

Consolidated Anti-Corruption Training and Publication Programme: Project Nikolaj 2003–2006

**Liz Carlbom
Jonas Wikström**

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Sida Evaluation 07/27

Department for Europe

This report is part of *Sida Evaluations*, a series comprising evaluations of Swedish development assistance. Sida's other series concerned with evaluations, Sida Studies in Evaluation, concerns methodologically oriented studies commissioned by Sida. Both series are administered by the Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit, an independent department reporting directly to Sida's Board of Directors.

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Authors: Liz Carlbom, Jonas Wikström.

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Sida Evaluation 07/27
Commissioned by Sida, Department for Europe

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Registration No.: 2006-001299
Date of Final Report: June 2006
Printed by Edita Communication AB, 2007
Art. no. Sida39720en
ISBN 978-91-586-8247-4
ISSN 1401—0402

SWEDISH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY
Address: SE-105 25 Stockholm, Sweden. Office: Valhallavägen 199, Stockholm
Telephone: +46 (0)8-698 50 00. Telefax: +46 (0)8-20 88 64
E-mail: sida@sida.se. Homepage: <http://www.sida.se>

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Executive Summary

Introduction

The fight against corruption has been identified as one of Sida's strategic priorities. Besides taking measures to mainstream corruption throughout its development co-operation portfolio, Sida is also supporting projects specifically targeting corruption. The project subject of this evaluation is, Nikolaj: "Consolidated Anti-corruption Training and Publication Programme".

According to the Terms of Reference (ToR) the objective of the assignment is to "evaluate the project in terms of achievement of project objectives, quality in implementation, results, cost effectiveness and lessons learned. In addition it is also expected that the evaluation team will analyse the relevance of the project in the portfolio of Sida in the Balkans."

Sida has been supporting the consolidated anti-corruption training and publication programme, project Nikolaj in Serbia and Montenegro since May 2003. The project has been implemented by the Management Centre NGO during three years until May 2006. Since the start the Centre has changed its name and is now the Centre for Security Studies (CSS).

The full ToR can be found in Appendix no 1.

The evaluation followed the structure below:

1. Collecting and reading of documents
2. Finalisation of evaluation design and development of questionnaires
3. Interviews
4. Analysis of interviews and relevant documents
5. Draft Report to Sida
6. Presentation and final report to Sida

During our stay in Belgrade we met with the present and the former Project Director of CSS, members of writers and editorial staff, trainers and former participants from the various training sessions.

We like to thank all the interviewees; they have been very generous with their time and sharing of experiences both verbally and through a variety of documentations.

Conclusions

The long-term objective is covering a huge area and can be linked to the project objective only in very general terms. As far as we know, there is no LFA prepared that could have helped to assist the monitoring and also to clarify the expected impact of the project.

To raise awareness in anti-corruption as well as in other reforms, training and publication is a common and practical way to reach results. The issue is to find the proper target groups and to ensure that the different activities will make an impact in society. In the project document, the target group was the professionals mainly responsible for fighting of corruption within the public sector. A selection of senior judges, prosecutors and police has gone through a demanding training with a high academic standard. The training has taken place after work and the duration has been 3–6 month.

Only half of the participants did not manage to finalise the training. However those who did, obviously have managed to make quite an impact both regarding their personal promotions and their work. Still the lack of clear and holistic strategies within the respective organisations can endanger both ownership and sustainability.

A value added is that gender mainstreaming has been present from the very beginning of the training programme. Although many participants came from ministries and government agencies such as the police and intelligence which are traditionally predominantly populated by male employees, these organisations have exhibited a high level of awareness of the gender issues from the start. This has been reflected in the candidates of their representatives. The overall proportion of female participants has ranged between 40–60% which is a very good result. Throughout the project there has been a general climate of gender sensitivity, despite the masculine culture usually dominant in these organisations. This includes the imposing of a gender neutral language during the courses and the discussions of gender issues relating to corruption during seminars.

The initiative to fight corruption through the anti-corruption platform started already in 2000 as a network including ministries, agencies and other relevant organisations with the aim to develop a Serbian national anti-corruption strategy. When the Sida financed anti-corruption project PACO Impact started in 2004 with one of the objectives to develop anti-corruption strategies in South-Eastern Europe, the platform was closed down to avoid overlapping.

One conclusion must be that coordination has been lacking and another that the network could have continued but with a different focus.

One source of information has been the Pulse. It has during the project period changed from being an electronically publication to also being a bi-monthly printed paper with the aim to be self-sustainable within five years. The quality of the printed Pulse is high, both regarding the articles and the lay out. The readers are participants from the anti-corruption training sessions, government organisations and others involved in the fighting of corruption. Never the less the number of readers seems to have decreased during the project period. The reason might be that the issue of making Pulse self-sustainable has been prioritised and CSS has limited the access to the electronically Pulse whilst the paper obviously has been too expensive for people to buy or subscribe.

Recommendations

The long-term objective is covering a huge area and can be linked to the project objective only in very general terms. A proper LFA should always be prepared to help the monitoring and to also clarify the expected impact of the project.

Nikolaj has worked successfully with capacity building in anti-corruption for a very special group, probably the leaders of tomorrow. To ensure ownership and sustainability there need to be a clear and holistic strategy for the various organisations on how to ensure the impact and further work in the fight of corruption.

Introduction training for new staff and to train trainers to be facilitators for internal training within the government is one way to widen the fight of corruption.

There are lessons to learn regarding the big % of drop outs from the training at CSS and to improve the selection of trainees to ensure that they have the proper back ground to adapt the curriculum.

Develop training courses to run a different and more practical training for those without the academic credentials.

For the future there is need to train the media on how to detect corruption and create awareness amongst the public. This might be a way to ensure that the fighting of corruption should be deeply rooted in the society

An important part of capacity building and a tool to succeed with the impact on anti-corruption training is the issue on change management. It is highly recommended to use a step-by-step method to get the necessary experiences and feed back before any project is implemented.

Regarding the Platform, the work done seems to have been both relevant and rewarding for those involved in the network. Experienced gained in this work should be used for the future.

We highly agree with CSS to produce a new electronical version of the Pulse, to publish the information of corruption and other security-related issues, in a different and cheaper form, thus allowing the initiative behind the Pulse to still continue to develop. We also recommend that it should be translated in English to share ideas and experiences also outside the Balkans.

1 Introduction

1.1. The Assignment

The fight against corruption has been identified as one of Sida's strategic priorities. Besides taking measures to mainstream corruption throughout its development co-operation portfolio, Sida is also supporting projects specifically targeting corruption. The project subject of this evaluation is, Nikolaj: "Consolidated Anti-corruption Training and Publication Programme".

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The full ToR can be found in Appendix no 1.

The ToR also states that the evaluation shall include a discussion concerning the preparation of a possible second phase of the evaluated interventions. This is no longer a central part of the assignment as the focus was shifted towards a discussion on possible options for Sida support in the field of anti-corruption in the Balkans that will take its point of departure in the lessons learned from this evaluation.

Included in the scope of the assignment is to furnish Sida as the commissioner of the evaluation with recommendations based on the findings.

1.2. Methodology

At the start of the assignment the evaluating team prepared a document to state their views of the criteria, focus and limitations of the assignment. This was introduced, discussed and finally approved during two meetings in May with Sida HQ.

According to the Terms of Reference (ToR) the objective of the assignment is to "evaluate the project in terms of achievement of project objectives, quality in implementation, results, cost effectiveness and lessons learned. In addition it is also expected that the evaluation team will analyse the relevance of the project in the portfolio of Sida in the Balkans."

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We like to thank all the interviewees; they have been very generous with their time and sharing of experiences both verbally and through a variety of documentations. See Appendix 2

2 The Context

Corruption has been identified by Sida and other development actors as a serious hindrance to development and in particular as posing a significant risk of unfavourable effects on development in, for example, poverty reduction, economic development, the rule of law and a democratic social structure. Anti-corruption concerns have therefore been made one of three strategic priorities for the period 2005–2007.

Below follows a section on definitions of the concept of corruption and how protection against it is interlinked with democracy, poverty reduction and gender equality.

2.1 Definition of Corruption

There is no single, comprehensive, universally accepted definition of corruption. Attempts to develop such a definition invariably encounter legal, criminological and, in many countries, political problems. The working definition of the World Bank is that corruption is “abuse of public power for private benefit”. Council of Europe, in its Civil Law Convention on Corruption, defines corruption as “requesting, offering, giving or accepting, directly or indirectly, a bribe or any other undue advantage or prospect thereof, which distorts the proper performance of any duty or behaviour required of the recipient of the bribe, the undue advantage or the prospect thereof”. Sida uses the following definition of corruption: “Institutions, organisations, companies or individuals obtaining improper gains by their position in an operation and thereby causing damage or loss”.

One of the most important analytical distinctions regarding corruption is between “political corruptions” and “bureaucratic corruption” (largely the same as the terms ‘grand’ and ‘petty’ corruption, also commonly used). Political corruption takes place at the high levels of the political system, and it involves political decision-makers. It manifests itself when political decision-makers use their political power with the principle objective of sustaining their own power, status and wealth. The worst form of political corruption is sometimes called “state capture”. That is when political corruption is so wide spread that the rule of law no longer applies and the country is ruled in breach with the constitution. Political corruption can be distinguished from bureaucratic or petty corruption, which is corruption in the public administration, in the implementation end of politics.


There are many different ways for measurement of the level of corruption. No method is flawless or unquestionable but they can provide good enough data for most cases, separately or in a combination. A description of a number of the most common measurements can be found in Appendix 3.

2.2 Protection against Corruption

All societies have more or less effective systems in place to defend themselves against corruption. The abilities and effectiveness of these systems differ depending on a wide array of factors. The picture below aims to describe the societal functions that constitute the protection against corruption in the form of a Greek temple¹. The roof is the actual protection against corruption, here called “National Integrity System”. It is supported at either end by a series of pillars, each being an individual element of the system. The “temple” itself is built on and sustained by foundations, which comprise public awareness and society’s values.

¹ Taken from J. Pope: Transparency International Source Book: Confronting corruption: The Elements of a National Integrity System, 2000, p. 35

The “pillars” are interdependent but may be of differing strengths. If one pillar weakens, an increased load is thrown onto one or more of the others. If several pillars weaken, their load will ultimately tilt, so that the “round balls” of “sustainable development”, “Rule of Law” and “quality of life” will roll off, crash to the ground and the whole edifice collapse into chaos.



When strengthening a system to fight corruption, all parts of the building need attention. However, no society will be able to reform all sectors at once so an assessment must be made of where to start in order to have the greatest impact.

2.2.1 Democracy and corruption

Can democracy serve as a protection against corruption? There are obvious links between the societal functions that constitute the National Integrity System described above and the functions that are needed to build a fair and democratic society.

The causal connections between corruption and democracy, however, are not clear-cut, i.e. a democratic form of government does not automatically lead to a lower level of corruption and lower levels of corruption do not automatically lead to more democracy. For instance, in the case of Singapore the success in combating corruption has not been due to a more democratic system nor has it lead to a more democratic situation.

Democracy can, however, function as a vaccine against corruption if it works according to the principles of Good Governance (described in the “temple” above). If, on the other hand, the state is weak, democracy can create new opportunities for corrupt behaviour. Some of the criteria that need to be fulfilled in order for democracy to be effective in reducing corruption are:

- A genuine political will to fight corruption
- A basic level of trust and loyalty between the democratic entity (demos) and the public service

- Clear codes of conduct within the public sector
- A basic level of public service delivery to all members of society

The first criterion has been the focus for much debate, especially among the donor community:

How can the political will be measured and assessed, and more importantly, how can it be built?

Research and evaluations seem to have reached consensus over the fact that political will needs to come from the inside. It cannot be created in a country by outside forces.² In the absence of will for change within the political leadership, the most efficient role of donors and other external actors will according to the same research be to support the forces for change that do exist in the country. This force can reside in many locations, branches of government, the political opposition, watchdog and other NGOs, international organisations, and both public and private sector institutions.

2.2.2 Corruption in relation to poverty reduction and gender equality

How does the level of income relate to corruption? There are clear correlations between GDP per capita and the level of corruption: The higher the GDP per capita, the lower the level of corruption. There are exceptions to this rule such as Italy with high GDP per capita but still high level of corruption and Chile and Botswana with low GDP per capita and low level of corruption but the overall picture is clear. It seems corruption is one important variable (of course one out of many) that affects the level of prosperity of a country.

In terms of corruption as a threat to poverty reduction, attempts to reduce poverty are affected by corruption both directly and indirectly. The direct effect is that the poor are denied access to numerous public services (in public administration, health care and education) because additional payment is often required. The indirect effect is that the existence of large-scale corruption greatly discourages foreign investors, which in turn threatens economic growth and thus the scope for poverty reduction.

Does gender equality affect corruption levels? According to some theories, the level of gender equality in a society will affect the level of corruption. Other attempts have tried to establish a relationship between a high level of women in politics and less corruption resulting from their presence and influence. However, the results from studies in the field are debatable and there seem to be no established consensus on the matter among researchers.

In terms of the effects of corruption with regard to the differences between men and women there is a great need for further research. It can be said that corruption, which drains public resources and takes much needed funds away from national economic development or social services, disproportionately affects women and the poor who are most dependent on them. Women may also be in less powerful positions to challenge corruption when it occurs.

Alternatively they may face gendered forms of corruption such as the demand for sex in return for particular services or resources³. General findings like these might provide valuable information on how to combat corruption in a gender sensitive manner. However, the specific implications of corruption for women and men must be considered in every sector in which reforms are proposed.

² "The impetus for a reform programme has to be home grown and home owned – the initiative to fight corruption must come from within a country, not from outside. There have been many examples of donors trying to impose anti-corruption programmes on countries as pre-conditions for them to receive aid, and none can be regarded as having had the intended consequences". J. Pope: Transparency International Source Book: Confronting corruption: The Elements of a National Integrity System, 2000, p. 45

³ C Sever, 2005: The Gender, Poverty, Governance Nexus: Key issues and current debates.

3 Findings

3.1 The Background of Nikolaj

Corruption is posing a real threat to the consolidation of the still rather fragile democratic system in Serbia. Corruption is also considered as inextricably linked with organised crime, which is affecting the whole society. Corruption and organised crime do not only pose a real security problem as such, they are also elements further weakening the establishment of a functioning rule of law. The development and management of corruption-control policy should therefore be seen as imperative for the current effort of Serbia to induce a greater degree of democratic and participatory decision-making in the system of social control. While there is a political will to attack the problems of corruption and organised crime there is no tangible policy platform for medium-term strategy in this direction. Considerable effort has been expended to improve the anti-corruption and anti-organised crime legislation but relatively few activities are taking place to enable the effective implementation of such legislation, through the training of personnel in anti-corruption policies.

The current CSS which is a Serbian NGO was registered in 1998 under the name The Management Centre. At the time many members of the state-controlled research and academic institutions became active in the Centre.

The Management Centre started to work in the areas of anti-corruption and anti-organised crime as well as in the management of foreign policy related to cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The experts in the centre participated in the first official university course on cooperation with ICTY in 2000 at the University of Banja Luka.

The project was conducted in cooperation with the Institute of Criminological and Sociological Research, under the Serbian Ministry of Science.

The Management Centre was the principal bearer of the project, and the Institute provided a proportion of the lectures and contributions to the Pulse, as well as logistical support. Courses were held under the Institute and in its premises. The Centre was not assisted financially, but with practical matters like office space within the Institute, printing of the Pulse, as it has its own printing press and diplomas for the participants in the courses were regularly issued jointly by the Centre and the Institute.

In the context of the policy of integration of the Centre with the Institute of Criminological and Sociological Research, this has now been fully realised, with the Institute's management having made a decision to register the Management Centre as based at the Institute starting as of January 2006, thus making the Management Centre one of the research centres of the Institute that focus on specific areas, corruption and organised crime. The integration will be a solid base for the period of further training and follow-up work during years to come.

Having previously received Sida support, the Centre approached Sida again in 2003 for the funding of further training of personnel in public service and relevant agencies in consolidated anti-corruption training and publication programme for a period of three years.

In the Assessment Memo, on the application for the Nikolaj project, Sida stated that corruption is a prime problem and that almost no practical information and knowledge is available on specific methodologies to fight corruption. There is need for a strong and properly managed research and education as well as an informed public to monitor the work of the government and the equally constant effort to help the government to institute practices and policies.

3.2 Project Document, Project Nikolaj

In the Project document, the project objectives are summarised in the following matrix.

Overall objective:	To consolidate initiatives on fighting corruption to become deeply rooted in the society as a longer-term control and capacity building structure to halt corruption as a pre-condition for organised crime and equip the government officials to conduct anti-corruption and anti-organised crime policy efficiently
Project objective:	To rise the awareness in the relevant professions and government departments of the newest methodologies to fight corruption. To advance the concrete skills and knowledge of the professionals who are naturally in the position to engage constructively in fighting corruption.
Output 1:	A total number of 180–240 representing policy makers, judges, magistrates, prosecutors, attorneys at law and police professionals have been trained.
Activities:	• Anti-corruption courses held every 6 months during 3 years with weekly lecturers and assigned work followed by round table discussions. • Selection and training of 25 professionals/course from state academic and control institutions.
Output 2:	Development of a formalised Anti-Corruption Platform
Activities:	• A formalised Anti-Corruption Platform in consultations with relevant agencies and informal contacts and formalised round-table discussions on a continual basis. • Advocacy of the Platform in the public sphere in cooperation with the media • Formation in the course of the first year of the project of an Expert Board to coordinate the implementation of the Platform with relevant ministries in the Serbian government
Output 3:	Publication of the Pulse bi-monthly in a printed format
Activities:	• Collection of information, preparation of analyses, conduct of PR liaison with government agencies and collaborators as needed and regular correspondence to obtain relevant decisions, official press releases or comments of ongoing events, policies and platforms.

3.3 The Logic of the Project Document

The project documents make certain assumptions on the linkages between the different levels of objectives in the project. In accordance with common log frame structure, the activities will collectively lead to the achievement of the respective outputs, and the collected achievements of the four outputs will lead to the achievement of the project objective or purpose that in turn will contribute to the achievement of the overall or long-term objective.

3.3.1 The project objective contributing to the long-term objective

The possibility to evaluate becomes more difficult higher up in the objective hierarchy. At the level of long-term objective, it is in general very hard to first of all measure impact and secondly to attribute possible effects to the intervention in question. It is also part of the definition of a long-term goal that the intervention will only contribute to its fulfilment.

The long-term objective is covering a huge area and can be linked to the project objective only in very general terms. As far as we know, there is no LFA prepared that could have helped to assist the monitoring and also to clarify the expected impact of the project.

The link between the project objective and the long-term objective, *consolidate initiatives on fighting corruption to become deeply rooted in the society as a longer-term control and capacity building structure to halt corruption as a pre-condition for organised crime and equip the government officials to conduct anti-corruption and anti-organised crime policy efficiently* seems to be based on three assumptions 1) that control and capacity building will make a deep impact in society beyond the political priorities of the government and professional organisations regarding anti-corruption and anti-organised crime and 2) that corruption is a pre-condition for organised crime and 3) that by improving the knowledge and skills of the government officials they will actually conduct their work in anti-corruption and anti-organised crime in a more efficient way.

The first assumption that the building of long-term control and capacity will contribute to prevention and control of corruption could be true. But the experience is that an effective and strong control mechanism usually, but not always, serves as a warning, that can discourage from corruption. However, it is very difficult to assess that the link between a strong and competent control and the reduction of corruption is there.

Regarding the second assumption that corruption is a pre-condition for organised crime the link could be that at least the grant corruption usually goes hand in hand with organised crime and vice versa, but we have a problem to see a realistic link to the project objective.

The third assumption that improved knowledge and skills of the government officials will actually make them conduct their work in anti-corruption and anti-organised crime in a more efficient way. In the long run this is of course correct but the means and ways to get there can be disputable.

The impact of training is very much related to the ability of the trainees to change their behaviour and use the new skills in their professional work. The proper organisation and systems has to be there and last but not least there has to be commitment to support change from the managerial level.

Our assessment is therefore that the link between the project objective and the long-term objective of the Nikolaj is rather general. As a result, it will be difficult to measure the real impact and sustainability the project will have on corruption.

3.3.2 The outputs leading to the achievement of the project objective

If the outputs are successfully accomplished it is assumed that they will lead to the achievement of the project objective, *to rise the awareness in the relevant professions and government departments of the newest methodologies to fight corruption. To advance the concrete skills and knowledge of the professionals who are naturally in the position to engage constructively in fighting corruption.*

This assumption relies on the commitment of the government and its different organisations to adapt new methodologies and changes in the fight of corruption. To implement change of any kind there is need for a good deal of sensitivity from the implementers at all levels and it takes time to adjust to a new situation.

The previous good reputation of CSS together with the approach taken with the three outputs focusing on

- A combination of academic- and work related training clearly recognisable in government practice for senior staff working in different fields with anti-corruption
- The increased publication of the corruption-monitoring magazine The Pulse and
- The anti-corruption Platform to encourage networking and sharing of experiences for relevant ministries seems to ensure a “balance” in capacity building.

To fulfil the assumption the following criteria must be achieved

- Awareness and willingness within the government to select and send participants to the training courses and also later allow for implementation of the new methodologies
- Staff prepared to undertake training after working hours to build up their competence to improve their working skills
- An increased knowledge of Puls, being a key reference publication on consolidated information about anti-corruption policy and opportunities for those interested to subscribe or buy the magazine
- Enough political will to participate in net work activities of the Platform to share experiences and cooperate in the fighting of corruption.

Our assessment is that, *if* these criteria are achieved, and *if* there is a will to adopt the changes and allow them to make an impact of the work on anti-corruption, only then will the outputs contribute to the project objectives.

4 Results

Below is presented the evaluators overall view of the project both in terms of work processes used and results achieved.

4.1 **Output 1: A total number of 180–240 representing policy makers, judges, magistrates, prosecutors, attorneys at law and police professionals have been trained**

Since the start of the project there has been a total of 6 courses with 227 participants from ministries and government agencies, all of them senior professionals engaged in fighting corruption.

The criteria for attending the courses was to allow the relevant ministries and agencies

to select 2/3 of the applicants from their senior staff and allowing the remaining 1/3 to apply through advertisement in the newspapers. During the 3 years since the project started more than 1000 has applied for the training. Because of the pressure from the government to allow as many as possible to participate in the training, at the end of the project some of the courses ran parallel and for a shorter period of 3 months.

The recruitment policy has been very strict and the courses have been based on very high academic criteria of passing the examinations and have received a high reputation for strictness and good quality from the government departments. The total number of students who have completed the programme with success and qualified for the award of a diploma was 118, only 52% of those who started the training. The reason for the 109 participants to not complete the course, was that they either failed the attendance requirement or failed in the examinations.

To ensure that the courses were tailor made for the needs of Serbia there were highly professional lecturers from the region while there were only a few international experts.

The Curriculum has been divided into three modules

1. The legal and political dimension of corruption
2. The ethics module
3. The administrative and economics module

All courses were evaluated by the participants, regarding the curriculum, the performance of the lecturers and the possibility to apply the knowledge and methodology in their respective professions.

The rate of success of the participants has been around 50–60% during all the training courses. Many of those graduated has since graduation, been promoted, a fact confirmed by those participants we interviewed.

The general view from the interviewed was that the training was very good and that most of them had the possibility, mostly due to a personal involvement, to implement what they learned once they returned to their organisations. Several of them were involved in internal training especially of the junior staff within their organisation and several of them were also writing articles for the Pulse and working

as lecturers in the new courses.

The training courses and the participants were presented on the web side of the Centre and some of the participants mentioned that the web side was commented by colleagues and others wondering how they intended to use their new knowledge.

A gender balance has been present from the very beginning. Although many participants came from ministries and government agencies such as the police and intelligence which are traditionally predominantly populated by male employees, these organisations have exhibited a high level of awareness of the gender issues from the start. This has been reflected in the candidates of their representatives. The overall proportion of female participants has ranged between 40–60% which is a very good result. Throughout the project there has been a general climate of gender sensitivity, despite the masculine culture usually dominant in these organisations. This includes the imposing of a gender neutral language during the courses and the discussions of gender issues relating to corruption during seminars.

This output seems to have achieved a very good result, even though the number of participants trained successfully only reaches 66% of the lowest number mentioned in the objective. Some of those graduated has been able to make an impact in their work and also to share the knowledge and skills with their managers and colleagues. Many of them have also been promoted after the training and all of those we met were still working in the area of anti-corruption.

Regarding the promotion, our view is that it is a doubtful tool to measure success. All of the participants were highly professionals already before the training and some of them might very well have been sent for training because they were due for promotion.

This kind of capacity building is important but there is also need to ensure ownership and sustainability through clear and holistic strategies on how to use the new methodologies in the fight of corruption.

4.2 Output 2: Development of a formalised Anti-Corruption Platform

Already in the year 2000 the Centre published a Platform for the reform of local government focusing on, among other issues, the role of local government in fighting corruption. Especially through administrative reforms and through demanding a greater decentralisation of the social control mechanism, primarily in the creation of municipal police forces.

Since the inception of Project “Nikolaj” and the start of its implementation, all the experts involved in the teaching and publication parts of the project were active in the initial stages of the preparation of an Anti-Corruption Platform. This took place through the initial analyses and newspaper contributions including to the public debate on the new laws, especially the Law on the Conflict of Interest and the regulations relating to the media sphere.

The work of the Platform was done in collaboration with the government agencies and various ministries, including the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Justice, and Ministry of Finance, which in the initial phase was the base Ministry for the Serbian Anti-Corruption Team.

When PACO Impact funded by Sida and implemented by the Council of Europe, initiated a Balkans-wide project on building National Anti-Corruption Strategies, including the cooperation with the Serbian Ministry of Justice to build a Serbian National Anti-Corruption Strategy, this was exactly the same thing as the part of Project “Nikolaj” dealing with the Anti-Corruption Platform.

At that stage, the project decided to close the Platform, rather than duplicating the work. Instead, Nikolaj were encouraged by Sida to provide their insights to the Council of Europe and help them build their strategy, and so they did. Although, the general feeling was that the effort was not appreciated.

Lessons learned should be for Sida to improve coordination to avoid overlapping especially since both of these Sida funded projects were in the same area.

4.3 Output 3: Publication of the Pulse bi-monthly in a printed format

The Pulse has been issued in Serbian language and was designed to contain information on all developments, policies, problems, issues and processes related to corruption in Serbia and Montenegro. It has been published as an electronic monthly and as a bi-monthly printed edition.

The list of team members who have created The Pulse includes 27 authors, 4 organisations that conduct surveys and prepared analysis, 3 linguistic editors and, across the 3 years, 6 staff members who have worked at layout and design stages, as well as 2 internet editors.

The Puls has a small but devoted group of readers by those involved in anti-corruption policy. The monitoring of the web side shows 150 hits/year, not much, even though the system is only measuring an institution as one hit, regardless how many visitors.

As of May 2004, the free access to the Pulse for participants in the anti-corruption methodology courses was denied. According to the Director of the Centre this was necessary since the contents of the Pulse were circulated widely once accessed online through free participants' passwords. Instead selected contents were made available to them through a separate password, and then only the contents required for the courses.

The reason was to encourage further subscriptions with the view to make the Pulse self-sustainable; according to the project document it should be covering its cost to 50–60% at the end of the project and being totally self-sustainable within 5 years. The project document also stated that the Pulse should be sent to 3000 police officers within the ministry of Interior, this has not been done.

At the same time, the marketing potential of The Pulse was a week spot, even though the design was good and the quality of the articles was high. There were only 75 subscriptions and the attempt to sell it in the shops was a total failure, 40 copies/month at the price of 250 dinars each.

To cover the total cost for one printed copy of the Pulse, the price has to be 58 SEK which is equal to 5,220 dinar. During the project period 18000 copies has been printed to the cost of 1,043,048 SEK. The target group was too small and the price was too high. In Serbia many of the newspapers have disappeared, and only the short-form information bulletins of a very low cost seem to survive.

As an adaptation of this aim, a new version of the Pulse, will be published as CSS Working Papers, to bring much of the information on corruption and other security-related issues, in a different and cheaper form, thus allowing the initiative behind the Pulse to still continue to develop.

As an activity outside the project document, CSS has printed the book Corruption and Forming of Modern Serbian State. It covers conceptual, institutional, political, methodological and ethical aspects of fighting corruption.

4.4 The Project Objective:

The effort has been admirable and there are some good results achieved under the three outputs. Nevertheless they have only fulfilled the project objective to a certain extent.

Even though the number of participants stated in the objective has been recruited to the courses there was only 52% who completed the programme and qualified for a diploma. The curricula for the training have been relevant and the lecturers have been highly qualified and well aware of the Serbian needs regarding methodology in fighting of corruption.

The completion rate is low even if we can understand and appreciate CSS judgment not to lower the standard. Our view is that there might be other options, to be even stricter during the recruitment and only accept those able to adapt to the high standard and/or to run a different and more practical training for those without the academic credentials

The impact of the training so far is promising, with some of the former participants acting as facilitators and training their colleagues in the new methodology. For example, there is high number of former participants that is now being promoted to a higher post within the area of anti-corruption after their training. However it is difficult to assess if promotion is an impact of training or if the training is a part of an already planned promotion.

Still we have found no trace of any realistic strategies on how to use the skills of the trainees in a systematic way once they are back. The impact achieved seems to be the result of various individuals more than a strong will from the leaders. To ensure ownership and long-term sustainability there need to be action plans as well as commitment from the organisations before they send participants to this kind of training.

The gender mainstreaming both during recruitments and training as well as the gender sensitive language used both in training and in the Pulse is well worth mentioning.

Regarding the platform the work done before PACO Impact seems to have been both relevant and rewarding for those involved in the network. Maybe the network could have continued but with a slightly changed focus.

In our view, Pulse, should have been delivered in 3000 copies to the ministry of Interior as stated in the project document. Instead of CSS denying access to the magazine or the web side, to try to make a small profit, the project should have used the opportunity to create a market by allowing their students to use the information freely and to share it with others.

Instead of removing the English translations when a lot of foreign embassies took the advantage to use the Pulse to update their countries on the situation of corruption in the Balkans, the project should have been happy about the public relation they were given.

The new version of the Pulse, in a cheaper form to be published as a working paper from CSS is a good idea. It is important though that it will continue its high standard and that the present target group should expand. There should also be an English section to spread the publication outside Serbia.

4.5 Long-term Objective:

The long-term objective of the project is as mentioned above *“to consolidate initiatives on fighting corruption to become deeply rooted in the society as a longer-term control and capacity building structure to halt corruption as a pre-condition for organised crime and equip the government officials to conduct anti-corruption and anti-organised crime policy efficiently”*

To evaluate the project against this very broad long term objective is difficult, still a lot of good work has been done, but in a very small scale and with a limited impact.

To date there is 118 motivated and well trained professionals within government and agencies. There is need for clear strategies to ensure the impact in terms of new methodologies to fight corruption. These strategies could be the start of developing action plans, creating ownership and sustainability. Using the trained professionals as facilitators in training of trainers is an important step to prepare the remaining staff on how to internally contribute to the fight of corruption.

The experience from the Platform could still be used in the regional cooperation remaining from the PACO Impact project. The Pulse will probably have a better impact in its new form as a working paper on the web side. To make a true impact it should widen its target group and also have an English translation for readers outside Serbia.

Nikolaj has succeeded in its effort to start the fighting of corruption through a small target group focusing on the leaders of tomorrow. To ensure ownership and sustainability we recommend that future Sida support should be done with a long-term objective more clearly linked to the project objectives. LFA should be used to ensure the possibility to measure the impact of results achieved. There should be strategies on how to continue the fight of corruption and the strengthening of democracy.

5 Resources

In terms of funds Nikolaj is a small project, the Sida budget is 3,078,157SEK but the project is also receiving some contribution from the Serbian government through the Institute for Criminological and Sociological Research and from some other donors.

Training has taken 24% of the budget for lecturers, seminars and workshops
the Pulse has 34% for printing, editing and layout but mostly for experts writing articles
40% is administration mainly salaries, rent of premises and offices supplies
and 2% is the printing of the book on anti-corruption.

Looking in the review mirror some of the money for articles in the Pulse might have been spent to spread the information for instance to the 3,000 police officers at the Ministry of Interior.

6 Conclusions

The long-term objective is covering a huge area and can be linked to the project objective only in very general terms. As far as we know, there is no LFA prepared that could have helped to assist the monitoring and also to clarify the expected impact of the project.

To raise awareness in anti-corruption as well as in other reforms, training and publication is a common and practical way to reach results. The issue is to find the proper target groups and to ensure that the different activities will make an impact in society. In the project document, the target group was the professionals mainly responsible for fighting of corruption within the public sector. A selection of senior judges, prosecutors and police has gone through a demanding training with a high academic standard. The training has taken place after work and the duration has been 3–6 month.

Only half of the participants did not managed to finalise the training. However those who did, have managed to make quite an impact both regarding their personal promotion and their daily work. Still, the lack of clear and holistic strategies within the respective organisations can endanger both ownership and sustainability.

A value added is that gender mainstreaming has been present from the very beginning of the training programme. Although many participants came from ministries and government agencies such as the police and intelligence which are traditionally predominantly populated by male employees, these

organisations have exhibited a high level of awareness of the gender issues from the start. This has been reflected in the candidates of their representatives. The overall proportion of female participants has ranged between 40–60% which is a very good result. Throughout the project there has been a general climate of gender sensitivity, despite the masculine culture usually dominant in these organisations. This includes the imposing of a gender neutral language during the courses and the discussions of gender issues relating to corruption during seminars.

The initiative to fight corruption through the anti-corruption platform started already in 2000 as a network including ministries, agencies and other relevant organisations with the aim to develop a Serbian national anti-corruption strategy. When the Sida financed anti-corruption project PACO Impact started in 2004 with one of the objectives to develop anti-corruption strategies in South-Eastern Europe, the platform was closed down to avoid overlapping.

One conclusion must be that coordination has been lacking another that the network could have continued but with a different focus.

One source of information has been the Pulse. It has during the project period changed from being an electronically publication to also being a bi-monthly printed paper with the aim to be self-sustainable within five years.

The quality of the printed Pulse is high, both regarding the articles and the lay out. The readers are participants from the anti-corruption training sessions, government organisations and others involved in the fighting of corruption. Never the less the number of readers seems to have decreased during the project period. The reason might be that the issue of making Pulse self-sustainable has been prioritised and CSS has limited the access to the electronically Pulse whilst the paper obviously has been too expensive for people to buy or subscribe.

7 Recommendations

The long-term objective is covering a huge area and can be linked to the project objective only in very general terms. A proper LFA should always be prepared to help the monitoring and to also clarify the expected impact of the project.

Nikolaj has worked successfully with capacity building in anti-corruption for a special group, probably the leaders of tomorrow. To ensure ownership and sustainability there need to be a clear and holistic strategy for the various organisations on how to ensure the impact and further work in the fight of corruption.

Introduction training for new staff and to train trainers to be facilitators for internal training within the government is one way to widen the fight of corruption.

There are lessons to learn regarding the big % of drop outs from the training at CSS and to improve the selection of trainees to ensure that they have the proper back ground to adapt the curriculum.

Develop training courses to run a different and more practical training for those without the academic credentials.

For the future, there is need to train the media on how to detect corruption and create awareness among the public. This might be a way to ensure that the fighting of corruption should be deeply rooted in the society

An important part of capacity building and a tool to succeed with the impact on anti-corruption training is the issue on change management. It is highly recommended to use a step-by-step method to get the necessary experiences and feed back before any project is implemented.

Regarding the Platform, the work done seems to have been both relevant and rewarding for those involved in the network. Experienced gained in this work should be used for the future.

We highly agree with CSS to produce a new electronical version of the Pulse, to publish the information of corruption and other security-related issues, in a different and cheaper form, thus allowing the initiative behind the Pulse to still continue to develop. We also recommend that it should be translated in English to share ideas and experiences also outside the Balkans.

Appendix 1 Terms of Reference

Evaluation of Swedish Support in the Area of Anti Corruption in South Eastern Europe
«Consolidated Anti-corruption Training and Publication Programme» and
PACO Impact: Implementation of Anti-corruption Plans in South Eastern Europe

1 Background

The overall objective for Swedish development co-operation is to help create conditions that will enable the poor to improve their living conditions. Furthermore, focus for development co-operation with the countries of South Eastern Europe is to support equitable and sustainable reforms that help the countries develop closer ties with the EU and integration into European co-operative structures.

The need to address corruption as an obstacle to democratic stability, rule of law and social and economic development in South Eastern Europe maintains its high priority status in Swedish development co-operation with this region. Fight against corruption has been identified as one of Sida's strategic priorities and acted upon accordingly. Besides taking measures to mainstream corruption throughout its development co-operation portfolio, as a cross-sectoral issue, Sida is also supporting two projects specifically targeting corruption. These two projects shall be the subject of this evaluation: «Consolidated Anti-corruption Training and Publication Programme» and «PACO Impact: Implementation of Anti-corruption Plans in South Eastern Europe».

Consolidated Anti-Corruption Training and Publication Programme

Project Objectives

Sida has been supporting Consolidated Anti-Corruption Training and Publication Programme (*Project Nikolaj*) in Serbia and Montenegro since May 2003, with a total amount of 3,060,000 SEK. This project is being implemented by the Management Centre NGO during three years, until May 2006.

The project was designed with the overall objective to consolidate the initiatives on fighting corruption and assist their incorporation in the society as a longer-term control and capacity-building structure to halt corruption as a precondition for organised crime and equip government officials to conduct anti-corruption and anti-organised crime policy efficiently. It was to be accomplished by raising the awareness in relevant professions and government departments of the newest methodologies to fight corruption and advancing the skills and knowledge of the professionals who are naturally in the position to engage constructively in the fight against corruption.

Activities

The methodology used in Project Nikolaj was organised in two types of activities: courses in anti-corruption methodology and policy and publication of consolidated information and analytical essays on anti-corruption in The Pulse bimonthly.

PACO Impact: Implementation of Anti-corruption Plans in South Eastern Europe

Objectives

Sida has been supporting PACO Impact project since March 2004, with a total amount of 14,000,000 SEK. This project is being implemented by the Council of Europe and is operating on a regional basis. Sida's support was a result of positive experiences from earlier co-operation with the Council of Europe on an anti-corruption project in Albania. PACO Impact was designed to go on during two years, but the duration has been extended until 31 July 2006 upon request from the Council of Europe. The extended project implementation period is expected to provide enough space for all the activities to be carried out.

The overall objective of PACO Impact is to strengthen democracy and rule of law in South Eastern Europe through the prevention and control of corruption. It was designed to contribute to the implementation (and further elaboration) of anti-corruption plans in the countries of South Eastern Europe.

Due to the rather complex set-up of the project, it was agreed that a testing period was required in order to secure the overall implementation of the project. Accordingly, the contract allowed an inception phase of five months, during which a detailed work and time plan for project activities was to be developed. After the inception period, the Council of Europe came up with the Inception Report, which was adopted as the final Project Document. Sida also decided to procure the services of a Quality Group (QG), as a special resource with regards the continuous monitoring and follow-up of the performance of the project. The first task of the QG was to evaluate the Inception Report, give recommendations to Sida regarding the handling of all suggestions/changes proposed and come up with general suggestions for the continuation of the project. The QG reports will be made available to the Evaluation Mission by Sida Stockholm.

Activities

Activities implemented under PACO Impact varied from one project area to another, but can be classified into four main clusters, in accordance with their objectives: improvement and elaboration of anti-corruption plans, strengthening of institutional mechanisms for the monitoring and management of anti-corruption plans, provision of legal expertise in criminal legislation on corruption and support to pilot activities.

2. Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation

The objective is to evaluate the two projects in terms of achievement of project objectives, quality in implementation, results, cost effectiveness and lessons learned.

In addition it is also expected that the evaluation team will analyse the relevance of the projects in the portfolio of Sida in the Balkans. The Evaluation Mission is expected to inform themselves in detail about Sida's strategic priorities and use them as a point of departure in preparing the report to Sida, which should consist of a detailed evaluation of the two projects, a brief sector overview and input for the upcoming discussions concerning the preparation of possible second phase of the evaluated interventions.

Important stakeholders

Even though anti-corruption interventions relate to all layers of public and private life, government institutions are the most important stakeholders in both projects.

It will be important to carry out many interviews to find out both the level of political will and how the projects have been perceived.

To name a few: in Serbia, PACO Impact Country Project Director, who is also the Assistant Minister of Justice, the Anti-Corruption Council, the Financial Intelligence Unit at the Ministry of Finance, the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Organised Crime, the Department for Combating Organised Crime at the Ministry of Interior and a number of line ministry officials dealing with the issue of corruption on a daily basis. The Law Faculty can be added to this list and so can the Association of Judges.

In Montenegro, the main contact points are the Anti-Corruption Initiative Agency, the Ministry of Justice, the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Organised Crime and the Department for the Prevention of Economic Crime at the Ministry of Interior.

The Mission should also meet civil society representatives, such as Transparency International chapters in respective countries, the Group for Changes NGO in Montenegro, etc.

In the case of the evaluation of the Management Centre it will be important to also interview participants from the trainings to find out if and how they make use of the knowledge gained. Have they changed their behaviour in any way?

The list of contacts is attached to this document, but the Mission is expected to organise their visit independently from Sida (including interpretation services).

Timing of evaluation in relation to project phases

The evaluation is to be done during the final phase of both projects and take into account the future prospects for both interventions. It can be classified as an ex-post evaluation, since most of the activities in both projects will have been finalised by the time the evaluation takes place. Consequently, the evaluation is supposed to identify the factors of success or failure, assess the sustainability of results and impacts and draw conclusions that may inform other interventions.

Therefore, preferably the evaluation should be carried out as soon as possible.

3 The Assignment (issues to be covered)

- **Achievement of objectives (effectiveness):** Evaluate to what extent each one of these two projects respectively has achieved its objectives, taking their relative importance into account. Answer the following questions: To what extent do development changes in the target area accord with the planned outputs, purpose and goal of the evaluated interventions? To what extent is the identified development the result of the interventions rather than extraneous factor? What are the reasons for the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives? What can be or could have been done to make the interventions more effective?
- **Impact:** Evaluate the totality of the effects of each one of the two projects respectively, positive and negative, intended and unintended. Answer the following questions: What are the intended and unintended, positive and negative effects of the interventions on people, institutions and physical environment? How have the interventions affected different groups of stakeholders? What do beneficiaries and other stakeholders affected by the interventions perceive to be the effects of the interventions on themselves? To what extent do the interventions contribute to capacity development and strengthening of institutions? To what extent can changes that have occurred during the life span of the interventions/the period covered by the evaluation be identified and measured? To what extent can identified changes be attributed to the interventions? What would have occurred without the interventions? Have plausible alternative explanations for identified changes been considered and convincingly ruled out?
- **Relevance:** Evaluate to what extent each one of these two projects respectively conforms to the needs and priorities of target groups and the policies of recipient countries. Answer the following questions: Are the interventions well in tune with the development policies of the partner country government at national and regional levels? Are they consistent with the policy of supporting partner country ownership? Are the interventions technically adequate solutions to the development problem at hand? Do they eliminate the main causes of the problem? Do proposed innovations have a potential for replication? Are the interventions consistent and complementary with activities supported by other donor organisations?
- **Sustainability of results:** Evaluate the continuation or longevity of benefits from each of the two projects respectively after the cessation of development assistance. Answer the following questions: Are the interventions consistent with partners' priorities and effective demand? Are they supported by local institutions and well integrated with local social and cultural conditions? Are requirements of local ownership satisfied? Did partner country stakeholders participate in the planning and implementation of the interventions? Are relevant host-country institutions characterised by good govern-

ance, including effective management and organisation? Do partners have the financial capacity to maintain the benefits from the interventions when donor support has been withdrawn?

- **Efficiency:** Evaluate to what extent the cost of each one of the two projects respectively can be justified by its results, taking alternatives into account (analysis of resource allocations and budget utilisation). Answer the following questions: Have the evaluated interventions been managed with reasonable regard for efficiency? What measures have been taken during planning and implementation to ensure that resources are efficiently used? Could the interventions have been implemented with fewer resources without reducing the quality and quantity of the results? Could more of the same result have been produced with the same resources? Could an altogether different type of intervention have solved the same development problem but at a lower cost? Were the interventions economically worthwhile, given possible alternative uses of the available resources? Should the resources allocated to the interventions have been used for another, more worthwhile purpose?
- **Effects on target group (gender specific):** Evaluate to what extent gender has been mainstreamed in both projects (project impact on gender issues). Pay particular attention to *Gender and Corruption in South East Europe: Making and Impact report* done by the Council of Europe and submitted to Sida in September 2004.
- **Long term impact:** Evaluate the performance of each one of the projects from a long-term impact perspective. Specify the performance of the Management Centre, the Council of Europe and experts/consultants.
- **Cross-cutting issues:** Evaluate to what extent each one of the two projects respectively has mainstreamed the major cross-cutting issues (in addition to gender perspective): human rights, environment, sustainable project impact on local empowerment including outreaching activities towards the civil society and the public.
- Evaluate the co-operation and co-ordination with present structures and networks (GRECO, Stability Pact etc) for fighting corruption in the region and the use of a regional approach in the specific area of support (valid for PACO Impact).
- Evaluate the organisational set up of Management Center and the PACO Impact national Offices respectively
- In case of PACO Impact and specific Council of Europe methodology, evaluate the relevance of using a common standard for fighting corruption in the region and the use and performance of expert-centred method for legislation drafting.
- Evaluate the possibilities of adopting a harmonised approach with another donor(s), with a particular emphasis on EU CARDS 2006.
- Conduct any other relevant Sida request that can be reasonably done within the time frame of the mission.
- Provide Sida with recommendations regarding the possible continuation of support. Recommendations shall be stated briefly, clearly and in an analytical manner, with the expected results listed. Bear in mind that any possible new interventions must have a clear exit strategy. The recommendations can be directed to both Sida and the implementing partner. However, the recommendations are to be issued to Sida and the findings of the Mission are only to be discussed with other stakeholders following Sida's approval.

4. Methodology, Evaluation Team and Time Schedule

The Evaluation Mission shall comprise of one or two individuals. Possibly one expert on corruption issues and one expert on capacity development.

The total duration of the assignment could be approximately 6 weeks (1 week planning, 3 weeks in the field, 2 weeks writing the report) preferably conducted in May and June 2006.

Following discussions with Sida Stockholm, the Evaluation Mission shall visit local project offices of the Management Centre and Council of Europe in Serbia and Montenegro and a few countries in the region covered by Sida interventions to meet with various stakeholders. The choice of countries to be visited can be liaised with the local project offices of Sida's implementing partners. The Mission can also liaise with them regarding the recommended contacts. A trip to Strasbourg, the seat of the Council of Europe, might be beneficial in providing a detailed overview of the PACO Impact project from the point of view of project management.

Sida Stockholm shall provide the Mission with the background information they will need to carry out the assignment. The Mission is expected to meet the Embassy of Sweden/Sida Belgrade in the beginning of the mission in the Region, for introduction and initial briefing. The Embassy of Sweden/Sida Belgrade cannot provide the Evaluation Mission with a full logistical support during their visit. Assistance can be provided to the Mission in arranging the transportation from/to the airport and in booking a hotel reservation in Belgrade, Serbia and Montenegro, during the visit. However, the Embassy of Sweden/Sida Belgrade might accompany the Mission during parts of their visit.

5. Reporting

The evaluation report shall be written in English and should not exceed 40 pages, excluding annexes. Format and outline of the report shall follow the guidelines in *Sida Evaluation Report – a Standardised Format* (see Annex 1). The draft report shall be submitted to Sida electronically and in 2 hardcopies (air-/surface mailed or delivered) no later than July 30 2006. The Team-leader shall in addition present the evaluation recommendations to Sida-HQ during a meeting in Stockholm. Within 2 weeks after receiving Sida's comments on the draft report, a final version shall be submitted to Sida, again electronically and in 4 hardcopies. The evaluation report must be presented in a way that enables publication without further editing. Subject to decision by Sida, the report will be published in the series *Sida Evaluations*.

The evaluation assignment includes the completion of *Sida Evaluations Data Work Sheet* (Annex 2), including an *Evaluation Abstract* (final section, G) as defined and required by DAC. The completed Data Worksheet shall be submitted to Sida along with the final version of the report. Failing a completed Data Worksheet, the report cannot be processed.

Appendix 2 List of Interviewees

Centre for Security Studies

Ms Aleksandra Bulatovic, Director

Institute of International Politics and Economics

Professor Aleksandar Fatic, Project Director of Nikolaj

Mr Srdjan Korac, Assistant Editor Pulse magazine

Institute of Modern History

Mr Goran Antonic, Editorial Board member

Ministry of Interior

Mr Mile Novakovic, Project Team

University of Belgrade, Law faculty

Mr Miodrag Jovanovic, Project Team

Institute of Political Studies

Mr Mijodrag Radojevic, Editorial Board member

Graduates of anti-corruption specialisation courses

Ms Maja Sandic, European Agency for Reconstruction

Mr Slobodan Kopricvica, Oil Industry Jugopetrol

Mr Veselin Djordjevic, Treasury Unit, Ministry of Finance

Mr Nebojsa Pantelic, Office of Inspector General, Ministry of Interior

Mr Milovan Milovanovic, Directorate for Anti-Money-Laundering, Ministry of Finance

Appendix 3 Measuring of Corruption

Perception

This approach is based on an assumption that the perceptions of population or specific groups about corruption are associated with the actual level or pattern of corruption with sufficient accuracy.

The assumption runs that general population or certain groups such as business people have sufficiently accurate knowledge about corruption in their societies or specific areas of expertise.

Strengths: The key benefit of this approach is the ease of measurement. It is possible to formulate straightforward questions without fearing – at least in most cases – that respondents would not be willing to give sincere answers.

Weaknesses: The basic assumption on the association between the perception and actual corruption must be qualified by a number of factors. Moreover the extent to which these qualifications apply cannot be easily established with accuracy. A major qualification is that factors such as media coverage of specific corruption scandals may excessively amplify popular perceptions about the overall level of corruption, i.e. create the so-called noise. This factor may inflate the perception relative to the actual occurrence of corruption. Another qualification may lead to opposite distortions and has to do with the highly secretive nature of corrupt transactions, which may contribute to the underestimation of corruption in people's perception. This may be particularly relevant for types of corruption remote from the common population (e.g. political corruption rather than everyday administrative corruption) in countries with restricted media freedom.

Experience

Asking people about their actual experiences of corruption is a major alternative to measuring perceptions. The approach is more straightforward, i.e. if one is interested in corruption, this is what he or she asks for.

Strengths: On the face of it, this approach appears to be a more valid measurement of corruption. The responses that one receives cover indeed corruption itself. By and large one would not expect such results to inflate the actual level of corruption because a respondent is unlikely to admit, for example, giving a bribe within a certain period of time if, in reality, he or she has not done so.

Ref: Valts Kalnins: «Assessing trends in corruption and impact of anti-corruption measures» Discussion Paper from The Anti-Corruption Network for Transition Economies, 2005

Weaknesses: The major limitations of this approach are the likelihood of deflated findings and receiving a skewed picture of corruption patterns. The possible deflation is due to the usually illegal and morally objectionable character of corruption; hence respondents may report more limited experience than actual. A common remedy for this limitation is posing questions, which do not require outright admission of own wrongdoings. Thus the researcher would receive some kind of mixed measurement of quazi-experience/quazi-perception. Overall this approach allows one to achieve findings, which allow for the conclusion that the actual level of corruption is equal or higher than the results of measurement.

The skewed patterns of corruption are due to the fact that for some forms of corruption it is easier and for some more difficult to select experienced and sincere respondents (those who experience regular extortion by fire safety inspectors or police officers are more likely to reveal their experience than those who have secured for themselves a few major corrupt deals with high government officials). Also those who experience corruption as mutually profitable, finely calculated transactions are unlikely to reveal their experience (directly or even indirectly) to researchers. Such type of corruption is, for example,

corrupt collusion between lawyers and judges in some countries or bribery of tax officials for reasons of tax evasion.

Beliefs and values

Another approach found in corruption studies is the measurement of certain beliefs or values, which are thought to be associated with corruption or lack thereof. In a sense this is the loosest of the three approaches discussed so far because what one measures is not corruption or any of its attributes (such as perception) at all. Examples of such beliefs or values are trust in public institutions and social relationships at large, sense of solidarity, respect for the rule of law, etc.

Strengths: Under a certain set of circumstances, such measurements may allow one to make some specific judgements about corruption situation. One of the most commonly measured attitudes is trust in public institutions. The assumption runs that people would not trust a corrupt public institution. So if an agency enjoys a high degree of trust, it is reasonable to assume that it is at least relatively free of corruption.

Weaknesses: This approach is probably less accurate than the previous ones due to at least two reasons. It is probably true that more often trust in public institutions is associated with certain cleanness thereof but no evidence suggests that this association holds universally. The world has seen examples where corrupt rulers have managed to maintain a considerable degree of public trust and legitimacy for extended periods of time (although usually not indefinite). Moreover people may trust in certain agencies purely out of ignorance, particularly in circumstances of limited media freedom. In other words trust may prove to be nothing more than a perpetual positive stereotype.

Even when there are grounds to claim that high trust is associated with cleanness, it is virtually impossible to conclude (without additional evidence anyway) that low trust is associated with high corruption. Public agencies may lack trust not only because of corruption but also because of lack of expertise or technical capacity within these agencies, i.e. distrust is likely to stem from the inability of an agency to ensure satisfactory performance and the poor performance may in turn be explained by a lot more factors than just corruption.

Service and sector assessments

This approach is partly analogous to customer satisfaction surveys and service quality assessments by clients commonly applied in private business.

Strengths: It is a suitable approach in situations when one wants to measure corruption in a specific agency or specific area of government activity, which involves extensive contacts with citizens (or clients in business language). The approach is based on an assumption that the more satisfied the clients, the less corrupt is the service provider. As in the case of trust measurement, it is easier to conclude that an agency is relatively clean of corruption. In the opposite case (corrupt agency) one is likely to obtain rather opaque evidence of something being wrong with the agency (unless the study is supplemented with inquiry into experiences of corruption directly). Overall this method is more suitable for measuring corruption within specific agencies or specific areas of government activity rather than within the country overall.

Weaknesses: Importantly, the accuracy of this approach strongly depends on the predominant form of corruption. Assessments of the service quality or client satisfaction may serve as indicators of corruption when the respondents are likely to perceive themselves as victims of corruption, e.g. when corruption represents primarily an extra cost. Where corruption is viewed as a benefit more than a cost, these assessments will not measure corruption because (1) more corruption will not lead to less satisfaction and (2) less corruption will not necessarily lead to more satisfaction with the service. This would be the case where, for example, bribery provides an escape from a legally deserved penalty.

Governance indicators

This approach focuses on the outputs of government activities and assumes that government performance in some significant ways is associated with the level of corruption. Particularly, the World Bank has focused on governance indicators⁴. As a tool to measure corruption, this method does not appear universally developed and widespread so far. However, it could serve as a significant validator of other measurements of corruption.

One way to use this approach is to focus at services provided by the government and associated cost. The price that the government pays for certain goods and services may be compared to a corresponding price in the private market or in other countries. An inflated price may serve as an indicator of corrupt or inefficient procurement while efficient delivery (value-for money purchases) will in most cases imply relatively clean procurement.

Another way is to focus at such governance indicators, which cross-nationally tend to correlate with the levels of corruption. Such indicators may be, for example, public expenditure as percentage of GDP for areas of governance, which are very important for populations (health or education) but which may provide relatively smaller corrupt returns if compared to, for example, large infrastructure and construction projects.

Strengths: This approach provides empirically observable indicators, which can be measured with a high degree of accuracy. It may serve as a method to validate already existing other data on corruption.

Weaknesses: The use of governance indicators have not developed as a well-established method for measuring corruption, yet. Moreover it is often difficult to conclude from such indicators alone that a country has a certain level of corruption. If, for example, a country X has a considerably lower public expenditure as percentage of GDP for education than in comparable other countries, it may mean that a corrupt government is to blame but it could as well be a deliberate political choice based on grounds other than corruption.

Associated social phenomena

The search for the validations of existing corruption measurement approaches has lead to explorations into what other social phenomena are associated with corruption. The rationale here is that corruption is strongly correlated with other kinds of behaviour that are less hidden and therefore measurable with greater accuracy. One example of this approach is measuring of the rate of underreporting of crime, which appears strongly correlated with the levels of corruption. Other possible phenomena might be tax evasion or smuggling but no well-established statistical correlations between these and corruption are known.

Strengths: The key strength of this approach is similar to that of using governance indicators. Namely, it provides empirically observable indicators, which can be measured with a high degree of accuracy (higher than that of measuring corruption anyway). It may serve as a method to validate already existing other data on corruption.

Weaknesses: This approach is hardly suitable as a self-standing indicator of the level of corruption particularly if one aims at measuring corruption within a single country rather than constructing cross-national indices. This is because a certain phenomenon may produce a significant association with corruption cross-nationally but within one country the establishment of, for example, a certain level of crime underreporting or smuggling alone is not sufficient for judgments about the level of corruption of some accuracy.

⁴ Kaufmann, D. Kraay, A. Mastruzzi, M. Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996–2004. The World Bank (2005) <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters4.html>

Indirect measuring of corruption and monitoring tools

Risk assessment

When governments want to know the state of affairs in terms of corruption, in order to develop new policies, often among the first steps is the identifications of corruption risks and assessment thereof. The latter would produce data, which particularly if combined with evidence of actual corruption, would provide a fairly accurate understanding of corruption situation. Since comprehensive identification and assessment of corruption risks require a certain deal of internal information about the operation of an agency in question, this is an approach most usually used by governments rather than by NGOs or other external parties.

The identification and assessment of corruption risks does not answer questions: how much corruption there is, what kind of corruption there is, how corruption affects the functioning of the agency in question and what broader consequences corruption has. Instead risk assessment does allow one to obtain answers regarding: the likelihood of specific types of corruption; the probable consequences of corruption.⁵

While the rule “if corruption can happen, it will happen” does not always hold, answers to the above questions, if combined with, for example, survey data, can also provide a fairly accurate picture of the actual extent and pattern of corruption.

Checklists

Several frameworks for the assessment of the state of affairs of governments’ anticorruption policies have been developed, some accepted by national governments as guidelines and some constantly monitored. Some of the most well-known are the Twenty Guiding Principles for the Fight against Corruption of the Council of Europe and the National Integrity Systems developed by Transparency International. EUMAP, a program of the Open Society Institute, developed own comprehensive methodology in the form of a checklist for the review of corruption and anticorruption policies in ten accession countries to the European Union (assessments published in 2002).⁶

Principles or questions included in such assessment frameworks are not usually focused exclusively on the formal existence of certain rules or agencies but overall one can say that they tend to be better suited for the mapping of the formal institutional framework rather than its actual working.

It is important to note that checklists usually focus on what governments openly do as part of their anticorruption policies rather than on corruption itself. So this method is hardly suitable for measuring the ultimate success or failure of anticorruption efforts in terms of changes in the occurrence of corruption. Also while international best practices do give reasonable grounds for associating certain institutional mechanism with reduction in corruption, it also true that across countries people within similar formal institutional frameworks still behave differently. Some of the cleanest countries in the world have limited formal safeguards against corruption while some highly corrupt governments keep on their corrupt business in the presence of extensive anticorruption laws.

The strength of such guidelines or checklists is that each of them combines in a single framework the key principles and measures, which are widely believed to be effective in countering corruption. While these checklists have clearly proved their relevance for getting a general sense of the quality of governments’ anticorruption policies, they also have their limitations.

⁵ Vadlīnijas iestādes pretkorupcijas pasākumu plāna izstrādei. (Guidelines for the preparation of an agency’s plan of anti-corruption activities). The Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau. Unpublished document.

⁶ EUMAP reports are available here: <http://www.eumap.org/reports/2002/corruption/> Last accessed on May 13, 2005.

The limitations lie in that they attempt to provide a one-size-fits-all approach to different countries and, since they attempt to capture multiple key sectors and aspects of anticorruption measures, they are necessarily built on a relatively high level of abstraction. The former is a limitation because not all aspects of anticorruption policy are covered by universally agreed international standards and because various factors – economic, political, and cultural – differ from country to country leading to situations where people act differently within similar institutional frameworks. The latter is a limitation because the famous saying *the devil is in the detail* fully applies to anticorruption policies. Thus it is often not enough to know that a country X has an apparently elaborate conflict of interest law. Instead it is important to know whether the implementation mechanism of the law is logically elaborated to sufficient detail, whether the implementing officials are capable and motivated to apply the law, whether in reality the law captures the types of official behaviour that one wishes to exterminate with the help of such law, etc.

The above signals a possible need to elaborate more focused checklists, which are relevant for specific segments of anticorruption policies (rather than for a grand anticorruption policy as a whole) and which are relevant for particular groups of countries, which share some important commonalities. Thus countries whose governments possess relatively large resources may make use of rather resource intensive measures while more poor countries will need primarily measures that consume lower amount of resources, e.g. sophisticated electronic governance systems may be a good option for more affluent countries while more poor countries might need easier physical access of citizens to public authorities.

Statistics and formal reporting

Governments usually compile some statistical data on the incidence of corruption. Sometimes these data are portrayed as indications of the level and patterns of corruption. Since statistics is often based exclusively on well-established legal facts, this measure may achieve unparalleled validity if one is interested in officially detected corruption.

What is sometimes neglected is the invalidity of official statistics of corruption incidence if the full corruption picture is the object of interest. The revealed cases of corruption are usually just the tip of an iceberg. Moreover it is usually difficult to establish a correlation between the number of revealed corruption cases and the actual corruption situation. Thus we never know whether an increased number of revealed corruption cases means an increase in the actual level of corruption or it means that a higher share of all corruption cases is revealed (unless supplemented by additional evidence). Similarly, if the official number of detected corruption cases is very small, it is impossible to establish from the statistics alone whether this figure reflects the overall low level of corruption or the low rate of detection.

Analysis of implementation of anticorruption measures

Checklists and official reports usually provide a standardized framework for feedback and accountability. Nevertheless such sources are at times incapable of reflecting the full fabric of the state of affairs in a given sector, which is vulnerable to corruption. Therefore it may be necessary to carry out in-depth analysis of policy implementation in specific areas.⁷ Among criteria, which may be applied, are effectiveness and relevance. Effectiveness here looks at whether a specific measure produces a change/impact while relevance applies to whether the achieved change/impact serves the broader policy aims and stakeholders' expectancies.

⁷ For a smaller piece of analysis on the implementation of conflict of interest regulations in Latvia, see chapter II of the following paper: Kalniņš, V. Čigāne, L. *On the Road toward a More Honest Society: The Latest Trends in Anti-Corruption Policy in Latvia*. The Latvian Institute of International Affairs (2003). http://www.lai.lv/9on_the_road_to.doc Last accessed on May 13, 2003.

Policy implementation analysis is a broad subject, which cannot be entirely dealt with here. However, it is clear that implementation analysis is greatly facilitated if policy makers have built in observable success indicators already when formulating and adopting the policy. For example, when reforming judiciary, it is worthwhile to foresee a procedure whereby judicial practice shall be compiled and analyzed for quality, e.g. by the Supreme Court.

However, even if such built-in indicators are missing, implementation can still be analyzed and evaluated. For example, the effectiveness of a policy may be detected by looking whether the introduction of a new regulation or practice corresponds to any change in measurable outputs of an agency. For example, if you introduce the rotation of officials and if the commencement of such rotation correlates to any changes in outputs of an agency, e.g. if rotation of customs officials is followed by an increase in customs revenues, chances are that previous officials were not up to their duties because of either corruption or other reasons and that your new measure has been effective.

Relevance, in turn, might be assessed through interviewing stakeholders who have an interest in the execution of a respective public policy. For example, business people who are required to obtain licenses and their clients are likely to be a good source of information on whether changes in the licensing system have brought about any good

Internal indicators of corruption

Internal indicators of corruption are those, which are typically used for reasons of internal control within agencies. The direct purpose of internal control is to ensure confidence in that an agency's objectives are being attained. Internal control is not only about controlling corruption but the accountability of employees/officials, the effectiveness of their activities and the trustworthiness of financial accounts all are elements, which are both essential for internal control and usually undermined when corruption occurs.

For purposes of government's self assessment (again specific objectives – assessment of corruption patterns and level, assessment of corruption vulnerabilities, assessment of the effectiveness of anticorruption mechanisms) a whole range of internal control indicators may be used.

Some of these approaches are often presented as methods for the detection and investigation of crimes such as corruption and fraud. Within the context of this paper, these detection methods are viewed as overlapping with the measurement of corruption or likelihood thereof. In many countries with relatively underdeveloped investigatory practice, such indicators are of limited use for investigation but they at least may give a better idea of how much and what kind of corruption is likely to take place in reality.

Audit⁸

Audits differ in their focus. One can distinguish at least three types of audits:

- a financial audit,
- a general performance audit, and
- a performance audit focused specifically on ethics (or anti-corruption for that matter) related requirements.⁹

None of the types of audits is intended as a tool to measure corruption per se. Rather they are often thought of as tools of deterrence of misconduct and data sources for investigators (primarily financial audits) or tools for assessing the performance of agencies (primarily general and focused performance audits).

⁸ The drafting of part 3.6. was facilitated by kind assistance of Mr. Sébastien Lanthier.

⁹ The latter two borrowed from: Public Sector Integrity: *A Framework for Assessment*. GOV/PGC(2005)3. OECD, March 11, 2005. P.70.

Financial audit (be it done by state or private auditors) is not usually perceived as a tool to monitor the state of corruption or government performance against corruption. Instead, in the context of anticorruption, it is first and foremost conceived as a weapon against corruption and a potent deterrent to waste and abuse of public funds.¹⁰

Nevertheless, for example, adequate ex ante controls of commitments and payments as well as ex post audits of government income and expenditures not only promote good governance and guarantee financial integrity but also provide data, which allows one to get the sense of patterns of probable irregularities such as fraud and corruption. For an audit to be effective, it is important that there are developed standards for transparency in day-to-day public operations and output measures, which provide a baseline against which outside reviewers or agencies themselves can assess their activities.¹¹ Review may also extend outside pure financial auditing of income and expenditure and stretch as far as assessing the very public policies, for which money is spent.

General and focused performance audits may have the integrity of public agencies as either one of their areas of interest (general performance audits) or as their primary focus (focused performance audits). This kind of audits pertains to evaluating not so much financial documents, but more to evaluating the presence and performance of, for example, ethics programs and codes, transparency in procurement and other relevant processes, co-ordination amongst “ethics” agencies, relevant reporting requirements, etc. Performance audits, which are focused on ethics measures, are basically straightforward performance reviews for ethics measures. As such they resemble implementation analysis but the latter is usually more focused on the implementation of particular policies and often takes the form of a study rather than a review process.

¹⁰ See, for example: Guidelines for the Status Reports. Endorsed by the Advisory Group for the Anti-Corruption Network for Transition Economies. September 10, 2003.

¹¹ See: *Public Sector Integrity: A Framework for Assessment*. GOV/PGC(2005)3. OECD, March 11, 2005. P.72.

Appendix 4 Abbreviations

CSS	Centre for Security Studies
CoE	Council of Europe
FIU	Financial Investigation Unit
GRECO	Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
MONEYVAL	Anti-Money Laundering Measurers
NGO	Non Governmental Office
NIKOLAJ	Consolidated Anti-corruption training and publication programme
OGG	Advisory Office of Good Governances, Human Rights and Equal Opportunities and Gender Issues
PACO Impact	Implementation of Anti-corruption plans in South Eastern Europe
SAP	Stabilisation and Accession process
SAP	Stabilisation and Association Process
SPAI	Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative

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