

Distribution of Second Hand Clothes in Angola Implemented by Practical Solidarity

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**Department for Co-operation
with Non-Governmental
Organisations, Humanitarian
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Management**

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Sida Evaluation 03/28

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Executive summary

This report presents the findings and conclusions of an evaluation of the Sida supported second hand clothes activities of Practical Solidarity (PS) in Angola, 1998–2002. Two main channels have been used, the Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration (MINARS) and PROMODES, a commercial company set up by an Angolan NGO, ADRA. Sida has financed the costs for collection and handling of the clothes in Sweden, freight and administration. Quantities and financing can be seen in the table below.

Shipped quantities (ton)	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	TOTAL
MINARS	250	556	931	890	900	3 527
PROMODES	383	350	641	225	0	1 599
Total	633	906	1 572	1 115	900	5 126

Sida financing (Million SEK)	5,5	8,4	13,7	9,4	7,7	44,7
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With respect to the MINARS component, the evaluation concludes that distribution of second hand clothes to vulnerable groups, including internally displaced people and war victims, has been relevant. However, the capacity of MINARS – financial, human as well as managerial – gives reason for serious concern. Furthermore, the commercialisation of clothes (probably around 25 % of total quantities) for “projects”, “incentives” and local handling costs for clothes has to be seriously questioned, both with respect to how commercialisation has taken place and how funds have been used.

At the time of the evaluation mission, co-operation with MINARS had come to a virtual standstill, due to containers stranded in the ports of Luanda and Lobito and inadequate reporting from MINARS. Given the humanitarian situation in Angola, PS is encouraged to investigate alternative channels for distribution of clothes for relief purposes.

PROMODES is a commercial company set up with the dual purposes of generating funds for ADRA, while at the same time revitalise rural trade by supplying essential goods to the rural population. Clothes from Sweden have been commercially by PROMODES for these purposes. Sida subsidies of the shipments to PROMODES have successively been reduced. Since 2002 PROMODES purchases all clothes from PS (at prices somewhat subsidised by PS).

The establishment of PROMODES is well in line with the generally recognized need to shift from short-term relief to reconstruction and development. It is also a model with a potential of becoming sustainable. However, achievement of the two objectives, revenue generation and rural development, have still been limited. PROMODES does not yet appear financially and organisationally sustainable and there are a number of important issues that need to be tackled urgently, including: a) establishing legal links between PROMODES and ADRA, b) improvement of the accounting, c) introduction of audits, d) establishment of indicators for financial and social objectives, e) strengthening of the management function, f) formalisation of company policies, g) diversification to reduce the dependence on clothes from PS and h) raising profit levels in order to assure sustainability and permit transfers to ADRA.

Acronyms

ADRA	Action for Rural Development and the Environment
AFRA	Sida's Department for Africa
DAPP	Development Aid from People to People
DNAPS	Department for Social Assistance, MINARS
DNIPD	National Directorate for Integration of the Disabled, MINARS
DNL	National Directorate of Logistics, MINARS
GEP	Department of Studies and Planning, MINARS
GII	Cabinet for International Exchange, MINARS
Kw	Angolan Kwanza
MINARS	Ministry for Social Assistance and Reintegration
PS	Practical Solidarity
SEAS	Secretariate of Social Affairs
SEK	Swedish crowns
SEKA	Dept. for co-operation with NGOs and Humanitarian assistance, Sida
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

1 Introduction

Clothes are a basic human need, for protection against weather as well as participation in social life. Children need clothes to attend school and adults have to dress for work. Clothes can be said to be a typical consumer product but there is also a large international commodity trade in second hand clothes. The fact that second hand clothes can relatively easily be converted into cash turns them into somewhat of a “hard currency” in weak economies. The many-faceted nature of clothes implies that they have a number of potential uses in development assistance.

1.1 Project background

Practical Solidarity (PS) is an umbrella organisation for five Swedish Solidarity organisations¹ that have been collecting clothes and other material for people in developing countries for more than 30 years. In recent years, approximately 70% of these clothes have been distributed to Angola through two main channels: The Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration (MINARS) and PROMODES, a commercial company set up by the Angolan NGO ADRA. As will later be seen, MINARS and PROMODES make use of the clothes in completely different ways.

The overall *objective* of the support has been to strengthen national organisations working with activities contributing to social, economic and political equality. The clothes may be used in commercial activities, to enable local production or other activities contributing to rural development and increased self-sufficiency. The activities should to the largest possible extent imply active participation by the beneficiaries, counter-contributions (clothes for work) and self-sustainable micro projects.²

The *target group* has been defined as the most vulnerable and war struck population, including refugees and rural families.

The *quantities* of second hand clothes shipped to Angola are shown in table 1 on the next page.³ Apart from clothes and shoes, shipments have sometimes also included other material, such as sewing equipment and office material.

Costs for collection, sorting and packaging of clothes in Sweden have primarily been financed by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) over its budget for humanitarian Assistance.⁴ Sida support to PROMODES was successively phased out over the evaluation period and terminated completely in 2002.⁵

¹ Emmaus Björkå, Emmaus Stockholm, Stiftelsen Brödet & Fiskarna, Gävleborgs Bistandsgrupp, aInsamlingsgruppen i Värmland.

² Synthesis of what has been stated in PS' applications to Sida. The exact formulations have changed somewhat over time.

³ Amounts may be easier to visualise by mentioning that MINARS has received approximately 25 containers yearly in recent years. One 40 foot container takes approximately 20 ton of clothes.

Also note that PS has delivered clothes to PS without Sida financing to PROMODES since 2000.

⁴ Since 1998, PS has always received the total amount requested from Sida. PS has not made an application to Sida for 2003 due to problems commented upon later in this report.

⁵ Clothes are *sold* from PS to PROMODES with a subsidy of approximately SEK 1,5/kg. This subsidy is financed by the PS member organisations.

Shipped quantities (ton)	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002 ⁶	TOTAL
MINARS	250	556	931	890	900	3 527
PROMODES	383	350	641	225	0	1 599
Total	633	906	1 572	1 115	900	5 126

Sida financing (Million SEK)	5,5	8,4	13,7	9,4	7,7	44,7
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The financing of second hand clothes has corresponded to approximately 7 % of Swedish assistance to Angola over the evaluation period.

A more detailed account of quantities and finance is also given in Appendix 3.

1.2 Purpose and delimitations of the evaluation

Sida has commissioned the present evaluation to gain a better knowledge about the effects of this support, as well as give an independent assessment of PS and its cooperation partners' capacity and handling of clothes. The evaluation will form part of Sida's base for decision-making regarding a possible future financing.

The report covers the five-year period 1998–2002. However, focus has been placed on the later years. The report also discusses some implications for the future in view of the Angolan development.

It should be noted that the study is not to be considered an audit. The report can neither confirm nor exclude possible irregularities.

The terms of reference are attached in Appendix 1.

1.3 Implementation of the assignment

The evaluation has been carried out by Lennart Peck of Boman & Peck Konsult AB, and Natália Pinto of AIP, Luanda.⁷ Work commenced in February 2003 with interviews at PS in Sweden, analysis of available documentation and planning of the visit to Angola. Angola (Luanda and Benguela) was visited during a 10-day period, including travel days. Meetings were held with representatives of MINARS at different levels, ADRA, PROMODES, the Swedish embassy and other stakeholders.

Additional interviews in Malanje were carried out by Anders Brandter and Cesaltina Basto, who simultaneously carried out another evaluation in this province.

A list of people met is attached in Appendix 2.

The possibility of collecting evaluation data for a five-year period marked by war, regarding two separate programmes, one which has been nation-wide, is obviously limited. This becomes even more evident considering the time available for research (see above). This point was made to Sida already before the start of the evaluation and it was agreed to focus on such aspects that would appear crucial for the decision making of Sida.

⁶ Plan/budget.

⁷ Contracting was made through the call-off agreement between Jarskog Konsult AB and Sida/SEKA.

The evaluation mission to Angola coincided with the yearly monitoring mission of PS. The two were conducted separately but provided many a useful opportunities for dialogue along the course of work, possibilities to check information and to exchange impressions. The consultants found this fruitful for evaluation work.

A draft report was presented to Sida on April 25. This draft was discussed with Sida and PS at a seminar on May 6. Comments received at this occasion and in writing from PS have been considered in the preparation of this final report.

We would like to extend our gratitude to everyone who contributed to this evaluation with information, ideas and practical support.

2 Programme Context

2.1 The Angolan clothing market

How do people in Angola get access to clothes?

Persons met during the mission estimate that approximately 80–90% of the Angolan population dress in second hand clothes. *Assuming* that the average minimum clothing requirement is 7 pieces per year, corresponding to approximately 2 kg, and that 85 % of Angola's 14 million population rely on second hand clothes, yearly national minimum requirements of second hand clothes would be somewhere around 24 000 ton. This is obviously a *very* rough approximation⁸ but still serves to set Swedish shipments in some perspective.

There are limited imports of new clothes, mainly from Brazil, low cost Asian countries and South Africa, serving mainly an urban upper middle class. Prices for these clothes are said to be considerably higher than for second hand clothes. Hence, the markets for new and second hand clothes are in practice no substitutes for one another.

Currently, no clothing or textile industry exists in Angola⁹. Given the current cost levels of Angola, it is doubtful whether a national clothing industry will be able to compete with low cost countries in the foreseeable future.

Imports of second hand clothes have been dominated by Development Aid from People to People (DAPP). Approximately 10–12 000 ton of clothes have been received per year only in the port of Lobito. Total quantities have not been possible to verify. The quantities shipped by PS have thus represented at the most 10–15% of the total DAPP imports. One of the reasons for DAPP's position is that the organisation acts as an NGO and therefore has been exempted from import duties (currently at 12% of the CIF value) and taxes.¹⁰

The second largest actor has been PS through its co-operation with MINARS and PROMODES. Also other aid agencies have occasionally supplied clothes to Angola, for example Finland in 2001/2002. However, there are no other aid agencies supplying clothes with the same continuity as PS.

Commercial imports of second hand clothes are also limited. The main reason given by one importer is that he has not been able to compete with the subsidised imports of DAPP and other donors. In Lobito, however, there is said to be an imports at small scale and generally importers would be more than willing to supply second hand clothes given that there was an active demand.

The market for clothes – new as well as second hand – has been hampered primarily by two factors. One has been limited *physical access* due to the war (poor roads, parts of the country cut off, high transportation costs). The other has been limited *purchasing power* of the Angolan population. Given the levels of poverty, people simply do not afford to buy clothes.

With the signing of the peace agreement in 2002, physical access has improved and the immediate

⁸ PROMODES usually calculates 3–4 pieces of clothes/kg. The figure 7 pieces per year is obviously rather arbitrary but was used in an evaluation of the second hand clothes support carried out in 1995.

⁹ Angola is said to have had quite important textile and clothing industries in former years but these are no longer in operation, partly due to the downfall of the cotton production. Other reasons have been the destruction of facilities and poor sectoral industrial policies in the past as well as bad macro-economic policies, for instance an overvalued exchange rate.

¹⁰ However, since the beginning of this year, this preferential treatment was stopped, giving other importers a possibility to compete with DAPP at equal terms.

need for clothes has actually increased as more people can be reached. However, the lack of money to buy clothes is as great as ever.

2.2 The humanitarian perspective

What has characterised the humanitarian situation and what are the links to second hand clothes?

In 1998 the war was once again intensified leading to a considerable deterioration in the entire country. Figures on the numbers of internally displaced people (IDP) are unreliable and notoriously inconsistent. In November 1998 the number of IDPs was estimated to be approximately 1,6 million. In 2000 UNHCR reported that 3,7 million people were directly affected by the war. Estimates of the number of IDPs ranged between approximately 2,3 (UN) and 3,6 (Government).¹¹ Following the peace agreement, IDPs have started to return to their origins. In early 2003 MINARS estimated that the number of IDPs was around 1,9 million. The return of many IDPs is of course positive but has also temporarily increased the need of humanitarian assistance.

The humanitarian disaster is not limited to IDPs and similar groups. Acute poverty, aggravated by the war, is widespread and social indicators, such as child mortality, life expectancy etc. are among the worst in the world.

In this situation, clothes can be seen as one out of many needs, along with food, water, shelter, agricultural tools etc.¹² The MINARS report to PS of 1998 talked of 1 562 000 identified people with lack of clothes. 76% of these were IDPs and needs were noted to be greatest in the northern region.¹³

Years of relief assistance is said to have created donor dependency and passivity among large groups of the Angolan population. Despite a continued need for relief assistance there is a broad consensus that Angola must now move from traditional “give-away” relief to reconstruction and development. This raises the question of alternative uses of clothes.

2.3 The Swedish context

What are the main driving forces in Sweden behind the programme?

Sweden is a country of great over consumption of clothes. There have been estimates that approximately 30 000 ton of clothes are thrown away every year, despite that most of the “user value” of the clothes remain.

PS is a solidarity organisation largely built around the collection of these clothes. Collection, sorting and packaging of second hand clothes can be seen as a “process industry” involving many full time employees and considerable investments. The collection of clothes is also important for membership commitment. Furthermore, the shipments of clothes are sometimes taken as a point of departure for information activities in Sweden, for example, the “Angola campaign” in 2000.¹⁴

Hence, there can be said to be quite strong Swedish motives to continue shipping clothes to Angola. Needless to say PS, Sida and persons donating clothes are also concerned about clothes being used in the best possible way.

¹¹ Figures quoted from PS applications to Sida.

¹² Persons interviewed during the mission, including OCHA, MINARS, ADRA and EC unanimously hold this opinion.

¹³ The basis for this figure is not stated.

¹⁴ The purpose of this campaign was to spread information about the situation in Angola. It included courses to own staff of the membership organisations, production of a leaflet and exhibitions in the second hand shops. On the November 11 a campaign day was held and all incomes from second hand sales were donated directly to the women’s rights project of the Africa Groups in Angola, a total of SEK 160 000.

Even though clothes are a “free resource” in the sense that they are donated from the Swedish public, collection, sorting, packaging and administration implies a real cost for PS. Looking only of the production cost for “summer mix”, the following figures from the main production centre of Emmaus Björkå, may give an indication.

Production cost for “Summer Mix”	Kr/kg
Collection	2,06
Sorting	1,82
Press/storage/loading	1,13
Administration	0,74

If the total costs (SEK 11 169 000) are equally split on all products (1 358 000) the cost per kg is 8.22 SEK/Kg.

The sales value of these products ranges from 4.50 SEK/kg for “rough mix” (summer + winter), 5,50–6 SEK for summer mix and 22 SEK/kg when clothes are sold to second hand stores (internal pricing).

3 MINARS

3.1 Objectives, indicators and assumptions

How was the co-operation designed from the outset?

PS has distributed clothes through MINARS, and previously the Secretariat of Social Affairs (SEAS) since the 1980'.

The general *objective* of this support has been to provide destitute people with clothes, either through free distribution or “clothes for work” activities.

An underlying *assumption* behind the support is that clothes are a basic human need that under current circumstances cannot be met.

There are no *indicators* in respect to the various objectives mentioned in the application to Sida, apart from quantities of clothes to be shipped to Angola.

The specific *target groups* are not specified in the project documentation but have been determined by MINARS: IDPs, returnees as well as persons receiving social assistance¹⁵ such as children, elderly, war veterans and persons with disabilities.

In view of the limited resources of MINARS, the programme has permitted commercialisation of clothes for funding of the management of the programme as well as other MINARS activities: 5 % by MINARS, Luanda and 10 % by the regional logistical offices.

Provinces have then been permitted to commercialise 15 % of received quantities for so called “institutional development” or micro projects.

In addition, 5 % of clothes have been permitted to be distributed to MINARS staff as “incentives”. The reason for this was to reduce the risk of internal theft and to give a stimulus to staff, considering very limited, or even unpaid, salaries from MINARS.

Thus, a maximum of 32 % of clothes have been *permitted* to be commercialised or given away as incentives.¹⁶

3.2 Main actors

Who have been involved in the programme?

MINARS has the overall responsibility for internal displaced people in Angola and co-ordinates humanitarian support to these in co-operation with other ministries, local authorities, UN agencies, national and international organisations. MINARS is also in charge of social affairs, including social assistance to vulnerable groups. It runs, for example, childcare centres and homes for elderly people.

Focal point for the clothing programme within MINARS has been the department of planning and studies (GEP). There has also been a considerable involvement of the department of social assistance (DNAPS). Directly under the central ministry, there are three regional logistical centres (north, centre and south). MINARS is also represented in each of the 14 provinces as well as at municipal level.

¹⁵ Usually within the institutions operated by MINARS.

¹⁶ Source: MINARS. The amounts do not include clothes for work programmes.

Until recently, the provincial offices of MINARS depended directly on Luanda. However, according to a reorganisation that took place in 2002, the provincial MINARS offices now depend administratively on the provincial government and to Luanda only thematically. The reorganisation also included merger of some departments. This reorganisation is said to have caused certain communication and practical problems.

MINARS is an organisation with a very limited budget and salaries of staff are extremely low. At the time of the evaluation the central logistical department, responsible for forwarding clothes to the provinces only had one truck, which was broken. The southern department had no truck.

Considering that MINARS operates in 14 provinces it is not possible to generalise in respect to competence and management capacity. The evaluation team met with persons of varying capacity and time was insufficient for any deeper analysis. However, a general impression is that the main constraints is not the personal competence of MINARS staff but just as much management, resources and the extremely difficult conditions under which the ministry has been working.

The evaluation team did not note the use of any particular indicators, except for number of people who have received clothes.

With an overall responsibility for social assistance and IDP issues, MINARS maintains links with many NGOs. However, the distribution of second hand clothes has been managed without involvement of any outside actors.

The co-operation between PS and MINARS is governed by an agreement, setting out the main principles for the co-operation. The current agreement was signed in 2002.

3.3 Programme execution

How has the programme been executed and by whom?

The distribution of second hand clothes is better described as a continuous activity based on one-year cycles, rather than as a project with a fixed start and termination.

3.3.1 Identification and planning

The programme departs from the

capacity of PS to collect and ship second hand clothes, the *requests* from MINARS, PS' *assessments* that second hand clothes are indeed needed and the *financing* of Sida.

MINARS has the responsibility to monitor the needs of the target groups and does so through its various departments, particularly the one for social assistance. By the end of each year GEP forwards a request to PS for the coming year.

The request is reviewed by PS and provides the basis for the application to Sida.

Once the yearly plan has been established, GEP Luanda prepares a plan indicating the amounts to be distributed to each province. Each province is then responsible for preparing a plan for distribution to specific locations and purposes. Exactly on what basis and what with criteria these plans are elaborated is not clear to the consultants.

Final selection of target group is made on site. For example, the administrator of a transit camp makes an assessment of which the most needy people are and distribute clothes to them. There does not seem to have been any formal selection criteria at this level nor any policy document or operative guidance on the part of MINARS.

Due to the war situation, planning has sometimes been difficult and modifications of plans have been required.¹⁷

MINARS participates with other national and international actors in various co-ordination forums. However, the evaluation team has not been able to determine if, and if so, how the clothing activities have been co-ordinated with others.

3.3.2 Implementation

Clothes are collected, sorted and packed¹⁸ at the various PS organisations in Sweden. Sorting is done, to the possible extent, according to the requests of Angola. The clothes are shipped either in rented or purchased containers, the latter coming to use in Angola.

The regional logistical centres of MINARS are responsible for customs clearance of the clothes and further distribution to the provinces. According to the project co-ordinator at MINARS containers *normally* stay in the port 10–15 days before they are released. After 15 days, a daily fee is charged by the port. However, Customs clearance became a problem in 2002 when the tax exemption of ministries terminated. 21 containers have been stranded in the ports of Luanda and Lobito, some for over one year, and had not been released at the time of the evaluation. In the case of the 18 containers that arrived in Namibe during 2002 the average number of days for release was 45 (with a variation between 5 and 80 days). The consultants have not been able to verify these data nor what has been done by leading MINARS management to solve the problem.

Inland transportation has also been a problem, not only due to the poor (or inaccessible) roads but also due to MINARS transportation capacity.

The time available for the evaluation has not permitted an analysis of how clothes are actually handled at provincial and local level. The general impression, from visits to Luanda and Benguela, is that routines for distribution of clothes exist but that there are problems of practical implementation.

In terms of control, it may be mentioned that in connection with their monitoring mission in March 2003, PS received copies from the southern and central regions of lists of what was distributed to the provinces during 2002. The lists specify to what province distribution has been made, what was distributed, quantity, weight, registration number of the truck, name of the truck driver and date for release from the regional warehouse.

For the central region, these lists are also signed by responsible for release of clothes, the driver and sometimes of accompanying representative of receiving province. PS was occasionally shown “certificates of receipt” from receiving province but has no copy of such documents.

Commercialisation is usually done by inviting traders at the informal market, of which most are women, to the storage houses of MINARS. Selling is then done directly.

3.3.3 Follow-up and reporting

GEP, Luanda, is to confirm receipt of containers and quantities to PS as well as provide an annual report no later than 15 February. For this, MINARS, Luanda, depends on reporting from the provinces. PS has provided MINARS with a format for yearly follow-up and reporting which has been forwarded to the provinces.

¹⁷ Source: GEP

¹⁸ Usually in bales of 45–50 kg, 210 kg or 450 kg.

However, reporting to PS has generally been incomplete, late and unreliable. This goes back to the data received from the provinces, which is often uneven, making it impossible to consolidate it. Furthermore, Luanda lacks the capacity to revert to the provinces, ask for additional information or make queries about the actual content of their reports. There is apparently no use of the reporting except for further reporting to Sweden. PS has been concerned about the poor reporting for several years.

The reports from the provinces, as well as MINARS reports to PS, include very limited information on the commercialisation of clothes (quantities sold, prices etc.). Apparently GEP Luanda is not in a position to control this activity.

The only provinces that had reported for 2002 by March 2003 were Benguela and Namibe.

The dialogue between PS and MINARS has shifted over time but has in later years been poor and irregular. It is remarkable and unacceptable that it took eight months for MINARS to inform PS of the stranded containers. MINARS has referred to technical difficulties and organisational changes, including the change of individuals. PS has been troubled by the poor communication and informed MINARS of this but yet continued shipments.

Once a year, PS has made a monitoring mission to Angola and at some occasions, representatives of MINARS have visited Sweden. This has provided an opportunity for direct dialogue with MINARS. However, from recent events it is clear that a much closer monitoring would have been needed.

There have been no formal audits or evaluations of the support during the period 1998–2002.

3.4 Results

What has been achieved by the project?

In 1998, after an evaluation had identified substantial problems in the central and northern regions, clothes were only shipped to the south. However, from 1999 shipments to the central and northern regions were resumed. Appendix 3, presenting planned and actual shipments of clothes from Sweden, shows that the immediate objectives, in terms of clothes shipments, have been fulfilled or even surpassed.

15 per cent of clothes have been commercialised at central and regional level for management of the programme.¹⁹ Even though another 15 % has been permitted to be commercialised at provincial level and 5% be given away as “incentives”, interviews indicate that the actual figure has been lower. It is reasonable to believe that about 70–80 % of the clothes have been available for distribution to the target groups.

As mentioned in the introduction, this evaluation is not an audit and cannot comment on irregularities, such as the possible deviation of clothes. However, the general level of corruption in Angola and the extremely low salaries within the government sector, in combination with the ministry’s incapacity to follow up and exercise control gives reasons for concern. In addition there is the lack of transportation capacity and the lack of internal and external audits.

The evaluation team has not been able to determine how far out in the provinces clothes have actually reached. Many destitute people live in areas where MINARS has had limited access.

¹⁹ For example, freight, payment to workers unloading clothes, travel of GEP and also local costs in connection with the visits of PS.

3.4.1 Direct distribution of clothes

For 2001, a year when 890 ton were shipped, MINARS reported a number of 1 988 973 beneficiaries.²⁰ Given the standard of reporting we consider this figure unreliable.

However, *assuming* that 75 % of total amounts were actually distributed, that each beneficiary received on an average 3–4 pieces of clothes²¹, equivalent to 1 kg, the approximate number of beneficiaries would be in the range of 675 000.

The respective proportions distributed to men, women and children have largely been determined by the content of the shipments, which in turn reflects the consumption pattern in Sweden. The proportion between male and female clothes has been quite equal. The proportion of children's' clothes (0–14 years) is around 25% weight wise.²² In number the proportion is of course larger. Knowing that the families in areas receiving clothes usually have more children than Swedish families, there are reasons to assume that there has been a certain lack of children's' clothes.

The impact of free distribution of clothes is quite direct: people, who would otherwise have no clothes, or clothes in very poor conditions, will be able to dress. Alternatively, poor people sell the clothes and use the money for other needs. For people with *some* purchasing power, receiving clothes mean that they can use their money for other purposes.

3.4.2 “Clothes for work”

As mentioned previously, clothes may be used to mobilise beneficiaries through “clothes for work” programmes. It should be mentioned that there seem to be two different notions of this concept. The usual one is that persons to receive clothes (the target group) are requested to perform some type of work, thus contributing to development instead of becoming passive receivers. However, projects where clothes had simply been used as means of payment to workers were sometimes referred to as “clothes for work” as well, by persons interviewed.

Under any circumstances, “clothes for work” activities of either type appear to have been rather limited. There have been no such programmes in the three provinces visited.²³ We were told that such activities are more developed in the southern region. Reporting is limited but in the MINARS report of 2000, 60 bales were said to have been distributed to 2000 persons for work, equalling 1,5 kg/person. Considering the total number of beneficiaries of clothes and that only 2000 persons received them through “clothes for work” in the region where it was most developed, we draw the conclusion that activities of this kind have been, on the whole, marginal.

This should not come as a surprise, considering that “clothes for work” are quite demanding in terms of human resources, management and methods.

3.4.3 Micro projects

The evaluation team only had the opportunity to visit two projects, both involving the building of child care centres. One was incomplete due to a lack of finance. *Examples* of micro projects mentioned in MINARS reporting include a vegetable garden, homes for orphans, disabled and elderly people, a

²⁰ Based on reporting from the provinces, probably also including beneficiaries of “micro projects”.

²¹ Which is recommended as a minimum quantity by MINARS.

²² According to statistics of PS and information from sorting in Mozambique.

²³ The evaluators visited one project where clothes had been used as payments to masons and women carrying water, but this may hardly qualify as a clothes for work programme given that clothes were not given to members of the supposed target group but merely used as payment.

carpentry, handicraft activities and agricultural projects. There is no information on results, beneficiaries etc. Nor is it possible, from available documentation, to state how many micro projects have in fact been implemented. It appears as if micro projects have been marginal in the northern and central region but somewhat more common in the southern region.

3.4.4 Institutional support

Funds from commercialisation of clothes have been used for a number of different purposes. The following, mentioned in reporting, are a few examples: Petrol and lubricants, maintenance, spare parts, printers and toners, bicycles, physical infrastructure, consumption materials, typewriters, furniture and telephones. Generally speaking, funds have been used to cater for immediate, material needs, sometimes in relation to the clothing assistance but usually not.

3.4.5 Incentives

There is limited data on how much clothes have been distributed freely to MINARS staff as “incentives”, and on what criteria. Even though 5 per cent of quantities received in the region *could* be used in this way, the officer in charge at GEP states that quantities have in fact been small. In 1998, 500 staff at MINARS institutions and IDP camps benefited from clothes as “incentives”. In 2000, 452 persons in the southern region received a total of 32 bales, equalling 1 600 kg or 3,5 kg/person.²⁴ This should be seen against a total quantity of 480 000 kg. There is no reporting from the central and northern regions.

There does not seem to have been any clear link between the “incentive” and the performance of receivers. Hence, the “incentives” would probably be better described as a general fringe benefit.

It is of course difficult to state what impact the give-away of clothes has had. Positive for the receiver, no doubt, but there is an obvious risk that such distribution also nurtures a culture of ministry staff demanding something “extra” for performing its regular duties. Handing out clothes as staff incentives also obviously reduce the quantities available for more vulnerable groups.

3.4.6 Side effects

Given that clothes have been distributed to destitute people without purchasing power, it is not likely that there has been an effect on the local clothing market. Destitute people are simply not part of this market.

The commercialised clothes (recently in the range of 150–200 ton/year) have increased the amount of clothes on the regular clothing market. The fact that MINARS have not yet paid import duties and taxes implies that this business may have affected the possibility of commercial companies to import clothes.

3.5 Relevance

How relevant has this support been in view of needs and priorities?

The issue of relevance must be discussed in various perspectives. Starting with relevance to humanitarian needs, available information²⁵ indicates that clothes have been, and still are, highly relevant to the picture painted in section 2.2.

²⁴ According to the reporting of MINARS.

²⁵ As provided by the European Commission, ADRA and as seen by the evaluators during the short field visit.

MINARS states that shipments of clothes are of high priority. The purchasing of 250 ton of second hand clothes with national government funds for relief purposes may be taken as an indication of the importance the government gives to this support. Meanwhile, 21 containers have been stranded in Luanda and Lobito and the fact that more has not been done to release them gives reason to doubt the government's actual commitment.

Relevance in relation to Sida's overall poverty reduction objective is high. The support is strongly focused on extremely poor groups. What it lacks, however, is a longer-term developmental impact. As Angola goes from emergency relief to reconstruction and development, free distribution of clothes will become less relevant, while using clothes as input to developmental activities, for example clothes for work programmes or using clothes as a means of income generation, should become increasingly important. This requires a completely different way of working, involving design, management and monitoring of projects.

In respect of the clothes that have been commercialised, relevance appears to be low.

According to the agreement between MINARS and PS, Angola should pay all local costs for local handling and distribution of clothes. Commercialising clothes, thus reducing the quantity of clothes that can be distributed for relief, to cover up for MINARS incapacity to assuming local costs is not in tune with this.

Generally speaking, the relevance of implementing social projects is high, but as was previously noted, there is no information of the relevance of concrete MINARS projects.

A quick glance at how funds have been used for institutional support reveal that it has mainly been for very short term needs. To be effective, an institutional support requires an analysis of the fundamental problems of an institution and an idea of how to solve them. Such an analysis has never been made.

Finally, as a government ministry, MINARS does not have the structure for effective commercialisation of clothes.

3.6 Sustainability

Has the support had a lasting impact?

Distribution of clothes for destitute people meets an immediate humanitarian need. It has never been intended to be a sustainable and it is not.

The idea of "clothes for work" programmes and use of clothes in micro projects have a potential for sustainability, but information on particular projects is lacking. Out of the two child care centres visited during the mission one was operating and apparently sustainable while the other one had been left incomplete one year ago. This shows the importance of obtaining information on particular projects to comment on sustainability.

The so-called institutional support has only given MINARS a temporary budget support. It has not been sustainable.

3.7 Cost-effectiveness

What is the value of this support in relation to alternative use of resources?

The average cost per kilo clothes, CIF Angola, has been approximately SEK 9, of which about half corresponds to costs for the collection, handling and administration, and the other half for international freight.

Assuming that 15 % of the clothes are commercialised for the purpose of covering costs in connection with the programme, the average cost per kilo clothes actually distributed becomes SEK 10.60. Costs for handling and distribution on the Angolan side are not known.

Have the results obtained justified costs or would there have been alternative, and better uses, of the money invested in the programme?

One alternative would, in principle, have been to *purchase clothes at the commercial market for second hand clothes*. It has not been possible to obtain sufficient information on international market prices to determine whether this would be a better alternative. The clothes of PS are not necessarily cheaper than commercial imports but prices have to be set in relation to quality. MINARS stresses the fact that building up a relation with a regular supplier, assuring an even quality, has been of crucial importance.²⁶

Another alternative would, in principle, be to *purchase new clothes*. These are generally more expensive but permit better adaptation to needs and are easier to distribute. Furthermore, second hand clothes, despite having been used, are said²⁷ to hold a quite high quality compared to cheap imports of new clothes.

Instead of financing second hand clothes, Sida could, in principle, also have used funds for *any other* assistance to poor people in Angola. Could approximately SEK 30 million have been used better in other ways than providing second hand clothes through MINARS? Only a thorough analysis of the Angolan needs and concrete project opportunities would give an answer to this question.²⁸

If Sida would decide to use its funds for other purposes, this would leave PS with the problem of financing current production (if it continues) and with the question of what to do with the clothes currently shipped to Angola. Alternatives would include sending them to PROMODES or similar activities, to send them to other countries (which again would require Sida financing) or sell them on the international market. PS estimates that “summer mix” would render approximately 6 SEK/kg on the international market.²⁹ Actual “production” costs were noted to be 5,75 giving a profit of only of 0,25 SEK/Kg.

3.7.1 Note on local commercialisation

There is no complete account of income from the commercialisation of clothes. However, MINARS’ report for 2001³⁰ shows prices of commercialisation between 5 and 18 Kw/kg, with an average of 13 Kw/kg, in a year when the average USD rate was 33 Kw. In other words, clothes were sold at approximately USD 0,4 or about half of their cost.³¹

²⁶ Clothes purchased by MINARS commercially are said to have been of poor quality.

²⁷ By PS.

²⁸ Just as an example of alternative uses of funds it can be mentioned that the recently evaluated project of ADRA/Africa Groups in Malanje provided vital support in a number of areas for 30 000 persons over approximately the same period as the PS programme with a project budget of SEK 14 million, a third of the financing for clothes. Meanwhile, the experience of Sida in recent years has been a difficulty to find relevant and viable projects to support.

²⁹ Prices on the international market for clothes vary and, according to PS, it is possible to find “summer mix” from 10–5 SEK/Kg depending on quality. PS occasionally sells surplus “summer mix” for 6 SEK/kg which may be seen a reasonable indicator of the sales value of clothes.

³⁰ Addendum.

³¹ The amount referred to corresponds to 41 ton.

Reported figures for Namibe only, for 2001 show that MINARS clothes were sold at 32 Kw/kg for mixed clothes and 14–15 Kw/kg for winter clothes and big bales for selection. In 2002 Namibe reported average sales prices of 45 Kw/kg, which approximately equalled 1 USD in July 2002.

Thus, the income from commercialise clothes locally has varied considerably and has in some instances been considerably *lower* than the cost of sending them. In other words, commercialisation has sometimes implied a direct loss of Sida funding.

4 PROMODES

4.1 Objectives, indicators and assumptions

How was the co-operation designed from the outset?

Several factors led to the creation of PROMODES. One was an increased awareness by the mid 1990's that ADRA would need alternative sources of finance to be sustainable in the longer perspective.

ADRA and its branches were already involved in various types of income generating activities. However, according to Angolan law, an NGO is not permitted to engage in commercial activity such as the commercialisation of clothes and other products.

Meanwhile, ADRA, concerned with rural development, had seen that local trade was a key factor for rural development. The rural population requires input such as fertilizers, agricultural equipment and consumer products, as well as opportunities to sell their produce and obtain cash.

Since the mid 1990's, ADRA had received limited quantities of second hand clothes from PS, which were either distributed freely or sold at subsidized prices by its branches.

PROMODES was formally established on February 5, 1998. The idea was to set up a self-sustainable commercial company with two main *objectives*.

One was to generate profit to finance activities of ADRA. The ultimate *target group* in this perspective would be the beneficiaries of ADRA activities in general. The objective rested on the *assumption* that the company would be profitable on commercial grounds.

The other objective was to promote rural development by revitalising rural trade, including increasing the supplies of important goods and “sensibilising” price levels. *Target groups* in this perspective would be people living in rural areas with a potential to purchase or sell goods (clients) or persons benefiting from the improved access of goods. The objective rests on the *assumption* that there exists a market failure (i.e. market forces do not function as assumed in a market economy) and that a company like PROMODES can contribute to correct this.

No concrete *indicators* are mentioned in PS' application to Sida.

4.2 Main actors

Who have been involved in the programme?

ADRA, which stands for Action for Rural Development and the Environment, had been founded in the new political environment after 1990 as a non-profit, non-governmental and secular organization without political affiliation. ADRA emphasises beneficiary participation, integrated approaches and sustainability. The NGO has grown rapidly and formed branches (“Antenas”) in various provinces. International donors finance the bulk of its activities. ADRA has currently 127 members. It is governed by a board, elected by the general assembly.

PROMODES was formed at the initiative of ADRA as a limited liability company. Due to the restriction that Angolan NGOs cannot engage in commercial activities, it was formed in the names of three private individuals³², of which two were board members of ADRA.³³

³² Fernando Pacheco dos Santos, Filomena Maria Lopes de Andrade and Duarte Bastos de Brito.

³³ One has recently withdrawn from the board of ADRA for personal reasons.

For all practical purposes, PROMODES is the commercial branch of ADRA. It responds to the board of ADRA and ADRA members encountered all relate to PROMODES as an integral part of ADRA. In legal terms, however, PROMODES is a private company owned by three persons. Even though the board of ADRA, *de facto*, functions as the board of PROMODES there are no legal links between the two. The statutes of the company state that 90% of profits should go to projects for development and the environment but surprisingly there is no explicit mentioning of ADRA. This gives rise to a number of concerns, for example the use future profits, the ownership of assets, the responsibility and mandate of the ADRA board versus the owners, what will happen if one of the owners of PROMODES wishes to withdraw etc. This situation has been recognised by ADRA who has stated that it will be dealt with in the soon future.

The company PROMODES, located in Benguela province, has its main office in Lobito. It rents a warehouse in Catumbela and has stores in Lobito, Benguela, Cubal, Huambo and Wakocungo. Its transport fleet consists of seven trucks³⁴. It currently employs 55 persons.

An important group of stakeholders are the clients of PROMODES. Clothes are mainly sold in bulk to traders at the informal market (80–90% women). Clothes are also sold to the public in PROMODES stores. Clients for agricultural supplies (such as fertilizers) and consumption goods (such as soap) are the rural population. Of particular importance in this context are the local associations sometimes formed in connection with ADRA work. Hence, PROMODES offers an opportunity to serve the population of these groups after the termination of the project; or the other way around, ADRA has created a market for PROMODES by having formed the associations.

ADRA participates in various co-ordination forums with aid agencies etc. However, being a commercial company, PROMODES operates largely independently.

4.3 Programme execution

How has the programme been executed and by whom?

Even though this may be considered a “project” from a Swedish point of view, PROMODES is a permanently operating company. Activities therefore do not follow a traditional project cycle.

4.3.1 Identification and planning

The initiative to form PROMODES came from ADRA³⁵ as described above. A feasibility study, financed by Sida and carried out jointly by ADRA and PS, was carried out in 1998.

The daily management of the company is the responsibility of its director. A budget is elaborated on a yearly basis.

The board of ADRA directs activities in broader terms but does not interfere in operative issues. Various documents outline the mission of PROMODES, possible future directions etc. but there is no formal company policy or business plan.

The director of PROMODES and PS prepares a plan for shipment of clothes on a yearly basis. This plan provided the basis for the application to Sida (when clothes were still subsidised by Sida).

However, there is no direct linkage between the annual plans of PROMODES and ADRA.

³⁴ Somewhat striking in relation to MINARS virtual inexistent transport capacity.

³⁵ The idea was also encouraged by donors, including PS/Sida.

4.3.2 Implementation

Clothes are shipped from Sweden and received in the port of Lobito. After customs clearance³⁶ they are brought to the warehouse of PROMODES for sorting and further distribution, except quantities sold in bulk in unopened bales.

Most of the clothes received are sold to traders in bulk who resell clothes on the informal markets. The best clothes are sold in the various stores of PROMODES. Some clothes of poor quality have been donated or sold at reduced prices. The clothes sales correspond to approximately 70 % of the income of PROMODES, which means a high dependency on one single product.

The sale of agricultural inputs, such as fertilizers, and consumer goods for the rural population, is done through the stores of PROMODES.

The pricing is based on cost. The director calculates with a margin of to cover the cost of clothes, fixed costs and a “reasonable” profit. The margin for fertilizers etc. may be lower. There is no formal pricing policy.

Clothes of higher quality sold in stores may render approximately 4 USD/kg. Clothes sold in bulk render approximately 1–1,4 USD per kilo. Some clothes of poorer quality have been donated. The following table shows average sales prices of clothes delivered:

Average sales price	Quantities received, kg	Income from clothes sales, USD	Average USD/kg
1999	350 000	430 000	1,23
2000	863 000	1 146 000	1,33
2001	799 000	870 000	1,09
2002	799 000	n.a.	n.a.

PROMODES competes at the clothing market with DAPP. However, there is usually no problem of selling clothes at current prices if they are of good quality.³⁷ Statistics of shipments and sales also indicate that clothes are sold rather quickly after arrival in Angola.

PROMODES offers some of their clients a credit. The current interest rate is 1,5% per month, plus adjustment for exchange fluctuations. By offering credit, also farmers with limited cash gets an opportunity purchase fertilizers and other agricultural input.

The *Swedish contribution* to PROMODES has primarily been in the form of second hand clothes. Originally, all clothes were donated to PROMODES through Sida financing. This provided the basis for setting up the business. Today PROMODES purchases clothes from PS at a somewhat subsidised price. This subsidy is paid by the member organisations of PS.

Apart from the shipment of clothes, PROMODES has benefited from advice from PS. The director has been in Sweden three times. Two other persons have also visited Sweden and the yearly visits of PS to Angola have given opportunities for dialogue.

³⁶ The logistics manager of PROMODES state that containers usually leave the port within one week of arrival.

³⁷ There is no information about the margin of the clients of PROMODES. Staff of PROMODES state from own experience that it is likely to be somewhere around 10–20% but this has not been confirmed. Clothes sold in Lobito are said to reach beyond the province of Benguela but it is not known how far.

4.3.3 Follow-up

PROMODES presents an “annual report” to the board of ADRA as well as to PS. This document presents activities, sales and provides various financial data. However, it does not present a complete financial statement. There is no balance sheet and the result is presented on a cash flow basis.³⁸ It is therefore impossible to determine the actual financial result of the company.

Meanwhile, PROMODES has hired an external accountant, preparing and accounting for the purpose of providing government authorities with the required information. However, this accounting is not used for the management of the company.³⁹

No audit has yet been carried out of PROMODES. ADRA has stated that this will be done in 2003.

Internal systems of control (stock keeping, reporting of sales etc.), manual as well as computer based, are in place.⁴⁰

The dialogue between PROMODES and PS is said to be smooth and frequent. The yearly visit of PS to Angola constitutes the main opportunity for Swedish follow-up.

4.4 Results

What has the programme achieved?

Results in terms of quantities of clothes shipped from Sweden are shown in Appendix 3. The table also shows the reduction of Sida financed shipments and the increase of shipments purchased by PROMODES from PS.

The very establishment of PROMODES is also an important result. To set up a company with 55 employees, five stores and a turnover in the range of USD 1,2 million (2001) is truly an achievement.

4.4.1 Generating funds for ADRA

However, the overall objective of PROMODES generating profits for ADRA has not yet been fulfilled. ADRA activities have so far only received USD 272 000 from PROMODES⁴¹. It should then be recalled that assets (mainly clothes) worth approximately USD 230 000 were transferred from ADRA to PROMODES at the creation of the company.

So far, incomes from sales have primarily been reinvested, which is nothing unusual for a young company. Nevertheless, it inevitably raises the question of the proportions to be reinvested vs. paid back to ADRA.

It also raises the question of whether PROMODES is actually making sufficient profits to generate a surplus to ADRA. This is further discussed under the sections on sustainability and cost-effectiveness.

4.4.2 Promoting rural trade

PROMODES has established stores in five locations, which supply substantial quantities of essential goods for the rural population. The annual report of 2001 lists the following:

³⁸ This means for example that repayment of debts to PROMODES is taken up as income, that depreciation of assets is not included and that stock variations are not detailed in the accounts.

³⁹ Furthermore, it shows certain differences in comparison with PROMODES “own” financial statements.

⁴⁰ However, as stated previously, the study cannot comment on possible irregularities or loss of clothes.

⁴¹ Biggest receivers have been ADRA, Malanje (USD 116 000), ADRA head offices (USD 45 000), Catumbela project (USD 33 000) and ADRA Benguela (USD 27 000).

Sales of non-clothes items	
<i>Imports</i>	
Vegetable oil	122 400 kg
Soap	129 600 kg
Fertilizer	360 000 kg
Agricultural seed	350 kg
Pesticides	2 600 kg
"Pulverizadores"	50
<i>Purchased locally</i>	
Fertilizer (compost)	120 000 kg
Ammoniac sulphur	60 000 kg
Magnesium phosphate	20 000 kg
Kieserite	10 000 kg
Traction animals	20

The facility to offer credits to clients is an important service to persons who otherwise do not have access to any credit facilities.

PROMODES has not yet started the other business line foreseen, that of *purchasing* products of the rural population and thus creating a two-way exchange between rural and urban areas.

The actual impact of the business of PROMODES would require a deeper analysis than has been possible in this evaluation. As can be seen, the amounts sold are quite important. PROMODES itself states that there are virtually no other companies supplying fertilizers to their clients and that PROMODES under any circumstances have had a positive effect on price levels. However, more data on possible alternative suppliers, prices and the use of products provided by PROMODES would be necessary in order to draw firm conclusions on impact.

Given the absence of rural credit for poor farmers, the credit schemes of PROMODES are likely to be of considerable importance to their clients.

4.4.3 Side effects

Increased access of clothes has not been an objective of this support and should therefore be seen as a side effect. Quantities have been limited in relation to those of DAPP but the very fact that DAPP has had to face competition *may* have pressed prices in the Benguela area.

The bulk sales of clothes have provided income opportunities for those trading in clothes, mainly women. To the extent PROMODES has offered clothes at lower prices than DAPP, it has mainly benefited the traders. The price to consumer is established by the market where there is no distinction between PS' and other clothes.

In the transition to a market economy, some Angolan companies are applying explorative price levels. PROMODES may have had a moderating effect on price levels.⁴²

Meanwhile, if the operations of PROMODES are subsidised this *may* have prevented other companies to enter the market. If so, this could actually have had negative effects on rural trade.

⁴² States ADRA and PROMODES. The fact has not been possible to verify but appears likely.

Another side effect worth mentioning is the fact that PROMODES, as a commercial company pays import duties and taxes⁴³. This obviously reduces profits but contributes to the income of the Angolan government.

4.5 Relevance

How relevant has this support been in view of needs and priorities?

The objective of creating a financial base for ADRA appears highly relevant. ADRA is today almost exclusively donor (and project) financed, which poses a threat to the organisations long-term survival as well as independence.

It ought to be in the interest of Sida, who has long supported ADRA in various ways, to see the organisation becoming increasingly self-financed.

Relevance of promoting rural trade also appears high. This may be seen as a means of going from relief to sustainable development. Exactly *how* rural trade is best promoted and if PROMODES is the right answer cannot be commented upon by this evaluation. However, the experience, knowledge and local presence of ADRA give reason to be positive.

Relevance to Sida's overall poverty reduction objective is high as well. ADRA is focussing on poor groups in its projects and the products supplied by PROMODES are purchased by, perhaps not exclusively, but in large parts by very poor people.⁴⁴

4.6 Sustainability

Has the support had a lasting impact?

By establishing a commercial, profit making, business, PROMODES has a great *potential* not only to strengthen the sustainability of ADRA but also to provide benefits – sustainably – to the rural population. However, there is nothing that says that a commercial company *will be* profitable and it is far from clear that PROMODES has yet reached a level of sustainability.

Organisation wise, PROMODES is currently very dependent on its Director. There is no Deputy Director. This, in combination with the fact that many routines and policies appear not to be very institutionalised⁴⁵ is a threat to the operational sustainability of the company.

It also remains to be shown that PROMODES is financially sustainable (see below). It is not clear that PROMODES is covering its own costs if depreciations are included, subsidies are discounted for etc.

Given that peace prevails in Angola, PROMODES is likely to face an increased competition from other companies. If so, this will be positive in view of the objective to promote rural trade. However, it will be a challenge financially and to the objective to generate funds to ADRA.

Another aspect is the dependence on clothes from PS, which are still partly subsidized.

⁴³ PROMODES pays import duties (12 % on CIF value, currently approximately USD 0,66/kg), consumption tax of 10 % and tax on profits of 35 %.

⁴⁴ The fact that the clothes not necessarily will end up among the poorest groups is of less importance here as clothes are only *means* to other objectives in this programme.

⁴⁵ In terms of being documented.

4.7 Cost-effectiveness

What is the value of this support in relation to alternative use of resources?

When the programme started, it was subsidised by Sida with approximately 9,30 SEK per kilo, (around 1 USD). Since then, Sida subsidies have been phased out but PS currently subsidise clothes with approximately 1,5 SEK per kilo (Total of SEK 1 1431 000 for 2002).

For a commercial operation such as PROMODES, cost-effectiveness basically translates into the question of whether the company is profitable. As mentioned, this is not clear from the annual reports but available information can still give some indications.

4.7.1 Cash flow, investments and transfers to ADRA

The table below shows *cash flow* in USD, which has been positive since 1998. The table also presents the amounts that PROMODES has registered as “investments”⁴⁶ as well as transfers to ADRA, which have affected cash flow but constitute no actual costs.

Year	Cash inflow (+)	Cash outflow (-)	Difference	"Investments"	Transfers to ADRA
1998	251 750	201 414	50 336	39 101	102 917
1999	362 023	304 913	57 110	44 477	11 225
2000	1 231 998	847 129	384 869	129 201	116 753
2001	1 356 680	1 172 523	184 157	336 716	16 933
2002	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	25 000

However, note that the table above does not consider e.g. variations in stocks and debts, nor depreciations.

4.7.2 Return on investment

However an analysis also has to take into account the cost of investment, which has been the following:

Source of investment:	USD
Value of assets transferred from ADRA:	230 000
Value of Sida subsidies:	1 520 000
Value of PS subsidies ⁴⁷ :	140 000
Total:	1 890 000

This may be compared to the current equity (“fundos próprios”), as shown in the balance sheet of the company. Below is a condensed balance sheet for PROMODES of 31.12.2001⁴⁸.

⁴⁶ For example purchasing of trucks.

⁴⁷ 2001: SEK 632.000

2000: SEK 377.000

1999: SEK 324.000

1998: SEK 0

Total: SEK 1 333 000 = USD 140 000 (Assuming exchange rate 9,5)

⁴⁸ Balance sheet prepared by PROMODES external accountant for external purposes, said to give a correct picture. Conversion to USD has been made with the exchange rate 32.80.

Assets	USD	Liabilities	USD
Cash	1 535	Suppliers	168 452
Assets in bank	104 461		
Clients	4 114	Equity	132 646
Products in stock	16 795		
Fixed assets	174 193		
Total	301 098	Total	301 098

The balance sheet shows an equity – “own funds” – of only 132 646 USD.

The value stated for fixed assets *may* be misleading due to exchange fluctuations. If the value of fixed assets purchased in previous years have not been adjusted with inflation, it will appear as undervalued (in current Kw). As an alternative one may look at what PROMODES has reported as “investments”. These amount to USD 549 495 (without depreciations⁴⁹). Equity would then be USD 508 000, an amount that is still way below the value of the investment.

In short, out of approximately USD 1 890 000 invested into PROMODES by ADRA, Sida and PS, about USD 500 000 million remained as assets by the end of 2001.⁵⁰

There may indeed be immaterial assets that have been built up in PROMODES, such as competence, a market position etc. Nevertheless, the negative return on investment so far should be a matter of great concern.

Repayments to ADRA were noted to be only USD 272 000.

4.7.3 Approximate result 2001

It may be argued that the first years, heavily subsidised by Sida, do not reflect the present situation of PROMODES. For this reason it may be useful to look at the latest available figures reflecting results, i.e. 2001. Even though there are no complete accounts, the following figures may serve as an approximation:

Estimated result	USD	Comments
Total revenue	1 243 110	As in annual report minus “repayments”
Cost of operations	–819 107	As in annual report minus value of “investments” and transfers to ADRA
Depreciations	–55 000	10 % of total investments up to 2001 (rough approximation)
Stock variation	–68 165	Start of year: USD 84 960, End of year: USD 16 794
Variations in debts	–178 680	Start of year: USD + 14 343, End of year: USD –164 334
Approximate result	122 158	

Financial results are thus in the range of USD 122 000. However, it should be recalled that PROMODES also benefited from 220 000 kg clothes financed by Sida, worth approximately USD 222 000 and a PS subsidy of approximately USD 70 000. If these were considered, total results would be negative by approximately USD 170 000.

⁴⁹ The actual amount should therefore actually be lower.

⁵⁰ PROMODES may still have had a positive cash flow, as the subsidies of Sida and PS do not affect it.

4.7.4 Cost-benefit

A cost-benefit analysis should also consider the benefits that PROMODES has had on rural trade. It is, however, impossible within the scope of this study to translate these benefits into monetary terms. Furthermore, as a commercial company, PROMODES has to be financially viable in order to survive. Benefits for farmers cannot make up for a loss-making business.

4.7.5 Comments

The above findings deserve some comments. PROMODES was indeed launched in a very difficult context. The new outbreak of war in the later 1990's has naturally affected business. Angola's transition to market economy and the whole economic environment has been rather chaotic. Considering the external factors, it should not be very surprising that PROMODES is facing financial difficulties.

However, consideration must also be taken to internal factors. During the missions, we were given the impression that some PROMODES stores were possibly not covering their own costs. The company has seven trucks, but three to four are said to be sufficient for current needs⁵¹. Sales prices apparently do not cover actual costs. These and other factors have to be dealt with urgently.

Furthermore, a proper accounting is vital, not only for formal purposes but also for daily business management and to assure that the company is not run with a loss. An authorised audit could be of great support to PROMODES in this respect.

⁵¹ Another assessment was made when the trucks were purchased.

5 Conclusions and implications

Angola has faced, and still faces, a serious humanitarian situation. Large numbers of people lack access to clothes, as a result of inadequate supply as well as insufficient purchasing power. After the peace agreement in 2002, the country has been moving from a state of war to another type of emergency: the acute poverty of millions of people. There is a general consensus about the need to move from traditional relief to reconstruction and development. This requires – and permits – different ways of working.

This evaluation points at a high degree of relevance of the MINARS and the PROMODES programmes. However, it raises serious doubts regarding programme implementation and results.

The fact that there are virtually no measurable objectives makes it difficult to speak of “fulfilment of objectives”. The overall goal “to strengthen national organisations working with activities contributing to social, economic and political equality” is of course rather high-flying. A substantial number of poor people have indeed received clothes, which no doubt has been important. However, the stated ambition that deliveries of clothes should be accompanied by active participation by the beneficiaries, counter-contributions, and self-sustainable micro projects does not appear to have been lived up to. Furthermore, out of a total of 5 100 ton of clothes shipped from Sweden (with and without Sida subsidy), 1600 ton have been commercialised through PROMODES and somewhere between 500 and 1000 ton have been commercialised or given away as incentives by MINARS. Thus, the actual target group has only received somewhat over half of the clothes shipped and, so far, seen few benefits of the clothes that were commercialised

5.1 MINARS

The evaluation concludes that the distribution of second hand clothes has been relevant to recent years’ humanitarian needs. There are no immediate signs that most of the clothes should not have been distributed to people really needing them. However, a closer analysis would be required to verify this.

The capacity of MINARS – financial, human as well as managerial – is a reason for serious concern. Furthermore, the commercialisation of clothes – probably around 25 % of total quantities – for “projects”, “incentives” and local costs for handling of clothes has to be seriously questioned, both in respect to how commercialisation has taken place and how funds have been used.

At present, the co-operation has come to a virtual standstill. Twenty-one containers are still stranded in the ports of Luanda and Lobito, a few of them since more than one year. Reporting for 2002 is still lacking. MINARS has virtually no transportation capacity. PS has not applied for Sida financing for 2003.

In the short-term perspective (1 year), the humanitarian situation still seems to justify distribution of second hand clothes for relief purposes. A renewed assessment has to be made by the end of 2003.

Given this perspective, it would appear logical to look for alternative channels for distribution of clothes. One may ask, why MINARS did not already use the transportation capacity of the World Food Programme to reach out those in real need? Why were second hand clothes not used as part of the package of non-food items delivered by the world food programme to the most affected areas? What other national and international organisations could have the capacity to distribute second hand clothes.

Limited shipments through MINARS in provinces where co-operation appears to have functioned better (mainly in the south) could also be considered in the future. However, it is up to MINARS to show that it has the sufficient capacity for this, in terms of planning, logistics, control, reporting etc.

MINARS fully subscribes to the idea of shifting from relief assistance to development project and has stated that it would like to use clothes increasingly for such purposes. However, this requires capacity to identify key development problems, plan, manage and monitor projects. MINARS still has to prove that it has this capacity before applying for project financing.

5.2 PROMODES

PROMODES corresponds well with the “new” vision of reconstruction and development rather than short-term relief. Providing financing to ADRA projects as well as revitalising rural trade are both highly relevant objectives. Furthermore, the working model which PROMODES represents offers a potential of sustainability that makes it very interesting.

The concern of this evaluation is whether PROMODES is actually fulfilling its objectives and whether it is sustainable

de facto. Operations have grown to an impressive magnitude in a limited period of time but impact, particularly in terms of income generation, has been limited.

It may be argued that the company is still relatively young and has operated under very difficult circumstances. This is true and the investment made must be seen in a long-term perspective. However, there is an urgent need to deal with the following issues:

Legal status and relation to ADRA: Even though PROMODES, for all practical purposes, is part of ADRA, there are no legal connections between the two. ADRA and PROMODES should without delay seek legal advice to settle this situation.

Accounting: PROMODES lacks an accounting giving the company management and board a complete picture of company finances. A balance sheet and statement of results, taking into account depreciations, stock variations etc. should be elaborated to serve as a management tool.

Audits: An audit is not only an assurance against possible irregularities but may also be an important support to company management. Given the magnitude of operations and the linkages to ADRA (having all of its other projects audited), it is strongly recommended that an authorised audit be made of PROMODES' 2002 accounts.

Human resources: PROMODES would not have been what it is without its present manager. However, the dependency of one person always constitutes a risk. A deputy director, preferably with financial capacity, needs to be assigned.

Policies: The objectives and operations of PROMODES are described in various documents but there are few official company policies. Policies on basic issues, such as how to balance profits and developmental impact, and transfers to ADRA vs. reinvesting, should be clearly established by the board.

Indicators: Even though PROMODES is a commercial company, it has a social mission. Indicators in respect to both social and financial objectives should be established, permitting regular follow-up. A clear distinction must also be made between financial and social activities in daily operations.

Profitability: The low return on investment should be a serious concern for the PROMODES management and board. A thorough analysis of the financial performance over the first five years as well as an analysis of costs and pricing is strongly recommended.

Diversification: 70% of PROMODES' income originates from the sale of clothes all delivered from the same supplier: PS. A diversification is needed to reduce risk in the medium and long-term perspective.

The Swedish support has primarily been given in the form of second hand clothes. The need to strengthen PROMODES organisationally gives reason to ask whether there is a potential for PS also to provide organisational support.

There have been discussions of establishing a "PROMODES II" in Malanje, based on the experiences from Benguela. Given the current weaknesses of the existing PROMODES this idea appears premature. However, *if* the crucial issues mentioned above can be settled, PROMODES proves financially viable and a second branch does not drain the existing one from too much resources, the idea may deserve serious discussion in the future.

5.3 The PS perspective

The shipments to Angola correspond to approximately 75 % of the collected clothes of PS. The Angolan development and the findings of this evaluation probably gives reason to reduce the quantities of second hand clothes sent to Angola, or at least to use clothes in different ways.

One may be to seek *alternative channels* for relief distribution.

Another could be to use clothes increasingly in *development projects*. This however requires suitable channels as well as a capacity to assess and monitor projects closely. Does PS have such a capacity at present?

Reducing the quantities shipped to Angola could also be seen as an opportunity for using clothes for relief purposes in *other countries*. This would of course require efforts to open up new channels as well as a new discussion with Sida.

Clothes may also be *sold* at the international market and funds be used for solidarity purposes. Funds obtained could be used as "own contribution" ("egeninsats") applying for project finance from Sida. But again, managing projects is something different than shipping clothes.

It appears as if PS stands at a point where it must make some strategic decisions of whether to continue specialising on relief shipments or turn increasingly to longer term development activities, and whether to maintain the strong focus on Angola or open up for shipments to other countries. These are, however, questions that can only be answered by PS and its members.

Appendix 1: Terms of Reference

(Unofficial translation from Swedish)

Evaluation of Sida's (Asdi) support to the activities of "Praktiskt Solidaritet" (Practical Solidarity, PS) in Angola.

1. Background

Sida supports the activities of PS in Angola by contributing to the purchase and freight of second hand clothes. The objectives of the second hand clothes support is contributing to alleviating immediate suffering among those affected by war, as well as strengthening the Angolan receiving organisations in their work to enhance socio-economic equality and development. The work of the local organisations should imply active participation of the target group and include a counter contribution (clothes for work), as well as lead to activities becoming self-sustainable with time. The receiving organisations in Angola are MINARS (Ministry for Social affairs and integration) and ADRA, an Angolan NGO mainly focusing on rural development.

In Angola, the shipments of PS are distributed between the northern and eastern, and the central and southern regions respectively. The main receiver of the clothes is MINARS (the Ministry for social affairs and integration). The clothing support should primarily satisfy the clothing needs in disaster situations and the distribution is decided upon by MINARS, being responsible for receiving and forwarding of the clothes. National transportation takes place by truck but also by air to the areas, which due to the security situation cannot be reached by land. Secondly, clothes may be used as "incentives" in the form of various types of micro projects as well as for sale in order to strengthen activities.

A smaller part of the clothes have been destined to ADRA and their commercial company PROMODES. The income of sales of clothes goes to micro projects focusing on rural development with a strong popular participation. The objective of PS previous clothes donations has been to build up an activity, which by Angolan own forces may continue without external financial or material support. As PROMODES has strived towards this objective, PS has reduced the Sida subsidised clothing volumes and at the same time increased the clothing volume that PS with subsidised prices are selling to PROMODES. No support for clothing shipments to ADRA was applied for in 2000 as the activities were functioning adequately without this support.

2. Purpose and Scope

PS has received financial assistance for freight of used clothes since 1988/89. The receiving countries have been Nicaragua, Mozambique, Western Sahara, Angola and Eritrea. Since 1998 Sida extends financing only to Western Sahara and Angola. The yearly support has since 1998 been between 11–12 million SEK (Approx, 1,2–1,3 million USD). PS have carried out own evaluations and studies regarding their activities in Angola. The latest evaluation was carried out in 1995 when the purpose was to gain a basic knowledge about the importance of the clothing support, which PS provides to Angola, as well as assess the preconditions for a continued clothing support to Angola. The evaluation demonstrated that there had been relatively large irregularities and volumes unaccounted for in certain regions, and it therefore recommended a suspension of deliveries via the ports in the central region (Lobito) and the northern region (Luanda). PS followed these recommendations under a couple of years but has now taken up the deliveries to these ports again. In 1998 PS carried out a feasibility study where the objective was to assess the preconditions for ADRA to engage in commercial activities.

3. The assignment

The purpose for the present evaluation is to gain a better knowledge of the effects on the target group of this type of humanitarian support channelled via PS, as well as giving an independent assessment of PS and its partner organisations' competence and handling of the clothes support.

The evaluation should consider the second hand clothes support which has been implemented by PS in Angola under the period January 1998–october 2002. Under the first part of this period the country has been at war which may have affected the project.

The following areas shall be evaluated:

- The need of clothing support and its possible comparative advantages over other relief support,
- Cost-effectiveness in relation to alternative forms of support,
- Target group selection,
- The planning process within PS and its partners,
- Strategy and modes of implementation,
- Fulfilment of objectives
- Participation of the target group and their opinion of the project,
- The importance of the clothing support for the partner organisation's other activities,
- The capacity of the receiving organisations,
- The distribution and administrative routines within the respective receiving organisation.

The consultant shall:

- Analyse the process of planning and preparation of the activities, including the situation analysis, which the selection of interventions were based on. The time aspect of interventions in relation to the form of financing should also be looked into, i.e. whether this form of interventions requires a long-term engagement or not. One should also analyse the long-term sustainability, particularly in relation to how the interventions have been coordinated/integrated with the relevant ministry and/or province delegation.
- Assess the fulfilment of objectives, i.e. the outcome in relation to objectives and expected results.
- Describe the target group and popular participation. To what extent has the identified target group been reached and in what ways does the target group consider the objectives and results useful?
- Assess the comparative advantages in relation to methods in order to reach the intended objectives and expected final results.
- Assess the differences in the handling of the clothing support between the to receiving organisations.
- Assess the ADRA/PROMODES project's relation to and understanding of local/national authorities.
- Assess the relations between PROMODES and ADRA's executive leadership. Assess the leadership and competence as well as the participation of other staff.
- Assess central steering and competence in the activities of MINAR's in relation to minister and regional leadership,
- Assess leading regional steering and competence in relation to MINAR's staff and target groups,
- Assess the projects' possible effect on the current disaster situation,
- Assess the importance of PS's "development cooperation commitment" in Sweden.

4. Methodology, implementation and time perspective.

The consultant shall:

- To through relevant documentation such as project documents, reports etc. The documentation is available at Sida and PS as well as at the receiving organisations.
- Interview the relevant persons and visit relevant organisations in consultations with Sida and PS.

Make field visits in Angola, including Luanda and Benguela as well as the southern region.

Appendix 2: List of People Interviewed

ADRA

Pedro Aleca	Director, Cubal
Patricia Baez	ADRA Advisor
Isídro Chikulu	Deputy Director, Cubal
Joaquim Fernandes	Director of Antena Malanje
Roque Gonçalves	Project Co-ordinator, Antena Malanje
Dinho Major	Member of the Board, Director of Info/Doc. Centre
Tuca Manuel	Director of Antena, Benguela
Luis Augusto Monteiro "Sila"	General Director and Board Member
Manuel "Sila" Neto	Former Assistant Director
Fernando Pacheco	Chairman of the Board and former Director
Domingos Sebastião	ADRA, Malanje

PROMODES

Carlos Manuel Amaral	Warehouse and Logistics
Duarte Bastos de Brito	Managing Director
Lucilina Cateve	Store Manager, Lobito
Filomena da Luz Domingos	Stock Control
Batista Alberto Antonio Geraldo	Store Manager, Cubal
Sebastião Kiala	External Accountant
Ana Rosa Monteiro	Accounting
Cidalia	Warehouse and Commercialisation, Catumbela
Rosalina	Warehouse and Commercialisation, Catumbela

MINARS

Jaime António	Cabinet for International Exchange (GII)
Samuel Balaca	Regional Division, Centre
Maria Idalina Carlos	Director, MINARS Benguela
Mauricio Cadjikila,	Director, Social Assistance, MINARS, Malanje
Augusta dos Santos Dia	GEP, Province of Luanda
Damásio Dinis	Department for Social Assistance (DNAPS)
Bernarda Floriano	MINARS, Cubal
Roquerebelo, Morongo	Director, MINARS, Malanje
Isac Neto	Nat. Dir. for Integration of the Disabled (DNIPD)
Yungu Rodrigues Pwissa	Regional Division, South
Serafim Raimundo	Logistical Department, Benguela
Lucas Ribeiro	Programme Officer, GEP
Paulo dos Santos	National Director, GEP
Pedro Sachiquete	National Directorate of Logistics (DNL)
Marinela Sendala	Department of Social Assistance (DNAPS), Benguela

Sida

Yara Fernandes	Programme Assistant, Swedish Embassy
Cecilia Gjerdrum	Councillor, Swedish Embassy
Lars-Olov Jansson	AFRA, Country officer for Angola
Ingela Winter-Norberg	SEKA/HUM
Gunilla Petrisson	SEKA/HUM
Susanne Spets	AFRA, Former programme officer at Swedish Embassy

PS Sweden

Tommy Andersson	Programme officer, West Sahara
Ove Klevemark	Programme officer, Angola
Göran Larsson	Chairman
Ann-Marie Norrman	Economist

Other

Antonio Manuel de Albuquerque	Mabilio de Albuquerque (importer)
Julio Kwanza Santos	Municipal Administration of Cubal
Walter Viegas	European Commission, Luanda
Dona Berta	Trader in clothes and client to PROMODES

As well as persons at MINARS child care centre in Luanda, at the transit camp in Cubal, at the Kiskerhof project in Cubal etc.

Appendix 3: Quantities and Sida Finance

VOLUMES (ton)	1998		1999		2000		2001		2002	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
ADRA/PROMODES, of which	350	350	350	350	863	799	947	225	0	0
– Sida financed	350	383	350	350	600	641	220	1 117	947	
– Without Sida financing	0	0	0	255	222	575	574			
MINARS, of which	250	250	550	556	900	931	880	890	900	924
– North		0	150	451	284	333				
– Center		0	0	0	197	205				
– South		250	406	480	409	386				
Total Sida financed	600	600	900	920	1 500	1 572	1 000	1 115	900	924
Total from PS	600	600	900	920	1 755	1 794	1 575	1 689	2 017	1 871

Sida FINANCING	1998		1999		2000		2001		2002	
	Budget	Outcome	Budget	Outcome	Budget	Outcome	Budget	Outcome	Budget	Outcome
Costs										
Clothes (collection, packaging etc)	2 760 000	3 151 038	4 500 000	5 067 119	7 800 000	8 050 275	5 446 000	5 732 116	4 557 000	n.a
Freight (including containers)	2 365 500	2 025 231	3 188 541	2 673 786	5 100 000	3 865 940	3 388 000	3 201 831	2 430 000	n.a
Administration and other	454 500	340 475	563 788	698 782	801 000	776 459	722 000	558 369	717 000	n.a
Total	5 580 000	5 516 744	8 252 329	8 439 687	13 701 000	12 692 674	9 556 000	9 492 316	7 704 000	n.a

Quantities, Sida financed	600	600	900	920	1 500	1 794	1 000	1 115	900	n.a
Standard cost/kg	9,30		9,17		9,13		9,56		8,56	n.a

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