Sida Evaluation 98/27

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Department for Natural Resources and the Environment

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Sida Evaluation 98/27
Commissioned by Sida, Department for Natural Resources and the Environment

Registration No.: Natur 95-0200
Date of Final Report: November 1997
Printed in Stockholm, Sweden 1998
ISBN 91 586 7672 4
ISSN 1401—0402

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Evaluation of the Cooperative Reform and Development Programme (CRDP), Uganda, 1 July 1993 to 31 June 1996

Final Report of the Evaluation Team to the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

November 1997

Preface

Fieldwork for this evaluation began in April 1997, and was largely completed by the end of May. This report went through several drafts, and was extensively discussed at two seminars held in Uganda, in August and November. The process of finalising this report was lengthy because of (a) concerns on the part of the evaluation team about the adequacy of the quantitative information available for evaluation purposes; and (b) concerns on the part of the Uganda Cooperative Alliance and the Swedish Cooperative Centre that the team might not have drawn completely correct conclusions from the figures that are available. It has been decided that the Uganda Cooperative Alliance will collect and collate further information on the recent business performance of the Cooperative Societies that participated in the Cooperative Reform and Development Programme, and present these results to Sida by February 1998. The conclusions in this report may therefore be modified in the light of those figures.

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1. Executive Summary

1.1 The Cooperative Reform and Development Programme (CRDP) was financed by Sida, through the Swedish Cooperative Centre (SCC) with country frame funds over the period July 1993 to June 1996. The implementing agency in Uganda was the Uganda Cooperative Alliance (UCA). CRDP represented an evolution of a long relationship between the Swedish and Uganda cooperative movements, and succeeded a larger, more diverse programme that had been funded since 1986 using '80/20' funds. CRDP has been succeeded by the Cooperative Management Development Programme (CMDP) that is, once again, financed with NGO funds.

1.2 Ugandan cooperatives are predominantly produce marketing organisations. Their financial, moral and political standing had been seriously damaged by their incorporation, until the early 1990s, as collection and processing agents, into an exploitative state monopoly marketing system.

1.3 CRDP initially had three distinct elements. The core element - formally comprising Cooperative Marketing and Women in Development Components - was aimed at reviving 150 Primary Cooperative Societies (including 30 Women's Groups) in six districts to make them into viable business units. This element was implemented by a special unit within the UCA, with its own HQ and field staff. There were two other minor elements (partly) implemented by other cooperative organisations - an Export Development and a Cooperative Finance element. These other two elements did not achieve their objectives. In particular, attempts to find major new sources of business for cooperatives in marketing non-traditional crops came to nothing. Both of these minor elements were terminated early in the programme.

1.4 Even the core element in CRDP was multi-purpose: the achievement of the business viability goal was seen to be integrally related to (a) bringing women effectively into male-dominated Cooperative Societies and (b) restoring democracy by empowering members in relation to committees in Primary Societies, and Primary Societies in relation to district-level Unions.

1.5 CRDP has achieved considerable success with these gender and institutional goals, mainly through a complex, large scale training programme. Women have a significant place in Primary Societies, and Women's Groups in particular have been enterprising and effective. These short term successes in Primary Societies are however threatened by the general failure to develop significant new economic activities for women.

1.6 The achievements in relation to the business viability of Primary Societies and Women's Groups are more modest, but positive. Levels of business turnover and profits did rise considerably in the second year of the programme when compared with the baseline. There has however been no further increase.

1.7 There are three distinct cause of this failure to achieve sustained, continuous improvements in business performance. Two of them lie outside the programme entirely: a substantial decline in coffee prices (and profit margins) and, probably much more important, the further liberalisation of coffee and cotton marketing in Uganda, and thus the intensification of private sector competition in produce marketing. The third reason is that the participating Primary Societies (in particular) have shown limited commitment to taking the steps needed to achieving business viability. There are two reasons for that. One is that the circumstances of selection of Societies to participate in CRDP were to some degree adverse: some participants were motivated largely by hopes of individual benefit. The other reason is that, by concentrating on the training programmes and being unable to focus adequate attention on issues of business viability, the UCA has not sent sufficiently strong signals to participating Societies about the importance of focusing on business development.

1.8 The fact that UCA has concentrated more on training than on business development partly reflects the design of CRDP. It was originally designed for two years - although implemented over two and a half years, with an initial period of relative inactivity, and an extension of one year at the end. Two years is very short for an institutional development programme. It was quite natural that UCA should focus on the more visible implementation targets, notably the training programme, rather than more diffuse, long term goals. In addition, the fact that CRDP started with a range of diverse components - with the gender component being very new (see 1.3 and 1.4) - dispersed managerial attention.

1.9 CRDP has involved an expenditure of 25 million SEK. This is a large sum in relation to the economies of the immediate target - the 150 Societies and Women' Groups. Expenditure on general overheads at SCC and UCA has been high. This reflects two factors. One is that SCC staff time and SCC-employed expatriates are inevitably expensive in a Ugandan context. The other is that UCA is a high cost operator in the Ugandan context - although the return on those high costs is a level of efficiency, honesty and financial transparency in programme implementation that it would be very difficult to match in Uganda. Additionally, the close cooperation between UCA and SCC has helped bring about useful flexibility in project management.

1.10 CMDP, the successor programme to CRDP, incorporates some positive lessons from CRDP.

1.11 The leadership of UCA believes that CRDP has contributed to achieving some broader objectives than those for which it was formally mandated. They include (a) providing a spearhead for the general reform and modernisation of the cooperative movement in Uganda; (b) the maintenance of a set of organisations able to provide 'countervailing power' to the private produce traders; and (c) sustaining a non-government organisation that is able to speak up effectively for the interests of small farmers in policy debates in Kampala. There is some evidence for the first of these claims. We are unable to judge how far CRDP has contributed to the second and third objectives.

1.12 CRDP provides some broader lessons for Sida about gender issues and the management of institutional development programmes.

2. The Programme Context

2.1 The purpose of this section is to draw the attention of the reader to the main points about the context of CRDP that are relevant to making, understanding and debating this evaluation. This necessarily means making simplifications that, in other contexts, would not be acceptable to people who are familiar with Uganda, the cooperative movement, CRDP, UCA or the coffee and cotton industries. A detailed completion report on CRDP is available from the UCA/SCC (Reference 1).

2.2 CRDP (1993-96) was one phase of a long history of Swedish support to agricultural marketing cooperatives in Uganda, that began in 1980/1. The previous phase, the UCA-SCC Cooperative Programme in Uganda, was evaluated in 1992 (see Reference 2). This support began on a movement-to-movement basis between the Swedish and Ugandan cooperative movements. The Swedish cooperative movement was represented by its overseas cooperation agency, the Swedish Cooperative Centre. Swedish support was small in scale initially, and financed through ë80/20í funds, i.e. 80% from Sida, and 20% from the Swedish cooperative movement. Swedish involvement grew rapidly after 1986, when the National Resistance Movement came to power in Uganda, peace was largely restored, and economic reconstruction began on a large scale. Uganda became a partner country for Swedish development cooperation, and support to the cooperative movement was given mainly through the country frame (i.e. official bilateral funds). Sida only recently opened a Development Cooperation Office in Uganda. Before that, it was able to rely on the strong personal and institutional relations that had been built up between the SCC and the Ugandan cooperative movement. All Swedish assistance to the Ugandan cooperative movement was channelled through the SCC. While most of this assistance was directed at the cooperative movement and its activities, some involved using the existing cooperative institutions, above all the Uganda Cooperative Alliance (UCA), as a vehicle for directing emergency and short-term rehabilitation assistance to areas of Uganda very badly affected by past conflicts - notably the Luwero Triangle and parts of the North. To appreciate why the UCA was chosen for this purpose - and to understand the evolution of Swedish aid to the Ugandan cooperative movement - we need to look a little more closely at the term ëcooperative movementí in the Ugandan context.

2.3 The Ugandan cooperative movement, as it existed during CRDP, can be viewed as the product of the interaction of three main historical processes.

(1) First, the cooperative movement was founded, during the colonial era, as a genuinely popular, grassroots movement that was independent of the state and formed partly through a process of trying to organise African coffee and cotton producers collectively to strengthen their bargaining position in relation to the mainly-Asian coffee and cotton traders. While cooperatives engage in a wide range of types of economic activities, the marketing function has always been dominant, and other activities relatively peripheral. The cooperative movement was organised mainly at the level of the Primary Society (that generally coincided with the unit of local government, the parish) and of the Union (the district). It was always political in orientation. Like the Christian churches, it provided a base for nationalist political activity.

(2) Second, beginning in the colonial era, but mainly after Independence, the cooperative movement became a vehicle not only for the monopoly marketing (and processing) of cotton and coffee on behalf of the state, but also for the economic exploitation of coffee and cotton farmers by the state. In Uganda as in much of Africa, monopoly marketing led to gross under-payment of producers, and to the appropriation of much of the export earnings by the state or by state employees. The Ugandan cooperative movement was always weak at the national and apex levels. Organisations like the Cooperative Bank (national level), the Uganda Cooperative Transport Union (national level) and the Uganda Cooperative Alliance (apex, with representation functions), had little power and few resources. The key resource, the coffee or cotton from which a surplus could be extracted, flowed from Primary Societies through Unions to the state coffee and cotton marketing boards. Power was concentrated at the top, and that was where most of the ësurplusí from coffee and cotton producers was concentrated. Primary Societies and Unions were obliged by law to procure and pass upwards all coffee/cotton produced within their territorial jurisdictions. They had little access to commercial credit for crop procurement purposes. Crop finance either came in the form of cash advances from higher up the marketing chain or not at all, i.e. produce was passed upwards in hope of later payment. In this period, the element of democracy within the cooperative movement disappeared almost entirely. Indeed, the term ëmovementí ceased to be appropriate. The ëmovementí was a collection of highly-politicised and partly-corrupted organisations that were in a state of continuous internal tension and conflict. Individual members at the local level were unhappy that they had to deliver their coffee or cotton to their Primary Society without payment, that sometimes they had to wait months for payment while inflation was eroding the value of their paper chits, that the ësecond paymentsí they were used to receiving once coffee/cotton had been sold on international markets rarely appeared, that they received little credit and few

other services, that the statutory charges made by societies for marketing were too high, etc. The Primary Societies were aggrieved about the same issues in relation to the Unions, generally with more valid reason. And the Unions felt exploited in the same ways by the statutory coffee and cotton marketing boards. Many Primary Societies continued to command the loyalty and interest of their members, partly because they controlled valuable assets such as stores and shops, weighing machines or vehicles, and provided services such as savings schemes, and sales of drugs and agricultural inputs. They still made a significant contribution to local social and political organisation. The Unions were more widely regarded with cynicism as places where the unscrupulous could make money. In sum, the moral standing and reputation of the ëcooperative movementí was severely damaged, as was its capacity to provide efficient economic services once its marketing monopoly was withdrawn.

(3) Third, the relative organisational weights of different levels of the cooperative movement changed substantially after 1986 when the leadership of the Uganda Cooperative Alliance succeeded in making it into the lead organisation. It had previously been small and weak. The new leadership, informed by experience in the International Cooperative Alliance and a perception of the need for radical change within the Uganda movement, was able to build up a powerful organisation by providing (a) a sense of vision and direction for a reformed cooperative movement and (b) an efficient and a reliable vehicle for the disbursement of foreign aid funds. As explained above, these included funds aimed at emergency and short term development work, as well as at the reform and rehabilitation of the cooperative movement itself. While some (Swedish) aid was directed through national level cooperative organisations such as the Cooperative Bank and the Uganda Cooperative Transport Union, the UCA was the dominant aid channel. There was first a shift of power and resources to the apex. But there are also recent signs of a relative shift from the Union and national levels to the Primary Societies. The Unions are in serious decline, and the national level organisations have almost disappeared. That some Primary Societies remain active is partly due to the activities of the UCA, funded by CRDP and other aid programmes. It is now UCA's declared policy to move towards a simplified structure for the movement, oriented around the Primary Societies themselves.

2.4 Coffee and cotton were once the mainstays of the Uganda economy. This is no longer the case. Farmers have diversified into a much wider range of crops as coffee and cotton production has become less remunerative. At the same time, there has been no process of amalgamation of Primary Societies to cope with these relative declines in their business volumes. In consequence, Primary Societies in Uganda are very small business units. They have few members, each of whom markets on average small volumes of produce. This is a major constraint on business success. That case was made forcefully in a strategic business plan for UCA drawn up by American consultants in August-September 1996 (Reference 4). Some of the statistics in Table 2 on CRDP Primary Societies illustrate the point vividly, especially as they relate to Societies that are larger and more active than average. For example, in 1995/6, the average business turnover of CRDP Primary Societies was 74.8 million shillings (SEK 623,000, or $81,000). Figures for surplus per Society are much smaller: 3 million shillings (SEK 25,000, or $3,228). As business units, the Womenís Groups that were included in CRDP are very much smaller than Primary Societies. The average membership of CRDP Womenís Groups, at 54 (Table 2), is barely larger than the formal minimum of 50 required to participate in CRDP, and far from UCA's target of 100. Womenís Groups do not have the base of a business in coffee or cotton marketing, but engage in a wide diversity of small scale economic activities. Their levels of business turnover per paid-up member in 1995/6 were less than a third of those of Primary Societies (Table 2). Levels of surplus in Womenís Groups were relatively higher only because of the relative prosperity of Womenís Groups in one Cooperative Union, Banyankole Kweterana. They were low in absolute terms.

2.5 UCA is a 'mixed' organisation, and has a complex relation to the Primary Societies and Womenís Groups included in CRDP. On the one hand, UCA is formally the democratically-controlled apex organisation representing National, Union and Primary Cooperative Societies. On the other hand, its intellectual, organisational and financial resources and its relationship to aid donors (especially Sweden and the US) have given it an autonomous leadership role. It has been one of the most vocal proponents of freeing the cooperative movement from state control, but successfully lobbied to have its position as the apex organisation of the movement embodied in the 1991 cooperative reform legislation. The UCA claims a political role in representing small farmers in Uganda, although its own grassroots members comprise only a minority of rural families, are in most cases inactive in the movement, and remain members only in a formal sense. The complexity of UCA's organisational position is not a matter of concern. It is similar to many development NGOs in poor countries that are dependent on aid funds. And it reflects adaptation to the fast-changing situation in Uganda in relation to economic policy and the position of cooperatives in the marketing of cotton and coffee (see below). Had the UCA not adapted in the way it has done, and taken a leadership role, it would have disappeared, and so would most of the cooperative movement.

2.6 While Swedish support to Uganda cooperatives has formally been divided into ëphasesí, the content, direction and purpose of that support has tended to evolve continuously, rather than changing abruptly from one phase to another. This reflects in particular two factors. One is the key role of the SCC, and the good relations it has developed with the UCA on the one side and Sida on the other. The SCC has been a key intermediary in shaping the programme, partly because of the absence, until recently, of a Sida Development Cooperation Office in Kampala. The SCC has been able to negotiate and renegotiate programmes with Sida on the basis of its strong local contacts, including the employment of Swedish technical cooperation personnel to work within the UCA office. SCCís long-term interest in Uganda has provided it with an incentive to keep the Swedish programme operational even when Sida funds were not available. This happened when the details of CRDP were continually being negotiated in 1992/3. The other, related reason why Swedish support has evolved incrementally is that there has been continual change in some key parameters of the situation and of public policy in Uganda, and aid programmes have been adjusted in response. The dominant factor here has been the gradual liberalisation of coffee and cotton marketing. When Swedish support to the Ugandan cooperative movement began on a large scale in 1986, the monopolistic coffee and cotton marketing (and processing) system outlined above was still in place. The elements of monopoly have gradually been reduced or eliminated, such that, by 1996, liberalisation was largely complete. Since the economic situation of cooperatives in 1986 stemmed directly from their central role in the monopolistic marketing system, the direction and extent of liberalisation has been a key policy variable for anyone concerned about the function and future of cooperatives. (It is only the wisdom of hindsight that tells us that near-complete liberalisation was ëinevitableí, and should therefore have been anticipated. It did not appear so in the early 1990s. It is worth bearing in mind that the process of economic liberalisation perhaps has been more thorough in Uganda than in any other country in Africa.)

2.7 The content and size of the programme of Swedish support to Uganda cooperatives over the past decade has been significantly determined by organisational factors: the high levels of trust and cooperation between (a) UCA and SCC and (b) SCC and Sida respectively; and the reputation that the UCA has established for honest and effective disbursement of aid funds. That statement may perhaps be understood as a criticism of the programme by people who believe that, in allocating development assistance, absolute priority should be given to correct definition of objectives, and to the use of ëlogical frameworkí evaluation tools for fitting activities to objectives. Within that perspective, questions of which organisations are used to deliver aid programmes are secondary. We are not taking that position here. For the ëpriority-of-objectivesí perspective appears unrealistic in the context of many poor countries, including Uganda over recent decades. Such is the scarcity of effective and honest organisations able to deliver aid that it makes a great deal of sense for donors to start from the potential capacities of plausible partners and then ask what kinds of programmes they could implement. This has been to a significant degree the actual situation in relation to the UCA (and its link with SCC) and Swedish aid - although it is unlikely that anyone involved would agree to our expressing it in these terms. This kind of ëinstitutional biasí has its dangers: it may tend to give excessive priority to the interests of the institutions concerned and to established ways of doing things rather than to thinking afresh to meet likely future needs. We do not however believe either (a) that this ëinstitutional biasí is inherently inferior to the ëpriority-of-objectivesí perspectives in the Uganda context or (b) that the UCA/SCC have been noticeably conservative in their judgements about the future of the Ugandan cooperative movement.

2.8 Because of the factors listed in the previous paragraphs, the purposes and objectives of Swedish support to the Ugandan cooperative movement over the past decade have often been several and ambiguous, rather than simple and explicit. Any attempt to define what the ërealí objectives have been involves some degree of interpretation of the facts. Broadly speaking, the main purpose of the initial phase of large scale support, from 1986 to 1992, was to reconstitute the cooperatives as efficient marketing organisations in a situation where, it was assumed, they would continue to enjoy (or suffer from, depending on oneís perspective), the continuation of some kinds of restrictions on the extent of private sector competition in coffee and cotton marketing and processing. Given that so much physical capital had been destroyed or allowed to decay during the previous years of internal conflict, some emphasis was placed on the provision of, for example, new stores and transport. Attempts to create a cooperative credit system also received attention. Considerable resources went into developing the organisational capacity of the UCA itself. This included in particular the creation of UNEX, a partially owned subsidiary international coffee marketing company that was to enable to cooperative movement to compete with the private sector in a liberalised market. (The other owners of UNEX were Unions).

In comparison with previous phases of Swedish support to the Ugandan cooperative movement, CRDP had three distinctive objectives:

(1) Partly in response to comments that previous assistance had been unduly concentrated on building up the UCA office and organisation (in Kampala), there was

an explicit focus on reviving the cooperative movement from the grassroots. The major focus was on the Primary Society level, with a secondary focus on the Unions. The UCA itself was viewed mainly as the implementation instrument. Six Unions, scattered round the country, were selected for participation in CRDP. Because issues of language, ethnicity and region are potential threats to national unity in Uganda, it was from the beginning of CRDP felt important that the programme be implemented in a range of districts representing all major regions. Subject to this imperative, the six most efficient and active Cooperative Unions were selected for involvement in the programme. Within each Union, 25 Primary Societies (and Womenís Groups - see below) were selected for inclusion. It was hoped that the Unions would work more closely and cooperatively with the Primary Societies during the implementation of CRDP and thereafter. This did not happen. Most Unions control substantial physical assets, notably real estate and vehicles, that bear little connection to produce marketing or to the immediate business concerns of Primary Society members. Their activists do not seem to have perceived themselves to have a major interest in produce marketing. The CRDP field staff, employed by UCA - two per Union - had their offices in the Unions. It was reported to us that some Union personnel were opposed to CRDP because it threatened to empower the Primary Societies in relation to the Unions, in a situation where there are often bad relations and quarrels about late or non-payment by Unions for produce delivered to them by Primary Societies. (In some cases at least, members of CRDP Primary Societies made no distinction between the UCA and their Union). Conversely, it was also reported that some Union personnel have become more helpful in relation to CRDP more recently as the general business situation of the cooperative institutions has worsened. CRDP was in practice focused largely on 150 Primary Societies and Womenís Groups.

(2) A major gender dimension was built into the programme from the beginning - and implemented with considerable success and with positive outcomes (see below). There were two institutional foci of the gender programme. One was the incorporation into CRDP of 30 existing informal Womenís Groups that were not part of the cooperative movement. The aim was both to make them economically viable and have them registered as Primary Societies. The more significant institutional focus was the existing Societies - mainly the Primary Societies rather than the Unions. As marketing societies, these had always been predominantly male organisations, in terms of membership and, even more, in terms of elected office. With few exceptions, women were excluded. The immediate explanation for this was that, in most of Uganda, women had few property rights in the crops marketed by the cooperatives - cotton and coffee. (The main exceptions were widows, who comprised a large fraction of female members). The exclusion of women did not however stem

only from unequal property rights. It also reflected the male domination of public organisation and politics more generally. The attempt within CRDP to change gender relations within existing Primary Societies was therefore a radical step. Two main instruments were used. One was intensive education programmes for ordinary and committee members that had a major gender component: both gender awareness and attempts to bring about attitude change. Two gender officers employed centrally by UCA developed and coordinated the gender element of the training programmes. They were able to benefit from the recent development of considerable expertise in relation to gender issues at Makerere University and other organisations in Kampala. The other main instrument to change gender relations was a ësweeteneri. There was a ëmatching granti programme, whereby CRDP matched new share capital paid into CRDP Primary Societies (and Womenís Groups), up to a limit of 5 million Uganda shillings (SEK 42,000) per Society. For new share capital contributions from male members, the matching grant was given on a 1:1 basis. However, for female members the grant was 2:1. This provided participating Societies with a strong incentive to enrol female members. This was relatively successful: in the participating CRDP Primary Societies (not including Womenís Groups), women now account for about one third of members - and about 10% of committee members. The SEK 4.4 million that was used for the matching grant amounted to 18% of the total CRDP budget. That sounds like a great deal of money; from the beginning some people took the view that the matching grant was too large. However, it amounts to an average of only 25,000 shillings (210 SEK) per ëpaid-up memberi (i.e. members who had re-joined and paid a new share contribution) in the participating Primary Societies and Womenís Groups. This is a significant but not a very large ësweeteneri.

(3) To a greater extent than during previous Swedish support, in CRDP formal prominence was given to the goal of turning Primary Societies and Womenís Groups into viable business units. This was said to be the ultimate objective. Whether this was such a dominant objective in practice is less clear (see Section 4).

2.9 CRDP was mainly but not exclusively focused on the reform and development of Primary Societies and Womenís Groups through a programme managed by the UCA. There were however other elements. One can divide CRDP, as originally planned, into three (unequal) elements, classified according to the cooperative institution in Uganda responsible for implementation:

(1) The largest and most important element was focused directly and mainly on the reform and development of 120 (original number) Primary Cooperative Societies and 30 (original number) Womenís Groups (see above). This element was

implemented by the UCA. Because the other two elements in effect failed and/or tailed off, this element became the CRDP, and receives almost all the attention of this report. Let us call it the 'core CRDP programme.'

(2) There was an export development element implemented mainly by UNEX, a coffee marketing company owned by UCA and a number of Cooperative Unions, that has its offices in the UCA building. There were a number of sub-components, variously intended to strengthen UNEX itself, help Primary Societies to construct coffee pulperies, and assist the cooperative marketing institutions to become actively involved in the export of 'non-traditional crops', i.e. crops other than their traditional staples, coffee and cotton. This element has not been a success; private sector competition has simply been too powerful, and became more so during the course of CRDP as market liberalisation was gradually extended. Many planned activities were cancelled when it became clear that they were unlikely to produce useful results. (Expenditure on this element corresponds to item B in Table 1.)

(3) There was a cooperative finance element, implemented mainly by the Cooperative Bank, an organisation whose effective ownership status remains somewhat ambiguous. The objectives were to provide additional capital for on-lending from the Cooperative Bank to Cooperative Societies, and to provide training in cooperative finance at various levels. This element has not been a success, in that there has been no visible improvement in the performance of the Cooperative Bank in providing rural credit; expenditures were reduced correspondingly. (Expenditure on this element corresponds to item C in Table 1.)

3. Evaluation Methods

3.1 CRDP terminated in June 1996, and was succeeded by the Cooperative Management Development Programme (CMDP). CMDP has similar objectives to CRDP, but involves a larger number of Primary Societies, and is financed through SCC by NGO funds. Sida decided to evaluate CRDP "in April-May 1997 when some results have matured but before a new phase has had visible impact." Evaluating CMDP was not part of our terms of reference. We have however found it useful to make a few comments on it to demonstrate the lessons have been learned from the implementation of CRDP. The conclusion of this evaluation are potentially relevant to Sida's other programmes that have substantial institution-building and gender components at the grassroots level. The terms of reference direct the evaluation to focus on the following issues:

> ëCRDP is interesting from a methodological point of view to all stakeholders through its ìbottom up, business oriented approach.î The findings of the evaluation will be of special interest to UCA in its future management of the programme, which the UCA has an intention to give a national spread. The ìvalue for moneyî (in a wider sense) is of great interest to UCA.í

3.2 The three members of the evaluation team all have experience directly relevant to CRDP. Mrs Sarah Mangali was General Manager of the Uganda Women's Finance and Credit Trust between 1989 and 1994, and has since been Assistant Country Director of Action Aid-Uganda. She therefore has extensive experience of micro-credit programmes, especially those with a gender dimension. Dr. Mick Moore, a specialist in development management, has led teams evaluating aid projects in several countries and in 1992 was the team leader of the evaluation of the earlier phase of Swedish support to marketing cooperatives in Uganda (see Reference 2). Mr. Z. Ojoo is an economist and private consultant, who has worked extensively on the evaluation of public development programmes and public expenditure in Uganda since 1991.

3.3 The team leader was in Uganda for 10 days in April 1997. During this time, the team (a) conducted formal and informal interviews with the staff of UCA, UNEX and the Cooperative Bank, (b) consulted records and documentation, and (c) jointly made field visits to seven CRDP Primary Societies and Women's Groups in the East Mengo and Banyankole Kweterana Unions. On the basis of these initial investigations, plans were made for the main field survey of CRDP Primary Societies and Womenís

Groups. This was conducted in May by Mrs. Mangali and Mr. Ojoo, working in different areas of the country according to a standard proforma. The sample comprised 23 CRDP Primary Societies and 7 CRDP Womenís Groups. They were selected randomly from within Unions, such that all Unions in the programme would be represented approximately equally. The sample included four Societies/Groups that had either been 'dropped' from CRDP for poor performance or not included in the successor programme, CMDP. We therefore saw failures as well as successes. Societies and Groups were informed in advance of the visits of Mrs. Mangali and Mr. Ojoo, and arrangements were made for them to meet separately with the committee and ordinary members, including women members. Every effort was made to locate the recent accounts of each Society and Group in the sample, and to extract from them financial data relating to the three years of CRDP (1993/4 to 1995/6). Mrs. Mangali and Mr. Ojoo were not accompanied by UCA staff, and arranged for local interpreters where this was necessary.

It did not prove possible to conduct the investigation in the case of three Primary Societies selected and one Womenís Group. Two additional Primary Societies were substituted and visited. The final sample was thus 22 Primary Societies and six Womenís Groups. Full financial information for the three years of CRDP was however obtained only for 11 Primary Societies and 5 Womenís Groups. (Note the much higher success rate in the case of Womenís Groups). Data on business turnover and surpluses for these 11 Primary Societies and 5 Womenís Groups are presented in Table 4. Including the initial field visits made by the team collectively in April, the team visited a total 35 Primary Societies and Womenís Groups, representing 26% of the 135 Societies and Groups still participating in CRDP when it terminated.

3.4 The field situation within CRDP Primary Societies and Womenís Groups is complex and variable. There is no doubt that we obtained only partial information in every case. Since most of the CRDP Primary Societies and Womenís Groups that we visited now participate in the successor programme, CMDP, their members have some incentive to present a favourable picture of their use of and benefits from CRDP resources. However, people generally talked relatively freely, and the frequency of tensions between committees and ordinary members - and between different categories of members (see below) - resulted in the provision of a great deal of information from different perspectives. We are satisfied that we have a good overall picture of the progress and results of CRDP at local level.

3.5 There are wide variations between areas as well as between individual Societies/Groups within single Unions. For example, Societies/Groups in Banyankole

Kweterana Union are relatively large, prosperous and active relative to others (see Table 2). Societies in Lango Union have been very successful in recruiting women members: the number of fully paid-up female members equals the number of males. We did our best to take this diversity into account in making overall judgements.

3.6 The main limitation to the conclusions of this report is that, in one important respect, it was impossible to reach very firm conclusions about causality in a situation where several interacting variables were changing continuously. We refer to the problem of explaining why CRDP investments have not led to a continuous, sustained improvement in the business performance of CRDP Primary Societies and Womenís Groups. As is explained in Section 4.10, there are at least three competing explanations: (a) the continuing erosion of Societies' business due to coffee and cotton market liberalisation and private sector competition; (b) declining coffee prices; and (c) the failure of Societies and Groups to take full advantage inflows of capital and other resources from CRDP. Partly because the participating Societies/Groups kept little reliable information on the volumes of business they transacted (see below), the data needed to decide between these competing explanations are simply not available.

3.7 The other limitation to our conclusions is that we do not have rich detail of how CRDP was managed by the UCA, or on relations between UCA and SCC, and SCC and Sida, during the initial years of the programme. There have been personnel changes, and, we assume that, as always in such cases, the perceptions and judgements of our informants are partly influenced by their own positions. This is not a major problem, especially as the historical time involved is fairly short.

3.8 The information available on the business activities of CRDP Primary Societies and Womenís Groups is deficient in several senses. First, the original accounts are not always audited regularly and rapidly, and may contain errors. We know that the physical assets of cooperative organisations are often grossly under-valued in their accounts, such that we have no usable information on capital assets - and therefore none on rates of return on those assets. Second, the financial year used for accounting purposes varies between Primary Societies, depending on the local pattern of economic activities and traditions. Aggregate figures that appear, for example, to refer to all CRDP Societies for 1995/6, in fact cover a less clearly defined time period. Third, the process of keeping accurate information on the business activities of CRDP Primary Societies and Womenís Groups in UCA does not appear to have received the attention that one would wish (see Section 4). Our field visits revealed some substantial differences between 'local' and UCA accounts for the same society. In one case, the figures provided by UCA that appeared to indicate an extraordinarily high level of business turnover for one Society actually related to coffee that had physically passed through the Society's store, not to the much smaller volumes that the Society had purchased and sold on. (Societies' stores and scales are sometimes used for private transactions). We have however used UCA's figures on the aggregate business performance of CRDP Primary Societies and Womenís Groups (Tables 2 and 3) because they are the only figures available.

3.9 The first draft of this report was presented by the team to a full day meeting convened by the UCA at Mukono on 25th August 1997. This meeting was attended by about forty representatives - one third of them female - of the UCA, participating Unions, Primary Societies and Women's Groups, and the Government of Uganda. That meeting was extremely helpful in improving the content and presentation of the report. A further meeting, held in Kampala on 17th November 1997, involved representatives of the UCA, participating Unions, Primary Societies and Women's Groups, and Sida, with one member of the evaluation team.

4. Findings

4.1 The export development component of CRDP has not been a success, for two distinct reasons. One is that coffee marketing has been further liberalised by the Government of Uganda and, as their original monopoly has been further eroded, the cooperative marketing organisations at all levels have further lost market share to private traders. The other reason is that the various attempts to involve UNEX and other cooperative institutions in the marketing of non-traditional crops have not succeeded. Cooperative organisations, that necessarily have a degree of inflexibility built into their operations, have been unable to compete with private traders. It is sometimes suggested that they could compete effectively if they had access to 'crop finance', i.e. credit to be used for crop purchasing. Given however (a) the long history of mistrust between levels of the cooperative movement (b) widespread non-repayment of bank loans by cooperative organisations, and (c) their dependence until recently on advances from monopoly state marketing boards that have now disappeared, there appears to be very little prospect that cooperatives could access large amounts of crop finance in the foreseeable future.

4.2 Spending on the export development component was severely curtailed as it became evident that it was unlikely to be effective. Total expenditure was only about one third of planned expenditure over the lifetime of CRDP. This flexibility is to the credit of UCA, SCC and Sida.

4.3 The cooperative finance component of CRDP has not been a success, in that there has been no improvement in the dismal performance of the Cooperative Bank as a provider of rural credit. Fifty six Primary Societies in CRDP have received loans from the Cooperative Bank under the Cooperative Credit Scheme. (It is not clear how far being in CRDP constituted a qualification for a loan.) Levels of repayment are very poor, although possibly no worse than for official rural credit in general in Uganda. It has not been easy to obtain reliable figures from the Cooperative Bank on the use of CRDP funds. Money was used mainly for training the Bank staff. Of that, a large proportion was probably used - but we were unable to obtain any figures - on overseas training for senior Bank staff. That was not formally outside the mandated use of funds, but remote from the objectives of CRDP. The financial position of the Cooperative Bank has been very poor since before the inception of CRDP, and there is continuing ambiguity about ownership and control, reflected in part in the appointment of a series of expatriate management teams. These problems are long-standing and deep rooted. It is in retrospect unfortunate that the 1992 evaluation of Swedish support to Uganda cooperatives (Reference 2) did not express even stronger reservations about continuing support to the Cooperative Bank. It is probable that this component contributed little or nothing to the achievement of CRDP goals. The cooperative banking system remains moribund, and UCA is now actively developing micro-credit systems through the Primary Societies. It was right for the UCA/SCC/Sida to terminate early this component of CRDP.

4.4 The remainder of this section concerns the 'core CRDP programme': funding to UCA intended to reform and develop cooperative marketing at grassroots level. As noted above, the intention to use CRDP as a vehicle to reform the Cooperative Unions (at district level) has not been realised. The programme has in practice been targeted almost entirely on Primary Societies and Womenís Groups.

4.5 With the exception of the two minor export finance and cooperative finance components, CRDP has largely been a ëtop-downí programme. The term ëtop-downí is used here in a descriptive not an evaluative sense. In one respect this was appropriate to the situation; in another respect it was less appropriate.

The basic components of the programme were formulated and decided at the level of UCA, albeit with some consultation within the cooperative movement. The package of services delivered - especially the training programme, vision workshops, the approach to gender relations and matching grant - has been largely standard. This was right. CRDP was an attempt to revive a cooperative movement that was in deep trouble, in terms of reputation, finance and morale. Only leadership and vision from the top could have worked in this situation - both to get any programme operational and to add 'radical' elements into it. In particular, the gender component would never have got off the ground had the project formulation process been participatory, for few of the existing, largely male, cooperative members would have even seen gender as an issue. In other respects too, such as their unwillingness to contemplate amalgamation of neighbouring Primary Societies to make more efficient business units, cooperative members are very conservative.

The other major element of 'top-down' in CRDP was the process through which participating Societies/Groups were initially selected. The issues here are complex, but we conclude that, even if the 'top-down' approach was inevitable initially, insufficient steps were taken at later stages to compensate for the adverse consequences. In the beginning, UCA tried to involve the Unions closely in CRDP, and indeed saw them as an integral part. The participating Primary Societies (20 per Union) were selected, jointly by UCA and the Union, from a list of 30 Societies nominated by the Union. The Womenís Groups (5 per Union) were also selected by the Union, without any selection from a short list. Expectations about receiving a cash subsidy (the ëmatching grantí - see 2.8 above) and getting access to credit were the driving force behind the interest of the Primary Societies and their members in CRDP. It is very likely that personal and political connections played a prominent role in Society/Group selection. In any event, participants were not given a strong, visible message that CRDP was a mutual endeavour to which they would have to make important contributions. The formal criteria for participation (membership numbers, business activity levels, staff quality etc.) were not applied rigorously, apparently because it was difficult to find enough Societies/Groups that met the criteria. The amount of new capital that members had to pay in to qualify themselves and their Societies/Groups for inclusion in CRDP was low: an average of 18,000 shillings (about US$18 at that time) per person. Given that Primary Society members are not generally from the poorest rural strata, this was not a sufficient financial sacrifice to ensure the commitment of the members to the programme.

One could argue that a number of factors made it unavoidable that CRDP began with these 'top-down' selection and participation criteria and processes: the commitment to try to work in harmony with the Unions so as to bring them into the reform process; the political imperative to work in six different parts of the country so as not to risk charges of regional favouritism; the need to attract participants from a cooperative movement plagued by distrust; and the fact that Sida was willing to fund CRDP only for two years, making a quick start necessary. It was however predictable that these 'top-down' processes would lead to problems, and to disillusion and drop-out once it became clear that CRDP was not to be entirely a (continuing) free gift. It should have been possible for UCA to make the best of this situation by gradually tightening the criteria for continuing involvement, and, in particular, to require further commitments of additional capital from members, especially in the economically more successful Societies. This may have been difficult within the three year period of CRDP. Additional capital contributions were not a criterion for participation in the successor programme, CMDP; they are however a criterion for accessing credit under CMDP.

4.6 The cost of CRDP was high in relation to the economies of the Primary Societies and Womenís Groups that it was designed to improve. One could debate extensively the best way of measuring both ëthe cost of CRDPí and ëthe economies of the participating Primary Societies and Womenís Groupsí. In practice there is little choice because so few (reliable) data are available. For example, we might wish to use capital as the basis for comparison, but (a) there is no reliable information on the capital assets of cooperative institutions (their physical assets are typically grossly under-valued) and (b) it is not clear conceptually how far CRDP expenditures on 'institutional development' should be classified as investments. The one thing we can do is to compare CRDP expenditures with (a) levels of business turnover and (b) surpluses of the Primary Societies and Womenís Groups that it was designed to improve. Total expenditure on CRDP over three years, at SEK 24.6 million, was equivalent to 15% of the business turnover, and 300%+ of the business surplus, over the same period, of the Primary Societies and Womenís Groups participating in the programme. Even if one excludes from the sums that 13% of CRDP costs incurred on UNEX/export development and cooperative finance components (see above), the programme remained large in relation to its 'target' economies.

4.7 We encountered differences of views about one possible partial explanation for these high overhead costs. One view put to us was that it reflected events in Sweden: there were long negotiations between Sida and SCC at the beginning of the programme; although some CRDP inputs, including (expensive) expatriate technical assistance, were in place and incurring expenditures from early in the first year (1993/4), funding for field operations was not authorised, and overhead costs hence were high. Other people disagreed. It was said that there was a clear understanding that Sida would fund the programme, and that the delays in signing the formal agreement - that were in part caused by Sida's concerns about the adequacy of the performance indicators proposed by UCA/SCC - either should not or did not cause operational delays. A complementary view was that an initial planning period was anyway needed once expatriate advisers and other resources were in place. We doubt that this account of 'delays' provides much of an explanation for the high overhead costs of CRDP, but accept that there are alternative views.

4.8 Because of substantial changes between 1993/4 and 1994/5 in the budgetary categories ('heads') used by the SCC, one cannot present a detailed account of expenditure patterns over the whole programme. The figures in Table 1 are for gross categories. They do however illustrate that the bulk of CRDP funds have been spent on 'overheads', i.e. organisations, persons and activities of a supporting and supervisory nature, rather than activities and investments at field level. The figures in Table 1 do not give the full picture: they do not include general Sida overheads in programme design and management or the costs of this evaluation. They do not speak for themselves, and different people will put very different interpretations on them. Some people will view the ratio of 'overheads' to 'field' expenditures as high. Of direct, actual CRDP expenditures, 42% went on SCC/UCA overheads, and 45% on ëfield operationsí for the core programme of reforming and rehabilitating Primary Societies (including the gender component). Close to half of this 45% for ëfield operationsí was actually spent on the ëmatching grantí given to participating Primary

Societies and Womenís Groups - that amounted to 18% of total CRDP expenditures (see above). Overheads, as we have defined them, were originally scheduled to absorb 30% of total CRDP expenditures, but actually amounted to 42% (Table 1). In effect, the savings made by the early termination of the export development and cooperative finance components of CRDP were diverted into additional overhead expenses incurred by the UCA and the SCC.

Are these overhead levels excessive? We do not feel able to answer that question bluntly. A number of points need to be taken into account in attempting to answer it:

(1) This kind of institutional development project, funded by an official aid agency and requiring very little physical investment at field level, is inherently likely to generate high financial overheads.

(2) It seems clear that the input of Swedish Cooperative Centre (SCC) staff to CRDP has been substantial: they have played a big role in preparing documentation in particular, and have been able to play an important advisory and support role because of the considerable trust that exists between them and UCA. SCC staff - and the expatriate consultants employed through them - are however very expensive in the Uganda context.

(3) The UCA is not a low cost organisation in the Uganda context. Its levels of staff remuneration, including allowances, are generally considered generous. It maintains a large office and organisational infrastructure in Kampala. Despite efforts over the years, its subsidiary companies (UCA Business Services, UCA Statutory Services) have not become profitable. One would expect this situation to lead to upward pressures on UCA costs of all kinds.

(4) However, UCA's high costs are justified in some respects. In particular, the generous staff remuneration might be considered an inevitable, worthwhile price to pay for committed, honest and efficient work on the part of CRDP staff. It is not clear that the kind of project management services run by UCA could in the past have been provided by another local organisation in Uganda with anything like the same degree of efficiency or honesty. (The results of audits of UCAís use of Swedish aid funds have been pleasing - see for example Reference 3).

CRDP's successor, CMDP, involves no contribution of Swedish funds to general UCA overheads.

4.9 In the early discussions of CRDP, the amalgamation of neighbouring Primary Societies into more viable business units was taken as a programme goal. However, it became clear early on that there was no popular support for this idea, and it was not then pursued by UCA. Such a programme could only have been achieved voluntarily; UCA could have provided incentives, support and encouragement. Some small progress has however been registered with the recent creation of an association of (CRDP) Primary Societies in Bushenyi District to manage the Kabwohe coffee factory.

4.10 The figures on the business turnover and surpluses of CRDP Primary Societies and Womenís Groups are imperfect (see Section 3.8). Further, since they relate to only three years - there simply are no data for earlier periods - they provide a very poor basis for drawing conclusions about 'trends'. If the figures are accurate, the aggregate pattern for those three years is fairly clear (Table 3): there was a substantial increase in business turnover and profit during the second year of the programme, but this tailed off during the third year. Our field survey results, for a small sample of Societies/Groups, are less encouraging than the aggregate figures from UCA relating to the entire programme, and indicate a distinct falling back in the third year (Table 4). Our field survey interviews support the notion of a big increase in business activity in the second year. They do not help us determine whether that level was later sustained.

We draw two factual conclusions: there was a big increase in business activity and profits in the participating Societies/Groups in the second year of the programme; and there was no further improvement in the third year. What we cannot determine is whether there was stability or decline in the third and subsequent years. The overall conclusion is that that CRDP has not lead to a sustained, continuous improvement in the business performance of the participating Societies/Groups. That fact appears clear; the reasons are not. There are three immediate potential reasons. The data needed to decide between them are simply not available. Each probably played some role, and the first was certainly significant:

(1) Most evident, the proportion of coffee marketed through the private sector has continued to increase as the market has been liberalised and the private sector has become more experienced and better-resourced. The picture is the same throughout the coffee areas. Cooperative marketing of cotton has held up better because this involves arrangements for the supply of (scarce) cotton seed that the private sector has not yet been organised to provide. There are wide divergences in estimates of the cooperative and private shares of the coffee marketing trade. When we asked about

the role of the cooperatives in primary level marketing - i.e. from the producer - we were given estimates ranging from 20% to 60% of the total. It is not clear that anyone knows the true figure, partly because the situation is in such flux, and partly because there are such a wide variety of marketing arrangements. The Primary Societies play a greater role than the Unions; they often collect produce from the producers (and small scale local traders) and then sell to private traders, cutting out the Unions entirely. However, all the evidence suggests that even the Societies' share continues to decline. Since produce marketing is the dominant business activity of Primary Societies, their levels of business activity are likely to continue to decline. (There are two bases for this expectation. One is the assumption that private trade channels will become increasingly stable, resulting the development of more trust between agents and different levels, and the wider use of informal credit arrangements. The other is that there is no sign that Societies will overcome the problem of lack of access to large scale crop finance. Most Primary Societies have no access to external sources of crop finance, and, if they sell produce to Unions, do so on credit.)

(2) Over the period of CRDP, the price of coffee fell substantially. This alone would have reduced the levels of business turnover and surpluses of Primary Societies. In the absence of any data on volumes of coffee and cotton marketed by CRDP Societies, we cannot estimate the significance of this factor.

(3) The CRDP Societies and Womenís Groups may not have made full use of the initial capital injection received under CRDP, and may otherwise simply have not made sufficient effort to become more viable business organisations. There is some evidence for this proposition, although it is mixed. Let us first look at the issue of capital. New capital injections under CRDP - members' new share contributions plus the 'matching grant' - amounted to an average of about 43,000 shillings (US$43) per paid-up member. This is a useful sum, but hardly the basis for a big expansion of business. As has already been noted, in many cases members paid in new capital not primarily to finance their Societies' business activities, but in the expectation that this would somehow help generate individual benefits, either in the form of a 'bonus' from the matching grant or access to individual loans. We came across a handful of case where members had actively pressured Society committees to return the new share capital they had paid in, along with the 'bonus'. These are apparently extreme and exceptional cases, but do help illustrate that what was on the minds of many CRDP participants was not the formal 'business viability' goals of the programme. A range of other field observations point in the same direction, notably the dearth of good record and account-keeping at Society level.

4.11 It is certain that CRDP Primary Societies in particular - Women's Groups performed better - did less to become viable business units than one would have hoped and expected given the formal goals of the programme. How far this explains their overall modest-rather-than-good business performance over the period is unclear; the other factors listed above also played a role in that. It is however important to examine the link between this disappointing business effort and programme design and management. There are two distinct ways in which programme design and management was sub-optimal from the point of view of the business viability objective:

(1) As is explained above, the programme was set up in a way that gave the wrong signals to the participants about objectives. The limited 'competition' for admittance to the programme, the role of external 'selection', the implied promises of individual benefits, and the small 'stakes' that participants were required to put up all helped to bring into the programme Societies that were either unable or unprepared to give priority to the business viability objective. This was not the universal case, but it was a significant problem. This is a design and selection issue.

(2) Similar points emerge at the implementation stage: the incentives and signals from UCA for the participating Societies to take seriously the business viability objective programme have not been sufficiently strong. Several pieces of evidence point in that direction: the content of reports from UCA to the funder and internal UCA documents on CRDP; the relative infrequency of the meetings of the steering/policy committees of CRDP where one would expect longer term 'strategic' rather than short term 'managerial' issues to receive attention; the deficiencies in the data base held at UCA on the business performance of participating Primary Societies and Womenís Groups; the apparent absence of any serious attempt to use CRDP resources to encourage Primary Societies to amalgamate into more effective business units; the fact that the regular auditing of the accounts of the participating Primary Societies and Womenís Groups, that was initially viewed as an important instrument for achieving CRDP goals, has not been pursued very vigorously; the early decision not to push for replacement of inadequate Secretary-Managers in participating Societies; and the inability of UCA to ensure that the participating organisations kept accurate records on the volumes as well as of the value of the produce they purchased. It is clear that UCA cannot be held responsible for the business performance of participating Societies. It could not directly intervene. It did however have very considerable influence, that was not wielded as consistently as one would wish. (We note that in the successor programme, CMDP, an accountant has been added to the CRDP field team in each Union.)

4.12 To say that UCA paid insufficient attention to the business viability objective of CRDP is not to suggest that programme implementation was lax. In fact, CRDP staff generally appear to have worked hard to implement the programme. Their efforts were however concentrated on more immediate and visible implementation targets, above all the completion of an intensive programme of training courses and workshops. These courses actually achieved considerable success in relation to the social, gender, and institutional objectives of CRDP (see below). There are three general points here. One is that CRDP was very ambitious: it required staff to do a great deal and to achieve a range of targets in a short period of time. Another is that, as one would expect, and in the absence of any explicit attempt to take this issue into account in the beginning, the visible, short-term implementation targets (notably training courses) received priority over the more diffuse business viability objectives. The third is that it is much easier for anyone concerned with CRDP to focus their mind on these issues now that the programme has been reduced to a 'core' directed at the reform of Primary Societies and Womenís Groups. When the programme was designed and initially implemented, it was more diffuse, and contained both cooperative finance and export development components that were different in focus. In addition, it involved a radically new emphasis on gender that absorbed considerable energy and attention. In sum, the fact that UCA paid insufficient attention to the business viability objective of CRDP largely reflects the circumstances and constraints surrounding programme design and implementation, not factors internal to UCA itself.

4.13 Our field survey generated much the same kind of picture of the organisation and management of Primary Societies as is available from other sources (e.g. Reference 3, pp. 26-7): widespread incidence of poor accounting, record-keeping and auditing; suspicions of mis-use of funds; and mistrust between committee members on the one side and ordinary members on the other. As one would expect, there is evidence of some local malpractice in formally signing up new women members so that the Society would be entitled to a matching grant equivalent to twice their new share capital contributions. The fact that these problems were widespread among a group of Primary Societies that were supposed to be among the best-managed and most active in the country either indicates that the process of selecting participating Societies was done badly or, more likely, that levels of management, morale, activity and honesty are in general low in the cooperative movement in Uganda.

4.14 In comparison with the modest overall success of CRDP in relation to the business viability objective, the picture in relation to the ësocialí objectives is very encouraging. There are three main components of this success: gender relations within Primary Societies; Womenís Groups; and empowerment of cooperative members in relation to the pre-existing organisational hierarchy.

4.15 It has already been noted above that the CRDP Primary Societies achieved a large increase in female membership, up to a third of the total, and that women now account for a significant minority of committee members, having previously been almost absent from committees. One might guess those figures to be entirely formal, designed to meet the criteria set up for receiving CRDP resources. In fact, our field evidence indicates that this is not the case, and that there have been significant changes in gender relations in many Primary Societies as a direct result of CRDP activities, mainly the vision workshops and various training programmes available for ordinary and committee members. Gender relations were a prominent theme in these training programmes, and were backed up by a cadre of (female) gender specialists in the UCA head office and within each participating Union. While there is little doubt that we were often given an exaggerated picture of changes in gender relations in our field visits, we saw plenty of evidence of real change, notably in the enthusiastic testimony of women members about changing male attitudes to their involvement in Society affairs, and in evident capacity of women to organise themselves effectively for purposes of discussion and public presentations.

These observations raise two major questions about the future. The first is whether these altered attitudes towards gender issues and these increased capacities for women to participate in cooperative (and other public) activities will persist to any significant degree once the stimulus of CRDP/CMDP - and the expectation of some kind of material benefit from them - has disappeared. We have no answer to that. The second question is whether these attitudinal changes and increased involvement in cooperative activities has resulted in any significant increase in womenís participation in the cooperative economy. The answer appears to be negative. Despite efforts to persuade them to do so, Societies participating in CRDP have not kept reliable records of the proportion of the produce that they market that comes from women. (And such records would have to be kept very carefully to be useful: coffee is not always sold to the cooperative by the producer, but be a small scale trader.) But it is clear from field surveys that there has been little change. Neither would one expect such a change, for the fundamental underlying point is that most of the produce marketed by cooperatives, especially coffee, is owned and controlled by men. If cooperatives are to become important economically to women, they have to engage in new types of activity relevant to women. The picture here is not entirely blank. We did find a few bright spots, especially in the Lango Union. Women-specific economic activities included: bottling passion fruit; maize milling; livestock trading; collective farm work; growing Eucalyptus trees; and growing and selling clonal coffee seedlings. Such activities were however very much the exception and generally on a small scale. The great majority of Societies we visited had no economic activities especially for women. The continuing enthusiasm of women for participation in Societies was often driven by hope that this would give them access to credit, generally for their individual trading or other economic activities.

4.16 By far the most encouraging component of CRDP has been the Womenís Groups (originally 30 in number) that were brought into the programme in the hope of making them viable, registered Primary Societies. Most have indeed achieved registration. This reflects a real enthusiasm among the members that derives in large part from (a) a common need - the subordinate position in Ugandan society of women, especially the widows who comprise a large fraction of Womenís Group members - and (b) the relative ease with which women are able genuinely to cooperate. Womenís Groups generally have important social, cultural and recreational functions and activities, as well as economic activities. Their members generally participated very actively in CRDP training. Womenís Groups have performed much better than the pre-existing Primary Societies in terms of keeping accounts and records, and to have had proportionately fewer problems of internal conflict and dishonesty. They have often been very entrepreneurial in seeking out and testing new economic activities. The big problem with Womenís Groups, as noted in Section 2.4, is that their levels of economic activity remain low. Average membership levels are low (54 - see Table 2). Any significant increase would probably reduce levels of participation and solidarity. In the absence of female control over major crops like coffee, the economic activities of Womenís Groups are likely always to be varied, unstable, and, on average, low. This is not a reason for not supporting them. It does however raise major questions about types and costs of support: the actual cost of supporting Womenís Groups under CRDP, in relation to their business volumes, has clearly been high. No new Womenís Groups were taken into CRDPís successor, CMDP, partly because of the perceived problems of dealing with organisations that had no legal status. We can understand this decision, but feel that CRDP has demonstrated that a major opportunity exists for an organisation that can support (and initiate?) Womenís Groups in an effective, low cost fashion.

4.17 CRDP has been designed and implemented through the existing cooperative hierarchy, including, especially at the initial stages, the Unions. There has always been some tension between (a) the need to work with the hierarchy and (b) the objectives, increasingly espoused openly by UCA, of both reconstituting the cooperative movement on the basis of the Primary Societies and of making those Societies more genuinely democratic and responsive to ordinary members. UCA believes that considerable progress has been made in achieving both these goals, and that CRDP has played an important part in the process. We are unable to make an independent judgement about the claim that Societies have been empowered in relation to Unions - or the associated claim that CRDP Societies have played an important role in some cases in bringing new reformist leadership into the Unions. To look at those issues would have involved the kind of deep investigation into local politics that we were neither equipped, prepared, directed or authorised to conduct. We did however see considerable evidence in the field to support the claim that, in CRDP Societies, ordinary members - including new female and youth members - are often assertive and organised in relation to the committees (and cliques) that in some cases had long been dominating.

4.18 The main instrument for the achievement of these considerable successes in relation to gender and participation has been a large, complex programme of training and related activities, mainly for members of Primary Societies and Women's Groups, but also for committee members and officers of Societies/Groups and Unions. Details of this training programme are provided in Reference 1. An idea of the range of activities can be obtained by listing the training (and related) units: vision workshops; legal awareness; gender; produce marketing quality; appropriate technology; family planning and food and nutrition; savings and credit; leadership; business planning; book-keeping; and study visits. The organisation and completion of this training programme was a considerable achievement. Course material was generally prepared specially. Most took place on-site in Societies/Groups own premises, and therefore helped bring about close, regular contacts between members and CRDP field staff. This helps explain why CRDP has had such a positive impact on the morale of many members of participating Societies/Groups. There were occasional complaints about the inflexibility of training schedules, including the holding of courses at points when agricultural operations were pressing. That however is no more than one would expect in a large and complex training schedule of this kind.

4.19 The fact that the training programme had a positive impact on gender awareness in a short period of time appears to reflect the fact that a considerable amount of gender training had previously been conducted by many organisations in Uganda. It was relatively easy to find both training material and staff to specialise in gender issues: two at UCA in Kampala and a Gender Officer to work with the Coordinator in each of the six participating Unions. It was our impression that gender awareness had been internalised within the CRDP staff cadre, and that the employment of separate Gender Officers, although clearly justifiable initially, may not be necessary in future.

5. Conclusions

5.1 CRDP initially had three distinct elements. The core element was aimed at reviving 150 Primary Cooperative Societies (and Women's Groups) in six districts to make them viable business units. This element was implemented by a special unit within the UCA, with its own HQ and field staff. There were two other minor elements (partly) implemented by other cooperative organisations - an export development and a cooperative finance component. These other two elements were not successful. In particular, attempts to find major new sources of business for cooperatives in marketing non-traditional crops came to nothing. Both minor elements were terminated early in the programme.

5.2 Even the core CRDP programme was multi-purpose: the achievement of the business viability goal was seen to be integrally related to (a) bringing women effectively into male-dominated societies and (b) restoring democracy be empowering members in relation to committees in Primary Societies, and Primary Societies in relation to district-level Unions.

5.3 CRDP has achieved considerable success with these gender and institutional goals, mainly through a complex, large scale training programme. Women now have a significant place in Primary Societies, and Women's Groups in particular have been enterprising and effective. These short term successes in Primary Societies are however threatened by the general failure to develop significant new economic activities for women.

5.4 The achievements in relation to the business viability of Primary Societies and Women's Groups are more modest. Levels of business turnover and profits did rise considerably in the second year of the programme when compared with the baseline. There has however been no further increase.

5.5 There are three distinct cause of this failure to achieve sustained, continuous improvements in business performance. Two of them lie outside the programme entirely: a substantial decline in coffee prices (and profit margins) and, probably much more important, the further liberalisation of coffee and cotton marketing in Uganda, and thus the intensification of private sector competition in produce marketing. The other reason is that the participating Primary Societies (in particular) have shown limited commitment to taking the steps needed to achieving business viability. There are two reasons for that. One is that the circumstances of selection of Societies to participate in CRDP were to some degree adverse: some participants were motivated largely by hopes of individual benefit. The other reason is that, by concentrating on the training programmes and paying only limited attention to issues of business viability, the UCA has not sent sufficiently strong signals to participating Societies about the importance of focusing on business development.

5.6 The fact that UCA has concentrated more on training than on business development partly reflects the design of CRDP. It was originally designed for two years - although implemented over two and a half years, with an initial period of relative inactivity, and an extension of one year at the end. Two years is very short for an institutional development programme. It was quite natural that UCA should focus on the more visible implementation targets, notably the training programme, rather than more diffuse, long term goals. In addition, the fact that CRDP started with a range of diverse components - with the gender component being very new (see 1.3 and 1.4) - dispersed managerial attention.

5.7 CRDP has involved an expenditure of 25 million SEK. This is a large sum in relation to the economies of the immediate target - the 150 Societies and Women' Groups. Expenditure on general overheads at SCC and UCA has been high. This reflects three factors. One is that the programme had still not been agreed between Sida and SCC when initial programme inputs, including expensive expatriate and local Ugandan staff were in place and drawing salaries. The second is that SCC staff time and SCC-employed expatriates are inevitably expensive in a Ugandan context. The third is that UCA is a high cost operator in the Ugandan context - although the return on those high costs is a level of efficiency, honesty and financial transparency in programme implementation that it would be very difficult to match in Uganda. Additionally, the close cooperation between UCA and SCC has helped bring about useful flexibility in project management.

5.8 The leadership of UCA believes that CRDP has contributed to achieving some broad objectives that do not appear explicitly in the project agreement. They include (a) providing a spearhead for the general reform and modernisation of the cooperative movement in Uganda; (b) the maintenance of a set of organisations able to provide 'countervailing power' to the private produce traders; and (c) sustaining a non-government organisation that is able to speak up effectively for the interests of small farmers in policy debates in Kampala. There is some evidence for the first claims. We are unable to judge how far CRDP has contributed to the second and third objectives.

5.9 CRDP has terminated. There is no scope to make recommendations about it. It has been succeeded by a similar programme, CMDP, also supported by Swedish funds. We were not asked to evaluate the design or implementation of CMDP, and feel that it would be inappropriate for us to make specific recommendations. Our views about the issues within CMDP that might merit managerial attention are however implicit in many of the judgements we have made above about CRDP.

6. Lessons Learned

6.1 The experience of CRDP demonstrates that well-conceived and well-delivered gender training programmes, supported by a good understanding of gender issues and by some material incentives, can have positive effects on gender relations in poor rural environments.

6.2 The experience of CRDP illustrates yet again the dilemmas faced in attempting to achieve grassroots institutional change in a diversity of poor rural environments with funding from an external aid donor. Because of the accountability constraints on aid agencies, aid agencies are obliged to set operational performance targets that may be insufficiently flexible and too uniform. There is the danger that the implementing agency focuses on achieving the more easily observable and monitorable performance targets at the expense of long term objectives. Especially when aid programmes are of short duration - and CRDP was originally a two-year programme, actually extended to three years - there may be insufficient time both for (a) genuine consultation and participation with grassroots beneficiaries and (b) for the implementing agency to establish the kind of bargaining relationship with grassroots agencies needed for effective programme implementation. CRDP would (probably) have been a more effective programme if it would have been possible for UCA to begin on a small scale in some localities, permit word of the programme to spread by word of mouth, receive enquiries and applications on a continuous basis, and ensure that only those Societies genuinely able to meet the relevant criteria and performance targets were admitted to and kept in the programme. As it was, the attentions of UCA were focused on meeting within a brief time scale the implementation targets agreed with SCC/Sida - notably renewing membership and share capital and running workshops and training programmes. This often involved expending a great deal of effort in cajoling Societies to meet time schedules and monitoring their use of CRDP resources. This effort detracted from the energy and attention that might otherwise have been directed at the ultimate goal of business viability.

These kinds of dilemmas are widespread in aid programmes in particular. There are no easy solutions. It might however help if Sida had an explicit procedure for predicting in advance the kinds of problems likely to emerge in the implementation of its programmes - and especially for predicting the emergence of problems likely to be neglected because they are not perceived as urgent and do not force themselves to the attention of programme managers until too late. Such an instrument would at least make it easier for programme managers usefully to monitor programme implementation, and increase the chances that they would intervene helpfully.

INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

MEMORANDUM

To:	Jan Runnquist	**Date:**	6.3.98
From:	Mick Moore	**Ref:**	CRDP Evaluation

Addendum to the Evaluation of CRDP, Uganda, 1997

I was team leader for the evaluation of CRDP in 1997. At that time, we had only (incomplete) statistics on the business performance of CRDP Primary Societies and Women's Groups for the three years 1993/4 to 1995/6, and no figures for the 1996/7 financial year. This limited the conclusions that could be drawn from the evaluation. At the request of Sida, the Uganda Cooperative Alliance has organised a new survey to obtain revised financial figures for the 250 CRDP Societies for the three years 1993/4 to 1995/6, and the new figures for the year 1996/7. I received these figures by fax from Pehr-Olof Bockelman of the Swedish Cooperative Centre two days ago. Clearly a considerable effort was made to obtain these figures. The Uganda Cooperative Alliance are to be congratulated.

The table below summarises the relevant aggregate figures from (a) from the 'End of Programme Report' for the three years 1993/4 to 1995/6 (i.e. the figures used in our recent evaluation report on CRDP); and (b) this 'New Survey', for the four years 1993/4 to 1996/7.

There following facts emerge:

1. The reported levels of business turnover are similar between the two sources, albeit appreciably lower for 1995/6 in the 'New Survey' than in the 'End of Programme Report'.

2. The levels of surplus ('profit') are appreciably lower in the 'New Survey' than in the 'End of Programme Report'.

3. Correspondingly, the overall surplus rates reported in the 'New Survey' - an average of about 1% of turnover per year - are considerably lower than those reported in the 'End of Programme Report' (about 5%).

4. Trends in business performance emerge as considerably worse in the 'New Survey' than in the 'End of Programme Report'. The volume of business turnover is the same in cash terms in 1996/7 as in 1993/4, the first year of CRDP. I do not know the rate of inflation, but there has clearly been a considerable reduction in turnover in real terms. More strikingly, surplus rates have declined consistently; in 1996/7, the 250 societies recorded an aggregate surplus equivalent to US$ 2.

5. Performance varies widely between Societies and Unions. Only in the case of the Busoga Union are there signs of consistent growth - but more in turnover than in surplus.

The regrettable conclusion is that the trends in business performance of CRDP Societies are in fact worse than we feared when writing the evaluation report last year. We stated in the evaluation report that "Levels of business turnover and profits did rise considerably in the second year of the programme when compared with the baseline. There has however been no further increase." One would have to change the last sentence to read: "Turnover in 1996/7 was considerable lower in real terms than in the baseline year, and rates of surplus have declined consistently, such that there was no aggregate surplus at all in 1996/7."

These revised and additional figures do not directly tell us more about the cause of this disappointing business performance. They are however fully consistent with our earlier conclusions: (a) that cooperative societies have been adversely affected by recent declines in coffee prices and (b) much more important, that they have been unable to maintain a substantial, economically-viable presence in coffee marketing in the face of increasingly-vigorous private sector competition.

'End of Programme Report'

	1993/4	1994/5	1995/6
Total turnover (mn. shillings)	3238	7154	8198
Total surplus (mn. shillings)	167	387	339
Rate of surplus (%)	5.2%	5.4%	4.1%
Index of turnover (1993/4=100)	100	221	253
Index of surplus (1993/4=100)	100	231	203

'New Survey'

	1993/4	1994/5	1995/6	1996/7
Total turnover (mn. shillings)	3735	6146	6740	3724
Total surplus (mn. shillings)	73	97	46	neg.
Rate of surplus (%)	2.0%	1.6%	0.7%	0
Index of turnover (1993/4=100)	100	164	180	100
Index of surplus (1993/4=100)	100	132	62	neg.

Appendix 1: Terms of Reference for the Evaluation of the Cooperative Reform and Development Programme, CRDP, Uganda.

1. Background

Sweden has - through the Swedish Cooperative Centre, SCC and the Uganda Cooperative Alliance, UCA - supported cooperative development in Uganda since 1986 through various projects financed from special NGO funds and from the so called country frame funds. It was decided in 1995 that as from 1 July 1996 the country frame support would terminate and that any continuation of the remaining project on such finance namely CRDP would thereafter have to be financed from NGO funds.

The main objectives of the CRDP are to contribute to achieving self-reliant development of primary cooperative societies, for the effective furtherance of the economic and other interest of their members. 120 societies are being revived as viable business enterprises providing economic and other services to their members and increasing female involvement in and influence on the operations. 30 previously existing female groups are also, on a pilot basis, being assisted to become economically viable.

The last phase of the country frame supported CRDP concerned the period 1 July 1993 - 31 June 1996. The agreed SEK 27 million was disbursed in full.

The most important stakeholders to the programme are the concerned members of the societies and female groups, the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the UCA in Uganda and SCC and Sida in Sweden.

The implementing organisations are UCA and SCC.

2. Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation

According to Sida instructions all projects are to be evaluated at a suitable time after their termination. After discussions with UCA and SCC it has been considered appropriate to make the evaluation in April-May 1997 when some results have matured but before a new phase has had visible impact.

CRDP is interesting from a methodological point of view to all stakeholders through its bottom up, business oriented approach. The findings of the evaluation will be of special interest to UCA in its future management of the programme, which UCA has the intention to give a national spread. The value for money (in a wider sense) is of great interest to UCA.

Apart from the above mentioned stakeholders it is hoped that the evaluation might be of a wider interest among cooperatives in East and Central Africa and that the East African office of the International Cooperative Alliance will use the report in its activities.

3. The Assignment (issues to be covered in the evaluation)

Generally the evaluation shall pronounce itself on the developmental viability of cooperative organisations as marketing channels for the small farmer sector and on specific advantages of cooperative enterprises in this context. Another main general point is on the relevance of the programme to cooperative revival in Uganda, on its overall achievement of its development and programme objectives as well as its cost - benefit. (Have the problems of the movement been correctly analysed, is the strategy for action relevant and are the activities logically relevant and realistic?)

More specifically the following points shall be included:

* follow up (with relevant genderwise observations) of stated quantitative targets and indicators on the development of the primary societies and womens' groups for instance: share capital build up, volume of business, benefits to members, increased operational efficiency . Comments on the ambition level of goals and targets should also be made.

* programme impact on member participation, awareness and influence in societies and groups

* replicability and sustainability of the intervention methods developed

* institutional development aspects of the programme. Has it been able to assist in creating societies and groups which are likely to be sustainable? Any effects on the cooperative unions?

* dynamics of learning and flexibility of action in UCA, SCC and the societies

* programme impact on gender awareness and female influence at different levels in the cooperative movement

* usefulness and efficiency of the use of the Export Fund and the Cooperative Development Fund

* assessment of the likely long term importance and impact of the programme (which in spite of its size partly has a pilot character) giving examples of impact outside the concerned societies and groups

* comments on the operational efficiency in implementation of the programme and on the respective roles of the main actors

* comments on external factors' impact on the programme's achievements

4. Methodology, Evaluation team and Time Schedule

The evaluation team will consist of the following three members:
Mick Moore, IDS Sussex, Team Leader
Z.O. Ojoo, Management Systems Consultants Ltd.
Sarah Mangali, Action Aid Uganda

Before starting its work in Uganda the team shall present a work plan to Sida after consultations with UCA and SCC.

A vast documentation on the programme exists. In good time before starting the field work the team shall arrange with UCA and SCC to receive all background material required from files, accounts, reports etc.

A total of twelve personweeks may be used for field work during April-May 1997 and an additional two personweeks for completion of the report. The twelve weeks shall include a one or two day workshop in Kampala with UCA and SCC for discussions on the main findings before the report is finalised.

Logistic and other practical support will be given by UCA. The Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Sida representative in Kampala shall be informed about the progress of the work and shall be invited to the above mentioned workshop.

5. Reporting

The evaluation report shall be written in English and should not exceed 30 pages, excluding annexes. The outline of the report shall follow Sida Evaluation Report - a Standardized Format (see Annex 3, p. 71 of Evaluation Manual for SIDA). Three copies of the draft report shall be submitted to Sida NATUR no later than June 10, 1997. Within three weeks after receiving Sida's comments on the draft report, a final version in five copies and on diskette shall be submitted to Sida. Subject to decision by Sida, the report will be published and distributed as a publication within the Sida Evaluations series. The evaluation report shall be written in WP 6.1 for Windows or a compatible format and should be presented in a way that enables publication without further editing.

The evaluation assignment includes production of a summary according to the guidelines for Sida Evaluations Newsletter (Annex 1) and the completion of Sida Evaluations Data Work Sheet (Annex 2). The separate summary and a completed Data Work Sheet shall be submitted to Sida along with the (final) draft report.

Appendix 2: List of Documentation and Other References

The team drew extensively on a range of written material that cannot by its nature easily be listed here, notably (a) regular work plans and reports on CRDP produced by UCA, (b) internal UCA files relating to CRDP, and (c) the reports and accounts of the Primary Societies and Womenís Groups surveyed. The main documents to which we refer in this report are:

Reference 1: 'Cooperative Reform and Development Programme (CRDP) 1993-1996. End of Programme Report', Uganda Cooperative Alliance and Swedish Cooperative Centre, November 1996.

Reference 2: 'Swedish (SIDA) Support to the Uganda Cooperative Alliance (UCA) - Swedish Cooperative Centre (SCC) Cooperative Programme in Uganda. Final Report of the Evaluation Mission, August/September 1992', October 1992.

Reference 3: 'Report on the Audit of Sida's Support to Cooperative Development in Uganda', Price Waterhouse, Nairobi, May 1995.

Reference 4: 'Five Year Strategic Business Plan', submitted to UCA by Agricultural Cooperative Development International, Washington D.C., October 1996.

Appendix 3: Tables

Table 1: Planned and Actual Expenditures on CRDP by Major Expenditure Categories

	Costs (000 SEK)		Costs (%)	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
A. General administrative overhead costs, of which:	8,250	10,205	30%	42%
(A.1. UCA general overhead costs, technical assistance and consultancy)	(6,550)	(8,010)	(24%)	(33%)
(A.2. SCC general overhead costs)	(1,700)	(2,195)	(6%)	(9%)
B. UNEX/Export Development (excluding technical assistance)	2,100	625	8%	3%
C. Cooperative Financial Development and Cooperative Development Fund	4,850	2,605	18%	10%
D. Field operations, (mainly classified as Women in Development and Cooperative Marketing)	11,800	11,171	44%	45%
Total	27,000	24,606	100%	100%

Source: Reference 1 and data provided by the Swedish Cooperative Centre.
Note: The figures in this table are indicative only. Because of changes in the budgetary classifications used by the Swedish Cooperative Centre midway through the project, it was not always possible to match categories precisely.

Table 2: Membership and Business Performance of Primary Societies and Women's Groups in CRDP, 1995/6

	Primary Societies			Women's Groups
	All Primary Societies	Primary Societies in Banyankole Kweterana Union	All other CRDP Primary Societies	All Women's Groups
No. of Primary Societies and Women's Groups	107	20	87	28
Average business turnover per Society/Group (000 shillings)	74,771	132,644	61,647	6,823
Average surplus per Society/Group (000 shillings)	2,991	10,430	1,280	642
Average number of paid-up members per Society/Group	179	307	150	54
Average business turnover per paid-up member (000 shillings)	417	432	409	126
Average surplus per paid-up member (000 shillings)	17	34	9	12

Source: Reference 1

Table 3: Business Performance of all Primary Societies and Women's Groups in CRDP, 1993/4 to 1995/6

	1993/4	1994/5	1995/6
Total business turnover (million shillings)	3238	7154	8198
Surplus (million shillings)	167	387	339
Surplus as % of business turnover	5.2%	5.4%	4.1%

Source: Reference 1

Table 4: Business Turnover and Surplus of the Sample Primary Societies and Women's Groups for which Complete Accounts were Obtained, 1993/4 to 1995/6

	1993/4		1994/5		1995/6	
	Business turnover	Surplus	Business turnover	Surplus	Business turnover	Surplus
Primary Societies for which complete accounts were obtained						
Banyankole Kweterane Union						
Butanda	103.0	7.0	11.0	2.8	44.0	0.8
Mutiima-Gumwe	33.0	1.0	67.6	1.1	53.5	0.5
Ruhaanga	17.0	1.8	117.0	1.5	65.0	3.7
Bugisu Union						
Lwambogo	49.5	-0.4	77.5	1.7	33.6	0.9
East Mengo Union						
Nakayaga	63.0	12.9	83.4	11.6	78.8	5.0
Kukula kwa Buganda	4.2	0.7	6.8	-1.1	11.8	0.0
Lango Union						
Igel Alwala	5.5	0.4	1.4	-0.2	3.2	1.5
Kangai	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Agwingiri	27.3	5.7	36.1	7.9	13.9	3.4
Nyakatonzi Union						
Rugendabara	12.2	-0.5	4.4	0.7	5.6	1.0
Abasaija Kweyamba	10.2	-1.3	1.8	0.3	6.2	0.3
Sub-total	328.9	27.3	507.0	26.3	315.5	17.0
Average per Society	29.9	2.5	46.1	2.4	28.7	1.5
Women's Groups for which complete accounts were obtained						
Kyakashambara	-	-	1.9	0.7	3.6	-1.0
Iganga	1.6	0.0	3.8	0.6	3.9	-1.2
Mirembe	-	-	13.0	0.3	7.0	0.4
Punu Atar	-	-	1.4	0.1	3.0	0.2
Nyangereka	-	-	-	-	1.9	0.2
Sub-total	1.6	0.0	20.1	1.6	19.4	-1.4
Average	1.6	0.0	5.0	0.4	3.9	-0.3

Source: Evaluation field survey

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