

Swedish/UNDP Governance Programme in Honduras

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Sida Evaluation 02/25

Department for Latin America

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Abbreviations – Abreviaciones

AMHON	Asociación de Municipios de Honduras (Association of Honduran Municipalities)
ASONOG	Asociación de Organismos No Gubernamentales (Association of Non-Governmental Organizations)
CEFAR	Centro de Facilitación Rural (regional coordination unit for PRONADERS)
CIEL	Centro de Informática y Estudios Legislativos (Centre for Electronic Data Processing and Legislative Studies)
CIJP	Comisión Interministerial de Justicia Penal (Interministerial Commission for Penal Justice)
CONADEH	Comisionado Nacional de Derechos Humanos (Human Rights Commissioner)
CPME	Comisión Presidencial de Modernización del Estado (Presidential Commission for Modernization of the State)
DGEC	Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos (Statistics and Census Department)
DINADERS	Dirección Nacional de Desarrollo Rural Sostenible (Department for Sustainable Rural Development in the Ministry of Agriculture)
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe – CEPAL)
ERP	Estrategia de Reducción de la Pobreza (Poverty Reduction Strategy)
G-15	Coordinating group/mechanism of aid donors in Honduras
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (Países Pobres Altamente Endeudados)
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
INE	Instituto Nacional de Estadística (National Statistics Institute)
LIOM	Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para la Mujer (Law on Equal Opportunities for Women)
PIOM	Política de Igualdad de Oportunidades para la Mujer (Policy of Equal Opportunities for Women)
PM	Public Ministry (Ministerio Público = Public Prosecutor's Office)
PNM	Política Nacional de la Mujer (National policy regarding women)
PRAF	Programa de Asignaciones Familiares (Programme for Family Subsidies)
PRODDEL	Programa de Descentralización y Desarrollo Local (Programme for Decentralization and Local Development)
PRONADERS	Programa Nacional de Desarrollo Rural Sostenible (National Programme for Sustainable Rural Development)
SAG	Secretaría de Agricultura y Ganadería (Ministry of Agriculture)
SETCO	Secretaría Técnica y de Cooperación Internacional (Ministry for International Cooperation)
SEK	Swedish Crown; currency unit (Corona sueca; unidad monetaria)
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities (Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para Actividades de Población; FNUAP)
UPEG	Unidad de Planificación, Evaluación y Gestión (Planning, Evaluation and Management Unit)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development (Agencia de Desarrollo Internacional de los Estados Unidos)

Table of contents

	Resumen Ejecutivo	1
1	Programme context	5
2	The evaluation; Methodology	7
3	Findings	9
3.1	Programme concept, programme design and impact	9
3.2	Sub-programme: Strengthening of national capacities to facilitate the decision-making process	12
3.2.1	<i>Main observations on design, execution and results</i>	<i>12</i>
3.2.2	<i>Conclusions and recommendations</i>	<i>16</i>
3.3	Sub-programme: Support to the formulation and implementation of gender equity policies for sustainable development	17
3.3.1	<i>National Women's Institute</i>	<i>18</i>
3.3.2	<i>Policy for equal opportunities in rural areas</i>	<i>20</i>
3.3.3	<i>Policy for equal opportunities in poverty reduction</i>	<i>21</i>
3.3.4	<i>Conclusions and recommendations</i>	<i>21</i>
3.4	Sub-programme: Support to municipal strengthening and decentralization	23
3.4.1	<i>Main observations on design, execution and results</i>	<i>23</i>
3.4.2	<i>Conclusions and recommendations</i>	<i>27</i>
3.5	Sub-programme: Support to the institutional strengthening of the legislative system and the application of justice	28
3.5.1	<i>The National Congress – CIEL</i>	<i>28</i>
3.5.2	<i>The Office of the Public Prosecutor</i>	<i>30</i>
3.5.3	<i>Electoral reform</i>	<i>33</i>
3.5.4	<i>Conclusions and recommendations</i>	<i>36</i>
3.6	Role and performance of UNDP in the programme cycle management	38
3.6.1	<i>Situation and mission of UNDP</i>	<i>38</i>
3.6.2	<i>UNDP management of the Governance Programme</i>	<i>40</i>
3.6.3	<i>UNDP administrative and acquisition services</i>	<i>43</i>
3.6.4	<i>Project audits</i>	<i>44</i>
3.7	Cost-impact rate of the Governance Programme	45
4	Conclusions	48
5	Recommendations	52
6	Lessons learned	55
Annex I:	The Swedish/UNDP Democratic Governance Programme in Honduras (Table)	56
Annex II:	The subject of governance in various strategies for development and international cooperation in Honduras; 1999–2006 (Table)	57
Appendix 1:	Terms of Reference for the evaluation	59
Appendix 2:	List of persons interviewed	64
Appendix 3:	List of documentation	67

Resumen ejecutivo

El objeto de esta evaluación es el Programa de Gobernabilidad en Honduras, financiado por Asdi (166,5 millones de coronas suecas¹) y ejecutado por el PNUD, bajo acuerdos de costo compartido. Las primeras actividades dentro del Programa tuvieron su inicio en 1998 y las últimas terminarán en diciembre de 2002.

El Programa está compuesto por 4 sub-programas, sumando 9 proyectos, como sigue:

Sub-programa: Fortalecimiento de las capacidades nacionales para facilitar el proceso de toma de decisiones

Proyectos: – Establecimiento de un Sistema Nacional de Estadísticas
– Apoyo al Censo de Población y Vivienda 2000

Sub-programa: Apoyo a la formulación e implementación de políticas de equidad de género para el desarrollo sustentable

Proyectos: – Apoyo al establecimiento del Instituto Nacional de la Mujer
– Apoyo a la ejecución de una política de igualdad de oportunidades en el tema de reducción de la pobreza
– Apoyo a la ejecución de una política de igualdad de oportunidades en áreas rurales

Sub-programa: Apoyo al fortalecimiento municipal y la descentralización

Proyecto: – Desarrollo municipal y descentralización

Sub-programa: Apoyo al fortalecimiento institucional del sistema legislativo y el ejercicio de la justicia

Proyectos: – Apoyo al Congreso Nacional (Centro de Informática y Estudios Legislativos)
– Fortalecimiento del Ministerio Público (Procuraduría); 5 Fiscales especiales
– Reforma Electoral

Los objetivos principales de la evaluación son: i) evaluar el impacto del Programa y determinar en qué medida el enfoque de programa hubiese agregado algún valor a la intervención en comparación con un procedimiento de tipo ‘proyecto por proyecto’; ii) analizar si la fórmula de ejecución a través del PNUD ha resultado ser útil y con una buena tasa de costo-eficiencia o costo-efecto (impacto) o si se debería considerar otros modos en el futuro; iii) analizar las experiencias generales más importantes del Programa y, basado en ello, hacer recomendaciones para futuras acciones de Asdi en el tema de gobernabilidad en Honduras.

Se pudo constatar, desde un momento muy temprano del ejercicio de evaluación, que los proyectos listados arriba no componen un programa en ningún sentido funcional u operacional de la palabra. Los proyectos fueron identificados y diseñados por PNUD y autoridades hondureñas en diferentes combinaciones y en diferentes puntos en el tiempo, con una participación más bien reactiva de parte de Asdi. La etiqueta de ‘programa’ fue adherida posteriormente, sobre todo en función de que Asdi ofreció financiamiento para una cierta canasta de proyectos y tal vez porque aparentemente existe una idea generalizada de que un programa es en principio algo ‘mejor’ que un grupo de proyectos.

El Documento de Programa no refleja una estrategia de programa y no contiene un ‘objetivo de programa’ que pudiera ser usado como instrumento de evaluación. Por lo tanto, la única manera de evaluar los resultados y el efecto o impacto del programa es hacerlo al nivel de proyecto o sub-programa.

Los proyectos de establecimiento de un Sistema Nacional de Estadísticas y de realización del Censo conforman, en efecto, un sub-programa funcional, en la etapa de diseño. Sin embargo, debido a

¹ Aproximadamente USD 17,9 millones a la tasa de cambio de octubre de 2002

problemas en asegurar el financiamiento completo antes de comenzar el proyecto del Censo y debido al largo tiempo que tomó la formulación y aprobación de la Ley que creaba el Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE) se produjo un desfase entre los dos proyectos y se perdió la organicidad del sub-programa. Es importante destacar que – a pesar de los problemas mencionados – los dos proyectos, cada uno de por sí, han sido fundamentales para la creación del INE y para la realización del Censo, ambos elementos siendo de calidad satisfactoria. Por otro lado, se ha complicado y demorado el análisis y la publicación de los resultados del Censo, debido a la falta de sincronización entre los dos proyectos.

Algo similar sucedió con el sub-programa de igualdad de oportunidades. Los tres proyectos fueron diseñados con la intención de que se apoyaran y retro-alimentaran mutuamente, de distintas maneras, aunque no parece haberse dado suficientemente pensamiento en cómo eso iba a funcionar en la práctica. En definitiva, el proyecto de establecimiento del Instituto Nacional de la Mujer que debió ser el proyecto ‘líder’ en este sub-programa fue el último en hacerse realidad. En todo caso, el proyecto Asdi/PNUD ha jugado un papel fundamental en la creación del INAM, para darle las capacidades que tiene y para posibilitar las importantes acciones que realiza actualmente.

El sub-programa de desarrollo municipal consiste en un solo proyecto, cuyo diseño no fue muy satisfactorio. Combina una ambición de impulsar el proceso de descentralización en Honduras, en general, con intervenciones precisas en 5 municipios. La idea central era que las experiencias concretas en estos municipios deberían ser retro-alimentadas hacia el proceso de descentralización, por ejemplo a través de replicación de modelos y estrategias. Además se debió apoyar directamente a la Asociación de Municipalidades de Honduras y a otros entes involucrados en el tema de descentralización. La línea de trabajo de ‘descentralización’ se perdió en la ejecución del proyecto desde el primer día y no fue retomada hasta el 2002, después del cambio de gobierno. Por otro lado, el trabajo específico en tres o cuatro de los cinco municipios participantes ha dado muchos frutos importantes y en este aspecto el proyecto puede considerarse como muy exitoso. Se ha hecho importantes avances en mejoramiento de administración y finanzas municipales y en temas de participación ciudadana, entre otros; en opinión de los evaluadores el proyecto ha logrado una buena tasa costo-impacto. Por otro lado cabe decir que si la replicabilidad de experiencias era una aspiración importante del proyecto se puede cuestionar la selección de los dos municipios más grandes del país (Tegucigalpa y San Pedro Sula) como municipios ‘piloto’, considerando que la gran mayoría de municipalidades en Honduras son muy pequeñas y pobres y con muchas problemáticas totalmente diferentes a las de ciudades grandes.

El sub-programa de fortalecimiento institucional del sistema legislativo y el ejercicio de la justicia carece de cualquier rasgo que le pueda merecer el calificativo de programa. Se compone de tres proyectos totalmente separados entre sí, en todo sentido. El proyecto de establecimiento de un Centro de Informática y Estudios Legislativos del Congreso Nacional ha logrado crear una base de datos y alguna capacidad de asesoramiento, pero el proyecto no ha tomado en debida consideración las necesidades y capacidades de los supuestos usuarios y, por lo tanto, no tiene aún perspectivas de lograr su objetivo final que es elevar la capacidad legislativa. El proyecto con el Ministerio Público (Procuraduría) ha logrado también arrojar algunos productos en términos de sistemas de información y capacitación de fiscales especiales, pero los limitados efectos de este proyecto se encuentran aún sobre todo en el ámbito central; no se puede observar mayores logros o cambios en los niveles regional y local. Finalmente, el pequeño proyecto de apoyo a una reforma electoral, iniciado en 2001, parece ser muy exitoso en impulsar y guiar el proceso de consultas que debe llevar a un amplio consenso nacional respecto a nueva legislación relacionada con el sistema electoral y temas afines. En este caso el PNUD ha demostrado ser un actor esencial, habiendo aprovechado su prestigio y capacidad de convocatoria y diálogo de una manera excelente.

No es posible establecer tasas de costo-eficiencia, costo-eficacia o costo-impacto para el Programa de Gobernabilidad en su conjunto, por razones ya comentadas. Incluso en el nivel de cada sub-programa o de cada proyecto esto es un ejercicio muy difícil. Lo que se puede decir con algún grado de convicción o certidumbre es lo siguiente: La creación de un Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y la

realización de un censo son logros absolutamente indispensables para el desarrollo de Honduras – ‘cueste lo que cueste’. Según se ha podido apreciar, los resultados obtenidos en ambos casos justifican los costos de manera aceptable, aunque es posible que se podrían haber realizado con costos algo menores, si se hubiera podido tener una mejor planificación y organización de estos proyectos desde su comienzo.

Algo similar se puede decir sobre el proyecto de establecimiento del Instituto Nacional de la Mujer, pero lo más importante aquí no es cuánto ha costado llevar el INAM hasta donde está actualmente, sino qué es lo que se va a obtener a largo plazo con las acciones de esta institución. Consideramos que las perspectivas en este sentido son excelentes, es decir que se puede esperar una muy buena tasa costo-impacto en el largo plazo. En cuanto al proyecto de desarrollo municipal parece que el mismo ya habría recuperado la inversión de Asdi, mediante aumento de ingresos y reducción de egresos municipales en por lo menos dos o tres de los municipios participantes. Un análisis en profundidad de estos casos, que tomase en cuenta diversos otros renglones cuantificables, así como intangibles, seguramente llevaría a un cálculo de rentabilidad social muy favorable. Los proyectos en el Congreso Nacional, Ministerio Público y el de Reforma Electoral no se prestan para cálculos de costo-impacto ni siquiera en teoría, y de todos modos aún no existen mayores efectos visibles de estos proyectos que alguien pudiera tratar de valorar. Es algo que se debería hacer en un par de años más.

Con relación al papel del PNUD en todo el ciclo del Programa de Gobernabilidad, se llega a la conclusión que el punto más fuerte de esta organización no ha sido precisamente el de diseño del ‘programa’ y de los proyectos. En esta etapa pesa mucho la necesidad del PNUD de movilizar fondos; esto a veces le lleva a aprobar proyectos insuficientemente pensados y otras veces a firmar proyectos antes de tener la totalidad de los fondos asegurados. En algunos casos (por ejemplo equidad de género) la ‘buena reputación’ del PNUD, así como su verdadera capacidad de diálogo y ‘lobbying’, le permite jugar un rol positivo e importante en lograr el despegue de nuevas iniciativas, especialmente en temas sensibles. Pero a la vez, la urgencia que tiene en concretizar proyectos, por razones económicas, puede llevarlo a acelerar los procesos más de lo apropiado. En la etapa de ejecución de los proyectos, la actuación del PNUD como ente asesor y de monitoreo es de calidad sumamente variada entre un caso y otro y entre un tiempo y otro. En algunos casos, los socios del PNUD se quejan de que esta organización no hace lo suficiente para que los proyectos sean bien manejados y, en otros casos, opinan que el PNUD interfiere demasiado en los proyectos y los maneja como si fueran suyos. Seguramente, una de las razones importantes detrás de esta variedad de percepciones es que los respectivos roles del PNUD, las agencias nacionales de ejecución y las agencias donantes no han sido suficientemente analizados y precisados, caso por caso. Los acuerdos de costo compartido y los documentos de proyecto son, por lo general, muy poco específicos en este sentido – se aplica más bien un enfoque de formulario estandarizado.

Las conclusiones y recomendaciones más importantes de esta evaluación son las siguientes:

Enfoque de programa

El enfoque de programa debe usarse cuando existen algunas razones específicas para hacerlo (y cuando existen condiciones). Para tener un verdadero programa es necesario comenzar por diseñar el programa y luego hacer el diseño detallado de los proyectos que lo componen. El programa – como programa – tiene que tener un ‘dueño’ nacional desde la primera fase de diseño y a través de toda su ejecución. En el caso del Programa de Gobernabilidad no se cumplió con ninguno de estos criterios – ni tampoco con otros criterios importantes – y el haber calificado estos nueve proyectos como un programa no ha dado ningún valor agregado a la(s) intervención(es), excepto (posiblemente) alguna facilidad extra para mover fondos de un proyecto a otro cuando haya sido necesario. Para la formulación de un nuevo Programa de Gobernabilidad sería esencial no cometer estos errores de nuevo; en primer lugar no hay que ‘forzar’ programas – se puede trabajar con programas de menor envergadura y con proyectos individuales al mismo tiempo si la situación indica que eso sería más realista.

Costos versus resultados e impacto

A pesar de lo difícil que es valorar los efectos de proyectos de gobernabilidad y temas afines, las observaciones hechas permiten concluir, con un mínimo de fundamento, que la inversión de Asdi en este programa ha sido justificada, desde el punto de vista de los logros ya obtenidos y, más aún, desde el punto de vista de los efectos que algunos de los proyectos puedan llegar a tener en el largo plazo. En cuanto al costo-eficiencia de los proyectos, el tiempo disponible para la evaluación no ha permitido análisis serios de nueve proyectos distintos, pero se percibe que los 3,5% en costos administrativos que Asdi ha pagado al PNUD para su apoyo en la implementación de los proyectos es razonable. No se puede identificar ninguna otra institución que por el mismo pago hubiera podido hacer un trabajo mayor o mejor de lo que el PNUD ha hecho.

Implementación por el PNUD o mediante otros modos

En el párrafo anterior se dice que el trabajo del PNUD en la implementación del Programa de Gobernabilidad ha justificado su costo. Esto, sin embargo, no significa que ésta es la única o la mejor alternativa para el futuro. La otra opción es pagar más por una implementación aún más eficiente y efectiva. Recomendamos que Asdi continúe usando los servicios del PNUD en casos seleccionados y de modos específicos en cada caso, pero también recomendamos que para un nuevo Programa de Gobernabilidad, la misma Asdi tenga una actuación propia más fuerte, en todas las fases del ciclo. Una vía en esa dirección es fortalecer la oficina de Asdi en Honduras y encargar la ejecución de una parte del programa (o proyectos) a consultoras y/o ONG. También se debe considerar la posibilidad de confiar en el modelo de ejecución nacional, pero en un sentido más completo de la palabra ‘nacional’. En los proyectos de ‘ejecución nacional’ del PNUD, el PNUD a veces asume funciones que deberían ser verdaderamente nacionales.

Futuras áreas de intervención

- El Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas requiere más apoyo externo y consideramos muy bien fundamentada la intención de Asdi de dar tal apoyo a través de una contribución al proyecto-préstamo para el INE que el BID está pronto a aprobar.
- Los proyectos con el Congreso Nacional y el Ministerio Público están lejos de lograr su cometido, y recomendamos que Asdi y PNUD conjuntamente revisen estos proyectos a fondo para asegurar que los recursos que quedan sean usados de manera óptima. El proyecto del Congreso necesita mucho más trabajo para lograr sus objetivos y en este caso sería recomendable que Asdi y PNUD continúen trabajando como socios. Lo mismo sería recomendable en caso de que resulte necesario prolongar el proyecto de Reforma Electoral. En cuanto al Ministerio Público, un futuro apoyo adicional de Asdi podría ser canalizado de manera más provechosa en el marco del proyecto-préstamo que el BID está procesando para todo el sector judicial de Honduras (USD 30 millones).
- En vista de que la Estrategia de Reducción de la Pobreza es el principal instrumento rector para el desarrollo de Honduras en los próximos años y considerando que, en este sentido, tanto el proceso de descentralización y desarrollo local cuanto el proceso de socialización e implementación de las políticas de igualdad de oportunidades son componentes esenciales, recomendamos que el esfuerzo principal de Asdi en el tema de gobernabilidad, a partir del 2002, sea dirigido a estos temas. Se podría continuar apoyando al INAM central en distintas áreas de su quehacer, pero un componente importante debería tener relación con el posicionamiento del INAM en los ámbitos regional y local. Por tanto es recomendable construir un programa que combine trabajo en gobernabilidad y desarrollo municipal y local en general con el tema de igualdad de oportunidades.
- La Estrategia de Reducción de la Pobreza requiere para su ejecución una institucionalidad y unos mecanismos de toma de decisiones más fuertes y adecuados que los que existen actualmente. En este plano, Asdi debería seguir consultando con el grupo de coordinación de los donantes (G-15) y con las Mesas Sectoriales (coordinadas por el Ministerio de la Presidencia) respecto a cuáles podrían ser los puntos más importantes para la futura cooperación sueca. Sin haber hecho tales consultas en el marco de esta evaluación, podemos proponer como posibles áreas de intervención, entre otras, las de creación o fortalecimiento de un Sistema de Inversión Pública y una reforma del sistema de empleo y salarios en el sector público

1 Programme context

Honduras is one of the poorest countries in the western hemisphere with an extraordinarily unequal distribution of income. In 2002, it shares with Guatemala and Nicaragua the lowest Human Development Index (UNDP) in Latin America and the Caribbean, leaving only Haiti clearly behind. This year, the GDP per capita stands at USD 952.¹ Unlike Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador, Honduras has not had any civil war but has, nevertheless, been affected by the internal conflicts in its neighbouring countries. Among other things, it became a territory of retreat for the anti-Government guerrillas in Nicaragua in the 1980's, the so-called 'contras', as well as a base for United States military forces. After a long history of military rule, there is formal democracy and civil government in Honduras since 1982. In 1994 a more concrete process towards development of real democracy was initiated. However, despite some advances made, the entire public administration and the judicial system are still penetrated with political partisanship and suffer from lack of technical capacities as well as wide spread corruption. The capacity within the civil society and its organizations to articulate their demands and proposals is growing but still low. Despite the approval of a new and modern Law on Municipal Government, in 1991, the practical accomplishments in terms of decentralization are few and scattered.

In October 1998, Honduras became the worst suffering of the victims of Hurricane Mitch, which led to a sudden great influx of international cooperation from many different sources. This natural disaster, which strongly affected also the other Central American countries, particularly Nicaragua, led to the Stockholm Conference in the spring of 1999. The most important result of this meeting was the decision that future cooperation with Central America should not only deal with reconstruction but also with an improvement of governance and transformation of the public institutions so as to create a climate of general openness, transparency, civil society participation and decentralization, all of this with the ultimate purpose of allowing all citizens to have a say in decisions that concern their lives.

Honduras is included in the HIPC Initiative.² In October 2001, the international financial community accepted the Poverty Reduction Strategy (ERP³), which had been completed by the Honduran Government in April. The ERP is now the fundamental development strategy for Honduras and a framework for all other policies, plans and strategies such as the current Government Plan and the National Policy on Women, just to mention two of them.

The Sida involvement in Honduras started in late 1996, with discussions between UNDP-Tegucigalpa and the Swedish Embassy in Guatemala on collaboration in the areas of democratic governance, including support to the judicial system, the Congress, the statistics office and to a census project. The first financial contribution from Sida, which was formalized in December 1998, amounted to SEK 18,7 million for the period August 1998 – May 1999; this so-called 'bridging programme support' referred to all the projects that became part of the Governance Programme, except the Electoral Reform project. On 22 December 1999, Sida signed two cost-sharing agreements with UNDP, together covering the whole Governance Programme through 2001, for a total amount of SEK 118 million. Then again, in March 2002, Sida decided to provide an additional amount of SEK 29,8 million to carry on the Governance Programme through December 2002. The main reason for this extension was the deficits in the project budgets, which had developed due to devaluation of the Swedish Crown against the US

¹ According to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

² HIPC: Heavily Indebted Poor Countries

³ ERP: Estrategia de Reducción de la Pobreza

Dollar and also because UNDP had signed projects with the Honduran Government for amounts that it did not have itself and which had not yet been secured from any other donor.

The Governance Programme is not covered by any single Sida decision document, but different projects and different packages of financing have been approved at different dates. Also, when the cost-sharing agreement with UNDP was formalized in December 1999, it became not one but two such agreements, both signed on the same date (99-12-29). We have not found any clear explanation anywhere as to why Sida and UNDP proceeded in this way. In general, it is a rather wearisome job to sift through all the decision documents, cost-sharing agreement documents, project documents (and a variety of amendments) and try to find a logical sequence of events as far as the financial building up of this programme is concerned. Anyhow, it can be concluded from the previous paragraph that Sida's total financial support to the Governance Programme, for the entire period August 1998 – December 2002, adds up to a total of SEK 166,5 million.⁴

Annex I to this report provides details of the Governance Programme and the nine component projects, which are the objects of this evaluation. The table contains the eight projects identified in the Terms of Reference plus one additional project (Electoral Reform) whose inclusion in the evaluation was agreed with Sida-Tegucigalpa at the start of the mission.

⁴ About USD 17,9 million at current exchange rate (mid-October 2002)

2 The evaluation; Methodology

This evaluation has had three main purposes: i) assess the impact of the programme and determine if and to what extent the programme approach may have added any value to the intervention in comparison with a project-by-project procedure; ii) analyse if the cost-sharing formula with UNDP has been a useful alternative or if other modes of execution should be considered in the future and; iii) analyse the important general lessons to be learned from the execution of the programme and on that basis give recommendations for future Sida actions in the field of governance in Honduras. As regards (iii), the ToR refer mainly to execution mechanisms and less explicitly to the choice of thematic areas of intervention. However, in conversations with Sida-Tegucigalpa throughout the mission, increased emphasis was put also on the very last point (i.e. thematic areas).

The complete Terms of Reference for the evaluation, with all the specific questions to be answered, are attached to this report as **Appendix 1**.

This evaluation was done between 2 September and 14 October 2002 by a three-member team, provided by the Swedish consulting company Hifab International AB. The team leader, Lars Eriksson, worked in Honduras between 2 September and 4 October and then continued with the analysis and report writing in Quito, Ecuador, in consultation with his two colleagues by e-mail. The specialist on legal matters and human rights, Lena Blomquist, worked in Honduras from 10 to 27 September and the local team member and gender specialist, Margarita Oseguera, participated in the work, full time, between 5 and 25 September.

During the entire time that the three members of the team were together in Honduras, they worked closely together as a team; consequently the main conclusions and recommendations presented in this report are a team product. At the same time, however, each one of them also had his or her special field of research: Lars Eriksson looked into the municipal and statistics projects and the matter of UNDP management and administration, Lena Blomquist was in charge of researching the projects with the National Congress, the Prosecutor's Office and the Electoral Reform, while Margarita Oseguera concentrated on the three projects related to gender equity. The necessary sharing and collective elaboration of information and opinions between the three evaluators was secured in different ways: i) many of the interviews were made jointly by two or three of the evaluators; ii) a good deal of the documentation was also analysed by two or three of the team members and; iii) the team members met at least once a day to inform each other of observations that had been made by each one of them separately.

The team made a field visit to Santa Rosa de Copán, San Pedro Sula and Puerto Cortés between 15 and 18 September. This allowed direct contact with a large number of people who work with the Municipal Development project as well as with regional and local prosecutors and representatives of women's organizations.

Apart from the field trip, the work consisted in a review of a vast amount of documentation provided by UNDP, Sida-Tegucigalpa and Sida-Stockholm, by the various projects directly and other actors, for instance other cooperating agencies. A large number of individual and group interviews, of the unstructured or semi-structured type, were held with Sida and UNDP staff, project coordinators and project staff, as well as beneficiaries and other representatives of civil society. The lists of persons interviewed and of the most important items of documentation are found in **Appendices 2 and 3** to the report.

No particular limitations were encountered in doing this evaluation, other than the usual time constraint. The task of any evaluation has a tendency to grow day by day as the work goes on; the more one does the more remains to be done. In this context, however, we want to point out – not as a simple courtesy but as a substantive comment – the extraordinarily strong support received from the Sida and UNDP offices in Tegucigalpa. Both were very well prepared to receive this mission and were swift and thorough in providing written and verbal information and opinions as well as in organizing interviews and the work programme for the field trip. Most of the representatives of the different projects in the Governance Programme were also very geared up to cooperate with the team. In addition, a number of persons who had to do with the Governance Programme in earlier years, but who are no longer in direct contact with it, dedicated time to talk to us: former members of Government, former UNDP staff, etc. We sincerely thank all of the persons mentioned in this paragraph as well as others who have collaborated without being specifically named here!

3 Findings

3.1 Programme concept, programme design and impact

As is strongly emphasized in the Terms of Reference for this evaluation, its purpose is to produce conclusions “with regard to the management, efficiency, impact and other aspects of the Sida/UNDP Governance Programme”. In practice, of course, the programme evaluation requires evaluation of the individual sub-programmes and projects that compose it, but this is an auxiliary element and not an end in itself. The object of the evaluation is the programme.

It seems to be generally presumed that a programme should have an additional value, above and beyond the simple sum of its components (sub-programmes or projects). Having noted this, however, it turns out to be difficult to find any more precise definition anywhere of what the term ‘programme’ really is supposed to stand for. For instance, Sida’s Strategy for Central America and the Caribbean talks about ‘programme support’, ‘country programmes’ and ‘regional programmes’, without anywhere specifying what a ‘programme’ is. As far as ‘programme support’ is concerned, this concept is only put forward as a sort of contrast to ‘small, single interventions’.⁵

UNDP, in its Programming Manual of December 2000, also talks about ‘programme approach’, ‘national programme’, ‘programme or project’ and ‘programme support’ etc., without providing any distinct definition of ‘programme’. It is only said that “the programme approach facilitates interventions of an interdisciplinary nature to address the multisectoral character of most development” and that “UNDP advocates the programme approach ... where the problem to be addressed cuts across sectors, themes and geographic areas, involves several institutions, is supported by different funding sources, and where most elements of a national programme are in place”.⁶

The kind of loose definitions that are cited above may be appropriate in various contexts, but they are not concrete and specific enough to determine if a programme, such as the Sida/UNDP Governance Programme in Honduras, is really a programme in any substantive or operational sense of the word or if it is just a number, basket or cluster of projects with no or little functional interrelationships. A basket or cluster of projects can be as useful as any other approach, depending on the circumstances, but if an evaluation is to emit opinions on whether a programme has reached its objectives, or if the programme approach is worthwhile, it is necessary to find out, first of all, if the programme deserves to be called a programme or not and if it really has anything that can be called a programme objective. To fill the definition gaps commented above, we have found it useful to make our own analysis of the programme concept, as follows.

First of all, we believe that there can be no single, universal and absolute definition of ‘development programme’ or ‘technical cooperation programme’ that could be used to determine whether or not a programme is a programme – this is not a Yes or No question! We would rather suggest a scale, along which a number or basket of projects can be ranked as having more or less of a programme character. Table 1, below, shows these criteria and contains our judgement as to how far the Sida/UNDP Governance Programme in Honduras meets them. The criteria are sorted from top to bottom in what we perceive as the proper descending order of importance; this means that the more ‘Yes’ answers that are given in the upper parts of the chart, the more we can call the programme a programme in the

⁵ “Regionstrategi, Centralamerika och Karibien, 1 januari 2001–31 december 2005”; UD; page 30

⁶ “UNDP Programming Manual, December 2002; pages 2–4

functional or operational sense. It is easily seen here, that the Governance Programme earns a very low grading in this regard.

Table 1. Is this 'programme' a programme?

Criteria	Fulfillment		
	Yes	Partially	No
The programme is designed <i>before</i> the component projects are designed (or at least simultaneously)			X
There are distinct functional relationships between programme objective and project objectives as well as some interdependency between component projects			X
There is a high degree of communication and collaboration between those who identify and design the programme and those who design the component projects		?	X
There is a programme document that clearly spells out the interrelationships between the component projects and is used as a tool for programme execution		?	X
There is a national authority in the host country that has a responsibility for the entire programme (in addition to individual project counterparts)			X
The component projects pertain to one and the same problem area and/or the same geographical region, etc.		X	
The entire programme and its component projects are implemented, supported and/or managed and administrated by one single external cooperation agent	X		
The entire programme and its component projects are financed by one single external cooperation agent	X		

The Governance Programme was not designed before its component projects; in other words, the sub-programmes or projects were not derived from a larger programme, other than overall government and donor strategies. The individual projects were identified and formulated starting in 1997 and in some case even in 1996, whereas the programme document is dated 16 December 1998. This programme document contains no information as to how, by whom and why it was put together. In the Context chapter it only points out, a bit tortuously:

“... the UNDP and the Government of Honduras have agreed on a Cooperation Framework which defines the main goals and opportunities for cooperation and support to national programmes and priorities that are congruent with the priority goals approved by the UNDP Governing Council, i.e. the elimination of poverty and the achievement of sustainable human development. The thematic areas agreed to within this Cooperation Framework and approached from a programmatic point of view are i) elimination of poverty, ii) good governance and iii) promotion of sustainable development; the gender equity issue cuts across all of them.”⁷

The programme document also says that:

“... the Government of Sweden has expressed its willingness to support the process of poverty reduction and good governance ... with an amount of up to USD 20 million during the four year period between 1998 and 2002. Indeed, the Government of Sweden has adopted the commitment to

⁷ Authors' own, unofficial translation from Spanish. This is the case with all direct citations that appear in English in this report, unless otherwise indicated in some specific case.

poverty reduction and the support to economic and social development in developing countries as a main element in its national policy.”

These quotations do already suggest, by themselves, that no real programme design work was ever undertaken in order to prepare the programme document. The information gathered from many different sources throughout this evaluation exercise strongly underpin the conclusion that what really happened was that UNDP and different Honduran institutions and actors – with some limited Sida participation – identified and formulated various different projects over a period of time. Then UNDP looked for financing and, when Sida confirmed its preparedness to provide a certain amount of funds, thought it appropriate and perhaps necessary to call it a programme.

It is important to point out that, during this time, Sida had no strong presence in Honduras; this came about after the Hurricane Mitch disaster in October 1998. The Swedish Cooperation Office in Tegucigalpa was established in mid-1999 and until then, cooperation or aid issues in Honduras were managed from the Swedish Embassy in Guatemala. Sida officers from the Embassy in Guatemala and Sida delegations from Stockholm are reported to have visited Honduras several times to discuss the governance projects with UNDP and Honduran authorities, but at this time – several years later – it is not easy to gather any precise information on the extent to which Sida really influenced the choice and the design of the projects. The overall impression is that Sida’s participation was of a rather reactive type. The numerous Sida decision documents referred to on page 2 also seem to reflect a lack of direction in the decision-making, even at the purely financial level.

The Governance Programme was put together through a very long and cumbersome process, which was mainly carried out during the last year of the Reina Government (1997) and continued throughout the first year of the Flores Government (1998). Everyone knows that changes of government in Central American countries routinely cause disruptions in the formulation and execution of national policies and, naturally, the programming of international cooperation is also strongly affected by the same syndrome. The fact that we are dealing here with the area of Governance (including politically very sensitive matters such as decentralization, support to the National Congress and gender equity) adds to the explanation of why it took such a long time to define a cluster of governance projects.

Two of the initial eight projects in the programme were signed by the Honduran authorities and UNDP in July and September 1998 and the other six were signed during the period March–May 1999. However, despite the fact that Sida had some sort of participation in this process since 1997, the cost-sharing agreements between Sida and UNDP were not signed until December 1999, that is between 7 and 18 months later. UNDP advanced funds to carry out some activities in some of the projects while waiting for the release of the Swedish financing.

The December 1998 programme document has the title: “Support to the strengthening of democratic governance and advance towards social equity”. In our view, governance and social equity are not only two different areas but each one is moreover quite hard to define. It is difficult to find any objective or operational reason to lump together two such amorphous areas under one single programme. Sida has chosen to call it a ‘governance’ programme, dropping the social equity element from the title; nevertheless, its contents remain the same under this different denomination, including the three projects dealing with gender equity. It may be a matter for discussion how much the issues of gender equity or equal opportunities for women have to do with governance and how much with social equity - or with other concepts of development. This is not only a question of semantics; we feel that if a package of projects can change name like this, without change in its contents, this is another sign of the absence of any programme at all and of the presence only of a number of projects in loosely related areas, financed by one single agent and managed by another single agent.

The programme document presents the general objective (programme objective) in the following words:

“This programme provides support to two of the thematic areas that are included in the [UNDP-Government of Honduras] Cooperation Framework: 1. Elimination of poverty through the sub-programme for support to the formulation and implementation of policies for gender equity in Honduras and 2. Improvement of governance through the sub-programmes for strengthening of national capacities to facilitate the decision-making process, for support to strengthening of municipalities and decentralization and support to the institutional strengthening of the legislative system and the application of justice.”⁸

This paragraph, besides being difficult to read, does not qualify as a statement of an objective of any kind but is just an agglomeration of sub-programme titles. It is followed by a lengthy reference to another project which is not part of the programme (Strengthening of Civil Society – National Think Tank) and the text then describes, under a new heading, a Development Objective, which the reader initially believes to be a lower level objective of the programme, but which on closer look appears to be the objective of the Think Tank project. The rest of the paper consists of separate descriptions of the four sub-programmes and their eight projects that constitute the programme.

The contents as well as the date of the programme document leave no doubt that it was written too late and for procedural reasons only and not as a living programming instrument. The so-called programme objective is of no use for evaluation purposes. Therefore, any effects and impact of the entire Sida/UNDP intervention in the governance area, which is described in the document, can only be measured at the project and, in the best of cases, the sub-programme levels. The design, execution and outcomes of the various sub-programmes and projects are the subjects of the following chapters. The sub-programmes are discussed in the same order as they appear in the programme document.

3.2 Sub-programme: Strengthening of national capacities to facilitate the decision-making process

3.2.1 Main observations on design, execution and results

The somewhat circuitous title of this sub-programme refers to two component projects: “Strengthening of the National Statistics System” and “Support to the 2000 Population and Housing Census”.

The observations and conclusions in this chapter are to a considerable extent based on the reports that resulted from the evaluation of both projects in November 2001, and which we have found to be quite complete and of rather high quality. The two evaluations were made at the same time by the same evaluation team and the only critical comment to be made about this exercise is that it has become less useful than it could have been if it had had the character of one sub-programme evaluation rather than two separate evaluations of two different projects. After all, these two projects are more interrelated than any of the other projects in the programme. More specifically, a sub-programme evaluation approach could have helped to direct more attention to the functional and temporal interrelationships between the two projects, which have indeed made up one of the main problem areas for both. At a practical level, such an approach could also have eliminated the need to present many elements of background information in duplicate, in two separate evaluation reports.

In addition to relying on the November 2001 evaluation reports, this evaluation team has also updated the information through in-depth interviews with the Director of INE, the Ex-Coordinator of the terminated Census project, as well as with several other concerned parties.

⁸ Programme Document, 16 December 1998; page 3.

Due to the limited access today to various persons, who were involved in the design of this sub-programme five years ago or more, it is a hard task to get a good grip on how the identification and design process developed and what were the main considerations that guided it. It is important to look into this, not primarily with the purpose of judging the performance of the sub-programme designers but to try to find out why the relationship between the Census work and the overall national statistics system kept being complicated even into the beginning of 2002.

In 1995, within the framework of the process of ‘modernization of the state’, an Inter-institutional Technical Commission produced a proposal for the creation of a national statistics system and a National Statistics Institute (hereafter called INE⁹). In early 1997, two different UNDP projects supported studies regarding the modernization of the national statistics system, which was then in the hands of the General Directorate for Statistics and Census (DGEC¹⁰). By that time, DGEC was in a state of institutional decay due to a vicious circle of insufficient government financing, inadequate staffing, changes in its subordination to different Government authorities, political dealings and so forth, all of which had led to a serious loss of credibility. In July 1997, an Inter-Institutional Transition Commission was set up, with the purpose of coordinating the elaboration and submission to Congress of the necessary law proposal for the creation of INE. The UNDP project document was apparently prepared some time in (late?) 1997, in view of its number (97/022) and the fact that its background description ends with the reference to the Transition Commission and the law proposal. The 2001 evaluation report does not take the story any further.

According to conversations with current and former UNDP staff members who had some personal participation or who have inherited some of the institutional memory, the further advancing of this project slowed down in 1998, this being the first year in power of a new Government¹¹. The project document was signed by UNDP and the relevant Honduran authorities in March 1999. The Swedish financing was formally secured through the signing of a programme cost-sharing agreement in December the same year. However, the project did not start operations until July 2000, when the Law was approved, that legally created INE and set a period of 6 months for the dismantling of the DGEC. The 2001 evaluation report points out that from this date, the Presidential Commission for Modernization of the State – in accordance with the project document – was the national executing agency for the project and that during the remainder of 2000, some training activities were undertaken while also some work was done on the design of the future organization of INE. The project came into ‘full’ execution only as from February 2001, when the Executive Director of INE took up her position¹² and the rest of the staff was hired. Summing up, it took at least four years to get from the initial project design stage to full start of the project. A tentative offer of Swedish financing was present for at least three years. As will be commented later on, however, not even three or four years was enough to get these projects off to a good start.

The Census project (97/023) was apparently formulated at the same time as the INE project and it is certain that it was signed by UNDP and the Honduran authorities on 4 September 1998. Considering these dates, it is quite surprising to find the following phrase in the project document: “The project HON/97/022/A/01/99 “Strengthening the National Statistics System” is currently under execution and will provide a system of valid and timely statistics...”¹³ As commented in the previous paragraph, the INE project was under no execution at all until July 2000 and was not even signed until March

⁹ INE: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas

¹⁰ DGEC: Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos

¹¹ This was also a period when discussions were going as to whether the DGEC should be converted into an INE or whether it should be eliminated, leaving a clean slate for the creation of an entirely new INE

¹² Appointed in January

¹³ Project document, page 3 (own translation from Spanish; own underlining)

1999. Some observers would probably consider the quoted phrase to be an unimportant editorial mistake, but one cannot avoid a disturbing feeling that this kind of ‘mistake’ is also a reflection of UNDP’s eagerness to have projects approved quickly to fill up its portfolio. In this particular case, however, it seems that UNDP is not the only one to be blamed for the rush; Sida is also said to have lived with a tremendous pressure to fill the pledge for post-Mitch support with projects possible to finalize in a three year period after the disaster – and considered the census project to be an element of ‘post-Mitch-support’.

With the benefit of hindsight, we suggest that it might perhaps have been wiser to postpone the start of the Census project for a while, to see how the establishment of INE would progress. Since this did not happen, it would most likely have been wiser to let the Census project finish the data analysis and publication than to transfer this task to INE – not because INE does not have the capacity to do it in its own way, but simply because any ‘change of command’ in the middle of a process like this one will almost inevitably lead to complications and delays. It appears now that some or most of the time that may have been gained by hurrying up the start of the Census project was lost again due to this transfer of responsibilities.

In addition to the problem of timing, the 2001 evaluation report points out that when the project started, in August 1998¹⁴, there was a great deal of confusion with regard to its cost, budget and funding. According to the information gathered, the first project budget (A), totalling 10,1 million dollars, was based on advice from a United Nations census expert, taking into account real experiences from other countries. Nevertheless, when UNDP signed the project in September, Sida had never offered more than 7,3 million and there was no commitment from any other side to cover the difference. So the project started with a deficit of almost 3 million dollars. Apparently, UNDP expressed its intention to mobilize this amount from other sources, but unfortunately this never worked. Later on, the Honduran Government had to save the Census financially by putting in some money of its own and by obtaining a quick loan from the IDB and a donation from Japan.

Of course, it is fair to ask also why Sida approved only 7,3 million dollars for the census project if Sida knew that the census was planned to cost 10 million and that no other funds were available (as Sida should have known). This would have been explainable if 7,3 million was the total amount Sida had to spend on Honduras. However, this was not the case at all, as is very clear from this entire report. Seven other Honduran projects in various areas were given financing through the same cost-sharing agreements and they were not all that urgent. This is a strong indication that it was not only UNDP that fumbled with the programme design but that also Sida showed some lack of foresight and thoroughness in its planning and programming work.

Elsewhere in this report, we talk about projects which are not like bridge-building projects, where one knows beforehand exactly what has to be done, how much of it and how much it has to cost. Municipal development and some other projects in the governance area are (or should be) more like processes than projects and can be seen as open-ended; one can do useful things for 5 million dollars but one can also do useful things for 1 million dollars, stop for a while without catastrophic consequences and then carry on again if more money comes in later on. Not so with a census! A census project is like a bridge project: obviously, one cannot do a bit of a census – a census has to be done completely and once and for all, otherwise it cannot be done at all. Therefore, carelessness with regard to financial commitments is particularly serious here.

¹⁴ It is unclear in what way the project started in August, considering that the project document was not signed until September.

Since the DGEC was already more or less doomed in 1998 and the INE did not yet exist, the project document stipulated that an Executing Unit was to be established to implement the project (the census)¹⁵. In another paragraph of the same document it is said that “initially it is the competence of the DGEC and later on of the INE to execute these activities”.¹⁶ However, the DGEC on its deathbed was to put its installations and equipment at the disposal of the project. The project document also determined that the census was to take place in 2000 (as indeed indicated in the complete project title), more precisely in the middle of the year, according to the tentative work plan included in the project document. Various unforeseen problems – the Hurricane Mitch and continued financial insecurity within the project, among others – led to a postponement of the census field work by a year. It was finally done between 28 July and 4 August 2001, which happens to be about half a year after INE became operational.

So, in August 2001, Honduras had a National Statistics Institute in operation and it had the data collection done for a census. But now the ‘inter-institutional problem’ appeared. The UNDP evaluation report of November 2001 (draft) refers to technical and personal discrepancies between the Director of INE and the coordinator of the census project. This report gave rise to a letter of protest from the Director of INE who felt that her professionalism and personal performance had been questioned. Neither the draft evaluation report nor the letter of objection makes it clear what the alleged discrepancies were about and, furthermore, the draft report was never amended in any way so as to become a final and agreed version.¹⁷ In September 2002, however, when talking to this evaluation team, the former coordinator of the census project emphasized one specific and important technical issue on which – according to him – he and the Director of INE had different opinions; this concerned the validation instrument to be used.

No matter what kinds of disagreement there may, in reality, have been between the census project and INE during the period August 2001 – January 2002, the following factors should be considered. According to current INE staff (former census project staff), the referred period was used by the census project to: repeat the field work in some areas where ‘gang rule’ had obstructed the work in July; post-census work; manual production of preliminary results; elaboration and printing of coding manuals and preparation for employment of personnel for the coding and data entry work. At the same time, a Transition Committee is reported to have been working, since July, on the organization of the transfer of census material, equipment and personnel from the census project to INE by 1 January 2002.

The transition implied, in principle, that the coordinator of the census project had the responsibility for decision-making regarding the census for a period of at least five months, while knowing that this authority would be transferred to the Director of INE – in the middle of an on-going work process. The Director of INE must have had reasons for concern ‘in the opposite direction’. In addition, the contracts of the personnel in the census project, including the coordinator, were being extended month-by-month during this period, apparently due to the usual financial problems. All of the above composes a scenario that gave good grounds for conflict and that must have created a lot of uncertainty among all parties involved, including worries about job security.

The ‘transition’ in itself can hardly have contributed to a swift conclusion of the census work and to an early publication of the results, which had after all been categorized as a post-Mitch emergency

¹⁵ Project document, chapter 4.2, page 8

¹⁶ Project document, chapter 4, page 3

¹⁷ According to UNDP, the Director’s comments were forwarded to the consultants who had done the evaluation, but they never replied. We have not investigated the reasons for the ‘no reply’ but can see only two possibilities: i) either the comments came too late from INE or; ii) this may have been another case where UNDP (like in the case of the evaluation of the Congress and Public Prosecutor’s projects) paid the consultants in full before they had finished their work.

necessity. To the contrary, it must necessarily have created extra complications and taken time from the technical work. In our opinion, the change of authority and organizational set-up at this particular point in time should have been avoided, by means of an extension of the census project. This view has nothing to do with the respective technical capabilities of the census project coordinator and the Director of INE – it is the change in itself that is the problem. In this case, one of the parties had already been managing the census for a considerable period of time while the other party was in the first year of setting up an entirely new institution; we cannot see that there could have been any good, substantive reason¹⁸ to merge these two activities when one of them was already at a rather advanced stage and the other at a very early one.

In any case, the first volume of the census results was made public on 18 October 2002 in the presence of the Acting President of the Republic. The remaining twelve volumes of data, plus accompanying analytical brochures are to be issued, step-by-step, through April 2003.

3.2.2 Conclusions and recommendations

The main part of the analysis above has been dedicated to the interrelationships between the Census project and the INE project, since this a programme evaluation and not a project evaluation. The conclusion on this point is, obviously, that the programme approach failed. The two projects have not supported each other but, to the contrary, they have complicated life for each other at the final stage of the census work.

According to the November 2001 evaluation, which was indeed done by technical experts in census and statistics, the results so far of both the INE project and the census project are good – when looked at separately! Our own limited observations point in the same direction. At present, some voices are heard questioning the quality of the raw data and the choice of questions in the census form. There are also some concerns about the coverage; during the field work, the enumerators had difficulties in getting access to certain urban communities (due to gang rule) and in some areas, on the border with El Salvador, an unknown number of inhabitants are said to have refused participation since they did not consider themselves to be Hondurans but rather Salvadoran citizens.¹⁹ However, no concrete evidence has been found to suggest any serious faults with the census results. A more exact judgement of the quality of the data produced by this census would require another specialized evaluation now, after the processing is completed.

As far as INE is concerned it appears to be working well, in general, at the time of this evaluation. Special mention should be made of its efforts and accomplishments in the establishment of a ‘national statistics system’ which is its ultimate mission. In this regard, INE is now collaborating with or preparing agreements on collaboration with the Ministries of Education, Health, Foreign Trade and other institutions, such as INAM. A business department has also been set up to sell statistical services to the private sector. INE’s main problem today is of an economic nature – it needs more financial resources. Sida’s intention to continue supporting INE in the context of an IDB loan appears to be very well justified.

Even a layman must realize that the INE and census projects have been extremely important, not to say indispensable. Both projects (in one shape or another) and their outputs must be considered as absolute necessities for Honduras at this time. On the other hand, the results of these projects have been accomplished only after going through some extremely complicated and excessively time-consuming movements, institutionally, legally and financially speaking. The first cause for these difficulties is, no

¹⁸ Hypothetically, the only good and substantive reason for a change would have been an unsatisfactory performance of the census project coordinator and staff. We have found no evidence of any such thing.

¹⁹ There is still a conflict between the two countries about the exact location of the border.

doubt, the different weaknesses of the Honduran state (power games, lack of governmental continuity and of a good and stable public administration, etc.) but these are, after all, part of precisely the same governance problem that the governance projects are intended to solve. Therefore, it is the cooperating agents themselves who have to take the responsibility for most of the problems that have come up.

3.3 Sub-programme: Support to the formulation and implementation of gender equity policies for sustainable development

Over the last decade, Honduras has strengthened the legal and institutional frameworks that support gender equity and equal opportunities for women, as one cornerstone of the democratisation process. Among the measures that have been taken, one may underline the approval of the Law on Domestic Violence, the Law on Equal Opportunities for Women (LIOM²⁰), a Policy of Equal Opportunities for Rural Women (PIOM-Rural²¹) and a National Policy on Sexual and Reproductive Health. It was in this context, that the Sida/UNDP sub-programme for “Support to the formulation and implementation of gender equity policies for sustainable development” was identified. This sub-programme is composed of three projects:

1. “Support to the creation of the National Women’s Institute (INAM)”, which will terminate in December 2002.
2. “Support to the Implementation of the Policy for Equal Opportunities in the Rural Areas”, which is also to be finalized at the end of 2002.
3. “Support to the Implementation of the Policy for Equal Opportunities in the area of Poverty Reduction”; this project was terminated in 2001.

According to the evaluation that was carried out in August 2001 by Virginia Vargas and Xiomara Bu, these projects were elaborated by UNDP in consultation with female Government officers, with women who were active in the political parties and, to a lesser degree, with some organizations representing civil society. The women who had fought politically for the approval of the LIOM in the Congress were interested in ensuring the continuity of the processes that had been started, and particularly in the creation of a National Women’s Institute. The referred evaluation report states that: “The creation of a public mechanism oriented to women had been promoted for a long time by the feminist movement and the campaign grew stronger after the Beijing Conference.”

The initial idea was for these three projects to work together, support and give feedback to each other. This was not accomplished; they came on to the scene disjointedly and without any common strategic vision and carried out their activities within different institutions: the Ministry of Agriculture²²; the Programme for Family Subsidies (PRAF²³); and INAM. One of the main causes for this fragmentation was the time it took to establish INAM; the other two projects started before INAM became a reality, despite the fact that this institution was intended to be the guiding and coordinating entity in the field of gender equity.

²⁰ LIOM: Ley de Igualdad de Oportunidades para la Mujer

²¹ PIOM: Política de Igualdad de Oportunidades para la Mujer

²² For an easier understanding of the text that follows later on it should be clarified here, that the implementation of the PIOM Rural is a responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture (SAG: Secretaría de Agricultura y Ganadería) which, however, has executed this responsibility through different departments, first its Planning, Evaluation and Management Unit (UPEG: Unidad de Planificación, Evaluación y Gestión) and then through the National Programme for Sustainable Rural Development (PRONADERS: Programa Nacional de Desarrollo Rural Sostenible) which is managed by the National Directorate for Sustainable Rural Development (DINADERS: Dirección Nacional de Desarrollo Rural Sostenible).

²³ PRAF: Programa de Asignaciones Familiares

3.3.1 Support to the creation of the National Women's Institute (INAM)

The Sida/UNDP support to the creation of INAM has been essential even from the stage of lobbying for its formal approval by Congress and Government, and all through its initial set-up in practice. In fact, lobbying was necessary not only in the public sector but – initially – even among certain women's organizations. Later on, the Sida/UNDP project has also been decisive with regard to the positioning of INAM in relation to the State and civil society; of course, the promulgation of a Law does not automatically secure full recognition of a new institution, especially in an area like gender equity, where there are still important pockets of resistance to be found in some segments of the community. Consequently, the results and effects of this project can hardly be separated from the accomplishments of INAM as an institution and it is appropriate to give a short description of INAM today, as an indication of what the project has been instrumental in creating.

INAM was formally established by Government Decree in September 1998 and began operations two years later (September 2000). Its mission is to: foment the full incorporation of women in the process of sustainable development, in its social, economic, political and cultural aspects; supervise and guarantee the application and obedience of the laws that protect women; and provide information and guidance to the citizens about the rights of women. This implies that INAM is responsible for regulating and leading the execution of the gender equity policies and that it is to play a proactive role in carrying on a dialogue with the State and the civil society in these matters. INAM's highest authority is its Governing Council (Consejo Directivo), composed of 9 members from the governmental sector and 5 from the non-governmental area. The Executive President of INAM has the rank of Minister without portfolio and she has recently become part of the 'social affairs cabinet' (Gabinete Social). INAM has a total staff of 41, of which 26 are paid over the national budget and 15 with funds from the Sida/UNDP project.

One of the main achievements of INAM to date is the elaboration and recent approval, by its Governing Council, of the National Policy on Women (PNM²⁴), which is now under execution on basis of a Plan of Action 2002–2007. The National Policy on Women is an integral part of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (ERP) and aims at eliminating any kind of discrimination of women, but particularly with regard to access to education, work opportunities and democratic participation. INAM provides advisory services to the various Ministries, especially with regard to the establishment of Gender Units and the observance of the gender equity policy in their strategic and annual plans as well as in their budgets.

The current Sida/UNDP bridging project for 2002 provides important support to the development of a Strategic Plan for INAM and a plan for relations with and impact on other institutions ("Plan de Incidencia"), the latter in consultation with leaders of the women's movement and female government officers. The purpose is to traverse all economic and social sectors with the gender approach.

When the present Government took power at the end of January 2002, INAM's position on the national scene was weak. This was due to the lack of awareness among Government officials of the importance of gender equity for the implementation of public policies but it was also a consequence of lack of clarity within INAM itself as to its own mission. The situation in these regards is now clearly changing for the better. The President of the Republic has adopted the PNM as part of the Government Plan 2002–2006 and has promised to elevate it to the level of 'Policy of the State' and publish it in the Official Gazette of Honduras. The Government Plan contains concrete references to the strengthening and sustainability of INAM and to the incorporation of the gender approach in the formulation of public policies.

²⁴ PNM: Política Nacional de la Mujer

The Institute has strengthened its own technical capacity and has, at the same time, initiated an awareness campaign within the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, combined with a programme for improvement of their gender know-how through the activities of the Sida/UNDP-financed INAM staff. The first steps are being taken for decentralizing the work of the Institute; in this respect feasibility studies are being made in 40 municipalities with the purpose of defining where to set up the first Municipal Offices for Women. These offices will initially consist of one person, specialized in gender issues, paid by the municipalities but working under the direction of INAM. Six of them are expected to be in place before the end of 2002, in Puerto Cortés, La Lima, Santa Rosa de Copán, Villanueva, Marcala and La Esperanza. These offices will work with the five central lines of the equal opportunities policy: health; education and communication; economy and poverty; violence; and social and political participation.

INAM, in coordination with PRONADERS, has made a comparative analysis of the PIOM Rural and the PNM, with a view to incorporate the first one into the second one. There is a need to connect the national policies with the sector policies. Within the framework of the PNM, INAM evaluates, sustains and legalizes the establishment of Gender Units in the various government institutions that have responsibilities in the agricultural area.

On 20 September 2002, INAM presented a proposal for a Mechanism of Dialogue to the Women's Movement of Honduras, bearing in mind that this body has played a leading role in the defence of women's rights in the country. The aim is to increase the interaction between INAM and the women's organizations in general with respect to the systematic monitoring of the PNM. The specific forum for this would be a National Assembly of Women, to be summoned twice a year by INAM.

For the immediate future, INAM is preparing to:

- Implement its First Action Plan in conjunction with the 2002–2006 Government Plan. The Plan includes promotion of women's social and political participation, reduction of violence, increase of life expectancy, active and recognized integration of women in the economic and educational areas. It also covers the further organizational strengthening of the Institute.
- Continue to decentralize actions among government institutions
- Advance in reforming the health and education sectors to include the gender perspective; these areas are considered to be of special strategic importance
- Participate in the overall decentralization process together with the Ministry of Government and Justice, looking after gender issues at the municipal and local levels
- Do applied research and evaluations of the implementation of the PNM and on the economic situation of women; the findings will be used as inputs in the elaboration of plans and projects and will allow INAM to negotiate areas of cooperation with the different Ministries

The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) recently selected INAM – because of its good performance – to join its Governance, Democracy and Equity Project. Honduras is the first, and so far the only, Central American country to participate.

As regards UNDP's performance as managing agent for the support project to INAM, the answer from the national side (INAM and the project coordination) is that the relations between INAM and UNDP have been good and fluid and that the administrative actions have developed smoothly, except with regard to the purchase of equipment, which is felt to be a slow process.

3.3.2 Support to the Implementation of the Policy for Equal Opportunities in the Rural Areas

The Policy for Equal Opportunities in the Rural Areas (PIOM Rural) was elaborated by the Ministry of Agriculture and related government institutions in consultation with the organizations of rural women that had, for almost three decades, tried to draw attention to the subordinate status of women as regards access to resources and means of production. The PIOM Rural was approved in March 2000 by the Council for Agricultural Development. Its central objective is to facilitate more participation and generate more and better economic, social and productive opportunities for rural women, within the framework of a national strategy aimed at eliminating the gender gap in the Honduran agricultural sector by 2015. The PIOM Rural is implemented with the guidance of an Inter-institutional Technical Committee of the Public Agricultural Sector, composed of seven government institutions and coordinated by the Ministry of Agriculture; it is considered to be one of the most important policy lines in Honduras, as concerns reduction of poverty. There is a Strategic Plan for five years, which gives priority to the institutional strengthening of the public agricultural sector and the social and economic empowerment of the rural women.

However, the PIOM Rural has been a victim of political fluctuations, in particular the change of Government. A progress report prepared by DINADERS points out that: “The implementation of the Gender Policy for the agricultural/rural sector has been affected by the rotation of personnel and the Government’s focussing of attention on other development priorities.” In the beginning, the general coordination was in the hands of the Planning, Evaluation and Management Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture, which was also responsible for policy formulation. Later on, the entire package was transferred to DINADERS with a series of difficulties that, according to the Vargas-Bu evaluation, arose from the fact that no knowledge or institutional memory was transferred, “making it impossible to have any accumulative continuity of actions.” At the time of the present evaluation, a year later, the general policy coordination is returning to the office of the Minister of Agriculture, while the implementation of the Action Plan remains with DINADERS.

One of the most important achievements is the decision that all the projects within PRONADERS must consider the gender aspect; the responsibility to watch out for this lies with the so-called Rural Facilitation Centres (CEFAR²⁵), which are regional arms of PRONADERS-DINADERS.

The Sida/UNDP cooperation has been important from the stage of formulation of the policy and through the current process of socialization of this policy at the municipal level. The 2002 bridging project is supporting the Ministry of Agriculture in implementing the corresponding action plans all over the country. The policy is also being implemented in the different entities within the agricultural sector, based on a Strategic Plan 2001–2006. DINADERS has created its own Gender Unit with an adequately trained staff, which will give advice to Gender Units in the other public entities in this area. The project has also helped to establish closer links between PIOM Rural and INAM.

The project has collaborated in the creation of a Rural Women’s National Council as well as Regional Councils, connected to the Consultative Council on the Poverty Reduction Strategy. These second-tier organizations maintain a permanent dialogue with the CEFAR, Municipalities and their associations as well as NGO and government representatives.

Within the framework of this project, assistance has also been given to rural women’s productive projects. About 3.400 women have benefited directly from this support and others have been helped indirectly through other projects managed by PRONADERS; one of those is a continuation of activities initiated by the sister project with PRAF. Finally it should be mentioned that DINADERS is

²⁵ CEFAR: Centro de Facilitación Rural

setting up a documentation centre in the field of gender and development, with a database organized by sex and age and by province and place of residence.

3.3.3 Support to the Implementation of the Policy for Equal Opportunities in the area of Poverty Reduction

One purpose of this project, which is now terminated, was to contribute to the fight against poverty in three provinces by strengthening women's organizations, train PRAF employees and support the application of gender policies in thematic areas such as: domestic violence; women's social and judicial participation; and 'rural women and poverty'. The other purpose was to build up a stronger profile for INAM; the project was to be a vector for transmission of policies to the field and for transmission of field experiences into the further refinement of the policies.

The 2001 evaluation concluded that this project had difficulties from the very beginning; it never managed to insert itself into PRAF, even though it was presumably designed in collaboration between UNDP and PRAF. According to the (former) Coordinator of the project and her collaborators, important efforts were made to train groups of women and the project also elaborated a proposal for a credit mechanism with organized women as the intended beneficiaries. However, PRAF showed no interest in putting this proposal into practice and the project funds that were earmarked for credits were never used; this left a number of women and their organizations with yet another feeling of deception and frustration. The Vargas/Bu report puts it this way: "The project wanted to try a new mode of intervention, but nobody had realized that this would also require a higher level of organization – in addition to a different philosophy". The project execution stumbled on the rigidity of PRAF's old rules and regulations with regard to the provision of credits, interest rates and legal requirements for borrowers. The project's fund for credits remained in PRAF and apparently it is still there. In retrospect it is difficult to see for what reason UNDP promoted or supported a project of this kind through an old institution such as PRAF which had not distinguished itself by fomenting empowerment but which has had more of a traditional social assistance character.

This project did not lead anywhere; it became an unfinished affair. The main reasons for this seem to be: i) the weaknesses in the whole project idea and design from the very beginning and ii) the fact that INAM, which was supposed to guide it, was established too late to do so.

3.3.4 Conclusions and recommendations

At the design stage, these three projects actually composed a sub-programme, in the sense that some concrete functional relationships between them were indeed planned. However, unforeseen²⁶ factors in the projects' environment and among their most important actors impeded these relationships to become a reality. The three projects started at different points in time and have lived separate lives; only during the bridging project in 2002, when the new government showed more positive attitudes to these matters, did the two remaining projects start to have some interaction. DINADERS and INAM have begun to have meetings to define common strategies and to ensure compatibility between their policies. INAM undertakes research that is important for SAG and DINADERS, and INAM and DINADERS are together requesting gender-specific information from the National Statistics Institute, to use it for their planning.

In the end, it can be said that two of the projects (INAM and PIOM Rural/PRONADERS) have managed to make good use of the Sida/UNDP contribution. They have given an important impulse to the formulation and implementation of gender-related public policies, which are important ingredients of the Poverty Reduction Strategy. One of the main efforts lies in trying to convert these policies into

²⁶ One could add, perhaps, that the project designers should have foreseen (or accepted) that it does always take a considerable amount of time to create a new public institution, such as INAM. Not having done that could be seen as a weakness.

regulating instruments for the work of the government and public administration and create a new 'social practice', agreed upon by both men and women in the different sectors of society. Two of the most important, specific contributions or effects of the projects have been the opening up of new participatory processes and the increased general awareness and acceptance of the importance of equal opportunities for women. The Sida/UNDP direct support to INAM has been of decisive and strategic importance in bringing out into the open various laws in favour of women which had been approved some time ago but which had led to very meagre results at the operational level. The Institute has, at present, a good internal organization, knows where it is going and has proven to have sufficient prestige to mobilize other actors in its field of work.

The direct support to productive activities among rural women has required a significant investment of time by these projects, and this is not necessarily a good strategy. The main purpose of the projects has been the socialization of the gender equity policies and this has suffered from the time-sharing with the productive projects, which after all run the risk of not being sustainable since they are of too short durations. Even though it is important to attend to this kind of needs among the women, it should be recalled that there are many other programmes and projects that work exclusively in this area - and with much bigger economic resources. Of course, an increased ownership of the PIOM Rural on part of the different national actors involved in its implementation, could facilitate the necessary mainstreaming of productive projects and an alliance building with all the cooperating agencies.

It is recommended that Sida continue to support INAM in order to safeguard the sustainability of the processes that have started. The 2002 government budget gives 8 million lempiras to INAM (about USD 470.000 at the October exchange rate). Proportionally, this is one of the smallest amounts assigned to any public institution. The allotment for 2003 is expected to be the same, in spite of the substantial increase in the activities of INAM. It is very likely that the Institute will obtain increased budgets as it strengthens its position in the government, but as it appears, this could not occur until 2004, at the earliest. The Swedish cooperation is important both for INAM and the Ministry of Agriculture to be able to continue widening their activities for poverty reduction with gender equity. Both institutions have made good use of the support received so far. DINADERS will have an increase in its budget for 2003, but when it comes to the specific task of implementing the PIOM Rural, the only external support so far has been the one coming from Sida/UNDP.

Any future Sida support should be concentrated on the socialization of the gender equity policies, both among government institutions and civil society, including women's organizations and local governments. Direct support to productive activities should rather be left to other actors who are better positioned to deal with them and who have considerable resources to spend in this area. Of course, INAM and whoever else that works at the policy level should be in close and permanent contact with development programmes and projects that handle productive activities so as to ensure a two-way flow of experiences and thoughts on strategies.

It is necessary to create – in INAM and other institutions – a capacity for additional research on the situation of women, which can ensure that policies keep being refined on basis of realities rather than assumptions. The cases of indigenous and afro-Honduran women are of special interest in this regard. New methods for the study of women's contribution to family life are also required; such investigations should serve as references for the formulation and adaptation of macroeconomic and sector policies with particular interest to women.

Finally, many important experiences of institution building for gender equity have been accumulated in different Latin American countries and elsewhere in the world. These could be of great help to INAM and the Ministry of Agriculture and it is recommendable that the managers and staff of these

institutions be given opportunity to know some of those experiences and to discuss their own (study tours).

3.4 Sub-programme: Support to municipal strengthening and decentralization

3.4.1 Main observations on design, execution and results

This sub-programme consists of only one project, with a much more adequate title: **Decentralization and Municipal Development**. The initiative to this project was apparently taken in early 1998 by the Mayor of Tegucigalpa, in conversations with UNDP. The Mayor also influenced the selection of the five municipalities, which were to take part in the project. All sources coincide in that the main reasons for selecting these five municipalities were the following:

- Tegucigalpa: – Home-base of the originator of the project idea;
- San Pedro Sula: – Second largest city in the country and important economic and productive centre;
- Puerto Cortés: – Had one of the few Mayors re-elected for a second mandate²⁷ and therefore considered as a particularly interesting partner;
- Santa Rosa de C.: – Of special interest to the Mayor of Tegucigalpa (his birth place);
- La Paz: – Had the only Mayor in Honduras from a minority political party.²⁸

The project document was written by an international consultant, who was expected to become its Chief Technical Adviser, but who in the end opted for another occupation in another country. This created a vacuum that was not filled for almost a year.

This project was thoroughly evaluated in May–June 2001 by a three-member evaluation team, representing UNDP, Sida and the Association of Honduran Municipalities (AMHON), respectively. The Team Leader was selected by UNDP. This evaluation concluded that the project emanated from a true and spontaneous demand at the municipal level. The report repeats, in the same phrase, that the project is not a result of any ‘decisive intervention’ from the supply side (the international cooperation community). This appears to be true, but it is not the important point of this remark; the most significant point is that the authors find it necessary to say this – evidently they were aware of the fact that the international aid community often dedicates itself to fomenting certain concepts, models or strategies among recipient governments, which are not always as timely and relevant to the local situation, as they should ideally be.²⁹

The report insists twice on the fact that the General Objective of the project responds adequately to the demands and needs of the country. However, it then goes on to heavily criticize the project design; the project document is considered to be too vague and the numerous objectives and planned results to be too all-inclusive. The consequence of this has, according to these evaluators, been that the project ended up being a sort of ‘petty cash box’, which was used for all kinds of activities and purposes, according to the wishes of the different Mayors at different points in time. There is probably some degree of truth in the latter statement, but based on our own observations of the situation in three of

²⁷ In November 2001, this Mayor was re-elected for a third period.

²⁸ The Mayors in Honduras traditionally belong to the Partido Nacional or the Partido Liberal, which are the main contenders in presidential and parliamentary elections

²⁹ There are high-level Honduran observers who feel, for instance, that the entire Municipal Law, prepared with support of USAID and approved in 1991, was copied from abroad and not totally adequate to the Honduran situation.

the municipalities (San Pedro Sula, Santa Rosa de Copán and Puerto Cortés) we feel that the 2001 evaluation was much too harsh in this regard. Some of the accomplishments made by this project up to September 2002, could hardly have been realized if the ‘petty cash theory’ had been entirely correct and there is no reason to assume *a priori* that ‘the Mayors own ideas’ had to be bad just because they did not coincide with the project document. This may be the place to mention that Tegucigalpa is the Municipality where not much has been done of any kind, while the Municipality of La Paz seems to take a middle position.

As regards the original project design, the 2001 evaluators are right in pointing out that it is sloppy from the formal Logical Framework point of view. It does mix up objectives with results and activities. Furthermore, it tends not only to include too many activity areas in the project but also, which is in principle worse, makes no analysis at all of the different general characteristics, points of departure and priority needs in five very different municipalities (different in terms of size, local economic basis, human resources, positioning in relation to the national development process and so forth). But the main weakness of the design is that it mixes, in one and the same project, specific support to five municipalities with support to the overall decentralization process in Honduras, without providing any real strategy as to how these two interventions are to be linked together. If the main idea was to provide replicable development models to a couple of hundred Honduran municipalities, most of which are very small and poor, then it is difficult to understand why municipalities such as Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula were chosen as trial cases.

Paradoxically perhaps, the lack of limitations of activity areas in the project document (i.e. the lack of detailed planning *ex ante*) may have turned out to be one of the contributing factors to the successes of the project within the municipalities individually. The Mayors, the local governments and the project coordinators have not had their hands tied by any exact recipes, based on third parties’ preconceptions, but have had the possibility – or were forced – to ‘muddle through’ in a process of experimentation and learning from experience. We do not agree that a project of this kind necessarily needs a large number of specific goals and indicators; it may not even tolerate anything of the sort. Improving local government is not comparable to building a bridge whose location and dimensions are decided in detail before starting the work. In order to achieve a better local government it is of course necessary to introduce certain new technical instruments but as much as anything else it is a matter of changing people’s attitudes and behaviour patterns and there can be no blueprints for this. What is essential, however, is to have good base-line studies that can allow measurement in due course of the achievements of the projects, in alternative directions.

The other main concern of the 2001 evaluators was that the project, until then, had only progressed along one of its two principal lines: municipal development. In their view, the other one (decentralization) had been left aside. The core idea of the project was to not only develop five municipalities per se, but to contribute to the overall decentralization process in Honduras by sharing local development experiences and replicating successful models and strategies in other municipalities. The fact of the matter is that these evaluators seem to have read more into the project document in this regard, than what the document actually says. In its strategy chapter, the project document does state that:

“In order to benefit the entire population of Honduras, the Municipalities that participate in the project will take special care to transfer their experiences to other Municipalities in the country. In this context, the participation of AMHON is transcendental, considering its character as a professional organization and its responsibilities for guiding processes of municipal development.”

However, the subject of transfer of experiences is then almost completely lost in the description of the objectives, results and activities of the project, i.e. in the logical framework. It appears only in a subordinate and almost invisible phrase somewhere at the end of Objective 4 and is totally absent at the level of Results. Therefore, the people who were later charged with executing the project could very well proceed with concrete activities in the five municipalities and forget the ‘decentralization line’ without deserving too much blame for negligence. In a way, the 2001 evaluators criticized the project for not having done what they thought it should have done (at that point in time), no matter what was written in the project document in 1998.

In September 2002, when talking with the Project Coordinator and other interested parties about the lack of project action in regard to the national decentralization process, their arguments revolve around the lack of interest in decentralization on part of the former Government (which is an undisputable fact). On the other hand, when the same parties suggest that no work was done with AMHON during the first years of the project because of its being a chaotic organization, one could ask if it is any less chaotic in 2002, when a lot of attention has indeed been given to it. These observations insinuate that the project also chose to work at the level of the five municipalities rather than at the central level, simply because it was easier and more likely to produce tangible results in this area, within a shorter period of time. There may also have been some ‘lack of chemistry’ between UNDP, the project and AMHON.

In any case, the 2001 evaluation led to a redesign of the project for the so-called bridging phase that is being carried out in 2002. The new version of the project document represents a considerable improvement over the original one. The logical framework has been cleaned up and a strong emphasis is put on the so far forgotten decentralization component, which is now represented by one of the two project objectives (instead of being concealed among the earlier four).

By September 2002, the project has supported AMHON in the elaboration of its “Strategic Institutional Development Plan” and it has assisted the Ministry of Government and Justice in its strategic planning, in the formulation of its Decentralization and Local Development Programme (PRODDEL³⁰) and a national decentralization policy, among other things. It is important to mention here that it is only with the new Government (from January 2002) that the Ministry of Government and Justice has acquired a high profile in decentralization matters, at the same time as this subject has again been given an important place on the Government’s agenda.

As regards the municipal development component – in the five municipalities – this 2002 evaluation team has tried to verify the information on what has happened after the earlier evaluation, by making short visits to three of the municipalities. In the case of Santa Rosa de Copán, where the Mayor was re-elected in 2001, the process of citizens’ participation in local government has made an impressive advance. Thirteen Citizens’ Commissions, dealing with different technical areas, have completed a strategic planning exercise jointly with the Municipality. Another particularly interesting example of the citizens’ participation in the management of municipal affairs is the process that has led to a voluntary agreement between the Municipality and the inhabitants about an increase in water tariffs.

An integrated computerized system for the Municipality’s administrative and financial management has been put into operation in Santa Rosa and the entire organizational set-up of the Mayor’s office has been streamlined. A Citizen’s Commission on Transparency is working and reports, among other things, that a number of elected members of the Municipal Council have started to pay their municipal taxes this year, after the Commission drew the attention to their earlier failings in this regard. The

³⁰ PRODDEL: Programa de Descentralización y Desarrollo Local

Commission has carried out a considerable number of ‘audits’ of the affairs of the Municipality as well as of community organizations that have received subsidies from the National Congress and the Treasury.

Santa Rosa de Copán, with support of the project, is also working on strategic planning with a dozen Municipalities that share with it the Río Higuito river basin. This is the only area where we have found an open disagreement on the project activities among local agents; the Honduran Association of NGO (ASONOG)³¹ claims that the project has disregarded important activities carried out by them earlier, while the project feels that ASONOG has not showed too much willingness for cooperation. The visit of this evaluation team was not a proper occasion for trying to find out “who is right” on this issue. It is, however, a sort of situation that should be avoided in the future, in general. There are always many actors on the local development scenario, and efforts should be made by all parties concerned to avoid that jealousies and excessive desires for prominence reach a level where they start to work against the purposes that are, after all, shared by everybody; this is the sort of problem that the implementing agency of a project (UNDP or whoever) should help to solve as part of their regular duties.

The most recent initiative taken by the Municipality of Santa Rosa de Copán is the creation of an Agency for Local Development whose purpose will be to mobilize and coordinate efforts of different public and private agents to inject dynamism into the economic development of the Municipality.

For a more precise picture of developments in Santa Rosa between 1997 and 2001, the following quantitative data should be considered. Of course, it cannot be specified exactly how much of these improvements are due to the Sida/UNDP project but all the documentation available as well as our own observations on the spot suggest that the project has played a key role for their accomplishment. The number of municipal employees has decreased from 218 to 177, while total municipal annual income has gone up from 8,5 to 25,8 million lempiras. The most interesting component on the income side refers to payments for public services, which have more than doubled between 1998 and 2001. The main reason for this increase is to be found in the increased number of subscribers; in the case of potable water this number has grown from about 2000 in 1997 to 4.600 in 2001. Evidently this is related to the negotiation of tariffs that has been mentioned earlier. But the numbers of registered users of other municipal services have also seen an impressive growth, for instance garbage collection, which had 1.326 users in 1997 as against 5.150 in 2001. The degrees of coverage of public services have developed as follows, between 1997 and 2001: potable water from 65 to 78%; garbage collection 24–79%; sewage 40–65,7% and; street cleaning 5–36,0%.

The Mayor’s main line of philosophy is that good local government can be reached only when citizens’ participation has become strong enough to make the development process irreversible, no matter who the next Mayor may turn out to be. When listening both to municipal employees and to representatives of the Citizen’s Commissions and other local actors, their enthusiasm seems to be strong and genuine enough for one to conclude that Santa Rosa de Copán may indeed have taken a first good step towards the irreversibility that the current Mayor is talking about.

The space in this report does not allow us to go into similar details about developments in the Municipalities of San Pedro Sula and Puerto Cortés, but it should be mentioned that important advances have been made here as well, with regard to public services, financial and administrative management and citizen’s participation. Puerto Cortés will soon put into operation a computerized financial administration system similar to the one in Santa Rosa. It has also taken an interesting initiative to regularize and directly support the election of community councils (‘patronatos’) through

³¹ Despite its name, ASONOG is a regional organization, active in Western Honduras, with Headquarters in Santa Rosa

secret balloting. In San Pedro Sula, the property register has seen a great improvement and citizens now have excellent facilities for instant payment of their property taxes. In 2002, the project has experienced a slow-down due to the change of Mayor and change of a good deal of municipal staff. Much of the project work has been concentrated on the strategic planning for the “Valle de Sula” (Sula Valley) area, which is composed of 17 municipalities, many of them very small and poor.

3.4.2 Conclusions and recommendations

Even though the Decentralization and Municipal Development project (= sub-programme) has not done exactly what was foreseen in the original project document, it has surely done more than enough to justify its existence and the investments that have been made in it. This is true despite the imbalance between the accomplishments in the three municipalities mentioned above, on the one hand, and the Municipalities of Tegucigalpa and La Paz, on the other hand. In the case of Tegucigalpa, the fundamental reason for the project’s long deadlock in 1999 and 2000 seems to be the death, in a late 1998 accident, of the Mayor who got it off the ground in the first place (and his replacement on the post by his widow).

The performance of UNDP as a managerial and guiding agent for this project appears to have been barely acceptable during the initial period. It took a long time before UNDP managed to provide the project with a full-fledge Chief Technical Adviser and the one who finally came seems to have had certain shortcomings that, according to some informants who were present at the time, should have received more attention from UNDP. Despite the fact that the Mayors of the five municipalities were signatories to the project document and constituted its Executive Committee they appear not to have played any important role in the project’s management in the beginning. One Mayor states that mostly they did not know how and why important decisions concerning the project were taken in isolation in Tegucigalpa (‘centralization of a decentralization project’). Earlier evaluators of the project also mention the project’s isolation from other actors in the field of decentralization and municipal development, for instance other international cooperating agents.

An ad hoc project evaluation in March 2000 by a former UNDP staff member³², very knowledgeable of UNDP rules and regulations, points out in his report that UNDP-Honduras was running the project in this period as if it were a direct execution project, meaning that this office was usurping the functions of the project coordinator. Evidently there was a lack of communication and mutual understanding in various different directions. One discontented partner has been the Sida office in Tegucigalpa or at least the officer responsible for this project, who points out UNDP’s lack of effort and adroitness to get the project out of the quagmire in the Municipality of Tegucigalpa.

The internal project management situation appears to have improved considerably after the new Project Co-ordinator took over in December 2000. Among other achievements one should mention resumption of activities in the Tegucigalpa Municipality, at least as of 2002. This has been facilitated by the new Mayor and municipal administration (as of 2002) and by the administrative and strategic changes that have been introduced by them.

As regards the UNDP management and monitoring of this project, this has been far from ideal during certain periods and in certain aspects; this may to some extent be a consequence of rotation among UNDP staff members who have had responsibilities for it at different points in time and at different levels. The geographical dispersion of the project is likely to have contributed to the weaknesses. The variations that can be seen between the opinions of different people on UNDP’s acting in this project

³² Kruidenink, Anton: Informe de consultoría; Asesoría estratégica para el HON/98/003 – Descentralización y Desarrollo Municipal; March 2000.

are probably also due a lack of common understanding between the various interested parties as to what UNDP really has the duty and the right to do – and what not – in a so-called ‘national execution’ project. Finally, there has been a rather weak Honduran ownership of the project most of the time, since the national responsibility for it was, in the original project document, spread out among the five participating Mayors (i.e. five executing agencies). Only as of the bridging project start in 2002, did the Ministry of Government and Justice sign as Executing Agency.

The final conclusion is that this project, despite shortcomings in design and difficulties in execution, has proven that the area of municipal development and decentralization is not only one of the absolutely central areas for democratic governance but also an area where external assistance can indeed play a very important role. Hence, the basic recommendation is that this subject should have a high priority on any future agenda for Sida support to governance in Honduras.

3.5 Sub-programme: Support to the institutional strengthening of the legislative system and the application of justice

This is another elaborate sub-programme title which can hardly hide the fact that the component projects have very little to do with each other. Initially, the sub-programme consisted of two projects: “Support to the National Congress” and “Support to the Office of the Public Prosecutor”. In 2001, another small project was added: “Support to the Electoral Reform Programme”.³³

3.5.1 The National Congress

The members of the Honduran National Congress have insufficient knowledge and resources to analyse law drafts. Therefore new legislation is often incoherent with regard to existing law and to the Constitution. This undermines the concept of a state under the rule of law and also the citizens’ trust in the public administration. The frequent use of catch-all law articles stating that “all other legislation incompatible with this law should hereby be regarded as null and void” has also contributed to the insecurity as to which law statutes are actually in force at a given moment. A tendency to overestimate the usefulness of comparative law, adopting legislation found in other countries, is another ‘worst practice’, not uncommon to the Honduran law-making (see also footnote 28).

The Legislative Decree 24/89 of 31 March 1989 created the Centre for Electronic Data-Processing and Legislative Studies (CIEL³⁴) to support the Congress in its legislative work. There is an obvious need for the services of CIEL in this area. The activities of CIEL were initiated in 1993 when USAID donated some bibliographic material and a compact disc database. Shortly after, the existing Congress Library was integrated as a section of CIEL. In 1998 the first step was taken for the creation of a database and for advisory and analytic assistance on legislative matters. CIEL is entrusted to supply the Congress committees and the Congress members with adequate information for their legislative activities, to organize and handle an efficient system for documentation and information within scopes that suit the competence and the needs of the legislative body, to prepare studies, analyses, assessments and views on law drafts.

The project has two components:

- Installation of a computer network and construction of a database containing all national legislation and other relevant information for the legislative activities of the Congress members in order to

³³ UNDP currently documents this as a fifth sub-programme under the title: “Promotion of trustworthy, effective and transparent electoral procedures”. We see no reason to complicate the picture in this way; in our definition, the third of the projects is as much, or as little, part of any real sub-programme as the other two.

³⁴ CIEL: Centro de Informática y Estudios Legislativos del Congreso Nacional

supply them with up to date and trustworthy information about the legislation in force.

- Assistance to the National Congress at large, its Standing Committees, the Congress members and the political party groups in the Congress through advice and analysis on legislative matters; educational efforts to strengthen the capacity of the Congress members to assess, evaluate and discuss law drafts in an informed way, based on solid knowledge and comprehension, thus to perform their legislation functions in a professional manner; and assistance to the CIEL staff to better perform their duties.

A two-person evaluation team, contracted by UNDP, studied this project in 2001 but has not yet delivered any evaluation report. However, we have had the opportunity to interview the local member of the evaluation team, key staff of CIEL, the former Co-ordinator and the Deputy Director of CIEL for the period July 1999 – January 2002, as well as other knowledgeable persons. On basis of this as well as on study of documentation we must conclude that CIEL has not been able to deliver the expected output.

One basic problem lies in the fact that the key staff and some others as well are subject to replacement after each election. It is a serious disadvantage for any institution that a new government can change all the top executives. Obviously this remark goes against the tradition in a ‘spoils system’ which tends to characterize presidential systems of government such as the Honduran one, but we nevertheless see the comment as justified given the particular need for independence and institutional stability in an entity such as CIEL. When the political party in power appears to be the ‘owner’ of a project of this kind, this will necessarily contribute to producing a weak and dwindling institution. A future support should have as its first priority to re-organize the institution in order to make it more of an academic/scientific and neutral service unit with no political ties.

The project started by the creation of a database for storage and retrieval of legal information, primarily focussing on the technical equipment as such. Computers and servers are just the tools in the digital information process. Unfortunately, however, they are often regarded as the result and not the means. Furthermore, servers and other computer equipment consist of bits and pieces which are acquired over time but which have to fit together. In the opinion of CIEL staff, the UNDP procurement practice has given more importance to the ‘cheapest device principle’ than to the requirements for consistency and compatibility. The technological infrastructure was described in an evaluation and reprogramming workshop in March 2000 as inadequate for the increasingly complicated and demanding information management. The same is valid today. The network that was intended to connect the Congress buildings has not yet been completed. Only some 30% of the Congress members have access to a computer in their offices.

The first step in the creation of information databases must be to study and assess the information needs of the intended end-users. What do they need to find? What is the information going to be used for? How do they want the information presented? What equipment is at their disposal? Are they able to handle the equipment on their own or do they need assistance to carry out a search? Such studies were never made, the assumption evidently being that digital information sources automatically will attend to all information needs, irrespective of the context. The Congress members have little interest in and knowledge about the existing CIEL services. Few members have attended the courses in information retrieval arranged by CIEL. Since only some 10% of all law drafts are produced by Congress members, one might discuss whether the project was founded on actual necessities.

All Honduran legislation until the year 2001 is stored in the existing database as well as all the successive Honduran Constitutions. The storage has been done by manually inscribing the text directly from the official publication for national legislation (*Gaceta Oficial*). Of course, by this method the

authenticity of the texts in the database cannot be trusted, as typing errors are bound to occur. Thus the quality of the contents of the database is not to be trusted without warnings.

The search function of the database is rather basic. A search can be made by using words or phrases that appear in the title of the required law or decree. The result of a search is presented as a list of the titles of the documents found. It is also possible to search for all legislation issued during a specific year. The utility of the database would be highly increased if the contents were organized and indexed to allow searches for concepts or words in the actual text of a document, not only the title.

The contents of a pocket size glossary, produced in the project, explaining the technical-legal vocabulary used in the law-making procedure signals that the Congress members are real novices and that the support services must be designed with this in mind.

The project has been audited twice by Price Waterhouse, for the periods January–December 2000 and January–November 2001. Both audits have commented the project's weak internal control system. The present CIEL administration found that the inventory was not complete and that equipment and vehicles were missing, another sign of unprofessional financial management in the project.

3.5.2 The Office of the Public Prosecutor – Five special prosecutors

The so-called Public Ministry (Ministerio Público) was created in 1993 to represent, defend and protect the interests of the citizens. It is a vital entity for a state under the rule of law and for the consolidation of democracy. The term “public ministry” is not widely used elsewhere and does not say anything about what the ministry is responsible for; we find it more useful to translate it with the term “office of the public prosecutor”, since this covers its main functions. However, for brevity, we sometimes refer to it as Public Ministry or PM.

As stipulated in the constitution the judicial sector is entitled to 6% of the national budget. This budgetary method introduces a substantial amount of rigidity and does not make for flexible financing according to varying needs over time. For 2002, the Ministry will receive USD 14.250.000 from the national budget, 750.000 from USAID and 412.500 from Canada.

The Ministry has four units: for prosecution, for administration, for forensic medicine and for fighting drug trafficking. The territorial organization is based on a division of the country in five regions and the thematic organization includes ten special prosecutors. The Sida/UNDP support within the Governance Programme is directed to information technology within the Ministry and assistance to five of the special prosecutor's offices: for the environment; for human rights; for protection of women; for ethnic minorities and the cultural heritage; and for protection of consumers and senior citizens. UNDP or Sida did not select these particular five areas on basis of any special criteria; they were given attention because the other five special prosecutors were already receiving support from other donors.³⁵

On 20 February 2002, a new penal process code came into force. Through this code the old, basically written penal procedure is now substituted for by oral proceedings under the principles of immediate and concentrated presentation of evidence. The former inquisitorial penal procedure, where basically the judge also acted as prosecutor, has been replaced by an accusatorial procedure, in which prosecutor and judge are not the same and where the prosecutor and the defendant are on an equal footing in the proceedings. The role of the public prosecutors is thus emphasised, as he is now in charge of investigations in order to support his action to start a prosecution and to produce sufficient evidence for a verdict of guilty.

³⁵ The other five special prosecutors deal with: corruption; defence of the Constitution; courts of appeal; children and disabled; and annulment (“casación”).

The restructuring of the penal process in conformity with the new code puts focus on the need for support to the Public Prosecutor's Office in order to meet the new demands on the officers of the institution, not to forget the specific needs of the special prosecutors. At present the cases that were filed before the new penal process code of 2002 are handled according to the old penal process code of 1984. Of course, this double system puts a special strain on those working in the prosecutors' organization.

The prosecutor's offices are represented in an inequitable way, both geographically and thematically. As part of the strive for democracy, however, the public prosecutors have been entrusted with some degree of independence, by which they have managed to gain a certain amount of trust among the citizens. However, they lack the resources and the capacity to further enhance their independence.

The project has two components:

- Strengthening of the five special prosecutors all over the country to help them carry out their duties in a professional and informed manner, by means of seminars, workshops, special technical assistance, legal information and educational material.
- Support to the creation and implementation of an internal communications system for efficient administration and handling of the cases.

The support to the special prosecutors is aimed at establishing special prosecutors in all regional and local Prosecutor's Offices in the country. This will be done through educational efforts, the creation of a computer network, the supply of relevant literature and the development of information systems. The principal target group for the programme is the staff of the involved institutions. They will receive education and equipment in order to enable them to perform their tasks in a more efficient and transparent way. The target group for the activities of the institutions involved is the citizens. Efficiency in the administration of justice will directly benefit a reliable and adequate attention to the citizens and support human rights at large. Thus the strengthening of the Prosecutor's Offices will also benefit the efforts of the National Ombudsman for Human Rights (CONADEH³⁶). The Ombudsman has the power to submit penal matters to the prosecutors for investigation and court proceedings. If the prosecutors are inadequately trained or their capacity is otherwise strained the Ombudsman's resolutions will become void of content.³⁷ Likewise a support to women (in this case the special prosecutors for women's rights) will have a twofold outcome since it will make for better living conditions for their children. In a long perspective the promotion of women's rights will also be an efficient instrument to fight poverty.

The educational efforts of the project have been rather centralized. Experiences from study trips abroad and seminars for the head prosecutors have not been transferred to the regional or local offices. The prosecutors are often transferred from one region to another, according to the local needs, and therefore it is essential that they all receive complete education and training in all special areas of prosecution. The library resources are very poor in the Prosecutor's Offices. One of the two 2001 project evaluators defined the Sida/UNDP project as "a small, isolated island" within the Ministry's domain.

There are six regional Prosecutor's Offices in the country³⁸, headed by a regional co-ordinating prosecutor, and twenty local offices, organized under their respective regional office. The majority of

³⁶ CONADEH: Comisionado Nacional de Derechos Humanos

³⁷ Sida evaluation report (Blomquist, Ugglå, Bartolomei) Nov.-Dec. 2001, on the Ombudsman institutions in six Latin American countries.

³⁸ In Tegucigalpa, Ceiba, San Pedro Sula, Choluteca, Comayagua and Santa Rosa de Copán.

the prosecutors are common or general prosecutors, which means that they handle all kinds of cases. In the Western Region of the Public Ministry, the regional office in Santa Rosa de Copán has 12 prosecutors. Before the new penal process code came into force, there were seven of them. One prosecutor is specialised in protection of children and disabled persons and in protection of women. The local offices in the region are situated in Gracias (7 prosecutors), in La Esperanza (5) and in Ocotepeque (3); none of these offices has a specialized prosecutor.

The regional office in San Pedro Sula has specialized prosecutors for human rights, protection of women, for children and disabled persons, protection of consumers and senior citizens, for environment and for ethnic minorities and the cultural heritage. The local offices of the region, in Santa Barbara, Yoro, El Progreso and Puerto Cortés, however, have no specialized prosecutors. The head of the San Pedro Sula office mentioned that the educational efforts are directed in a general manner to the regional offices, whereas they should ideally be designed according to specific needs in different regions. For instance, the Gracias a Dios-region has a high rate of cases regarding illegal deforestation and organized, drug-related criminality. In spite of this specific structure of the criminality in the area the local prosecutor's office in Puerto Lempira has two prosecutors with no special training; they would need education in matters of environment and organized criminality and also the assistance of technical experts in chemistry and forestry.

The new penal procedure code calls for more extensive support to the prosecutors by various experts and laboratory staff, such as experts in forensic medicine, ballistics and psychology, to mention a few. The fact that the experts have to appear before the court during the oral hearings is a big problem. There are very few experts available and they have to travel constantly, for investigation and to take part in court proceedings. This is particularly disturbing as more than 80% of the prisoners in Honduras are kept in jail for long periods of time, waiting to be sentenced.³⁹

All prosecutors are invited to participate in specialized seminars on the various topics supported by the Sida/UNDP project. Still the regional offices expressed some concern that the Tegucigalpa office receives more assistance than the others. A two-volume manual on the new penal procedure has been elaborated in the project and distributed to the prosecutor's offices, however, not to all personnel concerned, just a number of copies to each office. USAID has produced and distributed a handbook for prosecutors containing frequently asked questions, with answers and reference to pertinent law articles. On the whole the prosecutors would need more literature and law texts. The offices have had access to Internet, which was convenient for access to bibliography, etc., but early this year the connection was broken.

The prosecutors pointed to the fact that also the investigative police and the court judges need more training to live up to the expectations of the new penal procedure. The police must understand what to look for and what to ask for in their investigations. As for the judges they also need to adjust to the demands of the new procedural situation.

In one of the interviews, three judges of the "Juzgado de Sentencia" (criminal court of first instance) in Santa Rosa de Copán mentioned that also the public defence needs better questioning techniques and a better understanding of what is relevant or not for the case. The prosecutors must also learn procedural economy and how to handle their cases in court efficiently, avoiding the bringing in of a number of witnesses who remember nothing or saw nothing.

The penal sanction system today is not only of a repressive character as earlier; it is possible now, under certain circumstances, to sentence a person to 'service to society' instead of prison, which is generally

³⁹ Perfil II, 12 September 2002, IDB.

regarded as an important step towards a more humanitarian judicial system. However, humanitarian penal procedures also call for fast action on the part of the authorities involved. Due to above-mentioned shortage of education, of experts and of technical support, the prosecutors have difficulties to live up to the new regulations.

The project objective has been to create an investigation and documentation centre accessible to the local prosecutor's offices and the five special prosecutors and to support the five special prosecutors through educational efforts such as seminars, works-shops, technical assistance, legal information and educational material. During a meeting in the Public Ministry headquarters in Tegucigalpa, in the presence of the Prosecutor General and his staff, it was surprising to note how the focus was more on what is needed than on what has been done in the Sida/UNDP project.

However, from this meeting, other interviews and project reports it can be concluded that the IT-activities have been given an inordinate quantity of efforts and attention without results to match it. The documentation centre has so far produced a prototype for an Internet web-site for the Public Ministry. In view of the fact that only an insignificant fraction of the Honduran population has access to Internet one must ask why this undertaking was chosen with priority. Half a million lempiras have been used for installations for an Intranet, intended to connect the prosecutor's offices throughout the country, but not yet in function.

A number of courses and seminars have been held, attended by prosecutors, police, judges, prison directors, local mayors, social workers and firemen. So, in this regard, the project seems to have carried out a considerable number of activities, but it has not been possible to do any analysis of the quality of these events, in terms of how much and what kind of know-how has been transmitted and what are the possibilities for such know-how to be used in practice and relayed to others. A compilation of the principal legislation concerning environment has been produced and printed in July 2002. This law collection will later on be scanned for access via the Intranet to be created, paid by the Ministry's own funds.

During the present bridge support period the PM decided to manage the project without a separate project execution unit. Instead a co-ordination team in the PM is in charge, a fact which can be seen as a sign of increasing national ownership and which shows a certain amount of flexibility in the methodology of the PM. However, the actual handling of the support also gives rise to some concern. The bridging support period has been devoted mainly to organizational issues.

3.5.3 Support to the electoral reform programme

Historically, the elected state organs in Honduras have been rather isolated and with few links to society at large. Based on the 1990 Law on Reform and Modernization of the State, the Presidential Commission in charge of its implementation (CPME⁴⁰), has identified specific objectives⁴¹ in the area of political reform: strengthening of civil society by opening opportunities for political participation and intervention in the state administration; democratisation of the political parties in order to transform their role as means for participation and representation of the citizens in the political system; and to renew the electoral mechanisms and institutions in order to adjust these to a new, democratic practice. This electoral reform is generally regarded as the most urgent project in the Honduran strive for democratic governance.

The electoral system is one of the pillars supporting the legal nature of democracy. A firm consensus is prevalent between the civil society and the political leaders in Honduras about the necessity for reforms

⁴⁰ CPME: Comisión Presidencial de Modernización del Estado

⁴¹ Support to Programme for Democratic Governance-UNDP 2002, from the Honduras office, dated 3/3 2002.

in this field, in order to establish trustworthy, efficient and equitable election procedures. The electoral reform is a natural component in the Governance Programme.

Already in 1944, during a period of crisis under the military regime, the citizens of Honduras have taken an active interest in the development of democracy in the country and of the electoral procedure in particular. During the nineties the citizens' organizations have produced various proposals for reform of the electoral system as a means to redistribute powers in the polity. Suffice it to mention the proposal by the Citizens' Forum ('Foro Ciudadano') presented in March 1999: Proposal for the National Reconstruction and Transformation. This document proposes some themes, most of which were also put forward already in 1992 by the CPME. The 1999 document mentions inter alia the following changes: separation in time of elections of President of the Republic, Congress members and Mayors; the introduction of plebiscite⁴² and referendum⁴³; rules concerning the duration and the costs for political campaigns and publicity in the medias; separation of the Electoral Court and the National Population Registry and their establishment as separate and autonomous entities. All of these proposals are included in the present project.

UNDP, as a non-political organ with the advantages of being unbiased and a guarantee for the continuity of the project process, has undertaken to facilitate the creation of a neutral forum for negotiations between the political leaders and the civil society, intended to define the framework for an electoral reform, to facilitate the negotiations and to support the negotiations in technical and logistical matters. Although UNDP is a privileged witness to the negotiation process it cannot assume guarantees for the fulfilment of the political pacts that are concluded in the project.

UNDP runs the project under the direct execution formula, providing technical assistance, personnel recruitment service, procurement service and information and publication services.

The national project counterpart is a Political Commission, established for this particular purpose. The Commission reports to the political parties and to UNDP, while the Ministry for Development Cooperation (SETCO) participates in the monitoring and evaluation of the project.

The Political Commission, consisting of two high level representatives from each of the five political parties represented in the Congress, appointed by the president of the Executive Council of each party, has set the thematic agenda for the negotiations, the methodology, the timetable and the rules for dialogue with the civil society. The Political Commission is a forum for dialogue and negotiation with the civil society represented by groups, which have made proposals regarding the electoral reform or have expressed opinions in the matter. Through their spokesmen they can submit proposals to the Political Commission. Several meetings have been held with representatives from the workers' unions, peasants and indigenous peoples as well as with the private enterprise organizations in the country and with various NGO. International lecturers have been invited for information about the electoral system in other Latin American countries. The members of the Political Commission have visited such countries to share their experience in the electoral field.

The political phase of the project was concluded on September 4, 2001 when the five presidential candidates signed a Manifest of the Political Parties to the Honduran People, which sets the framework for the electoral reform. The Manifest includes the themes of Population Register, Electoral Court,

⁴² *Plebiscite* is a procedure whereby the citizens can comment on ratification of international treaties and covenants regarding the independence of the nation, the national territory and the national security or on decisions and consultations in aspects of special importance for the country. (Motivated decree draft of 11 March 2002, article 53.)

⁴³ By *referendum* 5% of the population entitled to take part in elections can opt for total or partial annulment of a law. If the referendum is favourable the executive power has no right to veto in the matter, not is its approval needed. (Motivated decree draft of 11 March, 2002, article 53.)

introduction of plebiscite and referendum, political campaigns, political alliances, financing of political parties, election of Congress members, presidential deputies and electoral law and the political organizations.

The technical phase of the project started in September 2001. On January 16, 2002 an "Agreement regarding the deepening of democracy, strengthening of transparency, terminating impunity and consolidation of institutions" was signed by three of the five parties represented in Congress. The agreement, which was not supported and signed by the two minority parties, amplifies the Manifesto to other areas such as limitation of the immunity of the Congress members. On February 17, 2002 the newly elected President of the Republic and the presidents of the five Congress parties signed a High Level Declaration on Political and Institutional Reforms in Honduras in support of the project.

A Jurist Commission has been created for the project in order to prepare a draft for a decree covering the necessary changes of the constitution (hereafter the decree) and a draft for a new electoral law (hereafter the law). The Commission has five members, one from each political party represented in Congress and all professional lawyers, assigned by their respective party and a co-ordinator contracted by UNDP. It meets twice a week and has so far concluded the decree text, in cooperation with the Political Commission. In the decree draft the theme of election of Congress members has been excluded; it will be included in the electoral law. The decree draft includes the themes of creation of a politically independent Electoral Court, citizens' participation by means of plebiscite and referendum, creation of a politically independent Population Register, introduction of a Vice President of the Republic and the rules concerning immunity for Congress members and other officials of the state. A final, motivated decree draft, revised and agreed upon by the two commissions, was sent to the president of the Congress on March 11, 2002 for deliberations and approval by this body.

From the above can be deducted that the project so far has not met with any obstacles. However, as the UNDP project co-ordinator points out, the difficulties lie in the political context: "The politicians are part of the problem and of the solution." Some of the political parties are hesitant to some of the proposed changes put forward in the project.

A strength in the project has been the constant cooperation and consultations with the civil society, NGO and the politicians on the various issues concerned. The sincere and frank contacts with the politicians imply that a sense of ownership has been established. On the other hand, the fact that many civil society spokesmen as well as politicians have little or no experience in working with international cooperation projects has been a weakness in the process. At present UNDP is making an investigation, within the project, to find out the reasons why the Hondurans have so little trust in their politicians. This is done by means of examination of existing studies on the subject, a nationwide inquest and interviews with carefully selected persons from all sectors of the civil society as well as politicians. This activity will be finalized in October 2002.

In meetings with members of the project's Political Commission, representing the two major political parties, it was pointed out by them that the most important elements in the proposed changes of the constitution are: the introduction of a Vice President of the Republic; and the separation and reorganization of the Electoral Court and the Population Register, both of a highly political nature. Plebiscite and referendum are not part of the election procedure but are equally important, as is the reduction of the immunity for Congress members. There is some hesitance within some party fractions regarding the introduction of plebiscite and referendum. A political agreement has not been reached on the issue of reduction of the number of Congress members (128 today) and how they are elected. A reduction would limit the political pluralism, which exists today and the small parties fear that it might all but kill them. On the other hand, it would force the actual incumbents to assist more frequently in Congress.

The interviewed members of the Political Commission recalled that it takes a 2/3 majority in Congress to accept a change of the constitution and since the biggest party presently suffers from internal disagreements there may be certain difficulties in this respect. On the other hand, the fact that the President of the Republic supports the project is important; the Congress listens to him, it was said. In case the Congress should indeed come to agree on the presented draft, the decree could be ratified in January 2003. They felt that the UNDP strategy to engage the civil society in the process is very positive and that UNDP has, in general, been an efficient and impartial actor in the project; the economic support has also been satisfactory.

In a meeting with representatives of the other ad hoc-commission of the project – the Jurists' Commission – they all agreed that the UNDP support has been excellent. To their knowledge, no other international organization has ever undertaken such a delicate and controversial task as this electoral reform project. The UNDP support has enabled the Commission members to join their efforts efficiently and the prestige of UNDP has been one of the key factors in the process. Satisfaction was also expressed about the logistical support and the basic services rendered by UNDP.

After drafting the decree the Jurist Commission directed its activities to the draft for the electoral law. However, the commission members were concerned by the fact that their contracts with UNDP will run out as of 30 September 2002 and they do not know whether there will be a continued period. They estimate that 70% of their drafting activities have been carried out as of today. The most problematic part is the regulations concerning the Electoral Court and the Population Register. The present rules automatically act in favour of the leading Congress party.

3.5.4 Conclusions and recommendations

The project with the National Congress is, in principle, highly relevant for the democratic process in Honduras. Nevertheless, considering the great number of shortcomings in the institution, we would suggest that the project be given a complete rest, at the very least until UNDP completes its on-going study of the Congress at large. Any future support to CIEL must be based on investigations of the actual situation and should start with a review of the CIEL organization and a technical revision of the existing installations. The information profile of the end-users, i.e. the Congress members, must be clearly defined, so as to allow the creation of an information system specifically designed to meet the real – not the supposed – information needs in the Congress. It is also highly recommendable that any future support to CIEL be integrated in a general support programme directed at the Congress and its institutions, in case other members of the international cooperation community should decide to work in this area.

As regards the Public Ministry it must be underlined that the observations made above on what the Sida/UNDP project appears to have actually done – in comparison with what it was supposed to do – do not pretend to represent a full-fledged project evaluation. It is very unfortunate that the evaluation made in 2001 did not leave a report; even if efforts were made now to at least partially substitute for this evaluation through a new gathering of concrete information, the time available did not allow any in-depth and detailed analysis of activities and results. It should also be pointed out here that the personnel of this project were – for one reason or another – less prepared and able to provide concrete information than were their counterparts in the other projects in the programme. As mentioned earlier, in the meetings more attention was spent on commenting problems surrounding the project and future needs in its area than on showing what has been done. The bi-monthly project reports are not very useful either, since they dedicate a lot of space to minute descriptions of administrative actions while less attention is paid to substance. In both ways, one gets the impression that the project management and staff themselves feel that not enough has been done.

The decision to support the ‘five special prosecutors’ in this project seems to be poorly founded, since the ‘special prosecutors’ exist in just a few places in the country. In the remaining areas all prosecutors are generalists and have to deal with all kinds of cases. As was stressed during interviews with prosecutors in the provinces the educational efforts in the project were directed to special prosecutors in the Tegucigalpa area and other bigger cities, while the offices in remote areas – the ones most in need of support – were left out. What is actually needed is that all prosecutor’s offices in the country are able to act as special prosecutors when necessary.

On 19 September 2002 the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) presented a plan for a Support Programme for Modernization of the Administration of Justice, directed at the Supreme Court of Justice, the Public Ministry and the Ministry for Security of Honduras. The programme would be financed through an IDB loan. This is Phase II of a programme that started in 1996, directed at the Judicial Power in Honduras, which includes the courts, the public defence, the judicial school, the prosecutors and other units of the Public Ministry and the executive power through the Security Ministry. The executive national organ is the Inter-institutional Commission for Penal Justice (CIJP⁴⁴) with representatives for the Supreme Court, the Public Ministry and the Security Ministry.

Support channelled through one organization instead of several donors will minimize the administration efforts for the receiving unit, such as reporting to the donors, meetings with evaluation teams and contact with the donor organizations. Also, a broader project perspective involving several receiving units from one sector of society, such as the judicial sector, could inspire to mutual projects and common efforts that otherwise might not have been thought of. One example is a common database for law texts; the Public Ministry has started to print compilations of law texts for different legal areas and are planning to scan them for access through the Ministry’s Intranet. By means of a MAN (Metropolitan Area Network) with other beneficiaries in the project, such as the Supreme Court of Justice, the costs and efforts for further storing and retrieval of legal documents in a common database could be shared. Such an integrated network is proposed in the IDB Programme Phase II, which has four main components: legislative improvements, education and training, physical infrastructure and technological modernization. The programme includes the components in the present Sida/UNDP support to the Public Ministry. We feel confident that joining Sida’s contribution to the major IDB programme would optimize the output.

The Electoral Reform project, the outcome of which will be basic for a democratic and transparent government with citizens’ participation, appears to show the UNDP management at its best. By careful monitoring of the political reality of the country and through persuasive diplomacy the UNDP has managed to carry this project to expected results so far. The funds spent have been put to good and efficient use.

For these reasons and with reference to what has been said above we recommend continued support to this project, to the extent that it may be necessary. So far a draft decree for constitutional reform has reached the Congress for deliberation and acceptance. When concluded, the intended reforms in this project will represent a giant step towards democratic governance in Honduras. The present support should be extended until the electoral law draft has been concluded and agreed upon by the Political and Jurists Commissions.

⁴⁴ CIJP: Comisión Interinstitucional de Justicia Penal

3.6 Role and performance of UNDP in the programme cycle management

One of the most challenging tasks in this evaluation is, no doubt, to emit a general judgement on UNDP's role and performance in the creation and execution of the Governance Programme, which could deserve to be called objective. There are, to our knowledge, no universal standards by which to measure the relevance, efficiency and efficacy of the work of cooperating agents and any comparison in this regard, between agents and between programmes and projects, must inevitably end up with a considerable load of subjectivity. However, we do try here to keep the objectivity criterion present and to base our observations and conclusions on facts and figures – as far as this is possible.

3.6.1 Situation and mission of UNDP

First of all, something should be said about UNDP's general situation, mission and working conditions and how these may affect its approaches and methods for project identification, design, execution, monitoring and evaluation. At least 15 or 20 years have now gone by since UNDP, at least in Latin America and the Caribbean, started to suffer from diminished funding and this is, naturally, a very negative factor for an organization that was set up to finance development and which actually did that for a long time. Any organization that finds itself facing this kind of difficulty must look for new paths to survival and new justifications for its existence.

At least by the second half of the 1980's, UNDP had discovered the possibility to act as a manager of projects funded totally or partially by other donors or by the host governments themselves (the cost-sharing concept was now being developed). One of the interesting early cases was Argentina, which may be commented as a sort of practical introduction to the topic. Here, the first civil Government (late 1983) – after a row of military dictatorships – needed a mechanism to help it establish a public administration with new people in it, on high posts. The Government knew the people they needed and had the money to pay them but they did not have the formal 'manning table' in which to insert them neither the procedures to do it quickly. It therefore turned to UNDP⁴⁵, which in a rather short period of time hired a couple of hundred national consultants, many of whom were not intended to be consultants at all but rather to carry out line functions. The UNDP input in the process was only to hire the individuals identified by the Government and to administrate their contracts; no substantive UNDP input was expected or delivered in these 'projects', neither at the design nor at the execution stage. For these services, UNDP charged administrative costs.

The cost-sharing mode of operation has spread and grown over the last 20 years until it has become the main line of work for UNDP in Latin America. In the particular case of Honduras, the 2001 Annual UNDP Report points out with satisfaction that the organization handled the financial execution of 50,5 million dollars that year, coming from 12 different members of the international aid community plus the Honduran Government itself. Attention is also paid to the growth of this figure over the last years: 12 million in 1998, 41 million in 1999 and 44 million in 2000. Nowhere in the report is there any information on how much UNDP contributed from its own funds, but an analysis made by the IDB shows that the UNDP's own share of the total reimbursable and non-reimbursable assistance to Honduras is about 0,12%. The Swedish contribution in Honduras is, according to this source, seven times as big as the UNDP financial input.

The mere fact that UNDP emphasizes the increasing execution of cost-sharing funds as a prime evidence of its own importance and success can lead an observer to expect, a priori, that the organization will dedicate a very important part of its time and energy on selling project ideas, creating

⁴⁵ Several of the Ministers and other high level members of the new civil government had worked for the UN system during the period of military rule so they knew what UNDP did and what UNDP might be able to do.

projects, finding financiers, negotiating cost-sharing agreements, becoming implementing agent of the projects – and charge administrative costs. To be perfectly clear, this is the main basis of subsistence for UNDP. While cooperating agencies in general do need to implement projects and spend their budgets in order to maintain and increase those budgets, UNDP is under an especially strong pressure to formulate and implement projects in a shorter perspective (or handle government funds for public procurement), in order to keep alive and well. This means, of course, that the search for quantity and speed may come to take precedence over the rigorous upholding of quality and good timing. The observations made earlier in this report about the formulation of the Sida/UNDP Governance Programme in Honduras suggest that such concerns are not unwarranted. One member of this evaluation team has had the opportunity to see similar situations in earlier UNDP programmes in Honduras and in Bolivia and Guatemala (all in 1999)⁴⁶. Furthermore, not even UNDP staff members themselves try very hard to deny the existence of this dilemma, although conversations on the matter often end up with a suggestion that things are getting better.

Now, the management of projects financed by third-party or Government funds is not the only important activity area for UNDP. The other UNDP role, which has become increasingly highlighted in recent years both by the organization itself and by other parties, is the one that could perhaps be called ‘facilitator of policy-making’ and which is referred to in the UNDP Programming Manual as follows:

“An essential strategy of the UNDP country office is to engage key government officials, and other stakeholders, in a dialogue on the policy framework for national development.”⁴⁷

In the case of Honduras this aspect is commented as follows in the 2001 Annual Report:

“... the UNDP has contributed as a facilitating entity, in the creation of forums for dialogue and in building of consensus between the government, the political parties and civil society. It has also focused its work on giving advice for the definition of public policies and the production of studies that should help in carrying out analysis that are necessary for decision-making.”

Earlier in this report, we have recognized, for instance, the important positive role that UNDP-Honduras has played in lobbying for the realization of activities related to gender equity (creation of INAM) and the role it is now playing with regard to preparation for electoral reform. On the other hand (although this is not an object of this evaluation) we have observed the work being done by the so-called ‘prospective unit’ in UNDP-Honduras, where the above-referred studies are being made. These studies are on the average of good quality and interesting per se, but the choice of certain subjects and the very academic style of writing in many cases put doubts into one’s mind as to how many readers (and who?) these publications will ever have, outside a restricted group of specialists. Some of the themes also appear to be rather distant from current and future development problems.

The point we want to make with the last couple of paragraphs is that UNDP sometimes appears to be a bit conceited about its influence on policy-making. So, if UNDP spends a vast amount of time and energy on resource mobilization, financial administration and procurement on the one hand and on high-level policy-making efforts on the other hand, the segment of activities that is liable to suffer is the one ‘in the middle’: realistic and down-to-earth programme and project design and hands-on day-to-day facilitating and monitoring of project execution.

⁴⁶ Refer to the following evaluation reports: Sida Evaluation 99/29 – “Apoyo al Programa Nacional Indígena en Bolivia”; and “Misión de Seguimiento y Evaluación de Proyectos de Reconstrucción y Desarrollo Comunitario en Guatemala, Honduras y Nicaragua”; Finnconsult Oy/Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland; March 2000.

⁴⁷ UNDP Programming Manual, December 2000; Chapter 4.1.1(b).

3.6.2 The UNDP management of the Governance Programme

In September–October 2002, the Sida/UNDP Governance Programme is managed in UNDP by the so called ‘Governance Cluster’, composed of one Director, one National Adviser on Governance, one International Adviser on Governance and Policy, two Programme Officers and two Programme Assistants. However, it is our understanding that the National Adviser on Governance has just been – or was about to be – recruited at the time of this evaluation and that the International Adviser is mainly dedicated to the Electoral Reform project, as a technical consultant or expert. In fact, the entire package of on-going projects is – for the purposes of monitoring and general support – divided between the two existing pairs of Programme Officer/Programme Assistant. The staff of the Governance Cluster will be strengthened shortly with one Junior Professional Officer and one UN Volunteer, who will assist with the judicial and human rights projects.

One of these teams handles the municipal development and gender equity projects, for a total amount of USD 1,437,840. This figure and all the following in this paragraph refer to the 2002 budgets. The other team is responsible for the projects related to the judicial system, Congress, statistics and some others, which add up to a total of USD 2,614,297. Six of the projects are financed exclusively by Sida (except some marginal sum from UNDP itself) and the Swedish contribution to these projects amounts to USD 2,604,013, which is 64% of the total package. In addition to this, Sida pays more than half the cost of the electoral reform project (Denmark and UNDP are the other contributors) and is also contributing to recent projects with the Armed Forces and in an anti-corruption project. So it can safely be said, without making a minute review of the exact figures, that Sida stands for at least two thirds of the financing of the overall programme that is handled by the UNDP Governance Cluster.⁴⁸

In order to have any precise information as to what management activities (and how much of them) UNDP actually carries out for the money it is paid in administrative costs, it would be necessary to do a time-study, which has of course not been possible in a short evaluation exercise like this. However, one can get some idea about the fulfilment of established monitoring activities by analysing the number of reports produced and tripartite meetings held, etc.

Table 2 on the next page provides figures on reporting, for the entire period of execution of the Governance Programme. The table is based on the documentation that UNDP delivered to the evaluation team, in two different instalments (it would have been too time-consuming and generally impractical for the evaluation team itself to make a physical search in the UNDP archives). When Sida-Tegucigalpa reviewed the initial figures in this table, they made a double-check in their own archives (on annual tri-partite review reports) and found many more reports than those which UNDP had provided to the evaluation team; these additional reports are indicated in parenthesis in the relevant column. It is quite likely that a similar situation would be found if Sida made an inventory of bi-monthly and ad hoc reports.

⁴⁸ The figures in this paragraph have been kindly provided by UNDP on special request by the evaluation team

Table 2. Substantive – technical project reporting

(number of reports from project start through September 2002)

Project	Bimonthly	Annual (trip. rev.)	Ad hoc or special	Final	Evaluation
Decentralization and municipal development	4	1	5		3
Strengthening of national statistics system	1	1	2		1
Support to the Population and Housing Census 2002		1 (+1)			1
Establishment of National Women's Institute (INAM)	1	(+2)	3		1
Policy of equal opportunities in poverty reduction		1 (+2)		1	1
Policy of equal opportunities in rural areas		(+3)			1
Support to the National Congress (CIEL)	1	1 (+2)	1		
Strengthening of the Public Prosecutor's Office	3	1 (+2)	2		
Electoral reform	3				
TOTAL	13	6 (+12)	13	1	8

The table shows that UNDP fulfills its expected regular monitoring activities in a satisfactory manner (in quantitative terms). The above-mentioned double-check made by Sida-Tegucigalpa on annual tripartite review reports, allows one to assume that the complete collection of such reports has in fact been found. The result is good, except that it is a bit surprising to see that the Decentralization and Municipal Development project has, evidently, had only one tri-partite review during its entire life. Another matter is the practical usefulness of the tripartite-review reports. Most of those seen by the evaluation team are made in a very particular format established by UNDP, based on quantitative rankings of different aspects and separate, short comments by different parties concerned, but with very little or no synthesis or analysis. In fact, they look more like raw materials for a report than a finished report and they do definitely not stimulate to reading. Anyhow, the reports themselves are probably less important than the meetings at which they are produced or discussed.

UNDP has been quite serious about fielding project or sub-programme evaluations. All projects, except the recently started electoral reform project have been evaluated, and the quality of the evaluation reports is generally good. The only dark spot here is the lack of an evaluation report (not of an evaluation!) for the Congress and Prosecutor's Office projects. The evaluation field work was carried out and a verbal debriefing was given but then the international team leader never delivered any written report. Unfortunately, UNDP paid him in full before receiving a report, so now it does not have any means of forcing a solution to this problem, other than a lawsuit. However, the practical value of this report would be considerably reduced now, a year later. Here it is, by the way, appropriate to ask what use is made of the evaluation reports. An evaluation exercise does not end with the evaluation report – it only ends if someone uses its conclusions and recommendations for some practical purpose. In the case of the Municipal Development project we have had the possibility to see for ourselves that the 2001 evaluation led to a redesign of the project – for the better. Sida-Tegucigalpa reports that the evaluation of the sub-programme on Gender Equity was decisive for not including PRAF in the 2002 programme. We have gathered no information as to what actions may have been taken on basis of the evaluations of the Census and INE projects; in any case, the first one was made at a very late stage to have any major consequences on the remainder of the project.

In this context, it is important to recall that while UNDP has the responsibility for the overall monitoring of these projects (which means among other things, making sure that meetings are held and reports produced), UNDP is not responsible for writing the reports and it is not the only agent responsible for the convening of meetings. These responsibilities rest basically on the so-called 'national

execution' agencies, except where a project is carried out under the (UNDP) direct execution formula. The question of division of duties and responsibilities between UNDP and national executing agencies seems to be surrounded by some obscurity or confusion in real life, no matter how well it may be described (in theory) in the UNDP Manual. A consequence of this is that evaluators hear all sorts of comments on UNDP from different projects and actors: there are people who feel that UNDP does not do enough and there are other people who think that UNDP takes over too much of project management responsibilities and rights. In the end, the most important comments to be made about the UNDP management of the Governance Programme and its component projects may be the following.

Firstly, since the Governance Programme started, there has been a considerable rotation of staff in UNDP, a phenomenon that must inevitably have negative effects on the continuity and conceptual stability of the project follow-up. The rotation of staff is a difficulty not only for UNDP, but also for Sida. However, the problem is potentially more threatening in UNDP, since the total size and internal movements of its personnel must be continuously adapted to the changing size and composition of its programme, which – as has been repeatedly pointed out – depends to a high degree on how much cost-sharing UNDP can mobilize over time and for what kinds of projects.

Secondly, the review of the nine projects in the programme has shown that there have been considerable differences in the intensity and in the perceived quality of the UNDP management, from one case to another, and that there have also been differences between different periods of time, in one and the same project; this is of course partly caused by the rotation of UNDP staff, but also by an identical problem on the national counterpart side.

Thirdly, it is not known how much time the staff of the Governance Cluster has dedicated to supporting and supervising on-going projects and how much they have spent on identification and formulation of new projects and on policy-related and administrative matters (refer to the discussion in the previous chapter). Although we cannot prove it with any hard facts, the general impression is that the UNDP staff has a very heavy work-load. Another way of putting it is that UNDP country offices (including the one in Honduras) have a tendency to take on an unlimited amount of work and responsibilities in order to grow and compete, while it is not always possible to increase or change the staffing situation at the same pace.

One conclusion that can be drawn from the above, without much hesitation, is that it would be both impossible and unfair to try to calculate some sort of cost-benefit rate for the UNDP management of the entire Governance Programme – any useful analysis of this could only be done on the project level. Anyhow, if Sida pays 3,5% in administrative costs⁴⁹ for the UNDP management and administration of these projects it means that Sida would have paid, in 2002, approximately USD 95.000 for having

⁴⁹ The December 1999 cost-sharing agreements say that “3,5% of the Swedish contribution may be used for programme administrative costs”, and a review of the different project documents confirms that the approved budgets do indeed specify absolute amounts for administrative costs that are equivalent to 3,5% of the Swedish contribution going to project implementation. A similar review of the 2002 “bridging project” documents, identified by the letter U (referring to the new Trust Fund agreement), reveal that the same 3,5% are applied for administrative costs this year, even though the Sida-UNDP agreement signed in March 2002 states that: “out of the contribution, a maximum of 10% may be used as support costs in accordance with Article 7 (a). and 3-5% as support costs in accordance with Article 7 (b) of the Trust Fund Agreement.” — The referred Article 7. Cost recovery of the Trust Fund agreement establishes that: “a portion of the Swedish contribution may be used by UNDP to cover support costs...These support costs include: (a) administrative and operational support costs, if any, paid to the executing and implementing entities; (b) costs incurred by UNDP in providing administration and handling service to the Trust Fund and its activities; 2. The level of support costs charged for item (b) above shall normally be between 3 per cent and 5 per cent. The total support costs for items (a) and (b) above shall not exceed 13 per cent of the total Sida contribution.

UNDP implementing projects for USD 2,7 million. Bearing in mind all the findings and considerations that are described above, including criticism and doubts, it is very unlikely that this sum of money could have bought any better management elsewhere.

There should, however, be possibilities in the longer perspective to have a better cost-effectiveness rate for project management and monitoring, either by decreasing the cost or by paying – what it takes – for a different style of project management and for a more intense project monitoring. As far as reduction of costs is concerned, the only alternative we can find would be to rely on national execution in the complete sense of the word and eliminate intermediaries (whether UNDP or any other). In such a case, the Sida office in Tegucigalpa would handle the project monitoring entirely by itself, in direct interaction with the national executing agency. A ‘better’ project management and monitoring (at a higher cost) could be achieved by sharing such responsibilities with other donor agencies which implement projects themselves, but we have difficulties in finding any concrete and recommendable alternative for this approach at the present time. The other way is to increase staff at the Sida office and combine this with execution of some programmes and projects through consulting companies and/or NGO.

Based on the analysis of the Governance Programme and its results, we believe that efforts should be made to have a stronger project management and monitoring in the future, even though it would cost more. It is probable that this would, in the long run, improve the impact of programmes and projects as well as the overall cost-impact rates.

3.6.3 The UNDP financial administration and acquisition services (Business Centre)

The 3,5% in administrative costs that Sida pays to UNDP includes contracting and procurement services, in addition to the substantive management and monitoring of the projects.

At the present time, the UNDP Business Centre in Tegucigalpa is composed of a Director and 32 staff members, divided between three departments or sections: Client Services (10), Acquisitions (11) and Contracts Administration (11). The Centre has been reorganized over the past year, with support from three different international management-consulting firms. In 2002, the Business Centre has put into operation a computerized administrative information system, which allowed it to quickly provide the following figures on its operations, on request of the evaluation team (Table 3):

Table 3. Business Centre operations 2001 and 2002

Type of operation	Number of operations	
	2001 (Jan – Dec)	2002 (Jan – Jun)
Acquisition of equipment	694	363
Individual consultant contracts (national)	351	336
Individual consultant contracts (internat.)	116	111
Hiring of personnel in group (national)	2237	2956
Hiring of personnel in group (internat.)	7	14
Total	3405	3780

According to current projections, UNDP expects to acquire goods and services for a total of USD 31,1 million in 2002. The main part of these funds will come from the Honduran Government (21,7 million). The remainder will be from: IDB (2,8 million); World Bank (1,8); IFAD (0,6) and finally 4,2 million from all other donors together.

As regards acquisitions of equipment and materials in 2001, they fell into the following categories: computer equipment, office supplies, electric and electronic equipment, advertising campaigns, software, communications equipment and vehicles, plus equipment for hospital laundries. In 2002, medicines and construction works have been added to the list. With respect to hiring of consultants and other personnel, we find it interesting to quote the following sentences from the 2001 Report on UNDP Honduras:

“In addition to the 3.500 acquisitions made in 2001, mention should be made of the support provided [by UNDP] to the National Census project, financed by the Governments of Sweden and Japan, UNFPA, USAID, and IDB. For this Census, UNDP ... took charge of the recruitment, selection, and training of the field staff, hiring 27.000 enumerators in a period of approximately 2 months. Also, UNDP made some 60.000 financial transactions in the field, in a period of two weeks, with a “zero mistake” result.”⁵⁰

In all the interviews that the evaluation team has had with the directors and other staff of the nine projects in the Governance Programme, questions have been made about UNDP's performance as a purchasing and contracting agent. Some projects simply express a general satisfaction, while others complain about slowness. One remark heard more than once is that it takes a couple of months to buy a couple of computers; in one case it was maintained that the corresponding national institutions would have done it quicker themselves – some spokesmen talk about an ‘excessive bureaucracy’. UNDP replies to this that, to some extent, processes are slower than what they should be, but that improvement is under way, especially after the above-mentioned reorganization. On the other hand, UNDP points out (and this sounds very plausible) that some projects do not fill out their requests for acquisition with total correctness and completeness, so that UNDP has to go back to them for clarification. To this chain of arguments one could add, finally, that until some time ago UNDP did not take sufficient action to ensure that the project managers and administrators actually understood all the rules and procedures (refer also to comments in audit reports.)

Another opinion, heard in one case, is that UNDP does not buy what the customer wants (a special brand of computer hardware). The UNDP policy is to invite bids for equipment (different procedures for different amounts) and the final selection is made on basis of price and technical specifications, not on basis of brand names. This means that a project which has a four wheel drive vehicle in the budget does not get a Toyota Land Cruiser just because the coordinator thinks it looks nice; it may get another make with equal characteristics, but cheaper. The Congress project maintains that UNDP's selection of computers has caused compatibility problems with existing equipment; the evaluation team has not tried to verify if this is true or not. Evidently, a situation like this could arise – it is the responsibility of the UNDP Programme Officers to help avoiding it.

In conclusion, the information gathered both from UNDP and from the evaluated projects strongly suggests that the UNDP Business Centre offers a good service at a very reasonable price. The size of this operation must, no doubt, produce an economy of scale and it is quite likely that in some cases it helps to avoid corrupt practices. An occasional mistake or disagreement with a project should not be taken by anybody as a reason not to use this service. Nevertheless, UNDP should be recommended to make even bigger efforts to give good and timely training to national project executors about the acquisition procedures so as to avoid problems caused by simple misunderstandings.

3.6.4 Project audits

UNDP has facilitated the following numbers of audit reports to the evaluation team:

⁵⁰ UNDP Honduras, Annual Report 2001; page 27

Decentralization and municipal development: 2
 Support to the National Congress: 2
 Support to the Prosecutor's Office: 2
 Policy of equal opportunities in poverty reduction (PRAF): 1
 National Statistics System (INE): 1
 Establishment of National Women's Institute (INAM): 1
 Policy of equal opportunities in poverty reduction (PRONADERS): 1
 Support to the National Census: 1
 Electoral reform: 0 (not yet due for this more recently started project).

The review made of the available audit reports showed that in general terms, the management of the national execution projects has suffered from some weaknesses, but not too many or too serious in comparison with many cases known from other countries. There have been no extreme problems and some of the problems reported could be seen as almost unavoidable. The most frequent comments in the audit reports are the following:

- Lack of reconciliation between project expenditures and UNDP expenditures;
- Lack of adequate accounting records;
- Weaknesses in internal control systems;
- Some purchases not sufficiently supported by documentation;
- Late delivery of UNDP manuals and insufficient training of project staff regarding rules and regulations (particularly a couple of years ago);
- Lack of documentation on tripartite reviews and follow-up visits by UNDP programme officers;
- High rotation among UNDP programme officers.

It is important to note that, in those cases where at least two audits have been made, the second one reports a very high degree of improvement on the points criticized in the first audit, as regards matters that the project management itself could do anything about.

The audits mentioned here are project audits contracted by UNDP and paid against the project budgets. We have not seen any external or internal auditing of the UNDP, and in this regard it should be mentioned that the Sida office in Tegucigalpa has had considerable problems in reconciling successive UNDP project budget revisions with the records on actual amounts of Swedish funds available.

3.7 Cost-impact rate of the Governance Programme

One of the expected results of this evaluation is some indication of the cost-efficiency of the Governance Programme. Cost-efficiency refers to the relation between costs and outputs (or products) of the projects. We will touch upon this matter in this chapter, but will dedicate more attention to the cost-impact rate, which we find to be of much more interest. In governance or other 'social' projects, outputs can be produced with good cost-efficiency, without therefore leading to any fulfilment of objectives or without having any impact at all. Installation of a database in a National Congress is one good example of this.

Here again, it must be recalled that the programme is composed of projects in very different areas, for which no one, single formula for a cost-benefit analysis could be applied. Therefore, the analysis of this matter must also be made on a project-by-project basis.

First of all, we have reviewed the different project and sub-programme evaluation reports produced in 2001 and have found - not surprisingly! – that this aspect has been left virtually untouched in all the cases. This is, however, a severe set-back, because making only one serious cost-benefit analysis of a ‘soft’ project in a ‘soft’ area like governance is already a hard task – making nine serious analyses of that kind in a few weeks (in addition to many other chores) is impossible. Therefore, many of the following comments are of a rather intuitive nature.⁵¹

The 2001 evaluation of the National Statistics System project (INE) states that: i) “the degree of effectiveness of the project...is considered adequate, particularly in view of the financial scenario on which it has worked; ii) “the efficiency shown by the project in the utilization of available resources is considered adequate, in relation to the time of execution as well as with regard to the technical and operational capacities acquired by INE”; iii) “the cost of renting the building where INE is housed is favourable in comparison with current market prices...but the scarcity of vehicles and the lack of territorial delegations increase the costs of gathering statistical information”. These remarks refer, of course, not to the cost-impact rate but to the operational efficiency of INE. However, they can be used to argue that the 2,2 million dollars that Sida has spent on this project has allowed the creation for the first time in Honduran history of a reasonably well-functioning statistics institute and the beginning of a national statistics system. This is an absolute necessity for the country and the future return on this investment is incalculable but, most likely, very high.

The evaluation of the Census project suggests that: i) “the degree of efficacy achieved by the project is considered to be outstanding...[in view of prevailing conditions]”; ii) “the project has...administrated its funds in an efficient and transparent manner”; iii) “the main effect of the project is the execution of the 2001 Census, a key event in the reconstruction of statistical practice in Honduras”. This evaluation team has not been in a position to compare the final cost of the Honduran census with the cost of similar projects in other countries, but since the project budget was prepared with advice from a UN census expert, we allow ourselves to presume that the cost calculation was adequate. The final comment on the cost-impact rate of the Census project must be the same as the one given for the INE project. Therefore, we feel confident in suggesting that this sub-programme has terminated with a perfectly acceptable, or even very good, cost-impact rate.

As regards the project for establishment of the National Women’s Institute, we find it impracticable to suggest any cost-impact rate at all (and the 2001 evaluation of the three gender equity projects makes no reference whatsoever to economic aspects). In our view, the creation of the Institute per se is only the first step in a long process, and the ‘worth’ of this undertaking can be established only in a very long perspective. If INAM manages to improve women’s social, political and economic participation over the next decade or two, allowing them to play the part they are supposed to play in the implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy, this half of the Honduran population is likely to produce a significant added value to the national economy. Something similar can be said about the equal opportunities project with the Ministry of Agriculture, although it seems unnecessarily generous of UNDP to have budgeted one million dollars to a project like this (in the end, Sida contributed only USD 470.000). Finally, the equal opportunities project with PRAF appears to represent a lost investment, due to its inadequate preparation and lack of ownership and interest on part of the responsible national authority.

⁵¹ There are two very big problems with cost-impact analysis, especially with governance and other social or otherwise soft projects. The first one is to give a value to the effects or the impact of a project and the other one is the counter-factual, i.e. what would have happened without the project. In most cases, the latter problem can only be approached by some more or less intelligent guesswork.

The 2001 evaluation of the Decentralization and Municipal Development project does also not venture into the areas of cost-benefit, cost-impact rates or anything of the sort, despite the fact that at least this one is a project, where there are some possibilities to calculate values of the project effects, with some basis in hard facts. For instance, in the Municipality of Santa Rosa de Copán, the annual municipal income has grown from 8,5 to 25,8 million lempiras over the four-year period between 1997 and 2001. If we assume that the increase was achieved in equal parts every year and that it is, to a considerable degree, a consequence of the project (and there are some reasons to do so), then the conclusion is that the project has produced an added value, only on this account, of 43 million lempiras (equivalent to about 2,5 million dollars at current exchange rate). This is 86% of the entire Sida contribution to the project. Similar developments have taken place at least in Puerto Cortés and San Pedro Sula. Furthermore, there are other project effects that could be quantified, such as: reduction of municipal expenditures on personnel, promotion of economic and productive activities among the inhabitants, improved public services (which can also be given a price tag), etc. There is no doubt in our minds, that this project has reached a very good cost-impact rate already at this stage, and that the rate will keep improving even more in the future. It is a case that should be subject to an in-depth and rigorous cost-benefit analysis at some point in time, to enrich the knowledge about these matters among cooperating agencies.

The projects with the Congress and the Public Prosecutor's Office do not seem to have been particularly cost-efficient (cost-output rate) and the elaboration of budgets for this type of projects should probably be done in a little more prudent and belt-tightening manner than was the case here. Anyhow, to calculate a cost-impact rate for this kind of projects is even more difficult than in the case of the gender equity projects. How much is a fair trial worth in monetary terms? How much a Congress that can elaborate better laws?

The main conclusions of the above are two: i) the cost-impact rates of most of the nine projects in the programme are very difficult to establish, and to the extent it were possible to do it in a reasonably scientific manner, they would most certainly turn out to be very different from one case to the other; ii) the overall impression is that the total impact of all the projects (the programme) so far may have justified the investment to a satisfactory degree and – if not – it is quite likely to do so in the future.

4 Conclusions

1. The Sida/UNDP Governance Programme in Honduras was not designed as a programme and, consequently, it could not – even in principle – be executed as a programme. It is a collection of projects, elaborated at different points in time mainly by UNDP and different Honduran entities. The programme label was evidently put on afterwards, in connection with the discussions with Sida on financing of a basket of projects. The programme objective as formulated in the programme document is not useful for any evaluation of programme impact. It is questionable if the disparate contents of this portfolio of projects should ever have been considered as material for a programme, in a functional sense of the word. The ‘programme approach’ in this case has been nothing more than weakly applied theory and it has had very little or no effects on the results and impact of the components of the programme. However, the fact that the projects in this basket have been financed mainly by one single agent (Sida) and managed by one single agent (UNDP) may have represented a small administrative advantage, especially with respect to the possibilities of transferring funds from one project to another, when appropriate. Finally it should be said that, even if the nine projects did not compose a programme, none of them is unjustified or marginal with regard to the strategies of Sida and the Honduran Government. On the other hand, the contents of this basket of projects could have had a better composition if a real programming exercise had been undertaken.
Refer pages 2 and 4–7.
2. The realization of Sida’s and UNDP’s ‘programme ambitions’⁵² was further hampered by the unfulfilling of UNDP expectations for contributions in at least one case and by Sida’s general difficulties with regard to its financial planning. Sida’s initial allocation of funds to different projects appears to have been affected by the ‘post-Mitch hurry’; funding was approved by Sida on a sub-programme or project-by-project basis and at different points in time, despite the supposed programme approach; problems arose for UNDP and the projects due to the loss of value of the Swedish currency in 2001; UNDP did not manage to provide timely and correct reports to Sida on the changing status of funds and budgets and this, in turn, forced Sida to spend much time and effort just on financial monitoring, taking time from the substantive follow-up of individual projects as well as programme.
3. Two of the sub-programmes in the programme did foresee a close interaction between their component projects: i) the ones dealing with the National Statistics System and the one supporting the 2000 Population and Housing Census and; ii) the three projects concerned with gender equity or policies of equal opportunities for women. However, due to insufficient analysis at the design stage of the real conditions for the creation of new public institutions and also as a result of unforeseeable events (for instance Hurricane Mitch) the practical collaboration and the synergy expected in these cases never materialized. It is only in 2002, that some cooperation or exchange has started to take place between INAM and SAG and between INE and the Census project. These projects, like all of the projects in the Governance Programme, could have done practically everything that they have done, without the existence of any of the others. *Refer pages 9–10 and 17.*
4. It follows from the above, that any evaluation of effects or impact of the programme must be done at the project level. Following are the main conclusions in this respect:

⁵² This evaluation has not found any signs of any programme ambition on the Honduran side with regard to these projects; this may be a symptom of realistic thinking with regard to the governance programme in particular or it may be a result of the simple fact that host governments have their own programmes ‘already’ (Government Plan, ERP, etc.)

Strengthening of national capacities to facilitate the decision-making process

The project for establishment of a national statistics system has accomplished its objectives, since it has been decisive in establishing INE and since this institution is now in operation and is doing a job of apparently good quality. Likewise, the Census project has achieved its objective to a high degree, since the field work for the Census was done successfully, this being the most difficult part of the exercise. The weak point in this project (or in these projects) is that the analysis and publication of the Census results have suffered an undue delay, because of the INE project and the Census project having been out of phase with each other from beginning to end. The census started before INE was in place, which may not have been the best of strategies; then the processing of the data was transferred to INE when it had already started in the executing unit of the census, with the result that technical discrepancies arose between the two entities. This so-called transition may not have been the ideal approach either. *Refer pages 10–11.*

Support to the formulation and implementation of gender equity policies

The project for establishment of INAM has reached its objective since INAM does now exist and is carrying out very important work in terms of socializing and implementing the equal opportunities policies. One may venture to say that INAM and perhaps even the equal opportunities policies would not have existed at all today if the Sida/UNDP support had not been forthcoming. The equal opportunities project with SAG has produced some positive results, although it has suffered from internal organizational and policy reshufflings in the Ministry. The equal opportunities project with PRAF led to some organizational and training work with women's organizations but the credit component of the project ended up in failure, due to the incompatibility of the project's methodological proposals with those of PRAF. This happened despite the fact that the project was designed in dialogue with PRAF itself. *Refer pages 12 and 17.*

Decentralization and municipal development

The single project in this sub-programme has produced very important results and has initiated very interesting processes in at least three of the five participating municipalities. For various possible reasons there was a long delay in doing any work regarding support to the overall decentralization process in the country; this has been done only after the evaluation and redesign of the project in the latter half of 2001. Even though the project has not done exactly what it was (vaguely) expected to do, it is our opinion that it has been very successful at the municipal level and that the Sida investment in the project has been highly justified. The project has opened up new avenues for local governance and development, which should be an important area for support in the future, from Sida, UNDP and the international cooperation in general. *Refer pages 21–23.*

Institutional strengthening of the legislative system and the application of justice

This sub-programme was initially composed of two completely unrelated projects:

- i) National Congress – Centre for Electronic Data-Processing and Legislative Studies and;
- ii) The Office of the Public Prosecutor – Five special prosecutors. To these was added, in 2001, the Electoral Reform project. The Congress project is very far from accomplishing its objectives, mainly due to lack of involvement and even of interest on part of the presumed users of the database. It suffers from politicking and staff rotation. The Public Prosecutor's project does not seem to have achieved much at the local and regional levels. The one thing that, more than anything else, has changed the entire scenario for this initiative is the approval of a new penal process code in early 2002, which makes completely new demands on all the prosecutors in Honduras, both of the specialized and the general type. Too much time and money seem to have gone into the efforts to create a web site and an Intranet, none of which is so far in use. The overall impression is that this project has not 'found itself' yet, neither in terms of management nor in terms of strategy. *Refer pages 26, 29–30 and 33.*

5. This evaluation has not clearly identified any particular unforeseen negative effects of any of the projects in the programme. It may be said, however, that personnel of the terminated project with PRAF feel some concern that the project may have created expectations among women's organizations, which were in the end left unfulfilled. In terms of unforeseen positive effects, we do feel that the municipal development project has made achievements that go beyond what was hoped for, for instance in the areas of citizen's participation and inter-municipal association. *Refer pages 17 and 21–23.*
6. It is not possible at this time to determine with any certainty or precision how much substantive participation Sida really had in the design of the governance programme, but all the observations made suggest that it was not much. One gets the feeling that Sida may have 'bought' a ready-made programme from UNDP 'off the shelf', rather than anything else. This is not the best way to proceed. UNDP's programme and project design work is inevitably affected by its need to create projects, look for resources for them and become the implementing agent, so as to ensure its own growth or survival on basis of the administrative costs it charges. Sometimes this may lead to good projects but sometimes it may also lead to a sacrifice of quality on the altar of quantity and speed; the Census project is one case in point – UNDP signed the project without having secured all of the necessary funding. On the other hand, UNDP's neutral status and prestige in Honduras is of very positive importance in certain cases; UNDP has proven to be effective in lobbying for interventions of a highly political and generally difficult character and to promote dialogue between different parties. The final conclusion to be drawn from this is that Sida should continue to collaborate with UNDP but in a more selective manner and with much more participation of its own in programme/project identification and design. At this stage, Sida should also ensure that attention is given in the first place to initiatives of a truly Honduran origin. *Refer pages 35–37.*
7. UNDP's performance as technical manager and supporting and monitoring agent for the Sida-financed governance projects is difficult to assess across the board. In this regard, very different situations seem to have prevailed in different projects and at different points in time. In some cases UNDP has evidently not intervened strongly enough to solve problems, to keep projects on the right track and to have them advance according to time plans. In other cases, the opposite seems to have occurred; UNDP has taken over functions and made decisions that would rather belong to the national executing agency or the project coordinator. In some cases, of course, there seems to have been a good balance. The overall conclusion is that the UNDP project management has been at least good enough to justify global administrative costs of 3,5% – this statement is made bearing in mind that we cannot suggest any other institution that could provide the same kind and quality of services at a lower price. The procurement services provided by the UNDP Business Centre are generally good and their cost is included in the 3,5%. However, the real issue for further discussion should not be if a 'UNDP-style of management' could be acquired cheaper from someone else; the question is if it is possible to get a 'better' management in some way, no matter if it is more costly. *Refer pages 38–40.*
8. The Honduran ownership of the Governance Programme has been weaker than what it should ideally be. There was never a national 'owner' of the programme as a whole, neither at the design nor at the execution stage. Also, the ownership has been diluted by the creation of temporary executing agencies. In the case of the Decentralization and Municipal Development project, the national responsibility was put in the hands of the five Mayors who formed an Executive Committee, but a long time passed without this Committee ever meeting. Despite the general weaknesses in terms of ownership, there seem to be good perspectives for sustainability of the results achieved by the statistics and the gender equity projects, and also – paradoxically – by the municipal development projects (despite the problem with the Executive Committee, there is a high degree of appropriation of the project among most of the municipalities). The worrisome cases in terms of

sustainability are the projects with the Congress and the Public Prosecutor's Office; the projects here do not seem to have achieved much of integration into the respective national institutions. Finally, with regard to the sustainability aspect, it must be pointed out that none of the projects in this programme contains any exit strategy.

9. It may perhaps look like a contradiction when on the one hand the governance 'programme' is strongly criticized as a programme while, on the other hand, several of the projects are deemed to have been quite successful and useful. Of course, this is no contradiction at all: it just means – and we repeat this once again – that the project successes are not a merit of the so-called programme approach, but a merit of each of the projects themselves or rather of the people who have worked in and with them. These accomplishments would no doubt have been made without calling this a programme. Chapter 6 – Lessons learned contains some other thoughts on the applicability and usefulness of the programme approach, which we believe to be relevant not only for the Honduran case but universally.

5 Recommendations

1. The National Statistics Institute needs additional external support and we fully agree with Sida's intention to collaborate here by means of a USD 2 million contribution to the national counterpart component of an IDB loan to INE; a formal decision in this regard is expected to be taken shortly. In addition to this, Sida and UNDP should closely monitor the developments in INE concerning the publication of the Census results.
2. The execution of the project with the National Congress – CIEL has already been slowed down by UNDP, reportedly to wait for the results of a general study of the problems in and around the Congress. In our opinion, the whole project should be terminated where it stands now and a close look should be taken by Sida and UNDP together on how to save what has been done and to retake the whole process anew (through a new project) with a more realistic perspective and with all the necessary attention given to the true needs and capacities of the Congress members and other users. Efforts must also be made to eliminate harmful political influences on the management of this project. If a new project is undertaken, we recommend it for implementation by UNDP, for reasons analysed elsewhere in this study and also because it would, simply, be better to continue with the same Sida/UNDP partnership than to introduce new agents in an on-going endeavour.
3. The project with the Public Prosecutor's Office is also an undertaking that has not reached any kind of conclusion. Sida/UNDP should monitor this project very closely during its last months to see to it that the remaining project funds are put to the best possible use. Then, Sida should wait and see what happens with the 30 million dollars IDB loan to the judicial sector, which has one component specifically for the Prosecutor's Office. It is possible that this loan/project may need to be complemented by specific supports to the special and general prosecutors at the local and regional levels. It is a matter that Sida and UNDP should follow up together, in direct dialogue with the recently established national Executing Unit for the loan and with IDB.
4. It is possible that the Electoral Reform project will need additional support in order to finalize the processes that are already under way and it is also possible – and even desirable – that additional work be done to proceed from consensus to action in this area. Sida should follow up this matter closely and take a favourable position in principle to new requests for support that may arise.
5. Since the Poverty Reduction Strategy is the basic framework for development in Honduras over the coming years and since it is necessary to create vectors and agents and strengthen institutions that are essential in this area, we recommend that Sida consider a large-scale programme for municipal development combined with implementation of the policies for equal opportunities for women. The programme can contain projects for strengthening of the Ministry of Government and Justice, the National Women's Institute and the Association of Honduran Municipalities at the central level, but the bulk of its activities should be at the local level. One recommendable approach would be to select a specific geographical area (a number of neighbouring municipalities and/or a river basin) and work there with support to the local governments and municipal administrations, strengthening of civil society participation and socialization and implementation of the equal opportunities policies. Such a programme (or a component project) should also spend increasing attention to economic and productive activities in the area of intervention. It is good to increase the municipalities' capacities for collecting taxes and increase their incomes but, at the end of the day, it is also necessary to increase the income of the inhabitants, so that they have something to pay the taxes with. When selecting a geographical area, consideration should be given to those municipalities where the current Sida/UNDP project has been working and where inter-municipal associations are already germinating (the Río Higuito basin and the Sula Valley).

6. The proposed Municipal and Local Governance Programme should be very carefully designed by Sida itself, through a preparatory assistance (or first project phase) over a period of at least 6 months, implemented by a consulting company or an NGO or a combination of both. This work should be done with the perspective of having the full project executed through a similar arrangement. We do believe that this programme or project should have a strong Swedish/Sida presence and consequently we do not recommend it for UNDP implementation or for implementation by any other intermediary.⁵³

In comparison with the current project, the new programme/project should have the following general characteristics:

- It should be designed more as a process than as a project, meaning flexibility, capacity for quick reaction to changes in the environment, less dependency on the logical framework but more attention spent on a solid base-line study
 - It should have its management unit in the area of intervention (not in Tegucigalpa)
 - It should have a longer duration, more long-term and less short-term personnel
 - Sida should be more visible and the project may make more use of international expertise in addition to the local ones
 - It should have a management mechanism that would ensure a higher degree of national ownership and more participation of Honduran entities in the decision-making
 - It should contain mechanisms that would help to connect the municipal/local development with other Swedish-financed interventions (e.g. education and health)
7. Other areas that could be considered for a future Sida-supported Governance Programme, keeping in mind the Poverty Reduction Strategy, are (in order of priority):
- Consolidation of the mechanisms for follow-up and evaluation of programmes and projects under execution and to be executed (i.e. a ‘public investment system’); refer Government Plan 2002–2006 (GP), page 73);
 - Improvement and implementation of rules and regulations concerning employment and salaries in the public sector (GP, page 74);
 - Definition and implementation of a municipal career system (GP, page 90);
 - Institutional support to provincial Governor’s Offices (Gobernaciones Políticas Departamentales), which are to be redefined (or defined for the first time) in the Law on Municipalities (GP, page 91).

Needless to say, it will be very important to decide on new areas of intervention in consultation with the other donors present in Honduras, through the well-established G15 group and with the seven technical committees (“Mesas Sectoriales”) that are working under the coordination of the Ministry of the Presidency. As regards development strategies and programmes, the Honduran society and government as well as the cooperating agents are already very well equipped with such. Annex II contains our own attempt to provide a simple, comparative analysis of the various strategies or principles that are valid at the moment and for the next few years, as far as governance is concerned.

⁵³ This may be the place to refer to Sida Evaluation 00/30 on Cooperation for Democracy and Human Rights in Nicaragua, 1977 -2000 (by D’Angelo, Uggla and Faroppa) which states in one of the conclusions (in our own translation): “Sida made some mistakes in managing projects through multilateral agencies. Sida entrusted the monitoring of project execution exclusively to the administrating agency...UNICEF...which had as a consequence that the Swedish cooperation lost the direct contact with its national counterparts.

8. In order to increase Sida's direct participation in the design and management of a Governance Programme and/or projects in Honduras it would appear appropriate to add two more professional staff members to the Sida office in Tegucigalpa. This should be done as soon as possible, since the bridging projects for 2002 are in their final phases and require close monitoring at this stage and, of course, since an important amount of work should be done urgently on the identification and formulation of a new programme.

6 Lessons Learned

The main lesson learned from the execution of the Sida/UNDP Governance Programme in Honduras is that, in general, much more effort and care has to be put in at the programme and project identification and design stage, than what was done here in 1996–98. This is a work that has to be given all the time and resources it needs. We do not refer here to the relevance aspect or to the logical framework approach in the first place (although the LFA is very important for certain types of project) but to a realistic, down-to-earth institutional, political and financial analysis and to the due consideration of timing factors, in other words to the feasibility of the projects. It may (perhaps) be the duty of the international cooperating agents to promote important policies and related projects and to get them done quickly, but the pushing should not go too far – not beyond the real degree of preparedness and will on part of the host country and, even less so, beyond what the promoters can safely promise to pay for. Some of the projects commented above demonstrate that too much hurry and the acceptance of too many loose suppositions in the beginning are likely to be punished by unnecessary delays and deceptions later on.

Another lesson is that the so-called ‘programme approach’ should be used only when there are some good reasons and conditions to use it and when everybody concerned have a clear and shared understanding of what the concept means. The simple gluing on of a programme label *ex post* does not add any value to an intervention. We do believe that there can be reasons and conditions for Sida to try to apply the programme approach in the area of governance and others over the coming years – in Honduras and elsewhere – but then the programme should be sketched first and the projects designed in the second place. Also, a national owner of the whole programme must be identified and be part of the programming exercise from the beginning. It should be noted also that one can have a programme in any area which includes some projects, while having at the same time other related projects outside of the programme. Use of the programme approach (in our definition of the concept!) should not be seen as an ever-present obligation but as an alternative.

It should be recalled that most or all governments have programmes and policies of their own. There is no absolute necessity for the external cooperation agents to try to make programmes within programmes – the important thing on their side is to coordinate with each other and with the host country in order to avoid duplication of efforts and to fill important gaps. But this can be achieved on a project-by-project basis just as well as on a ‘programme’ basis.

The final comment we wish to make is not about a lesson learned only from the Sida/UNDP Governance Programme in Honduras, but a lesson (or a philosophy) of a very universal character, whose validity seems to be reconfirmed once and again. It says that Governance Programmes are intertwined with policy-making and that external interventions in policy-making in aid-receiving countries should be made with humbleness. One author on the subject points out that: “Some would argue that democratic values and human rights are basic needs of people everywhere, no matter what their cultural background, and donors should do what they can to ensure that they have them. But others would take the view that these need to grow naturally from the cultural ‘soil’, and cannot be easily transplanted from outside.”⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Basil Edward Cracknell in “Evaluating Development Aid – Issues, problems and solutions”

Annex I

The Swedish/UNDP Democratic Governance Programme in Honduras

Project number	Project title	Approval dates		Execution dates		Financing (USD)		
		UNDP	Sida	Start	End	Sida	Budget A	Diff.
HON/98/003 HON/02/U13	Decentralization and municipal development	9 Jul 1998	19 Jan 2000	Jul 1998	Dec 2002	2.898.105	3.056.355	(158.250)
HON/97/022 HON/02/U14	Strengthening of the national statistics system	10 Mar 1999	22 Dec 1999	Jul 2000	Dec 2002	2.225.332	2.447.372	(222.040)
HON/97/023	Institutional support to the Population and Housing Census 2000	4 Sep 1998	19 Jan 2000	Sep 1998	Feb 2002	6.720.328	9.770.296	(3.049.968)
HON/97/021 HON/02/U11	Support to the establishment of a National Women's Institute	10 Mar 1999	22 Dec 1999	Mar 1999	Dec 2002	1.381.758	1.016.818	364.940
HON/98/011	Equal opportunities in the area of poverty reduction	25 Mar 1999	22 Dec 1999	Mar 1999	Dec 2001	982.256	1.000.000	(17.744)
HON/98/012 HON/02/U13	Support to the execution of a policy of equal opportunities in rural areas	n.a.	22 Dec 1999	?	Dec 2002	470.058	1.000.000	(529.942)
HON/98/019 HON/02/U15	Support to the National Congress	13 Apr 1999	22 Dec 1999	Apr 1999	Dec 2002	1.570.558	1.500.000	70.558
HON/97/007 HON/02/U16	Strengthening of the Public Prosecutor's Office	6 May 1999	22 Dec 1999	Aug 1999	Dec 2002	1.395.343	1.100.000	295.343
HON/02/U17	Electoral reform	12 Apr 2002	3 Mar 2002	2001	Dec 2002	144.521	144.251	0
Totals						17.787.989	21.035.092	(3.247.103)

Annex II

The subject of governance in various strategies for development and international cooperation in Honduras; 1999–2006

Stockholm Declaration; 1999	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP); 2001–	Government Plan; 2002–2006	Sida's Regional Strategy; 2001–2005	Sweden's Cooperation with Honduras; 2001–2005	Country Cooperation Framework UNDP; 2002–2006
Reconstruct and transform the countries on the basis of an integrated approach, transparency and good governance	Consolidate the National Anticorruption Council Deepen structural reforms, modernization of public administration Attack the weaknesses of the judicial system (disincentive to investors)	Combat corruption Modernize the state (stream-line public administration) Strengthen judicial system (security for investments)	Strengthen rule of law (instit. support to judicial system; prevention of crime and violence) Good governance (modernize public administration; combat corruption;)	Modernization of Congress Electoral reform Public administ. reform Support to judicial system	Support National Anti-Corruption Committee Reform key institutions: Congress, Supreme Court, National Electoral Tribunal, armed forces and, if requested, political parties
Consolidate democracy and good governance, strengthening decentralization with active participation of civil society	Decentralization Increase the participation of lower-income people in policy formulation and decision-making Raise the quality of political representation of the population (functioning of the legislature, innovations in parliamentary procedures and reforms in the systems of civic representation)	Strengthen judicial system (equality before the law; independence of state powers) Modernize the state (private sector particip.) Participatory democracy (electoral reform; dialogue state-civil society) Decentralization (transfer competences, resources and decision-making to local governments)	People's participation in political processes (electoral reform; citizens' education; integration of women and ethnic groups) Good governance (economic equity; decentralize economic resources and political power to local governments)	"Decentralization, as a method for governing the society, should be the main area for Swedish support" Municipal development Support to development of mass media and journalism	Decentralization and municipal capacity-building (policy advice, programme design and implementation) Consolidation of local development management capacity under the leadership of municipalities

Promote the respect for human rights as a permanent objective, incl. equal opportunities (women, children, ethnic groups and other minorities)	Guarantee public safety, social peace and the effective enjoyment of fundamental human rights	Strengthen judicial system (human rights) Human rights (National Commission; (children, youth, elderly, handicapped, AIDS patients) Development among ethnic groups Gender equity (women's social, political, cultural and econom. particip.)	Strengthen rule of law (human rights; women; children) Gender equity Support to Special Prosecutors and Human Rights Commissioner Gender-relevant initiatives through the National Institute for Women	Gender equity Support to Special Prosecutors and Human Rights Commissioner Gender-relevant initiatives through the National Institute for Women	Support to Special Prosecutors and Human Rights Commissioner Gender-relevant initiatives through the National Institute for Women
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Appendix 1

Terms of Reference

Evaluation of a Swedish/UNDP Governance Programme in Honduras

INTRODUCTION TO SIDA

Sida is the Swedish government agency for bilateral international development cooperation and most of Sweden's cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe. The Parliament and the Government decide on the development cooperation budget, the countries with which Sweden shall have programmes of development cooperation as well as the focus of cooperation.

Sida supports activities in almost 120 countries, including the partner countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Most of the resources are allocated to the twenty or so countries with which Sida has extensive, long-term programmes of cooperation. The framework of cooperation is specified in special country strategies and regulated in agreements between Sida and the government of each partner country.

Sida's contributions are based on the changes the partner countries wish to implement and are prepared to allocate funds to. Sida's task is to assess the type of contributions that can give results and then to provide the know-how and capital required. Each contribution is carefully studied and evaluated. Sida's support to any project ceases as soon as the project is able to operate independently of Sida funding.

Sida operates through some 1,500 partners in cooperation, mostly Swedish. These are companies, popular movements, organizations, universities and government agencies that possess the expertise to make Swedish development cooperation successful.

In the long run Swedish development cooperation should lead to wider economic and social cooperation to the benefit of all parties concerned.

For more information, please see Sida's homepage: www.sida.se

1 Background

Since 1998 Sweden has provided support in the area of Democratic Governance in Honduras, through a program managed by the UNDP. The framework for this cooperation is the democratisation process initiated by the Honduran State in the early 1980s when Honduras returned to democratic rule after 17 years of military dictatorship.

Since 1982 general elections for President and Congress have been held every four years and in 1996 direct elections for Municipal Authorities were introduced. In 1990 Honduras initiated a Structural Adjustment Program accompanied by a general policy regarding "Reform and Modernisation of the State", which was approved as a national law in 1992. This law consists of a comprehensive program regarding modernisation and reform in the following areas:

- a. The Executive Level in the area of modernisation of administration.
- b. Decentralisation and Municipal development
- c. Political modernisation
- d. Reform of the Justice System
- e. Control of corruption

- f. Strengthening of the Rule of Law and of the Civil Society
- g. Reform of the Legislative System

Based on the objectives of the law of Reform and Modernisation of the State, the Government of Honduras, in 1997 turned to the UNDP and Sweden seeking cooperation in the implementation of the necessary reforms.

A program for development in the area of Democratic Governance was thus designed and implemented, during the period 1998–2001, in the following areas:

- **Statistics** through a national census project “CENSO 2000” and through the creation of a National Statistics Institute, INE, both administered by the Ministry of the Presidency
- **Gender Equity** through the creation of a National Women’s Institute INAM, the creation of a National Gender Policy for the Rural Sector through the Ministry of Agriculture, SAG, and specific support to poor women through the Social Compensation Fund, PRAF
- Decentralisation and **Municipal Development** in five municipalities: Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, La Paz, Puerto Cortés and Santa Rosa de Copán
- **Legislation and justice** that has supported the National Congress through its Centre for Research and Education in Legislation Matters, CIEL, and The Public Ministry, through five of its specialised prosecutors in the areas of women’s rights, environmental issues, indigenous people and national patrimony, consumer rights and Human Rights.

Since the initiation of the above support, various factors have affected the execution of the program. Financial strains due to lack of additional funds from other donors and unfavourable development of the value of the SEK, in relation to the USD, have affected the accomplishment of the original objectives of the program.

In addition, the fact that a new government elected in November 2001 came into power on January 27, 2002 meant new actors and priorities. Therefore Sida did not consider it timely to make a new long-term commitment at the beginning of 2002 but preferred to conclude the first phase of the Democratic Governance program by adding a final year (2002). The program proposal was presented by the UNDP on December 17, 2001 based on the request for cooperation and priorities of the previous government. This proposal was thoroughly discussed with the new authorities but few changes were made to the original document.

The national partners in this additional phase are mainly the same as in the first period with the exception of the PRAF-gender project that was finalised by December 31, 2001. An additional project regarding Political/electoral reforms was included for 2002.

In parallel with the execution of this program during 2002, Sweden in dialogue with the Honduran Government will thoroughly analyse the various possibilities for long-term development cooperation in the area of Democratic Governance in Honduras. Therefore it has been decided to evaluate the existing Swedish UNDP-program in order for Sida to be able to make an informed decision on the possible future cooperation in this area.

2 Objective of the Evaluation

The evaluation is expected to provide information on performance and lessons learnt and serve as a basis for future decisions. The objective is to examine the results of the Swedish support through UNDP to Democratic Governance in Honduras during the years 1998–2002. The evaluation should analyse whether the programme has been strategic, methodologically well managed and efficient regarding the use of resources.

The evaluation should determine whether the objectives have been accomplished, whether the support was relevant and had any strategic impact. It should also be determined whether the program has been well managed, if the resources provided have been used in an efficient manner and whether the results are sustainable.

It is expected that the evaluation will contribute to strategic choices regarding contents and methodology in the design of future Swedish development cooperation in the area of Democratic Governance in Honduras.

3 The assignment

Aspects to be evaluated

- a. The Governance Programme should be evaluated at the programme level. Has the programme reached the objectives? If not, which are the reasons? Are there unexpected positive or negative effects of the programme as a whole or of any of the components included in the programme? What effects did the programmatic thinking have on the achieved results, the impact, the administration and the financial efficiency? Was the composition of the programme a strategically useful choice according to the Honduran Development Policies and Swedish Development Objectives? Was integration between any of the projects within the programme achieved?
- b. It should be evaluated how the UNDP has managed the Governance Programme, regarding quality of the technical assistance, the administration and cost efficiency. Has the fact that UNDP has managed the programme added specific value to the programme?
- c. Has the programme been designed and implemented in a way that enhances partnership and national ownership?
- d. The last field of analysis aims at setting the framework for future cooperation in the area of Democratic Governance in Honduras. Here the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the UNDP should be analysed in the light of other possible options when planning for a future Governance Programme in Honduras. Direct bilateral cooperation, co-financing with other bilateral agencies or using another multilateral channel are possibilities to be considered. In the analysis of these options it is important to assess the resources needed regarding staff (officials and experts) both at Sida Headquarters and at the Embassy.

4 Method

a. General orientations

The evaluation should be carried out on a programme level, focusing on the coherence, the relevance and the achievement of objectives of the programme as a whole. In order to carry out the evaluation the consultants should:

- Assess reports and other relevant documentation
- Interview different stakeholders – staff as well as beneficiaries – that have been involved in the programme at different times

b. Information sources

Written Sources

- Programme and project documents
- Decision Memoranda
- Agreements
- Programme and Project Reports

- Audits
- Evaluation Reports
- Regional strategies for the Swedish Development Cooperation with Central America
- Country Programme for the Swedish Development Cooperation with Honduras

Persons to be interviewed

- Current and former Government Representatives involved in the Programme
- UNDP staff working with the programme
- Sida staff in Stockholm and Honduras involved in the Programme
- Civil Society Representatives following Democratic Governance issues in Honduras
- Agencies for International Development Cooperation active in the field of Democratic Governance in Honduras

All the sub-projects of the programme have previously been evaluated individually. Regarding the gender sub-program evaluation reports are available on the National Women's Institute-INAM, the Rural Sector through the Ministry of Agriculture, SAG, and specific support to poor women through the Social Compensation Fund, PRAF. There are also evaluation reports regarding the National Census and the National Statistics Institute (INE) and the Decentralisation project. Unfortunately the evaluation reports regarding the legislation and justice support to the Public Ministry and the National Congress have not yet been delivered.

c. Alternative approaches

Sida would especially welcome any alternative suggestions that the consultant might present in the tender document on approaches and methods to be applied in performing of the assignment.

5 Requirements and qualifications

The assignment is proposed to be carried out by a team of three consultants – one Swedish and two internationals. The team leader must have experience in evaluation of development projects and specific knowledge of development cooperation within the area of Democratic Governance and public administration. The consultant is encouraged to include women in the team. (For further information see Articles 3.2.1–3.2.4 and Article 4.6 in the Invitation to Tender).

The team competence requirements must include

- knowledge of mainstreaming of gender equity in public policies and institutions;
- good knowledge of the UNDP as an institution, its methods and procedures;
- capacity to evaluate cost efficiency in development cooperation projects;
- good knowledge about Swedish development cooperation objectives and methods, including the area of democracy and gender equity.

At least one team member should be well acquainted with the Public Administration structures and actors within the Honduran (or at least Central American) context;

The fieldwork requires fluent Spanish while the analysis of written sources also requires Swedish and English.

6 Time Schedule

The work should be carried out during a maximum of six (6) weeks during the period 1st of August and 30th of September 2002, including fieldwork in Honduras. A Draft Report should be presented during

the first week of September. The Honduran Partners of the Programme, Sida and the UNDP shall have a maximum of two weeks for submitting written comments to the draft report. The Final Report should be submitted to Sida no later than September 30, 2001.

7 Reporting

The work in Honduras should start with a preparatory meeting at the Embassy office in Tegucigalpa and end with a summing-up meeting at the same office. Sida, UNDP and the Honduras partners will hold a meeting to discuss and comment on the report.

The report should be of an analytical character and contain recommendations for the preparation of future development cooperation within the area of Democratic Governance in Honduras. The report shall be written in English (maximum 40 pages) with an Executive Summary in Spanish (maximum 5 pages). The final version of the report shall be presented to Sida in 3 printed copies as well as an electronic version. Format and outline of the report should follow the guidelines in Sida Evaluation Report – a Standardised Format (see Annex 1). Subject to decision by Sida, the report may be published and distributed as a publication within the Sida Evaluation series. The report shall be written in 6.0 for Windows (or in compatible format) and be presented in a way that enables publication without further editing.

Appendix 2

List of persons interviewed¹

Sida – Stockholm

Göran Holmqvist, Director, Department for Latin America (interviewed in Tegucigalpa)

Gunnar Tidström, Department for Latin America

Ellenor Ekman, Department for Democracy and Social Development

Staffan Smedby, Department for Democracy and Social Development

Sida – Tegucigalpa

Jan Robberts, Councillor

Ina Eriksson, First Secretary

Claes Norrlöf, Adviser

Alfredo Stein, Adviser

UNDP – Tegucigalpa

Jeffrey Avina, Resident Representative

Margarita Bueso, Assistant Resident Representative

Jorge Ramos, Programme Officer

Juan Carlos Benítez, Programme Officer

René Herrera, Director, UNDP Business Centre

Sergio Membreño, Coordinator, Prospective and Strategic Unit

Government of Honduras (current and former Cabinet members)

Brenie Liliana Matute, Minister of SETCO

Moises Starkman, former Minister of SETCO

Rocío Tábora, Vice Minister, Ministry of the Presidency (and former UNDP officer)

Gustavo Alfaro, former Minister of the Presidency

Marcela Del Mar Suazo, Minister and Executive President of the National Women's Institute

Project: Strengthening of the national statistics system

Magdalena García, Director, National Statistics Institute (INE)

Gerardo Reyes, INE

Jimmy Soria, Chief Technical Adviser, UNDP

Project: Institutional support to the Population and Housing Census 2000

Conrado Zúñiga, Ex-Coordinator of the project

Project: Support to the establishment of a National Women's Institute

Dalila Pinel de Pineda, Project Coordinator

Liliam de Rivera, Assistant Coordinator

Technical staff; liaison officers with other institutions

Project: Support to the execution of a policy of equal opportunities in rural areas

Efraín Díaz Arrivillaga, Director of PRONADERS

Judith Castro, Project Coordinator

¹ The list includes only the principal persons that have been interviewed. In the municipalities and in some of the other projects as well, group meetings were held with presence of all or a big part of the personnel, whose names have not all been recorded, but who may nevertheless have contributed.

Ana Ortega, Technical Assistant
Lourdes Obando, Administrator
Gender specialists in regional offices

Project: Support to the execution of a policy of equal opportunities in the area of poverty reduction

Rina Oueli, Project Coordinator
Alma Zelaya, Responsible for micro-credits
Santa López, Responsible for training
Governing Board, Mujeres Solidarias de Santa Rosa de Copán

Project: Decentralization and municipal development

Maribel Suazo, Project Coordinator
Jorge Cálix, Regional consultant in Santa Rosa de Copán
Francisco Funes, Regional consultant in San Pedro Sula
Carlos Cañas, Consultant in Land Registry
Roberto Paz, Regional consultant in Puerto Cortés

Santa Rosa de Copán

Juan Carlos Elvir, Mayor of Santa Rosa de Copán
All Heads of Department of the Municipal Government
Various Citizen's Commissions
Francisco Machado, Director, Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (ASONOG)

Puerto Cortés

Marlon Lara, Mayor of Puerto Cortés
Allan D. Ramos, General Manager, Municipality of Puerto Cortés
Other municipal employees

San Pedro Sula

Lourdes de Ayala, Director of External Cooperation, Municipality of San Pedro Sula
Rafael Flores, President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Province of Cortés (CCIC)
Tomás Vaquero, Executive Director of CCIC
Alberto Carcamo, Director of the Valle de Sula Metropolitan Area (corpor.)
Consuelo Consuegra, Regional Representative of the Association of Municipalities of Honduras (AMHON)

Project: Support to the National Congress – CIEL

Juan Carlos Pérez Cadal, Director of CIEL
Marta de Samro, External Cooperation Coordinator
Erick Medina, Head of Computer department
Armando Ramos, Head of Investigation Unit
Ramón F. Izaguirre, Ex-coordinator of project
Santos Gabino Carvajal, Ex-Deputy Director, CIEL

Project: Strengthening of the Public Prosecutor's Office

Nirma de Pon, Director of External Cooperation and Project Coordinator
Rosa Emilia Mejía de Caríos, Coordination Assistant
Milciades Etelvino Ventura, Coordinating Prosecutor, Santa Rosa de Copán
Gerardo Abel Neal Barahona, Judge of the Criminal Court in Santa Rosa de Copán
Claudia María Baide Recarte, Judge of the Criminal Court in Santa Rosa de Copán
Mauricia Mateao Erreca, Judge of the Criminal Court in Santa Rosa de Copán
Walter Alberto Menjivar Mendoza, Coordinating Prosecutor, San Pedro Sula

Projects: Support to the National Congress – CIEL and Strengthening of the Public Prosecutor's Office
Ana María Pineda, member of the sub-programme evaluation team (2001)

Project: Electoral reform

Diego Achard, Project Coordinator, UNDP

David Matamoros Batson, Executive Secretary, National Party of Honduras

Jorge Arturo Reina, General Secretary, Liberal Party of Honduras

Lillian Interiano, Coordinator of the Jurist Commission

Miguel Angel Ortiz Ruiz, member of the Jurist Commission

Rubehin Hernández Vega, member of the Jurist Commission

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

Helge Semb, Country Representative

Lorena Rodríguez Bu, Sectoral specialist – State and society

United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

Duty D. Greene, Office for Strategy and Programme Support

J. Vicente Díaz, Economist

Appendix 3

List of documentation

1 GENERAL¹

- Documento de Programa: Apoyo al fortalecimiento de la gobernabilidad democrática y el avance hacia la equidad social 1998–2002; Gobierno de la República de Honduras-Gobierno de Suecia-Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo; Dec. 1998.
- Honduras – Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.
- Informe Anual PNUD Honduras 2001.
- Memorandum full assessment: Support to programme for Democratic Governance-UNDP 2002, from the Honduras office, dated 3/3 2002.
- Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland/Finnconsult: Reporte Final – Misión de Seguimiento y Evaluación de Proyectos de Reconstrucción y Desarrollo Comunitario en Guatemala, Honduras y Nicaragua. March 2000. (Eriksson, Kyrö, Lörö).
- Presidencia de la República: Plan de Gobierno 2002–2006 – Un Compromiso de Todos. Tegucigalpa, July 2002.
- Regeringskansliet/UD: Regionstrategi – Centralamerika och Karibien, 1 januari 2001 – 31 december 2005.
- Sida-Honduras: Honduras – Halvårsrapport oktober 2001 – mars 2002.
- Sida-Honduras: Programa de la cooperación de Suecia con Honduras, 2001–2005; August 2002.
- Sida Evaluation 99/29: Apoyo al Programa Nacional Indígena en Bolivia (Eriksson, Mejía, Sánchez)
- Sida Evaluation 00/30: Cooperación para la Democracia y Derechos Humanos en Nicaragua, 1997–2000 (D’Angelo, Uggla, Faroppa)
- Sida Studies in Evaluation 00/3: The Evaluability of Democracy and Human Rights Projects; ITAD Ltd in association with the Overseas Development Institute.
- UNDP Human Development Reports 1999, 2000 and 2001.
- UNDP Procurement Manual; September 2001.
- UNDP-Honduras: Manual de gestión de proyectos de cooperación técnica ejecutados por organismos nacionales; August 2001.
- UNDP: Primer Marco de Cooperación con Honduras 1998–2001
- UNDP: Second Country Cooperation Framework for Honduras (2002–2006)

2 SUB-PROGRAMME AND/OR PROJECT SPECIFIC²

Sub-programme: Strengthening of national capacities to facilitate the decision-making process

- Larios, José; Asenjo, Carlos: Proyecto Fortalecimiento del Sistema Estadístico Nacional HON/97/

¹ The list contains the more important publications, documents and reports that have contributed to this evaluation, regarding the overall programme. The list does not itemize the numerous Sida decision documents, cost-sharing agreements with UNDP and other “procedural” documents that have been reviewed.

² For all the sub-programmes and projects included in the Governance Programme, a large number of project documents, project revisions, bi-monthly reports, annual tri-partite review reports, special reports, audit reports and other miscellaneous documents have been reviewed. It would be unmanageable and of little use to list all these papers here. In the following, only the more important ones are pinpointed.

022, PNUD/Asdi; Informe de la evaluación de medio término con vision prospective(borrador); November 2001.

- Larios, José; Asenjo, Carlos: Evaluación externa con vision retrospectiva de cumplimiento de objetivos al proyecto HON/97/023 Apoyo al Censo de Población y Vivienda 2000, PNUD/Asdi; Informe de la evaluación; November 2001.
- Banco Inter-Americano de Desarrollo: Honduras – Fortalecimiento y modernización del sistema estadístico nacional; Informe de proyecto; September 2002.

Sub-programme: Support to the formulation and implementation of gender equity policies for sustainable development

- Instituto Nacional de la Mujer: Política Nacional de la Mujer. Primer Plan Nacional de Igualdad de Oportunidades 2002–2007. Tegucigalpa, Noviembre 2001.
- _____ Compendios de Leyes sobre los Derechos de la Mujer. Tegucigalpa, 2001
- _____ Plan Estratégico Institucional 2002-2006. Tegucigalpa, 2002.
- PRONADERS: Documento Marco del Programa Nacional de Desarrollo Rural Sostenible. Tegucigalpa, July 2000.
- Secretaría de Agricultura y Ganadería: Política para la Equidad de Género en el Agro Hondureño. Tegucigalpa, 2001.
- Vargas, Virginia and Bu, Xiomara: Evaluación del Subprograma de Apoyo a la Política de Equidad de Género en el Estado Hondureño. Tegucigalpa, August 2001.

Sub-programme: Support to municipal strengthening and decentralization

- Eslava, José: Informe de misión – Planeación estratégica; January 1999.
- Kruiderink, Anton: Informe de consultoría; Asesoría estratégica para el HON/98/003 – Descentralización y Desarrollo Municipal; March 2000.
- Andic, Fuat; del Olmo, Enrique; Díaz, Allan: Proyecto “Descentralización y Desarrollo Municipal en Honduras” – Informe de la misión evaluadora; May 2001.
- del Olmo, Enrique: Revisión sustantiva del proyecto de descentralización y desarrollo municipal HON98/003; September 2001.

Sub-programme: Support to the institutional strengthening of the legislative system and the application of justice

- Project document UNDP, HON/97/007, signed 6 May 1999.
- Sida evaluation report (Blomquist, Ugglå, Bartolomei) Nov.–Dec. 2001 on the Ombudsman institutions in six Latin-American Countries.
- Draft Apoyo al congreso nacional, UNDP project HON/98/019.
- Terms of reference for evaluation of CIEL, September 2001.
- Final report for the first phase, HON/98/019.
- Informacion Basica Sobre el Proyecto, Nov. 1998 – March 2000 (CIEL).
- Taller de evaluación y reprogramación del proyecto de apoyo al Congreso Nacional, March 2000.
- Article 316 of the 1982 constitution; decree 228-93 of 20 December 1993.
- Perfil II, 12 September 2002, IDB (loan in the judicial sector).
- Reporte de Ejecución Directa November 2001, December 2001, March 2002 and June 2002.

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