

Assessment of Lessons Learned from Sida Support to Conflict Management and Peace Building

State of the Art/Annotated Bibliography

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Sida Evaluation 00/37:1

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Introduction

This State of the Art Review and Annotated Bibliography has been prepared by the Conflict, Movement and State Formation Unit of the Centre for Development Research, Copenhagen. The review forms part of the study commissioned by Sida, *An assessment of lessons learned from Sida support to conflict management and peace building*, prepared by SIPU International, PRIO and CDR, and co-ordinated by SIPU.

The State of the Art/Annotated Bibliography focuses on evaluations and lessons learned from peace-building interventions and is an attempt to discern the main contours of the debate. The literature contributing to this debate includes evaluations, syntheses of peace-building policy and practice, existing State of the Art reports, and academic writings: these contributions often crosscut each other. The material covers themes ranging from the local causes of complex political emergencies to the global context within which conflicts unfold, and from the overall aim of activities and instruments applied by agencies to the assumptions on which various activities and interventions are based.

These themes are addressed in five parts in this report. The first part sketches the context and background to current conflicts, and provides a review of current concepts and existing conceptual frameworks for the development and analysis of interventions aimed at conflict management and peace-building. The second part discusses methodological issues surrounding 'evaluating evaluations'. Questions related to the criteria of success and failure are considered: the ALNAP and OECD criteria are among those touched upon. The methodology of this review is also outlined. In the third and largest part, a review of evaluations or studies commissioned and/or produced by relevant agencies is provided. The evaluations and reports reviewed are drawn mainly from 1998-99, but given the relative novelty of the field, few evaluations have so far been produced and it has therefore been necessary to include some documents of particular relevance and importance that date from the mid 1990s. Part four draws out lessons learned from the various project and programme evaluations at the aggregate level. The fifth points to some of the issues that are not dealt with in the evaluations, and attempts to situate activities supported by Sida in the general milieu of peace-building interventions.

While explorations of policy formations as well as the critical academic literature abound, evaluations of peace building and conflict managing activities are just beginning to emerge. In the preparation of this bibliography, CDR has conducted extensive library and database searches as well as contacted the evaluation divisions of several major agencies. However, due to the tight time schedule of the assignment, we do not claim the study or the bibliography to be comprehensive. A selection of other relevant bibliographies can be found in the references annexed to this report.

In addition, it should be noted that the views found in the literature and evaluations reflect the predominantly Western character of the debate, as well as an almost complete lack of the perceptions of the various local actors in conflict-ridden areas (Gundel 1999). This, of course, points to an important new field to be developed and supported.

1. Background and Conceptual Framework

There is a general consensus that, since the end of the Cold War, conflicts have taken new forms which have rendered previous types of intervention by the relief and aid community outmoded (Duffield 1997). A recent analysis has put this shift in context succinctly:

The fact that the great majority of armed conflicts now are internal conflicts reflects major structural changes in global politics. Geopolitics is not what it used to be. In an era of 'de-territorialisation' of economic activities, territorial gains are no longer as important to states... Weapons capabilities are now such that war between major powers has become virtually impossible, while technological change has put arms in the hands of warlords and militias which previously only states could afford, thereby changing the political and security landscape. (Pieterse 1998: 7)

Partly in response to such developments, but also shaped by other logic's (such as what Duffield calls 'a self-perpetuating relief and aid technocracy'), the humanitarian 'regime' or architecture has grown ever more complex in recent years as more players have entered the scene, of whom perhaps the most significant are the military and associated actors.

Sustaining themselves remorselessly into the new millennium, these new forms of conflict have nevertheless continued to confound the efforts of the international community, prompting new, often untested forms of intervention. The 'relief-to-development debate', which dominated the relief and assistance scene in the 1990s, has now given way to a new focus on conflict, security and peace building as a short or long term activity. As a result, new perspectives and frameworks for conflict management and peace building in humanitarian and development agencies are in high demand.

When it comes to understanding contemporary armed conflicts and ways of preventing them, the emphasis has been on the internal causes, such as bad governance and human rights abuses. More recently, however, studies on the economies of war have provided new insights into the ways in which transnational linkages and trade networks (in diamonds and weapons, for example) contribute to the war economies and to sustaining armed conflict (Keen 1998, Richards 1996, Reno 1998). Accordingly, methods to deal with these networks and linkages are currently being considered by various authorities, which may in time impinge on the arena of peace building.

1.1 A note on concepts: the bewildering vocabulary of war and peace

A major problem in the peace and conflict field, noted by many commentators (Gundel 1999, Bush 1999, Goodhand and Hulme 1998, Hybertsen et al 1998, Spencer 1998, ODA 1996), is the nebulousness and proliferation of concepts and terms deployed in this arena. Terms are both used interchangeably and to mean different things. While laying down the law in defining concepts may stifle creative thinking, this wild west environment almost certainly runs counter to constructive debate and has contributed to what has been called 'methodological anarchy' (Spencer 1998:5). Some kind of agreement on basic concepts is needed to take the debate forward.

One convenient starting point or baseline in the debate is the UN Secretary-General's *Agenda for Peace*, published in 1992 to take account of the changes in geo-politics in the wake of the end of the Cold War, and re-stated in revised form in 1995 (Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1995). The latter document identified six principal instruments for controlling and resolving conflicts between and within

states: preventive diplomacy and peacemaking; peacekeeping; peace building; disarmament; sanctions; and peace enforcement (Boutros-Ghali 1995: 12).

In this study, the useful and subtle definitions of conflict, peace, and peace building provided by Goodhand and Hulme (1998) have informed our enquiry. Goodhand and Hulme trace the evolution of these concepts, noting that the UN distinguishes between five main modes of intervention in conflict situations, of which peace building is one. It was seen as ‘the promotion of institutional and socio-economic measures, at the local or national level, to address the underlying causes of conflict’. Subsequently, peace building has become increasingly widely used ‘to mean any activity with the purpose of preventing, alleviating or resolving violent, or potentially violent, conflict’ (Goodhand and Hulme 1998: 15). We also recognise the utility of generic concepts like ‘conflict handling’ and ‘conflict management’ deployed by the UK’s Department for International Development since the mid 1990s (ODA 1996), and subsequently taken up by Sida and others. Use of such terms reflects increasing recognition that ideas of conflict resolution may be unrealistic, and that the notion of a linear progression – from ‘peace’ and ‘development’, through ‘conflict’ and stymied development, and back to ‘peace’, ‘normality’ and ‘development’ again – may be misleading and counter-productive in terms of policy interventions and practice (World Bank 1998, Duffield 1997, Moore 2000). Some agencies, among them Sida, have recognised these concerns and articulated them in policy terms, and this study aims to reinforce this policy course.

2. Methodology

This section considers two methodological areas: i) the methodologies deployed in current evaluations, ‘lessons learned’ studies, and ii) the methodological approach deployed in this review.

2.1 The criteria of success and failure in current evaluations

As noted by Spencer (1998), practice is ahead of theory and conceptual clarity within this field. In addition only relatively few evaluations of peace building activities/projects/programmes exist, and even fewer are available for reviewing. Among existing and available evaluations, there is no common norm or methodological criteria for evaluating peace building and still less baseline data and criteria for establishing links between inputs and outcomes.

Two main frameworks or sets of criteria are used in various forms and to varying extents in current evaluations of conflict management and peace-building activities. The first might be characterised as a ‘mainstream’ approach, exemplified by the criteria set out by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (see Spencer 1998): broadly these criteria are efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and relevance. The second approach might be characterised as ‘humanitarian’, since it seeks to refine the more orthodox mainstream framework by injecting consideration of the human impact of interventions: this approach is exemplified by the criteria developed by the Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Assistance (ALNAP). The ALNAP criteria are appropriateness and timeliness; coherence and co-ordination; connectedness; cost-effectiveness; coverage; and impact/outcome. In line with the Terms of Reference, the ALNAP criteria are applied in this study.

2.2 The Methodology of this Paper

We have taken a broad view of ‘peace-building’, and understand it to include not only interventions which have an explicit peace building objective, but also the use of conventional forms of development aid for the purpose of changing conditions and dynamics of conflict (the incentives and disincentives discussed below), or which may otherwise be informed by a peace-building perspective.

As is indicated by the very terms ‘Annotated Bibliography/State of the Art Report’, this study aims both at providing an annotated bibliography of recent evaluations and lessons learned from peace building interventions and at ‘stating the art’ within the field. Whereas the first aim primarily has been met by collecting and summarizing recent evaluations with an eye to the most important lessons learned within each evaluated peace-building activity/project/programme (part 3), the second aim is attempted by reading across these evaluations in order to synthesize and systematize the findings (parts 4 & 5). While the bibliography part aims at representing the main content of and differences between specific evaluations, the synthesis of the lessons learned aims at assessing critically the content of peace-building interventions in a broader perspective.

2.2.1 State of the Art

General policy statements on peace-building and conflict prevention focus on the overall aim of activities and on the development of different instruments. The question of how specific contexts influence the applicability and the possible effects of these instruments is much less developed. Least developed is the question of which assumptions, what kind of knowledge, and which political agendas have fed into the development of these instruments.

It is not within the scope of this work to develop a methodology for categorising peace-building activities. However, for the analytical purpose of ‘stating the art’, we have examined peace-building instruments on the basis of their aims, the scope of their actions, and the agents implementing them, as they occur in Sida’s Arbetspapper (1999) and in the evaluations reviewed. We distinguish between:

- Instruments directly aiming at peace building (‘reconciliation’).
- Structural peace-building/conflict prevention.
- Indirect forms of peace building and conflict prevention.

Some of the instruments directly aiming at peace building are considered in the project specific evaluations. The structural and indirect peace-building/conflict preventing instruments form part of the synthesis reports and country studies, such as in the consideration of how conventional or mainstream development assistance contributes to peace building.

2.2.2 Bibliography

A total of 21 evaluations or ‘lessons learned’ reports have been included in the annotated bibliography. The basis for the inclusion of reports has been: availability within the two weeks set aside from Inception Report (June 30) to the deadline for handing in the work (July 14); coverage of three types of interventions (Track II interventions, locally based peace processes and institutional capacity building efforts), and representation of both multilateral and national/bilateral donors.

The evaluations reviewed are classified as *synthesis reports*, *country studies* and *project-specific evaluations*, although this division is not always clear-cut. Each evaluation is then reviewed by highlighting:

- the scope of the evaluation or study, outlining the activities involved in the project or programme
- the methodology used
- the lessons learned from the evaluation.

3. Annotated Bibliography

3.1 List of evaluations reviewed

3.1.1 Synthesis reports

A. Ball, Nicole with Tammy Halevy (1996)

Making peace work: the role of the international development community

Washington DC: Overseas Development Council.

B. Klingbiel, Stephan, for the German Development Institute (1999)

Impact of Development Cooperation in Conflict Situations: Cross-section Report on Evaluations of German Development Cooperation in Six Countries.

Reports and Working Papers 6/1999

Berlin: German Development Institute.

C. Mazurana, Dyan and Susan McKay (1999).

Women and Peace Building

Montreal: International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development.

D. Spencer, Tanya (1998)

A synthesis of evaluations of peace building activities undertaken by humanitarian agencies and conflict resolution organisations, November 1998

Active Learning Network on Accountability in Humanitarian Assistance.

E. Sørbo, Gunnar M, Joanna Macrae and Lennart Wohlgemuth (1997)

NGOs in Conflict – An Evaluation of International Alert.

CMR Report Series R 1997:6

Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute.

F. Sørbo, Gunnar M et al/Chr Michelsen Institute and PRIO (1998)

Norwegian Assistance to Countries in Conflict. The lesson of experience from Guatemala, Mali, Mozambique, Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi.

UD Evaluation Report 11.98.

Oslo: Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

G. UNDP (2000)

Sharing new ground in post-conflict situations: the role of UNDP in support of reintegration programmes

New York: UNDP, Evaluation Office.

H. Uvin, Peter (1999)

The influence of aid in situations of violent conflict: a synthesis and a commentary on the lessons learned on the limits and scope for the use of development assistance incentives and disincentives for influencing conflict situations.

Development Assistance Committee, Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation.

Paris: OECD.

3.1.2 Country studies

I. Bush, Kenneth (1999)

The limits and scope for the use of development assistance incentives and disincentives for influencing conflict situations. Case study: Sri Lanka

Development Assistance Committee. Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation.

Paris: OECD.

J. Hallam, A. et al. (1997)

Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation in Mozambique.

Oslo: Chr. Michelsen Institute for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

K. Hauge, Wenche (1998)

An evaluation of Norway's role in the Guatemalan peace process

Annex 3 to Sørbo, Gunnar M. et al.(1998) Norwegian Assistance to Countries in Conflict

UD Evaluation Report 11.98.

Oslo: Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

L. Klaassen, Wim et al/Quest Consult for the European Commission 1997

Final Report Mid-term evaluation of the First Rehabilitation Programme (FRP) for Somalia

Commissioned by the EC Directorate-General VIII

M. Mahling Clark, K. (1996)

Mozambique's Transition from War to Peace: USAID's Lessons Learned.

Washington DC: USAID, Africa Bureau Information Center, Research and Reference Services.

N. Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Danida (1999)

Evaluation: Danish Support to Promotion of Human Rights and Democratisation. Vol.7 Guatemala 1999/11.

Copenhagen: MFA/Danida.

O. Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Danida (1999)

Evaluation: Danish Support to Promotion of Human Rights and Democratisation.

Vol. 8. Mozambique.

1999/11

Copenhagen: MFA/Danida.

3.1.3 Project-specific evaluations

P. Abuom, Agnes and Ad Hordijk, (1998).

External Evaluation: National Council of Churches in Kenya: Peace and Rehabilitation Project III

Utrecht and Nairobi: TAABCO/Matrix Consultants.

Q. Ball, Nicole et al (1998)

Managing conflict: Lessons from the South African Peace Committees

USAID Evaluation Special Study Report No. 78, April 1998.

Arlington, VA: USAID, Center for Development Information and Evaluation.

R. Kumar, Krishna with Irving Rosenthal/USAID (1998)

Scientific Cooperation and Peace Building: A Case Study of USAID's Middle East Regional Cooperation Programme

USAID Evaluation Special Study Report No. 77, April 1998.

Arlington, VA: USAID, Center for Development Information and Evaluation.

S. USAID/El Salvador (1995)

Evaluate the Past to Build the Future. Final Report of the Second Phase of the Evaluation of the Impact of Centro DEMOS Programme

USAID/El Salvador.

T. Utas, Mats (2000)

Lutheran Church of Liberia-Lutheran World Federation/World Service Trauma Healing and Reconciliation Programme. Evaluation report.

Submitted to Sida, SEKA/HUM

Stockholm: Sida 1998-05595.

U. Van der Merwe, H, Polly Dewhirst and Brandon Hamber (1998)

The Relationship between Peace/Conflict Resolution Organisations and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: an Impact Assessment

South Africa: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.

3.2 Evaluation summaries

3.2.1. Synthesis reports

A. Ball, Nicole with Tammy Halevy (1996)

Making peace work: the role of the international development community

Washington DC: Overseas Development Council.

Scope

The study reviews the experience of peace-building activities in relation to the peace-processes in El Salvador, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Cambodia. The aim of the report is to derive lessons learned regarding the role of the international community in general, and for the development agencies in particular. The cases were all based on negotiated settlements. The report divides an ideal peace-process into four phases: negotiations; reaching agreements and cessation of hostilities; the transition phase (until formal elections have been held); and the consolidation phase. The instruments for peace building are divided between instruments for building political institutions; for the consolidation of internal and external security; and for the promotion of economic and social revitalization. The report provides a list of appropriate instruments for each phase while emphasizing that the specific peace accords determine which instruments are applied in the specific cases.

Methodology

The study is based on case studies carried out on each of the four countries. No general criteria are explicitly applied in the case studies.

Lessons learned

On the basis of the specific conditions of conflict and post-conflict situations, the report recommends the establishment of a new category of ‘post-conflict transition assistance’. For highly politicised processes, usual benchmarks and performance targets are too stringent. Flexibility, sensitivity to local conditions, and the incorporation of training in conflict resolution techniques at all levels, are essential for agencies that will engage in peace-building activities.

The international donor community – and not only the diplomats – has an important part to play in all phases of peace building. In particular (development) aid agencies can contribute to keep expectations about the peace dividend at a realistic level. Timing, of elections for example, is often unrealistic. Reform of the security sector is critical to the ultimate consolidation of peace, and has to be promoted during all phases.

Donors need to consider how to strengthen government capacity without bolstering partisan political purposes. Involvement with governments and institutions cannot await elections. The report suggests that local, inclusive peace committees can counterbalance and decentralize the government activities in the transition phase. Also, donors can maximize capacity building and minimize partisanship through discussions and (financial) monitoring of governments, although the bolstering of the capacities of these local committees may be very time-consuming.

Co-ordination among actors is crucial in order to capitalize on the ‘fairly short window of opportunity’ for change in the post-conflict situation.

The report concludes that donors have to extend the time horizon of peace-building activities.

B. Klingbiel, Stephan, for the German Development Institute (1999)

Impact of Development Cooperation in Conflict Situations: Cross-section report on evaluations of German Development Cooperation in Six Countries.

Reports and Working Papers 6/1999.

Berlin: German Development Institute.

Scope

The report considers which aspects have defused as well as exacerbated conflicts and the role the German Development Cooperation (GDC) has played in conflicts and crises in the past. Country studies from El Salvador, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka are included. The aim is to identify factors contributing to conflict prevention/conflict resolution, as well as to assess the interaction of various instruments within the overall development cooperation framework.

Methodology

Conflict relevant information was gathered and processed at three levels: a) at project level, b) at the level of the embassy and local development offices, and c) at headquarters level. Country and project files were consulted, and interviews carried out with development officials at all levels within Germany. The field studies are based on interviews with those involved in development cooperation (DC) at embassies and with representatives of conflicting parties and the respective governments.

The report states that the system features a wealth of information, but much of it is inconsistent. Actors tend to eliminate inconsistencies by resorting to mechanisms of selective reporting. Local structures tend to be reluctant to refer to conflict situations. Projects endeavour to shield themselves from the context of the conflict: staffs do not want ‘their’ project impaired by an unfavourable

environment. As such, the report seems to be critical of the very data on which the evaluation exercise rests.

Lessons learned

At the macro level, the most important possible positive impacts of GDC on potential and actual conflict situations are found to be a) the eventual removal of causes of conflict (regional disparities, employment opportunities, defusing of conflicts over natural resources etc.), b) short and medium term political/social stabilization due to reconstruction measures, c) the production of political openness, participation, democratisation and an increase in the conflict awareness of societies/political systems, d) achievement of security and improvement of human rights through the presence of DC personnel, and e) the removal of opportunities for self-enrichment and of client systems through economic reform programmes/structural adjustment.

Among the possible negative or problematic impacts are the risk that direct support for and stabilization of governments (though official DC) may support actors involved in conflict. DC may also exacerbate conflict through encouragement of client systems and/or corruption. Wrong signals may be sent to the government and opposition forces through 'omission' (for example, failure to seize opportunities during policy dialogue) and approval, and regional imbalances through the promotion of certain regions preferred by the governing elites may be worsened. Violent countermeasures may be taken by the regime in response to pressure for political reform exerted by DC. Finally, competitive behaviour in the public sector may increase due to economic reform programmes or structural adjustment.

While some of the above impacts may be conducive to conflict in the short and medium term, they may lead to easing of tensions in the long term.

On the micro level, *explicitly conflict related measures* reveal largely positive impacts. The work of the Churches and that of the Political Foundations differ in one important aspect: the Churches usually have good local interlocutors, while the foundations depend on identifying suitable counterparts, an approach that may cause problems.

Non-conflict related measures are found to have a very wide variation of intended, and above all, unintended impacts. On the positive side is the contribution to long-term reduction of root causes. On the negative side, four unintended impacts are identified: decentralizing measures may help the government to develop potentially repressive monitoring mechanisms; DC measures may encourage self-enrichment and/or corruption; some DC projects/programmes may increase disparities among groups; resource related measures may have unintended effects as in the case of irrigation projects which ease pressure on land but simultaneously enabling new settlers to move in, thus provoking fresh conflicts.

The potential impact of instruments such as policy dialogue and conditionality on conflict situations is highlighted. Success largely depends on the donor's adoption of a coordinated approach, the avoidance of excessive DC ('over-aiding') and verifiable concrete demands and conditions. Linking policy to dialogue or conditions can, in principle, be very effective, whereas technical cooperation is more controllable (making possible a greater influence on individual project/programme components). Success depends very much on there being a suitable counterpart structure, which not all NGOs have.

C. Mazurana, Dyan & Susan McKay (1999).
Women and Peace-building.
Montreal: International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development.

Scope

This report documents and analyses a diverse array of current peace-building policies and projects from women's grassroots organisations, NGOs, the UN, and other organisations. Women's grassroots peace-building initiatives include reconciliation efforts, demilitarisation, and the healing and rebuilding of human relations (examples are drawn from Northern Ireland, southern Sudan, Russia, and the Caucasus region). NGOs' peace-building policies and programmes are analysed at the local, national and international levels (with examples from the US, the Philippines, Canada, Sweden and Israel). Finally, peace-building policies and programmes within the multiple branches of the UN and other regional organizations are analysed.

Methodology

The study is basically a desk study, employing a gender analysis to policies and projects of both a gender-specific and gender-neutral character.

Lessons learned

The study argues for the need to incorporate women's experiences in building peace – particularly at the local level – into overall peace building policy. A list of key lessons are addressed in the conclusion:

- For women's full participation in peace-building to be enhanced, a special focus upon building their capacities must be employed: gender must be incorporated as an explicit aspect of peace-building initiatives.
- While UN and regional peace-building initiatives are diverse, unless they are women-centred, women's roles and initiatives tend to be marginalized.
- All peace-building initiatives must consider the impacts of, and incorporate women into policies and projects.
- Psychosocial, relational and spiritual peace building should be emphasized as central aspects of any peace building initiative.
- Peace building is culturally specific. Local approaches to peace building should be recognized and built upon, including peace-building interventions of women-centred and local groups.
- The formation of networks greatly facilitates effective peace building, and improved communication and cooperation is needed.

D. Spencer, Tanya (1998)
A synthesis of evaluations of peace building activities undertaken by humanitarian agencies and conflict resolution organisations, November 1998
Active Learning Network on Accountability in Humanitarian Assistance (ALNAP)

Scope

This is a synthesis report of evaluations of peace-building interventions by humanitarian agencies and what the author calls conflict resolution/transformation agencies. The central issue is the extent to which humanitarian and conflict resolution agencies contribute to peace building, if at all.

The report is concerned with the content of peace-building interventions and the methodologies employed to evaluate them. It looks at the type of activities and the ethical stance of the agencies intervening, and discusses the key notions of peace, peace building and conflict.

The context is outlined: the new kinds of conflict, and accentuated civilian involvement in them; the nature of complex emergencies and of ‘predatory social formations’; the trends towards ‘private diplomacy’ and ‘privatised aid’; and the general donor strategy to use aid in place of political engagement: ‘the politicisation of aid’.

There is useful discussion and definition of the notions of peace, peace building and conflict, which are needed to make evident an intervention’s conceptual framework. An annex provides further useful definition of key terms.

Methodology

The study explores 15 country case studies drawn from 13 reports: half concern ‘third party’ humanitarian agencies, and the other half deal with conflict resolution/transformation organisations.

Nearly three-quarters of the cases focus on conflicts in Africa. The reports reviewed very greatly: some are evaluations, applying diverse criteria; others are more like studies of ‘lessons learned’. The author applies the ALNAP framework to assess the reports, placing them into a matrix deploying the criteria appropriateness, coherence, connectedness, cost-effectiveness, coverage and impact. The report offers a definition of each of these, and then assesses the 13 reports in terms of the criteria.

Lessons learned

The lessons learned relate to two main areas: i) lessons from the evaluations themselves, and ii) more general conclusions about evaluation methodology and its current shortcomings.

i) The evaluations reviewed show that the results and outcomes of peace-building interventions are mixed: they are mostly positive, making modest improvements at the local level, and reaching small proportions of affected populations. The limits of such interventions are stressed. The report nevertheless urges humanitarian agencies to add peace building to their intervention ‘checklists’. The success of interventions by humanitarian agencies depends on clear links between peace-building activities and their humanitarian work. Conflict resolution/transformation agencies are generally successful in carrying out overtly political aspects of peace building; but they should avoid involvement in government-government activities.

The report highlights some problems faced by humanitarian agencies in the peace-building arena:

- Humanitarian agencies often work without considering power dynamics.
- Peace building is a political process, which may compromise humanitarian principles.
- Humanitarian agencies are weak compared with other parties.
- More generally, humanitarian aid was not conceived to solve the problems it is now expected to tackle

The review notes there is a tendency to unrealistic time-scales, and suggests that ‘peace-building should probably be measured in decades’. It also observes that peace building requires many inputs from different types of actors at different stages (that is, in addition to humanitarians).

The report explores ethical issues surrounding peace-building interventions, noting that the ethical stance of humanitarian organisations is insufficiently articulated: organisations’ activities should be grounded in values that all staff are clear about.

ii) On the methodological level, the challenges are substantial. Common concepts are lacking; key terms and concepts are not standardised; and organisations do not ‘speak the same language’. The concept ‘peace-building’ is itself a generic term loosely used to cover many activities, including peace making and peacekeeping.

The report notes that there is ‘methodological anarchy’ because of the difficulties of gathering information in volatile situations and the lack of baseline data, with relatively few evaluations of peace-building interventions carried out so far. The studies reviewed used similar methods used: literature reviews, interviews with staff, and interviews with affected populations. But there are problems of data quality, which are derived from the kinds of questions asked. There is a lack of standardised criteria: evaluators use neither OECD criteria (efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and relevance) nor humanitarian-oriented ones, like the criteria developed by ALNAP. There is a need to establish more appropriate evaluation criteria and to apply them universally: moreover they need to encompass aspects such as the phase of conflict (latent, overt and post conflict); the degree or level of the peace-building effort; the objectives of the intervention; and the contribution of local inputs — the ‘local ownership’ issue.

E. Sørbø, Gunnar M, Joanna Macrae and Lennart Wohlgemuth (1997)
NGOs in Conflict – An Evaluation of International Alert.
CMR Report Series R 1997:6
Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute.

Scope

This evaluation assesses the impact of the London-based international NGO International Alert’s (IA’s) conflict-preventing and peace-building activities. It was commissioned by the major donors (the governments of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands) with the purpose of analysing and assessing IA’s work to date and making recommendations on future directions in its role and performance. IA’s considerable growth in terms of staff, budget and operations, as well as the wider context, in which conflict prevention and resolution have become an important and rapidly expanding area for aid agencies, forms the background to the study.

The impact of IA’s activities are assessed through case study analyses in relation to a) the premises and understandings that form(ed) the basis for the interventions; b) IA’s own objectives; and c) the claims made by IA itself in its own impact assessment report and other documents.

In terms of assessing lessons learned and suggesting methodologies for evaluating NGOs concerned with conflict resolution and their activities, the study is comprehensive and a good representative of the ‘State of the Art’. Given the comprehensive character of the evaluation, this review will focus on the methodological lessons learned and the recommended roles for NGOs in general.

Methodology

The impact of IA’s activities is assessed through analysis of programmes in Sri Lanka, Burundi and Sierra Leone. Material was collected and interviews conducted at IA’s headquarters in London. Short intensive field studies (six days in Colombo, eight days in Burundi) and telephone interviews (in Sierra Leone) were also conducted. Finally, a discussion paper on ‘Evaluating Conflict Resolution – Context, Models and Methodology’ was commissioned, and an overview and selected profiles of some key NGOs working with conflict resolution was produced.

Lessons Learned

Conflict resolution is a difficult area to evaluate. In terms of scale, it may be difficult to assess the impact of specific groups or individuals on wider political and social processes. Because of the complexity of factors, it may be impossible to judge the extent to which any single organisation or political body exercises influence (whether directly or indirectly) in such contexts. While various models for evaluation may improve the 'state of the art', it is important to distinguish between theory and practice. Thus, whether or not an NGO's activities actually do help prevent, mitigate or resolve conflict can only be properly assessed through case study analysis.

It is nevertheless believed that NGOs can perform a number of potentially constructive roles in conflict situations (for example, through 'good offices' work and mediation to prevent violence). There is, however, only very limited space for IA and other NGOs to operate at the highest level of political negotiations. The opportunity often arises 'by chance', and when it does, a particular organisation may be able to operate in close and transparent partnerships with other organisations like the UN, other intergovernmental organisations or governments. In such situations, NGOs often have general as well as country-specific expertise to offer. Rather than defining mediation as a primary and particular role for IA and other NGOs, priority should be given to:

- Creating spaces for dialogue, not primarily by facilitating negotiations but by assisting to develop local peace constituencies at different levels (for example, through the transfer of skills, knowledge, and resources).
- Engaging in advocacy and lobbying around critical issues of political, social and economic justice (for example, through long term commitment and a solidarity or human rights profile).
- Enhancing geographic specialization. Intervention in any country or region requires considerable knowledge and competence: geographic specialization allows for effective capacity-building as well as strong, long term partnerships in conflict-related work.

F. Sørbø, Gunnar M. et. al/Chr. Michelsen Institute and PRIO. (1998)

Norwegian Assistance to Countries in Conflict. The lesson of experience from Guatemala, Mali, Mozambique, Sudan Rwanda and Burundi.

UD Evaluation Report 11.98.

Oslo, Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Scope

This comprehensive study explores lessons learned from Norwegian assistance to six countries within the broad field that encompasses conflict prevention, conflict resolution and other peace building efforts. The objective is to discover whether Norway's efforts have affected the actual course of the conflicts and contributed towards a peaceful solution, to evaluate the instruments and channels that have been available and effective in various situations, to discover which of them Norway has used, and to find out what has governed Norway's choices.

Norway played a high-profile role in Guatemala and Sudan. But while that role was carried out successfully in the Guatemalan case, basically due to close co-ordination between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Norwegian actors, not least Norwegian Church Aid, the impact of Norwegian work in getting the warring parties to seek peace and reconciliation in Sudan has been marginal. In Mozambique, as in Sudan, Norway is criticised for insufficient co-ordination (also between Norwegian aid and foreign policy). In Burundi, Norway's involvement has comprised both mediation and reconciliation efforts, but basically linked to funding without direct Norwegian actors as in

Guatemala and Mali. In Rwanda, Norway has provided humanitarian assistance, but has not been involved in conflict resolution efforts.

Methodology

In the cases of Rwanda, Mali, Mozambique and the Sudan, the evaluation is based on already commissioned and completed studies. In the cases of Burundi and Guatemala (and parts of Norwegian assistance to the Sudan), primary data has been collected, although only in Norway: no key actors in the six countries have been interviewed.

Lessons learned

The study points to the fact that sustained Norwegian presence through ongoing and long-term NGO-programmes is an important factor behind the successful endeavours in Guatemala and Mali. A thorough understanding of the conflicts, a long-term perspective, good networks, contacts with various actors, and extensive flexibility in relation to the need for funding or initiatives emerging during the peace process are additional factors. On the other hand, Norway's involvement in Mozambique and Sudan shows insufficient integration between aid policy and programmes and of broader foreign policy issues including conflict resolution efforts.

The report concludes that:

- There is a need for sufficient capacity and competence related to the broad conflict resolution area both in the MFA, in NORAD, and among NGOs, including a) ensuring that coherent conflict prevention strategies are incorporated into development cooperation arrangements, b) designing aid programmes by translating NGO and donor 'best practices' in conflict situations into recommendations for the providers of aid, and c) exploring the interface between humanitarian aid and possible conflict escalation with a view to alleviating such escalation.
- It seems particularly difficult to manage or resolve conflicts where deep-rooted and sensitive issues are at stake. At the same time, protracted conflicts tend to proliferate and to become more complex and regional with time. This means that it is important for the international community to get involved as early as possible. Involvement must be based on in-depth knowledge and analysis, good networks, long-term perspectives and co-ordination. It is also important that different actors acknowledge their different roles, involving the critical task of blending official and Track II mediation. Humanitarian assistance can best serve to mitigate conflict, but cannot substitute for political action.
- It is important to avoid being constrained by the traditional division between the long-term perspective and more short-term efforts. There should only be a difference of degree in the two forms of aid. The main question to be asked is where, when and how can aid be most beneficial. The problem does not lie in getting one form of aid to merge with another (the continuum debate). Rather, long-term thinking should be combined with, not contrasted to, flexibility and ability to adapt to changing circumstances.

G. UNDP (2000)

Sharing new ground in post-conflict situations: the role of UNDP in support of reintegration programmes.
New York: UNDP, Evaluation Office.

Scope

This report is intended to be a comprehensive review of the work of UNDP in complex emergencies, with a focus on reintegration programmes. The intention was to draw lessons for a 're-position-

ing' of the role of the organisation in societies experiencing conflict or its aftermath. The evaluation looks not only at the quality and impact of reintegration programmes in which UNDP has been involved, but at wider issues of the involvement of development agencies in post-conflict situations. The review comes at a time when UNDP is re-examining its role in crisis and post-conflict situations, and aims to contribute to this process. Reintegration of internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees and ex-combatants is the particular area of focus.

UNDP interventions into the reintegration of war-affected populations are of three main types:

- Area-based economic and social assistance for recovery of war-affected communities
- Support for reintegration of specific target groups such as IDPs, returnees and ex-combatants
- Assistance for key institutions in the peace building and recovery process.

Methodology

The evaluation reviewed documents, made field visits, and held consultations with a range of officials in the UN system, donor governments and NGOs in Europe and North America. The evaluation team visited 15 UNDP programme countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Croatia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Liberia, Mozambique, Philippines, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and Tajikistan.

Lessons learned

The evaluation found successes in the three principal areas of UNDP activity outlined above, singling out de-mining efforts for particular mention. More generally, the report urges the UNDP to acknowledge that conflict is a major part of the current landscape in the developing world, and to organise accordingly. The agency should recognise that every stage of a crisis and after has a development dimension. It should also recognise that the 'relief to development continuum' is an inadequate paradigm: development and humanitarian concerns overlap, interact, and rarely follow a fixed sequence. There are often pockets of relative calm where development can continue. UNDP should therefore be present and active at all phases of a crisis or conflict.

The report acknowledges progress at the headquarters level in organisation and policy in the conflict and post-conflict field, exemplified by the establishment of the Emergency Response Division (ERD), a Crisis Committee, and a fund set aside for countries in 'special situations'. It suggests that further improvements could be made in the mobilisation of resources; operationally (including the better use of the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and greater use of NGOs); and in attention to gender issues.

In sum, the report recommends that post-conflict assistance should be recognized as a major part of UNDP's mission. The report urges UNDP to concentrate its support to the reintegration of war-affected populations on restoring social and human capital. It recommends area-based approaches at the community level rather than targeting particular groups, although some such targeting may be appropriate through training, credit, improving access to resources, and like interventions. Finally, the report urges the UNDP and the World Bank to agree on their respective strengths and to reinforce their complementarity in conflict and post-conflict conditions.

H. Uvin, Peter (1999).

The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict: A synthesis and a commentary on the lessons learned from case studies on the limits and scope for the use of development assistance incentives and disincentives for influencing conflict situations.

Development Assistance Committee. Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation. Paris: OECD.

Scope

In 1997, a high-level meeting of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) adopted the Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation. The Guidelines are to be revised in December 2000. Part of this revision consists in a research process on 'incentives and disincentives for peace' for the way humanitarian and development aid (the two 'old' instruments) can be used to promote dynamics of peace in recipient countries, and how transition aid (the 'new' sectors) can be incorporated in development assistance.

Methodology

The report synthesises and comments on the result of four case studies (Afghanistan, Bosnia, Rwanda and Sri Lanka), and ensuing discussions by representatives of DAC member countries and aid experts on this topic.

Incentives for peace refer to all purposeful uses of aid that strengthen the dynamics favouring peace – by influencing actors' behaviours, by strengthening pro-peace actors' capacities, by changing the relations between conflicting actors (ethnic groups, the state and civil society), and by influencing the social and economic environment in which conflict and peace dynamics take place. *Disincentives* refer to the opposite. They weaken and discourage the dynamics that favour violence. Incentives and disincentives can occur in a conditional or in an unconditional manner (i.e. with/without reciprocity requirements, or with/without an expected immediate response). Targets for incentives/disincentives include not only national governments but also rebel movements/guerrillas, neighbouring governments, and sub-state actors (such as local or regional governments, armies, civilian groups and civil society organisations).

Lessons learned

Four broad categories of objectives are employed through the use of incentives/disincentives:

- Influencing actors' behaviours (through increase in ODA, human rights training to military and police forces, demobilisation assistance, developing non-partisan curricula/textbooks, rendering governments more open to local peace initiatives)
- Modifying actors' capacities (through capacity-building and/or financial support for pro-peace/HR NGOs, mechanisms to limit the inflow of arms, demobilization programmes, leadership training, strengthening local peace-initiatives and networks, monitoring and reducing military expenditures, facilitating access to legal systems for marginalized individuals and groups, and helping local NGOs and community-based organizations to become more capable and responsive to their constituencies)
- Changing the relations between actors (through creating reconciliation and opportunities for inter-communal collaboration, trauma counselling, creating neutral communication and dialogue spaces, justice projects, democratic policing programmes, independent ombudsmen offices/civilian review boards for civilian oversight of security forces, support to traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, promotion of minority refugee return and re-integration).

- Changing the social and economic environment – the systemic root causes level (through debt relief to kick-start the economy, support to dialogues on electoral systems or free elections, strengthening the media and access to free information, providing peace-keeping forces or election observers, de-mining and demobilization, reconstruction of basic social and economic infrastructures, promoting transparent and accountable mechanisms of governance, promoting regional dynamics in favour of peace and integration).

Lessons learned from the case studies

- All aid creates incentives/disincentives for peace or war. The issue is not whether or not to create incentives/disincentives, but rather how to manage them so as to promote conditions/dynamics amenable to non-violent conflict-resolution.
- Efficiency may sometimes need to be traded for stability and peace.
- Aid alone usually has limited capacities when weighed against the range of international, national, regional or local pressures and interests.
- The impact of ODA on the dynamics of peace and violence in recipient countries takes place within the broader, often volatile, environment of the relations between the country and the international community.
- Therefore, aid policymakers and managers will need to work with non-ODA actors to develop a coherent and comprehensive policy involving diplomacy, military relations, finance and trade, and to develop and implement innovative approaches.
- The latter will involve the use of ODA in new domains (such as the judiciary and security); explicit attention to the way project design influences peace and violence dynamics; and investment in new kinds of knowledge and human resources for understanding the histories and social dynamics of inequality, division, and violence in societies, and the role of external actors in them. Decentralized decision-making must be created, allowing for more timely and more locally owned and co-ordinated responses to unfolding dynamics.
- The case studies suggest that donor coherence and co-ordination is generally low.

3.2.2. Country studies

I. Bush, Kenneth (1999)

The limits and scope for the use of development assistance incentives and disincentives for influencing conflict situations. Case study: Sri Lanka

Development Assistance Committee. Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation.

Paris: OECD

Scope

This is one of four studies that look at the use of aid as an incentive or disincentive in conflict and conflict prone situations: other cases studied for the DAC include Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda (see **H**, above). The study looks at various kinds of interventions, funded by international donors through UN agencies, consortia of international and local NGOs, and the Sri Lankan government. They are broadly of two kinds:

- i) responding to the basic needs of displaced people in the areas of health, food, children, trauma counselling, education and vocational training, legal aid, human rights and governance activities, specific peace building and conflict resolution, and gender-specific interventions.

ii) programme level interventions which attempt to integrate development and conflict mitigation objectives, such as initiatives by Norway and Canada.

The study considers ‘conventional’ development work and humanitarian activity, as well as those activities that are lumped together under the rubric peace-building, conflict mitigation, conflict resolution, conflict handling and so on. More widely the study considers whether ODA subsidises the government’s military expenditure and militarisation generally. A useful appendix outlines the terms and concepts peace-building, peace and conflict impacts, reconstruction, and conflict itself.

Methodology

The study involved interviews with officials of the Sri Lankan government, donor governments, UN agencies, and international and Sri Lankan NGOs, as well as reviews of documents by multi-lateral, government, and non-government bodies.

Lessons learned

The conclusions are rather standard: the structure and dynamics of conflict should shape efforts to influence disincentives for conflict and incentives for peace; nationwide planning is needed; there is a need for a physical international presence; aid conditionality as an incentive/disincentive is likely to be most effective at the local level; external actors need to know what partnership opportunities exist within the country; indigenous resources and capacities need to be harnessed; greater co-ordination is called for; tools to measure the developmental and conflict impact of ODA are needed; institutional memory is lacking; gaps between relief and development need to be bridged.

The most useful (if obvious) point made is the need to understand the dynamics of conflict, which in Sri Lanka is unusual and more complex than most. There is not one conflict but several, sometimes intersecting and sometimes not, with fluctuating levels of violence. There are conflicts between and among several groups: the Sri Lanka armed forces versus the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam; violence within the Sinhalese majority; intra-Tamil violence; Tamils against Muslims; and so on. Sri Lanka is also unusual in the continued functioning of state structures in contested conflict areas; the limited direct impact of the conflict geographically; a functioning, even thriving national economy despite (or perhaps because of?) the conflict; and the lack of international political attention or intervention. All of these and other features need to be taken into account in devising interventions that may affect the quantity and quality of assistance over time, and thus the incentives to peace and the disincentives to conflict.

The contrasting fortunes of some infrastructural projects involving water distribution and resettlement of land (associated with the large scale Mahaweli River Development Programme) are considered, focusing on their impact on conflict and peace. In some cases there evolved a common set of interests among Tamils and Sinhalese, but in other cases tensions and ultimately conflict were exacerbated. (an appendix examines the Mahaweli/Madura Oya project and the Gal Oya project, supported by CIDA and USAID respectively). Another project with specifically conflict-mitigation objectives reviewed briefly is the Three Thousand Houses scheme, which sought to provide 3000 houses in a community consisting of equal numbers of Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslims. While there were some objections, the study suggests that distribution appears to have been accepted, even though the size of each ethnic community varies, and some of the beneficiaries had been more affected by the conflict than others.

J. Hallam, A. et al. (1997)

Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation in Mozambique. Oslo: Chr. Michelsen Institute, for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Scope

The report evaluates the effects of Norwegian assistance to Mozambique in the areas of peace building, reconciliation and rehabilitation during 1990-95. Norwegian agencies were present beforehand in the country, cooperating with the FRELIMO government. The evaluation focuses on the projects that related directly to the implementation of specific points of the peace agreement, and in particular to repatriation and reintegration of refugees, demobilization, rapid rebuilding, de-mining, and activities for the promotion of political pluralism. Support for the implementation of the peace accord from 1992 made up 20% of the total Norwegian contribution to Mozambique in this period.

Methodology

The evaluation involved a policy analysis of decision-making and Norway's participation in the political process, an assessment of individual projects, and sociological recording of the meaning of 'peace' at village level. Interviews were undertaken at headquarters as well as community level in selected regions. Discarding standard project-evaluation procedures, the evaluation applies three criteria: 1) qualitative evaluation of objectives in relation to results (the socio-economic importance of areas de-mined, elections deemed free and fair etc.); 2) operational process criteria (choice of instruments (partners and channels) and their appropriateness); and 3) consideration of Norway's special contribution to the overall peace process, and if the particular Norwegian criteria of 'recipient autonomy' was enhanced. The evaluation states that it was impossible to assess the impact in terms of reconciliation at community level, and that it was hard to document how rapid rebuilding projects related to the peace process.

Lessons learned

The report concludes that a more (pro)active role of Norway was inhibited by the lack of high-level political engagement. Projects were designed as part of conventional 'development aid'. The large number of small projects put much pressure on administration and inhibited co-ordination and stocktaking of the political impact of the overall contribution. On the other hand, the NGO orientation and fragmentation permitted flexible, proactive responses.

The limited capacity and reach of the Mozambican government in the context of massive aid made public institution building a problem. NGOs and other agencies by-passed government or had to work with local administrations or national NGOs that lacked capacity and were not well co-ordinated with national administration. The assessment of local partners was insufficient, and problems of sustainability under the difficult conditions posed questions to the concept of 'recipient responsibility' in post-conflict situations. On the other hand, the report questions the value of NGOs trying to build government institutions for short-term purposes (such as a governmental repatriation office).

The evaluation points to the possible contradiction between a too heavy emphasis on structural adjustment and peace building at the national level. In regard to economic rehabilitation, the development aid to the energy sector may have had important peace-building effects beyond the economic and functional contribution by generating confidence in the peace process.

Other specific lessons learned include:

- One project realised that the reception of soldiers depended to some extent to their ability to bring something back home. Soldiers perceived themselves as more deserving than other war-victims.
- De-mining activities would have been successful if strategic issues rather than purely operational had been emphasised. Priority setting was a problem, and alternative, better use of resources was not considered.
- There is no evidence that the rate or direction of repatriation was related to the existence of social infrastructure, as is often supposed.
- Opportunities for contributing to political interaction were missed as surprisingly few NGO chose to work in RENAMO areas.

K. Hauge, Wenche/PRIO (1998)

An evaluation of Norway's role in the Guatemalan peace process

Annex 3 to Sørbø, Gunnar M. et al (1998) Norwegian Assistance to Countries in Conflict

Evaluation Report 11.98.

Oslo: Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Scope

This comprehensive study forms part of the larger project commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see F, above). It looks at the Norwegian strategy and assistance to Guatemala in relation to the peace negotiations and the Guatemalan peace accord. The importance of the study lies in the thoughtful methodological considerations and historical analysis of the local causes of the Guatemalan conflict.

Norway came to play an important role in the Guatemalan Peace Process. The study investigates why Norway came to play this important role and it was carried out. Assistance was closely linked to the role of Norway in the peace talks (facilitated by being a small country with no strategic interests), which from the beginning appeared a high-risk enterprise. The MFA engaged in relations with all of the important actors in the peace process, including the military. Support for the peace process also involved sponsoring meetings and discussion fora.

Methodology

No guidance for establishing peace and democracy in countries that are recipients of Norwegian aid was provided by the MFA. To make up for the lack of specified evaluation criteria, the report analyses Norway's role in relation to the causes of the conflict, the dynamics of the peace process, and the content of the final peace agreement and its implementation. It applies Dessler's (1994) categorizations of four causal roles of conflict: 1) the dividing lines in society (the channels), 2) the objectives of the parties to the conflict (the targets), 3) what ignites the conflict (the triggers), and 4) the factors that determine the extent, intensity, and duration of a conflict (the catalyst). The study was carried out in Norway and is based on written materials and interviews with Norwegian actors. No parties to the conflict or other actors in Guatemala were interviewed.

Lessons learned

State-to-State cooperation was not considered an option, and since NORAD had no representatives in Guatemala, the Norwegian NGOs present were given responsibility to develop a programme and to participate in networking related to the peace process. In addition to previous development

projects, they engaged in human rights education, information on the peace process, and in the repatriation of refugees. Substantive and rapid support to UN peace-related initiatives was part of the Norwegian engagement. No longer-term engagement with development aid was envisaged.

L. Klaassen, W. et al/Quest Consult for the European Commission (1997)
Final Report Mid-term evaluation of the First Rehabilitation Programme (FRP) for Somalia
Commissioned by the EC Directorate-General VIII.

Scope

This study reports on a mid-term evaluation of the First Rehabilitation Programme (FRP) for Somalia, funded by the European Commission, with a view to assisting the Commission in formulating its Second Rehabilitation Programme. The principal remit was to assess quality of planning and implementation in linking relief, rehabilitation and development. The FRP took off in 1994 with the two main objectives of carrying out rehabilitation and addressing the root causes of problems in Somalia: the report observes that the first is easier to address than the second. The main EC bodies involved were the EC Somalia Unit and ECHO. Peace-building and reconciliation forms one sector among nine reviewed (others are education, health, infrastructure, agriculture, livestock, small and medium enterprises, fisheries and environment).

No peace-building and reconciliation projects were funded directly under the FRP, even though some projects under the programme created conflict situations, especially where there were high capital input and selected beneficiaries. The EC Somalia Unit sponsored a study of political decentralisation in Somalia in 1995, coming up with a 'menu of options'. In 1996 two EC sponsored seminar on this subject were held. In addition, three projects by international NGOs were funded under the budget line: two peace-building projects run or supported by Italian NGOs, mainly in the sphere of demobilisation and creation of livelihood opportunities, and a civic education programme started by the Swedish NGO Life and Peace. The latter involves training programmes for key people in nine of Somalia's 18 regions, and targets women in particular. All three projects started in May 1997, and so it was rather early to assess their impact, although the report attempts to do so.

Methodology

The evaluation team consulted the EC Somalia Unit, and various implementing agencies, UN agencies and international NGOs, as well as the umbrella grouping, the Somalia Aid Co-ordination Body. Some 70 projects in various sectors (including peace-building) were reviewed in Somalia. The evaluation uses a version of the OECD criteria of efficiency, effectiveness and impact to assess the peace-building initiatives (which it also applies to other sectors).

Lessons learned

The report suggests that peace building and reconciliation should run as a linking thread through all sectors, and should receive more emphasis. The evaluation welcomes the fact that peace-building and reconciliation have been built into the Second Rehabilitation Programme, and suggests that experiences gained by the EC Somalia Unit in the area of conflict could be deployed to greater effect in the health, education, agriculture and infrastructure sectors. The study recommends further exploration of micro projects. Peace building should form a strong input into each of the sectors targeted overall, so that conflict does not rekindle old grievances.

M. Mahling Clark, K. (1996)

Mozambique's Transition from War to Peace: USAID's Lessons Learned.

Washington DC: USAID, African Bureau Information Center, Research and Reference Services.

Scope

The study explores lessons learned from USAID's support to the Mozambican transition process, 1990-95. Lessons are drawn on the basis of four USAID Mission projects constituting the core of the transition strategy. This strategy was implemented in order to avoid famine and death, to implement the peace accord, and to reintegrate populations in society. Some of the projects were previously existing projects, which were redirected as the peace accord was signed in 1992.

Methodology

The document states nothing about the criteria for or methods of this paper.

Lessons learned (in regard to USAID's own projects)

Previous presence (contacts and knowledge) in the context of the peace accord facilitated the development of the transition programme, in particular for the reintegration of displaced populations and the reactivation of agricultural activities. The peace agreement triggered a sudden need for more staff who were difficult to recruit. Information-sharing and organizational changes in part made up the shortfall. In addition the following points are underscored:

- During transition there is a premium on information-sharing and other forms of (US) inter-agency collaboration in task forces.
- The mission had to draw upon various sources of funding in order to obtain the necessary flexibility.
- Risk-taking is essential during transitions. Early US support for the electoral process was important in creating confidence in the process and to elicit additional donor responses.
- Timetables were unrealistic and inhibited good planning and resource use.
- Limited capacity for executing grants represented a critical bottleneck.
- Even-handed treatment of opposing parties is essential. Operations through governmental organizations and NGOs were therefore necessary.
- Inter-institutional collaboration has been complicated, troublesome and time-consuming, in particular when dealing with the (centralized and bureaucratic) UN-system, and especially with several *ad hoc* bureaucratic institutions developed for the situation.
- USAID's strategy in relation to election support was difficult to ensure since they depended on unsolicited project proposals. There was insufficient time for issuing request for applications.

In addition to these points, the demobilisation programme – based on paying a salary to soldiers during the six months following the demobilisation – had the unintended consequence of reducing the number of soldiers for the regular army to one-third of the agreed number.

USAID developed an impact monitoring system based on regular field visits and simple indicators (for example, supply of stable food available in local retail markets) to assess the contribution of USAID to the reintegration of populations into stable socio-economic activities. Field visits produced anecdotal evidence, but given local experience and knowledge of staff, they could be called upon to synthesize and report changes in the countryside.

Scope

The study evaluates the Danish (mainly transitional) contribution to the Human Rights and Democratisation (HR&D) in Guatemala in 1990–98. The aim was to learn lessons for the improvement of planning and implementation of future Danish support to HR&D. Danish support was channelled through a regional Danida Human Rights programme, UN agencies, and Danish NGOs. Since the peace accords from 1994–1996, support has been mainly linked to different aspects of these accords (including indigenous rights and capacity building, human rights and justice, UN verification mission trust funds, and so on). While the programme supported civil society organizations - which implied a ‘bottom-up’ approach to democratisation – it involved very little cooperation with government institutions because of Danish distrust of the government. A technical office for cooperation was established in Guatemala (but no embassy). Only two projects supported by Danida aimed explicitly at peace-building, reconciliation and conflict resolution. One was a governmental office for conflict resolution, set up by the Organisation of American States (OAS); the other was an office for the resolution of land conflicts. None of them were evaluated separately.

Methodology

The evaluation focuses more on the process in its entirety than on the impact of specific HR&D projects and programs. Data gathering included 15 days of fieldwork, with very brief visits at projects in the countryside.

Lessons learned

While the report in general evaluated the Danish contribution positively, it is noted that the majority of the individual (non-governmental) projects and local organizations funded are not sustainable without continued external funding. The lack of diplomatic representation in Guatemala has weakened the effect of Danish aid in the politically sensitive peace process. Technical assistance is not sufficient under these circumstances. The limited State-to-State cooperation has hampered the possibilities for systematic policy dialogue, but this cooperation would have required a more substantial, longer-term engagement and representation of the Danish Government. It has been difficult to coordinate different parts of Danish assistance (in particular Danish governmental and NGO initiatives) since it has worked through very different channels and offices. Nevertheless use of different channels is ideal for human rights and democracy promotion in politically complex contexts. The donor may combine NGO partnership at one level with government cooperation at a different level, or the engagement in longer-term commitments with attention to more immediate needs and opportunities. This however requires a strategic framework and criteria for priority setting.

From the donor perspective, it has been necessary to improve monitoring of local partner NGOs; but while recipient NGOs appreciated the general agility of Danida support, they resented the increasing rigidity of monitoring and ill-suited indicators for human rights work. The Logical Framework Approach (LFA) does not provide an appropriate format for planning and monitoring HR&D programs. In general documentation on supported projects is poor but improving.

Support for peace building may well increase the risks for violent conflict. The de facto linkage of victims’ organizations with one party to the conflict has produced mixed agendas and probably

increased the risk and uncertainty involved. Exclusive support to organized groups of victims (such as refugees and demobilised combatants) generated conflicts between these and other groups. Finally, support for organizations and institutions working for indigenous rights induced tensions between different indigenous organizations and between these and non-indigenous sectors.

Common features of 'successful' project components may be the will to take risks at given moments, and, in the case of NGOs, their previous regional experience and familiarity with political conditions. Little previous experience and too much money for too short a time are likely to lead to failure. Support to public institutions with no political backing is doomed to fail (for example, the Ombudsman for indigenous rights). Finally, issues of gender have been given little attention in the HR&D programme.

O. Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Danida (1999)

Evaluation: Danish Support to Promotion of Human Rights and Democratisation. Vol.8 Mozambique 1999/11.

Copenhagen: MFA/Danida.

Scope

This evaluation covers 32 different projects funded by DANIDA in 1990–98. Projects were implemented bilaterally, by multilateral organizations (such as UNDP and UNESCO), by international and Danish NGOs, and in partnership with Mozambican NGOs and central/local government institutions. They covered four themes: Elections; Justice, Constitution and Legislation; Free Media; and Popular Participation and Empowerment. The projects implemented before the elections in 1994 related to the need to find ways to further reconciliation (such as the UNDP peace package involving support for demobilization, reintegration of refugees, IDPs, and demobilized soldiers). The emphasis after 1994 was on the consolidation of organizations and institutions furthering human rights and civic participation in local government.

Methodology

While 11 projects were singled out for field visits, the evaluation was not intended to provide a detailed impact assessment of individual projects. The TOR emphasized the processes and dynamics of co-operation between the parties involved in the projects. A considerable part of the evaluation is dedicated to an analysis of the context and dynamics of human rights and democratisation in Mozambique.

Lessons learned

Links between specific projects and the overall changes are almost impossible to establish, the evaluation states. Aspects highlighted in the findings include:

Funding channels. As the peace process has progressed, Danida has broadened funding channels, involving new Mozambican actors. Danida has been at the forefront in supporting embryonic human rights and democratisation activities, scoring high on the timeliness of projects (examples include capacity-building of political parties before elections, and of new Mozambican human rights NGOs). Danida has taken the political and administrative risks implied by such interventions, developing practices of risk management, such as joint funding and administration with other (like-minded) donors. Bilateral engagement has focussed on support to the development of the official legal system. Engagement at 'grassroots level' has been handed over to international and Danish NGOs, while Danida has concentrated on the national level.

Identification, planning, implementation and monitoring. The legal sector project is criticised for ignoring the Mozambican (and other Portuguese-speaking) resources and knowledge in the design of projects; this has resulted in ideas not taking root. The classic ‘project-model’ is seen as too inflexible for the kind of projects supported in comparison with sector-programme procedures. The evaluation points to the lack of ongoing base-line studies relating to long-term projects, such as in the legal sector. No set of applicable indicators for human rights and democratisation projects was identified, although USAID (in its country report and the Performance Monitoring Plan in Mozambique) has provided the best inspiration for this kind of crosscutting approach.

Synergy. Projects were generally unrelated to Danida’s country programme activities. However, the legal sector project could easily become involved in legal aspects of other sector programs in the future. Engagement in social and economic rights, rather than only in the civil and political arena, also points toward synergy with the country programme. Danish NGOs have also been quick to design projects for the country programme that take into account the Danida interest in human rights and democratisation.

Impact at local, regional and national level. This is difficult to assess given the intangibility of intended impacts, the lack of relevant documentation, and a short time frame for most projects. Support to capacity building among national and local human rights organizations is seen as successful. However, support to legal reform is seen (by Mozambicans) as too donor-driven, and the legal project is perceived as having missed the opportunity to support initiatives relating to the four-fifths of the population who are without access to the formal legal system: linkages between formal and informal legal processes, training of lay judges, training of jurists in formal and informal legal norms, and information regarding citizen rights are among the initiatives that might have been considered here.

3.2.3 Project-specific studies

P. Abuom, Agnes and Ad Hordijk (1998)

External Evaluation: National Council of Churches in Kenya: Peace and Rehabilitation Project III.

Utrecht and Nairobi: TAABCO/Matrix Consultants.

Scope

The NCCCKs Peace and Rehabilitation project has been developed from a relief and emergency project in support of victims of localised clashes towards rehabilitation (including resettlement of the displaced) and peace-making initiatives. The length of the project is not stated, but it appears to have been implemented in the early 1990s. The evaluation was conducted with the purpose of assessing various project activities and the extent to which project objectives have been reached, as well as identifying beneficial and constraining factors towards the achievement of the objectives.

Methodology

The methodology used involved several ‘steps’, including a round of consultations with all the organizations involved, a study of recent studies and reports concerning the project’s peace and rehabilitation activities, and interviews with a number of national actors in the peace movement, project staff, Area Peace and Rehabilitation Committees (APRCs), and communities to consider the ‘potentially successful’ strategies for changing attitudes towards peace and conflict resolution. Two field visits to local communities in Kenya (Kapenguria and Kaptagat) have been carried out.

Lessons learned

The overall experience of the methodologies and strategies applied is that peace and reconciliation is unattainable without the contribution of all the social and community structures. To reach all the key players in conflicts, peace activities must be implemented in collaboration with the area chiefs, District Officers, and political opinion leaders. There is also a need to assist the communities to revive traditional ways of peacemaking.

Project performance and activities are generally seen as being effective and successful, especially in delivering of emergency and relief assistance, farm input packages, and peace and reconciliation activities such as peace seminars, sports for youth, peace posters, etc. Rehabilitation and resettlement activities such as land hiring, land buying, and income generating activities have not had optimal impact because of political factors and some internal project delays. Due to late approval and a wait for the outcome of a gender study, such activities have not benefited women sufficiently.

The most innovative part of the evaluation is the inclusion of the voice of local community leaders – both ‘pessimists’ and ‘optimists’. To them ‘peace’ means to regain the means to survive and to get attention for their problems. This is different from an extension of ‘relief work’, which may be counter-productive if not based on an analysis of the conflict areas. In addition:

- It is concluded that organizations such as NCKK are uniquely placed to be suitable channels of donor funds in relief and rehabilitation work because of their extensive networks, which allow them to connect local security problems with national strategic issues.
- At the same time, however, the role of the churches in peace work needs to be analysed in a historical perspective, since they may have been stakeholders themselves before their current peace-facilitating role.
- Ethnicity is only a camouflage for other conflicts. Looking for political solutions therefore should be given priority over emergency aid. Here knowledge of the possible actions of the major political actors is called for.

Q. Ball, Nicole et al (1998)

Managing conflict: Lessons from the South African Peace Committees

USAID Evaluation Special Study Report No. 78, April 1998.

Arlington, VA: USAID, Center for Development Information and Evaluation.

Scope

This report evaluates the 1991 initiative of supporting 27 South African organizations to set up national, regional (11) and communal (260) peace committees (PCs) in order to reduce politically motivated violence. The committees were inclusive in nature (civil society organizations, local and tribal authorities, and sometimes the security forces) and became engaged in mediation, education in non-violent alternatives, and the promotion of tolerance. The staff were professional, and committees were established from the national level downwards.

Local conditions differed and had a major impact on the success of the committees. The presence of the paramilitary ‘third force’ constituted a major problem for operations. The election campaign also seriously undermined the effectiveness of the committees. The record was therefore mixed. Committees were unable to stop violence, but seem to have reduced it. They did not end impunity of security forces, but they fulfilled the functions of breaking monopolies of communication by opening new channels, of legitimising ‘negotiation’ as a concept, by creating a safe space for raising controversial issues, by strengthening accountability, and by helping equalize power balances.

Methodology

The evaluation is based on a desk study and interviews with staff and organizers.

Lessons learned

Under appropriate conditions peace committees can engender dialogue, help to solve conflicts and foster constructive relationships across social divides. The factors determining these conditions are: political will among the national actors and a (positive) attitude on the part of security forces and other armed groups; dynamic leadership by exceptional personalities that stand out as role models; a well developed civil society; local ownership and locally accountable control of resources; an even-handed approach; contingency planning; and international support, including flexible funding. If allegations of misconduct are not investigated, immediate rumours develop and violence may be the result.

International observers can make an important contribution to the peace process, particularly if they go beyond mere observation and assist the work of the organizations directly. There may be a contradiction between the principle of even-handedness and the principle of local ownership. The committees may also benefit from involving groups other than official leaders (such as women, youth, and the internally displaced).

In conclusion, the concept, but not the structure, of PCs may be applied elsewhere. Committees have to be structured according to local conditions and should be ‘owned locally’, that is, develop on the basis of local and/or national initiatives. However, breaking the circle of violence is not a quick fix, but requires a long-term commitment to conflict management beyond the usual two years time frame of transitional projects. Five years is more realistic as a timeframe. While PCs were established in order to reduce existing levels of violence, they may also be useful means to prevent the outbreak of violence and support political transitions.

R. Kumar, Krishna with Irving Rosenthal/USAID (1998)

Scientific Cooperation and Peace Building – A Case Study of USAID’s Middle East Regional Cooperation Programme.
USAID Evaluation Special Study Report No. 77, April 1998.

Arlington, VA: USAID, Center for Development Information and Evaluation.

Scope

The objective of the Middle East Regional Cooperation Programme (MERC) is not only to promote development but also to advance peace among neighbouring countries in conflict. The US Congress has funded the project since its inception in 1979. Funds are administered by USAID as grants to intermediary institutions. MERC has supported a wide range of projects in health, education, agriculture, water, and the environment. Most of the early projects involved Egypt, Israel and the US; later, other countries, including Jordan and the Palestine Authority, took part as well. The scope of the case study is to assess the functioning of the programme, and the extent to which this type of programme can be an effective peace-building instrument.

Methodology

The evaluation was carried out by a two-person team, which interviewed MERC researchers, officials of concerned universities and research institutions, and expert informants in Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestine Authority. Few specific methodological considerations are stated.

Lessons learned

MERC was found to have contributed to peace building in three ways: a) participating researchers were clearly positively affected; b) cooperation between Egyptian and Israeli institutions was promoted; and c) constituencies with a stake in continuing such cooperation were generated and nurtured.

As for the limitations of MERC projects, two stand out: most projects have been ‘parallel’ investigations rather than collaborations, and an elitist bias has generally filtered out lower level scientists and administrators from attending regional conclaves. Among the factors affecting programme performance, the most important seem to have been the pervasive climate of mutual distrust and hostility between Arab states and Israel. The governments’ commitment to and support for cooperative projects has been critical. At the same time, asymmetries in the institutional infrastructure for science (such as level of development, amount of academic freedom, extent of government involvement) have influenced project design, implementation and output. When the intermediary institutions lacked scientific expertise, managerial skills and political sensitivity, the projects suffered and cooperation opportunities were reduced. Many projects encountered difficulties with allocation of resources, systematisation of accounting procedures, procurement of materials, and unclear or impractical divisions of authority and management.

The effects of scientific cooperation (SC) on peace building are discernable on the individual, institutional and national levels. But the overall effect of SC on peace building tends to be quite limited.

In addition to conforming to the norms of ‘good science’, SC projects should pursue an agenda that broadens support for peace building.

Two prerequisites must precede SC projects: there must be a political settlement between parties, and a third party that has friendly relations with the hostile countries must be involved. Different modalities of cooperation need to be appraised and pursued. Joint collaborative research is often not feasible during the early stages, for example.

Conflict situations often pose major problems for the project participants (threat of personal and professional ostracism loomed large, and mobility is limited). Solutions to these problems should be developed during the planning stage. Multilateral scientific initiatives are better situated to overcome political obstacles than bilateral projects.

S. USAID/El Salvador (1995)

Evaluate the Past to Build the Future. Final Report of the Second Phase of the Evaluation of the Impact of Centro DEMOS Programme
USAID/El Salvador.

Scope

The DEMOS programme was prepared and set in motion between 1992 and 1994 in relation to the peace accords. After a Guatemalan model — the National Strategic Studies Centre, ESTNA — DEMOS was set up to bring influential representatives of all social sectors in the country together in ‘an inclusive space, politically neutral, pluralist, promoting the capacity of the sectors concerned to contribute and participate in the resolution of national problems.’ USAID supported this ‘democratic leadership training’ programme. 120 leaders attended the courses, for which they received daily grants.

Apart from the work at DEMOS, the staff (attached to a University) were involved in ‘un-programmed conflict management activities’, such as mediating conflicts in El Salvador, Chiapas, and Cuba. The former participants in the workshops continued (as of 1995) to meet in an association generated for the purpose of following up the training and discussions at DEMOS.

Methodology

The evaluation was supposed to demonstrate the impact of the programme on the level of tolerance of direct beneficiaries, associated institutions, and the reconciliation process in El Salvador. It was in part participatory, involving the staff in the process, and in part based on a questionnaire to be filled in by former participants.

Lessons learned

The evaluation concluded that: 1) the participants had changed their attitudes, becoming more tolerant; 2) they had been able to effect changes in their institutions promoting less ideological and politicised work on Human Rights, work in pluralist teams, and being more objective; and 3) the participants had a positive impression of the wider impact on national reconciliation of bringing leaders from different sectors together. However, the use of questionnaires as a method for assessing this kind of impact may not be valid. The evaluation recommends that DEMOS moves towards economic self-sufficiency, introduce a measurement of changes in the tolerance of the participants, and design follow-up activities.

The success of this kind of peace building project depends on the ability to attract leaders, to provide a high academic level, and to disseminate activities in the public. Furthermore, the evaluation emphasises that there may be a dilemma between being silent about the programme’s activities for security reasons, and disseminating activities in order to generate wider effects.

T. Utas, Mats (2000)

Lutheran Church of Liberia-Lutheran World Federation/World Service Trauma Healing and Reconciliation Programme.
Evaluation report.
Stockholm: Sida 1998-05595.

Scope

This programme is run by a Liberian Lutheran NGO and comprises four kinds of workshops on trauma, healing and reconciliation. One focuses on the training of trainers; one on community awareness and capacity building; one on capacity building of security personnel; and a loose cluster of projects support small-scale income-generation and other projects for vulnerable populations. Workshops focus on how to generate a common understanding of the conflict, how to enhance forgiveness, and how to find ways and means to get started with ‘new’ lives again. In 1999, 1200 persons were trained at regional workshops, including 99 trainers who link the programme to a number of communities.

While the effect in terms of durable peace building is impossible to assess (apart from the fact that open violence is in general on the wane as of 1999–2000), the programme has a good reputation. In particular, the participants from the security sector received the programme enthusiastically. Since they are often people with a responsibility for education and training within their institutions, the multiplier effects are probably high, according to the evaluation. The programme is timely in relation to the level of armed confrontations, and the will to end them.

The programme had links to local knowledge through regionally based field counsellors. Local level impact may be measured by the apparently extensive use of trainers, participants and local staff in conflict settlement, where they are preferred to taking cases to court. Furthermore the community workshops may have prepared the way for the populations' productive engagement with development agencies working in the area, but evidence is anecdotal.

Methodology

The evaluation is based on two weeks' field study of the offices and projects of the programme that were supported by Sida during 1997–99. Criteria for evaluation are not specified, apart from assessing 'benefits' of the programme 'with special reference to gender, durable peace prospects and reintegration of ex-combatants'.

Lessons learned

The appropriate identification of trainees is essential to the success of this kind of Trauma, Healing and Reconciliation programmes. Too many members of the closed circuits of the NGO world participated in the workshops, reducing the effects and serving purposes unrelated to the aims of the programme (such as status, job-prospects, and other aspects of the local economy of knowledge). Monetary support may need to be considered in order to broaden the spectre of participants.

The use of communal 'field counsellors' secures good local relationships, but their role could be strengthened in regard to autonomous action, which would permit them to live up to (huge) local expectations to their capacity. Trauma and healing were not dealt with in practice, and the programme has no theoretical or professional basis for doing so. A more coherent approach is recommended. Finally the incorporation of traditional methods of conciliation could be incorporated in the programme.

U. Van der Merwe, H. Polly Dewhirst and Brandon Hamber (1998)

The Relationship between Peace/Conflict Resolution Organisations and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: an Impact Assessment.

South Africa: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.

Scope

Truth Commissions and Tribunals have taken different forms during the past 25 years. In the tribunal form, perpetrators are sued, while more recent Truth Commissions deal with victims who give testimonies as well as perpetrators. This is the case of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SATRC). Unlike many other Truth Commissions, the SATRC combines amnesty arrangements for perpetrators, with the reparation to victims.

Experience has shown that truth commissions can only work on the basis of a political consensus among major actors. Preparation for the creation of a broad constituency and setting up logistics takes time and should not be hurried. Truth commissions that are driven and organized by external agents only, fail to have an effect within the country in question (e.g. El Salvador). Probably the most important effect of such commissions is the provision of a national language and an institutional framework, which permit people to talk about the past. One assumption is that the creation of a special institution for dealing with the past enables the reform of the other state institutions with less weight on political questions related to the armed conflict and more on technical questions of reform (Buur 2000).

In cases where hearings are of a public nature, they are assumed to contribute to the introduction of new values. In general the disclosure of ‘the Truth’ is thought to constitute a precondition for the creation of sustainable peace. However, the case of Mozambique – where major actors as well as victims concurred that a truth commission was not appropriate – provides an argument against the unconditional prescription of truth seeking as the only road to reconciliation.

Methodology

The evaluation is based on extensive interviews with TRC staff and with two types of NGOs, the conflict resolution NGOs, and NGOs involved in other kinds of community support, such as health and education.

Lessons learned

Apart from the generally good relations between NGOs and the TRC, the evaluation of the TRC’s impact on local conditions shows that commissions of this type may generate secondary, communal conflicts in several ways:

Since the commission was linked to reparation and rehabilitation, the exclusion of potential victims from recognition spurred demonstrations and unrest.

Local hearings undertaken in politically divided communities have revived former adversities. According to local NGOs, the TRC has not dealt with this potentially violent aftermath of hearings.

A focus on national rather than personal healing has led to the neglect of the problems of victims who have participated in the hearings. According to local conflict resolution NGOs in South Africa, reconciliation was never seriously considered by the TRC, and NGOs have not been involved in order to make up for this shortcoming.

4. Synthesis of lessons learned

The evaluations and reports selected deal with a wide range of issues, scales, and analytical perspectives and levels. We have synthesized the lessons learned according to the ALNAP criteria for evaluations although they sit somewhat awkwardly with the prevailing operational conditions in the current context of armed conflict. By doing this, we hope to provide some illustrations for the discussion of these criteria and their applicability in evaluations of conflict prevention and peace-building, as well as for the refinement of more appropriate evaluation frameworks.

Throughout this part, reference to individual evaluations is made by stating the letter assigned to each in part 3.1, the evaluations listing.

4.1 Appropriateness and timeliness

Four sub-themes are frequently brought up in the evaluations with a bearing on the question of appropriateness: *knowledge and understanding; local partners and channels of funding; timing; and appropriate methods.*

Knowledge and understanding

The appropriateness of projects and programmes depends to a large degree on the ability to draw upon, and analyse local and up-to-date knowledge, in particular about political conditions (**E, I, P, T**). This is essential for the choice of channels, instruments and methods (**O, P**). Peace-building is not a universal fix, but has to be adapted to different cultural settings (**C, Q**). Indeed, ‘peace’ may have different meaning in different contexts (**D**). Besides, the flow of information is central for the ability to take advantage of sudden (and brief) ‘windows of opportunity’ (**A**), and for essential contingency planning, which means frequent revision of programmes and the calculation of possible alternatives by asking the ‘what if? –question’(**A**).

However, some studies find that there is a wealth of (often inconsistent) information (**B**), while other studies argue that projects and programs do not provide consistent information and documentation; the latter also makes evaluation of impacts on reconciliation and peace-building less feasible (**D**), although the situation seems to be improving (**N**). One of many reasons for this may be the selectivity of local administrators, and their reluctance to disclose conflict-related information for reasons of security and the risk of having projects closed down (**B**). Case study analysis is essential in this regard. Geographic specialization allows for effective competence building and knowledge production (**E**). For these and other reasons, the capacity for undertaking (political) conflict analysis has to be developed at many levels and in many settings (**A**).

Local partners and channels of funding

There is always a need for suitable counterpart structures (**B**). The question is which, how to identify them, and what kind of interaction is the most appropriate for a given situation. ‘Local ownership’ of peace-building appears from the evaluations to be a precondition (and even a policy (**J**)) for the appropriateness and possible impact of the support, be it at the community or the national level (**A, Q, U**). When choosing partners, it is necessary to assess their capacity since many have proved to be too weak to undertake the tasks; one evaluation has even questioned the usefulness of the criteria of ‘recipient responsibility’ (**J**).

The local perceptions of organizations and agencies should also be considered. The history of the donor countries, governments, and partner NGOs is very important for their ability to work in the given context (**A, S**). While churches are often seen as very well-positioned and connected, they may also have a history or a present role, which generates mistrust in a given setting (**P, T**). Particularly in the Latin American context, evaluations point to the problems national and local NGOs have had in adjusting to peace, coming from an armed conflict agenda (**A**). Also the victims’ or other community-based organizations appear to have had mixed agendas due to their relations with one of the parties to the conflict (**N, K**).

An additional point, over which the operating or donor agencies have little control, is the possibility that in a given setting they appear and are perceived in a similar way to representatives of armed forces or governments who have previously inflicted harm on the population or otherwise have been perceived as predators (**M**).

The use of Humanitarian Aid for the promotion of political agendas – such as criticizing the Afghan government – is not appropriate; there are other means for that end (**H**), and political use of Humanitarian Aid may compromise it (**D**). However, evaluations indicate that humanitarian aid agencies have a role to play in the promotion of local level peace-building, but also that humanitarian actions have an impact on conflict dynamics under all circumstances (**D, H**). This puts extra demands on their capacity to undertake conflict analysis and to be clear on the possible effects of their actions on peace-building (**D**).

The question of whether or not to support governments and engage in state-to-state cooperation in specific cases is recurrent, but the evaluations disagree on the point: for example, the pros and cons of working with the Guatemalan government (**N, K**). The question is central to the criterion of ‘connectedness’ i.e. the sustainability of activities supported. (**N**) suggests that some state institutions (such as the Universities) may be supported at an earlier point in the political process, and that donor governments would thereby have had more impact on governmental politics in the country in conflict.

There is much to gain from an early involvement and presence of donors and agencies (**A, H**). If donor agencies do not have resident representatives they can cooperate with multilateral agencies or NGOs with long experience and established contacts in the area (**K**); lack of diplomatic representation does however reduce the possible effects of overall support from a donor country (**N**). Finally, the combination of different channels for different, complementary purposes, may well be the most appropriate way for supporting peace-building, for example, by combining NGO support or pressure with State to State cooperation (**N**)

Timing

Timing is essential for the appropriateness of aid for peace-building. Support often arrives too early or too late (see Smillie 1999). The question of timing is complicated by the rigidity of the political agendas of the parties to the conflict. This causes delays in peace plans and hence presents huge operational problems for planned activities (**M, A, O**); it also complicates the desire to generate synergy between different forms of activities (**O**). More realistic timing is needed (**A, O, M**). (**A**) provides a listing of activities that can be undertaken in different (ideal) phases of an armed conflict between ‘negotiation’ and ‘consolidation’; but this list does not take ‘protracted complex emergencies’ into account, which move back and forth between negotiations and resumption of hostilities, as in Sudan, Angola, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, for example.

Most of the evaluations coincide in the proposition that (direct) peace-building activities are only appropriate when the parties to the conflict (at local and/or national level) have reached a point where they are willing to support these activities (**A, T, Q**). The problems of timing put strong demands on donors for flexible funding mechanisms and decision-making, and on their will to take risks (**A, M, O**). While risk-taking is essential (**M, K**), there are attempts to develop means to manage the risk, such as joint funding between donors (**O**). (**H**) suggests that decentralization of decision-making seems to increase flexibility and timeliness of the activities supported.

Sustained, long-term presence is generally seen as an asset for peace-building and conflict prevention (**F, M, N**). ‘Transitional aid’ should be extended beyond the often used time-frame of two years to maybe five years (**A**). Peace-building is a process the effect of which maybe should be measured in decades; therefore the question of when to evaluate peace-building efforts is not only *how*, but also *when* (**D**).

Methods

A recurring observation is that since the all-encompassing politicisation of everyday-life is part of the nature of armed conflict, one important technique in peace-building is to have parties focus on technical/practical problem-solution (food, water, logistics), rather than on the political domination of each other (**A**).

Another general point states that peace-building activities necessarily have to deal with all parties to the conflict in an even-handed way (**H, D, A, P, M, N**). Most projects designed to have to have a direct peace-building effect attempt to establish as broad a constituency as possible. Projects involve

all parties who are considered to have an interest and to be representative of some segment of society (local NGOs, local government, traditional authorities, employers etc) without resorting to formal democratic procedures. No evaluations have questioned the appropriateness of this method, but a few have pointed to the importance of analysing local power relations (**D, N, P**), identifying groups who are often marginalized from political process, such as women, youth, and displaced populations (**C, D**). Inclusion of local voices is important for evaluating peace-building effects and reconciliation (**P**), but this is often beyond the scope of evaluations. Hence, there is little in the way of systematic analysis of effects of reconciliation efforts. In relation to gender, only three evaluations consider and analyse the gender aspects of peace-building efforts (**C, G, L**).

Decentralisation of decision-making may in itself be a method to enhance the inclusiveness of peace-building measures (**H**). As a counterpoint to this general method of inclusiveness, some projects and programs emphasize support to particular victims' groups or groups who are considered to have been politically excluded previously (**N, K**). While these projects in general are evaluated positively, donors and operating agencies have to deal with the risk of contributing to secondary conflicts (**L, K**).

The methods used in direct peace-building ('reconciliation' and 'healing') projects are often random, without theoretical foundation, little standardized, and not subjected to systematic monitoring standards (**D, U**). Beyond the question of how to evaluate and measure peace-building and conflict prevention efforts, evaluations recommend that the usual standards, benchmarks and performance targets are too stringent (**A, H**).

4.2 Coherence and coordination

The demands on co-ordination are high in situations of armed conflict where many actors with different agendas and modes of operation are brought together in a short time (**A**). (**H** and **T**) conclude that coherence in general is low, and the synthesis reports undertaken by/for donor governments suggest that it is necessary to establish a coherent policy and strategy which include development aid, humanitarian aid, and other means of peace-building, possibly under the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (**F, H**). There is in particular a need to incorporate conflict prevention measures into development aid (**F, L**), and to clarify the links between humanitarian aid and peace-building (**D**). Several evaluations call for the elaboration of strategic frameworks (**N, O, F**).

The huge number of agencies often operating in these situations complicates co-ordination and attempts at generating coherence; the use of NGOs and the fact that they often operate at community level exacerbates this problem (**I, A**). While everyone recommends co-ordination, it is a time-consuming and complicated task (**M**).

One evaluation brings up the point that 'peace' is taken by some communal leaders to mean having a voice and means of securing their survival (**P**). This suggests the need to establish coherent policy, including economic measures in the finance and trade sectors (**H**). The lack of economic options is a huge problem for the reintegration of displaced persons and demobilised soldiers (**M, N, O**). Furthermore, reintegration (and general reactivation of production) are hampered by slow and politicised processes of land purchase, registration, trade permits or extraction of resources and the like (**M, O, N**).

4.3 Connectedness

The idea that some kind of involvement of government and national level actors is necessary for activities to have long-term effects, is a general thrust of the evaluations. However, when central state institutions are weak or illegitimate, aid agencies seek out local governments or NGOs as counterparts, often without proper assessment of their capacities (**N, J**). One report concludes that there might be a contradiction between ‘recipient autonomy’ and the conditions of armed conflict (**J**). Another evaluation suggest that transitory support to NGOs and civil society organizations can have important peace-building effects, while engagement with governments necessarily has to be long term (**K**).

While the generation of local, regional and national networks is important for the connectedness of peace-building activities (**C**), such networks may exist already (**F**). It is considered an advantage if NGOs (and Churches) have scope and a constituency that permit them to operate at community and national levels at the same time which enables them to bring issues and queries to national fora and actors (**M**). Inclusiveness in the supported processes is regarded a precondition for the long-term sustainability of peace-building (**P**).

The timing of peace-building activities is related to the issue of connectedness, although the rigid relief/development and short/long-term distinction should be overcome (**F**). However, long-term engagement by donor-agencies and is generally seen as a condition for sustainable effects (**A, H**). Diplomatic representation and co-ordination by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is seen to enhance connectedness (**N**).

4.4 Coverage

The concept of coverage may be ill-suited for the specific purpose of evaluating peace-building efforts. Here we have to look at the groups directly involved in the projects, as well as the possible multiplication or projection of the specific activities (**S, T, P**): Which media are used for communication? Do projects identify and involve persons and institutions, who are in a strategic position to change attitudes, structures or behaviours on a larger scale? Do they work at several levels at the same time? (**D, S**)

Another aspect of the question of coverage is related to timeliness: when one donor or agency take a risk and invests in a peace-building project, other donors are likely to follow, thus magnifying the coverage of a given project (**K**). Development projects (in health, education, and the energy sector) may undertake investments that may create confidence in the peace process and encourage other donors or investors to enter the given country (**J, H**).

Coverage may be enhanced by looking into simple means can that extend the reach of programmes related to peace building. A legal reform program can choose to focus on how informal or customary practices in the countryside can be incorporated, rather than focussing on the formal, legal system operating in the larger cities (**O**)

4.5 Effectiveness and efficiency

Evaluations are vague on the issue of (cost-) efficiency and effectiveness, apart from the fact that usual benchmarks do not apply in relation to peace-building, and that efficiency sometimes has to be traded for peace and stability (**H, J**). One evaluation notes that while linking policy to dialogue or conditions can in principle be very effective, it is much easier to control technical co-operation, since this enables donor agencies to exercise a greater influence on programmes (**B**).

4.6 Impact

The most important impact of direct peace-building measures (reconciliation, track II, local and national peace committees, truth commissions) seems to be their ability to provide a space, a language, and a channel of communication, which is not engulfed in the polarized political agendas of the armed conflict (**Q, O, R, U**). On a modest scale, direct peace-building projects can have a positive impact (**D, T, P, Q**; although **R** is a counter-example); this impact is greater if mass media and training is incorporated into the programmes (and given that the right trainees are identified) (**A, S, T**). But in the context of other instruments and interrelations between the ‘international community’ and a given country/conflict, the role and impact of aid in peace-building and conflict prevention is limited (**H**).

It is important to recognize that ‘all aid at all times’ has an impact on peace-building, and the main question is how to manage these impacts (**H**). An important finding is that conditionality usually does not work (**H**). The impact of aid for reforms in the security and legal sectors depends on the relations established between donors and government; evaluations warn that such reforms should not be too donor driven (**A, O**). They also mention many unintended (**B, G**) and sometimes negative impacts of peace-building projects. One type is aid-induced secondary conflicts between recipient and non-recipients (**J, K, U**), or tensions and problems generated as a result of local hearings or other healing and reconciliation efforts with insufficient, professional follow-up (**T, U**).

The single most important role assigned to NGOs is to create spaces for dialogue and to assist in the development of local peace constituencies through transfer of skills, knowledge and resources (**E**).

Finally, there is an obvious linkage between conflict management and peace building on one hand and the promotion of democracy on the other: each can have an impact on the other (and this linkage is also relevant to the criteria ‘coverage’ and ‘connectedness’). However, only two of the selected evaluations/reports have a specific focus on the linkage between conflict management and the promotion of democracy, through attempts to enhance human rights in Guatemala and Mozambique (**N, O**). Other evaluations nevertheless include aspects of the nexus between conflict management and the promotion of democracy nexus implicitly (eg. **B, J**). There is scope for more explicit intervention in this arena.

5. Conclusion

As was pointed out in the introduction to this study, the proliferation of new forms of conflict in many parts of the developing world has meant that conflict management, peace-building and related security issues have been forced into the consciousness of those parts of the international community that are concerned with development as well as the humanitarian arena. Arguably, conflict management and peace-building are on their way to being ‘mainstreamed’ in development policy and practice.

Looking at the current Sida strategy for conflict handling and peace-building in the context of the State of the Art, Sida appears to be in line with the current international thinking in the field, where conflict and (human) security is moving towards the centre stage. The strategy states that the overarching aims of Swedish development cooperation – peace and justice, human right and democratisation, poverty reduction, environment and gender equality – should be related to humanitarian aid. On the other hand, peace-building is becoming a concern for development as well as humanitarian assistance, which, in some ways makes obsolete the traditional distinction between the two. Finally, by stating a will to take risks in the context of armed conflicts and to undertake longer term engagements, Sida in the strategy also accepts the basic conditions of getting involved in conflict prevention and peace-building.

In some ways, the mainstreaming of conflict handling and peace-building is analogous to the manner in which gender issues have increasingly been built into the design of development and other projects, in response to critiques of past neglect of this crucial dimension. If this analogy is accepted, a note of caution should be sounded, for while gender considerations are typically written into projects and interventions, actual implementation of such statements of intent has, with some exceptions, been less than satisfactory.

Likewise, evaluations of projects have often omitted adequate consideration of gender dimensions. With some exceptions, the sample of evaluations reviewed in this study bears this out. There is a danger therefore that conflict management and peace-building may suffer a similar fate: they may be written into policies, programmes and projects but seldom be properly implemented, or, since their outcomes tend to be somewhat intangible, they may seldom be adequately evaluated.

Taken together, the evaluations reviewed in the present study cover vast ground, but some issues have received surprisingly little attention. The external factors that sustain armed conflicts are among these issues. While confidence in sanctions as a means to bend conflicting parties towards peace processes is on the wane, an interest in developing instruments for the control of conflict-sustaining transnational networks seems to be emerging among donor governments. Sida has also stated this interest, which is of relevance for Swedish foreign policy in general. Another related arena which appears inadequately covered in the evaluation literature is the relationship between peace-building initiatives and the promotion of democracy. This arena is addressed implicitly in some projects – through promotion of human rights, for example – but is seldom dealt with head on.

Another issue which, for obvious reasons, is absent from these evaluations, is the consequences of *not* acting upon signs of emerging conflicts. Also of relevance for the evaluation of current practices is the question of the consequences of not applying specific instruments in certain circumstances, such as, for example, the Truth Commission. Systematic comparative studies of similar situations with and without the application of a particular instrument are rare. There are still many untested assumptions behind interventions in the field of conflict prevention and peace-building, and with few exceptions, evaluations reproduce current norms and assumptions.

The relation between the specific contexts and dynamics of conflict on one side, and the opportunities and effects of different types of peace-building instruments on the other, is a third field which is rarely illuminated in the evaluations. One could imagine combining a typology of armed conflict and their different phases with a list of instruments that apply in different situations. But, as several of the evaluations emphasize, such a 'blueprint' or 'tool box' is neither feasible nor desirable.

Processes and mechanisms for obtaining knowledge, for undertaking conflict analysis, for strategic planning and for prioritisation are much more important.

Aid practitioners and agencies often complain about the high levels of abstraction of the academic literature and theoretically based evaluations: operational conclusions are missing and many recommendations cannot be translated into practical action. In the strategy paper for conflict management and peace-building (SEKA, May 1999), Sida shares this view, while at the same time acknowledging that 'the theoretical approach can be criticised for not being operational, the contextual approach for not being firmly anchored in science'. In reviewing the evaluations for this Annotated Bibliography/State of the Art Report we have found very few contributions that try to bridge the two.

While Sida's strategy is in line with the current thinking on these issues, it remains to be seen how the strategy translates into practice. The current evaluation of the Swedish contribution to conflict prevention and peace-building, to which this report make a modest contribution, should be seen as part of an effort to set the strategy on that course.

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