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El Salvador



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1 Introduction

Below, as is customary in semi-annual reports, brief and comprehensive accounts of the political, economic and social situations are presented individually. Furthermore, the last sub-chapter offers an extensive account of the election results of March 16, 2003 as well as their possible implications.

1.1 The Political Situation

The parliamentary and municipal elections held on 16th March produced some paradoxes: although showing some surprising slides in electoral preferences, the resulting power balance is almost a repetition of the results of the 2000 elections.

The most important election trends are:

- a) The power balance between left and right in Parliament (*Asamblea Legislativa*) remains unchanged. The governing Arena party lost two mandates but their ally PCN gained two. Together, the conservative bloc (Arena and PCN) reached the critical 43 votes needed for simple majority.
- b) The leftist FMLN, in spite of a major effort by Arena to win these local governments, retained most major municipalities. The big surprise, contrary to most predictions, is the FMLN victory in the capital city of San Salvador, defeating Arena by a comfortable margin.
- c) The fact that FMLN recovered its parliamentary strength: 31 seats. After an ideological split last year, when the more moderate so-called *renovadores* separated from the FMLN, the party had lost six seats in Parliament, down from 31 to 25.
- d) Abstention rates remained high, even though they were somewhat reduced compared to the last elections. This year, some 41 per cent voted, compared with 38.5 percent in the 2000 elections.
- e) The one party that won most new voters, both in absolute and in relative figures, was the conservative PCN (*Partido de Conciliación Nacional*) that soared from 110 000 to 180 000 votes, i.e. an increase of 65 percent! This result strengthens the PCN's position as "the third party" behind FMLN and Arena.
- f) The centerfield had limited success. While the center-left CDU gained 2 additional seats in Parliament, the "center-right" coalition

of PDC-MR-AP-PSD did not win any more seats than the ones that PDC alone had in the previous Parliament.

For more comments on the elections and their consequences, please see Chapter 1.4 below.

Limits to freedom of speech

During the last few days of March, Mauricio Funes, El Salvador's most prestigious journalist announced that he was being obliged to close down the editorial part of a TV news program. The manager of the TV network, TV Doce, chose to refer to the decision to close down the editorial *Sin Censura* as a "routine revision of programming", but both Mauricio Funes and a minority share owner Jorge Zedán accused the ruling party, Arena, of exercising pressure on the network's majority Mexican owners, TV Azteca. A storm of criticism followed the decision, from opposition parties, universities, the journalists' trade union and even numerous private companies that used to buy commercial spots on the network, owing to Funes' high viewer ratings.

Speculations about who had taken the initiative for this "informal censorship" ran high. According to one source, critical comment on behalf of Funes about a decision that Arena's candidate for Mayor of San Salvador, Evelyn Jacir, had taken on a TV debate issue before the elections had caused the outrage of the ruling party, especially as Jacir eventually lost the battle for San Salvador. The government and Arena denied categorically having put any pressure on TV Azteca.

US critical of judiciary's lack of independence

In a report on the human rights situation in El Salvador in 2002, the US State Department (Foreign Ministry) repeated their criticism from earlier years about the lack of independence and efficiency within the Salvadoran judiciary (including judges, prosecutors, the police force and the prison system). At the same time, the report highlighted efforts being made to counteract the problems. In this respect, the dismissal of a number of judges with dubious academic diplomas and the work carried out by the control agency *Consejo Nacional de la Judicatura*, are brought to the fore in the report.

Changes in Government

After the elections, two junior ministers have stepped down: the Junior Foreign Minister Héctor Dada Sánchez and the Junior Minister of Transport, Ricardo Yúdice. The latter based his decision on anticipated cooperation difficulties with Parliament, considering its new composition after the elections.

The Supreme Court rules out current electoral representation

Only days after the elections, the Supreme Court of Justice ruled against parts of the current electoral law, viz. the articles that allow for an unequal distribution of parliamentary representation in some regions. More precisely, the electoral system means that while in some regions, MPs are elected with only some 5 000 votes, in other regions an MP has to receive several times that number of votes in order to obtain a seat. For instance,

the department of Ahuachapán has twice the number of inhabitants as the department of Cabañas, but has the same number of parliamentary seats. However, as the ruling does not have any retroactive effect, it will not affect the recently elected Parliament. Thus, any changes in Electoral Law would have effects on the next Parliament (2006–2009). It also bears mentioning that the court ruling in fact addressed a legal complaint filed by the FMLN in May 2002, after some hasty changes to the Electoral Law had been made by the Parliament after a similar ruling of the Supreme Court last year.

Human Rights Ombudsman denounces the Salvadoran State in 1989 Jesuit case

On the 30th October, 2002 i.e. almost 13 years after the murder of the six Jesuit priests and two servants on the UCA university campus- the Human Rights Ombudsman (PDDH) published its resolution on the case. The 120-page report is a harsh reminder of omissions on the part of the Salvadoran state to effectively investigate and punish military personnel, both planners and executors of the crime. The resolution caused irritation in the Government, who is directly addressed by the resolution, as well as former Arena governments from 1989 onwards. The resolution is largely based on the report of the UN Truth Commission whose recommendations have been completely ignored by governments since 1993, when the Parliament pushed through a general amnesty law. The PDDH is the only state institution so far to take an active stance in promoting the resolution of the case. With this resolution, incumbent Ombudsman Beatrice de Carrillo has repeated the action taken in March 2002 when a PDDH resolution in equally harsh terms condemned the impunity granted in the case of Monseñor Romero (the Archbishop whose assassination in 1980 brought El Salvador one step closer to civil war).

1.2 Economic Development

Economic growth during 2002 is estimated at 1.9%¹. Here it should be borne in mind that growth figures are given in total terms, not per capita. Given the population growth of about 2% per year, a figure of 1.9% in fact means a slightly negative per capita growth.

The *maquila* sector has shown some recovery. The sector had experienced a dip as a result of weakened demand in the US after 11th September, causing the loss of some 8 000 jobs. Towards the end of 2002, some 6 400 jobs in the sector were recovered. In fact, El Salvador showed a quite strong recovery in a regional context, with an expected 6.5% growth as compared to the maquila in Honduras growing only by 1.6% and the other Central American countries showing negative growth.

In the *construction* sector, the post-earthquake dynamism began to decline towards the end of 2002.

In spite of depressed world market prices in traditional *agricultural* export items such as coffee and sugar, the agriculture sector as a whole has experienced some growth during the period. Growth sectors include basic grains (maize, beans), fruit and dairy products. The prevalence of the

¹ Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit: Country Report El Salvador, March 2003.

coffee crisis is illuminated by the dramatic changes in export revenue figures. During 2002, El Salvador exported coffee for only MUSD 107 which represents 3.6% of total export revenues. In comparison, in 1996 coffee represented 23% of exports, and the average annual export revenue during the period 1996–2000 was MUSD 344. This slump is the result of low prices as well as lower output in volume. The latter is, to a certain extent, due to the financial crisis experienced by many coffee producers, being embargoed by commercial banks and hence short of credits for plantation renewal. As a means of breaking this vicious circle, the producers have applied for some legislative measures that could alleviate the plight of the sector: temporary tax exemptions, a moratorium on embargoes of agricultural enterprises by banks, and a special subsidized credit granted by the state. All of these measures have received the approval of a number of opposition parties, while the ruling party Arena, with its neo-liberal stance, have declared themselves adverse. Hence, President Flores has exercised his right to veto these coffee sector alleviation projects.

During 2002, *tax collection* increased to an estimated 11.5% of GDP. The goal for 2003 is a further increase to 12% of GDP. However, here it should be borne in mind that this would still be one of the lowest tax burdens in the world, and that it is a low level even in a Latin American context. Tax revenues are distributed as follows: VAT 52%, income tax 29%, customs duties 9%, while property taxes represent only 1%.

The Government of El Salvador has continued its pursuit of *free-trade agreements*. The country is leading the Central American negotiations with the US on the one hand, and the negotiations between Canada and the so-called CA-4 (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua) on the other. In both cases, negotiations have been initiated but are not expected to bear fruit until the end of 2003. Undoubtedly, it might be said that the initial bargaining positions of both the US and Canada are quite tough, excluding several themes that would be of vital importance to the Central American countries (e.g. agricultural subsidies, sugar import quotas and textiles). The issue of immigration has been ruled out by the US.

In respect to free-trade negotiations with the European Union, the EU has displayed only a mild interest in entering into such a process. The Central American countries have therefore discarded negotiations, concentrating for the time being on the agreement with the US.

1.3 The Social Situation

A *medical strike* that started in September 2002, dragged on and as of March 2003 a final solution is still pending. The central issue is that of privatization of health services (or concessions, as the Government puts it). The Government has followed a hard line strategy, unwilling to negotiate and turning down several offers for mediation, e.g. from the Catholic Church. The strike originally started in the Social Security sector (ISSS) but occasionally involves medical personnel at the Ministry of Health. The strikers have received massive opinion support from the public, joining the medical personnel in several huge demonstrations, reportedly the largest ones in peacetime. Another surprising result is the strong backing of the strike by the traditionally conservative Medical

Guild. Observers have commented that even medical doctors fear the results of a privatization as they would risk becoming utterly dependent on a few medical insurance companies.

The strike has also had some impact on legislation. In November, leftist FMLN and conservative PCN joined forces and pushed through a legislative decree prohibiting any form of privatization of medical services, be it in the ISSS or in the Ministry sphere. This decree was, however, later reversed by another vote of ARENA and PCN.

In a broader societal perspective, several civil society organizations have criticized the Government's commitment to enter *free-trade agreements*, questioning the benefits for Salvadoran society, especially regarding the current negotiations between the US and Central America. Working from quite another perspective, the employers' organization ANEP has characterized this debate as an almost subversive activity that should be prohibited, for "attempting to work against the interests of the Central American countries".

In the 2002 UNDP Human Development Report², El Salvador is found among the 'medium human development' countries (position 104 among 173 countries), outranking its neighbors Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala by a narrow margin. According to the same report, 48.3 per cent of Salvadorans find themselves below the national poverty line, and another interesting conclusion is that El Salvador is doing better in terms of income poverty than in terms of human development. Among social indicators, it can be noted that the latest available statistics reveal that public health expenditure is indeed low at 2.6% of GDP (as e.g. compared to 3.9% in Honduras and 8.5% in Nicaragua).

1. 4. Special Theme: The Elections of March 16

The election results give the following distribution of parliamentary seats:

Party	Seats	Difference 2000/2003
FMLN	31	+ 0
Arena	27	- 2
PCN	16	+ 2
CDU	5	+ 2
PDC	5	+ 0
PAN	0	- 2
Total	84	0

The most remarkable trend in the recent elections appears to be the voters' punishment of the ruling Arena party. Somewhat bluntly put, the electorate cast their votes either in favor of the leftist FMLN or Arena's conservative ally PCN; even traditional Arena voters either refrained from voting or voted for PCN. This has stirred up a heated debate within Arena, obviously forcing them to change strategy for next year's Presidential Elections. (For more on this debate, see below).

The surprising success of PCN will most probably inject more uncertainties into Salvadoran politics, as it gives the party more muscle to twist

² Indicators are life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate, school enrolment and GDP per capita.

Arena's arm in legislative affairs. Hence, one reasonable prediction would be more joint votes PCN-FMLN in parliament, even if in most cases this would be a mere tactical maneuver on PCN's part.

The 14 department capitals are considered important landmarks of party influence. In these elections, FMLN won half (capital city San Salvador, Santa Tecla, Santa Ana, Chalatenango, Zacatecoluca, Cojutepeque and Usulután), while Arena will take office in five (Ahuachapán, Sonsonate, Sensuntepeque, San Miguel and La Unión). PCN won in San Vicente and PDC in San Francisco Gotera. Apart from these *cabeceras departamentales*, the single most important town hall is the one in Soyapango, El Salvador's second largest municipality as far as number of inhabitants is concerned, and this municipality was retained by the FMLN.

As has happened before the ruling party, fearing a loss in the upcoming presidential elections, has provoked a debate on the reform of the electoral system. For instance, this happened in 1994 between the first and second round of the presidential elections, when Arena was not altogether sure about victory. On that occasion, Arena took the initiative to an all-party agreement on a broad political reform of five points that was to be carried out by whichever party won the elections. (Nevertheless, the somewhat ironic result was that even though Arena and Armando Calderón Sol eventually won the election in the second round, as well as the elections of 1999, the reforms have been halted ever since.) In the current context, the ruling out of the electoral law and its principles of registration by the Supreme Court has fueled the debate and urges the Parliament to take some action (see chapter 1.1).

Undoubtedly, PCN is the party that benefits most from the existing caveats in the electoral system. Hence, their resistance to real change will probably be the toughest, and in turn considering the overall parliamentary situation, they will certainly be able to bargain and negotiate well with Arena. Consequently, real change as a result of any electoral reform appears rather unlikely.

Moreover, once again the elections seem to prove that partisan symbols weigh more than personalities in Salvadoran politics. However popular and famous the personalities, and however extensive the discontent with party leaderships, in the end the voters seem to cling to the party symbol rather than following dissidents and "drop-outs". In these elections, this has been the case for two known political personalities with high profiles: Gloria Salguero Gross and Facundo Guardado.

Salguero is a former Arena MP who also was President of Parliament in the early 1990s, while Guardado used to be a high-ranking figure in the FMLN, in fact the party's presidential candidate in the last presidential elections of 1999. Both grew weary of their respective party lines and decided to form new parties in the wake of the parliamentary elections.

Gloria Salguero founded the Partido Popular Republicano (PPR), hoping to draw scores of disenchanted Arena profiles and voters. When Guardado left FMLN in 2002, he attracted 6 of the 31 Members of Parliament who had originally composed the FMLN parliamentary group. Together with Guardado, parts of this dissident group formed the *Movimiento Renovador*, receiving a wealth of campaign funds to judge from the quantity of TV

spots and campaign signs. In the end, neither the “renovadores” nor Ms Salguero and the PPR were able to renew politics, receiving far fewer votes than most observers had predicted. As a matter of fact, both parties failed to attain the crucial 3% of total votes (the limit in order to be recognized by the electoral system as a legitimate political movement).

It is also worth mentioning that PAN, a phenomenon that arose in 2000 on the strength of the ex-paramilitaries known as *patrulleros*, disappeared from the map in this election.

Below, brief accounts of internal debates in political parties/alliances after the elections (Arena, FMLN, PCN, ‘The Center Coalition’ and CDU):

Arena (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista)

Arena has won three presidential elections in a row (1989, 1994 and 1999) but their parliamentary platform has continuously weakened during the last nine years. From enjoying 39 parliamentary seats (out of 84) in 1994, the number of MPs has now shrunk to 27.

Arena has also lost influence at local level. In 1994 the party held as many as 206 (out of 262) municipalities, which decreased to 160 in 1997 and eventually to 126 in 2000. As Arena only won 109 municipalities in these elections, the party has thus lost almost fifty per cent of local governments in nine years. It should also be noted that most of the municipalities that Arena retains are the smallest ones – as mentioned above, Arena won only 5 out of 14 department capitals.

Hence, for analysts as well as the party itself, the election results are generally viewed as a defeat for Arena, unleashing a vigorous internal debate. This has occasionally resembled infighting, especially because it is the first time that the internal Arena debates have been projected to the public via mass media. The most heated debate erupted over who should be the party’s presidential candidate and how this candidate ought to be appointed. Initially, and indeed for the very first time, one suggestion is that all party members have a say in this by applying some form of primary elections. However, this proposal has since been discarded and the party now seems to be opting for a model where COENA (Comité Ejecutivo Nacional, the party’s executive leadership) takes the final decision after having consulted local branches.

Another aspect of the internal debate is that as COENA had initially tried to present the electoral result as satisfactory (for instance, Francisco Flores, President of the Republic, stressed the fact that Arena and PCN together retain the crucial 43 seats for majority), party profiles who were marginalized during the Flores administration have harshly criticized the evolution of the party. Apart from the design of the electoral campaign and the strategy of incorporating outside personalities as candidates, the critics have also attacked recent decisions taken by the Executive (e.g. the coffee crisis vetoes and the tough stance on the medical strike), claiming that Arena has presented itself as a cold, arrogant and self-sufficient technocratic machine.

To understand these current internal divisions, it is important to bear in mind that during the Flores administration, Arena experienced a grow-

ing internal rift between “traditional politicians” and “big business”. The latter had a firm grip over the party up to the elections, with a COENA that had become characterized as “the privatized party” because of its members all being managers, executives or even owners of the major enterprises that have traditionally represented the bulk of party finance. Accordingly, a large number of Government ministers and COENA members are not even party members. Against this ‘big business group’ the traditional party elite are ranged. These are more hard-core/nationalist, often coming from small or medium-size businesses in the agricultural sector which have seen setbacks and suffered from the policies of the Flores administration.

Against this backdrop and the stark internal debate, two former presidents have taken on the challenge to unite the party, viz. Alfredo Cristiani and Armando Calderón Sol. A new COENA has been appointed and the party leadership has also been altered at regional and local levels, in general causing the “rehabilitation” of several former leaders. The most remarkable of these cases of “rehabilitation” is probably the political comeback of Mario Acosta Oertel. As long-time Minister of the Interior, he had built himself a powerful position but when he criticized government trade/agricultural policies (being a coffee grower himself he had experienced huge financial losses), he was immediately fired by President Flores who vaguely promised him a party career instead. However, simultaneously all immigration border personnel were replaced by police officers in order to cut away another of Acosta’s remaining influence bases. Before the elections Acosta stayed loyal to the party leadership in that he did attempt to mobilize his remaining bases, but after the mediocre election results by Arena, Acosta became a protagonist and joined in the criticism against the government and COENA. Interestingly enough, this stance has caused his rapid incorporation into the party leadership, getting him the post of Vice-President of Ideology (considered the number two in the party hierarchy).

To proceed, the debate on presidential candidates for 2004 has already started. A number of possible candidates have been mentioned (or have even presented themselves).

The length of the “list” so far is impressive:

- René León, Ambassador to Washington;
- Tony Saca, Board Director of ANEP (the employers’ federation);
- Roberto Murray Meza, industrialist with investments in local monopolies such as beer and cement industry, and with a long history of party activism;
- Carlos Quintanilla Schmidt, current Vice President of the Republic;
- Rolando Alvarenga, current MP;
- Juan José Daboub, current Minister of Finance;
- Cecilia Gallardo de Cano, current Editor in Chief of the daily La Prensa Gráfica and former Minister of Education during Calderón Sol;
- Mauricio Sandoval, Chief of Police (see below);

- Evelyn Jacir de Lovo, ex-candidate to Mayor of San Salvador and formerly Minister of Education in the Flores administration;
- José Ángel Quirós, Minister of Transport; and
- Mario Acosta Oertel (see above)

The most active in the public debate so far are Mauricio Sandoval and Mario Acosta. Carlos Quintanilla, the Vice President, has also gone to lengths to explain why he sees no impediment to presenting himself as candidate, even if some consider it impossible for legal reasons.

Mauricio Sandoval's chances stem from his post as Chief of Police, utilizing a very purposeful propaganda campaign on his supposed achievements as far as crime fighting is concerned. Mario Acosta would be the favorite of the traditional hard-liners in Arena. From his new "rehabilitated" status at the party top, he could have great opportunities to influence proceedings and manage information. However low-key for the time being, the possibility of Murray Meza or some other "big business" representative joining the fight should not be discounted; this group rarely campaigns overtly as the position as major party financiers yields substantial influence *per se*. Finally, another possibility could be that Arena will launch a former President. In fact, the latest rumors state that Arena is considering Alfredo Cristiani, together with Elisabeth de Calderón Sol (wife to Armando Calderón Sol, President 1994–99) as candidates.

FMLN

The FMLN leadership was quick to interpret the electoral results as a grand victory, with some leaders immediately making victorious projections about the presidential race in 2004. Certainly, the leftist party has been able to regain all the parliamentary seats lost during last year's party split (see above), and also to retain the capital city town hall on their own, i.e. without the support of the center-left coalition that stood behind Héctor Silva in 1997 and 2000. Also, this triumphant attitude may be due to the negative publicity the "orthodox" party leadership received in media after the exit of *renovadores* headed by Facundo Guardado (see above). Moreover, the quarrel between the FMLN and the former (and popular) Mayor of San Salvador, Héctor Silva, made many observers anticipate the loss of the town hall for FMLN.

Inspired by the general atmosphere of victory, on the very election eve, veteran communist and party patriarch Shafick Handal proclaimed that he was ready to accept the challenge of the presidential elections. This "acceptance speech" created considerable surprise and controversy, especially as several opinion polls had shown that Handal, however popular within the FMLN, provokes more resistance than sympathy among voters. Other voices rose immediately calling for a more profound debate centered on programmatic proposals rather than on personalities. Óscar Ortiz, re-elected mayor of Santa Tecla and also President of the Federation of Municipalities (COMURES), was the most prominent of these voices. Ortiz stressed the importance of building electoral alliances, not only in order to secure victory in the presidential run, but also to guarantee governance once in power.

Outside observers of the party have marveled over how these electoral results could possibly be taken as a proof of the real possibility of winning the upcoming presidential elections. Firstly, the FMLN hardly increased its number of votes in the elections. Secondly, it is one thing to win in the capital and another to win in the whole country. Thirdly, defeating Arena in a presidential election without the backing of a broad alliance is considered almost impossible. Fourthly, experience seems to show that the Salvadoran electorate use a different way of reasoning when it comes to voting for presidents rather than MPs.

To date, the following individuals have been mentioned as possible candidates (apart from the above-mentioned Handal and Ortiz):

- Victoria de Avilés, Supreme Court Judge and former Human Rights Ombudsman, who was involved in the internal FMLN debate about presidential candidates before the 1999 elections.
- Violeta Menjívar, long-time MP mentioned as possible Vice President.
- Arturo Zablah, businessman who served as minister in the Cristiani administration.
- Guillermo Mata, Medical Guild leader with a high profile in the medical strike.

PCN

As noted above, this party representing the military governments of the 1960s and 1970s was the party that gained most new votes in this election; from 110 000 in the last elections to roughly 175 000 votes this year. The most accepted explanation for this turnout seems to be that many dissatisfied Arena voters opted for the PCN as a way of “punishing” or at least sending a strong message to Arena leadership. The PCN has also profited from the membership of high-relief figures that used to belong to Arena. In fact, a considerable part of PCN’s new parliamentary group and mayors is made up of former Arena personalities; Orlando Arévalo, Francisco Merino, Roberto Angulo, to mention but a few.

The Center Coalition (PDC, MR, AP and PSD)

Contrary to what many had predicted, the center-field coalition did not fare well in these elections, despite many voters having expressed their weariness of the “Two Big” on either extreme of the political scale. Many observers have explained this by stating that the coalition does not represent anything new to voters in terms of personalities, and that several of these parties or movements are the most notorious in terms of infighting and quarrelling. Also, several candidates are recognized as being dropouts from other parties rather than bearers of a reform agenda. As an example, the inclusion of former guerrilla commander Ana Guadalupe Martínez in the PDC leadership was preceded by a public apology statement on her behalf for “wartime crimes” committed by the ERP (the FMLN guerrilla faction to which she used to belong). However, among voters this did not add credibility neither to the PDC nor Martínez herself. The Christian Democrats – the flagship of this coalition – have lost parliamentary representation constantly since the early 1990s. In 1994, they held 18 out of 84 parliamentary seats, whereas today, and this with the “assistance” of a coalition, they only have 5 MPs

(the same number of seats that they achieved on their own in the 2000 elections).

CDU

The *Centro Democrático Unido* received a considerable injection of new votes in this election, mainly due to the attraction of “the two Héctors”, namely Héctor Silva and Héctor Dada Hirezi. In spite of the conflict between the FMLN and Silva in November that led to Silva’s refusal to stand for office in San Salvador for a third time, the CDU and “both Héctors” have been very clear about not entering into sterile disputes with FMLN. Obviously, this has been done with a vision of mending left-wing cooperation before next year’s presidential elections, nevertheless this stance is very different from the position taken by the *renovadores*, the PSD and other FMLN dissidents. However, as yet the FMLN does not seem very interested in the electorally attractive figure of Héctor Silva and a coalition with the CDU.



Figure 1: Taken from *El Diario de Hoy* 2003-03-25

Free translation of Spanish text in **Figure 1: THE ACADEMY AWARDS – Salvadoran Style**

1. Best director: Shafick “Handalf”, for his movie *The Lord of the Rings (The Two Towers)*. “Whatever the critics might say, this movie won’t go out of fashion”.
2. Best supporting actress: Evelyn Jacir de Lovo, for her participation in *What Everybody Dreams Of*. “Please, hand me the guitar, I want to sing *Hello Goodbye*”
3. Best new actor of the year: the award goes to Carlos Rivas Zamora for the movie *Unknown Identity*. “Thank you so much for this Oscar. It’s all about winning”
4. Best script of the year: the Arena leadership, for the film *Titanic 3*. “Well, that’s how football is – sometimes you win, sometimes you loose”. “The important thing is that they are giving us an award”.
5. Best screenplay of the year: to the artists Héctor Silva, Héctor Dada, Rubén Zamora and Jorge Villacorta for the movie *Four Lucky Guys*. “This time we are really gonna make it, ’cause with the parliamentary immunity, nobody will bother us”

6. Best stunts: Gloria Salguero, Facundo Guardado and Mauricio Meyer. “Thanks for the award! It’s true we’re a little stubborn, but honestly, we didn’t expect this reward... Thanks!” “This time I’m throwing in the towel”

2. Swedish development cooperation in El Salvador

Orientation and perspectives

Sweden and El Salvador have not established a framework agreement on development cooperation. Almost all Swedish cooperation has been untied contributions (grants) and only a minor part is Technical Cooperation which requires a contribution from the local counterpart.

Disbursement levels for the last five years have been:

1998	MSEK 31
1999	MSEK 44
2000	MSEK 59
2001	MSEK 60
2002	MSEK 40
2003	MSEK 40 (planned)

The major partner for Sida in El Salvador is Fusai, an NGO whose main activity areas are low-income housing, local development and reconstruction efforts. In addition, UNDP continues to be an important counterpart.

Swedish development cooperation in El Salvador is based on the 'Regional Strategy for Development Cooperation with Central America and the Caribbean 2001–2005'. According to this strategy, the main orientations are 1) Increased social and economic equality, and 2) Democratic governance.

In the particular case of El Salvador, the strategy results in a concentration on two main areas and a phasing out by the end of 2005 of the traditional bilateral grant-based cooperation, parallel with a phasing in of new cooperation instruments primarily Contract-financed Technical Cooperation (CTC).³ From mid-2002, a new regional post aimed at promoting the specific use of this instrument in selected Latin American countries was introduced at the Embassy in Guatemala, with El Salvador being granted high priority.

³ Technical Cooperation, as defined by Sida, is also grant-based. However, it requires an element of cost—sharing from the local project owner (LPO). Furthermore, it cannot be used for investment purposes, its main objective generally being institutional strengthening, often through learning and human resources development.

The two main areas of cooperation for the period concerned are:

- 1) Democratization/Human Rights/Rule of Law
- 2) Local Development/Local Democracy.

New agreements during the period:

- UNDP, support to National Human Development Report 2003.
- FUSAI, extension of agreement. Local Development Funds in Nejapa and Soyapango, until June 2004 (no additional financial contributions).

Furthermore, preliminary decisions concerning the granting of funds for projects under the modality of contract-financed technical cooperation (CTC), were made concerning applications from the following five authorities:

- Fiscalía General de la República (FGR)
- Corte Suprema de Justicia (CSJ)
- Instituto Salvadoreño de Desarrollo Municipal (ISDEM)
- Fondo de Lisiados
- Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (PDDH).

Other potential CTC projects soon coming up for preliminary decisions include applications from:

- Alcaldía de San Salvador
- Dirección General de Estadística y Censos (DIGESTYC), and
- Corporación de Municipalidades de El Salvador (COMURES).

3. Projects and programs

3.1 Earthquake-related Support

Post-earthquake reconstruction and transformation: Housing Fund

In March 2003, there are still some matters which must be resolved before the proposed trust fund for reconstruction of housing after the earthquakes may be established. After having settled for the government agency National Fund for Low Income Housing (Fonavipo) as administrative organization, the delay is primarily due to the process through which the Salvadoran government has ensured that it will be able to guarantee its financial contributions (in terms of subsidies) to the fund. In brief, the trust fund is meant to provide housing credits for low-income groups (in conjunction with government subsidies), who cannot obtain credits elsewhere.

Projected Sida support: MSEK 38 over a three-year period.

Fusai – Reconstruction and Prevention/Mitigation of Disasters

Salvadoran NGO Fusai is currently implementing two projects (please see title) receiving Sida funding totaling MSEK 25.4. The two projects complement each other in the sense that alongside housing construction/repair, preventive measures are also taken by increasing the awareness and capacity of local authorities in six municipalities on this issue (these municipalities belong to the La Libertad and Usulután departments).

Examples of results during the period:

- a) As municipal capacity is consolidating in some areas, after having provided training courses for leaders, Prevention Boards have also been formed at community level.
- b) Coordination with other organizations working with mitigation (e.g. UNDP and several NGOs) in the municipalities has improved.

Total Sida funding: MSEK 25.4 for the period 2001–2003

UNDP: Coordination of the reconstruction process in El Salvador

As of January 2003, the UNDP program aimed at improving communications and understanding between sectors involved in reconstruction efforts has been concluded. The program has implemented projects

primarily at regional and local level. All in all, Sida support has included four projects, and below the general features and important results of these are briefly outlined:

- a) With focus on the eastern parts of the country, the Comisión Nacional de Desarrollo (CND) has worked with the Regional Coordinator of the East in coordinating development efforts and investments between various actors, ranging from local organizations to central government. For instance, as municipalities have perceived the need to join forces, the CND has assisted them in forming sub-regional associations. Moreover, as anticipated, coordination and training efforts as part of the project have resulted in more than fifty project proposals elaborated by participatory methods at local and regional levels.
- b) Salvadoran NGO Asdi (Asociación Salvadoreña de desarrollo Integral) has supported the joint initiatives of municipalities situated nearby the Bay of Fonseca. In turn, these efforts were triggered by an anticipated, and indeed significant, seaport investment in Cutuco (La Unión), provoking serious worries about the possibilities of achieving local development on local terms. One important result has been the creation of micro-regional associations of municipalities, and their elaboration of legally sound local regulations, e.g. in terms of contamination standards and territorial plans.
- c) In close collaboration with counterparts such as the government agencies ISDEM and FISDL as well as Comures (association of Salvadoran municipalities), the well-known Salvadoran NGO Funde (also a Diakonia counterpart) has systematized experience from five micro-regional development efforts. This experience will be published in the form of a book as well as a video film in the near future.
- d) Between February and October 2002, the second phase of a training program provided for representatives of several Salvadoran NGOs and the Human Rights Ombudsman was carried out. In brief, the training aims at improving capacity and knowledge of how to promote a culture of dialogue and negotiation. While the first phase centered on the, at that time, on-going conflict between the municipal council and downtown informal sector vendors, during the second phase participants took part in elaborating a more general framework for social conflict resolution in El Salvador.

Sida funding: MSEK 2.2 (2001–2002)

Diakonia's increased support to counterparts in reconstruction efforts

As Diakonia was an actor who enjoyed close contacts with Salvadoran civil society organizations, immediately after the earthquakes of 2001 it was granted an additional MSEK 6 to facilitate civil society reconstruction initiatives. In brief, Diakonia's efforts have drawn on a twofold strategy. By using the civil society coordinating body *Foro Ciudadano*, one part of the strategy has resulted in a large number of civil society organizations elaborating joint visions and proposals and eventually presenting them to the central government during the previous reporting period. There may have been some response from central government then, how-

ever possibilities for concerted dialogue between government and civil society representatives at national level seem to have decreased during the past six months.

In the context of a deteriorating overall situation regarding open dialogue between societal actors, Diakonia and its counterparts have concentrated even more on the second part of the reconstruction program, i.e. local development efforts in areas particularly affected by the earthquake. At local level, the reconstruction theme has been more firmly integrated into Diakonia's regular program for local democracy and development. This means that municipal council and community organization representatives have been trained in risk management, but also that local reconstruction committees that were formed in 2001 are gradually and successfully becoming an institutionalized part of local development politics in several municipalities. Not very surprisingly, one important result of these processes is increased participation in local politics.

Sida support: MSEK 6 for 2001–2002 (in addition to Sida's regular support to Diakonia's regional program).

3.2 Sida's Cooperation Program

3.2.1 Democratization; Human Rights; Rule of Law

Support to the Police Academy ANSP (through UNDP)

As the central offices of the Police Academy (ANSP) in Santa Tecla were severely damaged in the 2001 earthquakes, Sida approved the UNDP initiative to use an unspent balance amounting to about USD 200 000 on reconstruction of the offices, with UNDP managing tenders etc. After having suffered some initial delays, during 2002 the reconstruction project has successfully provided the offices with a new electrical plant, stairs etc. Hence, as of January 2003 the project is concluded.

The Human Rights Ombudsman (PDDH)

From its very establishment in 1992, Sida supported the Human Rights Ombudsman institution (Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, PDDH). As of 2002, the PDDH is also supported by USAID. In line with the decision in December 2002, the Sida department of DESO/DESA is currently assessing the PDDH application for support 2003–2004 (June). As described above, the PDDH is also one of the institutions viewed as most relevant for future technical cooperation (CTC).

Projected total Sida support 2003–2004: MSEK 1.2.

Fespad: Investigation, Action, Profile

Applying a modern and Human Rights-based vision of 'law and order', Fespad is a foundation which has succeeded in carrying out serious investigation while at the same time keeping a high public profile. In spite of frequent disputes with Government, primarily due to Fespad's rather progressive conceptualization of the Rule of Law as opposed to the more conservative Government policies, Fespad has been able to provide numerous workshops and specialization courses for government officials within the judiciary.

Apart from being a protagonist in the national debate on economic, social and cultural rights (SECR) where gender equality is emphasized, Fespad's profile is very high on refugee issues, having been selected by UNHCR as the national representative to monitor Government refugee policies. Moreover, the organization offers legal aid, targeting poor people and popular movements. Fespad also publishes specialized literature as well as popular education booklets.

Examples of practical results (January–December 2002):

- a) Ensuring that humanitarian assistance was provided for twenty Colombians, two Albanians and one Nigerian.
- b) Training in 55 rural communities on SECR, in turn creating seven local and one national network. These efforts are believed to have contributed to the doubling of reported violations of SECR in 2002 compared to 2001.
- c) Assistance and monitoring given in 35 cases where citizens have reported violations of their human rights.
- d) Organization of 61 events targeting judiciary personnel on the rights of the child, e.g. resulting in draft proposals for reform of the Penal Code so as to alter its perspective on young people.

Sida support: MSEK 2.4 during the period 2002–2004.

Basic Training Program for Judges

Channeled through the UNDP, Sida supports a program carried out by the *Consejo Nacional de la Judicatura* (CNJ, body monitoring the Supreme Court). In brief, the CNJ provides two-year basic training courses for lawyers who are intending to become judges at its judiciary Training School (*Escuela de Capacitación*). As the skills of new judges in the country will be improved thanks to the program, apart from enhancing the quality of the legal system/rulings, it is believed that judges will not only strengthen their autonomy vis-à-vis political society but also enhance public trust in the judiciary. Finally, it bears mentioning that as internal as well as external communications are regarded as particularly important in this project, it has been chosen as a pilot project for El Salvador within Sida-INFO's brand new communication strategy for Central America. Consequently, during the spring of 2003 Sida and its counterparts will jointly receive training and subsequently elaborate a communication plan for the project.

Sida support: MSEK 3 for the period 2002–2004.

Idhuca: Human Rights as a Challenge

During this reporting period, the Human Rights Institute of the Jesuit University of San Salvador (UCA) has continued its multi-faceted work aimed at improving the functioning of judicial and human rights state institutions. By and large, Idhuca carries out its work by way of participating in and organizing seminars, workshops and press conferences on themes ranging from general human rights training to the highlighting and monitoring of certain paradigm cases of alleged human rights violations.

Undoubtedly, Idhuca displays a very critical attitude towards state institutions, nevertheless it enjoys a great amount of respect from these institutions. Also, it bears mentioning that in a recent ceremony in Valencia (Spain), IDHUCA received the 'Lawyers of the World Human Rights Prize 2002'.

During this period, Idhuca has increased its activities related to migration issues, e.g. carrying out an intensified dialogue with the Salvadoran migration authorities. Furthermore, the institute has assisted in a hearing focusing on the independence of the judiciary in El Salvador, organized by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission in Washington.

Sida support to Idhuca: SEK 600 000 per year.

Election monitoring/ electoral law reform

Alongside its work with civil society initiatives at local level (see chapter 3.2.2), this Consortium of NGOs has played an important role as an independent organization not only monitoring the elections but also facilitating the elaboration of politically feasible proposals for reform of the electoral laws.

Regarding the elections, apart from assisting the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE – *Tribunal Suprema Electoral*) in coordinating its work, the Consortium has trained about 15 000 members of the local (and largely temporal) electoral bodies, e.g. by providing and explaining manuals for electoral procedures. Moreover, training was provided for about 500 independent national and international elections observers, who eventually monitored the electoral process in the general as well as municipal elections.

In a context of prevailing political deadlock in Parliament, after having been elaborated in a consultative process with political as well as civil society actors at regional level during the autumn, the Consortium presented a draft proposal for a reformed Electoral Law to all political parties in Parliament, as well as to several government agencies (e.g. the TSE). Among suggested alterations are the introduction of proportional representation in municipal councils and the right to vote according to place of residence (as opposed to place of birth). As the recent elections highlighted the caveats of the present system, in late March the Consortium and its reform agenda has increased its presence in the political debate.

Sida support 2002–2004: MSEK 3

UNDP Human Development Report for El Salvador

As was the case in 2001, Sida has supported the UNDP Office in El Salvador in its investigation and formulation of the National Human Development Report (HDR) 2003. While the 2001 edition focused on the results of the earthquakes (and hence triggered a debate on the country's evident social and economic vulnerability), the 2003 edition will highlight the challenge of regional integration, Free Trade Agreements and globalization. So as to widen public debate and increase potential impact, UNDP will launch a promotional/educational campaign in high schools, universities, private enterprise organizations etc.

Swedish support: 500 000 SEK in 2003

3.2.2 Local Development *Local development funds (Fusai)*

Sida's support to the two Local Development Funds in Nejapa and Soyapango in the greater San Salvador area has consisted of: in Nejapa, rotating capital for the Fund, and funding for Fusai's involvement in the Fund's work with the actors – while in the case of Soyapango, Sida has contributed to the financing of Fusai's efforts vis-à-vis local actors. During the preceding period, the Local Development Funds were evaluated by a multi-sectoral team consisting of Fusai, Sida and an independent consultant.

Among the most important conclusions was that the Funds have indeed been of great value in terms of forming a mechanism for cooperation between the private and the public sector, especially considering the historical legacy and the fact that the municipalities are governed by left-wing councils. Accordingly, the evaluation emphasizes that the processes at hand are primarily of a political rather than technical nature, in turn making them more complicated. Moreover, the Funds are perceived as playing a crucial role in the complex national political process of decentralization. Among challenges highlighted by the evaluation is the need to further develop an understanding of how to make investments/projects more sustainable.

During 2002, the Soyapango Fund was further consolidated and increased its local presence as it employed a manager and an assistant, moved into new offices in the town center and incorporated two new members representing the local private sector. More than anything, the Fund has been very successful in terms of providing a space for coordination and mediation. In 2002, the Fund played a crucial role in the resolution of two disputes, one between the municipality and a private bank and one between the municipality and the local market. Furthermore, female representation in the board has increased as of January 2003.

As regards the Nejapa Fund, it is fair to say that results have been more modest during this period. After having attained substantial dynamics during the first years, the counterparts/members have found it increasingly difficult to map out their respective roles in the fund (as was earlier the case in Soyapango). Nevertheless, there is a great commitment to resolving these problems and ensuring the sustainability of the fund, e.g. by way of obtaining legal status.

As the phenomenon of local development funds is indeed a new one, they have experienced various difficulties regarding e.g. relevant legal frameworks, which in turn have impeded their ability to turn available funds into projects. Considering the obvious role the funds still have played in local development (first and foremost in the municipalities but also as examples of viable cooperation between different sectors/interests at local level in El Salvador), the original agreements have been extended so as to allow for the use of Sida contributions until December 2003 (hence no additional funds have been provided).

Total Sida support for both funds: MSEK 3.6 (1999–2004). All disbursements made.

Broad support to democratization at local level

Diakonia supports a vast array of Salvadoran non-governmental organizations, many of which direct their efforts towards multifaceted support to democratic development at local level. Diakonia's partner organizations have formed a network for local development (Red de Desarrollo Local), which carries out development projects as well as being active at policy level. The network (comprising the organizations Fusai, Fundamuni, Fundaungo, Flacso, Funde and Sacdel) enjoys great respect and is often used as a point of reference by various organizations.

A number of member organizations also focus on large-scale educational and vocational training programs for local leaders which, for instance, has facilitated a process in which several small municipalities have created "regional communities" (mancomunidades). Another example would be the program currently underway run by Fundaungo (*Fundación Guillermo Manuel Ungo*). Focusing on the local elections in March 2003, between September (2002) and August this program aimed at strengthening the legitimacy of the electoral, as well as transition, processes of local governments. Activities focused on the elaboration of political programs on the part of the candidates and possible incumbent regimes, but also the distribution of information as regards citizens' opportunities for political action.

Another main theme in Diakonia's program in El Salvador is improved gender structure in local politics. Assisted by Diakonia, on September 20/21 the 3rd National Congress for Salvadoran Female Councilors, Deputy-Mayors and Mayors (Andrisas) resulted in a detailed discussion on issues such as "power, ethics and transparency", "gender equality" and "good local government for women". Furthermore, Diakonia promoted their participation, and that of female mayors from Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, in the Congress of Central American civil society organizations.

The Consortium of NGOs (*Consortio de ONGs*) has concentrated a significant part of their program on the local level. The Consortium consists of five Salvadoran NGOs; ISD, Fundaspad, Capaz, Iejes and ISED. During this reporting period the Consortium has striven to strengthen *mesas ciudadanas*, i.e. local civil society coordination bodies which, for instance, has resulted in the elaboration of a "citizen platform" in 30 municipalities. Produced in a participatory process, during the election campaign these documents were eventually presented to, and ratified by, the large majority of candidates running for office in 25 municipalities. Consortium activities have also included evaluation of local government performance during the period 2000–2003, arranging (and hence introducing) public and media debates between candidates at local level,

(For a summary of these organizations' efforts especially related to the earthquake disaster in 2001, please see Chapter 3.1, for more information on Diakonia and Consortium activities see chapters 3.2.4 and 3.2.1 respectively).

3.2.3 *Other Bilateral Assistance* *Contract-financed Technical Cooperation (CTC)*

The coordinated effort to systematically introduce the CTC modality for Swedish support to El Salvador which was launched during the preceding reporting period was continued and has resulted in project applications from eight public authorities and/or institutions, all within the framework of Sida's strategy for development cooperation in El Salvador. Five of these applications have been preliminarily approved for funding, whereas three will come up for decision within the near future. Applications from the following five authorities were given preliminary approval:

- Fiscalía General de la República (FGR)
- Corte Suprema de Justicia (CSJ)
- Instituto Salvadoreño de Desarrollo Municipal (ISDEM)
- Fondo de Lisiados
- Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (PDDH) (*Human Rights Ombudsman*).

Remaining applications for CTC projects soon coming up for decision include:

- Alcaldía de San Salvador
- Dirección General de Estadística y Censos (DIGESTYC), and
- Corporación de Municipalidades de El Salvador (COMURES).

Most of these projects will, if they qualify for Sida's approval and successfully complete the usual tender procedure during May–August 2003, probably get started at the end of 2003 or beginning of 2004.

In addition to continuing coordinated efforts for new CTC projects, follow-up has also been undertaken concerning the only ongoing project of this kind in El Salvador. The objective of this project is the elaboration of a master plan for sewerage and storm water disposal within the metropolitan region of San Salvador. The project is implemented by the region's urban planning unit, OPAMSS with support from the Swedish company SWECO. The proposal generated by the project is likely to be presented in May or June 2003, hopefully attracting the interest of potential investment institutions such as the IDB or the World Bank.

Sida financing of the OPAMSS project: MSEK 7.9 for the period 2002–2003.

Low-income housing through micro financing (Fusai)

Fusai has been implementing this extensive, popular housing program totaling some MSEK 41 since 1999. Originally the program drew on the presumption that the credits provided by Fusai were to be complemented by government subsidies, however to date this has not become part of government housing policies. Towards the end of the reporting period increasingly positive indications have been given by the relevant govern-

ment agency Fonavipo on this matter, but as yet a change in actual policies remains to be seen.

Total Swedish support: MSEK 41 (all disbursed).

Reform Program for the Public Health Sector (via PAHO)

Sida has supported the health reform process in El Salvador since 1986 through a regional reform program administered by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). The main objective of the reform project has been to develop an integrated and decentralized system for health services (SIBASI), with a high level of civil participation. During the last three months of 2002, health services were provided within the framework of the regional cooperation agreement from 1999, which was concluded in December 2002. One of the main achievements of Swedish cooperation has been the progressive involvement of local governments in the provision of primary health care through the integration of health, education, sanitation and environmental services. In some municipalities, results have been enhanced thanks to the active involvement of the incumbent mayors, i.e. crucial actors in the decentralization process. However, it should be mentioned that a rather great divergence exists regarding the level of development in the different SIBASIs. In March 2003, the final project report is under elaboration.

Total Sida support 1999–2002: MSEK 28.6

Water and sanitation (via UNICEF)

Since 1987, Sida has supported a water and sanitation program in El Salvador, channeled through UNICEF. The project was finalized in December 2002.

Total Sida support: MSEK 11 for period 2000–2002.

3.2.4 Swedish NGOs in El Salvador

For many years, several Swedish NGOs have been operating programs on a permanent basis in El Salvador, and most of these organizations have their own permanent representation in the country.

Diakonia and Save the Children/Rädda Barnen would be the organizations with the strongest presence, having their regional offices for Central America in San Salvador. However, due to financial restraints, Save the Children/Rädda Barnen has decided to gradually withdraw from Central America, consequently their regional office will be moved to San José, Costa Rica.

Apart from its support to local democracy and gender equality (see chapter 3.2.2), Diakonia assists Funde's project for land regulation and development in El Salvador. The project results thus far were recently presented by representatives from Comures (joint interest organization for Salvadoran municipalities) and the government agency for territorial development, OPES. Among the main points made on that occasion were the need for improved economic planning and increased housing investment, which in turn would require a transformation of the state as 70 per cent of the population acts within the informal sector. Moreover, Diakonia supports the Center for Consumers' Defense (*Centro para la*

Defensa del Consumidor) in its attempt to elaborate alternatives to the water reform, involving a movement towards concessions and privatization as proposed by the government and the IDB (Inter American Development Bank). The project focuses on information campaigns and the organization of local committees working in defense of water as a public good.

UBV, *Utbildning för biståndsverksamhet* (Education for Aid Activities) focuses on rural development and has volunteers supporting civil society organizations throughout the country. UBV has continued its efforts to coordinate and support sustainable networks between its partner organizations, through which they are able to draw on each other's experience and consider that they receive more attention from local governments and government agencies. A major theme in UBV's activities is that of gender equality, where raising of consciousness for men and women and targeting domestic violence play key roles. In line with a strategy for female participation, the proportion of women in leading positions in partner organizations has increased during the reporting period. Finally, training on the possible implications of the CAFTA (Central American Free Trade Agreement) and PPP (Plan Pueblo Panama) has been intensified.

The involvement of IM, *Individuell Människohjälp* (SOIR, Swedish Organisation for Individual Relief) encompasses several minor support programs for local initiatives. To take an example, in suburban San Salvador IM supports (partly through volunteers) the local organization Anaes, which provides primary health care services and day-care centers. Moreover, *Kooperation Utan Gränser* supports partner organizations in the cooperative sector. Two organizations that have finalized their activities in the country are *Svenska Kyrkans Mission* (SKM) and *KFUM/KFUK*, even though SKM has announced plans to start up again in the near future.

4. Donor coordination

Sweden has participated in the following donor coordination efforts:

– *UNDP: Human Rights Ombudsman (PDDH)*

UNDP has continued to act as a forum for meetings between donors and the Human Rights Ombudsman during the period. The focus of the meetings has shifted away from “saving the Ombudsman” towards concrete presentations of proposals for support on behalf of the institution itself.

– *Fespad, Idhuca and Consorcio de ONGs de Educación Cívica (respectively):*

Donor meetings have been conducted in a regular fashion between the NGOs and their respective groups of donors, where Sweden is represented.

5. Administration, personnel

In 2002, Embassy staffing for bilateral cooperation consisted of one Regional Advisor for CTC programs in Latin America, three Swedish Program Officers, one National Program Officer (NPO), one Assistant National Program Officer, one Assistant and one Counsellor.

In addition to the above-mentioned staff, the Embassy has a part-time consultant for information activities on development cooperation with Guatemala and El Salvador.

See also websites:

- www.diakonia.se
- www.rb.se (Save the Children/Sweden)
- www.ubv.se
- www.fusai.org.sv
- www.embajadasuecia.org
- www.uca.edu.sv/idhuca
- www.sida.se

Halving poverty by 2015 is one of the greatest challenges of our time, requiring cooperation and sustainability. The partner countries are responsible for their own development. Sida provides resources and develops knowledge and expertise, making the world a richer place.



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