

The Beira-Göteborg Twinning Programme

**– cooperation for municipal
development**

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Lennart Peck**

**Department for Democracy
and Social Development**

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SUMMARY

This report presents the findings and conclusions of an evaluation of the twinning programme between the cities of Beira and Gothenburg. The study has been undertaken by Mr. Lennart Peck of ICS Interconsult Sweden AB (team leader) and Arne Heilemann, Chief Executive of the Municipality of Lørenskog, Norway, in 1995.

The twinning activities started in 1990 and have included financial management, waste collection management, land and property management, general municipal management as well as support in other areas including culture and environmental protection.

The purpose of the study has been to present an independent assessment of the programme for future planning and to draw lessons of a general nature regarding twinning as a model for co-operation. To this end, the evaluation includes an assessment of fulfilment of objectives, sustainability and cost-effectiveness as well as an analysis of the model of co-operation chosen by Beira and Gothenburg.

Results vary between the different sub-projects. Generally speaking, fulfilment of objectives was found to be medium to low, except for in one case — environment — where it so far appears to be high. This is explained by the fact that planned activities have not always been fully implemented, i.e. output has not been produced to the extent expected, and that external factors have reduced the effects of output. Sustainability is found to be medium to low as a result of the financial and human resources constraints in Beira.

A proper analysis of cost-effectiveness has not been possible, as it has not been possible to quantify outputs. Generally speaking, it appears as if the model of co-operation, which has implied a broad mobilisation of people with no or limited previous experience of work in developing or Portuguese speaking countries, so far has been costly in relation to output. However, in a long term perspective it is possible that these investments will pay off. It is noted that there seems to have been no major difference in terms of cost between the use of frequent short term consulting as opposed to long term consultants stationed in Beira, time input equal.

In order to define the Beira - Gothenburg model of co-operation we relate it to a pure consultancy model and a pure twinning model. This makes it possible to draw a distinction between institutional consultancy, simply implying that an institution acts as consultant, and twinning which primarily refers to a relation of mutual exchange between the two parties. The Beira - Gothenburg model of co-operation could be described as a hybrid between consultancy and twinning. There are historic reasons for this and in an initial stage, this model was probably a good one, enabling the co-operation to "take off". However, neither the full potential of twinning nor of consulting has been obtained. The institutional contacts are limited and there is a problem of accountability and transparency in the project itself.

The case of Beira cannot be used to draw conclusions of general validity. Nonetheless, we take the experience from this evaluation as a point of departure for a general discussion on the benefits and limitations of the twinning model. We also discuss some of the preconditions for successful twinning: reasonable stability, availability of resources, not exceedingly high language barrier and a mutual commitment by both twinning partners. The absence of such prerequisites largely explains the model of co-operation chosen by Beira and Gothenburg as well as the results of the programme.

The main recommendation is that twinning is focused to areas in which the City of Gothenburg possesses a comparative strength, such as support to the democratisation process. It is also recommended that a clearer distinction is made between twinning activities and consulting, as the two implies different division of roles and responsibilities.

As regards twinning in general SIDA should, when the conditions are right, consider it as one alternative, but not as a substitute, to other kinds of support.

ACRONYMS

SIDA	Swedish International Development Authority, present Sida
PROPECA	Projecto Piloto de Educação Ambiental
Mt.	Meticais (approx. SEK 0.001)
CICB	Centro de Investigação e Consultoria da Beira
DPAM	Division for Public Administration and Management
SEK	Swedish Crowns
MAE	Ministry of Public Administration

1. INTRODUCTION

During the 1980s, the potential for municipal service export from Sweden had been discussed and a number of studies ultimately led to a change in the Swedish legislation, enabling the municipalities to engage in such activities. Meanwhile SIDA had started to work increasingly with so called institutional consultants, benefiting from their professional competence as well as their potential for a good understanding of the problems of similar institutions in developing countries.

During the visit of a delegation from Mozambique to Sweden in 1987, the idea to establish a twinning relation between the cities of Beira and Gothenburg was raised. The idea was actively supported by SIDA, Division for Public Administration and Management (DPAM), providing funds for fact finding and project preparation. The first formal agreement regarding finance to three different areas — financial management, waste collection and land management — was signed between SIDA and the City of Gothenburg in 1990. The following year a "Memorandum of Co-operation" for an extended twinning in areas such as culture, commerce, sports and social welfare was signed by the City of Beira and the City of Gothenburg. As of today over eighty missions in both directions, involving some fifty persons have taken place. SIDA's total investment in the programme amounts to approximately SEK 15 million, including all costs for project preparation and funds from the import support programme and for culture.

1.1 Purpose of the Evaluation

Supporting the twinning between two cities is one possible "model" for development co-operation between Sweden and other countries. As any model, twinning has its obvious benefits and limitations. The case of Beira and Gothenburg is thus of interest from a methodological viewpoint: Has it been effective? Could it be replicated? Under which circumstances? One purpose of this study is to draw lessons from the Beira - Gothenburg experience.

The second purpose is of more practical and formal nature. The investments made in the programme so far and the request for continued support call for an independent assessment of the programme as regards fulfilment of objectives, sustainability and cost-effectiveness. It is our sincere hope that our conclusions and recommendations will provide useful input to the dialogue between all of the involved parties and that it will benefit the future planning of this programme.

The full Terms of Reference for the assignment can be found in Annex 1.

1.2 Methodology and Implementation

The study has been carried out by Mr. Arne Heilemann, Chief Executive of the Municipality of Lørenskog in Norway and Mr. Lennart Peck, consultant from ICS Interconsult Sweden AB (team leader). Work started with a preparatory visit to Gothenburg, analysis of project documentation and meetings with SIDA in Stockholm and Maputo. Beira was visited during one week in April 1995, during which meetings

were held with the President and members of the Executive Council, representatives from the different project components as well as with the present and previous Governors of Sofala. While in Beira, we benefited from the company of Mr. João Raiva, representing the Ministry of Public Administration (MAE) and Mr. Brito Carneiro from the Municipality of Beira providing translation and practical support. After the field visit, a follow-up visit to Gothenburg was made, as well as a number of telephone interviews with persons at political level and from the Municipal Administration of Gothenburg.

A Draft Report was presented in May, 1995. It was translated into Portuguese and forwarded to Beira and Gothenburg. We greatly appreciate the comments on the Draft Report submitted by both cities. The Draft Report was discussed during a one-day seminar in Stockholm in November during which a number of interesting reflexions were made. Some of these have been included in the final version of the report, others not. Please note that the findings and conclusions of the report do not necessarily reflect the view of neither SIDA nor the twinning partners.

As regards methodology, the evaluation criteria and definitions generally applied by SIDA have been used. However, as usual when evaluating a project which was never designed according to the "Logical Framework Approach" or similar, this approach has had to be applied in a rather general *ex post* sense.

As we assume that the reader of this report is already reasonably familiar with the programme, we have chosen to limit the descriptive parts, going straight to the analysis according to the three main evaluation criteria. *Fulfilment of objectives* of each one of the programme components is analysed departing from available project documentation and findings from the field study. *Sustainability* is discussed in relation to three key factors — human resources, finance and technology — and the support likely to be needed in the future for a continuation of the services established through the programme. A proper analysis of *cost-effectiveness* would have required that input and output were measurable and that relevant information for comparisons would have been at hand. As this was not the case, we have limited ourselves to a presentation of the resources used for this project and a general discussion on how they relate to output and effects. We also identify some factors which are likely to have contributed to a higher or lower cost-effectiveness.

As for the analysis of the twinning concept, it must be stressed that every twinning relation is unique. We have therefore had to start by defining the actual "Beira Gothenburg model" of twinning. From that we go on to discuss the preconditions necessary for applying it, benefits and risks with this model and possible alternative models. It should be stressed that as a case study, the conclusions drawn from the twinning between Beira and Gothenburg can not be generalised. However, the lessons from this model, in this particular context, could still be of interest in comparisons with other experiences and when embarking on possible future programmes of a similar nature.

1.3 Limitations

Analysis of *relevance* has not been included in the Terms of Reference. If this had been the case it would have been important to take into account that the project context has changed considerably since the project was initiated.

Even though this project was conceived and decided upon in view of the overall decentralisation programme of Mozambique, only effects at local — not national — level have been studied. A study at a national level would of course be of a completely different dimension. However, the *main reason* for this limitation is that in none of the key project documents reference is made to any objectives at national level.¹

Considering the size of the programme it has not always been possible to account for all of the background information, even though it is relevant as such. This priority is based on the belief that the prime target group of this report in fact has followed the project since its start.

Another obvious limitation that needs no further commenting is the time available for this study, in relation to the magnitude of the programme and the complexity of the twinning-issue. We still hope that it will satisfy our client's immediate needs and that the report will serve as a useful point of departure in the discussion on the twinning concept.

Thanks!

We would like to take the opportunity to thank everyone in Beira and in Gothenburg for your contributions to this evaluation. We hope that this report will compensate you all for some of the time and energy you spent answering our questions and assisting us during our work. Special thanks to Mr. Holger Jonasson for a great job preparing background information and for assistance in connection with our visits to Maputo, Beira and Gothenburg.

¹The issue was raised at the presentation of the Draft Report. The consultants feel that it is important to distinguish between the effects of the twinning project and the achievements of the project co-ordinator beyond the explicit project activities, channeling experiences from Beira to MAE and SIDA. The latter may very well have been important but it seems very unlikely that the Beira-Gothenburg twinning as such should have had any effects at a national level.

2. FULFILMENT OF OBJECTIVES

In this section we analyse the fulfilment of objectives for each one of the project components. Actual achievements are compared to planned activities, expected output and intended effects, as stated in the various project documents.²

2.1 Financial Management

2.1.1 ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUT

In the Terms of Reference annexed to the SIDA contract for 1990/91 to 1991/92 it was stated that

"Together with the relevant departments of Beira City Council, the consultant will develop and modernise the systems for financial planning, budgeting, accounting, reporting and supervision"

"By June 1992, it is expected that Beira will have a better-structured and functioning Finance Directorate staffed by officials trained in the use of the modernised system, and that the finance departments of other urban directorates will have been trained in and have introduced the new system"

In the Project Document for the same period the following main activities were listed:

"Short-term experts from Gothenburg to Beira to collect basic data for a revised budgeting and accounting system and to make a preliminary assessment of training needs"

"Preliminary design of a revised budgeting and accounting system (work in Sweden).

"Study tour to Sweden by staff in key positions in financial management in the Beira Executive Council"

"Short-term experts from Gothenburg to Beira to elaborate on the design of the budget and accounting system"

"Basic training of Beira staff in the field of financial management"

"Continued system development, on-the-job training and pilot operation of the improved budgeting and accounting system. This implementation phase will be conducted by long-term advisers based in Beira backed up by short-term missions supporting in specific issues"

Preliminary needs assessment was initiated already during the project preparation phase. The first visits of Swedish consultants were made in 1990 during which the existing system and its shortcomings were studied. A study visit to Gothenburg for six persons from the Finance Directorate was carried out in late 1990. After the introduction of computers in Beira had been deemed feasible systems design began. During 1991 hardware was delivered, local computer training was initiated and certain existing

²Contract for Consulting Services to SIDA of 1990-1992, prolonged with one year to July 1993, Contract for Consulting Services to SIDA of 1993-1995 and other project documentation expressing objectives at various levels. Please note that there has usually not been a clear distinction between activities, expected outputs and effects in this documentation, but to facilitate the analysis of goal fulfilment we have to the extent possible grouped the statements in this way. In some cases where objectives have been stated vaguely, we have permitted ourselves to make certain "reconstructions" of the intentions, based on personal interviews and other documentation.

routines, such as the payrolls, were computerised. During 1992 the introduction of a new accounting system was initiated, as well as systems design, hardware deliveries and training³. In January 1993 the new accounting system called SCALA was put in full use. However, the old manual routines have been kept until today as a back-up system. There has been no new financial management tools introduced outside of the Finance Directorate.

Training of staff in the field of financial management has primarily been in connection with the introduction of the new computerised systems. Six persons have received training in basic PC operation and the new accounting system by Swedish consultants and another two persons have been trained locally.

Output from the two first years could thus be described as a step-wise introduction of new computerised systems within the Finance Directorate, including hardware delivery and staff up-grading.

A budget model was prepared in 1993 and SCALA has also included functions for budget and budget deviations.

In the Terms of Reference attached to the SIDA contract for the period up to 1995, the "specific objectives" are said to be

"To develop and implement improved processes for budget preparations and budget control in order to enhance the financial management capacity"

"To revise the systems for local revenue mobilisation and collection in order to improve the conditions for municipal autonomy".

The duties of the consultants are to

"Maintain the computerised accounting system and implement additional systems for financial management"

"Study the present and potential revenue sources, analyse the tax and fee levels and implement improvements in the collection processes"

"Prepare for the introduction of systems of a decentralised financial management within the Executive Council, including processes for internal control and auditing"

The computerised accounting system has been maintained and some additional systems for financial management, including registers for revenue collection, have been developed, largely by the finance director himself in D-base.

The budget procedure developed in 1993 has been used and certain improvements have been made in terms of cost centres and activity based budgeting.

In 1993 a complete revision of the tax structure was made with considerably higher fees for various Municipal services as a result. The Swedish consultants initiated and took an active part in this process. Measures have also been taken for improved control of the revenue collection, using the new system.

³An account of delivered hardware for this and other project components may be found in Annex 3. An account of training activities for this and other programme components is found in Annex 4.

No major attempts have been made to decentralise financial management, the main reason being that the human resources base has been considered to weak. Nor have processes for internal control and auditing been introduced.

Between 1990 and 1994, there have been a total of 21 missions of one or more persons to Beira for this programme component, corresponding to 592 working days. There have been five missions to Gothenburg and one to Brazil, corresponding to 214 days.⁴ Considering what was stated in the original objectives it should be noted that consultancy has exclusively been short term.

2.1.2 EFFECTS

There are actually few explicit statements as regards the intended long term effects of this project component. However, we may relate effects to the global project objective of the twinning, which is

"...to improve the managerial and operational capacity of the Beira Municipal government in order to safe-guard the accountability and credibility ..."

Today, the Finance Directorate performs more or less the same tasks as they did four years ago with approximately the same number of people. The main difference is that financial information can be obtained quicker and in formats that permit a better analysis. The control effects by running two parallel systems have probably also implied an improvement in the quality of data. Comparing the information in SCALA and in the ledgers, errors are sometimes discovered *in both*.

However, the *use* of financial data and the decision making processes have not changed considerably. To give a few examples: According to the instructions of the Ministry of Finance, complete account statements should be handed over to the Executive Council no later than five days after the end of the previous month.⁵ Before the project, the Directorate managed this in less than 50 % of the cases and at present, according to the Director of Finance, almost always. However, nobody could clearly state what these figures were later used for. A functional system for budgeting and budget follow-up has been introduced. Even though the budget process starts in the month of July and the budget normally is fixed at the Municipal Assembly before December, it is not approved at national levels until perhaps May or June of the budget year. In the meantime the previous year's budget is used. When the budget is finally approved it has very little to do with the financial reality. The *average* discrepancy between the budget of 1994 and real outcome was close to 200 %, with variations up to 900 % for individual budget items. Obviously this does not increase its usefulness as "preliminary" budget for 1995!

What probably *has* been of importance is that the Finance Director has obtained a tool for better cash management in an extreme situation where the budget has lost its actual role and the day-to-day financial management has had the character of "crisis management".

⁴In Annex 5 an overview of all missions for all programme components is given.

⁵It could be mentioned that this high level of ambition is even above current standards in e.g. Norway.

Probably, there have also been positive effects in terms of efficiency, considering that there has been a considerable increase in the volume of work that is still handled by the same number of people. In particular the various new systems and registers for revenue collection and payments should enable the Directorate to perform its functions more effectively without major cost increases. However, increased efficiency has not been the prime objective of the project and there is still, for reasons partly beyond the control of the Directorate a considerable over-staffing within it.

A particular objective of this project component was to *increase the municipal revenues*. These have increased with approximately 22 % in real terms in four years, from 781 million Mt (2 747 in 1994 prices⁶) in 1990 to 3 358 million in 1994. The share of subsidies has in the same time diminished from 48 % to 36 %. The local revenue collection has in fact increased by close to 50 % in real terms. The major improvements have taken place during the years 1993 and 1994. It is obviously impossible to determine how much of this increase that is an effect of the project. Still, the large increases in 1993 and 1994 are quite clearly reflections of the reform of the tax structure, in which the project was involved. The overall economic effects of this transfer of resources have not been looked into in this study.

The "fragile human resources base" was mentioned already in the early quarterly reports. It must still be considered very fragile and half of those that received training have had to leave the Directorate. Training has further been primarily of technical and administrative nature, with relatively little emphasis on actual financial and economic *thinking*. Nor has there been any training in financial management outside of the Finance Directorate.

The "accountability" and "credibility" mentioned as the ultimate objectives are still far from assured. The project has provided the necessary *tools* but the project environment and the limited number of people with the right competence have made it largely impossible to *use* these tools. The environment is a factor beyond the control of the project which must simply be adapted to in the best possible way. Increased *human resources development*, enabling a broader participation in financial management and control, should be of highest priority. Hopefully, the fact that the tools now at least are available will facilitate the development of human resources and create an increased awareness of the importance of financial management.

2.2 Waste Collection

2.2.1 ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUT

Receiver of the services under this programme component has been the Directorate of Urban Services. In the Terms of Reference, annexed to the SIDA contract for the first contract period it was stated that

"Support will be provided to developing city management of its urban services, including solid waste treatment. In-service and on-the-job training of urban managers in their specific areas of responsibility are expected to have taken place by June 1992, as well as accompanying improvement of routines and procedures."

⁶IMF World Economic Outlook.

In the Project Document attached to the same contract, the activities were specified as follows:

"Short-term experts from Gothenburg to Beira to study the issues of solid waste treatment including the present garbage dump and furnace"

"Continuous management support in the field of urban services with focus on topics as planning, resource allocation, purchasing and supervision"

In the Terms of Reference attached to the SIDA contract for the period 1992/93 - 1994/95 the duties of the consultant were defined as:

"Provide general support to the Directorate of Urban Services in order to secure the efficiency in the waste collection and maintenance of equipment"

"Carry out feasibility studies for the treatment of solid waste"

This programme component cannot be discussed without also considering the World Bank activities that have been running parallel to the twinning activities. The problems of co-ordination with these have been extensively described in the project reports. The World Bank financed overseas training and local consultancy support in periods from 1991 to 1993. However, the four Renault trucks that were to be procured for the World Bank's project only arrived after the departure of their consultants.

Another important part has been the decision in 1990 to use funds from the SIDA Import Support Fund to purchase seven Volvo trucks and one wheel loader. This was not part of the actual twinning programme but closely related to it.⁷ The trucks were delivered in 1991 and in 1992.

The first action by Gothenburg was in late 1991 when three consultants, during two weeks carried out a study regarding the future disposal and treatment of solid waste. A brief report was presented recommending, inter alia, closure of the existing garbage incinerator and installation of a new small one for hazardous waste. The consultants also recommended creation of a system for collection and sale of metals, measures to reduce the problem with drainage water and stressed that "as more trucks and equipment are going to be delivered to Beira it is important to elaborate a feasible strategy for collection of solid waste". The possibilities of soil composting of organic waste was mentioned.

In 1993, a mission was made, to study the feasibility of a technical assistance to the Directorate of Urban Services. Later, three missions were carried out for technical assistance to planning of the waste collection and to the truck workshops.

Lately a feasibility study for the incinerator was carried out. It was presented to the Directorate of Urban Services at the occasion of our mission in April 1995.

⁷The request came up largely as a result of the dialogue with Gothenburg. SIDA later hired own consultants to determine needs and financing was outside of the twinning budget. However, in Beira's perspective one has mostly seen it all as "Swedish support".


2.2.2 EFFECTS

In the Terms of Reference attached to the SIDA contract for the period 1992/93 - 1994/95 the objectives of this project component were said to be:

"To enhance the capacity of the municipal government in the fields of urban services (...) in order to create a firm foundation for urban development"

The diagram below shows the quantity of waste collected between 1991 and 1994.

Diagram 1: Quantities of collected waste, 1991-1994



Source: Direção de Serviços Urbanos. Figures for 1995 are preliminary.

The increase in waste collection reflects the arrival of the new equipment from SIDA and later from the World Bank. However, because of lack of qualified staff (trained mechanics and drivers) and financing (for fuel, consumables and maintenance) an increasing number of vehicles have had to be taken out of operation. The lack of preventive maintenance has halted the fleet in a short time. At the time of the visit, only two out of eight Swedish vehicles were in operation⁸. The other ones were out of service, either due to need of repair or to lack of consumables, such as tires. The operation and maintenance problem was identified in the first quarterly report of 1993. However, the warnings made there do not seem to have been taken seriously. This explains the recent decline in the quantities of collected waste. Figures are recent dropping back to where they were in 1990.

Financial data speak for themselves. The local Volvo representative has recently provided a cost estimate for the rehabilitation of the fleet as well as for regular maintenance. The cost for *rehabilitation* of the Volvo trucks alone has been estimated at USD 332 826 or Mt 2 500 million. The monthly total cost of *operation* of the *whole fleet* is estimated to be USD 573 800 or Mt 4 000 million, divided on USD 479 053 for the Volvos and USD 94 747 for the four Renaults. These figures should be set in relation with the total Municipal

⁸The four Renaults that arrived later with World Bank financing were still in operation.

budget which amounted to Mt 3 358 million. In other words, the cost of operation of the truck fleet well exceeds the total budget of the City of Beira.

Despite the fact that the Municipality only had one tractor and one old vehicle for waste collection in 1990 and now counts on 11 vehicles, the expenses for maintenance have actually been slightly reduced in real terms, by approximately 10 %, to Mt 61 million in 1994. This explains why the fleet has been partly taken out of operation. The expenses for fuel and lubricants have increased approximately by in real terms 80 % to 262 million in 1994.

As regards the technical assistance provided, the Directorate of Urban Services had not too much to say as it seems to have been rather marginal in relation to the assistance provided by the World Bank in the form of training abroad and long term consultancy. Irrespective of the quality of the assistance, the fact remains that support was provided for a system which in itself has proved to be nonviable.

As regards the study carried out in 1990, hardly any of the recommendations were implemented, apart from the closure of the incinerator and the feasibility study for a new one that has recently been carried out. It is particularly unfortunate that the recommendation to prepare a viable system for waste collection never was implemented satisfactory. The study could not be located in Beira when we asked for it.

In short, the effect of the combined Swedish and World Bank efforts have been a temporary increase in waste collection at a considerable cost, primarily for the donors but also for the citizens of Beira.

2.3 Land and Property Management

2.3.1 ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUT

In the Project Document covering the period 1990/91 - 1992/93, the activities were described as:

"Continuous management support in the field of urban development and land and property management comprising inter alia development strategies, procedures of land allocation and systems for land use fees."

Considering the complexity of the land and property issues as well as the fact that advisors from Denmark and England already were working within the Directorate of Urban Development, there were in fact no activities in this area during the first two years, apart from a certain managerial support of general nature provided to the director. Only by mid 1992 it was decided to transfer the manual land register to PCs as a means of enhancing control and thereby also facilitate the generation of municipal revenues. Two computers, printers and some additional office equipment were procured and ten persons were given training in basic PC operation. In early 1993 the feeding of information into the new system began.

The up-date of the land register has obviously been an important first step in order to prepare "development strategies, procedures of land allocation and systems for land use

fees". However, there have not been any project activities directly focused on these issues.

In the terms of reference attached to the SIDA contract for the period 1993/94- 1994/95 the duties of the Swedish consultants were said to be to:

"Provide general assistance to the process of transfer of the cadastre to computer based records"

"Carry out pilot activities for the introduction of the GIS in order to facilitate the production of basic information for town planning and land management".

The land register component first showed very slow progress. However, after a change of local staff work has advanced much faster and at present some 15 000 or 80 % of the land titles have been registered on computer files. At the same time the information in the files are checked with the real situation. This being the difficult and time consuming aspect of work it will probably have to be continued for a considerable time to come.

During 1993 it was considered that recent air photos and the data collected in the new land register could be used to set up a Geographical Information System (GIS) for the production of maps. Pilot activities for the introduction of GIS were initiated in 1994⁹. Computer hardware and software were put in place and two persons received training. Unfortunately, the software chosen soon proved unsatisfactory. Therefore it was decided to change to the same software that has been introduced by the Swedish company Swedsurvey at the national authority for production of maps, DINAGECA. During 1995, the same two persons as before will receive training in the new system.

2.3.2 EFFECTS

In the Terms of Reference for the first contract period it was stated that the project aimed at:

"...strengthening the Council's capacity to formulate policies and guidelines on urban development, as well as to implement town plans and property management procedures. This support aims on the long term at capacitating the City Council to take full charge of urban development, but within the term of the project aims at developing policy-making and supervision capacities in this area."

While for the second contract period, what can be seen as the long term objective of the project was stated as:

"To enhance the capacity of the municipal government in the fields of (...) town planning and land management in order to create a firm foundation for urban development"

The land issue is no doubt an important one, not the least as land may be an important source of municipal income. There are still no major effects to be seen as a result of this programme component as both the land register and the mapping function are still under development. What can be said is that, again, some of the *tools* for better land and property management have been provided. The broader aspects of land and property management and the main policy issues have not been tackled.

⁹A private consultant was sub-contracted for this purpose.

2.4 General Municipal Management

2.4.1 ACTIVITIES AND OUTPUT

Since the very beginning of the project the issue of municipal management has always been in focus. However, it was only in the second contract that General Municipal Management was identified as a separate programme component with the following objective:

"To review the responsibilities, authorities, resources, management and operation of the specialised directorates of the municipal government in order to create conditions for transparency and credibility of the municipal administration"

Three types of activities have taken place. Since the beginning of the project, the project co-ordinator has provided continuous managerial advice on an ad hoc basis in connection with his visits to Beira. Approximately 25% of his time was used for managerial support corresponding to approximately 16 field weeks.

During 1994 a series of "mini-seminars" with the directors of the Executive Council were held with the number of participants varying from about 10 to 20. The seminars were led by the project co-ordinator and covered primarily general management issues such as the concept of result based management.

There were also visits to Gothenburg by the previous and the present President of the Executive Council during which training in municipal management took place.

In the latest project document it is also stated that the duties of the consultants are to:

"Assist the City Executive Council in co-ordinating the activities carried out within the twinning project with the programs prepared and implemented by the World Bank financed pilot city project."

The project co-ordinator has been in relatively frequent contact with both the World Bank and the Ministry of Public Administration, which has facilitated co-ordination.

In the plan of operation written in 1994, an indicator of the programme component was said to be:

"A document presented that describes the long term and short term objectives of the Executive Council and define the internal organisation including the definition of the responsibilities for planning, execution and control of the service production for the citizens."

Such a document has been discussed, particularly in connection with the mini-seminars, but will probably not be completed before July 1995.

2.4.2 EFFECTS

As there have been few tangible outputs of this programme component, it is hard to identify any specific effects. The past and present President of the Executive Council describe their visits to Sweden as "useful". Surely, the presence of Swedish staff in Beira must have given certain inspiration to their counterparts. A common comment regarding

the mini-seminars was that they were "interesting" but did not contain much new. The President of the executive council and one of the Directors met described them as useful.

Most likely, there have been certain positive effects of this project component and some of them are perhaps still to come. However, their importance and magnitude have not been possible to determine in this study.

2.5 Extended Twinning

The purpose of the Memorandum of Co-operation of 1991 between Beira and Gothenburg was to broaden the basis of the twinning programme, outside of the areas defined in Gothenburg's contact with SIDA. It included culture, sports, social welfare, trade and industry and supply of surplus equipment. Gothenburg assumed the responsibility to arrange the necessary financing.

The only one of these areas which so far have been incorporated on a permanent basis has been culture — again with a substantial support from SIDA. In some of the other ones that were mentioned some steps were taken but with limited progress. However, in 1994 environmental protection has been added as a new component and a dialogue has in fact been initiated in a few other areas not originally foreseen. Below, we look at the different areas one by one.

2.5.1 CULTURE

During the initial visits of representatives from Beira to Gothenburg, contacts were also established with the Culture House of Frölunda. Frölunda showed interest in participating and in 1991 the head of the Culture House visited Beira to study the prospects for a joint co-operation.

Since then, there have been a number of visits in both directions. The first ones were financed over the twinning budget. Later on, finance for travel costs was obtained from the Swedish Institute¹⁰ and for consultancy fees, administration and language training from SIDA. In this way, a number of visits took place, at first on somewhat of an ad hoc basis as long term financing was never assured. From the budget year 1994/95 SIDA agreed to finance a three year project for support to the Culture House of Beira.

As a result of the above, there has only recently been a real project document with defined objectives. The general idea was, according to the provincial director of culture to "vitalise" the Culture House. In the quarterly progress report of June 1991 four main areas are defined:

- *technical assistance in elaborating the objectives, working procedures and basic organisation of a cultural centre;*
- *an exchange of instructors within the main fields of activity of the Casa Cultura*
- *support to the institution for preservation of traditions and cultural heritage ARPAC and to the library;*
- *realisation of a cultural event to be exposed in Beira and Gothenburg.*

¹⁰The SIDA funded programme for Cultural Exchange.

In November 1991 two persons from Gothenburg returned to Beira to work with colour, form and video in Beira. During the fall of 1991 and the spring of 1992 the provincial Director of Culture made two study visits to Sweden. In the month of May 1992 two persons from Gothenburg visited Beira to work with art as well as to introduce video within ARPAC as a way of documenting cultural heritage. The same year, the Swedish three man jazz group Etwas Anders performed on five occasions for a total of approximately 3 000 persons in Beira. In May 1993 the Director and Vice Director of the Beira Culture House made a two week study visit to Gothenburg. Later, in June, one person from Gothenburg visited Beira to prepare the exhibition "Beira Seen through the Eyes of the Children". Work on the exhibition continued all through the rest of 1993 and there was a renewed two week visit to Beira in October. During this visit puppet theatre was also introduced by a Swedish expert. The Beira exhibition at the Culture House of Frölunda was realised during the first quarter of 1994 and became a great success. An instructor from Beira, the dance group Kwaedja and one musician from Mozambique participated. A workshop was held in which approximately 500 children participated. The exhibition has later been shown in other places. During 1994 preparations were being made for a permanent co-operation between the two culture houses and an agreement was signed in November 1994.

Looking at the objectives mentioned above, it can be concluded that there has been an exchange of experience as regards working procedures and basic organisation of a cultural centre, in connection with the study visits as well as with the Swedish visits in Beira. However, there has been quite little of actual technical assistance and concrete output in this respect. New perspectives and inspiration from seeing the work done in Sweden have probably strengthened the Culture House in Beira but concrete effects of this have so far been rather limited. Hopefully they are still to come.

As regards the second objective, five instructors have been given training in four different areas: theatre, music, painting and video. One of these — puppet theatre — has been a completely new activity in Beira. For the other ones, the effects should have been a certain improvement and vitalisation but the number of students has remained basically the same. There was also some material provided, such as paint. The importance of this was stressed by representatives of Beira, perhaps reflecting a situation in which the main constraint not is artistic talent but material resources.

The support to ARPAC has been relatively limited and has consisted in the introduction of video for documentation of cultural heritage. Equipment as well as training were provided and it is estimated that a material of approximately 60 hours of film has been produced. The most important aspect should, however, have been the introduction of a new working method. ARPAC was not visited during our mission but we were informed that one continues filming despite the fact that the monitor on which films should be shown is no longer operational.

The planned exhibition was realised and seemed to have met everybody's expectations. On the one hand, it vitalised the Culture House in Beira during the actual production. On the other hand it gave Gothenburg a possibility to get to know Beira. The importance of this was stressed by the Director of the Culture House in Beira but it could also be

considered crucial for the whole idea of the twinning programme as this been the only occasion of a major presence of Beira in Gothenburg.

2.5.2 SPORTS

An invitation for a soccer team from Beira to participate in the Gothia Cup was made already before the signing of the Memorandum of Co-operation but the plans have never been realised.

2.5.3 SOCIAL WELFARE

A welfare organisation from Gothenburg, Stadsmissionen, showed an interest in participating and an identification mission took place in 1991. However, because of the lack of a local counterpart in Beira and problems of co-ordination, there was never any progress.

2.5.4 TRADE AND INDUSTRY

After the Memorandum of Co-operation had been signed, the Western Sweden Chamber of Commerce was contacted but it showed no major interest. Some attempts were also made to involve companies from Gothenburg in the markets for fresh fruit, seafood and shipping, but without any concrete results.

However, it could be mentioned that when the Chambers of Commerce in the two cities were visited in connection with this study, they both showed a considerable interest in establishing some form of relation.

2.5.5 PROVISION OF SURPLUS EQUIPMENT

One container of surplus material, consisting of office equipment and office furniture at an estimated value of 20 000 SEK, was shipped in December 1991. Lists of material required were circulated to the various institutions in Gothenburg and the NGO Emmaus - Praktisk Solidaritet handled the collection of material, packaging and freight. The material was distributed by a committee of the Executive Council to the various directorates of the Municipality of Beira. A follow-up study made by a representative of Emmaus in June 1992¹¹ noted that the distribution had not been without friction. No more containers were sent as the experience indicated that it would be more functional to purchase the material locally.

2.5.6 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION — PROPECA

The Pilot Project for Environmental Education, PROPECA, was an initiative of the present President of the Executive Council and persons that previously had worked within the Environmental Centre of the *Instituto Superior Pedagógico*. A first proposal was presented to the Executive Council in October 1993. It was natural to ask Gothenburg to support the implementation and Gothenburg in turn raised the issue with SIDA. In May 1994 a contract was signed between Gothenburg and SIDA. It included

¹¹Uppföljning av en materialcontainer från Göteborgs kommun till Beira, Susanne Fjällemark, 1992.

administrative support to the local institution¹² (remuneration for lecturers, costs for services acquired etc.), technical assistance by Gothenburg and equipment.

The objectives of PROPECA have been:

"To develop methods and processes for civic education and popular mobilisation for environmental protection"

"To carry out some pilot activities in the field of civic education"

"To realise some pilot actions based on the mobilisation of citizens willing to participate in the protection and rehabilitation of the environment"

"To produce a manual for civic education and popular mobilisation in the field of environmental protection"

Project implementation started by mid 1994 and there is already an impressive list of project activities and produced outputs:

- A survey to determine suitable ways of working and choice of communication channels etc.
- 26 full pages on environment in the paper *Diario de Moçambique* of a total of 44 planned;
- 12 theatre performances in three different languages and other public performances such as competitions;
- 52 15-minute radio messages in Portuguese on *Radio da Beira*, and another 36 planned. 4 out of 16 radio messages in a local language have been transmitted;
- 12 house cleaning campaigns;
- 3 public meetings as well campaigns in schools;
- A survey regarding peoples' opinion of the campaign

The only activity mentioned in the project document which has not and will not be implemented has been "creation of a plant nursery and mobilisation of citizens for afforestation".

The Swedish participation has been rather limited. A total of four persons have made three visits (2 persons each time) of approximately one week's time. Advice has been given as regards selection of target groups, the use of media, production of radio and television messages etc. but CICB has always had the responsibility for implementation.

The funds received from Sweden have been used for procurement of equipment (computers, video camera, television, tape recorder, and various forms of office equipment) and for rent, salaries and services from e.g. radio and other news media.

¹²PROPECA is implemented under *Centro de Informação e Consultoria da Beira* which was created by the Municipality but is run as an independent, multi-disciplinary foundation.

Ideas for future activities include coastal protection, tree planting, prevention of soil erosion, sanitation and research.

As regards the effects, a questionnaire was being processed in April 1994. It clearly showed that the programme had an impact at grass root level. Ironically, some citizens were complaining about the fact that while they were now doing as told by PROPECA — throwing garbage in the containers instead of the streets — the Municipality did not seem to be able to fulfil their duties to collect the garbage.

Fulfilment of objectives will have to be finally assessed after the first year of project implementation, but after three quarters, results are encouraging.

2.5.7 OTHER

A used television camera worth approximately 200 000 SEK was donated to the television in Beira.

During the first quarter of 1994 one journalist and one technician from Radio Gothenburg visited Radio Mozambique in Beira. A possible co-operation was discussed but so far nothing has materialised.

2.6 Overall Assessment of the Fulfilment of Objectives

As objectives seldom have been stated in measurable terms, a quantification of the degree of fulfilment of objectives is impossible. Quite clearly and not surprisingly the fulfilment of objectives varies between the different programme components. What can be said is that in none of the programme components fulfilment of objectives has been 100 %, neither when looking at activities, outputs or effects. In most cases it could be described as medium and in some cases, such as waste collection, low. However, PROPECA seems to be well on its way to fulfil — or even surpassing — original objectives and the experience of the two Culture houses also appears to have been positive.

As far as activities and output are concerned, much of what was stated in the project documentation has in fact never been implemented. This goes for almost all programme components and there seems to have been a tendency to include more activities than could possibly have been carried out with the financial restrictions of the programme and the resources and capabilities of the Executive Council. Possibly a large number of activities were included in the action plans to permit choice and thus greater flexibility in the programme implementation. Possibly there was also a bit of wishful thinking.

As regards effects, it could be recalled what was stated in the Project Document of 1990:

"The consultancy services to the City of Beira aims at strengthening the capacity and capability of the Executive Council to manage and operate the basic fields of responsibility for the local government. The consultancy services should introduce feasible systems, methods and tools for local government management and operation."

And of 1993:

"The Global objective of the technical assistance through a twinning project is to improve the managerial and operational capacity of the Beira Municipal Government in order to safeguard the accountability and credibility of the local government and promote a popular participation in the local government activities."

No doubt, the twinning programme should have led to a certain strengthening of the capacity of the Executive Council by the introduction of new methods, systems and management tools in a few areas. However, this has not been achieved to the extent expressed in the project documents, one reason obviously being that some of the activities mentioned were never implemented. Another, and perhaps even more important reason is that it does not always seem to have been possible to make full use of the tools and instruments introduced by the project as a result of limited financial and human resources in Beira as well as other limitations in the project environment. Again, the objectives and expectations expressed in the project documentation do not always seem to have been quite realistic.

3. SUSTAINABILITY

In this section we analyse sustainability of the various project components up to present date and the likelihood of sustainability for the future.¹³ This is done in relation to three different, but closely interrelated factors: human resources, finance and technology. An overall assessment is presented by the end of the chapter. Below we analyse the programme components one by one.

3.1 Management and Human Resources

The problem of management and human resources must be seen in the overall Mozambican context: low levels of formal education, extremely low salaries forcing civil servants to seek complementary income sources and a generally weak organisation.

Within the *Directorate of Finance* six people were trained by the Swedish consultants and another two were trained locally. Of these trainees, five are still working within the Directorate. Unfortunately, two of those that seemed to have had a high potential left. The other persons trained have acquired the technical skills to operate the new systems but only the finance director is in a position to actually use the system as an instrument for financial management and control. He is also the only person with a real capacity to function as an instructor. In other words, the sustainability of this component depends largely on one person only.

As regards the *Directorate of Urban Services*, there has been an immediate need for qualified staff to maintain and operate the waste collection trucks; drivers, mechanics etc. The advisory support and training provided by Gothenburg has been marginal in relation to needs. This is one of the reasons why this project component has already proved unsustainable.

Within *land and property management* ten persons were given computer training for the land register. All trainees are still working within the organisation. Only three actually work with the new system, which is relatively easy to manage. The aspect of human resources should therefore not have to be a great problem. For the mapping component, two persons will now receive training in GIS. It is still too early to make a proper assessment of sustainability in this area, but being more technical than the land register and with fewer persons involved it is inevitably more vulnerable in a long term perspective.

The *municipal management* component has primarily involved the directors of the City Council and consisted in training of individuals. There has been very little of actual organisational development or institutionalisation of new management tools. The sustainability will thus depend on for how long the present management will stay and to what extent they manage to incorporate their experiences in the organisational structure of the Municipality.

¹³Applying the OECD (1989) definition of sustainability: "A development programme is sustainable when it is able to deliver an appropriate level of benefits for an extended period of time after major financial, managerial and technical assistance from an external donor is terminated"

Elections at municipal level are scheduled for October 1996. Considering the overwhelming victory for the opposition in the Sofala province in last years general elections, it is not unlikely that there will be a shift in the City administration. The key persons trained in this project are then likely to be substituted and changes in the organisational structure could be expected. It should, however, be remembered that the persons that are trained will obviously bring their experiences with them, even in other positions. For example, the former President of the Executive Council of Beira, now occupying the same position in the city of Dodo, stated that he is still benefiting from what he learnt in Sweden.

The PROPECA has a staff of five persons with an educational level considerably above the average within the City Council. The group appears motivated and as long finance can be provided for them to stay within the project, human resources should not have to be a major problem.

At the Culture House, a total of five persons have been trained in a total of five areas, i.e. one person per area. All are still in one way or another connected to the institution but considering the fact that the Culture House has no operational budget and that the salaries paid by the City are very small, it may be questioned for how long and to what extent these persons will be available. The fact that only one person has been trained in each area obviously creates a considerable vulnerability.

3.2 Finance

There are some indications that the economy of Beira will improve in the future as a result of e.g. the end of the civil war and the economic reforms introduced, but the city basically starts from zero and at present there are not even funds for some of its most basic functions. Even though the coming decentralisation reform will facilitate the generation of local incomes, it will also imply new financial burdens.

Financial management is not a new activity as such and the project has not implied any major cost increases, apart from the ones for maintenance of the computer equipment which so far have been covered by the project. These costs are probably more than compensated by the benefits of better financial management and improved revenue collection. The net effect on programme sustainability of this programme component should therefore be positive.

The trucks for *waste collection* have been and continues to be nonviable in a financial perspective. In fact, the whole model for waste collection, introduced by the World Bank and Sweden, from a financial viewpoint appears unsustainable. A lower cost alternative must be sought.

The *land and property management* component is again something which is intended to improve the collection of revenues and a more rational way of handling the land register will rather reduce costs than raise them. The financial consequences of the GIS activities have not been looked into thoroughly, but cost could be expected to be reasonable in view of the benefits of improved land management.

The *municipal management* has been a pure transfer of know-how without any direct financial implication.

PROPECA has recently started and its budget is limited. However, it is the first project where SIDA has also financed operational costs of the programme. Even if these are limited, this may create a sustainability problem in a future perspective.

The same goes for the *culture* house which since 1994 receives a small but continuous budget support. Cultural activities of this kind are hardly sustainable anywhere without public support — Sweden is a good example. The difference is that in Beira, culture will not be able to expect any major support for a long time to come. The sustainability of this component therefore largely depends on whether the Swedish project will manage to assist the House to become self-financed.

3.3 Technological Factors

In terms of technology, most programme components have implied some form of computerisation. The daily operation of this equipment seem to function well but there is still a considerable dependency on external support for systems development etc. Hardware maintenance is said to be available in Beira but problems have sometimes been faced. Experience shows that even relatively simple equipment, such as part of the audio-visual equipment provided to ARPAC, can easily break down in the Mozambican environment, putting an end to the activities.

As far as GIS is concerned, the level of technology is relatively high. However, owing to the fact that the same system is used in Maputo there should be possibilities of technical and professional back-up.

The main problem area from a technological viewpoint has no doubt been the waste collection component. The whole issue of what technology actually would be realistic and sustainable, given the financial and human resources of Beira, must be looked into.

3.5 Overall Assessment of Sustainability

As noted, the likelihood of sustainability varies considerably between the different project components. In the table below we have tried to summarise whether the factors analysed above constitute an *immediate*, a *potential* or a *minor* threat to sustainability:

	<u>Human Resources</u>	<u>Finance</u>	<u>Technology</u>
Financial Management	Potential	Minor	Potential
Waste Collection	Major	Major	Major
Land Management	Potential	Minor	Potential
Municipal Management	Potential	Minor	Minor
PROPECA	Minor	Potential	Minor
Culture	Potential	Potential	Potential

There are only two project components for which likelihood of sustainability can be described as reasonably high. One is Municipal Management which has been limited to a direct transfer of know-how. The uncertainty rests in whether the trained staff will

remain. The other one is PROPECA which counts on qualified staff and where technical elements are limited, but where future financing may become a problem. All of the other projects face potential or immediate threats to sustainability. This picture is not very surprising when looking at the general situation in Mozambique today: its structural problems, lack of resources and aid dependency in virtually all sectors. By necessity, priority has to be given to the solution of immediate problems, giving little room for long-term sustainability considerations.

It is in this perspective that the programme strategy — short term consultancy and long term commitment — should be seen. From a sustainability point of view, regular short term consultancy has most likely been positive. The frequent problem that consultants become gap-fillers rather than advisers has been avoided as well as the problem of consultants making themselves indispensable. It should also have strengthened the local ownership of the project.

The appropriateness of a long term commitment also seems obvious. However, a long term commitment can not reduce the importance of the different project components being time limited and sustainable in themselves; otherwise the long term engagement will again easily turn into aid dependency. Given that the financial and human resources of Mozambique are likely to be severely restricted also in the future, the only viable approach will be always to seek low-cost solutions of appropriate technology that is manageable by the local staff.

A second question to be asked is whether it really *is* a long term commitment: the sustainability of the twinning relation as such. Financially, the twinning is now virtually 100 % dependent on SIDA. Even though also SIDA has expressed its long term commitment, there is no assurance of future financing beyond what has been stipulated in the contracts. Without SIDA funding, the "friendship" aspect of twinning would possibly continue but very little would remain in terms of content. As long as Beira is a net receiver of the programme, there ought to be a strong interest from this side in keeping the twinning alive also in the future, but a possible new Municipal administration may have other priorities and does not necessarily have an interest in taking over the previous government's friendship relations. In any case there would be a considerable disruption, both from a social and from a professional point of view. In Gothenburg, the limited involvement at institutional level and the heavy reliance on a few key persons constitute a potential threat. This has already been demonstrated by the fact that the present Chairman of the Executive Committee does not share the same great interest for the programme as the previous one. Particularly the very strong dependence on the project co-ordinator must be seen as a risk factor.

4. COST-EFFECTIVENESS

4.1 Resources

The origin and use of resources for the twinning programme is shown in Annex 5. The by far most important source of financing has been SIDA, DPAM. Yearly spendings on the various programme components are shown in table 1:

Table 1: Costs per Project Component in thousand SEK

	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93	1993/94	94/6 m.	TOTAL
Financial Management	1200	1360	1150	950	490	5150
Waste Collection	20	210	200	535	50	1015
Land Management	20	70	370	410	0	870
Culture	20	190	20			230
General Municipal Man. and Project Management	520	590	740	755	320	2925
TOTAL	1780	2420	2480	2650	860	10190

Source: Project Co-ordinator

Of these amounts, 60 % correspond to consultancy fees, 25 % to expenses in connection with consultancy and 15 % to other expenses such as local training, equipment, study tours etc.

General municipal management and project management can not be fully separated as the components have been carried out by the same person. The project co-ordinator estimates that approximately 25 % of his time refers to general municipal management and 75 % to project management.

The amounts for culture include only finance provided by the twinning budget. In addition to this, the Swedish Institute has contributed with approximately 200 000 SEK and SIDA with 200 000 SEK.

The funds for purchasing of the Volvo trucks were taken from the Swedish Import Support fund and amounted to SEK 3,8 million.

Contributions from the City of Gothenburg have consisted in donations, primarily surplus equipment, of a value of approximately half a million SEK¹⁴. Occasionally visits of official nature to Beira has been paid by the Municipality itself.

The fees paid to the consultants of Gothenburg have been at market levels, possibly on the lower side. The project has recruited staff from the Municipal administration and provided the respective institutions with a compensation for the personnel made available. However, hardly ever have the respective institutions had to take in any extra personnel

¹⁴see Annex 3.

because of the absence of those that have been in Mozambique. As a result, the additional income to the City of Gothenburg from the twinning project has apparently been greater than the additional costs. This has been possible by making use of what seems to be an under-utilised capacity of the Municipal administration. There have surely also been personal contributions in terms of time from those that have participated in the programme: language training during evenings and accumulated work when coming back to the offices, for example.

Contributions from the City of Beira, has consisted in making its personnel available for project activities and improvisation of working facilities. However, there have been virtually no *additional* costs for the project. That would hardly have been possible in any case, considering the financial situation in the Beira.

4.2 Cost-Effectiveness

An analysis of cost effectiveness requires that project inputs and project outputs are measurable, that outputs can be related to a specific inputs and that there is data for comparison. None of these preconditions is at hand in this case. We must therefore limit ourselves to some general comments as regards the relation between project input, outputs and effects.

A factor that should have contributed to a higher cost-effectiveness — for the financing agency — would be that fee levels have been on the lower side. Gothenburg should also have had a certain cost advantage when arranging study tours etc. considering the access to the municipal networks.

Factors that should have contributed to a lower cost effectiveness include that by recruiting persons with no previous experience of work in Portuguese speaking and developing countries, the learning process, including language training, has been longer and thus more expensive. The model of co-operation with many persons involved and much emphasis on social contacts has of course also implied a greater investment than would have been necessary with a more technical and "result oriented" approach. Whether this investment will pay off in the long run remains to be seen. If social contacts have a value in themselves, i.e. are seen as part of the project output, the issue of cost-effectiveness would also come in a different light.

As regards the issue of short term vs. long term consultants, it may be noted that the amount spent on consultancy and related expenses — SEK 8 million in four years — corresponds to approximately two long term consultants stationed the same time in Beira on a permanent basis, assuming a cost of approximately one million per year for one long term consultant. The average yearly number of field days for the twinning project has been approximately 400, i.e. approximately 1,8 working years. In other words, work input in terms of time has only been marginally less than if long term consultancy would have been purchased for the same amount of money. It seems as if increased costs for travel, etc. have been largely compensated by cost savings in items related to long term consulting such as housing and family allowance.

So what is best — long or frequent short term consultancy? Not very surprisingly, the Executive Council of Beira expressed the opinion that for more complicated technical

issues where a substantial support is needed, long term consulting would be preferable. However, in a twinning programme where a broad exposure and exchange of experience are important, short term consultancies are better. In the previous chapter it was noted that short term consulting was probably positive from a sustainability point of view. Short term consultancy also permits a higher degree of flexibility which must be of particular importance in the Mozambican environment. In this case short term consulting seems to have been an appropriate and cost-effective choice.


5 TWINNING AS A MODEL FOR COOPERATION

The idea of twinning — joining together two cities, institutions or similar units for a mutually benefiting co-operation and exchange — has been tried in a number of different contexts and in a number of different ways. Each twinning relation is in a sense unique and it is therefore impossible to talk about twinning as one uniform concept. In this chapter we therefore start by describing the "model" chosen by Beira and Gothenburg as opposed to alternative models of co-operation. We also discuss the benefits and limitations of twinning in general and under what circumstances the twinning model is likely to be applicable.

5.1 Organisation of the Beira - Gothenburg Twinning Arrangement

The contractual relations between the different parties are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Contractual Relations



The illustration shows that the City of Gothenburg has a double role as twinning partner with Beira and as a consultant to SIDA.


The first steps towards a twinning relation between the cities were taken informally during visits to the respective countries and the intentions were later confirmed by correspondence. The first formal contract was signed in 1990 between the Municipality of Gothenburg and SIDA, and included the provision of consultancy services in the areas of financial management, waste collection and land and property management. In Gothenburg's Terms of Reference, it is clear that Beira shall be the receiver of these services and the planned activities have been discussed thoroughly between the concerned parties. However, there is no formal agreement between the two cities.

Later, in 1991 the "memorandum of cooperation" was signed by directly the two cities. It has the form of a letter of intent to extend the twinning into areas other than those mentioned in the SIDA contract. Gothenburg assumes the responsibility to arrange the necessary financing. This is the *only* formalised twinning agreement between the two cities. When the co-operation in e.g. culture materialised the contracts were again signed between Gothenburg, SIDA and the Swedish Institute, not with Beira.

From 1 January 1995, all SIDA funded engagements of the Municipality of Gothenburg were taken over by the recently created Gothenburg Municipal Services AB, a self financed, non-profit company of the Municipality of Gothenburg.

These contractual relations are clearly reflected in the current organisation of work. Figure 2 shows the participants and the principal flows of communication.

Figure 2: Twinning Organisation



The main feature of this illustration is the fact that virtually all contact is made through the Swedish project co-ordinator while there are very few horizontal contacts between the institutions on the respective sides.

Project *planning* has been the responsibility of the project co-ordinator, in co-operation and in a dialogue with the concerned institutions. The Plan of Action for 1995/96 was written by representatives from the City of Beira but in several cases the Mozambican counterparts did not seem to be very well informed of the contents of previous project documents. On neither side had there been any substantial involvement of the City Councils in the definition of the project activities or programme content.

The project co-ordinator *recruits* necessary personnel from the technical departments of the City administration in Gothenburg, or if necessary, as in the case of mapping, externally. Thus, there has been a meeting between *individual* professionals from both sides. However, the direct contacts at *institutional* level have been limited to occasional study visits and courtesy visits. There seems to have been somewhat of a tendency of diminishing contacts at institutional level. The technical staff within e.g. the truck workshops and the land register state that if any technical problems would occur, they

would first try to contact the project co-ordinator, not the Swedish technical experts or their institutions. The only exception, where a real institutional cooperation seem to have taken place is the case of culture. This programme component is again part of the so called extended twinning, and the initiative for its realisation came largely from the Swedish institution.

The principal reporting from the project has been the quarterly reports of the project co-ordinator to SIDA (Maputo and Stockholm) Ministry of Public Administration and the Executive Council of Beira. The annual report for 1994 was, however, written with a considerable participation of the Mozambican side. Occasionally, there have been internal reports from the various directorates to the Executive Council of Beira but no joint reports. The Executive Committee of Gothenburg has received brief reports from the project co-ordinator on an annual basis.

5.2 Definition of the Beira - Gothenburg Twinning Model

5.2.1 DIMENSIONS

The model of co-operation chosen in this particular case can be defined by relating it to alternative models. Below we have therefore selected some of the dimensions which express the expected differences between *twinning* and a more traditional *consulting* relation, along which we may position the co-operation between Beira and Gothenburg.

Similar Functions — Different Functions

Twinning typically implies that two institutions with *corresponding* or similar functions establish a relation, while consultancy normally implies a relation between parties with completely *different* functions, for example a commercial company assisting a state institution.

In the case of Gothenburg and Beira the relation is in a formal sense between two cities of approximately the same size. However, while there has been a considerable institutional involvement in Beira, the same cannot be said about Gothenburg. In fact, there seems to have been somewhat of a tendency of increased differences as regards functions between the two twinning parties during the course of the project, as a result of the creation of Gothenburg Municipal Services AB and a reduction of the involvement at central municipal level in Gothenburg. In a strict sense, the twinning partners are now one municipality and one public enterprise. The Swedish staff are mostly recruited from institutions in Gothenburg similar to those where they work in Beira, but the institutional contacts have, as previously mentioned been limited. In reality, the counterpart of the President of the Executive Council of Beira is *not* the Chairman of the Municipal Committee in Gothenburg but the project co-ordinator from Gothenburg Municipal Services AB. The exception in this respect has been the co-operation between the culture houses in Beira and Gothenburg, which despite considerable differences share the same basic functions and where there has been a relatively high degree of institutional co-operation.

Non-Commercial — Commercial


Co-operation can be based on a commercial relation, i.e. a *client - supplier* relation in which one party pays for the services of the other, or — as typically for twinning — a mutually benefiting *co-operation*, where costs and benefits are shared by the two parties.

In fact, neither of these extremes would give a correct description of the relation between Beira and Gothenburg, as it is actually not a two-party relation but a three-party relation, with both client-supplier aspects and twinning aspects.

As regards the provision of resources, we noted that both Beira and Gothenburg, with a few exceptions, have had full cost coverage. This is illustrated by the fact that Gothenburg Municipal Services AB is a non-profit but self financed company. In other words, there is a *participation* in the programme but no net *contribution* to it. As regards the benefits, Beira stands out as the main receiver of the programme — which is quite obvious as the programme has been financed with funds for development co-operation.

Combining the two dimensions described above, we can relate twinning to some other forms of co-operation:

Figure 3



Referring this figure, the twinning between Beira and Gothenburg actually contains aspects of all of the four types of relations. In most project components, such as financial management, Gothenburg is primarily an institutional consultant to SIDA and Beira. For those components where there has been no institutional involvement at all, e.g. introduction of the GIS, the City of Gothenburg has functioned as any consulting company. Donation of surplus equipment could basically be seen as welfare activities. Study visits that have taken place and some components, such as the co-operation within the area of culture, could truly be described as twinning.

Institutionalised — Contract Based

A twinning relation can be expected to be *institutionalised*, i.e. incorporated among the long term commitments of the Cities, while consultancy is based on a contractual agreement.

In the case of Beira and Gothenburg there are aspects of both. The decision to enter a twinning relation has been taken at political level, however, rather passively. The *content* of the twinning programme is regulated in contracts with SIDA. In fact, with the creation of Gothenburg Municipal Services AB, and perhaps as a result of some changes of key people, there seems to be somewhat of a tendency *from* institutionalisation of the programme.

Social Commitment — Formal Commitment

While consulting implies a formal commitment to the other party, twinning is a voluntary relation, and the commitment will rather be of a moral or social character.

As twinning partners, neither Beira nor Gothenburg have any obligations towards each other or are in any position to put any demands upon each other. However, with the present arrangement, Beira is at the same time receiver of the services that Gothenburg should deliver as a consultant. The distinction between these two roles of Gothenburg does not always seem to be sufficiently clear.

Political responsibility — Legal responsibility

As a twinning relation is assumed to be institutionalised rather than contract-based, the control and responsibility are of a political nature, rather than legal and commercial. If the twinning relation is not well institutionalised there is a risk of a control and accountability vacuum.

In the case of Gothenburg the reporting from the respective City Councils as regards resource use and results has been very limited and no real debate on the twinning has taken place. This should not be surprising as Gothenburg has not contributed with any financial resources. There is virtually no risk exposure and Gothenburg's only stake in the project is goodwill and the possible indirect benefits of the programme. This lack of political control is partly compensated for by the control exercised by SIDA, as financing agency. Also, as the twinning programme has been largely a personal venture of a limited group of people that still have a considerable interest in the project, there is also a certain aspect of personal responsibility.

Permanent — Temporary

Being institutionalised, the twinning relation is assumed to be permanent, as opposed to a consultancy assignment which only lasts as long as stipulated in the contract.

There is a general understanding that the co-operation between Beira and Gothenburg should continue and the Memorandum of Co-operation has no limitation in terms of time perspective. However, limited institutionalisation and the dependency of funds from SIDA — which despite an assumed long term commitment finances the programme on a contract basis — imply that the bulk of twinning activities are "permanent" only for a few years at a time.

Broad Scope — Limited Scope

In a consultancy contract the services to be performed are usually clearly defined and relatively limited in scope, while twinning implies a broader relation. The institutionalisation and the access to the entire resource base of the two cities present opportunities for extended co-operation in a number of areas.

To a certain degree, this has been utilised in the case of Beira - Gothenburg, as manifested by the Memorandum of Co-operation of 1991. The co-operation within the areas of culture, environment and the discussions between the radio stations in the two cities are examples of spin-off effects that would hardly have come about without the twinning relation. However, the concentration into a few key areas, defined initially, persists. Furthermore, the dependency on external financing — the consultancy aspect — obviously implies that the realisation of new project ideas will be dependent on the willingness of SIDA or other donors, to support these activities.

Side-activity — Principal Activity

In a twinning relation, the participants perform their twinning relations as a sort of side-activity, not leaving their regular duties, while the consultant performs the services on a professional basis.

This twinning programme has been based on short term consultancies, implying that staff from Gothenburg has only had shorter leaves from their regular services. The exceptions are the project co-ordinator, who has been employed nearly full time by the project and the recruitment of external consultants, as for the Land Management.

Summing up...

Seeking to position the relation between Beira - Gothenburg along eight different dimensions of consultancy vs. twinning, we find that this relation could only be characterised as real twinning in a few areas. In all important aspects, Gothenburg — through Gothenburg Municipal Services AB — is an exporter of services with SIDA as the client and Beira as the receiver of services. This is done on a non-profit basis but in a business like manner.

5.2.2 MOTIVES FOR TWINNING

What are the reasons for entering into a twinning relation? From the Beira perspective, the answer should be quite obvious. The twinning has implied a considerable net transfer of human and financial resources to Beira. The city has had everything to gain and virtually nothing to lose.

However, from the point of view of a Swedish municipality it is not quite as obvious. Some of the *possible* motives, which in no way exclude each other, would be the following:

1. Political and ideological: The problems of the Third World concern us all. Co-operation at government level can and must be complemented with co-operation at other levels, such as municipal particularly to promote a popular participation and mobilisation. Increased exposure to other countries and cultures could also be a means of tackling the problem of racism.
2. Other forms of exchange: Despite the enormous differences between two countries like Sweden and Mozambique, there are always some areas where there is a real potential for a mutual benefiting exchange, such as culture and commerce.
3. Accumulation of knowledge and experiences: Being responsible for basic education the municipality has an own interest in and responsibility for acquiring knowledge about other countries including the African: geography, history, culture and languages etc.
4. Personnel management: Twinning can be used as an instrument in the city's personnel policy, as incentives to the employees and as part of the general development of human resources: subsidised language training and a broadening of perspectives, for example.
5. Goodwill: The city will receive goodwill from having participated in overseas twinning, something that may pay off in the long run, e.g. in commercial relations. The aspect of self esteem should also not be forgotten.
6. Profit/Cost coverage: Despite the fact that a Municipality should be non-profitable there are situations where the sales of services permit a more efficient use of fixed costs, such as when an organisation is over-staffed.
7. "Laissez-faire": There might also be situations in which there are no actual motive for twinning. However, as long as it does not imply any costs and losses, the initiatives of individual staff members of the municipal administration will not be stopped; a form of let-go policy.

Which have been the motives of Gothenburg? The representatives of Gothenburg, sometimes expressing a certain urge to participate in humanitarian activities, are pleased to make their resources available. However, it is a solidarity with full cost coverage or even with a "profit" in the form of indirect benefits. The City of Gothenburg does neither have the function, the legal mandate nor the political support to spend municipal funds in the name of solidarity.

Various forms of exchange are mentioned in the Memorandum of Co-operation of 1991, but again, it has been realised only in the area of culture. A future exchange in the other areas such as sports and commerce should not be ruled out but not much of expectations are shown.

Nor has accumulation of knowledge been a major theme even if there have been some effects in this direction, particularly for the culture component. Obviously, the persons that have participated in the programme have also gathered experiences and knowledge, however probably more of a personal character than of professional use. It may thus have had effects in terms of staff development (motivation). The Memorandum of Co-operation talks about Swedish institutions benefiting from new experiences and resources, but again, the persons have not been recruited by the project as part of an active staff development policy.

Goodwill and "placing Gothenburg on the word map" are arguments which often are raised. The persons that have participated in the project clearly take pride in this fact.


There is no official profit motive behind the twinning arrangement. Still we noted in the Section 4.1 on resources that Gothenburg's incomes of this co-operation are probably higher than its costs.

This leads us to the "laissez-faire" theory, which seems to be valid to a considerable extent in this case. As long as full cost coverage has been assured and the programme has not become a burden in some other way, Gothenburg has had nothing to loose on the twinning. That the expectations are low as regards benefits to the City is proved by the fact that there is no preparedness to contribute with any own resources, but if there would still be any positive effects — the better! Therefore, the previous Chairman of the Executive Committee and Project Co-ordinator, who have been the driving forces behind the Beira twinning, have received the strongest possible formal — but passive — support. In fact, most persons at political level know very little about the twinning with Beira. The present Chairman express a rather critical view to the twinning idea as such, but he has neither informed himself to any greater extent nor taken any action against the twinning. Neither have there been any initiatives taken at institutional level.

We could perhaps grade the above presented motives in terms of *degree of commitment*, the first ones reflecting a more *active* attitude and the latter a more *passive*. It is possible that the degree of commitment and motives for twinning will change over time — in either direction. On the whole, we must describe the twinning policy of Gothenburg as rather passive and with mounting local problems and the change in administration in Gothenburg, the twinning policy has not become more active over time.

In the previous section we related the Beira - Gothenburg twinning to the dimension twinning - consultancy. Positioning the City of Gothenburg along the dimensions *twinning - consultancy* and *active -passive* (twinning policy), one could say that we get a picture of the "degree" of twinning.

Figure 4: The Degree of Twinning



In figure 4 the difference between rhetoric and reality is shown. Though it is generally assumed that the twinning programme should be found at point 1, the real situation rather corresponds to the location of point 2, reservations made for considerable *differences between* the programme components. Whether it is possible — or desirable — to *move* from 2 to 1 will depend on the twinning partners themselves.

5.3 An Alternative Twinning Model

In the above sections it has been shown that the programme is very much a hybrid between a twinning arrangement and a traditional consultancy relation. It is possible that this model has been necessary, and even quite appropriate, in the early stages. A twinning agreement could be seen as an empty shell waiting to be filled with something; in this case it has been with the SIDA-funded consultancy. It is no doubt thanks to the capacity and efforts of the project co-ordinator that the twinning has taken off the way it actually has.¹⁵ The central role of the project co-ordinator can also be explained by the language barrier. Giving Gothenburg the responsibility for the use of SIDA funds seems reasonable considering the weaknesses in terms of financial management in Beira. It could also very well be argued that this model has been a way of creating at least a twinning-like situation, which has been better than no twinning at all.

However, the model also presents a number of inconveniences. The limited direct links between the institutions on either side mean that an important aspect of the twinning idea is lost.

At present, Gothenburg has a combined responsibility for needs analysis, project planning and execution and obviously this is done in the perspective of what the city has to offer. There is a risk that the programme will become increasingly supply-driven. There is obviously also the aspect of limited competition and the dependency on only one supplier — Gothenburg Municipal Services AB — for SIDA's continued support to Beira. Gothenburg has no doubt an important role to play in Beira, but it is not

¹⁵ It could be mentioned that Beira has twinning relations with several other cities — Porto, Bristol, Amsterdam and Padova — but because of the lack funds and a "motor" in the form of an active project co-ordinator these twinning relations have never reached beyond good intentions.

necessarily so that the City should be the *only* supplier of SIDA-funded support in a longer perspective.

It was pointed out that there is no political accountability for the programme either in Gothenburg or in Beira, nor the accountability of a real consultancy relation. As there have been no formal agreements signed between the two cities there has been a feeling in Beira that one has had relatively little to say as to what Gothenburg should deliver and not much to complain about if expectations were not met; maybe quite natural in a "friendship" relation? After all, without Gothenburg there would perhaps be no support at all.

As neither Beira nor Gothenburg has any major risk exposure there is in practice nobody to hold responsible if something goes wrong. Full cost coverage on both sides implies that there is nothing to reflect the priorities of the participants. It further reduces the incentives for cost-effectiveness, particularly as Gothenburg Municipal Services is a non-profit organisation in a monopolistic position.

As we saw, the benefits of Gothenburg are limited. In this perspective it can be questioned whether the City has any real incentives to develop and extend the relation in the future. The driving force is then likely to be on the individual level.


Please, note that the above points are *not* a criticism of the twinning partners — they are weaknesses of the twinning arrangement as such. It does not seem as if they have constituted any major problems so far. However, it is important to note that one has so far neither tried twinning in a real sense nor realised its full potential. If one wishes to develop the twinning concept, a more balanced organisation with a redefinition of roles is necessary. The exact form of this organisation must of course be decided by the two cities. Still, just as a *point of reference*, the following model of a symmetric organisation for twinning could be considered.

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Figure 5: Model for Symmetric Twinning Organisation

Municipality A

Municipality B



The Steering group:

- consists of an *equal number* of representatives from each side;
- has an *alternating* chairmanship;
- has the *decision making* function, within the mandate given by the respective City Councils and considering financial limitations;
- has the *control* function, reviewing reports from the twinning programme and informing the two City Councils where a debate is assumed to take place;
- takes *initiatives* to new activities and areas of co-operation;
- has a mutual right to impose *veto*;

The Secretariat:

- is composed of one *project leader* from *each side*;
- *executes* the decisions of the steering group;
- presents new *initiatives* to the steering group;
- is a secretary and *facilitator* in the respective reference groups;
- assures necessary *co-ordination* of the twinning activities;

The Reference Groups:

- are formed on each side and consist of a *broad spectre* of institutions, within or outside of the municipality, e.g. Chambers of Commerce, Schools and NGOs, that have or could have an interest in the twinning;
- Have an *advisory function* to the City Councils and other participants in the twinning.

The actual co-operation is assumed to take place between the different directorates, institutions, companies, NGOs etc. on each side. The financing of activities is a joint responsibility of the two parties — if necessary with external assistance.

SIDA funds could be seen as a compensation for the absence of resources in Beira. Even though Gothenburg can benefit from the SIDA financed co-operation, funds are obviously not intended as a support to Gothenburg. If financing is assumed to be a joint responsibility it would seem logical if SIDA provided the same amount of money — to Beira — as Gothenburg would contribute with to the programme. The benefits should then also be shared equally.

If SIDA would consider this type of support, it would be natural that funds were channelled through the Steering Group, being the decision making and controlling body. It is, however, not quite obvious how this should be done in practice, the reason being that the whole SIDA way of working is based on a client-supplier relation. But in a twinning programme *both* sides are givers and takers and they are *both* responsible to *one another*. Possibly a kind of "framework agreement", such as SIDA has used in other programmes, could be considered.

If, however, SIDA wishes to use the twinning programme to transfer a more substantial support to Beira, it will inevitably create an asymmetric organisation incompatible with the basic twinning idea.

In order to assure transparency and accountability — which the programme is in fact all about — it would in that case be preferable to make a *distinction* between the real *twinning* and the *consultancy assignments* that can be given to Gothenburg Municipal Services AB at the same conditions as any institutional consultant.

5.4 Preconditions for Twinning

Looking at the case of Beira, a relevant question would be: Under what circumstances can the twinning idea be realised? We have identified four factors which can be assumed to be crucial. The first is a minimum of *stability*, in terms of persons and policies, for the twinning relation to grow strong. As the twinning is reciprocal, and both sides should contribute to its realisation, both sides must have a minimum of financial and human resources. A condition for the social — as well as professional — relations is that the cultural and language threshold is not too high. Last, and perhaps most important, the respective parties must have a genuine commitment to the twinning idea, i.e. not only an interest in receiving the fruits of the twinning but a preparedness to contribute actively in its realisation.

Giving a rough score for each one of these factors on a scale — high, medium, low and zero — the situation at the beginning of the twinning between Gothenburg and Beira could be described as follows:

	<u>Gothenburg</u>	<u>Beira</u>
Stability	High	Low
Resources	High/Low	Zero
Language	Zero/Low	Zero/Low
Commitment	Low	Medium

While *stability* could be described as high in Gothenburg, Beira was facing civil war which has been followed by a considerable political and institutional instability. The City of Gothenburg could no doubt be described as resourceful, however, it has not had the political nor legal mandate to use own funds for overseas development co-operation. In Beira there have been no resources at all. The language barrier was massive with nobody (with a leading role in the project) in Gothenburg speaking Portuguese and almost nobody in Beira with any greater knowledge of English. As far as commitment is concerned Beira was obviously interested in any kind of support, but probably not very sure of the implications of a real twinning agreement. In Gothenburg, a limited number of people, directly involved in the project, have showed considerable interest, but on the whole, the commitment shown in terms of participation and contributions at Municipal level was found to be limited.

Commitment on individual level

To summarise, not only were the preconditions for a successful twinning programme poor but several of the main ones have been lacking completely, meaning that twinning in its true sense has been virtually impossible to realise. However, the lack of resources was compensated for by SIDA, the language barrier was overcome by intense language training and the limited commitment in general seems to have been compensated for by a very high commitment of a few key persons.

In this perspective, the achievements made are impressive. At the same time it explains why the relation to a large extent has become consultancy oriented rather than twinning oriented. It also explains why the fulfilment of objectives, sustainability and cost-effectiveness of the programme have been low.

Looking ahead, conditions have improved somewhat, but only marginally. The situation in Beira, as for the whole of Mozambique, must still be considered highly unstable. Also in Sweden there have been political shifts. In Sweden there has been a tradition of involving the opposition in all long term relations and to have a continuity at the Municipal level, but this programme has largely been a personal venture.

There are signs that the financial situation in Beira might improve somewhat in the future but the lack of resources will be considerable for a long time to come. On the Swedish side, there has been a considerable deterioration of the economy affecting not the least the municipalities. The fact that the financial responsibility for the twinning programme now lies within a company which is to be self financing, is a guarantee for a separation between the municipal service export and the regular municipal activities.

As regards language, there has been considerable progress but the language barrier is still high. The programme has come to a point where a relatively small group of technical staff on both sides are able to communicate. However, the direct contacts at e.g. institutional or political level are still restricted by the language barrier. Extending the twinning programme to schools, sport clubs etc. is also likely to be relatively difficult for the same reason.

The issue of commitment must be seen in view of the realities in Gothenburg. As pointed out by the project co-ordinator, the city of Gothenburg has an annual budget turnover of some 30 billion SEK. The Beira project has counted for about three million annually. The City Administration comprises some 50 committees and offices and another 50 municipal enterprises employing some 60 000 people. The City of Gothenburg has virtually not contributed with any funds of its own and has very low expectations as regards any benefits of the project. Despite the fact that the twinning has the firmest possible political and administrative base, this clearly explains the fact that the interest and commitment at higher levels within the City Administration is low.

In sum, the conditions for Gothenburg to fill the role as an institutional consultant have probably increased somewhat. Whether a real twinning relation is possible to establish will depend on the two twinning parties. At this moment it seems doubtful.

5.5 Benefits and Risks of Twinning

As each twinning relation is unique, no general statements can be made as regards benefits, limitations and risks of the "twinning model". However, below are some reflections made in connection with the case of Beira and Gothenburg which deserve consideration.

— Positive aspects

The fact that Swedish institutions have qualified professionals which can be utilised in development co-operation has been seen in many cases and is confirmed once again in this study. There is also the aspect of identification, when joining together persons from two similar institutions. Despite working under widely differing circumstances, there may be many things they have in common. This provides the basis for an exchange of experience as well as for mutual trust and understanding.

A close and trustful working relation is crucial for any cooperation programme, be it a twinning programme or a regular consultancy. In a twinning relation, with extensive social contacts and a mutual long term commitment, such a relation is probably created more easily.

A close working relation should facilitate the planning process. As the parties share the long term visions, it should be easier to adopt a flexible approach and improvise, rather than stick to pre-established plans.

The importance of a long term perspective is generally recognised as far as all development co-operation is concerned. However, in reality the perspective is all too often short or medium term. An institutionalised relation, which in principle shall never

end, provides a good platform for a long term thinking. It is plausible that a Swedish municipality, for which twinning remains somewhat of a side activity, is in a better position to advance slowly and wait until the time is ripe, than a professional consultant. A long term commitment also implies somewhat of a quality and "after sale service" guarantee.

Just as a sector support would benefit the co-ordination within a given sector, twinning between the two cities will enable a good local (geographical) co-ordination. At best, co-operation with one city can serve as a "pilot" project for the sector.

The links created between two cities and the multitude of areas within which two cities can co-operate offer spin-off opportunities, such as the co-operation in the area of culture and PROPECA. Each spin-off project will then in turn give additional strength and vitality to the twinning relation.

As twinning is a two-way relation, there will also be positive effects in Sweden. SIDA has a mandate to inform the Swedish public about developing countries as well as to promote popular participation in international development co-operation. Twinning is obviously an excellent way of doing this. As we saw above, the Swedish cities themselves should also have a self-interest in the twinning, culturally, socially, commercially etc.

Finally, there are other values in a twinning programme that are difficult to include in a project document. The importance of for example personal experiences, human bridge building and expressions of solidarity should not be underestimated.

— *Negative aspects and risks*

A twinning between two cities implies a considerable mobilisation of persons and resources which of course also implies high mobilisation costs. Visits of primarily formal or social character would for example not have been necessary in a regular consulting assignment. Massive language training is another example of start-up investments of this kind.

Professionals from the city administration may be highly qualified but they are probably beginners in terms of development co-operation, and newcomers to the country in question. Certain natural "beginner's mistakes" can therefore be expected.

In traditional development co-operation needs are identified and the necessary expertise is recruited where it is to be found. In a twinning relation, the areas of possible co-operation must be chosen also with consideration to a given "supplier's" resources. Programmes will therefore never become completely demand driven, but also supply driven.

Even though a general exchange of experience never hurts, the experience of one country might be of greater or less relevance for the other. We could for example see that the excellent system for waste collection in Gothenburg was not very relevant for Beira as it is simply too costly. For the introduction of the GIS system, one chose to call upon external resources, as a Portuguese speaking person with this competence could not be

found within the Municipality itself. In other words, twinning must be limited to those areas where there exists a real potential for a fruitful co-operation.

A strong social dimension and personal commitment may be beneficial for the working climate. However, there might be circumstances, for example when things go wrong and when a tough attitude is necessary, in which too strong personal commitments will rather complicate matters, placing not the least the individuals in difficult situations.

Twinning is per definition a two party relation and there is a mutual dependency for its continuation. This might lead to a situation where the parties avoid criticism and disregard negative aspects of the co-operation. Also SIDA enters in a form of dependency as the "consultant" cannot be replaced.

A risk of the "long-term commitment" is that a city like Beira receives the impression that it will always be able to count on external support, giving less incentive to aim at sustainable solutions of its problems. Not always is a long term presence desirable. For the solution of a specific problem, limited in time, twinning is probably a less suitable model.

Similarly, with the spin-off effects, there seems to be a tendency that Beira would like to see Gothenburg involved in an ever increasing number of areas, and as twinning city solve *all* of its problems. The risk of aid dependency is then immediate.

Just as it was noted that the geographical concentration favours local co-ordination, there is a risk that this will be at the expense of the sector co-ordination. In the case of Beira, this seems to have been avoided through the co-ordination with the Ministry of Public Administration. However, problems were encountered in connection with e.g. the budget process, where the activities in Beira largely failed due to the lack of improvement at national level.

The importance of the social dimension implies that the twinning is probably more dependent on a particular set individuals than consulting. If the twinning is not sufficiently institutionalised it will be highly vulnerable to staff changes.

There are also certain *limitations* of legal nature as to what point a Swedish Municipality can engage itself in the export of services. The point of departure is that Municipalities should stay within their core functions, i.e. local administration, but that exceptions can be made in certain cases, mentioned in the legislation. One important aspect is that a Municipality is not permitted to use its own funds and thus have a risk exposure in these activities. Exactly how to draw a boundary between export of services and a "mutually benefiting exchange" such as the one between the two culture houses is not quite clear.

The term development *co-operation* is commonly used, even when we in practice refer to a direct transfer of resources — *aid* — from Sweden to other countries. Twinning, however, could be considered co-operation in a real sense. As explained in the previous chapter, twinning can *not* be used as a regular channel of development aid resources or it will inevitable be at the expense of the actual *co-operation*.

6 MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The twinning between the cities of Beira and Gothenburg was launched under extremely difficult circumstances but with a considerable amount of enthusiasm. The mere fact that the twinning relation is soon entering its sixth year is an achievement in itself. Valuable experience has been gathered and important investments for a future co-operation have been made. However, in order to develop the twinning relation further, realising its full potential, a number of factors must be considered. The following points are our main conclusions and recommendations.

6.1 General Assessment

— *Fulfilment of Objectives*

The project has adopted a typical "process approach", establishing targets and objectives along the way, which makes a proper assessment of the fulfilment of objectives virtually impossible. However, judging from the ambitions expressed in the available project documentation goal fulfilment is generally limited. Explanations include the time needed for the start-up activities, such as language training and establishment of social contacts, shortage of finance and human resources in Beira as well as externalities, such as the slow pace of the national decentralisation process. In many cases, the objectives have perhaps been unrealistic, considering the project environment and available project resources.

Recommendation: Future project planning should include a clear definition of objectives and criteria for their fulfilment, to enable better monitoring and relevant action if objectives are not met. A better analysis of external factors is also recommended.

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— *Sustainability*

The sustainability of the different project components vary from medium to low. Lack of financial resources, limited human resources and the choice of technology all constitute threats to the continuity of activities established within the project.

Recommendation: The issue of sustainability should be given the highest attention when planning all on-going and future project activities. Given the financial and human constraints in Beira, the ambition must always be to find realistic low-cost solutions, manageable by the local staff. Self-financed or income generating activities should be given priority.

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The potential effects of institutional and political changes in the future should also be considered.

Recommendation: The twinning partners are recommended to extend their networks to include the opposition and actors beyond the Municipal administration, including the business community and civil society.

— *Cost-effectiveness*

As a result of high initial costs and limited fulfilment of objectives, the cost-effectiveness of this programme must so far be described as low. However, looking at the establishment of social contacts, language training and first time mistakes as long term investments, cost-effectiveness should be expected to rise considerably in the medium and long term.

Recommendation: The cost-effectiveness of the project should be monitored closely and if not substantially improved during the next project period the project and the model of co-operation must be reconsidered.

full cost coverage

↓
all use of funds
low
in the beginning
of the project

As both cities currently have full cost coverage for the programme activities, there is in fact no in-built incentive for cost-effectiveness. It has also created a situation in which the awareness of opportunity costs and the consideration of possible alternative use of funds have been low.

Recommendation: For each of the twinning components, Beira and Gothenburg should have some stake of their own, either in the form of finance, manpower or equipment, as a demonstration that the programme content is of high priority and to assure cost-consciousness.

Frequent visits of short term consultants has only been marginally more costly than if long term consultants would have been used. Meanwhile, it has permitted a considerably higher degree of flexibility and a broader exposure between the two cities.

6.2 Specific Programme Components

— *Financial Management*

The need for improved financial management, for control and planning as well as for enhancing municipal revenue is great. More than half of the resources of the twinning programme have been spent on this component. The installation of hardware and the introduction of new computerised routines have contributed to a better accessibility of financial data. It has also laid a first foundation for more efficient revenue collection. However, the technical improvements have only partly lead to improved financial management and control. One of the reasons is the limited number of people with a financial management capacity.

strengthening
in the
beginning

Recommendation: Future activities in the field of financial management should be focused on human resources development with emphasis on economic thinking rather than additional technical support.

External factors, such as the budgetary crisis and poorly functioning national routines such as in connection with the budget process, have also limited the usefulness of installed systems. Circumstances require what could be described as crisis management and continued budget constraints as well as the ongoing decentralisation process call for a considerable higher degree of flexibility than what would be the case in a stable situation and a mature organisation

Recommendation: All support to the financial management function should be given with consideration at the extreme instability and lack of financial resources of Beira.

As noted already during project preparations, the financial constraints of Beira must be reduced before other areas can be substantially developed.

Recommendation: High priority should be given to all activities, within or outside of the Directorate of Finance, which will generate municipal revenue.

— *Waste Collection*

This sub-project has included an advisory component, a hardware component which was financed outside of the twinning budget, and two studies on the solid waste problem.

The delivery of Volvo trucks gave a slight, temporary increase in the amount of waste collected. However, the trucks have already proved unviable because of the lack of funds and human resources for maintenance. Even if funds could be obtained for restoration of the fleet and for operation of it, it would be a mis-allocation of resources considering its unproportional share of the municipal budget.

Recommendation: The number of trucks should be reduced to a level at which the Municipality of Beira can assure proper operation and maintenance. The idea to temporarily lease out some of the trucks to finance operation of the other ones may be investigated. The possibility of renting the services from the open market should also be assessed.

The advisory services have been relatively limited and their effects rather marginal in relation to the advice and training provided to the Directorate of Urban Services by e.g. the World Bank. As the technology introduced for waste management has been shown to be nonviable in the short term, the value of the advisory services may also be questioned.

Recommendation: Future support in this area should be focused on the establishment of alternative modes of waste collection, more labour intensive and suited to the conditions and financial resources of Beira. PROPECA can be an important component in this work.

— *Land and Property Management*

The land issue will remain important for a long time to come and the already existing parallel market for land is a sign of its real value. In order to protect its interests as land owner it is important that the City establishes a system for information, collection of revenues and protection of the interests both of the private and public title holders.

Recommendation: Efforts to complete the land register — which primarily is a local task — should be continued and a direct linkage with the Directorate of Finance should be established as soon as possible, so that the register also can serve as an instrument for revenue collection.

It is still too early to draw any conclusions from the mapping component. However, particular attention should be given to general recommendation as regards sustainability.

— *General Municipal Management*

The need for a more effective and efficient municipal management in Beira is considerable. Furthermore, it is within this area that Gothenburg Municipal Services AB can be expected to possess its main comparative advantage. The close contacts that have been established should provide an excellent base for co-operation and transfer of know-how in the area of municipal management. However, so far activities under this sub-component have been somewhat of ad hoc nature and rather general, producing limited tangible output.

Recommendation: Activities within this project component should be focused on the areas where Gothenburg really has a comparative advantage and can use its unique resources as a Municipality, including the political dimension — elections, multi-party culture, the differences between administrative and political levels, the role of civil society etc.

The up-coming local elections offers an excellent opportunity to invite representatives from the different political groupings of Beira to study the political process in Gothenburg.

— *PROPECA*

After less than a year PROPECA shows considerable progress. There is an active local involvement, a considerable record of activities as well as output and the effects appear to be substantial in relation to the investments. In many ways PROPECA can be seen as a complement to the general waste management services of the city. If not resolved, the problems of the municipal waste collection may therefore reduce the impact of PROPECA.

Recommendation: Continued support should be provided to PROPECA, given that the present performance is maintained. PROPECA could also be used as a platform for the development and implementation of a sustainable system for waste collection and management.

— *The Extended Twinning Programme*

Culture is the only area in which there has been a substantial co-operation beyond the "core activities". This component proves that a two-way institutional co-operation is possible. However, the lack of financial and human resources in Beira inevitably creates a disequilibrium in terms of relations. A cultural exchange with Sweden is probably not as much a priority as a means of survival.

Recommendation: The co-operation between the two culture houses should be continued, with a maximum emphasis on mutual exchange but also with consideration of the lack of financial resources and immediate problems of Beira.

The twinning programme would become substantially stronger if it was extended beyond the municipal administrations of the two cities. The discovery that the Chambers of Commerce in both cities had a great interest in twinning but had not yet been in touch with each other, shows one example of the unused twinning potential.

Recommendation: Efforts should be made to broaden the twinning to other areas, in accordance with the Memorandum of Co-operation of 1991. This requires a high profile of the programme in both Beira and Gothenburg and an active promotion of contacts between organisations, schools, NGOs etc. by those responsible for the twinning on either side.

Experience also show that the experience of one city is not always of high relevance to the other and that the potential for a mutual exchange is in fact limited.

Recommendation: Co-operation should be limited to those areas where the experience and resources of the two cities are of actual relevance for one another.

6.3 The Twinning Model

The twinning model in the case of Beira and Gothenburg is actually a hybrid between twinning and consultancy. It is a three party rather than a two party relation with a low degree of symmetry. The institutional contacts have with a few exceptions been limited and the Swedish organisation resembles in many ways that of a consultancy company, recruiting professionals from the City of Gothenburg, and occasionally from outside. Beira is the net receiver of services while Gothenburg primarily is a supplier. The parties have expressed a long term commitment, but the continuation of the twinning is highly dependent on the time frames of the SIDA-contracts.

Considering the prevailing circumstances, this model was initially probably the only viable one. However, in the study it is pointed out that neither the full benefits of twinning nor of consultancy are obtained and that the double role of Gothenburg as twinning partner and as consultant sometimes creates confusion.

Recommendation: A clearer distinction should be made between the actual *twinning* activities and *SIDA financed consultancy assignments* implemented by Gothenburg Municipal Management AB as an institutional consultant.

Twinning requires a true commitment and a substantial investment if its potential is to be realised. Functioning as an institutional consultant requires a strategy with clear objectives.

Recommendation: The issue of to what extent and for what reasons the City of Gothenburg should engage itself in twinning and institutional consultancy should be debated within its Executive Committee so that a clear policy can be established.

Looking at it from a twinning point of view, the present arrangement has too low a level of symmetry in all aspects, a lack of political responsibility and too high a dependence on

one person while the institutional co-operation is limited. There are also limited incentives for Gothenburg to develop the programme further.

Recommendation: If Gothenburg wishes to establish a real twinning relation with Beira, it should be characterised by

- Shared responsibility for planning, execution and follow-up
- Own contributions from both sides and shared benefits
- High degree of institutional co-operation
- Clear objectives for the twinning relation
- A political responsibility on both sides
- SIDA funds used to compensate for the absence of resources in Beira

inkl personer (limitat)

From a consultancy point of view, the lack of a clear client-supplier relation with a defined roles and responsibilities, creates a problem of accountability. The fact that Gothenburg to a large extent has become Beira's channel to SIDA support and that SIDA's dependency on Gothenburg implies a lack of competitiveness in the procurement process. This, in connection with the fact that the two cities are provided full cost coverage, creates no in-built incentives for cost-effectiveness.

Recommendation: The consultancy should be characterised by

- A division between needs identification and the supply of services
- Competitiveness in the procurement process
- Clear client-supplier-donor relation

The high dependency of SIDA funds obviously makes the twinning relation vulnerable.

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Recommendation: The twinning partners are encouraged to seek additional funding from other sources, such as NGOs, local development funds and the business community, for the twinning activities.

Please note that the deficiencies in the present twinning arrangement have so far not had any substantial negative effects and are in no way a critique of the twinning partners. However, measures will be needed to reduce risks and ensure a positive development of the programme in the future. Some of these, such as the creation of a more balanced organisation and a higher degree of institutional co-operation should be possible to implement immediately without any major difficulties. The more far reaching recommendations could be seen as objectives for the medium and longer term.

In the report we also draw some conclusions of more general nature. Four factors which are likely to be crucial for the realisation of a twinning programme are identified: *stability*, *availability of resources* at both sides, a reasonable *language threshold* and *commitment* of the concerned parties. The twinning programme between Beira and Gothenburg was actually launched against all odds. However, a reasonable degree of stability has been maintained, the lack of resources was compensated for by SIDA, the language barrier was, at least partly, overcome by massive language training and the relatively low commitment at central level was compensated for by the very high commitment of a few key persons. As discussed in the chapter of sustainability, many of the key factors are

still negative. Experience show that this can be overcome, partly at the expense of SIDA. However, there is one thing that can not be brought in from outside: commitment. This is likely to be the crucial factor for the future success of the twinning between Beira and Gothenburg and it is primarily on the Swedish side that efforts must be made.

Recommendation: Before funding a twinning relation, SIDA should critically review the pre-conditions for this type of co-operation, considering the cost-implications and likelihood of success. A demonstrated commitment of the twinning partners should be the most important criteria.

In a donor perspective, the twinning idea offers *benefits* as well as *limitations* and *potential risks*.

The Swedish Municipalities constitute an important *resource base* for Swedish development co-operation. They may possess competence and experiences that are relevant for developing countries. However, the limitations as regards experience of the development process and the relevance of the Swedish models in a Third World context must also be recognised. The fact that the participants are pre-defined implies a risk that activities will be *supply driven* rather than demand driven.

Extensive social contacts creates mutual understanding and a good working relation. At the same time, it implies higher initial costs, a vulnerability to shifts of persons and could make it difficult to take tough measures when actually needed.

The *long term commitment* facilitates long term planning and gives a certain after sale guarantee to the receiving country, but it may give less incentive to self-sustainable solutions. Similarly, twinning may result in many positive *spin-off effects* but without sufficient balance in the twinning relation, this may also become an invitation to increased aid dependency.

There is a ^{Swedish} law which makes municipal service export possible but which also set certain limitations. It would be wise to look into this matter before extending the support to twinning activities.

Twinning can be used as one way of promoting development co-operation between Sweden and other countries. However, there is a limit to the amount of external resources that can be channelled through it if the balance and the actual twinning idea should be maintained.

Recommendation: Twinning should not be seen as a *substitute* to traditional development assistance but as a useful *complement*.

ANNEX 1. TERMS OF REFERENCE

SIDA
Förvaltningsbiståndsbyrån
Thomas Kjellson

1995-01-30

Sid 1
Dossier
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**TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR AN EVALUATION OF THE
TWINNING BETWEEN THE CITIES OF BEIRA AND
GOTHENBURG**

During a visit to Sweden and Gothenburg in 1988 by a Mozambican delegation headed by the Minister of State Administration, the idea of establishing a twinning cooperation between the cities of Beira and Gothenburg was developed.

The detailed project document for support to strengthening the administration and management of the Beira City Council through a twinning arrangement with the City Council of Gothenburg was worked out in 1989. The start of the project was however delayed by the fact that the World Bank-financed project for urban rehabilitation included the city of Beira in its activities. It was therefore necessary to sort out what should be included in the Swedish support to Beira and what should be within the World Bank-financed activities. By June 1990, the revised project document was agreed upon between SIDA and the city of Beira. A contract between SIDA and the City Council of Gothenburg was signed in July 1990 for the purpose of supporting Beira City Council to implement the project activities for the period up to mid-1992.

The twinning cooperation between the two cities included for the period July 1990 - June 1992

three components:

- financial management,
- urban services and
- urban development, land and property management.

The Swedish support to the public administration sector was extended for one year from July 1992 until June 1993, and so was the project for support to Beira and the contract with Gothenburg with mainly the same aim and direction as for the previous period.

In 1993, Sweden and Mozambique entered into a new agreement on cooperation in the field of public administration for the period July 1993 to June 1995. This agreement includes the continuation of the twinning between Beira and Gothenburg. The plan of operation states three areas for continued cooperation:

- financial management,
- management and operation of the municipal

administration and
- urban services, town planning and land management.

In the beginning of 1994 Beira City Council and SIDA agreed to implement a 'Pilot project in the field of environmental protection in Beira'. SIDA has contracted the City Council of Gothenburg to support Beira in the implementation of this project.

It is worthwhile noting that the two cities have agreed on working together outside the SIDA support in the fields such as culture, sports, social welfare, trade and industry and provision of surplus equipment. A Memorandum of Understanding on this cooperation was signed by the two cities in May 1991, for which other sources of financing than SIDA are being used.

During the entire project period it has been seen as important to provide the central Ministry of State Administration with information about the performance of the Beira - Gothenburg twinning project, partly as a concrete pilot project for improving the municipal services in a big city, partly as an input to the overall reform process of the Mozambican public administration.

It should be noted that Gothenburg City Council has, upon request from the Mozambican Government, been contracted by SIDA as consultant in the current District Pilot Project within the framework of decentralization and local government reform.

From the 1st of January 1995 Gothenburg City Council is represented by the 100% owned company Gothenburg Municipal Services AB as the contract partner in the three contracts with SIDA mentioned above.

Purpose of the evaluation

The purpose of the evaluation is to:

a) analyse and assess if the objectives and targets of the twinning project as stated in the project documents have been met, and if the results achieved are sustainable;

b) assess the cost effectiveness of the project;

c) analyse the model of a twinning arrangement between two cities used in this project, and to compare this model with alternative ways for implementing the project activities; and

d) based on a) - c) above, make recommendations on a possible continuation of the project beyond June, 1995.

Scope and Focus of the Evaluation

The consultants shall carry out:

- an analysis and assessment of the results - outputs as well as effects - achieved in relation to the objectives of the project, and their sustainability;
- an analysis of the development of the management and implementation capacity within Beira City Council;
- an assessment of the training activities carried out within the project;
- an assessment of the quality and regularity of the reports from the twinning project to the Mozambican central ministries of state administration, finance and construction and the eventual impact of these reports on the national policy making in the public administration area;
- an analysis of the method chosen by the City Council of Gothenburg to provide the support for the City Council of Beira, e. g. no longterm adviser working in Beira, using personnel from within the City Council of Gothenburg on shortterm missions, building up a longterm framework for mutual understanding between the personnel from the two cities, etc;
- an assessment of the cost effectiveness of the method used by Gothenburg to support Beira City Council to implement the project activities;
- a comparison between the method, achievements and cost effectiveness of the project with what could have been expected using alternative methods for supporting Beira City Council to implement the project;

Based on the assessments and analyses made as indicated above, the team shall give proposals for a possible continued Swedish support to Beira City Council after mid-1995. In making such proposals, the team should give special consideration to the possibilities of extending the SIDA support into the area of capacity building for environmental protection and planning.

Methodology and Manning

The consultants shall discuss with SIDA's Division for Public Administration and Management, review the written material about the project and discuss with Gothenburg City Council before the departure to Mozambique.

In Maputo, the consultants shall discuss with the Development Cooperation Section of the Swedish Embassy, the Ministry of State Administration and eventually the Ministries of Finance and Construction. In Beira, meetings should be held with the Sofala provincial authorities and with the leadership and the different departments of the Beira City Council. A final meeting with representatives of the Sofala province and the City of Beira should be organized, where the consultants should give a brief summary of findings and conclusions. Debriefing should also be held with the Swedish Embassy and the Ministry of State Administration in Maputo.

The review shall be carried out by a team of consultants, of which at least one should be a specialist in the field of local government administration and management. The working language is Portuguese, project documents are normally written in English and the reports from the project are available in English and Portuguese.

Time schedule and reporting

The review shall be carried out during a period of approximately four weeks in February-April 1995. A visit to Maputo and Beira shall be carried out during two weeks. A draft report in the English and Portuguese language following mainly the Format for SIDA evaluation reports shall be submitted to SIDA, Ministry of State Administration and Beira City Council not later than three weeks after the visit to Mozambique. The team shall present a final report in ten copies in each of the languages English and Portuguese to SIDA within two weeks after receiving the comments from SIDA, Ministry of State Administration and Beira City Council on the draft report.

ANNEX 2. LIST OF PERSONS MET

BEIRA AND MAPUTO:

Chacuamba, Vasco	Directorate of Finance
Chambisso, Paulo	Directorate of Urban Development
Diogo, Juliano	Directorate of Finance
Dunduro, Silva	Beira Culture House
Durbeque, José	Radio Moçambique, Beira
Guambe, José	Ministry for Public Administration
Liando, Jeremias	Directorate of Urban Services
Lourenço, Paulo	PROPECA/CICB
Macereque, Armando	Directorate of Urban Planning
Maite, Jacob	Directorate of Urban Development
Manjama, Luis	Previous President of the Ex. Council.
Masquil, Francisco de Assis	Previous Governor of Sofala Province
Miambo, Armando	Directorate of Urban Services
Remane, Mussagy	Beira Chamber of Commerce
Renço, Lucas Simão	President of the Executive Council
Roque, Carlos	Provincial Director of Culture
Socre, Felix	Directorate of Urban Services
Tomás, Felizberto	Governor of Sofala province

Various persons in the institutions mentioned above

GOTHENBURG:

Afzelius, Eva	Financial Management Group
Björk, Gunilla	Director of Sanitation Department
Bodin, Roger	Chief Executive
Börjesson, Bert	Sanitation Department
Eriksson, Bertil	Financial Management Group
Etéus, Lennart	Sanitation Department
Gesang Karlström	Frölunda Culture House
Johansson, Göran	Chairman of the Executive Committee
Jonasson, Holger	Project Co-ordinator
Karlsson, Sven-Olof	Financial Management Group
Lien, Viveka	Western Sweden Chamber of Commerce
Skager, Lars-Åke	Deputy Chairman of the Executive Committee
Svensson, Kerstin	2nd Vice Chairman of Executive Committee
Åhlander, Linnea	Frölunda Culture House

SIDA:

Dyrssen, Hallgerd	SIDA, Public Administration Division
Hammarström, Bo	Swedish Embassy in Mozambique
Kjellsson, Thomas	SIDA, Public Administration Division

ANNEX 3. DELIVERY OF EQUIPMENT

PROJECT FINANCED EQUIPMENT

	Financial Man.	Urban Services	Land Man.	PROPECA	Culture	Other/Various
Computer Equipment	5 PC 3 printers SEK 190 000	(1 PC transferred from Finance)	5 PC 2 printers SEK 260 000	1 PC 1 printer SEK 45 000		
Other Office Equipment	1 copying machine 12 calculators SEK 67 000		1 copying machine 3 type writers SEK 68 000			
Audio Visual				1 video camera 1 TV 1 video SEK 35 000		
Vehicles		Spareparts SEK 75 000				
Miscellaneous	Air Conditioning SEK 18 000					Project Vehicle SEK: 200 000

DONATED EQUIPMENT

<i>(Approximate values)</i>						
		Tires SEK 5 700	Instruments SEK 203 500		Video equipment SEK 30 000	Flags SEK 3 100
					Musical instruments SEK 10 500	Film Camera (TV) SEK 200 000
					Various material SEK 15 000	Office material (1 container) SEK 20 000

ANNEX 4. TRAINING ACTIVITIES

Most human resources development has taken place as on-the-job training in Beira and Gothenburg. Below is a summary of specific training events that have taken place

Subject	Year	Place	Duration (hours)	No. of participants	Still within the Municipality
Basic PC	1990	Gbg	40	6	3
Basic PC	1991	Beira	150	6	2
PC Software, Scala etc.	1992	Gbg	60	3	1
Basic PC	1992	Beira	150	10	8
PC Software, Scala etc.	1993	Gbg	40	3	3
DBase programming	1994	Brazil	90	1	1
Management	1994	Gbg	30	1	1
English, intensive	1991	Beira	50	1	1
English, intensive	1991	Gbg	20	1	1

The project has further financed local English courses for approximately 20 staff members of the Beira Municipal Council and courses in Portuguese for all of the consultants from Gothenburg.


Source: Project Co-ordinator

ANNEX 5. PROJECT MISSIONS

Number of Missions and Field Days per Project Component

		1990/91	1991/92	1992/93	1993/94	1994/	Total
FROM GOTHEN- BURG	Financial Management	4 missions 124 days	4 missions 158 days	5 missions 110 days	4 missions 124 days	4 missions 76 days	21 missions 592 days
	Waste Collection	— —	1 mission 42 days	1 mission 30 days	3 missions 85 days	— —	5 missions 157 days
	Land Management	— —	— —	2 missions 35 days	2 missions 25 days	1 mission 7 days	5 missions 67 days
	Culture	1 mission 16 days	2 missions 78 days	2 missions 45 days	2 missions 42 days	1 mission 28 days	8 missions 209 days
	PROPECA	— —	— —	— —	— —	2 missions 15 days	2 missions 15 days
	Municipal and Project Management	5 missions 92 days	4 missions 60 days	6 missions 60 days	4 missions 62 days	4 missions 47 days	23 missions 321 days
	Total from Gothenburg	10 missions 232 days	11 missions 338 days	16 missions 280 days	15 missions 338 days	12 missions 173 days	64 missions 1361 days
	Financial Management	2 missions 86 days	1 mission 63 days	2 missions 25 days	1 mission 40 days	— —	6 missions 214 days
	Urban Services	— —	— —	— —	— —	— —	— —
	Urban Planning	— —	— —	— —	— —	— —	— —
FROM BEIRA	Culture	— —	2 missions 56 days	— —	1 mission 35 (+ dancers)	1 mission 30 days	4 missions 121 days
	PROPECA	— —	— —	— —	— —	— —	— —
	Municipal and Project Management	1 mission 14 days	— —	1 mission 5 days	— —	1 mission 14 days	3 missions 33 days
	Total from Beira	3 missions 100 days	3 missions 119 days	3 missions 30 days	2 missions 75 days	2 missions 44 days	13 missions 368 days
		13 Missions 332 Days	14 missions 457 days	19 missions 310 days	17 missions 413 days	11 missions 217 days	77 missions 1729 days
	GRAND TOTAL						

ANNEX 6. RESOURCES



Sida Evaluations

- 95/1 Educação Ambiental em Moçambique. Avaliação de um projecto no Instituto Superior Pedagógico na Beira
Kajsa Pehrsson
Dept. For Democracy and Social Development
- 95/2 Agitators, Incubators, Advisers - What role for the EPU's? An Evaluation of South African Education Units supported by Sweden
Joel Samoff
Dept. For Research Cooperation
- 95/3 Avaliação do Programa de Gemelagem Beira - Gotemburgo
Arne Heilemann, Lennart Peck Translation: Dulce Leiria
Dept. For Democracy and Social Development
- 95/4 Evaluation of the Establishing of the Bank of Namibia 1990-1995
Jon A. Solheim, Peter Winai
Dept. For Democracy and Social Development
Section for Public Administration and Management
- 96/1 The Beira-Gothenburg Twinning Programme - cooperation for municipal development
Arne Heileman, Lennart Peck
Dept. for Democracy and Social Development



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