


SIDA Evaluation Report, Development Co-operation, Swaziland

1987/6

LOOKING BOTH WAYS

Swaziland between South Africa and SADCC

An Evaluation of Sweden's development co-operation with Swaziland.



By Samuel Falle and Karlis Goppers
Project backgrounds by Lars Johansson



The views and interpretations expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Swedish International Development Authority, SIDA.

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This report is the result of an evaluation mission to Swaziland in October 1986 by Sir Samuel Falle, Karlis Goppers (team leader) and Lars Johansson.


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SWAZILAND



Looking both ways

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CHAPTER 1

Executive Summary

This report evaluates Swedish bilateral development co-operation with Swaziland from its inception in the mid 1960s to its cessation today.

Sweden originally gave aid in response to a United Nations appeal following Swaziland's independence. Over the years SEK 147.2 million of Swedish funds have been transferred to Swaziland for various aid programmes.

Sweden's overriding aim, besides promoting development, has been to lessen Swaziland's dependence on the Republic of South Africa.

Over the years there have been differing opinions in Sweden about the future of Swedish-Swazi development cooperation. Some have wished to discontinue aid on the grounds that Swaziland is too subservient to South Africa but also because it is relatively prosperous by third world standards. Others have contested these views and wished to continue aid.

In November 1982 the government decided to terminate aid to Swaziland.

SWAZI SURVIVAL

Swaziland has been concerned with survival as an independent entity since the last century. Pressures have been great and it has lost some territory, but it still exists and is today an internationally recognized state, a member of the United Nations, the OAU and the non-aligned movement. It is also a member of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) group. Its relations with its northern neighbour Mozambique are good.

AMBIVALENCE TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA

Its policy towards South Africa was to a certain extent prudent. However, in the interregnum between King Sobhuza's death in 1982 and the coronation of King Mswati III in 1986, particularly 1983-85, Swaziland pursued a more subservient policy towards South Africa.

In some cases the Swaziland Government did, during that period, accept measures that other frontline states resisted.

The most striking example is the South African – Swaziland "Land Deal", and related to that, the Security agreement signed secretly in 1982.

The new South African Komatipoort – Richards Bay railway link crossing Swaziland is another example. This railway line runs counter to the aims of SADCC.

It is also questionable whether Swaziland has done enough within the Customs union (SACU), where another member – Botswana – has shown greater resistance to South Africa.

In the light of earlier Lesotho and continued Botswana attitudes towards similar South African actions, Swaziland therefore seems to have taken a more "collaborationist" line, which has been the main reason for the Swedish Government to end aid cooperation.

This having been said the mission finds that Swazilands "performance" has not been entirely different, at least not "in kind", compared to some of the other SADCC countries. The acceptance of a South African trade mission, or the hostile attitude towards ANC refugees are both features that Swaziland shares with several other neighbouring states including countries such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique. One is therefore tempted to say that with respect to at least some criteria for independence towards South Africa; the difference between Swaziland on the one hand and Lesotho, Botswana, etc on the other, is more a matter of degree than kind.

It should also be recognized that Swaziland's margin for action is limited. Even if the government maintained the highest possible profile against South Africa – as permitted by economic, structural and political conditions – the country would still remain massively dependent on its large neighbour. For example 60 percent of the Swazi states' total revenue comes from the South Africa controlled customs union.

A post interregnum Swaziland policy probably therefore will continue to be more or less "collaborationist" – it will continue to look in both ways – although there are indications that the country may be on its way to recover a more independent or "African" stance towards South Africa.

How Swazi politics turn out will depend on the impact of other influences, like the SADCC and different aid donors including Sweden.

SWEDISH AID – CONCLUSIONS

Swedish aid to Swaziland has played rather a minor role and it could be suggested that the size of Swedish aid is not at all in proportion to the expectations – the independence objective is a macropolitical and structural one, while the aid projects generally are somewhat limited and local.

This also gave the evaluation mission difficulties in scrutinizing contributions of Swedish aid projects. Only one project out of nine – the road project – had a clear connection between project design and the independence objective.

The nine projects evaluated were financed by Swedish aid but mainly administrated on a so-called multi-bilateral basis (multi-bi), thereby involving United Nations agencies. However the projects have normally also contained a bilateral transfer.

The educational sector is dominant, with about 35 percent of total funds followed by industry and agriculture with about 25 percent respectively.

The general impression of the projects' achievements is a mixed one. The most successful project is the Primary School Building Programme, while three of the larger projects – the Small Scale Industry Development, the Co-operative Development Centre and the Secondary Curriculum Project – are judged to have low cost-effectiveness and in some cases are even considered as failures.

The multi-bi administration is pointed out as one reason for the poor performance, where failure to recruit personnel and lack of information and reports are other reasons.

The evaluation mission concludes that the cessation of bilateral aid will not meet any serious political problems, particularly as the aid has never been enshrined in any formal agreement.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The mission does however not suggest an end to all of Sweden's aid programmes. It is our impression that the new government of King Mswati III is trying, not without success, to pursue King Sobhuza's policy of dignified independence, within the bounds of well-known constraints. Also in the light of recent developments in Lesotho Sweden's position of support for that country, but not to Swaziland, could possibly turn out to be awkward and illogical. The mission therefore argues that Sweden could continue with aid to Swaziland in the form of funding NGO's and refugee projects. Other areas mentioned are food production, education and Swazi linked SADCC-projects.

CHAPTER 2

Introduction

THE PROGRAMME

Sweden's development cooperation with Swaziland began in the mid 1960s. It was initiated in response to the United Nations' call for an international presence in order to help Swaziland develop and maintain as much independence as possible vis-à-vis South Africa. And this has been the main objective of Sweden's support since then.

The fact that this relative independence has not been achieved, nor even approached, has been the main reason why Sweden in the early 1980s decided to terminate the cooperation.

In absolute terms Sweden aid allocations to Swaziland have not been large, the country frame never having exceeded 10 million Swedish kronor annually. Over the years SEK 133.9 million (USD 23 million) have been allocated to the Swazi Government and an additional SEK 10.7 million (USD 1.8 million) to private organizations. However, as Swaziland is a small country with a small population, it ranked for several years among the three or four highest per capita receivers of Swedish aid.

Sweden has supported nine larger projects through the Swazi Government. In addition support has been given, as already mentioned, to private organizations and for disaster relief. The educational sector is dominant, having received approximately 60 percent of total funds. In most projects multinational organizations have been employed as executing agencies for Sweden's aid. These are UNESCO, FAO, ILO, UNDP and ADB. About 80 percent of the funds have been administered on multi-bilateral bases.

Over the last few years the development cooperation between Sweden and Swaziland has been gradually phased out and the budget year 1984-85 saw the end of direct Swedish aid to the country, although some residual funds have been disbursed after that date.

THE EVALUATION

Since Sweden in 1982 decided to discontinue regular bilateral development cooperation with Swaziland, it was decided to carry out an evaluation of the entire programme as well as of the motives and objectives underlying this aid.

The evaluation was carried out by a three man mission, led by Karlis Goppers from SIDA's Planning Secretariat and two outside consultants, Sir Samuel Falle and Lars Johansson. The team visited Swaziland from 7-25 October 1986. During this period all the projects, there were 14 in all, were visited and a large number of people, official and non-official, Swazi and expatriate, were interviewed. A list of these people is attached as Appendix 4. The team also visited a refugee reception centre and a refugee resettlement area.

The evaluation team would like to express its thanks to those many people in Swaziland, who gave us kindness, cooperation, help and good advice.

Joseph Hanlon gave vital suggestions to the final report, for which we would like to thank him. Among the people who offered valuable advice on the draft report we would like to mention also Kristoffer Leonardsson.

STRUCTURE

The evaluation starts to look to the past and analyses the reasons for starting the programme, continuing it for nearly twenty years, never enshrining it in a formal agreement and finally allowing it to lapse.

The complexity of the main objective of Swedish aid to Swaziland, to lessen dependence on South Africa appreciably, is an issue in itself as it is not entirely clear exactly how this objective should be interpreted.

We therefore want to assess not only Swedish aid but also how Swaziland's policy in general "performed" when it comes to attaining measures of independence from South Africa.

It is important here to highlight "indicative" events used to describe the indeed complicated relationship between South Africa/Swaziland. They are:

1. The border talks, at which South Africa offered the two Bantustan border areas Kangwane and Ingwavuma.
2. The security pact signed in secrecy in February 1982.
3. The strengthened Swazi policy against the ANC's presence in the country, a consequence of the security pact, involving also refugee policy.
4. The opening of a South African Trade Mission with diplomatic status, in Swaziland in 1984.
5. Swaziland's foreign policy particularly in relation to its northern neighbour Mozambique and SADCC, but also the OAU and the United Nations.
6. Its economic policy in relation to South Africa, e.g. the Customs Union.

Point 1 – 5 appear in chapter four, while point 6 is discussed in chapter five.

Thereafter Sweden's development cooperation in itself is elaborated in chapter six, followed by a discussion in chapter seven of the special form of administration that has been used for Sweden's development co-operation, namely the multi-bilateral form.

In its final chapter the report considers how to end the bilateral co-operation and possible future forms of Swedish aid to Swaziland.

It should be examined whether Sweden's objective of supporting Swaziland's independence was a realistic one.

COUNTRY BACKGROUND

The Kingdom of Swaziland is a small, landlocked country in south eastern Africa, completely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa to the north, west and south and the People's Republic of Mozambique to the east. It covers an area of 17 360 square kilometres. Its estimated population in 1984 was 645 064 and the annual growth rate is 3.4 per annum. The estimated GDP per capita in 1984 was SDR 768, making it richer than any of Sweden's 17 other aid-recipient countries.

Swaziland gained its independence from Britain in 1968. Being an internationally recognized state Swaziland is a member of the United Nations, the OAU, and SADCC, the Southern African regional development organization.

It has diplomatic relations with a number of states, including its socialist neighbour, Mozambique, many western and third world countries, Israel and Taiwan. It does not however have relations with the Soviet Union nor the Eastern block countries nor the People's Republic of China.

CHAPTER 3

Sweden's overall objectives

ORIGIN OF SWEDISH AID

Sweden's objective in giving aid to Swaziland was, since it started in 1963, to strengthen its activity against apartheid in the UN with practical measures. The purpose of the Nordic initiative in the UN at that time was:

That the UN, whose purpose was to bring about in South Africa an orderly change to a racial policy in accordance with the UN Charter, should – in addition to the pressure which had been exercised hitherto – try positive proposals which could facilitate positive developments and lead to some form of cooperation between South Africa and the UN.

The General Assembly established an expert group with Alva Myrdal as chairman. This group made proposals for a solution, which was rejected by the South African Government. In 1964 the General Assembly passed a resolution which resulted in the establishment of the UN fund for the victims of apartheid.

After Swaziland's independence in 1968 the UN appealed in various resolutions for help to Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland. Sweden responded to these appeals by slowly increasing its aid to Swaziland. In 1977/78 the country frame for Swaziland was set at ten million kronor per annum (USD 1.7 million) and continued at this level until 1983/84.

MOTIVES

A summary of Swedish motives is given in a SIDA Country Review (Landöversyn) of 1980:

... the most important motive for Swedish aid to Swaziland has been to support the country's struggle for independence from South Africa. This aid also has the objective of giving moral support to the independence struggle within South Africa; the importance of this has been emphasized by, inter alia, the South African Liberation Movement, ANC. Other aid/political objectives were much less important in the decision to support Swaziland. The solidarity with

UN efforts has also been expressed by the fact that Swedish support has been largely channelled through UN bodies.

This report of 1980 concludes by proposing that Swedish aid to Swaziland should be wound up. The case for this is expressed as follows:

The objective of Swedish aid has been to strengthen the country's independence from South Africa. However, South African influence is still present throughout all the Swazi community, not least in the economy. Even if the possibilities for breaking out of this dependence are small, Swaziland has nevertheless done very little to attempt this. On the contrary further lines of communication are being built through South Africa rather than Mozambique.

It is therefore proposed that Swedish aid to Swaziland should be wound up. The reason for this is partly the improved Swazi economy and partly the lack of Swazi will to assert its independence from South Africa, which is in conflict with the objective of Swedish aid to Swaziland. On both these points Swaziland differs markedly from Lesotho, the country to which, among Swedish aid recipients, it can most easily be compared. The same reasons argue against either continuing aid to Swaziland at today's level or increasing it.

SWAZILAND – A PARTNER FOR SWEDISH DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION?

This argument did not, however, prevail in 1980. It is interesting to note that the ambassadors in Maputo were more favourably disposed to Swaziland than was the local SIDA office. The ambassador's despatch in August 1978 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Stockholm is most relevant. He writes:

South Africa has Swaziland in a very tight economic grip. If the South Africans so wished they could very easily bring the Swazis to their knees. Both parties are fully aware of this. For centuries the Swazis have fought against pressure from the west from both blacks and whites. They have succeeded in preserving their independence but from time to time at the price of humiliation. It is tempting also to characterize the situation today in this way. No brave words are used in the dialogue with South Africa but reactions are often bitter.

In April 1982 a mission visited Swaziland in order to review Swedish cooperation with Swaziland.

In the agreed minutes, among other things, the following was said:

The Swedish Delegation informed the meeting that the Swedish Government was now prepared to enter into a General Agreement on Development Cooperation directly with the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland. The kind of agreement envisaged was a two year agreement which would ensure greater continuity in the future cooperation programme.

As late as in March 1982 SIDA decided to instruct its office in Maputo to prepare a Cooperation Agreement with Swaziland for the period July 1983 – June 1985.

However, this decision was suddenly reversed in November 1982. The new decision was conveyed to the Swazi Government at the programme discussions in Mbabane on December 2nd and 3rd 1982. The Swazi delegation expressed regret that a bilateral agreement could not be signed and pointed out that the cost to the Swaziland programme of UN agency fees reduced the extent of Swedish assistance in real terms. In spite of the decision not to sign an agreement the Swedish Government kept the country frame for 1982/83 at SEK 10 million (USD 1.7 million).

The ambassador in Maputo protested against the decision not to sign an agreement, in a letter dated 23 November 1982. The responsible official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied to this letter on January 11 1983. The sudden reversal of a policy that had seemed quite clear in October was not explained. It would seem to be a political decision by the new Social Democratic Government, influenced by the arguments against aid to Swaziland which have been set out earlier in this chapter. To quote the official:

Going over to a regular Development Cooperation Agreement – with all that would mean in the shape of increased official contacts between Governments – would probably give the other side the impression that we were prepared to expand direct development cooperation. Furthermore, this would happen in a situation where we have more grounds than in the past to question Swaziland's policy in a wider Southern African context. I am thinking particularly about the attitude to the ANC and the questionable dubious contacts with South Africa on the land question. Developments in Swaziland have simply gone in the wrong direction with regard to the overriding objectives of our Foreign and Aid policy in Southern Africa. In this respect the difference is striking between Swaziland and Lesotho, which – in spite of very hard South African pressure – has held to a consistent line concerning apartheid and the liberation movements' humanitarian activity. To this should be added the fact that Swaziland is significantly less poor with a per capita income more than four times as large as that of Lesotho.

That letter clearly heralded the decision to reduce the country frame to SEK 5 million (USD 0.8 million) in 1984/85 and to allocate no country frame for 1985/86 or thereafter.

The above section show that Sweden has ended bilateral cooperation with Swaziland – although without officially terminating it – for largely political reasons.

In later sections an attempt is made to relate the Swedish decisions to the geo-political context and economic environment in which these decisions have been taken.

CHAPTER 4

Conditions for survival

SWAZILAND'S HISTORY

Swaziland has survived as a nation despite several critical passages in its recent history. The extent of its independence can be discussed, but it has today its own borders and its own government. It is an internationally recognized state, a member of the UN, the OAU and SADCC. It has diplomatic relations with a number of states, including its socialist neighbour, Mozambique. It has also avoided the obviously threatening fate of becoming a South African Bantustan.

The Swazi people have managed to maintain their identity. This is no accident and must be attributed to the skill and wisdom of the Swazi rulers, particularly the late King Sobhuza II. He was born in 1899 and succeeded his father at the age of six months during the interregnum between the withdrawal of the South African Republic's short-lived protectorate and the establishment of the British administration in 1902.

Throughout the grab for Africa by the colonial powers in the nineteenth century the concern of the Swazi people was, as it is today, its survival as an entity, a united people, a nation with its own identity and territory however small. The pressures on this numerically small people before and after the turn of the century were immense – Boers, British, Zulus, and other African tribes, all more warlike, numerous and aggressive than the Swazis. It is said that once, under Zulu invasion, rather than fight they succeeded in hiding, so that, in the end the Zulus grew tired and hungry and went home. But their suppleness and cunning could not entirely save them, they lost much of their land and had to submit to British administration.

A quotation from Hugh Macmillan's article *Swaziland: Decolonization and the Triumph of Tradition* seems appropriate at this point.

While the Swazis always eschewed armed resistance and submitted peacefully to disarmament in 1903, they demonstrated their early resentment to the impact of colonialism and capitalism in a long series of deputations and petitions. They were past masters of prevarication, passive resistance and non-cooperation.

King Sobhuza II gained power after independence. The king was highly popular until his death 1982. But his approval of the "Land Deal" discussions with South Africa was sharply criticised by SADCC and OAU countries.



The history of the next sixty years is not particularly relevant to this report, although one event is worthy of mention. In 1912 Queen Labotsibeni became the main financial backer of the newspaper *Abantu-Batho*, which was printed in Johannesburg in connection with the newly formed South African Natives National Congress, today the ANC.

POST INDEPENDENCE POLITICS

Swaziland attained independence from Britain in 1968. As in its other colonies, Britain tried to leave behind a Westminster-style democracy. This had hardly worked elsewhere in Africa and it could not be expected to appeal to King Sobhuza. In the event it did not work and Sobhuza ruled in his traditional way.

In 1978 the King introduced a new constitution – described as a mixture of Swazi tradition and western democracy. This new constitutional structure contained a number of important institutions viz. Parliament, the Cabinet, the *Libandla*, the *Liqoqo* and the Monarchy. Under this system parliament was elected through traditional structures, from candidates of whom the monarch approved. It is thus no democracy in the western sense.

In Swaziland, under King Sobhuza, the "western" institutions, the parliament and cabinet simply carried out the policies decided by Sobhuza and his closest advisers.

King Sobhuza died in 1982. Around the time of the King's death and up till 1985, the country went through its most critical period since independence. This also affected its relations with South Africa and the country could be judged as having become more "collaborationist" during that period of "anarchic interregnum".*

THE BORDER TALKS

The border talks or the "Land Deal"** between Swaziland and South Africa became a public issue about a month after the security agreement was settled in February 1982.

These border talks have been cited as an important example of Swazi subservience to South Africa.

From the mission's brief visit it is not possible to ascertain exactly how this "Land Deal" should be interpreted. It is however, by no means clear that it was a "sign of subservience" towards South Africa nor could it be claimed to have been a battle for (legitimate) Swazi geo-political interests.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter the Swazis were deprived of considerable territories occupied by ethnic Swazis just before and after the turn of the century.

There were two specific areas one to the north and west and the other to the east, reaching to the Indian Ocean in the border areas between Mozambique and Natal. King Sobhuza had always been determined to regain these territories. He seemed to have little chance of success, indeed the reverse seemed more likely as the Republic (initially the Union) of South Africa had made many efforts to incorporate Swaziland, the last being in 1965.

After Swazi independence, however, the policy of the South African government changed in accordance with its Bantustan policy. It expressed a willingness for Swaziland to incorporate specific areas of South Africa to further "ethnic reunification". This meant specifically the swazi speaking Bantustan *KaNgwane*, the area to the North and West, and the one to the East, *Ingwavuma*, which was a part of KwaZulu, the "homeland" of the Zulus. This would have meant nearly doubling the population of Swaziland, giving it some land of dubious value but also an outlet to the sea, although it would have been necessary to build a port at Kosi Bay.

Sobhuza thought this was fine and called an international conference on March 19, 1982 to clarify the position of his government. Sweden attended among many other nations. This suited South Africa very well. It would mean the creation of a

* The expression is used by Hilda Kuper in the book *The Swazi. A Southern African Kingdom*, second edition 1986.

** An excellent summary of this question is given by Hilda Kuper in the above mentioned book.

"Super Bantustan" around an already independent and internationally recognized state, which would hopefully fit into the planned confederation of Southern African homeland states. Swaziland would be the brightest star in that constellation.

The land deal was also a "people's deal", as it would have released South Africa from nearly one million black inhabitants.

But it was not to be. The "governments" of both KaNgwane and KwaZulu protested and the question was taken to the South African courts. On September 25, 1982, which was after Sobhuza's death, the Supreme Court of Natal found the excision of Ingwavuma unlawful and later the Supreme Court of Bloemfontein gave a similar judgement in favour of KaNgwane. In spite of this some members of the Swazi government wanted to pursue the claim and this was the same group that later took power and adopted a particularly pro-South African policy. This is why the now dormant Land Deal is strongly criticized by opponents of Swaziland. But the origin of the Swazi claim and its pursuit by Sobhuza had, from a Swazi point of view, nothing to do with submission to South Africa, rather the contrary may be claimed to be the case.

In a regional context the Land Deal meant an explicit acceptance of the South African Bantustan policy, and it is linked to the security pact signed between the two countries in February 1982. As such it somehow involved a moment of subservience to South Africa, despite King Sobhuza's and many other Swazis' sacred mission to reunite all Swazis in a greater Swaziland.

Also in an Africa perspective, the deal was in conflict with the OAU constitution which accepts colonial boundaries. Almost all African states otherwise could sometimes raise legitimate claims to land in neighbouring countries.

In brief, Sobhuza was prepared to accept Bantustan policies and be thrown out from OAU in order to regain the lost territories. From a donor's view, this is hardly acceptable.

THE SECURITY PACT WITH SOUTH AFRICA

The Security agreement with South Africa commits both states "to combat terrorism, insurgency and subversion individually and collectively" and "to call upon each other whenever possible for such assistance and steps as may be deemed necessary".

This agreement was made public in 1984 by South Africa's Foreign Minister Pik Botha and his counterpart in Swaziland, Richard Dlamini, since Mozambique had signed another security agreement with South Africa, the so-called Nkomati Accord.

Both these security agreements can be seen as acts of subservience to South Africa. Still the two agreements differ considerably from each other:



President P W Botha of South Africa, president Samora Machel of Mozambique and president Quett Masire of Botswana, at the coronation ceremony of King Mswati III in April 1986.

- Unlike Mozambique – which was forced to sign the Nkomati Accord as a result of the crippling effects of the South African-backed MNR guerrillas – Swaziland was not confronted with an army of destabilization. All the same it did sign a similar treaty. It probably could have avoided signing this agreement in the same way as Botswana and Lesotho indeed resisted severe South African pressure to do so during the same period.
- Mozambique insisted on making the agreement public and used it as an instrument of diplomatic pressure against the South African government, which boosted international sympathy for Mozambique's cause. Swaziland lost that chance.
- The South Africa-Swazi agreement gives, if not a straight "go ahead", at least a justification for outright South African security operations on Swazi territory. The Nkomati Accord does not allow for such open South African intervention in Mozambique.

The security agreement between Swaziland and South Africa therefore, seems to be all in favour of South Africa, while the Nkomati Accord actually put some pressure on Pretoria and was not entirely in South Africa's interest.

From the South African government's point of view both the security pact and the land issue, and for that matter the Nkomati accord, were designed to decrease the

pressure on what is sometimes called its "second front". In Swaziland this meant eliminating ANC presence there.

RELATIONS WITH THE ANC

The Swazi attitude and behaviour towards the ANC, is a vital element in this evaluation. This is so because one important reason for suspending Swedish aid has been stated as Swaziland's recent hostile policy to the ANC, reflected in the imprisonment of ANC staff in Mbabane and the expulsion of hundreds of ANC refugees.

King Sobhuza was a subscribing member of the ANC for many years but it only established a notable presence in Swaziland after the Sharpeville killings in the early 1960s. Until the very end of Sobhuza's reign Swaziland was sympathetic to the ANC. King Sobhuza had a warm relationship with Oliver Tambo, who attended his funeral. This sympathy was however particularly difficult to sustain in practice, in view of South African ruthlessness. The South African Government and its influential military have no hesitation in attacking supposed ANC bases in neighbouring countries. Nevertheless under Sobhuza the ANC were helped discreetly as far as possible, not to launch attacks but either to remain in peace or to move on to the frontline states. The ANC's sabotaging of the SASOL II facility (South Africa's second petroleum from coal plant) was, however, believed to have been initiated in Swaziland. South African agents thereafter bombed two suspected ANC houses in Manzini, killing two people and damaging 40 buildings.

There was a resident ANC Director of Operations in Swaziland until, remarkably, as late as February 1982, when he was reassigned to Dar-es-Salaam. Also in 1982, soon after this, his deputy, another ANC official, and his wife were killed by a landmine placed beneath his car at Matsapha.

Swaziland was also, understandably, shaken by raids by South African commandos on alleged ANC bases in Lesotho in 1982. This brought fears that Swaziland, thought to be a launching site for ANC operations in South Africa, would be the next target. About 90 ANC members in Swaziland were rounded up and put in a refugee camp. The Swazi Government described it as "protective custody (not detention) to ensure their safety".

For this brief two and a half week mission it has not been possible to independently judge the nature of the Swazi authorities' actions against the ANC during the "Anarchic Interregnum". However from impartial, non-governmental Swazi and expatriate sources the following picture emerges.

There were clearly a few incidents during this period and there was close cooperation between the South African and Swazi police. However, the number of ANC members involved was small.

This collaboration seems to continue. In February 1987 it was reported that Swaziland had expelled five ANC members and that another eight would be expelled after completing their jail-terms. In February and March 1987 ANC members were arrested by Swazi police allegedly for the illegal possession of arms. In May 1987 a South African student and two others were shot dead by the Swazi police.

South African forces have carried out at least five incursions into Swazi territory to kill or kidnap ANC sympathizers during the past years. The South African police appears to have precise information on the ANC presence and activity in Swaziland:

- In December 1986 South African soldiers raided several houses in Mbabane killing two alleged ANC members and capturing four.
- On July 9 1987 two leading figures of the ANC and a young woman were killed in broad daylight by three white men driving along the road.

If the South African security police wants someone, they simply go and get him. It is clearly an unacceptable situation.*

A tentative conclusion is that the present Swazi government is not in itself anti-ANC, but there are key elements in the Swazi police and security forces that have close links with South African counterparts. King Sobhuza used his personal power to moderate and control this, usually acting in private. This control has not yet been asserted, but there are hopeful signs of a return to Sobhuza's policy of cautious sympathy: "If you want to stay please keep quiet, if you must be active please move on".

The post interregnum government has to be careful as it realizes that any ANC attack on South Africa from Swaziland would lead to violent reprisals. However, the example of Botswana shows there is some space for a more independent policy. There is no obvious collaboration between Botswana and South African police and security. Instead South African policemen have been jailed for crossing the border while they do so with impunity in Swaziland.

Swaziland has in the past flown ANC members out to safer places and could do so again.

* However, it does seem that John Daniel, a South African academic, who had taught at the University of Swaziland, was overstating the case in his paper presented at Uppsala on 10-12 April, 1985. *South Africa and a BLS State; The Case of Swaziland*. In this he stated that "the (Swaziland) security forces launched a brutal and sustained offensive against the ANC, which still continues up to the present time". While the 1983-85 Swazi regime was by all accounts corrupt and collaborationist, no one to whom we spoke in Swaziland – among them strong opponents of that regime – would describe its behaviour in such extreme terms.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE MISSION

For a long time South Africa wished to establish diplomatic relations with Swaziland. In 1984, that is during the time of what we have labeled as the pro-South African regime in Swaziland, a Trade Commission was established in Mbabane. It is active, diplomatic in its behaviour and concerns itself with trade, aid and presumably other matters that embassies deal with. It is in fact a very thinly disguised embassy. But it is a fact of life for Swaziland now and it could no more be expected to close the trade mission than Finland could be expected to close the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki if it so wished.

It is nevertheless unfortunate for Swaziland's image abroad that the mission was established. A prominent Swazi, strongly opposed to the 1983-85 regime, maintains that its establishment was completely unnecessary. Trade, of course, functioned very well on its own without a "Mission" and permitting it was a demonstration of that regime's collaboration with Pretoria.

Also countries like Zimbabwe and Mozambique accept South African Trade Missions in their countries and in June this year a mission was also opened in Lesotho. Still, the South African Trade Mission in Swaziland was the first mission in black Africa since 1967 when Malawi accepted one. It has also distinguished itself from missions in other border states to the extent to which it has played a political and diplomatic role besides its trade role.

RELATIONS WITH MOZAMBIQUE AND SADCC

Swaziland has been criticized for not orientating itself away from South Africa and towards Mozambique, when that country gained independence from Portugal in 1975.

At that time when Mozambique had relative stability and peace such an orientation was much more attractive than it is today when the country is torn apart by the MNR, a guerilla movement built up and promoted by South Africa. In February 1985 Mozambique protested to Swaziland for not taking action against the MNR who, according to Mozambique, operated from bases set up by South Africa in the Swazi mountains.

These operations have at times made rail and road links between Swaziland and the Maputo harbour impassable and highly dangerous, and have occasionally been targeted at Swazi transport. Still, Swaziland uses the Maputo port as much as it can for it is the closest harbour.

The Swazi co-operation in the construction of a new rail link from Komatipoort in Transvaal through Swaziland to Richards Bay in Natal should be seen partly in this light. The construction of this new 120 km railway line was completed in early 1986. It gives the industrial heart of South Africa a direct link to the sea, cutting

250 km off the existing route. This means that South Africa's use of the Maputo harbour has decreased dramatically. It has also given Swaziland a major incentive to decrease trade through Mozambique. Furthermore, it has allowed the South African Railways to increase cargo from Zimbabwe and Zambia.

Altogether therefore, this construction in itself opposes the essential idea behind the SADCC. Not surprisingly, Mozambique refused to participate in the opening ceremony of the railway line in February 1986.

On the other hand, during 1986 Swaziland completed a road work project upgrading the road to the Mozambican border. This could be seen as an attempt by Swaziland to put its foot in both doors – South Africa and the SADCC.

Swaziland has good or at least correct relations with Mozambique. The late President Samora Machel had a great regard for King Sobhuza and attended his funeral. He also attended the coronation of King Mswati III in March 1986.

Machel's view, reported in 1980 by the Swedish Ambassador in Maputo, was that "Helping Swaziland is helping Mozambique".

King Sobhuza's roving ambassador, Simon Sishayi Nxumalo, renewed his contacts with the late president on his release from detention (1984-85) and told the evaluation mission that if Machel had not been killed he would have visited Swaziland again in the near future.

Swaziland's relations with SADCC could be considered correct. But Swazi officials wonder exactly how the SADCC can help them. The Beira corridor is not relevant to them and the Maputo one, as already mentioned, is often blocked.

The securing and opening up of the Maputo corridor is naturally of concern to the SADCC and should therefore be of great interest for Swaziland too.

There are obvious reasons for the Swazis to lessen economic dependence to South Africa, and thereby link up more to the SADCC. Today Swaziland's responsibility in the conference is limited – it responds for manpower training – and no new moves are in sight at present.

When Swaziland hosted the SADCC annual meeting in January 1985 against South Africa's will, it showed some independence. But at the meeting it took the opportunity to publicly oppose sanctions against Pretoria, thereby reflecting strong South African demands.

Finally, Swaziland's relations with the OAU are cordial and it has maintained a low profile in the UN.

* * *

To sum up this section, Swazi's "performance" with South Africa is ambivalent – it was particularly so during the "anarchic interregnum". It can sometimes be judged

to be more collaborationist than other states in the region, but that is by no means clear.

In February 1982 for instance, while signing a security pact with South Africa Swaziland issued, the very same month, an "Economic Review" from the prime minister's office stating: "There is a declared policy by the Government of Swaziland to lessen dependence on the Republic of South Africa."

THE "LESOTHO SYNDROME"

Swaziland is often compared to Lesotho when it comes to measuring its "performance" with respect to being independent from South Africa. It is said that in spite of being even more dependent on South Africa than Swaziland, Lesotho has maintained a more independent stance towards its big neighbour.

In comparing Swaziland with Lesotho certain conclusions emerge from a SIDA country report on Lesotho, August 1986:

1. Lesotho has been no more democratic than Swaziland and repression of opposition considerably rougher.

2. In the 1980s President Leboa Jonathan seems to have adopted a remarkably tough and independent political line for a little island inside South Africa.

This defiant attitude, help to the ANC, diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, China and North Korea worked for a time. To quote the SIDA Country Report:

A resounding anti-Pretoria line, the role of "Gallant little Lesotho", got him (Jonathan) development aid and other economic resources and perhaps, even more important, international recognition and political support.

However, he appears to have overplayed his hand. Two bloody South African raids took place against the ANC on Lesotho territory in 1982 and 1985 in which Lesotho subjects were also killed. Tensions with South Africa finally led to a blockade around New Year 1986. Jonathan was deposed by a military coup on 20 January 1986. The Country Report attributes this to Jonathan's arming of the Basotho National Party's (BNP – Jonathan's party) Youth League and having them trained by the North Koreans. It is suggested that this was the last straw for the army. To an outside observer it does not seem unlikely that the coup was arranged by South Africa as it must have been dissatisfied with Jonathan.

According to the SIDA country report, cited above, the military government is striving to attain international respectability by explaining itself to SADCC, OAU and the Non-aligned movement. It has had talks with the ANC and not yet broken diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and China as South Africa has demanded. It has also strongly appealed for a continued Swedish presence.

It seems that Jonathan's policy was courageous, but that he was punished by South Africa. Perhaps a more moderate stand could have avoided a South African intervention and allowed Lesotho to continue to help the ANC discreetly. It seems that



At the age of 18 King Mswati III took over rule over the Swazis. He has made a good start and seems to have a will to clean up after the "anarchic interregnum" period.

Lesotho is now more helpless than before, and the liberation cause has therefore, at least not in the short run, been helped by Jonathan's defiant stand against South Africa.

Because of the coup in Lesotho, comparing Swaziland with Lesotho, there may today be emerging a picture in the light of which it is not clear that Sweden's current policy towards the two countries is problem free.

Lesotho (where Sweden has recently decided to establish a development cooperation Office) is moving fast in the direction of subservience to South Africa

KING MSWATI III – RETURN TO NATIONAL PRIDE?

The Swazi process of succession is complicated and very soon after the death of King Sobhuza a power struggle developed which worked in South Africa's favour. But it now seems that Swaziland is emerging out of the "dark interregnum" and can perhaps be expected to "perform" better.

Particularly the years 1983-85 were unfortunate ones. There was no King, the Queen Regent was removed from office and the country was ruled by a corrupt, self-seeking clique in the council of State, called Liqoqo. During this period Swazi policy was excessively pro-South African.

In October 1985, however, Prince Mfanasibili and Dr George Msibi were dismissed from the Liqoqo and allegations of substantial fraud made against them. The Liqoqo was later dissolved and, to the relief of the Swazis, the coronation of the young king was brought forward to April 1986. This was a happy occasion attended by, among others, President Machel, President Kaunda, Prince Michael of Kent, Maureen Reagan but also by President Botha of South Africa.

In October 1986 the anarchic interregnum's Prime Minister Prince Bekhimpi was replaced as Prime Minister by Sotja Dlamini, a former head of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Swazi Police. He is believed to have been a good choice and stands close to the new king.

Also in June 1987 the Swazi police arrested 12 people, including a cabinet minister and five other members of Swaziland's royal family on charges of sedition and treason. They are accused of taking part in the Palace coup in 1983.

King Mswati III has made a good start. He seems mature for his years (18) and the country now places its hopes in him. The mere fact that there is a king after almost four years' of interregnum has, according to unanimous opinions of observers on the scene, restored stability to the country.

Swazis in general, are cautiously optimistic. It now seems probable that in future foreign policy, Swaziland will steer a very careful course, trying to demonstrate that it is a good African nation, while at the same time trying to avoid provoking South Africa. In Swaziland's geographical situation any real independence from South Africa is unattainable, but there are naturally degrees of dependence.

Internally Swaziland remains a royal autocracy. However, there are indications that the Swazi authorities intend to move, albeit slowly, in the direction of modernization. An influential Swazi government official told the evaluation mission that the electoral system is to be changed so that the people will have a larger say.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Swaziland stands out essentially as a non-violent country. Throughout the recent struggle for power none of the contestants was killed. A few were put into prison for short periods and Simon Sishayi Nxumalo was adopted by Amnesty International as a prisoner of conscience. However, he is now free and shows no signs of having suffered serious privation. As one of our contacts put it: "People are not dragged away in the middle of the night. There is no torture, no executions, no terror". Relations between blacks and whites are relaxed.

Swaziland, however, is no egalitarian society. There is some malnutrition but probably no real hunger and certainly no starvation.

By the standards of Sub-Saharan Africa, Swaziland has one of the highest standards of living, even for the poor peasant. There is little corruption and while administration of aid is slow, it is not wasted, misused or stacked away in foreign bank accounts.

CHAPTER 5

Economic dependence on South Africa

DEPENDENCE PROFILE

Swaziland's economic situation is summarized by the World Bank in its Economic Memorandum (Nov 1985) in the following way:

Swaziland is surrounded by the territory of the Republic of South Africa. As a result, it is inevitably linked with the South African economy. It belongs to the Rand Monetary Area (RMA)* and to the Southern Africa Customs Unions (SACU). This means, in effect, that events in South Africa determine its exchange rate, and tariff policies, and to a dominant extent interest rates and monetary policies. Because of the openness of the economy and the country's membership in SACU and RMA, practically the only relevant macro-policy instrument available to the Swazi authorities is fiscal policy, and this mainly in relation to expenditures, since revenues are largely dependent on the Customs Union which provides 60 per cent of total revenues.

The country's economy is thus extremely dependent on South Africa, this dependence, based as it is on obvious and compelling factors such as size and geographic location, is so far-reaching that one may describe it as a situation of an almost complete (organic) integration of the Swazi economy into that of South Africa. It is clear that in such a situation it is unrealistic to pose an objective of any real economic independence. That would not be in Swaziland's economic interests, neither in the long run nor in the short. For Swaziland, its economic dependence on its all-pervasive big neighbour, is one that they must for ever live with, willingly or not, so it becomes for them in essence a situation of simply waiting, until a democratic system is created in South Africa.

* Since July 1 1986 RMA was replaced by the Common Monetary Area (CMA). This means that the rand will no longer be legal tender in Swaziland and the new agreement provides Swaziland (as well as Lesotho and Botswana) with greater flexibility i.e. in case of a further rapid depreciation of the rand, as in 1985.

A series of tables below illustrate Swaziland's massive economic and geo-political dependence on South Africa. In this report comparisons between Swaziland and other border states with respect to their varying degrees and natures of dependence on South Africa lie implicitly behind much of the reasoning. Tables showing other border states alongside Swaziland are therefore reproduced.

Table 1 SADCC Country trade with South Africa in 1984

Country	EXPORTS 1984 (as % of tot.)	IMPORTS 1984 (as % of tot.)
Botswana	6.4	79.7
Lesotho	94.0	95.0
Swaziland	37.0 (1983)	90.0
Malawi	8.0	39.0 (1983)
Mozambique	2.0 (1982)	12.0
Zambia	20.0	15.0 (1982)
Zimbabwe	20.0	19.8
Angola/Tanzania	-	-

Sources: IMF and World Bank Documents.

CUSTOMS UNION COLLABORATION

Regarding the SACU collaboration one must note that its economic and political goals are explicitly set in a direction quite the opposite to those of SADCC, to which Swaziland also belongs. While the former aims at increasing mutual dependence between the BLS states (Botswana/Lesotho/Swaziland) and South Africa, the latter is of course designed to achieve the contrary aim.

Table 2 Revenue from the South African Customs Union (SCA)
as % of Governments total revenue in 1984/85

Botswana	22 %
Lesotho	69 %
Swaziland	64 %

ENERGY DEPENDENCE

The Swazi energy dependence increased during the seventies. Before 1973 the country was self-sufficient in electricity, now import reaches 60 percent. Furthermore all its oil comes from South Africa.

Table 3 Energy imports from South Africa as % of total

	Oil	Electricity
Botswana	100 %	27 %
Lesotho	100 %	100 %
Swaziland	100 %	60 %
Mozambique	none	55 % of Maputos supply
Zimbabwe	aircraft fuel	none
Zambia	occasional imports	none
Malawi	30-40 %	none

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit

TRADE

In 1981 and 1982, about 67 percent of Swazi trade used the port of Maputo. By 1985, this share had dropped to 30 percent due to MNR attacks on the line, the cessation of iron ore exports, and construction of a South African financed line across Swaziland connecting the Eastern Transvaal with the port of Richard's Bay.

At present it is estimated that 90 percent of Swaziland's imports come from South Africa by road, but only 10 percent of exports go out that way. Thus most exports go out by rail. Sugar, wood pulp, coal and part of the citrus fruit export is railed out to Maputo port.

Table 4 Proportion of trade using South African ports

	Exports	Imports	Aggregate
Lesotho	100 %	100 %	100 %
Malawi			95 %
Zimbabwe			85 %
Swaziland			70 %
Botswana	25 %	100 %	+62 %
Zambia	(35-40) %	65 %	+55 %
Overall			+85 %

Source: SIDA-document (1985)

TRANSPORT VULNERABILITY

On the question of relative vulnerability with respect to transports it has been claimed that a country like Botswana is actually more vulnerable than Swaziland, because Botswana does not have a port outlet like Swaziland has Maputo.

Botswana also has a large common border with South Africa which is very hard to defend.

MIGRANT LABOUR

Between 1982 and 1984 migrant labour from Swaziland increased from 13 500 to 17 000, 81 percent of which are employed in the mining sector. Total remittances in 1983 were USD 13.8 millions.

Table 5 Migrant labourers in South Africa

Country	1983	Approx % of country's total work force	Estimated remittances
Angola	68	negative	negative
Botswana	25 967	±20 %	27.0 mn USD
Lesotho	145 797	±74	165.0 mn USD
Malawi	29 622	± 8	29.7 mn USD
Mozambique	61 218	±20 %	72.7 mn USD
Swaziland	16 773	±18 %	13.8 mn USD
Zambia	738	negative	negative
Zimbabwe	7 742	2 %	negative

Source: SAIRR, 1984, reproduced from CIDA document 1985

TOURISM

With respect to tourism it should be noted that two-thirds of all tourists coming in to Swaziland are South Africans and most of them stay in the four big hotels which are wholly owned and operated by the South African chain Sun International.

WATER FROM SOUTH AFRICA

To the list of various areas of dependence, also water for irrigation and other purpose should be added. All Swazi rivers originate in South Africa, so South Africa could easily kill e.g. Swaziland's sugar industry if they shut off the water. So water is a most serious example of dependency on South Africa.

INVESTMENT BIAS

Since independence, South African business interests have increased their presence which has further strengthened dependence on South Africa in industry, mining, as well as wholesale and retailing. These areas are today dominated by South African companies, but the British are predominant in the cash crop agriculture and forestry fields.

Subsequently, the largest wholesaler is the South African chain Metro; the mining company Gencor runs the asbestos and coal mines; maize milling is controlled by Kirsh; the only brewery is indirectly controlled by the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa; etc.



Orange packing at a South African owned citrus farm. Citrus plantations are largely owned by South Africans and export marketing is done by a South African farmer's co-operative company. Photo: Erik Steering/Pressens Bild.

An exception – at least partly to the exclusive dependency on South Africa – is banking, where some of the major banks are majority-owned by the British mother company with a minority participation of the Swazi government.

Beside the government the Swazi National Development Fund, Tibiyo Taka Ngwane, has gained considerable economic influence since independence. It today owns shares in virtually all big commercial projects and could be seen as a vehicle to establish Swazi control over business. Tibiyo is however controlled by the Royal family and is unaccountable to parliament.

The fund's involvement in investments with largely South African dominance, makes it a target for criticism exposing ties between the Swazi Royal clique and South African capital.

GOVERNMENT'S CONSTRAINTS

With the massive structural economic dependence also goes a very constrained situation in the government's freedom with respect to economic policy. To quote from a government economic memorandum, published in 1986:

... Use of the conventional tools of fiscal, monetary and pricing policies are circumscribed to such an extent that the major economic management instrument available to the government is the allocation and control of expenditure through the national budget. ...

The memorandum then points to the limited scope for an independent foreign exchange policy, interest rate policy and the lack of control over money supply, all as a result of the RMA. This earlier obliged Swaziland to raise its prime interest rates in line with developments in South Africa.

However the new Common Monetary Agreement, which replaced the RMA July 1 1986, increases the Swazi Government's ability to develop its own monetary policy. Whether this will lead to a vigorously independent strategy remains to be seen.

The basic principle of the Customs Union is equality of access to markets by both consumer and producer groups alike. This means that price determination is a function of average cost of production in the Customs Union area as a whole, not simply within Swaziland.

The government report goes on to argue that

... Given the severe restrictions on other policy instruments, resource allocation policies in the public sector are, therefore, the major means available to the government to influence the course of all development. The budget, and specifically, the way in which the budget is prepared and controlled, is of crucial importance to the development of the country.

The budget, however, is itself subject to major limitations as a policy tool. Aside from the overall fiscal constraint imposed by revenue and foreign exchange availabilities, many of the constraints are internal to Swaziland and can, to some extent, be overcome. Three aspects of the budget process in particular need to be highlighted. These are:

- (i) the limited coverage of the budget within the public sector;
- (ii) the weaknesses in the priority setting process in the budget cycle; and
- (iii) weaknesses in review and financial control through the budget.

It must be emphasized that the budget by itself covers only a portion of total public sector allocations. A substantial number of public and semi-public institutions operate partially or completely outside the budget framework. Excluded from the budget, for example, are the parastatals, the (Monarchy controlled, our remark) National Trust Funds (Tibiyo Taka-Ngwane and Tisuka Taka Ngwane) and the Minerals Committee. Partially included are the three agencies funded via Special Funds: the Department of Posts and

Telecommunications, the Water and Sewerage Board and the Central Transport Administration. ...

DELINKING

There are however, various ways by which Swaziland can act or manoeuvre in order to become marginally less dependent. Marginal changes may often be quite important for political effect, and may at times also produce beneficial economic effects.

Swaziland's membership in the 1980 created SADCC has been such a step towards fostering closer economic ties with other countries in the region and, hence towards reducing external dependence on South Africa. By joining the SADCC Swaziland rejected a too close link to South Africa, which wanted it to take part in Consas instead.*

There are a number of other delinking measures which the country could take and a few have in fact already been taken.

Leaving the Customs union

The Southern Africa researcher Joseph Hanlon has found that Swaziland could import through Maputo almost every product from the world cheaper than they are today importing it from South Africa (*Beggar your neighbours*, CIIR/James Currey, 1986). Hanlon argues, from that angle, that the BLS states are actually being cheated by revenues through their participation in the Customs Union. This takes place as they are only paid two years in arrears, but also that this arrangement turns out to be a means of protecting new local industrial development mainly in South Africa.

However, to leave SACU behind is a complicated step to take, involving the elaboration of a complete customs and excise policy and the creation of an administration that can maintain this task. On top of that almost all trade structures are directed towards South Africa and prospects to attract new industry would deteriorate considerably. And, if the Swazi government still would dare to take the risk, they would be targeted by South African retaliation.

In *Beggar your neighbours* Joseph Hanlon concludes:

Therefore, while withdrawal from SACU would have substantial potential for gain, there would be considerable changes required to reap that potential. Unfortunately, the costs are short-term, whilst the gains are largely further off in the future and harder to calculate with any certainty.

* With Consas, the Constellation of Southern African States, P.W. Botha wanted to formalize the relationship between South Africa and its satellites. But this attempt to directly link the BLS-states (but in a longer perspective the whole of Southern Africa) with the internationally rejected Bantustan states was too much for them to accept.

A less ambitious question on what actions the BLS states have taken on their own to increase their independence – with respect to the membership in SACU – therefore seems more appropriate at the moment. It is in this context sometimes considered that Swaziland and Lesotho have not been making choices within SACU which could have given them greater independence.

For instance Botswana has several times used the rules under SACU to protect infant agriculture (vegetables, poultry) and industry (vaccines, beer), while Swaziland has not taken such measures to e.g. protect its agriculture. Still, Swaziland has not been completely silent. E.g. it banned fruit import from South Africa between 1980-84 blaming the cholera epidemic and thereby protected its own production.

It also shows dissatisfaction with the SACU revenue sharing formula now and then, though this is a part of the negotiation process with the South Africans more than anything else.

Unsafe routes

In the field of transportation and communication most observers agree that the government of Swaziland could have done much more to decrease its dependence on South Africa. Some of today's dependence on South Africa in transportation is physically avoidable and the Swazi – Mozambique route is probably cheaper as it is shorter. It must though, be kept in mind that the Mozambique route, the main route for a more independent Swazi trade, has been particularly unsafe over the past few years. This, at present time, seems to cancel out its advantages.

Energy

With respect to energy we may note that the seemingly complete dependence on South Africa is mitigated by the large Hydro-electric scheme built in Ezulwini 1983-85 with main financing from African Development Bank (ADB). The large sugar and pulp industries are another example as they generate and consume their own energy from waste products. This suggests that the figure of two-thirds of electricity being imported from South Africa, is misleading.

Structural limits

Having established now that there are a number of areas where Swaziland could in fact have steered in a direction away from the massive dependence on South Africa, the question is:

To what extent would it have been possible to do so? The limits are set by economic, structural, and – naturally – political constraints. Finally, even though

there are at least some areas where Swaziland would be economically better off with less rather than more dependence on South Africa, there is clearly a limit, after which a further orientation away from South Africa's economy would become very costly. Because, after all, little Swaziland is geographically and physically – and culturally – an integral part of the surrounding lands, which are South Africa.

So (secondly), there are compelling structural reasons for being organically tied into the economy of a large neighbouring country. Obvious cases are transport, energy and infrastructure in general.

Thirdly, there are the purely political motives. It is submitted here that South Africa would simply not allow Swaziland to break away to any large degree, should the Swazi government wish to and find economic ways to do so. To understand this we can take an example from our own vicinity, that of Finland. The USSR has clearly expressed that it would not accept Finland as a part of the European Common Market. And that political argument is clearly understood by the Finns as well as by most other governments in Europe. In the case of South Africa versus Swaziland, the same type of argument applies, but perhaps even stronger, as we have argued above in previous chapters. Our overall conclusion from this brief overview of Swaziland's economic dependence on South Africa then becomes something along the following lines:

- There is today a massive economic dependence on South Africa which to some extent is self inflicted.
- So, had the Government wished, it could have been less dependent on South Africa in a number of areas than it is today.
- But – and this is the main point – the "margin for action" or discretion, that the government possesses in its potential or actual ambition to break away from the South Africa, is so limited that even if the government used it in the full extent possible – as allowed by economic, structural and political reasons – the country would still remain massively dependent on South Africa. Less massively than today, but nevertheless massively enough to give South Africa all the control it wants or needs. In a simple word, we can say that Swaziland can not in essence choose by itself to become independent of South Africa.

Now, if this argument holds true, does that mean that any striving towards more economic independence is futile and unnecessary? No, we do not think that need be the case. For a striving towards independence is important also psychologically in the political struggle against the apartheid regime. In the context of Black Africa's almost three decade long struggle against the apartheid regime, it is crucial that all the countries can present a united front. It is a political war which is waged in many areas, not least in the UN. And there it is extremely important to give the

impression that all the countries are doing their utmost to isolate the one country in the region which advocates racism and which chooses to terrorize its neighbours.

Botswana has clearly shown that there is political leverage to be used against South Africa, though not economic. Botswana has played an active role in the SADCC; it makes frequent and bold anti-apartheid statements; it keeps the ANC on a tight rein while allowing ample space for refugees and official anti-apartheid activities. And when South Africa puts it under pressure it stands up to it, negotiates professionally and make use of international fora. Also, as mentioned earlier, South African police cannot use Botswana as if it were its own ground.

It is beyond the scope of our evaluation to elaborate this point further, but we believe it to be generally understood and accepted.

LOOKING BOTH WAYS

The final conclusion which then follows from our reasoning is that when judging Swaziland's "performance" with respect to various indicators of independence vis-à-vis South Africa the lack of will on part of the Swazi Government to utilize the limited means it does have to manifest economic independence, should then "count against it".

In mounting such an expectation on Swaziland, we may recall that Swaziland is in many ways – through lucky circumstances and of course through adept policies – in a fairly privileged position with respect to the economic opportunity. John Daniels/Joseph Hanlon describe this situation in the following way:

... Like Botswana and Lesotho, Swaziland has tried to use its position in both the SACU and the Lomé convention as a way of attracting industry. They argue that new industry can have the advantages of South Africa without the disadvantages. On the one hand SACU membership means duty-free entry to the South African market, plus access to South African services and inputs. On the other hand, there is not the political stigma of being in South Africa; it is possible to export to African and Arab states which ban South African goods, while Lomé and other preference schemes give access to EEC and US markets not available to firms in South Africa. ...

This means that Swaziland is looking both ways and probably must. The failure of the Swazi government of the eighties has been that it has not been able to find a balance between these poles. It is now threatened by the obvious risk of being stigmatized, for instance Japan has banned fruit imports from Swaziland as it fears that the kingdom has become a sanctions-busting zone.

To get rid of these allegations – which increasingly have some foundation – Swaziland simply has to try and do more against apartheid.

CHAPTER 6

Development Cooperation

The development cooperation between Sweden and Swaziland began in the mid-sixties and has since then covered nine larger projects. In addition support has also been given through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and regional projects (Appendix 2).

Among the projects the educational sector is dominant. Education has received approximately 35 per cent of total funds followed by industry and agriculture with approximately 25 per cent respectively. Multi-bi has been the most common form of administration. In all of the larger projects but one (The Small Scale Industry Development Programme) multilateral organizations have been involved. UNESCO, FAO, ILO, UNDP and ADB have been used as executing agencies for the Swedish assistance. Many of the projects administered on multi-bi basis have also contained a bilateral transfer. These bilateral components have normally been of a kind demanding little administrative involvement from the part of SIDA. To some extent they have been motivated by the 12 – 14 percent administrative fees charged by the UN system. Approximately 80 percent of total funds have been administered on multi-bi basis.

The general impression of the project achievements' is a mixed one. Three of the larger projects (Small Scale Industry Development, Co-operative Development Centre and Secondary Curriculum Development Project) are judged to have low cost-effectiveness and are in some aspects considered as failures. The Primary School Building Programme seems to be the most successful project.

A number of problems have been salient in many of the projects of which some are connected to the administration by UN agencies (see also chapter 7):

- Failure to replace expatriates by national staff
- Lack of counterparts
- Delays in recruitment of experts
- Large reservations
- Lack of information and reports (evaluations)

- Administrative misunderstandings, including assignment of personnel beyond contract periods agreed by SIDA.

Table 6 SIDA financing in different sectors*

Sector	Total (SEK, million)
Education	47.0
Agriculture	33.4
Industry	35.2
Administration	10.6
Other	11.7
Regional	6.1
Emergency Aid	1.0
Total	147.2 (USD 24.5)

THE INDEPENDENCE ISSUE

The strengthening of Swaziland's independence from the South Africa has been the most overriding objective of the Swedish development cooperation with Swaziland.

Even on the project level the independence objective has indeed been expressed in four of the nine larger projects, but the analysis on exactly how these projects will contribute to the achievement at this objective has largely been lacking.

The only project where there is a clear connection between project design and the independence objective is the road project. In the other projects the connection between design and objective is very vague. This reflects the problems and difficulties of turning the somewhat abstract independence objective of Swedish development cooperation into concrete projects.

There is very little real, concrete evidence that Sweden's development cooperation has in any direct way promoted Swazi independence from South Africa. In any case such a direct link is almost impossible to establish, as Swedish aid is only a very minor part of total foreign aid to Swaziland.

When the projects have been evaluated in the past the emphasis of the evaluations has been focused on the achievement of production goals rather than on the independence objective. It ought to be mentioned, however, that only four of the nine larger projects have ever been ex-post evaluated in a comprehensive way.

But the shortcomings, when it comes to evaluating attainment of the independence objective, are not unique to the case of Swaziland. They are a result of the general problems SIDA has in defining, implementing and evaluating the

* See also Appendix 2.

independence objective. See for instance the before mentioned report produced by SIDA in 1984 (L Widell: *SIDA och oberoendemålet*).

THE EDUCATIONAL SECTOR

Compared to many other African countries receiving Swedish aid, Swaziland has a fairly well developed educational sector. The school system is in many ways a British copy.

Following independence in 1968, heavy emphasis was put on mass education. Universal and free primary education for all children by 1985 was initially set up as a goal. Today the goal is achieved in part although much still remains to be done regarding the quality of education provided and e.g. schoolfees is a heavy burden on the parents.

The educational sector has suffered from severe imbalances in various ways. E.g. the lack of secondary schools is a burning issue as thousands of children are left in the streets without anything to do. Curricula have been too theoretical and traditional. And qualitative aspects have not been given an attention to matching the rapid quantitative expansion. These aspects have certainly influenced the emphasis of Swedish aid on primary education and educational planning.

The lack of adequately educated nationals has been regarded as a major obstacle in achieving greater independence.

MATSAPA HIGH SCHOOL PROJECT

SIDA financing covered SEK 13.2 million (USD 2.2 million) during the period July 1971 – June 1977. The project was implemented by UNESCO.

Background

The educational sector in Swaziland is facing problems of high drop-out and examination failure quotas. Also, the large number of non-governmental secondary schools have developed non-compatible curricula and teaching methods. The curricula are usually not adapted to the needs of the country. By improving the Swaziland National High School (SNHS) in Matsapa in terms of buildings, curricula and teaching methods it could play the role as a model for the qualitative development of all secondary schools in Swaziland.

Objectives

The main objective of the project was to increase the country's supply of skilled labour. This was to be achieved through the improvement of the secondary education and thereby increasing the number of well-educated students at this level.



The Principal of Matsapa High School. Photo: Karlis Goppers.

Inputs

The Swedish assistance covered:

- Construction of new buildings and rehabilitation of existing buildings as well as procurement of furniture and equipment.
- Four Swedish experts at SNHS (1 curriculum development expert, 2 teachers in mathematics and science and 1 associate expert in science).
- One Swedish Educational Planning Expert at the Ministry of Education.
- A consultancy study on the possibility of local manufacturing of school furniture.
- Training of teachers in curricula and teaching methods developed at SNHS.

Expected outputs

To establish the NSHS as a model-school for the improvement of curricula and teaching methods in all schools at the secondary level.

Improved educational planning within the country.

Improved physical facilities at the SNHS, giving the school a capacity of 900 students of which 690 as boarders.

Proposals and prototypes for local manufacturing of school furniture.

Achievements

The pedagogic aims, which were probably over optimistic, had not been achieved at the end of the project period. The school could not altogether be considered to meet the standards of a model-school with large responsibilities in areas such as curriculum and teaching methods development and in teacher training.

The curriculum development part of the project was continued under the Secondary Curriculum Development Project in July 1977.

The construction part of the Project (including furniture and equipment), which amounted to approx. SEK 11 million, was finalized in a very satisfactory way. The school furniture was locally manufactured and to a large extent in line with the proposals in the consultancy study.

There is at present however substantial idle capacity in the boarding school – out of the 900 students who enrolled in October 1986 only 57 were boarders.

The incorrect estimation of boarders is what could be seen as the projects' main failure. These facilities are over-dimensioned basically because the students' parents can not afford to pay the fees. The headmaster therefore, wants to convert the empty dormitories into classrooms and laboratories, but funds for this are lacking.

Assessment

It is a functioning High School, not of a high standard, but trying hard to improve and it could therefore be rated as a qualified success.

The project must be judged to have low cost effectiveness, not only due to the poor achievements of the pedagogic aims, but also due to the idle capacity in the boarding school. The project wasted resources in projecting and constructing the above mentioned boarding school.

PRIMARY SCHOOL BUILDING PROGRAMME

SIDA financing covered SEK 16.3 million (USD 2.7 million) of which 6 million bilateral during the period July 1976 – June 1984. The project was implemented by UNESCO.

Background

The government of Swaziland has established the objective to provide universal primary education by 1985. For this purpose the Ministry of Education decided to undertake a massive construction programme of primary schools. The building programme would be financed by the government's regular budget, bilateral aid, World Bank loans and community self-help.

SIDA/UNESCO would provide technical assistance to the Ministry of Education by establishing a Primary School Building Unit (PSBU). The Ministry of Public Works had in the past been responsible for the construction of schools.

Alongside the SIDA/UNESCO project there was a bilateral agreement between SIDA and the government of Swaziland for Swedish financing of primary school construction.

Objectives

The main objective stated in 1976 was to give all children, aged 6-12, free access to primary education by 1985.

Calculations were made that this objective would imply the construction of primary schools for 83 000 children before 1985. A large part of the construction was to take place in less developed rural areas, something that was seen as contributing to Sweden's objective of supporting the struggle towards greater equality. Primary education was also seen as crucial, bearing in mind the imbalances of the Swazi labour market.

Inputs

The Swedish multi-bi assistance covered one project coordinator (architect), technical consultants, four UN volunteers, vehicles, equipment, training of local staff and a fund for experimental constructions.

The Swedish bilateral assistance contributed directly to the construction of primary schools by channeling funds to the Ministry of Education.

Expected outputs

The major production goals were to:

- Increase the Government's capacity to implement its Primary School Building Programme.
- Reduce school building costs.
- Establish design and construction criteria for primary school buildings.

Achievements

Prior to the project, the rate of construction of primary schools by the Ministry of Works was about 15 classrooms per year. When the SIDA and World Bank Projects were operational i.e. by 1980, some 60 classrooms were being constructed annually. Not only were the funds for construction considerably increased, but the Ministry of Education had managed to reduce the construction time by tight management control of contracts, use of local entrepreneurs, as well as streamlining designs and construction criteria.

A joint SIDA/UNESCO and Government of Swaziland evaluation in 1980 reviewed construction costs for primary school buildings constructed under the Project and those constructed by the Ministry of Works. This review indicated a substantial reduction of construction costs per square meter, from over USD 200 to about USD 100. The reduction of costs was partly achieved by improved management, but also by introducing low-cost designs, which allowed use of local small contractors. It should also be mentioned that the World Bank has adopted one of the primary school designs made by the Building Unit. This has led to a reduction in construction costs compared to the original World Bank design.

Assessment

The SIDA/UNESCO project must, due to its considerable effects in terms of reducing building costs, be considered highly cost-effective, and the design that finally has been agreed upon, looks practical.

The annual budget for construction of schools was about USD 5 million during the project period. Thus, the project, with an annual budget of approximately USD 250 000, would break-even if it has led to a 5 per cent reduction of the school construction costs. The savings have most likely been substantially greater than that and the project is therefore judged as highly successful.

SECONDARY CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

The SIDA financing covered SEK 8.1 million (USD 1.3 million) during the period July 1977 – December 1982. The project was implemented by UNESCO.

Background

Swaziland's Second National Development Plan (1973-77) strongly emphasized basic education, including broadened secondary education adapted to employment needs, stressing the importance of technical subjects as well as subjects adapted to local conditions. The plan called for a curriculum development away from the traditional curricula to one focusing on agriculture, technical skills, home economics and development studies. The government wanted to accomplish a shift in expectations of school-leavers from increasingly scarce white-collar positions in government to more productive and practically-oriented jobs in the private sector and in self-employment.

SIDA financed, through UNESCO, a high school project in Swaziland between 1971 and 1977 (see the Matsapa High School Project). This project consisted, in addition to construction works, also of technical assistance for curriculum development. The intention was that this curriculum development eventually would



Class room in one of the Primary Schools built by Swedish aid. Photo: Karlis Goppers.

be a model for all secondary schools in Swaziland. Partly due to problems encountered in the Matsapa High School Project, the government, SIDA and UNESCO discussed at an early stage a separate curriculum development unit within the Ministry of Education. The Project would be linked to a USAID-financed Primary Curriculum Development Project.

Objectives

The long-term objective of the SIDA/UNESCO Project was, with assistance from a USAID-financed project, to enable the Ministry of Education to establish and operate a National Curriculum Centre (NCC) staffed entirely by Swazi nationals, which would be responsible for the designing of curricula and for producing curriculum materials for all levels and courses within the school system.

Inputs

The Swedish assistance covered:

- Six International experts (1 Project Coordinator, 1 Education Research Expert and 4 Curriculum Experts in Science, Home Economics, Development studies and Elementary Technology).

- Consultants and support personnel.
- Equipment, operative costs and materials (printing, vehicles etc).

In addition to the SIDA contribution, the secondary curriculum development was supported by three experts provided by British bilateral aid who were responsible for curriculum development in Mathematics, Agriculture and English.

Expected outputs

The project aimed at supplying Swaziland with a national cadre of specialists in curriculum development, mainly through the provision of on-the-job training for Swazi counterparts by the international experts.

The Project should develop, produce, trial-test, evaluate, revise and recommend curriculum materials to the Ministry of Education for publication and use in all schools in Swaziland.

Achievements

At the end of the project no comprehensive curriculum for any of the subjects could be considered ready, even though some materials had been tested.

The training of Swazi nationals was not achieved at the end of the project. During the four and a half years of the project only one Swazi national worked as curriculum developer for more than a short period. Not until mid 1982, half a year before the end of the project, had a sufficient number of national staff been assigned to curriculum development.

The merger of the Primary and Secondary Curriculum Development Projects into the National Curriculum Centre took place in January 1983, i.e. after the project period. The NCC is today headed by a Swazi national and has national staff responsible for curriculum development, both for primary and secondary schools. NCC is however not yet fully equipped in terms of training and staff to carry out full-fledged curriculum development for secondary schools. NCC does not cover all courses at the secondary level.

Assessment

Up until the present this must be classified as an unsuccessful project. It compares unfavorably with the parallel USAID project to establish a Primary Curriculum. USAID acted in a rather hard-fisted manner with regard to its project. It refused to activate the project until sufficient counterparts were recruited. This attitude has been seen as very beneficial to primary curriculum development, which by now is for more advanced than the secondary one. It appears that the lack of counterparts caused a certain amount of demoralization within the SIDA/UNESCO project. It has been suggested that the National Curriculum Centre was established rather

despite than due to the SIDA/UNESCO project. Considering the limited outcome of the project it must be judged to have low cost-effectiveness.

The UNESCO personnel have been answerable to Paris, but not to Ministry of Education, which has further lessened the prospects for efficiency.

EDUCATIONAL PLANNING AND RESEARCH PROJECT

The SIDA financing covers SEK 11.5 millions (USD 1.9 million) of which 0.8 million was financed bilaterally during the period July 1983 – December 1987. The project is implemented by UNESCO.

Background

Following independence in 1968, the government of Swaziland focused attention on educational planning as a prerequisite for economic development. At the time there was no planning section at the Ministry of Education and most of the schools were private. With the support of Sweden the services of an executive educational planner was utilized to set up an educational planning section within the Ministry of Education and the first national staff was recruited in the beginning of the 1970s. Later on UNESCO/UNDP and from 1983 Sweden assisted in order to set up a full-fledged educational section.

Objectives

The three major objectives of the project are:

- The consolidation and further re-orientation of the educational system.
- The development of the national capacity for educational planning, research and evaluation.
- The development of effective administrative and supervisory structures to implement and sustain programs of educational development and reform.

Inputs

The Swedish funds should cover:

- Three UNESCO Advisors (1 Educational Planning and Research expert, 1 Evaluation and Statistics expert and 1 Educational Economics and Financing expert).
- Training of national staff within Swaziland and abroad.
- Equipment.
- Swedish consultancy services through a minor projects fund.
- Local administrative staff during 1987.

Expected outputs

- A fully operational Educational Planning and Research Unit at the Ministry of Education.
- Procedures for systematic gathering, analysis and reporting of educational data.
- A comparative cost analysis of the educational sector.
- Procedures for preparation, follow-up and analysis of the Ministry's annual budget.
- Analytical studies and research projects.
- A School Location Plan.
- A sufficient number of trained Swazi Educational Planners who are able to continue and expand the work at the Educational Planning and Research Unit.

Achievements

As the project has not ended yet it is too early to fully evaluate the achievements of the project. Apart from delays in the start of the project, largely due to recruitment problems, the progress so far is, however, promising. The Advisors of the project with their counterparts were fully involved in the work of the National Educational Review Commission (NERCOM) which recommended reforms in all aspects of the educational system in Swaziland. Based on the recommendation of NERCOM, implementing strategies are being finalized in which the Advisors and their counterparts have played important roles.

The three national counterparts have been given on-the-job training as well as training abroad. It is not at this stage possible to establish if the counterparts are capable of continuing and expanding the work of the project at the end of project.

A number of Staff and Management Development Programs have been successfully organized, co-ordinated and administered by the project in order to facilitate efficient implementation of educational reforms.

Assessment

The project will be evaluated by SIDA during the first half of 1987. On the basis of what the evaluation mission has seen it seems to be a promising and worthwhile project.

THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

Swaziland has a large agricultural sector, accounting for approximately 80 percent of export earnings. It has been estimated that 70 percent of the population make their living out of this sector.

The agricultural sector, like so much else in Swaziland, has a dual character. This dualism characterizes its institutional framework where the modern sector is

controlled by foreign capital. The traditional sector is meanwhile, controlled by the Swazi National Land (SNL). The latter is a Royal institution dating back to the colonial era, but the phenomenon as such goes back to the precolonial era, when the King/the Chiefs "gave" away land to those who needed it.

At the moment SNL constitutes about 57 percent of the land, a percentage that has increased steadily over the years ever since 1914. At that time the British declared eight percent of the land as reserves for the Swazi population then using the same measures (forced removals) and motives (control labour force, etc) as South Africa itself. Ever since the King ran a "buy-back-land" campaign, which had strong support and made the King himself a popular figure.

The King holds the land in trust for the nation and governs it through local chiefs, and with no accountability to the government.

The traditional sector is highly labour-intensive, with small holdings mostly producing for subsistence. As a consequence of urbanization and migrant labour, women are playing a very important role in this sectors agricultural production.

The remaining part of the land consists of the modern sector. It is capital-intensive, producing mostly irrigated crops for export and is to a large extent, about two thirds, owned mainly by British and to a growing extent South Africans.

Swaziland is to a large extent dependent on South Africa for exports as well as imports within the agricultural sector.

In the third development plan (1978-1983), agricultural education is given priority. Another area that has been given official priority is the co-operative movement.

The Swedish assistance to the agricultural sector has consisted of support to the Faculty of Agriculture and to the Co-operative Development Centre. The experiences from this cooperation have been mixed:

- The Faculty of Agriculture is judged to be cost-effective in terms of students trained but less successful in achieving the regional objectives.
- The Co-operative Development Centre suffered from severe delays in implementation and did not manage to adequately train local staff. The project has been described as an outright failure.

FACULTY OF AGRICULTURE

The SIDA financing covered SEK 24.9 million (USD 4.2 million) of which SEK 8 million bilateral during the period July 1974 – June 1985. The project was implemented by FAO.

Background

The Faculty of Agriculture was established at the Luyengo campus of the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (UBLS) in Swaziland in 1972. In 1976 Lesotho left the university cooperation and the UBLS became the University of Botswana and Swaziland. In 1982 also Botswana left the cooperation and the national University of Swaziland was established. The Faculty of Agriculture is organized into five main departments: animal production and health, crop production, agricultural economics, extension and education, home economics and land use and mechanization.

The economies of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are all based on the agricultural sector. Cattle-farming is of great importance in the three countries. In order to contribute to the development of the agricultural sector in these countries Sweden in 1974 commenced the support to the Faculty of Agriculture.

Objectives

The main objective of the project was to contribute to the development of the agricultural sectors in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland and thereby hope to reduce dependence on the Republic of South Africa.

Inputs

The Swedish funds have been used for several purposes, including: assistance to courses in Animal Health and Home Economics; agricultural teacher training; buildings and equipment. The largest part has been expatriate teacher salaries. Approximately one third of the funds have been used for buildings and equipment.

Expected outputs

The production goal of the project is to strengthen the capability and capacity of the Faculty of Agriculture in order to provide the agricultural manpower needed by Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland for their agricultural development programmes.

Achievements

It is very difficult to establish to what extent the Swedish support to the Faculty of Agriculture has led to reduced dependence on South Africa in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. However, due to the failure in the regional university cooperation the effects in Botswana and Lesotho are likely to be very limited.

During the period 1976 to 1982 708 students passed their final exams. During the project period the Swazi graduates had difficulties in getting placement or employment in their relevant fields. However, most of them managed to obtain employment



In 1914 the British introduced tribal areas on eight percent of the Swazi land, with the same intentions as in South Africa. King Sobhuza's buy-back-land campaign rose the Swazi owned percentage to 57. Photo: Jesper Kirknaes.

teaching agriculture or science in secondary schools because of the dearth of personnel in these areas. Most leavers have been employed by government but today an increasing number go to the commercial sector. As the commercial farms in Swaziland to a large extent are owned by South Africans one may perhaps conclude that this trend is not, at least not directly, contributing to the independence objective.

The physical facilities of the Faculty have been expanded in a very satisfactory way enabling the Faculty to cope with staff and the projected student intake.

Assessment

In terms of number of students trained the project is judged to be cost-effective. In general it must be seen as a largely successful project with the obvious exception of course that the regional university cooperation did not survive. However, the

reasons for this partial "failure" were numerous and given the motive of "nation building" of independent countries, perhaps the development with one university in each country is a logical one.

CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT CENTRE

The SIDA financing covered SEK 9.3 million (USD 1.5 million) of which SEK 3.4 million bilateral during the period July 1974 – June 1982. The project was implemented by ILO.

Background

The agricultural sector in Swaziland is as mentioned strongly dominated by foreign interests while the Swazi part of the agricultural sector consists mainly of subsistence farmers.

Maize, sorghum, cotton, rice and tobacco are the main crops but the marketed crops include only cotton and tobacco and to a small extent maize.

The co-operative movement today consists of 148 registered societies, but it started in the early sixties and the Co-operative Department itself was established in 1963.


The Swazi Government saw the co-operative activities as important factors in rural development, especially in the high potential agricultural areas where the co-operative societies would take care of sales of agricultural inputs and tools, marketing of agricultural products as well as administration of agricultural credits.

After independence in 1968 the expansion of the co-operative movement accelerated. This development in connection with the low educational levels of the co-operative members and the lack of trained personnel at the Co-operative Department caused acute problems. Several of the co-operative societies suffered from financial difficulties and could not satisfy the members' demand for extension services concerning production and credits or even supply necessary agricultural inputs.

In 1974 Sweden decided to support the establishment of a Cooperative Development Centre in Swaziland. The centre should be responsible for training members of co-operative societies, marketing and credit services and consumer services.

Objectives

The long-range objective of the project is to contribute to the conditions in which efficient and self-sustained co-operatives will grow and prosper, both in rural and urban areas.



The Faculty of Agriculture was originally a joint project involving Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. But now it is a national university. The SIDA contribution is judged to be largely successful. Photo: Karlis Goppers.

Inputs

The Swedish contribution covered:

- Four ILO experts (1 Education and Training expert, 1 Accounts and Audit expert, 1 Marketing and credit expert and 1 Consumer Development expert)
- Administrative staff
- Buildings and equipment
- Scholarships

Expected outputs

The project aimed at setting up a Co-operative Development Centre with adequately trained national staff. The centre should provide qualified services to the co-operative sector by giving advice, organize courses and producing educational materials.

Achievements

The centre did not become operational until 1977. At project end the goal of adequately trained national staff had not been achieved. The national staff at that time were only appointed to their posts in 1981. The ILO experts have trained personnel who have since been transferred or resigned. Today there are nationals on all posts, i.e., one Principal and four teachers as well as supporting personnel. The Centre is still relying on the services of one part-time expatriate adviser.

The premises are only used for co-operative training nine months a year with about 40 students attending each course. The remaining months it is either not in use at all or it is lent to the Ministry of Agriculture for various courses for budget reasons.

Some students do not get work which would imply that the centre was planned for an expansion of the co-operative societies that has not yet taken place.

Assessment

Considering the delays in implementation and the shortcomings in training local staff the project cannot be judged to be cost-effective. The idle capacity at the centre today also supports that judgement. The relevance of the centre to the traditional sector has been seriously questioned and the project has in SIDA's documents even been described as an outright failure. The mission can concur with that view.

THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR

Swaziland has, in comparison to many other African countries, a rather large industrial sector. Processing of agricultural and forestry products are dominant.



The glass factory in Ngwenya. Photo: Karlis Goppers.

It has been estimated that approximately 60-70 per cent of industries are controlled by South African capital. The industrial sector is marked by the customs union with the Republic of South Africa, which in practice gives only limited possibilities to protecting so called "infant industries". Fluctuations in the South African economic devaluations, subsidies and changes in tariffs are economic events, beyond Swaziland's control, that deeply effect the conditions for the local industrial sector.

The Swedish cooperation consisted of Small Scale Industry Development and Road Construction. Both projects had set up as explicit objectives to reduce Swaziland's dependency upon South Africa.

SMALL SCALE INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

The SIDA financing covered SEK 11.5 million (USD 1.9 million) of which SEK 2.5 million under the title "Special Programmes" during the periods July 1974 – June 1983 (country allocation) and July 1982 – May 1986. The programme was implemented by FIDE (Forsheda Idéutveckling AB) in cooperation with SEDCO (Small Enterprise Development Company).

Background

One of the most important goals for Swaziland's industrial policy is to encourage private initiatives and entrepreneurship, which is of rare occurrence. Swaziland started a special small-scale industry development programme in 1971 in cooperation

with ILO and England. The programme had founded eight industrial villages in different parts of the country holding more than 60 enterprises. The Swedish assistance has supported this programme.

Objectives

The objectives of the small-scale industry development in Swaziland is to:

- Reduce dependence on South Africa for imports of certain important consumer goods.
- Develop small-scale production of goods which use by-products from larger production lines as inputs in order to increase the total processing value in Swaziland.
- To reduce the social and economic division of the country into a modern and traditional sector.
- To create employment in rural areas and small towns with the purpose of reducing migration to the larger cities.

Inputs

The Swedish funds were mainly used for:

- Promotion of co-operation between Swazi and Swedish small-scale industries.
- Financing of a Chief Technical Advisor at SEDCO.

Achievements

Five schemes have been supported:

- BMN Wire Products in Manzini
- Swaziland Foundry and Pattern Makers in Manzini
- Swazi Glass Craft in Ngwenya
- Swazi Measuring Instruments in Piggs Peak
- Wood Working in Hlatikulu

In most cases Swedish partner companies have been involved, providing know-how and assisting in other forms, such as for example the training of Swazi nationals in glass-blowing techniques at Kosta in Småland.

The experiences of the projects have been mixed. The first reports were generally optimistic but as the factories reached a state where they should be able to continue

without external assistance, problems arose. Also, the weakening of SEDCO's administrative capacity in the early 80s has had very serious consequences for the projects.



Today Peak Industries mainly manufacture coffins, doors, windows and window frames. Photo: Karlis Goppers.

The glass factory and the foundry have been closed down as they were not able to market their products with a profit. In October 1986 at the time of our visit the wire work-shop was not in operation, due to financial constraints.

The wood-working project in Hlatikhulu no longer exists in original form. Some of the machines have been moved from Hlatikhulu to the premises of the closed down foundry, forming a new wood-working project there. The existing wood-working workshop in Hlatikhulu commenced its operations in March 1986 with no direct Swedish assistance. The Swazi Measuring Instruments was merged into Peak Industries and is no longer producing wooden rulers which was the original intention. Today Peak Industries mainly manufacture coffins, doors, windows and window frames. Peak Industries were given continued support under the title Special Programmes. Today the factory is operating efficiently but with some financial difficulties.

Some of the entrepreneurs who were once involved in the closed factories are now working successfully in other companies.

The projects have not been able to substitute for South African imports. The competition from efficient South African companies has, as was already stated, been too strong in the case of the foundry and the wire workshop.

Apart from the existing wood-working in Hlatikhulu, which could not really be considered a SIDA project, it is only Peak Industries that provides employment today. In mid 1985 there were 65 people employed at the factory. In October 1986 the factory employed 30 people.

The glass factory, using broken bottles as raw material for their products, was the only one of the five projects using by-products as inputs.

Assessment

All the projects have provided employment for a limited time. But as the programme has failed in establishing viable, profitable and self-sustained industries the overall industrial development programme can therefore not be regarded as cost-effective and as a result they could not compete with imports from South Africa. In fact out of the five that were started there is today only one complete project left in operation.

In addition, the programme has not been able to develop small-scale production of goods using by-products as inputs or reducing the dependence of the Republic of South Africa.

Furthermore, no attempts have been made to reduce the division between the traditional respectively the modern sector.

ROAD PROJECT LONHLUPHEKO – LOMAHASHA

The SIDA financing cover SEK 23.7 million (USD 4 million) during the period July 1982 – June 1987. The project was implemented by the African Development Bank.

Background

As a means to increase economic cooperation and thereby decrease dependence on South Africa, the so called Frontline states in 1981 formed the Southern Africa Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC). SATCC presented the same year proposals for 97 regional projects. Among these projects there was a suggestion of rehabilitating the road between Maputo and the Swaziland/Mozambique border at Lomahasha/Namaacha and also the continuation of this road within Swaziland to Lonhlupheko and Big Bend.

In November 1981 SIDA decided to finance the upgrading of the road between Lonhlupheko and Lomahasha using funds from the Swaziland country allocation.

Objectives

The objectives of the project was:

- To provide Swaziland with a high standard international road link to the port in Maputo through the upgrading of the road between Lonhlupheko and Lomahasha.
- To reduce transportation costs for the people living in the project area as well as for the economic activities in the surrounding vicinity of the road, such as a big sugar-mill with adjoining immense irrigated sugar-cane plantations, cattle-farming and two agricultural development areas on both sides of the road near Lomahasha.
- To strengthen Swaziland's independence from South Africa by contributing to the establishment of a transportation link to the Maputo port. This objective naturally presumed that the upgrading of the corresponding road in Mozambique would also take place.

Inputs

The Swedish funds financed 35 per cent of project cost. The remaining part was financed by the African Development Bank (50 per cent) and Ministry of Works (15 per cent).

Achievements

The road was designed by a British consultancy firm and the construction works were carried out by a Portuguese contractor. In April 1986 the construction works were completed. The road is of two lane bituminous standard (6.7 m width) for a total of 49.9 kilometres length.

The high standard road link to Maputo has not been fully established as the upgrading of the corresponding road within Mozambique has not been completed as yet, mainly due to security reasons.

Assessment

Although successful from a technical point of view, the project is still to achieve its objective in a regional context. The road, which is of good standard, is there, but as long as the Mozambique road link is not upgraded and as long as the security problems prevail, the link to Maputo will not be established.

The road is undoubtedly supporting the economic activities in the area, such as the sugar plantations and mill, but if the Maputo link is not there, the road only facilitates transports through the Republic of South Africa, as well as within Swaziland.

PUBLIC SECTOR

OPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME (OPAS)

The SIDA financing covered SEK 10.6 million (USD 1.8 million) during the period July 1969 – June 1984. The programme was implemented by UNDP.

Background

When Swaziland became independent in 1968 it was not prepared for taking over all administrative and political responsibilities. The administration was dominated by expatriates from South Africa and England. In all Swazi development plans, nationalization of the administration has been set up as a goal.

The forerunner of OPAS (Operational Assistance) started already in 1958 under the label OPEX (Operational and Executive Personnel) by the UN, as a response to many countries' needs of highly skilled officials within their regular local administrations. The OPAS conditions state that the personnel are formally employed by the local government and not regarded as UN officials. The government has to pay the regular salary for the position and the OPAS programme contributes with the difference to a UN expert salary.

Objectives

The main objective of the OPAS' support has on several occasions been stated as contributing to the political and economical independence from the Republic of South Africa (and initially Great Britain). This was to be achieved by reducing the dominance of South Africans and Britons in the local government and also by rendering the local government more efficient.

Inputs

The Swedish assistance has been used for covering the difference between regular government salaries and UN expert salaries for expatriates within the Swazi administration.

Expected outputs

The output of the programme could be stated as provision of skilled personnel in executive positions within the Swazi administration.

Achievements

Since 1969 the costs of officials in approximately 20 different positions have been covered by the Swedish support. During the past years, the Swedish support has gone mainly to the Swazi Telecommunications Administration. Some of the OPAS' officials have been Swedish.

According to various comments the experiences from the OPAS programme have been positive. Representatives from the Swazi Government have expressed their satisfaction over the results of the programme. However, some of the Swedes employed through the programme have been very critical, maintaining that the expatriate personnel has been working against the advancement of nationals.



The new road to the Mozambican border. This road project is successful from a technical point of view. But as long as the security problems prevail in Mozambique, the link to Maputo will not be established. Photo: Karlis Goppers.

Assessment

UNDP Reports on progress of the programme have been very scarce and the present evaluation mission has no real basis to form a judgement on this programme.

OTHER PROJECTS

OLDER HIGH SCHOOL PROJECTS

During the years 1964 to 1971 financial support was given to five highschools amounting to approximately SEK 1 million (USD 0.17 million) for the whole period. The schools supported were S:t Christopher's, S:t Francis', S:t Michael's, Salesion and Waterford School (see Appendix 5). The funds were mainly used for scholarships, in most cases to South African refugees, but also for buildings and

equipment. Funds were transferred on bilateral basis. No comprehensive evaluation of these projects has been made.

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS)

Up to June 1985 SEK 10.7 million (USD 1.8 million) has been disbursed to Swedish NGOs. Among other organizations involved are *Helgelseförbundet*, *Svenska Kyrkans Mission* and *Svenska Alliansmissionen*. One of the larger projects has been a health centre in Emkhuzweni in northern Swaziland. The health centre was implemented by *Helgelseförbundet* and had until 1979 received approximately SEK 1.5 million (USD 0.25 million). Other areas having received support through the NGOs are primary school building programmes and water projects.

Although no comprehensive evaluation of the projects has been made the general impression of NGO projects is very good.

REGIONAL PROJECTS

The Faculty of Agriculture and the Road Project Lonhlupheko-Lomahasha were both originally conceived as regional projects, although the funds have been partly drawn from the country allocation.

During 1968 – 1972 there was a project for promotion of the use of fertilizers in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. SIDA contributed with SEK 2 million (USD 0.3 million) for activities in all three countries. The project was executed by FAO.

In the SADCC context SIDA has, apart from the Road Project in Swaziland, supported two studies. The first dealing with the rehabilitation and electrification of the railways in southern Mozambique and Swaziland has received SEK 3.5 million (USD 0.6 million) and the other dealing with teacher education in the SADCC area has received SEK 0.6 million (USD 0.1 million).

EMERGENCY AID

After the cyclone Domoian in 1984 SEK 1 million (USD 0.17 million) was granted as emergency relief. At present it has still not been decided how these funds are to be used.

CHAPTER 7

The Multi-Bi dilemma

The multi-bilateral mode of development cooperation means that there is a United Nations' agency implementing a project financed by Sweden. The UN agency is paid 14 percent of the total aid amount for its part. Sweden's motives for adopting this method in Swaziland were partly to avoid having to establish an aid office to administer a small programme and partly to keep Swedish presence in a low key. Apart from a brief period in 1982, when a cooperation agreement was about to be signed, Sweden has wanted to be inconspicuous in Swaziland and as little committed as possible. In view of this Swedish policy the multi-bi approach is logical. It is questionable, however, whether it has been efficient or cost effective. The Swazis did not like it. They wanted a Swedish commitment, Swedish direct supervision of aid, and all available Swedish resources to go to Swaziland, not a sizeable percentage thereof (14 %) to the United Nations for administration.

A SIDA evaluation report on multi-bi development projects from 1984 is strongly critical of UNESCO, particularly in the Secondary Curriculum Development Project. It also criticizes UNESCO in the Primary School Building, although this project, as has been argued in the previous chapter, did turn out largely successful. It was the mission's impression during its visit that the UNESCO advisers in the Ministry of Education working on the Educational Research and Planning Project were doing a reasonably good job.

The SIDA/FAO project at the Faculty of Agriculture, University of Swaziland has been successful. The buildings looked fine and the experts provided have, it appears, helped to produce some qualified Swazis.*

* Rolf Beijer and Claes Lindahl, *Evaluation of SIDA financed trust-fund projects with the United Nations executive agencies. Report 4: Evaluation studies of selected projects.*

CRITICISM

There has been considerable criticism of the UN agencies. The criticism could be summarized as follows:

- *Communication problems:* There seems, at least at times, to have been severe communication problems between the UNDP office and the other UN agencies in Swaziland, between the UN headquarters and their Swazi offices, as well as between the Swazi UN agencies and the Swazi Government. On several occasions personnel have been contracted beyond the contract period agreed on with SIDA, and there has also been frequent misunderstandings concerning disbursements. On some occasions the UN agencies have demanded continuation of projects without informing the Swazi Government. There have also been complaints about too scant reporting to SIDA.
- *Problems with recruitment and counterparts:* Almost all projects have at some stage been delayed due to late arrival of UN experts. In almost all projects there has also been a lack of local counterparts and a failure to replace expatriates with nationals when projects expire. This aspect is particularly serious, as the actual willingness of the UN officials to be replaced by nationals has been questioned in several informal SIDA reports from Swaziland. It has been said that Swaziland is one of the last "air holes" for UN experts in Africa, a country comfortable to live in with a high standard and a "soft" administration, things that do not encourage UN experts to end their assignments.
- *The administrative costs* are high, 12-14 percent. This 12-14 percent has entirely been collected by the executing UN agency, while the UNDP office has not been compensated for the burden of coordinating the Swedish aid. There have been complaints about this from the UNDP office.
- *Low reflow:* Low reflow of funds for purchases in the donor country is a well-known consequence of UN administration. This seems also to have been the case in Swaziland.
- *Large reservations:* To a large extent the UN administration's inflexibility and the frequent delays have been held responsible for the large reservations that have occurred in the case of Swaziland.

A general impression is that there simply have been too many parties involved without anyone taking the comprehensive responsibility. A factor that cannot have made it easier is the high turnover of desk officers responsible for Swaziland at SIDA-S (7 assignments since 1975). Swaziland also had to compete for attention with the rapidly expanding Mozambique programme (perhaps also perceived as more "urgent"), as Swaziland and Mozambique were lumped together as one area of responsibility in Maputo as well as in the country bureau.

The intention in the late 70s to concentrate cooperation to fewer areas is also partly explained by this dissatisfaction with the administrative forms. Concentration on regional and educational projects would improve the situation by making UNESCO the sole UN agency involved and by letting the regional projects be handled together with the SADCC cooperation.

However, in defence of the administrative forms applied in the case of Swaziland, it should be remembered that the Swedish parliament had explicitly stated that the cooperation was mainly to work through the UN system (stated as late as in the Budget Proposal of 1978/79). As early as in the 60s, when the aid to Swaziland began, the presence of the UN agencies in Swaziland was seen as being a crucial factor for Swaziland's independence from South Africa. Also the use of the UN agencies has made it possible for Sweden to cooperate with Swaziland without too great an administrative involvement. There has also been general agreement on the advantages of letting the UN agencies take care of the burdensome personnel recruitment and administration. Finally, UN administration also meant that SIDA would remain less committed and could more easily withdraw from cooperation.

The negative aspects of the administrative set up mentioned above do not imply that there necessarily was a better alternative at hand. To some extent the administrative forms applied may be seen as a response to a dilemma: how to control the cooperation without getting too involved. One may also argue that Swaziland is a case where project implementation has suffered as a result of the small scale of the programs.

To sum up:

Directly administered SIDA aid would in general seem to be more effective than the use of UN agencies. However, the latter was an understandable choice given Sweden's wish for a limited involvement in Swaziland. Furthermore, it has had one notable success, the Primary School Building, while both the Educational Research and Faculty of Agriculture projects have been at least partly positive.

CHAPTER 8

New forms of co-operation

ENDING BILATERAL AID

Sweden's principal objective in giving aid to Swaziland was to contribute to the bolstering of the country's independence from South Africa and to assist in preventing it from becoming a Bantustan. This objective has apparently not been achieved and it therefore seems logical to terminate aid, after having cooperated with Swaziland for twenty years. Since the aid has never been enshrined in a formal agreement, it can be stopped relatively easily. In fact there is no need actively to terminate aid.

Nevertheless, the Swazi minister for education has recently been informed by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs that

"there is no longer any special budget allocation for bilateral Swedish support for Swaziland. This support has been phased out but there are other forms of cooperation. Sweden is prepared to continue its cooperation with Swaziland by means of disaster aid through private organizations and by regional aid through SADCC."

Swazi officials made it clear to the mission that they would be most dissatisfied with this: to terminate Swedish aid was to them, illogical.

The interregnum between the death of King Sobhuza II in 1982 and the coronation of his son, King Mswati III in 1986 was a difficult time for Swaziland. From 1983 – 1985 the country was ruled by a corrupt clique which was completely answerable to South Africa. This situation now seems to perhaps be changing and the team's impression is that the new regime of King Mswati III is trying, not without success, to pursue King Sobhuza's policy of dignified independence, within the bounds of well-known constraints, and in addition, to initiate some internal reforms. But given the fact that Lesotho – where Sweden has recently decided to establish a Development Cooperation Office – is moving fast in the direction of becoming a satellite state of South Africa, Sweden's position of support for Lesotho but not for Swaziland could turn out to be awkward and illogical.

The following arguments may be mentioned for and against Swedish bilateral aid to Swaziland:

IN FAVOUR OF FUTURE COOPERATION...

- Compared with many countries in Africa Swaziland is a relatively non-violent society. There are no political prisoners, no torture, no imprisonment without trial. Even during the so called anarchic interregnum nobody was killed by government order.
- Racial relations are good. Even South Africans, black and white, relax when they come to Swaziland.
- While the 1983-85 regime was more collaborationist than survival demanded, the new regime after the King's coronation seems determined to reassert Swazi dignity and, as far as this is possible, some independence of view.
- Swaziland is saddled with a serious and increasing refugee problem. Their treatment of previous and present South African refugees and Mozambican refugees is beyond reproach. Aid is needed here and would, it seems, be well administered.
- There is comparatively little corruption in Swaziland. Aid is slowly administered, but it generally seems to reach its targets in the end.
- Some of Sweden's projects have been quite successful.
- There is considerable rural poverty. The Swazi Government is trying to combat this but it needs help.
- The health sector needs considerable support.
- The presence of aid donors would bolster Swaziland in any ambition it may have to maintain its dignity and integrity under South African pressure. Sweden is an internationally respected neutral country. A continued Swedish presence would give Swaziland moral support proportionately much more than could be expected from the moderate size of the programme. In this context it may be worth noting that an important US advisor told us that the Swedes were the best donors of all in Swaziland.
- Sweden's withdrawal of bilateral aid may lead other aid agencies to follow the Swedish example which is not necessarily desirable.

...AND AGAINST

- Swaziland is, by Third World standards, relatively prosperous. Swedish resources could therefore be better employed in a poorer country. Its gross national product per capita was in 1984 reported by the World Development Report as US\$ 780, which can be compared to Lesotho's US\$ 530 and Zambia's US\$ 470. Botswana however had US\$ 980 and Zimbabwe US\$ 770.

- Swaziland already receives a large amount of aid from other donors.
- Income distribution is uneven. There is a prosperous Royal family, traditional chiefs and bourgeoisie, while the peasants and urban working classes are poor.
- There is no democracy in the western sense. It is a Royal Autocracy, with the King and his Elders and advisers answerable to no one.
- Even with the best of intentions Swaziland has been, and is likely to remain, economically quite dependent on South Africa through the Customs Union.
- It does not speak out against apartheid and the Republic of South Africa in the way Lesotho used to do and Botswana still does.
- It has too close security ties to South Africa, particularly since the security pact was signed.
- It does not harbour nor give shelter, succour and help to ANC activists. Today it has no ANC representative.
- Tibiyo Taka Ngwane Fund is held in trust by the King and is not answerable to the Ministry of Finance. The fund holds large shares in commercial projects controlled by South Africans. There is a tendency of the ruling Swazi elite to distance itself from the SADCC alternative.
- The country has allowed a rail link from Komatipoort to Richards Bay through Swaziland, which is against the spirit of SADCC.
- Ending Swedish aid could, as mentioned, be followed by others which could place sound pressure on the new government to redirect the country's policies.
- A Swedish critique can also note the low commercial reflow of aid money to Sweden in particular and where the Swazi government generally has proved to be rather reluctant to avoid companies controlled by South African interests.

FUTURE CO-OPERATION


Besides Swaziland's performance and the balance act between "for" or "against" bilateral co-operation, there are other dimensions that go beyond Swedish judgements and the factual decision to end bilateral aid.

These involve Swaziland's future in a regional context where a liberated South Africa as well as SADCC play a dominant role.

A Swaziland supported by donors and regional forces like SADCC will be better able to maintain long term development planning that the whole area can gain from the day South Africa has a majority government.

Swedish aid will therefore continue to flow into Swaziland in different forms as long as Sweden's dedication to the Southern African region as a whole continues. United Nations agencies, SADCC and non-governmental organizations are today channeling this aid.

The following areas could, according to the mission's observations be worthwhile to examine for possible future aid:



Lutheran school in Manzini area. Photo: Karlis Goppers.

- Food Production
- Refugees
- Schools (particularly Waterford School)
- Other aspects of education
- Health
- SADCC (which has already been taken up by the Swedish government in discussions with the Swazi government)
- Refugees
- NGO projects in general.

Some of the potential areas for future Swedish cooperation are commented upon in Appendix 5.

APPENDIX 1

Terms of reference

THE EVALUATION OF SWEDEN'S DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION WITH SWAZILAND

Sweden's development co-operation with Swaziland goes back to the mid sixties. It was initiated in response to the United Nation's call for an international presence in order to guarantee Swaziland's independence from South Africa. Since then the main objective of Sweden's support has been to contribute to Swaziland's independence from South Africa. The independence motive has also been the major one for Sweden's decision to terminate the cooperation.

In absolute terms Sweden's aid allocations to Swaziland have not been large, the country frame never having exceeded ten million Swedish kronor annually. In total, approximately 125 million kronor have been disbursed throughout the whole period. Nevertheless, Swaziland has for several years ranked among the three or four highest per capita receivers of Swedish aid.

Sweden has directly supported nine larger projects. In addition, support has been given through private organizations and in the form of disaster relief. The educational sector is dominant, having received approximately 60 per cent of total funds. In most projects multinational organizations have been acting as executing agencies for Sweden's aid. These have also been some bilateral components, but these have normally been of a kind that demands little administrative involvement on the part of SIDA. Approximately 80 % of total funds have been administered on multi-bilateral bases.

Over the last few years the development co-operation has been gradually phased out and the budget year 1986/87 is the last one. It has now been decided to subject the entire programme to an evaluation. Given the limited size and ambition of Sweden's support to Swaziland this evaluation is envisaged to be of a rather limited nature and ambition.

A rather thorough pre-evaluation desk study has already been undertaken, which describes and somewhat analyses Sweden's motives for commencing development

co-operation with Swaziland. This study also attempts to define the objectives that were explicitly and/or implicitly set up for this co-operation.

SIDA's knowledge of the Swaziland programme is today fairly limited due to the limited presence that Sweden has had in Swaziland, which in itself of course is a function of Sweden's limited ambition with this aid. Therefore it is foreseen that the study, although limited in scope, will be largely of an exploratory nature.

The main elements of the Evaluation are foreseen as follows:

1. Define and analyse Sweden's motives for commencing development co-operation with Swaziland. What were the explicit and/or the implicit objectives set up for this co-operation? Are these motives/objectives still valid today or have they changed?

If so, how have they changed? Discuss the "conditions for survival" of a small dependent boarder-line country like Swaziland.

2. Given the analysis under paragraph 1 above, what has the development co-operation between Sweden and Swaziland achieved in broad geo-political and/or economic terms.

3. Which are the concrete results achieved in the development projects supported by SIDA? If possible analyse what has been the cost effectiveness and what has been its cost-benefit impact in terms of the national economy?

4. A general survey of Swaziland's economic situation and its important components (migratory labour, customs union with RSA, tourism, economic dependence, etc). Discuss how this economic situation is affected by and how it interacts with foreign aid – Sweden's as well as overall aid, actual and potential.

5. Present and discuss various salient/important features of Sweden's development co-operation with Swaziland. One example of such a salient feature is the multi-bilateral form of co-operation which Sweden has relied upon almost entirely in Swaziland. What is the usefulness and effectiveness of this type of development co-operation? Has it been conducive to attaining Sweden's developmental and other goals in Swaziland? Or are there other forms of co-operation which might have been more conducive to attaining those goals?

6. Discuss/analyse the issue of ending a development co-operation relationship. What is the best (in the sense of being conducive to attaining Sweden's goals as stated above) method or process of how Sweden could or should phase out this co-

operation? Are there any important lessons to be learnt in this respect from Sweden's co-operation with Cuba, Tunisia, Chile or Portugal which are the other developing countries where Sweden has previously ended its development co-operation?

7. Discuss the possibility of future contacts/co-operation between Sweden and Swaziland in the light of the experiences gained from the 20 years that development co-operation has been going on. Is there a need/desirability for a new type of co-operation?

An Evaluation Mission consisting of three persons will visit Swaziland for 2-3 weeks in October. The Mission consists of one representative from SIDA's Evaluation Group and two hired external consultants. The terms of reference and the tasks assigned to the consultants are described in a separate document.

APPENDIX 2

Project summary

SEK MILLION, CURRENT PRICES

SECTOR/PROJECT	PERIOD	TOTAL SIDA FINANCING*	BILATERAL PART**	ADMINISTERED BY
EDUCATION				
Matsapa Highschool	71/72—76/77	13.2	—	UNESCO
Primary Schools	76/77—83/84	16.3	6.0	UNESCO
Curriculum Development	77/78—81/82	8.2	—	UNESCO
Educational Planning	83/84—87/88	11.5	0.8	UNESCO
AGRICULTURE				
Faculty of Agriculture	73/74—84/85	24.1	4.2	FAO
Co-operative Centre	74/75—81/82	9.3	3.4	ILO
INDUSTRY				
Small Scale Industry	74/75—85/86	11.5	11.5	SIDA(FIDE)
Road Project	82/83—86/87	23.7***	—	ADB
ADMINISTRATION				
OPAS Programme	69/70—83/84	10.6	—	UNDP

* Figures refer to amounts disbursed up until June 30 1985 except for the projects "Educational Planning", "Small Scale Industry", "Road Project" and "Emergency aid" where figures refer to amounts agreed upon.

** Part of the SIDA financing that has not been channeled through multilateral organizations.

*** Of which 11.8 MSEK from regional allocation.

SECTOR/PROJECT	PERIOD	TOTAL SIDA FINANCING	BILATERAL PART	ADMINISTERED BY
OTHER				
Older Highschools	64/65—70/71	1.0	1.0	SIDA
NGO's	64/65—84/85	10.7	10.7	
REGIONAL				
Fertilizer Project	1968—1972	2.0		
Rail Electrification	81/82—84/85	3.5		
Teachers Education	82/83—84/85	0.6		
EMERGENCY AID				
—	agreed 1984	1.0		
TOTAL		147.2	37.6	

APPENDIX 3

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APPENDIX 4

Persons met

Joseph Ayton	Chairman, Chamber of Commerce. On board of Governors Waterford School
Lee Bruntvig	Political/Economic Officer US Embassy
T Barry	Chief Technical Adviser, Ministry of Works (Road Project)
Neal Cohen	USAID, Economist
P Crouchkamp	Manager, Peak Industries
E M Dlamini	Educational Planner, Ministry of Education
Mr Dlamini	Headmaster, Emkhuzweni Primary School
Professor Dr John Fischer	Chief Adviser to the Minister of Agriculture
Uffe Hansen	Director of Lutheran World Service, Swaziland
R B S Hadzebe	Resettlement Officer, Ndzevane Settlement

LIST OF PERSONS MET

Jörg Peter Holla	Macroeconomic Adviser, Dept of Economic Planning
Bernhard Hausner	Deputy Representative, UNDP
Harry R Johnson	Deputy Director, USAID
Ms Isabella Bongie Katamzi	Principal Secretary Department of Economic Planning and Statistics
Yngve Kalin	Swedish Pastor. Lutheran Church in Swaziland
Henrik Kolstrup	Programme Officer UNHCR
Beatrice Khoza	Headmistress, Hlokohla Primary School
R.G.T S Leger	Chief Economic Planning Officer Dept of EP & S
Dr A H M Lulseged	UNESCO Advisor, Ministry of Education Chief Technical Advisor, Education Planning & Research Project
Douglas Leffler	Owner, Times of Swaziland
Mr Sanson Langwenya	Production Manager, Hlatikulie Wood Working
Sibongile Gladys Mduli	Head of Research. Central Bank of Swaziland
Jabu Matsebula	Editor, Times of Swaziland
Alan Major	Chief Technical Advisor, SEDCO

Peter V Mamba	Headmaster, Madlenya Primary School
Mr J Mamba	Principal, Mbekelweni Lutheran Primary School
Mr J S Mamba	Educational Planner, Ministry of Education
Dr G T Masina	Dean of Agricultural Faculty, University of Swaziland
Reverend M B Mabuza	Principal, National Curriculum Centre
Dr W Maier	Konrad Adenauer Foundation (advisor CODEC)
Mrs M B Mbelu	Educational Planner, Ministry of Education
Mr N M Maphosa	Manager, BMN Wire Products
Mr A Motsa	Financial Controller, SEDCO
Justice Nsibanelze	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education
Dr Simon Sishayi Nxumalo	Former Minister of Finance and other portfolios. Former Director General of Tibiyo Taka Nywane
Dudu Ndlela	Matron, Malindza Refugee Reception Centre
Mr A D Nkambule	Under Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, Industry & Tourism

LIST OF PERSONS MET

Mr H S Nkambule	Senior Curriculum designer, NCC
Mrs T Nkosi	Programme Officer, UNDP
Martin Reith	British High Commissioner
Vusi Edward Sikhondze	Principal Secretary Department of Economic Planning and Statistics
Tom Scott	EEC Representative
Dr Colin Sentongo	UNESCO Adviser. Ministry of Education Advisor, Educational Planning & Research Project
Tim Simpson	Manager, Standard Bank
Isiah Sigwane	Administrative Manager, Hlatikulu Woodworking project
Willian S A Shongwe	Headmaster, Swazi National High School (Matsapa High School)
Robert Thwala	Under Secretary for Development, Ministry of Agriculture
Peter Thorne	Commercial Farmer

APPENDIX 5

Refugees; Land; Nutrition; Waterford School

REFUGEES

Although Swaziland today, like the other border states, sees itself restricted in accepting ANC refugees, it still has an important role to play as host to refugees both from Mozambique (fleeing both from the MNR and from economic deprivations) and from South Africa.

The government today maintains a Refugee reception centre in Malindla. This centre was originally built for 112 refugees. It contained 793 people when we visited and 44 young men, in reasonable physical condition, had just arrived from Mozambique. It was thought they had come "to dodge the draft" as the Mozambique Government/Army were launching a recruiting drive.

At this time about 200 refugees are arriving each month, almost entirely from Mozambique, although there were a few South Africans. The immediate accommodation problem is to be solved by erecting tents outside the centre, of which there are already 94. Preparations are being made to receive 4 000 refugees. They will receive relief from the UNHCR and charitable organizations and they will have some ground allocated where they can grow vegetables. Their main diet is millie meal porridge on which they survive. A doctor and a dental hygienist visit once a week and there is some nursing care. The matron told us that the refugees' health was surprisingly good. There are classes in English and Siswati, the Swazi language.

We spoke to one South African refugee from Pietermaritzburg. He said that he had fled because the "pressure" (undefined) was too great and he was afraid of being killed, by whom was not clear. He gave the impression of being political. There were nine South Africans in the centre. There was certainly no question of handing them back.

It is policy not to move refugees from Malindza to the main resettlement area at Ndzevane, except for the purpose of uniting families. This means that, unless there

is a miraculous change in Mozambique, which seems unlikely, the population of Malindza will grow indefinitely. As already mentioned it now contains 793 people and preparations are being made to receive a total of 4 000.

Ndzevane settlement

This is more than a refugee camp, it is rather a large resettlement area.

The original concept was to create a self-sufficient agricultural settlement for a group of South African ethnic Swazis, who had to leave their homes in order to retain their cultural identity and avoid being pressurized and physically harassed into being reclassified as Zulus. They were part of a group of dispossessed Swazis, deprived of their rightful citizenship and homeland by the arbitrary introduction of colonial borders in the 19th century. They fled around 1980 to what little remained of their traditional lands within Swaziland but although it was "home" to them it was too small and dry to support them. The Government of Swaziland supplied more land, UNHCR and the Lutheran World Service, LWS, provided implementing personnel and funds. Together under successive tripartite agreements the three partners worked to provide a self-reliant community for these "Swazi refugees".

This arrangement seemed to work well and would have continued to work, albeit with difficulty had it not been for the Mozambican refugees. They started to come in November 1984 and there were 4 500 of them at the time of our visit. We were told that the total number of refugees in the area was 12 000, the Swazis also having increased well above the original concept of 5 000. The settlement covers an area of 6 000 hectares, 1 500 under cotton, the rest grazing and arable farmland. It cannot support 12 000 people, and so the Mozambicans are given rations of millie meal and beans. Some of them keep chickens, grow a few vegetables and work in the cotton fields. The original Swazi settlers much resent the Mozambicans, whose huts occupy some of the scarce land, and are jealous that they receive rations. They create trouble, drive their cattle among the Mozambican huts and there is a danger of violent conflict.

We visited the Mozambican camp and gained the impression that, at least, they were not starving and health conditions could have been worse. But there were three nurses and four nursing assistants for the whole 12 000! These refugees have fled from the war in their country. Some of them could be army deserters or guerilla resistance fighters; there is no way of knowing, but our guess is that most of them are peaceful peasants and other ordinary people caught in the crossfire. One village, for example, had been destroyed by a helicopter gunship, presumably suspected of harbouring MNR guerillas. The survivors had fled to Swaziland. We spoke, through an interpreter, to a Mozambican tinsmith, who appeared to have been a man of some substance in his homeland. His village was burnt by what he

described as "bandidos", presumably but not certainly the MNR. He had fled with six children and his second wife, having left his first behind for no good reason we could discover. One of his daughters had been killed during the attack on his village. He and his family occupy two huts, which he has built himself and he makes simple articles, such as buckets, with primitive tools. It is intended to give him better equipment so that he can operate as the artisan he is.

Nzdevane is close to the South African border. One night shortly before our visit the South Africans turned their searchlights on the settlement. This apparently terrified many of the refugees who fled in all directions and took several hours to return.

We were told that the South Africans know exactly what is going on in the settlement and transit centre. If they 'want' anyone they just come and get him 'unofficially'. There have recently been three abductions.

The situation described in the preceding report can only get worse if nothing is done about it. Fully aware of this the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) has commissioned a Feasibility Study for an irrigation scheme.

Quote from addendum to Feasibility Study:

The Feasibility Study identified a total of 1 660 ha of net irrigable land within the overall area of the Ndzevane Refugee Settlement and the Swazi Nation Land to the North. The areas proposed for development in a modified irrigation scheme have been selected from those areas previously identified.

The Feasibility Study concluded:

There can be little doubt that the arable soils of the study area, despite their limited depth are first class soils for irrigation.

LAND

Food production in Swaziland has good soils, a favourable climate, adequate water supply and human resources. However these resources have not yet been harnessed to provide adequate food and proper diets for all the people, increase productivity and supply the raw materials for agro-industries.

Swaziland agriculture is dualistic. One sector is commercial and comprises Title Deed Land (TDL) managed by private farmers, often expatriates, while some land in this sector is not used to full capacity, production is generally for the market and is concentrated on cash crops and commercial ranching. Yields per hectare and livestock off-take are generally high. Sugar, citrus and pineapple are the most important products and are largely export oriented. Cotton and vegetables are also produced.

The other sector, between 61 and 62 % of the total land area, is Swazi Nation Land (SNL) and is largely subsistence farming. It is characterized by the growing of food crops, especially maize, cattle raising, including small scale dairying, as well as a few cash crops such as cotton, tobacco and vegetables. Productivity and output in this sector are low.

More than 60 % of livestock farming is on SNL under a communal grazing system and annual offtake remains low. There is much overgrazing and the cattle population is too numerous and unproductive. There are over 1 million head of cattle for a total population around 700 000. Whereas Swaziland exports the bulk of its cash crops it is a net importer of food stuffs. As population is increasing at a rate variously estimated between 3.4 % and 3.6 % per annum the Government is seriously concerned about this situation.

Swaziland's agricultural policy from about 1970 to the early 1980s was based on the Rural Development Area Programme. This is similar in concept to the Integrated Rural Development Programmes in other developing countries. The programme encompassed almost 40 different projects. The objective was to resettle Swazi families on homesteads in the SNL and increase the standard of living of the people in the project area. The goal was to cover the SNL with RDAs.

This report is not the place for detailed analysis of the RDAP. In brief it was not a success. It was not cost effective, the administration was weak and the programme did not increase production. It did improve the infrastructure and communications of the country to some extent.

The 1985-86 crop year was a good one. In that season 15 000 additional hectares were put under maize; thus there were 60 000 ha in 1985-85 and 75 000 in 1985-86. Yield per hectare increased by over 10 % from the previous year to a national average of 2.2 tons/hectare from 1.9 tons per hectare. Production in 1985-86 was about 140 000 tons against 110 000 tons in 1984-85. This is commendable, but there will be storage and handling losses estimated at 20 000 to 30 000 tons. Storing and marketing facilities are still inadequate.

NUTRITION

The general conclusions of various nutrition surveys have been that per capita caloric intake is low and adequacy is affected by the season. There is undernutrition and wrong nutrition.

Calcium, vitamin A, riboflavin and niacin are generally the problems.

Children are at greater risk than adults. Stunting of children, largely because of chronic undernutrition, has been identified in 30.2 % of the rural children and 23.0 % of peri-urban children 3-59 months in Swaziland. (National Nutrition Status Survey 1983, p 10.)

Fortunately acute undernutrition has been found in less than one per cent of rural and peri-urban children. The solution to the children's nutrition problem should be within the Government's means to accomplish.

No striking regional pattern has been observed in terms of nutrition – all areas of the nation face similar problems.

However, there is a distinct seasonal pattern. During some periods of the year, when vegetables are out of season fairly serious shortages of critical nutritional elements are a problem.

The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives produced in September 1986 a new concise plan, "The Agricultural Strategy for the Kingdom of Swaziland". This deals with inter alia the areas of extension, storage and marketing. It is sensible, to the point, well intentioned and realistic. It needs a stronger administration however to ensure its effective execution.

WATERFORD SCHOOL

This is one of a series of schools, spread around the world called "United World Colleges", of which the original was Atlantic College in Wales. They are based to some extent on the British public school system but have improved on it in some important respects. The schools are for boys and girls and are international. They aim for the International Baccalauriat. They have something of the British 'Outward Bound' tradition, which encourages adventure and tough outdoor sports, such as rock-climbing, canoeing, exploring etc.

Waterford is beautifully situated high above Mbabane. It is purpose built without frills, but there are excellent facilities for study and sport. There are about 360 students, nearly all boarders, from many nations. The relevance of this school to our report is that it has about 60 South African students from varying backgrounds. Both Bishop Tutu's and Nelson Mandela's children have attended the school, as have the children of other prominent South African nationalist leaders. Oliver Tambo's niece is due to arrive next term. South African exiles, who could send their children to schools in Europe or the States, like Waterford as it gives their children a contact with Africa in preparation for liberation. Waterford is admittedly elitist. It is, however, possible by means of scholarships, of which more are needed, to give places to some underprivileged children. There are a few from Soweto. Two of these were telephoned one day by their respective sisters who told them that the "Comrades" – radical black youths – had threatened to burn down their houses if the Waterford students did not show themselves. This was in connection with a boycott of schools in Soweto. Waterford immediately arranged for the boys to be driven home, where they were able to convince the Comrades that their education

was important for the future of South Africa. They were allowed to return to school and their homes were not burnt down.

Bishop Tutu visited Waterford while we were in Swaziland and made a much appreciated speech.

A member of the mission visited Waterford and spoke with the Headmaster and members of staff. They made an excellent impression. The school is enlightened and progressive and not popular with the South African Government.

A member of the school's Governing Body visited Stockholm on 3 November 1986 to appeal to the Swedish authorities for assistance.

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LOOKING BOTH WAYS

This evaluation report examines among other things Swaziland's dependence on South Africa. The main conclusion is that Swaziland tries to balance between two poles – loyalty to the aims of the SADCC, while showing Pretoria a friendly face and allowing it to use its territory. It is trying to look both ways, but during the eighties South Africa's influence has dominated. In essence Swaziland cannot choose itself to become independent of South Africa.

The evaluation suggests that Swedish aid to Swaziland should continue via multilateral and NGO channels to specific areas.

The evaluation was carried out by a team led by Karlis Goppers, economist from SIDA's Evaluation section, and the two consultants Sir Samuel Falle and Lars Johansson.

Each year about 30 of SIDA's 200 projects are evaluated. A number of these evaluations are published in the Evaluation Series. Copies of the reports can be ordered from SIDA, S-105 25 Stockholm, Sweden.

