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AID UNDER FIRE

An Evaluation of the Mozambique-Nordic Agricultural Programme (MONAP)



By Yussuf Adam, Robin Goodyear, Martin Greeley,
Mick Moore, Julio Munguambe, Miguel Neves,
Penelope Roberts, Gulamo Taju and Sergio Vieira.



This is the final evaluation of the Mozambique-Nordic Agricultural Programme (MONAP), and was conducted in the period April-June 1990. The evaluation team consisted of **Yussuf Adam**, Centre for African Studies, Eduardo Mondlane University, Maputo, **Robin Goodyear**, freelance consultant, **Martin Greeley** Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, Brighton, UK, **Mick Moore**, (Team Leader), Institute of Development Studies, **Julio Munguambe**, Centre for African Studies, **Miguel Neves**, Institute of Development Studies, **Penelope Roberts**, Institute of Development Studies, **Gulamo Taju**, Centre for African Studies and **Sergio Vieira**, Centre for African Studies.

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*Yussuf Adam, Robin Goodyear, Martin Greeley, Mick Moore,
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INTRODUCTION

PREFACE

This final evaluation of the Mozambique-Nordic Agricultural Programme was conducted in the period April-June 1990 on behalf of the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA). The evaluation team comprised the following persons:

- **Yussuf Adam** (Centre for African Studies, Eduardo Mondlane University, Maputo), historian
- **Robin Goodyear** (freelance consultant), agriculturalist
- **Martin Greeley** (Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, Brighton, UK), agricultural economist
- **Mick Moore** (Institute of Development Studies), institutional specialist
- **Julio Mungambe** (Centre for African Studies), administrator and trainee economist
- **Miguel Neves** (Institute of Development Studies), administrator and trainee economist
- **Penelope Roberts** (Institute of Development Studies), sociologist
- **Gulamo Taju** (Centre for African Studies), educationist
- **Sergio Vieira** (Centre for African Studies), political scientist

We should note for the record that this was the first mission responsible for an overall evaluation of MONAP which had Mozambican members.

The expatriate members of the team arrived in Maputo on 21 April 1990 and left on the 19th May. At this time the MONAP Coordination Unit in the Ministry of Agriculture was still functioning. This was our base. The mission was mainly in Maputo. A number of day visits were made to projects and organisations close to Maputo, notably to Boane, Matola, Umbeluzi and Chokwe. In addition, various team members visited projects in and around Nampula, Namai, Quelimane, Beira and Chimoio during a six day field trip. An interim report of about one hundred pages was produced for the final meetings of the mission in Maputo, and was widely circulated in Mozambique and among the Nordic aid agencies with the intention of producing feedback to help prepare this final report. We are very grateful to a number of people who did send us written comments and suggestions. This final report was prepared at the Institute of Development Studies during June 1990, with the direct involvement of Yussuf Adam.

The team members greatly enjoyed the mission. We felt privileged to have been

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given the freedom to enquire in detail into a development programme and an aid relationship that has been both ennobled by high ideals and scarred by savage hostility and harsh reality. We should like to pay tribute to the many people who worked hard and enthusiastically on the MONAP programme, to those who were murdered and maimed in the course of their work, and to the open, pluralistic attitudes of the governments of Mozambique and of the Nordic countries in relation to their own activities. This openness made our task much easier and more interesting. We hope that it will also make it more useful.

It would not be possible to list all the personal debts accumulated in the course of this mission. Considerable efforts were made by many senior people to ensure that we were well briefed in both Maputo and Stockholm. All the National Directors of the Ministry of Agriculture in Maputo were present at our initial briefing and later gave us lengthy interviews. Almost all the people listed in Annex One, and others besides, helped us very cheerfully. Special thanks are due to the following people for the way in which they have supported our work: Evangeline Casqueiro, Dionisio Dias, Ana Fonseca and Laura Torvinen in Mozambique; and Nadine Beard in Brighton.

Mick Moore (Team Leader)
The Institute of Development Studies
Brighton, U.K.
June 1990

HOW TO READ THIS REPORT

This report is *not* the authoritative history of MONAP, the authorised history, or indeed any kind of comprehensive history at all. Resources did not permit any such undertaking. The report represents rather an attempt to answer what appear to be, from contemporary perspectives and in the light of the current situation in Mozambique and in the Nordic aid system, certain key questions which will help all those concerned to learn the important lessons from the MONAP experience. Those questions are defined in the Terms of Reference (See Annex One).

As one would expect, the issues about MONAP which appear significant today are not always the same issues which appeared significant in the past. It is interesting to compare the present report with the report of the last major general evaluation of MONAP – the Mid-Term Evaluation of MONAP II, conducted in 1982 (reference 29). That report, which generated a great deal of controversy, and was never formally accepted by the Government of Mozambique, focused mainly on the investment strategy which had been pursued.

The main point of critique was an alleged set of [inefficient] biases in favour of large scale production, the state sector, and livestock, especially milk production, and forestry. It was not evident at that stage that Renamo's de-stabilisation activities were to become so widespread, so long-lasting, and so successful in crippling development activities. The new economic policy (PRE) was still several years away. The economy appeared to be recovering from the traumas of the years around contraction in economic activity which took place in the mid-1980s. And the MONAP Coordination Unit was still developing the capacity for quasi-autonomous existence, and actions that was later to prove so contentious. Indeed, the Mid-Term Evaluation Report tended to welcome and encourage the creation of this administrative capacity in the Coordination Unit.

In sum, the issues facing the 1982 evaluation appeared to be relatively conventional: should investment go here or there? To the state sector or to the family sector? To milk production or to maize? It seemed reasonable to assume that such choices were available, and that the governmental machinery needed to implement choices either existed or could be created.

In 1990, perspectives on Mozambique are very different. The "older" questions are still relevant. They have however to compete for attention with a range of new issues, notable those stemming from internal insecurity, changes to a more market-oriented economic policy, and increasing concerns about whether the organisational dimension of MONAP did not explain some of the recurrent but unproductive tension which marred the latter years of the programme. And, since MONAP itself is now so much older, it is relevant to enquire more broadly into its "systemic" impact, notably its contribution to the development of indigenous institutional capacity in Mozambique.

GLOSSARY

AGRICOM	the large public sector rural trading organisation, which deals in the wholesale and retail purchase, storage, transport and sale of consumer and producer goods and agricultural products.
bairro	a ward in a city, i.e. a local administrative unit
casa agraria	a rural extension centre
CEF	the Forestry Research Centre
CEA	the Centre for African Studies, Eduardo Mondlane University
CFA	the Agrarian Training Centre (in Maputo)
cooperants	foreigners employed by the Government of Mozambique (and MONAP) at lower rates of remuneration than "international experts"
CRD	a Rural Development Centre
DANIDA	the Danish national aid agency
deslocados	people displaced from their homes by the war
DCO	the local [Maputo] office of SIDA
DEA [formerly DNEA]	the Agrarian Economy Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture
DINAP	the National Livestock Directorate of the MoA
DNDR [formerly DDR]	the National Rural Development Directorate of the MoA
DNFFB	the National Directorate of Forestry and Wildlife of the MoA
DNTA	(formerly) the National Directorate for Agrarian Technology
DPA	Provincial Directorate of Agriculture
DPCCN	the Directorate for the Prevention and Control of Natural Calamities
DRH	the Human Resources Directorate of the Min. of Agriculture
FAO	the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
FINNIDA	the Finnish national aid agency
Frelimo	the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (the ruling party)
GZV	Green Zones Office
IFAD	the International Fund for Agricultural Development
INIA	the National Agricultural Research Institute
INIVE [or INIV]	the National Veterinary Research Institute
MT [or meticals]	the Mozambican currency, officially valued at almost MT 1000 per US \$ in April 1990
NORAD	the Norwegian national aid agency
OMM	the Organisation of Mozambican Women
PRE	the Programme for Economic Rehabilitation, the new economic policy launched in 1986
Renamo	the Mozambican National Resistance, the foreign supported organisation responsible for most of the internal warfare in Mozambique
SEK	Swedish kronor
SEMOG	the national seed company
SETEP	the Technical and Professional Training Section of the Ministry of Education
SIDA	the Swedish national aid agency
UNICEF	the United Nations Children's Organisation
UEM	the Eduardo Mondlane University, Maputo
UNDP	the United Nations Development Programme
USAID	the American national aid agency
WUS	the World University Service

PART ONE: SUMMARIES

1. WHAT WAS MONAP?

Frelimo became the governing party in Mozambique in 1975 in circumstances marked by considerable disruption, above all by the flight in the preceding and succeeding years of most Portuguese settlers, and thus most of the national cadre of technicians, white collar workers, larger scale farmers and capitalists. At the same time, there was an enormous wave of optimism, both internally and abroad, that Frelimo, with its record of successful armed struggle against colonialism, would be able to use this situation to overcome the legacy of a peculiarly backward form of colonialism, transform internal socio-economic relations, including gender relations, and take Mozambique outside the tight network of neo-colonial relations of dependence in which it had hitherto been enmeshed. This was a brave stand for a country so close to — and so dependent economically upon — the Republic of South Africa. Even braver still was the decision of the new government to give active and visible support to the liberation struggle against the white racist regime ruling another neighbouring state, Rhodesia [Zimbabwe].

Frelimo's determination to tackle head-on racism, the subordination of women, neo-colonialism, the internal vestiges of its own colonial past and two militarily-powerful neighbours generated much admiration and offers of support elsewhere in the world. This was especially true in the Nordic countries, which had a record of giving substantial material, moral and political support to anti-colonial and anti-racist movements in Southern Africa, including to Frelimo itself. After Independence, this support became organised within the framework of a government-to-government aid programme. MONAP was an important component of this programme, although never a major one: it has from the beginning, for example, always been smaller in cash terms than direct Nordic import support to Mozambique. The Nordics joined the Eastern Bloc countries as Mozambique's main foreign supporters in the early post-Independence period. At this time, Mozambique faced considerable hostility from the major capitalist powers.

There are two major characteristics of MONAP revealed in the title of the programme. One is that it was, on the donor side, a **joint Nordic** programme. This meant that it was financed by Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Iceland according to a standard formula which had been established for all joint Nordic aid programmes. The main elements in this formula were: financial contributions

proportionate to national incomes; implementation responsibility to be allocated to the Nordic national aid agencies; and a system of inter-Nordic consultation organised at both ministerial and official levels. In the MONAP case, the Swedish International Development Agency [SIDA] was the implementing agency, for in the early period Sweden was the only Nordic partner with diplomatic representation in Maputo.

The other main characteristic of MONAP was that it was an **agricultural** programme — where 'agriculture' includes also forestry and fishing. For it was in agriculture that Mozambique's major problems appeared to lie. In the short run the exodus of Portuguese had an especially serious effect on agricultural production in the large scale [or 'commercial'] sector and on rural commercial networks. In the longer run, the Nordic donors in particular were keen to help develop the family sector of Mozambique's agriculture, a sector which had been both exploited and neglected to unusually high degrees under colonialism.

The idea of MONAP was discussed and developed between the Government of Mozambique and the Nordic aid agencies in 1975 and 1976. Both sides were aware of the limited experience and technical capacity of the Nordic countries in relation to African agriculture. For this reason the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations [FAO] was inducted into the enterprise from the beginning. It was felt that the FAO could provide the technical expertise that the Nordics lacked. It was also decided to focus Nordic support on those sectors of agriculture in which the Nordic countries had most experience: livestock, milk production and forestry. MONAP Phase I formally came on stream as a three year programme at the beginning of 1977. In practice it represented a development of the emergency financial assistance which the Nordic donors had provided to Mozambique to purchase imports in the preceding two years.

What was MONAP? There is in fact no unambiguous answer to this question. Indeed, as is explained in more detail in Section 2.1, it would be possible to answer the question in ways that would appear accurate from one perspective but quite misleading and tendentious from another perspective. There are many potential answers to the question. It is adequate here if one simply contrasts three alternative perspectives.

The **first perspective** is more formal and official, and can be visually summarised, albeit in a simplified fashion, by Table 1(1). In this perspective, MONAP was a succession of sets of particular projects to develop Mozambican agriculture with Nordic financial and technical assistance. The content of the programme was redefined at the completion of each phase. There was an evident shift over time from the livestock [especially dairying] and forestry projects, which had been intended to match Nordic expertise and were mostly implemented by large scale state enterprises and organisations, to projects aimed more directly at the small scale or family sector. [For some discussion of problems of defining agricultural sectors, see Sections 8 and 11]. It is evident that, at any point in time, MONAP supported a diverse range of types of activities. It also supported a very large cadre of expatriate technical assistance staff from many parts of the world, relatively few of them Nordic nationals. At its peak, at the end of 1982, MONAP employed about two hundred foreigners in Mozambique [see Section 16]. Around six hundred foreigners have at some point worked for MONAP. Figures on the number of

Mozambican staff are not so easily available. In 1987-88 they numbered about a thousand. Phases I and II were each originally planned for three years, and extended by a year, to the end of 1980 and 1984 respectively. Phase III was intended from the beginning to be a five year programme, although the agreement was initially signed for only three years. By 1986 it was made clear that, despite the wishes of the Government of Mozambique, the Nordic donors wished to terminate MONAP and support at least some elements of it on a bilateral basis. To allow for phasing out, Phase III was extended to the middle of 1990, lasting five and a half years in total.

A second perspective on MONAP would deny that it was essentially a collection of agricultural development projects, emphasise the long term cooperative nature of the Mozambique-Nordic relationship of which MONAP was an important expression, and interpret MONAP essentially as a fund of money and technical assistance designed to meet in a flexible fashion the urgent and important needs of the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture and agricultural sector. This perspective allocates MONAP a special role in agricultural policymaking in Mozambique, in intention at least, if not always in practice. There is no doubt that, from the perspective of the staff of the Ministry of Agriculture, MONAP was a special programme. It was in the first place very large. In its early years it was the major source of hard currency to support the activities of the Ministry of Agriculture — perhaps 80% in the period 1977-1984 — and thus received close attention from senior staff. This became less and less true over the years as more donors and more aid entered Mozambique, and as the Nordic donors themselves began to support agricultural development activities outside the framework of MONAP. Even so, in recent years MONAP has accounted for about a third of the hard currency resources [or the investment budget — the two are more or less synonymous in practice] of the Ministry of Agriculture. Virtually every part of the Ministry has at some point benefited from MONAP support.

The second reason why MONAP was of special importance to the Ministry of Agriculture was that it has in practice been an unusually flexible source of funding. To some degree at least MONAP has provided the kind of 'sector support' mentioned above. This flexibility has arisen from two major sources. One is that each phase of the programme has included a project called 'general support', which has provided considerable discretion in the actual allocation of money for a wide range of purposes. The other source of flexibility has lain in the virtually continuous problem of finding ways of spending the budgetary resources allocated. There has been a continuous institutional pressure to spend. This appears to have created a certain predisposition to interpret generously rules and principles about what kinds of activities would be eligible for MONAP funding. This flexibility has inevitably generated controversy. Some have seen it as resulting in financial waste. At the other extreme, it is argued that MONAP has been able to play a very valuable role as 'importer of the last resort': the agency able to rapidly finance the purchase of emergency seed, food and producer or consumer goods if unmet needs remained once other donors had made their commitments to Mozambique.

Alongside the debate about whether MONAP money was well spent there has been a debate about whether the decisions were made by the right people. For one unusual feature of MONAP was that it developed a large and powerful bureau-

racy of its own which was to a substantial degree autonomous of the Ministry of Agriculture in which MONAP was formally located. A **third perspective** on MONAP is then to see it essentially as a distinct set of institutions. The central institution was the MONAP Coordination Unit. This started life as a one-person office in the Ministry, staffed by a Nordic expert called the MONAP Coordinator whose vaguely defined job was to act as 'liaison' between Nordic interests and the sections of the Ministry implementing MONAP projects. An account is given in Section 13 of how this Unit grew such that by the mid-1980s it was sometimes viewed as essentially a separate Nordic organisation, almost a separate aid donor, possessing a great deal of discretion about how MONAP funds should be spent, considerable implementation capacity, and a capacity to influence directly the various Directorates of the Ministry. The Coordination Unit by this stage had its own personnel, housing, workshop, stores and procurement sections, as well as a construction unit managing the construction work for all MONAP projects.

There is some validity in each of the interpretations of MONAP set out above: that it was a set of development projects, a flexible source of programme funding for the Ministry of Agriculture, and a distinct set of institutions. The question of which perspective was the more valid becomes somewhat less open if one introduces the time dimension. For MONAP did undergo considerable changes in the course of its thirteen year life.

Looking at MONAP from the point of view of its **content**, i.e. the types of activities which it funded, there are a number of general trends. One of the more evident, already mentioned above, is the gradual shift from direct support to large scale production in the state sector, and especially of livestock and forestry products, to support for the peasant or family sector. [The term 'family sector' is generally used in Mozambique to describe what might otherwise be termed the 'peasant sector'. We have generally used 'family sector' in this report.] Unfortunately, the spread of bandit activities in the early 1980s nullified much more ambitious schemes to develop activities in the family sector [see Section 11, and Section 21 in the original report]. Another change in the content of the programme also results from the increasing insecurity problem: the increasing localisation of activities in a few areas where some degree of security was present, especially in and around the main cities. There was also, in the later stages, a tendency to separate out from MONAP those projects which were not under the administrative control of the Ministry of Agriculture. AGRICOM, the state agricultural and rural trading enterprise, was separately funded by SIDA from the beginning of MONAP III. Support for all fisheries projects except small scale freshwater fisheries was terminated at the end of MONAP II. And the management of the small scale artisanal industries project in Beira was handed over to the Danish branch of the World University Service in 1988.

Finally, one can look at the content of MONAP from the point of view of expenditure categories. The bulk of expenditure [61%] was on the supply of equipment and materials. This proportion however decreased markedly over time. The decrease was especially marked in the case of [durable] equipment, which declined from 58% of total spending in MONAP I to 20% in MONAP III. The difference was largely accounted for by a major expansion of expenditure on expatriate personnel [see Section 6].

Table 1(1): A simplified "project map" of the three phases of MONAP

Monap I (1977-80)	Monap II (1981-84)	Monap III (1985-90)
Umbeluzi/Boane Training School (TR-1) Tele Mechanical School (TR-2)* Natural Resources Conservation (TR-3)*	Umbeluzi/Boane Training School (TR-1) Agricultural Schools [four] (TR-4)	Technical and professional agricultural training, including six schools and institutional support to Human Resources Directorate of Ministry of Agriculture (Proj. 3)
Agricultural marketing (MI-1)	Support to AGRICOM (MI-1)	[SIDA support provided outside Monap]
Support to cotton sector (MI-2)	Support to cotton sector (MI-2)*	
Tools and implements (ME-1)*		
Support to MECANAGRO (ME-2) Acquisition of spare parts (ME-3)	Support to MECANAGRO (ME-2)* Acquisition of spare parts (ME-3)*	
Small scale fisheries (FI-1)	Small scale fisheries (FI-1)	Freshwater fish culture (Proj. 28)
Afforestation, Manica (FO-1) Affor., Maputo (FO-2) Affor., Sofala (FO-4) Affor., Nampula (FO-5)	Affor., Manica (FO-1)* Affor., Maputo (FO-2) Affor., Sofala (FO-4) Affor., Nampula (FO-5)	Institutional support to Forestry Research Centre (Proj. 45) Beekeeping (Proj. 27)
Forestry production enterprise (FO-6)	Forestry production enterprise (FO-6)*	
Small scale industry for communal villages, preparation (FO-7)	Small scale industry for communal villages (FO-7)	Small scale industries, Beira-Dondo (Proj. 29)
Tse-tse fly control (LI-2) Livestock development centres (LI-4)* Milk production, Chimio (LI-5) Beef prod., Buzi (LI-6)* National bush control (LI-7)* Milk production, Chokwe (LI-8)* Beef prod., southern Mozambique (LI-10/12)* INIVE (LI-13) Milk prod., Maputo (LI-15)	(taken over by FAO) Milk production, Chimio (LI-5) Milk prod., Gurue/Lioma (LI-14)* INIVE (LI-13) Milk prod., Maputo (LI-15)	Support to DINAP and milk production/processing (proj. 44) INIVE (Proj. 43) (Proj. 44, see above)
Cooperative development, preparing (CR-6) Farmer training (TR-5)	Cooperative development (CO-1) Rural development centres (CO-2)	Peasant sector support, incl. CFA (Projs. 21, 24, 25, 26)
Seed production (CR-1)	Seed prod., and quality control (CR-1)	Seed quality control (Proj. 41) SEMOC (Proj. 42)
Vegetable prod. (CR-3)	Vegetable prod. (CR-3)	Marracuene Green Zones (Proj. 23)
Citrus prod. (CR-4)*		
Irrigation and Drainage, Beira and Buzi (IR-2/3)	Irrigation, Beira (IR-4)	Beira Green Zones (Proj. 22)
General support (GE-1)	General support (GE-1)	General support (Projs. 10-19, 61)

Note: * indicates that the project was terminated at the end of that phase

Insofar as it is possible to do a useful periodisation of MONAP, this is best done not according to programme content but according to institutional and organisational factors. There were in fact a number of related changes occurring in or around 1983-84. From this perspective MONAP falls neatly into two halves of about six to seven years each. These changes are discussed in more detail in Sections 10, 13 and 16. In brief, they took the following form:

- 1) The effective withdrawal of almost all expatriate staff to the two main cities [Maputo and Beira] because of the security situation.
- 2) The maturation of the MONAP Coordination Unit as a powerful and partially autonomous agency.
- 3) The appointment of a new Coordinator who took a different view of the programme from his predecessors, saw the autonomy of the Coordination Unit as a means of improving programme implementation, gave priority to improving the conditions and morale of the staff of the Coordination Unit, and took steps to increase the proportion of Nordics among MONAP's foreign personnel.

From this time MONAP appeared to be a more distinctly Nordic entity separate from the Government of Mozambique. At the same time, recurrent tension began to develop between the Coordination Unit and the agency supervising it from the Nordic side in Maputo, the Development Cooperation Office [DCO] of SIDA. For these reasons, and for others connected with the worsening situation in Mozambique and the perception that the programme would not be extended into a fourth phase, the latter half of MONAP's life was less heroic and inspiring than the first half.

2. HOW CAN MONAP BE EVALUATED?

2.1 General evaluation problems

Evaluation of development projects and programmes is not normally an especially easy or straightforward process. The evaluation of MONAP poses an unusually large number of difficulties:

- 1) The programme covered a long period of time [13 years] and underwent a large number of changes in organisation, content and direction [see Section 1].
- 2) The programme has supported a large number of diverse activities located all over Mozambique, including those destroyed or rendered inaccessible by war; it is in practice very difficult to enquire into the full range of them.
- 3) MONAP funding has been dispersed very widely over a large range of different types of activities in the agriculture sector [broadly defined, to include forestry and fishing]. MONAP's history is intimately bound up with the history of Mozambican agricultural policy and performance since 1977. The relationships between them are complex and difficult to disentangle. It is sometimes difficult to evaluate an

aspect of MONAP without at the same time appearing to be evaluating Mozambique more broadly. In relation to agricultural performance, it is well to bear in mind that the resources attached to MONAP have been tiny in relation to the size of the Mozambican rural economy. There is little that MONAP resources could do directly to counter the many adverse influences bearing on the agricultural sector. In relation to policy the situation is more ambiguous. In its early years in particular, MONAP did account for a large fraction of the resources, especially the investment resources, available to the Ministry of Agriculture.

To that degree, MONAP may be held in some way accountable for aspects of agricultural policy. But *who* is to be accountable? For, as is explained in Section 13, MONAP has always occupied an ambiguous position somewhere between [a] formally, a rather unimportant office within the Ministry of Agriculture occupied by officers of the Government of Mozambique; and [b] a separate Nordic aid agency. The Government of Mozambique is formally responsible for everything done under MONAP. It is possible to go to the opposite extreme, and assume that the MONAP Coordination Unit, and thus the Nordic donors, can be held fully responsible. To establish who determined the decisions that were taken is very difficult. To assess whether both parties would have agreed on different decisions is almost impossible.

4) In its early years, MONAP was associated with attempts — conducted with considerable enthusiasm and under very difficult circumstances — to solve, by socialising production relations in agriculture, the problems created by the flight of capital, capitalists and skilled personnel around the time of Independence. These policies ran into a range of problems and have been substantially changed. They have always been contentious, and the debates and disputes surrounding them have been rehearsed again and again. Impressions and interpretations of MONAP can easily be influenced by emotive and ideological considerations, and by attitudes to recent Mozambican history in general. This is true of all points on the ideological spectrum, and of the Nordic parties involved as much as the Mozambicans. It is impossible to conduct an evaluation which is not also influenced by ideological considerations.

5) There are problems in even choosing appropriate evaluation standards and criteria for a programme which, like the context in which it has been expected to operate, has been deeply and adversely affected by political and military difficulties — especially the sudden transition to Independence in 1974, the rapid flight of most Portuguese in the preceding and immediately succeeding years, conflict associated with support for the liberation of Zimbabwe, and, above all, since the early 1980s, destabilization from abroad and widespread internal insecurity. One should also add to this list, as less important factors, the constraints imposed on programme implementation by political decisions taken in the Nordic countries: the severe restrictions on procurement of goods from South Africa; the pressures to ensure that a reasonable proportion of the procurement was undertaken in the Nordic countries [see Section 13]; the virtual limitation of the recruitment of SIDA experts to the Nordic countries [see Section 16]; and the restrictions on the travel and residence patterns of expatriate MONAP personnel imposed by security authorities after the intensification of internal subversion in the early 1980s [see Section 10].

Destabilisation from abroad and the resultant internal military conflict pose the biggest problem. The mission was frequently faced with what amounted to a challenge: "How can you possibly 'evaluate' in the middle of a war?" Some would add: "Especially a war which was intended to cripple and destroy development activities?" One can only answer that we have done our best to separate out the apparent effects of war on programme performance.

The war has not affected everything. It did not affect MONAP I or the planning of MONAP II. It began to affect the implementation of MONAP II in a serious way in the early 1980s. The war was certainly the major cause of the failure of the initiative to launch a major development programme for the cooperative and family sectors in MONAP III. The mission was able to observe how the existence of a degree of security in the 'Beira corridor' around Chimoio permits development projects to function satisfactorily. But there remains considerable scope for legitimate disagreement about the overall effects of war. Although we do not subscribe to it, we cannot, for example, **disprove** the claim that virtually all the problems associated with MONAP since 1980 can be traced back, directly or indirectly, to the effects of insecurity and war.

6) For much of the period since Independence, a large proportion of economic transactions were not undertaken in an open competitive market economy. This, allied to the severe undervaluation of the Mozambican currency [on conventional or market criteria], and very large currency devaluations in recent years, mean that it is rarely possible either to find the information or to construct the analytic tools [real price indices, shadow prices of foreign exchange, "realistic" metical-dollar exchange rates] which are needed to undertake a conventional economic appraisal of the costs and benefits of investments. [For a detailed discussion of this issue by World Bank staff, see reference 174, pp. 105-107].

7) From the very beginning there has been considerable ambiguity over the nature of MONAP [see Section 1 and 8]. Some people have viewed it as a **set of defined projects** to be implemented. Others have seen it as general flexible support to the agricultural sector.

This tension between alternative perspectives has carried through to the formulation of the Terms of Reference for this evaluation mission. A close reading of section 4 of those Terms of Reference will illustrate a difference [and a compromise] in emphasis between those who wish to look closely at the results of the individual projects under MONAP and those who wish to examine the impact of MONAP at a higher or more 'systemic' level.

The issue is extremely important, for the choice of one perspective rather than the other would in itself in large part determine the procedure and the result of the evaluation. The concrete, observable results or outputs of MONAP are undoubtedly much less than they would have been in a more stable political and security environment. To focus only or mainly on the concrete results would produce a pessimistic conclusion, **without** even raising the question whether the situation would have been even worse without MONAP support. It would not be appropriate for the mission to choose to evaluate MONAP as if it had been **either** one kind of programme [sectoral support] **or** the other [a set of projects]. We have attempted to explore the implications of each interpretation, and therefore to present as balanced a perspective as possible.

2.2 Some comments on this mission

The problems listed above would have affected any attempt to conduct a general evaluation of MONAP. There is also the question of the appropriateness and effectiveness of the evaluation which we have conducted. Others will have the last word on this. The mission simply wishes to make a few observations from its own perspective:

1) The excellent cooperation and assistance provided in Maputo and in Stockholm enabled us to work relatively effectively in the brief period of time available.

2) The total personnel resources put into the evaluation were not adequate to permit us to answer the many questions — both of detail about particular projects and of broad judgement about 'strategic' issues — which have been posed to us. Some readers may be disappointed.

3) The process of commissioning the evaluation in certain respects mirrored aspects of the implementation of MONAP itself, with the major result that the participation in the mission of the four team members from the Centre for African Studies was not confirmed until four days before the expatriate members arrived in Maputo.

4) The mission was handicapped by the limited Portuguese language ability of the expatriates involved. The five expatriates ranged between one native Portuguese speaker and one person with only limited reading ability in Portuguese. Four members had considerable experience in Africa, and two had previously worked in Mozambique.

5) Most importantly perhaps, it became evident that it would have been better to have engaged a smaller number of people to work in Mozambique for a longer period of time. This would have permitted: a larger number of people in Mozambique to be contacted and interviewed; a more consistent search of the archival material; and more time to reflect on issues and organise ways of following up those which appeared especially significant. Notwithstanding the willing help provided, it took some time to understand what information and statistics were available, and to access this information. In many cases, the kind of statistics we would have liked to use were either unavailable, or would only become available after a great deal of time-consuming additional work.

2.3 Coping with the problems

A detailed explanation of how the mission tried to cope with all the problems listed in Section 2.1 above would serve little purpose. In many cases the answers will be clear. There are however a few specific points that call for comment:

1) For ideas and information the mission has relied primarily on the following sources: previous knowledge and experience of MONAP projects; interviews with a very large number of Mozambican and, to a lesser extent, Nordic officials; existing 'public' documentation on MONAP, including a substantial number of evaluations of previous phases of the programme and of individual components; open access to the substantial MONAP archives in the Ministry of Agriculture; and a series of brief visits to MONAP projects in the provinces. Every effort has been made to cross-check sources.

2) We have attempted to use a range of different evaluation criteria for specific

MONAP projects in the effort to surmount the obstacles [listed in Section 2.1 above] to the effective use of normal evaluation techniques. These criteria include: [a] the appropriateness of investment, whether of capital or of personnel, and in both quantitative and qualitative terms, to current Mozambican circumstances of internal insecurity and to likely future circumstances should peace be established within a few years; [b] the degree to which important existing institutions have been maintained and left in functioning condition; and [c] the extent to which new institutions have been created to undertake important activities and left in functioning condition.

3) Because of the very difficult circumstances in which MONAP has been implemented, every attempt has been made, in writing this report, to avoid conveying any impression of allocating blame or responsibility for particular problems or 'failures' to specific individuals, groups or agencies. That kind of task is not in our Terms of Reference, not one we would wish to undertake, and not one which we feel we could reasonably undertake.

4) The mission observed that some of the participants in the MONAP process not only have different opinions and judgements, but have very different interpretations of the 'facts' about particular key events and processes. Such differences are quite normal. They result from a number of factors, but above all from the different structural positions of people in complex organisational environments. It is often very difficult for an outsider to judge which interpretation is the more correct. This is all the more true if the events happened long ago, and attitudes have been hardened by the stresses and conflicts at the time and by continual re-statement of positions and arguments in succeeding years. These points apply in particular to much of the early MONAP experience. The mission has not attempted to judge between competing interpretations of the same process unless [a] it appeared useful or necessary to make such a judgement to fulfil our Terms of Reference; and [b] we felt we could make the judgement with confidence. We have often been content to see alternative interpretations as illustrations of the tensions, conflicts and ambiguities which tend to underlie any large, complex, international activity like MONAP.

5) We hope and believe that the diversity of the personal, professional and ideological backgrounds of the members of the mission, combined with a high degree of sensitivity to the issue, have to a large degree protected this report against ideological bias.

3. MAIN CONCLUSIONS

The following are the main general conclusions of the evaluation mission:

1) It is very difficult to evaluate MONAP in any kind of 'objective' or 'neutral' manner. There is a substantial degree of subjectivity in the judgements made here.

2) At a rather abstract level, the SEK 1,200 million invested in the MONAP programme can be said to have produced three main general categories of result:

[a] The creation of capital assets — physical, human and institutional —

which are at present unable to generate a 'normal' or 'reasonable' rate of economic return because of war and general economic dislocation, but which are likely to generate a reasonable return if the economy is able to recover in the near future.

[b] A significant contribution to the survival of the Mozambican state and government, in the face of considerable difficulty and hostility, as a result of generalised, diffuse support which has permitted the Ministry of Agriculture [in particular] to be more active than would otherwise have been possible. This support has been delivered in the form of salaries, vehicles, equipment, expatriate personnel, travel allowances and a range of other resources.

[c] The loss or disappearance of resources as a result in particular of: over-investment; the ordering of inappropriate equipment; direct destruction by bandit attacks; the absence of maintenance policies and facilities; limitations in the quality of technical assistance; limited capacity of Mozambican structures to make effective use of the technical assistance provided; and various adverse secondary impacts of military conflict and economic dislocation.

Two or three of these general categories of result may be observed within individual projects. At the overall programme level all appear to be significant. There is no satisfactory way of weighting them more precisely. It is implicit in what is said above that most of the production-oriented activities which have received MONAP support are operating at low levels of physical output. It seems likely that, if it were possible to do so [and it is not], the application of normal benefit-cost analysis would reveal few cases where the rate of return would be considered satisfactory on conventional criteria — i.e. a net present value greater than zero or an internal rate of return above the accounting rate of interest.

3) In the later stages of MONAP, an excessive proportion of financial resources have been devoted to the general supervision of the programme by [mainly] Nordic agencies, especially the Coordination Unit.

4) MONAP is widely appreciated and praised by those Mozambican government officials who have been involved in the programme. It appears to have contributed substantially to the maintenance of good relations between Mozambique and the Nordic countries. Unlike some other aid programmes to Mozambique, MONAP was not substantially influenced by vested interest groups in either the donor or the recipient countries, and was thus not distorted to serve illegitimate ends.

5) A number of important and effectively-functioning agricultural sector institutions have been created and/or largely supported by MONAP. The list might include, for example: AGRICOM; the CFA; the Forestry Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture; INIVE; and SEMOC.

6) Despite the prominence of the issue in the debates surrounding MONAP, and very considerable efforts in many quarters, the programme has been able neither to deliver many direct benefits to the family farm sector nor to make major headway in developing the institutions and techniques needed for the Ministry of Agriculture to give effective support to this sector in the future. The major visible reason is the spread of destabilization activities in the countryside in the early 1980s. In very difficult circumstances, some useful experiments have been conducted in the development of agricultural extension activities [e.g. projects 22 and 25].

7) Gender issues were very rarely raised in the early years of the programme. From MONAP II onwards, concern has been expressed about the disadvantaged position of women, especially those in the family sector, and with particular regard to the issue of their long working hours. No sustained effort was made to channel benefits explicitly to women or to develop an explicit gender strategy.

8) The finance available for MONAP has generally exceeded the capacity of Mozambican agencies to effectively and efficiently use that money within a limited time period. [This is not to say that finance has exceeded needs]. There have accordingly been continuous incentives and pressures to make excessive expenditures of various kinds, notably: projects too large for the available technical and managerial capacity; capital investments in excess of physical requirements; purchase of capital equipment too complex in relation to needs or management and maintenance capacity; equipment and material supplies for which the need or demand was not demonstrated; and relatively expensive services.

9) Relatedly, the process of preparing and appraising MONAP projects has sometimes been marked by an inadequate concern for technical feasibility or economic viability [private or public]. While such procedural deficiencies were to some degree understandable in the preparation of Phase I, they have sometimes been repeated in less difficult circumstances.

10) The availability of finance in excess of absorptive capacity has meant that an increasing proportion of expenditure has been directed to organisations which function effectively and can demonstrate a capacity to spend money without generating excessive waste. We refer especially to SEMOC and AGRICOM. This is not a criticism. It is better to direct money to functioning institutions whose activities are basically appropriate, albeit with some questions, than to waste it or not spend it at all. The formal, general goals of Nordic aid have in effect been adapted to the realities of Mozambique.

11) Insofar as there were avoidable weakness in the administrative arrangements for MONAP, these stemmed largely from inappropriate structural relationships within and between the organizations involved: [a] the awkward and unfortunate position of the Coordination Unit within the structures of the Ministry of Agriculture; and [b] the duplication of responsibilities for the general supervision of MONAP on the Nordic side.

12) There has been continual debate about MONAP strategy and a reasonable degree of adaptation of the content of the programme to changing circumstances in Mozambique. This was however more true of the earlier years of the programme.

13) The most significant mis-match between the stated [and frequently re-stated] objectives of MONAP and strategies actually pursued lies in the areas of personnel training and staff development. The problem of scarcity of trained and experienced Mozambican personnel was acute, beyond almost all experience, and virtually unique. The response was conventional and inadequate: [a] the expansion of the formal training of agricultural technicians, which ran into many problems and delays, including the scarcity of people with adequate educational backgrounds for the planned courses; and [b] the use of the 'counterpart' system for expatriate personnel. The latter is of doubtful value in more normal circumstances; in Mozambique it was often impossible for the government to find staff who could

reasonably be described as counterparts. Little attention appears to have been paid to the issue of personnel development, and the contribution of MONAP, while positive and significant in some areas [e.g. the Forestry Directorate, the Livestock Directorate, INIVE], is overall less than might reasonably have been expected.

14) There was a structural mis-match between [a] the need for large numbers of high quality experts committed to working for substantial periods in Mozambique; and [b] the unwillingness to take the measures needed to broaden the basis of expert recruitment beyond Nordic countries. Technical assistance personnel in MONAP have on average served for too short periods; this is true above all of Nordic nationals.

15) The [avoidable] less positive aspects of MONAP were especially prominent in the latter years of the programme. It seems clear in retrospect that, given the 'failure' by the mid-1980s of MONAP either to provide effective, flexible sector support for agriculture or to demonstrate clear advantages of joint Nordic over co-financed or bilateral aid programmes, the decision to bilateralise could more profitably have been implemented earlier.

16) Despite a series of formal commitments, very little appears to have been done in practice to integrate the various components of the Coordination Unit with the relevant sections of the Ministry of Agriculture during the last years of the programme. It is only rather recently that this issue has been treated as urgent and important. The problems, actual and potential, which arise from the arrangements made to localise the MONAP administrative apparatus mirror the problems which have recurred throughout. The most successful transitions — in the sense that the institutions stand a good chance of continuing to function effectively — are likely to be those where whole units have been handed over to Mozambican state agencies with some autonomy and substantial continuing Nordic [SIDA] support in the form of finance and technical assistance: the Procurement Unit and the Maputo and Beira Workshops to AGRICOM, and the Nampula Workshop to SEMOC. It is not yet clear how well the former Personnel Unit of MONAP will be integrated into the Personnel Department of the Human Resources Directorate, Ministry of Agriculture. It seems possible that this transfer, formally effected at the end of 1989, came too late to permit the gradual integration of two very different systems. It is unlikely that many of the Mozambican employees of the Coordination Unit will accept the jobs they have been offered elsewhere in the Ministry of Agriculture. They are able to find more attractive jobs, especially those involving working directly for other foreign organizations.

17) The arrangements made for the MONAP projects after the termination of funding in June 1990 can in most cases be considered satisfactory, or better. This is especially true in relation to the major users of funds. AGRICOM and SEMOC have already been launched as separate, non-MONAP projects under SIDA funding, and appear to have a promising future. Some elements of agricultural extension [including the CFA], the Beira-Dondo small industries project, seed quality control and the Boane Agricultural School are also being catered for by the other Nordic partners. The SIDA personnel fund provides for the continuation of many of MONAP's expatriate employees, and a flexible source of finance for the Ministry of Agriculture to employ expatriates in the future. Of the two large area-based

agricultural projects, the Beira Green Zones Project has already been virtually terminated [as a separate project]; a continuation would not be justified. It seems possible that, were a thorough evaluation to be done, a similar conclusion would be reached about the Marracuene Project; no further external funding is in prospect. Support for DEA is currently being negotiated with SIDA.

There remain a number of relatively small scale activities which have not as yet received guarantees of future funding and remain in uncertainty: freshwater fish farming; a number of agricultural schools; beekeeping; and a number of localised extension and forestry projects. There is no doubt that in some cases the staff feel somewhat demoralised because their projects appear to have been excluded from continued external funding. This situation is unfortunate. However, in most cases there are important questions about the viability or priority of these activities, at least as at present organised. The decisions not to continue funding them, at least without detailed scrutiny and possible policy or organisational change, appear to have been generally correct.

18) In long run perspective, one of the biggest disappointments about MONAP may relate not to any of its formal objectives, but to the implicit [and contested] aim of providing sector support and thus enabling the Ministry of Agriculture to plan and implement agricultural policy on some kind of holistic basis. Over the course of MONAP the very opposite has happened. The Ministry of Agriculture has suffered heavily from 'projectification': the tying of most of its financial and personnel resources to a very large number of individual foreign aid projects, each with their own objectives, procedural requirements, demands for experienced counterpart staff, and high negotiation and reporting costs [in relation to the scarce time and energies of senior staff]. It is ironic that, as MONAP is terminating, the need for the kind of sector support that some people originally expected of the programme is now more urgent than ever.

4. MAIN IMPLICATIONS FOR MOZAMBIQUE

Little purpose would be served here by listing all the mistakes and deficiencies which are observable in the context of MONAP, and then detailing all the ways in which various agencies should try to perform better in future. We assume that everyone should try to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past and do better in future. The purpose of this and the succeeding section is to draw attention to a few key policy issues arising from the MONAP experience which are of sufficient generality that they would repay further thought. They mainly concern the management of the aid relationship.

1) Mozambique inherited from the colonial period a very rudimentary state apparatus for intervening in and promoting the development of the **family sector**. Despite many efforts, and largely because of war, this apparatus has not been substantially strengthened over the MONAP period. There is little prospect that

the situation can be much improved for many years to come. For the trained cadres, the institutions and the research backing are simply not available to run an effective agricultural extension or rural development service on a national scale. Yet there is every reason to believe that, given certain minimal conditions — notably security, transport links, remunerative prices and the supply of basic production inputs — the family sector could make a major contribution to economic recovery. It would seem advisable to concentrate resources in these areas. A clear declaration of faith in the economic capacity of the family sector by the government would both help reinforce such a policy internally and make a very favourable impression on almost all of Mozambique's aid donors.

2) Mozambique now incurs major costs, notably in the diversion of energies of the most senior administrators and policymakers, due to the **diversity of its sources of foreign aid**. It is important to attempt to strengthen the capacity of the state to deal with aid donors in a coordinated and relatively centralised fashion, within existing state structures. Donors themselves should be asked to recognise these costs and to help offset them.

3) The **development of institutional and human resources** capacity is critical to the long term development of Mozambique. This is an area that, despite declarations to the contrary, tends to have been neglected in past aid programmes.

4) The Government of Mozambique is frequently unable to comply with the conditions of aid projects that expatriate experts be given **local counterparts**. This situation is unlikely to change in the near future. It may be sensible to consider preparing a policy statement on this issue which specifies more than one kind of 'counterpart' relationship and the obligations of each party for each different type of relationship. [Some might involve explicit training elements of various kinds].

5) It may be appropriate and effective for the Government of Mozambique to ask its aid donors to both monitor and report regularly on the quality of the **technical assistance** they employ. Such monitoring could include performance assessment, cost analysis, and aggregate data on such issues as length of period served. The Government of Mozambique does not at present have the capacity to undertake such monitoring itself. It is anyway appropriate to internalise the monitoring and learning processes within the organisations which most need to learn because they can take remedial action — the aid agencies.

6) In the case of the more permanent and committed donors, like the Nordics, it would be appropriate to request a broadening of the **organisational base of technical assistance** from both the donor and the recipient end, to establish direct and lasting inter-institutional relations outside the narrow sphere of central government agencies — for example, between state enterprises, local governments, higher education and research institutes, companies, and non-government voluntary development agencies. From the relatively narrow perspective this might improve the quality of technical assistance by providing more continuity in both personnel and institutions, and more technical back-up from home for expatriates working in Mozambique. From a wider perspective, this might [a] broaden the basis of the commitment to Mozambique in the donor countries; and [b] promote the further extension of social and political pluralism in both donor and recipient countries.

5. MAIN IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NORDIC DONORS

1) MONAP has come in for criticism in relation to the relative ease with which money was committed and the technical weaknesses and suspect economic viability of some projects. The Nordic donors have however won considerable **respect** for other aspects of their approach, especially their general sympathy with Mozambican positions and problems, their limited concern to re-cycle aid money to purchases in the Nordic countries, and their openness in policy discussion. There may in some cases be some tension between efficient aid administration, in the narrow sense of that term, and the fulfilment of broader political objectives.

2) **Joint financing** of aid programmes by all Nordic countries is likely to generate administrative problems, especially where the programmes are relatively large and complex. Co-financing among smaller groups of countries may be a better option in such cases.

3) All formal **bureaucratic systems** have tendencies to expand to an inefficient degree, both by creating new posts and by multiplying procedures. Such tendencies may be especially evident in cases where the ultimate 'clients' have very little capacity to protest against such diversions of resources and efforts. This is often the case with aid programmes. The situation is worsened, as in the case of the MONAP Coordination Unit, when supervisory responsibility is fragmented among several agencies. A concern with procedure and process comes to dominate over attention to output and result. It is not clear that there are adequate safeguards against 'bureaucratic inflation' built into the way in which the performance of aid institutions is routinely monitored.

4) The suggestion in point 6 of Section 4 above about the **institutional basis of technical assistance** applies equally to the Nordic donors.

5) Since the value of the work of **technical assistance personnel** tends to be much higher in their third and fourth years of service, it would be appropriate to consider changing the remuneration package to encourage experts to serve for more than two years.

6) The level of **institutional development and personnel formation** varies widely among aid recipient countries. In cases such as Mozambique, where these levels are unusually low, it is inappropriate to follow standard aid donor procedures. Not only might the normal requirements for counterparts for expatriate experts need to be modified, but the whole issue of institutional and personnel development might often have to be made a central objective of projects and programmes.

7) Mozambique now urgently requires the kind of **broad, flexible sectoral or programme support** from aid donors which some people originally conceived MONAP to be, but which it has not in practice been, especially in recent years.

PART TWO: *THE MAJOR ISSUES*

6. WHERE DID THE MONEY GO?

MONAP started with an initial contribution of \$12.8 million in 1977 whilst MONAP I plans were being finalised. MONAP I during 1978 to 1980 had a budget of \$50 million; MONAP II [1981-84] had a budget of \$66 million dollars and the final five and a half years [MONAP III] had a budget of 375 million SEK about \$63 million]. In total, the budget was around \$192 million dollars or 1.18 billion SEK. During MONAP I and II, accounting was done in \$US; in MONAP III, SEK has been used. The accounts for the entire MONAP period have now been re-presented in SEK. The April 1990 draft of the terminal financial report [reference 115], in SEK, and finalised whilst the team was in Mozambique, is the source for all financial information in this report unless specific alternative reference is given.

Tables 6(1) to 6(6) and Figure 6(1) shows the pattern of expenditure over time. There is surprisingly high variability between years. This was mainly because in some years planned expenditure was curtailed due to problems with absorptive




Figure 6(1): Annual nordic expenditure on MONAP (million SEK)

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capacity within the Ministry of Agriculture and interference by the security situation. In other years, large amounts of the financial surplus were utilised by extraordinary expenditures, like imports of seeds and hand tools in 1985.

Table 6(1): Annual Nordic expenditure on MONAP 1977-1989

[Millions SEK]

1977	40.6	1978	55.8	1979	54.0
1980	63.8	1981	101.4	1982	113.1
1983	142.3	1984	110.8	1985	164.0
1986	92.5	1987	84.9	1988	54.3
1989	103.9				


Note: In these figures, 'expenditure' includes commitments. Cancellation in 1988 of commitments made earlier amounted to 15.3 million SEK. The total anticipated 1988 expenditure was thus reduced by this amount.

Source: Financial Controller's Office, MONAP Coordination Unit.

Table 6.2 details the contribution of the Government of Mozambique in meticals with very approximate SEK equivalents. Direct comparisons with SEK values of the Nordic contribution are necessarily of limited accuracy because of initial and worsening over-valuation of the metical up to 1986 [despite periodic small exchange rate adjustments]. This was followed, during MONAP III, by such large devaluation in 1987, 1988 and 1989 that comparisons of Mozambican contributions between phases are meaningless. The planned contribution of Government of Mozambique to the total budget was approximately a half in MONAP III and, we understand, the same or more in earlier phases. In practice, the actual release of Mozambican funds has often been less than planned and this has caused problems in project implementation, as mentioned frequently in MONAP annual reports.

The actual distribution of costs between government and the Nordic countries in any specific project varied according to the profile of expenditure. For example, the Government of Mozambique initially paid a higher share of construction costs and projects with high construction costs were therefore more dependent on success in releasing local funds. However, project specific analysis is difficult be-

Figure 6(2) Nordic country contributions to MONAP



cause Government of Mozambique expenditure is recorded in just three categories. Two of these — equipment and construction — correspond to MONAP categories. The third — 'others' — covers the MONAP categories of personnel, material, services and transport and allowances. Useful comparison is further restricted because, for various reasons, many Government of Mozambique project accounts do not include all current [as opposed to capital] expenditure.

Table 6(2): The financial contribution to MONAP of the Government of Mozambique

	Contribution in million meticaís	Approximate equivalent in million SEK
MONAP I	1,065	164
MONAP II	2,761	499
MONAP III	3,032	46
Total	6,858	709

Note: SEK equivalents are calculated by using average overall exchange rates during each phase of MONAP.

Table 6(3): Nordic country contributions to MONAP [%]

	Total	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III
Denmark	23.6	21.4	24.3	24.3
Finland	14.8	12.5	15.6	15.6
Iceland	0.9	0.6	1.0	0.9
Norway	16.2	15.9	16.2	16.5
Sweden	44.6	49.6	43.0	42.7

Note: Percentages are based on the accounts in SEK. MONAP I and II dollar payments have been converted at actual exchange rates, which varied but had little effect on percentage shares.

Table 6(3) and Figure 6(2) lists the percentage contribution to MONAP of the five Nordic countries and Table 6(4) show the distribution of MONAP funds by phase and by expenditure head. One might note that the distinction between 'equipment' and 'material' was sometimes flexible. The distinction in principle is between [a] durable goods that should enter into inventories and [b] non-durable items. Over 40% of total MONAP money went on importing equipment.

The changes between phases in the **proportion** of expenditure on different items is a poor guide to changes in **absolute** levels of expenditure. This is because MONAP II absorbed more money in less time than MONAP III. For instance, in MONAP III personnel was the largest single item of expenditure [32%] compared to only 22% in MONAP II. However, as Table 6(4) shows, expenditure on personnel actually fell from 123 million SEK over four years of MONAP II to 119 million SEK over five years of MONAP III. Of course, major projects in fisheries and in AGRICOM which had been a part of MONAP II became separately funded projects with bilateral Nordic support.

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Table 6(4): Nordic contribution to MONAP according to categories of expenditure [000's SEK]

	MONAP I	MONAP II	MONAP III	Total MONAP
Personnel	30,890	122,986	119,451	273,327
Equipment	142,721	269,813	74,434	486,968
Construction	13,494	13,781	46,270	73,545
Material	48,040	102,653	87,055	237,748
Services	10,133	39,832	37,273	87,238
Transport/Allow.	73	7,754	14,624	22,451
Total	245,351	556,819	379,107	1,181,277

There has been a significant trend in the distribution of expenditure between expenditure heads. Accompanying the relative growth in personnel expenditure in each phase was a dramatic fall in equipment expenditure from nearly three-fifths of MONAP I and nearly half of MONAP II to less than one-fifth of MONAP III. In large part this was a reflection of the changes in project portfolios, with the initial, equipment intensive support to state farms being reduced. In part perhaps, the history of problems with procurement, distribution and maintenance of equipment also encouraged a cautious attitude towards equipment expenditure.

Table 6(5): Project/sector distribution of Nordic MONAP expenditure [%]

	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III	Total
Livestock	24.5	7.8	8.5	11.5
Seeds	5.1	5.1	22.8	10.8
Peasant Sector*	0.1	11.2	6.9	7.5
Forestry	7.0	11.0	3.1	7.7
AGRICOM	12.1	11.0	-	7.7
Mecanagro/spare parts [ME-2 & ME-3]	23.3	5.4	-	7.4
Small scale fishery**	2.6	9.1	0.2	4.9
Formal training	4.0	3.3	5.5	4.2
Marracuene***	1.6	2.6	4.4	3.0
Beira Green Zones@	2.0	1.4	5.4	2.8
Seeds and handtools [18]	-	-	8.1	2.6
Cotton [MI-2]	1.3	4.7	0	2.5
Project 12/DEA	?	?	5.1	1.6
Others [19]	-	-	4.9	1.6
Smallscale industry [FO-7 and 29]	0.2	1.3	1.7	1.2
Citrus [CR-4]	3.7	-	-	0.8
Freshwater fish farming [28]	-	-	1.8	0.6
Beekeeping [27]	-	-	1.0	0.3
Handtools [ME-1]	0.8	-	-	0.2
Co-ordination Unit and SIDA costs@@	11.5	26.0	20.7	21.3

Notes: * Includes projects CO1, CO2, CR6, TR5, 21, 24, 25, 26 and 7 in various phases.

** Project F1-1 in Phases I + II; Project 53 in Phase III.

*** Projects CR-3 and 23.

@ Projects IR-2, IR-3, IR-4, and 22.

@@ Includes support to the Ministry of Agriculture in MONAP I + II.

Project/sector shares in total expenditure for each phase are given in Table 6(5). For each of these a more detailed breakdown and discussion is contained in Part Three of this report. The single biggest item was the Coordination Unit which took just over one fifth of the total budget [see Section 13]. [This total included general support to the Ministry of Agriculture in MONAP I and II which provided planning and other support to the Ministry beyond servicing MONAP projects. Hence, the total costs of coordination for these two phases is actually slightly less than the figures suggest, but details are not available.]

MONAP spending was widely distributed across different sub-sectors of agriculture. Only six sectors received more than 5% of the total budget, and only two — livestock and seeds — received more than 10%. Amongst these six 'leading' sectors there was good representation of the mix of activities supported by MONAP. Three sectors — livestock, seeds and forestry — were sets of projects mainly oriented to production, broadly defined. The remaining three covered support for marketing, provision of spare parts and support for the peasant sector. A noticeable omission from this list of main recipients is formal training. Despite the frequent emphasis given to the need for technical and professional training, actual expenditure was less than 50 million SEK over 13 years, and this expenditure was substantially devoted to construction and equipment rather than to more directly teaching-related activities.

The draft financial report also provides information on the distribution of expenditure between the six budget heads for each project in each phase. In the case of MONAP I, the figures provided suggest that the proportionate division between budget heads was the same for all projects. This was clearly not the case. Evidently, the records do not permit a project-level breakdown of total expenditure under different heads. The figures given are estimates. This is unfortunate but understandable and excusable — much of the expenditure occurred rapidly through direct purchase by the Ministry of Agriculture before accounting practices had been developed for MONAP. For MONAP II and MONAP III, more reliable figures were available for project specific expenditure breakdowns. Data for eight main sectors, accounting for nearly three quarters of total MONAP expenditure are given in Table 6(6).

Table 6(6): MONAP II and MONAP III

% distribution of Nordic expenditure within the eight main sectors or projects

	FI-1 AGRICOM	Forestry	Livestock	Proj. 7	Seeds	Training	Proj. 22
Personnel	33.8	6.7	17.4	30.6	29.1	34.5	19.6
Equipm't	36.6	76.2	40.3	34.0	46.7	29.4	42.2
Construct.	1.0	0.3	4.8	5.9	5.4	11.6	21.2
Material	19.9	14.5	7.2	21.4	11.0	18.3	10.1
Services	5.9	1.8	29.0	5.4	4.1	3.5	5.2
Trans./All.	2.7	0.6	1.3	2.7	3.7	2.7	1.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Note: The first five columns relate to expenditures, in both MONAP II and MONAP III, in the five most important projects/sectors in MONAP II. The last five columns do the same for the most important projects/sectors in MONAP III. Livestock and Project 7 appear in both; the latter was actually represented in MONAP II by projects CO-1, CO-2 and TR-5.

7. WAS THE MONEY WELL SPENT?

7.1 Introduction

Ideally, the answer to this question would include some quantitative assessment of benefits from MONAP activities. This would allow a rate of return calculation and some sort of 'objective' response to this question which is at the heart of the evaluation. In practice, this is not possible. There are two main reasons for this. The first concerns the composition of the MONAP project portfolio. Much MONAP investment was in activities that did not **directly** contribute to production. Estimation of economic returns to these activities is extremely difficult under any circumstances. In the case of direct investment in productive activities, quantification of benefits is, in principle, more straightforward. But, a second constraint operates here; for most MONAP-supported production activities the information base required for economic analysis is simply absent.

Using this division of direct and indirect production investment the whole of MONAP can be roughly divided with respect to potential for quantitative evaluation [Table 7(1)].

Before specific discussion of quantitative evaluation problems [sections 7.2 to 7.4], four comments need to be made about this table. First, category one — direct production investment — refers only to forestry, livestock, citrus and seed production. We have used the percentage share of these sectors from Table 6(5) even though not all expenditure in these sectors was truly **direct** production investment. Training expenditure is an example. Our intention here is to focus on problems of benefit evaluation and, for this purpose, it is sufficient to use these rough divisions corresponding to projects/sectors.

Table 7(1): MONAP and benefit assessment

Type of expenditure	% share in MONAP expenditure	Potential in principle for quantitative benefit assessment
Direct production investment	21%	feasible
Indirect production investment:		
a) extension, technology diffusion and area support	33%	difficult
b) formal training, marketing and sector support	36%	Almost impossible

Source: derived from Table 6(5). For details see text.

Second, we have divided category two — indirect production investments — into two groups. In 2a we have included small scale fisheries, all agricultural extension activities, the Marracuene and Beira Green Zones projects, and technology diffusion, including spare parts, seed imports and hand tools. In 2b we have included all sector support, including coordination costs, AGRICOM and formal training. The basis for this division lies in the differing applicability of quantitative evaluation techniques; for the activities in category 2b, it is inherently more difficult to estimate quantitative benefits.

Third, the column 'potential in principle for quantitative benefit evaluation' is deliberately very cautiously worded. It does not describe the actual benefit assessment possible for MONAP. Instead, it describes the potential for evaluation under ideal circumstances: where baseline surveys have been conducted as appropriate; where data collection for evaluation has been a part of project activities; where detailed records on the timing and nature of expenditure are available; and where relative values [prices] of inputs and outputs, including labour and non-marketed production, are known. One point deriving from this column is that some at least of the criticism of MONAP management for failing to quantify benefits is in fact misplaced. As Table 7(1) indicates, for 69% of MONAP expenditures, quantification of benefits would be difficult or impossible even under ideal conditions.

Fourth, the fact that it is unusually difficult to quantify the benefits of 2b expenditures — for example supporting DEA — is not a good reason for thinking that they are small. The opposite is almost certainly true, or at least can and should be true if investment in sectoral planning capacity is well designed.

7.2 Formal training, marketing and sector support

The problem with analysing benefits from these activities does not lie in defining the benefits but in measuring them. Table 7(1) rates benefits from these activities 'almost impossible' to quantify because of the major difficulties, even in ideal circumstances, of assessing the exact contribution of, say, improved sectoral planning or formal training to agricultural growth.

In evaluating training investment, for example, one approach sometimes adopted elsewhere is to use the difference in wages earned or salary received before and after training. This is supposed to provide an estimate of the increment in marginal product of labour. The method is wholly based on notions of a competitive market economy; as such, it is not anyway applicable to public employment except where relevant comparable private sector pay rates can be substituted for the administered labour 'prices' in the public sector. In the case of investments in the marketing infrastructure the estimation of benefits requires time series data on production response to investment in market infrastructure or comparison with a 'control' area where no such investments had been made.

These methods are contentious, highly dependent on good data and extremely sensitive to assumptions made by the person doing the evaluation. Anyway, in Mozambique the external disruptions to production and the changing organisation and operation of the state agricultural bureaucracies and technical services prohibit quantitative estimation of returns to these non-production activities.

7.3 Extension, technology diffusion and area support

This apparently heterogeneous set of activities, ranging across seed imports and spare parts provision to extension activities in crop production and in fisheries, has an important common strand for evaluation purposes. They are all activities where a major objective is to improve agricultural productivity through promotion of different or improved inputs. Under normal circumstances it is possible, with careful research, including substantial primary data collection, to estimate returns from such investment by comparing the production increment with the costs of the inputs provided. Such research is more difficult for some cases, for example, extension services, than for others, for example hand tools. However, even though in all cases, estimates are in principle possible, the data requirements are substantial, including baseline surveys and production records for the areas affected by individual projects. No such data exist for MONAP investments.

Whilst the early MONAP annual reports include national agricultural performance data at national level for the 'planned sector' [ie. excluding virtually all the family sector], the project specific reporting does not cover performance in any usable way. Specifically, the reports do not allow one to link output performance to type and amount of agricultural inputs used. In some cases, eg. spare parts or seeds, the absence of a close project link to the user of the input and producer of the output meant that relevant data collection was wholly infeasible. In these cases we often do not even know which production units were benefiting. In other cases, notably extension activities, the relevant data collection was simply not undertaken.

7.4 Forestry, livestock, citrus and seeds

The main common feature of these activities was that they involved direct investment in state owned production enterprises. Rates of return should be measurable more easily than for any of the activities in the category discussed above, since the output records of the state entities/enterprises concerned should reflect fairly directly the benefits from the investments made. Although some detailed evaluations have been attempted [eg. on forestry, see reference 13], they do not include quantitative estimation of benefits — even though much is known about the performance of individual activities within each sub-sector.

The seeds sector [See Section 17] has benefited from much more careful profit and loss analysis since Svälof took the management contract in 1987. However, this is not really an exception to the general absence of quantitative impact evaluation. For their profit and loss accounts show an operating profit but exclude the management contract and use shadow prices for local management costs instead. This may be a reasonable basis for examining the viability of the seed enterprise under local management but does not say anything directly about the efficiency of MONAP support to the seed sector. We should note also that, in the case of seed, a full socio-economic evaluation would have to examine the distributional impact of seed sector output within the farm sector. In other words, the social cost-benefit accounting of the company's sales may not correspond to the reported value of sales once distributional weights are applied, for example, in favour of the family sector.

For the other directly productive MONAP expenditures much less is known about enterprise performance. There are four types of problem. First and most fundamentally, adequate production records are not always available or have not been retrieved and retained in usable form from enterprise accounts. Second, data on local [non-Nordic] costs are fragmentary. Third, equipment inventories and procedures for capital depreciation have not been maintained. Fourth, prices have been administered rather than derived from market forces. There can be good reasons for this of course but one consequence is that **relative** prices become an unreliable tool for 'objective' assessment of enterprise performance.

7.5 Alternative perspectives

The only conclusion that can be drawn from the above, rather summary, discussion of quantitative evaluation is that it is not possible. While drawing this conclusion we should also emphasise the main message from Table 7(1), that for 69% of MONAP expenditure, it would anyway be unreasonable to expect useful quantitative evaluation. And, for the directly productive investment, there were extenuating circumstances, chiefly relating to the security situation, which heavily constrained meaningful investment analysis. Indeed, there seems little doubt that war, the weather and agricultural policies explain more about agricultural performance than the impact of MONAP support to the sector.

Rather than focus on the quantitative expression of direct economic returns therefore it may be more legitimate to concentrate on MONAP's contribution to long-run capacity of the agricultural sector. Most fundamentally, this has occurred through the MONAP contribution to the functioning of the Ministry of Agriculture which has been able to operate more effectively as a result. Support for GEP, DNEA and then DEA was one [project] form of this support. MONAP has also provided foreign staff, vehicles, supplies and hard currency which have contributed to Ministry of Agriculture operations. MONAP was the financial embodiment of the political solidarity of the NORDIC countries with the new Mozambican state.

More specific contribution has been achieved through the creation of capital assets, physical, human and institutional. These have been created in all sectors and are a resource which, under 'normal' conditions, could be expected to provide a reasonable rate of return. The generally very favourable response to MONAP of Mozambican personnel within the Ministry of Agriculture is, above all, a reflection of the value attributed to this capital investment. All three of these categories of capital assets are necessary, though unfortunately not sufficient, for improved agricultural performance. The effectiveness of much of this investment in capital assets can only be assessed in the light of future performance of the sector.

However, the provision of these assets has not been without cost. On the debit side, there has been loss of resources, largely though not entirely through inappropriate investment in physical assets. Some loss of physical assets is directly attributable to the war; all projects were war-affected and some, including AGRICOM and support to the family sector, were substantially affected. But beyond the war-induced losses, annual reports and related documentation have highlighted three main specific problems with physical resources: over-investment, inappropriate investment and poor maintenance. The MONAP investment in farm machinery

and spare parts is the best known for failures in these regards, but no sector has been wholly exempt. Whilst such mistakes in MONAP I are fairly readily excusable in the emergency circumstances, the problem persisted — though with less intensity — through to MONAP III. These problems were not always ones which MONAP personnel were in a position to deal with. Where intervention was possible the Coordination Unit did make vigorous attempts to deal with such problems itself. For example, the creation of three workshops [Nampula, Maputo and Beira] was evidence of commitment to limit maintenance problems.

A further category of lost resources relates to technical assistance expenditure [see section 16]. Analysis here is necessarily more speculative than with regard to physical assets but two types of human resource losses can be identified. First, when the quality of technical assistance has been less than might reasonably have been expected. Interviews with local project staff gave clear indication that this had been a problem though it would be hazardous to suggest specific dimensions to the problem based on a handful of interviews during a brief visit to Mozambique. Second, where the local capacity to make effective use of technical assistance has been insufficient. Sometimes this has been a direct result of security problems. In other cases, the absence of counterparts or slow and uncertain development of project activities has constrained effectiveness of technical assistance.

7.6 Five features of MONAP spending

So far in this section we have outlined the constraints that prohibited quantification of benefits from MONAP expenditure and assessment of the long-run contribution of that expenditure to asset creation. This section reviews five other aspects of MONAP spending which all relate to aid management. That is, they are features of MONAP spending that were driven principally by Nordic concerns with the quality and effectiveness of aid.

a) **Money management.** In a project portfolio as large and as diversified as MONAP's, effective systems of financial control are critical. In difficult circumstances, MONAP's record on financial control of Nordic funds moved from being more or less non-existent to being professional and effective. Planned budget control procedures were in place by 1981 and regular auditing took place at least from 1982. Despite efforts, the Coordination Unit was never really in a position to analyse and report on the contributions to MONAP of the Government of Mozambique. But use of Nordic funds was monitored in detail. The growth in the whole apparatus of the Coordination Unit reflected in part Nordic determination to pay close attention to effective money management. MONAP's external auditors conducted specific detailed enquiries into some issues and allegations, but found no evidence of misuse of funds.

b) **High Coordination Unit costs.** One consequence of effective money management was the heavy cost associated with the Coordination Unit, at least that part of the Unit concerned with financial control. This cost had two aspects: [a] the absolute level of MONAP funds — 21% of the total — which were thereby not available for project activities; and [b] the emphasis given to management of the MONAP portfolio to the exclusion of the contribution that the Coordination Unit could have made to the development of project management capacity more widely

within the Ministry of Agriculture. The Coordination Unit put resources into construction, procurement, financial control, personnel recruitment and housing which must have improved the functioning of these activities. These resources made little contribution to the development of the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture to serve other projects in a similar way [see Section 13].

Table 7(2): Annual expenditure performance 1981-1988.
Expenditure as a percentage of budget

	Total	Per- sonnel	Equip- ment	Const- ruction	Mater- ials	Services	Trans- port, etc
1981	74	80	89	17	66	44	30
1982	63	79	69	43	44	47	57
1983	75	81	72	70	75	70	65
1984	80	83	91	89	73	30	87
1985	92	87	99	88	94	87	79
1986	107	59	119	169	121	84	184
1987	113	na	na	na	na	na	na
1988	95	84	145	102	101	75	116

Source: MONAP Annual Reports 1981-1988

c) **Budgetary reallocations.** For many reasons, to do with the security situation and the planning and implementation capacity of the newly-established apparatus of the state, there were constant changes in the allocation of the budget both within and between projects; also, in each phase of MONAP, funds were diverted to uses which were not originally included. Table 7(2) gives details of actual expenditure as a percentage of the original annual budget for 1981 to 1988. It shows that no expenditure head was exempt from budget planning problems, ie matching expenditure to budget. Personnel showed somewhat less fluctuation than other major budgetary heads, notably construction and materials. However, of the four major expenditure heads — personnel, equipment, construction and materials — personnel was the only head where average expenditure performance overall was less than 80% of budget. One reason lies in the steadily improving expenditure performance of the equipment, construction and materials budget head which is in part due to the efforts of the Coordination Unit. A second reason may be that such budget heads provided an easier route to spending of surpluses than that provided by the protracted business of recruiting technical assistance [see Section 16].

Comparisons of actual and planned expenditure are anyway difficult to interpret as any sort of performance indicator because the cause of differences between them was so often the security situation. The more positive point here is that money appears often to have been reallocated to where it could best be spent. By MONAP III the inherent difficulties of budgetary planning were widely appreciated and control over reallocation decisions was an important feature of the activities

of the Coordination Unit and SIDA [see points d and e below].

d) **Pressure to spend.** Driving these budgetary reallocations was the felt need to fully utilise Nordic funds. MONAP I and II had had significant surpluses at the end of their agreed life which MONAP III had to avoid. SIDA, from 1984 agreements with the Ministry of Agriculture, emphasised the issue of budget utilisation and specifically referred to opportunities for expenditure outside MONAP projects [reference 36]. Thus, from the very beginning of MONAP III there were contingency plans to use the financial surpluses. The pressure to disburse funds may often not be a positive influence on the quality of spending; in the early years of MONAP it probably had negative rather than positive effect. But in MONAP III, with the knowledge that surpluses would exist, pressure to spend resulted in a planned redirection of financial resources. As described next, the family sector was the principal beneficiary, though not directly through Project 7, which suffered serious expenditure reductions of its own, largely due to the security situation.

e) **Flexibility and redirection to the family sector.** Initially, in MONAP I, direct benefits to members of the family sector only came through wage employment in state enterprises and through related investments. The support for communal villages, such as in forestry sector projects, was one example of related investment which, in seeking to secure a labour force for forestry operations, provided housing, health and educational facilities to peasants. The amount of wage employment generated as a result of MONAP expenditure is not known; in forestry and seed production several thousand person-years of employment have certainly resulted [see Section 11]. However, as described in Section 8, direct support to family production systems was not attempted until MONAP II and then only to cooperatives. It was not until MONAP III that family sector support became a central MONAP objective. In draft plans, some 49% of MONAP III expenditure was earmarked for the family sector. This amount was subsequently reduced substantially due mainly to the security situation and the difficulty of actually operationalising projects.

During MONAP III direct support to the family sector was fairly constantly redirected and reduced as a result of the security situation, but other measures were taken to compensate. First, there was additional central support to DNDR including CFA. Second, the seed project received additional funds from surpluses generated from curtailment of other projects and altogether received 23% of MONAP III funds [see Section 17]. The issue which this project is trying to address — regular supplies of reliable improved seed — are central to the development of family sector agriculture in the long term. Though, at present, family sector benefits can largely only be achieved through seed distribution via the emergency programme, the seed sector project will be an important resource for enhancing family sector productivity more widely when the security situation improves. Third, there was careful vetting by SIDA of proposed expenditures, both within projects and from MONAP surpluses, to ensure relevance to the family sector. For example, Boane agricultural school had a request for sprinkler irrigation equipment rejected because of its irrelevance to the needs of the family sector. Fourth, funds released from project curtailments were used for import of seeds and handtools. In 1986 these imports amounted to over 22% of total MONAP expenditure and in 1987 were over 19%.

Throughout MONAP there was growing attention given to improved project management, especially financial control, procurement and budget planning. This was an attempt to strengthen the project portfolio approach to MONAP organisation rather than to allow flexible — which for some spelt indiscriminate — sector support. This attempt was evident particularly in the protracted planning process for MONAP III and in the [initial] reduction of the scope of the programme to seven projects. Expenditure, commitments and absorptive capacity were more carefully monitored than had been possible in earlier phases of MONAP. When funds could not be used as originally planned, careful financial management allowed identification and redirection of surpluses, frequently towards support services for the family sector.

8. WHAT DID MOZAMBIQUE WANT FROM MONAP?

Through the MONAP programme the Nordic countries have been the main donor supporting Mozambican agriculture since Independence. For the early years it has been estimated that MONAP provided 80-90% of the hard currency budget of the Ministry of Agriculture. As other donors came in this share fell, but in 1989 MONAP was still estimated to provide 30% of the Ministry's hard currency resources. In effect, MONAP was the principal means for fulfilling the agricultural policy goals of the government of independent Mozambique.

8.1 Agriculture at Independence

Colonial rule is often said to have bequeathed a dualistic agriculture. In fact it was more of a continuum from subsistence level peasant producers, through petty commodity producers, both Mozambican and Portuguese, to modernised settler farms and then large scale plantations [mostly owned by non-Portuguese foreigners]. Some family farms were by no means 'traditional' subsistence producers; they utilised, for example, migrant labour income to invest in farm equipment and land improvement. Also, some Portuguese settler farms were relatively traditional, using oxen rather than tractors for example. The dualism implied by the terms 'traditional' and 'modern' or 'peasant' and 'commercial' sectors is thus very much a simplification. Nevertheless, we use these terms because they are convenient and because they remained central to the agrarian policy debate after independence. The Government of Mozambique thought in terms of a 'modern' sector which it was concerned to preserve and to expand.

The family sector accounted for over 99% of farms, about 50% of the cultivated area, over 70% of agricultural production, and about a third of marketed production [reference 177]. The main food crops produced in this sector were cassava, sorghum, maize, groundnut and beans. In 1970, 97% of the area in the modern sector was in farms above 100 hectares in size. Of these, over 80% were equipped

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with tractors, two-thirds with pumps and more than a quarter with trucks [estimated from data in pp. 87-95 of reference 171]. Table 8(1) provide 1970 census data on farm size distribution and sectoral contribution to production. The modern sector was almost entirely foreign-owned, with foreign corporations and rich settlers running the plantations and large farms. A further two thousand or so poorer, mainly Portuguese settlers — about half the total number of foreign farmers — owned or leased farms of around 20-50 hectares, often on the best agricultural lands. Only a very small minority of Mozambicans were assimilated into the modern sector.

Table 8(1): Farm size by sector at Independence

Farm Size [ha.]	Modern Sector				Traditional Sector			
	Units No.	%	Area [000 ha.] No.	%	Units [000s] No.	%	Area [000 ha.] No.	%
Under 0.5	-	-	-	-	306	19	92	4
0.5 to 5	141	3	1	-	1,297	79	2,068	23
5 to 10	108	2	1	-	38	2	244	10
10 to 20	183	4	2	neg	7	1	89	4
20 to 50	1,733	37	61	3	-	-	-	-
50 to 100	290	6	19	1	-	-	-	-
100 to 500	1,397	30	298	12	-	-	-	-
500 to 1,000	285	6	190	8	-	-	-	-
1,000 to 2,000	270	1	403	16	-	-	-	-
>2,500	219	5	1,512	61	-	-	-	-
Total	4,626	100	2,488	100	1,648	100	2,494	100

Source: reference 171, p 87.

The colonial economy depended on cheap family labour to produce food and agricultural exports and to work on settler farms and plantations. The colonial state employed a forced labour scheme to ensure adequate supply of labour for the foreign-owned agriculture sector and a forced cultivation scheme, especially for cotton, to ensure cash crop production. Tax rates were linked to wage rates and harsh enforcement of tax obligations obliged the peasantry to seek money incomes through these schemes or — especially in southern Mozambique — through migration to work in South African mines. Mozambican labour, on foreign-owned farms or in foreign mines, chiefly consisted of temporarily migrant males who maintained their permanent homes in the family sector. Labour reproduction costs were thus met by the family sector, chiefly by women responsible for agricultural production, domestic and reproductive work. However, family agricultural production received little support from the colonial state. Productivity remained low and, through violent repression and exclusion from the benefits of limited health, education and infrastructural investment, conditions were assured for the continued partial proletarianisation and partial commoditisation of family agriculture.

Independence was accompanied by the widespread abandonment of modern sector farms. Capital assets were frequently destroyed or removed. Other sectors

were similarly affected and the most urgent task at Independence was to reorganise the farm production base to restore the output and employment suddenly lost with the Portuguese exodus. At the same time, Frelimo had to determine the nature of production relations under the new state. The rather crude and primitive nature of colonial capitalism was one of several factors that greatly influenced the debate about development strategy which culminated, in 1977, in the Third Party Congress and the adoption of a socialist strategy for national development.

8.2 Socialist agricultural policy

The proposals for agrarian transition to socialism had two central components: the development of the family sector through villagization and cooperative agriculture; and the development of state farms in the abandoned modern sector. Important links were identified between the two sectors: the cooperative sector was to be a source of seasonal labour for the state farms; and the state farms were to provide agricultural machinery and extension services to the cooperative sector. This policy was further refined and developed in the years following the Third Congress: the state farms were to be 'poles of development' with a key role in assisting in the establishment of modern agricultural production systems in the cooperative sector. In practice, the cooperative sector has never developed and the maximum area cultivated, in 1984, was less than 13,000 hectares out of a total cultivated area probably somewhere between 2 to 2.5 million hectares [there are no records on the family sector]. Non-plantation, non-livestock state farms cultivated 123,000 hectares in 1984 [reference 184, p.16].

The directives from the Third Party Congress emphasised use of people's own resources to develop cooperatives. Accordingly, in the two sector strategy of socialist agrarian transition, the cooperative sector received only 2% of public investment in agriculture in the first years of independence. The state farms received the other 98%. Excluding the tiny proportion organised into cooperatives, the family sector received nothing directly.

This neglect of the family sector, which had produced 70% of all farm output prior to Independence, may be explained by four main factors:

[a] The belief that, since the peasantry had produced without support from the colonial state, they were self-sufficient and needed little support.

[b] The urgent need to invest both financial and scarce management and organizational resources in the maintenance and recovery in the modern sector.

[c] The belief that the achievement of socialist transition in the foreseeable future would entail the transformation of family production relations through communal villages and producer cooperatives.

[d] A belief that a large scale mechanized agriculture was the best way to produce crops in Mozambique.

Thus, the policy of socialist transition involved the socialisation of family farming through villagisation and producer cooperatives — largely without public investment but with strong political support — and, the reorganization and remobilisation of the modern sector through formation of state farms. In 1977 alone \$40 million dollars were spent on agricultural machinery, including 1,200 tractors. The biggest state farm, CAIL, producing irrigated rice in the Limpopo Valley, took 50% of the

agriculture budget and one third of the whole public investment budget in 1978 [reference 50]. According to Wuyts [reference 177, p.62] "the basic pattern of state centred accumulation continued to intensify through the whole 1977-83 period". This policy determined investment allocation. In response to concerns about sectoral balance of investment, there was only very slight adjustment towards the programme of cooperativisation prior to the Fourth Party Congress in 1983. By 1983, the economic crisis, partly a consequence of the agricultural policies which had been pursued, was of paramount concern. This marked the beginning of a period of policy transition; it is still continuing. In reviewing Mozambican wants from MONAP it is useful to separate the period of Socialist Transition [1975 to 1983] from the period of Policy Transition [1984 to date].

8.3 MONAP and socialist transition

The initial formulation of the package of assistance to Mozambican agriculture from the Nordic countries was conditioned by four factors:

1) The sense of solidarity between the Nordic countries and the liberation movements of southern Africa, Mozambique in particular [see section 9].

2) The sense of urgency attached to recovery in agricultural production and employment. The modern sector had been almost totally abandoned with serious implications for urban food supply and exports. With the advantage of hindsight there have been criticisms, from many quarters, of the emphasis on state farms. But the circumstances at Independence were very compelling. Even without the strength of commitment that there was to transformation of agricultural production relations, it was inevitable that major emphasis would be placed on the the state-managed reinstatement of the modern sector.

3) Policy formulation was strictly a national concern for independent Mozambique. The policy dialogue characterizing many aid relationships of the 1980s was not then possible.

4) Production objectives for the state farms — food supplies and dollar earnings — were massively constrained by two sets of factors: the acute shortage of trained and experienced manpower; and the virtual demolition of the rural trading network at independence.

The design of MONAP I in 1976-77 was very clearly conditioned by these factors. Most of the funding — totalling \$62 million in the four years up to 1980 although \$8 million was still unspent at the end of 1982 — went to support for state farms. Just over 12% went for marketing and distribution and just over 15% on central support and training, with small amounts elsewhere. Almost a quarter of the budget went to spare parts and Mecanagro, the state agricultural machinery service. The single biggest recipient, also almost a quarter of expenditure, was the livestock sector.

The allocation of funding was based on project plans. Some 44 were proposed by the government to the Nordic donors of which 26 were funded. In fact 34 projects eventually received some support through MONAP I. It is something of an indulgence to use the term 'project' to describe most of this set of initiatives. There had been no opportunity for the usual mechanics of project identification, preparation and appraisal. In reality, this first phase operated in large part as an emergency

programme of flexible sector support. This anyway reflected more accurately the needs at the time; the 'project' packaging was partly there because it was the default mode of donor assistance, and partly in anticipation of more carefully specified project plans for a further round of funding. The definition of the character of MONAP was long contested. The Government of Mozambique, naturally seeking maximum flexibility and discretion for itself, continually tried to assert that MONAP was a sector support programme rather than a set of projects. Many people on the Nordic side committed themselves to the same interpretation [see Sections 1 and 13]

The problems faced in the implementation of MONAP I were symptomatic of the wider problems in the national economy and in agriculture particularly. Principal difficulties lay in procurement and in staffing [see sections 13 and 16]. The organization of centralised large scale procurement and the planning and implementation of the agricultural campaigns were constrained by the shortage of trained and experienced manpower. Enthusiasm, commitment and hard work were not enough to handle the complex problems of reforming the state apparatus and re-energizing the modern sector. However, even though, as widely acknowledged, the efficiency of agricultural investment was low, its effectiveness, at least until 1980, was apparent. Whilst, with the exceptions of tea and copra, pre-Independence levels of production were not met, there was a substantial turn around from the low output levels of 1974 and 1975. Despite floods and droughts, the emergency investment programme of which MONAP I was the major part did increase food production and dollar earnings from several crops in several years [see Section 8.4].

Was MONAP intended to be a sector support programme?

"The Nordic delegation explained that it sees MONAP more as a general support to the Ministry's activities rather than as support to specific projects defined long in advance. However, it is important for the Nordic countries to be continuously informed, through SIDA, of changes already as they are planned."

Agreed Minutes of meeting between a delegation from the People's Rep. of Mozambique and a delegation from Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, 23/3/1979, p 1

"The Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique greatly appreciates the flexibility of planning within MONAP which should be regarded more as a programme of support to agricultural development than as support to a number of specific projects."

Letter from the Minister of Agriculture, Mario Da Graca Machungo, to the Swedish Ambassador in Maputo, 28/5/1980

"The form of cooperation was rather flexible and could in many cases be labelled programme support rather than project aid, but even these very flexible programmes had gradually been directed towards operational goals that were quite specific."

Swedish statement recorded in the Agreed Minutes of Consultations on Development Co-operation July 1 1983 — June 30 1985 between the Government of Sweden and the Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique, 25/5/1983, page 3

The main policy thrust — socialist transition — remained the same in the planning for MONAP II. However, in MONAP II more attention was given to project planning; problems of coordination and implementation; and staffing, training and technical assistance. The project portfolio was substantially altered with a reduction to 24 [initially 22] projects, of which 13 were continuations of projects on MONAP I. New projects included three addressed to the needs of the communal villages and the cooperative sector.

There was substantial agreement between the Government of Mozambique and the Nordic countries upon priorities and the mix of project activities. One area of tension was the degree of flexibility in fund administration. MONAP I was highly flexible and was a resource which the ministry could utilise for many hard currency needs beyond the project portfolio. Naturally, this meant that monitoring and evaluation of aid effectiveness was more difficult. From a donor perspective, there was a lack of direction to spending and that there was a reduced sense of control over use of funds. The Nordic response in MONAP II was to try to avoid generalized agricultural import support through a more careful specification of expenditure. The Ministry of Agriculture, however, from the very first discussions on MONAP II, had emphasised the continuing need for flexibility.

Table 8(2): Value and volume of Mozambique's principal crop exports
[Value in million meticals; volume in 000s metric tons]

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Copra									
Val	416	581	297	173	111	89	79	219	85
Vol	34	29	19	12	12	6	4	13	12
Citrus									
Val	40	68	84	170	100	80	136	133	89
Vol	11	16	14	17	12	8	11	10	8
Tea									
Val	408	680	938	502	970	591	446	104	51
Vol	14	23	30	16	25	13	7	2	2
Cashew									
Val	1438	1446	2102	1890	1647	647	650	499	676
Vol	18	17	16	12	17	6	4	3	3
Sisal									
Val	137	197	129	103	100	38	34	4	1
Vol	11	14	7	6	6	3	2	neg.	na
Sugar									
Val	182	952	797	888	332	346	246	295	326
Vol	25	119	64	63	29	25	16	17	20
Cotton									
Val	435	761	267	881	653	684	331	231	22
Vol	13	16	6	15	14	13	6	5	1

Source: reference 193, p. 168; and reference 194, p. 151.

Table 8(3): Marketed production 1973-1986

[000 tons]

	Copra	Cotton	Leaf tea	Sisal	Citrus	Cashew
1973	68	144	78	480	40	196
1974	65	133	80	470	37	190
1975	50	52	59	340	34	160
1976	72	37	67	325	30	120
1977	48	52	77	325	25	102
1978	60	72	68	375	39	90
1979	51	37	86	424	39	63
1980	37	65	90	298	37	88
1981	54	74	99	234	37	90
1982	37	61	110	140	38	57
1983	30	25	51	122	34	17
1984	25	23	60	137	na	25
1985	23	5	25	79	na	29
1986	28	11	6	22	na	40

Source: reference 193, p.179; and reference 194, pp. 148-150

MONAP II was heavily criticised in the mid-term evaluation report [1982]. These criticisms were not wholly accepted by the Government of Mozambique, but their major thrust — lack of support for the family sector — had been a theme of concern from as early as 1978 at very senior levels in the Party and was a main theme in the Fourth Congress deliberations in 1983. Agricultural performance was in crisis throughout MONAP II partly for external reasons [reductions in the world market prices of Mozambique's commodity exports], partly because of the worsening security situation, partly because of drought, and partly because of agricultural policies. Centralised planning, target setting and procurement for the state farms had led to massive investment inefficiency which was compounded by poor management at farm level. Large scale deficit financing of inefficient state enterprise led to shortage of incentive goods relative to the volume of wages. The parallel market mushroomed and family producers facing fixed prices for official marketed surpluses reduced non-food production. The policies adopted at Independence for the transition to socialism were becoming increasingly untenable. Although the commitment to socialist transition remained during the Fourth Party Congress, it was recognized that the means for its achievement needed radical revision.

8.4 Policy transition

The policy transition was driven by the eventual marked downturn in agricultural performance during the first part of the 1980s. As Table 8(2) shows, the performance of the seven leading export crops was highly variable in 1979 and 1980, but took a downward turn after 1981. Total marketed production for six out of seven of the crops is given for 1973-1986 in Table 8(3); with the exception of cashew, state farms were significant or else major contributors to all these crops.

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The data are not obviously very consistent with the export production statistics [Table 8(2)], although there could be reasons for this other than inaccurate records. Changes in marketed output are highly variable between crops but, excepting tea and copra, no crops reached their 1973 level. However, by 1980 all state farm crops had improved on their 1974-1975 low, and in all but one case [citrus], it was a very substantial improvement. Good performance did not always come in the same year for all crops so the annual aggregate record is poor. In fact the officially recorded value of marketed production [see reference 177, p.75] fell constantly from 1975. But with all crops helped at some stages by international commodity price movements, agricultural exports [Table 8(4)] increased in value until 1981. Then, by 1983, with the exception of tea and cotton, both the volume and value of exports had fallen by over 50% from 1981 levels. Cotton apart, the main annual crops on state farms were non-export oilseed and food crops.

Table 8(4) Mozambique's exports

[million meticals]

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Agricultural exports	6093	7030	5633	3782	3222	3018	2807
Total exports	9099	9926	8655	5286	4061	3309	3198
Agriculture as a % of total	67%	71%	65%	72%	79%	91%	90%

Source: reference 193, p.13

Table 8(5): State farm production: annual crops 1980-1983

[Tons]	1980	1981	1982	1983
Maize	30,803	33,789	47,477	27,232
Rice	33,000	25,594	38,677	15,022
Sorghum	111	297	534	343
Cassava	0	0	30	35
Beans	711	497	576	859
Groundnuts	37	15	21	20
Sunflower	1,624	3,285	933	543
Sesame	0	85	8	4

Source: reference 194, pp. 139-147

As Table 8(5) shows, the two major crops in this category, rice and maize, also showed a substantial downturn in 1983. The results for 1983 were particularly poor because of drought and because of the security situation. Also, the worsening balance of payments situation made all imports, especially fuel, difficult to obtain.

Further evidence on total marketed production for the six main food crops, is given in Table 8(6). The state sector, mainly because of maize and rice, accounted for about 50% of marketed production. What remained of the private modern sector accounted for about 10%, with only 1% from cooperatives. The remaining 39% of marketed output came from the family sector.

Table 8(6): Marketed production of food crops,
1980-88 [000 tons]

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Maize	65	78	86	56	83	59	22	28	48
Rice	44	29	42	17	19	18	19	32	31
Sorghum	1	1	2	1	2	2	1	1	1
Beans	10	15	7	5	4	4	3	9	8
Cassava	9	11	10	9	7	6	6	7	7
Groundnut	6	5	2	1	2	2	1	2	2

Source: reference 195, p.7.

As Table 8(6) shows, whilst there was some recovery in 1984, marketed production continued to fall until 1986. No evidence is available on the performance of the subsistence sector or the operation of the parallel market. There is evidence of increasing and severe hardship in the countryside. The shortage of consumer goods to purchase acted as a disincentive to production in the family sector. However, the exact dimensions of change are unknown, as are the relative contributions of war, policy and other factors. The estimates derivable from the national accounts [reference 177, pp. 74-77] suggest an increase in gross social product from agriculture in every year up to 1981 and only a slight downturn in 1982. These data have a very strong **negative** correlation with the data on marketed production and may well overestimate subsistence production. It is not possible therefore to give a full aggregate picture of changing agricultural performance. The more reliable evidence, and that which mattered for urban food supplies and exports, was on marketed production. The trend became very negative from 1983.

The poor performance of agriculture and the escalation of production problems on the state farms helped prompt a re-evaluation of public investment priorities in agriculture. Both the deficit on current account [22% of GDP] and the deficit on public expenditure [16% of GDP], were substantial in 1983. With defence expenditure increasing, there were simply no resources to maintain the levels of investment in state agricultural production. The Fourth Party Congress called for review of priorities and emphasised the role of the family sector and the private sector [reference 184, p.4]. A number of reforms were gradually put in place over the following years, including disinvestment of inefficient state farms, liberalisation of price controls, and provision of more consumer goods for rural areas. The reforms were lent coherence and macro-economic support with the adoption in 1987 of the economic rehabilitation programme [PRE].

The economic reforms are however incomplete: there is still a marked tendency for the Government of Mozambique to spend its own money on large scale, inefficient agricultural projects [sometimes perhaps because of pressures from aid donors more determined than the Nordic countries to use aid as a means of supporting their own national firms]. For example, in 1989 51% of Mozambican national funds for agricultural projects were destined for a small number of large new irrigation schemes which have been very heavily criticised. By contrast, and in large part because MONAP funding was used for different purposes, only 37% of external funds were destined for these irrigation schemes [see reference 174, vol. 2,

pp.56-57].

The planning of MONAP III coincided with the collapse in agriculture and the redirection of policy. There is clear evidence that the Nordic donors were strong supporters of a revision of public investment in favour of family agriculture. It is unlikely that this ideological position would have been argued with such force or received as much local acceptance if the crisis in agriculture had been less severe or less apparent. There was also internal conflict between Nordic personnel resulting from the continuing commitment to solidarity with the socialist state but the acknowledgement that the small peasants, a main Nordic aid target group, were being neglected through existing attempts to mount a socialist transition in agriculture.

The initial plans for MONAP III involved nearly half of the funds going to the family sector. This was subsequently scaled down, but MONAP was nevertheless in the vanguard in responding to the opportunities to work with the family sector after the Fourth Frelimo Congress.

9. WHAT DID THE NORDIC DONORS WANT FROM MONAP?

In the case of the Nordic donors in particular, foreign aid really is given away freely: it is given as a cash grant, not as a loan of any kind. In international relations as much as in interpersonal relations, gifts are rarely given completely altruistically: there are always other objectives somewhere in mind. These objectives are necessarily political. And even the most 'gift-like' aid imposes some costs on the recipient. Even if there is no pressure to recycle some of the money to purchase goods and services from the donor country, there are obligations to establish formal bureaucratic structures and routines to monitor, evaluate and report back to the donor.

Because aid is seen by the donor as a free gift, and is allocated politically, the allocation pattern is inevitably influenced by most of the political forces active within the donor states. This is not the place to become involved in a very deep analysis of the 'ultimate' objectives of Nordic aid programmes. Staying at the level of phenomena that can be observed, we can usefully discuss the issue by focusing on three major sets of Nordic interests that have influenced MONAP: the 'solidarity interest' [or 'public opinion']; private business; and the national aid agencies. It should scarcely need saying that these different interests sometimes contradicted one another. It may be less predictable that differing policies stemming from the 'solidarity interest' also sometimes had contrary effects.

9.1 The "solidarity interest"

If the notion of international aid being given for altruistic reasons has any meaning — and we believe it does — then there can be few cases on record where the element of altruism was stronger than MONAP, especially in its earlier years.

[The preparation of Phase III was marked by some sharp disagreements about the total financial commitments to be made; and the implementation of Phase III has sometimes been marred by a difficult atmosphere — see Section 10]. MONAP emerged as a logical consequence of the major commitment of most Nordic governments, large sections of the Nordic public, the major political parties, and many voluntary associations, to: anti-colonialism; anti-racism; opposition to apartheid in South Africa and to the extensions of South African military and economic power into neighbouring states; and the notion that, freed of these oppressive forces, newly-independent African countries could effect major improvements in the quality of life of their citizens through activist, interventionist and mobilising development programmes. It is important to remember that MONAP was initiated at a time when there was a near-boycott of Mozambique by most Western powers. The fact that Norway, a member of NATO, was among the funders of MONAP was of special significance given the involvement of many NATO members in supporting the Portuguese colonial power during the liberation struggle.

It is important too to remember that this solidarity was conceived and expressed in cosmopolitan and internationalist terms. It was in the first place a joint effort in the context of the Nordic countries themselves. In the second place, Nordic citizens were always in a minority among the foreign staff paid by MONAP. The nationality profile of the staff has been delightfully varied. In Phase I in particular, MONAP funds provided the equipment and materials needed by teams of Socialist Bloc technical experts in Mozambique who lacked hard currency support. In the third place, MONAP has funded Mozambicans to go abroad for training, conferences, workshops and study trips to many parts of the world, but has brought very few of these people to the Nordic countries themselves [see Table 15(1)].

We saw no evidence that this internationalist experiment was anything but a success in terms of working relationships. [It is equally true that the Nordic donors have been generally very open and pluralistic in their relations with the Mozambican authorities, and that this has been noted and very much valued.] There is no way of placing a monetary value on such an experiment. It should not be forgotten when listing costs and benefits, and any comments below on the problems incurred through 'solidarity' should be understood as marginal to this main conclusion.

The use of aid as a medium for the expression of international solidarity does however have the potential to incur costs — costs which arise from the fact that the relationship between donor and recipient is inevitably unequal. The gift relationship can always be modified at the will of the donor. And, when, as in the MONAP case, the donor is a coalition of highly pluralistic political systems, there are continual pressures from many different sources to alter the relationship to suit particular interest groups — campaigning 'altruistic' groups as well as materially self-interested groups in the more traditional sense of the term. Contradictions have arisen in MONAP as a result of differing specific interpretations on the part of the donors of the general notion of Nordic-Mozambican solidarity:

1) From the Nordic perspective, the injunction against using Nordic aid money to procure goods and services for South Africa may be viewed as absolutely integral to the whole Nordic approach to Southern Africa, and therefore an inevitable and essential condition for MONAP. It was part of a strategy to reduce Mozambique's dependence on South Africa. From the Mozambican perspective

this same injunction may be viewed as an arbitrary and irritating attempt to deny the reality of the deep dependence of the Mozambican economy on the South African economy. The issue has been subject both to formal compromise [permission to procure from South Africa under specified, urgent conditions] and, so we have been told, to informal manipulation of rules and information to permit such procurement [see also reference 49, p.10]. We have no way of judging how seriously the implementation of MONAP was impeded by the existence of these restrictions.

2) Attempts to enhance the Nordic component of the external dimension of MONAP, while desirable from one perspective, have imposed some costs on the programme as a result of the relatively uncompetitive nature, in Mozambican conditions, of Nordic sources of supply of goods and services. One example is to be found in the context of recruitment of expatriate staff. The attempt in recent years to recruit more Nordic nationals has resulted in the employment of people who are, at least on one major criterion — the length of time they are willing to serve in Mozambique — less suitable than alternatives [see Section 16(3)]. Another example concerns procurement of equipment and material for MONAP. Concern that every effort should be made to procure from Nordic sources led to the establishment of special routines that tended to add time to the procurement procedure, and thus delay the arrival of goods in Maputo [see Section 13(4)].

More generally and more importantly, over the course of MONAP there have been appreciable changes within the Nordic aid policy establishments over the central issue of what aid policy should be. There are differences between the different Nordic aid agencies. In practice the most significant change occurred within SIDA, which in the 1970s had tended to be relatively 'liberal' in its aid philosophy. This liberalism meant above all an expressed reluctance to influence the policies of the recipient government, and a willingness to support the policies they chose to implement. This was associated with a relatively high degree of devolution of power and responsibility to the DCO in the recipient country and a relatively flexible attitude towards the re-allocation of funds [see Section 13(1)].

In part no doubt because of the interpretation which some of its staff made of the early MONAP experience, SIDA has shifted to both [a] placing more insistence on some acceptance by the aid recipient of SIDA's own declared global policies [support for the poorest, small farms, popular participation; more recently, environment; more nebulously, notions of social and political pluralism]; and [b] a greater degree of sympathy with what have become the standard norms of most major aid donors, notably the validity of 'policy conditionality' and a preference for liberal, market oriented economic policies. The lens through which MONAP is currently being viewed from the perspective of the donor agencies is not the same lens as was in place in the earlier phases of MONAP.

It may or may not be true that these shifts represent an **accurate** change in perception about what is in Mozambique's best interests. It is certainly the case that some influential Mozambicans have shifted their thinking on similar lines. It is also the case that aid agencies must change their policies if they are not to become fossilised. There is an inescapable dilemma here that [a] from one perspective aid donors should, as in the MONAP case, make long term commitments to major development programmes; and [b] that such commitments are likely to lead to

some embarrassment as the donor's policy changes while the programmes are still being implemented. The donor may become vulnerable to the charge of acting contradictorily, and the recipient to the charge of not conforming to the donor's current policy.

9.2 The private business interest

The interests of Nordic business in MONAP are of two broad kinds. On the one hand, some Nordic companies have supplied goods to the programme through the Procurement Division of SIDA, Stockholm. On the other hand, some companies have gone further and become involved in Mozambique in the installation of equipment, the provision of consultancy and other services, or, at the 'extreme' — the case of Svalof's management contract with and equity share in SEMOC, the national seed company [see Section 17] — in the ownership and management of production facilities. One line of discussion in which we have participated has been the search for patterns of 'privileged' relationships between MONAP and individual Nordic companies. Such patterns may have existed; we have no evidence of them. We are in fact much more struck by the opposite: by the relatively insignificant involvement of Nordic business in the MONAP programme. Only a relatively small fraction of procurement has actually been made from Nordic sources [see reference 49]. And only a handful of Nordic firms have become actively involved in MONAP activities in Mozambique. Of these, only Svalof/SEMOC stands a chance of having a lasting impact. There is little sign that other companies have any major commitment to Mozambique.

The limited involvement of Nordic firms in MONAP is not surprising. General conditions in Mozambique have not been conducive to private business. The donors have apparently not made this a major priority. And relatively few Nordic companies have the kind of experience that would encourage them to become involved in a programme like MONAP. Direct encouragement and support from the aid agency is virtually essential: Svalof after all built up its expertise in tropical seed production through involvement with the Swedish aid programme in Zambia. Such involvements will inevitably lead to criticism and suggestions about the existence of inappropriate special relations. There has been a particular problem of this nature in MONAP arising from its joint Nordic character. Nordic companies have nationalities, and those that have become involved in MONAP have been Swedish. This has tended to evoke questions about whether or not SIDA has been privileging Swedish national companies.

Leaving aside this intra-Nordic complication, it seems likely that the more significant problem for the Nordic aid programmes in countries like Mozambique is not any impropriety associated with the involvement of private Nordic companies, but the dearth of such involvements [see Section 15].

9.3 The bureaucratic interest

The political management of Nordic aid programmes, national or multilateral, can pose difficult problems in environments in which there is a high level of public interest, a tradition and practice of openness in the affairs of public agencies, and

an active and critical mass media. There are many temptations and opportunities to engage in public criticisms of the management of overseas aid, and few restraints. Many individuals and groups are free to criticise in the name of the intended beneficiaries — the poor, the Third World, etc. — without the consent of those in whose name they speak. It follows that the national aid agencies, in addition to implementing aid programmes in the narrow sense of the term, are obliged to play a role in the political management of aid: in mobilising opinion, anticipating and avoiding problems, and compromising with interest groups in order to protect aid against major scandal or criticism. This function is a necessary counterweight to the existence of critical voices [like the mass media] which are not fully answerable for the consequences of the criticisms they raise.

The bureaucratic structures which disburse aid have interests of their own which will tend to shape the way in which they perform their functions. One can see a few specific examples in the MONAP case:

1) The continuous pressure experienced throughout the programme to **spend** money — and especially to run down the large savings which began to accumulate in the mid-1980s — reflected the embarrassments that arise in virtually every public agency at the prospect of accounting for 'failure' to spend the budget [see, for example, reference 180, p. 7]. It would almost certainly have been better, from the point of view of efficient resource use, had the problem of 'low absorptive financial capacity' of MONAP been openly discussed and alternative uses for the 'surplus' found [in Mozambique]. As it was, all agencies, from the Nordic Working Group downwards, seem to have found it more convenient simply to urge that, once it was committed, the money be spent.

2) When Renamo attacks became severe in the early 1980s, and one MONAP expert was killed, all MONAP expatriates became subject to the relatively stringent Swedish security rules about residence and travel. This considerably hampered the implementation of the programme [see Section 10]. The ruling was the subject of considerable criticism and debate. It was always relatively easy to cite cases of expatriates travelling or working without problem outside the Swedish limits. However, from the point of view of Nordic politics, the restrictions were virtually inevitable. Any further deaths of Nordic nationals at the hands of Renamo would have evoked massive concern and strong pressures for bringing to account those officials who had exposed Nordic lives. Once Nordic nationals had been subject to these rules, it was neither morally acceptable nor politically feasible to permit other, non-Nordic expatriate staff to be exposed to any higher level of risk. The restriction reflected the overwhelming 'need' of the Nordic aid structures to protect themselves, as institutions and as individuals, against possible political attack.

Leaving aside specific cases, the more general point is that MONAP appears to have become increasingly responsive to the 'bureaucratic interest' over time. The form and content of the programme were increasingly shaped by what was convenient for the bureaucratic structures involved, Mozambican as well as Nordic. In practice this tended to mean 'more of the same' [see Section 10]. This conclusion does not imply any special particular intention or manipulative skill on the part of the agencies involved. Indeed, they were too much in conflict with one another to have conspired effectively together [see Section 13]. It is simply that, as MONAP aged, other interests in the programme diminished — [the Nordic 'solidarity interest'

— see above; and the interest of the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture — see Section 13.3] — or, as in the case of Nordic business, were never very active at all. The administrators became more influential by default.

9.4 Conclusions

1) Although the Nordic interest in MONAP was largely 'altruistic', there were a series of other specific Nordic interests which were sometimes in partial contradiction to one another and to the easy implementation of the programme.

2) Outside two particular sectors [dairying and seeds], Nordic business interests appear to have been very little involved in MONAP. Only in the case of seeds has a long term relationship been established.

3) Over time the programme was shaped increasingly by the implicit interests of the various bureaucratic agencies which supervised it.

10. HOW WAS MONAP ADAPTED TO CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES?

[The discussion in Section 14 of monitoring and evaluation systems is very relevant, at a somewhat more 'micro' level, to the content of this section].

10.1 Changing conditions

General conditions — especially political, economic and military conditions — have changed very considerably in Mozambique over the lifetime of MONAP. At the beginning the situation was perceived as a short term emergency. The immediate need was to maintain all the capital assets left by the departing colonialists, and restore or replace all the market and administrative institutions that had largely ceased to function. Frelimo determined to achieve these goals in such a way that the result would be a considerable **transformation** in economic, social and political relations in a socialist direction.

The Party was at that stage imbued with a strong sense of mission and a belief in the correctness of its own position. Foreign help was welcomed, but on Frelimo's terms. As the only Western nations giving official support to Mozambique on any scale, the Nordic countries were both welcomed and, at least in some quarters, treated with a little suspicion. Circumstances were not right for Nordic donors to raise basic questions about the directions of Mozambican policy. They were there to support the policy. And that policy involved the extension of state control over most of the economy and a generally 'dirigiste' approach to the management of economic and social life.

It could be said that Mozambique has never since Independence ceased to exist under emergency conditions. What has changed has been the nature of the emergency. At Independence, the 'security problem' was limited to incursions over

Mozambique's western borders by the armed forces of the illegal white regime in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. The problem worsened as, in retaliation for the support given by the Government of Mozambique to the Zimbabwean liberation struggle, the white regime began to promote and support armed resistance to Frelimo by dissident Mozambican political groups organised into Renamo. The situation became more serious when sponsorship of Renamo was taken over by South Africa. By 1983 and 1984, Renamo attacks were making rural development work difficult or impossible in much of Mozambique. During the second half of the decade, there were few places outside the main cities that were at all secure.

The mid-1980s also saw a number of other major changes in MONAP's environment. The question of whether or not more state support should be directed to the small scale or family sector had been on Frelimo's political agenda from the time of Independence. Advocates of that approach gradually gained more support; the Fourth Party Congress in 1983 signalled a substantial change in formal policy in favour of the family sector. As is explained in more detail in Section 11, the spread of Renamo activities largely prevented the implementation or testing of this new policy in the field.

At around the same time, the economic situation began to worsen, especially in its most visible dimension — the physical availability of basic consumer goods. It was no longer possible to believe that the economy was on the mend after the temporary disruptions caused by Independence. The disruptions caused by military de-stabilisation were in many respects more severe.

The acuteness of the crisis in the mid-1980s encouraged considerable changes in official policy and the style of politics generally. The most tangible change was the adoption in 1986 [for implementation from 1987] of the new economic programme [PRE] which involved a shift back towards the market and the private sector. The extent of the government's commitment to liberal economic policies has gradually increased since that time, perhaps even more in practice than in terms of formal declarations. Among the other complementary changes were: a general liberalisation of political attitudes and practices; a shift in the external diplomatic sphere towards better relations with the main capitalist countries; an increasing dependence on foreign aid from these same countries; closer relations with the main multilateral development agencies, especially the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; and an increasing willingness, albeit stemming from lack of alternatives, to accept the 'advice' of these aid donors in designing and implementing economic policy. The statistics suggest that, as a result of the additional economic resources which have entered Mozambique in recent years, the economy has begun to grow quite positively after a long period of more or less continuous contraction.

Abstracting a little from the complexities of reality, one can define four main changes in the external circumstances in which MONAP had to operate: the change from the emergency conditions associated with Independence to a different type of [more permanent] emergency; the change in national agricultural policy to place more emphasis on the family sector; the emergence of insecurity as a major threat to development work; and adoption of a more liberal economic policy. The adaptability of MONAP can be considered in relation to each of these issues in turn. We then discuss the notion of adaptability more generally.

10.2 Adapting to differing emergencies

MONAP I was intended above all as a mechanism to help maintain the physical viability of the farms which had come into the state sector as a result of [a] the departure of most Portuguese; and [b] the intention of Frelimo to socialise agriculture. The wisdom of hindsight suggests that the design of MONAP I might reasonably have been improved by establishing a clearer separation, both in terms of budgetary allocations and in terms of timing, between [a] short-run, maintenance assistance; and [b] longer term development projects or programmes. There was ambiguity in this respect, just as there was ambiguity about whether MONAP should be viewed as **sector support** for Mozambican agriculture or a **collection of projects** to be implemented within a particular organisational framework [see Section 1].

The merging of immediate post-Independence emergency into a more permanent crisis did not in itself have major implications for MONAP. The issue of moving from 'emergency support' to more developmental objectives does not seem to have featured prominently in the preparation of MONAP II. The projects that were terminated at the end of MONAP I were terminated for a variety of reasons. Conversely, some of those projects which were continued in Phase II had a substantial short term component. Support for the import of machinery spares [ME-3] is a good example.

10.3 Adapting to changing agricultural policies

The role of MONAP in relation to the state/large scale v. family/small scale issue in agricultural policy was not simply a passive one of adapting to changes which arose elsewhere. To some, much-disputed and thus largely-indefinable degree, MONAP played a role in bringing about this change by providing resources and arguments for those who were attempting to promote the family sector line [see Section 11]. There are a series of related questions which are equally difficult to answer confidently. Did the Mozambican government have any real alternative in the late 1970s to directing almost all available resources to the attempt to maintain the state/large farm sector? How far was this sector actually expanded under the guise of 'maintenance'? Even if the Nordic donors had been more insistent about supporting the "family sector" at that stage, would this have been [a] acceptable to the Government of Mozambique; and [b] practically feasible? Was the conversion of the Government of Mozambique to support for the family sector 'genuine'?

These issues are taken up in more detail in Section 11. For present purposes the point is that MONAP did display a high degree of flexibility in relation to the state v. family sector issue. The reasons why so little was achieved in developing the family sector lay elsewhere.

10.4 Adapting to de-stabilisation

It seems clear that a major objective of Renamo banditry and terrorism has been to paralyse development work in the rural areas. There is the view that MONAP itself has been a special target. In response to increasing insecurity, all SIDA Experts were withdrawn to main towns in 1982 and 1983. Cooperants followed,

and by the second half of the 1980s only one or two MONAP-employed expatriates could be found stationed outside the two main towns of Maputo and Beira. Many Mozambican staff remained in place in the rural areas. Most suffered hardship, and some lost their lives.

Given the major role played by expatriate staff in the staffing and management of much of MONAP, their withdrawal from the rural areas meant the suspension or cancellation of much of the funding and many of the plans. MONAP 'adjusted' to this situation by finding new ways of spending the money available. It was perhaps to some degree inevitable that these tended to be Maputo-based activities, including, for example, training at the Agrarian Training Centre [CFA]. This concentration on the capital city and parts of the surrounding Maputo Province took place in many spheres of government activity at this time, especially in relation to investment [see reference 19, p.8].

If one accepts that it was inevitable, for reasons of internal Nordic politics, that MONAP expatriates were placed under tight security restrictions [see Section 9.3], the relevant question is then whether MONAP could have been redesigned to cope explicitly with the security problem and thus permit more development work to be done in the last five or so years of the programme. There were a number of possibilities for adaptation. One of the more radical of those proposed at the time was to use MONAP funds to permit the Government of Mozambique to directly employ expatriate experts, from countries of its choice, who would not then have been subject to Swedish security restrictions. One can question both the capacity of the relevant agencies in the government to organise such a system effectively and the political and moral acceptability to the Nordics of a stratagem which could easily be described as risking Brazilian or Portuguese lives where Nordic lives were too precious.

Another, less radical, mode of adapting would have been to concentrate more resources on both staff training and staff development in general, and the staff of the Provincial Directorates of Agriculture in particular. For all the provincial capitals remained accessible, and the potential for improving the technical and professional skills of staff is said to be high. In fact the additional training provided under MONAP was limited largely to the short courses provided by the Agrarian Training Centre [CFA] in Maputo. These were valuable, for morale as well as for practical reasons, and were directed in large part at provincial staff. But, as is explained in Section 15, staff training and development never received the serious attention from MONAP that they merited. We found no evidence that a provincial-focused training strategy was seriously considered at high level. It is certainly not raised in the one major review of MONAP which focused on the implications of the security problem — the high-level 'Inspection Mission' mounted by SIDA in 1986 [see reference 16].

The suggestions made by the 1986 Inspection Mission about how MONAP could be adapted to the prevalence of insecurity are all of a relatively marginal or conservative nature: they basically constitute lists of those aspects of the agreed programme which should be continued, given less emphasis, or terminated. This reflects the fact that, by this time, little strategic thinking was going into MONAP [see Section 10.5]. It also illustrates one of the reasons for this state of affairs. For one of the implicit functions of the Inspection Mission was to reaffirm to the

Government of Mozambique that the Nordic donors intended to terminate MONAP as a joint Nordic programme. Any attempt to suggest positive, proactive modifications to the content and form of the programme to cope with the security issue would not have been consistent with the basic message.

MONAP never fully adapted to the security issue in a **positive** sense, i.e. there was no major open discussion and strategic re-orientation in response to the security problem. The reasons may include general inertia and the specific problem discussed in the previous paragraph. It is however unclear how far any open debate about adapting to the security problem could ever have been profitably conducted. For we were told that the Government of Mozambique would have found it difficult to sanction any such debate, for by so doing it would have been in danger of admitting what was at that stage inadmissible: that Renamo would continue to be a major problem for a long time.

In fact, MONAP did adapt to the problems posed by the security situation for MONAP itself as an institution — above all the problem of how to spend the money. It did this in large degree by re-directing money to other activities which showed a substantial absorptive capacity, above all to the seed sector [see Section 10.5 and 17].

10.5 Adapting to PRE

Our general conclusion about PRE is much the same as the conclusion about the security issue: the change came at a time when MONAP had largely ceased to be the subject of much strategic thinking. PRE made it easier for those with access to foreign currency and thus market power, like the managers of MONAP, to implement their programme. Did they however make any contribution to the objectives of PRE by re-shaping MONAP activities to fit a more market-oriented economy in which public decision-makers were expected to pay close attention to the relationship between costs and benefits in financial and economic senses?

It is difficult to see that the managers of MONAP could or should have made any **major** change in policy or practice because of PRE. There were two important respects in which MONAP had previously conformed very closely with the more 'statist' pre-PRE economic regime. It had in the first place tended to put emphasis on getting activities started, keeping them going, and producing some kind of visible output, rather than on making calculations about economic alternatives, the best use of resources, or the ratio of costs to returns. In the second place, MONAP had encouraged the institutions which it has supported — and not least the Coordination Unit itself — to pursue a strategy of 'self-sufficiency', i.e. not to rely on the market and transactions with other economic agents to obtain goods and services, but to do the job oneself: to pay workers in food; to produce food on unused land; to establish in-house constructions units, workshops, stores, etc.

These tendencies towards getting something done rather than calculating what might be the best thing to do in principle, and towards organizational self-sufficiency rather than market relations, were mainly the product of compelling circumstances: the severe disruption of market economic relations, both at the time of Independence and as a result of banditry; and the risks of relying on other organisations at a time of acute scarcities of most resources. The relevant question

for the evaluation is whether, in more recent years, MONAP has effectively encouraged a shift towards market relations and economic calculations where these are relevant and appropriate — and there are large areas of the economy, especially the rural economy, where they are not, especially because of the innovative and experimental nature of development projects and because the scarcity of transport makes for highly distorted 'markets'.

Our answer to the question is on balance mildly negative. Those responsible for allocating MONAP funds have not always attempted to examine proposals with sufficient emphasis on the economic perspective. Investment levels sometimes appear excessive in relation to any likely future scenario, including the restoration of peace and security and a major increase in the level of economic activity. Pilot projects have been pursued without as much consideration as would have been appropriate or possible to the economic viability of the activities among the declared target groups (especially family farmers). And units established with MONAP support have been implicitly encouraged, through the provision of generous funding, to adopt 'self-sufficiency' strategies without adequate consideration of alternatives.

One of the most vivid illustrations of the latter point was provided by our visit to the Matola centre of the National Beekeeping Project. We were very impressed by the enthusiasm of the staff, not least by the song and dance routine extolling the virtues of the Project to which we were treated. The evident competence in marketing and public relations was impressive. But the basic economics of the unit raise many questions. Its function is to produce beehives for the National Project and act as a marketing centre for honey. In comparison with the rather low level of production of beehives, the relatively simple production technology involved, and the existence of a major demand problem for the product, the level of investment in the carpentry and metal-working shops appeared excessive. Yet more investment was going in, and there were plans to expand which appeared to us to lack any economic feasibility. Since the unit is located near the main industrial area of Maputo, we could not help thinking that it should be possible to produce hives more cheaply by purchasing some simple components now being made on site in small volumes and at very high cost per unit. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the availability in recent years of rather generous MONAP funding for this Project has given the managers incentives and signals that are inappropriate to the interests of both Mozambique and to the long term viability of this programme.

To grant money without requesting [or helping] the recipients to examine alternative means of achieving the same goal is necessarily to discourage them from thinking 'economically' in future. This is not fully consistent with the notion of MONAP as training programme, all the more so as most other sources of capital, whether official or private, require a more thorough economic appraisal routines than do some of the Nordic aid donors.

10.6 Adaptability and flexibility – some general points

The content and direction of MONAP changed considerably over the life of the programme. It did display a reasonable degree of adaptability. To understand why and in what senses this statement is true it is useful to talk in terms of two different types of adaptability, which may be labelled **strategic adaptability** and **flexibility**

respectively.

Strategic adaptability refers to the conscious and deliberate re-orientation of policy as a result of debate and dialogue. We cite as an example the 'conversion' of the Government of Mozambique and of the direction of MONAP investment towards a different strategy in support of the family sector in the early 1980s. Although the Government of Mozambique went on to change policies more radically in the mid and later 1980s, MONAP did not display the same degree of strategic adaptability as in the early years. In the later years there was less adaptation, and relatively little innovative capacity within the network of organisations which supervised MONAP. For this there appear to be several reasons. One was the fragmentation of responsibilities among the various Nordic agencies and the inter-agency tension that this produced [see Section 13]; this did not make for constructive dialogue. Similarly, the decision by the Nordic donors to terminate MONAP was opposed by the Government of Mozambique and never wholeheartedly accepted. This made it difficult to suggest any substantial innovation within MONAP for fear that this would either give the wrong signal to the Government or impose additional commitments on the individual Nordic aid agencies who were to inherit responsibility for continuing to fund the better components of MONAP. One might also add that MONAP appears to have suffered the general 'institutional inertia' which tends to set in in all large bureaucratic institutions in the absence of specific counterweights.

Some of the more evident results of this limited strategic adaptability in later years were: the incomplete adaptation of programme content and strategy to the insecurity problem and to PRE [see above]; and the great difficulties which were experienced in following repeated advice and reducing the scope and organisational complexity of MONAP projects to achieve more direction and focus. As so many people have pointed out, the apparent reduction in the number of projects between Phase I and Phase II — from 23 to eight — was in fact a simple re-naming exercise. The number of separate activities was unchanged. Groups of them were simply bundled together as one 'project'.

MONAP did however display a fair degree of adaptability to changing 'macro' circumstances. One of the reasons is certainly the relatively pluralistic and open atmosphere in which the programme has been implemented. It has been possible to scrutinise and criticise the programme from both Mozambican and Nordic bases. The response of programme managers to evidence of problems may have been incomplete [see Section 14]; there has however been response.

Even when MONAP displayed limited strategic adaptability, it always exhibited a substantial degree of **flexibility**, i.e. a capacity to adapt itself to the immediate pressures from the environment. And perhaps the most insistent of these pressures was the pressure to spend money. This pressure appears to have become stronger in later years as general improvements in management procedures raised more questions about expenditure proposals, and thus tended to delay the disbursement process [see Section 7]. It was possible to relieve the pressure by displaying flexibility in how money was spent. Within the [liberal] limits imposed by the implicit rule that MONAP could not support totally new activities not in any way scheduled, money could be committed to a wide range of agriculture-related activities. It was always possible to use some money for import support, and this was probably one

of its most valuable uses. And projects already within the MONAP portfolio which displayed a capacity to absorb funds effectively could be boosted. The seed sector is the prime example [see Section 17].

This flexibility derived largely from the ambiguous nature of the programme: whether it was **sector support**, **a simple list of projects**, or something in between [see Sections 1 and 2.1]. Given the extent to which some notion of 'sector support' was accepted as valid, it was always possible to argue [a] for changes in the project composition of the programme at the stage of preparing each new phase; and [b] for 'running adjustments' to agreed expenditure plans to cope with unforeseen circumstances.

The problem here was not lack of flexibility, but the ambiguity about what degree of flexibility did exist, and thus about the proper procedures for making decisions on specific allocations. The lack of a clear and public mechanism for allocating that money has perhaps resulted in a series of *ad hoc* decisions that may not have been in Mozambique's best interests. They certainly cannot be evaluated and thus demonstrated to be in those best interests. Equally importantly, this ambiguity about the nature of the programme has given the MONAP Coordinator a greater degree of discretion about the allocation of funds than was intended, or would be desirable if the MONAP programme were truly to be an equal and cooperative enterprise. It is very tempting for anyone in a position of authority to use such ambiguity to exhibit flexibility in allocating funds where that is convenient and, in other circumstances to deny that flexibility is even possible.

It would perhaps have been better if more flexibility could have been built explicitly into the programme from the beginning. This could, for example, have taken the form of a general agricultural sector support component comprising a number of general funds [eg. inputs, local personnel, expatriate personnel, consultancy] and procedures for deciding on how to allocate them.

11. WHO BENEFITED FROM MONAP?

11.1 The target groups

We have observed in Section 8 that MONAP can be understood in three ways: as a set of projects to develop Mozambican agriculture; as a flexible source of programme funding for the Ministry of Agriculture; or as a distinct set of institutions. Understood in any of these ways, MONAP was not conceived as a programme aimed at any very narrowly defined 'target populations'. Indeed, MONAP was an expression of Nordic support to the Frelimo government and to the newly liberated country as a whole; it was 'system support'. As a source of programme funding it had general objectives such as maintaining agricultural output, establishing food self-sufficiency, creating the basis of agro-forestry or developing the institutional capacity and human resources of the Ministry of Agriculture. As a set of projects, objectives were very generally defined with respect to the target

population of beneficiaries. MONAP I projects supported state sector enterprises which aimed, for example, to establish reserves of fuelwood for urban populations or to recommence milk production for those accustomed [or intended to become accustomed] to consuming it. In the context of these projects, there were sometimes more clearly defined beneficiary groups: for example, the workers in state enterprises whose employment was to be secured or who were to benefit from vocational training. Over time, the content of projects changed and with this the general target group of beneficiaries. MONAP III was originally intended to channel substantial investment into a set of projects to increase agricultural production and standards of living in the cooperative and family or peasant sectors, an investment which was drastically cut owing to the deteriorating security situation. There were also two projects to support food production by the family, private and cooperative sectors in the Beira and Marracuene Green Zones. We may add here that MONAP investments were located in nearly every area of the country at some stage or another. There was no particular regional target group.

The nature of those target groups which were identified is best understood by referring to the official line that there are four sectors in agriculture: the state sector, the cooperative sector, the family sector and the private sector. The first sector was the main immediate beneficiary of MONAP I projects. Two others, the cooperative and the family sectors, were considered to be the indirect beneficiaries. In MONAP II a set of projects [CO-1; CO-2; FO-7] were devised which targeted the cooperative sector as the immediate beneficiary and the family sector as the indirect beneficiary. In MONAP III the family sector was to be the immediate beneficiary of the ill-fated Project 7, although cooperatives and other forms of peasant association [sometimes referred to as the 'organised family sector'] were the strategic means through which benefits might be delivered. After PRE, the private sector was amongst the targets of a few projects.

The relationship between these sectors, and therefore between immediate and indirect programme beneficiaries, is to be understood in the context of the government's strategy for socialist transformation, formulated following Independence. This strategy conceptualised the state sector as the 'pole of development' for agriculture [including forestry] as a whole. These large-scale, mechanised enterprises were held to represent the future, 'developed' character of agriculture in Mozambique. They were the model for the cooperative sector which was intended, by 1990, to absorb the entire family sector. The relationship is also to be understood with reference to the actual social and economic links between the state, cooperative and family sectors. Employees in state enterprises were also actually or potentially members of cooperatives or part-time family farmers, while cooperative members were also family farmers. The development of the cooperative sector was linked to that of state enterprises; MONAP II projects in support of the cooperative sector were attached to such enterprises. These enterprises were also expected to supply real services to cooperatives: tractor hire, agricultural extension etc. Thus access to the services and knowledge of the mechanised practices of the state sector would indirectly benefit the cooperative sector and the family sector.

There was, of course, controversy about this strategy and the investment priorities of which it implied. The outcome was a set of new directives from the Frelimo 4th Congress in 1983 placing more emphasis on the **organised** family sector.

11.2 The beneficiaries

The actual beneficiaries on MONAP were thus rather diverse, scattered and difficult to identify, especially the indirect beneficiaries. The state sector benefited from MONAP I investments in particular. The private sector may benefit from some MONAP investments in the longer term. For example, some state enterprises supported by MONAP may be privatised in the near future. The cooperative sector has, with very few exceptions, declined. Economic security for most of the family sector has deteriorated because of the war.

But to evaluate the benefits of MONAP in terms of sectors would substantially risk missing the point. **Some** members of the cooperative, family and private sectors may well have benefited more than others in the short or in the long run.

Of these broadly defined target groups — the cooperative, private and family sectors — none is more difficult to describe with precision, and therefore in terms of who actually benefited from MONAP, than the family sector. This sector constituted some 80% of the population at Independence. A working, if crude distinction is made between this and the private sector. The latter comprises farmers who own more than 7-10 hectares of land, employ more than three permanent labourers, have the means of developing their enterprise and pay tax. Their numbers are more or less known, insofar as they are registered for tax purposes. It is also known that there is a considerable degree of differentiation within the sector. The smallest private enterprises cannot be very clearly distinguished from the upper levels of the family sector. On the other hand, very little was or is known about production, productivity or socio-economic differentiation within the family sector. [For some relevant work, see references 4 and 50].

Although the extent of socio-economic differentiation within the family sector has been — and may still be — less than in other areas of Africa, it exists. At the time of Independence there were areas where male migrant labourers' wages had contributed to accumulation — expressed, for example, in the possession of oxen and wives. Migrants' wages still constitute a source of economic differentiation. There were areas where a considerable proportion of the family sector engaged in cash crop production. The decline of this sector was however a significant factor in the economic crisis of the early 1980s. There are disparities in access to land. There are areas where many households in the family sector are *de facto* or *de jure* female headed. For this reason, as well as ethnic differences regarding residence and inheritance, the 'family' sector is constituted by very different sorts of 'families'. There are those who, as a result of recognition by the colonial state or leadership in their communities, have greater access to political resources for accumulation. There are important regional disparities owing to environmental conditions or colonial and post-colonial agricultural investments. The 'family sector' encompasses both rural and urban farming populations, the latter being the allotment owning households of the Green Zones where the land is almost always farmed by women. There is substantial gender differentiation in terms of access to material and political resources [see Section 12].

Given the very broad 'target' which is constituted by the family sector, it would be incorrect to suppose that all could have benefited equally from MONAP, whether defined either as a programme of sectoral support to the activities of the Ministry of Agriculture or as a set of projects. Two factors, of very different kinds,

prevent us from reaching very clear conclusions about this issue. First, no evaluations have been carried out of MONAP projects or of MONAP programme support with the primary objective of establishing the distribution of benefits or the extent, if any, of economic differentiation that might have developed. Indeed, such evaluations, except in certain exceptional circumstances [Chokwe might be one: see Section 21], would be virtually impossible since most MONAP interventions were not, for a variety of reasons, based on much baseline data. One attempt to do this in the late 1980s, in relation to the small FO-7 project which started in MONAP II, concluded that data on which such an evaluation might be based was no longer accessible. Baseline studies had not been adequate and in any case the project had been relocated as a result of terrorist attack so many times that not even the people who had been involved could be identified or located [see Section 26]. These points lead us to second factor which we have emphasised throughout this report. The extremely adverse conditions in which MONAP II and MONAP III cooperative and family sector projects have functioned has meant that very few sustainable benefits have been delivered at all. We can only assemble here, therefore, some hints and indications of where any benefits of a measurable or sustainable kind have accrued or where they might in the longer term accrue. Beneficiaries can be divided into two broad categories: [a] those who were employed or trained through MONAP funding, who may be labelled the 'employee beneficiaries'; and [b] those who benefited by virtue of being independent agricultural producers — the 'producer beneficiaries'.

11.3 Employee beneficiaries

The most immediate and obvious beneficiaries of MONAP have been the many thousands of people permanently or temporarily employed on MONAP projects. The direct beneficiaries of some projects were, as we noted above, actually or potentially unemployed as a consequence of the abandonment of settler agricultural and agro-industrial enterprises, the reduction of labour migration to South Africa and the implementation of sanctions against Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. The forestry projects in particular were major providers of employment [see Section 19]. Some of them involved welfare programmes for their employees, including creches in those cases where a substantial proportion of the labour force were women. The small FO-7 project tried to create saw-milling cooperatives from among the unemployed in Beira [see Section 26]. Included amongst those who gained at least temporary work were those employed in the MONAP II projects in support of cooperatives and communal villages to build facilities for the village and for project centres and their staff [see Section 21].

A second category of employees includes all those with staff jobs in the Ministry of Agriculture, in the MONAP Coordination Unit and in MONAP projects. These number thousands, including expatriates. Some of these benefited, in the struggle to procure staff of reasonable quality and in recognition of the extremely difficult conditions of work especially outside Maputo, from extra allowances in terms of housing, food and transport which differentiated them from other employees in the public sector [see, for example, Section 25]. This employment in turn of course created secondary jobs in the construction industry, for example, the rehabilitation

or construction of housing, agricultural training colleges and so on.

Some institutions established by MONAP, and which will continue without MONAP funding, employ a large number of people. SEMOC is the prime example.

Another category of evident beneficiaries of MONAP investment are those who have received formal or informal training in the agricultural colleges established with MONAP funding, or in the CFA, or in the counterpart system, or by the flexible fund set up to send Mozambicans to other countries for further education or to attend conferences etc. These have, we hope, advantaged their individual careers and in a number of cases which were specifically drawn to our attention, have positively advanced the capacities of the institutions to which they are attached.

11.4 Producer beneficiaries

Activities intended to benefit agricultural producers directly have hit their target only after overcoming two major categories of obstacle: [a] physical or political **access** to the service; and [b] physical or economic **capacity** to take advantage of the service. For example, although the main objective of SEMOC is to produce seed for the family sector, it has the physical capacity to deliver only in a few areas, produces seed only for two of the many staple crops produced in the family sector [rice and maize], and sells at a price which may not be economic for many family sector producers.

The projects which have aimed to provide benefits directly to the family or cooperative sectors have been terribly affected by the security situation, and since 1987 have been restricted to two areas, Nampula and Chokwe. Of the MONAP II family sector projects, not much remains which can be said to generate direct benefits, except perhaps surviving infrastructure such as building. There are indications that investment in the cooperative sector, other than direct employment, may have primarily benefited members of the family sector already advantaged by political, social or economic leadership in their communities and, indeed, that in some areas the cooperative movement declined precisely because of such problems. In Chokwe only a limited number of members of the family sector are probably in a position to take advantage of rural extension for reasons which are to do with local social, economic and technical conditions. In Nampula, the extension services are trying to manage the resettlement of the family sector in areas devastated by the war and provide emergency services which are not targeted at particular socio-economic sub-categories. In both cases, the private sector is re-emerging as an interest group which may benefit from present and future investment.

Fish-farming and bee-keeping are excellent examples of projects sometimes described as being aimed at the family sector which in practice, and for rather deeply-rooted technical-cum-economic reasons, are suitable only for relatively wealthy enterprises in the state or the private sectors. Neither of the two types of equipment available for bee-keeping are within the purchasing power potential of any but a small minority of the family sector and indeed the initial experimental shape of the project specifically targets the smaller private sector, in the hope of greater diffusion to the family sector in future [see Section 28]. Insofar as fish ponds and fish culture have been adopted at all [and the technology of integrated

rice/fish culture is quite complex], it has been by the state and the private sectors.

Can 'the family sector' as a whole be said to have benefited at all from MONAP? As we have noted above, members have been the indirect beneficiaries of MONAP funding though its most obvious impact; the creation or maintenance of employment. Direct benefits to the family sector have been limited by the war. The most obvious long term beneficiaries of MONAP may, quite unintentionally, turn out to be the private sector, large or small, and those better off sections of the family sector, who by virtue of location, or wage incomes or other factors, have been in a position to take advantage of equipment, skills or the market. This would seem to be the process taking place in, for example, the Marracuene Green Zones. The enduring benefit to the bulk of the family sector will be the extent to which MONAP contributed, through projects such as AGRICOM or through programme support, to the sustained capacity of the family sector to continue to produce at all.

12. HOW WERE GENDER ISSUES ADDRESSED?

12.1 Gender

Our Terms of Reference require us to assess, taking into account gender aspects, the impact of MONAP on food production; family sector development; manpower development; institution building; employment generation and agricultural planning [see also Ref 159]. While the evaluation team would not have carried out this study without considering the gender aspects of MONAP, the requirement poses a number of problems. The most salient of these are described below.

The **term** gender has not yet found a suitable translation in Portuguese. The **concept** of gender, or of **gender relations**, is unfamiliar to many [though not all] of the Mozambicans the team encountered. By gender relations we mean the social relations between women and men and the way in which these structure the economic and political relations [amongst others] of society. Gender relations usually constitute the most conspicuous feature of social difference and differentiation — whether in the division of labour, in access to material resources, or in the possession of social authority and political power. Mozambique is no exception, despite the firm political commitment of Frelimo to the eradication of women's subordination, that is, to women's liberation. This commitment was formed in the light of women's contribution to the armed struggle for liberation. The policy to bring about women's liberation has been implemented, as in other socialist societies, by granting women civil, legal and political rights equal to those of men. This strategy, indispensable though it is, has not yet been found to be **sufficient**. It has not been easy to develop practical objectives and practical strategies to transform gender relations.

There exist a number of descriptions of what are 'women's problems' in every

day life in Mozambique. As in the rest of Africa, the gender division of labour in the agricultural sector allocates to women much longer hours of work than men in productive and reproductive activities and responsibilities for different aspects of production and reproduction [references 12; 30; 59]. It does not, however, allow women equal control, in relation to men, over material resources, such as land, or income deriving from the product of their labour. The very long hours that women work contribute to preventing them from taking advantage of civil or political rights, such as taking part in organised forms of politics. Long hours of work and lack of control over resources has meant that, throughout Africa, women have not been in a position to take advantage of innovations or technologies, even if directed to them.

Thus programmes which treat women equally, that is as if they were men — which do not take into account gender relations — have a high probability of failure. An example which was drawn to our attention in Mozambique illustrates the problem. The bee-keeping programme offers its technology and services to women and men, without, as far as we were able to detect, distinction between the two. But, given the long hours that women work, and given their inferior access to or control over income to purchase equipment, it is unlikely that women will be able to take advantage of the facilities offered on equal terms with men. Judging from many experiences throughout Africa, bee-keeping may become a male enterprise, quite possibly with wives doing some of the work without remuneration, although this is not the objective of the staff of the project. New technologies or agricultural practices which men are in a position to adopt may, and generally do, leave an effect on women: that is, they also transform the gender division of labour as, again, many examples for Africa have shown. Gender-neutral technologies do not exist, any more than class-neutral ones do.

The strategy for the liberation of women in Mozambique is implemented through the OMM, the women's mass democratic organisation of Frelimo. The OMM is responsible for advising government on general policy issues affecting women. In addition, it runs a number of programmes for women such as income earning projects and adult literacy. It is no secret that at field level the OMM has few trained staff and limited resources. [It was not funded by MONAP; individual Nordic aid agencies have funded OMM projects]. The strategy of making a single, relatively weak organisation responsible for all the issues affecting women presents many problems. On several occasions when we drew attention to gender issues, we were told: "this is a problem for the OMM". Given the lack of resources and trained staff in the OMM, this approach is unsatisfactory. Perhaps more significantly, such a structure and responsibility limits the extent to which what is learned about 'women's problems' can be incorporated into the detailed planning of agricultural development. Yet that development depends heavily on [a] women's skills, knowledge and labour and [b] understanding the constraints resulting from the gender division of labour. It is acknowledged that practical objectives and strategies are now required.

12.2 The gender issue in MONAP

At the time when MONAP was conceived, the concept of gender relations and

its strategic importances in agricultural and rural development was not familiar to international aid agencies. [The Office of Women in Development was established in SIDA in 1979, but general policies and strategies were not developed until 1985]. From MONAP II onwards, several programme documents do refer to the importance of addressing two problems concerning women: [a] the excessive amount of work carried out by women farmers in the family sector; and [b] the severe shortage of women with agricultural training. Nobody, however, was appointed to develop an overall policy and strategy for gender issues within MONAP although such a person was appointed to SIDA, DCO in the mid-1980s [reference 144]. From that time, too, some socio-economic research carried out within or commissioned by MONAP identified gender issues as of critical importance to development strategies for the family sector [references 7; 8; 9; 23; 24].

The problem of work overload of women farmers was addressed in the MONAP II projects CO-1 and CO-2. Attempts were made to introduce a range of equipment [manual grinding-mills and pumps] to economise on time. In addition, the CO-1 team identified a problem of resistance of men to women as leaders of cooperatives. These projects were terminated without any formal assessment of their impact but the objectives were incorporated into the planning documents for the MONAP III project 'Support for the Peasant Sector', with the additional aim of introducing income-earning projects to women in the time saved. FO-7 had attempted this during MONAP II and its programme of training in spinning and weaving continued until 1987. The evaluation of this component of the project concluded that it had been badly planned and executed. The disintegration of Project 7 and the drastic reduction of its activities as a consequence of the security situation has meant that very little has been built on the potential experience of the earlier years. The project details in Part III of this report note any developments that we were able to discover.

The shortage of trained women agricultural staff was deplored rather than addressed. MONAP's support for agricultural training was rather conventional given the circumstances that there was, and remains, such an unprecedented shortage of technical and professional staff [see Section 15. The very low recruitment of women to agricultural schools, despite the existence of targets, is generally attributed to 'traditional' attitudes towards women's education. No doubt the situation is more complex than this: insofar as an increasing number of women are getting beyond primary school — the gender ratio is still unequal — they may be opting for commercial rather than agricultural training.

The need for more women extension staff is sometimes conceptualised in a rather limited way; since there are women farmers, there should be women staff. All staff should be able to appreciate gender issues and their relationship to agricultural practices. For the time being, however, the generally unsatisfactory content of agricultural training, and its continuing bias towards mechanised agriculture will continue to hamper extension work, whether carried out by women or men and especially bearing in mind the frequently encountered resistance to the idea that women should be able to use modern technology.

It is not surprising that the issues of gender relations in the family and cooperative sectors and in training should have been those most consistently raised in project documents: these are the areas where the issues are most conspicuous. A

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few other projects had employment policies regarding women which recognised some aspects of the gender division of labour and provided social provision such as child care [see Section 11]. We did not find similar provision in any existing programme. SEMOC, for example, which employs quite a number of women in its seed production enterprises, no longer provides creches.

12.3 Gender and employment

There are no figures on which we can make any estimate of the employment opportunities created for Mozambican women in MONAP. We observed, of course, that that there were not many women in management and technical posts and most white-collar women employees were in secretarial positions or sales. There are exceptions: women nationals have benefited from further and higher training grants. MONAP did not, however, have an employment policy with respect to gender and its staffing pattern reflects the gender division of labour that has developed in the non-agricultural sector.

Table 12(1): MONAP cooperants according to gender and job category*

Job category	Numbers		Total	% of men
	Women	Men		
Administration, office. management, statistics, design	39	29	68	43
Secretarial, translation.	21	0	21	0
Mechanics, engineers, transport, technicians, construction, architects.	3	61	64	95
Procurement, stores.	8	16	24	67
Rural extension, teachers, trainers, artisans.	16	46	62	74
Forestry, livestock, fisheries, veterinarians.	5	27	32	84
Economists, agronomists, sociologists.	18	44	62	71
Inadequate information	6	5	11	
Total	116	228	344	66

Note: * — The figures available to us were not classified by gender. This classification was done on the basis of first names. It may not be 100% accurate due to the range of nationalities involved. The job categories were also constructed on the basis of raw information.

The figures that are available concern expatriate staff. These reflect markedly different patterns of employment for women and men. Approximately 34% of cooperants were female and, of these, 34% were in office management, statistical and design jobs while a further 18% provided secretarial and translation services [Table 12(1)]. The figures are even more striking in the case of SIDA experts [Table 12(2)]. Approximately 90% of these were men. It seems likely that these figures simply reflect the heavy weighting of the MONAP programme and of service units in favour of the 'hard' sciences, and technical and mechanical skills in which women are unrepresented in the countries from which expatriate staff were drawn. We are unable to account for the overall difference in gender ratios between the cooperants and the SIDA experts other than to point out that SIDA

posts were more senior, reflecting a further aspect of the gender division of labour in the countries of origin.

These figures represent a 'side-effect' of the choice of programme intervention and indicate that need to consider the longer term issues which arise from indirect gender discrimination both in donor and recipient countries in terms of training and employment opportunities.

Table 12(2): MONAP SIDA experts according to gender and job category*

Job category	Women	Numbers Men	Total	% of men
Management, finance, planning and audit	4	21	25	84
Mechanics, transport, mechanical instructors, construction	0	26	26	100
Economist, agronomist, marketing	4	29	33	88
Rural extension, training	4	6	10	60
Forestry	0	9	9	100
Livestock, veterinary.	0	8	8	100
Purchase, stores.	1	14	15	93
Inadequate information	0	5	5	
Total	13	118	131	90

Note: * — See note to Table 12(1).

12.4 Conclusion

MONAP lacked a gender policy but, as we have shown in Section 12.2 above, gender issues were increasingly acknowledged as of significance even though the nature of the small-scale interventions which were made were of an ad hoc character. There is little point reiterating at any length here the points that have been made elsewhere in this report such as, for example, that no significant increase in food production was achieved and we do not for one moment suggest that this is accounted for by the failure to develop a coherent gender strategy, for example, in the family sector. The security situation undermined the capacity to build on the little experience gained and, as we have pointed out in Section 13.3, the last years of MONAP were not marked with the same vigour or concern to reconceptualise issues and strategies such as these.

There are two concluding points of a more optimistic kind. First, gender relations are very sensitive issues in Mozambique and there are a number of people who are concerned that practical policies and strategies should be developed which will address both the political issues and the need for improvements in agricultural production and productivity. Secondly, the increasing priority accorded the family sector will necessarily raise the issue of practical gender strategies. Something may be learned from other countries in Africa, although any application will necessarily recognise the particular character of gender relations that have developed historically in Mozambique. These concerns and possibilities will have to be realised, in the immediate future, under extremely difficult circumstances. The war has dislocated so many of the conditions of production and reproduction of the family sector. The

social and economic consequences of PRE are likely, in the short term at least, to place even more burdens upon women as producers and as reproducers of family welfare.

Regarding the development of policies for increasing production and productivity in the family sector, it seems to us essential that a reinvigorated gender strategy should be based on a redefinition of the patterns of differentiation within the family sector [see Section 11]. As we have noted there, gender relations in the family sector vary quite substantially and require finely-tuned strategies of intervention. There are, for example, substantial numbers of female headed households, as there are throughout Africa, whose conditions of production require particular strategies of intervention. There are households with women or men wage earners whose conditions of production differ from those which do not receive wages. There are the women farmers of the allotment holding urban households. The DNDR recognises that differentiated patterns of intervention are required in relation to the family sector as a whole: this is equally true of gender issues.

In the conclusions of Section 21 of the original report, we suggested that the present capacities of the extension service are not sufficient to provide a basis for the development of production and productivity in the family sector. In the short term, priorities of investment should be directed towards roads, transport, the maintenance of inputs and consumer goods, health conditions and so on. We fully recognise that investment priorities of this kind may have immediate gender [and class] consequences: some people will be able to take advantage of improved infrastructures more than others. The problem is that we doubt that the extension services at present would be able to counteract those processes, in line with whatever may be government policy, in the short term. It seems to us to be absolutely essential that, in this short term, priority should be given to determining gender objectives and gender strategies.

There are a number of possibilities regarding the future development of gender strategies in relation to agrarian development in Mozambique. These involve, initially, training. Both the CFA, Maputo, and the Centre of African Studies, University of Eduardo Mondlane, may welcome links with African, European or American institutions where gender strategies and gender planning are being developed. There are several funding agencies which might be interested in supporting such links. These interventions would need to be accompanied by micro-level research into gender relations to complement the work already being carried out at the University. It should also be observed that there are now a considerable number of projects in Mozambique, funded by a variety of international agencies, which are seeking to address either 'women's problems', or 'the gender division of labour', depending on their intellectual and political orientations. It is extremely important that their activities and conclusions should be discussed and made available to the Ministry of Agriculture and other agencies in order that future interventions can capitalise on what is already known.

13. WAS MONAP WELL ORGANISED?

[A large number of sources in the bibliography are relevant to this section in some way. We find references 49, 55 and 178 especially useful].

13.1 The growth of the Coordination Unit

The organisational dimension of MONAP which has attracted most comment has been the growth in the size and autonomy of the Coordination Unit. Almost everyone who has been involved would probably, at the very least, agree in describing this as 'unfortunate'. Some have both deplored and criticised this outcome in stronger terms. Whether it was in fact an avoidable outcome is not an easy question to answer.

From the administrative perspective, MONAP was from the very beginning caught in a dilemma. This dilemma stemmed in large part from the ambiguous nature of the content of the programme: it was both [a] a 'general support' programme to the agricultural sector whose supervision would necessarily have to be closely integrated into the key decision-taking processes of the Government of Mozambique; and [b] a large and diverse set of specific projects, supported by Nordic-supplied funds and personnel, whose uses had to be described and accounted for in some detail to the government apparatuses of the donor countries [see Sections 1 and 8]. To put the issue the other way around, MONAP was neither [a] a budgetary support programme for which a cheque could simply be paid annually to the Government of Mozambique; nor [b] a narrow and closely defined set of projects which could, as has in practice often happened with rural aid projects in Africa, be primarily implemented by the [Nordic] donor, using Nordic-employed personnel, Nordic funds, and Nordic administrative mechanisms and practices, with only marginal involvement from the Government of Mozambique.

Such ambiguity is not rare. Indeed, it is present to some degree in almost all aid projects. Aid always poses some kind of challenge to the notion of the sovereignty of the recipient government. The ambiguity became especially visible and problematic in MONAP for two reasons:

[a] The very large gap, in terms of general bureaucratic competence, material resources, and administrative style, between the Mozambican government apparatuses and those of the Nordic aid donors.

[b] The size and complexity of the MONAP programme, allied to complexity arising from the multiplicity of donors involved [see below], led to strong pressures for the development of a bureaucratic apparatus in Maputo that could meet the Nordic demands for adherence to standard and routinised bureaucratic procedures — written reports of progress, explanations of future plans and intentions, accounts in a form that could be audited, etc.

In more concrete terms, the dilemma about the administrative status of the

Coordination Unit can be understood in the light of the position of the MONAP Coordinator. This appears to have been literally conceived originally as a one-person job. The job description was rather vague, and has been described as a 'post-box' role. The Coordinator, a SIDA Expert, was formally a Mozambican public servant reporting to and working through a superior who in turn reported directly to the Minister of Agriculture. The position, while described by its early occupants as exciting and rewarding, was in some senses 'impossible'.

It was in the first place extremely hard work. Duties included: participating in major policy decisions; reporting to donors and acting as the channel of communication between them and the Government of Mozambique; keeping account of MONAP funds; supervising a large procurement programme; oversight of several dozen expatriate experts, most of them desperate for housing; running an office; and personally meeting Nordic aid staff at the airport and arranging their accommodation. All this was accomplished in an environment in which 'normal' market relations and administrative systems were severely disrupted.

In the second place, the Coordinator's job embodied a considerable tension between the formal and the real power and status of the occupant. As *de facto* 'gatekeeper' for the major source of foreign exchange to a Ministry desperately short of funds of all kinds, the Coordinator potentially held a great deal more power than his formal position would imply.

In the third place, the Coordinator sat at the interface between two very different types of administrative apparatus. On the one side there were the demands of the Nordic donors for the kind of bureaucratic procedures mentioned above. These were supplemented by another set of expatriate demands. The MONAP-employed expatriates, responding to the personal and employment problems created by the fracturing of market and administrative systems, wanted an organisation to make sure that they were housed, that their contracts were approved and salaries paid, that they and their families were given visas to leave and re-enter the country without waiting for months, that they were provided with the necessary official documents for inter-provincial travel within the country so that they could do their jobs, and that a large number of other necessary services were provided. On the other, Mozambican, side stood an administrative system that was both greatly weakened by the crises of Independence and imbued with a very different kind of ethos from the Nordic system. This has been described to us as the period of 'guerilla administration'. This had a number of dimensions. One was a general emphasis on getting things done *now*, rather than worrying either about formal procedures or about the longer term implications. Another was that effective relations within the administrative apparatus tended to be highly personalised. To a relatively high degree, formal bureaucratic position was not necessarily a good indication of either job content or power and influence. There was also a tendency to re-organise formal administrative systems frequently.

Whether or not 'guerilla administration' was a good thing in the late 1970s is perhaps an unanswerable question. To a large degree it was inevitable. The more important issue from the perspective of MONAP organisation is that the same label could accurately be used of much of the Mozambican government apparatus today. Some things have changed. The enthusiasm and commitment that was originally associated with 'guerilla administration' has weakened as problems have

mounted up and dragged on. And the proximate cause of much of the 'incoherence' that some people observe in the contemporary administrative system, including the Ministry of Agriculture, appears to lie in 'projectisation' — the fragmentation of resources, efforts and motivations among a large number of foreign-funded projects which provide the bulk of the financial resources available [see Section 15]. What matters from the present perspective is that, throughout the history of MONAP, it has in practice been very difficult to 'mesh' [a] the routinised administrative procedures which had to be instituted to meet [understandable] external requirements and pressures with [b] the flexible, personalised and, all too often, deficient procedures of the Ministry of Agriculture. It does, for example, appear to have been generally the case that: there is no effective accounting for the local funds disbursed to the spending units of the Ministry; funds are routinely disbursed weeks or months after they are due; the Ministry has no reliable record of its workforce; there is no routinised procedure for operational units to report on their achievements or for officers to report on the performance of their subordinates; and foreign [non-MONAP] cooperants may wait months or even years, after starting work, before they receive a contract and thus any salary. There is no single bureaucratic head of the Ministry — a practice inherited from the colonial system — and between two and three dozen officials might be reporting directly to the Minister. 'Policy' may thus sometimes be difficult to determine with precision, and anyway tends to change substantially each time the occupants of Ministerial positions are changed. There are sometimes long delays between [a] the introduction of changes in the organisation of the Ministry and [b] the formalisation and publication of these changes. The system of 'double subordination' of provincial units to both the Ministry and the provincial government further complicates daily administrative life.

To list these deficiencies of the Mozambican administrative system is not to imply that blame or responsibility can be attached to past or present occupants of senior posts. The system is the product of the interaction of a range of factors, some of them of external origin. It is also useful to point out that in some respects the demands for adherence to routine administrative procedures placed on MONAP from Nordic sources were relatively intense. We refer here to an issue dealt with in more general terms below: the relationship among the Nordic donors in respect of MONAP. One of the causes of inter-Nordic difficulties stemmed from the fact that MONAP was the only joint Nordic aid programme to be administered by SIDA. For SIDA's own routine procedures were less demanding than those of some of its Nordic partners in three respects:

[a] SIDA does not demand auditing of the use of aid funds by the recipient government.

[b] SIDA is willing to 'roll over' from year to year funds committed but not dispersed, while some other donors 'claw back' funds not spent in the year for which they were allocated.

[c] SIDA grants a relatively high degree of autonomy and discretion to its Development Cooperation Office [DCO] in the recipient country.

As is explained below, pressures from SIDA's Nordic partners meant that its own normal operating principles were, in the MONAP case, to some degree displaced in favour of tighter control from the Nordic capitals. Had MONAP been

purely a Swedish programme, the administrative requirements laid on the recipient might have been somewhat less.

In practice, these administrative requirements generated a very substantial response: the growth of the size, capacity and, eventually, the autonomy of the Coordination Unit. The idea of a one-person office was clearly never viable. Additional administrative support was rapidly recruited. At the end of 1982 the Coordination Unit employed 17 expatriates, including six SIDA Experts. The early 1980s also witnessed a process of internal differentiation and specialisation. By 1983 [a significant year — see below] there were separate sections dealing with finance, procurement, stores, workshop, construction and housing. Only a separate personnel unit was to be added later. Apart from managing MONAP's own administrative affairs in a narrow sense [e.g. recruiting, housing and managing personnel], the Coordination Unit was providing important services to the operational aspects of the field programme [repairing and maintaining vehicles; importing equipment and materials; maintaining inventories of spare parts; and supervising all construction work]. Sophisticated office systems and routines dealt effectively [to the best of our judgement] with most of the 'expatriate' elements of the programme — procurement of goods from abroad; the need to report to the Nordic donors according to their procedures and time schedules; the management and housing of SIDA experts; recruitment of cooperants; and the spending of foreign currency. These systems were totally separate from, and in effect incompatible with, the systems practiced elsewhere in the Ministry of Agriculture.

In the years after 1983 the Coordination Unit continued to grow, both absolutely and, even more strikingly, relative to the rest of MONAP. At the end of 1982, its 17 expatriate staff members accounted for 8% of MONAP's expatriate employees. By September 1987 it employed 34 expatriates in Maputo and a further five in the workshops in Beira and Nampula, the equivalent of 37% of MONAP's foreign staff. Correspondingly, the professional profile of the cadre of MONAP's SIDA Experts changed considerably. In 1980, three quarters of them had been **technical** experts of some kind, whether in the field of agriculture, natural resources or machinery. By 1986, technical staff were down to a third of the total, and various categories of **administrative and general support** staff dominated. The proportion of MONAP funds which were absorbed in this kind of supervision, rather than in direct development activities, increased during each phase of the programme [see Section 13.5]. It appeared to some people that the Coordination Unit was 'eating up' MONAP. Talk of 'empire building' was rife. How justified was this talk?

13.2 Alternatives to bureaucratic expansion?

In assessing the desirability of the growth of the Coordination Unit, the first point to make is that, as far as one is able to judge, the growth of some kind of quasi-autonomous Nordic-dominated agency to manage MONAP was virtually inevitable in the conditions prevailing in Mozambique in the late 1970s and early 1980s. There was a very powerful set of pressures working to that end: the general fragility and poor resource base of Mozambican state structures; the rapidity with which the senior personnel and the organization of the Ministry of Agriculture

were changed; pressures to establish an organisation which could easily and quickly perform accounting and other bureaucratic routines which would mesh easily with those of SIDA; the need to produce documentation according to the time schedules set by the Nordic programme review process; the pressures of a relatively vocal group of expatriate experts who expected assistance with housing, visas and other personal matters; the relatively wide dispersal of power and authority within the top levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy in the Ministry of Agriculture, and thus the natural tendency towards autonomy for an agency which, by virtue of the very dispersed nature of its programme, had to deal with many different Directorates and units on a day-a-day basis; pressures to spend money and to implement agreed programmes, and therefore to establish separate service units to deal with issues, like procurement, vehicle maintenance and construction, which appeared to constitute bottlenecks; and the attraction for many Mozambican officials of the existence of a quasi-separate organisation which could finance, especially in foreign exchange and at relatively short notice, many activities which could not otherwise be financed from Ministry funds. One must also add here a point that can easily be overlooked by people not familiar with the Mozambican system. MONAP, like other projects, was directly responsible for recruiting, contracting and paying its 'national' staff. They were not regular employees of the Ministry of Agriculture, and were employed under different terms and conditions. Information on these staff rarely appears in the MONAP reports. They were however numerous. There were more than a thousand in 1987 [see reference 55, p.10].

MONAP is not alone in responding to such a situation by establishing its own quasi-autonomous administrative system. Other aid agencies in Mozambique have done and are currently doing much the same thing, in ways that are tailored to the types of projects and programmes that they happen to be involved in. They do not always display the same degree of doubt and self-criticism about this that has been displayed by the Nordic participants in the MONAP process. We note also that the **intention** of many of the people who were involved in this process was to build up capacity in the Coordination Unit which would be at the service of the Ministry generally, including construction and co-operant recruitment services.

The first question to ask about the expansion of this Nordic bureaucracy is not whether the process went too far, but whether the bureaucracy should have been built up in the Coordination Unit itself, i.e. within a Mozambican government structure, rather than within a specifically Nordic structure. For there was such an alternative. From the beginning of MONAP there was a special cell within the SIDA DCO in Maputo, funded through MONAP, and devoted solely to the supervision of MONAP. This cell initially contained one officer, but numbered four at its peak. The division of responsibilities between the DCO and the Coordination Unit was never clear, and later caused problems [see below]. Since the DCO always had some responsibilities for the SIDA Experts working in MONAP, it is not impossible to conceive of an arrangement in which an expanded DCO cell took on the general support functions actually assumed by the Coordination Unit [especially personnel, housing and finance], and supported distinct units in the Ministry of Agriculture providing Ministry-wide services like procurement, stores, vehicle maintenance and supervision of construction. To say that this would almost certainly have been a better arrangement is to speak with the benefit of perfect

hindsight. [The reasons for this judgement will become more evident below]. **At the time** the issue never appears to have arisen in a form such that this kind of definite decision could be taken. The Coordination Unit just grew incrementally.

The process was the classic one of bureaucratic inflation. It was always possible to find tasks that were not being properly done, and thus always possible to make the case for an extra post or a new unit [within the 'Unit']. It is highly likely that this expansion of numbers and elaboration of structure had the same immediate consequences in the Coordination Unit as they do in other organisations, notably an increase in the proportion of time, energy and other resources devoted to **internal** communication and relationships, with a consequent partial turning away from the external world. No one had any strong incentive to point out these and other costs of each addition to the bureaucratic apparatus, nor any real interest in opposing such additions. It is easier to appreciate what these costs were if we look first at the way in which the character of the organisation of MONAP changed around 1983 and 1984.

13.3 The 1983-84 transition

Brief mention has already been made in Section 1 of the way in which the character of MONAP changed around 1983 and 1984. We see it as **the** watershed or turning point in the programme. The processes involved, which can be labelled structural, contextual and personnel, are explained here in a little more detail.

The two structural changes were relatively long term and gradual processes. The processes themselves did not advance especially fast in 1983-84; they had simply reached a sufficiently advanced stage that other things were more likely to happen. The two main structural changes have both been mentioned above. One is the increasing size and functional differentiation of the Coordination Unit, which gave it the capacity to play a more influential and autonomous role. The other is the relative decrease in the importance of MONAP to the Ministry of Agriculture compared to other sources of foreign funds. We do not have precise figures, but note that Mozambique gradually acquired more foreign aid donors. In 1977 MONAP was the sole significant source of foreign exchange for the Ministry. In 1989 MONAP accounted for about 30% of the Ministry's foreign funds, and was one of seventeen major donors to agriculture listed in a recent report [see reference 174, pp.56-57]. The Ministry of Agriculture and its related institutions [but not its related state enterprises] are currently required to handle 131 separate foreign funded projects [see reference 19, p.5]. As the number of donors multiplied, it would have been natural for the senior staff of the Ministry of Agriculture to have had less time to devote to MONAP business.

Two significant contextual factors appeared to have influenced the transition. One was the spread of Renamo activities in rural Mozambique in the early 1980s and the consequent imposition of Swedish security restrictions on MONAP's expatriate staff. In 1983 these staff began to be withdrawn from the rural areas; soon there were only one or two left outside the two largest cities of Maputo and Beira, and indeed the great majority were in Maputo itself. The effect of this move cannot be determined precisely. It appears however to have helped shift attention from the field end of the MONAP programme — it was indeed often difficult to find out

what was happening at field level — and to concentrate attention on Maputo and central administration. [We do know that relatively little attention seems to have been paid in MONAP in these later years to building up administrative and technical competence among the Provincial Directorates of Agriculture, despite the fact that their offices remained accessible from Maputo. MONAP was however not alone in this respect. The concentration of resources, institutions, power and activities in Maputo took place over a wide sphere at this time — for evidence see reference 19, pp.7-8.]

The second contextual factor was the reaction to the Mid-Term Evaluation Report of MONAP II, which had been conducted in 1982 [see references 29 and 103]. This was the work of a group of academics, and argued a case, especially a critique of supporting state farms, large scale units generally, and milk production especially, in a way that was perceived in Mozambique as excessively critical, although all the evidence suggests that the authors were in fact extremely sympathetic. The fact that the draft report was quoted and commented upon in the Nordic media before it was presented to the Government of Mozambique helped generate some negative reactions. The report was never accepted by the Government of Mozambique. Once again, it is not easy to be certain of the precise consequences. It seems however that this episode further promoted the disenchantment of some Nordic participants with the notion of deep and close involvement in support of all policy objectives of the Government of Mozambique, and at least prepared the ground for viewing MONAP as a more distinct and more Nordic enterprise.

Perhaps the most significant personnel change in 1983-84 was the arrival late in 1983 of a new Coordinator who appears to have held a very different conception of MONAP and of the role of the Coordinator than his predecessors. [The previous Coordinator remained in office until early 1984]. Previous Coordinators had been professionally involved in development issues as development planning specialists, and had seen their role as participating in regular and frequent discussions with senior staff of the Ministry of Agriculture over the implementation of MONAP. They were Portuguese speakers. The new Coordinator's background was mainly in Nordic farmers' organisations, and he was an agriculturalist by training. His appointment was partly a response to the suggestion that a project like MONAP required an agriculturalist at the helm. This was simply wrong. MONAP was too large and too diverse a project for any particular technical expertise to be crucial to the job of the top manager. Managerial capacity and the ability to work in Mozambican conditions with Mozambicans were clearly more important.

The new Coordinator appears to have viewed MONAP as a set of projects to be implemented, and not have engaged in close or regular dialogue with Ministry officials. This change was made all the more possible because in late 1983 and early 1984 the two senior Mozambicans in the Ministry who had worked closely with MONAP were transferred to other posts. Perhaps in part because his term of office coincided with the peak of physical scarcities of food and other basic commodities, the new Coordinator paid special attention to the welfare of the staff of the Coordination Unit. Mozambican employees were paid partly in kind. This was a controversial measure in some quarters, as were other steps to give what appeared to some to be special privileges to MONAP staff. More attention was paid to

sending staff on training courses, including overseas courses. Major efforts were made in the succeeding years to increase the salaries of MONAP cooperants compared to other cooperants in the Ministry. Although strongly resisted, these efforts were on the whole successful. At the same time, the Coordination Unit launched a successful campaign to increase the proportion of Nordic nationals among the cooperants [see Section 16]. The notion that MONAP staff [as opposed to the beneficiaries of MONAP funding] were a privileged group may have become more prevalent after this time.

Apart from this perception of MONAP staff as privileged, the main changes in the character and style of MONAP administration effected by the interaction of the factors listed above appear to have been:

- 1) The MONAP Coordinator became distanced from the central policy making discussions of the Ministry of Agriculture. Meetings with senior policy staff became less frequent and different in character. In his relationship with the Minister, the Coordinator appears to have become more like the representative of a donor organisation.

- 2) The Coordination Unit, which grew very fast in absolute and relative terms in the mid-1980s, [see above] became a more autonomous organisation, and indeed took on something of the character of a separate aid donor. For financial resources were still abundant, as were needs and demands. Heads of operational units in the Ministry of Agriculture came to the Coordinator with requests, and he now enjoyed more autonomy in ruling on those requests.

- 3) Rather as one would expect of the office of an aid donor, the Coordination Unit became more of a separate universe, in practical terms relating increasingly to its own staff and to Nordic agencies, and less to indigenous Mozambican structures. It is noticeable that, while SIDA Experts generally served relatively short terms in MONAP, the major and significant exception were the senior managerial staff of the Coordination Unit, who served an average of three years [see Table 16(2)]. Such continuity can only be welcomed. It is however at least plausible that this reflected the [relatively] privileged environment in which such staff worked compared with other experts more directly in touch with more typical Mozambican conditions. When this hypothesis was put to one former senior manager of the Coordination Unit, his reply was: "I had never really thought of that, but it is true that my wife, who works in the Ministry of X, sometimes used to tell me that my job was really like working in Europe".

- 4) The constantly-repeated objective of eventually integrating the various sections of the Coordination Unit into the appropriate parts of the Ministry of Agriculture appeared increasingly implausible. Both office routines and job expectations of the staff diverged increasingly. Since the declarations of intent to integrate never appear to have been backed by substantial incentives or sanctions, little was done in practice to further this objective. Those elements of the Coordination Unit most likely to survive as functioning organisations are those which are being transferred to organisations like SEMOC and AGRICOM which continue to enjoy substantial SIDA support. In other cases the Mozambican staff have either already left the Ministry for more attractive jobs elsewhere, or seem likely to do so. The best test of this situation so far is the personnel section of the Coordination Unit, which was transferred to the Human Resources Directorate of the Ministry

in late 1989, after little preparation. Only one Mozambican employee, an office messenger, was transferred. One of the two expatriates is in a temporary post and will be vacating that soon.

5) Oddly perhaps in the light of comments above about the increasingly self-contained, expatriate and Nordic character of the Coordination Unit, the period after 1983 was marked by considerable, almost routine, friction between the Coordination Unit and the other main agency representing the Nordic donors in Maputo, the SIDA DCO.

This friction had organisational roots. The DCO originally had one programme officer to deal with MONAP issues. This was increased to two in 1981, and at one stage involved four posts. Although it was generally understood that the DCO was exercising overall supervision of a policy nature and the Coordination Unit was responsible for the implementation of agreed plans, the boundaries between these jurisdictions, which were inevitably unclear, were never defined. This appears not to have been a major problem in the early years of MONAP, when the Nordic personnel in both agencies were working extremely hard under great pressure, and felt acutely the lack of support and assistance. It appears that at that time, insofar as there was any tension between the two agencies, this was likely to take the form of competition to get the other to perform particular tasks. Administrative capacity was scarce.

The situation changed after both parties — the Coordination Unit and the DCO — had increased their personnel and expanded their administrative capacities. There were a series of disputes over jurisdiction. The DCO tended to view itself as the counter-weight against the tendencies of the Coordination Unit to expand and to isolate itself from both the internal procedures and the changing policies of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Government of Mozambique more generally. The Coordination Unit in turn found the DCO interfering too deeply in routine matters of implementation, attempting to change elements in the programme that were formally agreed, and by-passing the Coordination Unit by dealing directly with the management of various MONAP projects. The tension was thus not only rooted in structural factors: personal and ideological factors also played a role. The perception of the proper role of MONAP held by the two Coordinators appointed in 1983 and 1987 was vigorously contested, on grounds of broad 'developmental' ideas, by staff of the DCO. In later years, the question of the institutional phasing out of MONAP also became a matter of contention. Many declarations were made about the necessity for gradually integrating the activities of sections of the Coordination Unit into the appropriate sections of the Ministry in preparation for the final demise of the Coordination Unit. This objective was advocated in the authoritative 1986 'Inspection Report' on MONAP III [see reference 16], and endorsed by the Government of Mozambique and SIDA. The DCO staff believed that little was done in practice to promote such integration; our evidence suggests that this was indeed the case.

This tension between the DCO and the Coordination Unit had adverse effects on MONAP as a whole, by both souring the atmosphere and making constructive discussion difficult. The programme lost momentum and became somewhat static. Further comment on this issue is however best left until we have discussed another dimension of the more general phenomenon — the unclear dispersion of supervi-

sory authority over MONAP among various Nordic agencies. We note finally that this is not the only such relationship which has incurred these kinds of problems. There have also been recurrent difficulties between the DCO and the senior Nordic staff of AGRICOM, which, since it became an independent project at the end of MONAP II, has like the MONAP Coordination Unit, been subject to rather ill-defined supervision from the DCO.

13.4 The Nordic supervisory structure

There were in effect four distinct Nordic agencies which claimed and exercised some general jurisdiction over MONAP: the Coordination Unit; the SIDA DCO; SIDA Stockholm; and the Nordic Working Group/Council. The duplication of responsibilities in Maputo between the Coordination Unit and the DCO has been discussed above. It was however replicated within the Nordic countries themselves.

The normal arrangement for a joint Nordic aid programme is that one of the national aid agencies implements the activity, reports to its partners, and consults them regularly, primarily within the framework of a joint Nordic Working Group, the administrative arm of the Nordic Council. The role of the Working Group is consultative and advisory.

The formal arrangements for MONAP differed from this standard pattern only in two minor details [see below]. The actual working relationships — the pattern of power and influence — were however significantly different. The Nordic Working Group became very much concerned with MONAP at an early stage. As a result of the force with which it expressed its views on a range of issues, it became more than a consultative body. As various other parties concerned with the management of MONAP began to react to and anticipate the views of the Nordic Working Group, the latter became in effect one of the significant supervisory bodies — albeit one which never bore formal responsibility. It seems that this situation was the product of four interacting factors [in addition to the possible influence of personal factors]:

[a] MONAP was the largest joint Nordic aid programme in financial terms, and was perhaps therefore considered to merit special scrutiny.

[b] Relatedly, there were particular concerns that an adequate share of MONAP's international procurement of goods should be made within the Nordic countries, both individually and collectively. Attention was focused on this issue as early as 1977 as a result of a procurement controversy in Mozambique, which, incidentally, involved MONAP funds but very few purchases from the Nordic countries.

[c] MONAP was the only Nordic programme administered by SIDA, and SIDA's normal control procedures were a cause of some disquiet on the part of some Nordic partners [see Section 13.1 above].

[d] MONAP attracted a high degree of attention because of the high ideological content of the programme it was supporting, especially state farms and state socialism generally, and particularly in Phase I, and the range of problems and criticisms which emerged early on.

Whatever the precise reasons, the Nordic Working Group acquired — not necessarily intentionally — some effective supervisory authority over MONAP. One

minor illustration and by-product was the establishment in the early 1980s of an 'extraordinary' sub-committee of the Nordic Working Group to deal with procurement issues. Procurement procedures were also modified. It became standard practice that, once tender documents were prepared by the Procurement Division of SIDA Stockholm, a five week delay [before public issue] was made while the documents were passed to the relevant government agencies of the other Nordic partners. This arrangement was specific to MONAP, and not followed in the case of other joint Nordic projects.

The most important consequence of this situation was that the pattern of overall supervisory responsibility for MONAP became less clear. The mission was told that, as a result, the SIDA DCO in Maputo was not always able or willing to exercise the degree of authority and responsibility that it would have under normal SIDA practice, and had to refer issues more frequently to Stockholm.

The most visible consequence of this overlapping of responsibilities among the four Nordic institutions — the Coordination Unit, the DCO, SIDA in Stockholm and the Nordic Working Group/Council — was recurrent tension between them. It was this tension, as much as any other factor, which explained the decision to terminate the MONAP programme. The initiative to terminate came from the Nordic side, and was opposed by the Government of Mozambique. Another consequence of the overlap was that the routine implementation of MONAP became more complex and slower than would otherwise have been the case. Ideas and decisions had to be cleared with a number of Nordic agencies and partners. We are unable to judge the extent of this phenomenon, but are inclined to believe that it was more than marginal. Detailed, quantitative evidence is not available. Our judgement is based on the impressions of people interviewed and a number of papers written by people involved. The most graphic piece of evidence quoted to us was that, because of the need to consult many Nordic partners, MONAP project directors were required in April each year to submit their budgetary requests for the financial/calendar year beginning eight months later. This was especially irritating and impractical in a near-war situation. [We note that an additional reason for this procedure was suggested to us: the need to get early clearance for expatriate recruitment and procurement. That however in turn raises the question of whether the actual pattern of Nordic cooperation was not also responsible for delays in these areas.]

It is also our judgement — albeit based in large part on impression and deductive reasoning — that this overlapping of responsibilities had a generally conservative effect on the strategic management of MONAP programme. The tension in the relationship between the Nordic partners, and the absence of clear attribution of final responsibility for the outcome of the programme, appear to have discouraged any strategic re-thinking, especially in the later years, in response to the problems of internal insecurity and to the new economic policy [see Section 10]. One should however add that the Mozambican Government does not appear to have been much concerned that Phase III was being extended without a thorough appraisal of the direction of activities.

13.5 The financial cost of supervising MONAP

We have no information on the indirect costs of supervising MONAP — the costs incurred by the Government of Mozambique, by SIDA [except those Maputo and Stockholm SIDA posts — seven at one point — directly paid from the MONAP budget], and by the other Nordic aid agencies. Information on the direct costs covers the costs of the Coordination Unit and of those SIDA posts mentioned above.

Table 13(1): The supervisory costs of MONAP

	MONAP I	MONAP II	MONAP III	TOTAL
Supervisory costs as a % of all MONAP expenditures	11.5%	26.0%	25.8%	22.9%
Costs of supervisory personnel as a % of all MONAP expenditures	1.5%	6.2%	11.9%	7.0%

Note: 'Supervisory costs' are the costs of the Coordination Unit and of those SIDA staff responsible for supervising MONAP and paid from the MONAP budget. The figure does not include other, indirect supervisory costs.

Source: reference 178, pp. 5-6.

The figures in Table 13(1) show that these direct supervisory costs were far from negligible. Overall, they amounted to 23% of all MONAP expenditure. Significantly, and exactly as would one expect in the light of the discussion above of 'bureaucratic inflation', supervisory costs accounted for an increasing proportion of the budget of each phase of the programme. This trend is masked in the aggregate figures on all supervisory costs [the first line of Table 13(1)] because of the way in which purchases of equipment and materials for the Coordination Unit and SIDA were very heavily concentrated in Phase II. The current cash value of these purchases in Phase II was over four times the level of Phase III. One presumes that heavy expenditures were no longer required in Phase III because large stocks of equipment and material were still available. The more useful indicator of the long term trend increase in supervisory costs is the second line in Table 13(1): the costs of supervisory personnel [i.e the staff of the Coordination Unit and SIDA staff 'dedicated' to MONAP] as a percentage of total MONAP expenditures. The increase is little short of dramatic: from 1.5% in MONAP I, to 6.2% in MONAP II, and 11.5% in MONAP III. To put the matter another way, the proportion of MONAP financial resources devoted to paying supervisory personnel in the Coordination Unit and SIDA increased ten-fold between Phase I and Phase III.

13.6 Concluding observations

Complaints about the alleged inefficiency of the administration of MONAP were presented to us relatively frequently from both written and verbal sources. The most common complaints concerned very specific and identifiable issues,

notably the long time lag between ordering of goods from abroad and the delays [and failures] in the SIDA system for recruiting experts. It is not possible to say unambiguously whether such complaints were generally justified. For we found that in each case the administrative process involved several parties, including agencies of the Government of Mozambique, and that delays could occur at all points. In addition, the general conditions prevailing in Mozambique tend to slow all administrative action. However, the only detailed and authoritative study of the efficiency of any component of the MONAP administrative machine — the study of the procurement section of the Coordination Unit conducted in 1988 — was critical both of the level of efficiency in a static sense and of the apparent failure of the unit to learn to be more efficient over time. The costs of operating the procurement section were found to be very high in relation to the volume of purchases [see reference 49]. It seems that the Coordination Unit could accurately be characterised as **effective** rather than **efficient**: a bureaucratic machine able to get many things done, but consuming a rather large volume of resources in relation to its output. Such a conclusion would fit in with the more general observation that there were few incentives or sanctions built into the MONAP/SIDA system to encourage efficiency, the search for direct, rapid and low cost solutions to problems, or any ultimate concern with the final impact of MONAP activities on Mozambican development.

We feel that there have been serious, avoidable problems with the organisational set-up of MONAP which have resulted in both high financial costs for supervision and indirect costs in terms of the efficiency of programme implementation. Further, we see little evidence that these issues have been conceptualised and debated in what we would see as the most useful way. The major types of questions which should have been asked are those we have raised above: What are the incentives for efficient job performance in this rather complex bureaucracy? What is the result of multiplying bureaucratic procedures and structures? Does it not simply reduce the sense of responsibility and accountability, and thus discourage staff effort and efficiency? Where are the mechanisms to act as a counter-weight against the 'normal' processes of bureaucratic expansionism?

These types of question are as relevant to aid recipients as to aid donors. That quarter of the funds allocated to MONAP which was spent in programme supervision in Maputo by Nordic agencies was money allocated to Mozambique.

14. HOW COULD PEOPLE LEARN FROM MONAP?

14.1 Introduction

There is no doubt that many people learned a great deal from the MONAP experience. The focus of this section is on learning of a specific type: the arrange-

ments for monitoring, evaluating and otherwise finding information on MONAP projects in the field, the way this information was conveyed to those responsible for supervision in Maputo, and the uses made of that information. For contemporary understanding of the functioning of organisations places considerable emphasis on mechanisms which facilitate **learning from experience within the organisation**. Especially in highly dispersed, diverse and experimental programmes such as MONAP, one would hope to find mechanisms which, among other things, [a] encouraged the reporting of progress, problems and difficulties in a non-evaluative and supportive manner; [b] kept management in Maputo in sufficiently close touch with project managers in the field to provide assistance when required, and always to provide reassurance that support was available; [c] stimulated staff members to evaluate their own position and performance; and [d] publicised the experiences of different projects in ways which would prove helpful to other people in the programme.

That the reality in MONAP was nothing like this is no surprise. One can cite as reasons not only the general fragility of Mozambican public administration and the effects of war, but also the fact that the notion of the 'learning organisation' was not popular when MONAP was designed. Such reporting systems as were designed [see below] were intended essentially for one way reporting up from the field, not as two-way feedback mechanisms. What actually did happen in MONAP in terms of [a] institutional learning and [b] institutional learning through routinised information systems, is far from clear. The picture presented below represents our overall impression, and a great simplification of reality.

14.2 Reporting from projects

The circumstances in which MONAP I was launched and implemented did not permit much attention to be paid to formal reporting systems. The ethos was very much one of solving today's problems today. Attitudes began to change when it was realised that MONAP was becoming a more permanent organisation and its projects were increasingly of a long term, developmental nature. A consistent [and relatively sophisticated] system for monitoring the performance of MONAP projects was developed with considerable care at the beginning of Phase II. Reports from projects directors were scheduled to provide the raw material for the general reports on MONAP prepared by the Coordinator. The initial arrangement was for two quarterly and two semi-annual reports per year. After 1981 the standard requirement has been for three quarterly and one final, annual report. The actual pattern of receipt of reports varied somewhat from this. Some projects failed to report regularly, while in a few cases, the reports were submitted with greater frequency and detail than was required. The report forms focused on the activities performed, achievements in relation to targets, and future plans. As far as we are able to tell, reports submitted by project directors to the Coordination Unit were always the same as those they submitted to the other agencies within the Ministry of Agriculture [normally, in recent years, the Directorate of Agrarian Economy]. The only reports which non-MONAP unit heads in the Ministry of Agriculture are required to submit are two-monthly financial reports, needed for the release of funds. The spread of the practice of submitting MONAP-style reports could in

principle be considered positive. The problem lay in their use [see below]. MONAP did not thus impose any especially onerous reporting obligations on project directors, and in some cases provided them with assistance in completing their reports.

There are no grounds to complain about the inadequacy of the volume of written reports from projects. The problems lie in other quarters. In the first place, and most importantly, there appears to have been very little feedback from the recipients in the Ministry of Agriculture, whether in MONAP or DEA, often because they were simply too busy. It is likely that this situation has worsened in recent years as the Ministry has become 'projectified' — overwhelmed with more than a hundred separate foreign funded projects [see Section 13]. The knowledge that reports were not being used was probably not beneficial to the morale of the project staff in the field, and raises questions about the wisdom of requiring so much written reporting. In the second place, the reporting system involved [a] very little external **verification** of the project directors' reports; [b] no real concern with the **impact** of projects on the supposed beneficiaries. The emphasis in reporting was on the performance of the activities themselves — e.g. the proportion of building work complete — or even less direct indicators of work capacity, such as the number of vehicles in service. The absence of verification is true even of relatively straightforward issues such as reported inventories. One must recognise the extreme difficulties of verifying activities and assessing project impacts in the field. In practice, and with a few significant exceptions, especially in the mid-1980s, the staff who might have done more work in these areas — the economists attached to MONAP with formal evaluation responsibilities — tended to be diverted to more urgent matters. Evaluation became largely a sporadic activity conducted by visiting consultants [see below].

There was some kind of institutionalised reporting system for MONAP projects but inadequate capacity, especially within the Ministry of Agriculture, to make very effective use of those reports which were submitted. The experience of MONAP was not however so very different from that of so many rural development projects in many parts of the world. Certain themes are very familiar: the integration into one programme of a complex range of diverse activities which then appear to demand a complex [and time-consuming] reporting system; the preparation of elaborate monitoring systems that prove impractical; detailed reports from the field that hide as much as they reveal; and senior staff too busy to read and act upon the reports they do receive. Given the circumstances prevailing in Mozambique, there is no reason to believe that the reporting systems for MONAP projects were particularly deficient; that the MONAP management was mainly responsible; or that a better reporting system could have noticeably improved project performance. The deficiencies in monitoring reflect the environment generally.

14.3 Staff completion reports

The completion reports of expatriate staff comprised another source of relatively routine information from the project level that was potentially of use as a management tool. These completion reports were however required only of FAO and SIDA employed experts. Cooperants were not requested to submit completion reports, although some did so. There was however no standard format. Reports

dealt with a variety of themes, from very personal employment circumstances to broad interpretations of the evolution of Mozambican agriculture. It does not appear as if they could have been used, or were used, to any substantial degree.

14.4 Evaluations

Hitherto, three significant general evaluations of MONAP have been completed: the final evaluation of Phase I in 1980 [reference 101]; the mid-term evaluation of Phase II in 1982 [reference 29]; and the mid-term evaluation of Phase III in 1986, which was actually described as an 'Inspection Report' [reference 16]. There have been in addition, and especially during Phase III, a large number of evaluations on specific sectors, projects and issues. The reports are listed in Annex Three.

The first point to note is that virtually all these evaluations — and all the general evaluations listed above — were conducted entirely by non-Mozambicans, most of them visiting consultants. This was not the expressed intention. At the very beginning of MONAP there was formal agreement that evaluations would be joint Mozambican-Nordic activities. And arrangements were made at the beginning of MONAP III to have the Centre for African Studies at Eduardo Mondlane University regularly involved in the evaluation process. The reasons why these intentions bore so little fruit are not entirely clear, although they no doubt include scarcity of competent Mozambican personnel. The result, and the main general point we wish to make here, is that the near-absence of Mozambican participation in the evaluation process tended to exacerbate the degree of instability that is generated by relying on external consultants. For the views of outside consultants who know little about Mozambique, although in many respects valuable and to some degree essential, can be very much influenced by personal characteristics or other peripheral considerations. And the consultants tend to be different each time. These points can be illustrated from the very different character of the three general evaluations listed above.

The final evaluation of MONAP I was conducted by a large team [12 members] of Nordic males. The report is remarkable for its blandness and the generally-uncritical support it gives to the continuation of MONAP.

The mid-term evaluation of Phase II has already been discussed in the **Introduction** and in Section 13. It comprised a small team of academic social scientists who became deeply exercised about certain aspects of the programme, notably concerns about equity and about the apparent neglect of the family sector to the benefit of the state sector. The report is intellectually impressive, but elicited a rather negative response in Maputo because of this apparent narrow focus, a certain 'crusading' style, and an apparent unwillingness to consider sympathetically the wide range of factors which had led up to the situation they found. For instance, there was little apparent sympathy for the argument that MONAP had originally focused on the dairying and forestry sectors simply because these were the sub-sectors of agriculture in which Nordic expertise was most developed.

The mid-term evaluation of MONAP III — the 'Inspection Mission' — was very different again. It was brief and in many respects a 'diplomatic exercise'. The three members visited few projects, but concentrated their efforts on [a] avoiding a repeat of the acrimony that had followed the 1982 evaluation; and [b] interceding

between the Government of Mozambique and the Nordic donors to try to ensure that the 'run down' and eventual bilateralisation of MONAP was organised effectively and without major conflict. The Mission provided very little material for discussion in relation to the content or direction of the MONAP projects.

There is a sense here in which these general evaluations were not independent exercises but to some degree, especially in 1986, tools used by the Nordic programme management for particular management purposes. We would not necessarily condemn this. But it has meant that the evaluation element in MONAP has been a little arbitrary. A clearer evaluation policy, more autonomy from the Nordic management of MONAP for those organising the evaluation, and a consistent Mozambican participation in the evaluation process would probably have produced a more useful product. It would certainly have produced a little more predictability. Evaluation reports should not be fully predictable, but the people being evaluated should have some knowledge of what evaluation involves, how it will be done, and what criteria will be applied.

15. DID MONAP HELP MOZAMBICANS TO HELP THEMSELVES?

15.1 A problem without parallel

The first point to make is that the institutional and personnel position of the Mozambican state just after Independence was, if not unique, certainly far worse than that of any other newly-independent nation in Eastern or Southern Africa. The rapid departure of the Portuguese had left so many organisations, public and private, without technical or managerial staff. Colonial rule had, notoriously, failed to educate the vast mass of the population or in any other way train and encourage them participate in their own government. And the in-coming Frelimo government wanted to run Mozambique very differently from the way the Portuguese had done.

The second point to make is that the position is not much improved today, a decade and a half later. Some evidence of this in relation to the institutional functioning the Ministry of Agriculture is provided in Section 13.2. In relation to personnel, a 1987 survey revealed that the Ministry employed 190 managers and technicians, but only 77 people with higher education experience, and another 61 who had completed high school. The situation in agricultural state enterprises was even worse [reference 174, p.53]. It is very common to meet people with, say, four years of education, holding senior public service posts. In terms of institutional and personnel development the Ministry of Agriculture, like the Mozambican state more generally, still has a long way to go.

It would not be appropriate to attribute the slow pace of institutional and personnel development with the Ministry mainly to MONAP. For MONAP was only one of many elements in the picture, and not a major one. At the same time, we have no hesitation in concluding that the most significant mis-match between [a] the stated [and frequently re-stated] objectives of MONAP and [b] the strategies actually pursued, lies in the areas of personnel training and staff development. The performance of the MONAP programme was inadequate, all the more so as the nature and seriousness of the problem appears to have been evident at the beginning. The responses were too half-hearted and too conventional. We can examine them by making a rough distinction between training efforts and efforts to develop institutions.

15.2 Responses to the problem – training

There were four acknowledged training elements in the MONAP programme:

1) Formal agricultural training

This was originally conceived to be the response to the problem of the lack of trained cadres in the agricultural sector. Large numbers of agricultural technicians would be trained by greatly expanding the number and capacity of the training schools. The fact that the training issue was conceived in this fashion undoubtedly reflects the emphasis on state farms and the state sector in general at the beginning of MONAP. The intention was to produce people who could work at a supervisory level in state enterprises, and thus help overcome the enormous problem facing the managers of those enterprises. [State enterprises have been the major employer of trained agricultural technicians — see reference 63, p.8].

On MONAP's agricultural training school initiative can be said that: [a] it took very much longer than anticipated to build the training facilities; [b] a range of institutional and personnel problems, all exacerbated by war, meant that even the physical facilities which were available have been used to only a fraction of their capacity; [c] there has even been a problem in finding students with adequate educational backgrounds to cope with the demands of technical courses; and [d] courses designed to train people to work in highly mechanised agriculture appear decreasingly relevant in the light of current and likely future economic circumstances.

The formal programme of agricultural education has, **so far**, failed to have any significant impact on the general human resources problem in the agricultural sector. However, even had the training programme achieved more, it could only have tackled one front of a very broad problem. Training agricultural technicians in the 1970s or 1980s could have very little impact, then or in future decades, on the shortage of trained managers, technical staff, or policymakers at middle and senior levels in the Ministry of Agriculture and all associated agricultural enterprises and institutions. The problem was in fact very narrowly conceived, as if the major problem lay at junior technical level.

2) Technical assistance

The very considerable quantity of technical assistance provided to Mozambique under MONAP has been organised along conventional lines. Each expatriate expert has been expected to work with a designated Mozambican counterpart, but

[a] the expert is not in any important degree selected for any special ability to train counterparts in this fashion and [b] there is no mechanism to evaluate either the performance of the parties involved or the results of the arrangement. There are good reasons to believe that the expert-counterpart arrangement is not very effective even under relatively favourable conditions. Conditions under MONAP have rarely been favourable. Counterparts have frequently had so little training compared with experts that the notion of professional partnership of any kind has been completely inapplicable. Yet the training responsibilities have not been specified nor their performance monitored. Worse, it has often been literally impossible for the Mozambican government to find counterparts at all. To some degree, the managers of MONAP from the Nordic side appear to have become caught up in the ridiculous 'game' played by so many aid donors — insisting that their own projects should be provided with counterparts, in the full knowledge that, given the absolute scarcity of qualified Mozambicans, one project's gain is another's loss.

Table 15(1): Destinations of Mozambican nationals funded by MONAP for foreign travel, 1987-1989*

Country or Region	Number of visits**
Nordic countries	5
United Kingdom	14
Portugal	7
Other Europe	7
Zimbabwe	25
Other Africa	20
Brazil	10
North America	5
Others	9
Total	102

Notes: * The data were supplied by the MONAP Coordination Unit, and were easily available only for these three years.

** The numbers relate to individuals.

We do not have any firm information on the overall contribution of MONAP's technical assistance to personnel development in Mozambique. There are some success stories in the cases of particular institutions. But there is good reason to believe that the overall picture is not very promising. This is especially likely given the rather short periods of service completed by most MONAP expatriate staff [see Section 16]. Those who served longer periods tended to be the senior staff of the Coordination Unit [Section 13], where little effective training of Mozambicans took place [see Section 15]. It is virtually axiomatic that expatriates who serve for only two years, and who come with only limited command of the local language, are unlikely to effectively train the people with whom they work. Such people become 'gap-fillers': they simply do a job. That is no bad thing. There is a great

need for expatriate gap-fillers in Mozambique, and will be for some years ahead. As many people observed to us, the MONAP technical assistance programme did not actually distinguish very clearly between those expatriates who were expected to be only gap-fillers and those who were expected to make some further contribution to the development of local staff.

3) Overseas courses

One of the most flexible elements in the MONAP budget has been funds available to send Mozambicans overseas for short training courses, study tours, conferences and similar activities. Some details of the numbers and locations of such activities for recent years are presented in Table 15(1). The range of activities is extremely diverse, as are the nature of the participants. They range from agronomy students to senior staff of the Ministry of Agriculture to the clerical staff of the Coordination Unit. It is not possible to evaluate this kind of 'training' with any rigour. It almost certainly has positive benefits for Mozambique, especially perhaps in challenging and changing perspectives. But everything we know about training and learning suggests that such isolated, individual and mainly short term experiences can contribute little to the acquisition of technical skills or to changes in professional attitude.

4) Strengthening DRH

Institutional support, in the form of funds and technical assistance, was provided to the training and personnel directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture [DRH — the Directorate of Human Resources] under MONAP III. This presumably reflects a perception that the training elements in MONAP were not going well, and required stronger direction. In practice, the training responsibilities of DRH are largely limited to supervising the agricultural training schools supported from MONAP and other sources. DRH exercises no staff development functions within the Ministry. Indeed, the Ministry is extremely decentralised [or fragmented] in relation to personnel issues. Foreign-funded **projects** recruit and pay their own staff; other staff are paid separately by other units in the Ministry or in the provinces. DRH has no involvement with salary issues, and very little with recruitment or promotions.

Without a substantial change in the organisation of the Ministry of Agriculture, the strengthening of DRH would have been unlikely to help much in staff development, although it might have improved the implementation of the projects for agricultural training schools. In practice, and despite MONAP support, this 'strengthening' did not take place. DRH has become known as a very weak Directorate, and has, among other problems, suffered a high rate of turnover of senior staff. Even in respect of the agricultural training schools it has been losing ground to other agencies; the Ministry of Education has assumed control of some schools [see Section 23]; and, in the Ministry of Agriculture itself, other Directorates have in recent years begun to establish their own training centres.

The weakness of DRH is not particularly surprising. Training sections of large public organisations tend to control no significant resources, and thus not to attract the more ambitious or able staff. The really significant training-related resources in the Ministry of Agriculture were the foreign currency resources to send people abroad. And these were kept under the control of the MONAP Coordination Unit [see above].

15.3 Was there really a strategy?

The ambiguity of the attitude of the authorities responsible for MONAP to the training issue can be demonstrated from the Agreed Minutes of Mozambique-Nordic meetings relating to MONAP early in the programme. On the one hand, one sees the powerful commitment to the idea of training over a wide area, and not just in the context of the agricultural training schools:

"It was agreed that extended training opportunities ranging from practical on-the-job training to formal courses should, as far as possible, be made available to the personnel running the projects. In the further planning of various activities within the programme, great attention will therefore be paid to training aspects" [reference 152, p.3 — the 'Agreed Minutes' for 1977].

On the other hand, there was no sign of anyone taking the steps necessary to realise such objectives. The Agreed Minutes for 1979 record the decision to ask MONAP project managers to prepare training plans for their staff and include the costs in next year's budget! It is difficult to see how project managers, busy with other things, often located outside Maputo, and presumably not training specialists, [a] could have possessed adequate knowledge of training possibilities; [b] could have been the best people to assess their staff's training needs; and [c] could have been fully committed to the importance of releasing staff for training when so many urgent tasks were pressing.

It seems clear that MONAP's general staff training intentions failed because no mechanism was ever created to press for their implementation or actually implement them. Many people worried about the issue, and more plans and declarations were produced. For example, the project documents for Phase III have quite specific and ambitious — but unrealised — plans for the training of the Mozambican staff of the Coordination Unit. We return below to the question of what might have been done instead.

15.4 Institutional development

The term 'institutional development' means many different things to different people. We do not intend to enter into a debate here. In using the term we are dealing with the same issues and problems as we have dealt with above under the heading of personnel development, but are placing a special emphasis on organisations or agencies rather than individuals. Institutional and personnel development go very closely together.

Yet 'institutional development' is altogether a more nebulous process than 'personnel development'. It is easier both to identify and recognise the development of individuals and to gain some impression of the causes than it is to either identify or explain the development of institutions. Since MONAP had no clear policy on 'institutional development' — i.e. no definable general strategy for causing it to happen — it is very difficult to identify the causal linkages between [a] MONAP support to particular organisations and [b] the apparent occurrence or non-occurrence of institutional development in those organisations. So many other factors entered into the situation. We can make three general observations on the issue:

1) There are certainly a number of cases in which institutional development has taken place in organisations receiving substantial MONAP support. In such cases there is a strong presumption that MONAP support played a positive role. We would cite in particular the cases of the Forestry and Livestock Directorates of the Ministry of Agriculture and INIVE. [The fact that FAO technical assistance played a major role in the first case does not invalidate our argument, for this assistance was provided with MONAP funds]. There are, conversely, cases where MONAP support has not been associated with institutional development. The Human Resources Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture is cited above as one such case. The Directorate of Agrarian Economy may be considered another.

2) As one might expect, some of the most effective cases of institutional development are likely to result from rather heavy institutional support notably in the form of [a] funds and expatriate personnel and [b] support from specialist institutions in the Nordic countries. AGRICOM is a case under point [a], and SEMOC qualifies under both points [see Section 17].

3) The performance of the MONAP Coordination Unit in relation to institutional development has been far less positive than one would have wished. There are two dimensions to this issue, the 'intentional' and the 'unintentional'. At the unintentional level we 'know', although partly through deductive reasoning as much as through direct evidence, that the existence of a powerful and competent but essentially foreign agency like the Coordination Unit effectively deprived Mozambican agencies of the opportunities to gain experience and learn by their own mistakes. As is mentioned above, the Human Resources Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture was effectively 'deprived', by virtue of the existence of the Coordination Unit, of any control over the allocation of foreign training and travel opportunities.

There will however always be disagreements with the line of argument put forward above. How can we know that Mozambican agencies could have taken and learned from the opportunities of which they were 'deprived'? More satisfactory evidence comes from the 'intentional' level. The following quotation comes from the evaluation of MONAP administration commissioned in 1987:

"In retrospect, it can be said that the MONAP supporting units have given priority to the efficiency part of the work. The daily and short term problems have been numerous and urgent. Duties with a long term perspective, like the transference of know-how, have not found time and attention" [reference 55, pp.7-8].

A study of the MONAP Procurement Unit, commissioned in the following year, reaches similar conclusions about the failure to transfer knowledge and competence about procurement procedures to Mozambican staff [reference 49, p.2, p.5, and p.6]. As is explained in Section 13, the management of the Coordination Unit showed limited enthusiasm for integrating their work with that of the relevant sections of the Ministry of Agriculture in adequate time to ensure real continuity of institutions and personnel.

The absence of any real commitment on the part of the management of the

Coordination Unit to Mozambican 'institutional development' in relation to the Unit's own functions must be taken as an indicator of the absence of any strong commitment to institutional development in the programme as a whole.

15.5 Were there alternatives?

Our major conclusion about what happened under MONAP is of a very critical nature. Although the acuteness of the problems of institutions and personnel were recognised, the means actually employed to tackle these problems — expatriate technical assistance, funding training schools, sending Mozambicans on short trips overseas — were very conventional and standard for an aid programme. They are means which do not generally seem to be very effective in more 'normal' situations of underdevelopment. For the peculiar circumstances of Mozambique they were very inadequate. The formal commitment to a broader training programme was never made operational because no agency was made responsible for doing anything about it. Talk of the importance of training and institutional development became in effect part of the ritual of official discussions.

Such criticism is easy. What could have been done instead? We have three major suggestions, although we note that the first two in particular may not have been acceptable to the Government of Mozambique:

1) Institutional and personnel development should have been declared as the main objective of MONAP [if not in 1977, then by 1980]. And the pattern of Nordic administration should have been tailored to meet that objective. That would imply above all that the senior Nordic expert in Mozambique — the person occupying the Coordinator's post — should have been made responsible solely for institutional and personnel development, and given the supporting staff necessary to do this job. Such a post would logically have been located within the Human Resources Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture.

2) The problem of lack of competent and experienced managers and policymakers within the Ministry of Agriculture should have been tackled by creating a long-term apprenticeship scheme for young people. This would imply [a] selecting batches of young people, identified by a range of aptitude tests rather than through educational achievement, from the upper ranges of the formal education system; and [b] providing for them definite career paths to the upper reaches of the Ministry through a combination of on-the-job experience [starting at low levels], short term training in specific skills [e.g. numeracy, writing, verbal presentation], and longer term formal education, possibly ultimately overseas. The basic idea is widely employed by large scale private and public organisations in many countries to select and train cadres of people who can both rise to senior management levels while still relatively young and achieve this promotion on the basis of a familiarity with work in the lower levels of the organisation. [Indeed, SEMOC has a written set of training objectives of this kind and a budget to carry them out.] Many variants are possible, but most would imply that participants remain in the programme for about ten years. One would plan for a high rate of 'drop-outs' on the way, and expect that many 'graduates' would leave the Ministry for other jobs. In most cases the benefits of their training would still accrue to Mozambique.

3) As has been discussed in Sections 15.2 above and 16, the way in which

expatriate technical assistance was provided to Mozambique was not optimal. Experts came as individuals, concerned about their jobs back home, and lacking technical, professional or moral support from home. Relatively few extended their period of service much beyond two years, and in effect tended to leave just at the point where they were potentially of real use to Mozambique. The organisations which recruited them and to which they related in Maputo — the DCO for SIDA experts, the FAO office for FAO experts, and the Coordination Unit for MONAP cooperants — could relate only as administrators, and could provide no technical or professional support. It would seem far better to attempt to organise technical assistance on a decentralised basis, directly between individual organisations in Mozambique and counterpart organisations in the Nordic countries. The rationale for such arrangements is spelled out in more detail in Section 16.4. The most important point for present purposes is that institutional development in Mozambique is more likely to occur in the context of direct cooperative arrangements between organisations working in the same field than if the Nordic input is provided in the form of a series of 'disconnected' individuals coordinated through a generalist administrative apparatus.

16. DID MONAP EMPLOY THE RIGHT FOREIGNERS?

The view has been advanced earlier in this report that MONAP should have been planned and implemented with a primary concern for the issue of **institutional development** in Mozambique. If one were to accept this view, then it would follow that the issues of the selection, preparation and deployment of the foreign technical assistance staff whose services cost the programme about 273 million SEK [about \$US 46 million at current exchange rates] would feature very high on the agendas for the recurrent monitoring, evaluation and reformulation of the programme. The fact that these issues received relatively little attention — and never appear to have been the subject of any major report or investigation — is perhaps further evidence of the limited importance which has in practice been attached to the broader issue of institutional development. Only one of the MONAP documents which we viewed [reference 179] deals exclusively with personnel issues; it provides some useful factual information on the administration of MONAP cooperants.

The absence of any previous investigation of technical assistance issues is of course a hindrance to successfully completing the final evaluation. This was somewhat balanced by the ability of the MONAP Coordination Unit and the Personnel Division of SIDA [Stockholm] to provide us with some basic statistics on cooperants and SIDA-recruited experts respectively. The tabulation of these statistics [see Tables 16(1) and 16(2)] throws considerable light on a number of questions. Before dealing with these issues we will briefly explain the three main categories of foreign staff employed under MONAP. [For numbers see Table 16(1)].

16.1 Categories of foreign staff

1) **FAO Experts** were recruited and serviced by FAO [Rome] at the expense of the MONAP budget. This personnel service was one of a number of services that it was originally intended that FAO should provide to MONAP. In fact it turned out to be the main one. [FAO was heavily involved in the preparation of MONAP I, but was rarely called upon to provide routine technical services, as originally envisaged]. And even this personnel service from FAO was, for reasons not entirely clear, largely terminated at the end of Phase Two [see Table 16(1)]. The main specific reason for using the FAO was to take advantage of its world-wide recruitment network. In general, posts were referred to FAO if: [a] it was thought that recruitment in the Nordic countries would be difficult, [b] if attempts to recruit there had been unsuccessful; or [c] if it were considered especially important to guarantee the professional calibre of staff. The FAO mechanism thus provided a degree of flexibility in the face of problems with Nordic recruitment [see below]. The main disadvantage of FAO recruitment was that the costs of their Experts were appreciably higher than for people recruited as SIDA Experts. The evaluation team was unable to consult records on FAO Experts.

Table 16(1): MONAP foreign staff by employment status and extent of post occupancy. 1978-1987*

Date	SIDA Experts		FAO Experts		Cooperants and others**	
	No. of persons in post	% of available posts not occ.	No. of persons in post	% of available posts not occ.	No. of persons in post	% of available posts not occ.
28/2/78	10	80%	9	59%	8	33%
15/8/78	21	32%	15	46%	10	47%
15/2/79	25	32%	20	41%	14	22%
15/8/79	27	23%	25	37%	15	42%
15/8/80	29	6%	32	18%	11	72%
15/2/81	26	53%	40	31%	26	69%
31/12/81	33	34%	39	17%	80	50%
31/12/82	36	23%	36	8%	136	38%
31/12/83	27	18%	32	6%	117	44%
31/12/84	21	34%	31	0%	120	37%
31/12/85	12	52%	9	40%	81	21%
31/12/86	15	32%	4	0%	81	20%
31/12/87	12	29%	3	0%	90	5%

Notes: * The figures in the tables in this section were obtained either from MONAP regular reports or from lists on cooperants and SIDA Experts provided by the MONAP Coordination Unit and SIDA [Stockholm] respectively. We noted that alternative sources of information on the same 'fact' were not always fully consistent one with another. There is however no reason to doubt the accuracy of the broad pictures suggested by the figures.

** The 'others' category refers to Portuguese nationals directly employed by MONAP in the early years of the programme before the category of MONAP cooperants was created. The reports do not always distinguish persons in the two categories in the period 1979 to 1981 when the two were in effect being merged.

2) **SIDA Experts** is the term we will use for people recruited for MONAP by SIDA [Stockholm] under standard SIDA arrangements and employment conditions. The Maputo DCO shared responsibility for them in Mozambique. SIDA recruitment was effectively limited to people resident in the Nordic countries. Most SIDA Experts were Nordic nationals. As is discussed below, recruitment was a recurrent problem.

3) **Cooperants** do not in fact appear on the list of MONAP staff until the end of 1979. In the period 1977 to 1981, MONAP employed a number of foreigners locally in Mozambique, almost all of them Portuguese nationals, on direct contracts not governed by any formal employment scheme. It was the evident need for and usefulness of foreigners prepared to work for lower salaries than FAO or SIDA experts, combined with the willingness of many supporters of Mozambique worldwide to come and work directly in support of Frelimo policies, which led to the creation of a formal category of MONAP Cooperants. 'Cooperants' was, and is, the general term used for foreigners who come to Mozambique to work in the public sector. MONAP cooperants were given salaries more attractive than those of most other cooperants, and over time these salaries [and other benefits] have been increased relative to those of SIDA Experts such that, depending in part on how one weights different components of the total benefit package, some people see the remuneration levels as being broadly similar.

The first cooperant was formally recruited in late 1979. Numbers rapidly increased to reach a peak in 1982. Since that time cooperants have accounted for the vast majority of MONAP's foreign employees [Table 16(1)]. Cooperants are recruited directly by the MONAP Coordination Unit, and are thus formally employees of the Government of Mozambique. Some are recruited in Mozambique; they are sometimes the spouses of other foreigners already employed in Maputo. Overseas recruitment has tended to be a recurrent problem. It was only in the mid-1980s that permanent recruitment agency relations were established in the Nordic countries. This has been associated with an increasing proportion of Nordic nationals in the cadre [see below].

16.2 Evaluating performance

It is extremely difficult for several reasons to evaluate the performance of foreign technical assistance staff in most circumstances. Their roles are often diffuse and ill-defined; and a wide range of issues connected with cross-cultural interaction result in widely differing judgements about the same individuals. In the MONAP case there are scarcely any written evaluations or records. This is especially true in the case of cooperants. Although they are employed on annual contracts, the normal practice has been to renew the contract automatically in the absence of a negative signal from either the employee or his/her superior. Despite attempts to establish such a routine, it has not been the practice for either cooperants themselves or their superior officers to return regular reports on their work. End-of-contract completion reports have been routinely requested from FAO and SIDA Experts, but not from cooperants. These reports vary widely in the type of issues they cover.

Rather predictably, opinions about the performance of MONAP's foreign employees vary widely. Certain stereotypes also get repeated. One, for example,

concerns Latin American political refugees, initially resident in Sweden, who were allegedly able to obtain jobs on the basis of spurious qualifications because of the impossibility of verifying their records. It is also sometimes suggested that recruitment from particular countries is dominated by patronage networks, or that, at some points at least, ideological considerations have dominated over technical proficiency in recruitment of cooperants. We have no way of assessing the overall quality of MONAP foreign staff. The fact that, for much of the programme, recruitment mechanisms for cooperants have been rather rudimentary has meant that there has been scope for inappropriate selection. Yet there seems little doubt that a sense of commitment to and enthusiasm for Mozambique and government policies has been exhibited by a large proportion of MONAP foreign staff, especially no doubt in the early years when enthusiasm was more abundant in general.

To say that the quality of foreign personnel was 'not bad' is not however necessarily to say that it could not have been improved. There are some plausible criticisms that have some factual support.

One of the more common complaints about the administration of MONAP was that SIDA [Stockholm] was very slow in recruiting experts, and that posts frequently had to be cancelled [or re-allocated to FAO recruitment] because of failure to find suitable candidates. There is considerable truth in such claims. We were told that there has in recent years been an average time lag of about a year between the initial identification of a SIDA expert post and the arrival of the successful applicant in Maputo. The figures in Table 16(1) demonstrate that the ratio of unfilled posts has generally been much higher for SIDA Experts than for FAO Experts [in particular] or cooperants. It has also often been the case that SIDA [Stockholm] has been able to find only a single candidate for the posts it has filled, leaving the Government of Mozambique with little effective choice. This has been true even of very senior positions.

One explanation for this state of affairs, which appears to have some plausibility, is that major recruitment efforts were never mounted outside Sweden, and that the potential pool of Nordic talent was not fully explored. If the point is valid, it is not clear whether responsibility lay more with SIDA [for not recruiting more vigorously in the other Nordic countries], or with the other Nordic aid agencies [for not giving sufficient support]. However, we consider this to be a secondary issue in explaining the overall problem with the SIDA recruitment of experts. The main point is that there was a direct contradiction between [a] the principle, in itself very understandable, of confining recruitment mainly to Nordic nationals; and [b] the fact that the pool of potential expertise in the Nordic countries was simply not big enough to supply MONAP adequately, especially at the relative modest salaries [from a Nordic perspective] paid to SIDA experts, and in a context where Mozambique was thought to be a difficult and dangerous place to work. This point about nationality impinges on the recruitment of other staff categories in addition to SIDA experts.

16.3 The nationality issue

There is documentary evidence that, at the early stages of preparation of MONAP, the Government of Mozambique was aware of the shortage of relevant Nordic

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technical expertise and concerned about the language issue. A preference was expressed for the recruitment of Portuguese nationals. In fact Portuguese nationals have always been the largest single contingent of MONAP foreign staff. And Brazilians and Spanish-speakers from Latin America have also been present in very large numbers. This was because of the relatively large numbers of FAO Experts and cooperants in relation to SIDA Experts [see Table 16(1)]. SIDA Experts have been predominantly Nordic nationals. In the early years of the programme, MONAP's foreign staff constituted a delightfully cosmopolitan group of people. There was no very marked association between nationality and seniority or location of posting. Although Portuguese and Latin Americans were employed relatively more frequently as cooperants rather than as experts, Nordics, whether SIDA experts or cooperants, were just as likely as other employees to be located outside Maputo.

Table 16(2): SIDA Experts in MONAP according to job category and average period of service

Job Category*	Number of persons**	Average period of service [months]
Machinery and workshop staff	18	21.1
Agriculture and natural resource experts	39	24.8
Trainers, including training administrators and advisers	12	26.3
'Advisory professionals'***	16	33.3
Senior management and financial staff****	17	34.9
Other support staff	11	27.1
Total	113	27.3

Notes: * These job categories were constructed by the evaluation team.

** The data relate only to those people whose contracts began before the end of 1986.

*** Includes economists, planners, a sociologist, a transport planner and management and financial advisers.

**** Of the people in this category, 14 served in the MONAP Coordination Unit as Coordinators, Deputy Coordinators, Financial Controllers, Building Coordinators and Heads of Procurement. They averaged 35.6 months of service.

The absence of a dominant Nordic component among MONAP's foreign staff may or may not have posed practical problems in the early years; it is not possible to judge from this distance. It however came to be perceived as a problem by people able to influence the situation. From around 1983, when so many other changes were taking place in the basic character of MONAP [see Sections 1 and 12], more vigorous attempts were made to increase the proportion of Nordic nationals within the cadre of cooperants. This was successful. [The tendency for MONAP cooperants' salaries to be increased relative to both SIDA Experts and other cooperants serving in Mozambique may be related as both cause and effect.] Another policy change helped to increase the Nordic staff component, although

there is no evidence that this was the intention. After the end of MONAP II in 1984, the programme ceased almost completely to employ FAO Experts [Table 16(1)]. FAO had recruited very widely. After 1985, the Nordic component of MONAP's foreign personnel was considerably increased.

Given the way in which MONAP was embedded in political and diplomatic relations between Mozambique and the Nordic countries, one can see a justification for ensuring good Nordic representation among the programme's personnel. There seems however to be little doubt that this was achieved at the expense of the efficiency of technical assistance in the narrow sense. For recruiting Nordic nationals incurred two, perhaps three, kinds of costs, all of them stemming from the relative unattractiveness of MONAP posts to people accustomed to some of the highest living standards in the world and a high degree of security in daily life. The first has been mentioned above: recruitment delays [for SIDA experts], with unmeasurable negative effects on programme performance and the morale of staff in the field. A possible second cost relates to the intrinsic quality of staff recruited. We have no evidence on this and do not see how evidence could practically be obtained. It does however appear plausible on deductive grounds that, for any given salary level, more qualified and competent candidates would be available from relatively lower income countries like Portugal and Brazil.

It is in relation to the third cost that we have the least unsatisfactory numerical evidence: the figures in Table 16(2) on the average periods of service completed by SIDA Experts. It appears overwhelmingly likely that the usefulness of foreign technical personnel working in a strange country [and an unfamiliar language] will tend to increase considerably once they have settled down and understood the context in which they are working. There seems to be widespread agreement that technical assistance personnel tend to be much more useful in their third year than in their second, and more in their fourth year than in their third. The figures demonstrate firstly that MONAP's foreign personnel tended to serve for too brief periods. For example, taking only staff recruited before the end of 1986 to avoid including periods of service cut short by the ending of MONAP, one finds that only 25% of SIDA Experts and 30% of cooperants served for 36 months or more. Average periods of service were 27 and 29 months respectively. Few SIDA experts extended their initial two year contract beyond one or two extra months.

The second conclusion to be drawn from the figures on service periods is that the Nordic personnel, on average, served for shorter periods than all other nationality categories, and thus contributed most to reducing the overall average period of service. This is especially evident in relation to the cooperants. While the overall average period of service for the [mainly Nordic] SIDA Experts is considerably longer than for Nordic cooperants [compare Table 16(2)], the former figure is somewhat distorted by a phenomenon already referred to in Section 12. Among the SIDA Experts, it was almost entirely the more senior and professional staff, especially those managing the MONAP Coordination Unit, who served for long periods of time. Those SIDA Experts working in more ordinary Mozambique conditions, and more with Mozambicans, tended like the Nordic cooperants not even to complete two years of service. Of the fifty seven occupants of the first two job categories in Table 16(2), only 6 [10%] served 36 months or more.

16.4 Some Implications

From the perspective of attempting to understand the MONAP experience, one implication appears to be that the policy decision taken in the early 1980s to increase the Nordic component among MONAP's foreign staff was probably mistaken on efficiency grounds. [We recognise the value of developing the Nordic technical assistance cadre, but wonder how far MONAP personnel policy was actually oriented to this end]. The more important point however is that, leaving aside the issue of whether the right kind of technical assistance was identified from the point of view of institutional development [see Section 15], the system of recruiting and employing foreign staff was not as well adapted as it might have been to finding good people in reasonable time and keeping them long enough in service.

There are at least three avenues to be explored by Mozambique and the Nordic donors in attempting to improve the situation in future:

1) More attention must be given to avoiding situations where expert recruitment is confined to such a small pool of potential candidates that the quality and timeliness of recruitment is compromised. The main methods of increasing the size of the pool are salary increases, reduction in nationality restrictions, and establishing a wider recruitment network.

2) A more cost-effective approach which would raise fewer implementation problems might be to weight the remuneration package for experts to provide incentives to serve for third and fourth years.

3) A more complex and difficult approach, but one which might be especially valuable in the long term, is to change the emphasis in expert provision from SIDA-recruited individuals serving on limited terms to inter-institutional relations between organisations in the recipient and the donor country respectively. This notion is an integral part of the proposal, already outlined in Section 15, to broaden the basis of aid from a purely government-to-government relationship. How it would work in practice would be difficult to say. It is relatively easier to envisage how it might operate in relation to teaching, research and investigatory activities [university departments, laboratories, natural resource investigation agencies etc.]. The objective would be to improve the quality of technical cooperation by [a] providing technical assistance personnel with adequate job security at home; [b] providing them and their local counterparts with technical [and morale] backup from the institution in the donor country; and [c] establishing a collective experience and memory to reduce the amount of resources required to 'break in' each new expatriate expert.

PART THREE: EVALUATION OF A MONAP PROJECT

The original report, which may be obtained from SIDA, contains a number of project evaluations. There are separate sections on Livestock, Seeds, Forestry, AGRICOM, Support to the Peasant Sector, Mecanagro and Machinery Spares, Training Schools, Marracuene, Beira Green Zones, Beira-Dondo small-scale industries, Fish Farming, Beekeeping, and The Directorate of Agrarian Economy.

Due to the limited space in this publication, we here, as an example of the project evaluations, present only chapter 18 of the original report.

17. SEEDS

Projects: CR-1 and Project 41, SNS, Project 42, SEMOC/Svalof

17.1 Brief history and expenditure

1977. The project began as a complex project with several agencies involved, including three national directorates, INIA and the UNDP/FAO Seed Production and Protection Project.

1978. MONAP-financed seed-cleaning equipment was installed at Chokwe and Chimvis. Seed production activities began in Manica and Sofala provinces. Security problems were already reported.

1979. The project was fully staffed with four SIDA experts and four FAO experts. There was a lack of suitable material for multiplication.

1980. Empresa Nacional de Sementes [ENS] was established. Seed production targets were set as part of the 5-year plan, 1980-85. Six seed cleaning centres were planned for Chimoio, Lichinga, Lioma, Moambe, Lionde and Namialo. State farms were responsible for seed multiplication as contract growers.

1983. It became clear that seed multiplication arrangements were unsatisfactory and the decision was taken to develop a 2,500 hectare rice seed farm on irrigated land at Lionde in the Chokwe irrigation scheme.

1984. The decision was taken to focus seed production and cleaning activities only in Lionde, Chimoio and Namialo with MONAP support. Two stations were

virtually abandoned because of security problems.

1985. A 10-year seed development programme was prepared by ENS with MONAP support and presented to SIDA. Proposals were accepted in principle but the emphasis on short term consultancies and technical assistance was rejected.

1986. A new project document was produced which included proposals for the involvement of a management agency which would be responsible for turning ENS into a commercial profit-motivated company. The management contract was awarded to Svalof of Sweden, a seed company with international interests. The initial task was the formation of a new company with the Government of Mozambique as the majority shareholder. Work on the development of the company began immediately.

1987. The first Svalof personnel arrived in early 1987. National seed policy guidelines were issued. The name of the enterprises was changed to Sementes de Mocambique Lda. [SEMOC] and the directors were appointed from both the old ENS and from SNS. Varietal comparisons were made to assist in the identification of material for multiplication.

1988. This was the first year of full operation of the seed development programme as laid down in the tripartite agreement between the Ministry of Agriculture, SIDA and Svalof. Four centres produced significant quantities of seed in the 1987-88 crop season. Varietal purification work commenced and further comparative trials were undertaken to assist with varietal selection.

1989. Development of the four centres, namely Umbeluzi, Lionde, Chimoio and Namialo, was continued and there was expanded seed production in the 1988-89 season. Three of the four farms had received new equipment in 1988 for cultivation, harvesting and processing. Experienced, professional farm management was introduced. 1989 saw some rapid improvements in farm management which will be reflected in 1990 production levels.

1990. SEMOC moved into the 1990s with four operational seed farms being run by an efficient team of managers with an excellent administrative support team in Maputo.

SEMOC received over 20% of the MONAP III budget, and since 1978, the seed projects [CRI and projects 41 and 42 and excluding seed support through project MI2 and project 18] received over 10% of total MONAP expenditure. The company's "estimated net result" for 1989 was a profit of 450 million meticaís. The costs of the management contract do not appear in the profit and loss account.

17.2 Objectives and Evolution of Policy

Since Independence the development of a seed industry has always been accorded high priority by the Mozambican Government. From the outset MONAP has supported the view that seed improvement was a vital factor in increasing yields of the staple food crops and thereby raising living standards of the family sector. Initially the basic objective of the seeds project was to provide seed for the family sector. Although this remains as an objective today, it is no longer the sole objective. One should note that SEMOC has in practice worked mainly on rice and maize, and is likely to do so for the foreseeable future. Some of the major family sector food crops, notably manioc and millets, cannot benefit from its activities for

a long time to come. Since the beginning of MONAP involvement in seed production in 1977 there have been three phases of development.

In the late 1970s, when the seeds project was in its formative years, several agencies were involved in implementation and yet the final production of certified seeds was by contract growers who were either state or private farms. The seed production process was however the responsibility of a Ministry of Agriculture body known as the Programa Nacional de Sementes [PNS]. The functions of PNS included the organisation of seed production, seed cleaning and seed certification. There were many problems in controlling the state farms growing seed on contract and production levels were frequently disappointing so that demands for seed were rarely satisfied.

It became clear that the PNS was not able to meet the seed production needs of the country and that a new approach was required. Major difficulties had arisen because of the absence of any precise definition of the functions of PNS. Consequently, towards the end of 1980 the National Seed Enterprises [ENS] was created and given a clearer definition of objectives. These included :

- to support production of seed for seven basic food crops, namely maize, rice, sunflower, phaseolus beans, groundnuts, wheat and soya.
- to undertake seed multiplication on ENS farms or through contracts with suitable state farms.
- to finance the construction of seven seed cleaning centres — in Chimoio, Lichinga, Lioma, Lionde, Mozamba, Namialo and Nante.
- to establish two new seed production farms.

Only one seed cleaning centre was equipped in 1981 [Lionde] and it was not until 1983 that a further five were completed. The planned centre at Nante was not constructed. The total installed capacity of the six centres was 18,500 tons per annum. However, only Namialo and Chimoio had associated ENS seed farms and the remainder were dependent on contract growers for their supplies of seed for processing and distribution. By the end of 1985, after continuing problems of quantity and quality of production, it was concluded that contract growers could not be relied upon to provide a satisfactory service. At the same time, a worsening security situation contributed to the decision to close down three of the six centres — Lichinga, Lioma and Moamba. Thus, three centres remained and, with the allocation of 2,500 hectares of irrigated land at Lionde, all had seed production farms.

The situation was reviewed at the end of the 5-year plan 1980-85 and proposals for a further 10 year programme were prepared. The proposals were accepted in principle but the organisational aspects were rejected in the light of earlier experiences. In 1986 a new project document was finalised in which the Swedish company Svalof was chosen to manage the proposed seed development programme. The contract was a tripartite agreement between the Ministry of Agriculture, SIDA and Svalof. The latter was granted executive responsibility under the ENS umbrella within the Direccao Nacional de Agricultura [DINA]. Following the early involvement of Svalof, it was agreed that a more efficient approach would be to free the seed production process from direct government control. Consequently an independent company Sementes de Mocambique Lda. [SEMOC] was established with the Government as the main shareholder.

The farms at Chimoio, Namialo and Lionde formed the basis for the 10-year seed development programme prepared in 1985 and for the revised proposals put forward in 1986. The farms are now an integral part of SEMOC and received substantial investment under MONAP III. In 1987 national policy guidelines were issued which gave SEMOC responsibility for the bulking of breeders seed and the subsequent distribution of certified seed to farmers in the countryside. The decision to largely restrict the bulking of seed to these three SEMOC farms was strongly influenced by the security situation. Obviously the concentration of production of certified seed in just three centres would not be very sensible in more normal circumstances, given the land areas which have to be covered and the poor state of the transportation infrastructure.

With the formation of SEMOC as a company with normal commercial objectives, some conflict with the original intention of the project — to serve the family sector — is inevitable. The need for subsidies has been recognised from the outset. The company management is being largely funded from the outside at a reported annual cost of 15.8 million SEK. Much of the seed is being purchased by the emergency programmes for free distribution to the family sector. In the long term the marketing problem will have to be tackled and meanwhile it is recognised that there will be a need for continuing subsidies.

17.3 Main issues relating to SEMOC

[a] Can the high level of investment and the large scale of operation of SEMOC be justified given the present conditions in Mozambique and the realistic potential markets for seed in the short term future?

The vast bulk of SEMOC seed sales to date have been to emergency programmes largely supported by funds from aid agencies involved in crisis management. Such sales cannot be regarded as any security for long term business for SEMOC. Indeed these sales may inhibit the ability of the company to market their seed in the future in those areas where seed has been distributed on an emergency basis. Although the company has provided a valuable service in the last three years, the economics of the exercise are almost certainly unfavourable if realistic costs are used and the high proportion of seed maize used for direct consumption as food is taken into account. In the strict sense, SEMOC seed has been used for import substitution; but since the aid agencies were paying there was no foreign exchange saving.

In the present situation it is difficult to make a rational judgement on the appropriateness of the scale of operations and installed machinery capacities. Present markets are obviously very limited, as is the range of crops and crop varieties available that are worthy of multiplication. There has been over-production of some crops which have been grown for seed — for example, a large proportion of the rice produced is sold as food. Seed of other crops is also known to be used for direct consumption rather than planted. It may be concluded that there is overcapacity in the system at the present time which will remain for some time to come. As SEMOC is a commercial company, the policy is, and will continue to be, to maximise returns from their farms. Land surplus to seed production requirements will be fully exploited. However it will not be possible to adapt the

seed processing infrastructure to alternative uses.

The future scale of operations will ultimately be geared to the open market which is demand-led and in which farmers will be required to pay for the SEMOC seed. Maize is the most important crop produced by the seed company and it is difficult to see an ever-expanding market to the family sector. Only open-pollinated varieties are suitable for distribution to family farmers engaged in low technology agriculture. The key debate over SEMOC concerns its capacity to serve the family sector. In *matuba*, received from INIA, they have a maize variety that, according to trial results at family farm level, is likely to allow yield increases without increasing risk or cost. Trials in Boane gave a yield in the 1990 maize harvest of 1,346 kg/ha compared to 568 kg/ha for traditional varieties. *Manica* is another promising maize variety and trials will help ensure that the right seed goes to the right places. In Namialo in 1990 some 400 hectares of maize were planted with basic seed of this variety and will produce around 600 tons of graded seed, which is enough to plant around 24,000 hectares in the 1990-91 season. Seed passed on from this area could very quickly cover not only the whole of the maize areas in Nampula Province but also the surrounding provinces. The seed company itself will benefit little from such rapid dissemination potential. For this could permit maintenance of acceptable production levels of open-pollinated varieties of maize without recourse to commercial seed purchases by farmers. If such an approach is adopted by the majority of farmers, the market for improved seeds will be much reduced in the future. The seed production business may only be viable if a succession of improved open-pollinated maize varieties is forthcoming. The main message of extension workers at the present time is maize seed selection. With proper mass selection techniques open-pollinated maize yields can be maintained.

In general, few farmers in the family sector operate much above subsistence level; the vast majority have minimal purchasing power which will limit the size of the market for any improved seeds. Seed costs will be difficult to control; SEMOC as a commercial company will have to charge realistic rates for the seed which they produce. In addition there will be the agents charges — SEMOC plans to distribute seed through a network of agents — and high distribution costs given the neglected road infrastructure and the security situation. In the absence of any direct subsidies, the cost of improved seed to the farmer may well be prohibitive in many cases.

[b] Does supporting SEMOC, a commercial company, conform with the original aims and objectives of the MONAP seed programme?

The present situation is somewhat unusual in that SEMOC, a commercial entity founded largely on investments made under MONAP aid, is now making substantial profits [at least with the accounting system presently being followed] mainly by conducting business with other aid agencies. Nevertheless, much of the seed being produced by SEMOC is being channelled through the aid agencies to the family sector, which definitely does conform with the objectives as set out for MONAP III.

In the long term there is some doubt about the ability of the company to supply seed to the family sector at prices which they can afford whilst at the same time making a profit. Seeds for the family sector are more expensive for SEMOC to produce than seeds for the modern sector; this is because yields are lower than is

the case for hybrid seed. In effect, the focus on family farms involves a reduction in the company's competitive situation vis-a-vis imported seed and, potentially, for seed exports. This fact, together with the high seed distribution costs now and, even with peace, for some time to come because of the poor roads, makes a strong case for some form of subsidisation if the commitment to the family farm sector is to be effective. In effect this is what SIDA is doing through the Svalof contract. However, with the Government as the major shareholder, it should be possible to develop some mechanism, either price controls or some form of direct or indirect subsidies, to ensure that the small farmers have continued access to the SEMOC seed. In the remoter areas, transport subsidies are certain to be required. Thus, despite the heavy investments made in SEMOC, commercial viability will be difficult to maintain in the future unless subsidies are provided to the family sector. From a company perspective, promotion of family farm sales is central. For a new market will ultimately have to be found for the 70% of production that now goes in sales to the emergency programme. SEMOC strategy depends on developing effective relations with marketing intermediaries [Agricom and others] and extension services. It is too early to assess the results of this approach, but it is being pursued with determination.

The company is already diversifying its commercial activities outside the seed business, apparently in an attempt to improve profitability and make full use of the available resources. These activities include:

- commercial crop production [eg some of the rice grown at Lionde and the 65 hectares of cotton planted at Namialo this year].
- the production of fruit and vegetables for sale on the open market.
- the hiring out of farm machinery.
- the servicing and repair of vehicles, tractors, cultivation equipment, etc from government departments and the private sector to generate some income from installed workshop capacity.
- the import and sale of vehicle spare parts and vegetable seeds.

Increasing diversification of the activities of SEMOC is likely to continue as long as there is a management contract in operation. These activities are unlikely to have much direct effect on the family sector, though there may be some indirect benefits.

In the changing economic climate of Mozambique, there is an increasing body of opinion in favour of privatisation. Since SEMOC has considerable assets and a sound increasingly diversified production base, it could become a prime target. The fact that SEMOC is now a commercial entity would greatly facilitate the privatisation process should this become desirable. Such a move would, however, hardly conform with MONAP objectives.

[c] Is the level of technology introduced under the seeds project appropriate for Mozambican conditions?

The farming systems, seed processing equipment and management systems adopted by the project include some of the latest technology and a high degree of mechanisation. They require a whole range of skills for the successful operation of the business. In addition, the foreign exchange costs involved are very considerable. Under the present management contract and with other material support being provided, skilled personnel have been brought in from overseas and the

foreign exchange costs are being met from donor sources. There is little doubt that, if the management contract were to be ended prematurely and foreign exchange support withheld, the project would be unsustainable.

An important consequence of the adoption of high technology systems is the inordinate amount of time required to train Mozambican staff to full competence so they are able to take over the project and run things as well as the expatriate management team. It is estimated that the time period required to develop the required skills may be as much as 10 years. A somewhat less ambitious development of the seed industry in Mozambique combined with much more training of local staff at an earlier stage could, in retrospect, have been a more appropriate approach — at least the handover period to full Mozambican control would have been considerably shortened. In the present circumstances, following the already significant investment in seed production, the project support has become self-perpetuating — the aid agency does not wish to see previous investment lost and the commercial seed firm wishes to retain the management contract. Hopefully therefore, the long term assistance will be forthcoming and will allow the Mozambican staff to be fully trained at the eventual termination of the management contract.

[d] Does the SEMOC monopoly of Mozambican seed production and its close relationship with INIA and SNS bode well for the future?

SEMOC is not supposed to engage in plant breeding and consequently the success or failure of the firm is in the hands of the third parties from whom breeder seed is obtained. The firm must rely on INIA for any locally produced pre-basic or basic seed whilst the importation of breeders seed is controlled by SNS. At the present time SEMOC is the only seed firm in Mozambique and has a virtual monopoly of the bulk seed production and certification activities carried out in the country. There is a close relationship between SEMOC and the two Government bodies closely involved in the seed industry — the National Institute for Agricultural Research [INIA] and the National Seed Service [SNS — which in the long term may be undesirable.

In the present situation SEMOC is the only organisation with the capacity to reliably multiply breeder seed and as such is a vital link in the seed chain. However, such monopoly dependence on SEMOC does not augur well for the future. Obviously, in the short term SEMOC must work closely with INIA, but this short term expediency should not mean that SEMOC has exclusive rights to INIA material in the future. In the interests of free and fair competition, other private sector interests should be allowed access to INIA breeder material under the same terms as SEMOC. With the involvement of a commercial seed firm in what is essentially a government-owned operation, there is a danger that the results of INIA breeding programmes will be turned to commercial advantage outside Mozambique, and without adequate reward for Mozambique.

The National Seed Service laboratories are located within SEMOC installations; consequently the SNS technicians are in daily contact with SEMOC personnel. The location of these laboratories is unfortunate because the SNS technicians have to give independent and unbiased judgements on the quality of SEMOC seeds. Such close contact with SEMOC staff could make it difficult to maintain independence. Similarly, if private sector competition with SEMOC does emerge, the

SNS technicians could be under a different kind of pressure when passing judgement on the seed of SEMOC competitors. Whilst there were sound security reasons for including the SNS laboratories within SEMOC complexes, it is not a satisfactory arrangement in the long term.

17.4 Evaluation

The overall assessment of the seed project is one of cautious optimism. There is a clear plan of operation, a high level of competence in management and a commitment to the family sector. The share of the MONAP budget going to seed production has been very high but, at least since the management contract, has been sensibly utilised. Similarly, the support for SNS has been effective though, when the security situation and infrastructure development allow, it is necessary to reallocate the seed certification activities so that they are physically separate from seed production.

ANNEXES

ANNEX ONE: *Terms of Reference of the Evaluation Mission*

1. Background

MONAP (Mozambique Nordic Agricultural Programme) commenced operation in 1977. A three-year agreement was later signed for the period 1978-80 (MONAP I), followed by a second phase 1981-83 (MONAP II). MONAP I and II consisted of 26 and 24 projects respectively, covering several major sub-sectors in the agricultural sector.

A mid-term evaluation of MONAP II was made in 1982. The implementation of MONAP II was extended by one year, 1984, while a third programme covering the years 1985-89 (MONAP III) was prepared. MONAP III was to have fewer projects, limited mainly to agriculture, extension and training, and the family sector.

The annual NORDIC contribution to MONAP III was SEK 75 million. Support to MONAP III came from all of the five Nordic countries.

The agreement on MONAP III is valid until 30 June, 1990.

2. MONAP Objectives

The agricultural sector objectives of the People's Republic of Mozambique have, for the past 13 years, gone through major changes following a series of significant policy adjustments adopted by the Government. During the late seventies and early eighties, emphasis was given to the development of the state agricultural sector and large cooperativization programme. Only after the mid-eighties the private and family production systems were given due recognition and, hence, formal sector development objectives set for them. Several documents (re: list annexed) can be consulted for the evolution of the PRM's agricultural sector objectives.

Following the government policy changes for the agricultural sector, MONAP objectives went through corresponding changes. During MONAP I, the state agricultural sector was given considerable attention and support. In the later years of MONAP II, support to both rural cooperatives and the small-scale family production system increased. During MONAP III, further shifts in emphasis were noted, mainly towards provision of technical assistance, supply of agricultural inputs,

manpower training and the development of the family sector. Appropriate documents in the annexed list can be referred to for specific objectives of MONAP during its various phases from which the following summary is obtained:

2.1 MONAP I Objectives:

- Maintain the pre-independence level of agricultural production regarding grain crops, livestock, citrus fruits, vegetables, forestry products, including artisanal fishery activities.
- Maintain and enhance rural services such as market, transport, supply of inputs and provision of agricultural extension services.
- Improve the technical skill of the manpower assigned to work within the agricultural sector.

2.2 MONAP II Objectives:

- Increase small-holder agricultural production.
- Improve the efficiency and capacity of the agricultural input-output marketing and distributions
- Improve the procurement and supply of agricultural inputs.
- Assist in the creation of an efficiently functioning agricultural extension system.
- Organize a national network for the production and marketing of certified seed.
- Raise the level of milk production.
- Improve veterinary services.
- Increase the output from forestry resources.
- Increase the catches by artisanal fishermen.
- Enhance the involvement of women in the development of the agricultural sector.
- Create training institutions for the agricultural and other related fields.
- Improve the working procedure and the overall capacity of the Ministry to formulate, implement and evaluate agricultural plans, programmes and projects.

2.3 MONAP III Objectives:

- Increase the production of food from the green zones around the major cities.
- Improve the technical and professional capacity in the sector by establishing agricultural training schools.
- Provide institutional support to the National Veterinary Institute (INIV) in its effort to improve the reproductive and productive efficiency of the livestock resources.
- Eliminate dependence on external seed supplies by creating a national network of certified food production centers.
- Strengthen the extension services provided to the family sector from the various Rural Development Centers, and contribute to the provision of Inputs required by the peasant farmers.
- Provide support to the phasing-out livestock and forestry projects.
- Provide general programme support to the various organs of the Ministry, mainly in form of technical assistance and supply of materials and equipment.

3. Purpose of the Evaluation

The evaluation has the following purpose:

- To make a final assessment of the achievement and impact of MONAP since its inception in 1977 until its end in 1989 and, thus, draw lessons of interest to cooperating parties. The evaluation will not include a detailed assessment of the development effects of each subproject. The evaluation team will, when appropriate, include project-level analysis.

4. Scope of Work

The evaluation team shall:

- 4.1 *describe* the economic and political circumstances under which MONAP was initiated and implemented, considering external destabilization activities carried out in Mozambique and review the evolution and trend of the PRM's agricultural and rural development policies since Independence.
- 4.2 *assess* the justification of distribution of funds between the subprojects, to the extent possible highlighting the decision making procedure.
- 4.3 *assess* the achievement of MONAP giving special emphasis to the following points
 - the compatibility, relevance and consistency of MONAP with the agricultural sector plans and programmes of the PRM
 - the adaptation of programme implementation vis-a-vis changing government agricultural policies and the security situation.
 - the realism and level of ambition set by the programme, end of the economical, developmental, technical and institutional appropriateness of the solutions adopted.
 - In general terms describe the results of MONAP compared to the stated project objectives for MONAP.
 - the MONAP generated benefits and their distribution among the target population and other beneficiaries and comparison with the costs of MONAP.
- 4.4 On the basis of existing information and, taking into account gender aspects, *assess* the impact of MONAP on the following points
 - food production
 - peasant sector development
 - manpower development
 - institution building
 - employment generation
 - agricultural planning
- 4.5 *evaluate* the sustainability of the activities supported by MONAP. Special attention should be given to competence and institution building and transfer of responsibilities. — Reasons for possible shortcomings should be highlighted.
- 4.6 *assess* the administrative arrangements of MONAP and its appropriateness for effective project implementation in Mozambique.

5. Timetable, Reporting etc

The work shall be carried out in accordance with the following time-table:

- 17-18 April: briefing in Stockholm

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- 21 April: arrival in Maputo
- From arrival and for four weeks, work in Mozambique — detailed schedule to be decided by the SIDA Office in Maputo in close collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture and the evaluation mission.
- Before the team leaves, main observations and conclusions shall be discussed with Ministry of Agriculture and DCO
- Draft report to be submitted by the team before 31 May.
- Final report in English to be submitted by the team before 30 June.
- Final report in Portuguese to be submitted within six weeks from submission of report in English.

IDS' members of the evaluation are the following.

- Mick Moore
- Martin Greeley
- Robin Goodyear
- Penelope Roberts
- Miguel Neves
- Mozambican members of the team have not yet been appointed.

6. Annex

- Pre-study
- List of reference documents
- List of people who can be contacted for reference.

ANNEX TWO: List of Persons Met by the Evaluation Mission

Note: there are a few omissions from this list in cases where we omitted to record names. Many of the designations are approximations.

Mozambique April 21 — May 19

Alexandre Zandamela	Minister of Agriculture
Ragendra de Sousa	National Director, DEA
Quendel Mendes	DEA
Saine Saavedra	DEA
Margarida Martins	DEA
Laura Torvinen	DEA
Abraham Kasai	DEA
Orlando Rafael	Director, Boane Agricultural College
Celso André Ruface	Deputy Director, Boane Agricultural College
Abel Cassamo	Deputy Director, Boane Agricultural College
Carlos Tembe	Dept of Production, Boane Agricultural College
Maud Johansson	Maths teacher, Boane Agricultural College
Rucai Aly Dauto	National Director, Directorate of Human Resources (DRH)
A. M. Parnuque	Head, Training Dept, Directorate of Human Resources (DRH)

Krystyna Bednarska	Training Dept, Directorate of Human Resources (DRH)
Ana Santos	Training Dept, Directorate of Human Resources (DRH)
Simone Isaac Magalu	Head, INIVE
Claudia Baule	INIVE
Carlos Concha	INIVE
Elizabeth Specht	INIVE, Manica
Abdul Adamo	National Director, DNFFB
Dinis Lissave	Director, FO5, DNFFB
Senhor Miguel	Deputy Director, FO5
Senhor Ribeiro	Chief of Forestry Dept, Manica
Milagre Cezerile	Director, CEF
Elisa Charane	Forestry Engineer, CEF
Mamora Nagakawa	Silviculturalist, CEF
Carla Ruas	DNFFB, FO2
Maria Monjane	National Training Programme Official, DNFFB
Sara Simango	Medium Level Technician, FO2
Andre Chipe	Elementary Level Technician, FO2
Joao Jaime	Basic Level Technician, FO2
Senhor Cordoso	Elementary Level Technician, FO2
Felix Sengo	Director, IFLOMA
Jose Arcobia	Cooperant, Project 27, beekeeping, DNFFB
Manuel Moraes	National Director, INIA
Joao Carrilho	National Director, DNDR/CFA
Paulo Zecula	DNDR/CFA
Luis Augusto	Cooperant, CFA
Elias Matlombe	DNDR/CFA
Clementina Machungo	DNDR/CFA
Cordelia Kleiner	DNDR/CFA
Ernesto Sinopali	DNDR/CFA, Director Project 7
Jose Carnoes	DNDR/CFA
Larazabal Duarte	DNDR/CFA, Consultant
Carmen Zucuna	Consultant, Evaluation of CFA
Pinto Luciano	Acting Director, Chief of Agriculture Provincial Serv., DPA, Nampula
Alberto Matavela	Chief of Rural Extension Services, DPA, Nampula
Walter Viegas	Cooperant, Project 25
Maria de Fatima	Financial Controller, Rural Extension, Nampula
Augusto Luis	Medium Level Technician, Rural Extension, Nampula
Senhor Cantifles	Basic Level Technician, Rural Extension, Nampula
Alica Macamo	Cooperative President, Marracuene (Project 23)
Maria Celeste Machava	Cooperative Deputy President, Marracuene (Project 23)
Deolina Machava	Chief of Production Marracuene
Francisco Nhantumbo	Peasant and Group Leader, extension programme, Boane
Felix Lisboa Cassa	Supervisor, extension programme, Boane
Elida Matola	Peasant and Group Leader, extension programme, Boane
Joao Nhantsurane	Services Chief, DDA, Boane
Teotonio dos Muchangos	Director, DPA, Beira
Domingo Madane	Director, Rural Extension Service, DPA, Beira (Project 22)
Senhor Cossa	Director, Small Industries Project (Project FO7/29)
Senhor Ramiro	Coordinator, Project 29, Beira
Ricardo Binzi	Administration, Project 22, Beira
Senhor Manuel	Training Officer, DPA, Beira

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Senhor D. Saguete	Hydraulics, Beira
Valdemar Schwartz	Extension Service, DPA Beira
Silvia de Guili	Women's Project, Green Zones Office, Beira
Ernesto Filipe Mause	Director, UDA Chokwe
Palmira Marsule	Co-ordinator, UDA Chokwe
Horacio Francisco	Manager, Casa Agraria, Conhane
Antonio Jose Muteto	Extension Officer, Conhane
Francisco Jose Muteto	Extension Officer, Conhane
Laurenco Jose Mafiega	Storeman, Conhane
Senhor P. Petrov	Cooperant (Project 24)
Felix Mandlate	National Director, DINAP
Pinho Morgado	Vet. DINAP
Camilo Duque	Vet. DINAP
Francisco Pinto	
Albino Luis	DINAP, Influen School
Nurramad Lazara	DINAP, Influen School
Azael Memjovo	DINAP, Influen School
Dionisia Dias	Head, Project 28, Fresh Water Fish Farming
Hugo Eloy Garcia	Cooperant, Project 28, Umbeluzi
Senhor Bonifacio	Technician/Extensionist, Project 28, Beira.
Ulf Arvidsson	Managing Director, SEMOC
Gerald Hartman	Marketing Officer, SEMOC
Sven Norrby	Accountant, SEMOC
Carlos Dominguez	Training Officer, SEMOC
Max Vandenburg	Farm Manager, Chimioio
P J Mathai	Crop Production Officer
Carsten Hey	Production Manager
Michael Hughes	Assistant Marketing Officer
Miloye Denic	Crop Production Officer
Jai Chand	Workshop Head, Nampula
Admir Bay	Head, Servico Nacional de Sementes
Abdul Bica	Director — General, Empresa de Leite e Lacticos de Maputo
Manuel Durao	Director
Maria Luis	Vet
Senhor Salvador	Vet
Domingos Machava	Block 41, Farm Manager
Alfredo Bango	Block 7, Farm Manager
Goncalves Praca	Block 7, Farm Manager
Xadroque Siteo	Block 2, Farm Manager
Augusto Silva	Block 2, Chief, Mechanization
Marcilio Fernandes	Director Finance, Fabrica de Leite
Esteveao Mucavel	Technician, Fabrica de Leite
Jose Manuel Antonio Graca	Director and Vet., UP Leite, Vanduzi
Xavier Basilio	Medium Level Technician, Vanduzi
Antonio Jose Chato	Medium Level Technician, Vanduzi
Miguel Bagnath	Vet, Fabrica de Leite, Quelimane
Abdul Cesar	Vet, Fabrica de Leite, Quelimane
Ana Isabel Xavier	Director of Provincial Veterinary Services, Quelimane
Jose Carlos Trindade	Director, Agricom
Thomas Thomsen	Coordinator, Agricom, and former Programme Officer, DCO Maputo
Sr. Mutafile	Director, Cotton School, Namialo

Jorge Sousa	Cotton Secreteriat, Ministry of Agriculture
Antonia Thomas	Acting Director, Empresa Pecuaria de Nampula
Mr Miranda	Deputy Director, Empresa Pecuaria de Nampula
Senhor Gamito	Governor of Nampula and ex-vice Minister of Agriculture
Soares Sebastiao Banze	Director, Empresa Estatal de Marracuene
Mario Galetovich	Director, Finance Empresa Estatal de Marracuene
Jorge Diniz Cardoso	Private Farmer, Marracuene
Castigo Langa	Director, SETEP, Ministry of Education
Damissio Mabuza	Director, Planning Department, Ministry of Education
Julio Diaz	Ministry of Planning
Gloria Lieberman	Centre for African Studies (CEA), Univ. of Eduardo Mondlane, (UEM)
Isabel Casimiro	CEA, UEM
Ana Joao da Silva	CEA, UEM
Maria Amida Maman	CEA, UEM
Bridget O'Laughlin	Faculty of Economics, UEM
Ana Loforte	Director, Anthropology Dept, UEM
Firmino Mucavel	Faculty of Agronomy, UEM
Allan Gustafsson	Consultant, Ministry of Finance
Mehari Tesfai	Coordinator, MONAP
Ingall Waldau	Financial Controller, MONAP
Luis Pinheiro	Deputy Financial Controller, MONAP
Evangelina Casquero	Documentalist, MONAP
Heimo Mikkola	Representative, FAO, Maputo
Tamiru Hunegnaw	Programme Officer, FAO Maputo
Lasse Parkkali	FINNIDA Representative and former MONAP Deputy Coordinator
Lars-Olof Edstrom	Swedish Ambassador to Mozambique
Gunvor Gonçalves	Head, DCO, SIDA
Jorgen Christensen	Emergency Programme Coordinator, SIDA
Lars Ekman	Programme Officer, DCO, SIDA
Pedro Figueiredo	Programme Officer, DCO, SIDA
Ame Disch	Assistant Representative NORAD
Stig Barling	Representative, DANIDA

Sweden 17 — 19th April

Johan Holmberg	Ass. Dir. General, SIDA
Jan Runnquist	Agriculture Division, SIDA
Inge Gerremo	Agriculture Division, SIDA
Peter Hegardt	Agriculture Division, SIDA
Kerstin Borjeson	Agriculture Division, SIDA
Willy Petterson	Agriculture Division, SIDA
Inge Bergvall	Agriculture Division, SIDA
Ove Hansson	Desk Officer, Mozambique
Ilmar Teng	Infrastructure Division, SIDA
Anne Bruzelius	Health Division, SIDA
Elizabeth Michanek	Evaluation Division, SIDA
Caroline Hannan Andersson	Office of Women in Development, SIDA
Stig Lövgren	Purchasing Manager, SIDA, Procurement Division
Paul Erik Schmidt	Agriculture Adviser, DANIDA
Gert Meiwicke	Head of Section, DANIDA
Sverre Utne	Agricultural Adviser, NORAD
Harri Porvali	Adviser, FINNIDA

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Edvard Grimstad	formerly MONAP Coordinator
Jan Olsson	formerly MONAP Coordinator
Kerstin Thulin	formerly MONAP Personnel Officer
Kajsa Pehrsson	previously Programme Officer, SIDA, Maputo
Kenneth Hermele	previously MONAP Economist at Ministry of Agriculture.

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AID UNDER FIRE

MONAP was a joint Nordic agricultural programme, in which 1 200 Swedish crowns have been invested since 1977.

The programme has created a substantial amount of assets – physical, human, and institutional – which at present are unable to generate a "reasonable" rate of economic return. But these assets are likely to be useful if the Mozambican economy recovers in the near future.

MONAP has failed to match some of its objectives, mainly in the important areas of personnel training and staff development. The solutions to Mozambique's acute shortage of trained personnel were conventional and inadequate. The expatriate experts have, on average, served for too short periods in Mozambique. Transfer of knowledge has mostly been a missing link.

MONAP's problems are of course to a large extent due to Mozambique's difficult political and military situation. But the war did not affect everything. Many of MONAP's shortcomings could have been avoided.

These are some of the conclusions in this final evaluation of MONAP.

Sweden's bilateral development co-operation, handled by SIDA since 1965, comprises 19 programme countries: Angola, Bangladesh, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, India, Kenya, Laos, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

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