessments, and recommendations, concerns remain about their capacity-building potential. In Kenya, BEFTs provided quick gains bypassing the slow national treasury procedures. Although this pragmatic solution achieved immediate results, it came at the cost of potential long-term capacity building within Kenya's energy sector. "*ESMAP is a quick help; we don't want to follow our slow national treasury procedures"*. The measurement of capacity development at various levels (individual, institutional, and enabling environment) remains a challenge.

Results summary table	
Summary	**Satisfactory**
Criteria	**Relevance: Satisfactory** – The ESMAP's interventions remain relevant in the context of the changed global landscape on energy, reflecting the goals of SDG 7 and the Paris Agreement under the UNFCCC. The ESMAP is seen as being at the forefront of the sustainable energy transition with its leading position globally and within the WB foremost acknowledged in the energy access agenda. **Effectiveness: Satisfactory** – Overall, ESMAP-funded activities have made good progress toward achieving both project-specific outcomes and Results Framework outcomes, especially related to development finance. Multiple and/or successive grants in a country is a key factor affecting outcome achievement and sustainability. The ESMAP has influenced a substantial portion of the WB's lending in energy access, renewable energy, and energy efficiency, and this link to WB lending operations represents a key pathway for ensuring sustainability of ESMAP results. However, ESMAP advisory services support broader energy policy reforms and regulations in client countries, which go beyond the WB direct lending operations, and the degree of effectiveness (and efficiency) of the ESMAP to a high degree depends on the ability to apply analytics, policies, knowledge products, technical assistance, and instruments produced by the upstream activities to generate and support downstream activities. It is less clear how this transition from upstream to downstream is supported by the ESMAP *(Danish PD 2024)*. The MOPAN study (2021/2022) also noted*: The Bank often does not demonstrate the contribution of its Advisory and Analytics to the achievement of development outcomes – there is room for more systemic uptake of these resources for operational learning.* **Efficiency: Satisfactory –** The ESMAP has maintained its cost-effectiveness while experiencing significant growth. Benchmarking of the programme management and administrative costs shows that the ESMAP is being delivered at comparable levels of efficiency to other similar programmes. Improvements are made for the 2025–2030 phase to streamline management processes, including the lengthy grant application process.
Sources of evidence	• Independent evaluation (2021) • Donor reporting, reviews, audits, appraisal, and decision documents (more than 10) • Interviews, WB task manager, country office, Nordic donor representative, final beneficiaries • Field observation
Strength of evidence	**Triangulation: Strong** (there is a wide range of sources that point to the same findings on effectiveness) **Quality of results framework: Moderately satisfactory** (indicators, targets, reporting): Generally speaking, the framework is considered solid and has been revised and improved periodically. There is still the issue of how to measure capacity and how to measure/isolate the contribution of the ESMAP when there are many other actors and factors involved. Although the ESMAP produces impact stories, the 2024 evaluation found the results frameworks overly complex, recommending simplification at output and outcome levels. The ESMAP has followed the recommendation and simplified the proposed new Results

	Framework for the FW 2025–2030 *(ESMAP management response to the evaluation recommendations)*. Several donors have expressed concern about ESMAP reporting on expected rather than actual results, which is not unique to the ESMAP, but it is about to change with the new 2025–2030 programme. *(2024 evaluation and PD Denmark)*

Examples of what worked	• The 2024 evaluation highlights an impressive volume of financing mobilised relative to ESMAP funding, with much more success in public than private financing. The ESMAP's funding is in the tens of millions per theme, while mobilised financing reaches billions.
	• The Renewable Energy Sustainable Renewables Risk Mitigation Initiative (SRMI) was particularly successful in attracting private investment. The SRMI team shared that a major driver of success in mobilising private financing is having the climate finance portions of WB projects (e.g., Green Climate Fund funding) conditional on including indicators for private capital mobilisation (and cancelling climate funding if those indicators are removed).
	• The 2024 independent evaluation points to examples of the ESMAP's effective contribution to transformational change:
	  ○ Energy Access and Quality Improvement Project (EAQIP) in Rwanda: EAQIP used bank-executed trust funds (BETFs) and recipient-executed trust funds (RETFs). The BETF funded stove selection, awareness studies, an updated operations manual, definition of subsidy levels and processes, capacity building for stove providers, ministerial guidelines, verification that stoves are in place and functional, and a capacity building workshop for financial institutions. The RETFs were used for partially subsidised purchases of clean and efficient cooking solutions for eligible households and to identify and pilot clean cooking technologies for schools. Between August 2022 and October 2023, roughly 165,000 stoves were disseminated by 14 companies through the programme, with participating companies selling additional stoves outside the programme, for a broader indirect impact. The project had a recipient target of 25% female-headed households and had achieved roughly 57%.
	  ○ The programmatic funding in support of the Power Sector Recovery Program in Nigeria has been highly effective, thanks to its flexibility. Rather than determining which analytical work would be needed when funding was requested in early 2021, the programmatic grants were based around the three main pillars: (i) power sector recovery and reform (improving existing grid), (ii) expanding last mile connectivity (grid and off-grid), and (iii) stakeholder engagement. The flexibility of the programmatic support allows for quick implementation of just-in-time support rather than having to wait for the proposal cycle to fund support.
	• The ESMAP's example of impact story:
	  ○ In Kenya, in 2014 and 2015, 150,000 households in informal settlements were connected to the country's formal electrification system, thanks to strong institutional buy-in, WB subsidies for connections, a community-based approach, global knowledge and experience sharing events organised by the ESMAP, where Kenya Power learned how similar issues were successfully addressed in Brazil and Colombia.
	• The ESMAP's Energy Data and Analytics team maintains and updates a variety of databases and tools, incl. SDG 7 tracking tool, which are widely recognised both within the WB and by external development partners, industry investors, and academia. These databases are likely to have long-lasting influence, as long as they are kept up to date. (2024 evaluation)
	• In Kenya, the ESMAP has supported enabling environment improvements in the energy sector (a draft regulation on mini-grids to bring clarity to operations, licensing, and dispute resolution, the development of a geospatial plan as part of the electrification strategy) *"The plan was a gamechanger, and without the ESMAP, we wouldn't have accelerated the work to improve energy access rates at this pace."*
	• In addition, the WBG, though not directly through the ESMAP, contributed to sector restructuring and the consolidation of the energy efficiency mandate by expanding the Rural Electrification Agency's role to include energy efficiency, establishing a one-stop shop for energy efficiency investments in Kenya. The ESMAP supported the

	development of a business plan for the Rural Electrification Agency, a roadmap for implementing their 2016–2020 Strategic Plan and fulfilling additional duties under their expanded mandate, as outlined in the then new Energy Bill.
	• According to the ESMAP, support under the current programme (2021–2024) led to (Danish PD 2024):
	  o USD 33 billion WB financing informed, including USD 19.6 billion in climate co-benefits.
	  o USD 19 billion external financing mobilised, including from the private sector.
	  o 16.5 GW generation capacity of renewable energy to be installed.
	  o 711 million metric tonnes of CO2 emissions projected to be reduced.
	  o 100 million people on their way to gain access to electricity.

Examples of what did not work	• Lack of strategic and transformative partnerships with other development banks, incl. with the AfDB's SEFA (CG 2024) • Limited private sector investments (CG 2024) • Weak capacity building approach for effective management of WB-financed interventions and limited capacity development for utility level technical staff whose lack of knowledge and skills hinder government decisions on energy transition (CG 2022) + measurement of capacity development at various levels (individual/institutional/enabling environment) • Realistic funding targets for effective implementation, for example, for clean cooking, where the available funding did not match the ambition set by the programme • Measurement of the use and effect of upstream knowledge products, guidelines, and tools – challenge in linking downstream impacts to upstream ESMAP work (2024 evaluation) • Indications of low ownership of BETF.
Factors (+ve, -ve)	• Demand-driven projects and local buy-in **(+ve)** • Strong government counterparts and coordination between the WB and the client. **(+ve)** • Flexibility of ESMAP grants to respond to the current needs and context of the sector, especially through the use of programmatic grants **(+ve)** • Underfunded programmes also influenced by shifting global and national priorities exacerbated, inter alia, by multiple global crises **(-ve)** • Limited capacity building **(-ve)** • Ambition level is high compared to funds available, difficult to see how the grants alone could be transformational across so many areas. The link to lending programmes makes the ambition more credible **(-ve)** • The extent to which the intended users of the global knowledge products have access and time to make use of them and the extent to which this is measured or known **(-ve)** • Government turnover and/or lack of ownership **(-ve)** • ESMAP and WB staffing limitations **(-ve)**

Summary of the trust fund's results in providing a comparative advantage		
Policy influence	**Policy influence – globally** (multi-country reach – including values and global public goods)	• **Highly Satisfactory –** The trust fund (also supported by the Nordic country agenda) supports global public goods and values related to accountability and environmental sustainability and poverty reduction. The framework for the next business plan (2025–2030) is built around recommendations from COP28 (triple renewable energy, double energy efficiency, and a just transition away from fossil fuels). The ESMAP's analytical and advisory services are integrated with the WB's country financing and policy dialogue in the energy sector.
	Policy influence – on the organisation	• **Satisfactory –** Because linked to and supporting the lending operations of the bank. Following the advice of the TAG, the next programming period (2025–2030) will have three umbrella windows (reduced from 29) and will focus on developing regulatory capacity among partners, access to

		electricity, clean cooking stoves, and systematic learning of experiences.
Multilateralism	**Strengthening the multilateral system** Delivering on the trustee mandate and SDGs	• **Highly satisfactory –** The trust fund is closely linked to SDG 7 and is firmly placed in the mandate of the WB. The trust fund activities are mainly carried out by WB staff at the country level, and the next programme reflects language from COP 28. The fund supports SDG 7 tracking tool.
	Strengthening the multilateral system (contributing to UN reforms, One UN, MDBs) Inter-agency cooperation	• **Satisfactory –** The trust fund supports and improves the quality of the WB lending and in so doing enhances the credibility of the bank as a multilateral institution in this sector.
Development delivery	**Development delivery –** Generate knowledge to enhance development impact	• **Satisfactory** – Many knowledge products, guidelines, and tools generated, but it is not known if they were used as intended. Challenging to link them to downstream impacts. Their use and effect were not measured. Some, as the mini-grid flagship report[90], were widely used.
	Development delivery – Scaling effects (national public resources, private sector, other donors)	• **Moderately satisfactory** – The in-country trust fund projects are linked to supporting much larger loan operations but with limited private sector investments, absence of strategic and transformative partnerships with other development partners, insufficient capacity building initiatives.
	Development delivery – Convening power and influence (national entities, other donors, civil society, private sector)	• **Satisfactory** – Because of the global reach, advocacy, and partnerships potential of the WBG with developing country governments, multilateral banks, private capital markets, bilateral donors, foundations, carbon-market finance institutions, national laboratories, experts in energy technology companies, consulting firms, and academia. However, the WB does not have a framework to guide and demonstrate the contribution of these partnerships to development results *(MOPAN assessment 2021–2022).*
	Development delivery – Access to skills (mobilisation of high level of expertise)	• **Satisfactory** – Because the funds were mainly used to contract consultants and in-house expertise and to share across countries, e.g. highly skilled WB staff.
	Development delivery – Access to country expertise (mobilisation of country experience/insight)	• **Satisfactory** – Linked to and supporting the lending operations of the WB, which involve significant investments and bring together public and private sector but mainly BETF, so capacity development and ownership are potentially constrained.
Aid effectiveness	**Aid effectiveness – reducing fragmentation** (harmonisation of external support)	• **Moderately satisfactory** – There are examples of synergy between WB and donor projects at country level, e.g., between the Swedish portfolio and the ESMAP in Tanzania, but overall, the potential has not been adequately exploited. Also limited uptake of EMSAP-generated knowledge products.
	Aid effectiveness – collaboration with other Nordic donors	• **Satisfactory** – Demand-driven bilateral coordination between Nordic donors. Overall coordination hampered by differing views, e.g., on fossil fuels, hydropower.

[90] https://www.esmap.org/mini_grids_for_half_a_billion_people_the_report

	Aid effectiveness – reduce costs for the donor	• **Satisfactory –** By supporting WB lending, the Nordic donors were able to finance at scale.

Lessons learned

- **Programmatic approach**: The use of a country-level programmatic approach proved effective, particularly for clean cooking initiatives.
- **Results framework**: Complexity of the results framework created administrative burdens and confusion, limiting clarity in measuring achievements.
- **Reporting**: Despite strong results on the ground, reporting on expected rather than actual outcomes can create the perception that there are no tangible achievements.
- **Continuity in support:** The ESMAP is complex, and it takes time to understand it. Hence, a continuous and steady non-financial support/secondments are beneficial for both the donors and ESMAP managers: *"they (the donors) know how to use us"*.

Intervention Case Study – Support for Institutional Capacity and Enabling Environment Improvements in the Energy Sector, Kenya – The ESMAP

Intervention case study: Support for institutional capacity and enabling environment improvements in the energy sector, Kenya Trust fund: The ESMAP – World Bank global trust fund	Grant – Bank-executed funds Mission to Kenya: 7–8 September 2024

Challenges addressed and intervention purpose – In Kenya, the ESMAP has sought to facilitate improvements in the energy sector, increased access to energy, enhanced renewable energy adoption, promotion of energy efficiency, by strengthening the capacity of the energy sector, incl. improvements in the enabling environment for public and private investments for energy generation, conversion, transmission, distribution, and storage. The ESMAP's focus has been on informing, facilitating, and accelerating investments in energy infrastructure, in particular WB lending programmes, in support of sustainable energy development.

Changes and absence of expected change

- **Examples of improvements:**
  - Draft regulation on mini-grids to bring clarity to operations, licensing, and dispute resolution.
  - Geospatial plan as part of the electrification strategy: *"The plan was a gamechanger, and without ESMAP, we wouldn't have accelerated the work to improve energy access rates at this pace."*
  - Business plan for the Rural Electrification Agency in support of implementation of the energy bill – a roadmap for implementing their 2016–2020 Strategic Plan and fulfilling additional duties under their expanded mandate, as outlined in the then new Energy Bill. In addition, the WBG, though not directly through the ESMAP, contributed to energy sector restructuring and the consolidation of the energy efficiency mandate by expanding the Rural Electrification Agency's role to include energy efficiency, establishing a one-stop shop for energy efficiency investments in Kenya
- **Examples of expected improvements:**

    - Contributions to sector improvements through a review of the legal and regulatory framework for solar and wind auctions, along with recommendations for enhancing this framework. In addition, recommendations for improving a legal and regulatory framework for battery energy storage systems.
- **ESMAP influence –** The ESMAP has supported large WB energy lending programmes in Kenya, and this link to lending programmes represents a key pathway for ensuring sustainability of ESMAP results.
- **Capacity –** BEFTs provided quick gains, bypassing the slow national treasury procedures. Although this pragmatic solution achieved immediate results, it came at the cost of potential long-term capacity building within Kenya's energy sector. "*ESMAP is a quick help; we don't want to follow our slow national treasury procedures"*. The major capacity development occurs through engagement in long-term investment projects that the ESMAP facilitates.
- **Geothermal strategy** – Discussing six potential business models for geothermal from fully private to fully public with hybrid approaches (PPPs) in between, outlining the advantage, disadvantage, and overall assessment of each model. The recurring issue was how to de-risk private investments. Geothermal projects require substantial upfront investment for exploration and drilling. Private investors often need to charge higher prices to recoup these costs, making it difficult to compete under the current tariff regulations. The strategy was not adopted.

Contributing/limiting factors

- **Demand-driven projects and local buy-in/ownership** – A strong sense of ownership of ESMAP activities for two main reasons:
    - First, the country's significant potential for renewable energy makes government buy-in easier than in many other places. Second, the government's initiation and active engagement through feedback loops as well as the recognition of the need for quick results to accelerate loan project preparation further enhanced this sense of ownership.
- **WB and government capacity –** Continuity in support combined with skilled and trusted national staff **+** strong government counterparts and coordination between the WB and the government.
- **Political economy** – Geothermal strategy was not adopted due to various political economy forces at play, incl. concerns of higher price for end users by increased private sector involvement in geothermal.

Trust fund influence

- **Link to WB lending programmes –** Linking the grants with infrastructure investments and technical support for further capacity improvements, also in support of attracting private sector investments.

Global Water Security and Sanitation Partnership Trust Fund (field study)

EQ	Summary findings
Criteria	• The choice to support the Global Water Security and Sanitation Partnership (GWSP) was a strategic one. The main criteria common to the Nordic donors was centred around alignment to Nordic cooperation strategies and the contribution to SDG 6. To some extent it was also guided by a long history of earlier support and the recognition that without Nordic support, the trust fund activities would be severely curtailed. The difficulty of knowing if it was better to support the sector bilaterally or through a trust was raised during the Danish decision-making process. Norway made a deliberate strategic decision to withdraw (because there were other higher sector priorities). • The most important trust fund feature was the reputation of the WB in managing and making good use of the funds and ensuring receptive and timely communication with the donors. Soft, preference-based earmarking made it easier to justify funding but in practice was not used in the sense of being followed up on. The opportunity for secondment was relevant for Denmark, although ultimately this did not take place. Doubts were expressed about the reporting on outcomes, the global nature of the trust fund, which meant that actives might not be tailored enough to country needs, and the reality

	of how synergy with bilateral programmes would be achieved in practice [all of which are doubts the relevance of which has been confirmed by subsequent experience]. • There was little or no consideration in the decision-making of the actions or position of other Nordic donors.
Influence	• There was an engagement strategy and advocacy agenda which was broadly common between the Nordic donors, more explicit and systematically followed up on in the case of Sweden. • The Nordic donors participated actively in Partnership council meetings as testified by the minutes of meeting and the view of trust fund staff who could recall the positions of Nordic donors. • Sweden mobilised considerably more resources than other donors to engage with the trust fund. Documents such as conclusions on performance and statements on reports provide an explicit follow up on how the policy dialogue has proceeded. • Denmark signalled an interest in closer engagement, but the lack of resources to do so was noted (prophetically) earlier in the decision-making process. • There was no explicit Nordic coordination, although in reality, the position of the Nordic and most of the other donors was similar and the need for coordination was not obvious. • The trust fund facilitated a high level of communication and inclusion of the donors in decision-making through the partnership council meetings and through meeting at global conferences. The donor voice, including Nordic donors, was clearly taken into account. One could say it was quite dominating (even controlling).
Results	• The results framework, monitoring, and reporting are considered strong and have evolved over time to deal with complex issues. The results framework is complemented by mid-term assessments, case study deep dives, project completion reports, and an independent evaluation. • Nevertheless, it has always been difficult to systematically report on outcomes and to demonstrate the contribution of the trust fund to changes that have occurred. Illustrative showcase stories and examples have been found to be the most concrete way of communicating higher level results by linking the i) challenge being addressed, the ii) approach adopted, and the iii) additionality of the trust fund actions. Other trust funds are not as clear on the results reporting as this trust fund. • Multilateralism: The trust fund supports and improves the quality of the WB lending and in doing so enhances the credibility of the bank as a multilateral institution in this sector. • Influence: The Nordic countries' finance enabled the trust fund to promote global public goods and values related to gender, accountability, environmental sustainability, climate, and poverty reduction. There is a strong global outreach via multiple high-level international sector meetings. There is influence on USD 6 billion per year through 'informed lending', which is more than individual Nordic donors could possibly obtain. Danish aims on synergies with and informing bilateral programmes or enhancing Danish water industry engagement do not seem to have occurred (and the realism of this is brought into question and based on the case studies, little evidence has been found (apart from a project in Tanzania). • Country delivery – Ownership: GWSP country-based projects are systematically linked to ongoing or planned WB lending operations, which means that they are anchored in government and WB priorities and programmes. This ensures a high degree of ownership – assuming of course that the loan operations are owned by the country, agencies, and beneficiaries involved in sustaining them. But it has also been noted by evaluations that the BETF modality means that the country stakeholders are sometimes in a passive, even spectator, role (in the case study in Kenya this was not the case). • Country delivery - Capacity: The GWSP has had a focus on institutional capacity development, which is well conceived. Many of the knowledge products are closely related to meeting identified capacity gaps in the sector. At the same time, capacity development is not monitored, and a tendency for the projects to substitute rather than build capacity has been noted. The main thrust of the grants is to support preparation of lending operations and/or advance policy dialogue on reforms. The grants are too small to develop capacity, which is more relevant for longer-term lending operations. • Country delivery – Results: GWSP performance measured against their approved workplans, and results frameworks are considered by all as satisfactory or better. Global knowledge products are high quality, but their use is not easy to measure. Emphasis is put on the process and co-generation with those intending to use the products.

Efficiency	• Nordic countries supporting the GWSP use 10% less human resources to manage the trust fund each. A small optimisation could potentially be obtained through joint appraisal and/or rotational lead in follow-up. • The Trust Fund secretariat is small and the set up was found to be lean and flexible by the 2021 independent evaluation. • The cost norms and productivity of the activities are governed by WB norms and management arrangements. • Activities are selected against their contribution to the approved work plan, and the demand for funds is greater than the availability, which combine to enhance the efficient use of funds

Brief description of the trust fund

Trust fund objectives and strategy – The GWSP was launched in 2017 as an international partnership to support countries to meet the targets related to water and sanitation under the SDGs, particularly those of Goal 6. It resulted from the integration of both the Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) and Water Partnership Program (WPP). The GWSP is a multi-donor trust fund administered by the WB's Water GP and supported by Denmark, Sweden, Australia, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and USAID. Norway has also supported the trust fund in the past. The primary objective of the GWSP is to support client governments to achieve water-related SDGs and develop climate-resilient water management through the generation of innovative global knowledge and the provision of country-level support, while leveraging WB financial instruments and promoting global dialogue and advocacy with key partners and clients to increase reach and impact. The GWSP aims to influence the quality, sustainability, and innovation of the WB lending operations related to water as well as to leverage the lessons learned from the WB's country operations to a global knowledge platform and think tank that shapes the global debate on water. The GWSP's strategy is to combine its role as a global think tank with an influence on WB lending supported by a 'knowledge into implementation' approach.

The GWSP has identified four entry points: global knowledge mobilisation; long-term country engagement; just-in-time support (technical assistance), and implementation and scale-up of reforms and investments. The strategy is reflected in the GWSP ToC, which has evolved over the years. For the most recent version, see Annex 3 (World Bank, 2022). Results from the combined interventions are reported on for nine priority countries: Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, Pakistan, Uganda, and Vietnam. There are two WB projects in Kenya and one in Tanzania that have links to the GWSP. In Kenya, the GWSP has four grants (a hydro-informatics tool; technical assistance (TA) for sediment management in Mwache watershed; water and sanitation reforms; irrigation reforms and private capital mobilisation). The GWSP focuses on five themes: sustainability, inclusion, financing, institutions, and resilience. The GWSP is structured around three blocks, based on which results monitoring takes places: Block A: Institutions/policies strengthened in support of the five priority themes. Block B: Support to WB lending operation – Tracks shifts in design of Water GP lending operations and results reported by the active portfolio. Block C: Validates knowledge in a selected number of priority countries – Combined results of GWSP-supported activities and leveraged WB lending and non-lending activities. Over half of the Water GP staff are located in field offices.

Trust fund institutional arrangement – The trust fund follows the governance arrangements of the Umbrella reforms. A partnership council chaired by the WB meets once a year. Decisions are reached by consensus with donor endorsement by a no objection procedure. The priority themes are integrated in the core business lines of the Water GP. The trust fund is bank executed for knowledge, technical assistance, and advisory services and recipient executed for project preparation activities. An umbrella programme management team coordinates day-to-day management and implementation of the GWSP. As allowed for in the institutional setup, a water consultative group without decision-making powers was originally foreseen to avail of donor expertise and aid donor coordination. However, this group was not set up and does not feature in later administrative agreements (World Bank, 2019, 2023d). An indirect rate of 17.5% applied as a percentage of the staff costs available to the Development Partner Centre. The trust fund fee varies from 5% to 2% depending on the cumulative size of the trust fund (from USD 50 million to USD 1 billion).

Nordic engagement

Rationale for Nordic support – The core rationale for funding was the potential contribution to SDG 6 with a recognition of the importance of water for achieving other SDGs such as poverty reduction, food security, environment, and climate change action. The Nordic donors contributed to the earlier trust funds that preceded the GWSP, which gave continuity and, in some way, an unwritten obligation. For Denmark, the thematic topic of water was also a relevant factor, especially in the context of Denmark reducing bilateral support for water programmes. The Danish council for development expressed uncertainty about whether multilateral support was more effective than bilateral for water projects. A key rationale for choosing the trust fund was the general track record of the trustee itself: "*World Bank trust fund was perceived as solid and relevant"* (MFA Denmark, 2019). The Norwegian and Swedish rationale for supporting the trust fund broadly reflected the same points.

There was some concern expressed about contributing to global funds due to lack of tailoring: *"global trust funds risked adopting a one-size-fits-all approach making adaptation to country-specific contexts challenging."* (MFA Denmark, 2019, p4) and the potential synergy with bilateral projects *"Council further questioned how synergies would be achieved without bilateral initiatives"* (MFA Denmark, 2019, p5)

Financial support – The contributions from the Nordic countries are summarised in Figure 136 below. Sweden is by far the largest of the Nordic donors and has contributed since the start of the trust fund in 2016. Norway made a small contribution at the start of the trust fund in 2017. Together, the Nordic countries account for 36% of the funding.

Figure 136: Nordic countries' contributions to the GWSSP MDTF







Funding (USDm)	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	Total
Denmark				5.23	2.80	2.55		**10.59**
Norway	2.29	0.08						**2.37**
Sweden	15.71	10.51	6.38	15.31	13.66		9.56	**71.14**
Nordic Total	18.00	10.59	6.38	20.55	16.46	2.55	9.56	**84.09**
Non nordic	21.03	20.93	21.01	22.18	17.89	20.53	27.34	**150.92**
Total	**39.03**	**31.52**	**27.39**	**42.72**	**34.35**	**23.09**	**36.91**	**235.01**

Results summary table	
Summary	**Satisfactory**
Criteria	**Relevance:** Satisfactory. The relevance is high given the shortfall in reaching SDG 6, and here the link to lending programmes is highly relevant. The global public good aspects of water resources management also make the global nature relevant – although tempered by the fact that there is already a large number of knowledge products and international meetings within the water sector, and the main issue is implementation in practice. **Effectiveness:** Satisfactory. The independent evaluation (Universalia, 2021), the mid-term assessments for nine priority countries as well as assessment by Danish and Swedish formulation and appraisal processes have all concluded that the results achieved by the GWSP (prior to and since 2016) have been significant and broadly in line with their mandate and results framework. **Efficiency:** Moderately satisfactory. Much of the work is carried out at the country level. The team in Washington is relatively small. WB cost norms and administrative procedures are used. Sixty percent of the projects are demand driven by WB lending operations. The choice of projects is guided by an approved workplan, and in-country projects are all linked to lending operations ensuring fiduciary control and meaning no new systems need to be set up. Staff and project productivity controlled through the WB managerial and governance environment at country level. The demand for funds is greater than what is available, which creates an incentive for productive use. The overhead is estimated at 10% (Sida, 2019b).
Sources of evidence	• GWSP workplans, annual reports 2019–2023 (more than 10) • Independent evaluation (2021) • Donor reporting, reviews, audits, appraisal, and decision documents (more than 10) • Interviews, WB task manager, country office, Nordic donor representative, civil society, final beneficiaries • Field observation – Ahero irrigation scheme where one of the GWSP products was visited
Strength of evidence	**Triangulation: Strong** (there is a wide range of sources that point to the same findings on effectiveness) **Quality of results framework:** Satisfactory (indicators, targets, reporting). Generally speaking, the framework is considered solid and has been revised and improved periodically. There is still the issue of how to measure capacity and how to measure/isolate the contribution of the GWSP when there are many other actors and factors involved.
Examples of what worked	The 2021 independent evaluation points to satisfactory and varied evidence of transformative impact on: • Client country systems (e.g., in Uganda, the 'Strengthening Government of Uganda Capacity to Deliver Sanitation and Manage Fecal Sludge' grant led to piloting of three cluster towns); • On the WB where it is noted that the GWSP has been influential, not only within the water area but also health and agriculture (e.g., in Nepal on a World Bank Climate Smart Irrigation project), this is further supported by the Danish appropriation of the GWSP, which concludes that "*GWSP support is widely recognized as making World Bank projects more "nimble", "dynamic", and "responsive"*. In financial year 2020, the GWSP made USD 31 million grants than informed USD 13 billion of WB lending, leading to a ration of approximately 1:400 grant to loan ratio; • On development partners and programmes where the GWSP participates in donor coordination mechanisms and helps ensure that projects are harmonised; and • Responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, not only in an emergency sense but also to pave the way for transformative changes (e.g., on handwashing and hygiene and on building financial resilience of service providers). Across the strategic areas, the Danish appropriation of the GWSP (MFA, Denmark, 2023) notes the following examples of results that are implementation related and support the knowledge into implementation strategy of the trust fund: • Inclusion: 100% of projects were gender tagged, meaning they demonstrated a results chain by linking gender gaps identified in the design phase analysis to specific actions tracked in the Results Framework during implementation.

	• Resilience: 100% of new projects incorporate resilience in the design of water-related activities. • Financing: Increase in the percentage of projects that supported reforms/actions improving financial viability (from 69% in FY21 to 89% in FY22), and projects with explicit focus on leveraging private finance (from 8% to 20%). • Institutions: The percentage of projects that support reforms/actions that strengthen institutional capacity is held at 100% in FY22. • Sustainability: All 24 Water GP lending operations promoted sustainable and efficient water use. • Kenya: The Irrigator of the Future tool was being successfully applied and replicated. It is accepted at a policy level and also had tangible benefits when applied at the scheme level, e.g., it brought about a more highly organised and rigorous diagnostic process and was clearly linked to costed action plans that also formed the basis for future performance contracts for senior scheme management.
Examples of what did not work	• Measurement of capacity development • Measurement of the use and effect of knowledge products, guidelines, and tools • Indications of low ownership of BETF • Time available by key WB and also national stakeholders to make use of the knowledge products (especially in fragile states) "challenges remain with respect to the capacity of Water GP staff … to access, absorb, and deploy the range of GWSP-supported global knowledge products for greatest impact" (Universalia, pxiv) • The Irrigator of the Future tool introduced by GWSP in Kenya at the Ahero irrigation scheme was generally highly satisfactory but there was a weakness in that there was not a provision for cascading the insights and methodology from the high-level farmer representatives to farmer structures and farmers lower down. There was a language barrier as at least 30% of the trainees were confident in the language of the workshops (English/Swahili) – only one of the four facilitators spoke Luo. The action plans focussed mainly on what the scheme management could do and did not identify farmer action or change of practice.
Factors (+ve, -ve)	• Project selection is competitive, guided by the approved workplan, linked to lending operations, and guided by WB governance, managerial and financial control systems **(+ve)** • Ambition level is high compared to funds available, difficult to see how the grants alone could be transformational across so many areas – the link to lending programmes makes the ambition more credible **(-ve)** • Strong and systematic interaction by donors (particularly Sweden), especially on the conclusions on performance and statements on reports **(+ve)** • The extent to which the intended users of the global knowledge products have the access and time to make use of them and the extent to which this is measured or known **(-ve)**

Results summary at project or intervention level verified through field visit	
Project	Application of the GWSP-developed Irrigator of the Future tool – field visit at Ahero irrigation scheme.
Criteria	**Overall:** Highly satisfactory. Mainly because of strong ownership at policy level and application at scheme management and among farmer representatives **Relevance**: Highly satisfactory. Although participatory irrigation management has been practiced for 20 years, the tool addressed the need for more robust diagnostic and costed action planning and was intended to be an eye opener in consolidating the change of mindset from public irrigation bodies from having a control function towards having a service provision and client orientation. **Effectiveness**: Satisfactory. The tool was introduced and had already had good effect but it has not been fully rolled out at farmer level, and change in farmer practices are not well identified. **Efficiency:** Satisfactory. A limited input of six days with four facilitators was made, and the outputs and outcomes achieved compare well with that scale of inputs.

Source and strength of evidence	**Sources:** A number of interviews at policy, irrigation authority, and farmer level combined with field visits. Documents on the tool and its application **Strength of evidence:** Strong (there is a wide range of sources that point to the same findings on effectiveness)

Summary of the trust fund's results in providing a comparative advantage		
Policy influence	**Policy influence – globally** (multi-country reach – including values and global public goods)	• **Highly satisfactory –** The trust fund (also supported by the Nordic country agenda) supports global public goods and values related to accountability and environmental sustainability and poverty reduction. There is a strong global outreach via multiple high-level international sector meetings. In Kenya there was a strong influence in the irrigation sector where reforms on farmer participation were strengthened using tools provided by the GWSP.
	Policy influence – on the organisation	• **Highly satisfactory –** One of the three main objectives is to influence and support WB lending in the sector and all in-country activities support loan operations. The PC clearly takes the donor viewpoints into account, and the secretariat filters the final approval of grants against the council-approved workplan.
Multi-lateralism	**Strengthening the multilateral system** Delivering on the trustee mandate and SDGs	• **Highly satisfactory –** The trust fund is closely linked to SDG 6 and related SDGs and is firmly placed in the mandate of the WB. The trust fund activities are mainly carried out by WB staff at the country level and the results framework is modelled to (and has also informed) the overall WB corporate scorecard for the Global Water Practice.
	Strengthening the multilateral system (contributing to UN reforms, One UN, MDBs) Inter-agency cooperation	• **Satisfactory –** The trust fund supports and improves the quality of the WB lending and in doing so enhances the credibility of the bank as a multi-lateral institution in this sector.
Development delivery	**Development delivery –** Generate knowledge to enhance development impact	• **Satisfactory** – Because many knowledge products and tools generated (as one of the three main objectives of the trust fund). The issue, however, is that it is not known to what extent in practice they have been used and if they worked as intended.
	Development delivery – Scaling effects (national public resources, private sector, other donors)	• **Satisfactory** – The in-country trust fund projects are linked to supporting very large loan operations.
	Development delivery – Convening power and influence (national entities, other donors, civil society, private sector)	• **Satisfactory** – Because linked to and supporting the lending operations of the bank, which involve significant investments and bringing together of civil society, private sector, and public sector. But they are mainly BETF, so capacity development and ownership are potentially constrained.
	Development delivery – Access to skills (mobilisation of high level of expertise)	• **Satisfactory** – Because the funds were mainly used to contract consultants and in-house expertise and to share across countries, e.g., highly skilled WB staff for sedimentation studies to extend longevity of a dam to be financed through WB loans.
	Development delivery – Access to country expertise (mobilisation of country experience/insight)	• **Moderately satisfactory** – Because linked to and supporting the in-country lending operations of the bank, which involve significant investments and bringing together of civil society, private sector, and public sector. However, there is an issue with national stakeholder involvement in the studies.

Aid effectiveness	**Aid effectiveness – reducing fragmentation** (harmonisation of external support)	• **Satisfactory** – The use of the WB lending operations meant that the in-country operations (BETF or RETF) were under the fiduciary and governance control of an already established system. The trust fund also enhanced synergies between the WB and donor projects at country level.
	Aid effectiveness – collaboration with other Nordic donors	• **Moderately satisfactory** – Little explicit coordination. However, the topics for policy dialogue were common across the Nordic donors.
	Aid effectiveness – reduce costs for the donor	• **Satisfactory** – Because instead of the donors getting involved in their own projects, they were financing at scale a single knowledge hub. Some duplication of efforts in that all the Nordic donors had staff that were involved in following up.

Lessons learned

- Ownership of knowledge products is best secured by ensuring that the process of generating them is inclusive of those that can make use of the products. (trust fund lesson)
- Measurement of the uptake and use of knowledge products is proving difficult to determine. (evaluators)
- Illustrative showcase stories and examples have been found to be the most concrete way of communicating higher level results by linking the challenge being addressed, the approach adopted, and the additionality of the trust fund actions. (evaluators and trust fund)

Hypothesis tested at field level

Nordic expectations on synergy and, in the case of Denmark, engaging with the Danish resource base were met (economic diplomacy – contracts, contacts, specifications framing).

Findings: This hypothesis was not confirmed. Some links have been made by a WB staff member based in Denmark to link with and explain the WB operations, but this has, for a variety of reasons, not led to any concrete contracts. A key reason is that the Danish companies do not have a strong understanding of how the WB works, in part because the modus operandi of the bank and the business operations of the Danish companies (including publicly owned utilities) are not compatible, and the scale and profitability of the potential contracts is not sufficient to justify the marketing and internal adjustment needed.

- The process of developing the global knowledge products has been inclusive and created ownership and capacity
  Findings: Partly confirmed. In the case study visited, the process of developing the products was not tested but their application was. In this case it was the use of the Irrigator of the Future tool. It was found to be applied in an inclusive way and to carry high ownership at local and national level
- The global knowledge products are being used and are having the intended effect
  Findings: Confirmed as above
- The scarce resources, the governance mechanisms and cost norms of the WB, and thoroughly tested strategy combine to create an efficient outcome
  Findings: No evidence that contradicts this hypothesis was found. It is found plausible although difficult to prove
- The GWSP strategy and accountability is strong enough to ensure that the funds are used for the original purposes and not for supporting standard lending operation tasks.
  Findings: The hypothesis was confirmed for the particular product whose use was verified in the field.

Project Evaluation Case Study – Irrigation Operator of the Future, Kenya – GWSP

Project evaluation case study: Irrigation Operator of the Future – Ahero irrigation scheme – Kenya
Trust fund: GWSP – World Bank global trust fund

Grant – bank executed: USD 141,111
Recipient: National Irrigation Authority, Kenya
Date of visit: 10 October 2024

Challenges addressed and project purpose – A main challenge that the project aimed to address was the need to consolidate and deepen the participatory irrigation management approach, ensure a service orientated approach, and make the irrigation sector more attractive for private investment. A part of this effort, the Irrigator of the Future was applied to a number of government-managed irrigation schemes including Ahero irrigation scheme that was completed in 1969 and serves more than 1000 farmers with an average holding of just under 1 hectare mainly under rice production. Two three-day workshops were held in 2024 involving 40–50 farmer representatives and up to five scheme management staff.

Changes and absence of expected change

- **Robust diagnostic** – Through a highly participatory approach, a robust diagnostic approach was adopted to deepen the understanding of the challenges facing the farmers and scheme management (+ve)
- **Mindset change** – The workshop contributed to consolidating a mindset change toward scheme management being service orientated and farmers taking initiative and control (+ve)
- **Sector reforms** – The application of the tool promoted the wider sector reforms to make irrigation commercially viable (+ve)
- **Action and accountability link** – The participatory and rigorous diagnostic analysis was costed and integrated in the scheme workplan and will be reflected in management performance contracts (+ve)
- **Farmer practice** – The actions focussed on scheme management actions and did not yet identify farmer actions or how to cascade the approach beyond the farmer leaders (-ve)
- **Application to private schemes** – It is not yet clear how to adapt the tool to private irrigation schemes which heavily outweigh government management schemes (-ve)

Contributing factors

- **Built on earlier reforms** – After nearly 20 years of practicing participatory irrigation management, there was a cohesive structure for farmer representation and leadership that could engage in the diagnostic and action planning.
- **Scheme management and farmers engaged** – The scheme management and farmer leaders involved were dedicated and highly skilled. Allowances were paid to the farmer representatives that were a factor in ensuring attendance.
- **High-level support** – There was high-level support for using the tool from the National Irrigation Board.

Trust fund influence

- **Quality application of GWSP tools** – The Irrigator of the Future tool developed in part by the GWSP and internationally tested, among other places, in Kenya was well facilitated and effective in ensuring a participatory and robust diagnostic analysis.

- **Link to WB loans** – The WB involvement served to bring high-level commitment to use of the tool to support sector reforms and pave the way to benefiting from WB lending and improving performance to encourage private sector finance.

Lessons learned

- **Changing farmer practice will take much more investment –** It will take a long time before the tool has an actual implementation effect on farmer practice. The tool or aspects of it would need to be cascaded down to the farmer level if it were to make a change in farmer practice.
- **Building on existing farmer structures –** Existing farmer structures and leadership were used and ensured that the tool was participatory
- **High level support –** The support and enthusiasm for the tool and approach from sector top leadership was important.

"We have discussed the challenges before but not to this level. This time we went to the root causes. For example, instead of just putting more murram on roads we identified the cause of road failure at key hot spots and identified the need to improve maintenance of drainage at those areas before road repairs" Scheme management

"Leasing by farmers is an issue as those taking short leases are not interested or committed to long term improvements yet. In the farmer leader groups, over 40% are leasing their farms – we discussed the root causes of this, identifying different situations and action that could take to prevent and mitigate" Farmer representative

"This training was better than other training we have had. But not all the farmer leaders were able to participate fully because only one facilitator spoke the local language" Chairman of a farmer representative organisation.



Table 1a – Results summary at project or intervention level verified through field visit	
Project	Application of the GWSP-developed Irrigator of the Future tool. Field visit at Ahero irrigation scheme
Criteria	**Overall:** Highly satisfactory – Mainly because of strong ownership at policy level and application at scheme management level and among farmer representatives. **Relevance:** Highly satisfactory – Although participatory irrigation management has been practiced for 20 years, the tool addressed the need for more robust diagnostic and costed action planning and was intended to be an eye opener in consolidating the change of mindset from public irrigation bodies from having a control function towards having a service provision and client orientation.

	Effectiveness: Satisfactory – The tool was introduced and had already had good effect but it has not been fully rolled out at farmer level, and change in farmer practices are not well identified. **Efficiency:** Satisfactory – A limited input of six days with four facilitators was made, and the outputs and outcomes achieved compare well with that scale of inputs.
Source and strength of evidence	**Sources:** A number of interviews at policy, irrigation authority, and farmer level combined with field visits. Documents on the tool and its application (need workshop report +action plan) **Strength of evidence:** Strong (there is a wide range of sources that point to the same findings on effectiveness)

PROBLUE (field study)

EQ	Summary findings
Criteria	• A strategic choice was made that the global public good of oceans was better managed through a multilateral approach and one where the incentive of concessional lending would also play a part (confirmed during field visits) • The main criteria for Sweden were the contribution to their strategies. They were re-energising their ocean strategy and the fund fitted that well. In general, Sweden focusses on poverty, gender, and human rights (and where relevant provides secondments with that expertise). For Iceland the rationale was that the fund (as a successor to PROFISH) supported sustainable and well-governed fisheries. For Norway, which initiated the fund, it was a means of raising global support and action on plastics (something that Norway could not do on its own) • There was an interest from Norway to get other donors to join. Especially Sweden, which became the second biggest contributor. But it was probably more about ensuring the viability of the fund rather than because it was Nordic
Influence	• Sweden (and the UK) had an explicit policy dialogue agenda, which they reported on (actions taken, results of the policy dialogue); Norway and Iceland also had clear positions and agenda on plastic waste, marine spatial planning, and governance of fisheries; Denmark had a low-key approach due to lack of resources to follow up in detail. There was Nordic cooperation in the setting up of the trust fund and setting up meetings with donors in Sweden: Nordic cooperation happens but not in the sense of excluding others • Norway was the first co-chair of the PC and had considerable influence on the setting up and direction of the trust fund • A special gender group was set up using resources outside the trust fund itself. By all accounts it was successful • The PC organised meetings in countries where activities were undertaken (e.g., in Ghana and Costa Rica), and the donor participated. This gave stronger engagement of the donors
Results	• The results framework was reviewed, discussed, and updated regularly. A key topic is whether the targets are sufficiently ambitious because 2026 targets have been reached very early • The contribution to multilateralism is strong because of a clear link to the SDG 14 on life below water, which is otherwise difficult to reach in a country-based approach. The trust fund activities demonstrate the value of global knowledge products and information sharing on a global public good • The influence is strong because the global trust fund is stronger than alternative influence channels as it is a global public good that is of key interest to Nordic countries and where individual country exposure would be unlikely to be as effective. It also has high leverage because it is linked to and supporting the lending operations of the bank. In Tanzania, the Nordic donors leveraged the WB's capacity, influence, and convening power to support ocean protection at a scale they could not achieve otherwise • Many knowledge products and tools were generated. The issue, however, is that it is not known to what extent in practice they have been used, and if they worked as intended. An all cases, they were linked to support for ongoing lending programmes • The trust fund activities were linked to and supporting the lending operations of the bank with a 1:50 leverage effect and a 40% increase in lending on ocean-related topics, bringing together of civil

	society, private sector, and public sector. Whereas the primary capacity building is expected to take place through long-term loan projects, the trust fund's activities have also contributed to capacity development at both national and local levels, primarily through learning by doing, while broader improvements in institutional and enabling conditions are not guaranteed and are expected to take more time to materialise (Tanzania field visits) • The PROBLUE call for proposals and obligatory link to ongoing or planned WB lending operations means that it is anchored in government and WB priorities and programmes, which reinforces a sense of country ownership. The evidence from Tanzania confirmed this, although the level of government ownership varied between national and local levels and especially at the local level, there are considerable risks, and the ownership will ultimately depend on the success of loan projects that the fund supports • PROBLUE successfully completed more than three times as many capacity-building activities as were planned at inception. Types of events offered include training workshops, awareness-raising activities, seminars, knowledge events, validation consultations, stakeholder consultations, national workshops, and webinars. A specific example is the week-long webinar organised by PROBLUE with stakeholders as part of the 'Fisheries Status Assessment Toolkit' funded by the programme • PROBLUE demonstrated additionality in Tanzania by enabling interventions that would probably not have happened otherwise; use of innovative approaches and tools for collecting data on waste density, sources, and waste hotspot mapping, allowing the engagement of Bagamoyo and other districts (Tanga, Mtwara) that would probably not have undertaken waste management initiatives of such scale, thereby accelerating progress towards the SDG agenda without the fund's support
Efficiency	• Denmark had a low-key involvement mainly focussed on financial support. Iceland provided experts that were seconded. Norway took a lead in setting up the trust fund and was the first co-chair of the PC. • Sweden did not have the resources to co-chair but was involved early on. Sweden is a large contributor and had an explicit written policy agenda with follow-up developed in part through a risk analysis with mitigation measures. • UK DEFRA did a business case that showed a cost-benefit ratio between 2.4 and 7.5; depending on the assumptions. • UK DEFRA 2022 annual review concluded that the fund provided good value for money based on assessment of outputs achieved (and cost of the outputs).

Brief description of the trust fund

Trust fund objectives and strategy – The PROBLUE Umbrella 2.0 programme is part of the WB's overall Blue Economy programme with a goal to achieve integrated and sustainable economic development in healthy oceans. PROBLUE follows on from the PROFISH trust fund and also incorporates the Fisheries Transparency Initiative (FITI). The WB defines the Blue Economy as the sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, improved livelihoods, and jobs, while preserving the health of the ocean ecosystem. PROBLUE supports the achievement of SDG 14: Life Below Water and the WBG's twin goals of ending extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity.

PROBLUE provides the WB with a vehicle to identify current trends and emerging threats to oceans and the coastal and marine economy, formulate appropriate solutions to action, and support the implementation of interventions for moving into the Blue Economy across four pillars: 1) Improved fisheries governance 2) Marine litter and pollution reduction and prevention 3) Blueing of oceanic sectors 4) Integrated seascapes. PROBLUE's strategy is to deploy its contributions to leverage significant resources from the WB and, eventually, the private sectors. To effectively influence WB operations, PROBLUE activities are designed to exploit entry points along the WBG programming and project cycles. Entry points around the programming and project cycle are aligned with the three Is approach: 1) influencing the agenda; 2) improving and enhancing operations; and 3) increasing impacts. In line with the three Is, each of the four pillars will focus on three main areas of engagement: 1) generating and sharing knowledge, to raise awareness and influence the agenda; 2) country-level support; and 3) increasing investments in the sectors. PROBLUE started in 2018 and there is not a fixed end year for the fund as its duration and activities depend on the available contributions from donors and the evolving needs of the projects it supports.

Trust fund institutional arrangement – The trust fund follows the governance arrangements of the Umbrella reforms. A PC chaired by the WB meets once a year. Decisions are reached by consensus with donor endorsement by a no objection procedure. The priority themes are integrated in the core business lines of the Water GP. The trust fund is primarily bank executed for knowledge, technical assistance, and advisory services and as of 2023, a few recipient-executed co-financing grants have been approved to support long-term investments and national policy reforms. An umbrella programme management team coordinates day-to-day management and implementation of PROBLUE. Norway was co-chair of the PC the first two years followed by the UK. PROBLUE is different from other trust funds in that it draws up an annual workplan and then on that basis issues a call for proposals from governments who provide concept notes to the WB country office to develop them into a proposal. These, normally bank-executed, projects, account for about 90% of the expenditure of the trust fund.

Nordic engagement

Rationale for Nordic support – Although broadly similar, the rationale for support differs between the different Nordic countries. Norway and Denmark preference their contribution to pillar two on marine pollution and more specifically plastic waste. The rationale for Norway and Denmark is to support a global public good, whereas the rationale for Sweden also has a more explicit focus on poverty reduction for marginalised and threatened coastal communities. Iceland has a focus on sustainable fisheries and governance, seeing PROBLUE as a continuation of the earlier PROFISH trust fund. A main rationale for all Nordic and also other donors is the potential for the trust fund to leverage WB lending and raise private sector funds in support of the overall objective of an integrated and sustainable economic development in healthy oceans.

Financial support – The contributions from the Nordic countries are summarised in Figure 137 below.

Figure 137: Nordic countries' contributions to PROBLUE





Funding (USDm)	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	Total
Denmark		2.96				**2.96**
Iceland	0.80		0.40	0.20	0.40	**1.80**
Non Nordic	0.34	6.46	23.25	30.29	45.79	**106.13**
Norway	15.75	5.11	6.95	9.01	4.87	**41.69**
Sweden	11.93	7.70	8.63	4.65		**32.91**
Total	**28.83**	**22.22**	**39.23**	**44.15**	**51.06**	**185.49**

Results summary table	
Summary	**Satisfactory**
Criteria	**Relevance:** More than satisfactory. Due to the global public good nature of ocean degradation and the impact on livelihoods. **Effectiveness:** Satisfactory. The independent mid-term review, Swedish internal assessments, and UK review conclude that the trust fund is on track to achieve its objectives. **Efficiency**: Satisfactory. Based on the 1:50 ratio of trust fund to mobilisation of finance (mainly WB loans).
Sources of evidence	• PROBLUE workplans, annual reports 2019–2023 (more than 10) • Independent evaluation (2024) • Donor reporting, reviews, audits, appraisal, and decision documents (more than 10) • Interviews, WB task manager, country office, Nordic donor representative, civil society, final beneficiaries • Field observation
Strength of evidence	**Triangulation**: Strong. Combination of documents from various sources, independent evaluation, interviews. **Quality of the results framework**: Satisfactory. The results framework has been reviewed, discussed, and updated regularly. A key topic is whether the targets are sufficiently ambitious. The results framework has three main areas: capacity building; tools, and knowledge products. *"We are never happy with results reporting but overall, it is quite good and is improving over the years – now more mature and with more tangible results"*. The independent medium-term review (KPMG, 2022) noted weak indicators for the various windows because they are too comprehensive or measure the wrong things. The fund's 'impact' in terms of cross-cutting issues, such as gender equality and reduced poverty success, is not tracked strongly enough. During 2023, however, the fund's follow-up framework was updated in close dialogue with the donors and is now deemed to be able to handle the above issues. The first reporting based on the new follow-up framework will take place in 2024. (Sida, December 2023, p10)
Examples of what worked	• There has been a 40% increase in WB ocean lending, and a ratio of 1:50 has been achieved (trust fund to funding, mainly loans (WB, 2023 annual report). PROBLUE has been instrumental in integrating a blue economy approach throughout the WB's operations, and compared to 2018, the WB has increased its investments from USD 5 billion to USD 9 billion in a sustainable blue economy by 2024, an increase of nearly 40%. (Sida, 2024) An extensive review in late 2021 by the co-chair of the PC noted: • The target for mobilising finance for development. PROBLUE has approved 77 proposals by 2021 with MFD-specific data and analytics and has already met their end-of-programme (FY26) target of 75. • The output from the Gender Working Group has successfully driven forward a focus on gender and given guidance to the secretariat (and the WB more generally) on how to better integrate gender awareness in project planning (the UK, 2022). Proposals that incorporate gender and climate analysis have exceeded targets with the 2022 financial year, delivering more than the entire end-of-programme target. • Tendency to deliver well on the number and quality of the knowledge products such as guidelines, tools, and databases as well as capacity events (e.g., the trust fund has done double the target level in terms of numbers for knowledge products and three times as many for capacity building events and a similar overachievement on tools) (the UK, 2022, p11). The

	evidence from Tanzania suggests that this contributes to human capital development at national and local and CSO levels and by generating knowledge and identifying policy reforms, it gives a solid foundation and provides a toolbox for advocacy work necessary for achieving sustainable change through improvements in institutional capacity and the enabling environment. While this will take time, linking this work to loan projects increases the prospects for success. • Example of knowledge products: A report analysing the marine litter footprint and assessing circular economy opportunities in Mozambique; assessment of pollution and plastic transmission in the Yangtze River; publication on qualitative and quantitative analysis of sources contributing to waste and leakage mechanisms in China; national assessment of plastic waste management in India; the study on the cost of environmental damage in selected coastal cities – first of its kind in Tanzania. • Examples of global tools include: A database and toolkit for MSP; a database for maritime transport costs; a methodology for cost-benefit analysis in aquaculture regarding biosecurity. Examples of regional tools include technical and economic feasibility study guidelines for plastic waste recycling plants; a toolkit on metrics to measure plastic waste in East Asia and the Pacific. Examples of national tools include: an input-output model for environmental-economic analysis in Fiji; guidelines and rules to minimise plastic packaging in Bangladesh; a plastics lifecycle assessment framework for cities in India; a survey tool on plastic waste perception and behaviour in the Maldives. • In the first five years (through 1 July 2023), PROBLUE has operated in over 80 low- and middle-income countries and contributed to: 1) increased capacity and knowledge about the blue economy and produced 322 knowledge products, 85 analysis tools and conducted 427 trainings and workshops; 2) USD 7.4 billion in investments in the blue economy, of which USD 5.7 billion were in the form of increased lending and USD 810 million in the countries' own investments; 3) thirty-one policies, plans, and regulations have been developed to create the conditions for a more sustainable blue economy; and 4) forty-four countries have strengthened their capacity and commitment to the blue economy at the regional level. The stable foundation of knowledge, analysis, and method instruments that PROBLUE built up during the first five years means that they can now move more towards a clearer focus on implementation in countries and regions and thus also a desired greater focus on RETFs. (Confirmed in Tanzania) • PROBLUE's part in the project also includes identifying and scaling up private financing, and they have succeeded in securing investments from several private actors, for example, Deutsche Bank and Danish Ørsted Energy (Narrative report 22/23, Dox 18/000373121).
Examples of what did not work	• Influence of recipients on the knowledge products appear secondary (although some collaboration with local NGOs as in Tanzania) • Relatively high percentage of national activities funding for UMIC/HIC (17%) • Investment by private sector has proven slow
Factors (+ve, -ve)	• The WB has a strong quality reputation that means that people tend to have confidence in the knowledge product and access it (+ve) • The call for proposals has a potential for high ownership (+ve) • The strong link to the WB lending programme means that the projects are not isolated (+ve) • There is still limited means of knowing if the global knowledge products are used in practice and have had the intended impact (-ve)

Summary of the trust fund's results in providing a comparative advantage		
Policy influence	**Policy influence – globally** (multi-country reach – including values and global public goods)	• **Highly satisfactory** – Because directly linked to a global public good that is of key interest to Nordic countries and where individual country exposure would be unlikely to be as effective. In Tanzania there was a clear influence in terms of bringing higher awareness and introducing tools of how to manage plastic and other waste that ended up in the sea in the capital city and seven coastal towns
	Policy influence – on the organisation	• **Highly satisfactory** – Because it is linked to and supporting the lending operations of the WB

Multi-lateralism	**Strengthening the multilateral system** Delivering on the trustee mandate and SDGs	• **Satisfactory** – Because it is clearly linked to the SDG 14 on life below water, which is otherwise difficult to reach through a country approach
	Strengthening the multilateral system (contributing to UN reforms, One UN, MDBs) Inter-agency cooperation	• **Satisfactory** – Because it demonstrates the value of global knowledge products and information sharing on a global public good and, through the call for proposal, ensures country ownership
Development delivery	**Development delivery –** Generate knowledge to enhance development impact	• **Satisfactory** – Because many knowledge products and tools are generated. In Tanzania these were used to develop litter management strategies at district level to serve the design of loan projects, and through additional studies, policy reforms were identified. They will take a long time to materialise but linking this work to loan projects increases the prospects for success
	Development delivery – Scaling effects (national public resources, private sector, other donors)	• **Highly satisfactory** – Because it is linked to and supporting the lending operations of the WB with a 1:50 leverage effect and a 40% increase in lending on ocean-related topics
	Development delivery – Convening power and influence (national entities, other donors, civil society, private sector)	• **Satisfactory** – Because it is linked to and supporting the lending operations of the WB, which involve significant investments and bringing together of civil society, private sector, and public sector – and despite that, mainly BETF country ownership is reinforced (although there are important risks to consider), and capacity was developed but primarily at individual level. Major capacity improvements expected within long-term loan projects
	Development delivery – Access to skills (mobilisation of high level of expertise)	• **Satisfactory** – Because the funds were mainly used to contract consultants and in-house expertise, promote innovative practices, and add value in the sense of facilitating engagement around waste management and plastic pollution challenges at local level that would not have occurred otherwise
	Development delivery – Access to country expertise (mobilisation of country experience/insight)	• **Satisfactory** – Because it is linked to and supporting the in-country lending operations of the WB, which involve significant investments and bringing together of civil society, private sector, and public sector at national and local levels
Aid effectiveness	**Aid effectiveness – reducing fragmentation** (harmonisation of external support)	• **Highly satisfactory** – Because instead of the donors getting involved in their own projects, they were financing at scale a single knowledge hub. Also, the use of the WB lending operations meant that the in-country operations (BETF or RETF) were under the fiduciary and governance control of an already established system
	Aid effectiveness – collaboration with other Nordic donors	• **Satisfactory** – Some coordination, particularly in starting up the fund between Norway and Sweden
	Aid effectiveness – reduce costs for the donor	• **Satisfactory** – Because instead of the donors getting involved in their own projects, they were financing at scale a single knowledge hub. Some duplicated efforts in that all the Nordic donors had staff that were involved in following up

Lessons learned

- The development of a pipeline of loan projects that aim at the same objectives and make use of the knowledge products takes a long time – after three years, still very few, if any, projects are operational.
- Early involvement in a new trust fund enables the donors to shape the trust fund.
- Other donors, such as the UK, devise a specific agenda in the form of a TOC for their contribution and then measure its progress and achievement on an annual basis. *Our provisional first ToC (B1.2.1) describes how the UK's inputs – including financial, strategic, and high-level advocacy support – assist PROBLUE with delivery of their outputs, outcomes, and impacts.*
- The ambition level of the results framework is an important topic.
- RETFs are one way to measure and determine country ownership.
- Linking the fund to loans and local needs reinforces country ownership, although it is not guaranteed.
- The BETF can bring about capacity development but mainly at individual level, while major capacity improvements (at institutional and enabling environment level) are through loan projects.

Hypothesis tested at field level

- **The trust fund activities at country level supported the achievement of trust fund objectives globally.**
    - The trust fund supported studies, assessments, and mapping associated with waste management with a focus on plastic waste, sources and density of plastic waste, and relationships with solid waste and drainage services and infrastructure in support of the development of plastic waste and litter management strategies for selected coastal cities in Tanzania – Bagamoyo, Tanga, Mtwara.
    - In addition, the fund supported the development of a comprehensive study on the valuation of the cost of environmental damage in selected coastal cities in Tanzania.
    - Finally, the fund promotes community-based waste management in waste hotspots in the Msimbazi River area in low-income neighbourhoods with informal or no waste management systems.
- **Although the trust fund was entirely bank executed, it engaged with government stakeholders by focusing on loan projects and addressing local needs. However, the level of government ownership varied between national and local levels and especially at the local level, there are considerable risks, and the ownership will ultimately depend on the success of the loan projects that the fund supports.**
    - The concept notes and proposal for the PROBLUE grant in Tanzania was initiated and largely developed by the WB office in Tanzania through an extensive consultation process with the PROBLUE Secretariat in Washington. The grant is largely used in support of the design of loan projects planned for three ongoing investments and one which is in preparation. The central government's sense of ownership of the concept note is reinforced by loan projects that align with the country's strategies and policies.
    - The development of the environmental damage cost study was characterised by an inclusive and participatory approach, involving all relevant national stakeholders – from government institutions and academia to NGOs and the private sector. This process brought together a broad network of environmental specialists, resulting in a final study that reflects broad national ownership, even though it was not initiated by the country's stakeholders themselves. Their buy-in and commitment were secured because the study aligned well with ongoing discussions on blue economy aspects within the administration (while there is no specific blue economy policy, the country has adopted several policies, laws, and regulations supporting various aspects of it) and the lack of a mechanism/legal mandate for valuing the cost of environmental damage in Tanzania. These factors helped ensure strong government support, particularly from the National Environmental Management Council of Tanzania, a key institution under the Vice President's Office

responsible for policy advice, enforcing environmental regulations, and monitoring compliance with environmental laws.

- Similarly, at the local level, the strategy for plastic and litter management in Bagamoyo was developed through a participatory approach, involving both local and national stakeholders, which fostered a sense of ownership and responsibility. However, the strategy and associated waste management investments in Bagamoyo were not locally initiated but emerged from discussions between the WB and the national government. While the strategy addresses local needs, it does so in a limited way, focusing more on the investments linked to the loan project rather than addressing broader needs beyond the project's scope, which is not surprising as the strategy was developed in response to the loan project. But there are important risks to be considered throughout the strategy implementation – linked to local capacities to effectively manage and monitor the implementation, and operate and maintain the system, local commitment and participation, and political economy risks at local level. Local ownership will therefore ultimately depend on the success of the planned investments, which the strategy is designed to support.
- In summary: Ownership at the national level was strengthened through loan projects that align with the country's strategies and policies. PROBLUE primarily offers support for the design of these investment projects – "*Link the work to a loan then it works, otherwise is lost funding*". However, local-level ownership depends largely on the success of investments in urban solid waste management infrastructure, and there are significant risks that require careful consideration and management.

- **While the primary capacity building is expected to take place through long-term loan projects, the trust fund's activities have also contributed to capacity development at both national and local levels, primarily through learning by doing, whereas broader improvements in institutional and enabling conditions are not guaranteed and are expected to take more time to materialise.**
  - Major capacity improvements are expected to occur through long-term loan projects. At the individual capacity level, the project coordination unit at the national level and PIUs at the local level are expected to enhance the technical skills, knowledge, and competencies of government staff involved in project design, preparation, coordination, implementation, and monitoring. Similarly, large infrastructure investments are expected to contribute to improved governance structures, systems, processes, and resources, as well as provide better infrastructure for managing large-scale operations and advancing policies and regulations.
  - The PROBLUE grant has contributed to knowledge generation, helping identify policy reforms aimed at strengthening institutional and regulatory capacities for marine and coastal management, but there is still a long way to go before these reforms are realised, although linking them with loans is promising.
  - The study on the cost of environmental damage in selected coastal cities, the first of its kind in Tanzania, led to an increased understanding of the importance of such valuations and the need for the valuation mechanism and why the country needs such a mechanism, what are potentially the urgent needs, and why it is important to set boundaries and priorities as to what to value and when, then how to value. The adopted method served as a good example. Equally important, whom to involve getting the numbers as accurate as possible and ensure country-wide ownership. The study has set an example of a participatory approach and showed its value: *"we have environmental specialists in this country, in government, in academia, in NGOs, we need to bring them together and utilise their expertise"*.
  - National and local participants involved in developing the litter strategy are likely to have enhanced their understanding and skills in planning, developing, and coordinating waste management strategies. Additionally, NGOs participating in pilot community-based waste management initiatives have gained additional skills and competencies.

- In summary, PROBLUE mainly contributes to human capital development at national and local and CSO levels, and by generating knowledge and identifying policy reforms, it gives a solid foundation and provides a toolbox for advocacy work necessary for achieving sustainable change through improvements in institutional capacity and the enabling environment. While this will take time, linking this work to loan projects increases the prospects for success.

- **The trust fund demonstrated additionality by enabling interventions that would probably not have happened otherwise.**
  - PROBLUE promotes the use of innovative approaches and tools for collecting data on waste density, sources, and waste hotspot mapping. By engaging a broad network of local NGOs and collaborating with the private sector, it has facilitated the use of tools such as an app that uses AI and drone imagery to map litter in cities.
  - It is unlikely that Bagamoyo and other districts would have undertaken waste management initiatives of this scale without the support from the fund. The fund provides added value by enabling local-level engagement and accelerating progress towards the SDG agenda.
- **The Nordic donors leveraged the WB's capacity, influence, and convening power to support public goods, such as ocean protection at a scale they could not achieve otherwise.**
  - There's a high leverage of the Nordic contributions because of linking the fund to WB loans and the bank's analytical capacities (example is the cost study) were utilised to design long-term investments.
  - The high leverage potential also comes with the bank's advocacy potential to contribute to improvements in policy and regulations.
  - The WB has brough together diverse stakeholders – national and local governments, academia, NGOs, and the private sector. These partnerships would have been difficult to achieve independently by any Nordic country.
  - In summary, by leveraging the WB's capacity, influence, and convening power, the Nordic donors were able to contribute to ocean protection challenges at a larger scale than they could have achieved on their own.

Project Evaluation Case Study – Environmental Degradation Cost Study, Tanzania – PROBLUE

Project evaluation case study: The Costs of Environmental Degradation from Plastic Pollution in Selected Coastal Areas in the United Republic of Tanzania
Trust fund: PROBLUE – World Bank global trust fund

Recipient: Governments of Tanzania and Zanzibar
Date of visit: 4 September 2024

Challenges addressed and project purpose: The study aimed to raise awareness and deepen understanding within both the Government of Tanzania and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar about the economic costs of environmental damage caused by marine plastic pollution, as well as to

identify areas for future action to address these issues. The specific objective of the study was to assess and value the costs of environmental degradation from marine plastic pollution, identify and prioritise critical areas and issues, and provide recommendations for effective control of marine plastic pollution in select coastal areas of Tanzania and Zanzibar.

Changes and absence of expected change

- **Policy input** – The study provides a solid basis for policy analysis and more targeted policy interventions and decision-making in the future. **(+ve)**
- **Awareness** – The first study of this kind in Tanzania. It led to an increased understanding of the importance of such valuations and the need for the valuation mechanism and why the country needs such a mechanism, what are potentially the urgent needs, and why it is important to set boundaries and priorities as to what to value, when, and how. **(+ve**)
- **Knowledge** – The adopted method served as a good example for future valuations. Equally important, whom to involve, getting the numbers as accurate as possible, and ensuring country-wide ownership. The study has set an example of a participatory approach and showed its value: *"we have environmental specialists in this country, in government, in academia, in NGOs, we need to bring them together and utilise their expertise".* ***(+ve)***
- **Sector reforms** – Broader sector and policy reforms, including improvements in institutional and enabling conditions, to enhance marine plastic pollution management are uncertain and will require significant time and sustained effort to materialise. **(-ve)**

Contributing factors

- **High-level support** – Government buy-in and commitment were secured because the study aligned well with ongoing discussions on blue economy aspects within the administration (while there is no specific blue economy policy, the country has adopted several policies, laws, and regulations supporting various aspects of it) and the lack of a mechanism/legal mandate for valuing the cost of environmental damage in Tanzania. These factors helped ensure strong government support, particularly from the National Environmental Management Council of Tanzania, a key institution under the Vice President's Office responsible for policy advice, enforcing environmental regulations, and monitoring compliance with environmental laws.
- **Participatory approach contributing to a sense of national ownership** – The development of the environmental damage cost study was characterised by an inclusive and participatory approach, involving all relevant national stakeholders – from government institutions and academia to NGOs and the private sector. This process brought together a broad network of environmental specialists, resulting in a final study that reflects a sense of national ownership, even though it was not initiated by the country's stakeholders themselves.

Trust fund influence

- **Link to WB lending programmes –** The analytical work was connected to long-term loan projects, enhancing a sense of local ownership and increasing the likelihood of success by linking sector reforms to WB ongoing (and potential future) lending. Improved sector performance is also expected to encourage private sector engagement.

Project Evaluation Case Study – Integrated Plastics and Litter Management Strategy, Bagamoyo, Tanzania – Problue

Project evaluation case study: Development of plastic waste and litter management strategy for Bagamoyo, Tanzania Trust fund: PROBLUE – World Bank global trust fund	Grant – bank executed: USD 275,000 for Bagamoyo, Tanga, and Mtwara Recipient: Bagamoyo, Tanga, Mtwara Date of visit to Bagamoyo: 5 September 2024

Challenges addressed and project purpose – The development of the integrated plastics and litter management strategy for Bagamoyo was part of a PROBLUE grant aimed at supporting investments in coastal cities under the TACTIC Project and the Msimbazi Basin Development Project. In Bagamoyo and other coastal cities (Tanga and Mtwara), the TACTIC project targets better infrastructure planning and the management of environmental risks, including plastic pollution. The PROBLUE-supported work focused on developing litter management strategies for these three coastal cities. This involved analysing the plastic litter situation, identifying groups and organisations involved in plastic litter management, consulting stakeholders on the data, and developing a comprehensive management strategy. The primary aim of Bagamoyo's strategy was to inform and facilitate WB investments under the TACTIC Project. This is expected to involve investments in public infrastructure as well as technical assistance to enhance public administration capacity.

Changes and absence of expected change

- **PROBLUE-supported outputs –** Studies, assessments, and mapping associated with waste management with a focus on plastic waste and sources, density of plastic waste, and relationships with solid waste and drainage services and infrastructure in support of the development of plastic waste and litter management strategies for selected coastal cities in Tanzania. ***(+ve)***
- **Expected capacity improvements** – Major capacity improvements are expected to occur through long-term investments. At the individual capacity level, the PIUs in Bagamoyo and other coastal cities are expected to enhance the technical skills, knowledge, and competencies of their staff involved in project design, preparation, coordination, implementation, and monitoring. Similarly, large infrastructure investments are expected to contribute to improved governance structures, systems, processes, and resources, as well as provide better infrastructure for managing large-scale operations. ***(+ve)***
- **Innovation promotion** – In Bagamoyo and other places, PROBLUE has promoted the use of innovative approaches and tools for collecting data on waste density, sources, and waste hotspot mapping. By engaging a broad network of local NGOs and collaborating with the private sector, it has facilitated the use of tools such as an app that uses AI and drone imagery to map litter in cities. **(+ve**)

Contributing/limiting factors to expected improvements in the management of environmental risks, including plastic pollution

- **Ownership** – The strategy was developed through a participatory approach, involving both local and national stakeholders, which fostered a sense of ownership and responsibility. <u>However, the strategy and associated waste management investments in Bagamoyo were not locally initiated but emerged from discussions between the WB and the national government</u>. While the strategy addresses local needs, it does so in a limited way, focusing more on the investments linked to the loan project rather than addressing broader needs beyond the project's scope, which is not surprising as the strategy was developed in response to the loan project. But there are important risks to be considered throughout the strategy implementation – linked to local capacities to effectively manage and monitor the implementation, and operate and maintain the systems, local commitment and participation, and political economy risks at local level. Local ownership will therefore ultimately depend on the success of the planned investments, which the strategy is designed to support.

Trust fund influence

- **Additionality/added value** – It is unlikely that Bagamoyo and other districts would have undertaken waste management initiatives of this scale without the support from the fund. In the absence of PROBLUE, the TACTIC Project would not have expanded to coastal cities, it would have limited its scope to inland cities. The fund provides added value by enabling local-level engagement in challenging environments and accelerating progress towards the SDG agenda.

- **Link to WB lending programmes –** The strategy was connected to expected infrastructure investments and technical support for improvements in public administration performance, also in support of attracting private sector investments.

Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa (field study)

EQ	Summary findings

Criteria	• Working with the AfDB was a strategic choice in order to anchor activities in an African-led organisation
	• The trust fund features that were important for Nordic donors include:
	  ○ High fiduciary standards of the AfDB, which minimise donor risks and to date have not exposed the SEFA to any fiduciary issues
	  ○ The prominence of the SEFA in the AfDB and the relatively low level of trust funds in the bank has given the Nordic and other donors access to high-level AfDB decision-making: "*the AfDB is more accessible than the World Bank*"
	  ○ African management and ownership of the bank helps to increase the ownership and commitment to green transition initiatives. *"Housing the fund within the AfDB enhances its national and regional ownership – the agenda is firmly aligned with African development priorities"*
	  ○ The SEFA is strongly embedded in the AfDB priorities as part of the new deal on energy
	  ○ The AfDB has relatively few trust funds
	  ○ There has been continuity in SEFA trust management staff over many years, which has meant that relationships with donors within the AfDB and with the market have been strong
	  ○ The SEFA was successful in convincing donors to fund energy via the SEFA instead of creating new funds, e.g., the Africa energy TA platform was created as sub-window rather than as a new fund
	  ○ The AfDB had local offices and outreach including in fragile countries
	• The involvement of other Nordic donors was important for Norway and Sweden

Influence	• Denmark as a founder of the trust fund and the largest donor had a lot of influence in shaping the fund • The Nordic donors engaged actively at the steering committee meetings and had common positions. Initially much of the influence was around the construction and management of the trust fund • The agenda for influence is quite politically driven from the donor side, e.g., Swedish MFA wanted to support the Sahel area, so it provided funding to the trust fund for that purpose • The Nordic-Indian constituency ensured that there was continuous Nordic presence and since the SEFA was one of the main trust funds, a lot of attention and support was provided with close coordination of the engagement of the Nordic and other donors • The factors for influence were also criteria for providing support, i.e., high accessibility of the fund; the close link between the fund and the AfDB operations; the relatively few trust funds in the AfDB. • Donors have to be well prepared and highly knowledgeable to be able to add value and influence the fund. They must understand the sector, the technology, the market, the geography, and the political economy
Results	• The results framework has had many revisions and is under constant revision • The fund has been adaptable and over 10 years has adjusted its offering so that both technical assistance and concessionary finance are provided • Multilateralism is supported by providing a trust fund in the AfDB • Ownership has the potential to be strong as the support is coming from an African-led and -managed organisation • Capacity development was built into the trust fund through the TA window for project preparation and enabling environment • A knowledge management strategy was in place, but the output was not as prolific as the WB's • Results are found to be highly satisfactory in terms of renewable energy generated, connections, jobs, and reduction of greenhouse gasses. Energy efficiency results are not prominent

	• Results in terms of attracting private sector financing, which was a main aim of the SEFA, have been disappointing as confirmed in a field visit to AREF. Limited private sector financing was obtained (5.4%), and the final (negative) result of the fund indicates that the private sector market players made the right decision. The subsequent AREF II fund is also mainly funded by DFIs.
Efficiency	• In early years, the disbursement was slow, in part due to the long gestation period for projects and the relatively strong and cumbersome fiduciary controls • The stop-gap funding and internal difficulties on use of in-house staff led to some inefficiencies in the use and retention of consultants • Some improvements in efficiency have arisen from adopting the programmatic approach

Brief description of the trust fund

Trust fund objectives and strategy – The Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa (SEFA) was established in 2011 in partnership with the government of Denmark and is managed by the AfDB with a mission to provide catalytic finance to unlock private sector investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency. The SEFA offers technical assistance and concessional finance instruments to remove market barriers, build a more robust pipeline of projects, and improve the risk-return profile of individual investments. The Fund's overarching goal is to contribute to universal access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy services for all in Africa, in line with the NDEA and SDG 7. Through its pillars on green mini-grids, green baseload, and energy efficiency and its focus on immature markets, demonstration potential, and cross-cutting benefits, the SEFA addresses critical energy challenges faced by millions of Africans. Since 2011, the SEFA has received contributions from other governments including Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Germany, and also from the Nordic Development Fund.

Trust fund institutional arrangement – The SEFA is housed in the AfDB Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Department (PERN) under the Power, Energy, Climate, and Green Growth (PEVP) complex. The governance and management arrangements are shown in the table below.

Table 1: SEFA's governance authorities and their mandate

Authority	Composition	SEFA Decision Power
AfDB Board of Governors (BoG)	Standing Governors	Authorises conversion of SEFA from trust fund to special fund
AfDB BoD	Standing Directors	Approves all Continuous Integration (CI) window operations and TA window operations > USD 1 million. Approves the original OPD version. Approves amendments to the SEFA legal instrument
SEFA GC	VP PEVP and one representative per donor	Provides 'no objection' for all CI window operations and for TA window operations >USD 1 million. Initiates amendments to the SEFA legal instrument. Approves amendments to the OPD. Approves annual SEFA work plan, budget, and semi-annual report
Operations Committee (OpsCom)	Standing Committee Members	Reviews all CI window operations
VP PEVP	Vice President	Approves TA window operations ≤ USD 1 million
SEFA TRC	Designated Department Representatives	Reviews and ensures quality of all operational proposals
SEFA Management Committee (SMC)	Designated Department Representatives	Reviews and ensures quality of all operational proposals prior to entry into the SEFA pipeline

The AfDB receives 5% administrative overhead (for SEFA 2.0, it is updated to 7%) of the total contribution to the SEFA to cover the cost of administering the trust fund. The annual audit fee and direct consultancy costs are levied on the trust fund at full cost recovery. The size of the administrative overhead follows the standard agreement between the AfDB and its donors.

Nordic engagement

Rationale for Nordic support – Denmark was a founding partner of the SEFA. The funding was from a climate envelope, and the rationale was to combat climate change through green energy transition that

mobilised private sector investment. The rationale was also to strengthen and align with the AfDB as a multilateral institution. It was noted in the paper to parliament that only 4% of climate finance was invested in Africa, and that 40% of the population of Africa had inadequate access to energy, which was a severe economic constraint. It was also noted that many of the countries that the SEFA was supporting were fragile. Finally, it was argued that since its start in 2012, a number of other donors had joined the fund, including Nordic donors, and that tangible results on energy access, reduction of greenhouse gases, and access to energy had been achieved.

The SEFA was in line with Norway's priorities on energy transition. Norway noted that they wanted to deepen engagement with the AfDB, noting that the AfDB is one of the actors with most influence with country authorities and was therefore an important partner in energy transformation. The AfDB's country presence was seen as an important factor. Working with the SEFA also gave Norway entry to international seminars on financing energy in Africa and an opportunity to meet with key actors on the ground. Like Denmark, Norway pointed to solid results arising from earlier phases of the SEFA. Norway both together with Denmark and alone have undertaken a number of technical reviews. The joint reviews and analysis with Denmark were also a positive factor in the decision to support the SEFA.

The SEFA was in line with Sweden's priorities on energy transition including renewable energy, energy efficiency, sector reform, and engagement of private sector financing. Sweden noted that the SEFA was strongly aligned to the AfDB, and AfDB ownership and leadership was strong. The AfDB's country presence is also noted with its ability to reach out to vulnerable and unserved people and be well positioned to respond to fragile and conflict-affected situations.

Financial support – The contribution from Nordic donors is summarised in the Figures 138 below:

Figure 138: Nordic countries' contributions to the SEFA





Funding (UA)	2011	2014	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Total
Denmark	34,223,787	4,799,010			25,549,012	7,977,143	5,727,234	**78,276,186**
Finland							128,585	**128,585**
Norway			3,090,359	4,094,066		4,478,541	3,937,856	**15,600,823**
Sweden				3,994,038	6,650,333	8,226,853	5,152,166	**24,023,390**
Total	**34,223,787**	**4,799,010**	**3,090,359**	**8,088,104**	**32,199,345**	**20,682,537**	**14,945,841**	**118,028,984**

As can be seen from the figure below, the Nordic share of the funding pledged by 2024 was 34%, which is also holding true for the envisaged disbursements up to end-2026 where the Nordic share is 36%.



Results summary table	
Summary	**Satisfactory**
Criteria	**Relevance**: **Satisfactory** – The relevance is high given the shortfall in reaching SDG 7, and here the link to lending programmes is highly relevant. The SEFA represents a core strategic instrument to achieve the AfDB's NDEA targets. The NDEA has a key focus on creating the right market conditions for sustainable energy financing in Africa, and the SEFA directly supports the NDEA through its goals of bringing projects to bankability and creating an enabling environment to catalyse private investments. The SEFA addresses the lack of funds to support feasibility studies and projects preparation, which are critical barriers to private sector development of renewable projects. Highly relevant in advancing the SDG 7 sub-target of doubling the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix. **Effectiveness**: **Satisfactory –** There is a consensus among recipients that the SEFA has been well managed by a strong team of experts, who have consistently been responsive, supporting, and cooperative. One donor particularly valued the availability of SEFA staff for informal discussions as well as their openness to being flexible and adaptable to changing circumstances. **Efficiency**: **Satisfactory** – Nordic donors found the bank management fee of 7% for indirect costs reasonable. The disbursement rate for components 1 and 3 was very slow compared to expectations (30% and 13%, respectively). This may be attributed to a combination of factors, including the lack of SEFA capacity, the general difficulty of working in the less developed countries with small/medium-sized projects, and the long procurement lead time. Low disbursement levels may also be partly a result of the considerable level of due diligence exercised by the SEFA team, which is only ready to disburse when they are fully satisfied that all efforts have been made to ensure that outputs are of the highest quality.
Sources of evidence	• SEFA, annual reports 2010–2023 (more than 10) • Sweden, Conclusions on Performance 2020–2022, and Statement on Report (2023) • Final Evaluation of the AfDB's support for renewable energy (2012–2021), October 2023 • Internal documentation on AREF and the project support facility • Donor reporting, reviews, appraisal, and decision documents (more than 10) • Interviews, AfDB SEFA staff, country office, Nordic donor representative, implementing bodies final beneficiaries • Field observation – one or two of the Kenya projects to be visited/contacted
Strength of evidence	**Triangulation: Strong** (there is a wide range of sources that point to the same findings on effectiveness) **Quality of results framework:** Satisfactory (indicators, targets, reporting): Generally speaking, the framework is considered solid and has been revised and improved periodically. There is still the issue of how to measure capacity and how to measure/isolate the contribution of the SEFA when there are many other actors and factors involved. The reporting tends to be snapshot rather than cumulative.
Examples of what worked	Reviews and reporting by donors such as appraisals point to satisfactory and varied evidence of results: • The SEFA (2012–2019 with final year of implementation in 2023) supported 68 projects in 30 countries with USD 84 million in investments focusing on hydropower and solar power

	and delivering 263 MW of power, more than 1.2 million connections, over 12,000 jobs created, and 0.6 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent reduced. The SEFA 2.0 portfolio stands at over USD 200 million over 27 projects that are expected to leverage USD 11 billion, representing 4690 MW in new capacity, delivering nearly 3 million connections. This is also expected to create over 40,000 jobs and over 22 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent in savings. • The SEFA also develops flagship blended-finance initiatives in the sector. It played a catalytic role in the preparation and financial close of the Africa Renewable Energy Fund (AREF) with a capitalisation of USD 205 million (2014), one of the first pan-African equity funds in the market. It also played a key role in establishing the Facility for Energy Inclusion (FEI), a debt financing platform for small-scale renewables across the continent with a capitalisation of USD 270 million. • The SEFA has been crucial in addressing a major market gap for financing of early-stage project preparation. The leverage ratio achieved by the SEFA project preparation facility has been estimated at 39, which is high. • The SEFA has retained its relevance in a changing market (dominated by the rapidly falling costs of the most popular technologies such as solar PV) by remaining focused on less well-established renewable technologies and riskier and fragile country contexts as well as the off-grid and green mini-grid space. • The SEFA financial management and control is efficient and effective and of acceptable standard, and administrative costs are at a reasonable level. The small SEFA team is well-integrated in the AfDB organisational structure and has been effective in screening and approving grant requests, overseeing the procurement of services provided, and monitoring project implementation. • AREF – The AfDB/SEFA were anchor investors and have provided flexible support that was essential for bringing in private sector capital for renewable energy projects. However, this did not work as expected as very little private sector financing was obtained, and the final (negative) result of the fund indicates that the private sector market players made the right decision. Seed capital and support was provided for the commercial and industry component aimed at scaling up transition from fossil fuel boilers to biomass boilers for large often multi-national manufacturing concerns.
Examples of what did not work	• Issues during SEFA 1.0: Significant consultant turnover, long gaps between consultant contracts/contract renewal. and difficulties attracting and retaining talented experts • The SEFA's enabling environment support needs further focusing to ensure additionality and synergy • Perceived burdensome due diligence requirements and bureaucracy • The SEFA 1.0 results framework was inadequate for a facility of this magnitude (lacks outcome indicators for enabling environment grants, indicators to track progress toward financial close, indicators for installed capacity under equity investments, and indicators for energy savings through EE) • The SEFA 1.0 lacked a developed ToC to ensure that the overall strategy of the SEFA would achieve the desired results • Some performance indicators have unrealistic targets and the SEFA progress reporting on these indicators does not fully reflect the SEFA's achievements and results. • In the SEFA 1.0 there was a weak link between project preparation and the component on enabling environment, with both having unclear added value and not achieving the complimentary effect that was envisaged • Energy efficiency was not prominent • Raising private capital was not successful through AREF (although many other highly worthwhile results were achieved) nor was the scaling effect of proving profitability of such investments because the final results of AREF 1 are negative.
Factors (+ve, -ve)	• Project selection is competitive, linked to lending operations and guided by AfDB governance, managerial, and financial control systems **(+ve)** • Complexity of procurement: Long procurement process not appropriate relative to the size of the SEFA projects, leading to delays in disbursement **(-ve)**

		• Ambition level is high compared to funds available. Difficult to see how the grants alone could be transformational across so many areas. The link to lending programmes makes the ambition more credible **(-ve)** • A challenge to recruit women in power construction projects **(-ve)** • The intention to crowd-in private finance has not worked out. In AREF, which was one of the most promising initiatives, the private sector funding is minimal (under a few per cent) and most funding for the renewable and energy efficiency projects is from Development Finance Institutions **(-ve)**

Summary of the trust fund's results in providing a comparative advantage		
Policy influence	**Policy influence – globally** (multi-country reach – including values and global public goods)	• **Satisfactory –** The AfDB has, with its African ownership and country presence, in the view of some donors, a strong capacity to influence policy also in fragile and conflict-affected situations. The SEFA promotes important global policy directions on climate change and green energy transition. There have been considerable enabling environment activities.
	Policy influence – on the organisation	• **Highly satisfactory –** One of the three main objectives is to influence and support AfDB lending in the sector and all in-country activities support loan operations. The SEFA serves as a 'hub' for renewable energy advisory and TA funding services inside the AfDB. The SEFA has contributed to increasing AfDB prioritisation of renewable energy projects. The SEFA has been a key vehicle for Danish influence in encouraging the bank to become a transformative actor for achieving inclusive and green growth championed by the private sector (although results have been mixed).
Multi-lateralism	**Strengthening the multilateral system** Delivering on the trustee mandate and SDGs	• **Highly satisfactory –** The trust fund is closely linked to SDG 7 and related SDGs and is firmly placed in the mandate of the AfDB. The trust fund activities are mainly carried out by SEFA staff at the country level, and the results framework is modelled.
	Strengthening the multilateral system (contributing to UN reforms, One UN, MDBs) Inter-agency cooperation	• **Highly satisfactory –** The trust fund supports and improves the quality of AfDB lending and in doing so enhances the credibility of the bank as a multilateral institution in this sector. The SEFA is a leading initiative that strengthens the AfDB reputation and means of delivering on its mandate.
Development delivery	**Development delivery –** Generate knowledge to enhance development impact	• **Satisfactory** – The enabling environment and project preparation facilities support enhanced development impact.
	Development delivery – Scaling effects (national public resources, private sector, other donors)	• **Satisfactory** – The in-country trust fund projects are linked to supporting very large loan operations. The leverage of close to 40 is high. Unsatisfactory in terms of bringing in private sector finance and creating a scaling effect by proof of profitability (because SEFA 1 investment in AREF was negative, losing 50% rather than a typical hurdle (internal) rate of return of at least 8%).
	Development delivery – Convening power and influence (national entities, other donors, civil society, private sector)	• **Satisfactory** – Because linked to and supporting the lending operations of the bank, which involve significant investments and bringing together of civil society, private sector, and public sector, particularly in an African context (although private sector finance was not highly evident at least in AREF I – but with prospects for the new initiative to target the commercial and industrial sectors).

	Development delivery – Access to skills (mobilisation of high level of expertise)	• **Moderately satisfactory –** The SEFA team during the earlier period was small and dependent on external consultants. This is being addressed in SEFA 2.0.
	Development delivery – Access to country expertise (mobilisation of country experience/insight)	• **Moderately satisfactory** – Because linked to and supporting the in-country lending operations of the bank, which involve significant investments and bringing together of civil society, private sector, and public sector. However, there is an issue of national stakeholder involvement in the studies.
Aid effectiveness	**Aid effectiveness – reducing fragmentation** (harmonisation of external support)	• **Highly satisfactory** – The SEFA has been able to attract funding from many donors involved in energy in Africa.
	Aid effectiveness – collaboration with other Nordic donors	• **Highly satisfactory** – There has been explicit coordination on joint appraisals and reviews, and Nordic donor assessments and positions are referred to decision documents by the Nordic donors.
	Aid effectiveness – reduce costs for the donor	• **Satisfactory** – Because instead of the donors getting involved in their own projects, they were financing at scale as a single knowledge hub. Some duplicate efforts due to all Nordic donors having staff that were involved in following up. The overhead costs of 7% are judged as efficient.

Lessons learned

- Long continuous support over more than 10 years brings results
- Encouraging and bringing in new donors is important for the scale and sustainability of the trust fund
- Close Nordic cooperation has brought benefits such as shared analytical work
- The AfDB is a reliable trustee and effective in outreach to fragile and conflict-affected situations
- The mix of TA at project and enabling environment level combined with concessional finance has proved effective
- Mobilising and attracting private sector finance has proven difficult

Hypotheses tested at field level

- African ownership and engagement in the preparation and implementation of projects was key to success, and efforts led by the AfDB are promising in this regard.
  Findings: Partially confirmed. As concluded by the 2023 independent evaluation (IDEV, 2023) the country offices of the AfDB are very important in ensuring that there is a close engagement with national stakeholders at both policy and operational level. It has not been possible to shed more light on whether the AfDB as an African organisation has made a difference, but it is plausible. The Desert to Power initiative (supported by Sweden) is an example where the AfDB was considered by Sweden and others to have advantages in working in fragile situations, and the AfDB points to this as an example of how African ownership of the bank has helped. The Norad assessment (Norad, 2019) concludes that the SEFA has credibility in the eyes of African governments who are shareholders and states "*it is strategic and influential, a fund made for and by Africa"*. The evaluation of 2023 (IDEV, 2023) notes that on the technical front, the IFC and the WB are still often regarded as the first port of call: "*However, concerns were raised by government officials and development partner stakeholders regarding the technical and financial skills of the AfDB country teams compared to those of International Finance Corporation (IFC) staff … Government officials often acknowledged the World Bank as the development partner that led energy sector dialogue with other partners and governments, except in South Africa, where the AfDB was recognized as the country's primary energy partner."*
- The concessional finance offered was additional and did not displace the market.
  Findings: This is largely confirmed at least for the case examined. For the case of AREF (first round) the negative results indicate that the concessional support in terms of the access to

technical assistance and preferential returns for private sector investors indicates that in hindsight the fund was not operating in a way that displaced the market. Only 5.4% of the USD 2,015 million fund was from private sources.

- Energy efficiency projects have proven difficult because they do not lead to large loans and are complex for private equity funds.
  Findings: Confirmed – Few energy efficiency projects have gone ahead. The IDEV (2023) noted that there were few activities targeting the management of energy demand in the regional member countries. However, in recent years, the bank has prioritised demand-side management and is working with countries such as Morocco, Kenya, and Senegal to support state-backed entities that will focus on demand-side energy efficiency in the public sector.
- The programmatic approach has proven efficient.
  Findings: Confirmed – The programmatic approach has allowed the SEFA to prioritise those projects that are most suitable rather than being constrained by country envelopes.
- The AfDB due diligence crowded-in private sector finance.
  Findings: Not confirmed, at least at the scale intended. The due diligence has been a factor and is viewed positively but there are many other factors that constrain the mobilisation of private sector finance. In the case of AREF, it was possible to close the funds using funding mainly from development financing institutions who financed just under 95%.

The Peacebuilding Fund (desk study)

EQ	Summary findings
Criteria	• The Nordic countries' foreign and security policies as well as development policies were built on long-standing support for the rules-based international world order with the UN at its centre and effective multilateralism. The UN systems' ability to support peace efforts is central in this context. The main rationale for the Nordic funding of the PBF is to support the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) to act to promote peace and conflict resolution. • The PBF was an outcome of the 2005 UN reforms that led to the establishment of the PBC, an intergovernmental body to support peace prevention and peacebuilding and the PBF. The Nordic countries supported these reforms and worked to support the establishment of the PBF. • The PBF supports UN reforms and UN working as one as it works out of the RCO. Hence strengthening the capacity of the RCO to act and the UN system to cooperate. • The PBF can act across the humanitarian-development nexus and contribute to fostering integration of peacebuilding and enhanced conflict sensitivity in the development and humanitarian pillars. • Since its inception, Nordic donors have provided 25% of the funding. Support from other Nordic donors (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) was not a determining factor for individual Nordic donors. It is rather support from the wider donor community that is the issue.
Influence	• Nordic donors have extensive policy coordination in NY on peace, conflict resolution, and the role of the UN, exemplified by joint statements in the UNGA and the PBF. They shared the same policy objectives: stronger focus on prevention, inclusion of gender and youth in peacebuilding efforts, wider engagement of national stakeholders (localisation), and funding for CSOs, strengthening partnerships, and engaging in how the fund is functioning as well as contributing to fundraising. At the same time as the Nordic donors are active on the policy agenda, they are cautious not to interfere with the politics of the fund; the choice of countries and the content of the projects. • High level of engagement. There is only sporadic coordination between NCs at HQ level regarding the trust fund – as there is also a level of competition around initiatives, e.g., the Pathways for Peace. • The Top 12 largest donors meet in a strategic annual dialogue – "the Top 12 Donor Annual Strategic Dialogue", including Sweden, Norway, and Denmark – where the participating

	countries engage. No prior HQ coordination and without involving Finland. There is no Steering Committee for donor engagement, but an Advisory Board appointed by the UNSG. • Due to the decentralised nature of Danish assistance, Denmark also used its engagement in related thematic groups of friends in New York to influence the PBF. • Coordination between Denmark and Finland on the establishment of a CSO forum.
Results	• The PBF is highly relevant and contributed to strengthening the UN's ability to act in situations of conflict and support prevention – but the lack of funding undermined the UN's ability to act within a core mandate • Nordic countries played a crucial role in setting up the fund and sought to influence the global peace agenda and approach to conflict resolution as noted above. The approach of the PBF reflects Nordic positions, but it is not possible to attribute this directly to Nordic influence. The Pathways for Peace project-enhanced coordination by the UN and the WB in contexts of fragility was initiated by Norway and Sweden, leading to new ways of working together. The CSO initiative driven by Finland is a concrete input. • Its contribution to UN reforms was more about strengthening the RCO than inter-agency cooperation. For this the funds were too small. • The ambition of the PBF was to be catalytic in mobilising peacebuilding support by involving national and local stakeholders. There are examples of such a scaling impact of peacebuilding, but most peacebuilding efforts are quite limited and local – and it has proved difficult to scale those local efforts to the national level. • NCs contributed to stronger emphasis on effectiveness through support for results and outcomes as well as learning and knowledge management. • Despite fundraising activities, inclusion in the Funding Compact, and recently assessed contributions, funding issues remain.
Efficiency	• Generally, a hands-off approach to management – but that also came with a loss of oversight. Support for country level steering groups. E.g., South Sudan. • Too small a budget that is spread across many themes and countries. PBF projects are below USD 4 million, and many are around USD 500,000 to USD 2 million. The typical project is 20–24 months, which is often too short to realise the ToC and support long-lasting change. • A short timescale means that there is not enough time for programme preparation and implementation. • The transaction costs associated with the fund itself are low (below 3%). But the transaction costs of preparing and implementing a project engaging more PUNOs are unclear. • Difficult to work together as a Nordic group. There is not always sharing of information, and there is an element of competition amongst the Nordics to present new initiatives and concrete cases.
Lessons	• Funding of core functions and mandates of the UN can be impacted by changing political situations, e.g., the drop in funding from Sweden (2024) and Finland (earlier). • Trade-off between hands-off approach and oversight. Two approaches: It empowers the fund if we stop micro-managing. We must be sure to set aside enough staff to follow closely what is going on. • Difficult to work together as a Nordic group. There is not always sharing of information, and there is an element of competition amongst the Nordic countries. • Trade-off between effective and efficient; the Top 12 Donors Annual Strategic Dialogue and exclusion of (smaller) donors.

Brief description – The PBF was established in 2005 following the 2005 reforms of the UN peacebuilding architecture that led to the establishment of the PBC, a new intergovernmental body to support peace building and prevention. The role of the PBF is to provide fast, flexible and catalytic funding in support of peacebuilding efforts in specific countries or cross border contexts with a view to reducing the risk of outbreak, escalation, continuation, and recurrence of violent conflict and move towards recovery by engaging with all stakeholders. The PBF is hence an important tool for the UN

system to react within the overall UN mandate. The PBC and the PBF are situated in the UN Department for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA). There is an Interactive Strategic Dialogue between the PBC and the PBF Secretariat. The Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden) played a strong role in the establishment of the PBC and the PBF to enhance the UN's ability to act in conflict situations or to prevent conflict.

Trust Fund objectives strategy and funding – The PBF builds on an understanding that lasting peace can only be built with national ownership and by addressing deeply rooted dynamics, interactions, and shocks. It requires a holistic approach that the UN system is well placed to foster and support through cooperation across the UN system's pillars of peace and security, development, humanitarian support, and human rights. The PBC and the PBF have become important UN multi-stakeholder forums for integrated advice and mobilisation of support from the international community for specific peacebuilding challenges. This strategy places the RC in a central role to ensure a concerted effort of the UN system in specific contexts. The current PBF strategy 2020–2024[91] aims to build on the PBF's comparative advantage of a timely, catalytic and risk-tolerant actor providing small-scale funds for UN inter-agency activities/or UN-CSO activities initiated through the RC offices. The focus is increasingly on prevention, and the priorities are cross border activities, facilitating transitions, incl. generate momentum and address financing gaps in countries transiting out of conflict, and fostering inclusion through empowerment of women and youth. Concretely, the PBF supports i) implementation of peace agreements and political dialogues; ii) strengthening national capacities to coexistence and resolution of conflict; iii) revitalisation of the economy and immediate peace dividends; and iv) establishment/reestablishment of essential administrative services.

The budget for the 2020–2024 period has been set at USD 1.5 billion, representing an increase of 70% over the last period. Currently, the contributions amount to USD 770 million (as of March 2024), representing a shortfall of about 50%. In 2023, the donor contributions amounted to USD 132 million well below the target of USD 330 million.[92] 92% of these contributions came from 12 donors. According to the PBF secretariat, despite success in getting new donors, funding is expected to be particularly low in 2024 as two of the largest donors are not supporting this year – namely Sweden and Germany (traditionally amongst the five largest contributors.) In 2023, the PBF approved USD 202 million for 93 programmes in 36 countries and territories.[93] It is an inbuilt assumption that the PBF funding will be catalytic and draw more resources from other multilaterals, the UN organisations, the IFIs, bilateral donors, CSOs, etc. The goal is to leverage every USD with an additional USD 10 in the current strategy period.

There is a commitment to efficiency with the distribution of funds from the PBF to be 96% for operations (which also include the budgetary overheads, and implementation costs associated with the PUNOs developing and implementing the projects), whereas the PBF secretariat costs 3% and the final 1% for the MPTPO for administrative support and oversight.

The PBF is not the only funding instrument for prevention and peacebuilding – as the UNDP and DPPA can also provide funding for some types of activities. The PBF remains the UNSG's most important tool for funding prevention and sustaining peace activities and for supporting the UN systems' ability to respond as a system at country level. At the same time, there is a need to ensure greater coherence between the various tools, also with a view to prioritisation of funding (including between peace keeping and prevention/peacebuilding) as funding needs are far from being met.[94]

Institutional arrangement – The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) guides the operations of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). The PBC may also offer policy guidance on how the PBF is to be used. Appointed by the Secretary-General, an Advisory Group for the PBF provides oversight into the fund's strategic direction and the effective use of its resources. Members are appointed for a two-year period and up to two consecutive terms. Fiduciary management of the fund is assumed by the UNDP's MPTFO with primary responsibility for maintaining the fund's accounts. The funding of the PBF has until now

[91] Peacebuilding Fund 2020–2024 strategy: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbf_strategy_2020-2024_final.pdf

[92] Peacebuilding Fund: Report by the Secretary-General A/38/779 29 February 2024.

[93] Report by the Secretary-General: Peacebuilding Fund A/78/779 29 February 2024.

[94] EU and Norwegian contribution to the consultation process on the UN Secretary, Our Common Agenda and General Policy Brief on the New Agenda for Peace. https://dppa.un.org/en/a-new-agenda-for-peace.

been based on voluntary contributions, but from 2024, USD 50 million will be provided through assessed contributions. This decision was based on a UNGA resolution facilitated by Sweden and Kenya (UNGA 76/305). KIIs inform that this decision was difficult to reach in the current geo-political environment of confrontation, as some large countries did not support the use of assessed contribution for what was described as a donor-created fund. The fact that funding has been provided by a relatively small group of countries has led to the establishment of the Group of Donors involving the 12 largest donors among which are Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. This group meets annually at a high level for discussions of the strategic direction and funding of the PBF. In addition, there are various other forums for discussions of directions and themes, some of which are primarily for donors and others also involve the wider UN Membership and recipients to share lessons learned. According to the PBF secretariat, there are no plans to change any of these after the decision to fund also via assessed contributions, as there is opportunity for the wider UN Membership to provide inputs to the PBF, also considering that the majority of funding will continue to come from a limited number of donors.

Nordic engagement

Rationale for support – The Nordic countries' foreign and security policies as well as development policies[95] are built on long-standing support for the rules-based international world order with the UN at its centre and effective multilateralism. The UN systems' ability to support peace efforts is central in this context. The Nordic countries are strong supporters of the UN system with the abilities to pull resources together across the humanitarian, development, and peace pillars to prevent conflict and promote stabilisation and peacebuilding. The PBF is one of the important instruments of the UN and the Secretary-General to act to prevent, defuse and stabilise, incl. through its contributions to fostering integration of peacebuilding and enhancing conflict sensitivity in the development and humanitarian pillars.

Financial support – Four Nordic countries have provided about 25% of total support to the PBF in the past decade: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden with Sweden as the largest amongst the Nordics and the second biggest in total. Other large non-Nordic donors include Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK.

Figure 139 below summarises the contributions from the Nordic countries.

Figure 139: Nordic countries' contributions to the PBF



[95] Organisation strategy for Denmark's contribution for support to the prevention, peacebuilding, and sustaining peace, 2022 file:///Users/susanulbaek/Downloads/Organisation-Strategy-for-support-to-the-prevention-peacebuilding-and-sustaining-peace-efforts-of-th%20(5).pdf.

Funding (USDm)	Denmark	Finland	Norway	Other DPs	Sweden	Total
2013			5,079,580	27,376,589	8,373,840	**40,830,009**
2014		5,431,000	5,003,336	60,138,744	7,744,869	**78,317,949**
2015		2,219,456	3,645,643	41,025,131	6,602,343	**53,492,573**
2016			350,467	51,145,821	6,264,404	**57,760,692**
2017	1,854,116		15,516,188	64,303,444	10,726,279	**92,400,027**
2018	885,988		8,697,669	98,210,714	21,131,391	**128,925,762**
2019	5,061,660		7,640,754	101,617,419	20,468,734	**134,788,567**
2020	10,439,177	3,523,425	12,288,243	121,517,607	32,487,481	**180,255,932**
2021	8,664,028	1,175,239	9,019,778	144,521,963	29,118,895	**192,499,902**
2022	7,725,022	1,202,223	10,610,192	108,130,986	25,005,126	**152,673,549**
2023	5,581,188	2,626,510	10,764,657	127,616,642	14,441,754	**161,030,751**
Total	**40,211,180**	**16,177,852**	**88,616,506**	**945,605,060**	**182,365,114**	**1,272,975,713**



Results summary – delivering on the Nordic countries' rationales for supporting the PBF:

Rationale		Summary of the trust fund's success in responding to the Nordic rationales for providing support
Policy influencing	**Policy influence – globally**	**Satisfactory –** The PBC and the PBF are recognised as important instruments for the UN to act to prevent and address conflict and support peacebuilding efforts. The Nordic countries, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden were active participants in this process and strong financial supporters not least. The holistic and focussed on root causes approach to conflict and peace reflects the Nordic approach as outlined in Nordic countries' development strategies. The extent to which the UN strategy is impacted by Nordic inputs or rather the result of emerging understandings and experiences by the global community, incl. the UN system of how to address conflict and peace situations, cannot be determined. This being said, the strategy of the PBF reflects a number of strongly advocated Nordic policy objectives, including the attention to women and youth in conflict, localisation, and partnerships. (One example of this being the Swedish and Norwegian funding of the Joint UN-WB report Pathway for Peace[96] that supported development of new ways of working together, e.g., IDA funding implemented directly with the UN (direct transfers to the UN, for the WB to leverage UN implementation capacity in fragile countries).
	Policy influence – on the organisation	**Satisfactory –** See above. One important success of the PBF is the increased attention to conflict analysis in the UNDAF and UNSDGs. This has filtered to also individual UN organisation strategies, programmes, and policies.
Multi-lateralism	**Delivering the mandate and SDGs**	**Moderately satisfactory –** The support for the PBF is highly relevant for delivering the UN mandate related to peace, security, human rights, and development.

[96] United Nations and The World Bank: Pathways for Peace 2018 https://www.pathwaysforpeace.org/

		BUT the lack of funding undermines the UN's ability to act in a key area where their mandate is strong and unique. Despite a strong value proposition as the UNSG's most important fund for peacebuilding and conflict prevention, it remains difficult to get larger traction from a wide group of donors. Some new donors have started to come in but with relatively small amounts. The exclusive governance systems may need to be updated to attract more and larger donors. Also, the incentive for the 12 key donors to invite other large donors is not clear.
	UN: UN reforms Inter-agency cooperation	**Moderately satisfactory –** Although not a prerequisite stipulated in the PBF, in practice the PBF is also, by the UNSG and the UN system, seen as an important part of the UN Development System reform with its emphasis on the lead role of the RC and the request for inter-agency programmes/projects in support of holistic approaches to addressing conflict situations. However, the funding is very limited, which in reality puts limitation on the importance for reform efforts.
Development delivery	**Generate knowledge to enhance development impact**	**Moderately satisfactory –** The intention with the PBF is to pilot innovative and risky approaches in the process ensuring learning through fast feedback loops. There are some successes in this area – e.g., conflict and climate. But there are also issues related to learning and knowledge management across the wide portfolio and many small projects. This is increasingly being addressed through thematic evaluations and better focus.
	Scaling effects (national public resources, private sector, other donors)	**Moderately satisfactory –** The ambition of the PBF is to be catalytic in mobilising peacebuilding support by involving national and local stakeholders. There are examples of such a scaling impact of peacebuilding related to PBF support, but most peacebuilding efforts are quite limited and local – and it has proved difficult to scale those local efforts to the national level.
	Convening power and influence nationally (national entities, other donors, civil society, private sector)	**Satisfactory –** The PBF supports the convening power of the UN RC and gives the RC a role and funding to intervene at country level, thereby contributing to multilateralism.
	Catalyse additional funding incl. from the private sector	**Moderately satisfactory –** The PBF draws in other resources, primarily from PUNOs in the concrete activities funded, e.g,. see under results below. It is also part of the strategy to work with the wider UN across the peace-humanitarian-development nexus and with the IFIs, bilateral donors, and CSOs. The PBF has a goal of mobilising 1 to 10 – so far this is only partly fulfilled with mobilisation of 1 to 4.88.
	Access to skills (mobilisation of high level of expertise)	The PBF itself does not possess expertise that can be drawn on by the RCOs. But through its funding, RCOs can acquire needed skills. Limited capacity by the receiving UN organisations was one of the main aspects of success.
	Access to country expertise (mobilisation of country experience/insight)	The PBF itself does not possess expertise that can be drawn on by the RCOs. But the RCOs can mobilise UN systems expertise in the context of projects.

Aid effectiveness	**Reducing fragmentation** (harmonisation of external support)	The RCO-led model has the advantage that it brings the UN system together through the JSC. Often JSCs do not manage to fulfill their role – can also be linked to lack of national participation (incl. government).
	Collaboration and coordination with other Nordic donors	**Moderately satisfactory –** There was overall policy coordination among the Nordics, but not specifically centred on the PBF. There is a high level of coordination in the context of the 12 largest donors (potentially negative impact on other donors that are not informed).
	Reduce admin costs for the donor	Not relevant

The UNSDG Human Rights Mainstreaming Multi-donor Trust Fund (desk study)

EQ	Summary of findings
EQ2 Criteria	• The decision to fund was primarily political; to fund an area of central importance to the Nordic countries' foreign and development policies in support of the UN mandate and founding documents. • The main criterium for support was to promote mainstreaming of human rights across the UN development system, and secondary to support UN inter-agency cooperation. The role of the Human Rights Mainstreaming Multi-Donor Trust Fund (HRM) was strengthened with the adoption of the SDGs that embodied human rights, also reflected in the boost in funding by the main donor (Sweden) in 2015. • Nordic funding has varied with reducing tendency. Decisions not to fund by Denmark was related to core funding of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and a contribution to UNSG Call to Action. For Finland lack of funding played a role. Norway increasingly found that HRM activities could be funded by the OHCHR, and Sweden's last contribution focused on one central activity: the human rights advisors. • Attention to the functioning of the HRM, incl. its strategies, policies, and results framework, was limited until the 2021 evaluation. There was general acceptance of the way the HRM functioned and the reporting on activities. There was wide support for the changes following the evaluation, involving a ToC, developed results framework, and a dedicated dialogue with the donors on policies and strategies. • The strong Nordic cooperation on HR in general in the UN, e.g., joint Nordic statements in the Human Rights Council was not reflected in the HRM, despite the Nordics providing 95% of the funding. It was only in the context of the very difficult financial situation the past years before the decision to close the HRM by the OHCHR that Norway and Sweden cooperated on fundraising (from other donors) for the HRM.
EQ3 Influence	• The Nordic countries accepted the ToR for the HRM MPTF as developed in 2010 and its later iterations. There is no evidence of specific areas where the Nordics sought to influence in a specific direction. This was left to the HRM and the inter-agency cooperation that the HRM supported to decide. • In the latter years there was stronger engagement – linked to the funding crises – and the need to engage new donors. Also, Norway and Sweden engaged in the evaluation as part of the evaluation reference group.
EQ4 Results	• The results framework, monitoring and reporting went through a major improvement, following the first evaluation of the HRM in 2021. Until then, reporting was narratives around inter-agency collaboration and country examples. There is no reporting on challenges or risks, except for the dire financial situation. The 2021 independent evaluation was the first evaluation to provide an independent view of the HRM activities and it noted some results and value added of the HRM.

	• The HRM supported human rights mainstreaming across the UNDS, and through the HR advisers contributed to strengthened attention to human rights analysis and activities in UNCTs and lifted the capacity of UN RC/UNCTs to address human rights at country level in the countries where they are present. • The trust fund promoted multilateralism as it supported UN system attention to human rights and inter-agency cooperation to promote human rights, drawing on the capacities of the OHCHR and other UN organisations that were already engaged in the human rights agenda.
EQ5 Efficiency	• Apart from Sweden and to a lesser extent Norway in the latter years, it appears that the HRM had minimal Nordic donor staff attention as the HRM was left to operate based on its ToR. • Sweden, being the largest donor, took a greater interest and kept a dialogue with the HRM secretariat. • The cost of the secretariat was small (1-2 people), and they were able to draw in extra human rights capacity from the DPO and PUNOs (that did not otherwise contribute to the HRM).
Lessons learned	• Consider the usefulness/added value of trust funds when dealing with core issues that should be funded by core contributions – (all Nordics provide core funding for the OHCHR). Difficult to attract donors as this was seen as a Nordic initiative. • The gradually increased focus on funding HRAs was appreciated by the UN organisations, but it undermined the broader mandate of the fund that ended up being primarily a fund for one initiative – the HRAs (who are also supported by the OHCHR). • Insufficient UN institutional incentives make the realisation of even highly supported policy goals very difficult to achieve as UN organisations focus on their own goals and fundraising for their own purposes. • Requires a considerable concerted effort by all, incl. the top level, to secure funding. This did not happen until too late. • More attention to synergies – Nordics can also promote HR in country offices through embassies and other means than the HRM. • "If we want to fund – we must set aside enough staff capacity to follow up." • Large donors want some visibility to continue to fund.

Brief description of the trust fund – The UN HRM was established in 2010 at the request of the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) to support the institutionalisation of mainstreaming of human rights into the UN development system. Encouraging respect for human rights is a fundamental purpose of the UN under its Charter. All agencies and organisations under the UN system, within their own unique mandate, are committed to the common values and purpose of the UN Charter and contribute directly and indirectly towards the realisation of human rights. The SDGs and their focus on human rights and leaving no one behind gave new impetus to human rights mainstreaming. The ensuing reforms of the UN development system to underpin the implementation of the SDGs strengthen attention to the importance of delivering human rights as part of the UN country's efforts. The HRM is designed to provide additional support to the UN country teams (UNCTs) to integrate human rights into all UN activities and support countries in delivering their international human rights commitments. The fund is important for delivering on the UNSGs vision for human rights as laid out in the Call to Action for Human Rights.[97]
Trust fund objectives and strategy – The objective for the HRM is to fund inter-agency initiatives to advance policy coherence at global level and to provide support to RCs and UNCTs to ensure that the UN development system contributes to a society where all people enjoy their human rights, including civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as the right to development and the right to a

[97] Human Rights Main Streaming Multi Donor Trust Fund: Terms of reference – version December 2021 – original version 21 October 2010, and latest amended December 2021. United Nations: UNSG Call to Action for Human Rights https://www.un.org/en/content/action-for-human-rights/index.shtml

healthy environment without discrimination and where they are empowered to be active partners in development in accordance with the 2030 Agenda and its promise to leave no one behind.[98]
The HRM supports the UN development system through the UN inter-agency network of Human Rights, LNOB, and Sustainable Development as well as at the country level, to fully integrate human rights in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, putting people at the centre of development and systematically applying a human rights-based approach by: i) advancing policy coherence, thought leadership, and knowledge creation and management on human rights in development (global level), ii) strengthening RC's and UNCT's capacities, knowledge, skills, guidance, and tools to put human rights at the core of analysis, programming, and advocacy, iii) expanding in-country capacity of RCs and UNCTs through the scaling of the HR advisors programme, and iv) providing direct funding and catalytic support to RCs and UNCTs to strengthen support and partnerships with governments on engaging with HR mechanism and integrating HR in development.[99]
The ToC stipulates that to achieve the objective, three changes need to take place: A: Duty bearers and partners promote and implement HR obligations in line with their international commitments; B: rights holders claim and exercise their rights; and C: Human rights are the core of UN Development system work at all levels – and for this to happen the following assumptions are made:

- RCs and UNCTs have incentives and are accountable for fully integrating human rights in all aspects of their work and implementing Call to Action
- The UNDS has coherent policies and messaging on human rights at all levels
- RCs and UNCTs have advice, skills, tools, and capacities to put human rights at the core of analysis, programming, and advocacy
- National and local governments and NHRIs have the capacity to engage with human rights mechanisms and integrate human rights in development as active agents and partners with support from RCs and UNCTs

HR defenders, civil society, and communities have capacity for meaningful participation with support from RCs and UNCTs. [100]
Institutional arrangements – Figure 140 gives an overview of the institutional arrangement. The fund is managed by a steering committee chaired by the OHCHR and six PUNOs on a rotating basis, which have signed an agreement on participation. The PUNOs include UNDP, UNICEF, UN Women, UNFPA, UNESCO, ILO, and WHO. Donor engagement takes place through the annual dialogue meeting.
Figure 140 below shows the institutional arrangement for the UNSDG HRM Multi-Donor Trust Fund.

[98] Human Rights Main Streaming Multi Donor Trust Fund: Terms of reference – version December 2021 – original version 21 October 2010, and latest amended December 2021, page 4.
[99] Human Rights Main Streaming Multi Donor Trust Fund: Terms of reference – version December 2021 – original version 21 October 2010, and latest amended December 2021.
[100] Human Rights Main Streaming Multi Donor Trust Fund: Terms of reference – version December 2021 – original version 21 October 2010, and latest amended December 2021.

Figure 140: Institutional arrangement for the UNSDG HRM Multi-donor Trust Fund



The UN Development Coordination Office (UNDCO), in its capacity as the UNSDG secretariat (Technical Secretariat), will support the implementation of the HRM and activities of the Steering Committee, with substantive support provided by the OHCHR, with other agencies leading on specific components/tasks. In addition, the UNDCO will provide advice on UNSDG policies and guidelines, and ensure institutional linkages and information sharing with the Task Team on Leaving No One Behind, Human Rights, and the Normative Agenda and other relevant UNSDG inter-agency coordination mechanisms where necessary. The administration is carried out by the UN MPTFO.

The institutional arrangement was found inadequate by the only evaluation conducted of the HRM.[101] The steering committee did not function as a forum for strategic discussions on human rights, which over the years had implied that the participation of the PUNOs had declined (which also to some extent reflected the limited capacity of the PUNOs to work with HR). Similarly, the engagement with donors was largely limited to reporting, with no mechanism and room for engaging donors in strategic planning and decision-making.[102]

Funding – Inadequate funding of the HRM MPTF has been an issue since its inception. The funding of the HRM is seen as critical by the UNDS for it to support inter-agency coherence and provide support for RCs and UNCTs. Lack of sustainable multi-year funding is singled out as a risk that undermines the objective of the fund. To deal with lack of funding, the steering committee in recent years mandated a resource mobilisation task team to act, and it is also foreseen that key donors support the resource mobilisation strategy. The evaluation found that the incentive on the part of the PUNOs to support fundraising was limited. The HRM secretariat confirmed that it was never foreseen that HRM support should be supplemented by contributions from the participating PUNOs, e.g., when working on inter-agency activities and engagements. They also asserted that in practice this would happen but almost only in kind – in the form of staff time. The secretariat also questioned the evaluation's finding as to the limited ownership and interest in the HRM, and the dwindling high-level participation in steering committee meetings as a sign of diminished ownership. It was suggested by the Nordic donors that the PUNOs have conflicting interests and wish to focus on own fundraising, and that demands for inter-agency cooperation by some organisations were seen as an inefficiency adding to the cost of programming (interviews and written documentation).[103]

In 2023, it becomes clear that it will not be possible to continue to finance the HRM at an adequate level, and a decision is taken by the steering committee to wind down the MPTF. There are bilateral discussions with the larger donors – Sweden and Norway, but the OHCHR decides to close the MPTF with reference to lack of donor funding. At the same time there is a decision by the OHCHR to continue to fund the

[101] Evaluation of the UNSDG Human Rights Mainstreaming Trust Fund 2011–2019. January 2021.
[102] Evaluation of the UNSDG Human Rights Mainstreaming Trust Fund 2011–2019. January 2021.
[103] Sida: Beredning af Indsatsändring UNSDG- HRM MTDF 2015–2019 2022–2025, revised March 2024.

HRAs in the UNCTs as they are seen as crucial for the continued strengthening of UNCTs to drive the human rights agenda.

Nordic engagement

Rationale for support – The main objective is to support a comprehensive and systematic approach to integrating human rights into the UN development system. Following the UN reforms and the strengthening of the RCs and the UNCTs, support to the HRM was seen as one way of capacitating the UN at country level to work with human rights and integrate human rights into UN development activities.[104] [105] [106]

Financial support – Based on the data available at the MPTFO, the following figures have been developed showing the Nordic contributions to the HRM MPTF.

Figure 141: Nordic countries' contributions to the HRM MPTF



Funding (USDm)	Denmark	Finland	Norway	Other DPs	Sweden	Total
2011		65,375				**65,375**
2012	802,311	129,320	1,427,679	64,905	1,513,100	**3,937,315**
2013		136,560		130,640	3,043,400	**3,310,600**
2014		123,480	675,995	804,700		**1,604,175**
2015		111,933		561,050	1,195,000	**1,867,983**
2016		111,670			1,109,960	**1,221,630**
2017					2,248,265	**2,248,265**
2018					6,617,805	**6,617,805**
2019		110,026	1,773,816		5,247,911	**7,131,754**
2020	625,450	108,652	1,132,695		1,178,696	**3,045,493**
2021	303,072	117,368	1,112,223		4,694,147	**6,226,810**
2022		103,610	1,497,918	216,000	1,957,675	**3,775,203**
2023		110,148	1,399,867	54,000	2,807,740	**4,371,755**
Total	**1,730,832**	**1,228,141**	**9,020,194**	**1,831,295**	**31,613,699**	**45,424,161**

The Nordic countries are funding close to 95% of the HRM. To date the HRM has received USD 45 million with Sweden providing 70% of the funding, Norway 20%, Denmark 4%, and Finland 3%. The initiative was seen as Nordic, and other partners did find that it, to some extent, overlapped core activities of the Office of Human Rights Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

It is a recurrent theme throughout the Nordic appropriation notes that funding is insufficient and not matching the needs and the ambitions of the UN development system, and that more attention needs to be given to fundraising. In 2022, Sweden and Norway hosted a high-level donor event to attract more donors by inviting 15 potential donor countries. The event was co-organised with the OHCHR and the HRM secretariat. According to interviews there was limited follow-up on the part of the secretariat, possibly due to limited capacity. In 2023, with no view to an improvement in the financial situation, Sweden and Norway are discussing whether to second a person to do fundraising. As it became increasingly clear that the HRM is winding down, Sweden decided to use the fund mechanism to continue

[104] Danish MFA, Programme document: Support for UNSDG Human Rights Mainstreaming Multi-donor Trust Fund, 2019.
[105] Norwegian MFA Template for decision UNSDG Human Rights Mainstreaming Mechanism. 21 November 2022.
[106] Sida: Beredning af Indsatsändring UNSDG- HRM MTDF 2015–2019 2022–2025.

to support the HRAs by earmarking its remaining funding (2022–2025 appropriation) for that specific purpose.[107] Denmark continues to support the aims of the HRM but decided to fund the UNSG Call to Action for Human Rights directly through a small grant contribution to a trust fund in the UNSG secretariat.[108]

Engagement strategies of the Nordic countries (here Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) – It is particularly Sweden and to some extent Norway that has been engaging actively with the HRM MDTF in the most recent years. The engagement has centred on fundraising through close interaction with the HRM MPTF secretariat and the OHCHR. There is no evidence to suggest that Sweden and Norway tried to engage with the PUNOs to gauge their ownership and ask them to leverage the funding of the HRM MPTF.

All donors are satisfied with the ToC and the results framework but at the same time think there should have been a more institutionalised approach to discussing policy and strategy with the donors that only materialised in the later years after the evaluation.

There is important engagement between the Nordic representations in NY and Geneva, the OHCHR and the HRM trust fund at the policy level promoting integration of HR into UNDS activities and strengthening the capacity of RCs and UNCTs, e.g., in. the context of the negotiation of human rights-related language in the QCPR resolutions and in the Human Rights Council sessions (e.g., the adoption of a Swedish-led resolution on the HRAs).

Secondment – There are no secondments.

Earmarking – None. Denmark and Norway see HRM contributions as a supplement to the core funding of the OHCHR.

Nordic cooperation: – There is strong policy coordination exemplified by the Joint Nordic statements in the HR Council. There is no evidence of Nordic cooperation in the context of the HRM MPTF. There is evidence of cooperation, sharing of information, and discussion of approaches and strategies between Sweden and Norway as the two largest donors.

Results summary

Rationale		Summary of the trust fund's success in responding to the Nordic rationales for providing support
Policy influencing	**Policy influence - globally**	**Satisfactory –** The HRM has supported the inclusion of HR into the UN Development System at all levels, including supported inter-agency cooperation, the presence of HRAs in 40+ countries, country analysis of HR and inclusion of HR aspects into UN Country development plans (UNDAF and later UNSDCF) in support of countries' HR obligations. RCs' and UNCTs' leadership on HR through HRAs and guidance and tools to operationalise HR mainstreaming. At the same time, the HRM is not acting at its full potential, i.a., due to minimal synergies between UN initiatives, minimal knowledge sharing and low level of engagement of many UN organisations, and limited HR staff capacities in UN organisations.[109] Apart from the funding, Nordic countries supported that the HRM supported the policy coherence among UN organisations on HR and promoted interaction with key donors on HR policies, e.g., joint messages in the context of UNGA discussions and the preparation of the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Reviews (QCPRs) and resolutions in the Human Rights Council.

[107] Sida: beredning af Indsatsändring UNSDG- HRM MTDF 2025-2019 2022-2025. latest revision March 26, 2024.
[108] Interview Danish Permanent Representation.
[109] Evaluation of the UNSDG Human Rights Mainstreaming Multi-Donor Trust Fund 2011-2019.

	Policy influence – on the organisation (here PUNOs)	**Moderately satisfactory** – Despite HR being part of most UN organisational mandates and a declared top priority by the majority of RCs, and embedded in the SDGs, HR is still not reflected systematically in the results frameworks for UN organisations.[110]
Multiltaralism	**Delivering the mandate and SDGs**	**Satisfactory –** The support for the HRM is highly relevant for delivering on the UN mandate and the SDGs. But there are limitations in implementation – see above.
	UN: UN reforms Inter-agency cooperation	**Moderately satisfactory** – The inter-agency cooperation supported by the fund has been a value addition (policy coherence, HRAs, training material, HRBAs) – but with the limitations pointed to above. There was no backing for fundraising, to some extent questioning the ownership of the development PUNOs to the HRM MPTF
Development delivery	**Delivery on results** (ToC, quality of results framework) Results where possible	**Satisfactory** – Multi-year results framework only developed after the 2021 evaluation. The ToC and the attached results framework cover the full UNDS, incl. global and inter-agency activities, as well as RC and UNCT activities. It is well developed, linking outputs, outcomes, and impact. It is also very ambitious as it puts the spotlight on the many outputs expected to ensure human rights mainstreaming throughout the UN system. Judging from the results framework and the progress reported in year one (2022) – there is momentum with regard to mainstreaming of human rights on a range of parameters (80% of UNDSCFs link with outcomes with recommendation from the Universal Periodic reviews; 88% of UNCTs have completed a human rights analysis (2022), and 66% have taken action to address shortcomings identified). There are also areas of more limited progress, e.g., related to inter-agency cooperation – where the ambition is only for one joint inter-agency knowledge product a year. **The contribution of the HRM to this overall progress on mainstreaming human rights in the UNDS is difficult to establish**. The evaluation (2021) concludes with regard to the Nordic priorities: A: The HRM made important contributions to institutionalising and operationalising HR mainstreaming within the UNDG/UNSDG. It developed guidance documents, capacity development tools, incl. on Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA), web-based guidance on the HR machinery, and guidance for evaluating HR, LNOB, and for RCs and UNCTs. The HRM provided support for inter-agency planning and included HR in planning documents but had limited success with country-level inter-agency programme implementation (due to limited funding). The most impactful has been the financing of HRAs at country level (43 countries in 2022), to advise UNCTs, bring national stakeholders together, support national reporting – but effect hampered due to lack of funding for concrete activities.[111] **The value added** of the fund relates to its support for inter-agency cooperation at a global level and linking this to regional

[110] Evaluation of the UNSDG Human Rights Mainstreaming Multi-Donor Trust Fund 2011–2019.
[111] Evaluation of the UNSDG Human Rights Mainstreaming Multi-Donor Trust Fund 2011–2019.

		and national levels. According to the evaluation of the HRM: *The Fund has used its comparative advantage of linking human rights mainstreaming efforts across the global, regional, and country levels to support the institutionalization of human rights mainstreaming and its operationalization at the country level. This work has contributed towards the widespread acceptance of the centrality of human rights within development work across the UNDS and has supported human rights mainstreaming throughout country level planning.* [112]
	Scaling effects (national public resources, private sector, other donors)	**Satisfactory –** The focus on guidance, knowledge production, and HRA has implied that human rights mainstreaming for relatively small amounts of funding reach widely across the UN development system. But there is still some way to go.
	Convening power and influence nationally (national entities, other donors, civil society, private sector)	**Satisfactory –** The presence of HRAs, improved analysis of HR, and outreach strengthened the leadership and advocacy of the RC and the UNCTs in countries.
	Catalyse additional funding incl. from the private sector	Not an objective.
	Access to skills and country expertise	**Satisfactory –** The HRM funded much needed expertise on HR to boost the knowledge and expertise of the UNCTs. There is no evidence to suggest that the Nordic countries sought to benefit from this expertise in their own country level work.
	Generate knowledge to enhance development impact	**Satisfactory** – The guidance tools for mainstreaming of HR into development were generally appreciated by UN organisations as was contributions to UNDS actions on HR.
Aid effectiveness	**Reducing fragmentation** (harmonization of external support)	**Inconclusive** – HRM provided impetus and funding for mainstreaming of human rights within the UNDS – situated in the DCO. It is part of the mandate of the OHCHR to promote human rights mainstreaming – so in this aspect this created the risk of duplication of effort. At the same time the unique placement at the center of the DS may have improved mainstreaming opportunities. The lead of OHCHR was ensured by their co-chairing of the Steering Committee. OHCHR also suffers from funding shortfalls.
	Collaboration and coordination with other Nordic donors	**Moderately satisfactory –** There was overall policy coordination among the Nordics in the context of the Human Rights Council, but no coordination on the HRM. Towards the end – coordination among Sweden and Norway on funding.
	Reduce admin costs for the donor	**Not relevant** as mainstreaming HR into the UN system would not have been a direct task for the Nordic donors

[112] Evaluation of the UNSDG Human Rights Mainstreaming Multi-Donor Trust Fund 2011–2019 First conclusion, page 56.

Lessons learned

- Consider the usefulness/added value of trust funds when dealing with core issues that should be funded by core contributions (all Nordics provide core funding for OHCHR). Difficult to attract donors as this was seen as a Nordic initiative.
- The gradually increased focus on funding HRAs was appreciated by the UN organisations, but it undermined the broader mandate of the fund that ended up being primarily a fund for one initiative – the HRAs (that is also supported by the OHCHR).
- Insufficient UN institutional incentives make the realisation of even highly supported policy goals very difficult to achieve as UN organisations focus on their own goals and fundraising for their own purpose.
- Requires a considerable concerted effort by all incl. highest level to secure funding. This did not happen until too late.
- More attention to synergies – Nordics can also promote HR in country offices through embassies and other means than the HRM.
- *"If we want to fund – we must set aside enough staff capacity to follow."*
- Large donors want some visibility to continue to fund.

Human Rights, Inclusion and Empowerment Trust Fund (desk study)

EQ	Summary findings
Criteria	• The Nordic countries' prominent global role as advocates for the human rights agenda and human rights-based approaches in development cooperation was a key driver for their collaboration on this fund. • The Nordic engagement was of strategic importance to their foreign policy objectives. • The rationale for supporting a human rights trust fund within the WBG reflects the bank's global influence and its potential to advance human rights if equipped with the necessary knowledge and expertise.
Influence	• The strict interpretation by the WB, supported by the borrowers, of the WB articles of agreement implied a continued need for policy dialogue and nudging at all levels for enhanced acceptance of human rights and human rights-based approaches. • Secondments of human rights expertise alongside funding were important for influencing. • Throughout the NTF period, Nordic engagement focussed on improving the fund's results framework in terms of clear baselines and annual targets and better ability to measure and demonstrate results, especially at impact level, the use of explicit human rights language in the fund's name and operational documents. • The Nordic countries supported HRIE to work with the UFGE fund to strengthen the HR dimension of UFGE, where the Nordic countries are also large donors.
Results	• With small funds, much has been achieved in a moderately supportive context. The WB was now more responsive to human rights-based approaches based on evidence and working methods developed by the NTF and now HRIE. The bank staff are now more receptive of taking into account human rights perspectives in their work, acknowledging the bank's potential for influence. • The fund activities influenced the bank's Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) that embeds human rights principles, including transparency, accountability, participation, and non-discrimination. The ESF is required by the borrowers in the context of the WB for loan and investment projects and created new space for the systematic consideration of social and human rights-related aspects (incl. participation, consent, access to information) as well as attention to indigenous people's rights in the bank's operations. In this context, the assessment of the fund's contributions to Nordic policies priorities – environment and climate, gender, poverty, conflict prevention, non-discrimination, etc. is positive. • *Multilateralism* – The fund provides an important modality in contributing to SDGs. HR are directly or indirectly linked to almost all SDGs and given the WB's significant influence on global development and the SDG agenda, it is of crucial importance to support the integration of human rights-based approaches into the WB's development work.

- *Ownership and sustainability* – Despite new donors now engaging in the fund, the HRIE remains underfunded compared to the task at hand. The fund did not have access to predictable and long-term contributions to allow for the Secretariat to have sufficient and qualified staff. The insufficient WBG management ownership has repeatedly been seen as a hindering factor for the sustainability of results, and this includes financial ownership. Budgetary contributions will not be realised as the management costs remain to be funded by the trust fund, in line with WBG policy.

Lessons learned

- The bank's Articles of Agreement in the view of the Nordic donors had been interpreted narrowly leading to the absence of a specific human rights policy and reluctance to use explicit human rights language.
- Nudging process – as the WBG management saw their role as balancing donor and client views.
- Learning by doing and flexibility in implementation allowed teams to manoeuvre and find space within the bank to discuss human rights. This emphasises the value of adaptability in introducing sensitive topics into institutional conversations.
- Nordic cooperation was strong and necessary to nudge this agenda forward as it required constant attention at all levels, and the Nordics were alone for the first many years.

Brief description of the trust fund

Trust fund objectives and strategy – The Human Rights, Inclusion and Empowerment (HRIE) Trust Fund is a continuation of the Human Rights and Development Trust Fund (HRDTF), which succeeded the Nordic Trust Fund (NTF) – a knowledge and learning initiative at the World Bank Group (WBG) established in 2009 by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. The NTF was originally met with scepticism by bank management and part II countries pointing to the economic development mandate of the WB and fears related to interference in national political issues and in particular ceasing lending to countries with human rights issues. Hence the mandate of the NTF was narrowly defined to support knowledge and learning in the bank to develop a more informed view on human rights. In the first decade, the Nordic countries worked alone. Only recently, more donors joined the Human Rights, Inclusion and Empowerment MPTF to pursue specific inclusion issues related, e.g., to disabilities and LGBT+ that had political significance in their countries.

The last phase of the NTF was closed in 2019. The NTF aimed "*to help the World Bank develop an informed view of how human rights relate to its analytical activities and operations"*. The objective was to be achieved through 1) the grant programme – financial and technical support for task teams across the WBG to explore and operationalise human rights in their projects or programmes; and 2) the knowledge and partnership programme, which provided training and capacity building to WB staff to familiarise them with human rights initiatives in their sectors of work and to incorporate human rights standards and principles in their work, and builds partnerships with relevant external stakeholders. The NTF continued in 2019 as the HRDTF with a focus on scaling up the bank's capacity in human rights by strategic engagement with the bank's management and providing grants to WB teams at different levels for improved integration of HR principles and approaches into its operations. The HRDTF was upgraded to the status of a Global Umbrella Programme in 2020 as a result of reform. The HRDTF then became the Human Rights Inclusion and Empowerment Trust Fund (HRIE), which is centred around six thematic windows: 1) Governance, Inclusive Institutions, and Empowerment, 2) Infrastructure, 3) Fragility, Conflict, and Violence, and Forced Displacement, 4) Research and Evaluation, 5) Social Inclusion and 6) Programme management and Administration. The overall objective of the fund reads as follows: "*to increase and strengthen the understanding and application of human rights principles in the WBG´s work"*. The ambition and objectives of the current phase of the fund emerged from discussions between the bank and donors during the period from April 2017 to 2019 as well as conclusions from the independent evaluation of the NTF conducted during 2017. The HRIE is supported by Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

Trust fund institutional arrangement – Due to an internal trust fund reform at the WB, the trust fund was moved from the Governance GP to the Social Development GP. The governance structure of the fund follows the new umbrella structure. The reform led to an adoption of the umbrella modality whereby the fund acts as an anchor/umbrella trust fund for all other trust funds at the Social Development GP.

The fund's administrative management processes are determined by the WB Board. The donor coordination takes place in the PC. This is a forum where development partners and trust fund staff meet to discuss the strategic direction, implementation, and results of the TF. The PC meets face-to-face at least once a year and decides by consensus. Through the PC development partners take part in approval of the annual budget and the annual work plan, revisions of the Program Document if/when needed. The HRIE is a bank-executed trust fund, meaning that grant recipients operate within the WB's scope and guidelines. Sub-contracting to NGOs or other external entities is not allowed.

Nordic engagement

Rationale for Nordic support – The Nordic countries' prominent global role as advocates for the human rights agenda and human rights-based approaches in development cooperation was a key driver for the initial decision to establish the NTF in 2009 to promote human rights and HRBA in the WB. Nordic countries were in the later years joined by like-minded peers such as Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, and the UK. The Nordic engagement was of strategic importance to their foreign policy objectives. The rationale for supporting a human rights trust fund within the WBG reflects the bank's global influence and its potential to advance human rights-based approaches in its lending operations and was closely linked to the Nordic countries' focus on poverty orientation and gender equality. Sweden assessed their contribution as a high but acceptable risk, considering the significant value it could bring by enhancing the human rights capacity of a big strategic actor in development cooperation with the potential to influence key processes both nationally and globally.

Financial support – The contributions from the Nordic countries are summarised in Figure 142 below.

Figure 142: Nordic countries' contributions to the HRIE



Funding (USDm)	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	Total
Finland	1.12	0.24			1.06	**2.42**
Iceland	0.10	0.12	0.10	0.30	0.20	**0.82**
Non Nordic	0.57	0.44	4.68	2.43	2.83	**10.94**
Norway	1.18	0.20	2.26		1.90	**5.53**
Sweden			2.30	2.21	1.92	**6.44**
Total	**2.96**	**1.00**	**9.34**	**4.94**	**7.91**	**26.16**

Engagement strategies of the Nordic countries – The establishment of the NTF was initiated at political level (Ministers and WB President) and became a reality after six years of discussions and secondments of staff before an acceptable model had been found that could meet the approval of the WB Board. The Nordic countries have continued this active engagement in discussions on setting up the HRIE, in particular around its ambition and the use of human rights language in the fund's name. As the countries see the trust fund as an entry point and platform for broader dialogue with the WB about human rights, they have actively participated in the PC meetings, held regular meetings with the fund's secretariat, and held joint donor coordination meetings, and they took part in joint field visits to Thailand, for example. Throughout the period, Nordic engagement focussed on improving the fund's results framework in terms of clear baselines and annual targets and better ability to measure and demonstrate

results, especially at impact level, and the use of explicit human rights language in the fund's name and operational documents. The ambition has been raised in terms of a more explicit human rights language in the programme document than previously, and also, the current results framework has traceable indicators, and the knowledge management component and the grants are more interlinked. However, it remains challenging to document and report on impact level results. The Nordic countries continue to push for a more strategic and effective integration of human rights into WBG operations, especially into WB lending operations.

Sweden's policy dialogue strategy centred around the projected risks for the fund's success, incl. the very need for the fund, the lack of understanding of what the integration of HR within the WBG means and entails, which hinges on different interpretations of the articles of agreement within the bank, the lack of commitment and ownership at all levels of the organisation, not only the fund's secretariat. In order to manage the risks effectively, Sweden recognised the importance and imperative of a coordinated Team Sweden approach, incl. high-level policy dialogue with the bank's board of directors. Sida's lead policy specialist for Democracy and Human Rights is often involved in relation to the strategic dialogue, coordination with and support from Sida's multi-unit, especially from the WB coordinators, controller support when needed, and follow-up missions are undertaken when feasible.

Finland was involved in the design of the new results framework also to ensure the inclusion of gender equality, to see gender equality as a HR issue not only women's economic empowerment (WEE).

Iceland's engagement has been low-key. They did not participate in annual seminars with grant recipients, and the meetings in Washington were attended by an NBO employee on Iceland's behalf.

The Nordic donors have had a greater influence in the trust fund compared to other funds, for example the UFGE fund.

Denmark was active in the establishment of the NTF but also found that the progress that had been achieved through the first 10 years in raising awareness of human rights, inclusion, and gender equality had been achieved, among other things, due to the incorporation into a version of the ESF of references to human rights.

Results

Summary of the trust fund's success in responding to the Nordic rationales for providing support		
Policy influence	**Policy influence – globally** (multi-country reach – including values and global public goods)	**Satisfactory** – The fund activities influenced the bank's ESF that embeds human rights principles, including transparency, accountability, participation, and non-discrimination. The ESF is required by the borrowers to obtain lending from the WB and created new space for the systematic consideration of social and human rights in the bank's operations. The inclusion of HR into Environmental and Social Safeguards created important standards for the borrowing countries in important areas like participation, stakeholder engagement, consent, and information disclosure, supporting the development of good practice in these areas; recognition of indigenous peoples' human rights dignity aspiration culture, also setting a standard in this area, rules and regulations related to land acquisition and involuntary resettlement, etc.[113]
	Policy influence – on the organisation	**Satisfactory** – The NTF managed to introduce and create an informed debate about human rights in the WB and through that promote human rights thinking into the ESF hence into lending operations. The ambition about a human rights policy which was the ultimate aim of the NTF and later funds has not been achieved. *"Human rights are still a debated issue internally at the WBG and at the Board, and there are members and staff that have the opinion that the WBG should not work on issues of human rights and 'interfere' in national issues."* The bank is more responsive to human rights than in the past. The sensitivity around the human rights discourse and language in the bank has decreased, and the bank's staff are now more receptive of taking into account human rights perspectives in their work,

[113] https://www.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/environmental-and-social-framework/brief/environmental-and-social-standards

		acknowledging the bank's potential for influence through its enormous scope of work, geographically and thematically. [114] However, progress has been slow and there is still a long way to go before the bank systematically adopts HR-based approaches at all levels and until sufficient commitment and ownership is ensured across the bank. The fund's financiers strongly advocated a human rights-based approach in its mandate. Broader discussions on terminology led to the conclusion that human rights-based approaches could be explored through the fund's activities, Finland ensured that gender equality was included in the results framework of the fund through the focus on intersectionality, the downside being that the grant teams are only encouraged to disaggregate gender data. The Nordic countries managed to get the HRIE to work with the UFGE fund to strengthen the HR dimension of the UFGE – to which they are also large contributors.
Mult-ilateralism	**Strengthening the multilateral system** Delivering on the trustee mandate and SDGs	**Satisfactory –** Nordic support for the trust fund contributed some integration of human rights into global development initiatives but not as much as intended yet (as above). Nordic support strengthened international cooperation, incl. multilateral policy dialogue on human rights, but the dialogue and cooperation were largely limited to Nordic countries and like-minded donors, such as the UK, Germany, Canada, and France. The fund provides an important modality in contributing to SDGs. HR are directly or indirectly linked to almost all SDGs, and given the WB's significant influence on global development and SDG agenda, it is of crucial importance to support the integration of human rights-based approaches into the WB's development work. Central to this effort is reinterpreting/redefining the WBG's Articles of Agreement and their links to human rights in order to unpack the bank's human rights obligations to enhance its commitment at all levels and to develop and adopt the WBG policy on human rights. The limited funding and how to attract new donors are often-discussed themes as the fund only relies on the Nordic donors and like-minded peers.
	Strengthening the multilateral system (contributing to UN reforms, One UN, MDBs) Inter-agency cooperation	**Satisfactory** – The fund engaged in discussions through joint events with UN agencies, particularly with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), with the aim to link the fund's work to the UN human rights system and related discussions to ensure complementarity and learning. For example, the OHCHR provided recommendation for the grant component of the fund on how to integrate human rights in the WBG operations and analytics, which the fund followed.
Development delivery	**Development delivery – results** (ToC, results framework, results)	**Moderately satisfactory –** The ToC and results framework of the NTF were criticised by donors for the lack of ambition and weak links between activities, outputs, and outcomes and the inability to track and report on impact-level results. All this has improved with the HRIE, but it still remains challenging to document impact. The main issues remained the fund's inability to catalyse the efforts by higher level support and the wide Board. The fund Is underfunded and does not have predictable and long-term contributions to allow for the grant scheme to be run effectively and efficiently and for the Secretariat to have sufficient and qualified staff.
	Development delivery – Generate	**Satisfactory** – The fund is seen as a centre of knowledge and expertise generating knowledge through studies and assessments that are meant to support the implementation of the environmental and social safeguards

[114] Nordic Trust Fund Completion Report 2009–2018 10 Years of Building knowledge on Human Rights in the WBG.

	knowledge to enhance development impact	into the bank's lending projects. Hence, the real impact is expected to happen in the context of these safeguards, but it remains unknown to which extent these studies have contributed to tangible improvements in human rights policies and practices within and beyond the WBG lending operations.
	Development delivery – Scaling effects (national public resources, private sector, other donors)	**Satisfactory –** With small funds, much has been achieved in a moderately supportive context, but there is still a long way to go before the bank systematically adopts the HR agenda and provides its own resources for the integration of HR into its lending operations.
	Development delivery – Convening power and influence (national entities, other donors, civil society, private sector)	**Moderately satisfactory** – As a bank-executed fund its role is limited to working with and through bank staff.
	Development delivery – Access to skills (mobilisation of high level of expertise)	**Satisfactory –** Access to external skills by engaging top-notch consultants, but this has somewhat limited internal knowledge and capacity building. A structural problem during the NTF period was the high consultancy fees, which limited institutional uptake and the development of internal competence and a knowledge base on human rights. For example, the NTF only allowed for a maximum of 20% of staff time to be funded by the project, which led to extensive engagement of external consultants. This policy has been changed under the HRIE MDTF, likely leading to a larger share of funds being allocated to staff time and a smaller share to consultant time.
	Development delivery – Access to country expertise (mobilisation of country experience/insight)	**Satisfactory –** The HRIE funded much needed expertise and knowledge generation within the WBG but there is no evidence to suggest that Nordic countries sought to utilise the fund's knowledge products for their bilateral work at country level.
Aid effectiveness	**Aid effectiveness – reducing fragmentation** (harmonisation of external support)	**Satisfactory** – Fragmentation reduced as the Nordic donors did not finance their own projects. But it was reported that one of the challenges that remain in the fund is fragmentation of grants.
	Aid effectiveness – collaboration with other Nordic donors	**Satisfactory** – As above
	Aid effectiveness – reduce costs for the donor	**Satisfactory –** Lowered costs for Nordic donors compared to what would have been the administrative and operational costs in case of running their individual projects. Also, the Nordic donors have avoided the costs associated with running parallel programmes or duplicating efforts.

Lessons learned (concerning influencing, multilateralism, and effective country delivery, particularly in relation to Nordic cooperation)

- In the view of the Nordic donors, the WB's Articles of Agreement had been interpreted narrowly, leading to the absence of a specific human rights policy and reluctance to use explicit human rights language.
- Nudging process – as the WBG management saw their role as balancing donor and client views.
- Learning by doing and flexibility in implementation allowed teams to manoeuvre and find space within the bank to discuss human rights. This emphasizes the value of adaptability in introducing sensitive topics into institutional conversations.

- Nordic cooperation was strong and necessary to nudge this agenda forward as it required constant attention at all levels – and the Nordics were alone for the first many years.

The Umbrella Facility for Gender Equality (desk study)

EQ	Summary findings
Criteria	• The Nordic countries support the UFGE as a key mechanism to advance global gender equality. Influencing of WB policies to be promoted widely in the WB loan operations were important rationales for support to the UFGE. • By providing grant support for data collection and analyses, policy development, piloting, and eventually for programme/project preparation, the Nordic donors wanted to improve knowledge and evidence-based policies and lending operations in gender equality within the remit of the trust fund. The policy influencing in global funds was not primarily directed at the trust fund itself as it already shared the same vision but was directed towards influencing others beyond the trust fund and deepening the implementation. • The UFGE aligns with Nordic countries' policy priorities, including improving women's economic empowerment, promoting evidence-based gender policies, and addressing systemic gender disparities, especially in fragile and low-income countries.
Influence	• The UFGE has a high potential for global policy influence through analytical work and impact evaluations. The independent mid-term review (MTR) from 2023 highlighted the development of 283 analytical reports by the UFGE on gender issues and gender gaps across several countries in all regions of its work, 157 impact evaluations providing evidence-based gender analysis at the country level since its inception in 2012, and the dissemination of evidence-based gender knowledge in policy communication to 100 countries. The deep dives conducted for the 2023 MTR suggest that the UFGE has influenced government policies and strategies. • However, it should be noted that no systematic UFGE-generated data exist on whether the dialogues and diagnostics have influenced policy. • Nordic inputs and experience have impacted the broader workings of the WB, supporting the uptake of gender initiatives. The UFGE's funding has enabled the WB and IFC to focus on specific areas such as Gender-Based Violence (GBV) and childcare, which otherwise would not have been funded. This improved evidence and programming in these areas.
Results	• The UFGE has had a mostly positive effect, and knowledge products have proven effective in advocating for policy change when presented to policymakers together with technical assistance and training. • The UFGE strengthens the multilateral system by supporting the implementation of the WB's gender strategy. The UFGE plays a unique role by using external funding to finance the creation of public knowledge goods, which are rarely funded internally by the bank. • UFGE-supported evidence has been applied in 251 WB operations and projects (MTR 2023). Every USD of UFGE funding has been reported to influence approximately USD 350 in WB project funding. • UFGE-developed approaches and models have been incorporated in 53 private sector companies (MTR 2023).
Lessons learned	• Collective Nordic engagement and advocacy in starting the fund was crucial for advancing the gender agenda in the WB. • Strategic entry and exit – Donors may engage with a trust fund when they perceive a strategic opportunity to catalyse change in alignment with their development priorities, but exit should occur when the agenda becomes sufficiently institutionalised, reducing the need for donor involvement. • Effective donor coordination is important for aligning expectations and ensuring that trust fund managers address them. When donors present a unified front, it amplifies their collective influence and makes it easier for fund managers to respond to shared priorities and concerns. • Tailored approaches drive policy change – It is important to ground gender initiatives in cultural and contextual insights to achieve policy outcomes. In Niger, for example, the UFGE informed policy changes on child marriage by addressing deep-seated social norms.

Brief description of the trust fund

Trust fund objectives and strategy – The UFGE is the WBG's sole multi-donor trust fund dedicated to advancing gender equality globally. The fund was established in 2012, and it serves as a mechanism for generating knowledge, data, and evidence to address gender disparities. It aims to help policymakers, development partners, companies, and WB and International Finance Corporation (IFC) teams to address gender issues in their interventions. Since its inception, the UFGE has grown into a collaborative platform supported by a diverse group of donors, including Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and the Wellspring Philanthropic Fund.

The UFGE's work is guided by four key pillars:

1. **Impact evaluations:** Conducting rigorous, evidence-based evaluations through Regional Gender Innovation Labs (GILs) to establish what works (and what does not) in addressing gender gaps.
2. **Private sector solutions:** Supporting businesses with practical guidance on closing gender gaps, particularly in employment, entrepreneurship, and financial access.
3. **Better gender data:** Developing innovative methods to improve the collection and analysis of gender data, including previously underexplored areas such as intra-household dynamics and ownership rights.
4. **Country-led research and innovation:** Funding country-driven research, pilot projects, and scale-ups that respond to local gender equality challenges.

The UFGE's primary objectives include:

1. **Enhancing knowledge and data:** Strengthening the availability of high-quality gender data to inform policymaking and operational design in areas with significant gender gaps.
2. **Driving innovation:** Investing in innovative pilots and frontier research to test new solutions that can be tailored to specific countries and regional contexts.
3. **Influencing policy and programmes:** Using rigorous evaluations and research findings to influence policy dialogue and improve the design of WB and IFC programmes.
4. **Engaging the private sector:** Identifying and scaling private sector solutions that demonstrate how companies can close gender gaps while achieving business success.

These areas of work contribute to achieving results in the following three main outcome areas as per the UFGE results framework:

1) **Influence policy dialogue at the country** level by increasing the availability and use of gender data and evidence in areas where gaps persist between males and females and in new areas where evidence about solutions to address these inequalities is weak.
2) **Improve design of operations and programmes** through knowledge and evidence leading to better designed operations with a sharper focus on implementation and results. Activities aim to strengthen and expand successful approaches and translate new evidence into results on the ground.
3) **Increase awareness and demand for gender smart approaches and interventions** with efforts to broaden support across a range of partners and generating awareness and interest among country clients with new data, research, and evidence.

UFGE activities are primarily implemented through WB implementing partners such as the GILs. However, some individual grants are implemented directly by task teams from the WB and the IFC. UFGE-funded activities draw on extensive cross-sectoral expertise across the WB, with teams working in a variety of units supporting a range of countries and regions. Among the implementing teams are the five Regional GILs. GILs test various approaches to achieving WEE and gender equality.

With UFGE support, fully operational GILs now exist in Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East and North Africa. Grants are also implemented by WB GPs, the IFC, and the Mashreq Gender Facility (MGF).

Trust fund institutional arrangement – The UFGE is governed by the WB's Gender Leadership Council (GLC) and receives strategic guidance from the UFGE PC, a group of development partners that support the fund. The GLC is the main decision-making body for the UFGE. It comprises senior-level representatives from each Regional Vice Presidency, the IFC, the Development Economics Vice

Presidency, and a selection of GPs on a rotating basis. As the coordinator and administrator of the UFGE, the GLC is responsible for reporting on the programme and participating in the WB's Gender and Development Group. The PC consists of representatives from development partners and is chaired by the Global Director of the WB Gender Group. The PC provides strategic guidance to the UFGE and advocates for increased awareness and alliances to foster gender equality. The Secretariat consists of two full-time staff supported by a small number of part-time consultants within the WB Gender Group. It is responsible for managing administration and coordination, knowledge dissemination, partnerships, and communication.

Nordic engagement

Rationale for Nordic support – The Nordic countries support UFGE as a key mechanism to advance global gender equality. influencing of the WB policies to be promoted widely in the World Bank loan operations were important rationales for support to the UFGE. By providing grant support for data collection and analyses, policy development, piloting, and eventually for programme/project preparation, the Nordic donors wanted to improve knowledge and evidence-based policies and lending operations in gender equality within the remit of the trust fund. The policy influencing in global funds was not primarily directed at the trust fund itself as it already shared the same vision but was directed towards influencing others beyond the trust fund and deepening the implementation.

The UFGE aligns with Nordic countries' policy priorities, including improving women's economic empowerment, promoting evidence-based gender policies, and addressing systemic gender disparities, especially in fragile and low-income countries. The UFGE enables innovative, data-driven approaches to influence policy, programme design, and private sector practices. Denmark's support emphasises the UFGE's contributions to sexual and reproductive health, family planning, and education, particularly in the Sahel region. This aligns closely with Denmark's development priorities on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) and regional impact. Iceland, a founding UFGE partner, views its support as part of its commitment to global women's empowerment. The fund's focus on data-driven innovation complements Iceland's emphasis on impactful, evidence-based interventions. Norway supports the UFGE as part of its strategy to advance gender equality globally, particularly in fragile contexts. It values the UFGE's ability to promote women's labour force participation and address barriers to equality through multilateral partnerships. Sweden's contributions align with its Policy for Global Development and leadership in gender equality. The UFGE supports Sweden's goals of enhancing women's political and economic influence while driving global progress on gender-focused agendas.

Financial support – The contributions from the Nordic countries are summarised in Figure 143 below.

Figure 143: Nordic countries' contributions to the UFGE Trust Fund



Funding (USDm)	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	Total
Denmark	1.06								0.65	0.48	0.41	**2.60**
Finland	0.15											**0.15**
Iceland	0.25	0.16	0.14	0.40	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.60		0.60	**2.95**
Non nordic	11.58	4.59	18.63	7.14	8.96	3.46	19.71	19.19	15.62	11.89	6.94	**127.71**
Norway	1.44	1.63	1.36	1.24				2.10	0.79			**8.56**
Sweden	2.60	2.61	2.03	3.17	1.11		1.11	1.04	1.19	1.74	1.45	**18.05**
Total	**17.06**	**9.00**	**22.16**	**11.94**	**10.27**	**3.66**	**21.01**	**22.53**	**18.85**	**14.11**	**9.40**	**160.01**

Engagement strategies of the Nordic countries – The Nordic countries were among the initiators of the fund and played a key role in the establishment and early funding of the trust fund. They were heavily engaged with the WB at all levels on the establishment of the trust fund, the content and expectations to the trust fund, trust fund management, policy priorities and possible earmarking, secondments, and policy inputs. The Nordic countries engaged with the fund through PC meetings where they mainly advocated for improved reporting and measurement of outcomes, enhanced communication and strategic engagement through better planning, and clearer governance, particularly regarding the role of the PC in the UFGE. There were criticism that the donors were not heard in PC meetings and that they received the preparation material too late: *"In meetings, they (the WB) present extensively, leaving little time for us to speak or ask questions. They are not used to working with demanding donors, and we get meeting materials only a few days in advance"*.

Denmark's engagement has been low key and participation in PC meetings was not a priority. Denmark decided to discontinue funding for the UFGE, as it was asserted that gender equality had now gained traction in the WB and there were other donors coming in to carry the mantel in these areas. Sweden and Norway stayed, as they want more recipient-executed funds. It is also recognised in Sweden and Norway that the funding for the UFGE needs to discontinue when *"enough is enough and the task is done, and when the WB needs to continue the work itself"*, also taking into account the countries' changing priorities and available funding.

Secondment – Denmark had provided technical skills as secondments in the UFGE.

Earmarking – All countries except Sweden earmarked their contributions. Denmark earmarked DKK 10 million (Appropriation Note, 2020) for activities in the Sahel region focusing on increasing the empowerment of women and adolescent girls and improving their access to reproductive, child, and maternal health services. This contribution was designed to complement the UFGE's broader gender equality goals, with a results framework outlining impact objectives, activities, outputs, required expertise, and implementation stages. The rationale for this earmarking was to support a distinct approach that departs from the WB's traditional project-based, siloed work. Denmark's proposal aimed to create demand-driven, cross-country, and cross-sectoral initiatives, fostering collaboration and relationships among policymakers across the Sahel. The WB's role would shift to that of a facilitator, enabling knowledge sharing, mutual support, and the exchange of strategies and lessons learned across countries, adding value beyond typical project implementation and technical support. Norway earmarked for promoting female entrepreneurship, incl. in the Mashreq region of Lebanon.

The 2023 MTR noted that the UFGE has incorporated donor contributions that are soft preferenced towards specific priorities that align with the UFGE's main objectives. However, as more funding has become increasingly preferenced, this has implications on the extent to which the UFGE can provide support to the emerging needs of country clients.

Nordic cooperation – The approach to Nordic cooperation was driven by pragmatism as the donors were already like-minded, making the value of coordination clear only when there were significant issues at stake, such as with the trustee. In such cases, it was more effective to collaborate with all like-minded donors to present a unified donor group. Recently, informal discussions involving all donors (not just the Nordics) took place to coordinate proposals for the UFGE. Key proposals include holding two PC meetings annually, strengthening partners' roles in steering the trust fund, improving the content and timeliness of PC meetings, and providing informal updates to PC members, including on reporting.

Results

Rationale		Summary of the trust fund's success in responding to the Nordic rationales for providing support
Policy influence	**Policy influence – globally** (multi-country reach – including values and global public goods)	**Satisfactory –** Due to its global policy influence through analytical work and impact evaluations (public goods - publicly available knowledge products), the independent mid-term review (MTR) from 2023 highlighted the development of 283 analytical reports by the UFGE on gender issues and gender gaps across several countries in all regions of its work, 157 impact evaluations providing evidence-based gender analysis at the country level since its inception in 2012, and the dissemination of evidence-based gender knowledge in policy communication to 100 countries. The deep dives conducted for the 2023 MTR suggest that the UFGE has influenced government policies and strategies. However, it should be noted that no systematic UFGE-generated data exist on whether the dialogues and diagnostics have influenced policy. The UFGE supports the implementation of WB gender strategy by provision of knowledge, evidence, and data.
	Policy influence – on the organisation	**Highly satisfactory** – Nordic inputs and experience have impacted the broader workings of the WB, supporting the uptake of gender initiatives. The UFGE's funding has enabled the WB and the IFC to focus on specific areas such as GBV and childcare, which would otherwise not have been funded. This improved evidence and programming in these areas. (MTR 2023)
Multilateralism	**Strengthening the multilateral system** Delivering on the trustee mandate and SDGs	**Highly satisfactory** – The UFGE's work aligns with SDG 4 and complements the efforts of key players such as UN Women. It strengthens the multilateral system by supporting the implementation of the WB's gender strategy. The UFGE plays a unique role by using external funding to finance the creation of public knowledge goods, which are rarely funded internally by the WB.
	Strengthening the multilateral system (contributing to UN reforms, One UN, MDBs) Inter-agency cooperation	**Satisfactory** – The UFGE collaborates with a diverse range of technical partners and international organisations (including UN Women and UNHCR), private sector entities (such as the Beirut Chamber of Commerce), research institutions (including the University of Ghana and the National University of Mongolia), and civil society organisations (such as Save the Children and BRAC Bangladesh) to develop more effective, country-driven solutions. As a result, over 300 WB projects have integrated UFGE evidence into their design or implementation. UFGE findings have also informed policy dialogue in 105 countries, and more than 80 private sector companies have adopted new policies or approaches based on UFGE insights (Annual Report 2023).
Development delivery	**Development delivery –** Generate knowledge	**Highly satisfactory** – Outcome 1 results (MTR 2023) – developed 283 analytical reports covering frontier gender

	to enhance development impact	issues and identifying gender gaps in several countries and regions. Conducted 157 rigorous impact evaluations to create evidence-based country gender analysis since its inception in 2012. Provided evidence-based gender knowledge in policy communication to 100 countries, developing a better understanding of gender disparities, lessons learned, and best practices within government.
	Development delivery – Scaling effects (national public resources, private sector, other donors)	**Highly satisfactory** – UFGE-supported evidence has been applied in 251 WB operations and projects (MTR 2023). Every USD of UFGE funding has been reported to influence approximately USD 350 in WB project funding (Swedish contribution appraisal 2021). UFGE-developed approaches and models have been incorporated in 53 private sector companies (MTR 2023).
	Development delivery – Convening power and influence (national entities, other donors, civil society, private sector)	**Moderately satisfactory** – As a bank-executed fund its role is limited to working with and through bank staff.
	Development delivery – Access to skills (mobilisation of high level of expertise)	**Highly satisfactory** – Because of the Regional GILs and impact evaluation. The UFGE mobilises high-level expertise, global and regional specialists, to inform gender-responsive policies and programmes, providing tailored technical assistance, and fostering capacity-building through partnerships with governments, academia, and civil society.
	Development delivery – Access to country expertise (mobilisation of country experience/insight)	**Satisfactory –** Because it is linked to and supports country lending operations, it also engages with local experts, stakeholders, and institutions to integrate country-specific insights into loan design and implementation.
Aid effectiveness	**Aid effectiveness – reducing fragmentation** (harmonisation of external support)	**Satisfactory** – Fragmentation reduced as the Nordic donors did not finance their own projects. But it was reported that one of the challenges that remain in the fund is fragmentation of grants through earmarking. The UFGE has incorporated donor contributions that are soft preferenced towards specific priorities that align with the UFGE's main objectives. However, as more funding has become increasingly preferenced, this has implications on the extent to which the UFGE can provide support to the emerging needs of country clients. (MTR 2023)
	Aid effectiveness – collaboration with other Nordic donors	**Satisfactory** – As above
	Aid effectiveness – reduce costs for the donor	**Satisfactory –** Lowered costs for Nordic donors compared to what would have been the administrative and operational costs in case of running their individual projects. Also, the Nordic donors have avoided the costs associated with running parallel programmes or duplicating efforts.

The Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund (desk study)

EQ	Summary of findings
EQ2 Criteria	• All Nordic countries delivered substantial support to Ukraine and there were many channels to choose from; three Nordic countries chose the WB URTF. The choice of the URTF was linked to WB experience in relief and reconstruction, previous collaboration and knowledge about the WB in Ukraine and broader, working with a trusted partner, and trustee features-related WB role in international aid coordination, systems for anti-corruption and managing risks. • Aid effectiveness and multilateralism. • The rationale for choosing this specific fund compared to other funding mechanisms and the size of the contribution was not argued in the appropriation notes.
EQ3 Influence	• Influencing the WB to act in Ukraine was pushing an open door. • Norway with its very large contribution that got the trust fund off to a flying start had good access to WB management and at working level, incl. in Kiev. • Influencing or just having a good overview of what was going on was difficult for other donors with only one PC a year. This is now being looked into – more frequent updates. • Acceptance of the Ukraine government ownership also dampened the donors' insistence on influencing priorities (although Sweden did earmark for energy for the first contribution). No specific influencing plans presented. Nordic priorities related to the poorest people, gender, and climate did not always get the highest priority. • None of the Nordic donors had pushed commercial interests – others had.
EQ4 Results	• The ToC and results framework developed at outcome level, with the results framework at output level evolving as the framework projects are developed. Results 1st year, measured at output level, e.g., 3 million vaccines distributed, ensuring payment of 98% of pensions. • Scaling: Grant contributions from the URTF provided support for programming and by blending with other sources of funding (e.g., IBRD/IFI loans, donor guarantees, etc.) providing capital at a lower cost to the GoU for the framework projects, and for budget support. URTF support of USD 180 million for farm credits unlocked an additional USD 1 billion of finance for agriculture from private sources. • The WB drew on its full range of capacities across sectors to deliver, supporting the functioning and building more capacity of GoU to deliver services.
EQ5 Efficiency	• The cost of administering the URTF was very low (USD 0.75 million a year) compared to the volume of USD 1.3 billion. This did not include the cost of preparation of programmes for support and support for managing the projects that is done by the Ukrainian Government. • This was felt to be a highly efficient way to support the GoU by participating donors.
Lessons learned	• The URTF ensures funding at scale and quality (using the WB programming expertise, technical and country knowledge, targets and ESF, and standards), which is what Ukraine needs. • The framework projects have provided a flexible approach to funding and allowed for quickly scaling and adapting as opportunities arise. • The use of TA. While it was important to have good analytics just in time, this had to be balanced with the need for TA that connects to the projects and supports implementation. • Balance relief and reform. The short-term recovery and reconstruction activities needed to take into account the long term – in order that short term funding also supports necessary long-term reforms. This was not always the case as the emphasis was still very much on the short term.

- Support standards that were linked to EU Membership. Support ambition of green recovery.
- Very strong ownership by Ukraine was a restraining factor on donors in pursuing their policy objectives.

Brief description of the trust fund and its place in the global support to Ukraine

The Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund (URTF) was established in December 2022 to address immediate relief and recovery needs and lay the groundwork for longer term reconstruction and reform. The URTF is an element in the WBG Multi-Donor Resources for Institutions and Infrastructure for Ukraine (MRII) collaborative platform, where the URTF channels donor grants to Ukraine complementing WBG finance and donor guarantees etc. The relief and reconstruction efforts in Ukraine are based on the joint WB, the GoU, the European Commission and the UN assessment of direct damage and needs following the invasion of Russia and the continued war (The Rapid Damage and Needs Assessments (RDNA)). A multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine coordinates the support – the platform consists of GoU, G7-countries, EU, and IFIs and selected large donors incl. Norway and Sweden, and Denmark as an observer.

Fund objectives and strategy – The URTF's development objective is to provide a coordinated financing and support mechanism to assist the GoU in sustaining its administrative and service delivery capacity, conducting relief efforts, and planning and implementing Ukraine's recovery, resilient reconstruction, and reform agenda.

The results framework is designed across two pillars and a cross-cutting pillar:

- Pillar 1 Government capacity and relief with two outcomes: Outcome 1.1. related to Government capacity administrative and service delivery and Outcome 1.2. related to the ability to reach people with relief
- Pillar 2 Recovery, resilient reconstruction, and reform with two outcomes: Outcome: 2.1 related to government capacity for analysis, and Outcome 2.2. which is project development and implementation.

The cross-cutting pillar is about the operational effectiveness of the programme, including development effectiveness related to addressing gender gaps, ESF standards, climate risks, and aid coordination.

The WB has developed/is in the process of developing framework projects within the following most severely affected sectors as identified in the RDNA: Health, essential infrastructure (internet), energy, housing, agriculture, education, and administrative and technical service delivery (capacity building and budget support). Framework programmes imply development of programmes based on Ukrainian needs and priorities and financing those using multiple sources. While the projects are designed and appraised at full scale following the normal WB standards (USD 500-800 million per programme), they are adaptable to events on the ground and scalable to include other sources of funding as they become available from the various funding streams available to Ukraine under the MRII and from sources outside the WB. The URTF provides up-front funding for all those programmes, often initiated with the support of a WB loan. The URTF also funds technical assistance and capacity building for Ukrainian authorities. In the design of the recovery and reconstruction projects, the WB needed reforms in the sector are factored in – by either designing the framework projects in a way that supports ongoing reforms (health) or laying the groundwork for future reforms (energy). [115]

Risk management follows the same procedure as for the WBG engagement in general. The major risks are fiduciary. Third party-monitoring across the WB portfolio is being rolled out to cover all programmes. In addition to project-related fiduciary risk the WB has for years worked to implement the Prozorro Procurement Platform, providing technical assistance for the GoU for project development and implementation management, anti-corruption measures, including enforcing anti-corruption laws, strengthening civil society, and educating citizens. The GoU, working with development partners,

[115] World Bank URTF: Annual Work Plan 2024–25, April 2024.

continues to take measures to enhance integrity and accountability. In addition, the WBG has mechanisms in place to deal with allegations of corruption and grievances. [116] [117]

Institutional arrangements – The URTF is governed by a PC co-chaired by the WB and the GoU Ministry of Finance and with the participation of all donors. The role for the PC is dual (i) Serve as a high-level governance body of the trust fund to provide strategic guidance and direction on the URTF's activities including advising on the results framework and priority setting, (ii) Ensure that the URTF efficiently and effectively supports Ukraine to implement its vision for recovery and reconstruction in support of the National Recovery Plan, which includes endorsing the URTF's Annual Work Plan and Budget, and reviewing the URTF's Annual Financial and Progress Reports, including a public Annual Report.

Amongst donors there are some discussions as to the working of the PC. At a donor meeting preceding the 2024 PC meeting, there was some discussion and agreement that more information sharing, discussion of adaptation of results frameworks, possibly also regular meetings in Kiev, was warranted in between the annual meetings. There was also an interest in developing a partnership document in accordance with the WB Trust Fund policies that describes the principles and procedure for the management of the fund.[118] This does not appear to be a specific concern for Norway as the largest donor as they find that they have good access to information and do meet the WB in Kiev and HQ for discussions related to the URTF and Ukraine. All framework projects are presented to the WBG Board ensuring oversight.

Funding – In the first year of operation, 2023–2024, 15 donors contributed USD 1.5 billion to the URTF. Norway and Japan provided the bulk of the finance (Norway USD 585 million and Japan USD 473 million). And the URTF disbursed about USD 500 million. The target for the financing of the URTF is to raise USD 1 billion a year for the next 10 years. The WB acknowledges that it is going to be challenging to maintain this level of funding over that many years.

Due to the evolving nature of URTF funding year on year, the URTF operates with a base case scenario based on known availabilities of funds as well as an investment case that would allow the URTF to fill all funding gaps. For 2024 the base case is USD 883 million, and the investment case is USD 1.9 billion.

The URTF has by the end of year 1 leveraged USD 1 billion in private capital (the end target is USD 1.5 billion by 2033) primarily for agricultural investments.

Nordic engagement – Iceland, Norway, and Sweden

Rationale for Nordic support – All Nordic countries have large programmes in support of Ukraine after the Russian invasion. Three Nordic countries choose to support the URFT as part of their response to the invasion of Ukraine. It is not clear from the available information and interviews what guides the distribution of the massive support for Ukraine among areas of intervention and partners. All countries provide some of their support through the WB but also use a range of other partners and trust funds.

Norway was engaged from the start of the establishment of the URTF, and the support is part of the Norwegian Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine.[119] Norway is motivated by previous cooperation with the WB, incl. co-financing of budget support in Ukraine, leveraging incl. from the private sector, the WB's prior experience with similar funds and with managing in situations of high fiduciary risk, risk sharing with the WB and other donors, greater transparency and predictability for the GoU, better coordinated assistance and dialogue with the GoU, and the in-built flexibility of the fund with the framework projects. Norway is also keen to provide project support rather than budget support (although it is recognised that budget support is also needed) to have tangible results to show for the large contributions.[120] "*WB MPTF is the way to organize aid in situations such as Ukraine – ensures aid effectiveness, donor coordination, leveraging of extra funds, and risk sharing"* (Interview with Norad)

Sweden's support to Ukraine is laid out in the Strategy for Sweden's Reconstruction and Reform Cooperation with Ukraine that identifies the sectors of support as well as the partners – basically listing multilaterals active in Ukraine and no criteria for selection of partners. In programme documentation

[116] World Bank: Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund Annual Report 2022–2023.
[117] World Bank web: https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/urtf
[118] MFA Norway: Mandate related to Norwegian participation in the 2024 Partnership Council meeting.
[119] https://www.norad.no/en/front/thematic-areas/the-nansen-support-programme-for-ukraine/areas-of-norwegian-support-to-ukraine-and-neighbouring-countries/
[120] Norwegian MFA: Beslutningsdokument – Støtte Gjennom Verdensbanken til Ukraine December 2022.

and interviews concerning the choice of the WB for a grant to the URTF, the WB is singled out for its prior experience with setting up trust funds in similar situations, systems for anticorruption and managing fiduciary risks, its ESF regime, and complementing the budget support activities that Sweden is also contributing to. Sweden made a soft earmarking of its first 2022 contribution towards energy as Sweden has a role in the green transition of Ukraine.[121] In the larger 2023 contribution there is no earmarking as it is recognised that this is not legally binding for the WB, and Sweden would rather allow the WB to use the funds flexibly.[122]

Iceland's choice of the URTF is based on the wish to contribute to the recovery and reforms through working with a trusted partner.

Financial support – The contribution from the Nordic countries is summarised in the table below for the year 2023. Norway provided about a fifth of the funding so far. During 2023 and at the end of 2023, the contributions evolved substantially:

Contributions to URTF end 2023.

Funding	End 2023 USD million
Iceland	6.33
Non-Nordic	841.1
Norway	585.42
Sweden	52.99
Total	1.485,84

Source: World Bank: Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund Annual Report 2022–2023

Nordic engagement strategies – The Nordic countries engaged at all levels to support a strong role and presence of the WB effort in Ukraine, incl. high-level meetings and through their joint Nordic-Baltic representation on the Board, where the WB support for Ukraine and the new modality of framework projects were being discussed. The Nordic countries also engage at country level through the Multi-Agency Donor Coordination Platform as well as working groups in this context and specific URTF meetings in country as well as through the URTF PC.

The overall approach has been one of support, with Norway and Iceland the most positive. There is recognition amongst the Nordic countries that the GoU, to a large extent, sees the funding as their funding and not to be micro-managed by donors. Norway accepts this point and does not find it necessary for the donors to get involved in the framework projects in the PC also in light of prior discussion on the WB Board. Sweden has voiced concern to strengthen the poverty focus and provided inputs on the health project with regard to gender (SRHR and GBV). Based on the experience with gender policies, a continued dialogue on gender is foreseen.[123] The WB acknowledged that it had been difficult to live up to the WBG standard targets with regard to gender and climate in the first year, but that this was now rapidly changing. There is attention to risks and risks management by all donors. Some concern was expressed by Sweden regarding slow disbursements of funds, but also recognition of the need to balance this demand with the imperative to prepare well and ensure oversight of the use of funds. None of the Nordic donors to the URTF had been pushing for commercial interests, whereas other donors had.

Overall, the assessment is that funding through the WB is good value for money – with inbuilt donor coordination, dialogue, and close collaboration with the GoU and minimising, to the extent possible, the fiduciary risks. There is attention to the continued roll-out of third-party monitoring and recipient feedback to ensure that services are benefitting where they should. There is also satisfaction with the attention to technical capacity building in key institutions as part of the programme.

[121] Sida: Beslut om insats URTF, 12 December 2022. Insatsnummer 16344 and Strategy for Sweden's reconstruction and reform cooperation with Ukraine. https://www.government.se/international-development-cooperation-strategies/2023/12/strategy-for-swedens-reconstruction-and-reform-cooperation-with-ukraine-20232027/

[122] Sida: WB URTF MDTF Beredning af instatsändring 2023-11-30, page 5.

[123] Sida: WB URTF MDTF Beredning af instatsändring 2023-11-30, page 38.

Earmarking – Sweden earmarked for the energy programme, related to its role in Ukraine to support the green transition

Nordic cooperation – There is Nordic cooperation at the policy level in the context of the joint Nordic-Baltic Office (NBO) in the WB. There is limited Nordic cooperation in the context of the fund. Iceland seeks information from Norway when necessary.

Results with regard to Nordic countries' rationales

Rationale		Summary of the trust fund's success in responding to the Nordic rationales for providing support
Policy influencing	**Policy influence – globally**	**Highly satisfactory –** The URTF provides and leverages highly needed flexible funding and technical support for Ukraine in high-priority areas also supported by the Nordic countries.
	Policy influence – on the organisation (here PUNOs)	**Satisfactory –** The WB itself did not need influencing to support Ukraine. In the rushed setup of the fund and the first contributions, Nordic policy priorities were not always ensured – the poorest people, gender, and climate. This is now improving.
Multilateralism	**Delivering the mandate and SDGs**	**Highly satisfactory –** Delivering on WB core mandate.
	UN: UN reforms Inter-agency cooperation	Not relevant.
Development delivery	**Delivery on results** (ToC, quality of results framework) Results where possible	**Highly satisfactory –** The ToC and results framework developed at outcome level, with the results framework at output level evolving as the framework projects are developed. Outputs will be measured at project level and aggregated where possible. The cross-cutting pillar picking up on development effectiveness as well as operational and administrative effectiveness to be reporting separately ensures attention to this area. The ToC and results framework will be adapted as the situation evolves, using the PC for discussions. Assumptions and risks identified are yet to be reported on in greater detail. Reporting on outputs – people reached; infrastructure reconstructed/recovered is done at framework project level.[124] E.g., for the heath project: three million vaccines administered, more than one million Ukrainians covered by the 'Affordable medicines programme', training of healthcare personnel for caring of people with mental health issues and gender-based violence. With support for systems and transfers: USD 100 million for house repairs distributed, 98% pensions continue to be paid on time, and 90% of public salaries.
	Scaling effects (national public resources, private sector, other donors)	**Highly satisfactory – The** grant contributions from the URTF provide support for programming and by blending with other sources of funding (e.g., IBRD/IFI loans, donor guarantees, etc.) provide capital at a lower cost to the GoU for the framework projects and for budget support. URTF support of USD 180 million for farm credits unlocked an additional USD 1 billion of finance for agriculture from private sources.
	Convening power and influence nationally	**Highly satisfactory –** The URTF is used as a critical tool by the WB and the GoU to support critical coordination of efforts incl. by funding framework project development, technical

[124] World Bank: Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund Annual Report 2022-2023

	(national entities, other donors, civil society, private sector)	assistance, and knowledge. The PC is one platform for coordination amongst the GoU, the WB and donors.
	Catalyse additional funding incl. from the private sector	**Highly satisfactory –** By end 2023, the WBG (incl. the IFC and MIGA) had mobilised USD 40 billion in grants, loans and guarantees.[125] The WBG plays a role as part of the overall coordination of support to Ukraine. The aim is to catalyse funding from the private sector. So far this has happened with regard to agricultural credits.
	Access to skills and country expertise	**Highly satisfactory –** The WB brings to Ukraine well-tested approaches from fragile situations. The URTF is in itself an example of this. Working in Ukraine differs as there is considerably more capacity, more developed infrastructure, and a spirit of collective effort to fight back against an external enemy that is not often found in fragile situations. The WB draws on its full range of technical capacities, and at the same time centres on enhancing the capacity of the GoU and other partners in Ukraine.
	Generate knowledge to enhance development impact	**Satisfactory –** The situation in Ukraine implies balancing URTF investments in knowledge production for future reforms and the need to focus on immediate support for implementation of relief and reconstruction.
Aid effectiveness	**Reducing fragmentation** (harmonisation of external support)	**Satisfactory –** The URTF is one platform. The most comprehensive being the Multi-Agency Coordination Platform. The URTF is well aligned to the GoU's plans and used by the GoU to further priorities also discussed elsewhere. The technical capacity (incl. related to transparency and project implementation management (PIM) built by URTF support is critical for the GoU's ability to implement budget support and other activities funded by all sources. The URTF/the WB promote standards that support the long-term goal of EU membership. At the same time, the URTF is one of many large funding channels requiring active aid coordination, to a large extent provided by the GoU.
	Collaboration and coordination with other Nordic donors	**Satisfactory –** There is coordination at policy level and in the context of the WB Board, but very limited coordination amongst Nordic donors in the context of the URTF. There is coordination with other like-minded donors as this makes more sense, and the URTF PC serves as one of the coordination forums. It is not possible to assess the extent of overlap/competition between different coordination forums.
	Reduce admin costs for the donor	**Highly satisfactory –** Economies of scale suggest reduced costs. One of the advantages of the URTF is that it reduces the admin cost of donors, compared to preparing and implementing projects individually WB systems for assessing and managing fiduciary risks are more developed and comprehensive than bilateral donors that rely on the WB systems.

[125] World Bank: Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund Annual Report 2022-2023 page 16.

	The cost of administering the URTF is very low (USD 0.75 million a year) compared to the volume of USD 1.3 billion. This did not include the cost of preparation of programmes for support, support for managing the projects that is done by the GoU.

Comparing the Nordic countries – The motivation for supporting the URTF is similar among the Nordic countries. There is general acknowledgement of the strong ownership by the GoU and the working relationship between the GoU and the WB, including in difficult areas related to governance and transparency, and acceptance of the difficult and fast evolving situation that warrants a more restrained donor engagement. Possibly, due to Norway's early engagement and subsequent large contribution, Norway's approach is more towards working closely with the WB than with other donor colleagues. And its focus appears to be on ownership and managing risks. This ensures quick access to information and exchange of ideas. There is no evidence to support that Norway tried to use this position to promote specific policies or approaches – rather that Norway supports the WB and the GoU in their efforts. Sida appears more inclined to work with the URTF than with other trust funds incl. pursuing priorities in the areas of gender, climate, and poverty.

JC	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
Most important criteria	Trusted partner with experience in providing large scale of funding in fragile situations, policy alignment aid effectiveness,	Trusted partner with experience in providing large scale of funding in fragile situations, policy alignment aid effectiveness, fiduciary risks reduced	Trusted partner with experience in providing large scale of funding in fragile situations, policy alignment aid effectiveness, fiduciary risks reduced
Engagement strategy	Engagement through the NBO at policy level, and PC.	Engagement with the WB at all levels, high level WB, the NBO, in country and PC.	Less intense engagement is also linked to the more limited size of the contribution.
Results with regard to criteria	Achieved	Achieved	Achieved
Efficiency Nordic country: Programme prep: Staff	Lean process with preparation of one-page note assessing the trust fund contribution alignment to Icelandic strategies and policy objectives.	The decision document is highly political and argued from a political angel, but with due reference to risks related to mismanagement, fragmentation of aid, etc.	Project documentation for 2022 contribution followed a lean procedure (forenkläd beredningsprocedure) to deliver on a government promise to provide funding for the URTF on a 14-day notice. Full Sida procedure with appraisal and assessment of Swedish policy objectives etc. of the expansion of support (2023)
Synergy in-country	Support aid, aid effectiveness	Synergy in Ukraine with other activities is supported – aid effectiveness No specific refence to Norwegian areas	Sweden earmarking for energy to support synergy with other Swedish funded activities – first contribution

Importance attached to Nordic cooperation	High importance – get information through the NBO and Norway	No specific importance. The NBO is important. Norway works with the WB and other donors as necessary	No specific importance. The NBO is important. Sweden works with the WB and other donors as necessary

Lessons learned

- The URTF ensures funding at scale and quality (using the WB programming expertise, technical and country knowledge, targets and ESF, and standards), which is what Ukraine needs.
- The framework projects have provided a flexible approach to funding and allowed for quickly scaling and adapting as opportunities arise.
- The use of TA – while it is important to have good analytics work just in time, this has to be balanced with the need for TA that connects to the projects and supports implementation.
- Balance relief and reform. The short-term recovery and reconstruction activities need to take into account the long term, so short-term funding also supports necessary long-term reforms. This is not always the case as the emphasis is still very much on the short term.
- Support standards that are linked to EU Membership. Support ambition of green recovery.
- Very strong ownership by Ukraine is a restraining factor on donors in pursuing their policy objectives.
- Continue to work on increased revenues to ensure long-term finance for reconstruction and reform.

Digital Development Partnership (desk study)

EQ	Summary of findings
Criteria	• Broadly, the Nordic countries sought to leverage their digital expertise and influence global digital policy while also utilising the WB's digital expertise and the trust fund's potential to leverage WB lending and attract private sector investments. It would have been difficult for Nordic countries to support themes within the fund's focus areas through other means.
Influence	• As members of the Steering Committee and the PC, the Nordic countries participated in high-level meetings and discussions about annual work plans, indicative budgets, strategic guidelines for the fund's activities, and periodic review of implementation indicators. However, as it is the bank's executed fund, the decision-making authority for all aspects of the trust fund's activities lies with the bank, and the Nordic donors' opportunities for strategic management and control of the fund were limited • The Nordics have influenced the fund's focus on gender, climate, environment, and an improved results framework. However, it is the fund's management that sets the overall direction of the fund, and the donors' opportunities for strategic influence are limited.
Results	• Multilateral – Nordic financial support for the fund has contributed to strengthening the WB's leadership role in global digital development efforts. It has strengthened the bank's role within the global development community in terms of being able to contribute or lead work in many of the fields that the trust fund was set up to support. Connectivity, for example, digital infrastructure-related work, digital governance, digital public infrastructure, global leadership role, global initiative and partnerships, the bank raised its profile through the TF. • Country delivery – scaling – DDP grants leveraged over USD 9 billion of lending by complementing IBRD and IDA financial resources with knowledge, technical assistance, convening, and partnership activities. • Country delivery – results – Since its establishment in 2016, the DDP has supported 125 advisory and diagnostic activities in 80 countries across a wide range of topics. In addition, the DDP has also supported 94 knowledge products, including country diagnostics under the DE4A initiative. But there is not enough evidence on how knowledge products are used at the project level, and this is not well documented.

	• Country delivery – reporting – The outcome and impact reporting is weak: *"we don't know about the impact, and we are trying to find out how to get information on the impact"*
Lessons learned	• Active involvement – Trust funds are not only about financial contributions. Effective influence requires active participation in strategic development, technical input, and steering activities. Donors need to contribute beyond financing by engaging in meaningful ways, such as sharing expertise and identifying areas for cooperation to enhance mutual benefit. • Understanding the trust fund and trustee – To influence the WB through trust funds, it is essential to understand how the fund fits within the bank's structure, including its role in global practices, country/regional leadership, and its contribution to project preparation. Efficiently working through trust funds requires insight into these dynamics to maximise their impact. • Balancing public and private sector roles in digital development – When engaging in digital development through ODA, it is crucial to ensure that public sector involvement does not disrupt sound business models or crowd out private investment. Collaboration with the private sector should enhance investment and avoid creating dependencies. • Rapid technological advancements – The fast pace of technological advancements poses a risk to the relevance of digital development strategies. Continuous updates and a forward-looking approach are essential to ensure that digital initiatives remain effective.

Brief description of the trust fund

Trust fund objectives and strategy – The DDP Trust Fund, managed by the WB, is a globally focused initiative implemented across more than 80 countries. It aims to operationalise the objectives outlined in the 2016 World Development Report on Digital Dividends by leveraging digital technologies and data to foster green, inclusive, and resilient social and economic development. The fund was established to address the growing digital divide between high-income and low-income countries, recognising that access to digital technology is a critical factor in achieving sustainable development goals. The fund is designed to attract and coordinate investments from multiple stakeholders: governments, private sector partners, and international donors. The DDP operates as a bank-executed fund, meaning that WB staff lead project implementation and oversight. In 2024, the fund evolved into DDP 2.0, expanding its geographical focus into middle-income countries, sharper focus on climate and environmental concerns, more explicit support to facilitating private sector investment, and enhanced ToC and results measurement framework.

The fund concentrates on six key focus areas: broadband connectivity, digital data infrastructure, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) industry development, digital safeguards, digital solutions for climate, and accelerating digital use across sectors. Under these focus areas, the DDP pursues five thematic objectives: developing a global index for digital adoption, enhancing the digital environment in developing countries, extending internet access for all, advancing digital governance, and mainstreaming digital solutions and platforms.

The objectives of the fund are set out in annual plans and depend essentially on the choice of countries and projects, as well as on the resources available. In other words, demarcations are made continuously, not only during the start-up phase. The DDP's activities are structured across three levels of engagement: global, country-specific, and dissemination. At the global level, the fund promotes knowledge-based policy recommendations. Country-specific objectives are pursued through technical assistance and integration into WB programmes. Dissemination efforts include annual high-level events, conferences, workshops, and publications to share insights and best practices.

The fund provides: 1) advisory services including targeted policy guidance, technical assistance, and capacity building; 2) knowledge products including data and diagnostics to provide actionable insights at regional, country, and local levels, research and thought leadership to expand the global knowledge base, as well as thematic operational toolkits; 3) convening services that bring together key stakeholders, from both public and private sectors, involved in advancing global digital development

The DDP supports significant initiatives like the Digital Moonshot for Africa, which aims to digitally enable every African individual, business, and government by 2030. Through these efforts, the DDP

Trust Fund acts as a catalyst for digital development, fostering policy innovation and the widespread adoption of digital technologies in developing countries.

Trust fund institutional arrangement – The central governing body of the DDP is the Steering Committee (SC), which is chaired by the WB. The SC provides strategic guidance to the fund, reviews and provides input to annual work plan and budget and periodically reviews key performance indicators to evaluate the fund's performance. The bank has final decision-making authority over all activities. The SC includes up to two representatives from each donor contributing at least USD 1 million and can also include observers and additional members as deemed necessary by the bank. The committee meets at least once a year, either in person or virtually. Complementing the Steering Committee, the PC provides broader strategic guidance, particularly on the implementation of the fund and any associated trust funds. This council also reviews progress reports and endorses annual work plans and budgets. It consists of representatives from the bank, each contributing donor, and representatives from donors of associated funds. Like the SC, the PC meets annually, but it may also convene for ad-hoc meetings if requested by its members. Operational management is carried out by a Programme Secretariat within the WB's Transport and ICT GP. This body is responsible for the day-to-day programme management, administration and coordination of the fund's activities, ensuring that funded projects align with the strategic objectives set by the SC and PC.

Nordic engagement

Rationale for Nordic support – Broadly, the Nordic countries sought to leverage their digital expertise and influence global digital policy while also utilising the WB's digital expertise and the trust fund's potential to leverage on WB lending and attract private sector investments. It would have been difficult for Nordic countries to support themes within the fund's focus areas through other means. Denmark contributed to the DDP as part of its broader *TechVelopment* agenda, under the government's *TechPlomacy* initiative, which aims to position Denmark at the forefront of the technological revolution. By engaging with the DDP, Denmark sought to influence global digital policy, bridge the digital divide, and demonstrate leadership in testing innovative areas such as the use of cargo drones for development. The partnership also provided Denmark access to the WB's digital expertise and a global tech community. Norway viewed its contribution to the DDP as a means to be at the forefront of digital transformation within development policy. This aligned with Norway's national strategy for digitalisation, which emphasises reaching the most underserved populations. Norway's support for the DDP was further justified by the efficient management and administration of the fund, ensuring that the resources are used effectively to achieve impactful digital development outcomes. Finland has a long-standing relationship with the WB in the field of ICT and digital development, which is a cornerstone of its contribution to the DDP. Finland's participation in the DDP built on its history of supporting digital initiatives, such as through the WB's Infodev programme. By contributing to the DDP, Finland continued its commitment to enhancing digital infrastructure and capacity building in developing countries, areas where it has significant experience and expertise.

Financial support – The contributions from the Nordic countries are summarised in Figure 144 below.

Figure 144: Nordic countries' contributions to the DDP Trust Fund





Funding (USDm)	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	Total
Denmark		2.14		2.95				**5.10**
Finland	0.32	0.62		0.22				**1.16**
Non Nordic	3.25	4.25	2.07	5.03	2.98	5.04	1.80	**24.42**
Norway				7.53		2.29		**9.82**
Sweden					1.80	1.73	0.70	**4.22**
Total	**3.57**	**7.02**	**2.07**	**15.73**	**4.77**	**9.07**	**2.50**	**44.72**

Results with regard to Nordic countries' rationales		
Policy influence	**Policy influence – globally** (multi-country reach – including values and global public goods)	**Satisfactory** – The fund contributes to a number of SDGs and the WBG's work in more than 80 countries.
	Policy influence – on the organisation	**Satisfactory –** The Nordics have influenced the fund's focus on gender, climate, environment, and an improved results framework. However, it is the fund's management that sets the overall direction of the fund, and the donors' opportunities for strategic influence are limited. Finland no longer considers trust funds to be vehicles for influencing the WB. Instead, high-level engagement with the WB's Board is a preferred option. *"The Bank can establish trust funds with their own resources"* However, there were indications of tacit influence from donors through the funding negotiation processes. The creation of the cybersecurity window apparently had a link to funding negotiations with South Korea.
Multi-lateralism	**Strengthening the multilateral system** Delivering on the trustee mandate and SDGs	**Highly satisfactory** – Nordic financial support for the fund has contributed to strengthening the WB's leadership role in global digital development efforts. It has generally strengthened the banks' role in the global development community in terms of being able to contribute or lead work in many of the fields where the trust fund was set up to support. Connectivity, for example, digital infrastructure-related work, digital governance, digital public infrastructure, global leadership role, global initiative and partnerships, the bank raised its profile through the TF.

	Strengthening the multilateral system (contributing to UN reforms, One UN, MDBs) Inter-agency cooperation	**Moderately unsatisfactory** – Coordination of the WB with the UN was not that good, except in some specific areas such as digital public infrastructure. On the connectivity side, the fund worked quite well with the International Telecommunication Union, but this was more of an ad hoc individual cooperation – not a strategic and systematic one.
Development delivery	**Development delivery – Results** (ToC, results framework, actual results)	**Moderately unsatisfactory –** Because the outcome and impact reporting are weak: "we don't know about the impact, and we are trying to find out how to get information on the impact"
	Development delivery – Generate knowledge to enhance development impact	**Satisfactory –** Since its establishment in 2016, the DDP has supported 125 advisory and diagnostic activities in 80 countries across a wide range of topics. In addition, the DDP has also supported 94 knowledge products, including country diagnostics under the DE4A initiative. But there is not enough evidence on how knowledge products are used at the project level, and this is not well documented. Example: a regulation for opening access for small-scale providers, e.g., in the case of Ethiopia ("*we asked about what guided their approach and we found that it was mainly from their knowledge products"*)
	Development delivery – Scaling effects (national public resources, private sector, other donors)	**Satisfactory –** DDP grants leveraged over USD 9 billion of lending by complementing IBRD and IDA financial resources with knowledge, technical assistance, convening, and partnership activities.
	Development delivery – Convening power and influence (national entities, other donors, civil society, private sector)	**Satisfactory** – Because of the fund's focus, especially in DDP 2.0, on public policy and financing for private sector investments and innovation as well as supporting governments in spurring a climate-resilient digital infrastructure as well as leveraging technologies and data to accelerate climate action.
	Development delivery – Access to skills (mobilisation of high level of expertise)	
	Development delivery – Access to country expertise (mobilisation of country experience/insight)	**Satisfactory** – Knowledge was generated at both the global and country levels, but there is limited use of it by Nordic countries in their bilateral engagement. Sida reported that global knowledge products were useful but were not systematically shared with Sida country staff, although there were instances of sharing with Sida's digital policy specialists. Finland used it in their bilateral work and policy development and programming. There were instances of coordination with the WBG in Tanzania. Finland has used its engagement with the trust fund in developing the EU's Digital Development framework. As a co-leader of the connectivity group alongside France, Finland contributed to expanding the EU's role in global digital infrastructure development. In this context, Finland closely monitored the activities of the WB and other entities to explore coordination opportunities. When the EU develops digital programmes in Africa, they are assessed against the WB's initiatives and areas of activity, exploring ways to complement each other's work effectively.
Aid effectiveness	**Aid effectiveness – reducing fragmentation** (harmonisation of external support)	**Satisfactory** – Fragmentation reduced as the Nordic donors did not finance their own projects. There was a lot of discussion about efficiency, especially at country level, where partners expressed a desire to improve coordination with the EU and other actors so that there are not too many interests that are involved in controlling the digitalisation of different countries.

	Aid effectiveness – collaboration with other Nordic donors	**Satisfactory** – As above
	Aid effectiveness – reduce costs for the donor	**Satisfactory** – Lowered costs for Nordic donors compared to what would have been the administrative and operational costs in case of running their individual projects. Also, the Nordic donors have avoided the costs associated with running parallel programmes or duplicating efforts.

Lessons learned (concerning influencing, multilateralism, and effective country delivery, particularly in relation to Nordic cooperation)

- **Active involvement** – Trust funds are not only about financial contributions. Effective influence requires active participation in strategic development, technical input, and steering activities. Donors need to contribute beyond financing by engaging in meaningful ways, such as sharing expertise and identifying areas for cooperation to enhance mutual benefit.
- **Understanding the trust fund and trustee** – To influence the WB through trust funds, it is essential to understand how the fund fits within the bank's structure, including its role in global practices, country/regional leadership, and its contribution to project preparation. Efficiently working through trust funds requires insight into these dynamics to maximise their impact.
- **Balancing public and private sector roles in digital development** – When engaging in digital development through ODA, it is crucial to ensure that public sector involvement does not disrupt sound business models or crowd out private investment. Collaboration with the private sector should enhance investment and avoid creating dependencies.
- **Rapid technological advancements –** The fast pace of technological advancements poses a risk to the relevance of digital development strategies. Continuous updates and a forward-looking approach are essential to ensure that digital initiatives remain effective.

Youth Entrepreneurship and Innovation Multi-Donor Trust Fund (desk study)

EQ	Summary – emerging findings from the desk case study
Criteria	• African management and ownership of the bank helps to increase the ownership and commitment. • The strong alignment of the YEI and the Jobs for Youth in Africa (JfYA) strategy as well as the fund's work in African countries, Pan-African initiatives, and fragile and low-income countries give the activities credibility. • Denmark has already established a partnership with the AfDB over several years. • The objectives of the YEI align with the ND's strategies. Sweden, for example, funded the YEI as it is aligned with its Strategy for Cooperation with the AfDB Group (2016–2018) and the Strategy for Development Cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa (2016–2021). These strategies prioritised sustainable and inclusive economic development, gender equality, and job creation.

Influence	• Denmark and Norway were the two original fund donors.
	• Denmark, Norway, and Sweden are three out of six donors; therefore, the Nordics were well-represented in the Oversight Committee.
	• All three NDs were regular and active participants in the Oversight Committee and followed policy dialogue objectives.
	• In terms of influence through policy dialogue, the NDs were partially successful in advocating for several issues:
	  ○ After advocating for a stronger geographical focus, including a focus on low-income and fragile situations, the fund released a proposal for a number of focus countries, which included 46% low-income and 42% fragile countries.
	  ○ There were significant improvements in results- and outcome-based reporting.
	  ○ Several steps have been taken to strengthen a focus on gender. In 2020, the fund introduced a collaboration with the AfDB gender team to leverage their resources and expertise. A representative from the gender team has also joined the technical review committee. Additionally, the 2022 annual report includes specific numbers on gender equality.

Results	• The ToC for the fund is ambitious, considering its limited resources, short timeframe, and the wide range of projects it encompasses. • The 2021 Mid-Term Review (MTR) highlighted that the YEI log frame does not adequately address the three distinct workstreams or provide clear outcome and impact results. • The YEI dealt with significant delays in almost all areas when starting up (establishment of the fund, initiation of implementation, allocation of resources, progress, and progress reporting). • An inherent difficulty when working in fragile countries is that political instabilities and inconsistencies can affect project implementation and complicate collaborations with government partners. This was also the case for some of the YEI projects. • As the AfDB's first trust fund, the YEI introduced an online monitoring system in August 2021 for generating on-demand reports for donors, staff, and stakeholders, though it is still in development stages. • To enhance gender-focused efforts, the AfDB assigned a gender specialist to the initiative. • A concern is the fund's lack of long-term financial planning as its funding strategy operates on a year-to-year basis. • In terms of catalytic efforts, the YEI has started some initiatives to attract private sector investments.
Lessons Learned	• In early years, the staffing of the management team was not adequate for the workload. • When operating over a longer and/or fixed period, longer-term replenishment strategies are useful, as are strategies for implementation with a smaller than expected budget. • It is difficult to work in fragile areas when depending on enabling environments or when aiming to collaborate with governments. In such cases, the likely effectiveness of the approach should be aligned with the goals.

Brief description of the trust fund

Trust fund objectives and strategy – The YEI MDTF aims to fund enterprise support and access to finance, and support studies and reforms that foster the growth of innovative start-ups created and led by African youth.[126] Launched in November 2017, the fund promotes the creation of sustainable jobs for young Africans by equipping youth and women-led start-ups as well as micro, small, and medium enterprises with the skills, financial support, and enabling environments to run bankable businesses.[127]
The fund focuses on:

- **Enterprise Support and Access to Finance**: Providing business development services and financial support to youth and women-led start-ups and micro, small, and medium enterprises.
- **Policy and Ecosystem Development**: Supporting studies and reforms that foster the growth of innovative start-ups created and led by African youth, thereby creating enabling environments for MSME development and youth employment.

The YEI MDTF is a key component of the AfDB's Jobs for Youth in Africa Strategy, which aims to create 25 million jobs and equip 50 million youths with employable and entrepreneurial skills by 2025.[128]
The YEI supports initiatives across three main areas[129]:

- Business Development Services: Delivered through enterprise support organisations like incubators, accelerators, financial intermediaries, and entrepreneurship networks to help youth-led start-ups and micro, small, and medium enterprises build capacity and gain better access to financial services.
- Research and Project Preparation Funding: Focused on generating data to enhance bank projects with significant youth employment potential, while expanding knowledge and providing policy advisory tools to foster entrepreneurship and job creation among young people.
- TA and Capacity Building: Offered to African governments, public agencies, and intergovernmental organisations to advance policy and regulatory reforms that promote job creation, skill development, and youth employability, including support for MSMEs and private sector growth.

The fund prioritises projects in low-income nations, fragile states, and regions experiencing significant economic migration. Current target countries include Ghana, Togo, Mali, Nigeria, Guinea, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda.[130]
Trust fund institutional arrangement – The YEI operates under a structured institutional arrangement designed to ensure effective management and impact. It is governed by an Oversight Committee, which provides strategic guidance and supervises the fund's activities. The Oversight Committee plays a key role in discussions of the annual programme and proposals for new interventions. This committee includes representatives from donor countries and the AfDB. A Technical Review Committee (TRC), composed of experts from relevant AfDB departments, offers technical advice and reviews projects to align them with the fund's objectives. The AfDB serves as the fund's administrator, leveraging its expertise to ensure transparency, accountability, and alignment with the broader goals of the Jobs for Youth in Africa strategy.[131]
The AfDB has a well-established and efficient organisational framework to manage the trust fund, with effective systems for overseeing its own capital investments and the financial contributions from donors. The bank collaborates with a range of partners in executing external activities related to Business Development Services (BDS), such as business incubators, accelerators, financial intermediaries, and other relevant Enterprise Support Organisations (ESOs). It also works with institutions focused on entrepreneurship ecosystem research and studies, including universities, think tanks, and research centres. Additionally, the bank partners with governments, ministries, and departments to strengthen enabling environments and regulatory frameworks. Eligible partners will receive funds in the form of grants, but capital investments, such as equipment and working capital, will not be financed. Individual proposals must ask for between USD 250,000 and USD 1,000,000. The Technical Review Committee clears out underbidding or exceeding proposals. Support is determined by the availability of funds and the trust

[126] AfDB (2019): Youth Entrepreneurship and Innovation Multi-Donor Trust Fund. Brochure.
[127] Youth Entrepreneurship and Innovation Multi-Donor Trust Fund | African Development Bank Group (afdb.org)
[128] AfDB (2019): Youth Entrepreneurship and Innovation Multi-Donor Trust Fund. Brochure.
[129] Youth Entrepreneurship and Innovation Multi-Donor Trust Fund | African Development Bank Group (afdb.org)
[130] Youth Entrepreneurship and Innovation Multi-Donor Trust Fund | African Development Bank Group (afdb.org)
[131] Youth Entrepreneurship and Innovation Multi-Donor Trust Fund | African Development Bank Group (afdb.org)

fund's operational priorities. All activities exceeding USD 500,000 are systematically audited. Other activities may be audited based on individual assessments. Fund recipients are undergoing a review prior to receiving assistance.[132]

Nordic engagement

Rationale for Nordic support – Denmark, Norway, and Sweden have all demonstrated a strong commitment to supporting the YEI, aligning their contributions with their respective development cooperation strategies. Each country's support is rooted in a shared objective to address pressing challenges in Africa, such as youth unemployment, poverty, and gender inequality, while fostering inclusive and sustainable economic growth. Through their involvement in the YEI, these Nordic countries aim to empower African youth, particularly women, by facilitating job creation and promoting entrepreneurship. Norway and Denmark were the two original donors to the YEI who pledged to contribute over the course of five years (2018–2022).

Denmark[133]	Denmark's support to the YEI reflects its commitment to tackling youth unemployment and fostering inclusive economic growth in Africa, key priorities outlined in Denmark's development strategy, 'The World 2030'. This contribution builds upon Denmark's earlier support to the AfDB for implementing the 'Bank Group Strategy for Jobs for Youth in Africa (2016–2022),' which aims to create employment opportunities for young people, particularly women, by enabling regional member countries to scale up their responses to the youth unemployment crisis. The YEI prioritises dynamic and innovative youth-led start-ups and MSMEs, both in the formal and informal sectors, aligning closely with Danish development policy and the United Nations SDG 8 on decent work and economic growth. Denmark views the AfDB as a trusted partner and has supported the institution across several areas over the years, recognising its role in addressing critical development challenges on the continent. Denmark's rationale also includes addressing forced migration through job creation and enterprise development. The fund works closely with the African Union and regional economic communities to strengthen the capacity of African actors in tackling migration and economic challenges, areas that are also central to Danish priorities. By empowering youth entrepreneurs, particularly women, the YEI promotes inclusive growth, stability, and gender equality in Africa, aligning with Denmark's overarching goal of fostering sustainable and equitable development globally. The WB has a further/global reach, but the AfDB is regional and thus creates better ownership and legitimacy.
Norway[134]	Norway's support for the YEI aligns with its commitment to promoting sustainable development, economic growth, and stability in Africa. By contributing to this fund, Norway aims to address critical issues such as youth unemployment and forced economic migration by strengthening entrepreneurship ecosystems across the continent. This initiative is consistent with Norway's broader development objectives, which focus on fostering inclusive economic opportunities, reducing poverty, and enhancing stability in regions facing economic challenges. By empowering young entrepreneurs and supporting the growth of micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), Norway contributes to creating sustainable jobs and stimulating economic development in Africa. Furthermore, Norway's involvement in the YEI MDTF underscores its dedication to international cooperation and partnership, recognising that collaborative efforts are essential to effectively tackle global challenges such as unemployment and migration. Through this investment, Norway supports initiatives that not only benefit African youth but also contribute to broader global stability and prosperity.
Sweden[135]	Sweden's funding for the YEI aligned with its Strategy for Cooperation with the AfDB Group (2016–2018) and the Strategy for Development Cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa (2016–2021). These strategies prioritised sustainable and inclusive economic development, gender equality, and job creation. The YEI targeted youth unemployment, a root cause of poverty, and aligned with the AfDB's Jobs for Youth in Africa Strategy, which focuses on decent work, entrepreneurship, and human capital development.

[132] Swedish appraisal of intervention.
[133] The World 2030 and the programme document.
[134] Norway | African Development Bank Group
[135] government.se/contentassets/a996c2a6a66d40708118f92a7c1176c3/strategy-for-swedens-cooperation-with-the-african-development-bank-group-20162018/

Sweden's contributions aimed to foster systemic change by enhancing skills development, aligning labour market needs with training, and improving MSME and private sector frameworks. High-level policy dialogue and direct government engagement further strengthened the enabling environment for entrepreneurship and innovation. Gender equality was integral, with a 50% female participation target and robust M&E mechanisms to ensure gender-sensitive implementation, consistent with the AfDB's Gender Strategy and Sweden's commitment to addressing barriers for women.

Additionally, the YEI supported environmentally sustainable practices and green growth, reinforcing the transition to low-carbon economies and resilience to climate shocks. Through this initiative, Sweden sought to advance poverty reduction, economic empowerment, and inclusive growth while addressing youth unemployment, gender disparities, and environmental sustainability.

Sweden has decided not to replenish the fund after 2022, as the new Swedish regional Africa strategy (2022–2026)[136] does not focus on employment-related objectives.

Financial support – The contributions from the Nordic countries are summarised in Figure 145. Sweden is by far the largest of the Nordic donors and has contributed since the start of the trust fund in 2016. Norway made a small contribution at the start of the trust fund in 2017. Together the Nordic countries account for 36% of the funding.

Figure 145: Nordic countries' contributions to the YEI Trust Fund



Funding (Million UA)	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
Denmark	1,171,230	2,841,711			4,012,941
Norway	4,452,304				4,452,304
Sweden	1,662,718	1,571,797	1,745,231	1,315,142	6,294,888
Total	**7,286,253**	**4,413,508**	**1,745,231**	**1,315,142**	**14,760,133**

[136] strategy-for-swedens-regional-development-cooperation-with-africa-2022-2026.pdf

Summary of the trust fund's success in responding to the Nordic rationales for providing support		
Policy influence	**Policy influence – globally** (multi-country reach – including values and global public goods)	**Mildly unsatisfactory –** Due to the AfDB's African ownership and on the ground presence, it is seen as a credible and authentic entity and is well-positioned to influence policies. The fund works in fragile and conflict-affected situations and works in multiple countries. Though the YEI promotes important goals and values in supporting young women and men in finding employment and starting successful careers, the fund itself does not have specific policy objectives.
	Policy influence – on the organisation	**Highly satisfactory** – The fund was originally established to implement the Jobs for Youth in Africa Strategy (2016–2025), and the ToC is inherently connected with this strategy. The fund's duration is also linked to the duration of the strategy. Therefore, there is a bilateral reinforcement between the AfDB's goals and policies and the fund.
Multilateralism	**Strengthening the multilateral system** Delivering on the trustee mandate and SDGs	**Highly satisfactory** – The fund directly works towards SDG 9 (Decent work and economic growth). The fund delivers country-level and Pan-African/regional projects in many fragile and low-income African countries. The fund's ToC is inherently intertwined with the JfYA and therefore delivers on AfDB core objectives and mandate.
	Strengthening the multilateral system (contributing to UN reforms, One UN, MDBs) Inter-agency cooperation	**Highly satisfactory** – The trust fund supports the implementation of AfDB strategies and mandate, while engaging with a multitude of African countries, and in doing so enhances the credibility of the bank as a multilateral institution in the area of jobs and employment. Though the YEI is not one of the flagship funds of the AfDB and is limited in time, it strengthens the AfDB reputation on delivering on their objectives and strategies in an area of high importance for many African countries.
Development delivery	**Development delivery – results** (ToC, results framework, results)	**Mildly unsatisfactory** – The ToC for the fund is ambitious, considering its limited resources, short timeframe, and the wide range of projects it encompasses. Nevertheless, its overall goal aligns with the JfYA strategy, which underpins the fund's rationale. However, the 2021 Mid-Term Review (MTR) highlighted that the YEI log frame does not adequately address the three distinct workstreams or provide clear outcome and impact results. Results reporting against indicators only began in 2020, following encouragement from donors, but the data quality and quality control were judged to be poor. A concern is the fund's lack of long-term financial planning, as its funding strategy operates on a year-to-year basis. This short-term approach, along with the absence of a clear plan for managing a limited budget, has drawn criticism from donors.
	Development delivery – Generate knowledge to enhance development impact	**Mildly satisfactory** – One of the three activity components the trust fund supports is 'Research and Project Preparation Funding'. The YEI funded several studies to enhance understanding of the entrepreneurship landscape and evaluate the feasibility of proposed projects. However, stakeholders observed that the bank shows limited enthusiasm for financing feasibility studies. The 2022 evaluation found that, of the seven research projects conducted so far, two have successfully unlocked financing for implementation.
	Development delivery – Scaling effects (national public resources, private sector, other donors)	**Mildly unsatisfactory** – The establishment of the fund, the initiation of implementation, and the allocation of resources faced substantial delays, alongside setbacks in setting up the YEI Secretariat. As a result, progress has lagged behind expectations, and this was further exacerbated by delays in reporting. The 2022 evaluation did not identify projects with significant near-term potential to generate substantial jobs. However, certain initiatives were recognised as having some promise in this regard.
	Development delivery – Convening power and influence (national entities, other donors, civil society, private sector)	**Mildly satisfactory** – The YEI engages with country and provincial governments for initiatives that often take the role of implementing partner. An inherent difficulty when working in fragile countries is that political instabilities and inconsistencies can affect project implementation and complicate collaborations with government partners. This was also the case for some of the YEI projects, such as the 'Local Content Development Program for Youth and

		Women-led MSMEs' in Mozambique, where it was challenging to finalise the necessary agreements. Evidence of collaborations with NGOs and civil society is difficult to find.
	Development delivery – Access to skills (mobilisation of high level of expertise)	**Satisfactory** – As the AfDB's first trust fund, the YEI introduced an online monitoring system in August 2021 for generating on-demand reports for donors, staff, and stakeholders. Since its launch, the YEI Secretariat has been actively capturing data to operationalise the platform. However, the system remains in the development and pilot phase, with full deployment and functionality still pending. To enhance gender-focused efforts, the AfDB assigned a gender specialist to the initiative. The YEI Secretariat is staffed by a team of consultants, including a Fund Manager and an M&E Officer, while the Task Manager role is fulfilled by internal AfDB personnel. The extent of engagement of thematic experts for country delivery is unclear, though the 2022 annual report, for example, describes that expert-led mentorship sessions were held for the Fashionomics Africa programmes.
	Development delivery – Access to country expertise (mobilisation of country experience/insight)	Unclear
Aid effectiveness	**Aid effectiveness – reducing fragmentation** (harmonisation of external support)	**Satisfactory** – Overall, the fragmentation is reduced through pooled donor funding rather than funding multiple bilateral programmes with smaller budgets. The YEI has been able to attract funding from several other donors in the early years of engagement. Next to Denmark and Norway as original donors, Sweden, Italy, and the Netherlands joined the fund. However, several donors have dropped out early and have not contributed throughout the cycle envisaged. No additional contributions were made in 2022. In terms of catalytic efforts, the YEI has started some initiatives to attract private sector investments, e.g., through commissioning feasibility studies of the Youth Entrepreneurship Investment Banks to *"directly address institutional market failures and de-risk youth entrepreneurs as an asset class"* (AfDB, 2022 YEI Annual Report). The YEI also supports the Jobs and Skills Marker, a collaborative initiative between the AfDB and the ILO, aiming to institutionalise the monitoring and measurement of jobs and skills within the bank's systems and processes.
	Aid effectiveness – collaboration with other Nordic donors	**Mildly satisfactory** – Nordic donors follow similar objectives in the fund, e.g., strengthening the focus on gender and having clear focus countries, thereby reinforcing each other in discussions. Denmark and Norway coordinated on the initial donor agreement, which they co-signed, and Sweden then based its contribution on the same agreement. However, there was only one year when all three donors contributed (2018), and Sweden was the only Nordic contributor for two years, so the opportunities to coordinate were limited.
	Aid effectiveness – reduce costs for the donor	**Satisfactory –** Lowered costs for Nordic donors compared to what would have been the administrative and operational costs in case of running their individual projects. Also, the Nordic donors have avoided the costs associated with running parallel programmes or duplicating efforts.

Lessons learned

- In early years, the staffing of the management team was not adequate for the workload.
- When operating over a longer and/or fixed period, longer-term replenishment strategies are useful, as are strategies for implementation with a smaller than expected budget.
- It is difficult to work in fragile areas when depending on enabling environments or when aiming to collaborate with governments. In such cases, the likely effectiveness of the approach should be aligned with the goals.

Annex 8 Information on the Trustees

There are variations in trust fund features among the trustees and also between trust funds administered by one trustee. Trust fund features are important for the ability of Nordic donors to pursue their overall objectives/rationale for the choice of the trust funds as a modality. Based on the rationales for choosing trust funds as a funding modality, the following trust fund features are of interest:

- The purpose of trust funds from the point of view of the trustee: Partnering between multilaterals and donors through trust funds serve different purposes for the multilaterals over and above funding. These purposes are important to consider for donors when pursuing their objectives through the trust fund modality.
- The governance arrangements: Governance structures have a direct bearing on opportunities for influencing, even though influencing takes many forms in addition to the formal channels through Boards or committees, direct contacts to staff in the trustees and high-level dialogues.
- Earmarking: the choice of channelling funding through a trust fund in itself constitutes earmarking compared to core funding. In addition, there is widespread interest among donors for earmarking or expressing preferences within trust funds.
- The administration and implementation arrangements: This relates to the effectiveness and cost efficiency of channelling funding through trust funds.

5.1 UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund

5.1 1. Inter-agency Trust Funds in the Context of Funding the UN

The Nordic contributions to UN trust funds will have to be assessed within the overall context of UN funding and the funding crisis of the UN. The past decade has seen two major trends in the funding of the UN: A substantial increase in funding – and this increase is primarily driven by an increase in earmarked funding.

Figure 146: Distribution of total UN system funding by financing instrument 2010–2020 USD billion



Earmarked contributions are made up of various types of contributions (see Figure 146). Project-specific earmarked contributions are by far the largest. The contributions to the inter-agency pooled funds that this evaluation focusses on make up 7% of earmarked contributions to the UN. Most of the inter-agency pooled funding is channeled through the UN MPTFO.[137] The development shows a slight increase in inter-agency pooled funds and a decrease in project-/programme-specific earmarked funds in accordance with the UN Funding Compact.

[137] The UN MPTFO does not have a full overview of the share of inter-agency pooled funds that is channeled through the MPTFO but expects this to be quite high. This is, however, likely to decrease over the coming years as OCHA has decided to create further country-specific humanitarian trust funds directly under the administration of OCHA, bringing the number of such OCHA country funds to 24. This decision was communicated by OCHA to the Pooled Funding Working Group in 2023, the decision by the Emergency Relief Coordinator was to harmonise the administration of the CBPFs under OCHA, responding to a need to ensure coherence and consistency in the administration across all CBPFs and overcome some structural issues (e-mail from the MPTFO dated 19 April 2024).

Figure 147: Earmarked contributions to the UN system by type 2018–2021 (percentage share of total earmarked contributions)



The UNMPTF Office was set up in 2004 to administer **multi-stakeholder inter-agency pooled funds to fund the UN development system,** where multi-stakeholder refers to the funding being provided by multiple stakeholders, incl. donors, national governments, other multilaterals, and philanthropies, and inter-agency refers to multiple UN organisations.

Purpose of Inter-agency pooled funds: The inter-agency pooled funds, which are almost exclusively administered through the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, is one modality for donors and others to provide non-core funding for the UN system in support of implementation of the SDGs. According to the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 3% of resources for the UN in 2021 were provided in the form of inter-agency pooled funds.[138] Figure 148 shows that funding through inter-agency pooled funds is increasing but still only accounts for 7% of earmarked funding for the UN system. The aim of the UN Funding Compact (2019) was to double the share of non-core contributions provided through inter-agency pooled funds from 5% in 2017 to 10% in 2023.[139]

[138] Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation and UN MPTF Office (2023, September): Financing the UN Development System. Choices in Uncertain Times.
[139] General Assembly Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (2019): Implementation of General Assembly resolution 71/243 on the quadrennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the United Nations system, 2019: Funding Compact. Report of the Secretary-General.

Figure 148: Earmarked contributions to the UN system by type 2018–2021 (percentage share of total earmarked contributions)



Source: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation and UN MPTF Office (2023, September): Financing the UN Development System. Choices in Uncertain Times.

5.1 2. UN Reforms and the Funding Compact

In the past decade, the UN has embarked on massive reforms to improve the impact, agility, accountability, and transparency of the UN delivering its mandate. The reforms cut across three pillars:

- Development with a focus on the UN delivering as one collective identity at country level based on one UN strategy in support of the country's priorities in the 2030 Agenda.
- Management (including decentralisation of decision-making, streamlining of policies and processes, and better accountability and transparency); and
- Peace and Security reforms prioritising prevention, sustaining peace, and strengthening coherence of political missions and peacekeeping operations by integrating the peace and security pillars of the UN and aligning more closely with the development and human rights pillars to get greater coherence.

The reforms were complemented with the ambition to increase the level and quality (flexible and multi-year contributions) of the funding of the UN, leading to the agreement between the UN and its Member States on a UN funding compact in 2018. The compact sets out a series of commitments on the part of the UN and its Member States, where the UN commits to joint planning and programming and ensuring alignment with national plans and avoiding duplication of effort, promoting results-based management, and enhancing transparency and accountability. At the same time, the Member States commit to providing more flexible and predictable funding including through core multi-year funding, and more flexible earmarked funds incl. pooled funds. Pooled funding for inter-agency cooperation is seen as more flexible and hence more desirable than single-donor earmarked funds as it allows for greater flexibility and, in addition, supports the UN reforms by promoting inter-agency cooperation across mandates to implement the cross-sectoral SDGs.

The UNSG reports on progress on the Funding Compact commitments in the QCPR.[140] The most recent 2024 report laments the falling share of the UN in ODA and the continued high levels of earmarking of funding (83% of total funding in 2022). According to the report, the UN is improving on its commitments to reform the UN into a system that can deliver together, avoiding silos and competition for resources, delivering results that leave no one behind. The report points to the repositioned UN country offices, the role for the RCs in responding and delivering. At the same time the Member States are not providing the types of funding that can support these reforms, too little funding and too inflexible.[141]To underscore this observation, consider the funding for UN activities in Tanzania where about 7% of the UN activities are funded through the Tanzania One UN Fund, whereas the rest comes through the UN organisation's own funding channels, including earmarked project funding.[142] At the same time, the QCPR acknowledges that earmarking will continue. Hence, an effort to distinguish between different types of earmarking, and that donors need visibility and recognition for their contributions.[143]

The Nordic countries by and large delivered on the Funding Compact commitments. Overall, the UN Member States have only to a limited extent delivered on the commitments. Core funding has increased slightly but commitments, for example, to fund the JSDG and the Peacebuilding Fund fall short of expectations. The UN development system continues to rely on few donors for the majority of funding, e.g., Sweden (number 4), Norway (number 8), and to a lesser degree Denmark (number 14). The five largest donors provide more than 40% of the funding.[144]

The continued dire situation for funding – and in particular core funding – of the UN has led the UN to distinguish between various types of earmarking that are more desirable than single-project earmarking. [145] UN Agencies, Funds, and Programmes are also to a larger degree customising their offer to the donors. An example is the UNDP that has created thematic funding windows directed at core areas for UNDP – namely poverty and inequality, governance and peace, nature and climate, and gender equality – to boost funding in these core areas. Overall, this did not increase funding for UNDP 'core funds' as a major share continues to come through earmarked contributions for projects and programmes. Activities funded through UN pooled funds dropped in recent years.[146]

Interviews with UN KII underscored that despite the reform efforts and the progress in UN systems cooperation as reported by the UN in its reports, competition for funding continues among UN agencies. The incentives to cooperate appear to continue to be weaker than the incentives to secure funding for own organisation or even own operation. For some UN organisations, e.g., the UNDP, the KPI related to securing additional funding continues to be an important performance criterion.

There is a substantial body of research[147] that points to earmarked funding as one of the major obstacles to the UN fulfilling its mandate and to the concept of multilateralism. Although UN agencies insist that policy is made by the governing bodies, earmarked funding incl. through trust funds, decides which part of the policies gets prioritised and implemented, undermining the one country, one vote representative nature of the UN. Furthermore, earmarked funding hampers the UN development system's ability to

[140] Implementation of the General Assembly resolution 75/223 on the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review of operational activities for the development of the United Nations system: Funding Compact of the United Nations support to the Sustainable Development Goals. 9 April 2024. (hereafter the 2024 QCPR).
[141] This point has been made several times. See e.g. MOPAN 2021: Lessons in Multilateral Effectiveness. Is this time different: Progress, challenges and opportunities.
[142] Case study One UN Tanzania Fund for this evaluation.
[143] Implementation of the General Assembly resolution 75/223 on the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review of operational activities for the development of the United Nations system: Funding Compact of the United Nations support to the Sustainable Development Goals. 9 April 2024. (hereafter the 2024 QCPR).
[144] Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation: Choices in Uncertain Times: Financial report 2023. (2023) page 60.
[145] The 2024 Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review contains an Annex with typologies and levels of earmarking for sustainable development
[146] UNDP Funding Compendium 2022 (2023) https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2023-08/undp_funding_compendium_2022_vs_1_as_of_24_aug_2023.pdf
[147] See e.g. Graham Erin: How Funding sidelined Multilateralism at the UN: Then, Now and possible futures. https://multilateralism.sipa.columbia.edu/news/how-funding-sidelined-multilateralism-united-nations-then-now-and-possible-futures (2024 Silke Weinlich et all: Earmarking in the Multilateral System Many shades of grey Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik Bonn 2020.

respond to demands and deliver on the SDGs coherently, effectively, and efficiently, increasing transaction costs, etc.

At the same time, the donors want to ensure that their priorities are met, their policies implemented, and their contribution to 'the better world' is visible and attributable. The UNSG 2024 QCPR recognises the need for continued earmarking as a way of funding the UN and the need to ensure the visibility and recognition of core and other flexible contributions of donors to accommodate the changed political environment in which the UN operates.

A new Funding Compact has been negotiated. The funding goals have been increased across the board reflecting the financing situation and needs of the UN. In particular the quest for support for inter-agency pooled funds has increased, from a level of 9% in 2022 to 25% in 2027, and the funding demands for the JSDG, the Peacebuilding Fund, and the RC fund (new) has been increased, despite the fact that the goals from the previous period have not been met. The new Funding Compact is expected to be approved by this year's UNGA. The view of Nordic countries is that *"it is aspirational and sets targets for all UN MS to deliver on"*.

5.1 3. UN Multi-Partner Trust Funds

Inter-agency pooled funds are considered a more desirable mode of providing non-core resources for the UN system. From the Funding Compact: *That type of funding allows entities of the United Nations Sustainable Development Group to engage more in joint activities, a key demand from Member States. … Such funding instruments provide the type of quality funding that allows the United Nations development system to integrate expertise and capacities across the system, as demanded by the 2030 Agenda. They also provide the flexibility needed to respond to rapidly changing and new country priorities. For country-level funds, they enable greater donor collaboration between Governments and the United Nations, facilitate policy and programmatic coherence and minimize the adverse effects of funding volatility. Such advantages are further realized when contributions are provided with adequate predictability and flexibility.*[148]

Hence, the role has expanded considerably after establishment of the SDGs, putting a premium on inter-agency collaboration, and today the MPTF Office plays an important role in financing the SDGs by offering flexible, inclusive, and efficient inter-agency pooled funding, enabling the United Nations development system agencies to collaborate more effectively.

Inter-agency pooled funds are designed with a clear programmatic purpose and results framework not earmarked for a specific UN entity and held by a UN fund administrator that passes funding through to finance projects and programmes agreed under the results framework by the PUNOs and the contributors. There are two typologies of inter-agency pooled funds:

- Multi-Partner Trust Funds involving multiple UN organisations. Funding comes from multiple partners based on broadly defined results areas that will be implemented by still-to-be-defined single/joint UN agency projects and programmes. This is the most used modality.
- JPs, which are funded by UN organisations and/or donors for a specific and defined programme, must involve more than one UN entity and must involve a pass-through agent to qualify as an inter-agency pooled fund.

MPTFs function as a pass-through modality – collecting and intermingling funds from various contributors and distributing them to PUNOs that then send the funds on to various implementing partners (governments, civil society, institutions, etc.).

[148] General Assembly Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (2019): Implementation of General Assembly resolution 71/243 on the quadrennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the United Nations system, 2019: Funding Compact. Report of the Secretary-General.

Figure 149: MPTFs function as a pass-through modality



Source: Inter-agency pooled funds: Key concepts and definitions

Governance: The MPTFs are set up at global, regional, and country level, and governance arrangements vary between MPTFs. The intention is for agile, transparent, and accountable decision-making. At country level the main governing mechanism often involves the UNCT and the national partner government, with a steering committee possibly with contributors and other partners in a more secondary role. At the global level there are various models; some with a main emphasis on UN inter-agency coordination and others also with emphasis on partnering with donors.

Figure 150: Governance arrangement generic example



Source: United Nations MPTF Office Partners Gateway (n/a): Governance and management.

To exemplify the varieties in the governance arrangements between trust funds, see Table 8.

Table 8: Examples of governance arrangements

Country level. **Albania SDC Acceleration Fund**	**Global level:** **Partnership for Action on Green Economy (PAGE)**	**Global level:** **Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)**
One UN Joint Executive Committee Co-chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister and the UN RC, the Joint Executive Committee meets once a year along with representatives from government ministries, the Office of the Prime Minister, and UNCT. The Executive Committee reports to the Government of Albania's Strategic Planning Committee. The RC manages and coordinates the fund in consultation with UN organisations. Administrative agent: MPTF Office – fund design and administration – receives contributions from donors and disburses to PUNOs.	**The Management Board** agrees on the overall programme of PAGE and the deployment of resources. The Board consists of representatives from the PUNOs. **Donor Steering Committee** Comprised of financial supporters, the Donor Steering Committee guides the development and implementation of partnership activities, providing strategic guidance and making recommendations to the Management Board and Technical Team on strategic aspects of implementation. Administrative agent: MPTF Office.	**The General Assembly** provides overall guidance. The **Peacebuilding Committee** supports the development of integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery and provides strategic advice to countries under its purview. The Commission may also offer policy guidance on how the PBF is to be used. The **PBF Advisory Council,** appointed by the UNSG, provides oversight of fund allocations. Administrative agent: MPTF Office administrators, and the participating organisations implement.

Sources: Trust fund websites and UNMPTF

Earmarking – The portfolio analysis provides data on earmarking by Nordic countries. It suggests that in addition to the earmarking that donors do when choosing a specific MPTF, there is widespread use of earmarking within MPTFs. Earmarking takes the form of expression of preferences for supporting some results rather than others within the overall results framework. It does not require separate reporting but assurances in the dialogue between the administrative agent and the donor that funds are used in accordance with expressed preferences.

Administration and implementation – For each MTPF/JP, an Administrative Agent is appointed, and the funds are administered and implemented in accordance with PUNOs' own operating policies and procedures for implementation. Programmatic and financial accountability rests with the PUNOs and the partners responsible for implementation.

5.2 The World Bank

WB trust funds complement WB operations in areas where the bank's ability to lend is limited. The WB depends on the availability of typically grant finance for support of advisory services and piloting new approaches that countries are reluctant to borrow for. In addition, the WB uses grant finance for activities in fragile settings and in the context of emergencies where lending is not an option. Trust fund funding has also been used to pay down interest rates on WB loans to secure lending in times of crises. More than 90% of trust fund disbursements are for RETF Country-Based Pooled Funds (CBPFs), typically advisory services complementing the implementation of WB loans or for activities in fragile settings.

Trust funds are also essential for the WB's ability to expand its knowledge services, including advisory services and analytics. Trust funds in 2022 provided 26% of the WB administrative expenditure for such purposes.

Figure 151: Overview of Trust Fund finance and purposes



Source: 2023 Trust Fund Annual Report. World Bank
** 97% was from IBRD/IDA trust fund resources (USD 18.8 billion), and 3% from World Bank-implemented FIF resources (USD 0.7 million).*

Over the past decade, the WB has carried through a series of reforms with the purpose of ensuring strategic relevance of trust funds to the goals of the WB, enhanced efficiency, and effectiveness of the considerable funding provided through trust fund partnerships. This has led to changes in governance arrangements as trust funds have increasingly been clustered under so-called umbrellas. Following the most recent Umbrella 2.0 reforms, the majority of trust funds are now clustered under 63 active and proposed Umbrella Trust Funds. The Umbrella 2.0 involves a PC for each umbrella trust fund involving all the donors under the chairmanship of the WB. The PC provides strategic guidance, decides the results frameworks and the communication and visibility plans, and reviews progress. Associated Trust Funds aligned with the Umbrella Trust Funds' overall development objective can be set up to respond to specific donors' legal or fiduciary requirements. They do not have a separate governance mechanism but provide dedicated financial tracking and reporting. Figure 152 provides an overview of an Umbrella Trust Fund 2.0.

Figure 152: Umbrella 2.0 Programme, at a Glance



Source: World Bank Group (2023, October): Partnering with the World Bank through Trust Funds and Umbrella 2.0 Programmes. A Guide for Development Partners.

It is still possible in limited instances to establish a stand-alone trust fund. They are typically set up to co-finance an already identified and developed WB activity where the results framework is provided by the WB activity. Such trust funds may not have a governance framework as they are set up to finance a specific agreed activity. If there are more donors, a steering committee chaired by the WB may be established. Donors receive the regular project reporting (ISR) based on the project's results framework. Establishment of such a trust fund is streamlined to the specific projects since all its features are directly related to the project itself.

Preferencing/earmarking within an MDTF of an Umbrella Trust Fund is possible.[149] Such preferences are non-binding and limited to expressions of interest in a particular geography, sector, or theme within the overall results framework of the Umbrella Trust Fund. There is no option to receive specific reporting as all funds are co-mingled. The preferencing is indicated in the trust fund agreement between the donor and the WB. The programme manager is responsible for handling all preferencing requests, including that there is demand for the preference, alignment with the overall results framework, that the bank can deliver on the preference, and that the donor understands that there will be pooling of funds and no separate reporting.

Associated trust funds are in themselves an expression of preferencing within the overall umbrella trust fund. Often these trust funds are based on previous trust funds that have now been included in the larger umbrella trust fund.

The WB administers trust funds through dedicated WB staff and is responsible for implementation of WB-executed activities and provides implementation support for recipient-executed activities.

[149] World Bank Group (2023, October): Partnering with the World Bank through Trust Funds and Umbrella 2.0 Programs. A Guide for Development Partners. Annex 4. Guidance on Managing Targeted Funding for Umbrella 2.0 Programs.

Financial Intermediary Funds

Financial Intermediary Funds (FIFs) are an increasingly popular tool, offering customised financing platforms for pursuing priorities in partnerships. They are often the result of high-level policy decisions focussing on a vertical theme and have so far proved effective in raising awareness and funding from various sources for addressing the theme. Their importance as a financing model has grown over time.

The WB facilitates the establishment and the functioning of FIFs by acting as a trustee. In addition to this role, the WB may host the secretariat of the fund and act as an implementing agency.[150] Figure 153 provides an overview over the role of FIFs and the various roles of the WB in supporting FIFs.

Figure 153: Roles of the WB in FIFs



Source: Development Finance Vice Presidency, Trust Funds and Partner Relations Department (DFTPR) (2019, 4th of June): Financial Intermediary Fund Management Framework.

The proliferation of FIFs also comes with challenges, as FIFs add to the fragmentation of the aid infrastructure. Large secretariats tend to develop policy and procedures that overlap with those of existing institutions, e.g., a project funded by a FIF and implemented through a multilateral organisation will often go through two parallel preparation and decision-making processes.

The FIFs come with independent governance structures that most often involve strong and representation by the donors that are funding the FIF as well as partner countries based on constituencies. Often boards are broadened to include other stakeholders, incl. donors from the private sector/philanthropies, as well as representatives from civil society.

Over time, the FIFs tend to develop their own ways of working based on the independent board's decisions and tailored to the specific role and rationale for the establishment of a specific FIF. And hence each FIF, its governance arrangements, administration, and its role in the aid architecture needs to be assessed individually.

5.3 The African Development Bank

Trust funds provide resources to support the development of high-quality project proposals that can leverage additional financing from the AfDB and other development partners. Trust funds initially focused on technical assistance in the context of AfDB lending. Today the role of trust funds is wider

[150] Development Finance Vice Presidency, Trust Funds and Partner Relations Department (DFTPR) (2019, 4th of June): Financial Intermediary Fund Management Framework.

and helps address key strategic and emerging issues for Africa's development, and it plays an essential role in attracting investment. For example, in the case of infrastructure projects, trust funds have served as key enablers in addressing 'soft bottlenecks', thus directly supporting the needs of governments and directly contributing to catalysing business–government investment in projects. The AfDB managed about 50 trust funds of which 24 are MDTFs (2020). Also, the AfDB trust funds have been undergoing reforms to make them larger, more strategic, and aligned with the AfDB policies to enhance effectiveness.[151]

The Trust Fund Policy (2021) defines two types of trust funds:

- MDTFs with at least two donors
- SDTFs or bilateral trust funds with one donor

The Board of Directors of the AfDB approves trust funds, and for trust funds above USD 100 million, the Board of Governors approves. The Board of Directors also approves project activities above USD 5 million and all requests that involve loans, guarantees, etc. For MDTFs an Oversight Committee will have approved all proposals above USD 750,000 before the larger ones above USD 5 million are presented to the board for final approval. Table 9 gives an overview of the approval procedures.

Table 9: Review/approval procedures

Technical review committee	Bank internal procedure. The TRC consists of bank staff. They view and clear all proposals
Donor/Oversight Committee (OC)	SDTF: non-objection by the donor for proposals over USD 300,000; MPTF, the OC will approve all projects above USD 750,000
Board of Directors	Approves all requests over USD 5 million and all requests for loans, guarantees, and equity investments.

All financial contributions are untied, but it is possible to express a non-binding preference, e.g., for the financing of a specific theme or sector within a trust fund. If the other donors agree, the AfDB will make a best effort to direct the number of resources in accordance with the preference.

[151] African Development Bank Group (2021, November): The African Development Bank Group Trust Fund Policy 2021.

Annex 9 Links between Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations




EQ4: What is the effectiveness of the Nordic support for multilateral trust funds?
EQ5 - What is the efficiency of the Nordic support for multilateral trust funds?
F17 The Nordic support to UN trust funds contributed to multilateralism.
F18 Although advancing the One UN reforms was a major objective of the Nordic countries, attainment of this objective is far from complete and in danger of losing credibility - due in part to internal UN and donor pressures and absence of uptake by other donors.
F19 Trust funds contributed to multilateralism with many of the global funds making a notable contribution to global public goods.
F20 Nordic countries' influence mainly served to enhance the existing policy directions of the multilaterals rather than introduce new policies – for both UNMPTF and MDB.
F21 There were some clear examples of Nordic influence that could be traced through to end beneficiaries at the operational level- for both UNMPTF and MDB.
F22 Earmarking within the trust fund was an instrument for influence in terms of setting priorities that had both positive and negative effects – for both UNMPTF and MDB.
F23 The trust funds put greater attention on results frameworks and reporting over time – partly in response to Nordic country pressure – for both UNMPTF and MDB.
F24 Outcome reporting was weak – for both UNMPTF and MDB.
F25 There was weak measurement of the use of global knowledge products – more relevant for MDBs as they mainly supported such products.
F26 Results have been achieved and in general the trust fund delivery performance is satisfactory (as evidenced in the sample cases)– for both UNMPTF and MDB.
F27 There is little evidence of successful crowding in of private funding – for both UNMPTF and MDB.
F28 Ownership, for the 3 sample cases examined in depth, was higher for UNMPTFs at local level than at national level, where ownership was not always high.
F29 Government ownership of MDB global/regional trust fund was variable, but stronger where there was a clear link to a loan program.
F30 MDB country level trust funds on the other hand had high levels of government ownership.
F31 Direct capacity development was an integral part of most UNMPTFs and there are examples of good results of capacity building at recipient level.
F32 The major capacity development effect of MDB trust funds was through the downstream loans.
F33 There was a high degree of variation among Nordic countries' approaches to programming, managing, monitoring, and reporting on trust funds, with some countries having lean procedures and others managing trust funds as any other development contribution – this had an impact on the administrative costs of the donor – for both UNMPTF and MDB.
F34 Decisions were made to support trust funds without sufficient consideration and budgeting for the staff inputs and oversight needed – although this was changing in some countries – for both UNMPTF and MDB.
F35 The drivers of multilateral organisation's costs (incl. overhead costs) were governed by internal trustee procedures and regulations, which had been accepted by the Nordic countries through their participation in the governing bodies of the UN and MDBs.
F36 Budgets and financial reports were inadequate to make assessments of cost effectiveness and efficiency – this was particularly the case where trust funds supported policy and institutional change as was the primary objective of trust funds examined. As in other development assistance it was rather the choice of the activities and their implementation that determined the cost effectiveness of the endeavour – for both UNMPTF and MDB.
F37 High costs associated with implementation through UNMPTFs were impacted by the slow progress on UN interagency reforms and harmonisations of systems, but also the operating environment and the model of operation played a role.
F38 The administrative costs of MDB trust funds was fixed and generally low for larger funds. Neither the WB nor the AfDB had full cost-recovery from the trust fund operations, but trust fund activities reduced costs related to ensuing loan operations and supported WB knowledge generation, hence benefitting the clients.
C7 The Nordic countries' support to trust funds supported multilateralism and the implementation of policies that reflected Nordic policy priorities (for both UNMPTF and MDB).
C8 Where the policy role and leverage, scale and convening power of trustees were mobilized, trust funds provided results that were largely satisfactory with examples of sustainable and transformative change – but results were difficult to communicate (for both UNMPTF and MDB).
C9 The global/regional trust funds were especially relevant and effective for advancing global public goods and presented strong comparative advantages for the use of trust funds (mainly MDBs).
C10 The efficiency of trust funds reflected the overall cost level and modus operandi of the trustees (for both UNMPTF and MDB).
C11 In general, trust funds contributed to aid effectiveness and efficiency of donor development cooperation, although there was a tendency for proliferation of trust funds (for both UNMPTF and MDB).
C12 Despite a high level of Nordic policy alignment on main themes and priorities, there was limited Nordic cooperation on trust fund contributions and in trust funds. There was scope for cooperation among the Nordic countries, also to free up time for policy influencing and learning(for both UNMPTF and MDB).
R3 Take stock of the active trust funds, and update and prioritize the engagements (for both UNMPTF and MDBs).
R4 Build on lessons learnt on the positive and negative factors of effectiveness and efficiency of the trust funds in order to inform trust fund selection and dialogue (for both UNMPTF and MDB).
R5 Explore ways to cooperate across the Nordic countries where appropriate to promote economies of scale to reduce the administrative burden and support joint learning (for both UNMPTF and MDB).
R6 Enhance communication of results from trust fund contributions and ensure that the decision makers and the public in Nordic countries, as well as in partner countries, are aware of the contributions to trust funds (for both UNMPTF and MDB).

Joint Nordic Evaluation of Contributions to Trust Funds

This evaluation of the joint Nordic contributions to trust funds serves the dual purpose of accountability and learning, with a focus on the latter. It covers Nordic contributions through trust funds managed by the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund (UNMPTF), the World Bank (WB), and the African Development Bank (AfDB). As the focus was on trust funds supported by at least three Nordic donors (the UNMPTF and the WB), and two trust funds with the AfDB, the evaluation addresses multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs) rather than single-donor trust funds. The portfolio analysis covers the period from 2004 to 2023, while the rest of the evaluation focusses on the past decade, from 2013 to 2023.



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