

Sharra Waste Dump Site, Albania-Feasibility Study and Urgent Rehabilitation Measures

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and Economic Co-operation**

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Sida Evaluation 04/11

**Department for Infrastructure
and Economic Co-operation**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1

INTRODUCTION

From September 2001 – December 2002, UNEP carried out the project *Tirana - Sharra Waste Dump Site – Feasibility Study and Urgent Rehabilitation Measures Project* (“the Project”), financed by Sida. The Project was implemented together with Albanian counterparts including the Ministry of Environment (MoE) and the Municipality of Tirana (MoT).

In early September 2003, Sida decided to carry out the “*Evaluation of Tirana–Sharra waste dumpsite – feasibility study and urgent rehabilitation measures*”, with the aim of reviewing the results achieved and lessons learned in the Project (“the Evaluation”). The key purpose was for Sida to learn as much as possible from this first environment project financed by Sida in Albania. The Evaluation was to address issues of relevance, achievement of objectives (effectiveness), impact, efficiency and sustainability.

The Evaluation was carried out by ERM Scandinavia, together with sub-consultants, during October–November 2003, and included review of project documentation and other relevant written information as well as interviews with project stakeholders in Tirana and via telephone.

1.2

THE SHARRA WASTE DUMP SITE PROJECT

The Project “*Feasibility Study on Risk Reduction Measures and urgent Activities at Sharra Landfill in Albania*” was initiated in 2001 by UNEP together with the Ministry of Environment (and its predecessor the National Environmental Agency, NEA) as a follow-up of the assessment made by UNEP in 2000 “*Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment – Albania*”. In response to a request by the Albanian Government, Sida decided to finance the Project with SEK 4 million.

The overall objective of the Project in the Terms of Reference (ToR) was to carry out a feasibility study in Sharra in order to identify and catalyse the urgently required measures. The ToR further outlined seven aims of the Project:

- Strengthen capacity of environmental authorities in national and local waste management.
- Support a medium and long-term management of the disposal site with a complementary management plan to improve environmental management standards of the site.
- Recommend and plan short-term remedial measures to urgently reduce risks.
- Recommend and plan medium and long-term remedial measures to reduce environmental impacts from the disposal site.
- Support/facilitate other short-term measures on site.

- Implement urgent short-term activities in order to reduce risks already in short-term.
- Identify feasible approaches to the above.

1.3

MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The aim of this report is to identify lessons learned, and therefore several aspects of the project that could have been better implemented have been critically assessed. However, the uncertain and regularly changing institutional structures in Albania, particularly at the time of this Project, implying great challenges to working in the country, should be taken into account when reading this Evaluation.

1.3.1

Relevance

- Sharra dumpsite is a major environmental risk, and the overall project objective to “carry out a feasibility study to identify and catalyse the urgently required environmental measures” is considered relevant.
- However, project design did not sufficiently take into account the institutional structure and counterpart capacity for implementation, possibly due to weak assessment by UNEP of these aspects prior to the set-up of the Project.
- A greater emphasis on institutional strengthening and capacity building in project ToR would have contributed to an increased sustainability of the Project.
- Social aspects, in particular related to recyclers living and working on the dumpsite, should have been considered in the project design.
- The project objective is in line with Sida’s country strategy for Albania, and in relation to goals and policies of the Swedish development co-operation in general.

1.3.2

Achievement of Objectives / Impact / Sustainability

- The short-term measures have not been successfully implemented and have not had much sustainable impact, visible in particular in that the fires are still burning on the dump site. One important reason for this is that there was not sufficient commitment of the local counterparts to implementation. Other reasons were the insufficient presence of the UNEP team in Tirana, unrealistic time frame and the lack of focus on institutional aspects in project design.
- It would have been preferable to have MoT as the local counterpart.
- The Feasibility Study of the Project was rather a baseline study. Future feasibility studies should assess wider aspects of measures, such as affordability, capacity building needs, legal constraints, etc.

- The main positive impacts of the Project is that it contributed to raising the awareness in the Albanian authorities of the environmental impacts of Sharra Dump site, and of the need to act. It also showed to the parties involved that it is possible to improve the situation at Sharra at reasonable cost. Further, the Project contributed to the planning for further measures for environmental improvement, by the MoE and by the MoT with support of the Italian Cooperation.

1.3.3 *Efficiency*

- It is difficult to make an evaluation of the cost-efficiency of the Project without more detailed financial reporting than what has been provided by UNEP.
- A positive aspect of the Project was the involvement of local experts (consultants, university representatives) in the feasibility study.

1.4 *MAIN LESSONS LEARNED*

- Counterpart ownership is crucial and considerable effort is needed to ensure this during project planning and implementation. For future projects, Sida should therefore ensure that a thorough institutional capacity assessment is carried out and allowed to influence project design. A stakeholder meeting should be organised prior to starting the project.
- It is important to choose the adequate institution as the formal counterpart for the project, to ensure commitment during implementation as well as sustainability after finalisation of the project.
- Albania is a country in process of profound and fast transition, implying uncertainties regarding responsibilities in public institutions, as well as weak capacities. This implies that projects have to be allowed to take time in planning and implementation, a need for a strong project staff presence, and an early assurance of counterpart commitment.

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1 BACKGROUND

1.1 INTRODUCTION

From September 2001 – December 2002, UNEP carried out the project *Tirana - Sharra Waste Dump Site – Feasibility Study and Urgent Rehabilitation Measures Project* (“the Project”), financed by Sida, together with Albanian counterparts including the Ministry of Environment (MoE) and the Municipality of Tirana (MoT).

In early September 2003, Sida decided to carry out an evaluation of the Project, with the aim of reviewing the results achieved and lessons learned in the Project. The key purpose is for Sida to learn as much as possible from this first environment project financed by Sida in Albania. On 24 September 2003, ERM Scandinavia was awarded the assignment to carry out the *Evaluation of Tirana-Sharra waste dumpsite – feasibility study and urgent rehabilitation measures* (“the Evaluation”), within the scope of ERM Scandinavia’s framework agreement with Sida (Sida reference number 2002-002177). This report presents the findings and recommendations from the Evaluation.

1.2 PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The purpose of the Evaluation is to review the results achieved and particularly to identify the lessons learned from the Project. This will facilitate the successful planning and implementation of future projects because the positive aspects of the Project can be built upon in future, and lessons can be learned from the less successful aspects of the Project. The Terms of Reference (ToR) of the Evaluation are provided in *Annex 1*.

The basis of this Evaluation was to identify lessons learned to assist the planning and implementation of future Sida projects. While it is natural for evaluation reports to be perceived as critical, it is important to remember the difficulties and constraints of working within the institutional framework in Albania during this period of profound transition. Despite these difficulties, there are several positive aspects of this Project that should not be forgotten when reading the suggestions for improvements that are the outcome of the Evaluation.

1.3 BACKGROUND TO THE PROJECT TO BE EVALUATED

The Project “Feasibility Study on Risk Reduction Measures and urgent Activities at Sharra Landfill in Albania” was initiated in 2001 by UNEP together with the Ministry of Environment (and its predecessor the National Environmental Agency, NEA) as a follow-up of the assessment made by UNEP in 2000 “Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment – Albania” ⁽¹⁾. In response to a request by the Albanian Government, Sida decided to finance the Project with SEK 4 million (approximately USD 400 000) ⁽²⁾.

The overall objective of the Project in the Terms of Reference (ToR) was to carry out a feasibility study in Sharra in order to identify and catalyse the

(1) Ref no 1, see Annex 4.

(2) Ref no 2

urgently required measures. The ToR further outlined seven aims of the Project, listed in *Box 1.1*. The full ToR of the Project are enclosed in *Annex 2*.

Box 1.1

Original Project Aims defined in the ToR

- Strengthen capacity of environmental authorities in national and local waste management
- Support a medium and long-term management of the disposal site with a complementary management plan to improve environmental management standards of the site
- Recommend and plan short-term remedial measures to urgently reduce risks
- Recommend and plan medium and long-term remedial measures to reduce environmental impacts from the disposal site
- Support/facilitate other short-term measures on site
- Implement urgent short-term activities in order to reduce risks already in short-term
- Identify feasible approaches to the above

The phases in the Project planning and implementation are illustrated in *Annex 3*. The key points related to the background of the Project are:

- The Project aimed to address one of five top environmental ‘hot spots’ in Albania.
- UNEP were responsible for project implementation. Several activities were implemented through UNOPS (eg procurement).
- The key local project counterparts were:
 - The Ministry of the Environment (MoE) (formerly NEA);
 - The Municipality of Tirana (MoT);
 - The Ministry of Transport and Public Works (now divided into other ministries).
- The overall roles and responsibilities of these counterparts in Albania changed throughout the Project.
- The initial plan was for the a study on the feasibility of measures to be developed from September to December 2001, and in parallel a plan for urgent measures was to be developed.
- Several workshops with key stakeholders were held during the Project, of which one was a planned, formal workshop at the end of the Project. No high-profile workshop was held at the start of the Project
- The Project was extended for 6 months (July to December 2002) to focus on capacity building
- The urgent measures were originally scheduled for implementation from November to December 2001, but the implementation was not fully successful. Further implementation in February 2002 was also not fully successful.

2.1 PHASE 1: DESK STUDY AND PREPARATIONS

A thorough review of existing documentation relating to the Project has been carried out. This included a brief review and analysis of:

- Sida's policies, strategies and priorities regarding Albania as well as those related to waste management.
- Relevant Albanian legislation, policies, strategies, priorities and any current action plans.
- Project documentation (Project ToR, contracts and agreements, progress reports, action plans, the feasibility study, and the final report).

A list of references and other documents is provided in *Annex 4*.

2.2 PHASE 2: SITE VISITS AND INTERVIEWS

Two international consultants from ERM visited Albania during 20-24 October 2003, working closely with the local consultant in the evaluation team, to meet and discuss the Project with the key stakeholders. Representatives from the following organisations were consulted during the evaluation mission (more details of the meetings and interviews are given in *Annex 5*):

- Ministry of Environment (MoE) (although high-level representatives were consulted, the main "driver" in the MoE had left the ministry and was unfortunately only possible to interview by telephone)
- Municipality of Tirana (MoT) (although high-level representatives were consulted, unfortunately no senior staff that had been present during project implementation were available for interview)
- Dump site Operating Company (met with our local consultant)
- Ministry of Territorial Planning and Tourism
- ECAT (a local NGO involved extensively in waste management)
- ASSA-Zeitgeist (a local NGO involved in another Sida project with the Roma people)
- The Italian Development Corporation
- Local experts and other local stakeholders
- UNOPS
- Sida local representation

The team visited the Sharra dumpsite, together with representatives of the Municipality and of ASSA-Zeitgeist. The technical impacts and measures at the site were studied, and the team had the opportunity to meet briefly with representatives of ARA, the Roma association, and a few dump site staff.

Telephone interviews were also carried out with several relevant employees of UNEP, Sida, local stakeholders, and international consultants involved (*Annex 5*). Interviews were carried out using a combination of standardised questions, posed to most interviewees as relevant, and an open discussion on the Project.

A detailed review of the information and opinions obtained during the interviews and meetings has been carried out. This report has been prepared to provide the findings and recommendations of the evaluation. As agreed with Sida, the report focuses on general conclusions and lessons learned, while aiming at not overloading it with detailed information on technical matters.

This section describes findings related to each phase or component of the Project, which are considered to have implications for the relevance, effectiveness, impact, efficiency and sustainability of the Project. The conclusions and recommendations resulting from these findings are provided in *Section 4*.

3.1 PROJECT DESIGN, PLANNING AND START-UP

3.1.1 *Sharra as an Environmental “Hot-spot”*

The initiative of the Project originated from the UNEP assessment of Albanian environment in autumn 2000, resulting in the report “Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment – Albania” ⁽¹⁾. In this assessment UNEP identified Sharra Waste Dump as one of five priority environmental and human health “hot spots” in Albania.

Without having made an assessment of other environmental and health problems in Albania, we fully support the conclusion made in the assessment that Sharra Waste Dump is a “hot spot” in strong need for improvement.

3.1.2 *Project Planning and Initiation*

The initiation of the Project was strongly advocated by the Ministry of Environment (originally the National Environment Agency, NEA) and the NGO ECAT, based on strong personal commitment from individuals in these institutions. UNEP appreciated this commitment and also had a desire to support the newly established MoE. This, together with the remit of UNEP to work with government agencies, was a contributing factor to UNEP choosing MoE as the formal counterpart in the Project, despite the fact that it had no formal responsibility for Sharra.

The MoT, on the other hand, was not a formal signatory to the initial agreements with UNEP. However, during project planning UNEP met with the Mayor of Tirana, and got a very positive response regarding the planned project, but other contacts at that time seem to have been mainly with MoE.

Among the persons interviewed in the MoE and MoT, only Tatiana Hema (key person in NEA/MoE) claims to have seen the ToR or been consulted regarding the design of the project during project preparations.

As discussed in later sections of this report, these factors, related to stakeholder involvement during planning, have probably had an important effect on the ownership of the Project.

(1) Ref no 1

The overall objective of the Project, as defined in Project ToR ⁽¹⁾, was to “*carry out a feasibility study in Sharra in order to identify and catalyse the urgently required environmental measures*”. The ToR also identified a number of more detailed aims of the Project.

While both the **overall and the detailed objectives** seem to have been relevant to the situation at the time in Albania and on the Sharra dump site, the Project design was not fully adapted to the situation, in terms of taking into account the institutional structure and counterpart capacity for implementation.

The Project **activities/scope of work** outlined in the ToR do not seem to fully correspond to the objectives. This is particularly the case regarding the development of a sustainable institutional framework (ie ensuring roles and responsibilities, compliance with regulations, etc, are appropriate) and strengthening capacity, which are essential aspects of ensuring that the improvement measures to dump sites continue to be implemented after the Project.

For example, “*strengthening capacity of environmental authorities in waste management*” is listed as the first of eight objectives in the Project ToR, but is not reflected in the scope of work, which mainly focuses on the technical remedial measures.

Further, the training and capacity building aspects of the ToR only mention on-the-job training, but the Project would have benefited from a greater focus on more structured stakeholder consultation, institutional strengthening and training workshops (as well as the on-the-job training).

Social aspects were not considered in the project ToR. In the Final Report UNEP states that during the Project they recommended to the authorities that the **Roma people** living and working at the dump site should be relocated (which was not given priority by the authorities). However, UNEP did not consider it to be in their mandate to deal with social aspects like this one, and therefore had not included these in the project ToR. The evaluation team considers this to be a key omission, since these aspects are important in two ways:

- 1) Direct relevance to improving the health and safety and working conditions of people on site (Roma and others), and improving the livelihoods of the Roma people who live at the site and pick recyclable materials from the waste. Gradually, focus should move from waste sorting at the dump site to source recycling (in which the Roma can still play an important role), while access to the site should be restricted to employees of the site operator and the MoT.

(1) Ref no 3

- 2) Indirect relevance related to achievement of the technical objectives of the Project – because the activities of the people waste picking on the site constrain the technical improvements such as waste compaction, reduction in fires, etc.

While it is true that UNEP cannot solve this complicated issue, the organisation, prior to entering into the Project, should have ensured that the project counterparts were committed to handling it. It is our understanding that UNEP did not fully realise the importance of this issue for a sustainable improvement of Sharra Dump site until some way into the Project. We have however also understood that it is a very sensitive issue, and the Albanian counterparts have not been in favour of discussion and action, despite UNEP raising the issue later on during project implementation.

From the start of the project, Sida made an effort to convince UNEP to address the problems associated with the activities of the Roma people as part of the project. However, UNEP were not willing to do this. Instead Sida decided to finance a separate project, implemented by the Albanian NGO ASSA Zeitgeist, in cooperation with the Swedish NGO the Olof Palme International Centre, with the aim of improving the conditions of the people working and living on the site.

As well as lacking detail on capacity building, development of the institutional framework and social aspects, the ToR was lacking in general detail related to the scope of works, particularly on the components required in the Feasibility Study (See Section 3.3).

The fact that UNEP developed the project and its ToR, *as well as* implemented it makes this lack of detail more problematic than would have been the case if the project had been subject to tendering. In the latter case, the tenderer/implementing agency would in its tender elaborated on how to carry out the project, including a detailed work plan etc. In this case, it would have been preferable if Sida would have sought a second opinion on the terms of reference and also requested a more detailed work plan from UNEP.

3.1.4 *Project Budget/Inputs*

It was **ambitious** to aim to achieve the project objectives within a budget of 4 MSEK (approx 400 000 USD), and particularly ambitious to aim to ensure that measures at Sharra implemented would be sustainable (ie they would be continued after the UNEP project has finished).

UNEP has not been able to provide information on the **international inputs**, but our estimate is that they totalled approximately 200 days over the 16 months of the Project, as detailed in [Table 3.1](#).

Table 3.1 *International consultant input*

Consultant	Project Role	Number of visits	Total number of days
Dennis Bruhn	Project Coordinator	Approx 15	Approx 150
Ewald Spitaler	Technical Expert	5	38
John Bennett	Institutional Expert	No information	Approx. 10?

A larger budget would have been useful to focus on capacity building and to lengthen the Project to help the longer-term sustainability.

3.1.5 *Sida project assessment and congruence with Sida policy documents*

From current and previous project managers at Sida and in Tirana, we have understood that Sida chose to take the role of “**silent partner**” in this project, trusting UNEP’s competence and capacity in project formulation and implementation. Coming into the project preparations at a fairly late stage, and with limited personnel resources, it was difficult for Sida to influence the project ToR, although some issues were raised, such as the Roma population, institutional aspects and the choice of main counterpart.

Sida has informed the evaluators that they made a “normal” assessment of the project prior to deciding on financing it, in terms of profoundness, degree of detail in the assessment memo etc. However, we find the Assessment Memo ⁽¹⁾ (now five pages) could preferably have been more detailed. Especially, a stronger focus in the assessment on the institutional aspects and the associated risks would have been preferable.

The **development objective** of the Project, as outlined in Sida’s Assessment memo, was to support the restructuring of Albania to a functioning market economy, with well-functioning public authorities taking responsibility for common resources and sustainable development. This seems to be an ambitious development objective for a short-term project as this, and is not reflected in Sida’s agreement with UNEP ⁽²⁾ or other project documentation of UNEP.

The **project objectives**, as listed in Sida’s memo, have a stronger emphasis on institutional strengthening on a central and local level than in UNEP’s ToR. It is also highlighted that recommendations on the **follow-up** of the Project have to build on the competence and resources of the authorities, and how these might change.

The Project can be considered congruent with the **Swedish Country Strategy** for development cooperation with Albania ⁽³⁾, which identifies the environment as a central issue, but does not give details on priorities regarding thematical or geographical areas.

(1) Ref no 4

(2) Ref no 5

(3) Ref no 6

At the time of project set-up and implementation, there was no specific Sida policy for environmental cooperation in the Western Balkan region⁽¹⁾.

3.2 *INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS/ COUNTERPART CAPACITY*

The assessment report acknowledged that the institutional structure was in transition and still weak in Albania. However, the Project ToR does not give the impression that a further analysis of the institutional structure, legal aspects, or the capacity of the Albanian counterparts, was carried out during project planning.

3.2.1 *Legal Aspects*

A summary of the legal aspects related to improvement of the Sharra dumpsite is provided in *Annex 6*.

Most important to note among the relevant laws is the law on *Organization and functioning of Local Government*, which was approved in 2000, ie prior to the set-up of the Project. However, the enforcement of the law has been gradual, and the full **transfer of the responsibility for Sharra from the Ministry of Transport and Public Works (MTPW) to MoT** seems to have been formalised on 1 January 2002 ⁽²⁾. Further, we understand that prior to this law, some operational and financial responsibility for the Sharra landfill was already in the hands of the Municipality.

In summary, the legal and institutional aspects of the operation of the dump site are very complex and constitute a big challenge to project implementation.

However, these important aspects, central to counterpart buy-in and efficient implementation of the Project, are not reflected in the ToR or in the Feasibility Study. When the Project was set up, the formal responsibility of the Sharra dumpsite operation seems to have been in the hands of the MTPW, not of the MoT or the MoE. Still, the MTPW does not appear to have been identified in the Project design as a key project stakeholder. While MoT did not have the full formal responsibility of the dump site at set-up of project, the law already existed, suggesting that MoT should have been more actively involved from the start of the Project.

Another aspect frequently mentioned by the persons involved in the Project during the evaluation is the **legalisation of the dump site**. Apparently UNEP was at the start of the Project given the impression that this was not a key constraint, and that MoT in practical terms already owned the dump site. During project implementation, it appeared that this was much more of a constraint than predicted, and it has still not been solved. The perceived problem was that the plots of land on which the dump site is located are owned by up to 200 people, many of whom are unidentified, and it was not

(1) In August 2003 Sida established "Guidelines for Sida's environmental cooperation in the Western Balkan Region" Ref no 7.

(2) Information on the exact time of enforcement differs depending on source.

possible to implement measures without consulting these land owners and compensating them to gain formal ownership. However, it is unclear if this was really a problem, and seems at least to some extent to be an excuse by the MoT for the lack of implementation of measures. This impression is strengthened by the information given by the Ministry of Territorial Adjustment and Transport (responsible for legalisation of land ownership and compensation of previous land-owners) that the MoT has still not submitted a request for legalisation of Sharra dumpsite.

3.2.2 *Counterpart ownership and division of responsibilities*

In general, the **counterpart organisations** in Albania are weak in terms of available resources and capacity, especially the MoT. However, as mentioned above, it appears that this was not taken into account in sufficient detail in designing the Project. The lack of financial and human resources of counterparts was a major constraint on the project implementation.

It is obvious that there was considerable confusion and differing views on the **responsibility for Sharra**. This was still the case when the evaluation team visited Tirana in October 2003, and many of the difficulties encountered during project planning and implementation were due to this uncertainty.

Apparently the interest of MoT in acknowledging their responsibility also varied during the project implementation period. At a certain stage, MoT seems to have preferred to use the fact that ownership was not theirs, in order to claim that the dump site was not their responsibility.

During the Project (February 2002), Sida asked UNEP to clarify in the Feasibility Study and the 2nd Progress Report, how the responsibility for waste management was divided between the different institutions. UNEP therefore included this in the final version of the Feasibility Study. However, the law on local government was not mentioned, and we have understood that the law was not known to all key UNEP project staff (if any).

It is very clear that there was a **lack of buy-in** and commitment from counterparts during the project implementation, particularly the MoT. It is particularly important that the commitment (and capacity) of local counterparts is ensured *prior* to commitment of money by donor organisations such as Sida and UNEP. It appears that this was not the case.

Several reasons have been identified for the **lack of commitment of MoT** to the Project:

- Lack of involvement of MoT at the design stage;
- MoE, rather than MoT, was the formal counterpart;
- MoT prioritisation of more “visible” issues in municipal management;
- Weak cooperation between MoE and MoT in general;
- Confusion all through the Project about the roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders in the Project. That was the reason for extra workshops in December 2001, January 2002 and March 2002.

- Lack of consultation workshops at an early stage, which are an essential part of buy-in and commitment (also related to the lack of project focus on capacity building);
- Delegation of responsibility for project actions in the MoT was given to a person who was not at a decision-making level;
- Lack of clarity of operational and financial responsibility for Sharra dump site in general (ie not only this project) – probably resulting in reluctance from MoT to spend much resources; and
- Major lack of financial and human resources, and high turnover of personnel in MoT.

A **Project Steering Committee** was formed early in the Project, but does not seem to have had a major impact on project management and implementation. More regular meetings of the Steering Committee would have been beneficial to increase commitment.

Also, there was little or no **communication** between the MoT and the municipal operating company operating the dump site. The municipal company expressed the view that they were not consulted either by UNEP/UNOPS, MoE or MoT, but were only instructed to follow orders from the international experts. According to the manager, when the representatives of the operating company had differing opinions to those of UNEP, these were not taken into account.

Since MoT was the institution which was to take over the formal responsibility of the dump site (and already in practice had a large responsibility) it would probably have been better to have **MoT as the formal counterpart**, with an early commitment. This would have required more focus on institutional strengthening and capacity building during the Project. Of course, the MoE could also have been a signatory to the agreement, given its early engagement in the “hot spot” and potentially the wish of UNEP to have a government-level involvement.

The factors listed above all relate to the situation in Albania at the time of project set-up and implementation – but are not unusual for developing countries and countries in transition. While several of these aspects are external to the Project, they should have been given more importance in project design.

Another factor might be that UNEP appears to have a view of the Project being “*theirs*”, not the Albanian government’s. In the UNEP documents, they talk about “*UNEP’s project*”, “*UNEP fulfilled its tasks, but...*” etc. This is in contrast to most development agencies, which nowadays speak about “*the project of the counterpart*” being “*supported by the donor*”. While this could be mostly a matter of wording, it is our view that such an approach to the cooperation does not contribute positively to a strong local sense of responsibility for the Project.

It is worth noting that the ToR and the project budget only cover UNEP's input (financed by Sida), while input from the MoE and MoT is not specified. Possibly this is normal practice in UNEP, but it is the opinion of the evaluators that the commitment and formal integration of counterpart inputs into the Project – possibly even as financial cost-sharing, not only in-kind - would have contributed to a stronger counterpart buy-in.

3.3 *FEASIBILITY STUDY*

3.3.1 *Content of the Feasibility Study*

The Feasibility Study was presented in draft version in the end of 2001, and published in its final version in April 2002 ⁽¹⁾ .

Studies of the feasibility of environmental improvement measures generally have standard components that are related to technical, financial, legal and institutional aspects. As an example – although varieties of course exist - the *World Bank Strategic Planning Guide for Municipal Solid Waste Management in Urban Cities* recommend that the components of a Feasibility Study on improvement of dumpsites should include:

- Investigation of the impacts of the dump site;
- Development of technical measures to mitigate the impacts;
- Review of the environmental impacts (positive and negative) of the measures;
- Review of the social impacts (positive and negative) of the measures;
- Review of the costs of the measures and particularly the affordability;
- Review of legal implications of the measures;
- Review of the institutional frameworks relevant to implementation of measures (eg roles and responsibilities); and
- Plans for training and capacity building related to implementation.

All these aspects are recommended to be considered in a feasibility study, since the neglect to do so can constrain the implementation of the planned measures.

UNEP has not been able to provide the evaluation team with a format commonly used by the organisation for feasibility studies, but considers the current feasibility study to be of normal scope.

In the opinion of the evaluation team, the Feasibility Study actually produced during the Project rather represented a **baseline study**, which investigated and identified the major impacts of the dumpsite (ie the first of the components listed above). The Feasibility Study report did not cover the other components listed above in any significant detail. Sida expressed the same view in correspondence to UNEP in May 2002.

(1) Ref no 8

Short-term measures were developed and planned, and an action plan produced in November 2001⁽¹⁾. Medium-term measures were also planned and some details provided in a report in June 2002⁽²⁾. Although these action plans did include costs and responsibilities for implementation, their development had not involved a review in enough detail of the affordability of the measures, the legal constraints, the social constraints and the capacity building requirements (ie the feasibility of the measures was not assessed in enough detail). In addition, although responsibilities for the short-term measures were agreed and then re-agreed by local counterparts in stakeholder workshops, the level at which responsibility for implementation was assigned in the MoT and MoE was not appropriate. Responsibilities for implementation of the medium-term measures were not clear in the report. In addition, the action plans and other reports included no discussion of alternative measures.

Although international waste management consultants would be expected to have a detailed understanding of the components of a feasibility study, and the Project ToR did specifically require a study and assessment on the “*feasibility of various remedial measures*”, it would have been more sensible for the **Project ToR to have been more detailed** on the components required in the Feasibility Study.

3.3.2 *Environmental Monitoring*

As mentioned, the ‘Feasibility Study’ was mainly a baseline study, involving environmental monitoring and assessment. The main findings were that the impact from the fires at Sharra on air quality is higher than the impact of leachate on ground and surface water. We agree that the emissions of toxic substances to the air are a major environmental problem. However, the conclusion expressed in the final report as well as in the executive summary of the feasibility study, that “the leaching and washing out of contaminants from the landfill to surface water is insignificant compared to ‘background’ values and not pose a significant risk” only reflect the results of test taken over a short time scale, in the dry season. The feasibility study acknowledges this weakness of this initial sample, and therefore recommends it to be complemented with a new sample during the wet season, as well as a continuous monitoring programme. However, this aspect never comes through in the executive summary of the study, or the final report of the project.

In general terms, environmental sampling and analysis can have significant methodological difficulties and results can be uncertain. The sampling program was carried out over a short time scale, meaning that the results of the monitoring have provided a useful **snapshot of the situation, rather than a detailed representation of the environmental impacts**. It would have been useful if this fact had been reflected in a discussion on the level of detail of conclusions that can be based on the results.

(1) Ref no 9

(2) Ref no 10

3.3.3 *Operational Issues of Feasibility Study*

Much of the work carried out in the Feasibility Study was by local experts (consultants, university representatives), and this is a positive aspect of the Project. However, this participation should have been in parallel with greater involvement and capacity strengthening of counterparts.

Although limited information is available on the Project, it is our impression, that the so-called Feasibility Study was expensive, given its scope. Although UNEP informed Sida in May 2002 that there was “some money” left of the budgeted USD 185 000 allocated for the Feasibility Study, it is not clear what the final cost was.

3.4 *IDENTIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF URGENT SHORT TERM MEASURES*

3.4.1 *Proposed Short-Term Measures*

The proposed short-term measures were presented in the action plan produced in November 2001, as part of the first Progress Report⁽¹⁾.

In general the measures proposed appear **appropriate in terms of their cost-effectiveness** – they are generally low-cost measures that are generally well known as good practices for dump sites in developing countries.

The action plan states that the “*overall approach taken in the short-term measures is to educate the landfill staff in proper landfill management*”. This is a sensible approach, although it is important that those responsible for planning, budgeting, monitoring and enforcement in the **MoT and relevant ministries are also committed** and well informed in order to ensure the continued implementation of measures after the Project.

The **time frame** for implementation of measures was over-ambitious, given that it takes much time to achieve results, and to change practices, in countries such as Albania. For example, UNEP’s technical consultant Ewald Spitaler, who was responsible for short-term measures at site, including on-the-job training, spent only 38 days, divided into five trips, on the Project, of which one visit was for the final workshop. It is not realistic to expect sustainable impact and changed behaviour from four visits of about 6 days – especially without the support and resources from local management.

It is not clear how many **alternatives** for different measures were assessed before the proposed measures were selected. In addition, more details on the measures would have been useful to help implementation, eg source and costs of cover materials to be used, methods for relocation of families living at the dump site, etc.

(1) Ref no 9

Although the short-term measures proposed seem to be sensible, their **implementation was more complicated** than UNEP predicted. The main focus of the short-term measures was to stop and prevent the fires on the dumpsite. However, the fires are still burning, and most interviewees of the evaluation are of the opinion that there is **little sustained impact** on the site, especially not in terms of fire fighting. The container provided by the project for offices is not being used – the site staff prefers the old concrete entrance hut. Still noticeable on site, however, is a drainage channel (although clogged with garbage).

According to the Roma population represented by the association ARA, the Roma have discontinued the habit of lighting fires for extraction of metals and/or visibility at night. However, they claim that other people working on the dump site are still doing this. The evaluation team did not have the possibility to confirm this information.

UNEP technical consultant Ewald Spitaler worked very much “hands on” on the dump site. By being present and by himself working there, he contributed to raising the profile of the work and **increasing the status** of the people there, who for the first time experienced external interest for their work. This was very positive. However, the transfer of knowledge does not seem to have been sustainable. As soon as Mr Spitaler left, the staff returned to old practices – even during the Project period, and even more after termination of project.

It is clear that it is not enough to teach the staff at the site, if the management of the dump site operation company and the municipality does not give priority and resources to this. The poor communication between the dump site operating company and the MoT, and the limited monitoring resources at MoT to enforce the new practices, is likely to also have constrained the sustainability of the measures.

It would have been useful for the development of the action plans to include more work to gain agreement on detailed **responsibilities for implementation**. For example, while the MoT, in meetings with the other project parties, *did* commit themselves to provide fire fighting equipment and tanks, it does not usually have the mandate to carry out fire fighting (as this is the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Order). It is unclear whether it was in reality legally possible for MoT to take on these roles, or whether the issue of responsibility was just an excuse used by MoT for not implementing these actions.

The **low number of man-days of international input** and the **lack of participation of the MoT** in the training, might have been contributing factors to the fact that the proposed short-term measures were not fully understood by the local counterparts. For example, the views differed between the counterparts interviewed regarding the reason for covering waste, the methods for fire prevention, etc. The impression is that the UNEP team had

not fully managed to convey the reasoning and benefits to the involved parties. Also, representatives for several of the local counterparts expressed that they did not consider the measures to be appropriate.

When it became apparent that a lack of input and involvement from MoT was constraining the sustainable implementation of the short-term measures, UNEP facilitated **stakeholder workshops** to generate agreement on responsibilities. This is a sensible approach. However, although agreements were signed at a high level, responsibilities seem to not have been assigned to an appropriate decision-making level in the counterpart organisations, and/or the assigned person left his/her position with the result that counterpart resources remained weak.

3.5 *IDENTIFICATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON MEDIUM-TERM RISK REDUCTION MEASURES*

3.5.1 *Proposed Medium-Term Measures*

The Catalogue on medium-term projects was produced in June 2002 ⁽¹⁾. As with the short-term measures, the measures proposed are generally sensible given the constraints related to resources. However, **more detail** would be needed on responsibilities in implementation, as well as a discussion of alternatives and risks/challenges related to project implementation.

The project catalogue indicates that the implementation of some of the medium-term measures was the responsibility of UNEP, although the original ToR of the Project was unclear whether these measures were to be implemented as part of the project.

The medium-term measures do not address the social issue of the **Roma people** on the dumpsite. There are successful examples in some countries where these types of people can be managed into teams collecting recyclables separated at source, managed better at the dump site so they operate in allocated tipping areas with adequate health and safety provision and eventually relocated. Although these changes take significant time, they must be included in medium-term measures at dump sites of this nature.

There are 16 categories of medium-term measure proposed. The important measure of the use of cover material, which has several benefits (fire prevention, reduces blowing of litter, reduces odours, reduces pests, etc) is spread amongst the measures in the report, which perhaps makes it lose some of its importance. It should be noted that landfill gas collection and management is needed for deep sections of the dumpsite if cover material is extensively used.

Ideally, integrated improvements in the waste management system are needed for Tirana. Waste collection has reportedly improved over the last

few years, but there are still shortfalls, inefficiencies and illegal dumping is widespread. The planning of medium-term measures could have usefully covered wider issues. For example one of the interviewees at the MoT suggested *“installation of a weighbridge at the dumpsite would have been useful to improve tracking of waste movements and reduce illegal dumping”*.

3.5.2 *Implementation of the Medium-term Measures*

As stated above, it is not clear from the project documentation whether the Project was planned to encompass the implementation of some of the medium-term measures. To a large extent, the medium term measures are still not implemented – which is however not surprising as the implementation of most short-term measures was not sustained.

3.6 *CAPACITY BUILDING/INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING*

As mentioned, no detailed assessment of institutional strengthening and capacity building needs seems to have been made prior to or in the early stages of the Project. This is reflected in the gap in the project ToR between the aims and activities: No specification is provided in the ToR on what type of capacities should be strengthened, or of whom, and there is no indication of a plan for how to do this, except for *“training on the job”*.

There was one major stakeholder workshop originally planned and carried out, to present proposed measures, obtain feedback, build commitment and buy-in to the measures, agree responsibilities for implementation. This was considered an important element in the capacity building process of the Project, and seems to have been the only formalised training complementing the *“on-the-job-training”*. This workshop, however, did not take place until December 2002, ie at the very end of the Project, which strongly reduces its benefit. Although not described in the UNEP documentation, we understand that several shorter *“mini-seminars”* were also held with the MoT and MoE.

In addition, three meetings with stakeholders were facilitated by UNEP to report and learn from the unsuccessful start-up of the short-term measures, and to further clarify project objectives and agree responsibilities, mostly as a response to the insufficient involvement by the counterparts.

The low priority given to capacity building by UNEP is reflected in the wording of the reports. In the ToR, capacity building is the first in the list of project aims, but is not reflected in the tasks and activities. In the Final Report ⁽²⁾, that aim has been moved and is now the last one, and in the section on Capacity Building in the report (p 17), it is stated *“While the focus of the Sharra Project has been on the technical project components (- - -) the secondary area of interest has been institutional strengthening, in particular through close cooperation with the Ministry of Environment and Municipality of Tirana ”*.

(1) Ref no 10

(2) Ref no 11

This is one of several examples of how UNEP, at least in writing, almost seems to think of capacity building as simply “participation”. In our view, participation and involvement of counterparts (to a much larger extent than what actually was the case in this project) is essential for any development project. If capacity building was an explicit aim of the Project, there should have been a more detailed plan for this.

Worth noting is that Sida, at least on one occasion, requested UNEP to give more emphasis to capacity building and institutional strengthening, especially to MoT, without which Sida feared that the long-term effects of the Project would be limited.

3.7 *REPORTING AND FOLLOW-UP*

3.7.1 *Reporting*

Six reports were presented by UNEP to the project partners:

- Progress Report, which included action plans for short-term measures, December 2001 ⁽¹⁾.
- Feasibility Study, April 2002 ⁽²⁾.
- UNEP project catalogue for medium-term risk reduction projects, April 2002 ⁽³⁾.
- Second Progress Report in April 2002 ⁽⁴⁾
- UNEP, Technical Design, project for medium risk reduction at Sharra Landfill, Studio “D & C”, August 2002 ⁽⁵⁾
- Final Report, April 2003 ⁽⁶⁾

In the summary of the Second Progress Report, UNEP state that “80% of the project goals were fulfilled”. However, as many interviewees pointed out, “the fires are still burning”. Also, the perception of 80% success does not seem consistent with the fact that the MoT – the main beneficiary - did not fulfil its commitments, including participating in training on-the-job and fire fighting. Again, this seems to be a reflection of UNEP’s view that the Project was “theirs” and could be implemented to a great extent without counterpart involvement. Also, it reflects that the Project goals referred to are only short term.

The Final Report likewise gives a very positive picture of the Project. Although there are clearly some positive aspects of the Project, the fact that many of the suggested measures have not been (fully) implemented, and the major source of environmental impact of the dump site (ie fires) has not been stopped, means that these UNEP reports do not illustrate a clear and realistic picture of the project achievements. We understand the need for diplomatic

(1) Ref no 9

(2) Ref no 8

(3) Ref no 10

(4) Ref no 12

(5) Ref no 13

(6) Ref no 11

wording, but think that it would have been useful if Sida and the counterparts had received a more honest description of the project with its problems and benefits.

The **financial reporting** from UNEP to Sida, as well as the original budget of the Project, were very superficial and lacked details on the use of funds. For example, in the “Interim Financial Report” submitted to Sida on 31 August 2003, together with the Final report, more than half of the total amount is registered as “Subcontract with UNEP” – which does not say very much about its use. Also there is little or no reporting of the expenditures per project component, the daily fee rates of the consultants or any other detailed information ⁽¹⁾. This lack of transparency regarding the financial aspects of the project made it very difficult for Sida and local partners to draw conclusions regarding the exact use of funds.

Also, this lack of financial information makes it difficult for Sida – and the evaluators – to assess if the funds have been used efficiently. While UNEP has informed Sida that they will provide more detailed information, this was not available at the time of this evaluation.

During project implementation, UNEP informed Sida that “some money” remained for further measures after implementing the feasibility study and the short-term measures. No detailed information seems to have been submitted on this.

3.7.2

Follow-up

UNEP does not seem to have identified any indicators for follow-up. In the Assessment Memo of Sida ⁽²⁾, however, five indicators are listed:

- Additional funding that UNEP manages to mobilise for the follow-up implementation phase. The mobilised funds should amount to 10 times the project budget (excluding urgent measures).
- Reduction of the number of people working illegally on the dump site as well as organising other sources of employment for them.
- Strengthening of local and national authorities.
- Attention in local media.
- Involvement of NGOs in urgent measures.

However, this does not seem to have been conveyed to UNEP. Also, no systematised follow-up of these indicators, or evaluation based on them seems to have been planned.

UNEP has undertaken an internal evaluation of the Project, focusing on the role of UNEP as implementing agency. UNEP has not been willing to send the evaluation report to Sida (or the evaluators), but has expressed an openness to verbally share the findings.

(1) Upon request from Sida in December 2003 for more detailed financial information, a brief summary of the costs under the UNOPS subcomponent was submitted, which provided some additional information. .

(2) Ref no 4

Despite the problems in implementing the short-term measures, and lack of sustained impacts on site, the interviewees in the evaluation generally reported that one positive impact of the Project was the **increase in awareness within the MoT and MoE** of the problems with the Sharra dump site and the need for action.

Also, the actions taken on site have shown the Albanian parties that *“it is possible to manage the dump site adequately at a reasonable cost”*.

An overall objective of the Project was to catalyse further action from other donors. It is difficult to establish which actions would have taken place without the UNEP project, and what is the effect of the Project. For example, based on a meeting with the Italian Cooperation during the Evaluation, the Italian Government seems to have decided to support waste management in Tirana prior to knowing about the UNEP project. However, results from the Project seem to have been used when planning the Italy-supported project.

This section lists conclusions and recommendations based on the findings of the evaluation. Unless otherwise stated, these conclusions and recommendations (as well as the findings) only refer to the current project. The evaluation team have not looked at any other projects or programmes carried out by UNEP, UNOPS or the Albanian counterparts, and cannot draw any general conclusions regarding these organisations.

4.1

RELEVANCE

- We support the conclusion made in the UNEP assessment of the Albanian environment in autumn 2000, that Sharra Waste Dump is an “environmental hot spot” in strong need for improvement. Based on this, the overall project objective to “carry out a feasibility study to identify and catalyse the urgently required environmental measures” is considered relevant.
- However, project design was not fully adapted to the situation in Albania, in terms of taking into account the institutional structure and counterpart capacity for implementation. It seems that UNEP’s assessment of these aspects prior to the set-up of the Project was not sufficient.
- The scope of work outlined in the ToR does not fully correspond to the objectives, particularly regarding strengthening capacity.
- Social aspects, especially related to the Roma (and other) people waste picking and living at the dump site, should have been considered in the project design.
- While we understand the need for tangible short-term measures for counterpart buy-in, we consider institutional strengthening and the development and implementation of a long-term management plan for urban waste disposal ⁽¹⁾ to be indispensable for a sustainable solution to the environmental problems at Sharra dump site, without which the short-term measures are of little benefit. A longer project (higher budget) and a better mix of technical and institutional measures would have been preferable.
- The project objective is in line with Sida’s country strategy for Albania, and in relation to goals and policies of the Swedish development co-operation in general. However, the low priority given by UNEP to ensuring a serious counterpart ownership is not in accordance with Sida’s policies and practices.
- The objectives and activities listed in Sida’s assessment memo give larger emphasis to institutional aspects than the project ToR. It is our impression that Sida attempted to feed this view to UNEP, but without success.

(1) We have been informed by UNEP that a management plan was developed, but it does not seem to be in use (none of the Albanian counterparts mentioned this). Neither UNEP’s project coordinator thought that it had ever been used.

The overall project objective, as stated in the ToR, was to “*carry out a feasibility study to identify and catalyse urgently required environmental measures*”. Further a number of “aims” were listed. The achievement of the objective and aims is summarized and reviewed in *Table 4.1*. It should be noted however, that the “aims”, as described by UNEP in the ToR, are in several cases rather activities than aims/objectives.

Table 4.1 *Achievement of Project Objective and Aims*

Objective and aims	Achievement	Comment
<i>Carry out a Feasibility Study in order to identify and catalyse the urgently required environmental measures</i>	Medium	Italian project is likely to continue work on Sharra dump site, but opinions differ regarding the importance of the UNEP project as a catalyst for this. The main impact of the Project is the increased awareness in the authorities of the environmental problems of Sharra dump site and the need to act.
<i>Strengthen capacity of environmental authorities in national and local waste management</i>	Low	Due to inappropriate project design, lack of counterpart involvement and high turn-over of counterpart staff.
<i>Support a medium and long-term management of the disposal site with a complementary management plan to improve environmental management standards of the site</i>	Low	Apparently a management plan was developed, but MoT/MoE do not seem to use it or even be aware of it, and UNEP has not been able to provide it to the evaluators.
<i>Recommend and plan short-term remedial measures to urgently reduce risks</i>	Medium	More analysis was required on the feasibility related to legal constraints, affordability, resources etc.
<i>Recommend and plan medium & long-term remedial measures to reduce environmental impacts from the disposal site</i>	Medium	More detail would have been useful (as with short-term measures)
<i>Support/facilitate other short-term measures on site</i>	Low	The implementation of short-term measures was generally not successful
<i>Implement urgent short-term activities in order to reduce risks already in short-term</i>	Low -medium	UNEP fulfilled its tasks, but the aim was not fully achieved and long-term impact was limited, ie due to insufficient input and involvement of counterparts.
<i>Identify feasible approaches to the above</i>	Low	No real feasibility analysis was carried out, ie few alternatives were considered, little financial and institutional analysis.

The key conclusions and recommendations related to the achievement of objectives are:

- The short-term measures have not been successfully implemented and have not had much sustainable impact, visible in particular in that the fires are still burning on the dump site. One important reason for this is that there was not sufficient commitment of the local counterparts to implementation – which in turn has several reasons, as discussed in other sections of this report. Other reasons were the insufficient presence of the UNEP team in Tirana and the lack of focus on institutional aspects in project design.
- The weak assessment and consideration of the institutional reality by UNEP, as well as insufficient focus on ensuring counterpart buy-in, for example through an initial stakeholder meeting, were major reasons for the weak achievement of project objectives.
- For future projects, Sida should ensure that a thorough institutional capacity assessment is carried out prior to the final decision on each

project, and that the findings from such an assessment are considered in project design, including choice of formal counterpart and in deciding on potential support. This should include an assessment of counterpart commitment and measures to ensure appropriate commitment (eg signed Memorandum of Understanding, ensuring responsibility is delegated to an appropriate level so the person can work day-to-day on the Project but still has decision-making powers).

This is already well described in the new Guidelines for Sida's environmental cooperation in the Western Balkan Region, established in August 2003 (i.e. not applicable when the Project was formulated and implemented) ⁽¹⁾ .

- It would have been preferable to have MoT as the local counterpart, since the municipality was already pointed out as having the formal responsibility for the dump site, and already had the main operational responsibility. In addition, MTPW should have been more involved.
- The project steering committee should have had a more predominant role.
- UNEP should have had permanent presence in Tirana and possibly more time on site, but especially more time with MoT, MoE, and the operating company to build capacity.
- The timetable for the Feasibility study seems adequate, while it was not realistic to expect the other components, including the implementation of short-term measures and capacity strengthening, to be done in the time period planned.
- Future feasibility studies should assess wider aspects of measures, such as affordability, capacity building needs, legal constraints, etc.

4.3

IMPACT

- In a very short time perspective, the urgent measures implemented during the presence of UNEP had an impact on the site, in terms of reduced fires, improved profiling etc. However, very little sustained impact was reported by the persons interviewed or could be observed when visiting the site, for the reasons described in other sections of this report.
- The main positive impact of the Project is that it contributed to raising the awareness in the MoT, MoE and site management of the environmental impacts of Sharra Dump site, and of the need to act.
- The project also showed to the parties involved that it is possible to improve the situation at Sharra and manage it properly at reasonable cost and without high-technology solutions. According to one interviewee, the Project has given the parties experience in project planning.
- The project has contributed to the planning for further measures for environmental improvement, by the MoE and by the MoT with support of the Italian Cooperation. The Italy-supported project, which encompasses a wider perspective on waste management, seems to have been planned already prior to their knowledge about the UNEP project. However, it is

(1) Ref no 7

positive that the MoT has insisted that the conclusions from the UNEP project (Feasibility study and catalogue for medium-term projects) should be used in the new project.

4.4

EFFICIENCY

- As mentioned above, it is difficult to make an in-depth evaluation of the cost-efficiency of the Project without more detailed financial reporting than that provided by UNEP. It is our impression, however, that the Feasibility Study was expensive for what was achieved.
- A longer or even permanent presence of international experts during the project period would have been beneficial to the achievement of project objectives. It is also likely to have been more efficient in terms of costs, since there would not have been a need to start all from scratch with the site work every time the UNEP consultant arrived.
- The main waste of resources, however, was the inefficient use of the time that the UNEP consultants spent in the country, due to the lack of involvement and inputs from the local counterparts.
- A positive aspect of the Project was the involvement of local experts (consultants, university representatives) in the feasibility study. However, this participation does not have the same long-term value as involvement and capacity strengthening of counterparts.
- An alternative approach, which could have been considered, would have been to carry out a pilot project, with all steps, including covering and profiling on one part of Sharra, to have a greater demonstration effect.

4.5

SUSTAINABILITY

- As is already obvious from previous sections of this report, there are few sustainable physical impacts of the Project. This is due to all the interrelated factors that have previously been discussed, especially insufficient institutional assessment and early assurance of counterpart commitment, insufficient focus on institutional strengthening, not enough UNEP presence, too short project time plan and weak counterpart ownership and involvement.
- However, the positive impacts that *have* in fact been the result of the Project, in particular increased awareness within the relevant authorities, are likely to remain, especially since follow-up activities are being initiated with other donor support. Sida should ensure that the Italian Cooperation takes account of the lessons learned in the evaluation.
- Hopefully the new projects will have more sustainable impacts on the situation at Sharra Dump site and on the management of urban solid waste in Tirana. It could be claimed that the initialisation of these new projects, especially that of the Italian Cooperation, is another sustainable impact of the UNEP project.

4.6

OTHER CRITERIA

- No formal stakeholder consultation was carried out with Roma or surrounding population during the Project.

- There was no plan for public awareness raising activities. Only by the end of the Project, in connection with the final workshop, and due to problems with waste collection in Tirana, did information about the Project and about the situation at Sharra come out in the media. Public awareness could have helped in putting pressure on MoT and increased the incentives for the municipality to be involved.
- The project was coordinated with other related donor-supported initiatives, for example institutional strengthening of MoE, funded by UK DFID.

5.1 LESSONS THAT CAN BE GENERALLY USED IN SIDA SUPPORT TO ALBANIA

Most of the lessons learned from the Sharra project can be generally used for cooperation with Albania, and other countries in transition. The following are the main issues:

- The main challenge in most development cooperation projects: Counterpart ownership is crucial and considerable effort is needed to ensure this during project planning and implementation.
- Sida should therefore ensure that a thorough institutional capacity assessment is carried out prior to the final decision on each project, and that the findings from such an assessment are considered in project design, including choice of formal counterpart and in deciding on potential support.
- Also, a stakeholder meeting should be organised prior to starting the project, and preferably even before finally committing external funding. All key stakeholders should participate in the meeting, at a level that has the power to enforce decisions, in order to reach agreement on division of responsibilities; inputs from each party, work plan and expected outcomes. The agreements should be signed by all relevant parties, bearing in mind that even very positive words from representatives of the involved institutions cannot be used as basis for project programming.
- It is important to choose the adequate institution as the formal counterpart in the project, to ensure commitment during implementation as well as sustainability after finalisation of the project. Also, it is risky to excessively base project planning on one enthusiastic individual.
- When Sida decides to take a “silent partner” role, it is maybe even more important to make a profound assessment of the project at the planning stage, since there are limited possibilities to influence the project during implementation.
- Although difficult, Sida should consider stopping project activities if counterparts do not fulfil their commitments. The possibility of and criteria for such suspension of project should be clearly spelt out at project start-up.
- Albania is a country in process of profound and fast transition, implying uncertain and changing division of roles and responsibilities in public institutions, as well as a weak capacity for management and implementation. For Sida and other donors, this means that projects and programmes have to be allowed to take time in planning and implementation, a need for a strong and extended project staff presence, and again, an early assurance of counterpart commitment. Further, this

means that also “urgent” problems, which seem to have a solution based on short-term measures, in most cases will require more extended cooperation to ensure sustainability of impacts.

5.2

LESSONS THAT ARE SPECIFIC FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AREA AND SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT

- As mentioned above, the responsibility for waste management and other public fields related to environment is changing. This means that the municipalities and other institutions which are recently taking over responsibility might not yet be prepared to do so, or have sufficient human and financial resources for this. The institutional framework, including roles and responsibilities, needs to be taken into account in project planning and implementation of all environmental projects.
- Social aspects need to be considered also in environmental projects, as a minimum where they influence the “technical” results of the project. Social objectives should preferably also be more explicitly included as an integrated part of a project, or, if this is not possible, in complementing action in parallel to project.
- Improved waste disposal arrangements are dependent on improvements in collection, as well as institutional capacity strengthening/capacity building and also raising awareness. In undertaking projects to improve final disposal (ie upgrading of dumpsites), therefore it is necessary to consider these other aspects of waste management and an integrated waste management solution is preferable, covering all aspects of the waste management system.

List of Annexes

Annex 1	Evaluation Project ToR
Annex 2	Project ToR
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Annex 1

Terms of Reference for the Evaluation

Dept. of Central and Eastern Europe
Division of Environment and Energy

1 September 2003

Diarienummer:

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION OF **TIRANA –
SHARRA WASTE DUMP SITE – FEASIBILITY STUDY AND URGENT
REHABILITATION MEASURES**

1 BACKGROUND

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) performed an assessment of Albanian environment in autumn 2000 to document the impact of the Kosovo conflict. Based on the assessment, UNEP produced a report entitled “Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment – Albania”. In this assessment UNEP identified five priority environmental and human health “hot spots” in Albania. One of these five “hot spots” was the Sharra Waste Dump on the outskirts of Tirana.

The National Environment Agency (NEA) then initiated a planning and small-scale rehabilitation project in Summer 2001 at the Sharra site through the Albanian NGO Environmental Centre for Administration and Technology (ECAT). The NEA thereafter requested Swedish assistance for undertaking a more in-depth feasibility study and initiating concrete emergency measures to reduce the negative environmental and public health effects of the dump.

Tirana - Sharra Waste Dump Site – Feasibility Study and Urgent
Rehabilitation Measures Project

Sida proposed UNEP to undertake these immediate follow-up measures, and consequently allocated 4 MSEK in 2001 to UNEP for the Sharra study and measures divided roughly 50% to the study and to the immediate risk reduction measures and 50% to the rehabilitation measures. The Post-Conflict Assessment Unit (former Balkans Unit) of UNEP in Geneva was the executing party of the project with key Albanian partners including the Ministry of Environment, Municipality of Tirana and NGOs. UNOPS project office in Tirana, when needed, provided implementation assistance with the urgent measures carried out on site.

The project was started in September 2001, originally to cover approximately 16 weeks, but during project period extended into end 2002. The feasibility study, originally to be completed by January 2002, was finalised between September 2001 and February 2002, and handed over to SIDA in April 2002. The plan for the urgent short-term risk

reduction activities was to be submitted for Swedish approval by 14 December 2001, and was initially submitted in November 2001. The plan/catalogue for medium-term risk reduction measures was handed over to SIDA together with the Feasibility Study in April 2002. Following the agreed project extension, the project activities ended in December 2002, with final closing stakeholder meetings taking place in Tirana in April 2003.

The specific agreement with UNEP listed 8 objectives for the Sharra project:

- Strengthen capacity of environmental authorities in waste management
- Support dump management with a plan to improve site standards
- Recommend and plan short-term remedial measures
- Recommend and plan medium and long-term remedial measures
- Support/facilitate other short-term measures on site
- Implement urgent short-term activities
- Identify feasible approaches to the above
- Complete activities within budget

The original project TOR set the following four key steps for the feasibility study portion of the project:

- Assess the environmental situation at Sharra and its impacts to the surrounding environment, with risk assessment based on collected information
- Assess measures to protect surface and ground water and technical possibilities to limit exposure to waste
- Design most feasible remedial activities, propose priorities and international donor involvement in the above
- Estimate costs and time required for the proposed measures

Activities originally envisioned for the feasibility study included:

- drilling, sampling and analysis of ground and surface water and soil
- evaluation of analysis results regarding contamination and protective measures required
- site visit of technical experts and feasibility study preparation
- identification of technical solutions and preparation of experts' feasibility study
- finalisation of feasibility study/reporting

Once the study was completed, it was originally intended that UNEP would submit proposals for urgent measures. However, due to possibilities to speed up the process, short-term measures (labelled SL01-03) were begun in parallel to the study already during autumn 2001. By December 2001, the project Progress Report 1 announced problems in implementing some of the urgent short-term measures. A workshop in December 2001 and follow-up meeting in January 2002 were arranged to deal with hindrances to implementation. A tripartite agreement of June 2002 was concluded between the Ministry, the Municipality and UNEP to ensure the

commitment of local stakeholders, and speed up implementation. Based on this commitment by Albanian stakeholders the project was then extended by 6 months till the end of 2002. A national workshop to strengthen the capacities of Albanian partners, covering the results of the Sharra project, was organised in December 2002 by the Ministry and UNEP. The closing project meetings were held in Tirana with all key stakeholders during April 2003.

In accordance to the overall mission of UNEP, this project also very much aimed to promote and catalyse the needed environmental rehabilitation activities by the national authorities as well as the international community.

2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

The purpose of the evaluation is to review the results achieved and lessons learnt in the project at Sharra waste dump during 2001-2003. **The key purpose is for Sida to learn as much as possible from this first environment project financed by Sida in Albania.** The evaluation is undertaken at this time since the UNEP project terminated in April 2003 and other projects are beginning or planned at the site or similar waste dumps in Albania. As this is Sweden's first effort in the field of environment in Albania an evaluation is conducted to gain as much knowledge and to learn as much as possible from the intervention. The UNEP activity at Sharra is not foreseen to continue in its present form, mainly since Sweden has chosen to work in the pilot region of Korca, UNEP post-conflict activities are phased out and other donors have shown an interest to take over the work at Sharra. Sweden continues to finance activities at Sharra by mobilising scavenging "recyclers" at the site through its framework partner Olof Palme International Center (OPC) and OPC's Albanian partner, ASSA-Zeitgeist.

Lessons learned from the project should be developed, and serve as a basis for recommendations for future projects. These lessons learned should be divided into two categories; **lessons that can be generally used in Sida support to Albania and lesson that are specific for environment area and solid waste management.**

The key interested parties of the evaluation are expected to be Sida, UNEP, Ministry of Environment, Municipality of Tirana and ECAT. Potential new donors such as Italian Cooperation and World Bank and parallel projects such as OPC/ASSA-Zeitgeist will also be interested in the evaluation.

3 THE ASSIGNMENT

The following issues shall be covered in the evaluation of the project (the evaluators may propose to focus on some of these issues in the evaluation and after agreement with Sida):

Relevance

The relevance of the project objectives as defined and documented during project preparation; i.e. in terms of reference for the project, the requests and needs of the project partner authorities. Have the interventions been relevant in relation to the goals and policies of Swedish development co-operation and to the needs and priorities of the partner country authorities and target groups? Are the expected results in the memorandum congruent with the goals listed in the TOR? Was the intervention relevant at this time of development in Albania? Was it correct/optimal to focus only on environment aspects of Sharra and not encompassing scavengers living and working at Sharra?

Achievement of objectives (effectiveness)

Achievement and realism of the project objectives as defined and documented in the terms of references, contracts and agreements for the projects, taking into account possible changes during implementation. Have programme and project objectives been fulfilled and is it possible to measure this? Were the methods used to achieve objectives optimal? Would it have been beneficial with a different set-up of the implementation team, for example in the form of the expertise being present for longer periods at Sharra? Was the institutional set-up of the project appropriate? Was the timetable for implementation realistic or would it have been beneficial with longer implementation time?

Impact (with focus on short term impact)

What are the intended and unintended effects of the activities, including effects on the intended target groups and on others? What are the positive and negative effects in the short and long term (if estimation of this can be done)? Was there any impact of the short term measures undertaken within the project? If yes, are these still presents? How will or how has the feasibility study been utilised? Is it likely to come to appropriate use and give input into further activities at Sharra?

Efficiency

The efficiency of the support provided should be analysed according to its adequacy in terms of the forms of inputs, their timing and duration.

Efficiency of project management, the quality of work plans, budgets, and reporting routines for the different components should be assessed. Are there more cost-effective methods of achieving the same results? How might better results been obtained? What have the added value been of the project?

Sustainability

Sustainability of the transfer of knowledge and institutional strengthening, improvements in development and the possibilities and commitment of the co-operating partner authorities to use the results of the project in the long-term should be addressed. To what extent will activities, outputs and effects be maintained or acceptable returns be provided when donor support has come to an end? What other funding or donor support exists that can continue funding these type of activities? **Was there sufficient ownership at the Ministry of Environment and at the Municipality of Tirana for the project?**

Other criteria

The evaluation shall take into account issues of public information, consultation and participation. Synergy effects between the project and the different environmental projects should be addressed and if it would have been beneficial to more closely tie them together.

4 METHODOLOGY, EVALUATION TEAM AND TIME SCHEDULE

Co-operating partner authorities/NGOs should be encouraged to be actively engaged in the evaluation (although not as part of the evaluation team). The learning aspect of the evaluation should be taken into consideration in the planning and design of the evaluation.

4.1 Methodology

Alternative methods and approaches for the evaluation than described below can be proposed.

Desk study and preparations in Sweden

The evaluation team shall review the documentation listed in Annex 1 and Annex 2 and other possible documentation handed over at the beginning of the assignment. This includes the documentation forming the basis for the work; e.g. project preparation, terms of references, work plans, and progress reports.

Site visits and interviews

The evaluation team shall visit the project site. The team shall conduct interviews with stakeholders in Albania i.e. the Ministry, municipal representatives, consultants/NGOs and individual beneficiaries.

Key persons in Tirana, Geneva and Stockholm involved in the project preparations, implementation and follow-up shall also be interviewed (Sida and UNEP, project consultants).

Reporting

An inception report, with the preliminary results of the desk study, shall be submitted to Sida within three weeks of the start of the assignment. The results from the desk study, visits and interviews will be presented to Sida Tirana orally before departure from Albania and to Stockholm in a written draft report in English within 6 weeks of the field visits. Sida will then review the first draft report. The second draft report shall be submitted to Sida two weeks after Sida has commented on the first version. After revisions, Sida will distribute the second draft report to the involved parties for comments. The final version of the evaluation report shall be submitted to Sida, two weeks after Sida has commented upon it, in 10 copies and on diskette. Subject to decision by Sida, the report will be published and distributed as a publication within the Sida Evaluations series.

The evaluation report shall not exceed 20 pages, excluding annexes. Format and outline of the report shall follow the guidelines in *Sida Evaluation Report - a Standardized Format* (see Annex 3). The evaluation report shall be written in Word 6.0 for Windows (or in a compatible format) and should be presented in a way that enables publication without further editing. It shall have a summary of maximum 2 pages.

The evaluation assignment includes the completion of **Sida Evaluations Data Work Sheet** (Annex 4), including an *Evaluation Abstract* (final section, G) as defined and required by DAC. The completed Data Worksheet shall be submitted to Sida along with the final version of the report. Failing a completed Data Worksheet, the report cannot be processed.

Composition of Team

The team to perform the evaluation shall have comprehensive international working experience, preferably in the transition countries in the Balkan region or eastern Europe, and have relevant knowledge of the 1) technical/ environmental (waste) and 2) management/ organisational and 3) financial issues. Experience of international development co-operation and of conducting evaluations is a requirement. At least one of the team members must be able to read and communicate in Swedish. An equal distribution of men and women in the evaluation team is desired. **It is desirable to include a local expert in the team.**

Time Schedule

The assignment is expected to take the evaluation team 15-20 days effective time in total, including preparations at home office, interviews in Sweden and Geneva, work in the Albania, report writing and presentations.

The assignment will end with the submission of the final version of the evaluation report.

5 UNDERTAKINGS

Sida will inform the involved parties of the review and forthcoming visits by the evaluation team. The evaluation team will be responsible for practical arrangements in conjunction with the mission in Albania. If interviews cannot be carried out in Swedish/Scandinavian or English, interpreters shall be hired and costs reimbursed by Sida. The evaluation team will be responsible for visits and arrangement in Albania, Sweden and Switzerland. Sida will ensure that all written material listed in Annex 2 will be made available.

ENCLOSURES

Annex 1: Financing decisions

- a. Sida Decision of September 2001
- b. Sida Memorandum of 3 September 2001
- c. Sida-UNEP Agreement of September 2001

Annex 2:

- a. ToR Sharra Project
- b. Progress Report, UNEP Activities at Sharra Landfill, Albania. December 2001 + Action Plan of November 2001
- c. Second Progress Report, UNEP Activities at Sharra Landfill, Albania, UNEP. April 2002.
- d. Feasibility Study for urgent risk reduction measures at Sharra landfill in Albania, UNEP. April 2002

- e. UNEP project catalogue for: medium-term risk reduction projects at Sharra Landfill, Albania. April 2002.
- f. UNEP, TECHNICAL DESIGN, project for medium risk reduction at Sharra Landfill, Studio "D & C". August 2002. (available at UNEP Geneva, UNOPS and Sida Tirana)
- g. Workshop, Managing Waste – Improving Quality of Life, Ministry of Environment and UNEP, December 2002
- h. FINAL REPORT: Feasibility Study on Risk Reduction Measures and Urgent Activities at Sharra Landfill in Albania, April 2003

Annex 2

Terms of Reference for the Project

PROJECT PROPOSAL
6 September 2001

Sharra waste dump site

Feasibility Study on Risk Reduction Measures and Urgent Activities

1 Background

1.1 Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment - Albania

In Autumn 2000, UNEP performed an assessment of Albania's environment. The results were detailed in the report *"Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment - Albania"*. During this assessment, UNEP investigated nine potential 'hot spot' sites that had been identified during a pre-mission conducted in cooperation with national / Albanian authorities. The assessment determined that five of the nine sites were, in fact, 'hot-spots' posing imminent risks to public health and the environment.

These five 'hot-spots', to which the international community should immediately provide emergency assistance, are:

- the chemical plant in Durrës;
- the fertilizer plant in Vlorë;
- the solid waste dump site in Sharra;
- the oil fields in Patos; and
- the oil refinery in Ballsh

The assessment report also presents findings regarding the impact of the Kosovo conflict on Albania's environment and Albania's institutional capacity for environmental protection. The report concluded with a series of recommendations for improving the state of Albania's environment.

The waste landfill site Sharra, near Tirana, was identified as one of the hot-spots that cause unacceptable human health risks. The assessment gave the following general recommendations concerning the dumpsite:

1. Strictly prohibit citizen and animal access to the dumpsite.
2. Develop a management system for the landfill, including strategies for halting the burning of waste, identifying types of waste, and limiting the contamination of soil and groundwater. Establish monitoring wells and screen them at different levels. Establish a monitoring program that includes surface water and groundwater downriver from the dump. Monitoring should include microbiological and organic compound parameters.

In connection to this hot-spot, recommendations were also given to local authorities with regards to risk reduction measures at a smaller dump site (Pezë-Helmës dumpsite) located in the same area

1.2 UNEP Feasibility Studies in Durrës and Vlorë

In order to catalyse urgently needed environmental action, UNEP performed a follow-up risk reduction assessment in Spring 2001. This feasibility study focused on the hot spots identified in Durrës and Vlorë as well as the more general challenge of creating a hazardous waste management infrastructure in Albania. The main conclusion of the UNEP feasibility study is that the hot spots in Durrës and Vlorë still urgently need environmental action and that feasible risk reduction measures are available, as follows:

- First, further access to both sites should be immediately prohibited and the people currently living in and around the contaminated sites should be relocated. This is the least expensive, fastest and most effective way to reduce exposure of humans and domestic animals.
- In Durrës, clean drinking water should be supplied to citizens living in and around the contaminated areas, as the groundwater and surface water is likely to be contaminated there. The chemical waste from the three storage buildings can be removed and the plant and dumpsite can be contained.
- In Vlorë, different remedial options are proposed, including capping, excavation and soil washing remediation techniques.
- The first Albanian secure hazardous waste landfill should be designed and constructed.

1.3 NEA Mission on short-term rehabilitation measures

During the summer 2001 National Environmental Agency (NEA) financed a small Mission to Sharra aiming at planning and executing small-scale short-term rehabilitation measures at Sharra. The Mission was organised by ECAT (the Environmental Center for Administration and Technology), Tirana. During the Mission, small-scale measures were carried out by an international consultant together with the staff of the disposal site. The Mission also listed a number other short- and long-term management measures which would improve the administration and technical management of the disposal site. Many of the recommendations would also, directly or indirectly, improve the environmental situation at the disposal site.

2 Proposal for Feasibility Study on risk reduction measures in Sharra

The Government of Albania, supported by the Swedish International Development Agency, requested during the summer of 2001, that as a follow-up to the Post-Conflict

Environmental Assessment – Albania, UNEP would carry out a feasibility study in Sharra in order to identify and catalyse the urgently required environmental measures. The project will be conducted by UNEP Balkans Unit in close co-operation with the Albanian government and national stakeholders.

2.1 Aims

Following the recommendations of the UNEP assessment phase and the recent NEA Mission, the feasibility study and screening investigations in Sharra will:

- strengthen the capacity of the environmental authorities regarding the national and local waste management;
- support a medium and long-term management of the disposal site with a complementary management plan on how to improve the environmental management standards of the disposal site;
- give clear recommendations and plan how to urgently reduce risks to environment and health with short-term remedial measures;
- recommend and plan medium and long-term remedial measures to reduce the environmental impacts from the disposal site;
- support and facilitate the other on-going and/or initiated short-term risk reduction measures and rehabilitation measures at the site;
- implement feasible urgency activities in order to reduce risks already in short-term
- identify feasible remediation approaches to all recommendations above

2.2 Scope of work - elements

A. Study the actual plans, initiatives and on-going activities

In order to avoid any overlapping and ensure synergies, the project will, in co-operation with NEA and respective local authorities, briefly screen the other activities and establish a strong concerted coordination of actions and initiatives.

B. Study the actual management structure and plans

Subsequent to the NEA Mission to Sharra, the project will analyse the current structures and management capacities. All recommendations for environmental and management measures will be adapted to meet the possible and realistic capacities of the local partners to implement, maintain and follow-up the measures.

C. Define the environmental conditions in and impacts of Sharra to the surrounding environment

A detailed sampling campaign will include borehole plan, installation of groundwater sampling wells, sampling of groundwater, surface waters and soil. In addition, the air monitoring needs will be assessed and, if necessary, planned and carried out.

Samples will be analysed in certified laboratory under the UNEP supervision. Screening of parameters includes various xenobiotic compounds.

Analyses will give further evidence of the environmental impacts and guide the impact mitigation measures. In particular, the analyses will indicate whether groundwater protective measures are needed. Furthermore, the sampling locations and framework will remain at the disposal of local stakeholders providing support to the longer-term needs of the local authorities.

The element will result in delimitation of the problem or the extent of the potential contamination.

D. Risk assessment based on the collected information

Following the studies on the current and long-term management plan of the site and the environmental impacts, UNEP experts will assess the exposure risks with regards to the local population and environmental impacts. The risk assessment will guide when selecting the approach of the mitigation and rehabilitation measures.

E. Study and assess the feasibility of various remedial measures

Parallel to the above-mentioned elements, the UNEP experts will collect existing data on the potential impact mitigation measures. Partly parallel to, partly on the basis of the earlier elements, the experts will define and describe alternative solutions for impact mitigation measures (including management system options for a landfill) and define clean-up criteria and assess the respective advantages and disadvantages, costs and time requirements of the various measures. If necessary, additional work will be carried out for selection of the most efficient impact mitigation measure (e.g. additional drilling and sampling).

F. Design the most feasible remedial activities

Based on the feasibility study and screening investigations, the experts will produce technical documentation that can serve as concrete input for the implementation phase (i.e. potential tendering procedure). The design will comprise of detailed drawings, list of works and equipment needed as well as the basic quality standards for the implementation.

G. Support and facilitate short-term remedial and rehabilitation measures when possible and feasible

One of the first issues of the project is the assessment of the needs for short-term remedial and rehabilitation measures. On the basis of the recommendations from the NEA Mission, the UNEP experts will be able to further instruct and support the short-term efforts carried out by the local management. In case necessary and possible, intervention and support of international community to the referred efforts will be supported with technical expertise. Small-scale urgent remedial works can be sub-contracted to local and international companies by the project if feasible. Based on the previous elements of the project and all relevant information, feasible urgency activities in order to reduce risks already in short-term will be implemented.

H. Reporting

UNEP will report on the progress and findings made following the UNEP procedures. Special reporting requests of the SIDA and NEA will be followed. The Government of Albania and other concerned entities in the country will be given the opportunity to review and comment on the study before finalization and will be authorized by the United Nations to use the Feasibility Study, once ready. The final report with the findings and recommendations is the property of United Nations Environment Programme but will be disseminated to all parties interested.

I. Co-operate with the national and local authorities

The project will ensure that co-operation with associated local experts strengthens the capacity of local and regional institutions in order to cope with existing environmental problems. As well, the project will benefit from the close institutional co-operation with the Government of Albania and, in particular, with the NEA. Close co-operation with the Regional Environmental Agencies and the relevant municipalities will be re-established. The identified and proposed measures, while providing a short-term solution, should set an example of best practise and, therefore, simultaneously contribute to longer-term environmental improvements in Albania.

J. Support the related activities of the other United Nations agencies and other international organisations

UNEP will aim at mobilising resources and efforts by other UN agencies and other international organisations for long-term environmental improvements. In the case of Albania, the regional environmental co-operation in the South-East Europe is currently changing and the environmental elements of that co-operation must be strengthened. Some international organisations, including UNDP are willing to develop the environmental agenda for their actions in Albania. UNEP is committed to assist and support these efforts.

2.3 Project team

The project team will consist of an international project coordinator, supported by both international experts as well as local experts that have been identified and chosen during the preparatory phases. In addition, consultancy services within certain fields of expertise will be required on a short-term basis. The involvement of the NGO community shall be encouraged, as well as public participation when possible. The project will be conducted by UNEP Balkans Unit, based in Geneva.

2.4 Preliminary time schedule and cost estimate

The preliminary time schedule for the feasibility study is 12 - 16 weeks. The total time span of project is subject to implementation of any feasible urgency activities that will prolong the time frame of this project. For cost estimate, please see attached budget proposal.

3 UNEP Mission

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) is the United Nations agency that has specialised environmental expertise. UNEP's mission is to provide leadership and encourage partnerships in caring for the environment by inspiring, informing, and enabling nations and peoples to improve their quality of life without compromising that of future generations. This mission is accomplished by setting the global environmental agenda, working with and providing guidance across the entire spectrum of United Nations activities impacting on the environment, and coordinating system-wide efforts in an array of environment-related issues and assessments. Environmental emergency response and recovery activities are hence part of UNEP's mandate.

Working within this mandate, UNEP has carried out post-conflict operations, including environmental assessment and clean-up in the Balkans region since May 1999. The projects in the region have aimed to provide independent and objective information to all parties interested in the environmental consequences of the conflict and to give clear instructions and recommendations on the priorities for clean-up and recovery activities. By aiming to minimize the environmental risks to human health, UNEP's work allows the reconstruction and rehabilitation process to occur within a safe and clean environment – a fundamental pre-requisite for sustainable economic development.

4 Contacts

All issues related to the Post-Conflict Environmental Activities in the Balkans are coordinated by UNEP Balkans Unit in Geneva. Mr. Henrik Slotte, Head of Unit, is the focal point and contact person for all administrative issues and Mr. Pasi Rinne, Senior Advisor, on all operational and technical issues. The contact numbers of the unit are: Telephone: +41 22 917 86 22 and Fax: +41 22 917 80 64.

Annex 3

Phases in the Sharra Dump Site Project Planning and Implementation

ANNEX 3 PHASES IN THE SHARRA DUMP SITE PROJECT PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION

<i>Date</i>	<i>Component</i>	<i>Outputs</i>	<i>Comments</i>
<i>Autumn 2000</i>	UNEP Hot Spot Assessment	<i>Report on 5 hot spots</i>	Sharra dump site was one of 5 priority hot spots.
<i>Summer 2001</i>	NEA/ECAT planning and small-scale rehabilitation project		- UNEP follow-up mission took place at this time. - NEA approached Sida for assistance.
<i>Sept 2001</i>	Feasibility Study and Urgent Rehabilitation Measures (Project) started		- Project funded by Sida and implemented by UNEP. - Project was planned for Sept to Dec 2001 plus time for implementation of urgent measures.
<i>Nov 2001</i>	Approved plan for implementation of urgent measures	<i>Approved action plan was for Nov to Dec 2001</i>	Implementation was not fully successful and sustainable
<i>Dec 2001</i>	Workshop to clarify goal of project and assess lessons learned from Feasibility Study and implementation of urgent measures		Workshop was arranged because implementation had not been fully successful
<i>Dec 2001</i>	Progress report	<i>1st Progress Report issued</i>	
<i>Jan 2002</i>	Meeting to clarify responsibilities and commitments		Aim was to facilitate the successful implementation of the urgent measures
<i>April 2002</i>	Feasibility Study completed	<i>Feasibility Study report</i>	Original aim was for completion of report by January 2002.
<i>Spring 2002</i>	2 nd phase of implementation of urgent measures		Implementation was still not fully successful and sustainable
<i>June 2002</i>	Meeting between MoE, MoT and UNEP to confirm commitment	<i>Project Services Agreement signed between 3 parties</i>	The 3 parties agreed that the next phase of the Project would focus on selected urgent measures.
<i>July to Dec 2002</i>	Project extended by 6 months		- Project was extended on the basis of the June 2002 agreement on future commitment. - Main aim of extension was capacity building.
<i>June 2002</i>	Catalogue of medium-term risk reduction measures	<i>Draft catalogue</i>	Sida only has draft version.
<i>December 2002</i>	Final project workshop		
<i>April 2003</i>	Final project report	<i>Final report</i>	Submitted to Sida HQ in August 2003.

Annex 4

List of Documents Reviewed

ANNEX 4 LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Documents referred to in the report, with reference number (ref no):

1. Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment – Albania, UNEP, 2000.
2. Sida Decision 491-2001, September 2001.
3. Project Proposal Sharra Waste dump site – Feasibility Study on Risk Reduction Measures and Urgent Activities, 6 September 2001.
4. Sida Assessment Memo, September 2001.
5. Sida-UNEP Agreement, September 2001.
6. Landstrategi Albania 1 februari 2001 - 30 juni 2002 (extended up to December 2003).
7. Guidelines for Sida's environmental cooperation in the Western Balkan Region, August 2003.
8. Feasibility Study for urgent risk reduction measures at Sharra landfill in Albania, UNEP, April 2002.
9. Progress Report, UNEP Activities at Sharra Landfill, Albania. December 2001 including Action Plan of November-December 2001.
10. UNEP project catalogue for: medium-term risk reduction projects at Sharra Landfill, Albania. April 2002.
11. Final Report: Feasibility Study on Risk Reduction Measures and Urgent Activities at Sharra Landfill in Albania, April 2003.
12. Second Progress Report, UNEP Activities at Sharra Landfill, Albania, UNEP, April 2002.
13. UNEP, Technical design, project for medium risk reduction at Sharra Landfill, Studio "D & C", August 2002. (Only a few pages reviewed by evaluation team).

Other documents reviewed:

UNDP Human Development Report, Challenges of local governance and regional development, Albania 2002

Result Analysis, Swedish Cooperation with Albania, 2001 – 2003, Stockholm Group for Development Studies, for Sida, July 2003.

Annex 5

List of Stakeholders Consulted

ANNEX 5 LIST OF STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTED

Stakeholders met in Tirana

Name of person	Organization	Role in the Project	Date and time of meeting
Robert Hall	First Secretary Swedish Embassy (Development) in Rome. Section of Cooperation with Albania	Not specific role	20/10/2003 17.00
Sabina Kasumovic	UNOPS	Procurement of goods under Project	21/10/2003 09.30
Pellumb Abeshi	Secretary General Ministry of Environment	Not specific role	21/10/2003 11.00
Agron Deliu	Institute of Environmental Studies	Local Expert (Air quality measurements)	21/10/2003 17.00
Vali Bizhga	Deputy Major of Tirana	Not specific role	22/10/2003 11.00
Eliona Popi	Director of Directory of Cleaning and Greening. Municipality of Tirana	Not specific role (She is appointed director on 01/2003)	22/10/2003 11.00
Andris Statolis	ASSA Zeitgeist	Not specific role. ASSA is working with Roma scavengers in the Sharra under another project financed by SIDA)	22/10/2003 17.00
Eva Cali	Expert. Directory of Clean and Green Municipality of Tirana	MoT representative in project	29/10/2003 09.00
Lejla Loshi	Sharra dump site, Chief of sector	Contact point MoT - dump site operating company	06/11/2003 11.00
Marjeta Mima	Director ECAT Tirana	Coordinator/facilitator for meetings organized under Project and contractor for local expert involved in the Project	23/10/2003 09.30
Silvano Tabbo	Director. Development Cooperation Office Italian Embassy in Tirana	Not specific role	23/10/2003 10.30
Eriola Muka	Expert. Sector of Sharra dumpsite. Municipality of Tirana	Not specific role in the Project. She appointed in the Sector on January 2003	23/10/2003 12.30
Vladimir Bezhani	Chief of Public Services Sector. Directory of Housing and Public Services Ministry of Territory Adjustment and Tourism	Not specific role	23/10/2003 16.30
Ylli Cabiri	Director. Human Development Resources Organization	Not specific role	23/10/2003 17.30
Besnik Baraj	Deputy Minister Ministry of Environment	Local expert for water quality measurement from Tirana University (before appointed in the MOE)	Joint meeting 24/10/2003 08.30
Narin Panariti	Director Directory for Environmental Policy, MoE	Not specific role	- " -
Mirela Kamberi	Director of Directory for Pollution Prevention, MoE	Not specific role	- " -

Stakeholders interviewed by telephone

Name of person	Organization	Role in the Project	Date of telephone interview
Pasi Rinne	UNEP	Senior Policy Adviser, Head of UNEP Balkans Unit	16/10/2003 + 05/11/2003
Mikko Halonen	UNEP (now mostly working for Finnish company)	Project Manager, UNEP Balkans Unit	14/10/2003
Dennis Bruhn	Previously UNEP, now independent consultant Atkins Denmark A/S	Project Director	17/10/2003 + 31/10/2003
John Bennett	UNEP Consultant, Bennett and Associates	Expert Institutional and legal aspects	15/10/2003 + 17/10/2003
Ewald Spitaler	UNEP Consultant, TB Spitaler	Technical Expert	22/10/2003 + 27/10/2003
Tatjana Hema	National Environmental Agency, (NEA) / Ministry of Environment (Currently in UNMAP, Athens)	Head of NEA, Deputy Minister for Environment Key initiator of project	15/10/2003 + 07/11/2003

Annex 6

Summary of Relevant Legal Aspects

Albanian legislation on waste management is in the process of development. There is still no legislation related to standards for design, construction and operation of landfills. Albania has no sanitary landfills at present (only dump sites).

1. The first Albanian law related to urban waste was the *Law on Public Disposal* (No 8094, 21 March 1996). However, this did not cover the disposal/treatment of urban waste. Article 13 stated that “waste treatment will be described in a special law”.

2. Article 10 of the Law on “*The organization and functioning of Local Government* (No 8652, 31 July 2000)” covers the “*Functions of Communes and Municipalities*”. Point 1 of this Article states that the Communes and Municipalities have full administrative, service, investment and regulatory competencies regarding certain functions, including collection, transport and processing of waste. Through this law, the formal responsibility for management of Sharra landfill was transferred from the Ministry of Transport and Public Works to the Municipality of Tirana. The law hence existed at the time of project set-up, but was enforced during the time of project implementation.

3. The development of legislation in Albania has continued to raise the profile of waste management, for example the *Law on Environmental Protection* (No 8934, 5 September 2002) defines in Article 21 the “*Obligations of legal persons for wastes*” stating that “*Physical and legal persons should use processes and techniques that:*

- *pose no risk to human health, water, air, soil, plant and animals;*
- *cause no additional noise or bad odour;*
- *cause no irreversible damage to nature”.*

4. The *Law on Environmental Management of Urban Waste* (No 9010, 13 February, 2003) covers “...*environmental and health protection from pollution and damages caused from solid waste, through their environmental management in each stage including; collection, separation, transportation, processing and destruction...*”. As far as public authorities are concerned, Article 5 of this law point 1 stated: “*MoE in collaboration with Regional Environmental Agencies and Environmental Inspectorate, organize the work for functioning of process of environmental management of waste and inspect its implementation in all levels*”. Regarding the rehabilitation of existing dumpsites in the Article 22 the law states: “*With entering in force of this law, existing dumpsites for the urban waste must start with preliminary management in the directions:*

- a) *soil covering and compacting*
- b) *construction of ditches for rain water surface waters leaches, collecting their in a isolated basin*
- c) *fire protection*
- d) *prohibition of the entrance of unauthorised people*
- e) *greening the close parts of the dumpsite”.*

Article 8 of the same law prohibits the burning on the open space (nature) including the spontaneous fires of wastes.

Annex 7

Photolog

ANNEX 7 PHOTOLOG

Photo 1 Old bulldozers at site entrance



Photo 2 Abandoned containers provided by UNEP for offices



Photo 3 Vehicles coming to the site to dump waste, in the background recyclers



Photo 4 Despite the day of the visit being a very rainy day, there were still fires on the site.



Photo 5 The drainage channel was filled with garbage



Photo 6 Smoke from fires used to extract minerals. Next to housing of Roma people.



Photo 7 Roma population's housing, next to the dump site. Recycled material in bags.



Photo 8 Roma girl living on the site.



Photo 9 Garbage bins in central Tirana



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