

WHAT RELIEF FOR THE HORN?

*SIDA-Supported Emergency Operations
in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Southern Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti*



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Content and organization of this report and how to read it

This report comprises two volumes. The synoptic Volume I comprises a thematic overview, conclusions and recommendations. Volume II comprises the country-focus, and case, studies carried out in the time available.

In Volume I the review team's findings are presented both – as in Chapter 3 – in the form of certain particularities of the SIDA-supported activities reviewed, and – as in Chapters 4 and 5 – more generally, as would be of interest to any donor wishing to support effective relief provision in the Horn (and elsewhere). The recommendations – in Chapter 6 – are similarly open to particular, and general, interpretation. Volume I has come about by joint effort and represents a common and agreed team view, kept within the restrictions of space set, finally compiled and worded perforce mainly by two of us. Of the Annexes to Volume I, Annex B on SIDA's relief policy and programme is based on the (limited) information available to the review team.

The contributions comprising Volume II represent work done by team members individually, as indicated with each contribution, presented here in informally edited manner. It is on the basis of this work that the synoptic analysis in Volume I rests. At the same time, however, in taking a synoptic view, considerable reliance has also been placed on other sources – as indicated in Chapter 1 – including the team members' own experience in the Horn prior to coming together to form the review team.

Finally, how are Volumes I and II to be read? The reader unfamiliar with the pertinent SIDA policy might start with Annex B to Volume I. The reader already familiar with this policy, but not the Horn of Africa as well, might find it best to start with the studies comprising Volume II before looking to Volume I.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACCORD	Agency for Cooperation on Research and Development
ALERT	All Africa Leprosy Research and Training Centre
ARP	Agricultural Rehabilitation Programme
ARRA	Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs
CSA	Central Statistical Authority Central Statistics Office
CRDA	Christian Relief and Development Association
CTIADP	Central Tigray Integrated Development Programme
DAC	Development Aid Committee, OECD
DAY	Development Aid for Youth
DCO	Development Cooperation Office (of SIDA in target countries)
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DLCO	Desert Locust Control Organisation
DPPM	Disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation
EBSN	Employment based safety net
EEC	European Economic Community
EECMY	Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus
EFS	(Swedish NGO)
EFSR	Emergency Food Security Reserve
EH	EriksHelp
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPPG	Emergencies Prevention and Preparedness Group, (UN)
EPRDF	Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front
ERA	Eritrean Relief Association
ERCS	Ethiopian Red Cross Society
ERO	Emergency relief officer (SIDA)
ERP	Emergency Rehabilitation Programme (Ethiopia)
ERRA	Eritrean Relief and Rehabilitation Agency
ESC	Ethiopian Seed Corporation
EU	European Union
EUE	Emergency Unit for Ethiopia
EWC	Early warning capacity

EWS	Early warning system
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FEW	Famine Early Warning System
FFW	Food for work
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH
IAS	International Aid Sweden
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
IHA-UDP	Integrated Holistic Approach – Urban Development Project
INGO	International non-governmental organization
ISS	Institute of Social Studies, The Hague
ISSAS	Institute of Social Studies Advisory Service
LH	Lutheran Aid Sweden
LPI	Life and Peace Institute
LWF-WS	Lutheran World Federation – World Service
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture
MOH	Ministry of Health
MSF	Medecin sans Frontieres
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NPDPPM	National Policy on Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation
OAU	Organization for African Unity
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
OLS	Operation Lifeline Sudan
ORA	Oromo Relief Association
PMU	PMU Interlife
PS	Praktisk Solidaritet
RB	Radda Barnen
REST	Relief Society of Tigray
REWA	Region East and West Africa (SIDA Department)
RRB	Regional Relief Bureau
RRC	Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
SCC	Sudan Council of Churches
SCF-UK	Save the Children UK
SEK	Swedish Kronor (USD 1 approx SEK 7.3)
SEPHA	Special Emergency Appeal for the Horn of Africa (UN)

SIDA	Swedish International Development Authority
SRK(C)	Swedish Red Cross
SPCM	Swedish Philadelphia Church Mission (R)
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SRRA	Sudanese Relief and Rehabilitation Association
TGE	Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TIDE	Tigray Institute of Distance Education
TOR	Terms of Reference / Transport Operation for Refugees
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation Front
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia
WADU	Wolaita Agricultural Development Unit
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WTOE	WFP Transport Operation for Ethiopia



PHOTO: HILDUR NETOCNY/BAZAAR

The funds for emergency relief have increasingly been spent on complex disasters where political issues and insecurity have been driving forces in creating the problems. This photo shows the destroyed Jamama bridge in Somalia. The bridge was an important link for the infrastructure in the whole region.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Context

SIDA has an annual budget of between SEK 1.2 and SEK 1.5 billion (up to 1994) for emergency relief. Of this between 12% and 20% is spent in the Horn of Africa, that is in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti. Increasingly these funds have been spent on emergency relief in response to what are termed "complex" disasters, i.e. where political issues and insecurity have been driving forces in creating the problems. These different types of disaster situations have raised questions concerning the traditional thinking about disasters and the way in which this informs relief.

As a result, in 1994 SIDA decided to commission a series of studies of its relief activities in different regions where political change and insecurity has affected its relief activities. This study of the Horn of Africa is the middle of a series of three studies, the first being in Southern Africa and the last in Cambodia.

The Review Team and Methods

This study of the Horn of Africa was undertaken by a four person Team based at ISSAS, at the Institute of Social Studies in the Hague. They were drawn from France, Britain, Australia and the Netherlands. All had extensive experience of working in the Horn either with NGOs or in various fields of policy analysis.

Preliminary investigations for the study began in June 1994 with analysis of SIDA's records concerning the projects under study. This was followed in late June by an initial team meeting in the Hague before fieldwork commenced in the Horn of Africa in July. This lasted for a period of eighteen person weeks in total, with all countries of the region visited, except for Somalia (but with the self-declared Republic of Somaliland included). Analysis of the field findings extended over many weeks with the first draft report submitted to SIDA for initial feedback in late September and the revised final draft prepared for wider circulation for comment by mid October.

Towards an Evaluation of Relief in the Horn (Chapter 1)

In nature this report is somewhere between an issues-driven programme evaluation and a policy or planning review. The issues considered include the situational circumstances of emergencies, their structural roots, the different channels through which relief support can be provided and aspects of their effectiveness. The focus is on SIDA responses to appeals for emergency support. A policy analysis is made of this programme, as viewed from the Horn.

Relief is not a neutral, solely humanitarian operation. It is at once a socio-cultural, political, economic and technical operation. As a result, acts of humanitarian relief acts have political implications. Therefore, as has been clear in all countries of the Horn, they have a variety of implications and consequences. Some of these are positive and effective as desired. Others are negative and untoward.

The encompassing strategy of relief policy 'this time' ought to be that 'next time' relief could be reduced in scope and scale yet still obtain the same delivery objectives.

Defining 'Relief' and Presenting 'the Horn' (Chapter 2)

In the Horn of Africa many of the emergency situations are complex, in terms of both the perceived causes and the responses required. A major reason for this is the current climate of conflict and insecurity in the region. Up to 15 million people are currently affected (mid 1994).

The processes in the Horn which have created instability and emergency situations are wide ranging. They include the breakdown in traditional management of natural resources which is in part due to state interventions, the pressures of economic decline and structural adjustment and political fragmentation.

Understanding complex emergencies in this region requires cross-cultural contextual thinking about vulnerabilities, local needs, economies and ways of life such pastoralism, politics, ethnicity, insecurity and the like.

SIDA-Supported Emergency Relief Operations (Chapter 3)

Patterns of Expenditure: Ethiopia is the dominant recipient of emergency relief in the last three years (1991/92-1993/94) receiving 39% of the regional total. Eritrea is second (25%), while Somalia received 21% and Sudan 15%. Eritrea has been receiving a growing share since Independence in 1991, and in 1993/94 received the largest share (32%).

Categories of Problems Addressed: The category "refugees war and conflict" dominates (48%) the problems addressed by SIDA relief funds, especially in the Sudan and Somalia. Reconstruction and rehabilitation, which is most important in Eritrea and, to a lesser extent, in Ethiopia, is second (24%), followed by drought (20%).

Types of Activities Supported: Logistics (22%) and food distribution (22%) are the major project activities supported, followed by general relief activities (16%). Rehabilitation of ex-soldiers, returnees and farmers is the next most important activity (13%), ahead of health and water provision (7%).

Channels and Partners: NGOs account for around half of the funds obtained from SIDA and are also involved with implementation using a similar share. The multilateral channel is the next most important in term of value of successful applications for relief funds. The bilateral channel is the second most important in terms of implementation. Swedish NGOs account for most of the NGO applications for funds, but indigenous NGOs implement 24% of the total funds spent and almost half of the funds implemented through NGOs.

Appropriateness: There was no evidence of strikingly inappropriate relief assistance provided with SIDA funds. In general it appears that SIDA relief aid is appropriately chosen. However this is the result of actions by SIDA's partners rather than SIDA, making the choice of partners critical.

Timeliness: SIDA does respond quickly to most requests, and is appreciably / noticeably quicker than the average for the donor community. While response times could be improved further by certain levels of funding being available in the DCOs and Embassies this could expose them to excessive local political pressures.

Flexibility of Funding: SIDA is recognised as being a donor which appreciates the need for flexibility with funds. It also has a belief in the ability of field partners to make appropriate decisions about the best use of funds. However, the implications of flexibility might be reviewed in the light of the way unearmarked funds to UN agencies often become tied up soon after they are received and so are unavailable for later crises.

Coverage and Gender: Despite targeting, coverage is unsatisfactory in terms of certain vulnerable categories in certain circumstances for example as regards gender, children, aged and internally displaced populations.

Natural Environment: Normally environmental impact analysis is missing from relief intervention strategy. This could have disastrous effects in some circumstances.

Effectiveness: Even in the conditions of extreme insecurity as in the Horn, emergency relief aid saves lives. Therefore both risks (of poorer performance) and benefits (from better performance) attend radical reform of relief interventions in times of acute need.

Innovation: SIDA is well respected as a donor which is prepared to try new approaches to solving problems where other donors are more reticent. However, this seems mainly to occur through bilateral aid activities and not through its funding of NGOs and UN agencies where, with the absence of any conditions on the relief aid, it is "business as usual".

The Worst Bottlenecks: Despite the extraordinarily difficult circumstances on the ground, delivery problems in the emergency areas are not the severest

constraints for relief support's effectiveness. Rather these lie with lack of comprehensive and back-up policy, strategy and dialogue.

Unintended Consequences: In complex emergencies relief aid may be used in ways which prolong, not end, conflict and distress. Relief aid may create problems of economic inequality that were not in the local area before, and distort markets. Therefore care should be taken in considering the wider impact of relief measures.

Monitoring, Evaluating, Reporting and Planning: While SIDA does require reporting on all relief funds and has a format prepared for this, this tends to be only of a narrative and accounting type. Most importantly there is little in the way of a feedback process through reporting about better ways to approach relief and the lessons learned which could be shared among SIDA's partners and built into SIDA's own institutional memory, decision-making and advisory process. Partners must be encouraged to see the advantages of critical and analytical reporting, and SIDA to take a more evaluative and proactive stance.

Synopsis: Overall it is clear that SIDA funded relief assistance is seen in the Horn to be user-friendly, and effective at saving lives. However, this assistance does less to rehabilitate these people and virtually nothing to address the structural roots of the problems. To be blunt, however, the perceived success at the situational and immediate level, may owe as much to luck as judgement given the low emphasis on proactive choice. More is made to hang on bases of trust and confidence than monitoring and evaluation.

Congruity of Practice and Principle: SIDA's policy aims for emergency relief support may be broad but explicit guidelines, as to how to achieve, for example, links between relief and development, are lacking. Provided SIDA is prepared to make some commitment to a dialogue with partners, broad levels of tying with flexibility over re-allocation would be strategic.

Global Issues for Relief (Chapter 4)

Issues which need to be considered if relief is to be of maximum effectiveness include:

Problem Identification: Identifying and responding to the roots of the problem would allow relief agencies to provide more than just symptomatic relief and begin to get ahead of the immediate problems. In this way a long term contribution to reducing the occurrence of some emergency situations might be achieved.

Food Security: Poverty and structural food deficits, whether of total production or local availability, make emergencies worse than they need be.

Needs Assessment: To avoid "the numbers game", assessment procedures must be agreed by recipient and donors, using headcounts and employing neutral observers where distortion can occur.

Logistics etc: Different options for procurement, storage, delivery and distribution should be considered in all circumstances, including local sources and capacities, e.g. local purchase of grain.

Participation, Local Capacity and Institutions: Sustainable capacity to address emergency situations depends on local capacity and institutions. In particular, donors should consider the generally unused private sectors resources and their potential for contributing to relief activities.

Peace Making, Peace Keeping and Humanitarian Intervention: Disaster prevention would be strengthened by peace keeping, conflict resolution and peace making). However, very few funds are put into such activities from relief sources.

Migration and Refugees: Relief assistance that helps maintain people at their homes as much as possible is best. This requires advanced early warning.

Returnees and Internally Displaced People: Internally displaced people are a major but somewhat neglected group. Female headed households are especially neglected. Considerable pressures can be placed upon communities receiving returnees. Policies to support returnee-affected, as well as refugee-affected, communities are not well developed.

Management of Relief: Cross-mandate type approaches view relief in a broader context. Given the poverty of the communities in the region, refugees and other victims of disaster situations should not be distinguished from the poor unaffected communities. Over-attention and over-aid need to be addressed by strengthening local institutions, such as Relief and Rehabilitation Commissions which control external agencies.

Militarization of Relief Aid: The disadvantages as well as the benefits of increasingly militarised aid need to be investigated as this may increase rather than decrease tension.

Policy Dialogue and Coordination: Overall coordination of relief activities should be under the control of the national government and its coalitions, or the local government or civil group in control of any area. Donors and their partners should support this coordination, not compete or conflict with it. Obviously where there appears to be no authority to coordinate with, humanitarian and other aid is faced with very difficult options indeed. One of these must be for such aid organizations to take responsibility for plainly an operational role.

Towards a Comprehensive Relief Policy (Chapter 5)

Application procedures: In view of the experience (not with SIDA) of major delays at the application stage in the relief process, specific attention should be given to helping governments and agencies make their applications to donors in ways which facilitate donor decisions.

Early Warning Capacity (EWC): Early Warning Capacity (EWC) needs to be strengthened within government institutions in the region and more advanced warning sought through socio-economic studies and vulnerability assessments. Conflict EWC needs to be developed. Together these measures should facilitate longer-term planning approaches to emergency relief.




PHOTO: HELDUR NETOCNY/BAZAR

Emergency transport in Panyagor near Kongor in Southern Sudan. A child collects grains of corn from a leaking sack.

INTRODUCTION: TOWARD EVALUATION OF RELIEF IN THE HORN

In this chapter the background to the assignment is given and the approach taken by the review team described. Finally some remarks on the team's field experience in the Horn are given drawing attention to what proved to be the issues which could be evaluated.

A. BACKGROUND TO THE ASSIGNMENT

The purpose of this report is to evaluate and review selected aspects of SIDA-supported emergency relief aid in the Horn over the past four to five years. The aim is to look forward, be constructive, and draw lessons of experience for future occasions.

According to our information, it is not anticipated by any party that there will be a decrease in appeals for such aid. On the contrary, there are signs that some increase is expected both absolutely and relatively as regards other types of aid.

Despite SIDA's long involvement in relief there has been seemingly little formalisation of policy. Recently, a brief strategy statement has been produced providing a more formal statement (SIDA, 1993a). From this and other sources consulted (See Annex B) a number of major policy orientations may be identified. These provide criteria against which SIDA's support to emergency relief activities in the Horn can be reviewed.

Besides the emphases on saving lives and mitigating human suffering the major policy orientations given in the brief strategy statement include:

- linking of relief to long-term preventive operations,
- supporting countries in developing their own disaster prevention and preparedness measures,
- linking of disaster preparedness to long-term development, with joint funding from development and relief funds.

In addition, the strategy statement includes operational policies which emphasise:

- rapid decisions, flexibility, strategic planning, evaluations and follow-up;
- use of a wide range of channels – bilateral, multilateral and NGOs, including

local and international NGOs as well as Swedish ones,

- overall emphasis on UN agencies and NGOs;
- selection of channels and partners on a number of criteria, notably their ability to reach the target population;
- strengthening of local partner agencies;
- development of regular discussions about disaster relief in countries which repeatedly suffer long term emergency situations, and
- coordination of relief assistance with regular bilateral development aid, to which it should be seen as a supplement.

B. Toward a programme review: the approach of this report

Three of the most important sets of issues and processes in emergency relief aid, are:

- (a) needs identification/assessment as carried out in the countries afflicted and the subsequent formulation of appeals which are also prepared in these countries;
- (b) needs identification/assessment as done in the donor country, whether somewhat independently of the processes in the recipient country or in direct response to them; (this may also be undertaken at intermediate levels – such as the LRCS in Geneva where appeals by member societies are received, strengthened and transmitted); and
- (c) the provision of support however determined and designed that – hopefully – reaches the afflicted people in the distressed areas before it is too late, and the effects which this has.

The review team, having been verbally instructed in Stockholm to address only (a) and (c) in the above short list of crucial issues, confined its work to the Horn (apart from some briefing and final reporting in Stockholm and a visit by two members to DHA and other UN bodies in Geneva). Accordingly this report builds on such case materials as could be established and assessed for selected SIDA-supported (ie partially SIDA-funded) interventions in the name of emergency relief aid in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and the Sudan. This was further analyzed by drawing on a wider range of sources within the experience of the Team members.

The result is a report which lies somewhere between, on the one hand, a policy or planning review and, on the other, a programme evaluation. It strives nonetheless to take a systematic view of the whole process and field of relief aid in the Horn. However, neither the word 'programme' nor (as we have seen) 'policy' should be overdetermined in meaning. What is reviewed in this report is not a unified and coordinated set of activities and interventions, and not a policy that goes clearly

beyond general guidelines into readily identifiable general principles and priorities.

Turning now to some of the specifics important for the present review, much turns on the single fact that SIDA-supported emergency relief in the Horn is very diverse in terms of the range of activities supported. For instance, it is by no means confined to food and associated aid for famine relief, because various aspects of rehabilitation (and repatriation/ replacement and re-integration) are included. The implication of this great diversity of SIDA support for this (and any similar) review, is double-edged: a systematic approach is particularly desirable for an overall assessment, but at the same time such is especially difficult to achieve.

On top of this there is the severe constraint presented by the fact that there is little available monitoring and evaluation data on individual projects for the review team to assess. This means that in the time available it was not possible for the team to do more than gain some preliminary analyses of individual projects, on the basis of interviews and some visits. In addition, the diversity, with no two projects the same, meant that there was no very practicable way in which the multiplicity of initiatives could be sampled with any statistical significance.

In these circumstances, which involved only four weeks of visiting and interviewing in the Horn as intensively as possible where access allowed, the 'wider sources' on which this report partly depends proved to be of crucial importance. These include the team members' own experience over the years in and of the Horn and elsewhere (including Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania). Comparatively little of this experience may have been focused on SIDA-supported projects before the present assignment. However, these projects are not exclusively unique despite certain specificities.

Socio-cultural and political-economic research on the Horn of Africa is exceptionally rich and deeply policy-oriented. Among other things, this research helps to establish exactly what, in terms of problem identification, a relief review must analyse. For instance, very much turns on the extent to which famine is, and locally is seen to be, normal more than aberrant, repeatedly occurring in marginal natural environments. The nature of poverty and emergencies are other major considerations.

At the same time, this research makes it clear that what are presented as 'symptoms' or effects are not only symptoms. They are also among the causes of continued emergencies. For instance political and military conflicts – which are themselves of various kinds – and less violent but nonetheless severe battles for policy mastery, have historical and contemporary institutional etiologies of their own as power plays. Clear links of these there may be with environments, material resources, cultures, ethnicities, population densities and economic inequalities. But the exact nature of such linkage is to be ascertained. Where human behaviour is concerned, such linkages are not necessarily causal, if strong. Similarly, 'roots' and 'effects' are not entirely transparent categories either.

It follows that overall the bitter consequences of conflict, degradation, and relief intervention, such as severe debilities, deaths, displacements, migrations and refugees are only part (the 'situational' or symptomatic part) of the broader ('structural') picture. They are overt signs only, not root causes or conditions. However it is only these situational 'targets' which find ready media coverage, tug heartstrings, trigger public contributions, determine donor's attitudes and the behaviour and the relief actions which they take. The structural dimensions rarely command public visibility, appeal and urgency.

This report is based on an extensive travel and visit schedule in the Horn of Africa (including exploratory meetings and a briefing in Stockholm (see Annexes C + D). Nevertheless, time was limited for both the period for travel and observation as was that for analysis of findings and writing-up. Often it was difficult to 'trace' SIDA's funding contributions, project information was only poorly available, the presence of SIDA relief staff on the ground was very little, in Somalia and Southern Sudan there was much too extreme insecurity (no security in Mogadishu so UNOSOM ruled out any visit there), and the heavy rains in highland Ethiopia and Eritrea made some of the planned field visits impossible.

C. The review team's field experience: evaluable issues for this report

Any field inquiry-based programme review or policy or project evaluation must carefully re-interpret its terms of reference as it proceeds, in the light of what it finds to be practically possible to do with sufficient confidence to come to bottom-line judgements. *For the present study, what proved to be evaluable is the general pattern of SIDA response and support, rather than the performance details of particular projects. In particular, specific attention was given to the characteristics of the different partners, the contexts within which SIDA's relief support operates and in-country SIDA Emergency-Officer responsibilities.*

What is not evaluable in a report of the present type includes, for example, local practices of needs assessment and targeting, individual project performance, and the cost-efficiency of SIDA funding contributions to particular agencies or projects. Also, especially for evaluative assessments of relief interventions, severe limits are faced in terms of effectiveness-, and impact-, analysis. A good base-line knowledge about the situation before intervention is a prerequisite not only for an appropriate intervention, but also for measuring its results. However, most areas where relief is needed are remote and, in poor countries, there is a shortage of resources and trained manpower to collect reliable data on the socio-economic and environmental condition of the affected populations.

In addition, assessments are only transitory as the hard work and valuable resources of relief interventions are easily wasted in the war situations, as for instance between different Somali factions. There is also the difficulty of creating

sustainable interventions in societies ill-prepared to procure their basic food needs at the best of times, let alone attend to social services such as health, education and administrative capacity building.

Thus for various reasons relief is less often monitored and evaluated than, in some cases, development. Worse, often relief is not considered to be a serious candidate for monitoring or evaluation given that, in times of catastrophes, one does what one can to save lives, does not expect to have as much success as one would hope for, and has one's hands full with absolutely urgent matters. While understanding of such a posture, however, this review team does not share it. Among other things it is mindful of the huge scale of funding involved, and the need for accountability in this regard. Nevertheless undoubtedly there are a number of technical difficulties of data and method (see Annex C).

DEFINING 'RELIEF' AND PRESENTING 'THE HORN'

In this chapter, emergency relief aid is introduced and the Horn of Africa, as a focus for relief, is described. Finally there are a few remarks towards understanding complex emergencies.

A. Emergency relief aid

'Relief' is understood in this report, as a 'process' rather than an 'event'. This is based on the essential concept that relief aid comprises a diverse field of activities, not just a single operation or type of operation. These take place over a long period of time.

Relief operations comprise those activities handled during disasters by local, national, donor and international organizations, as well as by communities, households and individuals.

Typically, the emergencies that call for relief operations at present in the Horn (to which for example Rwanda could be added) have come to be termed "complex emergencies". "Complex" in this context refers as much to the complexity of response required as to that of the causes. But these two aspects are interrelated. These disasters, because they are due to a volatile mixture of environmental, demographic, political, cultural, military, development policy and other causes, call for a broad spectrum of responses within a strategy.

It follows that what is to be considered in this review is a wide range of linked yet various issues and options. These include:

- the roots of the problem(s),
- early warning capacity,
- disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation,
- emergency relief, and
- normalisation and rehabilitation (including repatriation or replacement and re-integration as well as educational and social institutional capacity building).

To this list must be added, given recent experience in the region, peace-making, peace-keeping and humanitarian intervention. *Therefore relief policy should*

be determined by thinking simultaneously about a number of inter-related issues, recognising integrities but also appreciating interlinkages.

It is salutary to remember that, however successful an intervention may be *this* time, inevitably there will be a *next* time. The encompassing aim of relief policy (along with rehabilitation) ought to be to ensure that, next time, relief could be lesser in scope and scale yet still able to attain the same delivery objectives.

In order to improve the quality of relief it is important that it is possible to identify both 'situational' and 'structural' causes and effects, and issues and options. The 'situational' features of emergencies include what elsewhere in this report are called the 'symptoms' presented for remedy. Obviously, these require immediate and urgent action *this* time. Similarly, however, the 'structural' features such as 'root causes', also require to be addressed *this* time, but also over a longer time period. Otherwise, next time, the emergency is likely to be worse, or at best not very different.

For example, there are situational and structural types of food shortage or deficit. Both kinds occur simultaneously, the former heightened by vulnerabilities tracing to the latter, the latter made more acute by vulnerabilities tracing to the former. As a result, simultaneous consideration of two different types of causes, situational and structural, is necessary. Each has its own theory (eg as to which groups are the most vulnerable groups). Each has its own policy (eg as to types and conditions of support that are strategic). Once again there is considerable complexity to cope with and a need to operate strategically on different fronts at the same time.

What is to be envisaged as regards these different fronts is a parallel, rather than an integrated, approach. The limited results of 'integrated approaches to rural development' in African (and Asian) agriculture, as they have been conceptualised and practised, are only all too familiar and argue in favour of a parallel, rather than integrated, approach.

It is also necessary to remember another fundamental. The intervention known as 'aid', whether for 'relief' or 'development', is at once a socio-cultural, political, economic and technical operation. Review and evaluation ought to consider these multiple aspects. For instance, 'needs assessment' is not just a matter of technical options and choices alone. It is also an exercise in socio-cultural analysis and construction, and an act with estimable economic, environmental, and political, consequences.

The same is true for all the other elements in the relief process including for example: decision-taking as to types and modes of support required, logistics, channels, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, participation, monitoring and evaluation, and policy and planning review.

That humanitarian aid has more than humanitarian characteristics and consequences, and is therefore to be reviewed accordingly, is very much in evidence in the Horn. For instance virtually everyone with whom the review team discussed the matter tended to think that humanitarian intervention in Somalia had saved lives,

certainly, but at the same time has more intensified, than resolved, the emergency situations there. Also it has failed to create a 'secure environment' or any semblance of political stability for humanitarian operations or address the structural causes of the emergency situations. *Overall it may be concluded that often emergency relief solves some problems but also creates new ones.*

Emergency food aid operations in Southern Sudan are similar. They are widely seen as having resulted thus far in prolonging, rather than remedying, the root problems of the present emergency. In contrast cross-border relief, along with other support, helped solve the Northern Ethiopian/Eritrean problems. However, it may be that in Tigray restrained external aid levels may indeed have stimulated the local population – actively assisted by the liberation movements – to seek more indigenous, therefore more appropriate and durable solutions.

Other ironies of humanitarian intervention that came to the review team's attention include the way in which emergency relief overwhelms, rather than supplements, self-aid efforts (be these community-based or commerce-based), and creates dependency rather than helping toward self-reliance.

Emergency relief aid's characterising rationale is altruistic and humanitarian. However, while the urgent end of saving human lives would be widely considered, in operational and situational terms, to justify having recourse to emergency means, humanitarian intervention is also a form of social, economic, environmental and political action. Therefore it is not 'neutral', even where it succeeds in being 'impartial'. It has social, economic, environmental and political costs and consequences, benefits and drawbacks, as well as humanitarian ones.

It is all the above sorts of concerns which come together in the concept 'complex emergency' as used by international and other agencies and donors. Complex emergencies are typically those which arise in conditions of civil war and cross-border strife and in environments characterised by economic and natural degradation and, often, population pressure.

The key point to note from this discussion is that emergency relief requires careful contextual thinking if appropriate decisions are to be made. This cannot be achieved unless the conceptual framework for that thinking has been thoroughly explored and the characteristics and implications of emergency relief thoroughly understood.

B. The Horn of Africa: a focus for relief

Of all regions in Africa, the African Sahel in general, and the Horn of Africa in particular, has come to claim the principal attention for relief aid in the last two decades. The countries concerned – those addressed by the present review – are: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and in particular the South, and Djibouti. Of these countries, in particular Ethiopia (and its formerly northern area which is now Eritrea) has for over forty years been a focus for Swedish aid, of various types and going to various sectors. There has also been for a long time a significant Swedish presence in Somalia.

The majority of the peoples of the Horn (65-85 percent) are engaged in agricultural and livestock production (Table 2.1.) The pastoral sector provides between 25 and 40 percent of the protein intake in the Horn of Africa. These two modes of livelihood are further divided into sedentary cultivation, fishing, hunting and gathering, pastoralism (transhumant and agro-pastoralism) and other forms of urban farming and urban-based pastoralism.

Agricultural (both crop and animal) production in the countries of the Horn is divided into traditional and modern sectors. A development policy preference for the modern sector is common, with a clear cash crop bias in national and foreign aid-sponsorship. On the other hand, the traditional sector, where the majority of the population subsist, and most food crops are produced, is rather neglected. This is reflected in the lack of food security policies (national or regional), a situation which has helped create the present situation of continuous chronic food shortages and famines.

Pastoralism, which is practised by about 15 percent of the population of the Horn (60 percent of the Somalis and 25 percent of the Djiboutians), is particularly neglected. Pastoralists are marginalized both politically and economically. Policy makers and administrators are often frustrated by pastoralists' movements from dry to wet season pastures, as determined by seasonal climatic variations. Invariably ill-suited settlement schemes have been designed which sometimes lie close to the borders of other states in Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and Somalia in attempts to restrict pastoral movement and bring pastoralists under the state control. Such policies have harmed rather than benefited pastoralists since settlement means putting more pressure on the immediately surrounding fragile cultivable and pasture lands and the breakdown of an established social and economic subsistence system.

The war of will between pastoralists and the states of the Horn has resulted in many pastoralist-lead liberation movements in Somalia, Sudan (Dinka, Nuer etc), Djibouti (Afar) and Ethiopia (Somali, Afar and Oromo). Political instability in the major pastoral areas of the Horn has been combined with a subsistence crisis resulting from unfavourable terms of trade (livestock-grain terms of trade), drought and epidemics.

Famine is a symptom of vulnerability within given socio-economic, political and environmental conditions which results in hunger and mass starvation. Vulnerability famine situations take the form of a significant number of people suffering acute - which at the same time is also chronic - food shortage and disruption of their livelihoods in such a way that recovery is unlikely without external assistance. Famine, war, political instability and natural and man-made environmental disasters are some of glaring causes of vulnerability. If however, agencies want to deliver relief aid to 'the most vulnerable groups', 'vulnerability' needs to be more fully understood so that these groups can be exactly defined.

The post-independence history of the Horn has been one of civil wars between the states and liberation fronts of different ethnic and ideological orientations. The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia continued for almost thirty years (1961-1991). Other rebel groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front still claim some grievances against the EPRDF-led Transitional Government of Ethiopia. The civil war in the Sudan continued for over twenty five years (1955-1972 and 1983 -) with a short lull following the 1992 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement. Civil strife in Somalia continued following the Somali-Ethiopian war (1977 -1978) and gave way to the Somali civil war. This continues, albeit with different degrees of intensity, from 1981 to-date. The civil war between the Afar and the central Government in Djibouti which began in 1976 is still raging. Wars in the Horn have claimed millions of lives. Death, disablement, the destruction of peoples' sources of livelihood, displacement and the creation of refugees are amongst the most harrowing consequences of war. The Horn of Africa has suffered and endured all of these.

Table 2.1: Population (millions) and area (thousand sq km) of the countries of the Horn, 1993

	Popul- ation)	Urban (%)	Pastoral (%)	Area Sq. Km	Crops and animals cont. to GDP (%)
Djibouti	0.540	81.0	25.0	23.20	08
Eritrea	3.547	24.0	30.0	117.60	65
Ethiopia	53.383	13.0	8.0	905.45	40
Somalia	7.712	36.0	60.0	630.00	66
Sudan	25.200	22.0	14.0	2505.80	36
Total	90.382			4181.865	

Source: (1) Africa South of the Sahara, 1994, Europa Publications, London.
(2) Economist Intelligence Reports, various issues 1990-1994, London.
(3) Times Atlas of the World (Second Edition), 1993, Harper Collins, London.

Drought and famine plague an already politically unstable sub-region and together have increased peoples' vulnerability even further. Images of starving millions have visited millions of households through TV screens and charity organizations which appeal for help in cash and in kind. The recent history is one of a shorter cycle of droughts followed by severe famines (1972/1975, 1983/1985, 1988/1990, 1991/1993). These famines have been experienced in different parts of every country in the Horn if not whole countries and the whole sub-region.

In addition to war, famines have added more displaced peoples, some internally and some across the borders with neighbouring countries. These calamities have created a large pool of vulnerable people whose only means of survival currently

Table 2.2: Refugees, displaced peoples and famine victims in the Horn, 1993/94 (thousands).

Country	Refugees	Displaced	Drought Affected	Total	% of total popul.
Djibouti	58	—	100	158	29.25
Eritrea	—	—	1,500	1,500	42.28
Ethiopia	162	—	6,700	6,862	12.85
Somalia	50	350	10	410	5.31
Sudan	470	3,000	1,300	4,770	18.92
Total	740	3,350	9,600	13,700	15.15

Source: (1) Africa South of the Sahara, 1994, Europa Publications, London.

(2) SEPHA, 1992-1993, Special Emergency Programme for the Horn of Africa, UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs.

(3) It should be noted that refugees, displaced peoples and famine victims are overlapping categories in many cases.

is relief food and international charity. A picture of misery, destitution and helplessness is summarized in Table 2.2 which shows the number and classification of displaced peoples according to refugees, internally displaced and drought victims.

Peoples' traditional coping mechanisms (such as group ties, use of alternative food sources such as wild plants, hunting and gathering) are no longer capable of delivering them from chronic food shortages. A socio-economic baseline study of households, undertaken by REST in Tigray, gives the following indications of survival strategies at the household level (which of course may vary over time, and more than one of strategy may be chosen by a particular household):

Table 2.3: Survival strategies, household level, to fill the gap of food deficits

hire out labour	40.5%	selling local beer	0.9%
borrow grain	38.3%	petty trade	2.3%
borrow cash	25.8%	handicraft	1.5%
sell livestock	20.6%	begging	0.9%
sell other property	0.6%	migration	1.5%
relief aid	24.8%	assistance from rels.	1.5%
sales of trees	1.9%	other	11.0%

Source: Socio-economic baseline study of households in Central Tigray, REST Research Unit, July 1994.

The present economic order is one in which the producers of raw materials have constantly lost out to the dominant economic systems. The fight for survival is also a fight against external pressures exerted on poor peoples by ill-conceived national agricultural policies (crop production-biased), international financing institutions (World Bank/IMF Structural Adjustment Policies) and rich and powerful regional economic blocs (Common Agricultural Policies and highly subsidized EEC farmers). Large numbers of pastoralists and arable cultivators have been relegated to poverty and destitution.

Unlike the past, when arable cultivators could store some of their grain surplus to cope with periodic food shortages, peasants today have developed new consumption patterns which could not possibly be satisfied within the range of prices which they get from their production. During drought, pastoralists are forced by market mechanisms and the social forces which control the market to sell more animals in return for far less grain than in the past. *This is a process which contributes to decapitalization and forces many pastoralists out of pastoral production altogether.* Flight to relief food centres and abandoning the local community are among the last options that they resort to.

Thus there are many reasons why the Horn is currently such an important area for relief and rehabilitation aid. The number of people at risk is enormous, variously estimated at between 13.7 and 15 million in 1993/94. Poverty is extensive, deep and 'the norm', not exceptional and untoward. For years there has been war, civil strife, violent conflict and breakdown in traditional management of natural resources which in part is due to state intervention for reasons of government not development.

Throughout African history, war has been ultimately associated with famine and poverty, which in turn are influenced by political and economic structures along with poor environmental management and degradation. This association is, therefore, nothing new. However it has only relatively recently been brought firmly into theory and policy with regard to famine. That famine has more to do with deficient food distribution and access (related to purchasing power and/or distance as well as socio-political factors), than total production in a country (or even the famine-affected part of a country) has also long been known for Africa, and especially the Horn.

C. Understanding complex emergencies

As discussed in Section 2A, the problems for which relief aid is seen to be the solution in the Horn (and Rwanda) are typically known as 'complex emergencies'. What is meant by this expression is a concatenation where boundaries between one and another cause and condition of the distress are unclear. The interwoven strands prominently include political and military dimensions. None of the causal influences show clearly linear or even cyclical trends to facilitate analysis and understanding of the situations. Further, the intervention required is seen to be

particularly multiple in nature, and complex. A donor or agency finds it elusive to decide what exactly the problems are, and what to do about them, especially if its mandate and discourse excludes the political and the military. Thus humanitarian intelligence and action by no means has the field to itself.

As if this did not present enough of a problem, this complexity of situational and structural dimensions is compounded where donors seek to act for the benefit of not their own but other countries and cultures. Here there is a double challenge as to the knowledge and understanding required. This comes on top of all the usual issues for donors as regards their own priorities and institutional capacity to respond creatively to appeals, with choices of the channels and types of support preferred, the methods of monitoring and evaluation to be used, and so forth.

To take the matter of the type of emergency in question first, a principal path to better understanding is to ask what has been most important in determining any classification of emergencies. For instance, what is the dominant thinking about the typologies of emergencies, their causes, the consequences of the emergency situation and the type of intervention available? *Too much emphasis has been placed on thinking about the types of intervention with insufficient attention given to problem identification and the causes of emergencies.*

Of all the classifications in the standard literature of types of emergencies - such as slow and sudden onset, natural and human-made, simple and complex, etc - it is necessary to ask whether, deliberately or otherwise, they are the result of thinking driven more by the responses which are seen to be (currently and conventionally) possible, rather than by analysis of the problem. Classifications need to take into consideration the target populations' views, as well as agency perspectives. Attention must be paid also to structural, as well as situational, causes of vulnerabilities.

The matter of cultures is scarcely less multi-faceted and confused where labelling tells us more about the labeller than the labelled. On the one hand there are issues of 'donor culture' and 'relief culture' each with its own canons about 'the other' and what 'is wrong' about it and 'must be put right'. On the other hand there are the rather less specific notions of 'the other' (i.e. the recipients) and its imponderabilities which 'westerners' and other 'outsiders' at large - not donors and relief organizations only - bring to their attempts to understand African affairs, including complex emergencies in the Horn.

Donor and relief agencies tend to see emergencies as events not processes. That is, they do not address disaster situations in their long-term structural contexts. Not least for its own pragmatic reasons, what the donor or agency considers is mainly the dramatic and immediate action required of it in the form of spending its resources and delivering relief support right now. This encourages thinking which sees problems as situationally isolated, in other words as aberrant events. Only delimited (or delimitable) target populations are seen as 'the problem'. 'The solution' therefore is plain and is focused. It is that there are victims who by whatever means must be rescued.

This targeting of relief support on isolated tragic moments leads to a relative neglect of structures and trends. Better understanding of emergency situations comes from recognising this and making allowance accordingly. It is partly with this in mind that this report urges parallel, not integrated, approaches to relief and development approaches, with reforms in each. A simultaneously dual strategy is best because disasters, like poverty, will always be with us. *What is required of intervention and support is that the trouble is taken to act as regards the catastrophe this time in a way that will have a forward mitigation effect for the catastrophe next time.* This is realistically all that 'disaster prevention' in the Horn for the foreseeable future can hope to do.

Because an urgent, immediate and event-oriented situational intervention has legitimacy, efforts going into even relief monitoring, let alone relief process evaluation, tends to be considered by the organizations involved as wasted effort. Yet learning from one intervention what might be best for another depends in part on knowing just what happened at the earlier time, from agencies' and beneficiaries' points of view (and those who are also affected for example by being left out). Evaluation often crucially depends on what can be recorded and discussed and analyzed as close to the actual time as possible.

There is a further aspect of the urgency of intervention. It is that NGO's seen as charitable organizations have come to be increasingly relied upon both for need assessment and relief delivery. Here it is necessary to understand, where NGO's do merit this reputation as effective channels for urgent action, and in what areas, and why, this is appropriate. In this circumstance and connection a number of possible reasons have come to light in the course of the present review. One of these is indeed that they are more altruistic and charitable than business and commercial enterprises, where exemplary officers work long hours and make a serious effort to take and identify with views 'from below'. But it would be wrong to take too essentialist a view of NGO's on this single ground alone. Equally, or more importantly may be, for example, their close familiarity with the particular locality concerned, their support of high overheads costs, their limiting of immediate objectives simply to once-off relief delivery by whatever (and however un-participatory) means, and their ability and perhaps preference to act without coordination with other (governmental or non-governmental) organizations.

It must also be asked whether NGO's have any comparative advantages for rapid relief delivery to problem spots because of their status as non-political and non-governmental instruments. While they may be more able to address pockets of emergency need, they are not well suited to addressing the structural causes of emergencies. NGOs may have taken a political views of problems and solutions largely for self-survival reasons. This reflects, however, also a philosophy of policy and socio-economic analysis which grows less applicable as regards both general conditions in the Horn and complex emergencies in particular.

Where a political cause or consequence is part of the problem, it must be part of the solution

as well. Notions which are typical in development and relief agencies alike, to the effect that 'politics' do nothing but 'obstruct' progress, are counter productive and besides the point. *Thus NGO's which do recognise and consider the importance of the political, and do not look only for a technical fix, are likely to have more to offer in the area of peace and effective relief provision and rehabilitation.*

Currently to a very considerable extent 'ethnicity' reigns as much in relief (and development) donors' and agencies' policy papers as in 'the media'. 'The other' (i.e. the recipients in emergency situations) is assumed or constructed in ethnic terms. As a result, all manner of things are attributed to – blamed on – the single factor of 'tribalism' because it is seen to be so characteristic. *The task for better understanding in this regard is for policy analysis to put neither too much, nor too little, emphasis on ethnicity.* To redress the excesses of present discourse, for instance one strategy would be to have recourse to this single factor only in the last, not the first, resort. The present report, however, recoils even from this. Its view is that no single factor description and explanation (of any kind) is justifiable. Where an interactive situation and structure is admittedly complex, the best kind of bottom-line judgement will reflect this and remain resolutely relative multiple.

Towards this ideal of balanced understanding and judgement the following few observations may help. The first is that ethnicity as in the guise of tribalism is not 'a given' in any society but rather something affirmed or created by whatever means. This is to say, as indeed has been remarked in some anthropological studies (which would repay comprehensive review and consolidation), that 'ethnic war' is likely to have as much – or more – to do with war as a means for defining an ethnic dimension of social and political identity as with ethnicity as a cause of war. *War in the Horn – as elsewhere – is made of power as well as ideology. Ethnicity is a theme on which politics – and of course equally economics – plays selectively. Now it puts it forward, now it draws it back, creating, masking, exposing, moderating.* Ethnicity is not, in any sense, a constant either of identity or attribution and when it is brought into play and operation it has many meanings, not one only.

The ethnicity called tribalism is malleable, sometimes used, sometimes not. Therefore it is unlikely to have categorically sharp boundaries or to be self-evident in all social contexts. It is contingent not categorical. The case of present Ethiopian (and to a somewhat lesser extent Eritrean) public policy as regards 'ethnic nationalities' is pertinent in this connection. Regionalization of governance and its decentralization is premised on 'tribe'. However, where social or geographical demarcation is unclear administrative and political boundaries are contested accordingly.

Politics played as identity politics in the Horn may find it particularly culturally and historically convenient to frame identity in ethnic terms, such as tribe or clan. But in the Horn, as elsewhere in the world, only some politics are identity politics. At all events, ethnic, economic, social, occupational, religious and cultural categories and groups and activities are always seen in politics relatively one to the other.

Analysis of complex emergency situations must accordingly reflect such myriad dimensions.

A final brief comment must be made with regard to donor and relief agencies' understandings of the semi-arid environments that characterise this region of Africa. What is required is that these environments are understood in the ways in which the people who make their livelihoods in this region understand them. The coping mechanisms and the like of pastoralists, or semi-pastoralists, and their traditions of environmental management, crucially depend on livestock more than arable values and norms. To seek to 'irrigate the desert and make it bloom' – if such is realistic at all – is to destroy, not develop, these livelihoods. *Feed-aid and other forms of stock-aid are therefore even more important than food-aid in order to keep the pastoral economies operating. Animal health as well as human health is a crucial strategic priority. The tendency for governmental and non-governmental organizations alike to take a single approach to disaster prevention is unhelpful, especially as it is seldom informed by pastoralism.*

Arguably officers not in headquarters but in the region, being closer to the local scene, are in a better position to make the special effort required to understand it. This, however, does not come about automatically. The education and experience in cross-cultural analysis that social anthropologists and others have is not available to everyone. 'Being there' geographically, or nearly there, ought to help. It does not, however, mean that instantly social and cultural distance is diminished as well. Social and cultural learning about other cultures – which may turn out to be not so different as was first imagined – ought not to be left to chance.

Relief (and development) offices should devote part of their resources to their own further education (for instance with the aid of visiting social anthropologically trained policy fellows-in-residence and similar arrangements involving other specialists). Often UNDP offices are devoid of pertinent specialist expertise, being mainly generalist and executive in their staffing at professional levels. Where this is so they can scarcely be expected to discharge either their system co-ordination or capacity-building responsibilities in areas where specialist competence is indispensable. Their reference centres' subscriptions to popular magazines outnumber those to professional journals. Even the half dozen – or half of that half dozen – main world journals in English on relief and development studies are conspicuous by their absence (along with subscriptions to locally published professional journals). Their senior staff say they know what really they ought to read and keep up with other than what is required for immediate administrative tasks – and that even if they did, they'd have no time. Some international non-governmental agencies are better informed despite their smaller budgets.

To sum up, complex emergency yields only to a contextual and complex understanding. This must be as much – or more – political as technical. In terms of their roots and occasions, such emergencies are not equally complex in all their dimensions. To determine which characteristics are true of which dimension is one of the principal analytical tasks.

Other challenges arise for some of the 'outside' key actors engaged in seeking to respond to complex emergencies because they occur in what for them (but not all actors) are 'other' cultures, environments and politics. On top of all this, 'normal' structures and processes of governance including security are in suspense or disorder. Who gains from such circumstances is less obviously apparent at first glance than who loses. The earlier points or periods at which intervention other than relief would have been merited and practical may similarly not be immediately known or remembered.

That the majority of the population afflicted is poor, or ultra poor, presents another difficulty: this is not the type of poverty understood by the neo-classical schools of economics (which are anyway more oriented to growth than poverty) that are currently dominant in development policy.

Everything official, legitimate and understandable to these outside but concerned actors seems – and to an extent is – in breakdown. thus reaching an understanding that could lead to appropriate and structural action cannot proceed with any plausibility in the ordinary way of trend analysis and extrapolating expertly from the present to the future. There is special need for analytical capacity in conflict resolution to be linked with structural understanding of emergency situations. Participation in this mode of policy engagement must be political as well as technical and in many cases with a role for religious and civic organizations. Indeed participation is to conceptualize policy analysis as overall, more important than to dwell on analysis and understanding as primarily a matter of expertise.

CHARACTER OF THE SIDA-SUPPORTED PROGRAMME IN THE HORN

This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part analyses the overall patterns discernible in SIDA's relief aid in the Horn based on the statistics available. The second provides a general description of some of the most common types of projects in the Horn on the basis of observations made. The third, which is based on the field discussions with recipients of SIDA support, project staff, and a variety of field visits in each of the countries covered in this review, identifies a number of specific characteristics of SIDA's relief assistance. The fourth offers a number of remarks on the congruity of practice with SIDA emergency relief policy.

A Portfolio and Patterns of Expenditure

a. Data Sources, and Accuracy

The Terms of Reference for the review team include an annex which identifies projects funded through the Emergency Relief vote. This vote is only part of Swedish support to UN agencies and NGOs working in disaster situations, as both have alternative sources of Swedish government funds for emergency relief activities, either frame agreements with SIDA or grants from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Reportedly the latter two exceed the former by a considerable amount. However in this study only funds disbursed through SIDA's Emergency Relief vote are considered.

In order to understand the projects which have been funded from this source, SIDA's records of each project were studied by a local consultant in Stockholm working on behalf of the review team. A summary data sheet was prepared for each project showing:

- the amount allocated,
- the applicant to SIDA,
- the implementing partner,
- the nature of the activities to be carried out,
- the objectives of the project, and
- SIDA's categorisation of the type of problems being addressed.

While in general the figures reported and information found from this exercise

were verified in the field, in a few cases the actual disbursements were apparently greater than those recorded in the Annex to our TOR. In a few other cases the opposite was true with an underspending of the funds and subsequent return of the balance to SIDA for reallocation. The limited time in Stockholm and with field partners prevented checking to identify the correct figures of expenditure for each project, and so in all calculations the original figures given in the TOR Annex have been used.

Additional problems with the data were that not all of the project files showed the implementing partners, while in some cases there were joint appeals and also some instances of apparent joint implementation. Further, the internal SIDA categorisation of the problems which the projects addressed were missing in about a quarter of the cases. In several cases, especially relating to grants to UN agencies, no project documents were on file so details of the implementing partner and the use of the funds could not be ascertained.

The simplification of the data in the following analysis introduces a number of small errors. For instance only the main purpose for which the funds were used is identified, and only one implementing agency is recorded. This has led to a level of generalisation which, had time permitted, could have been reduced. However, it should be noted that this would have required much more time studying the project files, while the absence of reporting on most project grants made within the last 18 months (as 18 months is the reporting deadline) would have reduced the validity of this exercise considerably.

It should be noted that the detailed analysis by project from the SIDA statistics was only undertaken for the four years 1990/1 to 1993/4 (not the five years in the TOR). This was partly because of the time consuming nature of the work but mainly because the purpose of this exercise was initially limited to that of helping team members know something of the various projects which they might visit or discuss with field staff. It was felt that given the transient nature of relief projects and their staff, projects over 4 years old would be extremely difficult to trace on the ground and discuss with staff who managed them.

b. Patterns of Expenditure – Spatial and Temporal

The overall pattern of expenditure through the SIDA Emergency Relief vote is given in Table 3.1. The Table shows the pattern of disbursements by SIDA to field partners, not the actual use of these funds over two or, in some cases, more years, nor the commitment of the funds by SIDA.

Table 3.1a shows that there are major annual variations in relief expenditures to the region as a whole between 1990/91 and 1993/94, with a low of SEK 84m in 1991/92 and a high of SEK 283m in 1992/93. Proportionately greater fluctuations in expenditure occur by country, from SEK 1.2m in Somalia in 1991/92 to SEK 78m in 1992/93 and from SEK 58m in Sudan in 1990/91 to SEK 8m in 1991/92. However, in two countries, Eritrea and Ethiopia, the flow of relief assistance does

not fall below SEK 30m in any year. This is a result of strong historical links with these countries and good NGO contacts. These have been reinforced through Ethiopia being a programme country for almost three decades and by the recent consideration of this status for Eritrea.

Of the individual countries, Ethiopia is the dominant recipient of emergency relief in the last three years (39%). Eritrea is second (25%) while Somalia receives 21% and Sudan 15% of the total for these four countries. Eritrea has received a growing share since independence in 1991, and in 1993/94 received the largest share (32%).

Table 3.1: SIDA Emergency Relief Expenditure in the Horn of Africa 1990/91 to 1993/94 (1)

a. Amount Spent in SEK m.

	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93	1993/94
Eritrea		35.641	43.789	62.665
Ethiopia	102.467	39.910	116.059	60.692
Somalia	17.133	1.200	77.937	40.850
Sudan	57.528	7.519	45.947	28.966
Total	177.108	84.269	283.732	193.173

b. Percentage of Total Horn of Africa Emergency Relief Expenditure by Country

	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93	1993/94
Eritrea		42.3%	15.4%	32.4%
Ethiopia	57.9%	47.4%	40.9%	31.4%
Somalia	9.7%	1.4%	27.5%	21.2%
Sudan	32.5%	8.9%	16.2%	15.0%
Total (SEK m)	177.108	84.269	283.732	193.173

c. Summary Expenditure

	1990/1-1993/4		1991/2-1993/4	
	SEK m	%	SEK m	%
Eritrea	142.095	19.3%	142.095	25.3%
Ethiopia	319.128	43.2%	216.661	38.6%
Somalia	137.100	18.6%	119.987	21.4%
Sudan	139.960	19.0%	82.432	14.7%

Notes:

1. The data for 1993/94 is incomplete. The data used in this table is as presented in the Annex to the review team's TOR which was prepared in March 1994. This does not include international aid / regional funds (C1) or humanitarian aid (C2).

Figures are for actual disbursements not SIDA decisions/commitments, or actual use by partners.

There is no SIDA expenditure in Djibouti during the years covered in this Table as far as could be identified.

In addition to these expenditures by country recorded in the Annex to the TOR, the analysis of SIDA records identified major additional emergency relief expenditures to the Horn of Africa in 1990/91 and to a much lesser extent in 1992/93 and 1993/94. These were primarily regional funds which totalled:

SEK 238.0m in 1990/91 (of which SEK 180m was given to the SEPHA appeal),

SEK 93.6m in 1992/93

SEK 7.5m in 1993/94.

In addition there were some considerable expenditures under the C1 International Aid Programmes (SEK 57.6m) and C2 Humanitarian Relief (SEK 55.6m) in 1990/91. Also SEK 5.85m was given under a special heading "Reconstruction" in that year.

In 1990/91 it is possible to break down by country SEK 112.6m of these expenditures. This shows that Ethiopia received 82.4% of these funds, while Somalia and Sudan each received around 9%. However, care should be taken when considering these figures as they are almost certainly incomplete.

c. Category of Issues Addressed

The SIDA Emergency Relief Section's categorisation of the issues being addressed by the projects reported in the Annex to the TOR, are summarised in Table 3.2. Unfortunately the use of these classificatory groups was very incomplete in Ethiopia in 1990/91 and for many of the Sudan projects. As a result, for the four year period considered less than 45% of the funds spent in the Sudan could be allocated by group, compared to over 88% in Eritrea and Somalia. Another concern is the subjective nature of the classification, a point emphasised by the Emergency Relief Section in SIDA, Stockholm. As a result these figures should be viewed with caution, although they do provide one way of characterising the SIDA supported relief activities in the region.

Table 3.2 shows clearly the overwhelming importance of conflict as the underlying problem being addressed by SIDA's emergency relief funds in the Horn. The category "Refugees, war and conflict" accounts for 48% of the funds spent. This is especially important in the Sudan (87%) and Somalia (71%), and to a lesser degree in Ethiopia (40%) and Eritrea (35%). In contrast, the reconstruction and rehabilitation category is second in overall importance because of the activities in Eritrea (44%), where it is dominant, and in Ethiopia (32%). Drought is the third most important problem overall (20%), and is the second or third most important problem addressed in all countries. Drought would probably dominate in Ethiopia if the funds for relief trucks given to the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission had been included in the drought category.

Table 3.2 also shows the almost complete absence of any funding to address disaster prevention, the only case being in Ethiopia where the Emergency Relief Coordinator's post was placed in this category.

Table 3.2: Problems Addressed by SIDA Supported Emergency Relief Activities in the Horn 1990/1-1993/4 (1).

	Eritrea(2) %	Ethiopia %	Somalia %	Sudan %	Total %
Refugees, War & Conflict	34.6	30.6	70.6	87.1	47.9
Drought	19.4	23.7	16.5	11.8	19.5
Reconstruction & Rehabilitation	43.9	24.5	12.7		23.7
Disaster Prevention		0.9		1.1	0.3
Locusts	1.2				0.3
Other	0.9	20.4	1.0		8.4
Total Allocatable (SEK)	127.0m	196.2m	121.1m	59.1m	
% Allocatable of Country					
Overall Total	89.4%	61.5%	88.3%	42.2%	

Notes:

1. The data for 1993/94 is incomplete. It is as presented in the Annex to the review team's TOR which was prepared in March 1994.

2. The data for Eritrea covers the three years 1991/2 to 1993/4, whereas the data for the other three countries is for the four year period 1990/91 to 1993/4, with all countries having incomplete records for 1993/4 (see Note 1).

d. Type of Activity Supported

From the project documents seventeen categories of emergency relief expenditure were identified. Out of the total expenditure for the four countries shown in Table 3.3, over 95% could be categorised by the type of activity undertaken.

As would be expected the three categories dominating the emergency relief activities overall in the Horn are transport and logistics (22%), food distribution (22%), and general relief activities including food provision, transport and health services (16%). Specific health services and water provision (7%) is the next most important category which is equalled in importance by the rehabilitation of farmers. However, if the three rehabilitation categories are added together they account for over 13% of the funds and in this consolidated form would be well ahead of water and health provision as the fourth most important activity. It should also be noted that some SEK 20m for ex-soldier rehabilitation was provided from the regional funds to Ethiopia in 1991/92 thereby confirming the importance of rehabilitation in SIDA funding.

The relative importance of activities in the Horn overall is the result of the different patterns of activities within the individual countries. Of particular note here is the dominance of transport and logistics in Ethiopia (35%), of the three rehabilitation categories (25%) in Eritrea, and of health and water issues (21%) in Somalia. Other country specific emphases are industrial development (23%) in Eritrea (due to the use of Emergency Relief funds for infrastructure rehabilita-

tion), local government administrative support (8%) in Somalia, and local food purchase in Eritrea (8%) and Ethiopia (6%).

Table 3.3: Major Activities Undertaken with SIDA Emergency Relief Funds in the Horn, 1990/1 to 1993/4 (1)

	Eritrea(2) %	Ethiopia %	Somalia %	Sudan %	Total %
General (3)		14.0	24.1	34.9	16.4
Food Distribution (4)	18.6	24.0	3.2	40.8	22.0
Food Purchase (5)	7.5	5.9			4.2
Transport + Logistics	8.5	34.7	12.7	14.5	22.3
Health / Water (6)	3.0	2.5	21.3	8.1	6.8
Children / school (7)	5.6	2.7	2.5	0.4	2.9
Rehab. farmers	15.1	4.9	8.7		6.8
Rehab. ex-Soldiers			3.2		1.5
Rehab. returnee support(8)	9.6	5.9	2.6		5.1
Returnee Experts (9)	6.1				1.2
Locust and Pest Control	2.6			0.9	0.7
Industrial Devt. (10)	23.4				4.7
Institutional Devt. (11)			17.4		3.0
Administrative Devt. (12)			7.5		1.3
Collected items (13)		0.5		0.5	0.3
Budget Support (14)		1.0		0.5	
Relief Coordinator (15)		0.8			0.4
Total (SEK)	132.874m	304.223m	115.100m	108.660m	660.857m

Notes:

1. The data for 1993/94 is incomplete. It is as presented in the Annex to the review team's TOR which was prepared in March 1994.
2. The data for Eritrea covers the three years 1991/2 to 1993/4, whereas the data for the other three countries is for the full four year period 1990/91 to 1993/4 with all countries having incomplete records for 1993/4 (see Note 1).
3. General disaster relief includes unspecified or very wide ranging activities, typically including food distribution, transport, health services, water provision and seed distribution.
4. Food distribution includes food for work and free food.
5. Food purchases are mostly made locally.
6. Health/water includes clinic provision/rehabilitation, health activities and water provision.
7. Children/school includes other children activities as well as schooling.
8. Support for returnees includes displaced people.
9. Recruitment of experts who were nationals of the recipient country living abroad.
10. Industrial Development is for baby food factory and electricity infrastructure.
11. Institution Building is for improving capacity of International Agencies in non-food relief operations.
12. Administrative Development is re-establishing district and regional councils.
13. Refers to sale/distribution of collected items from Sweden.
14. Budget support is general budget support for ALERT.
15. Relief Coordinator is SIDA Emergencies Officer in Addis Ababa.

Rehabilitation is not being supported in the Sudan. Institutional support is found only in one project in the region, this being in Somalia where the specific aim is "improving the institutional capacity of UNICEF and other international agencies to respond to non-food needs". Other projects such as the OLS operation

in South Sudan also include such activities according to the field observations but these are not reported in the SIDA records.

e. Channels and Partners

Analysis of the partners who receive emergency relief funds from SIDA can be made in two ways:

- those who successfully requested funds from SIDA and
- those who are implementing projects.

For the former group data was obtained for all of the funds in the Annex to the TOR, while for the implementing group the partners using 81 % of the funds were identified.

Table 3.4: Relative Importance (%) of Channels and NGO Groups in Swedish Supported Emergency Relief in the Horn, 1990/1-1993/4 (1)

	Eritrea(2) %	Ethiopia %	Somalia %	Sudan %	Total %
Applications					
Bilateral	25.2	31.2			18.3
Multilateral	20.1	23.9	45.8	53.4	32.8
NGO	54.7	44.9	54.2	46.6	48.8
Swedish NGOs	47.7	42.2	53.8	46.6	46.3
Northern NGOs		0.9			0.4
Internatl NGOs		1.3	0.4		0.6
Indigenous NGOs	7.0	0.5			1.6
Implementation					
Bilateral	53.4	39.5			28.2
Multilateral (3)		18.3	37.8	28.8	20.7
NGO	46.6	42.2	62.2	71.2	51.1
Swedish NGOs (4)	5.0	5.8	31.3	17.5	12.8
Northern NGOs (4)		1.1	2.1		1.0
Internatl NGOs (4)	4.7	7.8	28.8	17.0	13.1
Indigenous NGOs	36.9	27.5	36.7	24.2	

Notes:

1. The data for 1993/94 is incomplete. It is as presented in the Annex to the review team's TOR which was prepared in March 1994.
2. The data for Eritrea covers the three years 1991/2 to 1993/4, whereas the data for the other three countries is for the full four year period 1990/91 to 1993/4, with all countries having incomplete records for 1993/4 (see Note 1).
3. Some multilateral agencies transfer SIDA funds to government departments in recipient countries for bilateral implementation.
4. Some implementation by non-indigenous NGOs is undertaken jointly with indigenous ones.

The importance of NGOs is clear from both sections of Table 3.4, with 49% of the funds successfully sought and 51% of the funds implemented through NGOs. Multilaterals are the second most important channel of successful applications, but only the third most important in terms of implementation. This is because of the transfer of funds from multilateral applicants to government departments in recipient countries for implementation. There are no bilateral channel applications in either Somalia or Sudan as they are not programme countries, and there is no implementation using bilateral partners in these countries despite the potential for transfer of funds from multilateral agencies to government departments. There is a very high level of bilateral application for funds in Eritrea even though it is not a target country.

At the country level, analysis shows that while NGOs are usually the most important application channel, there is one exception in Sudan, where the multilateral channel (53%) is most important. (This is because of the funding of the OLS operation through UNICEF). In terms of implementation there is again one exception to the dominance of the NGOs, this being in Eritrea where bilateral implementation through the government is most important (53%). Eritrea is also an exception in that it has no multilateral implementation using SIDA funds according to the data available, this being due to the use of multilateral funds for implementation by government departments. The multilateral channel is also relatively small (18%) in Ethiopia where bilateral implementation (40%) is almost as high as NGO implementation (42%).

Study of the NGOs shows that, as expected because of SIDA rules, the Swedish NGOs applied for over 90% of the funds allocated. One exception is in Eritrea where indigenous NGOs, notably ERA / ERRRA, have accounted for almost 15% of the allocated funds. However, in terms of implementation the overall picture is very different with indigenous NGOs dominant (47% of the NGO funds) and international NGOs (26%) also more important than the Swedish NGOs (25%).

At the country level, there are again exceptions to this pattern with no indigenous NGOs implementing in Somalia and a consequently much higher importance of Swedish NGOs (50%) and international NGOs (46% of the NGO disbursed funds). The importance of Swedish and international NGOs is also high in the Sudan (25% and 24% respectively) compared to Eritrea and Ethiopia where they account for between 10% and 15% of the funds implemented through NGOs.

Rough (and overlapping) analysis of the NGO partners is possible using a threefold division in terms of their origin and orientation:

- a) religious,
- b) humanitarian,
- c) political.

Organisations which are related to political movements are classified as political, while those which are from church origins are classified as religious, even though their work is primarily humanitarian. The origin of organisations is

important because it affects the orientation and to some extent the underlying goals of their activities and their staff recruitment. This in turn affects their comparative advantage as implementors of relief activities. This categorisation of SIDA's NGO partners is shown in Table 3.5.

Table 3.5 Categorisation of SIDA's Partners working in Emergency Relief

Swedish NGOs

1. Radda Barnen (H)
2. PMU - Interlife (R)
3. Praktisk Solidaritet (P)
4. Swedish Red Cross (H)
5. SOS Kinderhof International (H)
6. International Aid Sweden (R)
7. Diakonia (R)
8. Star of Hope (R)
9. Swedish Evangelical Mission (R)
11. Lutheran Aid Sweden (R)
12. Swedish Christian Social Democratic Movement (P/R)
13. Health Care Group for Eritrea (H)
14. Swedish Philadelphia Church Mission (R)
15. Caritas Sweden (R)
16. Swedish Church Relief (R)
17. Action for Political Refugees (P)
19. EriksHelp (R)
21. Welfare Association for Eritrean Children (R)
24. Life and Peace Institute (R/H)
25. Swedish Missionary Council (SMR) (R)
68. Feed the Children Ethiopia (H)

Other Northern NGOs

20. Norwegian Church Aid (R)
22. SCF-UK (H)

Indigenous NGOs

10. Integrated Holistic Approach (H)
52. ERA / ERRA (P/H)
53. Eritrean Catholic Secretariat (R)
54. Evangelical Church for Eritrea (R)
55. Eritrean Alliance of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (H)
64. Ethiopian Red Cross (H)
65. Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus (R)
66. REST (P/H)
72. Sudanese Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) (P)
73. Sudan Council of Churches (R)
74. Association of Christian Resource Orgnzns. Serving Sudan (R)
80. ERA/REST/ORA (H)
81. Local NGOs, unspecified

International NGOs

- 32. ICRC (H)
- 33. IFRC (H)
- 34. Lutheran World Federation (R)
- 35. Medecin sans Frontieres (H)
- 36. CAFOD (R)
- 37. African Committee for the Rehabilitation of Southern Sudan
- 38. ALERT (H)

Other NGOs

- 30. Various NGOs (Mainly indigenous)

Multilateral Channel

- 41. WFP
- 42. UNICEF
- 43. UNHCR
- 44. FAO
- 45. UN Volunteers
- 46. Several UN Agencies
- 47. UN in general
- 48. World Bank
- 49. UNOSOM

Bilateral Channel

- 18. SIDA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
- 23. Swederelief (Ministry of Defence) (H)
- 51. Eritrean Government
- 61. Ethiopian Government (MOA)
- 62. RRC
- 63. ARRA

Table 3.5 shows that the largest groups of Swedish NGOs are religious in their origins and orientations (12). Humanitarian organizations are second in importance (5), followed by those with a political orientation (2). Among the indigenous NGOs the balance in terms of types is more even, with religious NGOs still most important (5), followed by political ones (4) and humanitarian ones (3). International NGOs are predominantly humanitarian (4) with only 2 religious ones and none with political orientations.

This discussion of the relative importance of different types of NGOs and their origins could be made more precise – were time and space to permit – by analysis with respect to the quantity of funds the NGOs have obtained from SIDA and the funds which they have used in implementation. However, this was not possible and the report now turns to an overview of the characteristic projects which SIDA has supported.

B. Characteristic Projects

Looking at the specific projects which SIDA has supported it is possible to identify several different types of projects and to comment upon their effectiveness across the region. Eight major types of projects are identified for this discussion and these can be grouped (with some overlap) in terms of their approach and emphasis as follows:

Issues Oriented

- relief provision
- relief transport
- health service provision

Target Oriented

- support for refugees
- children's education and other social services,
- internally displaced people,

Rehabilitation

- agricultural and economic rehabilitation, and
- administrative restructuring and rehabilitation.

Significantly, there are insufficient activities which can be classified as disaster prevention to make a category specifically for this.

Issues Oriented Projects

a) Relief Provision

The largest group of projects (27) are those involving a combination of different types of relief provision, usually transport and the distribution of food with other services such as health and water. The major integrated activity here is Operation Lifeline Sudan which is mainly funded through UNICEF.

Of the relief provision projects, a third (9) involve food for work activities which to different degrees include some concern for rehabilitation. While food for work is most common in Ethiopia (5) it has also been undertaken in Eritrea (3) and Sudan (1). The agencies most concerned with this use of food aid are EECMY in Eritrea and Ethiopia (which is supported by LH and LWF), SPCM in Ethiopia (supported by PMU) and ERCS in Sudan and Ethiopia (supported by SRK and IFRCS).

Free food distribution projects (9) are mainly used in situations where there are displaced people and refugees, notably in Somalia and Sudan. The projects often include the aim of stabilising the population and preventing further migration. ERCS in Ethiopia also uses free food but in drought relief situations with stable populations.

Local purchase of relief grain is restricted to three projects with ERA (now ERRA) and REST in 1990/91 and 1993/94, although local purchase is also used for seed purchases in Ethiopia (see Agricultural Rehabilitation below).

b) Transport

Of the 21 transport projects, the most important type of projects in terms of money are those involving the provision of vehicles and technical support to the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) (4). In addition there has been some support for the importation of trucks for the private sector (1), specific NGOs (SPCM) (1) and projects (Locust Control) (1). All of these also occurred in Ethiopia. Such specialist development of transport capacity, as distinct from integrated relief, is clearly only possible in situations where institutional development for long-term relief has taken place and where SIDA expects the institutions which it supports to have a "life-expectancy" which makes the investment worthwhile.

Another common type of transport project involves the funding of air lifts of food in crisis situations (7). These continue in the Sudan and have been important in Northern Ethiopia and Somalia in the recent past. The major partner in these activities is LWF, with the UNOSOM and WFP also involved. This might be seen as one of SIDA's areas of comparative advantage, reflecting its ability to respond quickly in a crisis situation unlike some of the other donors.

The provision of funds for the transport of items, such as second-hand clothes and hospital equipment, which have been collected or purchased in Sweden by NGOs, is also quite common (4). These tend to be small, one-off, or ad hoc grants.

In addition, there are two projects which relate solely to the land transport, these being for the transport of specific food loads in Tigray, and the establishment of a logistics centre to facilitate the distribution of food in Kordofan, Sudan. However, usually land transport is included in composite relief provision projects where it is linked with the purchase of the relief goods.

c) Health Service Rehabilitation and Provision

Of the 11 general health projects, the largest group (5) are concerned with the rehabilitation of health services, both hospitals and community services, primarily in Somalia (4) but also in Eritrea (1). These activities have been funded through UNICEF and three different NGOs (RB, SRC, SOS Kinderhof)

The other major group of health projects (3) involve funds provided to UNICEF for use in Ethiopia. These have also mainly been used for supporting the rehabilitation of health services, but this was only found out in the field, the decision records in Stockholm having no project documents.

While the majority of the health projects are concerned with rehabilitation, a small number are concerned with the provision of health services alone. These include budget support to MSF in Somalia, funding of their response to a cholera

epidemic in the Ethiopian Ogaden, and the purchase and transport of medicines to Somalia for SOS Kinderhof.

Target Oriented Projects

d) Refugees and Returnees

Of the 22 projects concerning refugees and returnees there is considerable diversity. One of the clear areas of concentration is four decisions which support RB's provision of education and other social services for Sudanese refugee children in western Ethiopia. A much larger amount of money has been provided through three decisions which support the camps of refugees serviced by LWF, RB and various church NGOs in Kenya for Southern Sudanese refugees.

The provision of health services in refugee camps (7 projects) has been supported by RB through MSF-Belgium in eastern Ethiopia and through UNICEF in Somalia, while PMU have supported relief provision in the Sudan for people living in the vicinity of refugee camps. Three projects, two in Eritrea and one in Somalia, have supported the return and rehabilitation of refugees, these activities being assisted by EFS and LH. There are also four projects which involve support to UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP for refugees but there are no details about these projects.

e) Children's Education and Other Social Support.

The majority of projects specifically for children (excluding the Sudanese refugee children discussed above) are to be found in Eritrea (6). Here SIDA has supported two projects concerned with school construction and the provision of materials and consultancy services, as well as two projects, through RB, for the reunification of children with their families. There is also support to orphaned children in Eritrea and for improved inter-community relations between Christian and Muslim children. The only other children's project in the period considered is in Somalia involving school reconstruction and training of teachers. (It should be noted that during the late 1980s RB was involved in a major family reunification project in Ethiopia).

f) Internally Displaced People

The support to displaced people, other than refugees, involves three groups of projects. The largest number of projects (5) involve supporting the return of Ethiopian soldiers from Eritrea (ICRC and ERCS) and their rehabilitation in farming (with support provided through SPCM and EECMY/LWF) and in urban employment (with support through two small Ethiopian NGOs, IHA and Day, and the ex-Soldiers Commission).

The second group of projects (3) is concerned with displaced people in Sudan where, through WFP, UNICEF and PMU, funds have been provided for the food and non-food needs of people displaced within the southern Sudan.

In Somalia SIDA has supported the ICRC in its work during times of fighting and has supported UNICEF to develop an institutional capacity to cope with displaced people,

Rehabilitation Projects

g) Agricultural and Economic Rehabilitation

In all four of the countries in this region which are in receipt of SIDA support there are some rehabilitation activities funded by SIDA. The largest amount has been spent in Eritrea where rehabilitation of the electricity supply and agricultural / economic rehabilitation have been allocated a total of SEK 48m. Notably the World Bank has been the channel through which much of the agricultural and economic rehabilitation has been directed.

In Ethiopia seed provision via FAO and to a lesser extent REST, both using local purchase, are the only specific rehabilitation projects totalling some SEK 35m. In Somalia FAO is again important as a channel for agricultural rehabilitation along with EFS. In the Sudan IAS has been the main channel undertaking seed and tool distribution, water service provision, school and health rehabilitation, and the establishment of grinding mills.

h) Administrative Restructuring and Rehabilitation

Support to administrative rehabilitation has occurred in only two countries in the region. In Eritrea there have been small sums of up to SEK 5m spent on institutional and staff aspects of government rehabilitation, with a project to encourage the return of skilled nationals and support to public administration. In Somalia the Life and Peace Institute has supported the re-establishment of District and Regional Councils.

i) Other Projects

Among the various projects not clearly fitting into one of the major groups above there are some notable ones which show the diversity and the character of Swedish assistance in the Horn.

There are three large projects in this group:

- a baby food factory in Eritrea funded through RB,
- general budget support for ALERT in Addis Ababa, and
- the Disaster Relief Coordinator at the DCO in Addis Ababa.

Small projects involve supporting the reconstruction of buildings in Addis Ababa destroyed by the 1991 explosion, and the provision of shelter (tents) OLF soldiers demobilised before the election.

C. Experience in the Horn

a) Appropriateness

'Appropriateness' must be defined. *Appropriate assistance is assistance which people need and want at a particular point in time, is beneficial and does not have negative effects or cause problems. Given the long-term, structural causality of disasters, appropriate assistance should have a lasting effect by contributing, at a minimum to rehabilitation, and optimally to development which addresses the underlying, structural causes of the emergency.* It should be sensitive to political conditions as well as humanitarian issues, reach all categories of people in distress, and be cost-effective. (This latter area is unavoidably beyond the scope of the present study).

Given that there are hardly any clear standards, norms or guidelines for appropriateness in respect of the various type of emergency problems, recent standardization and training by UNICEF/WFP-OLS on health, education, nutrition surveys, food need assessment techniques, etc., are to be confirmed. This should be carried out more widely in the region (at least in SIDA funded projects), in full collaboration with the relevant technical departments and ministries. NGOs should be invited, according to previously defined needs and gaps, with UNDP as the lead agency.

To summarise, there are various levels to consider:

- (i) How appropriate is the aid, given the root causes of the emergency problem; does it have a structural effect (eg food aid versus seeds, cash, tools etc)?
- (ii) How appropriate is the choice of relief services/product at the inception stage (eg external food aid or local food purchases)?
- (iii) How appropriate does relief appear when it arrives (eg bad quality food grain, miscomposed concentrates, out-dated medicines)?
- (iv) How does short-term aid fit into the long-term situation and the does it support the development of local capacity to address emergency situations and solve the underlying structural causes.

In the case of Ethiopia, so far as appropriateness in the narrowest sense above is concerned, it could be said the situation is relatively satisfactory as many of the partner organizations are old hands at the game, have made most of the usual mistakes long ago and learned from them. Elsewhere in the region there remain lessons to be learned from individual cases of inappropriate supplies.

SIDA relies on its partners to choose how need is to be identified, and how funds are to be spent appropriately, once the project proposal is agreed. This assessment of need is sometimes undertaken by local authorities and communities and is outside the control of the partners. The review team has no evidence of the extent to which local partner organizations and local authorities carry out need assessment correctly to ensure that appropriate assistance is requested. It also has no

information on the extent to which SIDA comments on the appropriateness of the activities proposed in applications for relief funds, (nor on the applications that have failed and why). On the other hand, there are several examples of what appear to be very appropriate projects which meet priority needs from local source needs. For example the case of SIDA support for the provision of seeds to the MOA in Ethiopia through FAO, which uses local purchase to encourage production in surplus areas.

Where SIDA's partners try to ensure appropriateness, there is no evidence that this was SIDA-inspired. If SIDA has no directions in this regard of its own, its pattern of support and the type of activities implemented with its funds are partner-driven, with partners' interests dominating in terms of motives, selection of support activities and target groups. In general the review team gained the impression that SIDA partners are experienced and do a reasonable job meeting the situational needs of emergencies in appropriate ways.

b) Timeliness

Timeliness is of the essence in a number of respects: timeliness of requests for support, speed of decision-making once requests are received, timeliness of delivery, etc. *A comprehensive relief policy in SIDA could considerably reduce time lag between the occurrence of disaster and response. When a disaster strikes a situational assessment could be made for instance with the help of a quick response, stand-by, advance unit.*

However, in other cases SIDA is responding to less sudden and not unexpected emergency situations as they develop. In such cases timeliness in response could be achieved by better prognosis of unfolding situation and better analysis and monitoring of such situations.

SIDA depends on the partners with whom it works for the appropriate timing of requests. This depends on the field sensitivity of the partners and their administrative structures which together affect the emergencies identified and the speed with which requests are prepared and submitted to SIDA. Sometimes there are bottlenecks within Swedish NGOs at their headquarters in Sweden (or so the review team learned in the Horn).

The team's principal finding was that generally SIDA is considered to respond quickly to most requests, with most applications receiving responses within two weeks to a month. This is appreciably quicker than the average for the donor community. But experience of the UN system is different as regards responses to annual appeals.

There are examples of very quick responses. One is the case of the 1994 army worm outbreak in Ethiopia, where a SIDA response took only two days. Part of this quick response was because of in-country funds left over from previous support to DLCO for the 1993 locust campaign. *This suggests that there could be a strong case for sizeable funds being made available at the DCO/Embassy for local use for relief. This would make responses even quicker. However, this could put the DCO/Embassy under excessive political pressure and so it is probably better to ensure quick responses with funds held at SIDA's headquarters.*

c) Flexibility

Recipients state they are appreciative of SIDA policy which allows them to re-allocate funds from one activity to another within an agreed project. Adjustments can thus be made to sudden changes in field conditions. An example is where MSF, implementing for RB, swapped funds from the Ogaden, where warfare had made operations impossible, to the Gambella area to meet a sudden influx of people with disease risks. SIDA is seen as a donor which recognises the need for flexibility. Where SIDA has good partners there seem to be no abuses of this.

Flexibility should, however, come out of a well-established policy framework. Its implications should be thought through. It ought not to be as it were a stray feature in itself. It should be subject to the higher objectives set for policy, such as the combining of a structural approach with quick reactions, and should be accompanied by a strategic choice of pragmatic options and readiness to take advantage of these.

Some revision of arrangements might be in order in the light of the reported problems with unearmarked funds to UN agencies. These become tied by the recipients as soon as they arrive and are not subsequently available for a sudden emergency. An unallocated frame turns out to be a difficult tool to use well in practice, being something different from allowing flexibility with allocated funds within a given activity. Where left-over funds have to be returned for new decisions, and cannot just be reallocated, raises different issues again.

The argument in favour of unearmarked funds is that this ensures maximum flexibility and adaptation to immediate need, with the final decision concerning the use of funds resting with the implementing agency. Immediate reallocation of funds to meet changing needs is possible under this system without the delay which reference to the donor would entail. Besides this logic, such an arrangement suits SIDA's current practice which is not to get involved in detailed field decisions. And this helps keep down overheads.

However, in many cases it appears that funds unearmarked by SIDA are not used in a flexible manner by the recipient but are quickly allocated to current activities by the receiving organization and then cannot be made available for later emergencies which occur. This leads to repeated appeals to SIDA for further support which are met with negative replies because of the previous allocation, a situation which often leads to tensions. An example of this was the financial crisis which the UN's key relief coordinating unit in Ethiopia, EPPG (now FUE), faced in 1993. SIDA refused support because the UN system should have taken responsibility for this from its own resources which included considerable SIDA funds.

In addition there is the general criticism that in many cases such unearmarked funds get lost in the system of the recipient organization, and cannot be traced to specific items or achievements. This makes all reporting and monitoring very difficult.

In contrast to the flexibility of unearmarked funds there have been some

positive experiences with earmarked funds given to WFP for a specific purchase of food at Asab. These funds, because they were tied, were available for reallocation for a local purchase at the request of RRC and WFP, with the approval of SIDA in Addis and Stockholm.

UNICEF would like to develop for Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) a budget mechanism to enable it to respond pro-actively. Unearmarked funds would be a positive contribution to this ability.

The view of the review team is that broad levels of tying with flexibility over re-allocation would be better than straightforwardly unearmarked funding, provided SIDA is prepared to make some commitment to a dialogue with partners over earmarking and reallocation.

d) Gender Sensitivity

Survival and coping strategies during famine and food shortages depend in the first place on family, kin and neighbourhoods who operate within a given social network and support system. Studies of post-event coping strategies have shown that men often leave the villages or animal camps when the food crisis intensifies, and the families begin to sell their labour and productive assets, such as ploughs, agricultural implements, and livestock. Women, children and the elderly are often left behind either to wait for remittances from migrant relatives or for relief agencies to come to the rescue.

Recent studies have also shown that the majority of the rural populations in Africa are women. This situation applies to the Horn of Africa. This implies that women constitute the majority of the labour force and hence shoulder much of the work burden. They do not only carry on with the traditional domestic activities, but they also take the extra role of carrying out activities which were traditionally done by men. Even in the refugee camps (Brons et al 1992) there are more females than males due to the fact that men migrate to other towns or abroad. In general there is higher male than female mobility which also requires that relief policies should be particularly sensitive to gender issues.

Although relief operations are increasingly gender conscious, most relief operations are still conventional. It took the multilateral, foreign and national NGOs longer than anticipated to recognize the importance of including women in the management of relief operations. SIDA support to UNICEF, Redda Barnen and UNHCR is largely devoid of this criticism and could be safely described as gender sensitive. This, however, is not the general pattern for SIDA supported relief activities at present. On the whole women-specific relief and rehabilitation projects are far less common than conventional relief and emergency operations.

e) Environmental stress

Almost two thirds of the Horn of Africa is drylands with less than 600 mm of rain per annum, while the whole of Somalia and Djibouti are drylands, each receive less than 400 mm per annum on average each. Agricultural and livestock production

which constitute the mainstay of the rural populations are dependent on the climate. The Horn of Africa drylands (>350 mm rainfall) are dominated by pastoral nomadism and areas of 350-400 mm rainfall are used for agro-pastoralism. Areas of more than 600 mm rainfall are considered more reliable for large-scale and intensive crop production. Generally, the rain is both unreliable and unpredictable, and long spans of rainfall shortages often result in crop failure and the death of animals and hence the creation of famines and destitution. The natural causes of environmental disaster such as floods and shortages of rainfall are in most cases mediated by man-made processes including over-cultivation in fragile and degraded soils, overgrazing, poor water management practices, deforestation and their accompanying socio-economic consequences.

Environmental insecurity, food shortages and political conflicts are closely interlinked. Hence there are discernable linkages between land degradation, poverty and access to food in the Horn of Africa. As mentioned earlier in this report, environmental degradation is influenced by a variety of policy issues, including the pattern of development, the political context (instability, war, civil strife) population growth and how they impact on the dominant resource management system. In understanding emergency situations, it is necessary to go beyond the fragility of the physical environment to elucidate the socio-economic and political consequences of land degradation (famine, destitution, refugees, displacement and migration) and the national and international responses (relief, rehabilitation and development).

f) Effectiveness

Little serious evaluation of effectiveness is done for instance of the kind SCF-UK undertakes, monthly, in their South Sudan Programme. Interviews through household surveys, and observations of local markets and compounds, should answer for example the following questions:

- How successful was targeting, quantities delivered, timing?
- How much of the inputs were bartered?
- Number and type of beneficiaries?
- Detailed information on the reception, use and (immediate) effect of inputs, such as seeds, tools, fishing equipment, mosquito cloth, blankets, 'displaced kits', etc.

REST's current initiative of a baseline study in seven Weredas of Central Tigray has, besides 'knowledge improvement', the objective of gauging 'changes that have taken place as a result of a project intervention'. The baseline study's results are meant to provide the 'point of embarkation from which changes, qualitative and quantitative can be monitored'. One of the main reasons given for the baseline study was that REST wished to be able to have the following questions on their interventions answered, whether on relief, rehabilitation or development:

- How do we measure impact?

- What do we get for every dollar?
- Are we really on the right track? How do we know?

When looking at effectiveness of relief aid, one should distinguish quantitative from qualitative results. All too easily, agencies go for the quantitative assessment, and find that, for example, 1000 blankets have been sent, 970 received, so that a success rate of 97% has been reached. The results of this action are then said to be successful. However, there are other, more pertinent questions:

1. Who received them?
2. How were they put to use? How many were sold on?
3. How durable did they prove to be?
4. Did the chosen item undermine the long term recovery of the people? and, why not,
4. What exactly happened with the 30 blankets which were not received, and anyway, was it cold?

Effectiveness has much to do with how strategic the intervention is including whether initial and continuing problem identification and need assessment is appropriate.

The criteria the team applied wherever possible in reviewing project implementation were useful as far as a general estimation of the projects' degree of 'success' was concerned. However they could not be made relevant as indicators for detailed evaluation, given the absence of detailed data. Nor had the implementing agencies themselves much to offer with regard to in-built evaluation systems.

Undoubtedly emergency relief is expensive to deliver, especially in such severe conditions of conflict as characterise countries in the Horn at present. This is a reality, however unfortunate, that must be faced by donors and evaluators. Doubtless research would find that some economies could be made in respect of individual cost items. No doubt improvements could be made – through better needs assessment and supplies procurement – to ensure that only the most appropriate forms and kinds of support are identified and delivered. Conceivably on the basis of special inquiry, some savings could be made also as regards the overhead costs of relief delivery (reportedly of the order of 40 to 60 per cent).

On the basis of data available to it this review team cannot comment one way or the other on the cost-efficiency of SIDA support whether in particular cases or more generally. Nonetheless the review team gained the distinct impression that, despite the very difficult circumstances in the Horn at present, relief's track record is widely considered to be good. The fruits of a more proactive stance would include clear identification of areas where improvements can be made.

g) Innovation

SIDA is respected as a donor which is prepared to try new approaches to solving problems where other donors are more reticent. However, this seems mainly to occur through bilateral aid

activities and not through its funding of NGOs and UN agencies. In the absence of distinctive criteria for relief aid, it is "business as usual" for aid channelled through NGO and UN agencies. Strengthening the capacity of partners is important if they are to operate more innovatively.

Innovativeness can only come about through a proper capacity for research and analysis. Of course with the existence of so much concrete experience in the relief and rehabilitation field, the research should be 'applied' with the objective of improving the response to situational emergencies, and even better, of helping avoid them.

The way REST currently is approaching its policy development deserves attention. Seed banks, credit systems, soil- and water-conservation, and issues like 'participation', base-line studies and early warning indicators, all find incorporation in its comprehensive approach.

h) The worst bottlenecks and their solution

It is the chronic vulnerability, due to structural problems, of certain categories of people to the effects of drought and insecurity which is at issue in complex emergencies, and not merely the incidence of acute drought and insecurity. This chronic vulnerability has developed because the range of sophisticated adaptive responses, insurance mechanisms and coping strategies of the poorer farmers and pastoralists are being undermined. These adaptive responses and coping mechanisms are being exhausted because of prolonged drought and insecurity, environmental degradation, and poorly conceived macro-economic agricultural and other policies. Strategic relief aid therefore would be intervention at the level of people's survival activities, helping them to strengthen their capacity to withstand drought and insecurity. If such an approach would address structural dimensions of emergencies it might indeed 'make a lasting difference'.

As a form of humanitarian intervention, relief delivery in the presently very insecure political and military circumstances in the Horn is beset with all the difficulties that can be instantly imagined. *On this matter, however, the sense of the review team is that delivery capacity and the performance of implementing agencies is not the greatest immediate obstacle. Rather the most damaging limitations arise for example where there is lack of advance warning intelligence – or notice and action taken where there is advance information – with the result that emergencies which could well be predicted or expected 'come as a surprise'.*

In most cases there is lack of adequate inter-agency policy dialogue and coordination. This occurs in advance warning, but then, when action is taken, it may affect operational planning and liaison. Rarely are the problems related to a lack of capacity to deliver.

In addition to these problems, relief in the Horn suffers from a number of the more commonly expected problems. These include that:

- imported food supplies have to be handled through inadequate port facilities;

-let alone towards 'development'. Therefore SIDA-funded relief operations in the Horn do not have much structural impact.

Currently there is hardly any policy relationship between relief activities and SIDA's Development Programme. Thus strategic 'correction' through intelligent collaboration in the fields of problem analysis, planning and implementation is not possible. The real difference SIDA's relief and rehabilitation package makes to the structural problems of emergencies in the Horn is, unfortunately, minimal.

Specifically as regards SIDA's pattern of preferred channels and partners, the sense of the team is that the degree of user-friendly effectiveness that present practice is widely considered to attain is a significant achievement. *To be blunt, however, this perceived success, appears to owe as much to luck as judgement in the choice of partners.* Notably proactive choice and a willingness to go beyond customary habit is lacking. Very much is made to hang on bases of trust and confidence that have been built up, very little on monitoring and evaluation.

The major concern, therefore, is that there is serious doubt about the lasting impact of relief and whether it makes any difference except at the point of its delivery in the emergency situation. The major problems preventing more effective relief lie not in the physical distribution system but in inadequate advance warning of political processes, especially as regards disasters due to political conflict, and lack of inter-agency coordination and understanding of other contextual and structural factors.

D. The Congruity of Practice and Policy Principle

The review team found little evidence of comprehensive SIDA policy towards relief. While some broad principles of strategy have been prepared and a number of lines of thought are sketched in various documents (such as the 1986 FEF), explicit consideration of how these should be turned into practice is lacking. For instance there is no strategic guidance offered, or operational arrangements made, concerning how the link between relief and development can be articulated and operationalised.

When it comes to assessing the extent to which the broad outlines of policy are followed up in practice, there appear to be major shortcomings. For instance, there has been no emphasis (as proposed in the policy statement) on the follow-up and evaluation of relief activities in order to compensate for the speed with which preparations and decisions about relief applications are made. (This could be related to lack of staffing in the Emergency Relief Section in Stockholm which makes it difficult for this Section to keep up to date with the reporting which is provided).

Additionally the nature of the reporting on relief projects involves little analysis of the activities undertaken and their wider impact. Here, a major problem is faced in achieving feedback from the current limited reporting into relief policy discussions and decisions. This is the lack of circulation of reports on relief projects

to the Embassies, DCOs and Emergency Relief Officers (where they exist) in the field, and to the regional departments and the country desk officers at SIDA's headquarters.

Further areas of lack of congruity between principle and practice are in the failure to link relief to rehabilitation and development, and the absence of emphasis upon disaster prevention and preparedness activities. For example, despite some rehabilitation activities in Eritrea and Ethiopia, most activities funded through the Emergency Relief vite are purely relief. There is very little by way of disaster prevention and preparedness activities, and advance attempts to mitigate the impact of disasters. The development of institutional capacity to address these aspects, including the provision of early warning, seems therefore to have been given little support despite SIDA's policy objectives.

At the same time, while there is a considerable involvement of local NGOs, *there is little evidence, from the project documents seen, of activities to ensure the development of local capacity to address relief issues. Indeed this appears to be an area which requires exploration with a number of Swedish NGOs, especially the church organizations, whose staff, although well versed in practical field operations, have few formal qualifications in relief and development work.*

The portfolio of projects which SIDA supports is driven by requests from the field partners. This may be justified in terms of these partners having more specific field knowledge which SIDA cannot hope to have for all countries and locations, especially as 90% of relief aid goes to countries without DCOs. The issue of principle involved in this situation is a need to ensure that these partners are efficient and keep abreast of local early warning information and the evolving thinking about relief.

In addition in the countries where SIDA has Development Cooperation Offices and Emergency Relief Officers there is unused potential. These offices and staff should develop dialogue with prospective partners about the issues and opportunities to be addressed in the field and report on this to SIDA to enable principle to be adjusted to practice where this is appropriate.



Eritrea, Massawa province. Thousands of people lost their homes as a result of the hurricane.

GLOBAL ISSUES

Further to the specific points in Chapter 3 with respect to SIDA's policy practice, there is a number of broad issues of principle for any donor to attend to if relief operations in the Horn and similar support elsewhere are to be strengthened. These are discussed in this chapter based on the review team's understanding of relief as a process, separated out so that (as requested in the TOR) they can be addressed with a large degree of generality.

A. Problem Identification and Complex Causality

If the root structural causes of a problem are not understood, relief aid cannot be delivered with lasting effect. Therefore, different levels of problem identification need to be undertaken, reaching down to the structural origins of an emergency. The way people are touched by physical or mental problems is usually the result of a series of causes and effects. The emergency situation, or symptom, which needs to be addressed forthwith, is usually intensified by numerous structural difficulties. As there are never simple linear explanations of emergencies, it is important to identify and analyze both situational and structural aspects of these (see 2.C).

Some root causes, or structural origins, of situational emergencies in the Horn of Africa are: conflict/war and political oppression, environmental degradation, population pressure on land, seasonal climatic and other conditions, unbalanced economies, poverty, economic stagnation and decline, inappropriate agricultural policies and unadapting agricultural practices. These are all interlinked. For example:

Situational or superficial

- Problem 'level 4': Malnutrition and famine
- Problem 'level 3': A sharply decreased level of local food security for people who remain in their home areas, and for those who are displaced by force or who have decided to look for assistance elsewhere (migration, refugees).
- Problem 'level 2': Armed conflict creating insecurity, causing a breakdown of traditional life support systems.

Root or structural

Problem 'level 1':

Civil war intensified by ethnic strife, economic exploitation and political oppression, rooted in colonial history.

If a thorough understanding of levels 1, 2 and 3 is not acquired, relief aid can bring only short-term, symptomatic relief, not longer-term improvement of the situation.

Of course, this type of problem identification needs to be undertaken separately for every local situation, as substantial local differences occur. To facilitate the timely and appropriate organization of relief, there is a crucial need to pre-identify problems. The specificities of each emergency or disaster area need to be studied and monitored. It may then become apparent that many problems are recurrent or perennial. An understanding of such cyclical emergency situations, may avoid the procedural headache of annual decision-making. Effective disaster preparedness and prevention can only be achieved through such problem analysis.

Agencies must get ahead of crises by developing thinking and acting that is strategic, not just imposed by immediate circumstances. The aim must be to avoid the 'dependency syndrome' by considering people's contextual situation with its structural problems, rather than merely fixing only on their immediate needs. As more knowledge is acquired about roots and causes of problems, the more practical it is that relief can be linked to development and long-term intervention.

There is here a clear need for closer collaboration between SIDA's Development Programme and SIDA's Relief and Rehabilitation Programme. As relief funds can only be granted by SIDA for two years, development funds may have to be used to complement relief efforts in addressing root causes. SIDA needs to help its partner agencies develop comprehensive intervention approaches, which link immediate objectives with longer-term goals.

B. Food Security and Disaster Prevention, and Mitigation

The capacity of communities to produce sufficient food to satisfy their basic needs has often been at stake in the Horn of Africa. Emergency relief efforts are then the response of the international community. Food security matters have been traditionally the responsibility of the head of the household (at the family level) or the chief (at the village or clan level). Traditionally, all members of society were involved in making sure that families and communities had sufficient food stored to bridge the periods of drought, or other calamities.

The introduction of money in a society (the need for cash for school fees, taxes, agricultural inputs, consumer goods) and the intensity of societal problems related to the introduction of modern weaponry (warfare, banditry, theft, mass migration) have caused a breakdown of the traditional systems of food security at the primary levels of society. The results are clearly negative, because after each prolonged drought and subsequent partial or complete failure of harvests, communities have

become more and more vulnerable. This has resulted in immediate and devastating effects – malnutrition, hunger and starvation.

Aid agencies usually respond to these situations, in terms of delivering the food to the needy, in a quick and also quite efficient manner, as this report shows. These relief activities, in contrast, hardly ever address the issue of indigenous capacities. Help comes from outside, and is provided to the people. The adverse influences of this hand-out type of food aid have been amply recorded by now, and, fortunately, a shift can be observed in some agencies in the way in which food aid is provided. Food-for-work has now replaced some of the hand-out types of food aid. Even cash-for-work has been introduced in relief situations as a more dignified way of strengthening people's purchasing power so that they can obtain the necessary food.

An even more progressive policy than food-(or cash)-for-work could be applied by the introduction of grain banks. These should be considered as a special kind of 'saving & credit scheme'. The purpose is to build up a local stock of food to bridge the recurrent shortage periods. This avoids exploitation by commercial traders who purchase the excess harvest for low prices and sell it at high prices later in the year at time of local shortage.

If a grain bank mechanism can be developed to secure food stocks as locally as possible, this has many advantages over food hand-outs. As expressed by farmers in Mali who are running their own grain bank programme, the advantages are:

- No free-gift food, but food acquired with our own effort (self-reliance!).
- We buy, we store, we manage and we sell the food. Funds generated can be used to support the food production sector.
- This system is based on a long-term view and is therefore much more effective than short-term food hand-outs or food-for-work.
- Grain banks have a positive effect on the local economy. Local trade and grain production are stimulated.
- As local grain varieties are used, grain banks respond much better to taste requirements and storage durability.
- As the grain banks operate as locally as possible, we lose much less time than buying from faraway markets.
- We are not vulnerable to exploitation by food traders or money lenders, because we now have the trade in our own hands.

Village grain banks also have advantages over traditional (family) storage:

- in the traditional basket type family food stores.
- The village organizes itself with regard to the grain bank. This has a positive spin-off to other organized village activities.
- A grain bank store usually has an over-capacity which can be used when harvests are very good. Family stores lacked that over-capacity and food had to be sold immediately after harvest.

REST has already introduced a successful system of seed banks in Tigray. It is therefore worth exploring the relevance of this for villagers elsewhere in the region.

However, it must be recognised that food security can be obtained through a variety of activities, and not just food production, grain banks and food distribution. In particular the diversification of economic activities is important in generating income which can be used to purchase food. As a result broader thinking about how to achieve food security deserves attention.

Grain banks are one form of disaster preparedness which help mitigate the impacts of such events. Attention should also be given to other forms of community development and research which will help improve food security and thereby ensure that communities are more prepared for disaster situations. This group of other mitigation and preparedness measures should include research into the development of more drought resistant farming systems and stock disease resistance through veterinary programmes.

C. Needs Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation

If agencies are to respond quickly and appropriately, thorough needs assessment is a *sine qua non*. Before relief can be organized, agencies need the following essential information:

- a clear identification of type of need (food, water, health care, shelter, etc),
- the number of people at risk (including vulnerable groups),
- the quantities (per person per day),
- duration of aid (number of days) etc.

In cases where needs assessment may be unreliable (say because of conflict, or the vested interests of certain community leaders), neutral observers (assessors) must be employed. This will help to avoid the 'numbers game' – the problem of need assessment based on biased figures. This numbers problem is widespread throughout relief operations in the Horn (as it was for instance in Biafra).

The following measures may help to achieve a more reliable outcome:

- (i) Assessment techniques should be standardized, monitored and regularly evaluated.
- (ii) Needs assessments should be discussed and agreed upon, prior to implementation, by all parties involved. A simple agreement should be signed, determining technique (how) and implementation (by whom, when, where). Training and assistance should be provided to those who are responsible for needs assessment at field level.
- (iii) Where distortion can easily occur, impartial observers should be employed to oversee the local organization and help them maintain their professional stance.

- (iv) The responsibility of assessing the needs of a population should as far as possible rest with the community itself, which should produce the necessary information. The role of external needs assessors is to facilitate and stimulate the community's own efforts.

Headcounts (whereby people are counted one by one) must become - and be known as - the best basis for needs assessment and consequent relief. Communities, or their leaders, often refuse to undergo proper headcounts. It should be made clear, that even in mass migration/refugee situations, this is the only way they will receive relief.

To insist on a headcount may seem to be a tough measure at time of human despair, but it is the only way to achieve general satisfaction: for implementing agencies (so that they have the correct numbers), for donors (so that they do not feel 'cheated') and for the population in need (so that they know that the relief process is transparent). The only losers here may be some 'leaders' with vested interests, who have their own reasons to avoid disclosure of the real numbers.

Socio-economic baseline studies are very helpful in providing relief agencies with invaluable data about populations in need. In the case where a development project has been undertaken prior to an emergency situation, baseline data may be available. In the Horn, any so-called 'ordinary development situation' may be transformed in a short time into a 'special emergency'. This is all the more reason for undertaking socio-economic baseline studies to link development and relief. Furthermore, such long-term socio-economic monitoring contributes to the identification of vulnerability within communities and to problem analysis.

One particular weakness of needs assessment is that, once the operation has started, little monitoring is actually done during the relief period. Monitoring should be done with a view - as for example in cases of supplementary feeding - to taking people off the list if they no longer need relief, or adding those who have become needy in the meantime. Monitoring during relief distribution processes can ensure that the relief goods provided do actually meet the needs of the people. Care must be taken that relief provision does not have negative impacts, either because needs were wrongly assessed, or because relief is provided for too long a period or in the wrong manner.

Needs assessment should furthermore consider, beyond emergency needs, demands for seeds, cash, tools and oxen, i.e. rehabilitation. Seasonal factors should also be taken into account, as they determine the impact of many relief inputs. Needs assessment should provide a start to considering the support needed to address structural problems. Rehabilitation is the first step from the symptomatic towards the structural.

D. Logistics: Resource Allocation, Procurement, Storage, Delivery, Distribution and the Role of Local Purchasing and the Private Sector

On the basis of needs assessment, decisions should be taken with regard to:

Resource allocation: products to be delivered (also appropriateness - of what use is whole grain maize to refugees without grinding facilities?)

Procurement: quantities, costs, purchasing arrangements and locations of procurement

Storage: facilities needed, their management and location

Delivery: road, rail, water, air, transport costs, time and security

Distribution: frequency, quantities, distributors and beneficiaries (heads of households, community leaders or individuals).

To deliver relief aid in time, and efficiently, a forward planning system is needed. Choices will have to be made on the basis of: appropriateness, timing and costs.

Because of the manifold problems involved in the logistics of relief, agencies engaged in getting aid to people pay little attention to important contextual issues. *The logistics of relief are important but should never 'monopolize' the agency's thinking and decision-making.*

Local purchasing of relief items such as food, shelter materials, cooking utensils, seeds and agricultural tools, should be given priority. Advantages of local purchases over imported goods are:

- (i) more appropriate products
- (ii) lower prices / costs
- (iii) reduced transport costs
- (iv) improved accessibility / more rapid delivery
- (v) stimulation of local markets
- (vi) encouragement of local production.

Disadvantages may include:

- (i) Poor quality
- (ii) Danger of increased market prices
- (iii) Insufficient quantities
- (iv) Uncertain and irregular availability.

The attitude of many international relief agencies is 'urgent help is needed, so let us provide it'; local capacity is often disregarded. Only if local purchases are to be ruled out for justified reasons, should importation be considered.

One serious constraint in promoting local purchases is that many relief campaigns generate gifts in kind, such as grain, cooking oil, shelter materials (tents, plastic), cooking equipment, from international donors. Early research of

local markets will help to identify food, goods and materials available for local purchase and this should be fed into appeals.

The capacity of local private transporters also needs to be considered as part of any forward planning system, so that rather than neglecting local capacity it is used and developed. At present aid agencies positively discriminate against the private sector by directing their relief funds through UN, NGO and local government institutions. The efficiency of these channels has rarely been questioned, despite the fact that they have to respond to a very uneven demand and so have considerable periods of under-use. The efficiency of management of relief fleets also needs to be studied, along with the possible advantages and constraints of using the private sector for haulage.

The current Ethiopian discussion about the commercialization of relief transport has been important in helping agencies and the government look for less expensive solutions and as a result the costs of long distance hauling have been cut by a third. Of course, it also touches the more essential question of how much the private sector could and should be involved in relief operations. The types of operations which could be considered for privatization are: transport (road, air), storage, distribution and lodging of agency staff. Each situation needs to be looked at, and judged, on its own merits. However, as a guideline, privatization should be given preference over agency-, or government-run operations, under clear conditions including:

- (i) clearly lower costs
- (ii) use of contracts, including penalty clauses
- (iii) close supervision by responsible relief agency
- (iv) use of open tenders and multiple suppliers to avoid the 'politics' in privatization.

Although the governmental partners of relief agencies may have problems in accepting the involvement of the private sector in relief operations, this should not hamper an active policy change coming from the side of the agencies. Discussion and training may be necessary to overcome resistance.

E. Building and Rebuilding Local Capacity and Institutions

Where local capacity exists, it should be used to take over the tasks and responsibilities of the external implementing relief agencies. In this way human resources and institutionalization of capacity can be developed.

At the very outset of an emergency situation, or even better, before, at the problem analysis phase, local organizational capacity should be identified from grassroots up to national level. UN agencies, such as UNDP, UNICEF, and WFP are well placed, together with the appropriate partner agencies such as research and policy institutes, to assist with making an inventory of local NGO's, grassroots

associations and government agencies. Other agencies, such as SIDA and SRC should undertake their own analysis of potential partners. Subsequently, sectors of intervention, capacities and weaknesses may be mapped out. Assistance in capacity-building can be provided, if local organizations are to be involved in future relief operations.

In the case of Ethiopia, where decentralization is actively being pursued as a national policy, the key issues are standardisation and coordination. These will have to be considered when local NGO's etc are to be responsible for running relief operations. Training courses, workshops, internships and other means of capacity- and human resource-building, are needed to help countries develop viable organizations for the implementation of relief and rehabilitation operations.

The question is, of course, how international NGO's see themselves evolving in parallel with such an approach. They need to reduce their direct operational involvement, take a step backwards, and concentrate on providing the support necessary to permit local capacity- and human resource- building, even if that results in their superfluity in future situational emergencies. This is what 'partnership' really means in the context of aid.

It is all too easy to criticise local NGO's and regional bureaux, government agencies and grassroots organizations about their lack of 'absorptive capacity', 'technical backstopping' or 'financial accountability'. But if local organizations are to improve, they need active support based on some degree of confidence. If this confidence does not exist, because of negatively-biased perceptions about local capacity, indigenous organizations will never be able to escape from a position of 'perpetual underdog'.

The whole question of local capacity-building starts at the family and community level. Seed storage, grain storage, distribution, village relief committees, credit schemes etc are activities which should be run by communities themselves. All relief, rehabilitation and development work should be geared towards strengthening community capacity by facilitation.

Although no ready-made recipes exist for local capacity-building and appropriate hand-over procedures, some guiding principles may be used as a simple checklist. Each activity should develop its own policy and strategy on capacity-building and hand-over, depending on the local situation and potential organizational capacity, the aim should be to:

- (i) Formulate a project in such a way, that from the outset it identifies and uses local capacity in an optimal way. 'Local' is taken to mean:
 - (1) community based groups and organizations,
 - (2) local NGO's, local government (district level), religious groups and churches, and
 - (3) national NGO's.

- (ii) Make sure that from the beginning a system of local check and balances exists. An advisory board with diverse representation of local leadership and community could provide such a system.
- (iii) Train project staff to ensure technical upgrading for project needs, and management skills for future independence. Use of exchange visits within the country between projects and, where appropriate, with projects in other countries, can be an effective means of local capacity-building. Both project staff and representatives of local communities should participate in, and benefit from, this type of 'training'.
- (iv) Develop a plan for hand-over of project activities and equipment in an early stage of the project cycle. Discuss this plan regularly with all local partners, and if necessary, adjust the plan according to project evolution and local organizational capacity.
- (v) Find out, at an early stage, if project staff are interested in, and have the potential for, creating their own local NGO, with the aim of taking over responsibilities and tasks from the external aid agency. Develop, in cooperation with relevant staff, a management plan for such an initiative, including realistic options for financial support.

In development, 'participation' is usually an afterthought required only to ensure that the target population involves itself in the (externally) planned project. Genuine participation, although a difficult objective within the context of emergency relief, should be based on the principle of external support for locally initiated self-help activities. REST is trying to apply this principle in Tigray.

F. Peace-Making, Peace-Keeping and Humanitarian Intervention

There is a growing population, and an eroding natural resource base, in the Horn of Africa. If current conditions continue, this is bound, for some time yet, to exacerbate potential conflicts over the access to, ownership, and use of its resources, resulting in social and political unrest. When one considers the money and effort going into relief and rehabilitation, it is clear that disproportionately few resources are invested in peace-making and -keeping processes.

There seems to be a divide in the Horn between the worlds of the 'fire fighters', whose aim is to treat the structural causes of disasters, and that of the 'first-aiders', who concentrate their efforts on treating the victims of emergency situations. The fires of conflict are more or less left to be lighted and to burn, while the international community spends most of its energies on dealing with the results of human tragedies.

Combined efforts should be undertaken to put maximum strategic pressure on those who have the power over, and are therefore most directly responsible for, maintaining peace in the region. There are political, economic and aid pressures

which should be employed to convince and, if necessary, compel those in power to spend more time, effort and money on peace initiatives, as a integral strategic tool for addressing the issues in the Horn.

The vested interests – a sensitive subject – of aid agencies (NGO, GO and multilateral) whose 'raison d'être' lies in the disasters of others, need to be openly discussed. They may in effect be among the stumbling blocks to peace. The huge aid 'machinery' operating in situations like Southern Sudan, Somalia and Rwanda keeps many agencies 'in business'.

The Horn is a great employer for the international humanitarian community. The Horn is also a good client for arms traders. These unpalatable observations find their place in a study such as this, simply because they reflect a flagrant reality which cannot be ignored when considering relief and rehabilitation delivery to victimized people.

There is a need for a build-up of knowledge about, and capacity for conflict resolution. In the case of 'Somaliland', internal conflicts are being addressed by meetings between clan elders. The international community through UNOSOM, the 'peace-keeping' operation of the United Nations, has thus far paid very little attention to this type of conflict resolution, even though it has proved to be rather successful. One problem is that the UN considers that it officially deals only with governments, whatever that may mean in the case of the Somalia at present.

A remarkable achievement in the Southern Sudan civil war situation is that two warring parties – the government and the SPLA – are signatory parties in the tripartite agreement on humanitarian operations (Operation Lifeline Sudan, OLS) with the United Nations. This unique approach deserves further development and repetition elsewhere. Advanced though this operation is in humanitarian aid experience, however, it still falls way short of an effective peacemaking effort.

The present peace talks under the auspices of IGADD have not attracted the full international attention and support they deserve. A few hours after signing 'another' ceasefire, it was already violated by the Sudanese government. Given sufficient international political will, economic pressure, and, if necessary, aid withdrawal, an organized peace-making process with assistance from humanitarian action could stop conflicts at a much earlier stage.

Other examples of across-the-lines cooperation are the Joint Relief Programme in Ethiopia in 1988 from Wollo into Tigray, and the various NGO-consortia dealing with aid from Sudan into EPLF-TPLF and OLF-held territories during and after the 1984-85 famine.

Concerted efforts are necessary for the resolution of conflicts. The experience which humanitarian relief and peace agencies have gained in the countries of the Horn, should be put to good use when peace-making and peace-keeping activities are undertaken. But considerable new resources should go into research on innovative ways of addressing potential and ongoing conflicts.

Conflict resolution would profit from an approach in which the structural context of the conflict situation in question is given even more prominence than the conflict itself. In turn, this structural context involves an order of domestic politics of resources allocation which deserves even more prominence than the resources themselves.

G. Migration and refugees

Insecurity and the breakdown of life support systems cause people to leave their home areas and seek assistance elsewhere. When this occurs on a large scale with communities - and, in the case of Rwanda, entire societies - moving away from their homes, problems of internally displaced people and refugees develop. In such artificial situations, people need to be provided with food and all the basics of living.

Keeping people at home, rather than having them go to camps, is desirable in relief and rehabilitation situations, as has been Ethiopian RRC policy since the mid 1980s at least. In this way the problems of camp life can be avoided, communities can be kept going so that they can contribute to managing relief and rehabilitation facilitated by external agencies. This requires, however, quality early warning systems to ensure that problems are identified at an early stage.

Furthermore, a certain logistical capacity is essential for the delivery of relief (as far as possible) to the doorstep of those in need. Operation Lifeline Sudan is successful insofar as it averts massive refugee situations through skilful 'relief-at-home' activities. After many years of refugee experience, the Tigrayans too now have a clear policy of avoiding people moving away at times of food shortage. An extensive 'safety net' is created to ensure that food security is achieved and extended for the longest possible period.

One of the issues receiving more and more attention is the so-called 'cross-mandate' concept. In the case of Ethiopia this has led to a 'Memorandum of Understanding' (signed November 6th 1992) between the Government (the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission) and the UN Agencies (the UNDP). A cross-mandate operation is defined as: 'the pooling together of financial and material resources as well as the expertise and manpower of all agencies involved for the single and unified objective of providing assistance to meet identified relief, rehabilitation and developmental assistance needs of drought victims, locally-displaced persons, refugees and returnees without discrimination.'

The three points stressed in such cross-mandate thinking are:

- (i) pooling of agencies resources whatever their mandates;
- (ii) addressing relief, rehabilitation and development in a linked manner, and
- (iii) treating both victims and locals equally and according to need.

Compared with general practice, this concept is exceptional in that it acknowledges the need to assist victims of drought, conflict or natural disaster, regardless ('without discrimination') of their 'status' in the international humanitarian

system. In isolated cases of contemporary humanitarian aid in Africa, 'refugee-affected' and 'refugee/returnee-receiving' area approaches have been applied, recently in Ethiopia these have been formulated as overall policy.

The real challenge of the cross-mandate concept is 'pooling together'. The reason why, after almost two years, this approach has not yet been substantially applied in Ethiopia, lies most probably in the many organizational hurdles which involved agencies, government departments and NGO's will have to overcome for 'intersectoral' cooperation, the basis for which has to build through coalitional action on the part of interested parties who may (initially) be based outside the established official organizations.

Mass displacement of people (whether international refugees or internally displaced people) always has an adverse impact on the environment. Such situations should be closely monitored from the earliest indications to the ultimate solution of the problem. There is almost always a 'local population' involved, whose land and other natural resources are threatened by the sudden influx of other resource users. The carrying capacities of these areas need to be studied (preferably before the problem occurs) and measures taken to avoid over-exploitation of natural resources.

Very often, refugees get a lot of (international) attention and assistance, whereas local people are forced to cope with dangerously increased pressure on their lands. The final decisions on settlement areas for refugees and internally displaced people must take into account:

- (i) the appropriateness of the area for human settlement,
- (ii) the capacity of the resource base and its sustainability in relation to the expected duration of the problem, and
- (iii) the impact on the local population.

UNHCR should be playing a leading role in determining these three factors, providing the necessary advice and orientation for the appropriate national and international institutions involved in the organization of reception areas and settlements.

UNHCR – as in Ethiopia – has recently led the way in showing how sociological anthropological and socio-economic surveys can be used in a quick manner to inform refugee settlement and returnee settlement. UNHCR has started to develop its policy and capacity on environmental assessment of refugee settlement. Some NGO's are active in this field. There is a need for integration of environmental assessment capacity in relief operations. *Environment* should be accorded its proper place along with 'food', 'health', 'water and sanitation', 'shelter' and local markets and the 'economy'.

Formal camps for refugees can create major problems: people stay there, not wishing to return home because of the benefits they are obtaining, and expect to obtain. The positive experience of an informal camp in Dollo, Ethiopia, was that people went home at an early stage and did not even wait for their 'return home

packages'. Formal camps attract newcomers because of hand-outs. Such people are not refugees in the pure sense; they participate in a 'relief-rush' created by over-attention and over-aid.

Relief agencies should be very aware of this problem of camps and be ready to discuss and, if necessary, critically question their own role in exacerbating the situation by creating islands of 'comfort' in oceans of despair. Where the problem is one of agencies 'jumping on the bandwagon', locally-based (whether within government or not) aid coordination should be organized to correct this.

H. Returnees, reintegration, demobilization, repatriation

Repatriation is rightly given a lot of attention nowadays, as the best possible alternative to long-term refugee situations. Pressure by international agencies to get people to return home has in the past led to some very dangerous circumstances. Especially following conflict, there will always be a highly ambiguous reception situation. Relief agencies responsible for returnee programmes often see themselves caught between two major objectives: an early solution of refugee situations and, not less important, trying to ensure the continuing safety of former refugees. Improved international regulations may be needed to ensure returnees are protected from political and other repercussions.

Other problems concerning the repatriation of refugees and the return home of internally displaced people may be identified:

- (i) People are often economically better-off during their treatment as 'refugees' or 'internally displaced persons' – especially the former – than in the new situation where they have to reintegrate at home. Linking relief to rehabilitation efforts, and rehabilitation to development activities in the home country, seem to be the best approaches in these situations.
- (ii) The timing of return can create problems, especially if there is a lack of sensitivity to the agricultural cycle.
- (iii) Returnees usually place enormous pressure on the often weakened home communities. A 'returnee-affected area' approach within returnee programmes is an obvious need.

The reintegration of ex-fighters/soldiers in countries such as Ethiopia and Eritrea causes special problems and therefore needs special attention and appropriate programmes. There is a danger that ex-soldiers/fighters will become bandits (in Ethiopia: 'shifta'), if no attractive alternative opportunities can be ensured. Only through access to land or jobs will re-integration in the society become a possibility. The re-integration of these young men – and sometimes women – in civil society is a prerequisite for lasting peace. The question is not only one of giving these people resources, but also reorienting them for civilian life and generating the appropriate economic conditions and policies which will create job opportunities, especially in the urban areas.

There is an understandable friction between those who were actively involved in 'the struggle' and those who took refuge, and were therefore 'outside' the struggle. Treatment giving preference to either one of these groups obviously creates frustration and unrest in the other.

The reintegration of professionals proves to be a difficult exercise. Some analysts wonder if the already-powerful profit most from reintegration programmes. Others claim that paid reintegration - salaries and incentives are usually provided in these programmes - should be avoided, both as a matter of principle and to prevent unfair competition with others in the labour market.

Another view favours investing in 'brain-pumping' (i.e. reversing the brain drain), by attracting nationals back to help rebuild their post-war countries. It would be worthwhile to follow closely the various initiatives in this field and evaluate success rates over time.

Some categories of returnees identified by the review team are:

- (i) Refugees from official refugee-camps
- (ii) Refugees from other refugee settlements
- (iii) Forced settler returnees
- (iv) Spontaneous returnees
- (v) Organized returnees (under the UNHCR mandate)
- (vi) Urban refugees
- (vii) Rural refugees
- (viii) Professional educated ex-refugees
- (ix) Refugees with little or no formal schooling
- (x) Demobilized soldiers
- (xi) Liberation fighters
- (xii) Internally displaced people including displaced rural and urban dwellers due to ethnic tension
- (xiii) Expelled households, e.g. from Eritrea, often female-headed

Internally displaced people are, of all these categories, probably the most vulnerable and least assisted group.

Returnee programmes need to be implemented within overall government policy. If due attention is paid to existing government programmes in the relevant technical fields (e.g. economic planning, policies for agriculture, education, labour, etc.) the integration of returnees will certainly prove to be more successful than if returnee projects are implemented in relative isolation. Reintegration must be linked to economic development and growth processes, especially recognising that people make their livelihoods by means of a variety of activities, not just one alone.

I. Management of Relief

Issues to be addressed in the programming of relief include a strategy to ensure that adequate attention is given to Disaster Prevention Preparedness and Mitigation (DPPM) activities as well as activities contributing to linkage of relief with development. These remain neglected areas due to the lack of emergency pressure associated with them.

Administrative approaches that view relief emergency situations in a broader context – such as in cross-mandate strategy – should be given predominance. Given the poverty of probably all communities in the region, refugees and other victims of disaster situations should not be over-distinguished from the unaffected – but poor – communities.

Targetting of urgent relief should be considered carefully throughout the delivery stage of relief and as those eligible for this may not be constant throughout the operations.

Relief management should be guided by lessons – especially as regards unanticipated consequences – learned elsewhere. Thus over-attention and over-aid need to be addressed by strengthening local institutions such as Relief and Rehabilitation Commissions or appropriate line ministries' departments which control external agencies.

J. Militarization of Relief Aid

One very clear tendency in relief aid today is the fact that the operations become ever more militarized. This becomes evident in four ways:

- (i) Military sides in a conflict become involved in protecting, handling, distributing and, sadly, abusing relief aid.
- (ii) The United Nations employs increasing numbers of blue helmets in peace-keeping operations (Somalia, Rwanda, Mozambique, etc).
- (iii) Individual nations sometimes deploy military personnel to pacify areas (e.g. the US in Somalia, France in Rwanda).
- (iv) Military units from Northern countries participate in relief operations (e.g. Belgian and Dutch Airforce and Army personnel with Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) food drops in Southern Sudan, Norwegian Army personnel in Tanzania with UNHRC operations).

As humanitarian operations are of an ever more complex nature, and take place in increasingly unsafe circumstances, military discipline, organization, logistics, and security-minded approaches seem to have proved their worth. There is a further need for research into the precise benefits of such an approach.

Conversely, there is a danger that the use of army personnel in aid delivery, and certainly in 'pacification' work, may lead to heightened tension. The whole issue of the UN Mandate with regard to peace-making and -keeping is very important for

Preparedness, when considered strategically, comprises several issues. It includes indigenous preparedness (coping strategies), specific logistical actions such as stock-piling of relief through emergency grain reserves etc, and organizational issues including the development of capacity in the society and government to cope when problems occur. Clear local policy is also needed to help clarify the responsibility of different agencies when disasters strike.

Prevention has implications for a wide range of activities across many developmental and other sectors. It includes consideration of drought resistant crops and irrigation, pollution and environmental control, and last but not least, conflict resolution. Food security, which is a central requirement, must be available on community/family levels, and food reserves on district/regional/national levels.

Mitigation, like prevention, also requires measures across a large number of sectors to reduce the onslaught of disasters when they come. Economic diversification and coping strategies are ways in which mitigation may be achieved. Regional organizations such as IGADD and even the OAU have roles here, as well as national governments and donors.

In view of the fact that, despite more than three decades of international involvement in relief activities, the frequency of disasters has increased rather than decreased, *it is safe to argue that the international community has been more involved in disaster mitigation rather than disaster prevention.* This experience has implications for donor policy and for linking relief, rehabilitation and development. Donors would be more cost-efficient by proactively providing support to address preparedness and prevention rather than by only reactively picking up the pieces after a disaster, especially where high cost actions, such as air transport, must be relied upon. *Given the perennial nature of the recurrence of disasters in the Horn, such that emergency funds appear to be constantly needed, programming of relief funds for prevention, preparedness and mitigation activities over the long periods of time required to address these issues is needed.*

D. Channels and partners

Channels and partners for relief operations should be selected for their expertise and their complementarity with those for development aid. Indeed sometimes the same channels and partners could be used for both.

Except in Somalia, SIDA emphasizes the use of local NGO's as major implementors of emergency relief projects. *Especially in the case of relief, NGO's, whether national or foreign and whether working as facilitating or operational agencies, have for long been considered to have a comparative advantage over governmental organizations (despite for example governmental complaints that such comparative advantage especially of foreign NGO's comes through high overheads costs).*

For foreign – so called international – NGO's it may be necessary to review this received wisdom. Recently the role of these NGO's has been much criticised for not contributing to local

institutional capacity building but rather providing an alternative to this and thereby continuing a dependency on foreign provision.

The nature of the relationship of foreign NGOs with their local 'partners' is obscure. This review team has not had the opportunity to probe this sufficiently but senses that this relationship, complex as it must be, is seen very differently 'from below' by the local partner, compared with the way in which it is described and presented 'from above' by the foreign NGO. There is little indication that this relationship could accurately be described as 'partnership' by both parties.

The broader context in which this criticism of foreign NGO's has arisen has contributed to a weakening of their position with regard to their host governments. As a result of new democratic elements in national politics, the very institutional logic in which statedly non-political organizations were held to be so virtuous has changed. The present ideology of national and international institutions could be read as supportive of new ideas. For example, ought a role in relief be found for political parties not in government?

Governments and donors do not need to depend on NGO's so much under today's conditions of liberalised economies, commercialization, private sector ideology, and improved foreign exchange conditions. That the received wisdom about NGO's may have reflected their own aspired-to self-images, rather than the tests of evaluation, is another interesting matter not without significance for this review but it cannot be pursued here.

Current policy debates about whether NGOs should be operational or non-operational agencies may be less germane for a comprehensive approach to relief than the following question. *What are the advantages and disadvantages of transforming foreign NGO's into national organizations with not just one or two poorly trained junior nationals in the lowest positions, but with well trained national staff in all positions?*

The risk of such a desirable organizational reform, through which foreign NGOs become national bodies, is that with localization of ownership, control and management, less foreign funding may find its way to them. To minimize this risk, because foreign funding or support in another sense will continue to be essential, keeping foreign connections, including retaining a foreign element in their naming and staffing, may be wise. (An image comes to mind: Oxford University Press Nairobi, and OUP Addis Ababa, etc, are nominally linked with OUP, Oxford, as well as perhaps with each other, but they are national, independent, businesses. Ought there to be – to continue with the image – Radda Barnen Ethiopia, Radda Barnen Eritrea, etc?)

As for UN multilateral agencies, one governmental and civic view of these as seen from the Horn is highly critical. For example UNHCR and the DHA are seen to be weak, while the practical efficacy coordinating powers of the UNDP Resident Representatives, other than in Ethiopia, are seen to be poor. The reasons for this vary, most likely, from case to case, but poor staffing could be a recurrent problem. The current UNDP team in Somalia tends universally to be excoriated

professionally in terms of its leadership as being scarcely even 'a B team'. But such criticisms of staffing are not made of UNDP's elsewhere in the region. Much of the criticism of poor UN performance in relief and relief coordination must relate in part to the inherent difficulty of the relief and refugee problem with which they have to deal, as well as conflicting tendencies as regards principle functions and responsibilities within some UN organizations.

In other governmental and civic perspectives in the Horn, more positive recognition has prominence – as for example of the coordination and organization of relief delivery by UNICEF and WFP together in Operation Lifeline Sudan. So clearly the position is mixed.

The problem of profile in staffing is probably very general in nature. This is partly because of the changing role of the UN. *If, earlier, its responsibilities were mainly for 'editing' the world, now with peace-making duties and the like, the UN finds itself responsible also for 'writing' the world. For such different kinds of responsibility different types of experience and training are needed.*

International humanitarian action, in the form of sending relief to complex emergencies, ought not be undertaken as altruistic crisis-management, least of all as crisis-management regardless of cost and above conditions being attached to it. *'Humanitarian' should not be theorised as 'neutral' as for long 'charity' has been. By no stretch of the imagination can the UN, as primarily an intergovernmental organization and as directed by the Security Council, merit being described as 'neutral'.*

A positive and multiplex character attends all aid and intervention. Humanitarian forms are no exception. Where it is primarily international frontiers and national sovereignty that present the greatest obstacles, what must be thought through could be introduced by another business image (which like that used earlier toward rethinking foreign NGOs, also is obviously not applicable in detail). Multi-national business organizations recognise national frontiers but nonetheless find ways to pursue their own objectives across them by positioning themselves accordingly. Multi-national humanitarian agencies similarly need to position themselves strategically. Towards this end, humanitarian activity on the international scene should be strengthened as a conflict monitoring and management resource which is independent of the UN and more linked with regionally powerful authorities.

The private sector should be considered as a new type of partner. The aim would be to support commerce-based, alongside community-based, initiatives. Capacity building of business organization should be furthered through linking development with relief, using the opportunity presented by the latter to strengthen local commercial infrastructure.

E. Relief and Rehabilitation

Rehabilitation here means 'restoration' and 'normalization' of livelihood to the

status quo ante, but ideally with value added, i.e. improvements. Many difficulties may be involved in attempting to realize this in the Horn, including where this involves repatriation of people to areas from which they have been displaced.

A comprehensive relief policy should, at minimum, be re-affirmed and where necessary re-defined to include rehabilitation. It should look forward at least that far. The success of an emergency relief intervention in treating the situational aspects of a disaster involves the ability to achieve rehabilitation.

A realistic time frame must be found for funding rehabilitation linked to relief, whether within or outside a country-frame (which thus far has been used primarily for development rather than relief efforts).

F. Relief and Development

It does not fall within the scope of the present study to compare and contrast relief with development interventions. *The effectiveness of relief efforts in dealing with the situational problems 'despite everything' are creditable and should not be underrated.* While relief policy and relief aid are in need of reform, similarly development policy and development aid are in need of reform.

A realistic and sufficiently comprehensive approach to relief is a different and better thing than some wayward product of 'merging' or 'integrating' relief with development. One risk of such integration would be that the integrity of the relief effort would be lost. Hence a parallel rather than integrated approach is preferred by the review team.

This report has urged throughout that the nature or intensity of the emergencies about which appeals go to SIDA is two dimensional, situational and structural. Emergencies are situational, in the sense that they are the result of untoward (even if periodic or perennially expected) climatic, political or economic events which cause acute distress, even threatening loss of life. There always will be such emergency situations, and they will require mitigation accordingly. But the nature of disasters is also chronic, that is structural. For instance, in conditions of poverty, the toll taken by emergencies is all the greater. *Therefore there are two sources of vulnerability, situational and structural, not one. Both should be addressed. Constructive interlinking of relief with development thinking is widely considered to offer the potential to do exactly this.*

At the same time, however, while such linkage may be desirable in itself, to achieve it is by no means easy to overcome many organizational, programming and actual operational planning and implementing difficulties. Programming of relief in the SIDA case cannot be committed for more than two years, while development funds are committed for five. The majority of emergency funds must be kept available for immediate, unexpected (again if not unanticipated), uses.

There are further problems at the operational level of interventions. *Some aspects of relief are necessarily welfare activities, such as the giving of free food. Development is supposed to be not of this nature but rather to stimulate local capacity building. These*

contradictions mean that what is required is less an integrated than a parallel approach, not a merger but a comprehensive yet variegated strategy.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings presented in this report, the following general recommendations are indicated. To these should be added the observations made in emboldened text in the argumentation developed in Chapters 1 and 5.

I. Evaluative Reviewing as a Process

Evaluation that makes a difference to policy and practice is a process in and through which evaluable issues are clearly explored and there is sufficient participation of both interested and disinterested parties.

This report should be considered to be only one step in such a process. This review process should be continued by three means:

(a) Distribution of this report

This report should be distributed at a minimum to those who have assisted with information toward its preparation, inviting additions, corrections, etc.

(b) Meeting of relief parties and organizations in the region

This should be seen not simply as a means of disseminating the findings of the completed review, but as a way of widening and deepening participation in an on-going process. Among other things this meeting(s) should:

- (i) continue to broaden and re-define 'relief' conceptually and operationally, to include, at a minimum, 'rehabilitation';
- (ii) continue to examine optimal forward linkages of relief/ rehabilitation with development;
- (iii) review the extent to which the systematic view of relief in the present report provides adequate coverage;
- (iv) take the general themes in this report into specialist areas where technical – sectoral – considerations can be addressed;
- (v) elaborate a practical method for (a) monitoring, and (b) evaluating, relief operations;

- (vi) explore the actual and preferred nature of donor (SIDA)-practitioner/partner relations; and
- (vii) review earlier relief policy and strategy analyses and their recommendations to determine what did or did not happen as a result of those evaluations.

(c) Specialist Literature Reviews and Case Studies

This will involve taking the process initiated by the present review and the anticipated regional consultation(s) further by means of:

- (i) specialist literature reviews, and
- (ii) case studies in the Horn as covered by this report with the addition of Northern Kenya.

These case studies should be project-driven, with sufficient time provided for detailed evaluative study, and should address the case for the establishment of baseline data required for evaluative purposes and the development of better monitoring and evaluation systems.

2. Administrative Institutions of Relief

Relief aid operations must be re-conceptualized to include rehabilitation of affected populations – refugees, displaced persons and in-situ victims. Detailed examination and review of administrative institutions and arrangements most conducive to best delivery and impact of this broader view of relief should include:

- (i) using cross-mandate agreements as compared with other approaches to inter-sectoral and inter-agency coordination;
- (ii) reviewing operational as compared with facilitating roles and responsibilities for non-governmental organizations, especially partner organizations;
- (iii) using, as much as possible, free market organizations in relief logistics and management – compared with the role of government, multilateral and NGO organizations;
- (iv) developing government and community level capacities to address relief and rehabilitation, as well as disaster preparedness, prevention and mitigation, to complement commerce-based operations;
- (v) assessing the efficacy of linking relief to non-relief ('development') oriented line ministries, other government agencies and NGOs;
- (vi) reviewing the comparative advantages of providing different types of relief through different channels as regards particular sectors such as health, food, infrastructure, logistics; and
- (vii) developing methods of addressing 'formal camp' situations for refugees and the so-called 'forgotten refugees' i.e. spontaneously settled refugees, and internally displaced people.

3. Strategic Planning: Situational and Structural Responses

Relief must address both the situational and structural aspects of emergencies at the same time by means of a parallel, not integrated, approach. In this way relief, to address situational aspects, should not lose out to development efforts. This parallel approach will involve:

- (i) making some conceptual and operational links between relief/rehabilitation and development interventions, and identifying the structural causes of situational problems, by way of:
- (ii) thinking and acting on two fronts simultaneously, when considering what support to give to relief efforts at the outset, i.e. solving immediate, emergency problems in ways conducive also to long-term actions for solving the underlying systemic problems,
- (iii) promoting active collaboration between SIDA Relief and SIDA Development departments, including requiring a Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation (DPPM) assessment of all development projects and relief activities,
- (iv) looking carefully at how situational and structural interventions interact so that one will not undermine the other,
- (v) ensuring that sufficient institutional capacity – through training, human resources development – is in place for implementing agencies (including UN agencies) to plan for, and carry out, a comprehensive relief strategy, including anticipated DPPM impact assessment, environmental impact assessment, etc.

4. SIDA Policy Strategy

As the process of review to which the present report is a contribution is taken further, SIDA should consider how to come to strategic positions for a more elaborated relief policy. This could involve:

- (i) taking a proactive rather than a reactive stance, developing a more critical interest in the relief activities which it funds and developing a dialogue with its partners about the best way to proceed, even to the extent of:
- (ii) developing its own priorities, for instance, as regards to what proportions of the total expenditure on relief aid should go to specific objectives (with monitoring and evaluation also receiving a percentage of total expenditure);
- (iii) placing conditions upon grants to relief partners according to the objectives of a comprehensive relief strategy;
- (iv) reviewing present practice as regards choice of partners and channels (which this review team senses to be narrow and restrictive while not ineffective);

- (v) funding not only projects or once-off interventions but also permanent organizations such as quick response standby-service units (ready to act on an emergency basis wherever needed), relief aid research and training units or institutes, and institutionalized Early Warning Systems (EWS) and contingency mechanisms which are not limited to technical but extend also to socio-political assessments.

5. SIDA Administrative Arrangements

In terms of administrative developments, it is suggested that SIDA consider:

- (i) staffing levels within the Emergency Relief Section which with 2% of the SIDA staff has responsibility for 20% of its expenditure,
- (ii) the qualifications of staff within the Emergency Relief Section so that they are able to develop necessary dialogues with partners and with political and other sources of structural analysis,
- (iii) the operational responsibilities of the Emergency Relief Section and the extent to which it should devolve some of its "phone answering" responsibilities to especially competent partners,
- (iv) the procedures within the Emergency Relief Section so that they are adjusted to the different partners and size of requests,
- (v) that all country frame programmes be required to include support for the development of DPPM strategies and activities and that these be supported through the DCO staff,
- (vi) that regular relief issues are dealt with through the DCOs so that relief activities can be better linked with development projects in the target countries and with political analysis from the embassies, thereby providing possibilities for addressing the structural aspects of emergencies,
- (vii) requiring partners operating in non-target countries to liaise with Swedish Embassies where they exist to ensure where possible structural aspects of emergency problems are considered,
- (viii) the number and terms of reference for SIDA's Emergency Relief Officer in the field, in the light of all the above so that their numbers, skills, and posting times allow them to take a more proactive - and prepared - stance, including:
- (ix) managing devolved responsibilities from headquarters to the field, especially in non-target countries.

6. Making Evaluation more Inclusive

The evaluation process should be broadened significantly to include:

- (i) SIDA relief decision-making in Stockholm,
- (ii) appeals processes followed by multilateral agencies and NGO's,
- (iii) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) policies and decision-making for relief and funding of multilateral agencies outside the SIDA Emergency Relief vote,
- (iv) the relationship between MFA and SIDA policies and decision-making processes,
- (v) the relationships between relief aid and development aid through each of the three channels – bilateral, multilateral, and NGO, and
- (vi) the relationship between relief as directed through the three different channels and various partners.

Annex A:

SCOPE AND FOCUS OF THE EVALUATION

The scope of the evaluation is presented below. Further, the following issues should be emphasized in the individual country sections:

- Ethiopia: reconstruction,
- Somalia: interventions during conflict, and the peace process,
- The Sudan: interventions during conflict and the use of UN channels.

Although Kenya is not specifically emphasized, situations there of relevance for the evaluation should be taken into account. The team is invited to report and comment on other parts of the region, where particular aspects need to be highlighted.

The evaluation will comprise – but not necessarily be limited to – the following aspects:

- A. *Impact.* It may be too early to undertake a full coverage evaluation of the effects of the Swedish disaster relief assistance. However, in several respects – survival, various aspects of health, the capacity of refugees to resettle or to repatriate, and effects on local markets and on a macro level – impact can be assessed. Based on actual deliveries, the evaluation will assess impact as far as possible, and whether effects are sustainable.
- B. *The preparatory process.* Several actors are involved in the start-up of an emergency operation. The evaluation will discuss initial measures, such as the local identification and assessment of needs, the impact of time and other constraints, early warning, the planning and decision-making of concerned actors in the recipient countries – including the selection of implementors – at the international level, and in Sweden, and the relevance of respective actions for the process and for its final results. Donors, implementing organizations, and recipients will be addressed.
- C. *The conflicts.* Against the background of a short description of the conflicts – genesis, history, the mechanisms, the change of regimes, the renaissance of ethnicity, weapons, demobilization – the evaluation will discuss to what extent the conflicts were fully understood and how this understanding was reflected in reporting, analysis, the formulation of objectives, and the design of disaster relief operations. The evaluation will also discuss whether, in which ways and to what extent this issue affected the implementation of operations, their effects and their impact.
- D. *Channels.* Almost all possible channels have been used in the Horn – UN, NGOs, Swedish government agencies, and recipient governments. The evaluation will assess their relative efficiency and reliability, measured in terms of their respective objectives and in comparable terms, such as cost terms. The reasons for and the rationale behind choosing one channel instead of another will be discussed, including the effect of using indicative planning figures. The UN channels are of particular interest.
- E. In several major operations, various problems connected with *donor coordination*

have caused an inefficient use of resources. In the present operation, the coordinating function of the UN and its DHA was emphasized early. Donor coordination in the Horn of Africa will be analyzed in the evaluation, based on an analysis of UN organizations, bilaterals, and NGOs.

- F. *Cooperation with the recipient countries.* The role of recipient governments and organizations is normally of prime importance for success. The evaluation will address this issue, analyzing the interplay between the actors and assessing the degree and quality of actual involvement.
- G. *Logistics.* Considerable amounts of Swedish aid have been allocated to logistics. The functioning and cost-efficiency of different transport options will be studied in the evaluation.
- H. *Refugees.* Against the background of a short description of the refugee situation, comprising the background for and the characteristics of individual refugee movements, including the roles of drought and conflict, the evaluation will address in particular the following aspects of the work performed: the analysis of the situation; the role of appeals; the relevance of plans of operation; their implementation; social, organizational and other aspects of refugee camps; preventive efforts; logistics, and timing.
- I. *Purposes.* Most Swedish funds have been used for food and other items to be distributed. Support measures such as logistics and coordination, and special programmes such as wells drilling, have also received substantial amounts. Normally, resources are linked to approved and specified purposes, which may allow greater impact. But Swedish funds are also granted to operations without being linked to any individual item within the operation.

It is considered one of the advantages of Swedish aid that it can be used flexibly, i.e., implementors may decide its final allocation, filling gaps in a total operation. This procedure entails a risk, however, that Swedish aid is used for and identified with purposes which are necessary components of an operation, but which would not be eligible on their own merits. This risk will be discussed in the evaluation.

Another issue to be addressed is fungibility, i.e., whether the presence of Swedish disaster relief has made it possible for armed conflicts or other disaster causes to continue. The evaluation will address the issue of choice of purposes, analyzing

- i) whether Swedish disaster relief in the Horn of Africa has had comparative advantages, and suggest whether it should preferably have been used for some purposes rather than for others, and
- ii) whether Swedish aid has been available on more flexible terms than that of other donors, and – if so – what is the overall value thereof.

The team will also assess whether agencies and organizations have been able to request and receive financing from disaster relief funds for development or other purposes.

- J. *Adjusting to changing circumstances.* Normally, timing is of critical importance in relief operations. In the Horn of Africa, drought was again threatening millions during 1990. The first SEPHA appeal was issued by the Secretary-General in January 1992. Subsequently, a series of appeals, requests, and decisions has been made, relating to occurred or anticipated events. The evaluation will discuss and assess the timing of decision-making and of interventions throughout the whole operation. The constraints created by the continuing conflicts in the region and the possibilities to execute humanitarian interventions in areas where fighting is going on will also be discussed.
- K. *Rehabilitation.* The issue of rehabilitation was addressed in decision-making regarding interventions in the Horn. The scale and form of interventions are relevant for the subsequent rehabilitation phase. The outcome of relief interventions will be

part of the conditions for subsequent rehabilitation and reconstruction. The evaluation will discuss whether the Swedish financed inputs have been conducive to rehabilitation and reconstruction.

- L. *Gender issues and the situation of children.* In-depth studies have shown that interventions, such as the provision of basic supplies to refugee populations, tend to favour male refugees at the expense of women and children and other more vulnerable groups. The evaluation will address effects on the target groups in terms of gender. This means inter alia the collection of gender disaggregated data.
- M. In all their work, the evaluators will attempt to draw *conclusions on two levels*—on that of the Horn of Africa itself and on a general one, i.e., addressing the issue of relevance of experiences for Swedish disaster relief at large. Key themes are lessons learned, comparability, suggestions to be considered in future operations, and suggestions for future, other evaluations. Subjects within the present assignment that need further study, such as, e.g., the control of funds or impact assessment, will also be suggested by the team.

Annex B:

SIDA Support to Relief Operations in the Horn of Africa 1990 to 1994 –

POLICY PARAMETERS AND PROGRESS

A. Introduction

This Annex provides an overview of the policies and processes of SIDA's support for relief operations in the Horn of Africa. It is based upon information obtained both from SIDA's headquarters in Stockholm and from discussions with SIDA officials, partner agencies and other donors in the field, and in Geneva. The amount of time allowed for discussions in Stockholm was limited. As a result no discussions were held with officials in the headquarters of the Swedish NGO partners or with sections within SIDA other than the Emergency Relief Section and the Evaluation Section.

B. Overall Policy Parameters

From the only statement of SIDA's emergency relief strategy available in English (SIDA 1993a, 35) it is possible to identify a number of policy orientations. These may be divided into four groups: goals or objectives, channels for disbursement, criteria for the choice of projects, and methods of operation or approach.

SIDA has two stated goals or objectives for its relief support:

- to save lives and mitigate human suffering, and
- to link relief to long term preventative operations in order to increase people's preparedness.

Emergency relief can be channelled in six ways:

- bilaterally to governments in SIDA's programme countries,
- via Swedish NGOs,
- via Swedish government organisations, such as Swedrelief,
- via UN organisations,
- via international organisations (including NGOs), and
- via local NGOs in SIDA's programme countries.

The criteria which affect the assessment of applications for emergency relief are:

- the aid capacity and capability of the organisation (which is applying for the funds),
- the relevance of the project in the context of the prevailing situation, including the presence of other organisations and donors, and

D. Processes of Application and Selection

Organisational Arrangements

Within the Swedish government system there are Ministries which make policy, and agencies, such as SIDA, which implement these policies. In general the ministries are relatively small and have no implementational responsibilities, while the agencies are much larger. With respect to emergency relief, SIDA is responsible for all decisions whichever channel is used and for administering support through the bilateral arrangements and NGOs. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is responsible for C1 International Aid Programme funds which it disburses to multilateral agencies, mainly the UN, without any reporting requirements.

In terms of staffing the multilateral aid section of the MFA (including the multilateral relief section) has some 70 staff. SIDA has around 500 staff in its headquarters and 120 or so in Development Cooperation Offices (DCO) in the field. The Emergency Relief Section within SIDA is located within the NGO Division, one of the 9 divisions of the Sector Department, the biggest part of SIDA. The Emergency Relief Section has only 8 to 10 staff, some 2% of SIDA's headquarters staff despite the fact that it administers the disbursement of SEK 1,500m a year (in 1993/94), 20% of the organisation's annual budget.

In addition, at any time, there are two or three Emergency Relief Officers (EROs) in the field, these being posted in areas with particularly severe emergency problems. At present there are such officers in Nairobi (for the Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi), Angola and Mozambique. Their terms of reference typically include the preparation and follow-up of emergency and humanitarian support, the gathering of information on needs and support for the emergency situations, and the scrutinisation of requests for support. However, their activities seem to be given little support from Stockholm with limited feedback on their reports. (This is, perhaps, due to the staffing constraints in the Emergency Relief Section and the reported heavy work load of the country desk officers.) In addition, there is no requirement of dialogue between them and Emergency Relief Section over completed relief activities: the reports on these are not sent to the EROs as a matter of course.

In addition the EROs do not have the right to initiate any relief projects. SIDA believes that these initiatives should all come from field partner organisations. This rule concerning project initiation has been neglected to a limited extent during the last four years in Ethiopia, with a number of projects having had some input from the ERO. This has ranged from encouragement to submit proposals, to specific ideas about their operational arrangements. (See Volume II Annex F on Ethiopia).

In addition to the emergency relief vote, funds for similar purposes may be provided from the country frame funds. These cases are handled by the DCO and the relevant Regional Department in SIDA Headquarters, while the Emergency Relief Section is not necessarily consulted.

There is a joint SIDA / MFA Emergency Relief Coordination Committee which until a few years ago used to include representatives of the Swedish Red Cross. This Committee meets once a month, or more frequently if circumstances require. Although this is strictly a SIDA committee, it is chaired by an ambassador from MFA who ensures that foreign policy goals are kept in view. While the Committee is responsible for the coordination of emergency relief, it has no decision-making power. (See below for decision making).

At the field level the relationship between SIDA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is changing as SIDA's Development Cooperation Offices (DCOs), which exist in the programme countries, are being brought within the Embassies. In future the Head of the SIDA DCO will report to SIDA through the Ambassador, and hence the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, rather than directly. This is part of a process to be found in several DAC countries

to bring development cooperation and emergency relief assistance much more under the control of the political part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As stated in Chapter One of this Volume, relief is not neutral, no more than is development.

Although there may be some potential for reallocation of development assistance funds and their supplementation during the year, the annual SIDA budget proposal does include a specific allocation for Emergency Relief. As a result the availability of Emergency Relief funds varies through the year, being best in July when the new financial year starts. Consequently, the level of SIDA allocations in response to requests can vary over the year. One reported problem is the failure of the SIDA internal financial monitoring system which is not able to always to assess the availability of unallocated relief funds. This is partly because they are divided among the different regional departments (e.g. REWA - Region for East and West Africa) at the start of the financial year in July and are not kept in the Emergency Relief Section which has no budget allocation funds or powers (see below, Application and Allocation Procedures for details).

The Emergency Relief funds have a number of characteristics. The most important of these is that they are not programmable. This means that funds cannot usually be secured for more than two years, and often only for much shorter periods. As a result long-term rehabilitation and the linking of relief into rehabilitation and development activities is not possible with these funds alone. To do this a project must obtain additional funding from the country frame, but this is only possible in target countries and these only receive some 10% of SIDA emergency relief funds. The argument behind this is that, for interventions of more than two years, country frame funds should be used. This is not possible, where, as is usual, the country frame funds are fully committed. Joint projects with emergency relief and country frame funds are thus rather rare.

The project agreements for Emergency Relief funds are very general and seldom give any detailed guidelines about implementation. This, combined with the fact that implementation is often through a partner, makes follow up of projects difficult by EROs where they exist and where their TOR permit this. Follow up is especially difficult in the case of the UN system where most grants are in response to general appeals and used with funds from other sources. As a result the local implementing organisation may not be aware of the origin of the funds being used. The situation is made worse by the fact that there is no mention in the Emergency Relief agreements that liaison should be maintained with the DCO.

Application Procedures

The applications for SIDA emergency relief funds can be divided into four groups, namely those made by recipient governments through bilateral contacts, by UN agencies, by international NGOs, and by Swedish NGOs, either on their own behalf or on behalf of their partners such as indigenous NGOs and international organisations (e.g. ICRC).

In the first case applications are made to the DCO or embassy and passed on to SIDA's Emergency Relief Section. UN agencies' appeals are made usually directly to the MFA, or occasionally via the Embassy in the country concerned, the request then being forwarded from MFA to SIDA with or without MFA recommendations. In the last but one case INGOs apply directly to SIDA or via a DCO or Embassy, while in the final case Swedish NGOs apply through their Headquarters in Sweden to SIDA.

The quality of the applications for relief funds which the review team has seen is variable. Generally there is little background information given and they are rather blueprint in nature with little sign of participatory processes being used in their preparation. However, standard forms do exist for the Swedish NGOs to complete and this facilitates decision making. (This might be considered for wider application.)

The decision-making process for all applications involves the Emergency Relief Section discussing the application with the country desk officers of the appropriate Regional Department within SIDA's headquarters. Where an ERO exists this person will be asked directly by the Emergency Relief Section to comment on all applications. There is little consultation with the DCOs in programme countries as they are concerned primarily with development and have been reluctant to get involved in relief issues.

The initial application, in the form of an Idea Memo, is then prepared as a Project Support Document by the Emergency Relief Section. This becomes a Decision Document once it is signed and noted by the responsible people. The crucial person in the decision-making, and budget holder for these decisions is the Head of the appropriate Regional Department; in the case of the Horn this is REWA (Region East and West Africa). The other persons involved in such decisions, who must sign as observers of the decision, are the Head of the Relief Section, and the Head of the NGO and Relief Division.

This coordination of relief decisions with the country desk officers is reported to have increased considerably in the last three years. Since 1992 the final decision over all emergency relief decisions has been made by the Head of the Regional Department concerned. This is an indication of the increased concern in SIDA for linking relief and development.

For all relief decisions of up to SEK 15m, SIDA can take the decision by itself through the Heads of the different regional departments signing the decision document. For sums above this figure the weekly meeting of ministers (i.e. the cabinet) has to approve the decision and then empower the SIDA to sign the decision document on behalf of the government. Where reference to the cabinet meeting is required the procedure is more lengthy and usually takes over a month. This is in contrast to decisions within SIDA which typically take two to three weeks, but can take only a few hours when necessary (as with the reallocation of funds from desert locust control to army worm control in Ethiopia in June 1994).

Despite the staffing constraints in the Emergencies Section, the review team encountered no complaints in the Horn about the speed of decision making and timeliness of SIDA support. In fact the opposite was mainly the case with SIDA being commended in most cases for the speed with which it makes decisions in response to requests, especially to NGOs, but also to UN agencies in most, but not all, cases.

Attempts have been made to streamline emergency decision making and to provide a firmer basis for the major "umbrella" NGOs working in this area by developing annual frame agreements for disaster relief. For projects of less than SEK 2m the NGO in question can make a decision using its own criteria to allocate these frame funds and then report this to SIDA. Such frame agreements have been made with five NGOs, namely Swedish Red Cross, PMU, LH/SKM, SMR and Diakonia). In contrast, it is reported that proposals from some of the smaller NGOs are given a very rigorous treatment. Similar frame agreements exists with UNHCR on a trial basis and will eventually be suggested for WFP and other UN agencies as appropriate. In addition WFP, UNHCR, and UNICEF annually receive from MFA major global funds which have the potential to be used for emergency operations at their discretion.

One final point about decision making is the rule of thumb response which is reported to occur with UN appeals. This is based on the belief that SIDA should provide about 5% of the sum for which the UN agency is appealing once the appeal is judged as worthy by MFA. It appears that this rule of thumb has come about because of a lack of more concrete criteria.

Follow-up Arrangements

The requirements for reporting on Emergency Relief funds allocated by SIDA are the same whichever channel is used for their disbursement. Reporting is required within 12-18 months after the funds are disbursed from SIDA. No interim report or other form of feedback is required whatever the size of the grant. Many agencies wait until the deadline and some reporting is delayed beyond that. In some cases interest by the DCO in the outcome of an Emergency Relief project has been rebuffed by the recipient organisation referring to the deadline.

While some progress has been made towards more standardised reporting of emergency relief funds, the reports are very general and provide little basis for any evaluation of the impact of the disbursement and discussion of the issues involved. Typically the reports consist of a factual reporting of disbursements with emphasis upon any variations from the agreed schedule and votes. There is no analysis of the success of the project and its contribution to wider relief, rehabilitation and developmental objectives.

These project performance reports are submitted to the Disaster Relief Section but its staff cannot always keep up with them. In June 1993 it was reported that there was a backlog of some 100 unread reports concerning the Horn. (This represents approximately two years of projects which means that the formal feedback of field experience to decision making is some 3.5 years out of date). Reports are not usually submitted to the DCO even where there is an Emergency Officer at the DCO unless a specific request is made. Similarly the Country Desk Officers in REWA do not receive these reports, despite the fact that they are the main advisors to the regional head who is responsible for the money.

With the limited distribution of the reports on Emergency Relief funds there tends to be little follow-up of this funding. No indication was seen that dialogues have been developed between SIDA and its implementing partners about the implementation methods, project formulation, and linkage to disaster prevention and development work. Part of the reason for this limited follow up is the absence of EROs in the field. It should also be noted, however, that attempts to follow up a project some 18 months after the time of expenditure are likely to be very difficult. This is also the case even where there are EROs as they tend to focus on a few areas of particular concern and follow those through and do not have the time to follow up all the projects funded by the Emergency Relief Section.

Despite the limited reporting required of emergency relief projects, some of the NGOs who do not yet have frame agreements are seeking such agreements precisely because of the reduced reporting they involve.

In contrast it should be noted that where the DCO has signed emergency relief agreements with local partners reporting is much more thorough with quarterly, bi-annual or annual reports required depending on the nature of the project.

There are clearly questions raised by this experience with reporting and follow up. While in part these questions could relate to possible expansion of staffing within the Emergency Relief Section, but they also relate to the distribution of responsibilities and the way in which reporting is organised and the support for it. Clearly a major responsible department at present is the relevant regional department as the budget holder and the role of the country desk officers in the follow up of projects needs to be reviewed if this arrangement continues. In addition, the recognition of the value of reporting among partner agencies needs to be encouraged so that reporting is seen as useful and is used by them. Further digestion of reporting by "umbrella" partner NGOs might also be developed once reporting is seen as useful by them so that SIDA itself is not involved in following up every individual project.

Whatever the arrangements which are considered and accepted, they must above all

lead to a better learning process and one which helps relief partners address emergency situations more comprehensive, considering structural as well as situational aspects.

Annex C:

ORGANIZATION AND METHOD OF THE REVIEW

(a) Aims, scope and nature of the review

The aims of the review were set out in the Terms of Reference. The major points are extracted and presented in Annex A. In the course of the initial briefing in Stockholm it was suggested that the review team should also consider whether SIDA's strategy for emergency relief, especially for complex emergencies, was sufficiently clear, proactive and comprehensive. It emerged that for some officers a major concern was with regard to the very large sums of money which, as it was said, were 'thrown' at relief. It was surmised by those expressing this concern that a more directed and judicious use of such funds might enable them to have more positive effect. It was also clear that there was little known about the effects of the present approach, while the precise patterns within the overall funding was poorly understood other than (as annexed to the TOR) simply by appeal and project.

All in all, therefore, it transpired that the review's TOR (Annex A) required elements of revision (or at least re-interpretation) amounting to greater emphasis on programme review - rather than project evaluation - aims.

It had seemed evident from the outset to all team members that, with the time and resources available, it would not be practicable to come up with a series of project evaluations of any seriousness. Now, with the revision of aims, it seemed that what was required was not that anyway but an issues-driven review of a policy programme. 'How', asked one SIDA officer introspectively and with much earnestness, 'should we think about humanitarian aid now?' Evidently considerable transcendence of particularities was required of the review with greater emphasis given to the broad lessons which could be learned rather than the specific experiences of individual projects. (Indeed the TOR called for findings to be particular in some respects but general, and lessons-oriented, in others).

Of the various ways in which such 'transcending' of the particular could be achieved, the team opted to devise and take a theoretical view of relief as a process and to relate its observations and conclusions to this. In doing this, the team decided that its task was to consider at the same time both 'structural' as well as 'situational' dimensions of disasters and the relief required.

Evaluative research usually includes a comparative perspective of some sort be in its design. For example, one donor's approach may be studied in comparison with that of another, or one form of aid - eg relief aid - could be assessed in contrast with another - eg development aid - where such a programme distinction can reasonably be drawn. Similarly strategy with much emphasis on policy conditionalities could be appraised in part by being compared and contrasted with strategy with emphasis on policy dialogue.

Per contra, evaluation consultancies, are more limited in their design. They are seldom

comparative. Instead consultants are selected for their breadth of earlier experience which hopefully extends to comparative cases. Ideally, review teams (as in the present case), also benefit from having experience not only in consultancy and research, but also in management.

The review team responsible for the present investigation was selected to comprise four persons each with considerable experience in The Horn and neighbouring countries (and in the case of the team leader elsewhere in the world as well) in the areas relevant to this review's ToR. As is usual in the case of consultancy, recruitment was strongly driven by availability (at, in academic terms, a moment's notice) as well as expertise. Nationality considerations were not seen as crucial either by the funding or the implementing parties. The fact that some members had previously worked together was taken into account positively but again was not a deciding factor for recruitment.

On the subject of the composition of the team it is further to be noted that, in this case, the option preferred was one of 'independence' in the sense that its members were all 'outsiders' to the organizations (some of) whose activities were to be reviewed. Only one member was joined by a (former) SIDA staffer and that for only a few days. To make some compensation for this the team leader remained in Nairobi to meet SIDA's Regional Emergency Officer on his return from summer leave in Sweden. (Because of such leave no Swedish Ambassador could be interviewed by any team member). At no point was there any government or NGO participation as a member of the team. Another factor which in effect limits the credentials of the team as an evaluation mission is that it proved not possible to make full use of the budget item for local consultants to be recruited in the Horn, although two (also one local assistant) were employed for a total of 25 days.

To make up for such limitations of credentials every effort was made to talk with representatives of as wide a variety of interested parties as possible. These included government staff involved both with relief and rehabilitation and with policy and sectoral issues of relevance. Project staff of partners agencies as well as senior managers in these (including country representatives) were also interviewed while researchers working in the area of emergencies and relief were also interviewed. Field visits were undertaken where possible and field staff and some beneficiaries and local government official interviewed. SIDA Stockholm inputs were made through meetings with one or more members of the team at the outset in Stockholm (familiarization and briefing visits) and through debriefing (in Stockholm) and follow-through (at The Hague).

(b) Division of labour

In organising the review mission's activities, to begin with a division of labour was decided. This was undertaken with little reflection, for this division had seemingly been settled for the team before it met and this was rather taken for granted at that point in the process. Three team member were to work individually in different countries of the Horn, these being chosen on the basis of their previous experience and current access. One was to serve as team leader and circulate, while at the same time paying particular attention to gaps and, where possible, to multilateral organizations.

We worked therefore more as individuals forming a loose net, rather than as a tight team. This was partly by choice. The aim was that this issues-driven review should capture as many issues as possible on the basis of individual travel and access. This approach was also partly a result of circumstance. An enormous geographical area had to be covered in a very short time and, compared with other humanitarian relief aid reviews in the countries in the region, by only a small team.

The team met jointly and as a whole for only six days in the course of the entire assignment. Two were at The Hague, before the fieldwork in the Horn, one in Nairobi well

into the period of field inquiry, and three back at The Hague almost immediately after the month of fieldwork in the Horn. The purpose of the team meeting before the fieldwork was partly to meet each other (for the first time for some), as well as to jointly decide matters of initial strategy (to be more issues- than project-driven). At this same meeting the common theoretical view of relief as a process was agreed in outline (perhaps surprisingly almost instantaneously and somewhat casually). Also some of the headings – which became those comprising Chapter 3.C – were identified.

The team meeting in Nairobi during the fieldwork reviewed progress, re-affirmed the anticipated difficulty of project-level work on the basis of actual experience. At the same time a common frame for presentation of project-level impressions was agreed, to make for easy cross reference and to facilitate identification of illustrative cases of best project practice and worst. The theoretical frame was refined. It was decided who would be responsible for first drafts of sections – which were then identified provisionally – of what would become Volume 1.

The meeting at ISS back at The Hague (the base for the time being, but with interruptions, of two team members) finalized chapter headings and subheads on which the organization of the synoptic report depended. Also pencilled in were some main lines of findings and conclusions. Agreements were reached as to how the writing would be finalised and the general nature of the two day visit to organizations in Geneva by two of the team was arranged.

The agreed arrangements for the production of the Final Draft Report (FDR) were that Vols I and II would be prepared as simultaneously as possible. It proved impossible to achieve the ideal that Vol II would be readied before Vol I so that the latter could be compiled from the former mainly by the team leader (who was not writing any country material). In the event, Vol I of the FDR had to be prepared (over a longer period than anticipated) through circulation of the team leader among members and circulation of pieces of drafts via fax and phone conversations in the absence for the most part of Volume II. (In its final form and wording, Vol I perforce owes most to the time given to this task by only two of the team of four.) Vol II materials, in toto, took much longer to produce from their observations and readings than their authors originally expected.

(c) Evidence and measures

In the Horn, physically reaching projects proved difficult. This was because of security problems or travel problems in the heavy rains season. So the principal allocation of time necessarily had to go to identifying knowledgeable officials willing and able to meet the team members. They were generally interviewed in their offices. Among other things the obvious drawback of this approach is that very few beneficiaries in the villages and camps could be reached. However, it was the team's view that only casual information could have been collected from brief visits to villages and camps. On the other hand if these had been considerably prolonged this would have meant that only four or five could be made and that would have made it more difficult to take any transcendent, or overall, view. An additional problem was that project monitoring data series simply do not exist, let alone in-house evaluations of sufficient scope, which the review team could work from.

Not getting to very many actual projects also meant that opportunities to meet project-level officials and others in the Horn were few and far between. In addition, those normally invaluable conversations that one has in the long convivial journey in the vehicle going out to the project couldn't happen either.

Up to a point, and even for an issues-driven rather than a project-driven review, lack of detailed project performance data is a drawback. But an issues-driven review does not depend for its evidence on project-data mainly. Rather, what it does require in full measure

is an understanding of the institutional context of policy and intervention, and a sense of what it is reasonable to expect and require of the management of emergencies (given present or enhanced levels of training and institutional capacity). Such management is not to be expected to be or become able actually to prevent an emergency from ever happening again - there will always be a next time. But it is reasonable to require that it should proceed so as to ensure that next time the scope and scale of emergency support required can be less than would otherwise be likely to be the case. *What, in short, is required of relief this time is that it should seek to make a serious difference to emergencies seen as both longer-run processes and immediate events.*

The standard principal method of eliciting evidence and argument on which a programme policy review must rely heavily is that known as 'triangulation'. Ideally this should be informed wherever possible by access, on the part of those interviewed and interviewer alike, to project performance data. But even in the relative absence of this latter, as is characteristic of relief situations, some evaluable issues may be addressed. In the absence of hard data, one has to manage as best one can with soft information, for instance as regards the effectiveness and impact and other characteristics of relief at the point of delivery (see the series of subheads in Vol 1, Chapter 3.C).

The term 'impact' in an evaluation study refers to something deeper and broader than 'effectiveness'. Thus typically TOR (as in the present case) ask for judgements as to both 'effectiveness' and 'impact'. This, however, is a tall order. The single method of approach a review team has to adopt when faced by extremely limited time and resources will find it difficult to be so comprehensive. To explore these concepts will illustrate why.

By 'effectiveness' (and of course 'ineffectiveness') is normally meant, as in the present review, something close to 'outputs' delivered, including the 'implementation' of these. 'Outputs' and 'implementation' come from 'inputs', i.e. material and human resources allocated, actually released and made available. To proceed with this illustration, levels of effectiveness reached may then be measured against inputs. As a result they may then be judged to be 'efficient' (eg cost efficient) or otherwise. To be able to come to such efficiency judgements requires an array of project performance data (including financial and related costs where a cost-efficiency exercise is required). This simply was not available to the present review. (Undoubtedly a future task for a suitable composed group would be to turn every stone available and to come up with the best approximation to a cost-efficiency analysis of relief.)

When 'impact' is taken to mean something broader and deeper than 'effectiveness', questions are to be asked for instance about whether an operation was well conceived or not in the first place. Was the problem that was addressed the relevant problem? The idea behind thinking in this way about 'impact' is that even a successful - and cost-efficient - operation 'fails' if the patient dies immediately (or later) of the same or a similar affliction. Impact assessment must also consider the matter not only of the now and later, but also of the here and there (targeted and surround areas) at the same time (and later). Here the point is that the impact of relief may be felt not only by those who do receive it, but also by those who don't.

Therefore effectiveness and impact questions are somewhat different. To answer either type requires an inter-disciplinary and inter-sectoral approach, and elements of a common policy-theoretical framework. But the precise methods and resources required for these vary. Organizing concepts vary also. In the terminology devised for this review, situational analysis depends more heavily on effectiveness than impact information. In the case of structural analysis the emphasis is the other way about.

TEAM MEMBERS' SCHEDULES IN THE HORN

RA: Raymond Apthorpe
JK: Jip Ketel
MS: Mohamed Salih
AW: Adrian Wood

So Somalia
Er Eritrea
K Kenya
Su Sudan
Et Ethiopia

RA:
 June 9-18: Et
 July 18-30: K
 July 30-August 3: Et
 August 11-13: Et
 August 13-18: K

JK:
 July 12-15: Su
 July 15-21: Er
 July 22-27: K
 July 27-29: Su
 July 30-31: K
 August 1-6: Et
 August 6-8: Er

MS:
 June 9-16: Et
 July 23-August 4: K
 August 5: Et
 August 6-10: So
 August 11-14: Et

AW:
 July 4-22: Et
 July 23-24: K
 July 25-31: Et

Annex D:

PERSONS INTERVIEWED AND INSTITUTIONS VISITED

(With apologies for omissions, due to missing records)

In Sweden

Swedish Government – Stockholm

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Carl Olof Cederblad, Ambassador, Coordinator for Disaster Relief

Anders Pedersen, First Secretary, International Development Cooperation

Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA)

Stephan Dahlgren, Head, Evaluation Department

Bie Granbom, Head, Emergency Relief Section

David Friberg, Programme Officer for Emergency Relief in the Horn of Africa

David Abresparr, Desk Officer for Ethiopia and Eritrea, REWA, subsequently Economist,
DCO, Addis Ababa

Lars Tengroth, Desk Officer designate for Ethiopia and Eritrea, REWA

Non-governmental organizations

Life and Peace Institute

Sture Normark, Editor, Horn of Africa Bulletin

Nordiska Afrikainstitutet (the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies)

Jonathan Baker, Senior Research Fellow, Leader of the Urban Development in Rural
Context in Africa Programmes

Individuals

Krister Eduards, Consultant, Stockholm Group for Development Studies

Karin Metell, Consultant to Mission Team

In Ethiopia

Ethiopian Government Organisations

Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC)

Abade Zemo, Deputy Commissioner

Getachew Tesfaye, Head, Fund Raising Coordination Department

Teferi Bekele, Head, Aid Programme Coordination and Monitoring Department
Kifle Mariam, Head, Regional Coordination Section
Tedla Desta, Head, Early Warning Department
Ayele Belachew, Head, Transport and Logistics Department
Hirpa Kabeta, Transport Department (responsible for Alpha Trucks)
Torgny Nyholm, Transport Management Advisor
Ben H.M. Van Ampting, Project Manager, Strategic Transport Fleet for RRC (formerly Transport Operation for Refugees Organization – TOR)
Mesfin Asfere, Head, South Wollo Zone, Relief and Rehabilitation Bureau

Commission for the Rehabilitation of Members of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans

Mulugeta Gebre Hiwot, Commissioner
Awgechew Negash, Head, Planning and Programming Service

Administration for Refugee/Returnee Affairs (ARRA)

Abreha Haile Michael, Deputy Director

Ministry of Agriculture

Bekele Haile, Modal Officer for Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation
Wzo Haimanot, Head, Crop Protection Dept
Elias Ergitho, Head, Finance Department

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection

Solomon Abate, A/Manager, Soil Conservation Research Project

Kutaber Wereda

Berhanu Aragau, Wereda Administrator

Multilateral Organisations

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Peter Simkin, Resident Representative
Mary Symmonds, Assistant Resident Representative, Programme Area 4

World Food Programme (WFP)

Pieter Dijkhuizen, Deputy Country Director
Jean Quartier, Coordinator, Monitoring and Logistics
Kumucha Grange, Senior Logistics Office
Lemma Jembere, Logistics Officer
Jesus Cespedes, Project Officer, Rehabilitation of Agricultural and Forest Lands
Tsfaye, Information Officer

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

Sobhi M. Abdel-Hai, Senior Project Officer, Emergency & Basic Services
Musa A. Bungudu, Emergency Project Officer

Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)

Ms. Marjorie Smith-John, Deputy Representative
Sissay, Emergency Programmes Officer

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

Dennis Blair, Assistant Representative (Programme), Regional Liaison Office for Africa
Tarik Muftic, Repatriation Officer
Ahmed Yusuf Farrah, Consultant to UNHCR

Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia (EUE)

(formerly Emergency Prevention and Preparedness Group (EPPG))

Jim Borton, Head

Mark Bidder, Programme Officer

Wolfgang Meinzing, Consultant on Migratory Pests (for Army Worm outbreak)

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

Lucas T Tandap, Chief, Environment Unit, Natural Resources Division

Ali I.M. Todaro, Deputy Exec. Secretary

Donors**Embassy of the United States of America**

Sharon L. Carper, Programme Officer for Refugees

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

Mike Harvey, Programme Officer for Relief

Kay Sharp, Famine and Early Warning Project Manager

Yohannes Habtu, Famine and Early Warning Project Officer

Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities

Dieter Meschwitz, Programme Consultant for Relief

GTZ, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GMBH

Atena Belete, Assistant Coordinator, Ex-Soldiers Reintegration Project

Rolf Nolke, Manager, RRC Restructuring Project

Swedish Government – Ethiopia

Development Cooperation Office, Swedish Embassy, Addis Ababa

Michael Stahl, Counsellor and Head DCO

Claes Norrlof, Senior Economist

Daag Skoog, First Secretary, Senior Programme Officer for Natural Resources

Gunnar Thunstrom, First Secretary, Emergencies Officer

Swedish Non-Government Organisations**Swedish Philadelphia Church Mission**

Hakan Elm, A/ Director

Mamo Mulugeta, Relief Coordinator

Seth Malmvern, Manager, South Omo Project

Daniel Gezahegne, Manager, Kundi Project

Rädda Barnen (Swedish Save the Children)

Lennart Reinius, Resident Representative

International Humanitarian Organisations

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

David Horobin, Relief Coordinator
Atoussa K. Parsey, Information & Reporting Delegate
William Knocker, Field Monitor, South Wollo Zone

International Committee of the Red Cross

Bertrand Kern, Deputy Head of Delegation

Northern Non-Government Organisations

The Lutheran World Federation

Paavo Farm, Resident Representative
Jan Schutte, Deputy Resident Representative
Melkamnesh Alemu, Relief Programme Coordinator
Gebreyes Haile, Soil and Water Conservation Projects Manager

Concern

Brian Nugent, Country Representative
Fesseha Gedamu, Agriculture & Natural Resources Programme Officer

NORAGRIC DFS

Dr Arne Olav Oyhus, Researcher
Yves Pieper, Forester
Elke Peiler, Forester

Save the Children Fund (UK)

Ben Foot, Country Representative
John O'Dea, Head, Nutrition Surveillance and Early Warning Programme

OXFAM (UK)

Liz Stone, Deputy Country Representative
I.T. Transport,
Colin Relf, Executive Director

Medecins Sans Frontieres, Holland

Nick Heemskerk, country Representative

Ethiopian Non Government Organisations

Ethiopian Red Cross Society

Abraham Workineh, Secretary General
Mesfin Halefom, A/Head, Relief & Social Services Department
Tana, Head, Development Department
Marcos Lake, Head, Finance Department
Tesfaye Mechecha, Branch Secretary, South Wollo Zone

Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus

Lulseged Alemayehu, Associate General Secretary
Bodja Gelacha, Head, Relief Department
Wakjira Gute, Coordinator, Ex-Soldiers Rehabilitation Programme
Iphrahim, Assistant Head, Project Implementation and Monitoring Dept
Berhanu, Manager, North Shoa Integrated Rural Development Project
Dereje Jaleta, Site Team Leader, North Shoa Integrated Rural Development Project

Integrated Holistic Approach /Urban Development Project

Sister Jembere Tefera, Director

Food for the Hungry

Melesse Birru

Development Aid for Youth (DAY)

Asrat Gebre, Director

Christian Relief and Development Organisation

Brother Gus O'Keefe, Director

Fikrite, Publicity Officer

REST

Teklewoini Assefa, Director

Berhane Gebresenganu, Dept. Director

Berhane Wolde Tessai, Fund Raising

Abdul Khadir Mohammed, Head Fin/Admin

Ibabe, Head Agri. Dept.

Tadesse Woldu, Agricultural Officer

Kiflom Belete, Environmental Officer

REST Credit Scheme

GebreMariam Tessema, Project Director

Yeman LakeMariam, Branch Manager

Nebiat GabreGerges, Field Worker

Zufan Negusse, Field Worker (stagiaire)

Gide Meressa, Creditholder

Shashe Worke Tafere, Creditholder

Mebrahte Gezagne, Creditholder

Ethiopian Private Organisations**ALHPA Truckers Association**

Yemane, Chairman of the Board

Solomon, General Manager

Private Individuals in Ethiopia

Shimelis Adugna, former Commissioner of Relief and Rehabilitation Commission

Asfaw Jemeru, Founder of the Asfaw School

Tegegne Gebre Egziabher, Head, Department of Geograhpy, Addis Ababa University

Tegegne Teka, Research Fellow, Institute for Development Research, Addis Ababa University

Dessalegn Rahmato, Senior Researcher Fellow, Institute for Development Research, Addis Ababa University

Alula Pankhurst, Head, Department of Sociology and Anthropology

Laura C. Hammond, Doctoral Research Student, University of Wisconsin at Madison

Simon M. Woods, Accountant, auditing Ethiopian Red Cross Society

KPMG Peat Marwick

Intergovernmental Organisations for the Horn of Africa**Desert Locust Control Organisation, East Africa**

Dr A.H. Karrar, Director

In Kenya

a) Nairobi

Swedish Embassy

Dorrit Alpaeus-Stahl, Counsellor

Carl Bertil Lostelius, Head, Development Cooperation

Maria Nordenfelt, Senior Programme Officer

Rädda Barnen

Hirut Tefferi, Resident Programme Manager

UNICEF

Helena Eversole, Programme Officer

Seifulaziz Milas, Evaluation Unit

UNDO

Yemane Tekle Mariam

Elias Habte Selasse

Lutherian World Federation

Stefan Savensted

UNHCR

Millcet Kanungi, Information and Public Relations

UNOSOM

Knut Bauer, Department of Humanitarian Affairs

Babiker Khalifa, Political Liaison Officer

Life and Peace Institute

Representative and Senior Advisor

Rapid Relief Wing

KeA Arlund, Manager

UNDP

Naigzy Gebemedhin

b) Nairobi-Kakuma (Turkana)

Visit to Kakuma Refugee Camp with Allebel Derib (Rädda Barnen, Acting Programme Coordinator for South Sudan):

Fedele Majok Mabior, Social Worker

Stephan Karanja, Field Assistant Group Care

Ater Barnaba Klour, Inspector Minor Groups

Vincent Mangok, Social Worker

Looel Andrew Ekan, Pre-School Educator

Eduard E. Acheni, Field Assistant Foster Care

Fatuma Juma Ismail, Project Coordinator

Allebel Derib, Programme coordinator South Sudan

Kakuma-Lokichokio

UNICEF/OLS

Ognjen Predja, Camp manager

Jennifer Johnson, PO

Trevor Harvey, Security Officer

Karl ..., Logistics Officer

Food Dropping in Maiwut with Belgian Air Force hercules

UNICEF/OLS

Douglas Johnson, Oper. Manager

SCF-UK

Gilly Furnivall, Ass. Relief Coordinator

UNICEF/OLS

David Hughes, Agricultural Officer

OXFAM, UK

Mary Davies, Logistics Officer

CIDA

Melville Middleton, PO-Nairobi

IN DIRE DAWA AND DJIBOUTI

Ahmed Abdel Rahman, Ex-SNM Commander

UNHCR Djibouti

Elike K. Segbor

ONARS

Ahmed Samireh, Executive Secretary

Refugees and Returnees Administration

Mandefro Tegegne, Ex-Director

In Republic of Somaliland

Government

Muse Bihil Abdi, Minister of Interior

Mohamed Ali Ati, Minister of Minerals and Water Resources

UNICEF

George Ngatiri, Health/Nutrition Officer

Erasmus Morah, Chief Monitoring and Evaluation Officer

UNHCR Somaliland Republic

Anthony Moga, Field Officer

Food for the Hungry

Melesse Birru

In Sudan

a. Khartoum

WFP

Lucielo Ramirez, Resident Representative
John Crisci, Information Officer
Benedict Fultang, Development Advisor

UNICEF

Mohammed A. Tayyarah, SPO
Per E. Wam, PO
Bob McCarthy, P.O. Emergencies

OXFAM-UK

John Buttery, Country Representative
Amal Kunna, Development Coordinator

ACORD

Dr. Samira Amin Ahmed, Country Representative

Eritrean Embassy

Consul

Displaced People Camp in Djebel, 2 Field Officers of the DOD

UNHCR

Margaret O'Keeffe, Representative

SCC

Agyedo O'Bwogo, Relief Coordinator
Richard Tito Longa, Administrator

Radda Barmen

Omer Hassan Saad, Local Representative

b. South Sudan

Lokichokio-Akot

Visit to Akot and Billings in SPLA Controlled Area in South Sudan

Oxfam-UK

Bol Yuol, Prog. Manager
Anna de Roos, Nutrition Officer
Jimmy Okot, Veterinary Officer
Manasah Mayen, Agric. Officer

Visit to Road Project, Sudanese Household

Visit to 2 hospitals, market:

Dr Elijah Makender, Medical Coordinator, Billings

CUSH (Akot)

Andrea Maketh, Programme Coordinator

In Eritrea

ACORD

Hasabenebi
Administrator

UNICEF

Justin Maeda, Resident Representative
Tsehaye Haile, Education
Debessaï Haile, Health

UNDP

Herbert P. M'Cleod, Resident Representative
Claudette Walker, Deputy Resident Representative
Ahmed Raju, Funding Assistant
Goder Yohannes, NPO PROFERI

UNFPA

Diana Langston, PO

ERRA

Teklemichael Woldegiorgis, Deputy Director

LWF

Bram Voets, Country Representative

Eritrea Electricity Authority

Abraham W. Micael, General Manager
Halotu G. Amlak, Technical Manager

Ministry of Finance and Development

TesfeMariam Tekie, Development Department

Office of the President

Ghennet G/Micael, Int. Econ. Coop.
Berhane Abrehe, macro Policy and International Cooperation

Department of Social Affairs

Tewolde Zerizghi, Head Planning
Abraham Berhe Sereke, Head Family Reunification
Ghezae Embaye, Head Street Children

Rädda Barnen

Abrehet Asfaha, Administrator
Per Tam, Resident representative (Eritrea and Sudan)
Eva Lundblad, Deputy Representative
Ghebrehiwet Berhane, PO

UNV

Sue Lemesurer, PO

Ministry of Education

Wedi Bashay, Administrator

Tamasgan Tekie, Project Coordinator

CERA

Gerense Kelati, Commissioner

UNHCR

Arnulv Torbjornsen, Chargé Mission

Peter Cook, Administrator

WFP

Lalit Godamunne, Country Director

Köping Adograt twinning school project and returnee settlement, Mensur

Woldegaber Gabreab, Director of School

Mihny Heiny and Ahmed Osman, Local Administrators

Samuel Tareki, Agricultural Officer

In London**Overseas Development Institute, London**

John Borton, Head, Relief Studies Network

Save the Children (UK)

Angela Penrose, Deputy Head, Public Relations and Information Dept

In Geneva**International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies**

Christopher Jackson, Desk Officer, Africa Department

Simon Missiri, Programme Officer, Africa Department

Marcel Fortier, Somalia Section

Pentti Haapiseva, Chargé de Programmes, Africa Department

International Council of Voluntary Agencies

Burgess Carr, Director, Humanitarian Affairs

DHA

Randolph Kent

The Lutheran World Federation

Brian Neldner, Department for World Service, Director

Carol Birkland, Secretary for Evaluation and Documentation

UNHCR

Mohammed Dualeh, Senior Public Health Officer

Refugee Policy Group: Centre for Policy Analysis and Research on Refugee Issues

Jacques Cuénod

Annex E:

SOME REFERENCES CONSULTED

I. GENERAL RELIEF AND EMERGENCY STUDIES (Horn and wider)

Bohle, H et al (eds.) *Famine and food security in Africa and Asia. Indigenous response and external intervention to avoid hunger.* Bayreuth, Verlag: Naturwissenschaftliche Gesellschaft Bayreuth e.V. (Bayreuth Geowissenschaftliche Arbeiten 15)

Bondestam, L., 'Disasters raise difficult questions: a review of Swedish emergency aid' in P. Fruhling, ed. (1986), *Swedish Development Aid in perspective*, Stockholm.

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Borton, J. et al (1993) *Evaluation of ODA support for NGO post-flood rehabilitation activities in Bangladesh 188-89.*

Devereux, S. (1993), *Theories of Famine, Harvester.*

Hutchinson, R.A. (1991) *Fighting for survival. Insecurity, people and the environment in the Horn of Africa.* Gland, Switzerland, IUCN.

Johansson, E. (1993) *Literature search on disaster relief.* Stockholm, Secretariat for Analysis of Swedish Development Assistance.

Keen, D. (1993), *Famine, needs assessment and survival strategies in Africa*, Oxfam Research Papers 8, Oxford.

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Maxwell, S. (1993) *Response to drought and famines in sub-Saharan Africa: a new agenda.* (mimeo).

Ross, J., Maxwell, S. and Buchanan-Smith, M. (1994) *Linking relief and development.* Report on a workshop held at Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex. Falmer, Brighton, IDS, University of Sussex.

Swift, J. (1993), 'Understanding and preventing famine and famine mortality', I.D.S. Bulletin vol. 24, No. 4 (and indeed all the contributions to this Bulletin issue)

Thompson, C. (and Food Security Unit, SADDG) (1993), Drought Management Strategies in Southern Africa, UNICEF, Nairobi

2. SIDA DOCUMENTS

SIDA (1993a) SIDA's Strategies. Stockholm, SIDA.

SIDA (1993b) Redefining the role of the state and the market in the development process. Stockholm, SIDA.

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SIDA (1994) State, market and aid. Redefined roles. Stockholm, SIDA.

3. ETHIOPIAN DOCUMENTS

a. General situational and donor policy documents

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Hansson, G. (1993) Transition in Ethiopia, 1991-1993. Lund, The Planning Secretariat, Lund University. (Macroeconomic Studies 45/93)

Rowe, R. (1994) "Ethiopia: emerging from a long dark age". The Courier, No 145, pp. 16-22.

USAID (June 1993) Back to the Future

Zapata, G. (1993) Preliminary study on the social effects of structural adjustment in Ethiopia: how to measure them and limit their impact. (Report submitted to Radda Barnen)

b. Relief situation and relief management studies on Ethiopia in general

Borton, J. (1994) The changing role of NGOs in the provision of relief and rehabilitation assistance: Case Study 3, Northern Ethiopia and Eritrea. London, Overseas Development Institute. (Working Paper 76).

Dessalegn Rahmato (1991) Famine and survival strategies. A case study from northeast Ethiopia. Uppsala, Scandinavian African Studies Institute.

Gebreyes Haile (October 1992) Food and Hunger Situations in Ethiopia. (mimeo, LWF)
Gebreyes Haile (January 1994) Continuum from relief to rehabilitation and development. (mimeo, LWF)

GTZ (December 1993) Management and Effects of Food Aid Interventions in Ethiopia (1985-1993) Evaluation Study (Prepared by GTZ)

Holt, J and Lawrence, M. (1993) Making ends meet. A survey of the food economy of the Ethiopian north-east highlands. London, SCF UK.

Maxwell, S. (1994) Linking relief and development: an Ethiopian case study. (mimeo).

Melkamnesh Alemu (1993) Can emergency relief assistance be used as the basis for long term development to prevent famine in Ethiopia? M.Sc. Thesis, University of London.

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Wood, A.P. (1976) "Farmers' responses to drought in Ethiopia". In Abdul Mejid Hussein (ed.) Rehab: drought and famine in Ethiopia. London, International African Institute, pp. 67-88. (African Environment Special Report 2).

c. *Current relief situation*

Early Warning System (December 1993) Food Supply Prospect in 1994 (Crop Growers and Nomads) (Prepared for RRC)

Early Warning System (April 1994) Food Situation in 1994 and Assistance Requirements (Prepared for RRC)

RRC and UNICEF (February 1994) RRC and UNICEF 1994 Appeal for non-food emergency assistance.

Save the Children (UK) (May 1994) The current food situation in Ethiopia. A SCF position paper (Prepared by Mark Bowden)

UNEUE (December 1993) Situation Report

UNEUE (April 1994) Food Situation Report for Ethiopia

UNEUE (May 1994) The Main Elements of the Revised 1994 RRC Appeal

WFP (June 1994) Emergency Report for Africa : Situation Report No. 1

d. *Government policy towards disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation*

(in chronological order despite different authors!)

Relief and Rehabilitation Commission / UNDP (1992) Memorandum of understanding on the implementation of the cross mandate concept.

Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (December 1992) Vulnerability Profile in Famine Prone Areas of Ethiopia: An in-depth study of five awrajas. (Study to assist in the development of DPPM Policy) (Prepared by Shawel Consult-International)

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Transitional Government of Ethiopia (November 1993) Annex 1 Sub-Programme on Institutional Strengthening.

Transitional Government of Ethiopia (November 1993) Annex 2 Sub-Programme on Advocacy/Support to Macro Policy for Disaster Preparedness.

Transitional Government of Ethiopia (November 1993) Annex 3 Sub-Programme on Area-based Integrated Development Programme.

Transitional Government of Ethiopia (November 1993) Annex 4 Sub-Programme for Migration and Pastoral Development.

Transitional Government of Ethiopia (November 1993) Annex 5 Sub-Programme on Food Assistance.

Transitional Government of Ethiopia (December 1993) Aide Memoire, National Workshop on DPPM.

Transitional Government of Ethiopia (December 1993) Programme Document, Annotated Outline for DPPM Policy Workshop.

Transitional Government of Ethiopia (March 1994) Annex 6 Sub-Programme on Migration.

Transitional Government of Ethiopia (January 1994) Establishment of National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Fund.

Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (January 1994) Cattle camps and other livestock services. (Study to assist in the development of DPPM Policy) (Prepared by Shawel Consult-International)

Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (January 1994) Non-drought disaster propensity in Ethiopia. (Study to assist in the development of DPPM Policy) (Prepared by Shawel Consult-International)

Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (January 1994) Labour-intensive off-the-shelf projects. (Study to assist in the development of DPPM Policy) (Prepared by Shawel Consult-International)

Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (January 1994) Secondary economic activities. (Study to assist in the development of DPPM Policy) (Prepared by Shawel Consult-International)

Relief and Rehabilitation Commission / RRB Dessie (1994) Criteria for identification of beneficiaries in south Wollo.

SOS Sahel (May 1994) National workshop on design issues in employment based safety nets. (Report prepared by Taye Assefa.)

UNDP (July 1994) Programme Support Document for The National Programme on Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation.

e. Partners, projects and issues

Armyworm Control

TGE Ministry of Agriculture (1994) Emergency assistance for armyworm control. Project document.

Early Warning Systems (not recorded elsewhere)

Famine Early Warning System (FEWS), Ethiopia/USAID (February 1993) Harvest Assessment (Prepared by USAID Mission and FEWS Field Representatives)

FEWS Ethiopia / USAID (September 1993) Pre-harvest Assessment (Prepared by Kay Sharp)

FEWS / USAID (October 1993) Pre-harvest Assessment (Published by FEWS Project)

FEWS Ethiopia / USAID (December 1993) Harvest Assessment 1993/4 (Prepared by Kay Sharp)

FEWS Ethiopia / USAID (May 1994) Vulnerability Assessment 1994/5 (Prepared by Kay Sharp)

Save the Children (UK) (December 1993) 1993 Kremt Season Report: Hararghe (Prepared by Mark Lawrence et al)

Save the Children (UK) (May 1994) 1994 Belg Season Report: Hararghe (Prepared by Yassim Mohammed et al)

Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus (EECMY)

EECMY and LWF/WS Ethiopia (September 1992) Soil and water conservation project. Western Zone, Wollega Region. (Project Document).

EECMY/LWF (1994) Ex-Soldiers Project Evaluation Report. (Prepared by Elizabeth Getahun, Asmelash Bezabeh and Fekru Ayana).

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International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRCS)

IFRCS (1994) Ethiopia: 1993 Rehabilitation and Relief, Displaced and Drought Victims. Final report. Addis Ababa, IFRCS.

Lutheran World Federation / World Service, (LWF/WS) Ethiopia

LWF (1994) LWF/WS Ethiopia, Annual Report 1993. Addis Ababa, LWF.

Rädda Barnen

Radda Barnen (1990) Continuation of child family re-unification project of Wello. Project Document.

Radda Barnen (1992) Report on emergency medical assistance to Somali refugees and Ethiopian returnees. (Project implemented by MSF)

Radda Barnen (1993) A summary report on the emergency health activities of MSF in the East as well as the West.

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Refugees and Displaced People

GTZ (May 1994) Reintegration of Ethiopian Nationals Displaced from Eritrea (Final Report). Study commissioned by RRC.

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UN Emergencies Prevention and Preparedness Group (December 1993) Moyale, Dollo, Negele and Ginner Situation Report. (Prepared by Admaasu H/Yesus)

UN Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia (January 1994) Gode Field Trip Report. (Prepared by Gromo Alex)

UN Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia (March 1994) The repatriation of refugees from Eastern Sudan to Humera, Tigray: a situation report. (Prepared by Laura Hammond)

UN Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia (April 1994) Field Trip Report - Jijiga. (Prepared by Frederic Vigneau)

UN Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia (May 1994) Returnees in Humera Part One: Situation Report. (Prepared by Laura Hammond)

UN Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia (no date) El'medo Resettlement Village located in the Alder Zone of Region 5.

Relief Transport Project

Hallenborg, R. (1992) SIDA's Vehicle assistance to RRC, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Lease Purchase Scheme 1993.

Hallenborg, R. (1993) Review of the relief transport sector in Ethiopia.

Seeds Provision Projects

FAO (December 1992) Progress Report, Urgent Supply of Staple Grain Seeds.

FAO (March 1993) 1992 Agricultural Inputs Emergency Programme for Northern Ethiopia.

FAO (March 1994) Progress Report on 1993 Emergency Rehabilitation Programmes.

FAO (May 1994) Progress Report on Implementation of the 1994 FAO Emergency and Rehabilitation Program.

Transitional Government of Ethiopia (July 1994) Urgent provision of seeds to drought-affected areas of Region 3. (Project Proposal to SIDA)

Swedish Philadelphia Church Mission (SPCM)

SPCM (no date, c. 1993) Itisa Tekle-Haimanot Monastery Rehabilitation Program for ex-soldiers. (Project Document)

SPCM (1994) Kundi afforestation and rural community development program. (Project Document)

SPCM (1994) Omo-Kibish food for work project. (Project Document)

UNICEF

UNICEF (August 1992) Final report for the Government of Sweden. Project: Emergency, Ethiopia.

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UNICEF (April 1993) Final report for the Government of Sweden. Project: Emergency Water, Ethiopia.

UNICEF (April 1994) Final report for the Government of Sweden. Project: Emergency Health

World Food Programme (WFP)

WFP (June 1993) Can a cloudless sky have a silver lining? The scope for an Employment-based safety Net in Ethiopia (Prepared by Simon Maxwell) (Food for Development, Discussion Paper 1)

WFP (June 1993) WFP's Experience with Employment-based Food Security Safety Net in Ethiopia (Prepared by Wolfgang Herbringer) (Food for Development, Discussion Paper 2)

WFP (June 1993) Inventory, Map and Analytical Review of Food and Cash-for-Work Projects in Ethiopia (Prepared by Aytenew Birhanu and John Aylieff) (Food for Development, Discussion Paper 3)

WFP (August 1993) Experiences in Operating a Food-for-Work Programme (Prepared by Paul O'Sullivan) (Food for Development, Discussion Paper 5)

WFP (1993) Food Aid Monetization in Ethiopia (Prepared by Kumela Gragne) (Food for Development, Discussion Paper 6)

WFP (1993) From Food Relief to Development: Prospects for Food Monetization in Eastern Hararghe and the Ogaden of Ethiopia (Prepared by Richard Hogg and Nathalie Galle) (Food for Development, Discussion Paper 7)

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What Relief for the Horn?

**SIDA-SUPPORTED EMERGENCY OPERATIONS
IN ETHIOPIA, ERITREA, SOUTHERN SUDAN, SOMALIA AND DJIBOUTI**

Up to 1994, Sweden's annual assistance to emergency relief operations amounted to between SEK 1.2 and SEK 1.5 billion (USD 165-206 million). Of this between 12% and 20% was spent on the five countries of the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti. The funds have increasingly been directed to "complex" disasters, where political issues and insecurity have been driving forces in creating the problems. The different types of disaster situations have raised questions concerning the traditional thinking about disasters and the way in which this informs relief interventions.

This study of the Horn of Africa is the second of a series of three studies of relief aid, the first focusing on Southern Africa and the last on Cambodia.

The evaluators found that in general, SIDA relief aid is appropriately chosen and that SIDA responds to needs notably quicker than the average donor. SIDA is also recognized as a donor which appreciates the need for flexibility with funds and for new approaches to solving problems. However, the evaluators found that despite efforts at targetting, coverage was unsatisfactory in terms of certain vulnerable categories such as the aged and children, and that monitoring and evaluating activities need to be improved.

The relief activities at the immediate level are considered as user-friendly and effective at saving lives, but do less to rehabilitate people and virtually nothing to address the roots of the problems.

The evaluators recommend that administration, monitoring and evaluation of activities in SIDA's relief aid should be improved. They also stress that relief strategies should address situational and structural aspects of emergencies at the same time.

Each year some thirty of SIDA's over 200 projects are subjected to evaluation. Of the evaluation reports, the five or six considered to be of more general interest are published in this series, SIDA Evaluation Report. Copies can be ordered from the Evaluation Unit, SIDA. Postal address: S-105 25 STOCKHOLM, Fax No.: (46)-(8)-612 49 80.

