
SIDA Evaluation Report, Government, Mozambique

1987/3

DROUGHT AND DESTABILIZATION

**An Evaluation of Swedish Disaster Relief in Mozambique
1983 to 1985**



By Tom Alberts and Krister Eduards



The views and interpretations expressed in this report are those of the author and should not be attributed to the Swedish International Development Authority, SIDA.

Copies of this report can be obtained free of charge from SIDA in Stockholm.

The **SIDA Evaluation Report** Series is published by SIDA's Evaluation Section. General Editor: **Karlis Goppers**.
ALLF 171 7 138.
Printed by: Fälth's Tryckeri, Värnamo 1987.



SWEDISH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
S-105 25 STOCKHOLM, TELEX 11450 sida sthlm
ISBN 91-586-7088-2
ISSN 0283-0736

D R O U G H T A N D D E S T A B I L I Z A T I O N

An evaluation of Swedish Disaster Relief in Mozambique
1983 to 1985

by

Tom Alberts and Krister Eduards

This report is the result of an evaluation mission to Mozambique in June 1986 consisting of Tom Alberts, Swedfarm, and Krister Eduards, Swedish Project Managers.

Editing: Ulrik Volgsten

Cover design: Marie-Louise Hedman

Cover photo: Gustaf Eneroth/SIDA photo library

MOÇAMBIQUE




TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	1
THE EVALUATION	4
Chapter 1 BACKGROUND	5
Chapter 2 THE MOZAMBIKAN CRISIS	8
The Past	8
The Post Independence Shock 1975-1979	10
The Dreams for the Future 1980-1982	13
The Deepening of the Crisis 1982-1985	14
Disaster Situations During the Last Decade	18
Disaster Situations which Might Occur in the Next Decade	24
Chapter 3 MOZAMBIQUE'S EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH THE CRISIS AND DISASTER SITUATIONS	26
Changing Priorities and Policies	26
Mozambican Structures Formed to Deal with Disaster Situations	28
How are Needs Identified and Channelled to DPCNN	30
Mozambican Capacity and Ability to Deal with Disaster Relief Programmes	32
Chapter 4 THE RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO THE MOZAMBIKAN CRISIS AND DISASTER SITUATIONS	35
The First Response to the Emerging Crisis	35
The Slow Response to the Disaster Situations in the 80's	37
Coordination between Mozambique and Donors	39
Chapter 5 SWEDISH DISASTER RELIEF TO MOZAMBIQUE 1983/84 AND 1984/85	42
Trucks	43
Rehabilitation of MONAP II Projects after the Cyclone Domoina	50
Agricultural Handtools and Wheat Seeds	56
Grants to the Red Cross	62
Grant to the Swedish Free Church Aid	65
Grants to the Church of Sweden Aid	67
Chapter 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	73
ANNEX 1 Terms of Reference	
ANNEX 2 Bibliography	
ANNEX 3 Abbreviations	
ANNEX 4 Persons Contacted	

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The people of Mozambique are among the poorest in the world. There has been a successively deepening crisis since the Independence of Mozambique in 1975. By 1986, it has become a social, economic, military and political crisis. Already in 1975, the situation was serious and would in itself be sufficient for emergency situations to develop. In addition, military attacks, frequently supported from the outside, and periodically resurging, natural hazards such as droughts, floods and typhoons have resulted in emergency situations which have affected millions of people.

It is, therefore, concluded that even if peace existed in Mozambique, the country would still face a deep crisis and emergency situations would develop.

Within the foreseeable future, unless significant quantities of food are imported, a major part of the urban population will starve. There is, however, a danger that the needs of the more articulated urban population receive a higher priority than that of the rural population who has suffered the most. For their survival, the people of Mozambique depend on a massive influx of foreign aid.

With an extremely weak economic situation, civil strife and natural hazards, the people in Mozambique are very vulnerable. Even small disturbances such as the lack of fuel and spare parts for water pumps, could trigger off disaster situations.

During the last few years the climatic conditions have been significantly better than during normal years. However, it is probable that during the next decade new natural hazards will occur. Moreover, since the economy has continued to deteriorate after 1985, and the defense forces receive an increasing share of the national budget, leaving less for other needs such as rural development and health, it is possible that the extent of disaster situations will increase. If the security situation continues to remain serious, the lives of many Mozambicans will be in danger.

It is difficult to conceive of significant improvements in the economic and social situation of Mozambique within the next five years. On the contrary, it seems likely that the situation will remain serious, and, could even deteriorate rapidly.

In view of the foregoing, the mission concludes that a long-term perspective has to be applied to the planning of disaster relief to Mozambique.

In this perspective the consultants wish to suggest a further shift of emphasis of relief operations in Mozambique. Much more effort should be geared into the rehabilitation of displaced and otherwise affected populations and to the creation of increased disaster preparedness. The Government's endeavours in this direction should be welcomed and supported by foreign aid.

It is true that rehabilitation projects have had difficulties - tools and seeds have been delivered late, rains have failed, fighting has driven people away. But it would be wrong, therefore, to refrain from supporting them. In the consultants' eyes, rehabilitation projects should be improved with generous foreign assistance - not only hand-tools and seeds are needed but also food, clothes, soap, salt and sugar as well as transport and other services including adequate planning.

In 1984, lack of preparedness was one reason behind the late start of relief operations. The preparedness to act in new situations of emergency need to be improved in several respects. Stocks of emergency supplies have to be established. Transport has to be improved, as well as communications, including radio. The capacity of the national administration has to be expanded both on a central and on a provincial level. These are examples of where foreign aid could play an important role in improving the national ability to cope with recurrent emergency situations.

It is also concluded that further deliveries of relief supplies will be necessary, at least as long as an acute shortage of essential food and other items prevails on a national level.

The number of donors has increased recently in Mozambique, including in the field of disaster relief. They are spread over a large number of varied activities and areas. This dispersity produces poor co-ordination and suboptimal use of resources. Mozambique would be much helped if donors could enter into agreed long-term engagements, e.g. to supply a certain quantity of cereals per year or to build up gradually a functioning coastal transport. And under the aegis of the Government co-ordinated division of labour between donors could increase the impact of aid considerably. A geographical division of labour should also be considered.

THE EVALUATION

The terms of reference of the evaluation state that the evaluation - besides reporting on the experience from the Swedish emergency assistance - should focus on, among other things, the following:

- Historical perspective with emphasis on food supply, accessibility of water, infrastructure and health care.
- War and conflicts and other factors which contribute to the crisis situation.
- Acute disaster situations the last ten years and their causes.
- Vulnerability and disaster tendency: areas and groups which are specially exposed; issues of distribution.
- Description of existing structures for identification of disaster relief needs, their planning and implementation capacity and their areas of responsibility.
- The government's attitude to foreign disaster relief.


The evaluation was undertaken in June 1986. It was performed by Messrs. Tom Alberts, SwedFarm, and Krister Eduards, Swedish Project Managers. The terms of reference is given in Annex 1.

CHAPTER 1 - BACKGROUND

The People's Republic of Mozambique became independent from Portugal in 1975. The Portuguese had monopolized practically all economic, political and social power. When they left the country, Mozambique faced a serious crisis. This has been further aggravated by civil strife, supported by Rhodesia and later by South Africa, to destabilize Mozambique and by economic policy decisions. Civil strife has increased during latter years.

Mozambique is rich in natural resources. The agricultural potential is among the highest in the world, but the people inherited an underdeveloped economy. The people are extremely vulnerable, and even small disturbances can lead to disaster situations. Natural hazards are typical phenomena which have led to emergency situations. It is estimated that the drought in Southern and Central Mozambique in 1982-83 caused about 100 000 deaths. Western donors did very little during these drought years to assist the affected people. In part this can be explained by the reluctance of the West to give support to a staunch Marxist regime. But, it is probably equally true that because Western donors then primarily directed their efforts to disaster relief programmes in the Sahel region, particularly in Ethiopia, the effects of the Mozambican drought were not appreciated. In fact, after Mozambique joined the World Bank, the International Monetary fund had signed an agreement with South Africa, Western aid to Mozambique has increased substantially.

Mozambique has aspired to rapid socio-economic growth. During the first years after Independence, most efforts were channelled to the modern sector in order to accelerate development. There was little awareness of the profound crisis emerging in the country and considerable resources were channelled into costly projects which later had to be abandoned. Mounting economic difficulties, armed attacks on economic targets and people, and natural hazards have shattered



Even if peace existed the country would still face a serious crisis.
Photo: Anders Nilsson/SIDA photo library

the economy and left a greater part of the Mozambican population subject to an imminent threat of starvation. At the beginning of the 80's Mozambican policy makers started to adjust the policies to cope with the deepening of the crisis. In 1986, the Government Estimates that 1.8 million people are affected. Unless assisted they run the risk of starving to death.

To assist needy people the Government created in 1980 a National Co-ordinating Council for the Prevention and Control of Natural Disasters. Because of lack of funds and of trained personnel little can be accomplished without foreign assistance.

Because of the continuing state of emergency prevailing in Mozambique, Swedish emergency assistance has increased considerably in recent years. In order to assist people affected by the drought, or by other calamities, four bilateral SIDA relief operations and six Swedish NGO grants were implemented in Mozambique during fiscal years 1983/84 and 1984/85. These interventions have been evaluated by the present mission. As has been mentioned above, the evaluation has had to concentrate on the preparation and implementation of assistance, and to leave the effects of the interventions aside for the time being. The bilateral grants have also been studied more in detail than those through NGO's.

CHAPTER 2 - THE MOZAMBIKAN CRISIS

The Past

One of the more important reasons for Mozambican poverty is the type of colonization practiced by Portugal. One aim of the colonizers has been to exploit natural resources such as gold, silver and ivory. Another has been to use available labour force at a minimum cost. The lack of agricultural growth in Mozambique meant that it was more profitable to sell labour as slaves than to use the labour force within Mozambique.

This exploitation of available labour is a common denominator in the history of Mozambican development. There is relatively plenty of good agricultural land in Mozambique. Therefore, it was no easy task to convince the population to work on the Portuguese farms and on foreign plantations at a low wage, since the Mozambican peasant could always survive cultivating his own piece of land. Instead of relying on economic incentives, the Portuguese introduced a series of coercive measures to obtain cheap labour. Among these can be mentioned forced labour, taxes to force workers to earn money, and the legal obligation not to migrate within or outside of Mozambique.

Agricultural development can be obtained by a combination of capital and technical know-how. But the type of agricultural system introduced by the colonialists was profitable - cheap land and labour, and the need to modernize Mozambican agriculture was never felt.

The use of forced labour in Mozambique also meant that the peasant families had less time to cultivate their own pieces of land, and a result has frequently been starvation among the native populations. The need to educate the native populations was minimal and, in fact, could even become a threat to the existing system, because it would become difficult to dominate an educated people. Moreover, both education and training are costly. As a result, in 1975, about 98 % of the Mozambican population was illiterate and almost 90 % did not speak Portuguese.

Another measure to control the native populations was Portugal's monopolization of marketing. By imposing restrictions on the selling of agricultural products, and the purchasing of agricultural inputs and consumer goods, the peasants were restricted to their role as a supplier of cheap labour to the needs of the colonial system.

The economic growth in South Africa and in Rhodesia, mainly in the mining sector, demanded labour. Export of Mozambican labour to these two countries became another way for the colonial power to obtain revenue. In fact, the lack of development of Mozambique meant that the country tended to adapt itself to the economic needs of South Africa and Rhodesia. This export of Mozambican labour, several hundred thousand male workers, also had the effect of pushing up



At the time of independence about 98% of the Mozambican population was illiterate.
Photo: Anders Gunnartz/SIDA photo library

wages in Mozambique, and led to some modernization of Mozambican agriculture in certain areas. In addition to supplying labour, transit trade became an important source of revenues to Mozambique. Over 90 per cent of the total rail shipment of commodities in Mozambique was for South Africa and Rhodesia.

The two significant earnings obtained from transit trade, and from the migrant workers in South Africa and South Rhodesia, permitted Mozambique to initiate an industrialization process and, at the same time, to regularly import more than the country exported. Thus, in 1972, exports financed 54 % of imports, in 1973 49 %, and in 1974 this figure had risen to 64 %. The industry which grew was highly dependent on imported raw materials and semi-elaborated products. Thus Mozambique depended on their neighbour to the south.

The Post Independence Shock 1975-1979

Even before Independence, the Portuguese and other foreigners started to leave Mozambique, and it is estimated that by 1979 the great majority (about 200 000) had left the country. As was mentioned earlier the Portuguese controlled practically all aspects of Mozambican political and economic activities. Since the Mozambicans had not received any education of training, the gaps left, when the Portuguese abandoned the country, could not be filled with Mozambicans.

A series of cumulative effects fuelled the downward spiral which would weaken the Mozambican economy to the extent that in the 80s mass starvation became an imminent threat. Some of these will be discussed below.

The exodus of the Portuguese meant that the marketing system practically ceased to exist. Agricultural production could not be distributed from the countryside to the urban population and to the world markets. Moreover, agricultural inputs were not delivered at the right time and in the right quantities. Therefore, production levels could not be maintained because of lack of inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, spare parts, fuel etc. The Mozambican peasants have always accounted for an important share of production both for the domestic and the export markets. As the market system collapsed the distribution of consumer goods to the countryside

dwindled. As a result the Mozambican peasants withdrew into a more subsistence-oriented agriculture. Thus, marketed production fell much more than total agricultural production.

The new Mozambican administration, without any experience, had to do something with about 2 000 abandoned Portuguese farms. Partly out of necessity and partly for ideological reasons these were nationalized. The scarce management capacity directly resulted in a decline in production on these farms too, which in turn reduced export earnings. The same trend can be found in most other economic activities such as industry, transport, construction and so forth. Available agricultural inputs were used less efficiently because of lack of educated and trained personnel. Moreover, there was a reduction in the flow of agricultural inputs into the agricultural sector. On both accounts agricultural production declined significantly.

The over-all effects on the Mozambican economy were disastrous. Domestic production decreased as a result of the consequences of the exodus of the Portuguese. When exports declined the capacity to import also declined which in turn meant that less of inputs and inter-mediary products were available to the Mozambican economy. This in turn meant that production had to decline even further - a vicious circle.

Data on the Mozambican economy is of notoriously poor quality. In order to obtain some indication of the economic performance during this period the following two measures have been used. The first refers to the quantity of exports of goods. Statistics for the seven most important export goods were used and the average for the 1973/74 exports was calculated. The next step was to take the same goods for the 1975-79 period and calculate a new average. These two were then compared and are produced below in Table 1. The products are listed in order of the value of exports in 1973/74:

Table 1

Quantities exported of the most important products
(1 000 tons)

<u>Product</u>	<u>Average</u> <u>1973/74</u>	<u>Average</u> <u>1975/79</u>	<u>Difference</u> <u>in %</u>
Sugar	169.1	60.3	-64.4
Cashew nuts	27.0	10.0	-29.8
Cotton	40.1	13.9	-65.4
Copra	45.1	34.3	-23.8
Forestry Products	120.3	58.8	-51.1
Tea	18.1	14.6	-19.3
Prawns	3.5	3.6	3.4
Average:			-35.8

Source: CNP, 1985.

As can be seen from these figures, the six most important export products of Mozambique suffered significant declines in the volumes exported, only the volume of prawns increased. On balance, any country facing such drastic declines in exports will face a serious crisis.

The other measure used is the volume of marketed production. It should be noted that these figures refer to official data and do not include non-registered trade which has increased during latter years.

For ten agricultural products marketed by the State after Independence, the total volume was an average of 368 thousand tons in the years 1973-74. In the period 1976-79, excluding the year of Independence because of administrative changes, the total yearly average had dropped to 231 thousand tons, or a decrease of 37 %.

During these years the Mozambican economy was further strained. The Republic of South Africa (RSA) curtailed the number of migrant workers from Mozambique to RSA and curtailed also transit trade. Moreover, Mozambique adhered to the UN proclamation of a boycott against the then Rhodesia in 1977, and suffered from a significant decrease in transit trade earnings. In addition Rhodesia supported guerilla attacks against economic targets within Mozambique, thus further aggravating her difficult situation.

The Dreams for the Future 1980-1982

By the end of 1979, the most devastating effects of the exodus of the Portuguese settlers had been dealt with. Contrary to many observers' claims the Mozambican economy had not collapsed. Although the objective stated at the Third Frelimo Congress in 1977 to attain pre-Independence production levels in 1980 seemed impossible to reach, the economy had stabilized. Moreover, the struggle for Independence in Zimbabwe was coming to an end, the high costs of the embargo would stop, and, most important, it was generally believed that guerilla attacks would cease. At the end of 1979, the president declared in a speech that by 1990 Mozambique would have overcome underdevelopment. Industrial development was to accelerate and a large number of capital-intensive mechanized projects were to be implemented not least in the agricultural sector. There had been a significant influx of foreign aid during these first years of Independence, not least from the Scandinavian countries, and several development banks had viewed Mozambican requests favourably. Mozambique had a good credit rating in commercial lending and could increase borrowing rapidly. The foreign exchange constraint was serious, but policy makers did not at that time consider it would become critical.

In fact, some signs showed that the drastic decline in economic activities had been halted. While exports decreased at an average of 7 % per year in the 1975-79 period, in the period 1980-82 the decline was only about 2 % per year.

Moreover, guerilla warfare practically ceased in 1980 and 1981 as a result of Zimbabwe's independence.

Mozambique has followed the practice of calculating Gross Social Product (GSP) in accordance with socialist methods of national accounting. In the case of Mozambique GSP is the sum of the output of the following sectors: agriculture, industry, construction, transport and trade. It should also be mentioned that there are no statistics for the peasant sector in agriculture and this accounts for about 2/3 of agricultural production. With these comments in mind, using official data on GSP and population, the following

index series is obtained for GSP per capita, in US \$:

Pre Independence, Average 1973/74	149
At Independence (1975)	100
Average 1980/82	98

Since Independence, the state farm sector has received most public resources channelled into agriculture, though the peasant sector contributed most of the agricultural production in the country. The urban sector though, depended on the marketed surplus from the state farm sector and food imports. As the peasant sector trading possibilities diminished (agricultural products to be traded against consumer goods and inputs) the peasant sector reduced even further its marketed surplus. But again, the decline was smaller than 4 per cent per year (1980-82) versus 9 per cent per year in the previous period (1975-79).

Foreign trade perform an important function in economic development. Domestic trade permits regions to specialize in agricultural production. Thus, one region can specialize in rice and another in cassava and a third in livestock production. By trading all parties usually gain. Trade also permits, that during a deficit year, people can use their savings to purchase food from other regions. If domestic trade is not developed people tend to become more vulnerable to climatic variations than otherwise. One of the salient features of Mozambican agriculture is that domestic trade was profoundly disturbed if not disrupted after Independence.


The Deepening of the Crisis 1982-85

In addition to the problems discussed in the previous sections, two additional problems emerged during this period.

The first one is the climatic variations. Historically Mozambique has always suffered from drought and floods. In general, the climatic conditions seem to have been somewhat better than the long run average during the 1975-82 period.

In 1982, a severe drought developed in many regions in Mozambique. One of the most affected provinces was Inhambane. The figure below illustrates the situation which developed.

Figure 1.



As can be seen, at the end of 1978 and most of 1979, there is a deficit in precipitation. For the years 1980-1982, there is considerably more rainfall than the long run average. At the beginning of 1982, rainfall declines substantially. The peasants thus had to face a change, from very good years to very poor years. But it is also significant that during this whole period, 1978-85, the total amount of rain seems to be above rather than below the average. But in 1982 Inhambane was probably the worst afflicted province in Mozambique, about 100 000 dead out of a population of 1.1 million.

That the effects of the 1982-83 drought became so serious can be attributed to several factors. Among these should be mentioned the over-all decline of the Mozambican economy which meant that the Mozambican Government had limited, if any, possibilities of assisting people in need. Another important factor is that because domestic trade was not functioning, the peasants had reduced their production levels


since they could hardly purchase any goods from their sales of agricultural production. In such a situation it is difficult to save. Thus, the peasants in Inhambane had few resources to face the drought which occurred.

Not all of the provinces suffered drought at the same time, but surplus areas would not and could not export to food deficient provinces. Many would not, because peasants close to neighbouring countries could get a better deal by exporting their products than by selling to the Mozambican marketing agencies. Others could not, because civil strife and guerilla attacks had increased rapidly in this period.

Thus, droughts and floods which have always occurred in Mozambique, strain the Mozambican economy further and mass starvation can occur at regular intervals. Large scale migration is one response to such disaster situations and there are already signs that many people are leaving the country.

The second factor is civil strife and guerilla attacks. It was generally believed that after Zimbabwe's Independence in 1980 there would at last be peace in the country. However, South Africa stepped up its support to the various resistance groups which had developed earlier. Systematic attacks on key economic targets were carried out. Intimidation of the rural population became frequent and it became unsafe to travel on many roads. As an example can be mentioned the attacks on the sugar estates which meant that Mozambique has become a net importer instead an exporter of sugar. The power line from Cabora Bassa to South Africa has been systematically sabotaged. This again reduces Mozambique's export earnings. Agricultural production and necessary inputs such as seed and fertilizers, and consumer goods cannot be transported to many areas in Mozambique. Because of intimidation many people tend to abandon their family farms and cluster together in new villages. Creating viable new farms requires resources which again strain the economic and administrative capacity of the Mozambican Government.

Disaster situations have emerged several times in Mozambique since Independence in 1975. There are several causes and each one of these would suffice to create havoc



A military guard at a plantation - because of guerilla attacks Mozambique has turned into a net importer of sugar.

Photo: Paul Rimmerfors/SIDA photo library

with the Mozambican economy and lead to starvation for many people. One could ask why there has not been even more starvation.

There are probably several factors which can explain the survival of the rural population. The first is that Mozambican agriculture is underdeveloped and a major part of agricultural production is consumed locally and only a smaller part marketed. The second fact is that about 80 per cent of the population live in the countryside scattered over a very large area. Finally, the fact that Mozambican peasants have a long history of coping with difficult situations, have made them less vulnerable than people in many other countries. Taken together, these factors explain why people survived in the period 1975 to the beginning of the 80s. Since then the situation has deteriorated even further and the combined effects of war and climatic hazards have created disaster situations.

In summary, the Mozambican crisis has many causes. The country is very vulnerable and even minor disturbances can cause a major disaster. Examples are many:

When people starve they eat their seed. The lack of seed means that future production will be in danger.

In one area, in the Chimoio province, the Portuguese settlers drilled some 30 wells and equipped them with pumps. This area then attracted Mozambicans who came to settle there. Since Independence, the lack of maintenance of these wells has meant that one after the other of the wells stopped operating. When the last well stopped thousands of people were left without water. When technicians, spare parts and fuel are scarce and transport unsafe, the results may become disastrous.

Disaster Situations During the Last Decade

The Threat of Mass Starvation

After Independence in 1975, there was an imminent risk of mass starvation. Marketed agricultural production decreased by about 30 %. Since Mozambique is a very poor country, minor changes in the supply of food can have profound effects. About 15 per cent of the population live in urban areas, and

the great majority, 85 per cent, in rural areas. Agriculture is the backbone in the Mozambican economy accounting for over 75 per cent of export earnings.

A decline in agricultural production and in marketed production particularly affects the urban population, unless adequate measures are taken. A major part of the food intake in the urban areas consists of cereals such as rice, maize and wheat, of which the latter has always been imported to Mozambique.

The effects of the Mozambican crisis could be felt immediately in the cities as the domestic supply of food decreased. As a result food imports increased rapidly after Independence. It was believed that the state farm sector could, within few years, supply the cities with most of the necessary food as well as make a substantial contribution into export earnings. For this and other reasons most of the public resources to the agricultural sector were channelled to the state farms. As it turned out, the state farm sector absorbed more resources than the state farm produced, and became an additional strain on the weak economy.

Meanwhile, both the peasant sector and the small commercial sector received little, if any, resources and most of Mozambican agricultural production continued to deteriorate. The situation has become so dramatic that large parts of the agricultural sector may not be able to produce an agricultural surplus for many years to come but be in need of additional food supplies to survive.

Thus, Mozambique would need to import significant quantities of food even under 'normal' conditions. It has been estimated that at least 250 000 tons of cereals have to be imported for the urban population alone.

Today, exports only finance a minor part of imports. Imports of vital inputs such as fuel, spare parts, capital replacements and needed raw materials have been curtailed. The survival of the urban population depends on Mozambican capacity to obtain grants and aid loans. Commercial credit as a source of funding is closed.

Civil strife and wars add additional strains on the Mozambican population. But it is equally clear that the Mozambican situation would be precarious even without these.

Natural Disasters

Mozambique has always had to cope with great variations in the natural environment. Since the country is very large the probability that all provinces would suffer a drought at the same time is very small.

In 1981, DCO, SIDA's Development Office in Maputo, noted that in six out of ten provinces (Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, Sofala, Manica and Tete) there had been a scarcity of rain in the 1978-79 period. The information from the Meteorological Services and the National Water Directorate confirms this. (See Annex 3 for details.) In August 1981, an epidemic of paralysis was reported in the Nampula province. It was attributed to consumption of insufficiently processed cassava roots. This was the result of a dry period in 1980.

In 1981, there were reports of floods along the Zambezi river. Already at this time, the weakening of the economy made it difficult for the Government to cope with climatic hazards. Sweden was already providing disaster relief. Again, in 1981, a drought situation developed which culminated in the disaster situation in 1984. Cyclones take place at regular intervals. The last major one was Domoina in southern Mozambique in January 1984.

The figures in Annex 3 suggest that the Mozambican reports of drought, floods, typhoons and other natural hazards did in fact occur. Compared to normal years the situations which emerged were difficult ones to cope with. But, it seems also true that between 1977 and the beginning of 1986 there is nothing to suggest that the situation has become more difficult than what has generally been the situation in Mozambique. In fact, total precipitation, province by province, has more probably been above the long run average than below it.

Thus, the emergency situations which have appeared cannot be explained only in terms of climatic hazards but other factors have to be considered as well.

Civil Strife

When Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, the general belief in Mozambique was that the guerilla groups operating with

Rhodesian support would cease. In fact, for a few years the situation became more peaceful. However, South Africa has interests in the development of the front-line states, including Mozambique. According to many observers, South Africa has since been directly promoting "counter-revolutionary guerilla" in Mozambique. (See for example article by John S Saul.) The primary objective is not to replace the government, but rather to destabilize the economy:

"In other words the experience of countries like Nicaragua and Mozambique suggests that the planners of this kind of warfare have developed a quite sophisticated sense of just what kind of linkages are necessary to begin to move an underdeveloped country forward. And they have crafted their intelligence and operational capacities quite self-consciously to identify linkages-in-the-making and to destroy them in the countries which have been targeted. ... Indeed, as we shall see in the following section, Mozambique does provide the purest case of South Africa's deployment of the counter-revolutionary guerilla."

(Saul, pp. 9-10)

If domestic trade is disturbed people tend to become more vulnerable to climatic variations.
Photo: Anders Gunnartz/SIDA photo library



Even though the MNR of Renamo, **Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana**, pretends to be a united force, it is composed of several internally competing groups. In addition, the destabilization and the crisis have led many others to join the ranks of the bandits, as the Mozambicans call them.

"With the downward spiral of the Mozambican economy, counter-revolutionary-cum-bandit life may also have begun to seem a 'job-option' for some young Mozambicans, the MNR thus feeding on the results of its own destructiveness."

(Op. cit., p. 21)

South African pressures, not least through its support to MNR, resulted in Mozambique yielding, and, in March 1984, signed an agreement with South Africa, the Nkomati agreement. The agreement envisaged that RSA would stop its support to MNR that Mozambique would expel ANC personnel and that economic co-operation would be intensified between the two countries. In August-September 1985, the MNR military base in the district of Gorongosa was captured with the assistance of Zimbabwe troops. Captured documents showed South African support after the signing of the Nkomati agreement. To what extent RSA continues to give support to MNR has an important bearing on the possibilities of solving the present crises.

The type of MNR attacks in Mozambique ranges from attacking economic targets such as factories, trucks and other vehicles, bridges and power lines, to health stations and schools. In many areas the civilian population is terrorized.

The dramatic effects of these attacks can be illustrated by the fact that today only one sugar factory is operating because the others have been destroyed by the MNR. Sugar was the most important export product of Mozambique, and this year, 1986, Mozambique has to import a major part of its sugar needs.


The MNR is active all throughout Mozambique though with different and varying intensity. The Tete and Zambezia provinces were in the middle of 1986 most affected.

The security situation has deteriorated during the last few years. In June 1986, the Government for the first time recognized that civil strife was a major cause for declaring a province as disaster area, Zambezia.

The cumulative effects of the MNR activities have not yet been fully felt. Even if all guerilla activities stopped immediately, it would take some years before the full effects are felt.

The preceding pages provide some partial information on the Mozambican crisis. When the Portuguese abandoned the country it became impossible to maintain economic activities. Disaster situations did in fact develop already during the first years.

One of the most important reasons for the profound suffering caused by natural hazards has been the presence of



The types of guerilla attacks ranges from economic targets such as factories, bridges and powerlines to health stations and schools.

Photo: Anders Nilsson/SIDA photo library

the MNR. Affected people cannot be reached simply because the security situation does not permit the Government to enter into many areas. Moreover, the Government's real possibilities to assist people in need are very small indeed, since it lacks trained personnel and economic resources for the purpose.

The economic conditions of the rural population has seriously deteriorated through the combined effects of economic policy, drought and guerilla activities. As an example can be mentioned that there were about 1.4 million cattle in the country before Independence, more than 70 per cent were owned by the peasants. Today, according to official estimates there are less than 900 000 head of cattle. Other estimates suggest that only 400 000 - 500 000 head of cattle are left in the country. Cattle represent an important asset which in times of crises can be sold.

For this and other reasons, future crises may well be much worse than those we have seen thus far.

Disaster Situations which Might Occur in the Next Decade

The Government of Mozambique has given priority to solving the security situation. As a consequence about half of the budget is ear-marked for the armed forces. From this follows that other important activities will receive less.

What will happen in the next decade is very much linked to the development in South Africa. Within the next five-year period it seems likely that the economic situation will remain serious and with a high probability of worsening. The security situation may or may not improve. The real possibilities for the Government to attack and reduce the MNR guerilla are small. Natural hazards will continue as in the past. It should be noted that the effects of the last years' difficulties will exert a negative influence during the next years. Taking all these factors together, a rapid economic and social improvement during the next five years seems remote. In fact, natural conditions have been better than normal and even minor drought situations will cause serious problems.

In 1985, major economic indicators suggested a further deepening of the economic crisis. Most basic consumer goods are in critically short supply. The security situation which seemed to improve when the MNR Gornogosa base was captured changed, when the MNR recaptured it a few months later. In Zambezia, the MNR controls large areas of the Province and the same is true for the Tete province.

Even if one would consider a very positive scenario for the next decade, it would take a very long time to produce any tangible results. During the first five years, 1987-91, it seems probable that the situation will remain as serious as it is in 1986, and, unfortunately, it could even become worse.

In the last few years, a great number of people have received disaster relief aid. The gigantic work of rehabilitating these people has only begun. In addition, new areas with affected groups have been added to the list in 1986. These in turn will require rehabilitation programmes. For practical purposes, the Mozambican crisis will remain for a decade or more. The major task is to break present trends.



The MNR bandits also terrorize the civilian populati
Photo: Joel Chiziane/SIDA photo library

CHAPTER 3 - MOZAMBIQUE'S EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH THE CRISIS AND DISASTER SITUATIONS

Changing Priorities and Policies

During the first years after Independence, Mozambique's major efforts were directed towards mitigating the effects of the exodus of the Portuguese. At this time the amounts of commercial credit and bi- and multilateral aid surpassed Mozambique's capacity to absorb it. Mozambican policy-makers were determined to pull the country out of its underdevelopment quickly. The first efforts were the attempts to halt the rapid decline in over-all production, not least in agriculture. Moreover, at the Third Frelimo Congress in 1977 he stated objective in the Economic and Social Directives was even more ambitious, namely, to attain pre-independence production levels in 1980.

Adverse natural conditions occurred during these years such as the floods in the South (1977) and Zambezi river (1978), drought in the South and Centre Provinces (1978/79), and in the North and Centre (1979/80). Whether climatic irregularity is increasing or not is still an open question. Since the prevailing belief in Mozambique at the end of the 70's was that a rapid economic development was imminent, the need for planning for disaster situations was never felt. Natural disaster relief operations were planned and implemented on an *ad hoc* -basis. Important experience was thus gained and would influence the organizational set-up implemented in 1980.

Moreover, during these years the Zimbabwean war of liberation was taking place and several hundred thousand Zimbabwean refugees were in Mozambique. The guerilla attacks in Mozambique during these years were supported by colonial Rhodesia. Commandos hit hard at economic targets in the Western Provinces of Mozambique during these years. The Mozambican economy was further strained by the presence of refugees in the country and in order to cope with this

problem an office for support to refugees was created under the President's Office (Nucleo de Apoio aos Refugiados) in 1977.

At the end of 1979 it was clear that Zimbabwe would become independent and logically it was expected that guerrilla activities within Mozambique would cease. It was also clear that the Mozambican economy had not collapsed during the first years after Independence in 1975, something which was feared by many observers on the eve of Mozambican Independence. Mozambique had survived and the very rapid decline in production had been halted. There were strong hopes for the future and at the end of 1979 the President declared that during the 80's Mozambique was to overcome underdevelopment. To this end a Perspective Ten Year Development Plan was to be made. Mozambique prepared itself for a very rapid economic growth and development. The Frelimo Party, the Public Administration and the people were all mobilized for a gigantic developmental effort.

The domestic security situation improved after Zimbabwe Independence at the beginning of 1980, but South Africa stepped up its support to guerrilla warfare within the country so that already in 1981 the security situation had worsened again. Therefore, by 1981, it was becoming increasingly evident that such a gigantic developmental effort was impossible. Economic problems were mounting again and natural adverse conditions compounded the already serious problems the country was facing.

The Fourth Frelimo Congress in April 1983 substantially modified, if not reversed, the policies of a gigantic developmental effort and stressed rural development and peasant participation while emphasizing the importance of small projects. As a result, the 10-Year Development Plan was never published.

In 1985 the economy was declared a War Economy, and disaster conditions were recognized in 7 out of 10 provinces. Official figures claim that 1.8 million people are affected (May 1986). Unofficial estimates suggest that this figure may be substantially higher. It is quite probable that the remaining provinces will be declared affected as well. In

1986 the Government for the first time recognized that the security situation was a cause for declaring a province as a disaster affected region (Zambezia).

The observed changes in development policy also have a bearing on the Mozambican structures formed to deal with disaster operations as will be discussed below.

Mozambican Structures Formed to Deal with Disaster Situations

During the first year after Independence the National Directorate for Cooperation, DNCI, (Direcção Nacional de Cooperação Internacional) within the Planning Commission had the responsibility for co-ordinating emergency programmes. In 1977 the Office for Liberation Movement Refugee Support (Núcleo de Apoio aos Refugiados em Movimento de Libertação) was created, reporting to the President's Office. It is estimated that some 300 000 people received help through this Office. (Verbal communication from DPCCN.)

A series of natural disasters made it clear that the present organization was not effective in handling the problems. It was also felt that the international community was demanding a more efficient organizational structure than the DNC could provide. Therefore, a completely new structure was introduced in September 1980.

One of the major intentions seems to have been to strengthen the over-all authority of the new entity. A National Co-ordination Council for the Prevention and Control of Natural Disasters was set up. (Conselho Coordenador de Prevenção e Combate às Calamidades Naturais - CCPCCN.) It is composed of the following members:

Minister of Planning	President
Minister of Trade	Vice President
Ministry of Agriculture	
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	
Ministry of Health	
Ministry of Transport and Communications	
Ministry of Education	
Ministry of Construction and Water	

Since the time of creation of the Council there have been Ministerial changes, the latest one in April 1986 when the Ministry of Internal and the Ministry of External Trade were fused into one Ministry, Ministry of Trade.

The composition of the Council was particularly important. The President of the Council was at the time of its creation not only Minister of Planning, but also Minister of Agriculture, a situation which meant a strengthening of the status of the Council. For several years the Vice President has been Acting President a fact which has meant an effective co-ordination in the area of food supply. Another factor of importance is that these ministers have remained in office for a very long time.

The Council meets twice a year or more frequently if needed. In order to implement the directives of the Council an executive body was created - The Department of Prevention and Control of Natural Disasters within the Planning Commission. It is headed by a National Director (Director Nacional). A National Director has an important status, but it is below that of a Vice Minister, a State Secretary or a Provincial Governor. In order to be an effective instrument for planning and co-ordinating of disaster programmes, the Director, therefore, needs the strong support of the Council, particularly in dealing with the Provinces.

Facing the increasing pressures to cope with different disaster situations in the country, the Government of Mozambique decided to strengthen DPCCN. In December 1983, the Government initiated discussions with CARE, a US non-governmental organization, to strengthen the logistics of disaster relief activities such as transport, storage and maintenance. During 1984 an agreement was concluded with the Government of Mozambique and the CARE-team became operational at the beginning of 1985. At present there are about ten officials giving backstopping in Maputo and six officials in the Provinces. It is expected that there will be another three posts added to the staff in the field in 1986.

At the regional level the administrative set-up is approximately as follows. Each Province has a head, a Governor (Governador Provincial) who is directly responsible

to the President of Mozambique. Each Ministry has its own regional representative, Provincial Director (Director Provincial) responsible to the Minister concerned and to the Governor. The Provincial Government (Governo Provincial) is headed by the Governor and includes the Provincial Directors. The regional Government has a great deal of power and the Governor particularly so.

In the case of the National Council for Prevention and Control of Natural Disasters there is a regional equivalent headed by the Governor. This means that implementation of programmes and activities at the Regional, District and Local levels have been effectively controlled by the Governor. His views have been decisive for the implementation of disaster programmes. This regional decentralization also means that other ministries' activities related to a disaster operation will be co-ordinated at the provincial level.

The obvious advantages of such an administrative set-up also entail certain dangers. Resources placed at the disposal of the Mozambican Government to assist victims of disasters can be diverted to other uses at the regional levels. This has happened and may happen in the future.

The DPCCN has regional representation in all of the Provinces except Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula. The office in the Zambezia province was opened in 1986.

How are Needs Identified and Channelled to DPCCN

Mozambique is divided into 10 Provinces and about 125 Districts (Distritos). Each district is in turn divided into Localities (Localidades). The present security situation makes it impossible to know the extent of administrative coverage.

Since Independence in 1975, the party has made great efforts to organize the people. Parallel to the administrative set-up there is a political organization. It begins with the cell (Celula), circle (Provincia) and so on up to the highest levels of the country.

Thus in theory, and to some extent also in reality, there are two different ways by which people can channel their needs to the authorities. One way is through the public

administration at the local level. The other way is through the party channels. Again it is the Governor in a province who assembled the information gathered throughout the province, analyzes and forwards this information to DPCCN through its regional offices (delegaoes regionais).

Thus DPCCn is constantly receiving information from the different provinces which serves as a basis for estimating the affected population and their needs.

The over-all lack of administrative capacity in the country, and the need for rapid and relatively accurate information from the provinces, have prompted donors and Mozambican authorities to bypass the bureaucracy. Thus, donors attempt to inspect affected areas in *situ* to assess the needs. Also, in the April/May DPCCN Newsletter it is stated that: "DPCCN/Maputo will collaborate more and more with District Administrators in updating the figures of affected populations in the districts - an activity which we are attempting to strengthen in all provinces".

The identification and assessment of the needs of affected people is of paramount importance. This information has to be collected where the affected people are situated. Several decisive factors should be mentioned:

- High levels of illiteracy;
- the Portuguese language is the second language for most people in Mozambique;
- the communications net-work is very rudimentary;
- many areas are severely affected by war or similar activities;
- a central planning system imposed on a colonial bureaucracy;
- civil strife in most provinces.

In addition information flows will be much slower than in normal circumstances. Taken together these factors suggest that it is and will remain very difficult to:

- identify where the needy people are situated;
- assess their needs;
- monitor the effectiveness of disaster relief programmes.

Mozambican Capacity and Ability to Deal with Disaster Relief Programmes

Mozambique neither has been able effectively to deal with the disaster situations which have developed, nor is it likely that the country will be able to deal with future disasters without massive foreign aid. Even without natural disasters and without civil strife, the country would still need massive aid to prevent a significant part of the population from starving. (Suffice to mention that, excluding the affected population, the country needs to import several hundred thousand tons of cereals.)

Moreover, unless the donor countries were willing to actively participate in the planning, implementation and monitoring of relief operations many people would simply die because the required type of aid would not arrive in time.

Having said this, it should be mentioned that much progress has been made to date. The Government has recognized its difficulties in coping with the present situation. The aforementioned creation of DPCCN was one step towards improving the present situation. Another important factor is that the Government invited CARE to improve the logistics of the department. The Government's attitudes towards the international community has also changed and today is much more open than it was a few years ago. As a result it can be noted that while at the end of the 70's there were but a few organizations working in disaster relief programmes, in 1984 there were more than 120, and the number is still increasing.

The lack of information on the needs of affected people has already been mentioned. Other important aspects are that the planning and implementation of the emergency aid requires a minimum of logistics. Given the fact that the number of affected people is in the range of two million, the demands on the Mozambican administration would seem insurmountable. It should also be kept in mind that civil strife, poor communications and administrative deficiencies make the matter worse.

There is an important balance to be struck. On the one hand it would appear as if the needs of the affected population would require a military type of organization with

Western standards of operational efficiency. On the other hand it should also be clear that this is a Mozambican problem which has to be solved by the Mozambicans with the assistance of the international community. Because of this, there is a Mozambican need to co-ordinate efforts by the Mozambicans themselves. The vulnerable situation in Mozambique today and well intended donors imposing their particular solution on different problems may well in the end create havoc with the fragile Mozambican administration and be counterproductive as far as effective support to needy people and their rehabilitation are concerned.

As far as the physical infrastructure is concerned in dealing with disaster aid the following comments can be made:

- 1 Over-all storage capacity in the country seems more than sufficient to cope with present volumes;
- 2 Silos storage capacity and future plans are as follows:
 - Maputo 25 000 tons which is expected to be increased by 20 000 tons (West Germany) plus 15 000 tons (Japan)
 - Beira 12 000 tons, and an additional 15 000 tons will become operational in 1986.
 - Nacala 6 000 tons, and another 10 000 tons will probably be built.
- 3 The Mozambican ports were built to handle much larger volumes than at present. However, as a result of the economic depression since Independence in 1975, port facilities could be in need of repairs and maintenance.
- 4 The major bottleneck in the physical transportation of goods from abroad to the needy people can be found in the distribution from major ports to the affected areas. The generalized lack of vehicles, spare parts, mechanics, fuel and management to secure an optimal use of the available fleet has meant that a much larger

transportation fleet is needed than would have been the case in normal conditions. The lack of maintenance of roads also means that the wear and tear on vehicles is great. Civil strife has added an additional toll, and several drivers have been killed and many trucks have been destroyed. As a result goods tend to pile up in major ports with the resulting pilferage and decay of perishable goods.

To partly attenuate this situation many organizations and the Government have resolved to use non-traditional ways of reaching the affected population. Thus, air freight has increased substantially but at very high costs. Transport within the country has as far as possible been replaced by coastal freight with smaller ships and barges.

Still, the fact remains that it is difficult to reach the affected population with aid.



Civil strife has made transportation dangerous and many truck drivers have been killed.
Photo: Paul Fauvet/SIDA photo library

CHAPTER 4 - THE RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO THE MOZAMBIKAN CRISIS AND DISASTER SITUATIONS

The First Response to the Emerging Crisis

The proclamation of the People's Republic of Mozambique in 1975, and the marxist-leninist policies of the new Government baffled the West. As a result foreign aid from many Western countries such as the USA and the European Economic Community was very small. It was not until the 80's, when Mozambique adopted a less anti-Western approach in its foreign relations, that this situation changed.

The Scandinavian countries, particularly Sweden, rapidly increased their aid programmes during these first years, 1975-80. The first agreement with Mozambique was put into effect for the Swedish fiscal year July 1975 - June 1976. Already in the first fiscal year 1974/75 (July - June), SEK 12 million were used by the Government of Mozambique. In the period 1975-80, about SEK 500 million of Swedish aid was disbursed to Mozambique. This aid was an important factor in permitting the new Republic to survive the first economic shock after Independence. This aid was particularly important, insofar as very few strings were attached. During the same period Mozambique relied heavily on different forms of co-operation with the Socialist block. Very little information has been released on the Volume and content of the aid received from these countries. It is believed that a significant part was in the form of barter trade agreements involving deliveries of goods and services from the Socialist bloc to be paid with future deliveries of Mozambican agricultural exports.

The UN system established representations from the birth of the new Republic. In fact, the World Food Programme had already in 1974 started operations in the liberated zones of the North. Mozambique also became a member of the African Development Bank and the International fund for Agricultural Development.

Few non-Government Organizations (NGO's) were present, with some important exceptions such as the Africa Groups (Sweden) and the Eduardo Mondlane Foundation (Holland). However, appealing to international solidarity, Mozambique managed to recruit a great number of individuals to partly fill the gap in trained personnel when the Portuguese left the country in large numbers. Many of these expatriates were highly motivated, and had close contacts with different solidarity organizations outside Mozambique. This in turn facilitated the rapid expansion of NGO's in the 80s.

During the struggle for Independence, many religious organizations had associated themselves with the colonial regime, something which after Independence caused severe strain in their relations with the Government. The Government did restrain the development of religious institutions. Still, it must be recognized that the Mozambican Government has always adhered to the principle of religious freedom for the individual person. Again, the deepening of the crisis in the 80s has paved the way for an expansion of religious organizations and their activities throughout the country.

While Mozambique in the period 1975-80 was very active in the international arena, e.g. denouncing the Ian Smith regime in the then Rhodesia and apartheid in South Africa, very little factual information was available about the deep crisis developing in Mozambique. Moreover, Mozambique's own efforts to mobilize its people, first to obtain pre-Independence production levels and later to overcome underdevelopment in ten years, hardly conveyed the idea of a profound crisis. The possibility of the crisis worsening, to such an extent that a greater part of the population would become susceptible to starvation, seemed remote to most observers.

Thus, the international community did not know much about Mozambique, and was divided in its approach to the country. The marxist-leninist rhetoric angered some, while others adopted a wait-and-see attitude. Some nations such as Sweden committed itself to support the Mozambican Government in its endeavours to develop the country. Although the Swedish commitment was firm, the Mozambican design of development programmes and projects often questioned in the active dialogue which was evolved between the two countries.

The Slow Response to the Disaster Situations in the 80's

As has already been mentioned, the combined effects of the economic crisis which started from an extremely low level of development, civil strife and not least floods, droughts, and hurricanes during the period 1982-1984 provoked a series of disasters in Mozambique. This occurred while international attention was directed towards Ethiopia and other afflicted African countries particularly in the Sahel region.

The Mozambican Government's policy has been to attempt to assist affected people where they are living, thus trying to avoid large camps. Obviously, a scattered but suffering population draws less international attention than a concentration of affected people. Mozambican successive appeals (1980, 1982, January 1983) met with little response. Finally, at the end of 1983, the international community started to respond. To illustrate, in 1982 DPCCN received the equivalent of SEK 21 million, in 1983 17 million, and in 1984 251 million. (DPCCN, Relatorio 1984, p. 4.)

It should be noted that yielding to the pressure of economic crisis and disaster situations developing all throughout the territory, Mozambique made a series of important political concessions. In 1984 Mozambique signed the "Nkomati agreement" with South Africa with the purpose of eliminating, or at least reducing, the South African supported RNM (Resistencia Nacional de Moçambique) guerrilla warfare in Mozambique. Moreover, Mozambique became a member of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and signed the Lom III agreement with the European Economic Community. Thus, the political conditions for massive aid from the West had been met. Meanwhile, from what information is available, the Socialist block also increased disaster relief aid to Mozambique.

The international community's response was, however, not rapid enough. In the previous of Inhambane alone, the number of deaths from starvation is estimated at 100 000 in the 1984/85 period. (DCO 1986-01-31, p.3.)

Estimates of the number of people in need of disaster relief, given the difficulties in obtaining information in Mozambique commented on in the previous section, have a wide

margin of error. Firstly, it should be noted that, given the disruption of the agricultural production system, about 3 million people living in the cities would starve, unless international aid supplied them with food. In addition, there were about 2.5 million affected people at the end of 1985 (DPCCN, Programa Outubro 1985, p. 3), and this figure has dropped to about 1.8 million in May 1986, distributed as follows below (DPCCN, Newsletter April/May 1986).

<u>Province</u>	<u>Number of people affected</u>
Manica	228 000
Tete	330 000
Maputo	120 000
Sofala	402 000
Zambezia	250 000
Gaza	208 000
Inhambane	310 000
Total	1 848 000

At first sight, these figures suggest that there has been a significant improvement in the disaster situation in the last year. The International relief efforts have produced tangible results. Some observers in Mozambique claim, however, that these estimates may be on the low rather than on the high side. It should also be noted that the three Northern provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula are not included. It is known that civil strife is frequent in these provinces and, to the extent that information becomes available, the total number of affected people might increase.

People in acute distress attract international attention. The concentration of suffering people is easily covered by Western mass communication media. Such situations command an immediate response of solidarity from people in the West. Consequently, most disaster aid to Mozambique has been relief programmes.

There is an inherent danger in the way international disaster relief programmes operate. Concentrating people to camps draws international attention. Moreover, it is relatively easy to supply those affected with relief aid. The

Mozambican Government might, therefore, be tempted to increase the flow of aid by concentrating the people into camps. Hitherto, the Government has consistently stuck to its policy of assisting people where they live. However, to escape civil strife many people have fled disputed areas and have settled in camps. In turn the Government has attempted to settle these people in new communal villages. However, these new villages may become refugee camps.

Historically, people in Africa have migrated in large numbers in response to adverse conditions. In modern times people in the Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane province have worked in the mines of South Africa to supplement their family incomes. Today, there is an estimated number of 250 000 Mozambicans living illegally in neighbouring countries. (League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies' representative, Maputo.)

With an improvement in the information networks in Mozambique, the time between a disaster occurring and relief aid reaching the affected people should be shortened. The UN system is working towards establishing an early warning system. FAO/WFP are active in building storage capacity for buffer stocks to meet sudden declines in food production and/or marketing.

Although disaster relief aid is becoming more effective, much improvement is still needed. However, the economy of Mozambique is shattered and its possibilities of initiating a development process are minimal. It is within this context that a gigantic effort of rehabilitating the affected people has to be initiated. During this process new groups of affected people will be added to the ones already in need of rehabilitation. International experience suggests that it is generally difficult to find donors for such needs.

Coordination between Mozambique and Donors

Since 1984, massive disaster relief aid has been flowing into Mozambique. A great number of countries, international agencies and non-government organizations have been participating in these activities. Since Mozambique is a very poor country

with an acute shortage of practically everything, such an influx of goods is bound to promote corruption. Until recently, corruption seems to have been minimal in Mozambique. There is a growing concern among donors, and Mozambican officials would privately agree that corruption is growing. The problem seems to be inevitable but must be kept to a minimum.

Because of the slow response of the international community, the Government has been primarily concerned with increasing the total flow of disaster relief aid and less with co-ordination. Moreover, most donors have resisted attempts at effective co-ordination. Several reasons for this can be given. For example, food aid is often a convenient way of disbursing an excess of agricultural production. Such aid has little impact on World Market prices and there is little danger of depressing the prices of the donor country's regular exports. To what extent such aid creates havoc with domestic markets in the recipient country is an open and much debated question. Therefore, donors want to donate what is a surplus in the donor country. In a disaster situation, the timing of deliveries is important. The arrival of ships, unloading and further distribution have to be carefully programmed. Coordination among donors and with the Mozambican Government, therefore, is essential. Some of these aspects will be discussed in the next section.

One attempt to overcome this difficulty of co-ordination has been the efforts by UNDP, and the OEOA (Organization of Emergency Operations in Africa) established in 1984 as a response to the criticism of UN inactivity. OEOA has collected information on the needs, communicated it through Government agencies to the head office in New York. This information has in turn been communicated to potential donors. OEOA has then proceeded to discuss which part(s) could be pledged by different donors and in this way attempted to accommodate Mozambican needs to different donors' willingness to supply different goods and/or services. Such a laudible co-ordination effort has met with difficulties. As was mentioned above, on the one hand, donor countries and organizations resist being co-ordinated. On the other hand, Mozambique has

claimed (understandably) that such co-ordination efforts should be a Mozambican prerogative.

Co-ordination of international relief aid to Mozambique has to be improved. One alternative is the UN system which exhibits serious deficiencies such as being a very bureaucratic organization, with officials being assigned for a limited time period only. Moreover, these officials are accountable to the UN and not to the Government. It would, therefore, seem preferable to strengthen the Mozambican ability to co-ordinate disaster relief programmes. Such an assistance would have to include expatriate personnel in key positions and a significant improvement in reporting to the donors.



Mozambican ports are built to handle larger volumes than at present.
Photo: Kate Trubcott/SIDA photo library

CHAPTER 5 - SWEDISH DISASTER RELIEF TO MOZAMBIQUE 1983/84 AND 1984/85

In the following, all Swedish assistance to Mozambique during fiscal years 1983/84 and 1984/85 financed from disaster relief funds are described and evaluated. As can be seen in the table below, the period comprises four bilateral grants and six grants through NGO's.

Swedish Disaster Relief to Mozambique, 1983/84 and 1984/85

Contents of grant	Purpose	Channel	Approval	Termination	Amount granted, SEK million
1 Volvo Trucks	Drought relief	Government of Mozambique	840112	March 84	5.0 (+ 6.7 from other funds)
2 MONAP rehabilitation	Cyclone Domoina	Government	840322 840628	May 85, March 86	5.0 (+5.4 in Nordic contrib)
3a Agricultural handtools	Rehabilitation of drought affected	Government	840726	Summer 85, prosecution of purveyor on-going	10.0
3b Wheat	Emergency relief	Government	840726	Sept 84	9.0
4 Seeds	Rehabilitation of drought affected	Government	840927	April 86	8.3
5 Financial grant	Drought affected	Swedish Red Cross	840119	1984	1.0
6 Financial grant	Affected by floods and cyclone	Swedish Red Cross	840330	1984	1.0
7 Financial grant	Drought affected and cholera campaign	Church of Sweden Aid	831003	Jan 84	0.6
8 Financial grant	Drought affected and cyclone rehabilitation	Church of Sweden Aid	840329	Summer 85	1.0
9 Financial grant	Drought affected	Church of Sweden Aid	840629	not yet terminated	1.4
10 Financial grant	Drought affected	Swedish Free Church Aid	840210	1984	1.0
				Total	43.3

As has already been mentioned, the possibilities of moving around in the country have been restricted during the present evaluation mission. Also, the operations to be evaluated have been implemented quite recently, some of them not yet terminated. For these reasons, the assessment of the effects of the Swedish relief aid will not be exhaustive. The evaluation of the operations will in several cases limit itself to general assessments of effects and to the evaluation of the preparation and the implementation of the assistance in question.

Much of regular aid programmes to Mozambique do in the present circumstances take the character of disaster relief. Evidently, this also goes for Swedish assistance, which to a considerable extent consists of funds for the importation either of general imports or of goods necessary for the running of projects. During the period under study, regular imports have tended to be replaced by emergency imports. As many of the items imported are being financed both from regular development assistance budgets and from disaster relief funds, it is no longer really meaningful to maintain the distinction between the two kinds of aid. Actually most aid granted to Mozambique today has an emergency character. However, for the purpose of deliniating the present study, its terms of reference are restricted to those relief actions, which were financed from Swedish disaster relief funds during fiscal years 1983/84 and 1984/85.

A large part of the mission's impressions and considerations is in effect also relevant for the regular aid programme, particularly as concerns its emergency aspects. In accordance with its terms of reference, however, this evaluation report discusses explicitly only the emergency operations mentioned above, even if some conclusions could equally well be applied on the country programme.

Trucks

Background and objective

On November 21, 1983, the Government of Mozambique presented a request for Swedish disaster relief to the Swedish Embassy in Maputo. SIDA-DCO had been notified in advance and had

prepared the issue by sending a memo to SIDA-HQ proposing disaster relief "to an amount to be decided upon later for the procurement of, in the first hand, trucks and seeds".

At that moment the drought in southern Africa had reached enormous proportions. In Mozambique around four million people were affected, mainly in the southern and central parts of the country. The Government had launched relief operations containing i.a. food, medicines and seeds. In seven districts in Inhambane province and in four in Gaza province, 750 000 people out of a total of 1.3 million were seriously affected. The Government had just signed an agreement with the World Food Programme concerning relief aid for the two provinces. Over 30 000 tons of maize and beans would be delivered by WFP.

The WFP agreement meant that food and other supplies for the groups affected would become available in Maputo, in some of the ports along the coast and along the railroad to Zimbabwe. What was lacking was trucks for road transports within the two provinces. The objective of the requested Swedish aid was to create this transport capacity. The total cost was estimated at USD 1 781 000.

Furthermore, seeds were requested at a total cost of USD 219 000.

Description

The Swedish assistance given in response to the Mozambican request, consisted of 32 trucks 6 x 4 with fixed platform including standard tool-boxes, two trucks 6 x 4 with fuel tanks 18 m³, one mobile workshop and spare parts to an approximate value of ten per cent of the total value. The purveyor was Volvo, who at their own cost added another mobile workshop to the list. Training for drivers, mechanics and spare parts specialists was included in the deal, as well as technical assistance for service points at Xai-Xai, Maxixe and Vilanculos. The full contract amount was SEK 11.7 million.

Seeds were also delivered at a total cost of SEK 0.9 million. They were, however, financed out of regular funds for import support. Consequently, they are not discussed further in this report.

According to the exchange of letters between the two Governments, the trucks, including spare parts and technical assistance, were to be used in relief work in the drought areas of Inhambane and Gaza provinces. After the termination of the relief programme the vehicles were to be "automatically transferred to the vehicle-pool of Agricom".

Thus, the trucks were channelled to the DPCCN and would be operated in conjunction with Agricom, who later would receive them for their own operations. As it turned out, however, they were incorporated into Agricom's fleet on arrival. They were thereby not only inserted into a functioning transport organization but also able to transport relief goods to the needy areas and Agricom goods back.

The trucks were financed partly from disaster relief funds, SEK 5 million, from unutilized funds under a credit line, SEK 4 million and the remainder, SEK 3 million, from the country frame allocation.

Preparation and Implementation

After the request was granted by SIDA, the two Swedish truck manufacturers Scania and Volvo were invited to submit their tenders. Volvo's bid was considerably lower than that of Scania, not least because Volvo had had a contingent of trucks standing for some time because of an uncompleted delivery. The Mozambican authorities concerned preferred Scania because of their good record and longstanding presence in the country, but accepted the argument of SIDA that the price difference in Volvo's favour was too large - it meant an additional six trucks in the deal - not to be given a decisive influence. Volvo, on landing the contract, agreed to arrange the training of drivers, mechanics and spare parts controllers in the country and to station a service engineer there for a six months period to guarantee the functioning of the trucks. The contract was signed on December 23, only one month after the receipt of the official request.

Due to faulty specification in the original request, an over-sized tanker truck was included in the contract. When this was discovered, the heavy tanker was exchanged for two

tankers of the same size as the 32 trucks. This error produced an additional cost to the procurement. After fruitless efforts to sell the heavy tanker to someone else, it was finally delivered to Mozambique after all, financed from the country frame allocation and used by Petromoc.

The staff training took place during February and March 1984, although somewhat complicated by the lack of language skills of the Volvo experts. None of them spoke Portuguese. The remaining impression in Maputo of this and other after-sales services is that Volvo may not be seriously interested in the Mozambican market. The draft contract was also not sent by SIDA-HQ to the DCO in Maputo, an action which could have improved the quality of implementation through the detailed spelling out of requirements.

The trucks arrived in Mozambique during February and March, three months after the presentation of the request. They were distributed to three Agricom transport centres: Xai-Xai in Gaza province and Inhambane and Vilanculos in Inhambane province. The mobile workshop was made stationary and its truck converted to transport purposes. One tanker was put into service in Gaza and Inhambane. The second tanker was stationed in the province of Tete to support the emergency operation there, Tete being the most drought-stricken province in the country besides Gaza and Inhambane.

The additional workshop provided by Volvo for the support of the emergency operation was kept property of Volvo. Thereby, it became the object of prolonged controversy, neither Volvo or their representation in the country nor the Mozambican authorities regarding it as their responsibility to put it into operation. It was not until early 1986 that it was taken in use, then by the provincial authorities in concordance with Volvo for servicing the needs of a fisheries project.

The vehicle fleet has been working in the assigned area since March 1984. According to reports from the provincial Government and from Agricom it has been a reliable and efficient mode of transport. During the first six-months period - the period to be reported on according to the agreement - it managed to supply 250 000 people in need with their daily

rations of food. 34 114 tons were transported and 3 054 012 ton kms produced, out of which 19 601 ton kms and 1 616.71 ton kms were for emergency purposes. Up till today four vehicles have been damaged beyond repair by mines or by armed attacks. The remaining 29 trucks are all in working conditions.

All but one of the trucks in Inhambane province have recently been transferred from Agricom to the DPCCN provincial administration. By Government decision 85-01-01, DPCCN is to establish its own fleet of vehicles for emergency operations. Differences of opinion between DPCCN and Agricom regarding the payment for transport services rendered have also played a part in this. Early 1986, 18 trucks were transferred, one remaining with Agricom. Current information has it that this change has made return transport for e.g. Agricom more difficult to arrange. Questions in this respect have, however, been answered in the negative, both by DPCCN and Agricom.

The transfer of the Volvo truck fleet from Agricom to DPCCN is clearly part of the implementation of Government policy. This policy raises, however, the question of the long-term transportation structure in Mozambique. Although not really within the mandate of this study, this question does indeed have relevance for the future, i.e. post-emergency, use of the present vehicles. Several options are available in the long run, viz. the establishment of public provincial multi-purpose transport companies, the revitalisation of private transport services, the strengthening of various single-purpose transport services such as Agricom, and others. As the need for a centrally controlled transport system is not that great in regular circumstances, it would be possible for a post-emergency structure to be characterized by plurality, thereby providing easier general access to transport. An application of present Government policies on such a structure could result in an increased interest in the role of private truckers. The trucks studied here would have a role to play in such a scenario.

Spare parts for the truck fleet were delivered together with the initial consignment. Further orders have been placed for supplementary deliveries. Spare parts in stock at present and on order will suffice for approximately another two years. The spare parts stock is still with Agricom.

Full reporting according to the agreement has been provided by Mozambique.

Evaluation by Mozambique and by DCO

Concerned Mozambican authorities underline the positive impact of the emergency programme and the successful role played therein by the trucks delivered from Sweden. Although all Mozambican parties concerned are satisfied with Volvo in that respect, it is also stressed that monetary savings made in the short run through a low procurement price, can turn out to be heavy expenses in the long run, if maintenance is not guaranteed by Volvo during the entire life-time of the fleet. The six months' maintenance services included in the contract are also considered too short, as maintenance needs usually increase after that period.

DCO considers that the service rendered by the trucks has been satisfactory. The operation has been troubled, however, by the controversy between DPCCN and Agricom about unsettled bills. DCO did find it desirable during the period of operation to intervene in the controversy, but had to refrain from doing so because of its own staff constraints. DCO maintains that more detailed prescriptions for the use of the vehicles should have been incorporated into the agreement between Mozambique and Sweden. DCO is also apprehensive of decreased accessibility of vehicles for transport demands other than DPCCN's in the future because of the transfer of the Volvo trucks to DPCCN.

Consultants' Evaluation

This case of disaster relief has been a successful operation. It was well conceived and swiftly implemented. The trucks are of good quality and designed to meet the requirements. They have been introduced into and used by a competent Mozambican organization for the purpose agreed upon. In a

situation of prolonged emergency, the Swedish truck fleet will be able to continue rendering services for several years more.

A provision is, however, that proper maintenance is guaranteed. One of the weaknesses of this operation is that Volvo has not made a serious effort at establishing satisfactory maintenance services in Mozambique. It is too early to judge the economic value of this fact, but it is certain to increase the total cost of the Volvo fleet in the long run. This in turn decreases the considerable economic advantage ascribed to the Volvo offer at the time of procurement. It does seem quite possible to the consultants that the total life-time ton km cost per vehicle ultimately will become higher than it would have been with the Scania trucks. In this cost there should be included the additional work required in connection with the introduction of a new brand into the country.

As there was such a clear difference between the tenders of Scania and Volvo, and since there is material of comparison available in the country in the form of very similar Scania truck fleets, it is hereby suggested that, at an appropriate future time, this case be studied more systematically, in order to illustrate possible trade-offs between price and quality in procurement.

Another weakness in this operation was the after-sales services provided by the purveyor. A minimum requirement for short-term training staff is that they speak the language they are going to train in. It should be reasonable to expect that a large-scale operator like Volvo shared this view. This case shows, however, that such aspects have to be entered into the sales contract. It also seems preferable, in the case of complicated procurements, particularly including technical assistance, that draft contracts be sent for comments by SIDA's purchasing division to the DCO concerned.

As has been stated by the Mozambican authorities, it is also not a very efficient utilization of resources to post a service engineer in the country for the first six months of operation. After initial training of staff and trimming of vehicles no great needs of advanced service will occur. It

seems preferable to phase the presence of such technical expertise over a longer period of time. The transfer of the trucks to DPCCN has, according to the people interviewed, not yet affected the availability of transport for other than emergency purposes. Experience from other countries, however, points clearly at the existence of such a risk. This is a factor which would have to be considered in any agreement concerning the provision of vehicles for emergency purposes.

The exchange of letters between Mozambique and Sweden was executed before the delivery of the trucks. It is the only one of the four agreements studied here, which was in force during the whole operation. On the other hand it is quite sketchy in content and says e.g. nothing about the ownership of the vehicles, an amendment which had been suggested by SIDA-HQ. The inclusion of such a paragraph could have facilitated subsequent operations considerably.

Rehabilitation of MONAP II Projects after the Cyclone Domoina - Background and Objectives

On January 28 and 29, 1984, the cyclone Domoina struck the southern parts of Mozambique, resulting in several storms and floods. More than 100 persons were killed, 9 500 families lost all their belongings, some 70 000 families lost their harvests and irrigation systems, roads, bridges, electricity supply lines, buildings and other infrastructure were destroyed. The total material damage caused by Domoina was estimated at around USD 75 million.

Two weeks later the Ministry of Agriculture presented a programme for the rehabilitation of damaged projects within the second Mozambique Nordic Agriculture Programme, MONAP, amounting to USD 1 650 000. The estimates had been made by project staff, instructed by the MONAP coordination unit to plan the rehabilitation of projects to "the same level of activity that each project had achieved before the cyclone". This goal also became the objective of the subsequent rehabilitation programme.

Several other proposals for Swedish bilateral disaster relief were presented and discussed, such as consultancy studies of the reconstruction of roads, bridges and power

stations, deliveries of certain equipment and supplies for such reconstruction works and the purchase of a tanker for the water supply of Maputo. The Swedish emergency assistance finally granted was, however, limited to the MONAP rehabilitation, which is thus the only case studies here.

Preparation and Implementation

Following the presentation of the emergency situation and the MONAP proposal by SIDA in the Nordic Donor Group, the Group decided to have the proposal appraised by an independent consultant.

The appraisal was performed during one week in March by one person, an engineer who did not speak Portuguese and who was unfamiliar with conditions in Mozambique. According to project staff in Maputo it added nothing to the process and gave the impression of being some irritation *forma*. The appraisal did produce quite some irritation amongst project staff, but did not, on the other hand, put off the approval of the request. The request would not have been processed by the Swedish Disaster Relief Consultative Group until 22 March anyway.

On that day the Disaster Relief Group recommended a Swedish contribution of SEK 5 million to the MONAP II rehabilitation programme. The Swedish contribution would be subject to contributions also from Denmark and Norway. This information was passed on to MONAP, who, therefore, could not go ahead with implementation pending the confirmation of Norwegian and Danish support.

The contributions of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, totalling SEK 10.4 million, were finally confirmed mid-June. This sum was approximately 80 per cent of the sum requested. The funds would be available early July. The time span from request to confirmed approval, though still informal, was exactly four months. Of this time one and a half months was consumed for the Swedish decision and another two and a half for the Nordic decisions.

Following the confirmation of funding, the Ministry of Agriculture presented a revised rehabilitation programme early July. It was approved for implementation early August.

The table below compares its budget with those proposed originally by the Ministry and by the consultant.

**Budget for the MONAP II Domoína rehabilitation programme,
in thousand Meticaís**

Project	Budget Proposal Rehabilitation Programme Domoína July 2, 1984	Ministry's Report February 13, 1984	VIAK Consultancy Report March 21, 1984
Umbelúzi/Boane Training Centre (TR-1)	532	1 234	1 240
Agrarian Cooperatives Development (CO-1)	5 471	10 281	7 200
Regional Centres for Participatory Research and Development (CO-2)	7 381	14 365	4 120
Milk Maputo (LI-15)	18 556	26 916	21 340
Coastal and Inland Fisheries (FI-1)	104	1 512	1 120
Vegetables Maputo (CR-3)	5 812	5 812	5 200
Agricultural Marketing (MI-1)	526	451	520
Rehabilitation of irrigation system	12 950	2 000	2 000
Non-identified damages	-	3 430	5 860
Incidentals/cost- differences	668	-	-
Fuel, expatriate staff	-	-	12 600
TOTAL	52 000	66 001	61 200

The major parts are the rehabilitation of two co-operative projects, a milk production project, a fruit and vegetables project and two irrigation schemes.

By the end of May 1985 the bulk of the following projects had been implemented: the Agricultural Training project TR-1, the co-operative projects CO-1 and CO-2, the small scale fisheries project and the fruit and vegetables project. Two projects were late - the milk production project and the two pumping and irrigation schemes.

The main item for the milk production project was the replacement of cattle washed away by the floods. Procurement,

which was effected in Zimbabwe, was complicated and postponed several times for different reasons. Misunderstandings were created in Zimbabwe, resulting i.a. in financial claims on SIDA. Finally, in April 1986, 160 heifers were delivered, all safe and sound, after having been flown in from Harare.

It is relevant to note, however, that this project is one of those, where Swedish support was planned to be phased out during the next three-year period, the reason being serious doubts about its economic viability. The question has been raised whether, in such a situation, it was really motivated to invest approximately SEK 2 million in new cattle. The answer has been found in the original orientation of the planning of the rehabilitation programme, i.e. to reestablish the level of activity of pre-Domoína.

As concerns the rehabilitation of irrigation systems, tenders were invited from Danish, Norwegian and Swedish consultancy companies for the design, procurement and supervision of the Umbeluzi and Changalane pumping stations. VIAK, who have a team posted in Maputo, were chosen instead of the Danish company Carl Bro, Swaziland, to undertake the work. VIAK were more expensive but able to start working at least one month earlier than Carl Bro, who had not been able to visit the sites, especially Changalane. This was considered decisive. Because of the risky security situation at Changalane, the work was split into two, and a negotiated procurement of VIAK was undertaken for Umbeluzi only. This process took another two weeks, and the contract was signed on November 30, 1984. The cost agreed does seem high, however. Fees e.g. are agreed at more than 18 weeks, whereas the same company had designed four pump stations for drainage in 12 weeks earlier that year.

After the design of the project and the preparation of tender documents, the Empresa Hidráulica do Maputo was contracted for the work. The Umbeluzi pump station was fully rehabilitated in March 1986. The faulty design of a water intake caused a cost increase of 20 per cent. The station has been built to a considerably higher standard than the average in the country, particularly as regards resistance against future floods. Its total cost is approximately three times the cost of other stations with an equivalent capacity.

The rehabilitation of the Changalane pumping station has not yet been started. Security conditions do not seem to allow any operations within the immediate future.

The Agreement concerning the rehabilitation programme, see Annex 5, was not entered into until October 30, 1985, clearly too late to be of any use during most of the operative phase.

Reports have been submitted by MONAP to SIDA, describing the advancement of the programme.

Evaluation by Mozambique and by DCO

From the Mozambican point of view the MONAP II Domoina Rehabilitation Programme was a slow one, the Umbeluzi irrigation pump station e.g. being rehabilitated a little more than two years after the cyclone. The slow implementation of Swedish aid in this case is attributed to i.a. the complicated and sometimes unclear process of decision-making.

It is also not quite understood that it was necessary to call for several tenders for the design of the rehabilitation work. A situation of emergency should allow a more direct, negotiated procurement, in this case of VIAK, who were permanently present in Maputo. It is on the other hand also noted on the Mozambican side that a consultant from VIAK was hired to appraise a programme, where VIAK themselves had interests, and that the consultant, in his appraisal report actually did propose an additional, though not really necessary, programme monitoring function, which should explicitly be executed by VIAK.

The DCO considers that the idea of rehabilitating MONAP projects was a good one. It was a natural thing to channel Swedish emergency resources into needy areas, where there already was an infrastructure capable of using it and where SIDA was familiar with conditions and needs.

However, the slow decision-making concerning the total contribution of the Nordic countries is judged serious by DCO. It resulted not only in loss of time but also in loss of enthusiasm by people concerned, and thereby in loss of impact.

Of the components of the programme, DCO finds all of them viable, except the milk project. The cattle lost should not have been replaced at such a price. DCO did not, however, state this position during the preparative phase of the operation.

Consultants' Evaluation

The consultants agree that the choice of rehabilitating MONAP II projects was a rational one, particularly in view of the strained administrative capacity of SIDA in Stockholm and in Maputo. The MONAP co-ordinating unit was also quick in presenting a complete programme proposal for the rehabilitation.

It does, however, not seem evident that there should be only one orientation of the programme, viz. to reestablish what was damaged. Such a principle does seem reasonable in the case of on-going projects. But the base for reestablishing a project, whose feasibility is subject to serious doubts, appears questionable. Today, there seems to be a fairly general belief that the complicated and expensive purchase of cattle was a doubtful investment.

DCO was in a position to influence the programme at an early stage, as well as the consultant. Both apparently chose not to.

As for the procurement of the consultancy company, it does seem reasonable to engage VIAK rather than any other company, who would need another month before work could be started. However, available documentation does not indicate any real obstacles against bringing in an element of competition also in the second stage of the procurement when the contract was being negotiated. It seems that the security situation would have allowed the invitation of Carl Bro into that phase of the procurement. The error committed in the design of the Umbeluzi pump station also shows that the utilization of a Swedish or Nordic consultant is not a guarantee against quality losses.

The disaster relief funds granted can, according to the present agreement, be utilized up to July 31, 1986. Formally, no disbursements can be made after that date. This seems to

imply that, if the Changalane rehabilitation is to be executed, additional discussions and agreements have to be initiated. This has been brought to SIDA's attention.

Decision-making, finally, was made unnecessarily slow in this case by making the Swedish contribution conditional on those of Denmark and Norway. This arrangement meant an additional two and a half months' delay in implementation. This case being an emergency operation, it seems to the consultants that it should have been possible to announce a Swedish contribution only referring to planned contributions by other Nordic countries.

Agricultural Handtools and Wheat

Background and objective

In view of the severe drought in Africa during 1983 and 1984, the Swedish Government presented a special bill to Parliament on March 15, 1984. The bill referred to the serious food supply situation in several African countries. The majority of the countries south of Sahara were in a grave economic crisis, added to which came the effects of a prolonged drought. In southern Africa, political and economic pressure from South Africa on its neighbours further aggravated the situation. Additional Swedish aid funds were proposed to alleviate immediate needs. Also preventative measures should be undertaken in order to decrease the vulnerability as regards drought and other natural calamities. That is the early formulation of the objective for this intervention.

Late June that year, SIDA presented a plan to the Government in order to implement the bill. The plan comprised projects in eleven countries plus additional proposals for the Sahelian and the southern Africa regions. For Mozambique three proposals were included - agricultural handtools, SEK 10 million, wheat in bulk, SEK 9 million and food and agricultural inputs through the Church of Sweden Aid SEK 1.4 million.

Preparation

In the meantime, a dialogue had been initiated in Maputo concerning the use of the additional relief aid becoming available. One item which was urgently needed, but for which

financing could not be arranged within the regular Swedish programme, was agricultural handtools. On June 13, the Government of Mozambique presented its request to the Swedish Government, indicating its various priorities. First priority was agricultural handtools for victims of floods and drought to the tune of SEK 10 million. Other priorities were i.a. sunflower oil, oil and caustic soda for soap production, raw material for irrigation tubes and mills and other equipment for irrigation. The total sum requested was SEK 30 million.

The immediate reaction within SIDA was to accept the Mozambican first priority. But instead of including, as well as this, any of the other items in the request, SIDA counter-proposed a boatload of wheat to relieve the acute situation in the country. The two offers were welcomed by the Mozambican side.

Immediately upon the Government's decision, procurement of the wheat was undertaken. The delivery was contracted 7 July. On August 3, the ship chartered left for Ethiopia and Mozambique. Discharge was made of 2 900 tons in Nacala and of 3 100 tons in Maputo. In Maputo considerable delays were caused by port congestion, mainly due to the on-going discharge of large quantities of American maize. Demurrage claims of USD 21 500 had to be paid.

After discharge, the Swedish wheat was distributed through the regular commercial network, proceeds being returned to the Ministry of Finance. The Maputo consignment was distributed in the provinces of Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane and the Nacala shipment in the provinces of Nampula, Cabo Delgado and Niassa. After milling, the wheat is distributed to bakers, other food industries and to the markets. By applying fixed prices throughout the distribution system, the Government can make available cheap end-products, though in restricted quantities, to the population. The consumers of the wheat are urban or semi-urban people, not the rural groups. Both groups are, however, affected by the difficult food situation. Certain substitution effects are also observed, meaning that increased quantities of wheat result in a decreased general competition for grains, leading to a higher availability of maize, too.

The procurement of agricultural handtools turned into a confused, complicated and protracted operation, whose effects are still felt. The list to be procured included hoes, machetes, axes, sickles and files. The controversy arose about two hoe items.

The receiver, the State Company for Agricultural Commercialization, Agricom, participated in the tender evaluations. On that occasion, agreement was reached concerning all suppliers and bids, including the two renders for hoes from Jayhind Agrico of Bombay, India. Agricom representatives maintain that reservations were made as regards the quality of Jayhind produce. During the subsequent contract negotiations, new evidence was produced, casting further doubts. Although Agricom consequently wished the negotiated contract with Jayhind Agrico not to be signed, SIDA judged that, with appropriate safeguards for quality control, it would be safe and, for economic reasons, advisable to enter into an agreement.

After approximately six months, the handtools were delivered. In accordance with the contract, the supplier had arranged a pre-shipment inspection in Bombay by an institution authorized by the Indian Government. The consignment was approved and, consequently, paid for. The contract contained a clause, allowing the purchaser to arrange a pre-shipment inspection of his own. SIDA had commissioned the Société Générale de Surveillance to undertake that test in Bombay before shipment. Due to the lack of co-operation from the supplier, this test could not be performed. Other and later tests, however, showed serious deficiencies in the hoes delivered. The final tests in November 1985 came out so badly, that they had to be redone in order to check that the laboratory equipment was not at fault. The conclusion of the tests is that the expected lifespan of the hoes delivered by Jayhind is approximately 30 per cent of normal expected lifetime. SIDA has approached the supplier, with the help of the Indian Embassy in Stockholm, in order to negotiate a price reduction. Possible amounts of compensation should, according to SIDA-HQ, be used for additional deliveries to Mozambique according to national priorities.

In the meantime, the handtools financed by SIDA have been delivered through the Agricom distribution system. Out of 1.1 million implements purchased, 26 650, i.e. 2 per cent were reported lost. The distribution was specified in the agreement, Annex 6, which, however, was not effective until May 16, 1985. Agricom had also obtained SIDA's written consent to a slightly modified plan of distribution. This was followed, the southern provinces of Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane receiving approximately 20 per cent and the central Manica, Sofala and Zambezia provinces almost 80 per cent of the total consignment. It is often difficult to follow specific hoes and axes in the distribution - possibly with the exception of the Jayhind hoes. But it can be noted that out of the 2.1 million agricultural handtools imported through Agricom in 1985, 1.1 million were financed by Swedish disaster relief funds.

No formal reports have been submitted by the Mozambique authorities concerning the utilization of the Swedish aid.

Evaluation by Mozambique and by DCO

The Swedish financing of handtools is regarded by Mozambican representatives as a highly relevant input into the rehabilitation efforts. It is lamented, however, that the quality of some of the deliveries turned out so poorly. The co-operation with SIDA on this procurement has evidently produced considerable irritation on the Mozambican side. The hoes in question are now accredited for Mozambican planning purposes with a two years' lifespan. Apart from that, Sweden's preparedness

to react in a flexible way to needs in Mozambique and to adapt its support to circumstances in the country are held in high esteem.

As concerns the wheat grant, the Mozambican authorities do not have any particular observations. The delivery came at an appropriate moment and did clearly help to alleviate a difficult food situation. The congestion in the port of Maputo, which resulted in demurrage claims, is regarded as a one-off phenomenon. The problem of the Government is not congestion in the ports, it is too little in the warehouses.

DCO finds the orientation of this intervention excellent. The formulation was also good, where SIDA had the executive responsibility in consultation with Agricom. It was a severe blow that misunderstandings occurred and that the



The lifespan of the delivered hoes was only 30% of normal expected lifetime.
Photo: Gustaf Eneroth/SIDA photo library

independent pre-shipment inspection in Bombay did not take place.

A specific problem in the distribution phase was that the final test results were not available until very late. Too late, in fact, to mark the Jayhind hoes as "B quality" or to inform buyers by some other measure that this was not regular Agricom quality tools, so as to avoid damage to Agricom's reputation with their buyers.

DCO sees language problems and lack of understanding as the main cause of the difficulties.

Also the wheat grant is seen as well conceived intervention. It was useful and delivery was according to plan.

Consultants' Evaluation

For the rehabilitation of displaced rural populations, the provision of agricultural handtools is necessary. For this purpose the Swedish grant was highly relevant. Approximately half of the sum granted was used in a satisfactory way. The procurement of hoes, however, at USD 6 million, resulted in unacceptably poor deliveries. Confusion and lack of understanding, i.e. due to language difficulties between the parties, are at the roots of the matter. Since it has now been clearly demonstrated, however, that the hoes in question have only 30 per cent of the value paid for them, the matter has shifted to being one of prosecution for faulty deliveries. These facts should be profited from, in order to provide a fuller value for the funds granted to Mozambique.

The wheat delivery is a considerably less complicated type of aid. It is probably one of the least demanding per krona used as regards administrative capacity. It was a useful input in a situation of acute food deficiency in the country. Its implementation was swift. The only observation concerns port congestion in Maputo, which seems to have been an isolated phenomenon.

It should also be stated that both grants are relevant for the objective of the Swedish emergency programme, which in turn, also demonstrated its relevance as regards the acute situation in Mozambique. It could be debated, however, whether or not a grant in accordance with the priorities

presented by Mozambique, e.g. for the production of soap, or a grant of maize, would not carry more important benefits for the groups directly affected by the drought than the wheat delivered from Sweden.

Also in this case agreements were entered into quite late. The wheat grant was already delivered and consumed when the exchange of letters took place and the production of handtools was finished.

Seeds

Background and objective

When submitting its proposal to the Swedish Government, mentioned above, concerning measures of relief connected with drought in Africa, SIDA mentioned that a further proposal concerning grants for seeds to countries in southern Africa was being processed. After requested information had been received from FAO on needs in Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe, this proposal was also finalized. The proposal totalled SEK 15 million, of which 9 million were set aside for Mozambique. Government decision was taken late September 1984, in accordance with SIDA's proposal.

Thus the objective for the seeds grant was the same as above, viz. to alleviate the emergency needs of and to assist the rehabilitation of victims of drought in Africa.

Preparation

The sum allocated for Mozambique, SEK 9 million, was based on a FAO/OSRO proposal indicating an urgent need for seeds in Mozambique of 1 200 tons of maize and 200 tons of sorghum. However, when the Swedish contribution was announced in Mozambique, quite different needs were presented by the Mozambican authorities: seeds for vegetables, beans and cow peas, garlic and potato. Since the time when the FAO/OSRO information had been collected, at least one season had gone by. Other foreign assistance had also become available. SIDA agreed to the procurement of the suggested items. SIDA also decided, on the basis of DCO's assessment of the Mozambican procurement competence, to delegate purchasing to the Mozambican side, i.e. in this case the state company Interquímica E.E. in Maputo. It was underlined by DCO that the procurement

should be governed by the provisions of the procedural agreement between Sweden and Mozambique, and that DCO would like to observe the procurement process. The parties also agreed that SIDA would pay the suppliers directly upon request from Interquímica.

The arrangements were spelt out in an exchange of letters between the two Governments. This was, however, not executed until April 1985. By then 7 of the 9 million had already been disbursed.

Implementation

Some fifteen companies in Africa and in Europe were invited to submit tenders, two of which were Swedish. In consultation with DCO, contracts were placed for vegetable, potato and garlic seeds in the Netherlands, in the UK and in Swaziland. The total cost of the orders placed came out at SEK 4.1 million, considerably lower than planned.

In consequence extra seeds of potato and sugar beans were procured in a second round in April 1985. Orders were placed in Botswana and in Swaziland at a total value of SEK 2.7 million. This was also cheaper than planned.

Thus a third round of procurement was undertaken in May, this time of maize seed. One order was placed in Swaziland at approximately SEK 1.7 million.

Subsequently, parts of earlier procurements had to be changed. Supplementary orders were placed during the summer of 1985, this time of tomato and potato seeds from Swaziland. By this time the total sum disbursed or committed amounted to SEK 7.7 million.

A fourth and final seed purchase was undertaken during the winter of 1985/86. Vegetable seeds were procured from Holland at a total of SEK 0.5 million. After this procurement, the account was closed by SIDA-DCO. Remaining funds, approximately SEK 700 000, were returned to the disaster relief account at SIDA.

By June 1985, total seed deliveries were approximately 80 tons of vegetable, 1 500 tons of potato, 285 tons of maize, 80 tons of sugar beans, 8.5 tons of garlic and 150 kgs of tomato. To that was then added during winter another two

tons of vegetable seeds. All seeds were distributed through the Boror Distribudora F.E. and their provincial delegations and godowns. For the family sector the final distribution was carried out partly by Agricom. Private, state and co-operative farms procure partly directly from Boror, partly through the regional administration's agricultural branches.

The implementation of the seeds grant became extraordinarily time-consuming. The administrative arrangement meant that a large number of recurrent decisions and approvals as well as payment transactions had to be performed by DCO.

By the time of the evaluation mission, June 1986, all seeds procured under the Swedish emergency grant had arrived in the country and should have been used. A final report on the utilization was yet to be submitted.

Evaluation by Mozambique and by DCO

The Mozambican authorities concerned have expressed their appreciation of the Swedish grant, which was used for seeds needed for different campaigns during 1985 and 1986. They consider this as a valuable additional input into agricultural production at a time of acute food shortage. No particular observations concerning implementation are presented.

DCO formulates criticism concerning the genesis of the operation. Data provided by FAO/OSRO for planning purposes was outmoded when it was to be applied. In a country, where SIDA has expertise contracted in the field of seed production, it would seem more natural to collect information straight through the DCO than via FAO.

Also as regards implementation, DCO has its reservations. Prices were misjudged initially by Interquímica, which resulted in several subsequent rounds of procurement. Procurement was later executed in a competent way, but the physical handling of seeds was not satisfactory, resulting in significant quality and quantity losses. DCO also points at deficiencies in the distribution performed by Boror.

Consultants' Evaluation

The consultants consider the delivery of seeds to be a highly relevant contribution to rehabilitation efforts. This grant

is therefore judged positive on that account. The choice of seeds does not, however, seem quite clear. Due to restrictions on mobility, end-users and final effects have not really been studied. Still, the consultants do not feel convinced that e.g. potato seeds are more relevant for the target group, i.e. the population affected by the drought, than the sorghum suggested by FAO/OSRO.

Implementation was not satisfactory. The administrative arrangement turned out to be quite cumbersome. The root cause of this was DCO's assessment of the competence of Interquimica and Boror to handle the whole operation. Ex post it seems clear that some reinforcement of that system should have been considered. It has not been possible to assess the extent of quality and quantity losses in the operation, but it is evident that e.g. the transportation of such sensitive goods as seed potatoes requires specialized skills within the organization. The recent reorganization, whereby the procurement of seeds is transferred from Interquimica to Boror, may create the necessary conditions for satisfactory operations in the future.

Grants to the Red Cross

Drought Relief

The Swedish Red Cross, SRC, received two grants during the period under study. The first one was a disaster relief programme for Africa at a total of SEK 10 million in co-operation with national Red Cross associations in Mauretania, Mozambique, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Tchad, Zambia and Zimbabwe. SEK 1 million was used, together with another SEK 1 million of SRC funds, for the drought relief operation of the Mozambican Red Cross, MRC. The main items purchased were food and other supplies, vehicles and other equipment, which in turn were used for the transportation of large quantities of supplies given in kind.

Around 140 000 people were to be assisted during a period of 3 to 4 months through the operation, according to reports from the League of Red Cross Societies, LRCS. A chartered DC-3 Red Cross plane flew supplies and staff into and within Manica province. Red Cross delegates were dispatched for the

co-ordination of the operation and the flights and for technical services. Mozambican nurses, MRC officers and volunteers were trained.

The Swedish contribution to the operation, SIDA SEK 1 million and SRC SEK 950 000, amounted to around one fourth of the cash donations received by the Red Cross. Added to this came contributions in kind, amounting to SEK several millions.

Cyclone Relief

Parts of the grants in kind received by the MRC during 1984 were intended for another Red Cross operation in Mozambique, the cyclone Domoina relief effort. This operation was supported by the second SIDA grant, SEK 1 million.

The character and effects of Domoina have been described above. The objective of the Red Cross intervention was to alleviate 20 per cent of the relief needs, as established in surveys of the flooded areas undertaken in the ensuing days.

Eight national Red Cross Societies and two Governments donated a total of SEK 2.4 million in cash plus clothing, kitchen utensils, tents and blankets. The SIDA grant was used for the procurement of tents, blankets and spare parts.

Red Cross relief centres were established in the cyclone stricken area, where food, clothing and blankets were distributed and first aid was provided. Vehicles purchased for the drought relief operation were used for the transportation of supplies from Maputo to the relief centres. The number of people assisted through the operation is, however, not reported.

The reports indicate initial difficulties in reaching the target group with supplies and in providing safe water. Other international emergency assistance helped in repairing roads and bridges, thereby facilitating access.

Evaluation by Mozambique, by the Red Cross and by DCO

Mozambican authorities appreciate the Red Cross contributions to the emergency operations in the country.

The Red Cross considers the two operations as successful. They were both, however, hampered by the worsening security situation in the districts. International support came forth rapidly and in adequate quantities.

DCO is of the impression that the two Red Cross operations were successful. DCO attaches a particular importance to the fact that the Red Cross brought in material and staff of their own, thereby actually increasing the total capacity available in the country for emergency operations.

Consultants' Evaluation

The mission feels that the Red cross intervention in the drought and cyclone relief needs of Mozambique during 1984 was relevant and adequate. Available reporting does not indicate, however, the number of people really reached, nor to what extent and during how long time they were assisted.

The cash grants from SIDA are inserted by the Red Cross into their operational budgets, alongside with their own contributions. Thus, they will finance direct operative costs as well as e.g. international staff involved in the work. The consultants do not regard this as inappropriate, as the staff in question are actually also an operative input.

Grant to the Swedish Free Church Aid

In December 1983 the Swedish Free Church Aid applied for a grant of SEK 1 million for an emergency operation in Mozambique. The amount was granted 1984-02-10. Their own contribution would be SEK 350 000. The objective was to assist people who were starving.

By that time about 2 million people were estimated to be starving in the southern parts of the country because of the prolonged drought and because of the internal unrest there. Tens of thousands of cattle had perished. People were leaving the countryside by the thousands, seeking refuge in towns or camps. Food, seeds and medical supplies were badly needed.

The Christian Council of Mozambique, CCM, appealed through the World Council of Churches, WCC, for international support. Funds were needed for the procurement of i.a. maize flour and of drugs against malaria.

The Swedish Free Church Aid response, totally SEK 1.35 million, was channelled two ways. SEK 720 000 were passed on to the Free Baptist Church, who added another SEK 57 000 to the sum, which was subsequently transferred to the Baptist Church of Mozambique, one of the Christian Council member churches. The money was used for the provision of maize, maize flour and bean seeds. The supplies were subsequently distributed through Government structures, and in the presence of a representative of the Baptist Church of Mozambique, in the provinces of Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane and Tete. Detailed reporting has been provided by the Free Baptist Church.

The remaining funds, SEK 630 000, were channelled to the Christian Council of Mozambique, CCM, in support of their relief operation. The funds were intended for maize flour and cholera drugs, though it is not possible to tell from available reports, whether they were used for exactly those purposes. All cash donations are mixed in one account by CCM. They are then used for various procurements, comprising i.a. food, seeds and tools.

Evaluation by Mozambique, by the Swedish Free Church Aid and by DCO

Mozambican authorities appreciate the relief action by CCM in Mozambique. They do not keep track of whether donations to the CCM or their member churches come from Sweden or any other country.

The Swedish Free Church Aid regards this operation as successful. Several visitors to the country have reported similar positive impressions. Particular importance is attached to the good co-operation between the authorities, mainly the DPCCN, and the churches.

DCO appreciates the work of CCM. Their operative capacity, through churches, congregations and other institutions provide an additional resource to Mozambique, which is of particular importance in a situation, which requires the utilization of all available operative resources.

Consultants' Evaluation

The consultants consider the CCM drought relief operation, as far as can be judged from available reports, as successful. Importance should be attached both to the existence of a separate operative structure and the good co-operation with the authorities.

It should be noted, however, that reports are mainly centred around inputs into the operations, stating the receipt and channelling of funds and material into such province or institution. Outputs, e.g. number of meals distributed or persons fed, are only exceptionally indicated. Effects have not at all been assessed in available reports.

Grants to the Church of Sweden Aid

The Church of Sweden Aid, CSA, received three grants for emergency operations in Mozambique during the present period, all three connected with the drought. They are SEK 600 000 1984-10-03, to be channelled through the WCC to the CCM, and SEK 1 million 1984-03-29, and SEK 1.4 million 1984-06-29, respectively, to be channelled through the Lutheran World Federation, LWF, to the Lutheran World Service, LWS, representation in Mozambique.

The first grant was a contribution to the same operation supported by the Swedish Free Church Aid described above, p. 67, only earlier. Based on appeals from the CCM and the WCC in January and in March, the CSA applied for a SIDA grant mid-September. The request was granted after two weeks. The money would be used for drugs, food, seeds and tools.

The CCM drought relief operation has been described and commented above. The role of CSA between the WCC and SIDA is similar to that of the Swedish Free Church Aid.

The second grant was part of a LWF relief operation for drought and cyclone affected people. It was oriented towards Botswana, Swaziland and Mozambique. The total budget for the operation was SEK 10.3 million, out of which 7 million were destined for Mozambique. SIDA contributed SEK 2 million to the operation, of which 1 million for Mozambique.

The operation comprised the importation and distribution of 7 500 tons of wheat, 10 000 blankets plus tents, food and other supplies. The SIDA grant was used for costs of transportation, distribution and control i.a. of the wheat donated from Denmark. With their own money, about SEK 0.5 million, the CSA procured blankets, tents and cheese.

The supplies were delivered through the LWS office in Maputo to the Government authorities engaged in the relief operation, and distributed through the Government network, i.e. DPCCN, hospitals, feeding centres and others in the provinces of Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane and Tete. According to reports all donations were received in good order and handed over to the Government authorities during the latter half of 1984.

The third grant was a contribution to a major effort by several churches to make a systematic effort at alleviating the effects of drought in Africa. Co-operating institutions are i.a. LWF, Caritas, WCC and Catholic Relief Service. The original fund raising target for the Churches' Drought Action in Africa was USD 100 million - final contributions totalled 300 million. The programme received a CSA contribution of SEK 19.6 million, out of which the Swedish Government contributed 16.6 million.

The purpose of the operation was to distribute seeds and handtools to small farmers, who had been displaced because of drought or, in the case of Mozambique, internal strife. Funds would also be used for the importation and distribution of food. This relief and rehabilitation efforts was to be implemented through the churches in each country.

Implementation has been slow, however. The security situation in Mozambique has considerably hampered the operation. Up till today, June 1986, only half of the allocated amount has been requested and transferred from CSA.

Evaluation by Mozambique, by the Church of Sweden Aid and by DCO

Mozambican authorities welcome the support received from the churches abroad. They appreciate not least that LWF inputs often have been used to supplement or facilitate Government

relief organizations, e.g. through the provision of supplies of fuel.

CSA feels that the operations have been successful. They have difficulties in following in detail the use of resources in e.g. the WCC reporting. As receipts and disbursements are not linked together, but reported on in a programme framework, it is not possible to follow one specific contribution through the system.

DCO considers the CCM operations as generally successful. The LWF contributions seen as less valuable, as it is not implemented through a separate structure, additional to that of the Government. The assessment is made that equipment and supplies, which are finally distributed through Government channels, could preferably arrive there without the detour via a NGO chain of instances.

DCO is also not convinced of the relevance of all donations received. Tinned cheese, e.g., which turned up in the markets after being delivered to Mozambique, is judged as irrelevant as regards the target group for the operation.

Consultants' Evaluation

The mission has, again based on available reports, a positive impression of the CSA-supported operations. What was said above about the reporting limiting itself to inputs, is also valid here. The consultants do not, on the other hand, consider the difficulties in following in detail the use of financial resources in programme reports to be relevant. The fungibility of funds, i.e. the possibility to substitute foreign grants for national funds on "aid-worthy" items e.g. health agricultural development and vice versa on other items such as defence makes such an effort senseless. The interest should rather be geared towards the results of the operations supported.

The fungibility of funds also creates at least some interest in what is procured for the NGO's own funds, the tinned cheese being a case in point. It is actually often preferable to donate cash, which can be used for cheaper and more adequate local procurements, than to use collected funds for the provision of supplies, which then have to be shipped

over long distances and eventually may turn out irrelevant for the intended purpose.

The consultants agree with the DCO appreciation of the CCM relief action capacity through the member churches. The LWS representation in Maputo, seemingly in a phase of transition at present, is, however, being expanded and will possibly in the future also be able to offer an implementing capacity of its own.

CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Swedish interventions evaluated by this mission all addressed the consequences of the severe drought prevailing in Mozambique during the early eighties, with only one clear exception, the Domoína cyclone rehabilitation programme. Thus, of total SEK 43.3 million disaster relief to Mozambique during fiscal years 1983/84 and 1984/85, 38.3 million were granted for drought relief. To this should be added large unspecified amounts granted for the same purposes from other funds, mainly within the country programme. Altogether this constitutes a major Swedish effort at relieving the situation of drought-stricken people in Mozambique.

Analysed in this one context, the Swedish Interventions fall into the categories of **relief** and **rehabilitation**. So far no specific projects have been executed in the fields of **disaster preparedness** or **prevention**. The relief operations comprise the deliveries of trucks and wheat, while the handtools and the seeds were granted for rehabilitation. The NGO grants were combined relief and rehabilitation operations. Of the bilateral grants, those aimed at relief were considerably more successful than those oriented towards rehabilitation. It is true that relief operations are in principle less complicated than the rehabilitation of affected people. Yet, this is not the reason for the limited efficiency of the handtools and seeds grants, the causes being rather of an administrative character. The consultants wish to stress this fact, as the following arguments will be presented in favour of a shift of emphasis towards a more long term disaster-oriented assistance to Mozambique.

As can be seen in the cases studied here, the best interventions, e.g. the handtools, are conceived of within the context of a dialogue between donor and recipient, where the relationship is characterized by openness, comprehension and flexibility. This should all be evident, but its implications are often overlooked, e.g. as regards the importance of informing one's partners at various instances, of consulting

locally knowledgeable persons before deciding and of adapting one's procedures to the conditions of the situation. The consultants feel that the latter two not being fulfilled satisfactorily are at the root of the poor implementation of the handtools and seeds grants. It should be stated, though, that the **conception** of the five bilateral operations was successful insofar as their relevance for their objectives are concerned. The only case where the consultants do not feel convinced concerns the target group orientation of the seeds grant - sorghum must be judged as more relevant for the target group than e.g. potatoes. Some doubt is cast also on the wheat grant. Conditions in the country have not, however, permitted a conclusive study in this respect.

If identification and formulation of projects, with few exceptions, must be regarded as good to very good, this evaluation would rather point at weaknesses in **decision-making** and **implementation**. Time used for decision-making varies considerably in the cases under study. In an emergency, time is usually a decisive factor for saving lives or acting at an appropriate moment. The consultants have difficulties in seeing the factors which would excuse the slipping away of time, which is not really necessary for some particular action. This goes for bilateral aid, e.g. the Domoina rehabilitation operation, as well as for NGO interventions, where in one case half a year could pass by before an appeal for relief aid was passed on to SIDA. The mission feels that in emergency aid, time should always and explicitly be regarded as a resource, which must never be subject to unnecessary waste.

Planning and implementation do offer the most important room for improvement. The mild project component of the Domoina rehabilitation programme illustrates the need for applying a planning model with discretion and care. The handtools grant is an example of the costs of lack of comprehension and adaptation in the procurement process. And through the seeds grant, one can study the administrative implications of an awkward model of implementation.

Only one case, the Domoina rehabilitation programme, contained a direct link between the regular aid programme and

disaster relief. But other operations, like the handtools and the trucks grants, do utilise procedures and channels established within the country programme. Both approaches have permitted a certain increase in the speed and precision of interventions.

But most of all, within the area of decision-making and implementation, the consultants wish to stress two points of a general character. Firstly, much effort is usually devoted to the analysis of needs and target groups and to the identification and formulation of projects, both in operations and in e.g. staff training. Decision-making and implementation rarely receive the same status, while - as the present study clearly shows - they are just as indispensable for success. Secondly, in the frontline of operations one will find the DCO staff and their Mozambican counterparts. The conditions of work often being harsh and resources scarce, these officers are above all in need of support in the form of advice and services from headquarters. The consultants have observed several instances of slow, unsympathetic or inflexible reactions. It is naturally not argued here that DCO should have unconditional HQ support at any chosen moment. But it seems quite clear that an increased responsiveness, particularly in the instances mentioned in this chapter, is called for.

The consultants would also like to present some observations concerning **agreements** and **contracts**. Agreements between Mozambique and Sweden have, with only one exception, been entered into much too late to be of value during the operation agreed upon. It is sometimes argued that the climate of co-operation and confidence between the parties is such, that agreements are not really needed for the operation per se, but more for the record. The consultants cannot accept this argument. Changes tend to occur much more often than planners seem to expect. It is also necessary that arrangements and conditions of importance for the good execution of the operation be entered into the agreements, a case in point being the ownership of the trucks delivered. Contracts, too, are legal instruments, whose power has been under-utilized. The evaluation indicates that when complicated procurements are

contracted, particularly including technical assistance from the supplier, much may be gained through sending the draft contract - while it is being negotiated so as not to lose time - to the DCO for their comments.

Reporting is mainly either non-existing or centered on inputs and activities rather than on outputs and effects. This applies to both bilateral and to NGO interventions. Where reports have been submitted, they have been prepared by expatriate staff stationed in Mozambique. Reporting to donors cannot be expected to be an item of high priority to Mozambican authorities at present.

The evaluation has covered five bilateral grants and six grants through NGO's. As mobility has been restricted and effects thus not really evaluated, it is difficult to present a conclusive comparison between the two modes of implementation. Some aspects are visible, however. Both groups of interventions are hitherto restricted to relief and rehabilitation, though initiatives in the field of preparedness are forthcoming. The identification and formulation of operations does not vary considerably. On the one hand implementation through NGO channels in Mozambique, such as the Red Cross or the Christian Council of Mozambique, does present an additional administrative capacity. On the other hand, the consultants have found no evidence in the cases studied here for the thesis that NGOs would be more efficient channels to reach the poorer segments of the population than the official ones.

Recommendations

The consultants wish to offer recommendations regarding the formulation of Swedish disaster related assistance to Mozambique concerning on the one hand the four categories **relief, rehabilitation, preparedness and prevention** and on the other hand specific aspects of aid like **preparation, financing, implementation and co-ordination**.

A guiding principle for the formulation of recommendations has been the consideration of experience and capacity. Only such activities are recommended for direct interventions, where SIDA already has experience, where there is an

established field of co-operation of where SIDA has some other comparative advantage. This means that e.g. health care is not recommended though it is sorely needed and may well be suited for NGO interventions.

The target group for the proposed interventions are actually two. The first hand target group is the rural population who has been affected by fighting and by natural calamities. Secondly, the consultants consider that in the present circumstances also segments of Mozambique's urban population are affected to such an extent that Swedish emergency assistance can be motivated. However, the consultants wish to emphasize that measures geared towards the rural poor must have the highest priority.

A long-term planning perspective is recommended both for official and for NGO disaster relief to Mozambique.

In the field of **relief aid**, the mission recommends that Sweden be willing to supply occasional deliveries of essential foodstuffs and other supplies. Edible oil is being delivered at present. It is possible that the next delivery should be maize procured in the region, or beans, salt or raw materials for soap production. Wheat is also required, though target group considerations indicate a higher priority for maize. A close co-ordination with national authorities and donors concerned is recommended regarding the choice of supplies to be delivered.

Rehabilitation is one of the two fields where this mission wishes to recommend stepped-up action.

Direct support for the Government's rehabilitation efforts should have higher priority. Agricultural handtools, seeds and other inputs into agricultural production as well as supplies for the temporary survival of the population to be rehabilitated are indispensable for rehabilitation projects. The area is known to both sides since previous co-operation, procedures and contacts have been established. The inputs in question have to be imported - in the case of seeds much can be procured in the region, while quality handtools can be imported at a lower cost than it takes to bring in the raw material required for national production. The consultants regard this option as highly suited for Swedish emergency aid.

A second priority at present, which may become a first priority within a year or two, is a fund for NGO rehabilitation projects. A large and rising number of NGO's have sufficient funding for their proposed projects at present through official and private donations. By way of this work a considerable operative capacity is being created. In order to allow Mozambique to continue profiting from that capacity if and when this present funding is exhausted, the consultants would like to recommend that SIDA explore the possibilities of establishing a trust fund with UNDP for that same purpose. The administration of the fund should be delegated to the UNDP in its totality.

Support for the rehabilitation of displaced agricultural populations can also be effected through the strengthening of the traditional commercial network so as to provide an outlet for agricultural produce. Goods for sale, means of transport and commercial instruments and implements are examples of inputs required for the rehabilitation of commercialization. This is an area previously touched upon by the country programme. The consultants recommend it for further consideration also in this context.

The second field, where the mission recommends increased activity is **disaster preparedness**.

A top priority in this area is a reinforcement of the DPCCN. It has a key role to play in the continued emergency and is currently expanding its organization on the provincial level. It is in urgent need of additional human and material resources. A Swedish support should concentrate on the areas of information, planning and co-ordination of operations. It should consider both central and provincial functions of DPCCN. In view of the long-standing and trustful co-operation between Sweden and Mozambique, and as Sweden has already engaged in technical assistance to the Government administration, the consultants strongly recommend such an institution-building project to be prepared.

As the emergency situation tends to spread to new provinces, the need for relief transport arises again and again. Sweden has considerable comparative advantages in

heavy transport, and has provided trucks previously to Mozambique, for emergency purposes as well as for regular projects. The provision of vehicles for the provinces of Zambezia and Nampula can be a highly valuable contribution. A major Japanese grant of trucks may, however, be destined for those two provinces. Should that not be the case, this mission recommends the further delivery of vehicles for emergency transport from Sweden to be considered. Experience from previous interventions should be profited from, e.g. concerning delivery and preparatory activities, ownership, transport planning, maintenance and repair.

In order to support the vehicle fleet already donated for emergency operations, it has been suggested that a spare parts fund be established. The mission has found that spare parts in stock and on order will suffice for the coming two-year period. For the time being this matter does not seem urgent.

At present **disaster prevention** has to be postponed, not because of lack of urgency but for security reasons. The mission would strongly recommend that, at a later stage, preventive measures such as flood control, water supply and soil conservation be considered.

The above recommendations concern direct interventions by SIDA. The consultants also recommend that disaster-related projects through NGO's receive attention and financial support. One such project is the Red Cross Disaster Preparedness Project, which has recently received a contribution from SIDA. Another request may be presented by the Swedish Africa Groups shortly. Possible combinations of direct and NGO interventions could be of interest too, e.g. in a project for the strengthening of DPCCN.

In view of the considerations of experience and capacity mentioned above, and after a very preliminary assessment of urgency and of the availability of other sources of finance - multilateral, bilateral and NGO - a number of projects and interventions suggested or being discussed at present in Maputo have not been endorsed by the mission. Examples are the financing of the air-lifting of emergency supplies and of the logistical support unit (CARE) of DPCCN, the procurement

of a shallow coastal vessel and of portable radio-communication equipment, the establishment of a ships' company and the rehabilitation of rural health services or of port facilities.

The consultants find the question of financing less clear in the present circumstances in Mozambique than is normally the case. As the whole country is in a critical situation, almost all foreign assistance could be characterized as emergency aid. At the same time disaster relief funding could clearly play but a supplementing role to that of the country allocation. Also the very same kind of equipment or supplies have previously been delivered as project support, as import support or as emergency aid. The mission recommends a pragmatic approach to the financing question, which in the present planning and funding situation would suggest that all proposals presented above be eligible for relief funding. Candidates for financing jointly from the country allocation can be the rehabilitation of the rural commercial network, because it could also be a component in the agricultural sector programme, and the institutional support to DPCCN, because it would have to run over some years, necessitating the phased combination of two sources of finance.

The character of each operation, rather than its source of finance, should decide how it should be **prepared** and **decided** upon. A long-term project, like the proposed support to DPCCN must be prepared like any regular bilateral project. Emergency deliveries, on the other hand, have to be quick. In order to decrease the time used, the mission recommends that DCO investigates in more detail where Swedish grants for relief and rehabilitation would be most useful, initiates early consultations with the Mozambican authorities concerned and with them establishes the data needed for decision-making.

As regards the **execution** of operations, the mission recommends that the need of personnel be thoroughly analysed before deliveries of equipment or supplies are undertaken. Also, it is of great importance for success that SIDA assures a continued presence during operations, of varying extension and intensity according to requirements, in order to provide support when new problems arise.

The prevailing situation in the country underlines more than usual the need for co-ordination between donors, not only in the preparation and implementation of projects, but also in areas such as evaluations and general studies. In particular UNDP-Maputo should be kept informed of plans and intentions. The limited capacity of the national administration has occasionally made it necessary for donors to assure co-ordination between Mozambican authorities concerned. The mission furthermore recommends an improved internal co-ordination between SIDA's different HQ divisions and the DCO in Maputo.

The very pressing situation in Mozambique today and during the coming years is not only a formidable stress on the country's population, it is also a veritable challenge to concerned donors. Only in doing their utmost will they be able to stand up to that challenge and render valid assistance to a people in urgent need.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

1 BACKGROUND

Mozambique has been stricken by several severe natural disasters since 1977. Floods have been followed by an extended drought. Cyclones which occurred in 1979 and 1984 have caused further devastation. The effects of these natural disasters have been exacerbated by the war situation in the country.

The war alone causes incalculable damage and Mozambique's present economic crisis makes the country extremely vulnerable. The need for disaster relief assistance is assessed as very pressing and is expected to remain so in the near future.

Sweden has contributed approximately 45 million SEK as disaster relief during 1983/84 and 1984/85. This relief has mainly been channelled through four larger scale bilateral projects. Disaster relief contributions have also been used by non-governmental organizations for six other inputs.

2 AIM

The proposed evaluation shall collate and preserve the experiences which have been gained and the lessons which have been learned from the Swedish disaster relief activities already implemented. The aim is that the deliberations and conclusions of this evaluation will form the basis of the design and direction of future Swedish disaster relief activities in Mozambique - both in the short and the long term.

3 THE TASK

The evaluation shall throw light on the following issues in the context of Mozambique.

3.1 The crisis in Mozambique

- Historical perspective (especially the last 10 years) with emphasis on food supply, accessibility of water, infrastructure, health care (a summarized description).
- War and conflicts and other factors which contribute to the crisis situation.
- Acute disaster situations during the last ten years and their causes.
- Vulnerability and disaster tendency; areas and groups which are specially exposed; issues of distribution.

3.2 Structures in Mozambique designed to deal with disaster situations

- Description of existing structures for identification of disaster relief needs. Their planning and implementation capacity. Their areas of responsibility.
- How are needs defined and by whom? Which types of assistance needs occur in connection with which type of disaster?
- Capacity for storage and distribution of disaster relief assistance (including goods other than cereals).

3.3 Foreign disaster relief during the 80's

- The government's attitude to foreign disaster relief.
- Channels for receiving foreign disaster relief.
- Forms of co-operation between Mozambican governmental authorities and donor countries concerning disaster relief.
- Coordination between donors: forms and experiences.

- Which problems arise when receiving foreign disaster relief (at government, district and village level).

3.4 The Swedish disaster relief support 1983-85

- Aim, direction, type of resource, channels, type of financing, implementation, follow-up and reporting.
- Experience from each input: their relevance, efficiency, result, cost-effectiveness. How do the interested parties assess the activities? The Mozambican authorities - central and local, the final recipient, DCO and any others involved.
- The effects on the final recipients, both in the short and long run. Their possibilities of managing new crises.
- The decision-making process on the Swedish side: initiative, presentation of request, preparation and decision seen from the field and SIDA Stockholm respectively: experiences and problems (bi-lateral respective NGO inputs).
- Coordination with the long term development assistance; long term consequences.
- Dialogue with the Mozambican authorities: possibilities of stating conditions.
- Coordination with Mozambican authorities and with other donors.

If the situation allows, it would be of value to obtain an assessment from the affected people - their view of disaster relief. Did they receive the help they needed? At the right time? Has disaster relief increased their ability to manage the crisis situation? Have they been allowed to influence the design of the disaster relief. Are there any disadvantages for them caused by disaster relief?

3.5 Conclusions and recommendations

The evaluation shall result in conclusions concerning the following matters.

- Design of future disaster relief in the short and long term: direction, channels, target groups, priorities etc, assessment of the suitability of different channels in different situations.
- Choice between disaster relief assistance and country frame funds for disaster relief assistance.
- Possibilities of making demands on Mozambican authorities in connection with disaster relief inputs. e.g. concerning Mozambican participation, reporting and Swedish insight into activities.
- How can coordination with other donors and Mozambican authorities be improved?
- How can the preparation and decision-making within Swedish disaster relief activities be improved?

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- AGRICOM The Nordic Project for Support to Agricom, Annual Report 1985. Maputo, April 1986.
- Comercialização para 1980-1985, Agrícola. Statistical Tables.
- Estatísticas de Comercialização Agrícola em 1981-1985. U.P.E., Maputo, maio de 1986.
- Alberts, Tom. Moçambique, MONAP och landsbygdsutveckling. Mars 1983.
- Böckelman, Per-Olof. Agricom E.E. - Mozambique. Appraisal of AGRICOM's Request for Nordic Support During 1987. March 1986.
- CARE Roster of Relief/Rehabilitation Agencies in Mozambique. May, 1986.
- Fact Sheet.
- Commissao Nacional do Plano. Informação Estatística 1975-1984. Maputo 1985.
- DANIDA Farm Input Supply. Mozambique - Tete Province. Appraisal and Evaluation Report by a Danida Mission visiting Mozambique from 6 to 18 January 1986. Canida, March 1986.
- DCO-Maputo. Fortsatt planering av katastrofbistånd till Moçambique. 1986-02-25.
- Verksamhetsberättelse 1985/86 och verksamhetsplan 1986/87.
- Viktiga punkter ur president Samora Machels tal inför ungdomsorganisationen OJMs II kongress.
- Travel Report. Lorries for Moçambique - effective relief aid. 1984-10-09.
- Minnesanteckningar från besök hos "Deputy-Delegate" Röda Korsliga, Maputo. 1985-09-04.
- Koordinering av katastrofinsatser i Moçambique. 1985-05-15.
- Framtida svenska katastrofinsatser i Moçambique - en diskussion av behov, inriktning och utformning. 1986-01-31.
- Katastrofbistånd till Moçambique 1983/84 - 1984/85. 1985-03-20.

Kvartalsrapport 3. Halvårsrapport 2. 1985/86.
Biståndskontoret i Moçambique.

Folkförsamlingens 14:e sammanträde/Session 12-14
december 1985. 1986-01-06.

President Machel's besök i Manica- och Zambezia-
provinserna. 1986-01-03.

Förändringar i den ekonomiska politiken i
Moçambique efter IV:e partikongressen. 1985-06-02.

Departamento de Prevenção e Combate às Calamidades Naturais.
(DPCCN). Emergency Programme - Outubro - 1985.
Finns också på portugisiska Programa de Emergência
- Outubro - 1985.

Report. January 1985.

Mozambique. Natural Disasters Hamper Development.
Maputo, March 1985.

Relatório 1982/84. Maputo, agosto de 1984.

Report on the Drought Situation in the People's
Republic of Mozambique and Request for
International Assistance. Maputo, January 1983.

Monthly Newsletter. Various issues, latest April
and May 1986.

Instituto Nacional de Investigação Agronómica. (INIA) Série
Terra e Água.
Reddy, Jeevananda S. General Climate of Mozambique.
Clima Geral de Moçambique. Comunicação No. 19 a.
Maputo 1984.
Inventario Nacional dos Recursos Agro-Ecológicos.
Comunicação No. 28. Maputo 1985.

Instituto Nacional de Planeamento Físico. Classificação dos
desenvolvimento e do potencial dos distritos na
República Popular de Moçambique. Maputo, Dezembro
de 1985.

Institute of Development Studies. Agricultural Pricing Policy
in Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Study
Commissioned by the Nordic Aid Agencies. IDS,
December 1985. (Ellis, Frank; Harvey, Charles;
Kydd, Jonathan; Mackintosh, Maureen and Thomson,
Anne.)

International Monetary Fund. (IMF) Staff report for the 1985
Article IV Consultation. May 31, 1985.

League of Red Cross and red Crescent Societies, Drought in
Africa. Descriptive and Financial Report for 1984
and for January-June 1985. September 1985.

Mozambique Red Cross Situation Report on Relief Operation for Drought Victims in Mozambique. August 1981.

Mozambique Red Cross. Provincial Delegation of Maputo.
Report on the Floods. Maputo, 9 March, 1984.

MONAP Financial Statement 1985. Mozambique Nordic Contribution. Ministry of Agriculture, may 1986.

Kuypers, Antoon; Geensen, ton and Kwaakenaak, Henk.
Chuva em Marracuene. Maputo, 20 de Outubro de 1984.

Reviews of African Political Economy.
Fauvet, Paul. Roots of Counter-Revolution: The MNR. No. 29, July 1984.

Saul, John S. Mozambican Socialism and South African Aggression: A Case study in destabilization. Atkinson College, York University, Toronto 1985. Under Fire II. In "This Magazine" 1984-05-12.

Serviço Meteorológico de Moçambique. Statistical Tables on precipitation. Various years.

SIDA-Stockholm. Halvtidsöversyn av biståndet till Moçambique. 1986-04-11.

Förberedelser för fortsatt katastrofbistånd. 1986-02-04.

Information om politbyråmöte i Moçambique. 1986-03-21.

Översättning av Proceduravtal med Moçambique. 1986-02-19.

Om katastrofer och katastrofbistånd. En principdiskussion. 1985-07-23.

Svält och katastrofbistånd. En annoterad bibliografi. Oktober 1985.

Trends and Tendencies in the Current Literature on Disaster Relief. December 1985.

Katastrofbistånd för återuppbyggnad av Gorongozar-distriktet, Moçambique. 1986-01-09.

Midterm Review of the Development Cooperation between Mozambique and Sweden for the Period 1 July 1985 - 30 June 1987. Maputo 5-9 May, 1986.

Planering av långsiktigt katastrofbistånd till programländer. 1986-04-29.

Riktlinjer för svenskt stöd till katastrofförebyggande åtgärder. 1986-04-28.

- D'Souza, Frances. Strengthening Information Networks in Mozambique. UNICEF, Maputo 1986.
- Tickner, Vincent. The Agricultural Marketing System in Mozambique. December 1985.
- UNICEF - VIAK. Estudo sobre operações de transportes. Maputo November/December 1985.
- United Nations Office for emergency Operations in Africa. (OEOA) Status Report on the Emergency situation in Africa as of 1 February 1986. Report No. OEOA/3/8. New York 1986.
- Food Situation and Prospect for the Next Crop Year. (May 86 - April 87).
- United Nations Development Programme. (UNDP). First Emergency Quarterly Report. 31 December 1985. (Mozambique)
- United States Agency for International Development. (USAID). Mozambique Food Needs Assessment. Maputo, April 1986.
- Utrikesdepartementet och Sida. Katastrofbistånd för utveckling. Fallstudier av Etiopien och Bangladesh. Liber Allmänna Förlaget, Stockholm 1986.
- Wilkens, Ann. Fallstudie Etiopien.
Eduards, Krister och Seim, Anita. Fallstudie Bangladesh.
- Linnér, Sture. Huvudrapport.

ABBREVIATIONS

ARO	Africa groups Recruitment Organization
CCM	Christian Council of Mozambique
CCPCCN	Conselho Coordenador de Provenção e combate às Calamidades Naturais
CSA	Church of Sweden Aid
DCO	Development Cooperation Office (SIDA)
DPCCN	Departamento de prevenção e combate às Calamidades Naturais
LRCS	the League of Red Cross Societies
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
LWS	Lutheran World Service
MONAP	Mozambique Nordic Agriculture Programme
MRC	The Mozambican Red Cross
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
SEK	Swedish Krona
SRC	The Swedish Red Cross
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WCC	World Council of Churches

PERSONS CONTACTEDSIDA-Development Cooperation Office in Maputo (DCO)

Anne Bruzelius	Head of Office
Ulla Andrén	Agricultural Officer
Gunvor Gonçalves	Economist

Ministry of Agriculture

Edvard Grimstad	MONAP coordinator
Kenneth Hermele	Economist, MONAP
Michale Beyene	Economist, Office for Projects and Studies

FAO and FAO Land Use and Natural Resource Evaluation Project

Dario L.F. Mihajlovich	FAO expert
Lars Ekman	Associate Expert
Ms. Marina Costa	Librarian

FAO Food Security Project

Carlos Canales C.	Project Manager
-------------------	-----------------

AGRICOM

Ana Maria Ribeiro	Special Projects
Hernando Silva	Commercial Division
Jan Runnqvist	Coordinator
Guillermo Cuellar	Economist
Robert Nsubuga	Statistician
Pedro Valdivia	Transport Department

Ministry of Trade

Sergio Cassamo	National Director
----------------	-------------------

NORAD

Arthur K. Sydnes	Head of Office
Anne Beathe Jensen	Deputy Head

Red Cross

Bo Bäckström	Head of League of Red Cross
--------------	-----------------------------

VIAK

Öars Sundström
Ingemar Johansson

Regional Head
Technician

DANIDA

Charles Woollen
Ole Blicher-Olsen

Procurement Officer

UNDP

Lise Stensrud

Information Officer

DPCCN

Amós Estêvão Mahanjane
Terry Jeggle

National Director
Director, Care-Mozambique

KFK (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau)

Mr. Grolleaud
Dr. Holger Platz

Consultant
Economist

National Water Directorate

Mr. Horácio Cuna

Meteorological Services of Moçambique

Mr. Rocha

Deputy Director

SIDA EVALUATION REPORT SERIES

- 1986/1 **ELEPHANTS DON'T RUST**
An Evaluation of SIDA-supported Forestry Development and Forestry Industry in Laos by Karlis Goppers, Reidar Persson and Sven Bo Bergström
- 1986/2 **DEVELOPING ENTREPRENEURS**
An Evaluation of Small Scale Industry Development in Botswana 1984-85 by J-O Agrell, B-D Bergman, P Hallerby and K Ring
- 1986/3 **FROM HOSPITALS TO HEALTH CENTRES**
A Joint Evaluation of Swedish Assistance to Health Sector Development in Kenya 1969-1985
part I
by Lillemor Andersson-Brolin, Carl-Gunnar Eriksson, Ralf Johnsson, John Martin and Christina Regnell
part II-III
by Lillemor Andersson-Brolin, Carl-Gunnar Eriksson, Ralf Johnsson, John Martin, Johnsson Nganga, Samuel Ongayo, Christina Regnell, Charles Thube
- 1986/4 **MEN OR MACHINES?**
An Evaluation of Labour Intensive Public Works in Lesotho
by Geoff Edmonds, Karlis Goppers and Mikael Söderbäck
- 1986/5 **PUBLIC TRANSPORT IN LAHORE**
An Evaluation of a Swedish Development Assistance Project
by Rolf Gillebo, Bernt Nielsen, Roar Skarbøe and Börje Wallberg
- 1986/6 **MANUFACTURING FISHING VESSELS**
An Evaluation of SIDA-supported Industrial Rehabilitation in Somalia
by Staffan Larsson and Jan Valdelin
- 1986/7 **PROMOTING LABOUR RELATIONS IN AFRICA**
An Evaluation of the ILO/SIDA Labour Relations Project in Selected English-speaking Countries in Africa
by Allan Read and Christer Eriksson
- 1986/8 **FORESTRY UNDER THE GUN**
An Evaluation of SIDA-supported Forestry Development in Nicaragua
by Karlis Goppers, Carl-Henrik Kuylenstierna, Klas Lindén and Jan-Erik Nylund
- 1986/9 **AFRICA FIGURES**
An Evaluation of SIDA-financed Institutional Cooperation in Statistics between Sweden/Tanzania and Sweden/Zimbabwe
by Bertil Odén, Bertil Egerö and Halvard Lesterberg
- 1986/10 **MOBILIZING RURAL WOMEN**
Two Tripartite Evaluation Reports on Community Action for Disadvantaged Rural Women in Sri Lanka and Kenya
by Katarina Larsson, Sulochana Sabaratnam, Rheha Wazir (Sri Lanka) Inga-Lill Andréhn, Jotnam K. Okidi, Ayele YesheWalul (Kenya)
- 1987/1 **EXTENSIVE RURAL DEVELOPMENT**
An Evaluation of the Zone I Programme in Guinea-Bissau
by Jan Olsson, Lars Smedman, Göran Widerström
- 1987/2 **FOREIGN EXCHANGE ZAMBIA**
An Evaluation of the Auction System in the Zambian Economy
by Rudolf Jalakas
- 1987/3 **DROUGHT AND DESTABILIZATION**
An Evaluation of Swedish Disaster Relief in Mozambique 1983 to 1985
by Tom Alberts and Krister Eduards
- 1987/4 **HEALTH CENTRES-IN NEED OF TREATMENT**
An Joint Evaluation of Sweden's Support to Health Sector Development in Tanzania 1972-1976
by Lillemor Andersson-Brolin, Frants Staugård
- 1987/5 **TRAINING FOR PUBLIC SERVICE**
An Evaluation of Sweden's Co-operation with Zimbabwe in Public Service Training 1982-1986
by Astrid Dufborg, Merrick Jones, Elisabeth Lewin

DISASTER RELIEF IN MOZAMBIQUE

Through the combined effects of economic policy, drought and guerilla activities, economic conditions as well as security in Mozambique have seriously deteriorated. Today a major part of the population faces starvation. Mozambique, for its survival, depends on massive influx of foreign aid, but donors are spread over a large number of activities and areas. Insufficient co-ordination between donors, and the Government's lack of preparedness to act in emergency situations, leads to poor results in the struggle against disaster. Sweden's support is largely effective, although there were problems in implementation.

These are some of the findings of the evaluation mission consisting of *Tom Alberts*, *Swedfarm* and *Krister Eduards*, *Samhällsrådet*.

Sweden's bilateral development co-operation, handled by SIDA since 1965, comprises 17 program countries: Angola, Bangladesh, Botswana, Cap Verde, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, India, Kenya, Laos, Lesotho, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Vietnam, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Each year about 30 of SIDA's over 200 projects are evaluated. A number of these evaluations are published in the SIDA Evaluation Report Series. Copies of the reports can be ordered free of charge from SIDA, S-105 25 Stockholm, Sweden.



SWEDISH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

ISBN 91-586-7088-2
ISSN 0283-0736