

Institutional Development Programme (RCI) at the Ministry of Education in Mozambique

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**Department for Democracy
and Social Development**

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Sida Evaluation 03/29

**Department for Democracy
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Executive Summary

Introduction

Sida has been supporting the Institutional Development Programme (Programa de Reforço da Capacidade Institucional do MINED) at the Ministry of Education since September 1998. The main activities of the programme began in August 1999 with the arrival of a Management Advisor, who was placed in the Ministry to support the implementation of the programme. The programme was originally designed to end in 2001 but was extended in 2001 for another two years. The main objective of the programme was to develop the capacity of the Ministry at all levels to manage the national education system in a way that supports the delivery of the Education Sector Strategic Plan and in particular ensures an efficient and effective use of its resources. The objectives of the programme since 2001 have been:

1. Organisational development and improvement of management and leadership;
2. Development of the planning and monitoring system;
3. Improvement of the financial management system;
4. Improvement of Human Resources and administration;
5. Improvement of the quality of education.

The results of the Institutional Development Programme RCI

The most significant outputs of the RCI programme are:

- Training for school directors in all provinces
- Upgrading of MINED internal information system
- School mapping started
- Seminars held in the area of human resource development, planning and management in the provinces and districts
- Training delivered to the provinces and districts in public accounting and public procurement
- Individual training in Education & Planning, human resource development and English

It is the team's understanding that the greatest impact of the RCI has been on a provincial and district level. Under the RCI umbrella, courses were run for provincial and district directors and relevant staff on financial and budget planning and management. Although there are no evaluation results available from these courses, it is hoped that they have helped to improve the planning and monitoring work at these levels.

The RCI programme has built capacity on an individual level both on a central, provincial and district level. An increased consciousness exists within MINED regarding the need for change, which the RCI programme was expected to create. However, many of the planned activities were not implemented and in particular there was a failure to execute the more strategic activities, which represented the framework for the activities of the programme. The constraints to a successful implementation of the RCI are briefly presented below:

1. Weak and unclear role of the working group for institutional development
2. Change in Political leadership
3. Lack of commitment and engagement in implementing the RCI

4. Missing strategic framework
5. Reluctance towards recruitment of technical assistance
6. Limited effectiveness of the Management Advisor
7. Lack of systematic monitoring

A conclusion is that the programme failed to produce the planned results and the capacity development at the higher organisational and institutional levels. The professional / individual level has to some extent been strengthened within MINED. However, this kind of ‘bottom up’ capacity development does not represent a sustainable path for change unless supported by capacity development originating at the strategic organisational and institutional level.

The content of the RCI programme as it was presented in the project document is still very relevant. The most important other ongoing activity for institutional development is the Modernisation and Restructuring Programme. It is the feasibility of these programmes that the evaluation team is questioning, in terms of how these substantial changes can/shall be implemented, highlighted by the RCI experience.

The Management Advisor function

The Management Advisor (MA), employed by SWEDEC, has worked hard not only on behalf of the RCI programme but also in building a wider institutional transformation of the Ministry particularly in the area of human resource management and financial management. His work in facilitating and moving forward both the FASE process and in trying to get the Ministry to respond proactively to the challenges of the ESSP, particularly through the active working of the Technical council and working groups has also been valuable.

Nevertheless the views of both the Ministry and the Management Adviser himself are that despite hard work and continual prompting, success in terms of those expected results has been limited. It was difficult to define a clear role and working space for the MA, both as a result of limited support from the Ministry and a diverse background and competence of the MA.

The Modernisation and Restructuring Programme

There has been very limited collaboration between the RCI and the Modernisation Programme. The WGID has taken various initiatives and developed concrete proposals for a linkage between these two institutional development initiatives, without any result. The Modernisation Programme is presumably “taking over” the institutional development activities within the RCI and it is therefore important to learn from its successes and mistakes.

The Future Vision document of the Modernisation and Restructuring Programme proposes an ambitious programme of institutional and structural change in three phases over four years. The reform includes the abolition and merger of 22 existing bodies. The Future Vision document does not define how the reform shall implemented. More detailed documents are being prepared to clarify how the vision should be implemented. The timeframes however seem unrealistic and the evaluation team recommends a feasibility review to be made of the more detailed ToR of the programme. Recent history of the Ministry also indicates that it is difficult to accomplish change programmes of this kind.

Recommendations for the future

The recommendations are divided in five sections:

A. Recommendations for Improved Organizational Capacity at MINE, 6.1

In this section we recommend the Ministry to take action on a number of important issues, affecting an effective performance of the organisation. For example the delays in processing teacher contracts, the planning capacity, the incentive system and the centralised decision-making is highlighted.

B. General recommendations for Future institutional development efforts in the education sector, 6.2

The recommendations are explained under the following headings:

1. Involvement of MAE and UTRESP as frame of references for MINED Reforms
2. A clearer focus on relating capacity building to key issues in service delivery
3. Gender awareness needs to be prioritised
4. Use of Periodic rather than Resident Advisers
5. Careful Assessment of the Person Specification of the Lead Adviser
6. Development of an institutional framework around which a capacity development programme can be developed

C. General Recommendations for management of donor contributions, 6.3

The recommendations are explained under the following headings:

1. Transfer of Programme Management from the development partner to the beneficiary organisation in line with demonstrated improvements in capacity
2. Funding should be tied to Results
3. Closer strategic level involvement of development partner in contribution management

D. Recommendations to the Ministry of Education for improved management of reform, 6.4

The recommendations are explained under the following headings:

1. Creation of an effective ESSP Secretariat
2. Regular meetings of the Technical Council
3. Development of Performance Monitoring Systems
4. Evaluation of the Primavera FMIS System
5. Development of Job Descriptions for Senior Managers
6. Development of Proper Change Management Structures and Processes

E. Specific Recommendations for future support to institutional development in the education sector, 6.5

The recommendations are explained under the following headings:

1. No continuation of or replacement of RCI programme
2. Support to the Modernisation and Restructuring Programme under certain conditions
3. Slow Build-Up of Funds in line with capacity for FASE
4. Strong Consultancy Support for Performance Monitoring
5. Adaptation by development partners of a strategic and result-based management viewpoint in its relationship to the Ministry
6. Establishment of an ESSP Technical Assistance Fund

List of Acronyms

MINED-	Ministério da Educação
RCI-	Programa de Reforço da Capacidade Institucional do Ministério da Educação;
ASDI-	Agência Sueca para o Desenvolvimento Internacional;
PARPA-	Programa de Acção para a Reducção da Pobreza Absoluta;
UTRESP-	Unidade Técnica de Restruturação do Sector Público
CIRESP-	Comissão Interministerial de Restruturação do Sector Público;
MAE-	Ministério da Adminstração Estatal;
SIFAP-	Sistema de Formação em Administração Pública;
SIP-	Sistema de Informação de Pessoal;
EGEF-	Estatuto Geral do Funcionário do Estado;
SISTAFE-	Sistema de Admnistração Financeira do Estado;
MPF-	Ministério do Plano e Finanças;
MADER-	Ministério da Agricultura e Desenvolvimento Rural;
FASE-	Fundo de Apoio aos Sector Educação;
PASE-	Programa de Apoio ao Sector de Educação;
DAF-	Direcção de Administração e Finanças/ Director de Administração e Finanças;
PROAGRI-	Ptograma de Apoio ao Sector da Agricultura;
COPA-	Comité Paritário de Avaliação;
DPE-	Direcção Provincial de Educação;
DPAC	Direcção Provncial de Apoio e Controlo
PROANI	Programa Avante Niassa
UTRAFE	Unidade Técnica de Restruturação da Administração Financeira do Estado;
DPPF	Direcção Provincial do Plano e Finanças;
EP1	Ensino Primário do Primeiro Grau/ Escola Primária do Primeiro Grau
EP2	Ensino Primário do Segundo Grau/ Escola Primária do Segundo Grau
ESG1	Ensino Secundário do Primeiro Grau/ Escola Secundária do Primeiro Grau
ESG2	Ensino Secundário do Segundo Grau/ Escola Secundária do Segundo Grau

1. Introduction

1.1 The assignment

Since September 1998, Sida has supported an Institutional Development Programme (Programme de Reforço da Capacidade Institucional do MINED) at the Ministry of Education. The programme was originally designed to end in 2001 but was extended during 2001 for another two years. The main objective of the programme is to develop the capacity of the Ministry at all levels to manage the national education system in a way that supports the delivery of the Education Sector Strategic Plan and in particular ensures an efficient and effective use of its resources. Sida recruited SIPU International to evaluate the programme between 1998 and 2002. The team worked in Mozambique during two weeks in April and as well as interviewing senior officials in the Headquarters of MINED, visited its representatives in the provinces of Niassa and Maputo and two districts in these provinces.

The team consisted of the following members:

Karin Schulz, Team Leader

Grayson Clarke

Maria Catela

André Calengo

1.2 Method and limitations

The ToR for the assignment is broad in context and focus. It includes many dimensions and has a mix of evaluating the institutional development programme, and its impact on the capacity of MINED, and making recommendations for future institutional support. Since the ToR is broad, it has only been possible, in the time available to the team, to examine the broad impact of the programme rather than its detailed effect on the different directorates both at the central and provincial level. The absence of adequate initial benchmarks also makes such analysis problematic.

The programme consisted of five objectives. A sixth objective concerning quality of education was included in the programme in 2001 and has a somewhat different approach and content. The team suggested that the evaluation should not cover that area of the programme, since it involves different competences than the team represent, which was approved by the Swedish Embassy in Maputo.

Furthermore, the team has relied mainly on the second hand sources at hand in the analysis of outputs and results of the capacity building activities. The documentation of the process describing how and why the programme developed in this way was limited. The team also used primary sources and through discussions and interviews complemented the reports. Almost no documentation or evaluations were made with regard to the training and seminars that have taken place within the programme, which also created a limitation for the evaluation team.

Regarding the recommendations for the future, the team finds that it is neither appropriate or possible to present complete proposal for future flexible and joint ID-capacity support, including Human Resources Development, at all levels of the Education system, which is requested in the ToR¹. That demands a different focus than this evaluation inhibits. However, the team will present recommendations for the path towards such a support.

¹ Final version ToR.

The evaluation framework is based on three key criteria:

1. The relative achievement of Programme outputs
2. The coherence and relevance of ongoing activities in the area of Institutional Development
3. The extent to which the support has assisted MINED in building a coherent and sustainable path for institutional development

The report is structured as follows:

- Section two: Introduction, objectives, design and organisation etc.
- Section three: Institutional context in terms of other reforms in the public sector
- Section four: Findings in relation to the RCI programme
- Section five: Conclusions regarding the RCI and future support to Institutional development and MINED
- Section six: Recommendations

2. Context

The Institutional Development Programme (RCI), was profoundly planned and prepared, which is highlighted in this section. During the preparation phase the risks were analysed and the management and the monitoring of the programme was planned which is described in 2.3–2.5.

2.1 Description of the Programme for Institutional Development

The Institutional Development Programme (RCI) was developed to respond to one of the MINED Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) objectives. This objective is defined in the ESSP as strengthening the institutional capacity of MINED, especially in the area of policy analysis, planning, management and system administration.

The other two ESSP objectives are to:

- Increase access to educational opportunity at all levels of the education system and improve retention, with particular attention to the reduction of age, regional and gender differences, and;
- Improve the quality of education, by providing training to teachers; enhancing the qualification and training of school directors, improving the monitoring and assessment systems; and ensuring the provision of essential learning materials.

ESSP was approved three years after the adoption, in 1995 by the Mozambican Government, of the “Política Nacional de Educação” (National Education Policy).

The initial Institutional Development Programme was conceived as an Institutional Capacity-building programme (MINED/Asdi 1998/2001). In 2001 the Swedish Embassy requested that a reviewed programme document should be developed, as a result of the annual review, since the results of the programme had not been achieved and few activities had been implemented. Half of the budget would be disbursed only after the reviewed document was sent to the Embassy. A review was presented in May 2001 called the “Institutional Development Programme” (IDP) 2001–2003. The review is a very brief document giving a brief background of the history of the programme and reflecting briefly of the organisation at the time. It does not hold the quality of a programme document. It is therefore unclear to the team what the status is of this review document.

In both the original and revised programmes, the overall objective remained, namely to develop the capacity of the administrative and management functions at all levels in MINED in a way that it ensures continuous improvements in service delivery. The following table shows the objectives of the two versions of the RCI programme.

The table shows that areas for RCI 1998–2001 and for IDP 2001–2003 are similar except for compo-

Institutional Capacity Building Programme, 1998–2001	Institutional Development Programme, 2001–2003
1. Organisation and management development, 2. Development of planning and monitoring systems, including strengthening of the MINED computer force; 3. Financial development management; 4. Human Resources management staff Administration and Human Resources Development (HRD), 5. Development of public relations functions.	1. Organisational development and improvement of management and leadership; 2. Development of the planning and monitoring system; 3. Improvement of the financial management system; 4. Improvement of Human Resources and administration; 5. Improvement of the quality of education.

ment N°5; Development of a public relations functions and Improvement of quality of education. The Development of public relations functions was not regarded as a main issue after the Minister appointed an official for public relations in 1999. The objective of the Quality of Education was included in 2002 as a new component.

The fact that the reviewed document was very similar to the original shows that the delays in implementation were not because the programme was irrelevant or not reflecting the needs and problems at MINED. However, the risks and prerequisites for a successful programme implementation were not thoroughly analysed and dealt with at this stage by either Sida or MINED.

The total budget planned for the programme was USD 5.95M (1999: 0.6M; 2000: 1.15M; 2001:1.7M, 2002: 2.5M).

2.2 Design and organisation of the RCI

The RCI was developed as a component of a larger MINED programme aiming at changing the whole system of education. In this regard, RCI objectives, activities and expected results would be set-up in line with those of the ESSP.

The overall objective of the proposed programme is to strengthen MINED to play a more active role in the development of the national education system. An assessment of the situation in relation to management and operating methods in use at MINED was therefore carried out as a departure point of RCI designing process. This process was long and it involved several directorates within the Ministry. The positive aspect of this was that many employees had the opportunity to learn about the process and participate in its preparation, which in its turn should help to guarantee the ownership of the programme by the Ministry.

On the other hand, some of the activities that were to be considered in the RCI had already begun. To ensure the relevance of the programme, MINED held several management seminars, both at national and provincial level including a national seminar on team change and management. The objectives of these seminars were to disseminate ESSP's contents and make provinces and districts part of the planning process. Another objective was to launch a discussion on the management procedures and attitudes at those two levels.

The seminars confirmed the need for capacity building. It also became clear that management at the Ministry should be reviewed in order that more attention can be devoted to gender issues in the developing of human resources and the recruiting for leadership positions. Therefore, it was recognized in the programme document, that gender issues should constitute a meaningful part of the human resources development component of the programme. However, no initiatives to raise gender issues during the implementation of the RCI were visible to the evaluation team in reports and interviews.

In the final composition of the programme the different components were seen as an effort to translate the different elements pertaining to management and development for education, which both in terms of numbers employed and the share of the state budget constitutes the largest sector of the Government.

Both the initial RCI (MINED/Asdi, 1998/2001) and final version (MINED/ Cooperating agencies, 2001/2003), were not designed to constitute a final and detailed programme of objectives, activities, results, and budgets. Detailed programmes and accurate budgets were to be negotiated on an annual basis, which offered much greater possibilities for ownership by the Ministry and the flexibility to respond to evolving priorities and issues. In this sense, RCI was supposed to be seen as a framework of objectives, activities and results to be definitively set through annual plans and budgets. The annual

plans and budgets were planned to be subject to regular review through the engagement of external consultants and technical assistance, which regrettably never took place.

2.3 Programme Management

A Working Group for Institutional Development (WGID) was established as the anchor point for the management and monitoring of the programme. Currently, MINED has a total of seven working groups comprising different areas of concern such as, gender, access to education, quality of education, etc.

Representatives from relevant directorates form the working groups, with many directorates represented at national director level. Working groups have consultative mandates and may prepare proposals for decisions, to be made by the competent bodies of the MINED, in particular the Minister and the Permanent Secretary.

The WGID is a consultative organ, which means that the responsibility for the very implementation of the activities rests with the national directors and heads of institutions. However, the initial RCI seems to be more ambitious by implying that ID Working Group should have implementing responsibilities for the programme activities. It was originally planned that the Permanent Secretary could chair the WGID, which was later changed to the National Director for Human Resources.

Together with WGID other consultative forums were established or planned in the context of ESSP. Among these broad organs arise the “Grupo Conjunto de Coordenação” (Joint Coordination Team), former Ad- Hoc group, with a coordination function between the MINED and the donors, the “Grupo de Gestão Financeira e Procedimentos” (Financial Management and Procedures Group) the “Comité de Gestão Financeira” (Financial Management Committee), and the “Equipa de Coordenação da Carta Escolar” (School Mapping Coordination Team).

Finally, an Executive Secretariat was conceived as the body in charge of coordinating RCI within ESSP. An Executive Secretariat assisted by a small group of staff was planned. The Secretariat would particularly assist the ID Working Group in preparing and implementing programmes and projects. This design was later found not to work in practice, mainly because of the failure to set up a properly resourced and mandated Executive Secretariat.

In the implementation of the programme, a Management Advisor (MA) who would be employed by a Consultant Company would assist the Ministry. He would be placed in an advisor position direct to the ID Working Group. The Chairperson of this Group would be his/her direct counterpart. The MA would also collaborate with the Executive Secretariat and would be in a position to advise and support the MINED Management in all issues related to organizational and management development.

2.4 Risk management

The programme document also identified some weaknesses and threats to the programme. It was pointed out that many of the risks were related to the complexity of the programme and others could emerge depending on the donors’ attitude and position towards the programme. Some of these weaknesses and threats were the result of inconsistencies of the Management structures in the MINED, the limited number of qualified staff in management positions and the low level of coordination, at that time, among donors.

To remedy these, one initiative that was suggested was that the Ministry, should start giving more management responsibilities to younger staff members, many of who have a good educational back-

ground and the capacity to develop the necessary managerial competencies. For the donors specifically it was suggested that they should abandon a narrow project approach to capacity development and have a more programmatic strategic approach.

In the decision document of Sida (DESO-1997-0141) the risks were taken seriously and it was emphasized that a new risk analysis should be made after the review of the first proposal in 2001.

2.5 Monitoring of the programme

Bearing in mind the complexity of the programme, the need to set up a systematized monitoring and evaluation process was recognized at an early stage. This need would be met through both an internal and external monitoring and evaluation function.

To enable the monitoring and evaluation process, MINED and the cooperating agencies were supposed to agree on a common monitoring system to be conducted on a regular basis. An external evaluation was planned after two years, to give guidance regarding the development of the programme. However in reality no external evaluation or systematic monitoring was undertaken as planned, apart from the regular reports from the WGID and the Management Advisor.

3. Institutional Context

A common complaint by all stakeholders operating in the Education sector is that the capacity of the sector to develop is restricted by Government insistence (supported by the International Financial Institutions) to address many reform issues such as civil service pay and financial management systems development on a Government wide basis. In sections 3.1 and 3.2, we examine the current thrust of public sector reform and how it may have contributed to limiting the impact of the RCI.

3.1 Public Sector Reform

In 2000 the Mozambican Government launched its Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (PRSP), known as PARPA. The initial PRSP was a year later adjusted and widened to respond to World Bank/International Monetary Fund (WB/IMF) recommendations. These international financial institutions had suggested to the Mozambican Government a more participatory and consultative process in the PRSP preparation and adoption. As a result, a new PRSP, PARPA 2001–2005 was adopted.

For the implementation of the PARPA the Government has been adopting a number of reform initiatives in areas such as legal and institutional development, public service delivery and financial management. One of the most important of these initiatives is the Public Sector Reform Strategy 2001–2011 adopted by the Government in 2001, which is aiming to cover all the areas listed above. Public sector reform tops the Government's agenda, and it has established an Inter-ministerial commission to lead the process, which is headed by the Prime Minister.

The *Unidade Técnica da Reforma do Sector Público* (UTRESP) (Public Sector Reform Technical Unit) was created by the Council of Ministers Decree no. 6/2000, and its role, amongst others is to give technical support to the *Comissão Inter-Ministerial da Reforma do Sector Público* (CIRESP) (Public Sector Reform Interministerial Committee), whose members include in addition to the Prime Minister, the Vice-President, and the Minister of State Administration. The Committee's role is to plan and co-ordinate the reform activities of the different organisations comprising the public sector. The UTRESP, as a technical arm, has also the responsibility of providing the necessary technical assistance to the sectors.

The reform has been structured in five thematic areas:

- 1 Organisations and processes of public service delivery;
- 2 Public policies; human resources;
- 3 Financial management
- 4 'Good Governance'
- 5 Anti corruption.

It has also planned to be conducted in two phases; the first phase will cover the period from 2001–2004 and the second from 2004–2011.

In the context of PARPA the Public Sector Reform fulfils the objective of ensuring the public sector organisations guarantee the provision of essential quality public services, and the sound growth of the private sector. Accordingly, Government functions are oriented to public policy formulation and monitoring; setting -up of legal framework; promotion of development initiatives and control and evaluation of results. On the other hand, the process of public services delivery is to be decentralised to independent public organisations, local governments, and private sector and civil society organisations.

The main priority areas for the Reform were set out on a table called *Sector Público de Moçambique* –

Presente e Futuro (Public Sector of Mozambique – Present and Future), which includes: (A) Redefinition of the Role of the Government, (B) Improve performance of public servants, (C) Strengthening of the provincial, municipal and district governments, (D) Improving governance, (E) Financial Management, and (F) Better policy coordination. Basic indicators complement these areas in generic quantitative terms, as well as descriptions of the current and future status. These are presented as action plans. The table was complemented by documents, which outline the operationalisation of plans for each area. The action areas of the first meeting were maintained, largely, in this meeting, either as priority areas or part of them, in its specification. A Quick Wins Programme was also established, with the objective of improving the procedures in a quick and low-cost form.

Role of MAE

MAE is one of the four nuclear organs of the public policy management, together with the President of the Republic, the Cabinet of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Planning and Finance.² This confers to it a fundamental responsibility in the Public Sector Reform process to:

- Produce public policy;
- Develop the National System of Human Resources Management, which includes a global human resources policy;
- Implement a Training System in Public Administration (SIFAP), with the corresponding training and professionalisation policy for the public administration.³

The Ministry of State Administration (MAE) is carrying out most of the activities proposed by CIRE-SP. However, some have been relegated to a second plan and priority given to others. MAE is, by mission, responsible for the public sector and the operational guidelines to all the state apparatus. Among MAE's interventions, the System for Career and Remuneration (that establishes a unique salary table, job descriptions, standard career paths and forms of progression, to be applied by all ministries), the Personnel Information System (*SIP 2000*) (a data bank where all the public servants are registered), and the State Servants General Statute (*EGFE*) (which congregates all the norms for professional behaviour, rights and duties, progression and classification forms and many other norms) are examples of the systems that constitute the framework within which any sector reform has to be designed and implemented.

This relationship between the reform procedures at MAE, UTRESP and MINED implies that MAE/UTRESP should be called upon to participate in MINED reforms in the areas which are relevant for its regulating function, both establishing the framework within which innovation will be possible and negotiating the extent of those innovations. This will simultaneously guarantee the completion of the Public Sector universal norms and assure MINED that the innovations that will be proposed are in compliance with the norms and the Public Sector Reform Programme and will, therefore, be accepted.

3.2 SISTAFE

SISTAFE is the acronym for the new public financial management system to be developed by the Ministry of Planning and Finance (MPF) and used by line ministries and other State administration entities. The project commenced in 2002 and has effectively replaced a SIDA funded public accounting

² *Resumo dos Estudos sobre: O Papel do Sector Público, Políticas Públicas, Política de Descentralização e Desconcentração e Política de Formação*, UTRESP, p. 9.

³ *Idem*. See also *Estratégia Global da Reforma do Sector Público 2001–2011*, Comissão Interministerial da Reforma do Sector Público (CIRESP), Imprensa Nacional de Moçambique, Maputo, 2001.

project, which had been developing a new public accounting model and FMS in the period 1999–2001. The major differences between the two approaches is that SISTAFE will encompass the writing of a new financial management package from scratch, using an openly available source code (Java 2 E) and linked explicitly at the beginning to the development of a Single Treasury Account in the Bank of Mozambique, covering all Government bank accounts in the commercial banking sector. The original accounting model concept envisaged the purchase and tailoring of a large commercial package such as Oracle Financials (offering far more analytical capabilities) supported by a more phased move to unified treasury management.

The development of a public financial management system has created tensions within both the Government and the development partner community. The present model of public accounting dates back to 1881 and is essentially a cash based system in which budget releases are provided on a rolling interest basis with each further release of funds being conditional on a proper justification and clearance of funds used in the previous period. This is incompatible with a modern budget drive system in which funds are drawn down on the basis of activity-based plans translated into cash flow terms. The other major problem with the existing system is that its coverage is only partial. With the growth of development assistance, and different channels for flows of external funds, a substantial amount of funds are essentially off-account. This has in turn created major issues concerning misappropriation and leakages of funds, which are of particular concern to the development partner community and the IMF in particular.

The extremely limited capacity of public financial management expertise in Mozambique has created problems about how to resolve this situation. The MPF has favored a top down ‘single size’ fits all solution. However the slow pace of development has frustrated a number of line ministries including MADER and MINED whose capacity to draw down sector based donor funds is restricted by the lack of a functional FMIS. They have explored and in the case of MADER actually developed a Ministry specific system. The tension has its parallels also in the Donor Community between partners principally interested in sector budget support and who therefore favour Ministry specific development and those who favour general budget support and support the MPF approach. DFID have essentially switched positions during the last three years from a sector to a macro view and as a result withdrew funding from a planned FMIS development in MINED.

However, there is legitimate concern about the realism of the SISTAFE concept. The plan envisages a pilot system will be ready for testing in the MPF and MINED by October 2003 with a fully developed system ready for use early in 2004. There are serious doubts whether these deadlines will be achieved. Furthermore the top down approach will in all likelihood substantially reduce the analytical capacity for sector financial reporting in favour of a system, which meets aggregate financial needs. Among the factors which promote concern in this area is the lack of discussion over the chart of accounts (and in particular fixing code string lengths and fields) and the need to set up an FMIS user group in the Ministry of Education in order to establish both a dialogue around needs and on the development of plans and related capacity to implement.

As a result, the MINED is currently implementing a locally designed and supported FMIS system ‘Primavera’ for FASE and World Bank funds. The system has apparently been installed at the central level and is being installed in the provinces. However, there have already been some delays in installation and it is not at all clear that the system itself has the analytical capacity to support a full SWAp.

4. Findings

This section starts with a reference to annex 3, where the main activities are presented. Under 4.2 the impact of RCI is analysed in the light of the evaluation criteria mentioned under method, which are a summary of the areas in the ToR. Thereafter we make a financial analysis of programme and organisational capacity. Finally we discuss the other substantial institutional development initiative in the Ministry, the Modernisation and Restructuring programme.

4.1 Summary of implemented activities of the RCI 1999–2002

A table showing the implemented activities and achieved objectives and results is presented in annex 3.

The programme began in reality in August 1999, when the Management Advisor arrived, and the Working Group started with a focus on strategic activities in the area of organisational development. Among the initiatives was a revision of the structure of the organisation on central, provincial and district level, which presumably was discussed among the stakeholders. The WGID presented various ToRs to the National Directors for decisions but few actions were taken. This resulted in a very low grade of implementation during 1999–2000. In 2001 the reviewed project document was presented, as an attempt to make changes and identify the bottlenecks of implementation. However, this document did not address the implementation problems sufficiently.

The planned amount for 2001 was 15 MSEK and 90% of the funds were executed on planned activities. A closer analysis of the planned activities and the actual output shows that quite a limited amount of the planned activities were realised. A large number of ToRs have been presented by the WGID, written mainly by the MA, and then decisions were missing from line managers. Often the funds were not used at all, since activities never took place. But in some cases the spent amount on activities increased significantly. This implies a very weak capacity to estimate costs and a risk for less cost-conscious solutions. Sida showed through its yearly approvals of reports and plans that it allowed the programme to use the funds with great flexibility. The strategic issues were brought up in the annual consultations by Sida and the Swedish Embassy but without defining any clear conditions for the Swedish support. The Swedish Embassy also tried on several occasions to bring up the weaknesses of the RCI in a dialogue with higher levels in the Ministry. However, these statements from the Swedish partner really never lead to any change in the implementation of the RCI.

The result was that the more strategic activities were not executed, which was a great failure of the impact of RCI, since those represented the framework for the activities of the programme. These are for example; evaluating the capacity of MINED, seminars regarding the development of the organisation and functions of MINED on a central and provincial level, development of financial management systems in the provinces, long term financial management experts at MINED, development of a human resource strategy, decentralisation of database for personnel to a provincial level etc.

In 2001 an increased number of donors showed interest in the institutional development programme. In a meeting the donors requested that the programme was given a higher status by having the Vice Minister of the Permanent Secretary as its chairman, and that a few donors should be advisory members to the WGID. The first request was turned down but three donor representatives were included in the WGID as advisory members. During the 3rd annual review meeting in May 2001 it was agreed that an “Institutional Development Strategy” should be developed, containing timeframe and work plan for its operationalisation. This initiative was a trustworthy attempt to create a framework for the programme. A ToR for the creation of the strategy was developed, but no action was taken. It is unclear to the team how Sida responded to the passivity on behalf of the MINED.

In 2002 the plans to create an institutional development strategy as part of the ESSP came in a new light and Ernst & Young were hired to prepare the new project “Modernisation and Restructuring of MINED”. Many attempts were made during the year by the MA and the WGID to approach this project, since the main focus was institutional development, without any success.

4.2 The impact of RCI

1. *The relative achievement of Programme outputs*

The most significant outputs of the RCI programme are:

- Training held for school directors in all provinces
- Upgrading of MINED internal information system
- School mapping started
- Seminars held in the area of human resource development, planning and management in the provinces and districts
- Training delivered to the provinces and districts in public accounting and public procurement
- Individual training in Education & Planning, human resource development and English

It is the team’s understanding that the greatest impact of the RCI has been on a provincial and district level. Under the RCI umbrella, courses were run for provincial and district directors and relevant staff on financial and budget planning and management. Although there are no evaluation results available or impact known from these courses, they should have helped to improve the planning and monitoring work at these levels. In both the provinces of Niassa and Maputo a greater awareness has developed regarding planning. However, in these provinces other donor organisations (bilateral and NGO’s) also had focussed on these areas, making it difficult to evaluate which activities created what impact.

The training of school directors is expected to have had an impact on the quality of the management of the schools. The training of trainers method was used successfully. Other circumstances are affecting the management capacity of the school directors in the districts of Mozambique, for example the difficulty regarding the hiring and promotion of teachers. Another problem for the school directors is the time spent on the collection of teacher salaries at the district office, which can take two weeks on a bicycle for some school directors in Niassa every month.

Another conclusion is that the RCI has strengthened the individual capacity at MINED.

As evaluation of the the different training activities within the programme was scarce, it is difficult to draw conclusions regarding the impact of RCI, however staff we met who had attended training activities, were often positive in general, but also said that the training was too short and that there should be some form of refreshment training. It was also emphasized that it was difficult to change behaviour when everything else in the organisation is alike. The selection criteria for what are the most prioritised area for capacity development and who should be prioritised in receiving the training has been very unclear and solely based on the perceptions of individuals in the directorate for human resources.

The team organised a small exercise with the WGID to discuss the major strengths and weaknesses of the RCI. The working group was divided in to two discussion groups. The two groups identified the following strengths and weaknesses of RCI:

Strengths

- 1) Identification of the sector problems in a wide intervention which defined clear working plans and the respective budget, including the needs for staff training;

- 2) Continuous implementation of activities as conditioned by the availability and flexibility in the use of Sida funds;
- 3) Training opportunities in planning, human resource management and financial management;
- 4) Regular Working Group meetings.

Weaknesses

- 1) Weak leadership and coordination of the programme activities and the respective target groups;
- 2) Lack of a systematic monitoring and evaluation of the programme;
- 3) No engagement in regard to the implementation of the planned activities;
- 4) The expected contributions were not received due to the fact that some donors did not honour their promises;
- 5) Problems in the flow of information and link between the Working Group and Directorates.

The exercise with the WGID confirmed the impressions presented to the team in interviews and through the documents.

2. The coherence and relevance of ongoing activities in the area of Institutional Development

The content of the RCI programme as it was presented in the project document is still very relevant. The most important other ongoing activity for institutional development is the Modernisation and Restructuring Programme, which is also relevant in its content. It is more the feasibility of these programmes that the evaluation team is questioning, in terms of how these substantial changes can/shall be implemented.


There has been very limited collaboration between the RCI and the Modernisation Programme. The WGID has taken various initiatives and developed concrete proposals for a linkage between these two institutional development initiatives, without any result. The Modernisation Programme is presumably “taking over” the institutional development activities within the RCI and it is therefore important to learn from its successes and mistakes. The Ministry has evidently not found the RCI or the experiences within the WGID sufficiently important, to create more coordination between the two programmes.

Other institutional development activities, led by other donors are taking place mainly on the provincial and district level. The collaboration between the donors in the support to the education sector as well as the creation of the FASE Fund presumably had a positive impact on coordination of ongoing activities in this area.

3. The extent to which the support from SIDA has assisted MINED in building a coherent and sustainable path for institutional development

The RCI programme has built capacity on an individual level both on a central, provincial and district level. An increased consciousness exists within MINED regarding the need for change, which the RCI programme was expected to create, according to the MA. An example is that to some extent directors are more prone to participate in leadership courses. However, the greatest effect can most probably be seen in the provinces where school directors, district and province administrations have been trained in human resource development, planning and public accounting. These strengthened individual capacities have had limited impact on the organisational or institutional level, since they have not been a part of a strategic framework or a common will for change. The persons involved in training activities have not systematically used their new knowledge.

We may summarise the impact of the programme in terms of a matrix, presented in Sida’s policy for capacity development, which serves as a tool for understanding capacity development on different



levels. A conclusion of the evaluation team is that the programme had ambitions to deliver change at all the levels outlined in the matrix above. However, the programme failed to produce the planned results and the capacity development at the higher organisational and institutional levels. Possibly, the strengthened capacity at province and district level could be interpreted as capacity development at organisation unit level. The professional / individual level has also to some extent been strengthened. However, this kind of 'bottom up' capacity development does not represent a sustainable path for change unless supported by capacity development originating at the strategic organisational and institutional level.

4.3 Financial analysis of the RCI Programme

The original three year Programme was budgeted at a cost of USD 2.5 million. With the extension of the programme this was increased to approximately 5 million. At the end of 2002, approximately 80% of the Programme budget had been expended. Details are produced in the Financial Summary Table (Annex 4).

Budget execution in the initial period of the programme 1998 – 2000 was particularly weak and the analysis of expenditure inadequate. This reflected the inability of the Ministry to clearly articulate its priorities in the annual work plan, and to effectively execute the work plan thereafter. The low rate of execution in the year 2000 partly reflected the absence of the Management Adviser for an extended period while issues over the delivery of the programme were resolved. In the period 2001 and 2002 overall budget execution improved considerably with around 90% and 86 % of overall budgeted funds being spent respectively. Nevertheless this masks considerable variations between the programme sub-components, and in particular for 2001 a significant number of budgeted activities for which there was no spend.

A significant problem throughout the programme was that the MINED book-keeper, using an Excel spreadsheet to keep the accounts (which was perfectly reasonable in the light of the number of transactions), did not analyse the expenditure by sub-component and activity. In 2001 and 2002 the Management Adviser manually analysed the invoices between headings for his own records and this financial analysis was included in the Annual Report of SWEDEC AB. However a simple restructuring of the

⁴ Sida's policy for Capacity Development

Excel workbook into separate linked worksheets for each sub-component and / or the addition of an activity code which could have allowed the expenditure to be easily sorted would have rendered this manual work un-necessary.

4.4 The Effectiveness of the Management Adviser Function

A key element in the RCI programme was the role to be played by the Management Adviser, which was originally envisaged as a three-year appointment. The Swedish consultancy company SWEDEC won the procurement procedure lead by the Ministry, and was contracted by the Ministry. SWEDEC's Management Adviser, Mr Staffan Lundqvist, started his assignment in August 1999 and although he has continued in post since that time, this period has included a period of non-residence in the second half of 2000 to give the Ministry time to reassess its commitment to the RCI programme and the MA-function.

The key elements of the role and expected results were outlined in the terms of reference produced in 1998. The role as envisaged by the terms of reference was a very wide-ranging one but the key tasks were:

- a) The ongoing redesign of the programme to meet the evolving needs of the Ministry and ESSP, including assistance with the setting of capacity building priorities and selection criteria for beneficiaries of training programmes;
- b) Support to the production and implementation of the annual RCI work plan, including overall financial monitoring;
- c) The identification and mobilisation of short term support to deliver the programme and;
- d) Support to decision taking and implementation processes particularly of the WGID in order to institutionalise the proposals developed under the RCI and other supporting initiatives.

A review of the Management Adviser's results against those expected are summarised in Annex 6. The MA has worked hard not only on behalf of the RCI programme but also in building a wider institutional transformation of the Ministry particularly in the area of human resource management and financial management. His work in facilitating and moving forward both the FASE process and in trying to get the Ministry to respond proactively to the challenges of the ESSP, particularly through the active working of the Technical council and working groups has also been praiseworthy.

Nevertheless the view of both the Ministry and the Management Adviser himself is that despite hard work and continual prompting, success in terms of those expected results has been limited. We consider the principal reasons for this as follows:

1. Limited Counterparts at Execution Level

In addition to WGID having inadequate decision-making powers, there is also a shortage of suitably qualified, empowered and confident staff with whom the MA needed to co-operate at execution level. This was of course one of the key issues that the RCI programme was meant to resolve in order to ensure continued development of better programme management after the MA's departure. In certain cases staff have been trained but have had no delegation of authority from Director level and have therefore not been empowered to take issues forward.

2. Limited Support from the Ministry

A major issue throughout the programme has been the lack of ownership of the programme despite innovative design features of the Programme (such as the direct employment of the Adviser by the Ministry) to encourage such ownership. A key player in developing this sense of common purpose was that of the chief counterpart, the Director of Human Resources, but the whole senior management of

the Ministry are responsible for the effective use of the Swedish funds and a proper implementation of the RCI. An example of limited support to the MA is the reluctance to involve and consult the MA in the initial diagnostic study and subsequent design of the Modernisation programme, though this was directly relevant to the RCI programme.

3. Unclear Role and Limitation of Working Space

The MA's function was clearly intended to focus on using programme funds to move forward key issues on the implementation of the strategic plan. In the event the MA has found it difficult to move forward key strategic issues in the absence of support from senior managers. Even when support has been present from some Directors, the lack of a genuine collective decision taking in the Ministry has allowed other directors to effectively spike 'initiatives' (The Technical Council consisting of the Heads of the Working Group is supposed to act as one such body, but has met only infrequently in the lifetime of the Programme). The MA has been drafting large numbers of terms of reference in respect of consultancy projects requested by specific directors, only to see nothing subsequently done to implement them.

As the RCI programme has gone on, the MA has sought to strengthen his impact in areas (such as teacher training and school mapping) which while important are perhaps not core to his original terms of reference. This has reflected the desire of the MA to find working space allowed by the Ministry where he can have some impact. He has also energetically tried to prompt and push forward the meetings of the various committees and working groups on which he has been involved. These include the WGID and the Working Group for Financial management, the Financial Management committee the Core Implementation Team for FMIS and the Technical Council. While this administrative effort is admirable for its enthusiasm and commitment, to a degree it only serves to mask the lack of ownership and involvement of the Ministry and will not certainly contribute to the sustainability of programme management arrangements.

4. Lack of Technical Focus

The terms of reference required the MA to have specific skills in education development and organisational management. The MA fulfilled these broad requirements and also possessed substantial international experience in education management. However, in retrospect the MA role should have had a clearer technical focus based on human resource development, leadership, planning, performance management and/or financial management. These have been the key issue areas for the Ministry and had the MA been able to establish technical leadership in these areas, it would have enhanced his overall credibility and allowed the possibility for greater support from senior management to the RCI Programme in general. Had the Ministry been less resistant to commissioning support from well-qualified international specialists, this may have mattered less. But in the circumstances where the Ministry was reluctant to draw down short-term consultancy support, it made the MA more vulnerable to the complaint of 'what is he really giving us'? Especially since the majority of staff has a teacher background, the education focus of the MA should not have been prioritised.

5. Importance of Portuguese Language Capacity

Despite substantial English language training offered and taken up under the Programme, the Ministry remains one where even at senior level staff remain able to function effectively only in the national language. While oral comprehension skills are adequate, speaking and reading skills in English still remain under developed.

We consider that the MA's initial language training programme was wholly inadequate in terms of allowing him to function effectively in the first year and this in turn contributed to the difficulties

presented to the MA. The MA subsequently invested considerable time and effort in achieving adequate language skills and while his oral Portuguese is not fluent, it has enabled him to interact more effectively with his counterparts.

4.5 Organizational Capacity at National, Provincial and District Level

Human Resources Management

The Ministry of Education is the largest sector ministry in Mozambique, in terms of number of staff, including teachers. Its staff number 50.000 people, out of 110.000 on the whole of the State Apparatus. The human resources management is in this country done at central level, what makes it extremely difficult for MINED to keep up, in all procedure dimensions, with this amount of contracts. The result is that enormous delays happen when contracting teachers for the provinces, district and local schools, with serious consequences for the good management of the school year. The ministry is aware of the problems and is making efforts to improve the human resources management system. This is, in fact, an area contemplated by the RCI, and no institutional development reform at MINED can be applied without taking this aspect in consideration, since it is one of the serious bottlenecks of the sector.

Centralisation and Strategic Management

The formal centralisation of decision-making calls the planning procedures to the central level, making it rather difficult for the lower levels, even as high as provincial, to have access to the planning know-how. In fact, the report on The SWAp Process (“sector wide approach”)⁵, of 2001, indicates that “noticeable improvements have taken place [at MINED] since the beginning of the ESSP process”, but the authors were “unable to determine whether the monitoring (performance) indicators [were] effectively used to assess progress in implementation”. Moreover, they point out “the lack of capacity at provincial level to implement the ESSP”, concerning mostly “strategic planning, operational planning, budgeting, costing and reporting.”

Provincial and district projects, including NGO interventions, have been helping the Directorates at those levels to produce annual plans and exercise the respective follow-up. This was evident, for example, at the Province of Maputo, where the Directorate uses the help of a consultant within the Finish PASE project. This may not be the case, however, in all the provinces and certainly not of all the districts. The competence for a “sector wide approach” (SWAp), which exists to a certain extent at central level, does not consistently replicate itself at the successive levels down to the school.

Reform Constraints

A number of constraints can be identified which affect the degree to which reforms of institutional development character can be applied to MINED. First, there is the legal country framework for Public Administration. This establishes laws and procedures for the functioning of the ministries, which should be considered. Procedure norms such as for contracts, career and promotion, salaries are the same for all ministries and have to be met before any new measure is introduced, even if for rationalisation of processes. Innovations have to pass through the filter of the Ministry of State Administration and eventually be approved by the Council of Public Administration, the Council of Ministers and/or the Parliament. Therefore, the room for change is limited and implies a number of legal mechanisms and many months of diligent work.

⁵ “The process involved in getting to a sector wide approach can be characterised as one in which sector strategy is formulated and budgeted, matched to available finance through an interactive process, converted to a workplan, and formalised in agreements between the implementing agency and the source of finance.” (in Foster, quoted from *The SWAp Process – Report from a Joint Technical Review Mission for the Education Sector Strategic Plan*, 2001, p.4.)

Low salaries are also a well-known constraint, which has been much discussed by the government. However, very little has been done so far, inducing some people to look for complementary jobs. Some measures concerning the salary system have brought some order into the matter, but the aim to significantly raise the salary levels has not yet been possible (see section on Public Sector Reform, above).

Public administration structures are heavily vertically hierarchical and authority is highly recognized among staff. This makes the staff strongly dependent on their bosses and closes the door to innovation. Hierarchies are, under the point of view of the organisation, perfectly delimited levels in their competences, which have to be scrupulously respected either in decision-making or in persons and documents circulation. This means that the persons in charge of the successive levels have to be informed or consulted before the matter follows to the next level. This compulsory procedure is often cause of delays when developing activities, since the unit head considers the proposals for action which in turn imply corrections before the documents are taken to the immediately following level. The time factor imbedded in this process is not usually taken in consideration when programming the activities.

By the same logic, the unit heads at the same hierarchical level do not intervene in the professional areas of their peers, except in the Ministry Councils, where they can be called upon to express their opinion. The fact that the RCI Programme demands the intervention of several Directorates and Departments means that each Director is, in fact “coordinator” of the activities, which lie within his/her line, depending on the funds that are allocated to him/her by the formal coordinator. This fact ascribes to the formal coordinator of this Programme, responsible before the donors, a somewhat different management function than that of the other projects.

As to decision-making, this is heavily formally centralised and the delegation of competences is set by decree or dispatch, from one head of unit to the next, downwards on the hierarchy ladder. Delegation to other staff is rare and occasional. This situation prevents staff developing initiatives themselves. However, this formal centralization is willingly acknowledged by the staff, which is perfectly adapted to this structural option. Vertical hierarchy and formal centralisation of management are, possibly, two motives for the weak communication flow that happens in this type of structure. In the same way, it originates a poor sense of ownership and individual responsibility, which hampers the existence of a healthy individual identification with the organisation, of the kind that makes one “defend the organisation colours”. Therefore, jobs are often executed as routines, each one seen by the public officials with little meaning to the whole.

Professional Qualifications

In spite of the generally good academic qualifications of most of the MINED staff, they often do not possess professional qualifications that give them the expertise for technical work, since most of them have been teachers. This is a serious hindrance to certain professional specialities, for example, financial management. This fact obviously reduces effectiveness and is even more serious at provincial, district and school level. It is common to find teachers dealing with the administration and financial procedures at the school secretariats.

In spite of this situation, the contribution that technical assistance can make does not seem to be valued as a means to improve job execution. This is particularly negative as the need for counterparts at execution level has been overlooked. Counterparts could potentially work in parallel with and acquire the consultants’ know-how, helping to achieve sustainable capacity development.

Equally relevant is the role played by working groups in the ministry, however they have not been attributed any decision-making and representative power and therefore, have a very limited capacity for meaningful intervention in the organization decision making process. The appointment of staff to such groups is made at every different professional level, taking in consideration more the area of work than

their expertise or decision-making power. The representatives are rarely reporting back to their respective director, which prevents the decisions of the working groups from having an impact in the respective units.

4.6 MINED's Modernisation and Restructuring Programme

4.6.1 Background

One of the key problems that has dogged the RCI throughout its existence has been that capacity building programmes have been delivered in the absence of a new modern institutional framework, which could create both the motivation and the skills to change. As a result of the absence of such a framework, many programmes have had little impact other than general awareness raising.

During the period of the RCI a number of institutional development proposals were made of an incremental nature in order to create better functioning of the Ministry in certain areas. For example the Financial Management Capacity Building report of March 2000 proposed a merger of the Directorates of Planning and Administration and Finance to ensure better co-ordination between planning, budgeting and financial reporting. The Ministry did not respond to the proposal and consequent similar proposals concerning strengthening the working groups met a similar fate.

A new ministerial team and Permanent Secretary was appointed after the November 1999 elections and early in 2002 they directly commissioned Ernst & Young without any procurement process to carry out a diagnostic study of MINED, and to develop a future vision for the institutional development of the Ministry. The diagnostic study was produced in June 2002 and the Future Vision in March 2003. At the present time Ernst and Young consultants are carrying out further diagnostic work in the provinces and undertaking preparation work for a number of projects in the first phase. The Government has indicated that the modernisation of MINED will serve as a pilot model for its institutional reform of the machinery of Government as part of the UTRESP public sector reform process.

MINED funded part of the first phase of this project from its own resources, presumably from the State Budget, which has been augmented by large inflows of general budget support. The Ministry has now indicated that it does not have the funds to undertake implementation of the programme and has therefore prioritised the Modernisation programme in the annual workplan for 2003, partly being financed by FASE. It has moreover indicated that it wishes to appoint Ernst & Young to carry out the implementation phase in its entirety, subject to some smaller specialised pieces of consultancy work being sub-contracted to other firms. The implications of both the original procurement process and this intention will be outlined in section 4.

4.6.2 Review of the Diagnostic Study and Future Vision

The diagnostic study provided a number of important insights into the operations of the Ministry including the processing of documentation and the centralisation of routine administrative tasks (e.g. permissions for leave) which should be dealt with at district or even school based levels. The Consultants correctly identified many of the key problems of the Ministry – poor information flows, an emphasis on routine administration at the expense of policy making and over reliance on a few members of staff. It also identified a number of 'quick wins', most notably the development of a front office to record and process the large amount of external correspondence that the Ministry receives. This should yield considerable staff and timesavings over present process, which involves 77 administration staff from all Directorates in this task, with consequent delays over documents being sent to the wrong place etc.

The Future Vision proposes an ambitious programme of institutional and structural change in 3 phases

over 4 years. The reform includes the abolition and merger of 22 existing bodies. While most of these proposals may be reasonable, other more obvious changes such as merging the Directorates of Planning and Administration and Finance are not considered. The document Future Vision is a very global document, which doesn't define how the reform shall implemented. The timeframes however seem unrealistic. Recent history of the Ministry also indicates that it is difficult to accomplish change programmes of this kind. Indeed the experience of trying to amalgamate GEPE, the school construction project unit within the Directorate of Planning, which has still not been achieved after 3 years, is evidence that resistance to change is very strong and there is little willingness or capacity to manage change effectively.

So far little has been done to build the change management teams necessary to implement such significant institutional reform. The Minister has appointed a small team of 4 advisors to help develop and promote the vision and its various key strategies within the Ministry. However at the time of our mission, only the team leader was working on the project and the other team members were largely doing their previous jobs. Below Director level, there is virtually no knowledge of the detail of the proposals. Furthermore such a large programme will involve considerable time from senior (director level) and head of department (section level) staff. Nothing in the history of the RCI programme indicates that they will either be willing or able to free up the large amount of time that will be required to effectively counterpart and manage the consultant staff. Without such involvement there will be no realistic championing of any changes, resistance will be high, and any changes likely to be cosmetic and small scale. In their presentation to the team of the 'Future Vision' we did not find that Ernst & Young presented any solutions to how these problems may be overcome.

A further major problem with the Future Vision is that structural and process change is not explicitly driven by the requirements of the Education Strategic Plan or the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PAR-PA). There are occasional references to these documents but not in a way which clearly relates proposed changes to improved service delivery (e.g. reducing the cost of construction of schools or managing FASE or improved planning and monitoring processes).

5. Conclusions

In this section the conclusions regarding the constraints on a successful implementation of the RCI are elaborated on. Finally the conclusions regarding the future steps towards the Modernisation and Restructuring Programme and the FASE Fund are presented.

5.1 Constraints on a successful implementation of the RCI

Weak and unclear role of the working group for institutional development

The WGID has had its limitations in terms of contributing to the effectiveness of the programme. According to the ToR the working groups under the ESSP of the Ministry are only consultative organs and have a technical nature. Their function is to give advice and prepare proposals for decisions to be taken by the relevant body within MINED. For the implementation of the programme, the national director concerned is responsible.

This arrangement, to hold the WGID responsible for planning but not implementation, has, for example, led to limited flow of information, little engagement between the plan and its implementation, the abandonment of planned activities and the low dissemination of the programme⁶.

New Political leadership created new circumstances

Another important factor, which probably has affected the ownership and engagement in the RCI is that six months after the effective start of the programme a new Minister, Vice-Minister and a new Permanent Secretary were appointed. After the arrival of the new Minister, Ernst & Young was contracted for similar activities as were planned within the RCI programme.

Lack of commitment and engagement in implementing the RCI

The representatives of the WGID identified a lack of leadership and coordination of the programme as well as limited engagement from the Ministry in the programme. This lack of interest in taking forward initiatives has led to slow decision-making processes and that many activities have not taken place. The team's conclusion is that the content of RCI was and is relevant, so why have the managers at MINED not been interested in implementing the programme? Many factors most presumably have created the lack of commitment and engagement, some connected to the constraints to reform mentioned earlier in this document, such as; limited delegation, limited internal communication, lack of incentives, limited capacity etc. These factors in turn are an effect of a hierarchical management tradition and organisational culture.

Activities turned out less effective due to a missing strategic framework

Many activities turned out to be ineffective due to the lack of a strategic framework or objective for specific activity. Seminars and discussions were held without having defined how to use or take responsibility for actions. In addition, the training of school directors was made without developing a manual first, the production of self-study material was turned down by DAF and there was no plan for refreshment training. The human resource development seminars on a provincial level were made without having a strategy at MINED centrally. A course in project management was held in 2002, but there have been no interest to create transparency regarding the projects of the education sector, which is probably why the database for projects never was created. Members of staff have been trained in

⁶ See Workshop on strengths and weaknesses with WGID

human resource development and in English but there has been no follow up or analysis of whether staff have had the opportunity to practice this new knowledge.

Reluctance towards recruitment of technical assistance

In the project document of RCI as well as in the annual plans technical assistance has been considered. The MA and the WGID have produced ToR for different assignments and activities in the plans, but the national directors have been reluctant to recruit technical assistance within the programme. In the area of financial management the National Director of DAF argued that the Ministry was not ready to receive technical assistance until now. Decisions and systems needed to be in place first. This is a reasonable argument, however the consequence should be that external funds should be closely monitored if financial management systems are not in place, which has not been the case at MINED. It was argued in the interviews, which the team made, that TA should be organised properly. It should be regarded as development of capacity and not gap-filling and a relevant counterpart should be assigned at the Ministry. The team's conclusion is that the fact that the WGID presented ToRs, not based on an articulated need in the organisation, contributed to the reluctance.

Limited effectiveness of the Management Advisor

Due to the difficulties mentioned under section 3.3 the MA had difficulties of fulfilling the role that he and the Ministry expected.

Gender awareness is lacking in the implementation of RCI

There is hardly any awareness regarding gender in the documentation of RCI and the team could not identify any activity aimed at strengthening gender awareness within the programme. Since no evaluation exists from the training activities it is difficult to assess the participation of women in the capacity building activities. On a provincial level, the engagement of women is slow but increasing on the school director levels (for example four new female school directors have been appointed in Niassa).

Donor involvement in Working Group for Institutional Development

The representation of donor members in different working groups is an attempt to exert an increased influence, and to speed up the process of change. However, the impact of such donor involvement may be counter-productive in taking both ownership and responsibility away from the Ministry. Instead competence and appropriate systems should be built up in the Ministry, and donor involvement in day-to-day managerial activities should be circumscribed. First, most of the donor representatives are not trained education managers and therefore their competence to give advice on detailed matters may be justifiably questioned. Secondly, if the donors get involved in influencing decisions of an organisation they are responsible for monitoring, it may create a potential conflict of role problem. Thirdly, it is against the present general thrust of policy development to micro manage programme support, instead of focussing on the results of that programme.

Lack of systematic monitoring

As presented in the section 2, Sida had planned for extensive monitoring and risk management. This systematic follow-up and monitoring was never implemented which has also contributed to limited impact of the programme and its lack of cost effectiveness. The annual plans were of very poor quality and very limited analysis regarding the failure to implement strategic activities were made. If a proper monitoring of results had been made, measures could have been taken to adjust the programme or to stop disbursements unless the strategic institutional development initiatives were taken.

5.2 Conclusions regarding possible Responses to the 'Future Vision' of the Modernisation & Restructuring Programme

The Future Vision is currently the only institutional framework in existence for MINED and it is the only one that the Ministry is likely to support at least for the remaining lifetime of the present Government. The team's conclusion is that it is a promising vision of a modernised MINED. However, some doubts exist regarding the feasibility of the reform in the way that Ernst & Young have presented the plan for implementing the vision.

This provides the Development Partners with a number of dilemmas. The first relates to the original procurement process, which does not in any material aspect conform to the requirements laid down in section 7 of the FASE procurement process. If there had been a full open tender competition at the design stage, it would have been possible to approve a 'design and implement project' based on a schedule of rates of the winning tender and an agreed 'quality assured' work specification developed at the design stage. However it seems difficult to have a truly open competition at the implementation stage, as both the Ministry and Ernst & Young have indicated their belief that E & Y should be given the implementation work without tender, and that only some specialist pieces of work should be sub-contracted.

According to the WB Consulting Services Manual 2002 (pg 20, figure 4.1) incumbents should not normally be allowed to participate in continuation of assignments but it is permitted upon conditions. To reduce the risk of an unfair procedure, the ToR of the continuation of the programme could be prepared by a third party, who validates the feasibility. In other words a feasibility review of the proposal could make it possible for the E&Y to participate in an open competitive tender procedure.

The E&Y are now engaged in planning in detail part of the project implementation phase. This project preparation is not appropriate in the light of international procurement regulations. Since the donors seem determined to emphasise a proper procurement of the implementation phase, the project preparation currently being done by E & Y can be considered invalid.

In the light of this determination, it is difficult to see how the donors could support the implementation projects of the 'Future Vision' without breaching their own procurement regulations. On the other hand, refusal to support the Modernisation Programme, could mean that the Donors do not have any direct involvement in the institutional reform in the immediate future. Moreover with the fungibility of aid, increasing the amount of funds provided through FASE, may indirectly allow the Ministry to fund the programme through the space given in the State Budget.

In the light of this, two other options exist for support to the programme. The first is to provide support on a project-by-project basis (for example the front office administration project) with the possibility of allowing E & Y to do some projects on a single tender basis (but nevertheless observing a due procurement process). The second is to support a more wide-ranging engagement after a feasibility review by a third party, possibly resulting in supporting the first two-year phase of the programme. In either case there would need to be a due procurement process, and as the development partners have no involvement in the programme, a 'quality assurance review'.

5.3 The Proposals for FASE

From the beginning of the ESSP, there was an expectation on the part of both the Ministry and the Donors that there would be a rapid move towards a full SWAp with budget support being provided through an Education Sector Support Fund. The model adopted by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development for its PROAGRI programme for the channelling of funds and its execution and

reporting mechanisms offered a suitable template for MINED to follow. However an early appraisal mission in September 1999 concluded that a number of conditions did not exist in MINED for the early adoption of the PROAGRI model, most notably the absence of properly developed and budgeted work-plans at central and provincial level, and the absence of suitable financial management capacity (including an FMIS) to manage all budget funds to a satisfactory standard.

During 2000 and 2001, a number of proposals were made to support the building of sufficient financial management capacity, including a technical assistance/institutional capacity building programme (March 2000) a detailed proposal for an FMIS (December 2000)⁷ and a better alignment between donor and Government planning processes for a SWAp (May 2001)⁸. The Management Adviser was actively involved in all three of these missions and spent a great deal of time trying to take forward the proposals from each. In particular he was instrumental in finally getting the Ministry to engage in the FMIS development through the establishment of a Core Implementation Team, although the sudden withdrawal of the funding support from DFID subsequently nullified this work. The MA has also worked extensively to facilitate the adoption of a Memorandum of Understanding for FASE.

On the whole the Ministry's response to much of this work has been unclear. Responses have either not been made at all (particularly to the technical assistance proposals) or have been delayed, which may also reflect differences of opinion among Directors and an absence of effective collective decision making processes. Some positive steps such as the rescheduling of the Annual Review and COPA meetings, and the re-phasing of the central and provincial planning timetables were made in response to the May 2001 report but a number of recommendations have not been implemented. These include the failure to adopt a 3 year Medium Term Work Plan and the development of semi-annual and annual reporting.

In September 2002, a Memorandum of Understanding was finally adopted by the partners and the Government and a set of agreed financial management and procurement procedures for the execution of FASE (drawn extensively from the PROAGRI model) have also been agreed upon. However at the present time there is still no working FMIS although the Ministry is currently introducing a new system (see section on SISTAFE), and the annual planning procedures (producing 50 page plans for 50 plus institutions) are still under development.

Five donors (Sweden, Ireland, Finland, Canada and Germany) have disbursed into FASE in May 2003. A FASE FOREX account and MINED Metica's execution account exist and disbursements can be made. In late April 2003, MINED and the donors agreed on the use of the FASE Funds during 2003, although it should be pointed that FASE is co-funding the overall Ministry work plan. However, the Ministry prioritises the activities being financed from FASE in the annual work plan. The experience of agriculture is that it will however take considerable time to work up to full disbursement and develop adequate financial management and performance monitoring systems to ensure proper targeting of funds on ESSP priorities and minimisation of leakage. It is regrettable that more opportunity was not taken of the RCI Fund to develop faster the systems needed in the FASE process.

⁷ Grayson Clarke, . . .

⁸ *The SWAp Process – Report from a Joint Technical Review Mission for the Education Sector Strategic Plan*, 2001.

6. Summary of Recommendations

6.1 Recommendations for Improved Organizational Capacity at MINED

A number of organizational constraints prevents MINED from successfully attaining reform objectives. Firstly the delay in processing teacher contracts, we recommend that more effort should be made in order to intervene in this area as an urgent priority, since it negatively affects all other interventions that MINED wishes to have as far as the reform is concerned.

The deficient/insufficient planning procedures at central and decentralized levels is a barrier to better management. Planning, and more specifically strategic planning is even a key issue for reaching good results as far as the ESSP is concerned. Therefore, we recommend that a wide and sound training programme is undertaken on these matters, that covers provincial and district levels first, and the schools in a second phase.

Closely related to the MAE and UTRESP frame of reference mentioned above is the country legal framework for Public Administration. The space for change is limited and implies a number of legal mechanisms and many months of hard work. We recommend that this legal framework shall be well identified as a starting point, in order to provide a well established platform upon which to build the reform.

Low salaries are also a well-known constraint, which has been much discussed by the government. This is a national problem and therefore we recommend assessing possibilities for establishing internal incentives of diverse types, naturally accompanied by firm management measures on the staff contribution to and involvement in their work.

Public administration structures are heavily vertically hierarchical. This makes the staff strongly dependent on their bosses and restricts innovation. We envisage, and therefore recommend, that a way to minimize this problem is to increase delegation, which will not necessarily weaken the heads' decision-making power, when delegation is made on operational levels and by activity.

By the same logic, the unit heads at the same hierarchical level do not intervene in the professional areas of their peers. This is a difficulty for the Programme Coordination function when he/she is chosen from among his/her peers. We recommend that this function will be assigned to a manager at a higher level than of those who are the coordinators of each programme component. The role of the head-coordinator should also be an active one in relation to the "coordination function".

As to decision-making, this is heavily formally centralised and the delegation of competences is set by decree or dispatch, from one head of unit to the next, downwards on the hierarchy ladder. Delegation to other staff is rare and occasional. We foresee the need, and therefore recommend that the heads of unit institutionalise regular unit staff meetings, monthly for example, where a check could be made on the progress of the activities and the implementation difficulties, in order to involve the staff in the unit rationale and mutually integrate the content of their tasks. These meetings follow naturally from the strategic planning procedures that should be adopted and were referred to above.

In spite of the generally good academic qualifications of the MINED staff, they often do not possess professional qualifications that give them the expertise for technical work, since most of them have been teachers. The recommendation on counterparts at operational level made elsewhere is again relevant here. This is, in our view, essential and should be considered as a priority. This does not, of course, substitute the great need for training in specific areas.

The role played by working groups in the ministry is important, at present they are not attributed any decision-making or representative power and therefore have a very limited capacity for meaningful intervention in the organizations decision making process. This could be minimized by the regular unit staff meetings recommended above, which would be an opportunity to outline the decisions of the working groups to the decision-making level and thus action points could be followed up.

6.2 General recommendations For Future institutional development efforts in the education sector

1. Involve MAE and UTRESP as frame of references for MINED Reforms

MAE (Ministry of State Administration) is responsible for setting the administrative norms of the State Apparatus and, together with UTRESP (Public Sector Reform Technical Unit), the frame for the public sector reform under way. This constitutes the frame of reference within which the MINED reforms may expand. The relationship between the reform procedures at MAE, UTRESP and MINED implies that MAE/UTRESP should be called upon to participate in MINED reforms in the areas which are relevant for its regulating function, both establishing the framework within which innovation will be possible and negotiating the extent of those innovations. This will guarantee the completion of the Public Sector universal norms and assure MINED that the innovations that will be proposed will confide to the norms and the Public Sector Reform programme and will, therefore, be accepted.

2. A clearer focus on relating capacity building to key issues in service delivery.

Successive annual reviews of the ESSP highlighted many recommendations that have not been followed up. At the same time, there has been inadequate progress on core issues around planning, expenditure management and control and effective monitoring and evaluation of the service delivery. A large amount of resources has been used on lower priority issues to the detriment of progress on these core areas. Future ID programmes must have a clearer focus on relating institutional development to service delivery issues and focus on results in the schools of the provinces. This will in turn facilitate the identification of blockages and wider institutional change.

3. Gender awareness needs to be prioritised

The RCI did not sufficiently bring up gender issues or initiatives to strengthen a gender equality perspective on an institutional level. In any future initiative for institutional development a much clearer focus on the benefits of gender equality in the society as well as in the organisation needs to be emphasised. Increasing awareness is the first step to take in order to make any changes possible. Clear gender equality action plans should follow to increase gender equality in the organisation and to encourage a gender balance. Furthermore the statistics should be gender sensitive at all levels.

4. Use of Periodic rather than Resident Advisers

Resident advisers have found it difficult to work within MINED. There are sound institutional reasons in this case for using short-term rather than resident advisers. There can be a much greater stress on Ministry ownership in terms of taking forward the results of the consultants' work, drawing down consultant resources and making sure that counterparts are available to work with. There is also consequently the possibility of creating more sustainable changes. The Short-term adviser is less likely to be diverted from the key tasks in order to essentially fill time or support the normal bureaucratic processes of the Ministry. A satisfactory compromise in countries like Mozambique is for an adviser to do a resident stint at the beginning of 6 – 12 months in order to build credibility and trust with counterparts, and then to revert to a regular short term role.

5. Careful Assessment of the Person Specification of the Lead Adviser

The terms of reference said little about the skills and experience required of the Management Adviser and as we have seen, this probably contributed to the absence of a clear technical focus for the role. The team leader is a key position for any programme and depending on its size and nature, the needs will be different (from a managerial administrative role for very large projects to highly technical ones such as for this project). A careful selection process needs to be instituted, and in the absence of suitable long-term candidates, those preferring only short-term should be given preference. Development Agencies need to invest in essential language skills for their consultants in the same way they would for their own staff.

6. Develop an Institutional Framework around which a capacity development programme can be developed

A major weakness in the RCI programme was that the capacity building programmes were not developed in terms of priorities for meeting the needs of an Institutional Transformation Framework. Training therefore took place in an 'institutional' vacuum and in many cases was not effectively prioritised or structured to meet current changing needs. The RCI programme did attempt in 1999 and 2000 to create a framework for transformation but did not succeed in making real progress. For future programmes, capacity building/training should be identified as largely downstream tasks after the institutional framework has been developed (and at stages revised).

The institutional framework could usefully be developed as a series of developmental platforms, which are clarified first before individual activities are designed. This will help to ensure activities mutually support the creation of the platform. For MINED these platforms could be around developing systems and transparency (Stage 1), and developing a policy-oriented Ministry (stage 2), and decentralisation of management (stage 3).

In addition clearer initial benchmarks of the organisation's starting position need to be taken and regular monitoring of those benchmarks against targets subsequently made. This will make external evaluations more straightforward and factual. See annex 8 for more explicit ideas of an institutional framework.

6.3 General Recommendations for management of donor contributions

1. Transfer of Programme Management from the development partner to the beneficiary organisation in line with demonstrated improvements in capacity

In its design, the RCI programme assumed a much greater capacity for Ministry ownership and direction than proved to be the case throughout the programme period. For future projects, any institutional assessment of the beneficiary organisation in the programme design phase must analyse carefully the body's capability to directly manage and account for programmes and if necessary, propose a more hands-on management approach by the Development Partner. Transfer of Programme Management capabilities should occur as pre-set quality criteria (eg on accounting, satisfactory relationship with chief counterpart, quality on planning, monitoring and reporting etc.) are met and sustained.

Another conclusion from the experience of RCI is that sustainable development is not possible in the absence of will and capacity of the collaborating organisation. As a consequence, the capacity development initiatives should not be more ambitious in time and scope than the collaborating organisation can handle or include areas which is not in line with the priorities of the organisation.

2. Funding should be tied to Results

Although the Programme articulated expected results of the Management Adviser interventions, this

was a static one off analysis for the original Terms of Reference and needed to be broken down on a priority and annual basis. Also the annual plans should be based on a review of the original programme document and formulated as prioritised objectives, results and activities every year. The expected results of programmes should be framed (on a rolling basis) in terms of ‘must see’, ‘like to see’, ‘wish to see’ outcomes, and the flow of funding closely tied to the achievement of realistic but challenging ‘must see’ results.

3. Closer strategic level involvement of development partner in contribution management

In general we found that the Swedish Embassy and SIDA took a too hands-off standpoint in the management of the RCI programme, given the capacity of the Ministry. This was incompatible in a weak control environment from the point of view of ensuring value for money. We do not argue for a day to day involvement in the minutiae of this or other programmes. However it was and is legitimate, for the Swedish Embassy to question the strategic priorities of the work plans, the extent to which they were inconsistently carried out (or not undertaken at all), the failure of the Ministry to respond to the recommendations of a number of assignment funded or part funded from the Programme and accounting weaknesses. In particular it was legitimate to question why the same recurring weaknesses were identified in successive annual reviews when funds were available (and unspent) to remedy these. In future programmes, we would recommend strategic level supervision/monitoring linked carefully to the flow of funds.

6.4 Recommendations to the Ministry of education for improved management of reform

The Evaluation team is reluctant to make a large number of recommendations to the MINED, partly because recommendations of previous reports have not been responded to but more importantly because we believe a critical test of the Ministry’s commitment to reform is to try to ‘do its own thinking’ rather than rely on consultant reports.

Nevertheless we do conclude that if the Ministry shall receive substantial donor support in the future, it needs to embrace a much more pro-active and open approach to management of donor contributions in five main ways.

1. Creation of an effective ESSP Secretariat.

The ESSP Executive Secretariat has a vital role to play in ensuring that the ESSP programme is coherently planned and delivered across the Ministry, rather than being an assortment of non-aligned activities under the responsibility of different directors. The ESSP Secretariat must therefore be strengthened by the addition of at least 3 personnel (with coordinating responsibilities for educational outcomes, finance, and decentralisation) and the Executive Secretary be given delegated powers by the Permanent Secretary to direct any organisational unit in the Ministry to carry out necessary changes and reforms. He/She should be the focal point for the donors on all ESSP related issues including personal responsibility for ensuring agreed recommendations from the RAR are implemented. Existing working groups should report to the Executive Secretary, and through him/her to the Permanent Secretary, and for non-delegated issues to the Technical Council

2. Regular meetings of the Technical Council

The Technical Council should act as the Ministry’s Executive Board. It should be responsible for making, disseminating and implementing the Ministry’s main policies. It therefore needs to meet on a regular basis (10 times per annum), with a proper agenda distributed at least 4 working days prior to the meeting and minutes compiled and distributed within one week. Minutes should clearly identify actions,

timescales and responsibilities and a number of items, notably ESSP implementation, Financial Management development and the Modernisation Programme should be standing agenda items. A member of the ESSP Secretariat should act as secretary to the Council.

3. Development of Performance Monitoring Systems

Performance monitoring should be a major issue for the Government, not least because if monitoring continues to be ineffective, the donors might question the efficiency of the funds spent. The Ministry must take this seriously by formally delegating the Monitoring role to an existing Director. It is strongly recommended that this should be the Director of Planning (whose title should be extended to include Monitoring and Evaluation) because planning instruments need to be designed in such a way as to provide clear monitoring tools, and that the results of monitoring need to be fed into the planning process. The formal allocation of this responsibility is further underpinned by the presence of Statistics and Informatics sections within the Directorate. The role of Provincial Directors of Planning should also be extended to include monitoring and evaluation. Furthermore, at the earliest possible opportunity, the Ministry with the possible help of external facilitation needs to adopt and implement a performance monitoring strategy (including the measurement of key indicators such as those identified in Annex 7).

4. Evaluation of the Primavera FMIS System

The implementation of the Primavera system is of critical importance to improving the performance of the Ministry and providing assurance to donors on the use of their funds. The Ministry needs to commission an external support adviser who can provide independent advice and support in the 'client role' to the Ministry.

5. Job Descriptions for Senior Managers needs to be developed

All Senior Managers down to Head of Section (Reparticao level) should have standing job descriptions identifying key responsibilities, outputs and reporting lines. This will be essential for any co-ordinating group (either the ESSP Secretariat or the Modernization Secretariat) to work effectively, and will help to eliminate both duplication and gaps in responsibility.

6. Development of Proper Change Management Structures and Processes

We do not intend to make any recommendations on the content of the Modernisation Programme. However as we have noted at the moment, MINED has limited capacity to manage systematically any change, irrespective of the nature of that change or its source.

The Ministry is therefore recommended to:

- a) Reconstitute effectively the Modernization Secretariat and allocate written duties to both the Secretariat as a whole and to individual team members. Any such Secretariat should have clear reporting responsibilities to the Permanent Secretary.
- b) Establish, resource and train small change agent teams in each Directorate of MINED responsible for disseminating information, providing feedback from the 'bottom up' and supporting the Director in implementing change (eg on office moves, staff changes etc). At least one member of each team should be allocated at least 75 % time to the Project.
- c) Establish similar structures in the provincial departments with the Provincial Director acting as change leader and appointing a small dedicated team. One staff member should be appointed or seconded full-time to the programme.

6.5 Specific Recommendations for future support to institutional development in the education sector

1. No continuation of or replacement of RCI programme

There has been no request from the Ministry to continue the present programme in either its current or revised form and therefore there is no basis for continuing to fund the programme.

2. Support to the Modernisation and Restructuring Programme under certain conditions

For reasons given in section 4, namely its flawed procurement process but also feasibility issues around the Programme, direct support should only be given to the Modernisation Programme, bilaterally or through FASE, if and when those issues are sorted out.

While we recognise the Modernisation Project as important and one that the development partners may wish to influence, the terms of any such engagement would need to be radically altered along the lines indicated at the end of section 5 to enable such an involvement. We strongly recommend that a third party make a feasibility review of the Modernisation and Restructuring vision document and the ToR for the implementation phase. A correct, and supervised, procurement process could then be made.

3. Slow Build-Up of Funds in line with capacity for FASE

Development Partners should refrain from making early and heavy disbursements into FASE before there is assurance of the quality of planning, monitoring and financial management mechanisms. Some Funds already exist which can be used to test the system, now that work plans have been agreed. Development Partners with Education responsibilities and the MINED should work closely with PRO-AGRI partners to ensure that the lessons from that programme are absorbed by both MINED and the Donors.

4. Strong Consultancy Support for Performance Monitoring

In the absence of sound strategic internal monitoring systems within MINED, donors should support extensive performance monitoring through teams of dedicated consultants working at provincial and district level, and using a case study / audit approach. This performance management should have two objectives; to create organisational learning that enhances the management capabilities in the organisation and secondly to provide the donor with the required information regarding progress. Donors should avoid the commissioning of one-off short-term impressionistic reviews by small teams of consultants (often differing from one year to next). The team should include consultants (international and national) as well as MINED representatives in order to build up monitoring capabilities.

Performance Review should include both qualitative and quantitative work. In particular there should be a number of auditable outcome and process indicators, which supports a more evidence-based review to the evaluation of progress against ESSP targets. Annex 7 provides a list of performance indicators for key educational outcomes and processes that should be monitored on a periodic basis, with the reason for including each particular measure. The list is not intended to be comprehensive and other equally important indicators may be identified. We believe that a substantial amount of information regarding outcomes (including quality indicators) is already collected by the Ministry or its agencies, but is not necessarily systematically used in evaluation. Many of the other process indicators are not collected although it would be readily easy to do so, and may involve simple manual recording rather than any complex IT solutions.

Consultant costs for such reviews should be chargeable to FASE to emphasise to the Ministry that the failure to develop adequate internal monitoring systems has a significant cost. This recommendation is

made as a parallel one to that for the Ministry to take urgent steps to introduce sound internal performance monitoring.

5. Development partners need to adopt a strategic and result-based management viewpoint in its relationship to the Ministry

The relationship between the development partners and the Ministry needs to be more result-based like, with donors focussing on the key outcomes from their engagement and funding and less on the detail of how to get there. The Senior Management time of the Ministry is overloaded and donors should not contribute to worsening this problem. On the other hand there are issues of strategic importance (qualification of teachers, adoption of the new curriculum, planning and monitoring systems). However, in the continuous dialogue with the Ministry, donors must not be prepared to accept inadequate performance. The mutual commitment of the partners should be held in focus. The service, delivered by the MINED, should be monitored with the support of defined results concerning the service delivered as well as the internal capacity development leading to improved performance.

6. Establishment of an ESSP Technical Assistance Fund

The Evaluation Team recognises both the continuing substantial gap between the required and current capacity of the Ministry for the delivery of the ESSP, and the need for both external technical assistance and funding to help close this gap. Both the development partners and the Ministry have shown some interest in establishing such a TA Fund, using a proportion of FASE funds. We would also support the establishment of such a Fund, provided that it supports the development of a *mutually agreed policy dialogue* (not simply what MINED sees as its needs) and the implementation of high priority systemic changes to meet the requirements of the ESSP.

With regard to the establishment and management of such a Fund we would make the following recommendations

- a) The ESSP TA Fund should be initially established for a period of 5 years to meet the TA requirements of the new ESSP 2004-08.
- b) The ESSP Technical Assistance Fund would only be used for technical assistance, and disbursement of the funds against an agreed annual work programme would constitute an important trigger for the disbursement of overall FASE funds. Any unused funds at the end of each year would be carried forward, with the prospect of any unused balance being returned to the donors at the end of the lifetime of the Fund (this may of course be waived subject to donor agreement).
- c) A proportion of the FASE Funds (a minimum of 5 % up to a maximum of 15 %) should be paid directly at the same time of disbursement of the main funds, into a separate ESSP Technical Assistance Fund, held in US dollars. This account would be used to pay directly for international technical assistance, and in the case of national technical assistance would be converted into Meticaïs in the same process as the main FASE Funds.
- d) Prior to the beginning of each planning year, an annual work programme would be developed under the auspices of the Technical Council and agreed with the FASE donors. This would be the basis of determining the size of the annual contribution into the TA Fund.
- e) An ESSP Fund Adviser would be appointed by and be responsible to the donors. He / She would be responsible for advising donors on the development of the overall FASE and ESSP TA programmes, and the wider issues pertaining to the implementation of the ESSP and modernisation of the Ministry. He / She would be funded outside the FASE mechanism and would not sit in the Ministry. MINED should appoint a counterpart to the Fund advisor.
- f) MINED (for example the Finance Management and Procedures Working Group) would be responsible for initial drafting of the work programme and all terms of reference in accordance with

section 7 of the FASE Procurement Manual. In light of the resistance towards TA, a policy should be created for the use of TA by the MINED with the support of the fund advisor, defining positive prerequisites that need to prevail (for example who writes ToR, defining responsibilities and monitoring mechanisms, payment procedures etc.). Furthermore, results and indicators should be formulated, connected to the work plan, identifying the capacity development outcomes that are expected and the indicators of success connected to these. A small proportion of the ESSP TA Fund could be used for TA support for these processes. The ESSP Fund Adviser would have a ‘no objection’ function in relation to individual ToRs, and in monitoring overall procurement and accounting in line with FASE procedures. Copies of all contracts would be lodged with the Adviser.

- g) For a small number of ‘functional areas’, framework contractors could be selected for work under \$ 50,000. All framework contractors should consist of a partnership of at least one national and one international company. This will help both in skills transfers to local consultants, in building understanding of local conditions and in overall quality assurance.
- h) The FASE Procurement Manual will be used as the principal guide to the procurement of consultants. Where this is silent, World Bank procedures contained in ‘Guidelines: Use of Consultants by World Bank Borrowers and by the World Bank as Executing Agency’ shall apply.

6.6 Recommendations for learning from the experience of the RCI

The Evaluation team would like to emphasize on the learning from the gathered experience within Sida, the donor community and the MINED of support to institutional development in the Education sector. This evaluation is only one input in this learning, representing an external viewpoint based on the experience of the implementation of the RCI programme. The Evaluation team is fully aware that not everyone will agree upon the picture of the reality we present, or our conclusions or recommendations. However, we believe that everyone can find some learning or interesting ideas reflected in this report and together with your own reflections of the experience of the RCI programme we believe that some lessons learned could be drawn.

To emphasize the learning of the evaluation of the RCI we propose that one or several workshops should be held, with the support of an external facilitator, for example divided in three steps focussing on:

1. Individual learning (I have learned that..) from the RCI (each one thinks individually on three learning points)
2. Group discussions (presenting individual learning points and creating a joint list of learning points)
3. Creating action learning plans (how to make our learning happen in reality)

The MINED and for example Sida will need to discuss different learning aspects while we recommend to hold separate workshops. One workshop is recommended to be held together, with MINED and development partners, focussing on the common learning.

Annex 1

Terms of Reference for an External Evaluation of the Institutional Development Programme (RCI) at the Ministry of Education in Mozambique

1 Background

Poverty remains entrenched and widespread in Mozambique, where 70 per cent of the population live in absolute poverty. Conditions for women and men differ substantially and there are major imbalances between rural areas and Maputo. The great majority of the poor – some 85 per cent – live in the countryside. Women are particularly vulnerable; about 85 per cent of women living in rural areas are illiterate.

The PARPA, the Mozambican PRSP, is the overall strategy for reducing poverty. The vision is to create conditions to reduce poverty through a sustainable high economic growth and through inputs in the social sectors. The sectors given priority are education, health, rural development, infrastructure, good governance and macro-economic stability.

The main challenges facing Mozambique are remedying the serious shortage of technical and management capacity, deficiencies in the education system and sustaining high growth levels at national and household levels. Scope for implementing and following up poverty strategies is limited by inefficiency and capacity and resource problems within the public administration. The problems are most acute at provincial and district levels. Capacity is being further depleted by the ravages of HIV/AIDS.

Good governance is identified as a key condition to succeed in reducing poverty. The public administration must be developed and decentralised to be able to deliver social services to the poor. Good governance is a prerequisite for increased transparency and sustainable growth. The Ministry of State Administration (MAE) is one of the main executors of the public sector reform programme, which is led by a Ministerial Council under the Prime Minister and managed by the Technical Reform Unit UTRESP. The unit has been involved thus far principally in planning the reforms, securing finances, and making studies. The reform programme is at present starting to do functional analyses of all the ministries, with the intention of identifying possibilities for rationalisation and decentralisation of their structures and activities. In the Ministry of Planning and Finance (MPF) the Technical Reform Unit UTRAFE works with the introduction of the new Financial Management System SISTAFE.

2 Institutional Development – Ministry of Education

The Ministry of Education (MINED) is one of the sector ministries first in line for implementation of the public sector reform programme, including the SISTAFE. The restructuring process will start in the MINED based on an organisational analysis done by Ernst & Young. This proposes a smaller and more efficient organisation, decentralisation of resources and responsibilities and institutional capacity building. How these changes are implemented will be critical for MINED's work in the short as well as the long term.

In 1995 the government of Mozambique adopted the National Education Policy (PNE). In this Policy the Government identified three lines of action, namely the expansion of access and equity, the improvement of the quality and relevance of education as well as the institutional capacity building. In

recognition of the fact that due to the scarcity of financial and human resources would make it impossible to meet all education related requirements at the same time, the PNE defined the Basic Education as the first priority, followed by Literacy and Adult Education.

The Education Sector Strategic Plan (ESSP) adopted in 1999 reaffirms the objectives and priorities defined in the PNE. The three main objectives of the ESSP are:

- To expand access and equality;
- To improve quality, and
- To strengthen the institutional capacity.

For the third area MINED has implemented an Institutional Development Programme (PRCI – Programa de Reforço de Capacidade Institucional), hereinafter referred to as the programme, from 1998–2001, supported by Sida. 2002 the World Bank and DFID also decided to support the programme. There has also been other donor activities in the area of institutional development, for example GTZ has support in Inhambane, Manica and Sofala, and Danida in Zambezia, Tete and Cabo Delgado.

The main objective of the programme is to develop the capacity of the Ministry structure at all levels to manage and administer the national education system in a way that ensures an efficient use of all resources allocated. The programme goals are covering¹:

- Organisation and management development;
- Development of planning and monitoring systems;
- Financial management development;
- Human resources management, staff administration and Human Resources Development;
- Development of a Public Relations Sector function
- Quality of education – Teacher Training and support to teachers, Inspectors and Pedagogical Supervisors (included 2001)

Since 1 August 1999, the consultant company Swedec International AB has a contract with MINED, concerning management support to the programme. A Management Adviser to assist the Institutional Development Working Group is contracted by Swedec International.

3 Purpose and scope of the evaluation

The purpose of the evaluation is to give an independent view of the Institutional Development Programme, and to look at coherence and relevance of different undergoing activities in the area of institutional development (ID), ie the public administration reform that is to start, including the SIST-AFE, the Mined Restructuring and Modernization-proposal as well as other donor activities. The issue is thus broader than just to evaluate the programme. The evaluation is to serve as a basis for future joint donor support to institutional strengthening of Mined.

The evaluation is to cover 1998–2002.

4 The assignment – issues to be investigated

General issues

The consultant shall carry out an external review of the programme, an evaluation of the degree to which the **objectives** and purposes of the programme have been fulfilled in a relevant, coherent,

¹ Programme document 1998.

effective, efficient and sustainable manner. The consultant should also assess the impact of the programme and give recommendations for future actions. The evaluation is supposed to be both backward looking and forward looking.

The consultant is to put the programme into the whole context of ID. To be able to do this a **mapping of ongoing and planned ID-activities** has to be done. The evaluation should assess the **coherence between the programme and other ongoing and planned ID-activities**. Are there duplication of some activities, how can this be avoided? Are there important areas/issues that falls behind the chairs? How does the Restructuring and Modernization programme relates to the programme and other ID-activities?

The evaluation is to analyse the programme at all levels, **central, provincial and district**. The evaluation requires collection of data in at least two provinces.

The evaluation is to **analyse the Management Adviser – function** in the programme. The consultant is to make a proposal on the most appropriate MA-function for ID in the future. The consultant is to make a proposal for future flexible and joint ID-capacity support, including Human Resources Development, at all levels of the Education system.

The evaluation should assess **lessons learned and make concrete recommendations for future action**. The evaluation should come up with recommendations for future support, viewed in the light of planned reforms and with the aim of getting more coherence and harmonization in the area of ID.

Specific issues

Is the programme **relevant** in relation to goals and policies and to the needs and priorities of Mozambique and target groups? Is it appropriate in relation to the societal problems identified?

The evaluation should look at the **incentive structures** as tool for analysing progress and backlogs in institutional development. How does the incentives affect the progress in institutional development? What incentives are governing the MINED-officials at different levels? What is pushing the employees at different levels to do a good work?

Have **outputs** been produced as planned? Have project and programme objectives been fulfilled? Have the expected results been achieved? Have activities been carried out as agreed? Are there more **cost-effective** methods of achieving the same results? Could the same outputs have been produced with a smaller amount of inputs/resources or could the same inputs/resources have produced a larger output?

Are there any obstacles that limit the rate of success?

If there have been delays during the implementation process, what are the reasons?

What are the intended and unintended **effects** of the activities, including effects on the intended beneficiaries and on others? What are their positive and negative effects in the short and in the long term? Has the institutional development support had the expected impact?

How is the **MINED organisation governed**? Who is taking what decisions and when? The RCI has had the objective to support **decentralization and delegation of decisions**, what has been achieved? What has promoted as well as hampered the results?

What are the **weaknesses** and **strengths** in MINED in relation to management? What are the strengths and weaknesses of having a working group on institutional development? Could the work on ID in Mined be organised in other ways?

Why have the **technical assistance** proposed and agreed in the RCI Programme Document, in particular covering the area of financial management, been utilized only to a very small extent?

Will the education system, at all levels, deliver benefits to an acceptable extent for an extended period of time after the withdrawal of the development assistance? To what extent will activities, outputs and effects be **maintained** or acceptable returns be provided when the donor support has come to an end?

What has been the advantages and disadvantages with the **model** where MINED has the agreement with the consultant company SWEDEC?

What will be the **role of the Financial Agencies** (FA) in the ongoing and coming reforms related to ID? Which is the best way to support MINED, as well as provinces and districts, in institutional development? The evaluation should come up with proposals on how to **harmonize** different ID-activities.

Have issues regarding **gender and equity** been considered? What actions can be taken to increase the gender awareness?

The consultants should contact the agriculture SWAp **PROAGRI** to see how similar institutional development changes have been carried out at MADER.

5 Methods

The evaluation should be based on a review of relevant documents and on interviews with stakeholders in Mozambique at all levels. It will include gathering of facts and interviews with the MINED including provinces and districts, MAE, MPF, some other sector ministries including MADER, financial agencies and partners. It is important to make interviews at provincial and district level since the decentralisation of competence and capacity is an important objective of the programme. The consultants should elaborate on a methodology for the evaluation.

The consultant should respond to and comment upon the ToR.

The responsibility for setting up meetings, copying etc rests with the consultant.

6 Consultant profile and requirements

An external consultant, maybe a small team, is to carry out the evaluation. Care should be taken that the expertise has not had a direct stake in the programme.

The consultant should have experience of:

Institutional and capacity development in public administration including;

- Organisational and management issues
- Planning and control
- Financial management

Understanding and knowledge of education issues in general and Mozambique in particular is an advantage.

It is an advantage if one of the team members is a mozambican consultant.

The report is to be submitted in English. The consultant, or at least one of the team members, must be able to speak and read Portuguese.

7 Time table and reporting

The evaluation should take place in April 2003.

A draft report should be submitted to Sida and the Ministry of Education no later than May 26 2003.

Mined and Sida will deliver comments on the draft report not later than June 10 2003.

A final report should be submitted by June 23 2003.

Annex 2

List of persons interviewed

Evaluation of the Institutional Development Programme (RCI) at the Ministry of Education in Mozambique

LEVEL/ORGANISATION	Name	Title/Function
Provincial Directorate of Education (DPE) in Niassa	José Sebastião dos Santos	Head of Planning
DPE Niassa	António Rocheque	Head of Finance and Administration
DPE Niassa		Head of Human Resources
City Education Office (s) Lichinga, Niassa	Domingos Quenclane	Director
District Education Office (s) Niassa	Hassine Abdala	Head of Finance and Administration
District Education Office (s) Niassa	Ângelo Rabione	Head of Planning
District Education Office (s) Niassa	Joaquim Quira	Responsible of Human Resources
24 de Julho Primary School (Level 1), Lichinga District, Niassa	França Francisco João	Teacher
Provincial Directorate of Support and Control (DPAC) Niassa	José Nunes Gilberto	Coordinator for Institutional Support Programme and Coordenador of UTRESP Unit Niassa
Financing Agencies (FA's) Niassa	Estrella Ramil	Coordinator Intermón
FA's Niassa	Rob Pattersson	Coordinator Ireland Aid
FA's Niassa	Camilla Salomonsson	Sida – PROANI
Provincial Directorate of Education (DPE) in Niassa	Gilda Mahumane	Provincial Director Education
District Education Office (s) Maputo Province	Mário Bombe	Director
Machava Sede Secondary School, Maputo Province	Rodrigues Xavier	Director
MINED	Zefanias Muhate	Permanent Secretary
MINED	Virgilio Juvane	National Director Planning
MINED	Antonio Chambal	National Director Finance and Administration
MINED	Pedro Baltazar Biché	National Director Human Resources and Head of Working Group for Institutional Development (WG ID)
MINED	Staffan Lundqvist	Management Adviser
MINED	Mafalda Duarte	Assistant Executive Secretary of ESSP; World Bank Adviser to the MINED
MINED	Ismael Cassamo Nheze	National Director Pedagogical Resource and Head of the Team for the Modernization and Restructuring Programme
MINED	Moisés Matavel	Head of Office to the Minister
MINED	Manuel Lobo	Adviser to the Minister, EFA/FTI

LEVEL/ORGANISATION	Name	Title/Function
MINED	Manuel Rego	Adviser to the Minister, Carta Escolar, member Modernization and Restr. Team
MINED	Kauxique Maganlal	Head of Informatic Department
MINED	André Utui	Head of Planning Department
MINED	Fernando Rachide	Head of Department for In-service Training
MINED	Florência Moiane	Executive Secretary to the National Director Planning
MINED	Zaida Baúle	Technician at Department for International Co-operation
MINED	Cremildo Binana	Head of Department for International Co-operation
MINED		Accountant ASDI funds, National Directorate of Finance and Administration
MINED	Joaquim Matavele	INDE, Member WG ID
Ministry of Planning and Finance (MPF)	Carlos Jessen	Director UTRAFE
MPF	José Sulemaine	National Director Planning and Budget
MPF	Domingos Lambo	Vice Director National planning and Budget, local planning
UTRESP	José Macuane	Consultant UTRESP
FA's	Core Group of FA's – joint meeting	Netherlands, Germany, Ireland, Canada, Denmark, Finland, World Bank, UNESCO, UNICEF, DfID, EU, Sweden
FA's	Magnus Lindell	Counsellor for Development Co-operation Swedish Embassy
FA's	Karin Sverkén	Programme officer, Swedish Embassy and Member of Working Group Institutional Development
FA's	Agneta Lind	Regional Education Adviser Sida
FA's	Scott Simons	Donor Coordinator PROAGRI
Sida	Helena Reuterswärd	Programme officer, Education Department, Sida, Stockholm
Sida	Karin-Anette Andersson	Country desk officer, Africa Department, Sida, Stockholm
Consultants	Ritva Alberts	Consultant, undertaking Institutional Dev. courses
Consultants	Ibraimo Ibraimo	Managing Partner, Ernst & Young
Consultants	Clara Silva	Ernst & Young

Annex 3

Matrix of outputs and achieved results

RCI MINED

Result area	Expected results	Achieved results	Comments
1. Organizational development and improvement of management and leadership	1.1 Management Advisor contracted;	1.1 Management Advisor (MA) contracted;	1.1 MA started with his services one year after the commencement of the programme; MA contract was successively extended up to June 2003;
	1.2 Management seminars for the MINED top executive;	1.2 Archived partially. In March 2002, a 2-day seminar was organized and attended by the Minister, Vice- Minister and the Permanent Secretary; Planed seminars for 2000 and 2001 had been successively postponed;	
	1.3 Management and Leadership seminars for all national and provincial directors conducted: 10 seminars at national level and 11 seminars at provincial levels;	1.3 A total of 32 seminars conducted;	1.3 The total number of director trained not available from the 2001 and 2002 reports. During 2000 a total of 40 directors were trained in the course of the 40 seminars conducted that year;
	1.4 Organisational charts for all directorate at MINED elaborated;	1.4 Not achieved;	
	1.5 Job Descriptions for all staff at MINED elaborated;	1.5 Not achieved;	1.5 A total of 10 seminars at national level and other related activities and products (e.g. TORs, procedures and forms, etc.) were conducted and produced in preparation of the elaboration of the Job Descriptions;
	1.6 Competence Profiles for all key posts elaborated;	1.6 Not achieved;	1.6 But WG ID members were trained by a World Bank consultant for carrying out the activity;
	1.7 Analysis of capacity and competence of each MINED directorate in relation to expected target concluded;	1.7 Not achieved;	1.7 The Working Group for Institutional Development was introduced in the methodology by a World Bank Consultant in 1999 and other preparations were made to start the activity during 2000 but no response came from the concerned national directors.
	1.8 A first MINED Plan to improve its capacity concluded;	1.8 Not achieved;	
	1.9 Management seminars for all districts directors, including organisational structures and Job Descriptions conducted;	1.9 Achieved partially;	1.9 Numbers of school directors trained is estimated to represent 50% of the total number of 8,000 existing school directors in country (data for all the reporting years are not available).
	1.10 A programme for School Directors training developed and implemented.	1.10 11,000 Training manuals for each module produced; a series of decentralised training courses conducted; approximately a total of 4,000 school directors trained; production of a Manual for School Directors initiated with DANIDA funding. All provinces have a team of trainers	

Result area	Expected results	Achieved results	Comments
2. Development of the planning and monitoring system	2.1 ESSP circulated and discussed in seminars and meetings; 2.2 An Activity Programme for MINED, based on the ESSP and available resources, prepared; 2.3 A team of MINED qualified professionals to lead regional seminars in planning established; 2.4 MINED's internal communication system improved; 2.5 The existing study on School Mapping is actualized and principles in School Mapping established; 2.6 School Mapping in pilot provinces performed; 2.7 A national team and provincial to implement School Mapping programme set-up; 2.8 School Mapping in the whole of Mozambique performed; 2.9 Basic data on the present status of inspection and monitoring provided; 2.10 A first in-service training course in inspection and monitoring to all provinces, districts and school directors carried out; 2.11 Principles of inspections and monitoring established; 2.12 Training programmes drafted and first courses initiated in Nampula, Manica and Maputo; 2.13 The roles of inspections and the inspectors defined; 2.14 Inspectors at all levels trained; 2.15 Results of carried-out inspections at national level processed for use in educational planning; 2.16 An ESSP Executive Secretariat established and functioning and being responsible, with the MA assistance, for the management and supervision of resources, administration and monitoring of ESSP; 2.17 A data bank created which permits monitoring of progress and problems in projects;	2.1 Achieved partially; 2.2 An Activity Programme for MINED, based on the ESSP and available resource is annually prepared; 2.3 A team of MINED qualified professionals to lead regional seminars in planning has been established; 2.4 MINED's internal communication system has been improved; 2.5 Achieved; 2.6 School Mapping performed in two provinces, Inhambane and Cabo Delgado; 2.7 A national team to implement School Mapping programme has been set-up; 2.8 Not achieved; 2.9 Achieved; 2.10 Not achieved; 2.11 Principles of inspections and monitoring has been established; 2.12 Training course conducted; 2.13 Not achieved; 2.14 Achieved partially; 2.15 Not achieved; 2.16 Not achieved; 2.17 Not achieved; A course in Project Management was conducted during 2002. Apart from this activity no thing more was done and achieved in this initially important area;	2.1 ESSP not sufficiently utilized at provincial level and completely unknown at district level; 2.7 The provincial teams have not been set-up yet; 2.16 An ESSP Executive Secretary has been formally appointed since 1999 but his functions have been dubious, he has not been defined as MA counterpart as defined in the RCI programme.

Result area	Expected results	Achieved results	Comments
	2.18 The Executive Secretariat and the Working Group in a position to prepare, negotiate and manage a programme of tenders and procurement; 2.19 The MINED has assumed a leading role in co-operation with donors.	2.18 Achieved partially, concerning the Working Group; 2.19 Achieved partially.	
3 Improvement of the financial management system	3.1 A system for Planning and Budgeting for the MINED introduced; 3.2 A system for Planning and Budgeting introduced also in provinces and districts; 3.3 Decentralization and delegation of tasks in the financial area introduced in provinces, districts and school. 3.4 A number of Technical Assistances provided, both in short and long term basis, at national and provincial levels, including the contract of provincial advisor in financial management for each province; 3.5 Basic financial management and public accounting training delivered to all staff in the financial area at national, provincial and district level.	3.1 Not achieved; 3.2 Not achieved; 3.3 Achieved partially; 3.4 Not achieved; 3.5 A number of training courses conducted. The courses covered relevant financial areas such as Procurement and Basic Public Accounting.	3.1 and 3.2 Under these objectives a Financial Management Information System (FMIS) was to be established for MINED and the provinces. It was supposed to be financed by the British DFID. Many important preparatory activities were carried out, but the DFID informed the MINED in April 2002 it no longer would support the activity; 3.3 Some tasks in the financial area have been decentralized to provinces, districts as well to some level of schools (Primary School 2 and Secondary and Technical Schools); 3.4. A number of preparatory activities were concluded, including the approval of the TORs for the TA. Also SIDA accepted to support the salaries of the provincial advisors. However the Directorate of Administration and Finance (DAF) did not react. 3.5 Total number of staff trained was not available from the annual reports. But it has been estimated that a total of 500 staff have benefited from the training course.
4 Improvement of Human Resource management and administration	4.1 A computer system for staff administration installed in DRH in the MINED and functioning satisfactorily; 4.2 The same system installed and installed and functioning in the provinces; 4.3 Responsibility and authority transferred to the provinces; 4.4 Follow-up and monitoring routines of the provinces by the DRH established and functioning; 4.5 Work aiming at delegation to districts of administration tasks initiated;	4.1 Achieved partially. MINED has not started exploiting sufficiently all the capacity and possibility the system can provide; 4.2 Achieved partially, the system has been installed, but only partially, in two provinces (Manica and Maputo City); 4.3 Achieved partially. Some important areas, such as recruitment of staff and teachers are initiated at provinces, districts and schools; 4.4 Achieved partially; 4.5 Achieved partially;	

Result area	Expected results	Achieved results	Comments
	4.6 A strategy toward improving flow of information at the MINED prepared and under implementation; 4.7 The assessment of capacity and competence concluded; 4.8 A Human Resource Management policy and strategy developed and approved by the MINED; 4.9 A number of 25 MINED staff completed studies at Universidade Pedagógica on Educational Planning and management; 4.10 A number of 2 MINED staff have completed a Doctor's degree on Educational Management in France; 4.11 A study programme abroad prepared and implemented.	4.6 Achieved partially; MINED had been conducting a yearly Seminar for central and provincial Human Resource staff. 4.7 Not achieved; 4.8 Not achieved; 4.9 A number of 25 MINED staff completed studies at Universidade Pedagógica on Educational Planning and management; 4.10 A number of 2 MINED staff have completed a Doctor's degree on Educational Management in France; 4.11 A number of MINED staff benefited different training courses abroad: 7: Human Resource Management (Turin, Italy and CEPPA-ISBO); 4: Management Development (ESAMI, Swaziland); 4: Informatics (South Africa); 2: Textbooks and other Learning Materials (Institute of Education, France); 2 Educational Management Information System (Institute of Education, France); 2: Planning Successful Education Projects and Programmes (Institute of Education; France); 2: Advanced Course in Educational Inspection and Supervision (Institute of Education, France); 23: English Language (South Africa and England).	4.8 Designed to be conducted by a three month Technical assistance, the correspondent TOR's were ready since 2001 but no decision was made to initiate the tender process.
5 Development of a Public Relation function	5.1 A Public Relation Sector established in the MINED since 1999.	5.1 A Public Relation Sector established in the MINED;	
6 Improvement of the Quality of Education	6.1 MINED staff at national and provincial level trained in the methodology of school evaluation and analysis of school results; 6.2 Teachers' training institutions trained in teaching methodology; 6.3 Directors and Assistant directors of teacher training institutions trained in School Administration, School Planning and in other relevant areas related to their activity; 6.4 Institutional Teacher training institutions upgraded in equipment and other working needs.	6.1 One training course conducted with World Bank funding; 6.2 Achieved partially. A total of 32 teachers trained during 2002; 6.3 Achieved partially.	6.1 Data on number of staff trained not available from the annual reports; 6.2 Objectives aiming to improving the quality of education were introduced in the RCI for the first time in 2002 after the mined and the World Bank agreed to considerably reduce the WB budget for Quality of Education and instead use the funds for School Constructions purpose.

Annex 4

Financial summary

		1999		2000		2001		2002		Total	
All Figures in USD		Budget	Actual	Budget	Actual	Budget	Actual	Budget	Actual	Budget	Actual
Objective											
1. Organizational Development	146 750	97 375	360 000	109 700	480 000	573 500	672 000	444 600	1 658 750	1 225 175	
2. Development of systems of planning and control	140 000	111 375	228 000		140 000	36 100	130 000	38 600	638 000	186 075	
3. Strengthening of Project Management & Co-ordination	0		10 000		15 000	0	0	0	25 000	0	
4. Development of Financial Management Systems	0		389 000		535 000	145 000	960 000	993 700	1 884 000	1 138 700	
5. Development and Management of Human Resources	56 250		36 000	63 700	340 000	614 300	325 000	406 500	757 250	1 084 500	
6. Teacher Training							183 000	46 600	183 000	46 600	
Miscellaneous				327 760		13 800		24 400		365 960	
TOTAL	343 000	208 750	1 023 000	501 160	1 510 000	1 382 700	2 270 000	1 954 400	5 146 000	4 047 010	
1. Organizational Development					10	4 (48%)	8	2 (17%)			
2. Development of systems of planning and control						3	2 (57%)	3	1 (15%)		
3. Strengthening of Project Management & Co-ordination							1	1 (100%)	0	0 (0%)	
4. Development of Financial Management Systems						2	2 (100%)	3	0 (0%)		
5. Development and Management of Human Resources							2	2 (26 %)	4	2 (12%)	
6. Teacher Training							1	0 (0%)			
USD : SEK Exchange Rate		8		10		10		10			

Annex 5

A análise do IDWG dos pontos fortes e fracos

Resultados de um exercício em Maputo a 29 de Abril de 2003.

Group 1

Strengths

- 1) Availability of training opportunities in planning, Human Resource Management and Financial Management;
- 2) Identification of a particular field in the above areas as needs for staff training;
- 3) Facilities in the use of ASDI funds;
- 4) Regular meetings of IDP Working Group;
- 5) Availability of clear annual plans and corresponding budget.

Weaknesses

- 1) Financial contributions from cooperating partners were not total;
- 2) Planned activities that were not carried out;
- 3) Problem with the flow of information and communication with those directorates that are not represented in the Working Group at national director level;
- 4) Lack of a monitoring system;
- 5) Problem with the supervision and control of the implementation of the programme.

Group 2

Strengths

- 1) Identification of the sector problems
- 2) Planned activities are carried out normally due to the regular disbursement of funds;
- 3) The programme facilitates the definition of interventions with regional integration;

Weaknesses

- 1) Low coordination between the leadership of the programme and the target group;
- 2) Lack of monitoring and assessment of the training activities;
- 3) There was no engagement between the plan and its implementation;
- 4) Low dissemination of the programme.

Summary for the two groups:

Strengths

- 1) Identification of the sector problems which defined clear working plans and the respective budget, including the needs for staff training;
- 2) Continuous implementation of activities as conditioned by the availability and facility in the use of ASDI funds;
- 3) Training opportunities in planning, Human Resources Management and Financial Management;
- 4) Regular Working Group meetings.

Weaknesses

- 1) Low leadership and coordination of the programme activities and the respective target groups;
- 2) Lack of a systematic monitoring and evaluation of the program;
- 3) Non-existence of an engagement in regard to the implementation of the planned activities;
- 4) The expected contributions were not received due to the fact that some donors did not honor their promises;
- 5) Problems in the flow of information and link between the Working Group and the Directorates not represented at national director level.

Annex 6

Comparison of Results against Expected Outcomes in the MA's Terms of Reference

Expected Result	Achievement
Main Activities under Present IDP have been carried out	Partial Achievement. Large numbers of training activities have been carried out. However significant activities such as the establishment of a Project database, the full implementation of the HR database at national and provincial level and the introduction of job descriptions have not been implemented
MINED planning and monitoring systems have been upgraded	Much greater focus on producing detailed and costed work plans at all levels in the system with a better alignment between the planning and budgeting timetables. The programme has supported the successful implementation of school mapping in 2 provinces and it is intended to extend the programme to the 8 remaining provinces. Training needs to be given on both updating the exercise and using the information for planning processes However most planning takes the form of detailed work rather than strategically focussed result based plans. They are also overly long and are impossible to consolidate coherently at national level Overall linkages between PARPA, ESSP, MTEF and annual planning remain vague or non-existent. MTEF remains weak, although partly this is the result of weak direction from the Ministry of Planning and Finance. Little progress has been made in developing monitoring systems or in adapting or analysing the data from the annual census. The annual census itself continues to work well and is currently being upgraded to a 4G language with the help of a junior professional officer from Sweden. However the Ministry lacks a strategic approach to monitoring and fails to prioritise it as a key activity. It essentially prepares for the RAR one week before.
General management skills have been improved and more young management staff of both sexes have been included in the development process	Training has been provided to Ministry managers at national and provincial levels on leadership and general management skills in a two week programme. This has probably improved awareness of modern management methods but its practical impact has been impossible to estimate as no indicators, benchmarks and targets were set, and no follow-up training or evaluation has been attempted
The competence and capacity has enabled the Ministry to delegate much of the responsibility for finance and staff administration at least	Substantial numbers of MINED staff have been trained in public accounting and the overall competence of staff has been raised. In addition to training, significant numbers of book-keepers trained in Cuba have also been deployed. Again it is impossible to establish direct impact as no benchmarks were taken or targets set for example speed of clearance of justifications (Balancetes) by the MPF. The Financial Management Working Group is one of the most active groups and the Financial Management Committee has also become operative with the introduction of FASE However at present there is very limited delegation of fund management within national headquarters and to provincial level, and substantial technical assistance to support financial management at provincial level has not yet been utilised.
A HR Development Programme has been developed and the first initiatives under this Programme have been	A large number of HR events have taken place, including annual seminars for MINED HR officers. However HR development is not anchored in an institutional strategy or HR policy document, and the various trainings cannot be categorised as a programme meeting identified competencies Although a working group on gender exists and meets, it has had little positive impact

Expected Result	Achievement
taking place at least; The programme has a gender profile	at the national level. Most positive gender initiatives have been taken at the provincial level (eg in Niassa, 4 female district directors have been appointed in the last year at the behest of the Provincial Director)
A Public Relations function has been set up and is working	This objective was withdrawn shortly after the programme launch. There is still much work to be done in terms of improving the flow of information to external stakeholders and in particular the role of the International Co-operation Department in managing the relationship between donors and NGOs and the Ministry
The MINED internal communications system have been upgraded and the information culture improved	The internal communications network of MINED HQ was substantially upgraded in 2001/02. 600 telephone extensions and 600 computer connections provided under specifications developed by a DFID funded assignment supported and taken forward by the MA. There is a functioning intranet system and more staff is using the server at least as back-up. Three provinces have also had their computing networks upgraded. However there is limited use of new technology by most staff. There are few active users of the Intranet despite the physical difficulties, and few organised databases or back-up routines on the server
A new programming of the further development of competence and capacity in the Mozambican education system has been made and complementing components have been initiated	The MA worked with WGID to develop on a rolling basis annual work programmes. He also worked on a substantial of related assignments and supported vigorously the work of the Technical Council and the Working Group. However he and the RCI programme do not appear to have built sufficient capacity to systematically identify training needs, develop a coherent competency based annual training programme or an institutional development strategy.

Annex 7

Key Performance Indicators (KPI)

The following are suggested KPIs for the annual monitoring process. A number may already be being collected through the annual census database. There would need to be further elaboration of the indicators in the form of a technical Note (outlining the precise measure and the source of information for its measurement).

Financial

Recommended Indicator	Purpose
% of the Overall Budget Envelope and Main Components thereof State Budget / FASE Funds / World Bank Credit spent at central level	To establish changes in balance of spending at operational vis-à-vis central (support) level
% of overall budget and components thereof (described above) allocated in cash to a) districts and b) schools	As above, with the emphasis being on 'money to allocate' at school level
% of overall budget and components thereof allocated as resources (cash or materials) to schools	As above, with the emphasis being on direct operational spending at school level
% of overall budget and components thereof allocated to purchase of equipment and learning materials	Amount of non-salary recurrent spending on educational materials
% of overall State Budget spent on teacher and administrative salaries	Balance between salary and non-salary proportion of the recurrent budget
% of ghost names on payroll determined through annual payroll audit	Extent of fraud and misappropriation
Average time taken to clear DPE 'balancetes' by DPPFs at provincial level	Efficiency of financial reporting by DPEs
Use of transparent equitable unit cost based criteria to allocate State Budget and FASE funds to provincial, and from provincial level to districts and schools	Equity and efficiency of budget planning by MINED
Development and implementation of concise standard format for provincial and institution annual plan	As above
Development of rolling MTEF based on ESSP, and budget model	Effectiveness of long-term budget planning

Construction

Recommended Indicator	Purpose
Provincial Cost Comparators for standard school design	Cost efficiency of construction & detection of possible irregularities in regional procurement
Provincial Cost Comparators for non-standard school design, based on classroom cost	As above, demonstrating cost impact of community support
International Cost Comparisons	As above using Sub-Saharan African indicators

Human Resource and Gender

Recommended Indicator	Purpose
At provincial level, average length of time between teachers' application for promotion and MINED decision	Efficiency of MINED HR function at provincial level
Average and maximum length of time between MINED submission of approved promotion application request to MPF & Tribunal Administrativo and promotion taking effect	Efficiency of MPF / Tribunal Administrativo in supporting education service
Average and maximum length of time taken by Tribunal Administrativo to register annual teacher contracts	As above
% of qualified (permanent contract) to unqualified teachers at provincial and district level	Effectiveness in raising overall number of qualified teachers in face of expanding enrolment
% of school directors trained (substantively) in management eg in current modules	Ongoing effectiveness of school management training
Coverage (in terms of provincial installation) and quality (in terms of validated personnel records input) of HR database.	Assessment of use of HR database as management tool
% of directors at national, provincial, district and school level who are women)	Gender equality measure
% of qualified women teachers of total qualified teachers at all levels and overall	Attraction and retention of women teachers to teaching cadre
% of teachers under 40 dying in-service	Effectiveness of HIV/AIDS and other killer disease prevention

Education Quality and Access

Recommended Indicator	Purpose
Gross and Net Enrolment rates at different levels by province and district	Standard international 'access' measures
% Repetition at grade 2 and transfers at grades 5, 7 and 10 by province and district	Key 'quality' measure with automatic promotion
Examination Results at grades 5, 7, 10 and 12 by province and district	As above
% of rural pupils in EP2 by province, entering ESG 1 and ESG 2	Key access and poverty related measure

Annex 8

Elements of an Institutional Framework

Stage	Key Milestones	Activities
Stage 1 Developing Systems and Transparency	– Production of short but comprehensive MTEF Submission – Production of Annual Internal Budget with key performance targets – Production of Annual Report containing both financial and performance – Job Descriptions for all Senior Staff – Regular Meetings of the Technical Council with proper agendas and minutes – Dissemination of key decisions to staff – Proper functioning Executive Secretariat and Modernization Programme Team	– In liaison with MOF production of standard format – Development of consolidated budget format – Development of Annual Report Format; identification of key performance indicators – Review of current senior manager duties including re-allocation for Modernization Programme – Facilitation of regular meetings, with working groups acting as sub-committees – Review of staff Communications Policy and Strategy – Recruitment and Reassignment of staff; Formal empowerment from Minister / PS; Change Management Training
Stage 2 Developing a policy oriented Ministry	– Slimmed down Central Ministry HQ with service delivery functions transferred to provinces or autonomous agencies – Revised central departmental structure with focus on promoting educational outcomes – Individual budget holder responsibilities at central and provincial level – Creation of effective school inspection service and independent internal audit – Formation of Independent Ministry Board to receive reports – Strategic Plan and MTEF updated annually on rolling basis – Job Descriptions for all staff	– Review of Modernisation Programme proposals and gradual implementation of revised proposal – Development of effective change Management strategy for all levels – Right-sizing of these functions; Training; Empowerment through regulations, adequate finance and independent reporting – Further Training and Development of Planning and Monitoring function – Training for senior managers in writing job descriptions

Stage	Key Milestones	Activities
Stage 3 Decentralisation of management	– Clear distribution of responsibilities between provinces, districts and institutions, with all aspects of service delivery being the responsibility of provincial level – Service Performance Agreements between provinces and centre – Equitable distribution of total budget (state + donor) to provinces, with emphasis on getting resources down to school/institution level – Creation of effective provincial inspection and audit service – Provincial Directors equivalent status to functional Directors in Ministry and creation of wider Senior Management Team – Senior Management positions filled on competitive basis – Performance Appraisal for senior staff- Rolling medium term provincial plans, aggregating to an effective national plan – Effective Rollout of HR database	– Further design work on allocation of responsibilities – Major rebuilding and equipment of district offices including working with MOF on banking facilities – Support to formula funding design and implementation and effective local financial monitoring – Support to build-up of provincial infrastructure including adequate budget and competitive pay levels – Support to all aspects below

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