

Reconciliation and Development Program (REDES)

**Sida – UNDP Partnership for Peace
in Colombia 2003–2006**

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Department for Latin America

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Sida Evaluation 07/37

Department for Latin America

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Executive Summary

In November 2003, Sida and UNDP signed a *Partnership for Peace in Colombia* for a period of three years to support the Reconciliation and Development Program (REDES). The partnership aims to address eight impediments to sustainable development and peace in Colombia, which perpetuate violent conflict, inequality and exclusion of vulnerable groups: i) armed conflict, ii) unequal distribution of economic and political power; iii) weak democratic institutions; iv) increasing poverty; v) unequal distribution of land; vi) impunity and human rights violations; vii) humanitarian rights violations and viii) trafficking of illegal drugs.

REDES' philosophy is to promote reconciliation and development initiatives in violent conflict zones involving all stakeholders, with the aim of rebuilding fragmented communities, strengthening weakened democratic institutions, reviving traditional social networks, restoring relations between local government and civil society, countering corruption, ending practices of coercion and impunity, and providing viable economic livelihood alternatives. REDES: acts in partnership with civil society, government and the private sector; promotes human rights and public policy and changes in practice in all its programs; and works simultaneously at local, regional and national level.

The purpose of this evaluation was to provide UNDP, Sida and other REDES donor agencies with an assessment and recommendations vis-à-vis REDES' focus, progress, organizational and structural issues, as well as to distil lessons learned and best practices. The review assessed whether the REDES interventions have contributed to reducing the impact of violence on communities and the most vulnerable groups and how development and peace building projects could be successfully initiated in two conflict ridden regions, Montes de Maria and Meta. The evaluation process served as a platform for dialogue for all REDES beneficiaries and stakeholders to influence future agenda and cooperation areas for the Sida/UNDP Colombia partnership (2007–10).

The evaluation concluded that the REDES program is highly strategic with a clear focus on finding solutions to the key problems and bottlenecks impeding sustainable development and peace in Colombia. REDES creates new spaces for multi stakeholder participation to promote regional and national development debates, in which the voices of the most vulnerable groups -historically excluded- are fairly represented. Its empowerment strategies for marginalized people consist of reviving traditional networks, building capacity and providing accompaniment, which facilitates their inclusion in new participatory governance processes. As a result, UNDP plays a unique role in the Colombian conflict context, as REDES is the only UN program that champions a development and peace building approach in poor zones deeply affected by the armed conflict. REDES attempts to structurally transform public policies and practices at a local, regional and national level, whereas most aid agencies remain stuck in the humanitarian service delivery mode.

REDES has laid out a series of strategies that have proved to be effective in initiating development and reconciliation projects in the midst of armed conflict. This evaluation highlights five REDES best practices that sum up the success of the program in the regions and that require more in-depth documentation to provide possible models for UNDP programs operating in other conflict environments:

- A presence in the development and peace processes at local and regional level
- Revival of local civil society organizations to (re)build social capital and cohesion
- Fostering of alliances between local government–civil society to begin restoring confidence
- Facilitation of local dialogue and protection initiatives with vulnerable groups, particularly successful among youth and peasant farmers

- Linking local initiatives to national public policy agendas and vice versa to promote structural transformation and CPR awareness (e.g. landmine awareness and prevention).
- Use of international leverage in regional programs.

The evaluation has identified six common characteristics from the analysis of these practices, which may well explain their achievements:

- i) Political vision
- ii) Political commitment to accompany risky dialogue processes
- iii) In-depth knowledge of conflict and stakeholder interests
- iv) Participatory, multi-stakeholder involvement
- v) Identification and engagement of local leadership
- vi) Rights based development orientation (inclusion and equality).

At the same time, REDES experiences a number of serious limitations that harbor some intrinsic weaknesses. The evaluation highlighted four problem areas:

- Impunity and lack of good governance in deadly conflict zones
- National level political institutional and advocacy engagement
- Internal UNDP program coordination and CPR mainstreaming
- Limited donor communication and lack of coordination.

Two sets of recommendations were formulated to provide advice to REDES and its stakeholders in designing the next phase:

a. Strengthen the REDES development strategy

- Right to Development and Human Security: elaborate REDES strategies to include the rights' based development approach and human security dimensions
- Apply good governance criteria in Civil Society Organizations (CSO) partner monitoring to strengthen sustainability of the social networks (representation, accountability, transparency and democratization)
- Introduce Small Grants Fund to CSOs in regional programs to facilitate small livelihood and social cohesion projects and increase beneficiary ownership of regional programs
- Restructure and reduce lines of action, by grouping and strategically linking them to objectives
- Promote and accompany specific vulnerable group organizations, e.g. displaced people, women in vulnerable positions, indigenous and Afro-Colombian people; and promote representation and participation of these vulnerable groups in work of all CSO partners.

b. Mainstream human rights focus

- Mainstream human rights issues and change agents in REDES regional programs, for example through community conflict resolution projects in collaboration with the “justices of peace” and “*conciliadores en equidad*” (impartial conciliators); HR and conflict resolution training for mayors.

- Gender equality: develop gender equality analysis and include “prevention of violence against women” strategies in all programs
- Truth, justice and reconciliation: focus on having a presence in the processes of reconstruction of the truth and access to justice, strengthening victim organizations at local and national level, and advocacy for international standards in the NRCC process.

c. Role of REDES in UNDP Colombia

- Include the REDES approach in UNDP Colombia’s new territorial strategy to increase program coherence and consistency in funding, coordination and CPR approach among UNDP Colombia’s development programs
- Strengthen national level advocacy with political players and vice versa to establish national peace and development debates in the regions, and to connect local and national agendas
- Systematize best practice collection within UNDP and wider UN community and clarify concepts and methodology of best practice documentation with SURF and HDU etc.
- Choose ten indicators that reflect REDES achievement in overcoming peace impediments

d. Secure and enhance sustainability of REDES achievements in the next phase

- Develop an exit strategy for REDES in MM and Meta for next program phase
- Produce overarching REDES strategy, justifying differences between MM and Meta
- Decentralize program management, increase staff presence in the field
- Additional selection and preparation criteria for new REDES regional programs
- Develop a sustainable budget plan in line with the unique REDES socio-political strategy
- Promote an in-country UN mini-reform by piloting experimental, lean UNDP procedures and innovative inter-agency partnerships.

Recommendations to REDES in relation to other players:

e. Strengthen dialogue with national government institutions

- Develop peace advocacy dialogue with key peace stakeholders (like the DP, PGN)
- Develop a unified strategy to interact with government departments and local entities; to this end REDES needs to improve its external communication tools and formulate a public information strategy to promote the REDES message
- Seek broader institutional support for REDES good governance initiatives, such as: signing of good governance pacts; citizens’ participation in planning and budgeting of municipal development plans; and fostering ongoing dialogues between state and civil society.

f. International leverage on national level political advocacy processes

- Step up high level political advocacy support involving UNDP leadership to promote good governance and peaceful resolution of the conflict at a national level
- Increase UNDP and International Community involvement in national level advocacy for public policy change (with for example the High Commissioner for Peace) to complement the regional efforts to build a new governance tradition from the bottom upwards

- Strategically position REDES in UN community, e.g. through participation in four inter-agency working groups and by launching a clear CPR communication strategy.

g. Improve communication and coordination among REDES donor agencies

- Form a donor consortium and consider institutional funding to reduce project planning, monitoring and reporting burden on REDES administration
- Continue the good donor partnership practice and “political accompaniment” and actively support REDES’ good governance, development and peace advocacy at national level advocacy to change public policy and create a culture of peace in Colombia.

1. Introduction

1.1 Rationale

In November 2003, Sida and UNDP signed a “Partnership for Peace in Colombia” for a period of three years that ends in December 2006 (Decision RELA 130/03 y 2005-003592). The partnership aims to address the eight impediments to sustainable development and peace in Colombia, which perpetuate the processes of violent conflict and the exclusion of vulnerable groups, i.e. i) armed conflict, ii) unequal distribution of economic and political power; iii) weak democratic institutions; iv) increasing poverty; v) unequal distribution of land; vi) impunity and human rights violations; vii) humanitarian rights violations and viii) trafficking of illegal drugs.

During 2003, UNDP Colombia published an acclaimed Human Development Report, facilitated the London multi-stakeholder development and peace dialogue and conceived the *Reconciliación y Desarrollo* (Reconciliation and Development – REDES) initiative in partnership with BCPR and Sida, in an attempt to initiate development and peace initiatives in poor rural zones deeply affected and divided by the protracted civil conflict. By the end of the year, the REDES program was launched in three regions (Montes de Maria, Meta and Oriente Antioqueño) for a period of three years and a total accumulated budget of ten million USD.

The REDES philosophy is to promote reconciliation and development initiatives in conflict zones involving multiple stakeholders with the aim of rebuilding fragmented communities, strengthening weak democratic institutions, reviving traditional social networks, restoring relations between local government and civil society, countering corruption, ending practices of coercion and lawlessness and providing viable economic livelihood alternatives. REDES acts in partnership with civil society, government, the private sector and other UN agencies; it emphasizes human rights and public policy and practice changes in all its programs and works simultaneously at a local, regional and national level.

The purpose of the evaluation is to provide UNDP/REDES, Sida and other REDES donor agencies with an assessment of and recommendations on REDES’ focus, progress, organizational and structural issues, as well as to distil lessons learned and best practices. The review was to assess whether the REDES programs have contributed to reducing the impact of violence on communities and vulnerable groups and how development and peace building projects were successfully initiated in two conflict ridden regions, Montes de Maria and Meta. The evaluation process served as a platform for dialogue for REDES stakeholders to discuss future program and cooperation priorities in Sida and UNDP Colombia partnership (2007–10). REDES beneficiaries, from local counterparts, government, CSOs and community leaders to regional and national recipients and REDES, participated in the evaluation. Lastly, the evaluation analyzed impact indicators and provided recommendations to consolidate REDES achievements in the next phase.

The Terms of Reference (ToR) formulated five specific objectives of the evaluation (see Annex 1):

1. To systematize methodologies and their impact on the generation of development and peace building initiatives, as formulated and promoted by REDES.
2. To identify and analyze the achieved results vis-à-vis the set REDES program objectives.
3. To identify best practices and weaknesses in the various development and peace initiatives, and advise how REDES can consolidate and sustain its achievements.
4. To analyze the REDES impact from a national perspective.
5. To analyze the capacity generated and catalyzed by REDES and identify which process aspects contributed most to meeting the set objectives.

1.2 Evaluation Methodology

The mission collected data in Bogotá, Montes de Maria and Meta from August 13 to September 5, which was followed by eight days of writing and analysis. The team consisted of three members: Maria Camila Moreno (anthropologist, IDPs and human rights), Anders Rudqvist (sociologist, methodology and Colombia analyst) and Elisabeth Scheper (regional planner, conflict prevention, program management, and team leader).

To assess the overall relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the program, the team reviewed REDES programs through a desk review of background documents, workshops and meetings with REDES and UNDP staff, key donors and local and international implementation partners. Concurrently, the team conducted a host of interviews with beneficiaries at local, regional and national level (at intermediary and target group level; in individual and focus group settings) and observed a wide variety of ongoing program activities in Montes de Maria (MM) and Meta (i.e. (*Mesas Humanitarias* Humanitarian Round Tables), zonal youth committee meetings, *Noche Monte Mariana* (cultural night time celebration in Montes de Maria), *Consejos Regionales de Empleo* (Regional Councils for Employment), alternative development program planning meetings with small-scale coca growers and a field visit to coca-producing areas in Meta etc).

The consultations included five sets of stakeholders: i) beneficiaries; ii) reference groups; iii) local, national and international counterparts; iv) UNDP staff and management; and v) other UN agencies. The team analyzed and documented five key regional and local processes:

- i) Community organizations and social networks
- ii) Local government initiatives
- iii) Humanitarian Round Tables and Regional Councils for Employment
- iv) Participatory public policy advocacy (PDPs)
- v) Network of communicators.

At national level, the team reviewed REDES' involvement in five initiatives:

- i) National public policy change with *NPD* and *Acción Social*
- ii) Post-Cartagena process and G24
- iii) Peace Laboratory III
- iv) National Commission on Reparations and Reconciliation
- v) Landmine Action

In addition, the team assessed REDES' crisis prevention and recovery (CPR) mainstreaming efforts in UNDP, in the wider UN system and among national and local counterparts.

To assess the effectiveness of the REDES program at the national level, the team evaluated the alliance building and advocacy efforts to influence public policy by documenting and reviewing:

- i) Recognition of REDES and its partners' work by national and international players;
- ii) Frequency and nature of advocacy interactions at national level facilitated by REDES, especially the interaction between civil society and government at the national level;

- iii) Effectiveness of advocating for public policy changes, both in terms of actual changes, generated capacity of civil society and quality of advocacy messages and supporting documents (including mainstreaming the CPR agenda at the national level);
- iv) Sharing and accessibility of best practices data generated through the REDES experience.

The regional and national REDES' programs were reviewed using its strategic framework (communities, alliances, public policy and knowledge); expected direct and indirect results were evaluated on their contribution towards overcoming the four main conflict and violence impediments at a regional level: fragmented communities, weak democratic institutions, coercion and despair, and weak rule of law and illicit drug-trafficking; and gender equality aspects. Two key beneficiary REDES were documented: the youth REDES to protect and prevent recruitment in Montes de Maria and the peasant farmer cooperatives working on alternative income generation to replace illicit crop cultivation in Meta. Lastly, the team conducted individual interviews with all REDES program staff to review job descriptions, discuss self assessments and identify human resource bottlenecks. In addition, the team met with the UNDP Human Development Unit and the regional SURF staff to discuss documentation and dissemination practices of the lessons learned and best practices to formulate recommendations for REDES' monitoring and evaluation unit.

Various limitations were encountered during the evaluation process. REDES had not collected systematic data on its social mobilization processes, nor does a baseline exist from the start of the program phase. Furthermore, REDES annual reports and thematic project documents present output data, but provide few insights into direct and indirect results, while the REDES knowledge management unit had not yet documented good practices. In absence of these data, and in view of the complex nature of the program in a violent conflict context, it was not possible to assess the impact of the REDES program in the span of only three weeks. Annex 2 contains the mission's full agenda, while annex 3 provides more elaborate reflection on methodological limitations and concepts used in this evaluation. The team would like to express gratitude to the REDES team for organizing and accompanying our many field trips, for their open and responsive attitude and for their warm and cheerful hospitality that made the mission a memorable and cultural experience.

The report is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 sets out the rationale of the evaluation and its methodology. Chapter 2 presents a brief conflict context, the preparatory phase of the REDES program and REDES program outline. Chapter 3 records the findings of the REDES work in three clusters: regional development and peace programs, the role of REDES in national level peace processes, and REDES planning, monitoring and knowledge management systems, impact assessment, knowledge management and CPR mainstreaming. Chapter 4 draws conclusions about the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the program and highlights lessons learned, both positive (best practices) and negative (threats and weaknesses). In conclusion, Chapter 5 provides two sets of recommendations to the REDES management and its key partners.

2. Conflict and REDES Response

2.1 Conflict Statement

2.1.1 Conflict analysis

Colombia has been the stage of violent conflict since the 1940s, when two long standing political parties (*Partido Liberal* (Liberal Party) and *Partido Conservador* (Conservative Party)) entered into an armed political confrontation. Each party mobilized its own militias, which operated mainly in rural areas. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, these embryonic self-defense peasant farmer groups were transformed into guerrilla movements, which aggravated the political conflict. During the period known as *La Violencia* (1948–1965) alone, app. 180,000 persons were killed. In the 1980s, the violence further intensified when paramilitary groups moved into the guerrilla controlled territories. Various peace and demobilization initiatives in the 1980s failed, resulting in regrouping and a resumption of fighting. In the 1990s, a broad national people's peace movement gained ground, with 10 million Colombian citizens voting for peace in 1997. Advanced peace negotiations with the FARC broke down in 2002, rendering the tenth subsequent peace process unsuccessful.

The current armed context is characterized by intensification and geographical expansion. The presence of armed groups controlling different regions, the intensity of the conflict and its dynamics and effects are the result of multiple and complex factors, including: i) the strategic, political and military plan of each group, ii) the region specific economic, political and social dynamics; iii) the search for and diversification of income sources by armed groups. At a national level, the geography and the economic, social and military scope of the conflict had a different impact on the North and South of the country. In the North, a process of streamlining and legalizing of paramilitaries was preceded by demobilization of most visible paramilitary structures. While military interventions lessened considerably over the past year, their political and economic influence continues to consolidate, as the paramilitaries penetrated deeply into different society circles. In the South, in regions like Orinoquia and Amazonia, the FARC has been relatively successful in gaining control in the colonization frontiers and over the coca economy, besides proving to be a powerful military force and destabilizing factor.

The government has changed its traditional response by developing an ample military presence in the regions, as part of its policy of “*seguridad democrática*” (democratic security) and has created a kind of “armed peace”. However, over the past decade, the percentage of Colombians living below the poverty line increased from 53.8% in 1991 to 59.8% in 2000, which indicates that this middle income country is in conflict and suffering from grave human rights and international humanitarian rights violations. The government's response is indicative of internal contradictions and reflects a trend common in some western nations to lump concepts of insurgency, insecurity and terrorism together in one bag. At the same time, these contradictions also provide possibilities for advancing peace initiatives and the process of reconciliation, as the state is expected to show a large degree of responsibility and decisiveness in finding political and legal compromises and, in the process, to be accountable to civil society and the international community.

Though indicators show some reduction in violence over the past few years, there are threats which could intensify the conflict and put democratic governance in danger, challenging the government to face up to actual peace scenarios. The demobilization process resulted in the demobilization of over 30,000 paramilitary combatants and now the judiciary faces the historic challenge of enforcing the Justice and Peace Law. According to governmental and international reports however, local armed structures set up by the self-defense forces (AUC) have managed to perpetuate their de facto powerbase. The Government and ELN are exploring the possibility of a negotiated peace settlement and recently,

both FARC and the government showed interest in seeking new ways for the humanitarian exchange of prisoners. Future negotiations between the government and armed groups will likely require bilateral scenarios, international facilitators, agendas and procedures. To be really effective, they need to adhere to proper democratic participatory principles, in which civil society has a role in building peace, developing and implementing peaceful conflict resolution alternatives and setting agendas to exercise their rights in the search for social justice.

2.1.2 The development dilemma

The key obstacle for peace negotiations and the historic problem in Colombia is the unequal distribution of wealth and income, combined with the social, economic and political exclusion of large parts of the population. Many observers therefore conclude that Colombia needs urgent, structural reforms, aimed at resolving problems of extreme inequality, poverty and exclusion¹, and also because poverty and unequal distribution is a major obstacle for the development of the domestic market and thereby restricts the overall economic growth.² The large investments in the reinforcement and expansion of the National Army are increasing the national budget deficit, while investments in the social sector remain proportionally low. A side effect of the inequality, military expenditure and fiscal deficit is that out of an economically active population of 20 million people, only app. 740,000 pay income tax.³

An important feature of the power struggle and conflict in Colombia is the land tenure, characterized by high concentration, low productivity and lack of access to land by the majority of the peasant farmer population. Only 20% of all arable land is cultivated and much of it is dedicated to grasslands. The land tenure concentration was accelerated by the conflict and land acquisition by drugs traffickers.⁴ Of the estimated 1.4 million land owners in Colombia, 1.1 million own smallholdings, while 1.3 million peasant farmer families (54 percent) have no access to land. Historically, government policies have made no effort to redistribute land or capital, while the redistribution of expropriated land from drugs traffickers and paramilitaries has been slow and inefficient. The national agricultural policy continues to focus on the promotion of agro-industry and investments in animal husbandry and export crops like African palm, rubber y cacao. The economic growth of recent years did not favor low investment sectors at all. According to information from the National Planning Department, based on a household survey in the 13 largest cities, the real income of workers dropped 10, 6 percent in 2004 and 2005.⁵

The production of coca and illicit drugs trafficking has played a key role in the spread and intensification of the conflict, as it reinforced the economic base of illegal armed groups and has penetrated and corrupted many local administrative and public institutions. Colombia is the main cocaine producer in the world (approximately 70% in 2005). 93 percent of the coca is produced by small farmers that make

¹ E.G., UNDP, Human Development National Report Colombia, Bogota, 2003, Andes 2020 (*Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano Colombia, Bogotá, 2003, Andes 2020*): A New Strategy for the Challenges of Colombia and the Region Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 2004, Washington Office on Latin America, Blueprint for a New Colombia Policy, March 2005, Adam Isacson, Failing Grades: Evaluating the Results of Plan Colombia, Yale Journal of International Affairs, Summer, Fall 2005.

² The recent World Bank report says that Latin American countries have to tackle poverty more aggressively if they want bigger growth and want to compete with China and other dynamic Asian economies. It also says that while economic growth is key in reducing poverty, it is the very poverty that makes it difficult to achieve high and sustained growth rates in Latin America, which continues to be one of the regions in the world with the most inequality with nearly a quarter of the population living on less than US\$ 2.00 a day: G.E. Perry, O.S. Arias, J.H. López, W.F. Maloney, L. Servén, Poverty Reduction and Growth: Virtuous and Vicious Circles, The World Bank, Washington DC, 2006. In Colombia, depending on the method of calculation, between 52.8 and 66 per cent live on less than US\$ 2.00 a day.

³ Julia E. Sweig, Challenges for U.S. Policy Toward Colombia: Is Plan Colombia Working, The Regional Dimensions? (Written statement before the 108th Congress United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee) Council on Foreign Relations, October 29, 2003.

⁴ That have 4 million hectares of the best land, i.e. 48 per cent.

⁵ El Tiempo, 4 September 2006: real income for workers fell by 10,6% in 2 years, Eduardo Sarmiento P., *El modelo inequitativo* (The unfair model), El Espectador, week of 10 to 16 September 2006, p. 2C,

up 69 percent of the total area under coca cultivation.⁶ By comparison, the poppy cultivation covers app. 4000 hectares and represents only 2 percent of the world production. The strategy of the government is to forcibly eradicate illicit crops by aerial fumigation. Colombia is the only country in the world that allows such fumigation. Initially, only large plantations were fumigated, but since 2002 small peasant farmer plots are also being targeted, but without a matching policy to resolve the structural problems that cause the drug cultivation. In 2002 and 2003, over 260,000 hectares were fumigated to eradicate less than 60,000 ha and the CIA admits that as in 2004 around 135,000 hectares were under cultivation, they have effectively failed to eradicate even a single hectare.⁷ According to the latest available data, the area under coca cultivation has increased a further 6000 hectares in 2005, despite intensive fumigation, which clearly underlines the need to rethink and radically change the strategy and prevailing practices.

The implications of the conflict and drug production have rendered Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities even more vulnerable, because of their geographic and political isolation and poor economic situation. Repeatedly, these groups have been the victim of massacres, human rights violations and forced displacement and recruitment by armed groups. The most vulnerable groups in the conflict context are the internally displaced and the peasant farmer sector in remote parts of the country. The situation is particularly critical for women and young IDPs.

2.2 REDES Response

2.2.1 Preparation phase

REDES started a visionary program to (re)build social capital and social cohesion in areas with protracted civil conflict. The main objective of the REDES program is to revive and strengthen traditional social organization strategies for peace and development in the context of violent, protracted conflict with the aim of reviving social and institutional networks. This is expected to result in an increase in security, a reduction in the vulnerability of groups marginalized by the conflict and to facilitate sustainable development processes to resolve conflicts and build peace and reconciliation at a local, regional and national level.

The REDES concept is the result of an elaborate consultative process with the participation of a diverse set of social and institutional players, both local and international, held in the context of UNDP Human Development Report for Colombia, “*Callejón con Salida*” published in 2003 and devoted to the conflict⁸, and negotiations between UNDP, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) and the Government of Colombia over the new Colombia Cooperation Framework (CCF 02-06) and the Humanitarian Action Plan (PAH 02-06). Two priorities were formulated:

1. The CCF’s main priority is to reduce the incidence of complex emergencies and promote strategic action to reduce violence and the UNDP is best placed to coordinate crisis management.
2. A conflict prevention program approach directed at a regional level will maximize coordination and avoid isolated, dispersed and fragmented project- and resource allocation.

UNDP/BCPR New York and Sida played an active role in the REDES strategy development and area selection. An integrated BCPR identification mission assisted the Country Office in the program design in May 2003 and comprised five experts representing BCPR’s service lines (justice and security sector

⁶ All data with reference to illegal cultivations should be seen as approximations as figures vary from source to source.

⁷ El Tiempo, editorial, *En los Parques*, no, 15 May 2005.

⁸ This HDR won the price of best HD report and the process has become a model for other countries’ preparation of Human Development Reports. An Analysis Unit was maintained to follow up the Human Development Report “*Callejón con Salida*.”; it developed a Data Bank for Best practices, where projects to overcome the conflict and peace building efforts are documented. (Sida Annual Report 2004)

reform, transitional recovery, landmine action, small arms and demobilization, disaster reduction). The mission visited five regions (Meta, Oriente Antioqueño, La Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta, Chocó and Montes de María), held extensive discussions in Bogotá and made many recommendations which are summarized in two categories:

Recommendations regarding approach:

- Acknowledge local specifics of conflict realities
- Respond to conflict emergency with a medium to longer term focus
- Promote dialogue and coordination at and between a local, regional and national level
- Secure local participation at every stage of a regional program design
- Build on existing structures and identify legitimate players in each local context, to foster strategic alliances with neutrality to accelerate the peace process.

Recommendations regarding program components:

- Build horizontal social bridging capacity through network building
- Promote vertical links between regional programs and national politics
- Design innovative risk reduction strategies to create new windows of opportunities
- Improve local good governance and responsible citizenship
- Strengthen institutional capacity of counterparts at regional and national level
- Mainstream gender equality
- Exchange, document, disseminate experiences and lessons learned at regional and local level in cooperation with National Planning Department (NPD) and INDH
- Develop diverse mechanisms to coordinate bilateral and multilateral resources
- Improve participation and coordination mechanisms among regional UN system programs for peace and development to avoid duplication.

The mission recommended six thematic priorities, in accordance with BCPR's service lines:

1. Reduction of armed violence (DDR, civilian protection, preventive youth initiatives to reduce recruitment risk)
2. Landmine Action (develop technical capacity of local and national government agencies; local structures to decentralize landmine action; integration of landmine action into national agenda)
3. Internally displaced (capacity building and coordination among agencies; aid to municipalities with large displaced populations; public information/ communication)
4. Natural disaster risk reduction (build capacity of local and regional committees of SNPAD to formulate local risk reduction strategies and strengthen DGPAD and GIS).
5. Justice and Security (connect national reflection on security reform with local realities)
6. Local economic and social development and income generation (local development processes based on local organizational structures, link peace building, development and peaceful co-existence.

2.2.2 Site and counterpart selection

With BCPR seed funds, a six months “Preparatory Assistance Program” was launched in July 2003, in which the REDES strategy took shape. Three regions were selected: Meta, Montes de María (MM) and Oriente Antioqueño (OA), based on five common characteristics:

- i) A violent conflict scenario characterized by fierce disputes over territory between legal and illegal armed groups
- ii) A deteriorating humanitarian crisis, due to proliferation of land mines, forced recruitment of youth and displacement
- iii) Conflict and disaster management and risk reduction strategies urgently needed
- iv) High incidence of poverty, social polarization and fragmentation of civil society players and necessity for alternative income generation initiatives.
- v) Historic civil society capacity for social mobilization and conflict resolution present, which has been badly affected by the violence and protracted conflict.

During the interviews, several additional criteria surfaced, like new conflict openings, strong local leadership with national level REDES (i.e. gelling players like the Catholic Church with grass roots members and moral authority) and selection preferences of the Government. Lastly, the relative proximity and accessibility of the areas, either from the main office (Meta and OA) or regional UNDP office in Cartagena (MM), was considered vital in the first phase to pilot innovative reconciliation approaches at community level, which required intensive monitoring and political presence. Also, in environments such as Meta and MM where armed illegal groups, through threats, corruption and political connections at all levels, enjoy extended political and economic influence or control over local governments and public institutions, special measures to protect and closely monitor project activities and social players are clearly warranted. The question was raised why REDES did not target the most violent regions head on. The evaluation concludes that the site selection was wise, as the violence and poverty in MM and Meta is severe (i.e. disappearance, selective assassinations, extra judiciary killings and forced displacement) and justifies support, while a presence of local structures and multiple player willingness to act as partners are prerequisites to pilot a long term development and peace model that works simultaneously at local, regional and national level for policy and practice change. The REDES socio-political CPR approach should not be confused with humanitarian crisis response.

REDES program implementation concentrated on Montes de Maria and Meta, while the more affluent region of OA thrived mostly on thematic interventions of landmine action, income generation and women and peace. The two territories have distinct geographic settings and problems, which are consistent with the previous conflict analysis. It allowed REDES to pilot the applicability of its peace and development strategies in different conflict contexts. MM’s civil society has been traditionally divided, with weak but relatively stable local government institutions. Meta mirrors a reverse context: stronger civil society structures are matched by rogue local government institutions. (See Annex 4 for more details) The geographic differences impact deeply on the conflict too. Low lying, pastoral MM borders the Gulf coast in the North and is a trafficking zone for drugs to be shipped overseas, with substantial Afro-Colombian populations, presence of indigenous groups and a history of extreme poverty and landlessness. Meta lies to the South of Bogotá, where the plains start sloping into the Amazon basin. It is a new frontier area with economic opportunities that abound for those with access to land or capital, with new land opening up for cattle farming, oil drilling, agro industry and coca production, encroaching into natural reserve areas. Both regions have strong regionally defined presence of the National Army, FARC and paramilitaries. Towards the end of the first phase, a new program area was opened in Huila, built on some REDES that were funded through the Small Grants Program. Huila presents another geographic conflict challenge, as the region has historically been

dominated by one armed group, the FARC, and is rather isolated by high mountain ranges and deep valleys.

The REDES program stands out as a BCPR best practice model, in view of its strategic set of counterparts at community, regional and national levels and its integrated sector approach. Over the past three years REDES managed to build relationships with five groups of player:

- Community networks, regional committees etc. to restore fragmented communities and foster people's participation in governance and peace building
- Alliances between regional and national Government players and civil society;
- Specialized government agencies, like National Landmine Observatory, *Procuraduría Nacional* (National Procurator's Office), UN Human Rights Office, National Directorate of Attention to Disasters and National Planning Department
- European Commission and World Bank, through the Third Peace Laboratory and the "Peace and Development Program" managed by *Acción Social*
- UN system: UNICEF and UNFPA on youth protection, violence against women and gender mainstreaming; UNHCR, UNCHR, OCHA and IOM on IDPs and PDP drafting; and lastly with UNODC on alternative development strategies for coca growing areas.

2.2.3 REDES program outline

Taking all recommendations to heart, the REDES program chose three specific objectives:

- i) Reduce the impact of the violence on vulnerable communities
- i) Increase the capacity of civil society and state institutions to implement consensus strategies with the aim of overcoming the conflict
- ii) Promote socio-economic incentives that provide development alternatives to vulnerable players and reduce the impact of the economy of conflict in the region.

In four regional programs, REDES seeks to strengthen local democratic processes that promote people's participation and good governance, as well as stimulate income generating activities and foster public policies for employment and development that is rights based and inclusive for all stakeholders involved. To this end, REDES adopted a multi focal, regional development approach with four distinct strategies: i) strengthen communities, ii) foster public-private partnerships and international alliances, iii) generate knowledge on the internal conflict and CPR approaches and iv) create space for participatory public policy formulation and follow-up.

Colombian civil society has historically been subjected to repression, but its leadership suffered disproportionately over the past five decades of violence (disappearances and extra judiciary killings etc). As a result, the social fragmentation and disorganization has left vulnerable communities even more exposed to exploitation by human rights abuses, land grabbing and forced recruitment by armed groups, legal or illegal. Local government has been badly affected by the armed conflict and suffered high mortality among its leadership too. As a result, the basic public service provision in poor, conflict ridden regions is minimal and security is extremely low. The international player dimension of the REDES' alliance building has two added values: it has strengthened the political accompaniment and protection of local civil society REDES and it has been successful in linking beneficiaries with World Bank & EU peace and development programs.

The REDES program furthermore plays a catalyzing role in strategic alliance building to initiate economic, social and cultural recovery process in the regions. REDES facilitates the building of hori-

zontal and vertical advocacy alliances at local, regional and national level. A participatory conflict and poverty analysis with involvement of multiple stakeholders is a first step to formulate regional Peace and Development Programs (PDPs) and will inform required public policy and practice changes. The third key strategy is to develop long term, national level political, good governance and equity oriented solutions to the conflict based on regional experiences. Lastly, REDES documents its experiences in mainstream conflict prevention approaches and will develop knowledge management strategies to exchange good practices with other BCPR programs in (post) conflict and crisis environments around the world.

REDES developed twelve project lines of action, combining themes and sectors, which can be grouped into four categories: i) human security; ii) socio political and institutional development, iii) socio-economic development, and iv) reconciliation and justice.

3. Findings

3.1 Regional REDES Development and Peace Programs

3.1.1 Revival of civil society organizations

REDES selected one local civil society organization in each region, to coordinate the participatory planning process and to assist in capacity building of community REDES and local leadership. The region specific conflict dynamics and different management styles resulted in distinctly diverse social mobilization strategies and partner choices in MM and Meta.

In MM, REDES chose to work with the religious leadership to bridge the deeply divided society; its network connects a wide and active community at local and national level and has moral authority to appeal to virtues of inclusive development and participatory accountable governance. REDES accompanied the Foundation for Peace and Development of Montes de Maria (*Fundación Red de Desarrollo y Paz de los Montes de Maria* (FRDPMM, referred to as the *Fundación*)): a registered membership organization of social networks and Community Based Organizations (CBOs), which coordinates the implementation of Peace and Development Programs in MM. Separately, the “Red Montemariana” was built to link CBOs in 15 municipalities and facilitate PDP activities at community level. It serves as a support, solidarity and knowledge network to all members. In addition, REDES developed a regional youth network to formalize their participation in development planning activities and partnered with BCPR’s SADU and IOM to develop a small grant fund to initiate cultural, social and economic youth activities. Due to its catalyzing role in capacitating civil society in MM, REDES developed a close relationship with vulnerable community groups and directly assisted in building horizontal networking capacity, confidence and trust, essential to improve a community’s resilience in an armed group context.

In Meta, civil society is historically much stronger; hence REDES chose to work with existing CSOs. CORDEPAZ was founded as a service delivery CSO in 2000, had prior experience in back stopping civil society peace initiatives and received international funds in the past. It became REDES’ main partner in conflict assessments, PDP planning, capacity building training, youth organizing etc. Its Board is comprised of religious leaders and founding members but local recipient CSOs are not represented. REDES’ second partner is the Meta Department branch of ANUC (National Peasant Farmer Association). The ANUC leadership was under extreme pressure over the past decade and its local associated poor peasant farmer members were in dire need of solidarity and economic support. In interviews, ANUC leaders confirmed that the REDES’ accompaniment has provided “political” protection and generated renewed confidence to regroup and launch new initiatives on alternative income generation,

legal aid to victims of forcible land evictions and peasant farmer youth network building for peace in the Meta region. As a result, REDES has mostly indirect relations with community based organizations in Meta, though recent initiatives with associations of small-scale agricultural producers in the Puerto Lleras sub region indicate that issue-based direct CBO partnerships are developed too.

More research is needed to determine the impact of different civil society organizational models on the sustainability of the revival efforts. The membership orientation of the Fundación provides institutional guidelines for participatory planning, decision making and accountability. However, it strongly depends on the bishop's leadership and REDES' accompaniment; hence its capacity to continue to act as a bridge builder across horizontal divides in MM in the long run needs careful management to become sustainable. CORDEPAZ may have a stronger management capacity as CSO service organization, which could lead to institutional concerns on representativity and sustainability. First, its permanent board is not elected and thus not accessible to CBO recipients of the services, which could eventually raise issues of legitimacy and accountability. Second, as a professional agency, it depends on external funding run and may not prove sustainable in the long term. ANUC is an interesting in-between partner. It is membership based, but with a strong national level influence on the regions. It would be interesting to study how the REDES work with community based ANUC affiliates strengthens their position in the national movement. A measure of success would be when the sustainable peasant farmer network in Meta can change public policy in ANUC at national level too. In sum, when promoting development amidst conflict, building on existing local structures and in a manner that is responsive to local conflict context, different counterpart groups among regions are unavoidable and should be promoted. However, to enhance longer term sustainability of local organizations, it is absolutely necessary to monitor the good governance and democracy practices of civil society in the region, to guarantee that organizations become more representative, transparent and publicly accountable.

REDES makes a conscious effort in all aspects of its work, to generate awareness of and respect for human rights and to include most vulnerable groups. These are identified as youth at risk of recruitment by armed groups or drugs-traffickers, indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations, subsistence farmers and vulnerable women. The MM youth network and Meta's peasant farmer networks are successful examples of social mobilization that begin to rebuild a sense of social cohesion (see Chapter 4.4 and Annex 5). At the same time, the evaluation observed that gender equality in civil society REDES and government institutions needs more strategic thinking in the REDES program, especially with regards to inclusion of women in decision making, access to information and reduction of gender based violence. REDES needs to define "vulnerable women", i.e. female headed households or women subjected to domestic violence and analyze causes of their predicament in order to devise more effective strategies. For example, the 11th REDES action line, "reproductive health of women through UNFPA", was launched in 2005 as an increase in sexual violence against women was expected in the wake of paramilitary demobilization and reinsertion programs. It was to address multiple adolescent pregnancies as a result of fragmented family and community relations as well. Both problem sets however, are symptomatic of structural gender inequalities, low physical security and the low economic status of women, particularly in Caribbean communities. Hence, REDES needs to rethink its women's program and set targets to increase the physical, social and economic security of women, their participation in decision making and peace processes, and their organizational capacity. UNFPA recently completed a gender diagnostic (regional analysis) in MM in partnership with REDES, which provides a baseline to monitor interventions aimed at structurally redressing gender inequality. Good practices were developed in the "Small Grants to CSO" program with women and indigenous groups; these need to be documented and applied in the REDES regional programs as well.

Internally displaced persons are a very vulnerable group that requires more strategic REDES attention too. An estimated 3.5 million persons or 8% of the Colombian population is displaced, as a result of conflict, land grabbing and drug-trafficking. Eighteen urban centers function as IDP magnets and

include Sincelejo (MM) and Villavicencio (Meta). IDPs have participated in a local planning and pilot activities in MM (i.e. Morroa PDP, *Consejo de empleo* (employment council) in Sincelejo), but a clearer program strategy is in order. In our meetings with OCHA and UNHCR, keen interest was expressed in collaborating with REDES in social and economic IDP reintegration programs and in advocacy efforts to prevent future displacement through public policy, protection and early warning mechanisms. The new, Sincelejo based, regional UN coordinator could facilitate such close collaboration as a first pilot. However, this new post has been vacant for 12 months, which indicates that the “UN mini-reform” objective is not a real priority for UNDP and its UN partners.

REDES’ political accompaniment is of paramount importance to generate a safe space for dialogue and dissent to bridge divides and provides mental and moral support that motivate CSO partners to gather courage and resume social mobilization activities in violent conflict environments. To imagine one’s future without conflict, poverty and fear, and jointly plan interventions to that end, proved a powerful and convincing idea to mobilize and motivate shattered communities to join REDES development efforts. The team interviewed community leaders and network coordinators around MM and Meta, who all reached the same conclusion: the political accompaniment is equally important as REDES’ financial and technical support. Leaders claim to be better informed of conflict causes and trends, more abreast with government intentions and initiatives (or the lack thereof) at Department and municipal level, more familiar and in contact with community leaders across the MM region. Collaboration in the REDES program has given them new ideas, means, motivation and confidence to take responsibility to rebuild their communities and resist the impact of violence. The REDES’ accompaniment as impartial but compassionate bridge builder has seemingly discouraged armed groups to commit large scale human rights violations.

In sum, in the perception of REDES beneficiaries, the program has made major contributions to reduce their vulnerability to violence, even though recent conflict statistics do not indicate improvements in absolute terms yet. First signs of improving bridging relations among divided communities can be found in the regional culture and social events organized by the Red Montemariana and the MM youth network (the rotating 11 municipalities’ football tournament in which all local youth groups participated and fund raised; the Montemariana Cultural Night in Cartagena); and the courageous March to Commemorate the Disappeared in San Onofre on August 29, organized by victims groups to call for truth, justice and reparation and a fair NCCR process. The matrix below gives an overview of main achievements and beneficiaries based on data provided by REDES staff (“*datos duros*” (hard facts) excel sheet). The information is rather general and neither complete nor consistent between regions, which illustrates that a more standardized and diligent monitoring system is an urgent requirement.

Several recommendations can be made. First, horizontal links between REDES’ thematic and community based initiatives can be improved. Cross fertilization opportunities have been overlooked, as managing the large number of parallel initiatives proves a major logistical challenge. To convene annual all partner meetings, i.e. like the September conference in Meta, is a good start, but effective regional cross fertilization requires coordination in the planning stage. Second, REDES needs to strengthen organizations of vulnerable groups and promote the fact that their representatives are better represented among staff and programs of larger CSOs, particularly in the REDES’ regional counterparts: the *Fundación*, CORDEPAZ and ANUC/Meta. Third, REDES has forged interesting vertical alliances between community-based REDES and national civil society in its public policy advocacy work (i.e. linking youth, victim organizations and women’s groups between regions). However, these vertical alliances are mostly event based and their long term sustainability is in question. The conflict literature shows that societies with strong vertical social capital between state, civil society and citizens are better capable to anticipate and resolve conflicts peacefully. Hence, the REDES and alliances building ideally need horizontal bridging and vertical linking components, which requires more strategic planning in the next phase.

Table 1. REDES program partners and achievements in Meta and Montes de María (2003–06)

Region/ 2003–06	Meta	Montes de María
Processes/Space/areas generated/assisted	1. Initiated regional peace and development program and assisted in the preparation of Third Peace Laboratory of the EC 2. Strengthened coordination of civil society to respond simultaneously to emergencies, rehabilitation, reconciliation and development, resulting from poverty and conflict 3. Strengthened the “Corporación Desarrollo para la Paz del Piedemonte Oriental CORDEPAZ” as coordinating body 4. Human capacity building and technical assistance of local staff.	1. Initiated Development and Peace program in Montes de María 2. Established the “Asociación de Entes Regionales” 3. Accompanied the regional assembly process 4. Supported the establishment of the regional office of the National Commission for Reparations and Reconciliation.
Entities involved	1. Corporación Desarrollo para la Paz del Piedemonte Oriental, Diócesis de Villavicencio, Cámara de Comercio, Diócesis de Granada, Vicariato Apostólico de Puerto Gaitán, 2. CINEP, Federación de Comerciantes (Fenalco), Comité de Ganaderos, PRO ORIENTE y Pastoral Regional para la Orinoquía y la Amazonía.	1. Fundación Red Desarrollo y Paz de los Montes de María, Diócesis de Cartagena, Magangué and Sincelejo; and Menonite Church 2. Government of Sucre and Bolívar and mayors of 15 municipalities 3. Chamber of Commerce of Sincelejo, University of Cartagena 4. NCRR, IOM, OCHA
People working in REDES initiatives	100 persons	– App 550 local leaders in 15 municipalities – AET has 19 members (15 mayors, 2 governors and 2 technical staff) – 25 members of organizing committee of the Proceso Regional Constituyente
Beneficiary Population	18 municipalities (total population: 500,000)	15 municipalities (total population: 450.000)
Participants in REDES initiatives	App. 20,000 persons	App. 120.000 villagers
Duration	Three years	3.5 years
Allocated budget	US\$ 460,000	US\$. 2.000.000
Relevance to achieving REDES aims	Organized most vulnerable and poor people in the department, made an effort to build organizational processes to increase democracy and overcome violent conflict	Enhanced institutional dynamics and social processes traditionally present, to find peaceful negotiated settlement to armed conflict, extreme poverty and strengthening of local democracy and reconciliation.
Expected direct results	– Consolidate a regional development and peace proposal that has legitimacy and recognition – Selection of the Meta Dept. as participant in the Third Peace Laboratory for the EU.	– Regional structures will promote peace and development strategies and interventions. – Built regional political framework for peace and development – Strengthened social organization and community mobilization capacity – Create space/area for strengthening public institutions – Built alliances between international community and local/regional level – Fostered increase of resources streaming into the region from national government and international community
Contribution to promoting peace and development	Built social, political and economic alternatives to respond to dynamics that feed conflicts and obstruct development processes.	Same as previous question

3.1.2 Local good governance

In societies affected by protracted violent conflict, the relations between embattled civil society and weakened local authorities often get profoundly disrupted, which negatively impacts on the vulnerability of poor communities to violence and extortion. REDES therefore seeks to reconnect local civil society and state institutions at municipal and department level and to build their capacity to develop and implement consensus based policies and programs to end the conflict. To this end, REDES has initiated ongoing dialogue processes on participatory governance, civilian protection, human rights, mine action and economic recovery initiatives with the Department authorities of Meta, Bolivar and Sucre, and with mayors and municipal offices. In addition, REDES convenes joint events for civil society to assist local authorities in planning and budgeting exercises and in the process to develop longer term private – public partnerships. In our meetings, the Governors of Bolivar (deputy), Sucre and Meta commended REDES especially for the planning and budgeting dialogues with civil society and for the landmine action campaigns that focus on awareness raising, preventative monitoring and caring for the landmine victims.

REDES allocated only a small part of its budget directly to local government activities, as the neutrality of local authorities is questioned and their capacity to deliver basic services to poor and vulnerable populations is extremely low. The Governors would welcome greater input from local authorities in the REDES' program and budget decisions (and in the Third Peace Laboratory as well) and greater emphasis on economic development programs as productive investments are scarce in conflict regions. However, as Colombia is a middle income country, REDES advocates, in its national policy, working for a fairer regional distribution of government resources and (re)allocation of available local development budgets from NPD, EU's Third Peace Laboratory, WB's *Acción Social* program and from UN sister agencies. In interviews with the Governors, officials shared the impression that advances made by the REDES programs are an important factor in the selection of MM and Meta as focal regions in the PLIII. In addition, they acknowledge that REDES' continued local capacity building back-stopping is an important service that the EU will not provide.

The diverse regional contexts and visions of responsible REDES managers resulted in different local governance partnership strategies. MM is divided over two departments (Bolívar, Sucre) and 15 municipalities. Most mayors lived outside the region in the 1990s, because of high intensity conflict and multiple assassinations. President Uribe's national "seguridad democrática" policy has substantially increased the military presence in MM since 2003. Most mayors returned to their duty stations at the time REDES started; they remain quite vulnerable to undue pressure from armed groups in this "military enforced" peace context. To buttress the mayors' position and to launch regional participatory governance initiatives, REDES facilitated the foundation of the "*Asociación de Entes Territoriales*" (AET) in 2005. Concrete objectives are to develop a joint vision and voice, to manage regional resources for projects involving multiple municipalities and to discuss peace building and development strategies. Two Governors and 15 mayors meet on a regular basis to discuss development, peace and human rights issues.

The AET is still in the confidence building stage and the five mayors interviewed indicated as main results: improved interpersonal relations and a sense of joint purpose (i.e. they now call each other spontaneously for advice, jointly analyze problems and face armed threats to their territory together). Yet, the AET has been actively involved in a few programs too, like in the foundation of the Youth Small Grants Program in 2005 and in the preparations of the Peace Laboratory III, in partnership with the Fundación in 2006. To show commitment to other players in the region, the AET members signed a "Pacto de Gobernabilidad Montemariana" (good governance pact) and they plan new activities to improve relevant skills, including human rights and conflict resolution training. If successful, the AET could become an important network to plan and advocate for regional assistance at national level and to promote peace and development efforts, with local authorities assuming a greater role in protecting

and providing basic services to its citizens. It will take a big effort on part of REDES to sustain the AET for some time, as mayors are elected for one term office only and the next municipal elections are scheduled for October 2007.

In Meta, a formal mayors' network, like AET, was not deemed feasible in view of the rogue nature of local authorities (a high incidence of removal and legal persecution of mayors on corruption charges) and their close alliance with armed groups controlling the region. Therefore, REDES chose to work and dialogue with mayors on individual basis only to reduce the political risks and adhere to "do no harm" principles. Regional good governance efforts in Meta thus focus mainly on the Governor's office (planning and budgeting exercises, mine action). Interestingly, the Army is actively involved in REDES' landmine awareness program. However, in the absence of an AET like structure, it seems the space for regional local governance dialogue opportunities in Meta is limited, which makes it harder to foster institutional local government – civil society relations and promote regional activities. The peace and development dialogue is limited to a few municipalities with more 'neutral' leadership. The dilemma echoes the earlier questions on criteria for future REDES region selection. The team notes that the MM mayors have close relations with the paramilitaries too and attributes variation to different assessments of risk and willingness to take risks by regional coordinators. Even a flawed AET structure can create space and structures for innovative dialogue that otherwise do not exist (i.e. the Good Governance Pact of MM). Others put more weight on "do-no-harm" aspects to avoid support to armed groups. However, structures like AET could be a prerequisite for a regional good governance dialogue process, in the absence of other forums. The mission therefore recommends that REDES' senior management analyzes different approaches to engage local government in MM and Meta and inherent risks, to distil an informed and more uniform REDES approach towards local government engagement.

3.1.3 PDP and public policy change

Alliances between public – private sectors promoted by REDES are best understood as pluralistic dialogue networks that work simultaneously on transformation of conflict, defending and achieving human rights, promotion of alternative equitable economic development initiatives and inclusive, capable and legitimate local and regional government. Its participatory, inclusive and rights-based development focus challenges traditional development vision and provides alternative approaches to promote and sustain public policy changes. In terms of results, the team identified three.

First, REDES managed to open channels of communication and meeting areas for civil society and local government in MM and Meta, and to connect them to national level. REDES acts as facilitator and at times as mediator between the two parties, which harbor a deep sense of distrust towards one another, when dialogues get polarized. The capacity of REDES to convene different actors creates unique areas for multiple stakeholders to discuss conflict and peace concerns. Second, REDES introduced a public policy agenda focused on equitable and sustainable development and peace to its regional partners, which could have a great impact on poor and excluded communities. It launched a thinking process among public and private players and showed some initial results in joint advocacy strategies for landmine action and youth participation, which got institutionalized in regional plans and incorporated in local budgets. Third, REDES accompanied civil society's revival and repositioning in the regional peace and reconciliation arena by strengthening its capacity to analyze conflict and poverty, formulate more equitable public policies and identify alternative approaches to peace building and development in their communities.

Since 2005, REDES has paid more attention to the role of communication and media in the sharing of results of local consensus building processes. The "*Red de Comunicadores*" (communicators' network) in MM was launched in 2005 to play an important role in communicating peace and reconciliation messages to influence public opinion and change the peace discourse to seek a political end to the conflict (see 3.1.6). In Meta, a communicators' network is in the making; in their presentation in the

annual partner meeting in August 27, representatives explained that they needed six more months to get operational. While the MM network has a community activist basis, the Meta network seems to draw more from journalists, academics and human rights defenders.

Several municipal planning processes have been initiated since 2005. The representative of the Morroa municipality (MM) summarized how local government and civil society jointly undertook a social mapping exercise to formulate a municipal development plan. The participatory planning process included 96 civil society players, over 50% of them female. 200 IDPs who are currently residing in Morroa were involved in the planning too. Youth and peasant farmers groups formed two special interest committees to have their specific interests reflected in the plan. Art played an important role in communicating the ongoing dialogue to the wider audience during the planning process and helped in building community consensus. The Morroa civil society committee plans to monitor the transformation of their PDP into public policy and to safeguard its continuation after next year's municipal election. Three municipalities are replicating the experience at the moment. María la Baja has just completed a participatory budgeting exercise, Zambrano is to start one, while the mayor of Carmen de Bolívar has recently launched a public accountability initiative.

In addition, some initial thematic successes, in which regional and national levels were linked, should be mentioned too. Intensive dialogue between the NCRR and REDES partners in OA and MM, led to the decision to open regional NCRR branches in Oriente Antioqueno and Sincelejo.⁹ As the program most active in landmine action, REDES succeeded in partnering the National Mine Observatory to create national awareness and protection programs, as well as initiate care projects for landmine victims.

3.1.4 Humanitarian round tables (Mesas humanitarias) and human rights

The Human Rights components of the REDES program is one of the least developed. During 2005, the staff member in charge of the topic was also the same person carrying out the functions of the Administrative Assistant. From March of this year the work has been assigned to a dedicated person. According to the Logical Framework of the Program (Partnership Program for Peace in Colombia, UNDP – Sida), the hoped for result of the human rights component is: “the government authorities and civil society have developed regional strategies for the protection of vulnerable communities and to reduce attacks and threats against them and reduce human rights violations “. In general terms the most visible result of REDES in relation to Human Rights is the setting up of the Humanitarian and Human Rights Round Tables (*Mesas Humanitarias y de Derechos Humanos*) in Montes de María and Meta.

The two regions are characterized by having suffered an excessive escalation of internal armed conflict. Both in Montes de María and in Meta, at the end of the last decade, some of the worst massacres in the history of the country took place (the Chengue and the El Salado massacres in Montes de María and the Mapiripán massacre in Meta). The regional dispute between the paramilitaries (AUC) and the guerrillas and the subsequent military control by the AUC has left an indelible mark of pain, suffering, fear and distrust in these regions which has resulted in the dismantling and weakening of social movements and human rights organizations.

Until recently human rights defenders were persecuted and in some cases killed and others identified and stigmatized. However, the space for talking about humanitarian and human rights issues in Montes de María and Meta have been gradually reactivated, thanks mainly to an international accompaniment such as UNDP, through the REDES program and other UN agencies. As a sign of the REDES impact in these regions and of its accompaniment in the organizational processes of civil society, a Human Rights Round Table (*Mesa de Derechos Humanos*) was recently set up in Montes de María, that is just starting operation and a Humanitarian Round Table (*Mesa Humanitaria*) was set up in Meta.

⁹ REDES partner in OA, *Madres de la Candelaria*, got national recognition for its work with victims of the violence and won the national peace prize in November 2006.

Human rights round table (Mesa de derechos humanos) in montes de maría

The idea of setting up a human rights round table in the region emerged from the framework of the program of development and peace and through the initiative of the Foundation for Development and Peace of Montes de Maria (*Fundación Red de Desarrollo y Paz de los Montes de María* (FRDPMM)), during the process of human rights training promoted by REDES and carried out by the Social Foundation (*Fundación Social*). This founding process, which culminated in December 2005, drew together social and institutional sectors and had as its objectives the recognition of the participants as representatives of human rights, training in human rights and replication through promoters. The fact of putting the issue right back in the thoughts of social and institutional organizations created the conditions for the proposed Human Rights Round Tables (*Mesa de Derechos Humanos*).

As in Meta, this Round Table tries to act as an opportunity for dialogue and a platform for the different peace building initiatives in the region. The objectives are to show the human rights situation in Montes de Maria and to influence the inclusion of a human rights focus in the regional and local public policies. Although they are only now beginning to define the possible areas of work, it is clear that the participatory organizations are looking to make efforts and to put together a common agenda of work in human rights aimed first at the teaching of human rights. The participants consider that this is a good way to begin because teaching human rights does not put them at risk and prepares the conditions for raising, in the near future, the political profile of Mesa.

The accompaniment of REDES in this phase of the preparation and announcement of the setting up Human Rights Round Tables (*Mesa de Derechos Humanos*) has been very important, because as in Meta, it implies support and legitimacy. For a second phase of the project with the *Fundación Social* it is hoped that the technical support for the Round Table (*Mesa*) will be strengthened. Furthermore the Foundation (*Fundación Red de Desarrollo y Paz de los Montes de María*) has expressed its interest in including the Human Rights focus in the development and peace program. This is a very interesting initiative and there is hope that human rights won't be just one more issue on the agenda of the PDP, but, instead, really be the driving force behind all its activities. Therefore REDES, as part of its technical assistance to the PDP process, has put at the disposal of the Foundation (Fundación) a consultant who can put together a suitable proposal.

With the aim of supporting the consolidation of these spaces, it is relevant that REDES strengthens and widens its technical assistance through links with the United Nations Office for Human Rights – UNHCHR –, the “Defensoría del Pueblo” and human rights national organizations. In the case of UNHCHR, a proposal already exists to train mayors and councilors of Montes de Maria and Meta in human rights, which would help in creating conditions for the inclusion of human rights in municipal development plans.

Additionally the support of REDES can also include training members of these Round Tables (*Mesas*) in human rights and raising the profile of these Round Tables by presenting regional and national events to the relevant authorities and institutions who deal with this issue. Furthermore REDES can help to sponsor dialogue and contact through national human rights and peace spaces, networks and platforms with whom REDES has contact and promote a greater accompaniment of the international community in the regions to raise the political cost of any violations of human rights against the members of these spaces.

However it is important that the REDES human rights strategy prioritizes the inclusion of the most vulnerable groups of society (female heads of household, displaced people and victims of violence, displaced communities, indigenous people and afro Colombians) in human rights training; furthermore that it prioritizes their participation in the different scenarios of coordination and negotiation and inclusion in the regional and local agendas dealing with problems which affect them. These include such things as violence against women, the search for lasting solutions for displaced communities, the peaceful resolution of conflicts by strengthening players such as the peace judges and the conciliators in

fairness (created by the Constitution of 1991) and issues related to truth, justice and reparation, in particular the strengthening of the organizational processes of victims and the enforceability of their rights

Humanitarian round table, meta (mesa humanitaria del meta)

The main predecessor to this initiative promoted by REDES, the Catholic Church and sectors of the civil society of Meta, is the Meta Civic Committee for Human rights whose main objectives were to revive the memory of the violations of human rights in the Department since 1985, to denounce the violations of human rights and the breaches of International Humanitarian Rights (*DIH*) and to document cases for litigation. At the end of the Nineties, members of this Committee were persecuted and assassinated, which led to the dissolution of this space, leaving a significant vacuum in respect of human rights in Meta and generating a general climate of distrust.

In May 2005, the Humanitarian Round Table (*Mesa Humanitaria*) was founded, in spite of the fear and the permanent doubt as to whether the necessary protection existed for those speaking about human rights in the Department. A year and a half later the balance of experience has been very positive, although progress is still needed in respect of a greater consolidation of the space and a greater involvement by its members. The Humanitarian Round Table of Meta is a mixed space whose primary target is to guarantee the totality of human rights from an inclusive and democratic vision. Those participating include *Cordepaz*, *Pastoral Social*, *ANUC* and other social organizations (afro Colombian and indigenous), *Defensoría del Pueblo*, UNDP, and others.

The purpose of the Round Table is to create a joint platform that profiles community peace initiatives and promotes the teaching of human rights and the incorporation of human rights in regional and local public policies. Although the definition of the character of the Round Table and its strategies is still under discussion, including the question of accusations, the fact that such a space exists in Meta in which to meet and discuss the humanitarian situation and human rights is highly significant. In this sense, the support of REDES has been a deciding factor for backing the initiative and in some way of “reinforcing” it, thereby granting legitimacy to the Round Table and the work of defending human rights by the organizations who participate. Similarly REDES is highlighting the technical support that it provides by offering a consultant to the Round Table to help define its character and formulate its plan of action.

3.1.5 Regional employment councils

The employment figures in Meta are worrying. The rate of unemployment in the Department (29 municipalities) is 14% and for underemployment it stands at 35%. In the capital, Villavicencio, the rates are 16% and 30% respectively. According to the study “Structure and dynamics of the urban labor market in Meta, 1984–2003” carried out by REDES, the average length of time for finding a job is 64 weeks (for unemployed people with secondary education it is 79 weeks, for college students 77 weeks, and for people aged between 30 and 49 years old it is 80 weeks). The informal labor market has grown, especially in Villavicencio, and “self employment” at the moment makes up 45% of employment (in Villavicencio it rises to a surprising 75%). The growth of employment is associated with low quality and low productivity jobs and the sectorial composition of employment in the Department is following the pattern of the economy with the service sector making up 80% of the total.

The present conditions of poverty and marginalization in Montes de Maria are the result of various factors, such as the change from the economic model of the 90s which gave rise to the economic opening and the dismantling of the social policy aimed at the farming sector, thus disrupting the economic base of the region, decreasing crops and productivity and causing, together with the situation of insecurity caused by the armed conflict, people to leave the land. In 2004 the Department of Sucre registered 24.5% of its population (209, 462 people) as homeless and 67.2% (574,525 people) as living

in poverty.¹⁰ In the region, attention paid by the authorities to the vulnerable groups, victims and displaced people because of the internal armed conflict is only beginning which has contributed to the fact that the rate of unemployment is greater than 30% in the urban areas and more than 40% in the rural areas. Lack of access to education, together with the limited job opportunities contributes to a flourishing criminality and violence particularly among young people, who become members of armed groups. The circumstances referred to in the two regions are the reason why REDES is seeking to promote job creation in these regions.

The Regional Employment Councils (CRE) in Meta and Montes de Maria are intersectorial spaces for dialogue and reconciliation between the public sector, the private sector, the education sector and the civil society organizations who are seeking to influence regional and local policies, strategies, projects and actions that affect the economic activity, thereby promoting competitiveness, the generation of employment and income and that contribute to promoting peace and coexistence in the regions. The CRE emerged through a directive from the Ministry of Social Protection supported by REDES in the regions. Participants in the councils are, with some variations between the two regions, representatives of the public sector, the private sector, the financial sector, education, organizations of civil society and large, medium and small companies.

From studies of employment and business problems in the two regions (the Structure and Dynamics of the Labor Market, in Meta and a survey to find out the training needs of micro, small and medium sized companies in Sucre), the CRE have had a series of events (meetings, forums, conferences, workshops on specific subjects and conciliation round tables), to highlight employment problems and to contribute ideas to Department policies in respect of employment. In Meta emphasis has been given to advocacy, information and activities for creating policies through different public events, such as participation in "Internal Agendas of Productivity and Competitiveness", incorporation in the PDD, and the *Plan Indicativa* for the Department. In addition there are proposals to create the Enterprise Development Plan and the Employment Policy Plan, from the perspective of the CRE. The Enterprise Development Plan is being formulated and the Department Employment Policy Plan is formulated. In Meta, during 2005 and 2006, the Council has been the only process where there has been active and representative participation, where the different players from the Department come together and that has motivated dialogue and reflection.

In Montes de Maria more emphasis has been given to micro-projects and production activities such as exporting honey, collection and distribution of water, marble mining, training for work through qualifications and technical assistance and micro-financing. This has been complemented by information on incentives, access to markets and state employment policies. The credibility the project has achieved is seen as a strength of the CRE and progress is seen because a neutral meeting space has been created where the players express their points of view about the regional socioeconomic development and look for joint alternative answers. There is a great commitment from some players in contributing actively to the processes.

Amongst the weaknesses found is the uncertainty surrounding the sustainability of the activities, the lack of a greater commitment by some of the players, concrete and tangible actions in Meta, problems of continuity and the low level of governability in the respective Departments. It is necessary to add that a continuing fundamental problem is the very unequal links to power among the members of the CRE, of whom some represent the local elite and others the vulnerable groups and those economically, politically and socially excluded by the conflict and these same powerful connections that prevail in these regions. In addition these respective groups represent very different and sometimes opposing visions of economic development. For that reason it is of extreme importance that REDES keeps a close eye on the dynamics of the links, formal as well as informal, in the development of the activities

¹⁰ María M. Aguilera Díaz, *La Economía del Departamento de Sucre: ganadería y sector público*, Agosto 2005.

of the CRE. In addition, it would be worthwhile to carefully review if, and in which forms, the productive and employment targeted activities of the CRE are different from any other development or employment project. In order to carry out such a review it should be determined in which way the economic and productive activities impact directly on topics or objectives such as, peace processes, citizen participation, democratic governability and defense of human rights since such criteria must be those that justify or not the economic-productive projects in the scope of the REDES program or in that of a Laboratory of Peace.

Alternative development and illegal crops

One of the most serious problems in the Department of Meta is the existence and increase in illegal crops that are directly related to the armed conflict, because they constitute a fundamental source of financing for the different armed groups. The fight for control of the coca growing areas is a factor that widens and intensifies the armed conflict in the region. The access of the armed groups to the large profits and the capital produced by the coca growers contribute in decisive form to the military and economic strength of such groups and the coca growing economy. And it also affects, through corruption, public administrations, the local governments and the judicial systems, making worse the already critical conditions of governability and the quality of the local authorities. As a consequence to the expansion of the coca growing economy a strong increase has been seen in recent years in the purchase of land, due to investments and “laundering” of assets of paramilitaries/drug traffickers, a process that directly threatens the existence and the stability of the economy of the medium and small farmers.

In order to deal with the problem of coca in Meta, REDES and *Cordepaz* have made a study of the coca economy in the department of Meta and to continue this within the ambit of REDES and the III Laboratory of Peace in Meta, a project, “Integral Alternative Development”, has been formulated as well as activities for strengthening farmers’ organizations in the most important coca growing zones of the Department. This has been done to deal with, in a serious and determined way, the problem of growing illicit crops. The first actions consisted of establishing relations with three farmers’ organizations (basically associations of small producers) in the most affected coca growing zones and which had municipal and Department recognition.

In conjunction with these organizations, social projects are being prepared with a strong productive component to respond to the commitment by the farmers to gradually and voluntarily replace illicit crops. The identified productive projects will have to be adapted in terms of transfer of technology and investigation of the ecological conditions of the tropical rain forest and to have a strong environmental component (agro-forestry adjustments, silvo-pastoral models). Fundamental to this is the knowledge and the accumulated experience of the provincial centers and organizations such as *Corpoica* and *Cormacarena*; in addition the productive culture of the inhabitants is basic in the zones where the projects are under way as well as the understanding of the potential demand of the local markets that can be supplied with products from the alternative development projects. Contact has been made with the regional and local institutions in the Departments which are specialists in technical assistance, such as *Corpoica*, *Fedecacao*, *Centro Provincial Agroparques*, *SENA* and *Puertos del Ariari* for the preliminary technical support activities (soil tests, visits and crop and capacity identification), prior to the start of production activities, relevant to the necessities of the farmers and to the potential of the market.

A key element in the substitution agreements that take place consists of replacing the “cash flow” generated by the illegal crops. Fumigation and forced eradication bankrupt the producer and have a negative impact on the economies of the municipalities. This is the reason for opposition from the inhabitants to the strong measures¹¹ that in addition constitute a humiliation for the small producers. What is proposed, consequently, is a manual, gradual and voluntary substitution by these producers.

¹¹ In private, traders, transporters and local authorities regret the use of these measures by the national Government.

The legal income must replace that coming from coca and, over time, become permanent. The situation concerning ownership, possession or tenancy of land is an important factor concerning strategy and this pilot project. Given that the land has recently been colonized and is the scene of disputes because of access to land by tenant farmers, ranchers, indigenous people, agricultural investors, displaced people, workers or day laborers, etc, it is important to rely on the State to introduce mechanisms (individual or collective ownership, recognition of councils, indigenous areas, etc.) that allow a stable occupation of the land and the recovery of the land for using productive processes suitable to the ecological conditions and the environment. At the same time, it is crucial that the communities and the producer associations obtain a certain amount of autonomy in the face of the armed illegal groups (FARC and the AUC) to advance development processes, when replacing illegal crops. For this the intervention by international organizations (e.g. United Nations, European Embassies, etc.) and local organizations (e.g. Catholic Church, Universities, Scientific Research Centers, etc.) is crucial in providing a permanent accompaniment to the communities that decide to participate in the alternative development project.

This, without a doubt, is one of the most important and strategic projects of REDES and *Cordepaz* in Meta. The small producers in the coca growing areas are one of (if not the) most vulnerable groups in Meta, exposed to the pressures and threats from the different armed groups. The illegal crops in turn constitute a key element in the internal armed conflict in Meta and the country as a whole. The policy of the government towards this issue has been a failure and the interventions of UNODC have had a marginal effect as they have been regarded as too subject to and too close to the controversial policy of the government and without a greater methodological change. Therefore, this pilot project pilot, which is based on permanent interaction with and participation of the small producers, constitutes an important chance to renovate the alternative development, with an impact on all the Peace Laboratories in Colombia.

3.1.6 Network of popular communicators in Montes de Maria

The network started up in June 2005. In October coordinators of the network were established and finally in November of the same year the first regional meeting of communicators took place. The network, at the present time, has 274 members that participate in various ways in popular communication. The members are owners and directors of community media, social and cultural promoters, journalists and communicators as well as those interested in the issue. There are 12 legal community broadcasters in Montes de Maria of which 60% have municipal coverage while 22% have sub regional coverage and 17% have regional coverage. The network has members in the municipalities of El Carmen de Bolívar, Córdoba, Marialabaja, San Jacinto, Los Palmitos, Ovejas and San Juan Nepomuceno y Zambrano.

In the region of Montes de Maria the mass media, including the popular communicators, carried out self censorship and within this framework certain subjects were taboo. Conditions for freedom of expression are still unsatisfactory and some subjects are taboo, but today it is possible to act with more freedom and the communicators attribute part of this climate of change to the accompaniment of REDES and the “Foundation” in the region. Now it is possible to cover subjects that, not long ago, could not be aired. Nevertheless, limits still exist on freedom of expression and even the “*Fundación de Desarrollo de los Montes de Maria*” has been exposed to pressures. In the face of this situation and so as not to risk reprisals, the popular communicators are trying to be non provocative by being creative.

The coordinators of the network to network meet monthly with the Foundation and these meetings serve to develop the accompaniment of the Foundation with the process as well as to establish a space for consolidation and feedback among the partners of the network. The community radio stations of the network make a strong contribution to the processes of communication from the point of view of social change. They are media where there is greater education for the staff and who see communication as a way of influencing the community. For these media it is very important that education, culture

and communication are central to the process of involving the people, which is why they organize training workshops for young people and children, and offer programs to make people aware of issues such as health, education and politics (human rights, democracy, coexistence, etc.). The network is proposing an alliance to coordinate and simultaneously broadcast specific programs on several radio stations. It will also coordinate the collaboration and opportunities for broadcasting with *RESA*, the project for ensuring food supplies and will use the program *Finca Montemariana* to reach out to the small scale farmers in the sub regions with information on problems such as the environment and project promotion. Other future projects include: school radios, children's collectives, cultural centers, topics on culture, peace and communication as well as campaigns on health, solidarity and political awareness about electoral processes.

The experience of the network of popular communicators is still in its early stages, but there is no doubt about importance of the accompaniment of REDES and the *Fundacion* to establish a space for consolidation and feedback between the members of the network, thereby offering a type of visibility and protection against the armed groups. In addition, the popular broadcasters, although sometimes small, have the capacity to reach out to the marginalized groups in the more isolated areas of the region.

3.2 Role of REDES the Peace Processes at a National Level

3.2.1 Public policy engagement at the national level

Two cooperation and finance agreements exist, one between REDES and the National Department of Planning (*DNP*) and one between REDES and *Accion Social*. The first is a technical cooperation agreement that has as its objective the strengthening of the Unit of Development and Peace of the Directorate of Justice and Security of the *DNP* whose job is: to evaluate the impact of the development and peace programs; institutionally strengthen them; and formulate public policy in respect of development and peace. This last issue particularly interests REDES in so far as the institutionalization of the PDPs within the framework of a public policy of peace in the country, (i.e. that is going to last a long time), allows for the building of a solid foundation for the sustainability of the involvement of REDES in the regions. According to the Directorate of Justice and Security, it is not solely a matter of incorporating the topic in the new development plan but to go beyond that and they want to formulate a longer term public policy, agreed with the regions, through a dialogue on public policies.

REDES' support to the *DNP* has consisted of financial resources for the Unit of Development and Peace, but mainly has taken the form of technical support and dialogue about the programs of development and peace and, more recently, about the Third Peace Laboratory. The *DNP* recognizes the important contribution that REDES has made to strengthening the programs of development and peace of Montes de Maria and Meta so that in these regions there are the organizational, operational and financial conditions for having a third laboratory of peace. Both REDES and the *DNP* agree on what is necessary to strengthen there links and coordination in the regions, because sometimes there is duplication of effort. This greater coordination would allow for making the best use of resources and would guarantee that the national Government assumes its responsibility in a more coherent way in accompanying the regional processes of development and peace and the laboratories of peace. Initiatives of the civil society with resources from international technical cooperation do not mean that the Colombian State can delegate its responsibilities and duties on the matter of guaranteeing and achieving economic, social and cultural rights. For this reason the European Commission is concerned that the national Government is transferring the technical responsibility for formulating the Global Operational Plan and the Annual Operational Plans of the third peace laboratory to the programs of REDES and UNDP.

The second case concerns a cooperation agreement between UNDP/REDES and *Accion Social* (*the DEX Agreement*) through which REDES receives resources from the national Government and World Bank to

strengthen its activities in the regions (MM, Meta and Oriente Antioqueño) where the third peace laboratory is going to take place and 5 other regions (Eje Cafatero, Buenaventura, Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, Cartagena and Huila) prioritized by *Accion Social*. Nevertheless, in practice but with the exception of Huila, REDES is not in charge of these resources or activities in these zones even though REDES is paying the bill. In the case of Cartagena, for example, it is the local development program of UNDP that is in charge of operations. *Accion Social* recognizes the relevance and importance of the involvement of REDES in the regions, where it has a presence in the peace and development programs, especially in respect of the preparation for the third peace laboratory. It also recognizes, as a significant contribution, the methodological approach of REDES which is aimed at strengthening the capacity of the local institutions and civil society.

For its part, *Accion Social* coordinates the World Bank funding for peace and development that is carried out in several regions of the country, including Montes de Maria. There, the Foundation Network of Development and Peace of Montes de Maria is responsible for the projects financed by these funds and by REDES. This signifies, as was demonstrated to the Evaluation Mission, a very heavy administrative load that today has nearly overwhelmed the Foundation. This situation is evidence of poor coordination in the area between the different programs and a lack of cooperation and coherence between them.

3.2.2 The role of REDES at a national level in the peace process

In accordance with documents of the REDES Program (Project Document

– “Partnership for Program Peace in Colombia, UNDP – Sida” and respective reports), the component “Civil Society and post – Cartagena process” has as its objective the empowerment of the civil society in democratic processes of peace building, together with the national Government and the international community. At a national level, this component is seen mainly through the accompaniment of the Cartagena Consensus, the G-24 and the initiative “*Punto de Encuentro*”.

“*Punto de Encuentro*”

“*Punto de Encuentro*”¹² (Meeting Point) is an initiative that appeared in December 2005, as a result of the Congress of Peace Initiatives. It brings together most of the national organizations and spaces who are working on Peace issues. This space for cooperating on peace initiatives tries to move towards building a consensus amongst its participants and to define binding actions that allow them to carry out joint tasks and activities. “*Punto de Encuentro*” also wants to be an opportunity of cooperation for more peace events.

The process of consolidating this initiative has been slow as it brings together diverse criteria, visions and interests. According to some of its representatives¹³, it was the organizational regional processes that put pressure on the national initiatives to reach agreements and oriented efforts for cooperative action in the regions. This process of mutual recognition between the national peace initiatives has been accompanied from the beginning by UNDP through the REDES Program. The work of REDES has been that of technical secretariat and to facilitate the logistical and operational conditions for the meetings of *Punto de Encuentro*. According to the organizations that are part of this initiative, the accompaniment of an external agent such as the UNDP – REDES has allowed *Punto de Encuentro* to consolidate, in spite of the prejudices and distrust that the different organizations expressed in the beginning. They consider that the UNDP – REDES offer a neutral space that allows them to build up trust in a way that they do not feel pressure from meeting any particular network or organization. The national organizations who are part of *Punto de Encuentro* understand the work of the technical secretariat of UNDP, but

¹² *Punto de Encuentro* is made up of Programa por la Paz – CINEP, Planeta Paz, la Redprodepaz, Redepaz, Iniciativas de Mujeres por la Paz, INDEPAZ, Asamblea Permanente por la Paz, Comisión de Conciliación Nacional, Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris y Suippcol.

¹³ These comments emerged in the meeting held by Members of the Evaluation Mission and the organizations Redepaz, Asamblea Permanente por la Paz e Iniciativas de Mujeres por la Paz and la Comisión de Conciliación Nacional.

they do not clearly see what REDES' role is. This needs to be resolved to establish joint agendas that strengthen REDES in the areas and also contribute to the strengthening of the national organizations and their link with the regional processes. The 2007 mandate of *Punto de Encuentro* will be decisive in validating a joint policy action between the different national initiatives for peace. The objective in the medium term is that *Punto de Encuentro* becomes a point of reference on issues of peace in the country.

On the other hand, the methodology of a permanent exchange of information and opinions and equal participation by the different players promoted by REDES through the technical secretariat has enabled progress towards the building of a common agenda. Unlike previous experiences to create platforms of joint action – such as “*Paz Colombia*”, on this occasion the initiatives consider that they have been overcoming sectarianism and that the organizations, REDES and the platforms have matured politically. The mediation of the United Nations through the UNDP REDES program has significantly contributed to progress here. As far as the main challenges of this program of strengthening and cooperation of the civil society and the facilitating by REDES, the following should be mentioned:

- Every national peace initiative must include in its own agenda the “*Punto de Encuentro*” agenda. Similarly concrete strategies of joint action and political and programmatic identity need to be established
- National cooperation of the different peace initiatives must also have a reference in the regional processes and also strengthen the relationship between what happens in Bogotá and what happens in the regions. The REDES program, in so far as it has a presence in four regions of the country (Montes de Maria, Meta, Oriente Antioqueño and Huila), could promote and facilitate a greater dialogue and relationship with the national peace initiatives of peace
- the national peace initiatives agree about what is necessary to widen reflections about the situation of the country to take into account the different possible peace scenarios (AUC, ELN, FARC), the political situation (second term of office of President Uribe Vélez) and subjects that have been systematically dealt with such as the drug trafficking
- It is necessary, as some of the participants of the *Punto de Encuentro* indicated, to widen the dialogue with other sectors, such as economic organizations and the political sector
- It is also very pertinent to strengthen the dialogue between the peace movement and the human rights movement. Initiatives like the *Techo Comun* (Common Roof) that bring together human rights and peace organizations must be strengthened to bring the peace and human rights agendas in the country closer together. In this sense, the REDES program can contribute, as an impartial external player, to generate confidence and to facilitate the rapprochement between these sectors.
- On the other hand, the cooperation and the coordination between the different voices of civil society on peace and human rights issues must also aim at being considered as valid interlocutors by the national government, which defines the public peace agenda. The UNDP would be the so called bridge builder between the Government and *Punto de Encuentro*, as it has, for example, with the organizations. This requires the United Nations to strengthen dialogue with the national Government and rebuild trust.

G – 24 and Cartagena Consensus

At the beginning of 2003, discussions began about forming a round table of international cooperation between Colombia and donor countries, for which the United Kingdom offered to act as host. The last Round Table of donors had taken place in Milan. Different sectors agreed that it had not ended with satisfactory results; participation by the civil society had been minimal and the government agenda did not include the subjects prioritized by the international donors. In order to overcome the difficulties of Milan, the Colombian Government, the civil society and the international donor countries propose the

Resident Humanitarian Coordinator of the United Nations acts as facilitator of the preparatory dialogue for the new Round Table. This request arose from the acknowledgement of the strong polarization that existed in the national political ambit. As result of the tripartite preparations, agreement was reached on the subjects for the agenda, which finally centered on aspects such as human rights, peace and the humanitarian crisis. In parallel a wide representation of the Colombian civil society at the Round Table was sought, that included not only NGOs of differing perspectives but also the Church, social movements, the private sector and regional players.

The conclusion of the London Round Table (*Mesa de Londres*) was the approval of the London Declaration, which became an inescapable strategic framework for the relationship between Government, civil society and the international community. In order to give continuity to the process already started, a new Round Table of International Donors took place in Cartagena in January 2005. As in London, during the period of preparation the UN Humanitarian Resident Coordinator facilitated the dialogues that allowed the building of agreements on key subjects. As a result of these agreements two consensus documents were obtained, the first endorsed by the organizations of civil society – Declaration of the Cartagena Consensus – and the second agreed by all the governments represented at the Round Table – Declaration of Cartagena. It is necessary to highlight the achievement of these agreements since the subjects dealt with in the meetings were very controversial: human rights, demobilization, armed conflict and the humanitarian crisis.

The London process had a greater follow up on the subjects defined in the agenda on the part of the international community. Through a United Nations initiative, the Group of 24 countries – G24- was convened, which constitutes a periodic and regular meeting opportunity for dialogue and eventual building of consensus between the diplomatic representations of the donor countries. This group has a rotating presidency and a coordinating element (Troika). The G – 24, besides enabling a channel for dialogue and permanent interchange between the main Embassies in Colombia has given the international community a greater influence on subjects of great political sensitivity, and it has allowed them to act as a bridge between the authorities and civil society. On the other hand, the London process triggered greater cooperation in civil society, which has allowed them to have a more organic and coordinated participation in the processes of consultation on the strategy of international cooperation. This greater coordination and cooperation of the civil society is stated in the Consensus of Organizations of civil society meeting in Cartagena, better known as the Consensus of Cartagena¹⁴.

The technical secretariat of the Humanitarian Resident Coordinator, through REDES, has facilitated the dialogue between the civil society and the national Government. The meetings allow equitable participation and the exchange of ideas. Similarly, some of the representatives of the Consensus¹ indicate that UNDP/REDES has generated confidence within the different players through this process, which has allowed dialogue between different points of view. The accompaniment of the Humanitarian Resident Coordinator of the United Nations gives political endorsement and legitimacy to the process. As in the case of *Punto de Encuentro*, the greatest challenge to the post-London – Cartagena process, in which is mentioned the civil society and the role played by REDES, is to consolidate the processes of dialogue between the different sectors (organizations, social groupings, political sectors, peace movements, human rights movements, etc.), to include in the agenda specially sensitive subjects such as the development models and the role of the regions in the discussion about the agendas of international cooperation (to take the themes defined in the London – Cartagena process to the regions and as part of the dialogue with the regional governments).

¹⁴ The Cartagena Consensus is made up of la Alianza de Organizaciones Sociales y Afines, la Confederación Colombiana de ONG, el Consejo Nacional de Planeación, el Consejo Gremial – Asociación Nacional de Industriales (ANDI), Fundaciones Empresariales – Fundación Restrepo Barco, el Secretariado Nacional de Pastoral Social and la Federación Colombiana de Municipios

A greater added value of the REDES Program could be in facilitating the dialogue between the national agenda of international cooperation and the regional processes, like the Programs of Development and Peace (*Programas de Desarrollo y Paz*).

3.2.3 National commission for reparation and reconciliation (NCRR)

The National Commission for Reparations and Reconciliation was created within the framework of Law 975 of 2005 or the Justice and Peace Law. It is a mixed commission made up of representatives of government bodies, representatives of the civil society nominated directly by the President of the Republic and two representatives of the victims selected by the NCRR from people proposed nationally by the organizations of victims.

Although the Law of Justice and Peace, is close to the international standards of reparation (investigation, verdict, sanction, truth), the proposed mechanisms for putting them into practice do not succeed in protecting the rights of the victims and represent serious obstacles for the NCRR to achieve its goals.¹⁵ A recent ruling in the Constitutional Court (Decision C-370 of 2006) discussed the constitutionality of the Law of Justice and Peace, limited its scope and declared as internationally iniquitous the articles that contradicted the current constitutional principles and treaties on human rights. Nevertheless, the national Government in the decree projects that regulate the above mentioned law, and by disregarding totally the Constitutional Court ruling, has exceeded its powers and has widened the law in favor of those victimizing people and limited even more the guarantees for the victims. In the face of this situation, the NCRR has not made an official joint announcement. Nevertheless, some of the representatives of the civil society, in a press statement, have expressed their concerns and disagreement with the content of the projected decrees. Evidently the mixed character of the NCRR hampers what can be said en bloc in response to decisions by the executive. This situation puts restrictions presently on what decisions the NCRR can take that involve the official position of the Government.

This complex panorama is exactly what REDES faces when it decides to support and to accompany the process of the National Commission of Reparation and Reconciliation. On the other hand, from the point of view of the Evaluation Mission, the role of REDES is not clear. At the moment the NCRR is being given technical assistance: by the International Center for Transitional Justice for preparing its plan of action; by OCHA for charting and characterizing the victims' organizations; and by a series of temporary advisers on different issues, contracted by donors such as Asdi and USAID. From what this Mission has been able to understand, the support of the UNDP through REDES has been more of a political character, and this it has taken shape in the initiative to create and to administer a Trust Fund that would receive the contributions of the different donors for the financing of the activities of the NCRR.

In addition, REDES has been accompanying and supporting the initiative of Monsignor Nel Beltrán (member of the NCRR) to create a Regional Commission of Reparation and Reconciliation in Sucre that would cover all the Atlantic Coast (it is part of the 5 regional commissions approved by the NCRR). This proposal, that was already presented to the Round Table of Humanitarian Groups (*Mesa de Humanitarian Operadores*), is trying to obtain the endorsement of the international agencies that are present in the region, so that they create a second group that supports this Commission. Some agencies of United Nations, such as ACNUR, have expressed concerns about the possible confusion between the humanitarian actions necessary in the region to take care of the effects of the serious humanitarian crisis and the actions of a more political nature of the Regional Commission of Reparation and Reconciliation.

This position, from the point of view of the Evaluation Mission, corresponds to the principle of impartiality that the United Nations must defend in a country in conflict like Colombia. REDES can review the relevance of supporting NCRR and its regional proposals, without apparently contributing a

¹⁵ Opinions expressed by *Consejo Nacional de Planeación, Comisión Colombiana de Juristas and Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris*, organizations that make up part of the Carta Consensus, in a meeting with the Evaluation Moción Team.

clear added value. The United Nations position on the subject of truth, justice and the reparation must mainly be in favor of the victims and the defense of the constitutional principles and the international instruments for defending human rights that the country and the Government have accepted and subscribed to. In this sense, we considered that REDES must widen their activities to promote the local, regional and national organizational processes for victims so that they have the capacity and the force to make their rights to truth, justice and reparation indispensable. REDES, also, by having coherent strategies, can contribute by fortifying the initiatives for reconstruction of the truth of the civil society and to prepare the conditions for the establishment of a future independent and inclusive Extrajudicial Commission of the Truth.

3.2.4 Peace laboratory III

Both the different PDPs and the Peace Laboratories in Colombia were inspired by the approach, the design and the practical experiences of the first Program of Development and Peace, in Magdalena Medio. Each one of the PDPs in Colombia, however, has its own particular characteristics imposed by the conditions and circumstances of the different regions where they are located. The First Laboratory of Peace emerged when the European Union decided to support the PDPMM in a political opportunity of dialogue between the Government of Andrés Pastrana and the ELN which included the demilitarization of a zone in the sub region of South Bolívar¹⁶ and to hold a National Convention, with participation by the National Government, ELN and the civil society. The peace talks with the ELN offered an opportunity to do something concrete in respect of the European desire to support a negotiated end to the conflict. In addition, the experiences, lessons learned and the strengthening of the PDPMM in its previous phases, made the Magdalena Medio a strategic region in respect of the peace processes in Colombia and allowed the European Union to initiate a peace and development effort that complemented and strengthened a process already in motion.

The process with ELN was not successful that time, but the collaboration between the PDPMM and the European Union continued and resulted in the launching of the Second (Norte de Santander, Macizo and Oriente Antioqueño) and the Third Peace Laboratory (Meta and Montes de Maria). The Third Laboratory starts with the experiences of the first two Laboratories, and has the strategic purpose of consolidating peace and development initiatives in conflict zones with a view to constituting a strategic sector so that the international cooperation is more integrated and coordinated to the national life of Colombia.

The program has three forms of involvement:

- to support two regional programs of development and peace (Meta and Montes de Maria) that have had some impact on violence, conflicts and exclusion. This component builds on the experience of the previous laboratories to extend support to other initiatives of the local and regional civil society and communities that support a significant element of development and peace, focusing specially on women, the young, ethnic (indigenous and of African descent) groups;
- by basing itself on the contributions from both components mentioned, to contribute to the formulation of a public policy for peace and development including within the framework of the political Constitution of the country.

The Third Peace Laboratory has as its purpose the strengthening the national, regional and local peace initiatives as a contribution to the building of a culture of peace with social justice, and the peaceful resolution of regional, economic, social and political conflicts. The implementation of actions in the three components of the Third Peace Laboratory are always oriented by these objectives.

¹⁶ At the start of the dialogue in 1999 the zone covered 7.600 km² in the municipalities of Santa Rosa, Simití, San Pablo y Morales. At the end in 2001 it only covered 2 municipalities, San Pablo and Cantagallo.

1. The *geographic component* builds on the experience of the two previous laboratories, in two regions that bring together the necessary conditions contained in the philosophy of the Peace Laboratory.
2. *Policy* being the other tool, is developed from the studying of the local and regional processes and realities so that in a participatory and analytical way it feeds the state policy, as an institutional response to the efforts of the civil society in building a country in peace with equitable development in the total respect of the rule of law.
3. The *thematic component* is aimed at peace and development initiatives led by ethnic groups (indigenous and afro Colombian), women's organizations and the young people both local and regional, as these are some of the most vulnerable groups in the face of the effects of the conflict, promoting the creation of space for peace, respect for human rights, and at the same time strengthening the democratic governability as a result of citizen participation.

3.2.5 Campaign for action against landmines

The component "action against antipersonnel landmines" in the REDES program looks to reduce the impact of the use of these devices on the communities and to diminish the risk to the civilian population, by creating and strengthening the national, regional and local institutional capacities, civil society and communities for action against landmines. With the aim of making progress in strengthening institutional capacities, REDES has signed a memorandum of understanding with the National Observatory of Landmines of the Presidential Program for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Rights (*Observatorio Nacional de Minas del Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional Humanitaria*). Within the framework of this joint effort between REDES and the Observatory, the anti landmine Committees of Antioquia, Meta and Montes de Maria have been set up and are accompanied by and receive the technical support of both REDES and the Observatory.

In the same way, the actions of REDES are directed at placing the subject on the public agendas of departments and municipalities and promoting their incorporation in Department development plans, which has already been achieved, with even a budgetary allocation. In the case of Meta, the authorities assigned eighty million Colombian Pesos for the issue, in its 2007 budget. REDES recognizes that there is not sufficient political will for the issue to occupy a really important place in the national public agenda and to be also seen as a public policy issue. The government action is still limited to just assistance and there is no strategic vision to treat the subject as one of the most serious examples of the humanitarian crisis which exists in the country. As a matter of fact, it is important that REDES strengthens its actions with the relevant national authorities, in order to raise the profile even more of the problem in Departments like Meta and to obtain decisions to increase the preventive measures and care for the victims. As far as prevention is concerned REDES has promoted in Meta, Montes de Maria and Antioquia, together with the anti landmine Committees, the formation of "multipliers" in the different communities so that they spread information on the subject and the preventive measures that need to be taken.

The issue represents challenges that must be considered in defining strategies to strengthen the local, regional and national capacities and to promote in Colombia a greater responsibility and commitment. These challenges can be summarized as follows: an increase in the use of landmines and in new locations; difficulty of access to zones at risk; insufficient institutional capacity for clearing landmines; lack of resources in regional organizations; deficiencies in data, channels and flows of information between the competent organizations; and lack of programs for helping victims.

3.3 REDES' Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Systems (PMES) and Knowledge Management Systems

3.3.1 Planning, budgeting and monitoring

REDES started as a visionary program to (re)build social capital and social cohesion in areas of protracted violent conflict. To develop innovative, territory specific, socio political strategies, REDES needed and obtained programmatic and budgetary freedom and flexibility from Sida and BCPR in the initial stage to learn on-the-job and adjust its activities in response to region specific circumstances. However, the absence of program oversight systems to plan, budget and manage the variety of regional and sectoral programs created serious efficiency challenges, which were not adequately addressed by UNDP and REDES management in the early years.

The sharp increase of the overall REDES budget in the last year poses an additional challenge to the management and a possible threat to REDES' cutting-edge socio-political strategy. The program was designed to manage one million US dollars annually, but its budget almost tripled in 2005, with new contributions from Spain, *Acción Social* and a doubling of the Sida budget to a grand total of US\$10.3 million over 3 years. Moreover, the REDES networks in MM and Meta have been selected as partners in the Third Peace Laboratory, which will add another couple of million US dollars to the regional program budget (total PLIII budget: €14–17 million) and requires an extra effort on the part of REDES counterparts like *Fundación* and *CORDEPAZ* to monitor and report on it. There is an urgent need for UNDP and EU to work on a set of joint monitoring indicators to reduce reporting duplications.

While the successful resource mobilization record proves that REDES succeeded in gaining trust of national and international agencies with its innovative approach, it raises a number of profound institutional concerns at the same time. The team was surprised that apparently no internal debate was held to assess potential programmatic consequences of a rapid program expansion. This requires more standardized administrative and monitoring systems that may well clash with REDES' management tradition of programmatic flexibility and responsiveness to change in a local context. One explanation could be that the sharp budget increase coincided with a change in senior management of both the Resident Coordinator and the REDES coordinator. Hence, the evaluation team recommends that the new management and donor agencies design a more sustainable resource mobilization and related human resource strategy for the next phase.¹⁷

Only towards the end of the first program phase did REDES acknowledge and act on the urgent need to develop planning, monitoring and evaluation systems (PMES) to properly manage its activities, resources and results to begin to sustain its impact. A new annual planning and monitoring system became operational in June 2006; it links for the first time individual program activities to planned budgets, funding source, expected outputs and results, categorized by overarching REDES objectives per region and project line. Regional managers can make major changes to their plan only with a written request and management approval. This enables REDES to monitor program progress to target and will generate essential management information to improve planning in subsequent years. When well maintained and monitored, the new system will prove a highly valuable instrument to improve the sustainability of the next REDES programs.

The new monitoring system can be improved as a management tool. First, guidelines need to be set for the desired level of detail in the planning sheets (e.g. the PDP planning for Meta on one page for a budget of US\$408,000 does not provide sufficient monitoring information). Second, specific project allocations need to be in accordance with the overall REDES objectives. Third, the sector and thematic

¹⁷ There is a lack of coordination among the international donors of REDES, both in terms of program planning and in narrative + financial reporting. This seriously burdens the program staff that need to produce multiple reports and financial statements to donors, which each have different funding timelines, outline formats and indicator sets and it needs streamlining in the next phase.

planning sheets need to clearly indicate where the activities are envisaged, to enable the system to generate region specific summary sheets. This information will allow the management to bring greater efficiency to the large number of workshops, diagnostics and training schedules. Fourth, it is advisable to produce quarterly region-specific activity overviews and use them as active planning and monitoring tools in REDES management team meetings. As a bonus, this tool will enhance the insight of the thematic program staff in the overall implementation of REDES program in the field.

Slow UNDP administrative approval procedures and transfers of funds to local counterparts, led to delays and are a source of complaint, the only major complaint from local counterparts after much praise for REDES). The *Fundación* explained they needed to undertake several additional motivational campaigns to re-engage community beneficiaries, because activities were delayed for months. This is a common UNDP problem around the world. However, as UNDP country offices are getting more involved in Direct Execution (DEX) programs in (post)conflict environments, it is absolutely necessary to simplify procedures and reduce UN bureaucracy when it is in partnership with CSO and community based organizations. The team lauds Sida's efforts to advocate both at the High level Commission and in-country for a "UN mini-reform", which would moreover imply improved aid coordination and harmonization between UN agencies at regional and local level.

In the meantime, to make partnerships with local CSOs more efficient and effective, a Small Grants Fund could be integrated in each regional program in the next REDES phase. UNDP's BCPR and Bureau for Resources and Strategic Partnerships (BRSP) launched a Small Grant pilot Program (SGP) with the aim of experimenting with more effective and sustainable partnerships with CSOs in post-conflict environments. REDES was one of three Country Offices selected to participate in the pilot phase (2003–05), which aimed at building peace through dialogue, recovery of democratic and civilian institutions and through economic revitalization. The SGP evaluation (2006) concluded that it was desirable to initiate a second phase for the ongoing pilot projects to consolidate gains, incorporate CSO partnerships in regular national UNDP programs, conduct special capacity-building training (dialogue, consensus building, conflict assessment, prevention, etc) and to strengthen the vertical linking of CSOs with key stakeholders, especially regarding Government – CSO partnerships in national peace building and reconciliation efforts.¹⁸ An interim grant to REDES to this effect is to be approved for the amount of US\$100,000 this September. The planned budget includes several components of interest to the planning of the REDES second phase: e.g. consultant advice for launching small grants in MM and Meta, capacity building of vulnerable group organizations to enable access to the national Laboratory III fund, capacity building of victims organizations to participate in the NCRR and several youth initiatives.

3.3.2 Outcome and impact assessment

Evaluating the effectiveness and impact of the REDES program has been complicated from the outset. First, there was no baseline data collected in the first REDES program regions. Starting as a sociopolitical intervention strategy, REDES did not initiate a thorough planning process. Most energy was devoted to creating an environment to rebuild traditional community networks and encourage local officials to support civil society building work in the middle of armed conflict. Second, because REDES piloted a novel development and peace approach, they felt that many regular program indicators would not apply. Third, the logical framework provided by Sida as a planning and budgeting tool is output oriented. Four, REDES aims to address root causes of conflict and has ambitious overall objectives that require structural transformation in the regions, which cannot be achieved in a three year program with a limited involvement. Also, regional development and peace programs are susceptible to external

¹⁸ Regarding Colombia, the SGF evaluation proposed to: generate strategies on how to integrate and foster sustainable CSO partnership in the country program; discuss possibilities for matching grants from Sida and the EU and World Bank peace funds; develop additional strategies to strengthen the vertical linkages between national government and track III peace initiatives; to document UNDP's accompaniment role and share its work on peace building CSO definitions and monitoring indicators to improve the quality of future mappings.

factors beyond the direct influence of REDES. Hence, it proved nearly impossible for REDES to show lasting impact according to conventional and orthodox evaluation criteria and even harder to establish those results were because of REDES interventions. In other words, the traditional problem of attribution during the evaluation of complex development programs in rapidly changing environments becomes particularly acute in this case.

In the 2nd half of 2005, a small team worked for six months to develop a monitoring and evaluation model, entitled “*REDES: hacia un modelo de implementación deliberativa*”. The largely theoretical paper provides definitions, explains PMES processes and proposes a monitoring model for REDES. The model, which is currently used in REDES reporting, chose the four REDES core strategies, called strategic objectives in the model, as basic entities to measure outcome: community organization, alliance building, public policy and knowledge management.¹⁹ However, the indicators proposed in the model, measure mostly outputs or, at best, direct results, and no effort is made to link achieved results to improvements in the situation of beneficiaries or to advances made to overcome the key impediments to development and peace in Colombia.²⁰

The team strongly recommends that REDES and Sida review their logical framework to make it result-oriented and internally consistent. Aims, objectives and strategies are frequently interchanged in annual plans and reports, with a detrimental effect on the reporting of results. For example, most of the results presented in the 2005 REDES report to Sida are actually realized activities or outputs (like ‘work with civil society’, ‘accompaniment of partners in the territories’ etc.). REDES’ four core strategies (how to achieve the objectives) are called strategic objectives in recent documents, which makes a means become an end in itself. This also explains why the REDES monitoring model is output-oriented. The original aims, objectives, strategies and interventions from the REDES program document, reworked by the team below, begin to show more coherence (please note there is no exclusive relation between boxes in and no objectives could be found reconciliation):

REDES aims	Objectives	Core strategies	Program clusters
Reduce the impact of the armed conflict on vulnerable groups in specific territories	Promote and endorse local strategies for human development	Communities (Revive civil society)	Security (protection of vulnerable groups)
Rebuild local institutions and social REDES	Build capacity of civil society and state institutions to jointly develop consensus strategies to overcome the conflict	Alliances (Build horizontal and vertical alliances)	Sociopolitical and organizational development
Build good governance at local, regional and national level	Promote socioeconomic initiatives to provide options to vulnerable groups and reduce the impact of the illegal armed groups and drug-trafficking	Public Policy (Prepare, propose, adopt public policies)	Pro-poor socioeconomic development
Promote development and peace in protracted violent conflict zones	Consolidate and mainstream a form of development that includes conflict prevention, peace building and critical learning	Knowledge (documentation management and Mainstreaming CPR)	CPR Mainstreaming
Facilitate processes of reconciliation	–	–	Reconciliation and Justice (HR mainstreaming?)

¹⁹ The document formulates them as results: organized communities (*comunidades organizadas*), alliances (*alianzas constituidas*), adopted public policies (*políticas públicas adoptadas*) and created common knowledge (*conocimiento común creado*). (p.12–13)

²⁰ With the exception of the public policy, but it is not clear how “level of incorporation of new policies” and “opportunity for incorporation” are exactly measured.

To select indicators that provide insight into REDES' effectiveness in reaching its aims, objectives and results requires linking of the four main strategies to conflict and violence impediments at the root of the conflict: fragmented communities, weak democratic institutions, coercion and despair, impunity and illicit trade. One of the most interesting results of the REDES intervention is the increased confidence and trust that beneficiaries attributed to participating in the program. This increased sense of community is seemingly more based on perception than actual change in the armed conflict context or security provided by the State. Nevertheless, as this changing security perception has motivated communities to take up mobilization efforts and engage in planning dialogue with local authorities, the team concludes these important results indicate that a beginning is being made in rebuilding fragile communities and re-establishing relations between civilians and local government. Thus, the time has come for the REDES team to end its global search and choose ten key indicators close to home that link systematic quantitative data (to establish a presence on which basis the results can be "owned") with qualitative data that measure changing relationships, capacity building. The matrix below compiled by the evaluation team, provides a summary of major programs, direct results and expected impact that can assist in the process of indicator selection:

REDES Outcome	Beneficiaries/REDES	Direct results (outcome)	Impact: overcoming impediments
Community organizing, social network revival	Youth Local CSOs Subsistence and small farmers Indigenous groups Victims of the violence IDPs ANUC	– Revived local organizations – Cross region networking, bridging capacity building across divides – Increased confidence and creating environment in which trust can be built – Political protection, reduced vulnerability – Participation in planning processes as dialogue partner for government – Restructuring of peasant farmer and indigenous organizations in MM	– Fragmented communities recuperate – Reduced vulnerability to armed groups. E.g. forced recruitment – Pre-empted land eviction – Informed public policy change for peace – Mainstreaming in national development as future recipients of Third Peace Laboratory funds and technical assistance
Thematic dialogue space/areas	Mesa Humanitaria Constituent Assemblies Defensoria	– Safe space/area to analyze roots and impact of violence – Platform to bridge dissenting opinions and formulate solutions	– Respect for human rights and dignity, reduced deadly violence – Community conflict resolution capacity/mechanisms developed
Good and participatory governance	AET, Fundacion, CORDEPAZ, Observatorio Minas, National Army, Governor's office, Consejos regionales empleo	– Regular Government – Civil Society dialogue to re-establish relationships – Prepared ground for joint PDP planning – Regional landmine action plans – Multi player planning/preparation of The Third Peace Laboratory	– Shared analysis on conflict and peaceful resolution of the conflict – Citizen's participation, increased transparency and accountability of local government – Rebuilt vertical relations between state and civilians, state protects civilians


REDES Outcome	Beneficiaries/REDES	Direct results (outcome)	Impact: overcoming impediments
Alliances	Red de Comunicadores Red de Jovenes Red Montemariana ANUC/Meta, Peasant farmer Ass.in MM, Ass.of small coca producers in Meta Consejo Regional de Empleo	– Planned and implemented joint regional programs, like football tournaments, cultural nights, alternative cropping strategies – Success in having youth special needs incorporated in regional development plans – Process to land rights and reparations to peasant farmer IDPs and victims initiated in Meta – Alternative employment creation	– Alliances produce more social cohesion through confidence and trust building – Increased visibility and protection of local and regional processes to include most vulnerable groups – Increased resource allocation to conflict zones through Acción Social and The Third Peace Laboratory
National level PDP work	NPD, NCRR, Vice President's Office Fiscalia, Defensoria National Mine Observatory, National CSOs G24 Small Grants Program	– Policy and practice change on mine awareness – G24: tripartite national level peace and development dialogue – Strategic partnerships with NPD to monitor the Third Peace Laboratory and include results in public policy change	– G24 keeps Peace high on national agenda, advocacy pressure on government to seek for peaceful solutions to conflict – London/Cartagena – Civil Society repositioned at national dialogue table – National recognition of regional work: Madres de la Candelaria are recipients of National Peace prize 2006.
Knowledge management	REDES, SURF, HDU, Small Grant Program to build CSO capacity	– Best practice data – Urban security project – UNDP CPR mainstreaming through new "territorial development strategy" – Small Grants to CSO model	– Innovative approaches adopted elsewhere (Pacific) – Improved effectiveness of UN system in conflict environments – Improved UN capacity to partner with CSOs in conflict zones
Coordination	Gov: Accion Social, NPD, Observatorio, Defensoria UN: UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNHCHR, UNFPA, UNIFEM, OCHA, UNOCD Int: Sida, EC, G24	– Aid harmonization (ISAJ mission) – Strategic partnerships added value to sum of total – Improved resource efficiency and effectiveness – Joint Sincelejo/UN coordination	– REDES as UN mini reform model – Increased efficiency in conflict prevention programs in Colombia's conflict zones

3.3.3 Knowledge management

REDES established a knowledge management unit in its office in late 2005 (one full time person). To address the difficulties encountered in measuring impact, the unit set out to undertake an elaborate study to collect indicators to measure development in the context of violent conflict around the world, in order to develop widely appropriate knowledge management tools. By mid 2006, this research process had been completed and a working group comprising the REDES monitoring coordinator, financial monitoring officer and knowledge management coordinator was established to: *"prepare and disseminate methodological and conceptual tools for the analysis, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the REDES strategy and other international good practices."* (REDES Annual Report 2005–06, p.36) The working group is to present a proposal by the end of 2006. Hence, REDES had not published best practices at the time of writing this report.

While the team appreciates the thorough approach of the new knowledge management unit, it was at the same time surprising that there were no pilot impact indicators being tested in MM and Meta as part of the methodology development process, given the sense of urgency to establish the impact at the end of the 1st REDES phase which cost 10m US dollars. Moreover, exchange with two other UNDP Colombia knowledge management and best practice initiatives appears to be limited “*Banco de Buenas practicas para superar el conflicto*” (Bank of good practices to overcome the conflict) managed by the Human Development Unit and the “Urban security monitoring project” managed by the SURF office for Latin America and the Caribbean). The team received Bank’ first best practice case study on the work of the social REDES in MM, dated June 26/27 2006, but its follow-up is not clear. The SURF adopted a different strategy. At its start, it inherited a data base of 8000 best practice cases and set out to analyze them: 60% were purely local initiatives in which international agencies had not played a role. Only 10% of the good practices had some form of UN involvement and 7% had UNDP involvement. The data base was rarely used by development practitioners, UN staff and counterparts; it was mainly students who consulted the website. Hence, SURF decided to fundamentally change its approach, from providing services to delivering “products”.

Three SURF approaches seem of particular interest to REDES knowledge management. First, to actively broker supply and demand, the team tried to capture common lessons that characterized the best practices. For example, five common success factors could be distilled from good local governance practices: vision, legitimacy, stakeholder collaboration, good governance and community participation. This analysis was translated into a diagnostic tool, accessible on the internet. The common lessons were shared with wider audiences in so-called “knowledge fairs”. SURF offered to assist to host a knowledge fair on the REDES experience in Colombia or the region to mainstream CPR. Furthermore, the urban security project has developed interesting indicators, grouped in six categories: deficit of social capital, risk factors, organized crime, gender and domestic violence, socio-regional context and inefficient police and rule of law. Many could apply to the REDES regional context.²¹ See Annex 6.



However, to get an approximation of the REDES impact on regional security would require a decent baseline, an intensive quantitative and qualitative monitoring of both political and military conjunctures at regional and national levels and the project interventions in a project area, plus a comparable non-project area). This would imply a huge investment of time, staff and funds but could generate interesting and reasonably acceptable results. In the meantime, while REDES can not adjust indicators

²¹ However, the urban security project applicability has two limitations. It monitors trends in urban security, but does not measure impact of UNDP program interventions. SURF agreed it would be, methodologically, extremely difficult to prove correlations between increased security and a program result. Second, quite a few indicators are culturally and contextually sensitive and may indicate improved security. Increased police presence in communities may provide security to some, but could instil fear in vulnerable communities if not combined with good governance practices. To get an approximation of the REDES impact on community security would require a decent baseline, an intensive quantitative and qualitative monitoring of both political-military conjunctures at regional and national levels and the project interventions, in a project area plus a comparable non-project area). This would imply a huge investment of time and money, but could generate interesting and reasonably acceptable results.

from the urban security model, it will be useful to adopt common lessons analysis (the Annual Report 2005 identified among other PDPs, *Red Montemariana*, *Punto de Encuentro*, *Colectivo Comunicadores*, *Asambleas Regionales Constituyentes* as best practices) and to borrow from the indicator sets (i.e. the social cohesion, gender based violence and reduction of risk) to develop an internal evaluation system.

3.3.4 CPR mainstreaming

The mainstreaming of CPR is a global UNDP priority; however concrete guidelines on how this should be achieved are absent and no official Spanish documentation on the CPR mainstreaming policy is available in BCPR. Hence, the concept of CPR mainstreaming was not clear to the REDES team at the start of the evaluation. It was mostly understood as documentation and knowledge management process and less as an active dialogue process to promote a CPR analysis and approach in UNDP and the wider stakeholder community at national and regional level.²² The REDES approach is considered one of BCPR's best practices and often presented in interagency/office presentations. For example, the REDES youth program is one of the six best practice cases in the ongoing Youth and Conflict policy and program development project and, in mid 2006, a (departing) REDES staff member spent six weeks at the regional BCPR office in Fiji to exchange REDES approaches during the UNDP Pacific CPR program formulation.

The team concludes that REDES has been quite effective in mainstreaming CPR approaches in the regions, through its conflict and player analyses and partnerships with UNICEF, UNFPA and UNCHR. A Sincelejo UN coordinator could further facilitate this inter-agency CPR process. CPR mainstreaming in the UNDP Country Office has been limited. The team recommends strategically linking CPR to UNDP's new "territorial strategy". As to the CPR mainstreaming at national level, the evaluation team concludes this can not be the sole responsibility of REDES, although improved knowledge management, combined with a good communication strategy would help. Promoting effective CPR approaches in the UN system would require the active involvement of the UN Resident Coordinator to overcome inter-agency competition and broaden the focus from humanitarian assistance to early recovery and development. Senior management engagement and HQ support from BCPR/New York is required to make progress in transforming the programs of the UN family in Colombia towards a rights-based approach to development in conflict zones.

REDES' mission could be enhanced and better understood as good practice, if the Right to Development (RTD) approach is incorporated in its socio-political strategy, in accordance with the global UNDP policy. It wouldn't change but rather strengthen the REDES program narrative and provide focus to its national advocacy for public policies change. The RTD approach differs from previous development models, in that it attaches a more explicit normative and legal context to development programs and policies. Four RTD components could be stressed:

- i) Its focus on inclusion of vulnerable groups that have been marginalized and traditionally excluded from the benefits of development; to ensure participation, equality, non-discrimination and access to opportunities in society by promoting the rule of law, transparency, accountability and sound public management practices and institutions.
- ii) The RTD Covenant specifies clear obligations of the State to ensure full exercise and progressive enhancement of the RTD and to eliminate obstacles. It should end "massive and flagrant violations" of human rights and promote fundamental freedoms for all.
- iii) The State should also develop and promote (inter)national peace and security, to "achieve general and complete disarmament" and to use the resources thus released "for comprehensive development".

²² The BCPR definition of CPR mainstreaming is "a process of assessing the implications for UNDP of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programs, in all areas and at all levels, through a crisis lens."

- iv) Great importance is placed on the role of civil society, as key mediating agents between communal groups, governments and markets and partners of the government to resolve conflicts, which is the essence of the REDES strategy.

Other UNDP strategies that will enhance REDES' discourse are the Millennium Development Meta principles that share the same rights values, including freedom from hunger and fear of violence, oppression and injustice.²³ Both the RTD Covenant and the MD goals are ratified by the Government of Colombia. Two MDG strategies focus on human security:

- *"We are determined to free our peoples from the scourge of war, whether within or between States"* (MD, 2000, Peace, security and disarmament, p.3)
- *"We will spare no effort to ensure that children and all civilian populations that suffer disproportionately the consequences of natural disasters, genocide, armed conflicts are given every assistance and protection so that they can resume normal life as soon as possible."* (MD, 2000, Protect the vulnerable, p.7)(see Annex 8, MDG strategies)

REDES is a valuable program concept to BCPR, with "freedom from fear, want and despair" as its main objective, and works simultaneously on three core dimensions of human security²⁴:

- *Development dimension*: to reduce the risk, vulnerability and insecurity resulting from poverty (poor access to productive assets and basic services), gender disparities and other forms of inequality (freedom from want).
- *Governance dimension*: to reduce the probability (risk/vulnerability) of human insecurity and violent conflict poverty (relative deprivation), resulting from income and asset inequalities accompanied by weakened institutions, failed governance and a lack of respect for political and individual rights (freedom from fear).
- *Societal cohesion dimension*: to address the social-psychological aspects of security, including a sense of dignity, identity, efficacy and hope, re-enforced by an institutional and social network of support based on interpersonal trust and societal cohesion (freedom from despair).

Profiling REDES programs using these universal UNDP RTD and human security principles could also facilitate the formulation of more strategic outcome and impact indicators and increase the accessibility of REDES knowledge and experience to UNDP staff in other conflict environments and thereby enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of CPR mainstreaming.

²³ See Elisabeth Scheper – Gender Equality, Human Rights and Freedom from Despair; Towards a Strategic Stakeholders' Partnership to Prevent Violent Conflict in Asia. Expert paper presented at the UN Conference on Gender Mainstreaming and the MDGs, Islamabad, March 2005.

²⁴ See Colletta, N.J. (2003) Human Security, Poverty and Conflict: Implications for IFI Reforms.

4. Conclusions

4.1 Relevance

Strategic interventions to overcome key impediments

The evaluation concludes that the interventions of REDES are highly strategic with a clear focus on finding solutions for the key problems and bottlenecks to sustainable development and peace in Colombia. REDES creates space for multi stakeholder' debates promoting local and national development and peace program, in which the voice of vulnerable groups – historically excluded- is included and their issues addressed. Empowerment strategies for vulnerable groups include promotion of traditional organizations, capacity building and accompaniment, and as such provide equitable access to marginalized communities in participatory planning processes. UNDP plays a unique role in the Colombian conflict context, as REDES' programs champion a reconciliation and development approach in deprived regions deeply affected by the armed conflict. It advocates structural transformation of public policies and practices at local, regional and national level, where most agencies continue in the humanitarian service delivery mode.

REDES as a socio-political regional strategy

To work on development in areas of protracted violent conflict requires a novel “geographic socio-political strategy”, as traditional development program approaches fail to respond effectively to ever changing, volatile conflict environments. The REDES focus on social political mobilization and strengthening of community networks and local capacities is achieving results in enhancing community resilience. However, the rogue nature of local government institutions, the territorial presence of armed groups and the illicit drug-trafficking have limited the prospects for effective economic development program results in REDES program areas.

Selection of regions

The main criteria for program area selection included: violent conflict scenario characterized by fierce disputes over territory between legal and illegal armed groups; a deteriorating humanitarian crisis; need for crisis management and risk reduction strategies; poverty, social polarization and fragmentation of civil society players; historic civil society capacity for social mobilization and conflict resolution. The selection of MM and Meta with distinct geography, player sets and socio-economic trends, represents the diverse conflict and development dilemmas in Colombia and allowed REDES to pilot novel approaches to work with civil society and state players in different violent conflict settings. During the pilot phase, REDES coordinators thus developed different program emphases and methodologies in MM and Meta. Some agencies with a human rights oriented mission cautioned REDES in our interviews to partner with local counterparts in areas controlled by legal and illegal armed groups, as they are likely to hijack project results and “do-no-harm” principles cannot be safeguarded. The team concludes that working in conflict zones with a wide spectrum of state and non-state players implies taking risks. Hence, REDES needs to systematize these regional experiences, document lessons, weigh pros and cons and agree on a common REDES player strategy before selecting and expanding to new REDES regions.

The Government has played a critical role in the area selection too. In the preparation phase, Oriente Antioquia was prioritized by the government, while *Acción Social* has provided additional funds to UNDP since 2005 to start new REDES programs in Eje Cafetero, Buenaventura, Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, Cartagena and Huila. With the exception of Huila, UNDP decided to allocate the resources to other UNDP Colombia programs without giving REDES even a CPR mainstreaming role. The team recommends clarifying the nature and content of the partnership of REDES and UNDP with *Acción*

Social. Staff of *Acción Social* are on UNDP's payroll and the vice versa without a clear justification, while *Acción Social* is representing UNDP/REDES on occasions and carries its logo on their business cards. There is little programmatic justification for this decision that was taken during the senior management transformation stage. The team concludes such management decisions undermine specific program, monitoring and advocacy responsibilities of REDES in coordinating its development and peace programs. UNDP needs to adopt clear institutional program planning, implementation and monitoring procedures and responsibilities among its programs to enhance the consistency and relationships with government donors.

Mobilization of local civil society

The two regions have distinctly different strategies for social mobilization and capacity building of civil society. MM has a historically weak and divided local civil society, while Meta is used to stronger civil society structures. REDES played an important role in accompanying the foundation of the *Fundación*, a local membership organization incorporating CSO and community based organizations and the *Red Montemariana*. Due to its catalyzing role, REDES develop more direct relations with vulnerable communities. In Meta, the collaboration with existing agencies like *CORDEPAZ*, a service delivery CSO, and the Meta Department branch of *ANUC* (National Peasant farmers Association) resulted in both direct and indirect relations with community organizations.

REDES has integrated vulnerable groups in its programs, including youth, indigenous, peasant farmers and women. The youth and peasant farmer networks are quite strong, while the women's network needs organizational strengthening. REDES needs to rethink its women's program and set targets to increase the physical, social and economic security of women, their participation in decision making and peace processes, and their organizational capacity.

Collaboration in REDES funded programs with political accompaniment and technical support, have helped CSO leaders get better informed of conflict trends and causes, be more abreast with government intentions and initiatives (or the lack thereof) at Department and municipal level, and more familiar and in contact with community leaders across the regions. As a result, new ideas, means, motivation and confidence were generated for them to take responsibility to rebuild their communities and resist the armed players. In short, in the perception of REDES beneficiaries, the program has made major contributions to reduce their vulnerability to violence.

Strengthening of local governance

The two regions show a similarly different focus on strengthening and enhancing the quality of the local governance. In MM, the AET was established to improve good governance at municipal level and initiate development and peace dialogue to initiate participatory planning and budgeting processes involving civil society and government at department level. In addition, the local authorities actively participate in sector programs, like landmine awareness, youth networks, human rights round tables etc.

In Meta, REDES started similar participatory governance exercises with the Governor's office, but, so as not to jeopardize the program, refrained from building formal alliances with the mayors in view of their political affiliation with armed groups. The capacity of local civil society to participate in the planning of local public policies has improved, which puts them in a stronger position to advocate for good and more legitimate governance. However, in the absence of an AET-like structure, it seems the space for regional local governance dialogue opportunities in Meta is limited, which makes it harder to foster institutional local government – civil society relations and promote regional activities.

Public policy change

Changes in public policy for development and peace at regional and national level are equally important to address the negative impact of the protracted conflict and the drug-trafficking on local good governance in the two regions. National peace dialogue initiatives, involving large international agencies, advo-

cate for negotiated solutions to the armed conflict. However, the National Government actions appear insufficient. In the absence of articulate national peace strategies, REDES advocated desired policy changes, i.e. working with the NPD on monitoring of EU and WB peace and development programs and raising awareness of the importance of public policy sector changes, e.g., through the national landmine observatory and regional committees and through accompaniment of the *Madres de la Candelaria*'s advocacy for victims of violence and the regional CNRR offices (as part of the Small Grants to CSO fund).

In the next phase, REDES and the UNDP Resident Coordinator need to put a more concerted effort, in accordance with international community initiatives, on the promotion of public policy changes at national level. It is necessary to reinforce the regional REDES initiatives and sustain their impact by improving good governance, strengthening the rule of law and stepping up the protection of citizens at regional and local level through top-down policy and practice changes. Furthermore, UNDP can provide added political leverage of UN-system participation in the Third Peace Laboratory to reaffirm the importance of the EC's efforts, especially vis-à-vis the National Development Plan.

4.2 Efficiency

4.2.1 Programming and financial management

REDES obtained programmatic and budgetary freedom from Sida and BCPR in the initial stage to respond to region specific conflict circumstances in a flexible way. The absence of management and oversight systems created serious efficiency challenges, which were only addressed by the UNDP management in 2006. The new annual planning system will prove, if maintained properly, a highly valuable instrument to manage and monitor future REDES programs.

Slow UNDP approval procedures and transfers to the regions have caused delays and, at times, loss of motivation among engaged beneficiary groups. UNDP needs to simplify its procedures for DEX project interventions in conflict zones, beyond introducing Small Grants to CSO. Furthermore, it needs to improve the aid coordination in the UN system and respond the calls for a "mini-reform" in line with High Panel discussions in New York and the Paris Agreement on donor coordination

The lax attitude of UNDP in recruiting two key management positions (the REDES Program Coordinator and the Montes de Maria Region Coordinator remained vacant for 10 months and one year respectively) created a leadership void in a crucial program phase and has hampered the overall development of the REDES program in 2005/6. The new UNDP Coordinator initiated internal discussions to launch a territorial development strategy to build much needed cohesion among the UNDP Colombia programs. The team saw only brainstorming documents, in which REDES seems to be presented as UNDP's grassroots and local capacity building program that operates at regional and local level only to prepare the ground for economic development programs like ART GOLD. This suggests that the REDES' unique sociopolitical intervention strategy is either not well understood or not appreciated in UNDP Country Office, as the preambles of these programs are totally different and national advocacy policy and practice change work is an essential REDES component to transform the conflict context from both bottom-up and top-down.

Financial coordination among UNDP Colombia programs is not only an issue in relation to *Acción Social* funding of REDES regions. When analyzing the budget, the team noted that 23% of the proposed Sida allocation for 2006 is allocated to knowledge management, which seems out of proportion. The budget line is largely absorbed by the Human Development Unit and the Best Practice Bank 17%), while these programs have no direct relation to REDES. This explains why in spite of high budget allocations to best practice documentation and knowledge management, three years on there is little research and no publications on the REDES experience. The team recommends to negotiate closer programmatic collaboration between different UNDP units, or, if this is not feasible, to lift these components out of the REDES budget

4.2.2 Human Resource policies and institutional sustainability

The nine individual staff interviews were held at the end of a 10 months interim period without a REDES program coordinator, in which management responsibilities were divided among the two senior REDES staff members.²⁵ Confusing instructions from UNDP leadership made REDES focus more on specific sectors (economic pilots) at the cost of others. These two combined caused tensions in the REDES team. While the evaluation served as a reaffirmation process of REDES' vision and purpose, the internal staff dynamics still needed to be sorted out and hence influenced the responses. The evaluation team was impressed by the brightness and commitment of the individual staff members, but noted that most are young and therefore have limited field and management experience. The main conclusions are divided in three categories:

Management, coordination and communication

- The exchange of knowledge, experience and internal communication among staff members is limited. There were no regular team meetings convened to inform, coordinate efforts and formulate common agendas. As a result, staff have insufficient insight into the overall REDES program progress and direction, which affects its effectiveness. For example, most team members are not familiar with the position and role of REDES vis-à-vis the NCRR.
- The communication lines in REDES seem vertically structured, in which junior professional staff are informed through regional coordinators. The first claims to have little say in program decision making. It is important to pay more attention to internal consensus-building to instill and strengthen the team spirit and coherence among different REDES interventions.
- The new Coordinator has the important task to not only rebuild the team spirit and provide guidance to the thematic staff, but also to analyze existing differences in programmatic choices and selection of counterparts in the regional programs, to develop a common intervention strategy in future program areas.

Team composition, job description and selection criteria

- The team composition needs to be reviewed to meet the technical needs of the program.
- All core staff interviewed are based in the Bogotá office, which does not seem to be in line with the REDES program philosophy; field postings need to be considered in the next phase.
- The recruitment of the Sincelejo Coordinator should be a top priority.
- Donors expressed concerns over the lack of seniority in the REDES team. In the interview with the UNDP Resident Coordinator, this was explained by the low professional scales (P2 and P3), while donors claim they are compatible with other UN agencies field programs.
- The job profiles are too broad, the tasks too many and not compatible with the staff's practical experience. They need to get synchronized before the next phase starts and the scales need to be reviewed too. In addition, it would be good to include in each profile the shared responsibilities of the overall REDES performance.
- For specialized themes like human rights and justice, REDES needs to hire professionals with broad field experience to strengthen the vision, strategy and monitoring of regional programs.
- As to general selection criteria, work experience with communities, thematic knowledge, stakeholder REDES, analytical capacity and report writing skills could orient contracting of new staff.

²⁵ The nine positions are: Program Coordinator, two Regional Coordinators, and six Thematic Coordinators (Civil Society, Mine Action, Third Peace Laboratory, London/Cartagena, Human Rights, PMES and Knowledge Management). The CSO Coordinator is also the new Regional Coordinator for Huila. Four of the nine core-staff members are foreign nationals (2x Italy, 1x Sweden, 1x Spain).

Staff capacity building

- UNDP and REDES need to design a staff capacity-building plan to strengthen the knowledge of priority themes. During the interviews, the staff showed keen interest in such a provision.
- Special training in program management, monitoring and evaluation skills is essential to strengthen the efficiency and sustainability of REDES interventions
- A strategic planning exercise for the next phase, as well as annual planning workshops, will prove valuable tools in strengthening program cohesion and give direction to the team.

4.3 Coordination and Collaboration with Local and International Partners

UNDP and REDES highlighted three success factors for its much appreciated Sida partnership:

- i) Size and flexibility of Sida's resource mobilization
- ii) Dialogue partnership: jointly strategized and provided confidence-building support to REDES coordinators during the inception phase
- iii) Accompaniment in building political alliances at national and international level, i.e. assisted REDES in convincing authorities and donors to collaborate with the program.

While the Sida–UNDP partnership was close and mutually satisfying in first two years (“political accompaniment”), it became strained during the course of the 2005–2006 budget year, when REDES was without a Program coordinator for 10 months and UNDP repeatedly failed to meet commitments regarding planning, timely reporting etc. During the management void, REDES program staff received confusing directions from the UNDP management, damaging its internal cohesion. With the arrival of the new leadership a week prior to the mission, REDES began to rebuild its partnership with Sida. This evaluation served as a program review and team building exercise that got the REDES team geared up to start a nation wide stakeholder consultation process to plan the next three year phase. The team advises UNDP and REDES to appreciate and make more use of Sida's institutional multilateral development and aid harmonization policy and its high profile among international and national players in Colombia to strengthen the sustainability of its regional programs and effectiveness of its national level advocacy.

The partnership with the BCPR office in New York was likewise strong in the initial two years, but started to dwindle after the 2004 mission, to be picked up in late 2005 by its Conflict Prevention Unit. The technical advice missions and financial support to REDES in the early days (2002/4) were vital in REDES' program formulation and staff capacity building to develop a multi-stakeholder and sector approach that incorporated all six BCPR service lines. While REDES matured and diversified its funding sources, the SADU (Youth and Protection) and Mine Action units continued its funding and backstopping dialogues, which left a clear mark on the REDES program, considering the progress made in landmine awareness and youth network building. Furthermore, BRSP/BCPR's Small Grants to CSOs pilot project allowed REDES to develop insights in partnering with the women peace movement and experiment with organizational development of vulnerable groups: women, indigenous and youth organizations, both in and outside three program regions, with a strong focus on horizontal bridge building and vertical advocacy linking capacity. The Colombia SCP was evaluated by BCPR in the spring of 2006; results were very encouraging, making BCPR approve a second SGF phase, with a continued focus on national level, the Third Peace Laboratory, NCRR and vulnerable group initiatives. In all, BCPR provided two two-year integrated grants to REDES for a total sum of 1.84m US Dollars. With the seed funds, REDES brought Sida on board in 2004 and four smaller grants in 2005, which doubled the annual budget from 1.3m US Dollars to 3.5m US Dollars in 2006.

At the debriefing session to REDES' bilateral donor agencies, hosted by Sida, there was general agreement that communication and coordination among bilateral donors needs to be improved. With the exception of Sida, all donors have picked specific themes and/or regions to fund, which not only reduces effective donor coordination, but puts a heavy monitoring and reporting burden on the REDES administration too. Closer consultation among donors could lead to a core funding approach and the formation of a donor consortium will reduce the administrative burden. Lastly, the REDES' regional counterparts would benefit from a more active role from the international donor community in national level advocacy for peace, inclusionary governance and public policy changes.

All interviewed stakeholders (European Commission, *Acción Social* among others) involved in the EU funded Third Peace Laboratory agreed that REDES has made a valuable and important contribution in preparing the ground for the actual implementation of its two regional programs in the Meta and MM. In this respect, the work carried out by REDES at national level and in its link with the regional and local levels, constitutes a particularly important asset. REDES' work and methodology is also likely to be useful with regard to project activities focused on ethnic minorities, women and youth, based on REDES' Small Grants Program, which enriched its work with civil society at large.

It therefore seems likely that REDES will provide added value through the accompaniment of the Third Peace Laboratory in the coordination of its thematic component, "*Iniciativas para la paz*", which prioritizes Afro-Colombians, indigenous peoples as well as women and children as special beneficiary categories. REDES would be particularly well equipped to: i) provide technical assistance to this component implementation; ii) provide access to linkages and dialogue platforms that form part of the REDES work carried out so far, to reach new groups and initiatives; and iii) convey the political importance of UN involvement in the Third Peace Laboratory, thus reaffirming the importance of the effort promoted by the European Commission, especially vis-à-vis the new National Development Plan.

The channeling of EU and World Bank funds to the regions however, puts a heavy administrative management burden on the local REDES counterparts. In the case of MM, the *Fundación* is at risk of getting overstretched by these additional responsibilities, to the detriment of its technical assistance work and deserves greater attention and better sharing of coordination roles. Moreover, it was not clear to the team what the REDES responsibility is vis-à-vis the oversight of the Third Peace Laboratory and *Acción Social* funds disbursed in the regions. Because the *Acción Social* budgets are integrated in the overall REDES and UNDP budgets, a direct responsibility may be assumed, even for the programs in regions outside the REDES program, while in case of the PLIII, REDES will not play an intermediary funding role. It is important to clarify this political, coordination and funding responsibilities before the next REDES phase starts.

4.4 Lessons Learned

4.4.1 Common characteristics of REDES' best practices

REDES has developed a series of strategies that have proved to be effective in initiating development and reconciliation projects in the midst of violent conflict. Chapter 3, the findings, documented the variety of project interventions and networks and alliances fostered. Without repeating the details, the evaluation selected five REDES best practices, which sum up the effectiveness of the program in the regions and require in-depth documentation to provide possible models to other UNDP programs operating in conflict environments.

The core good REDES practices can be identified as:

- Accompaniment of development and peace processes at local and regional level
- Revival of local civil society organizations to (re)build social capital and cohesion
- Fostering of alliances between local government-civil society to begin restore confidence

- Facilitation of local dialogue and protection initiatives of vulnerable groups, particularly successful among youth and peasant farmers
- Linking local initiatives to national public policy agenda and vice versa to promote structural transformation and CPR awareness (e.g. landmine awareness and prevention).
- Use of international community leverage in regional programs

Six common characteristics could explain the success of these good practices:

- i) Political vision
- ii) Political commitment to accompany risky dialogue processes
- iii) In-depth knowledge of conflict and stakeholder interests
- iv) Participatory, multi-stakeholder involvement
- v) Identification and engagement of local leadership
- vi) Rights based development orientation (inclusion and equality)

Experienced REDES coordinators need to reflect on these practices in the next planning phase and work with the knowledge-management and SURF staff to develop ten simple, measurable indicators to monitor future REDES progress and share their experiences with UNDP staff active in other conflict environments. During the staff interviews, several best practices were identified; most are micro cases in which one or several of the good practices helped make a breakthrough at community or CSO level. To increase the cases' universal applicability, it is necessary to seek for the common lessons, like the ones suggested above or others, which identify aspects of a higher order, to improve the mutual benefit of ongoing BCPR linking and learning exchanges with international agencies' staff. A final good practice that was mentioned by several REDES staff members is the predominantly local (Colombian) identity of the REDES team; the mission had no means to verify this, but it could be an interesting topic in future comparative BCPR research.

4.4.2 Threats and weaknesses

The REDES program has also met with several restrictions that caused intrinsic weaknesses. The evaluation has highlighted four:

- i) Lack of good governance and impunity in deadly conflict zones
- ii) National level political institutional and advocacy engagement
- iii) Internal UNDP program coordination and CPR mainstreaming
- iv) Limited donor communication and lack of coordination

Opportunities and threats posed by the internal UNDP coordination and management implications of limited donor coordination were discussed in chapter 3.3; thus only i) and ii) are explained here.

Good governance in deadly conflict zones

MM and Meta were selected as REDES regions, because of their violent conflict scenario in which legal and illegal armed groups fiercely defend territories under their economic, political and social control. In MM and Meta, the national Army, FARC and AUC are the de facto ruling powers and use their military force and affiliated organizations to exercise full authoritarian control, which includes directing the nomination of local government officials and allocations of budgets at the cost of public policy and fundamental human rights. In this context, the authority of local and regional authorities is severely undermined and debilitated, and the civilians are at the mercy of armed groups. How is it

possible to strategically empower democratic governance institutions in such a hostile and corrupt environment? The lack of good governance and rule of law makes working on transforming government-civil society relations and creating participatory development processes a serious challenge in the regions.

A few inspiring results, like the signing of the “*pacto de gobernabilidad*” in MM and Meta, indicate that intermediate strategies can be pursued to create space for public-private debate in which civil society can influence regional public planning and budget processes to improve the social accountability and transparency of local governments. Such strategies largely rely on capable social organizations that can advocate changes in political practices and participate in political dialogues. The accompaniment of REDES proved essential in building local capacity to interact with official institutions. Still, major public policy change and structural transformation of power relations cannot be among the expected REDES results and impact. This reality should inform the choice of indicators too.

National level political advocacy engagement

REDES has strategic cooperation agreements with various national-level government institutions, most notably the National Planning Department (DNP) and *Acción Social*. The Development and Peace Unit in its Directorate for Justice and Security evaluates the EU’s LP programs, and REDES’ technical assistance and political dialogue support is meant to institutionalize PDP practices as good public policy to eventually enhance the impact of REDES interventions in the regions. While the EU is concerned that REDES involvement is convenient for the national government to delegate responsibilities of formulating operational peace and development plans to REDES and civil society partners, again in the given context, it seems the best of options.

What is however of paramount importance is to maintain a high national level advocacy pressure on the Government to provide minimal guarantees to realize essential policy changes to improve the participation and inclusion of marginalized communities in national development and peace processes. In this effort, REDES needs more substantial and strategic support from UNDP and the wider UN system.

5. Recommendations

5.1 Recommendations to UNDP and REDES Management

a. Strengthen the REDES development strategy

Rights approach to development: The team recommends that REDES incorporates the RTD in its program analysis and international dialogues, while preserving the unique Colombian peace and development discourse for local audiences. Profiling the REDES program from the RTD and human security perspective will facilitate the formulation of more strategic outcome and impact indicators and a better understanding of the REDES model and experience in other post-conflict countries. The twelve separate action lines need reformulating in five comprehensive clusters: security, socio-political and organizational development, socio-economic development, reconciliation and justice and CPR mainstreaming.

The team strongly recommends that REDES continues to strengthen and expand the support to and incorporation of grassroots organizations and groups such as peasant farmers and indigenous peoples in the Meta and MM regional programs, since these represent the most vulnerable and prioritized groups with respect to the aims and objectives of REDES and the regional PDPs.

The team advises that the pilot project, on integral alternative development activities to substitute illicit coca cultivation in Meta, be continued and deepened in order to produce methodological and organizational knowledge and experience that can subsequently be transferred to the regional components of the Peace Laboratories as well as be used as inputs into an urgently needed alternative strategy to reduce illicit coca cultivation.

Good governance in CSOs: Both the RTD and human security strategies place a great importance on the role of civil society, as key mediating agents between communal groups, governments and markets and as a key partner to the government to resolve conflicts, which is the essence of the REDES strategy too. A strong civil society is vital to Colombia's capacity to manage social and economic transformation peacefully and mediate conflict. To increase the sustainability of the REDES and alliances fostered in the REDES regions, it is recommended that more attention is paid to monitoring good governance practices in CSOs (representative and rotating leadership, accountable and transparent management and participatory decision making with beneficiaries). A Small Grants Fund for CSOs initiatives needs to be integrated in all regional programs to facilitate community level economic and social projects and increase beneficiary ownership of regional efforts.

Vulnerable groups: REDES needs to promote representation and participation of vulnerable groups in the work and management of all its CSO partners, next to strengthening and accompanying vulnerable group organizations, like youth, women in vulnerable positions, IDPs, indigenous people and Afro-Colombians. REDES can tap into the valuable experiences of the Small grants program to strengthen women, minority CSOs and the REDES' national-regional alliances, which also provides an interesting framework for the thematic component of the Third Peace Laboratory.

b. Mainstream human rights focus

HR mainstreaming: to increase the sustainability and impact of the human rights awareness and dialogue projects, round tables and regional constituencies, it is recommended that REDES mainstreams human rights issues and relevant HR change agents in its regional programs. The RTD approach provides a more explicit, normative and legal context and underlines government responsibility. In addition, specific projects could be developed to follow-up on the network meetings at local level; i.e. to launch community level conflict resolution projects in collaboration with the "Justices of Peace" and "*conciliadores en equidad*" and the training in human rights and conflict resolution of mayors (UNHCHR & PGN).

Gender equality: gender equality and women's rights also require a more deliberate focus. While women are participating in good numbers in all REDES programs at every level, the program lacks an explicit gender analysis. REDES needs to rethink its women's program and set targets to increase the physical, social and economic security of women, their participation in decision making and peace processes, and their organizational capacity.

Truth, justice and reconciliation: at the time of the mission the development of nine regional NCRR offices and the involvement of key REDES' partners were much debated. The evaluation recommends focusing primarily on the strengthening of victim organizations at local and national level, on advocacy of international standards in NCRR process and on accompaniment of essential work in reconstruction of the truth (historical memory), access to justice and to reparation. REDES could partner various initiatives, recently started, to monitor the impact of the reinsertion of demobilized combatants and IDP populations on the receiving communities.

c. Role of REDES in UNDP Colombia

Territorial Development Strategy: REDES needs to articulate its strategy and unique CPR approach in UNDP Colombia's new "Territorial Development and Peace Strategy" that is being developed to bring greater coherence and consistency to UNDP programs and improve resource mobilization and coordination. The team learned this new strategy gives REDES the responsibility for internal monitoring and

coordination of field program planning. This would provide a good opportunity for CPR mainstreaming, provided clear guidelines on REDES' responsibility and authority are agreed upon by all. REDES can lead an institutional reflection on the way in which UNDP Colombia identifies new regional programs and improves its methodology and focus. However, some internal brainstorming documents seem to present REDES as a social mobilization program, after which other programs like ArtGold take over. Other debates suggest that REDES should focus on local and regional levels, while national level advocacy of policy change will be coordinated by the UNDP Office.

National level advocacy and vertical alliances: Both lines of thought could undermine the comprehensive REDES philosophy. Linear regional program planning does not seem feasible, as geographic and beneficiary selection criteria differ dramatically among UNDP programs (REDES deliberately works in conflict zones with most vulnerable groups). REDES' national level public policy advocacy is rooted in its regional work through facilitation and accompaniment of vertical alliance building processes between national government and local civil society players. Moreover, local players in key reconciliation processes (like DDR, reinsertion, NCCR, victim organizations claims) need the accompaniment of REDES at a national level. National peace and development debates need to be shared in the regions and local and national agendas need to be linked. Hence, national policy advocacy is vital to the REDES concept and its ultimate success.

UNDP support to REDES: Although the advocacy work carried out by REDES at a national level needs strengthening in terms of technical backstopping, the alliances promoted by REDES offer good platforms to influence participatory public policy formulation, to operationally national policies in the field and to provide a feedback mechanism for local civil society that will be affected by these policies. UNDP and REDES need to restore national level advocacy relations that were somewhat neglected during the long senior management transition phase in 2005/6. They also need to advocate more institutional support (political, technical and financial) to the NPD's Justice and Peace Unit that monitors the Peace Laboratories with REDES support, dialogue on security, protection and economic aspects of the reinsertion process of demobilized combatants and displaced communities, on improving procedures for victim testimonies in the NCCR, on land tenure conflicts etc.

Strengthen coordination of UNDP knowledge management: A third priority is to streamline the knowledge management and best practices collection efforts in UNDP Colombia. According to the Annual Plan 2006, 23 percent of Sida's REDES contribution is to be spent on three units: HDU, REDES' knowledge management unit and the SURF. This high allocation is however not met by practical results of REDES best practice dissemination. Three recommendations: i) clarify concepts and methodology of best practice documentation among the units; ii) as HDU received 17% of REDES budget, it is fair to request them to partially support the REDES knowledge management unit and conduct applied research in REDES program regions, iii) UNDP Colombia publications need to include REDES achievements to share with BCPR practitioners elsewhere. A priority is to analyze the Youth REDES, as part of BCPR's global 2nd Youth and Conflict project.

d. Secure and enhance sustainability of REDES achievements in the next phase

To promote the development and reconciliation strategy nation wide, REDES would need to expand its program to additional regions and develop an exit strategy for MM and Meta in the next program phase. To this end, different program choices in MM and Meta need a thorough analysis to come to an overarching strategy, especially vis-à-vis desired partnership models with local authorities. To increase its programmatic efficiency and sustainability REDES needs to consider decentralizing its program management and increasing its staff accompaniment in the field.

REDES has to select ten outcome-indicators that reflect how objectives have been met as a result of its four key strategies (community organizing, alliance building, public policy, knowledge-management) and assess the impact of these results on overcoming the eight development and peace impediments.

REDES needs to seek the assistance of experienced program-management and monitoring experts to assist in designing a simple but effective system. Unfortunately such expertise is not available in REDES partner institutions (HDU, SURE, Sida or BRCP New York), that are all weak in result and impact assessment. Next, REDES needs to provide training to its field staff to become familiarized and enabled to monitor their own work as a continuing process.

Selection criteria for new regions, beyond the existing list, could include cross-border conflicts²⁶ and humanitarian-aid harmonization considerations (follow-up of the ISAJ mission, UNDP is to coordinate early recovery programs). REDES could also build on its work with ethnic minorities, women and youth at a national level under the Small Grants Program, e.g. in the accompaniment of partners in the Peace Laboratory III that has a similar thematic focus. REDES needs to prepare its expansion into new regions in a timely manner, construct a good baseline and design regional partnership strategies with monitorable indicators. For its longer term feasibility and sustainability, REDES needs to develop a sustainable budget plan that generates sufficient funds, but keeps at the same time, room for the unique REDES sociopolitical strategy. In this respect, UNDP needs to promote a more comprehensive in-country UN mini-reform by piloting experimental, lean UNDP procedures and innovative inter-agency partnerships

5.2 Recommendations to REDES in Relation to Other Players

a. Strengthen dialogue with national institutions

Formulate a unified strategy to interact with government departments and local entities (like the DP, PGN); to this end, REDES needs to improve its external communication and formulate a public information strategy to promote the program's core messages. Stepping up political advocacy at a national level will complement the bottom-up transformation process. Such advocacy could aim at building wider institutional support at a national level for REDES' regional good governance initiatives, like the signing of good governance pacts, citizens' participation in planning and budgeting of municipal development plans, which require the willingness and investments of government institutions to partner civil society.

b. International leverage to political national level advocacy processes

Support from REDES core donors, like Sida, BCPR, Spain and the Netherlands, in national level advocacy for public policy change (e.g. High Commissioner for Peace) will complement the local efforts to build a new governance tradition bottom-up. It is important that REDES positions itself strategically in the international and UN-community, e.g. through participation in four permanent inter-agency working groups to seek advocacy alliances and to fulfill its CPR mainstreaming obligation.

c. Improve communication and coordination among REDES donor agencies

The team recommends that REDES' donor groups form a donor consortium, consider institutional funding (un-earmarked) and to agree on a single, common project planning, monitoring and reporting system. This would reduce the administrative burden on REDES and its key partners like *CORDEPAZ* and *Fundación* considerably. Likewise, it is recommended that UNDP and EU work together to devise one set of monitoring indicators and financial reporting requirements for Third Peace Laboratory program funding in MM and Meta.

The team strongly recommends Sida to continue its good donor partnership practice and "political accompaniment" of REDES' good governance, development and peace advocacy at national level advocacy to change public policy and create a culture of peace in Colombia.

²⁶ The border region with Ecuador seems a good option, as UNDP runs a regional development and peace program on the other side.

Annex 1 Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference for the evaluation of the “Programa para la Paz Asdi-UNDP” (Asdi-UNDP Peace Program) in Colombia, 2006

1. Introduction

Asdi/RELA has been supporting the Asdi-UNDP Peace Program from November 2003, for a period of 3 years, until December 2006 (RELA Decision 130/03 and 2005–003592). The total Swedish contribution during this period has been 46,150,000 Swedish Krona (SEK).

The UNDP REDES (*Reconciliación y Desarrollo*/Reconciliation and Development) program is focused on the Peace and Development Programs (*Programas de Desarrollo y Paz*), in the regions of Montes de María and the Department of Meta, which are regions greatly affected by the conflict.

The general objective of the REDES program *is the promotion of and support to endogenous strategies of social organizations for peace and development in a context of deep-rooted violence. These strategies are already part of or are becoming part of social and institutional networks to reduce the impact of violence on vulnerable populations and to facilitate peace building and reconciliation at a local, regional and national level.* Therefore, the program is looking to strengthen democracy, and above all, local democracy by promoting the participation of the people and good governance, in order to generate social robustness, public, private and international alliances, helpful and specific knowledge about the internal conflict and facts about the participatory formulation of public policies, as well as promoting activities aimed at income creation and developing employment and development policies. It is worth remembering, that the primary objective of the program is to generate development in the midst of conflict. This means both generating development to prevent and to manage the conflicts, as well as the formulation of methodologies that allow the promotion of development in serious conflict zones. The specific objectives of the program are: to reduce the impact of the violence on vulnerable communities in the zones where the program is operating; to increase the capacity of civil society and the state institutions to implement consensus strategies for overcoming the conflict; to promote socioeconomic incentives that offer development opportunities to vulnerable groups and reduce the economic impact of the conflict in the region; to consolidate a development approach towards the prevention of conflicts, the building of peace and learning lessons.

2. Evaluation Purpose

The purpose of the joint evaluation between the Swedish Agency for International Cooperation and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) will be:

- To systematize the methodologies and the impact of these in the generation of development and peace initiatives put together and promoted by NETWORKS.
- To provide an analysis of results and to identify achievements vis-a-vis the objectives in the REDES program.
- To identify best practices and the challenges that the different peace and development initiatives of REDES will have to confront to consolidate achievements.
- To analyze the impact of the program from a national point of view: This means analyzing how development of best practices at local level has influenced the development of similar programs similar at a national level; and how the national ambit has contributed to the implementation of the REDES.

- To analyze the capacity of the REDES program to articulate and catalyze the identification of specific aspects of the implementation process that contributes to achieving identified objectives.

It is worth saying that the joint Asdi-UNDP evaluation will serve as an instrument for dialogue between RELA-Asdi Stockholm, Asdi/Embassy, UNDP and national counterparts for the elaboration and implementation of a new program of cooperation 2007–2010.

The evaluation must focus on analyzing *if and how* the program has contributed to a reduction in violence and to promoting development in the regions of Montes de Maria and Meta, taking as its fundamental base the development of qualitative and quantitative indicators which allow the analysis of methodology as much as the processes and the results.

This evaluation will have to be seen as a process of knowledge generation and best practices as well as an instrument of learning as much for Asdi as for the UNDP.

Background

The main document that guides *the Swedish cooperation* with Colombia is the “Colombia Country Strategy paper 2003–2007 “. This document establishes that the purpose of the present cooperation between Sweden and Colombia is to promote a culture of peace for a peaceful and negotiated end to the conflict, as well as respect for human rights and international humanitarian rights, and to alleviate the effects of the conflict by means of humanitarian aid.

The strategy for Colombia highlights internal armed conflict as a serious impediment to the development in Colombia. Other impediments are: the unequal distribution of political and economic power; the increase in poverty, weak democratic institutions, impunity, human rights violations and violations against international humanitarian rights, drug trafficking and unequal distribution of land, which are all linked and which strengthen each other and that moreover contribute to the development of the conflict.

On the other hand, *United Nations Development Program*, UNDP has incorporated, as part of its country strategy, a focus on building peace and sustainable recovery. The process of development in countries with general internal violence like Colombia is of vital importance as is the participation of all key players in order to ensure that their interests and rights are reflected in the results and indicators.

The UNDP supports the use of participatory focuses and methodologies with local governments and organizations of civil society, and promotes the formulation of national public policies linked to territorial processes. This methodology today constitutes a central tool built into the REDES program.

Participation by interested parties

The participation of the UNDP in the evaluation process will have to be from the beginning of the preparation stage. The Terms of Reference will have to be sent to UNDP for their comments.

The evaluation team will have to begin its visit to Colombia with a meeting with Asdi/Swedish Embassy and then a meeting with the UNDP, the team in charge of developing the program and the personnel of Asdi in the Swedish Embassy.

The evaluation must put great emphasis on the participation and the opinion of the beneficiaries of the program.

Before the arrival in Colombia of the evaluation team, UNDP will have to make available all the necessary documents to gain a good initial knowledge of the program. Asdi/Swedish Embassy can also make available any documents it thinks relevant for the task ahead. UNDP should also help the evaluation team in the preparation of the agenda and arranging meetings with the beneficiaries of the program. At the end of its visit to Colombia, the evaluation team must have a meeting with the UNDP and Asdi in which they will present their preliminary findings.

The closing report will be presented at a workshop in Bogotá, in which all interested parties who are in Bogotá should participate.

3. Scope of the Evaluation

The evaluation team will have to evaluate *the relevance, the impact and the efficiency of the program in relation to the general objective of promoting and supporting the endogenous strategies of social organizations for peace and development in a context of deep-rooted violence. These strategies are already part of or are becoming part of social and institutional networks to reduce the impact of violence on vulnerable populations and to facilitate peace building and reconciliation at a local, regional and national level.* The evaluation will take place in the regions of Montes de Maria and Meta. Therefore, the evaluation team will have to develop qualitative and quantitative methodologies to measure the impact of the program based on the following 5 strategic points:

- Provision of and promotion of the organization of communities and social networks
- The building and the development of strategic alliances
- The generation of knowledge and instruments for sharing analyses
- The generation of public policies and putting them into local and regional development plans
- Evaluation of the different processes from the perspective of how they help, or otherwise, in meeting established objectives.

In order to obtain the input necessary to be able to reach conclusions in relation to the main evaluation question, the evaluation team will have to check within its qualitative and quantitative analysis the impact and the results of REDES in respect of the beneficiaries of the program, the groups referred to, and local and national counterparts in the regions of Montes de Maria and Meta. It is worth saying that the analysis will also have to emphasize the national variable (role of counterparts at central government level) so as to identify the different processes and methodologies that contributed to the development and the implementation of the REDES strategy. This will enable an assessment to be made on whether the Asdi-UNDP program for peace is consistent with the necessities and priorities of the target group and the policies of the country (regional, local and central). At the same time, the evaluation team will have to take into account the evaluation of the program *BRSP/BCPR Pilot Small Grants Program on Strengthening the Capacity of CSOs in Post Conflict Environments* in Colombia. Finally, it is worth highlighting that the evaluation team will be free to consider any other issue that might be relevant or interesting to Asdi. If an issue means a big change to what is set out in their Terms of Reference, prior approval must be obtained from the Embassy/Asdi and UNDP. Any additional issue must be included in the “Inception Report” and be approved by Asdi and UNDP.

The scope of the evaluation will also have to work with the following “focus groups” as valid interlocutors stemming from experiences, results and impact of REDES:

a) Perception on the part of the beneficiaries and qualitative and quantitative data collection

It is recommended that when analyzing the perceptions of the beneficiaries, account is taken of how much has the involvement influenced the well-being of the different groups of beneficiaries (for example in relation to the level of violence, the level of development in its communities, what suggestions do the beneficiaries have for the future of the program etc)?

Similarly, it is considered important to develop qualitative and quantitative indices to evaluate amongst others: the number of beneficiaries; community organizations; the amount of social networks created; the number of registered incidents of violence; funds destined for the development of the regions.

b. Perception on the part of the groups referred to

The identification of groups referred to will be important in respect of collecting opinions from an important number of players and organizations who do not work directly with the REDES program. The perceptions of these groups will be important as a measure of what outsiders think of the process.

c. Perception of local, national and international counterparts and quantitative data collection

The perception of local and national counterparts will allow the collection of data that will enable it to be evaluated whether they have added to the efforts of the REDES program, and to what extent the REDES program is catalyzing and bringing together a greater participation and support by the local authorities and the international community in advancing processes of peace and development.

d. Perception of the administrative part: Administrative management and Coordination

These will answer the following questions:

- is the administrative and management system relevant to the program? How has interaction between the administrative and management systems been achieved?
- Is the program an appropriate strategic solution (as much politically as technically) to the problem of present development?
- How have the coordination efforts within the UNDP been for this program (internally within the institution at a regional and national level, as well as with other organizations and other United Nations agencies)?
- How has the program coordinated its efforts at local, regional and national level? With the United Nations agencies? With the organizations of the civil society, with the institutions of State and with international counterparts?
- How does the process of taking of decisions function within the program and what are the mechanisms to initiate and to carry out different initiatives from the regions?

4. Recommendations and Lessons Learned

The evaluation will have to provide Asdi and the UNDP with recommendations on improving the focus, procedure, organization and structure, as well as on lessons learned that could be as useful to Asdi as to UNDP in respect of future cooperation. It is therefore recommended that a workshop is held to benefit from lessons learned, best practice and the generation of knowledge. It would be important to invite the various counterparts and beneficiaries of the REDES program to this workshop.

Finally it is important that this evaluation serves as a platform to define the future programmatic areas of the REDES program, as well as the framework for Asdi cooperation 2007–2010. It is also hoped that the evaluation manages to identify the main challenges that the REDES program will have to face in order to consolidate the impact and results. Similarly, it is important that this evaluation enables the identification of other potential donors and contributors.

5. Methodology

This work will have the characteristics of an external evaluation, based on generating qualitative and quantitative data. Before presenting the different methodologies for the respective analyses, and initiating the different interviews the Evaluation Team will have to present an “Inception Report” to Asdi/ Swedish Embassy and the UNDP in Bogotá.

This “Inception Report” must include the concept definitions that the Team will use in the qualitative and quantitative data collection, as well as in their interviews (for example security, human development). In addition it must include the methodology proposed by the Consultants for carrying out interviews and the process for selecting interviewees, etc. Furthermore, the inception report will have to contain a detailed questionnaire that will be used as a point of reference for the collection of qualitative and quantitative data, and for the interviews conducted with the different counterparts in the course of the evaluation. This questionnaire will be jointly developed by Asdi and the UNDP.

The “Inception Report” will be sent to Asdi/Swedish Embassy in Bogotá, at the latest 4 days after the start of the evaluation. Asdi/Swedish Embassy in consultation with UNDP and Asdi/Stockholm will approve the “Inception Report” before the Team of Consultants goes to the regions.

The UNDP will provide the necessary documentation required by the consultants and will coordinate the interviews they need to conduct for the evaluation, as well as the field trips.

The consultants will present their preliminary conclusions to the UNDP and Asdi/Swedish Embassy for their comments before finalizing the report. The final report will be presented in a workshop with the participation of the relevant program beneficiaries, UNDP and Asdi/Swedish Embassy.

6. Chronogram

The evaluation will take place over a period of 30 days x 2 consultants, as follows:

Activity	Detail	Period
Planning evaluation and studying of documents	Preparation of methodology of evaluation	4 days
Initial introduction workshop	Participation by beneficiaries and counterparts from Start of evaluation.	1 day
“Inception report”		3 days
Interviews and collection of qualitative and quantitative data in Montes de María, Meta y Bogotá		14 days
Writing of final report		8 days
Workshop to present report (including travel)		3 days
	Total 1 International consultant and 1 local consultant	33 days

7. Evaluation Report

The evaluation report will have to be written in Spanish and must be a maximum of 30 pages, without counting the annexes. The report must include an Executive Summary both in English and in Spanish.

An electronic draft copy of the report will have to be sent to the Swedish Embassy in Bogotá, no later than two weeks after the report is finished. The Swedish Embassy will send the draft report to UNDP for its comments. Asdi/Swedish Embassy will have to approve the draft report within two weeks of receipt.

If Asdi considers it suitable, the report will be published in the series “Sida Evaluations”. The consultants will have to be available to complete the Asdi evaluation form on finishing the Evaluation.

The use of the following structure is recommended for completing the report:

Executive Report – summary of the evaluation with special emphasis on the main conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations.

Introduction – presentation of the aim of the evaluation, main questions and conclusions

The evaluated program – description of the program that has been evaluated, its objectives, history, organization and beneficiaries.

Conclusions – evaluation of the results of the program and how it was carried out taking into account the criteria described in the reference terms.

Lessons Learned – general conclusions with potential for greater application.

Recommendations

Annexes – terms of reference, methodology for collection of information and analysis, references, etc.

8. Hiring of the Consultants

The Evaluation Team must have an ample knowledge of:

- Evaluating programs/cooperation projects
- Experience in conducting evaluations in a conflict context Political and social relations between the civil society and the State, and their respective roles/functions
- The United Nations. Knowledge in areas of conflict prevention, reconciliation and the relationship between development and conflict.
- The Colombian political and socioeconomic context
- To have previously conducted evaluations of peace programs and development in Colombia
- Communicative skills to write reports, to facilitate the participation of beneficiaries, to conduct interviews, as well as an effective presentation of the results of the evaluation.
- Organizational capacity to plan and to handle an evaluation process that involves many people.
- Good command of English and Spanish

One of the consultants should be Colombian

9. Bibliografía

Swedish Embassy/Asdi

- Estrategia de País Colombia 2003–2007
- Decision RELA 130/03, “Support to Sida-UNDP Partnership Program for Peace in Colombia 2003–2006”. November 25, 2003
- Decision RELA 144/04 “The projects media and conflict and human development area, within the Sida – UNDP Partnership Program for Peace”. November 2, 2004
- Decision RELA165/04 “UNDP partnership for peace – additional funds”. December 10, 2004
- Decision RELA 2005-003592 “UNDP Colombia, partnership program for peace 2005–2006”. October 5, 2005
- Agreement Asdi – UNDP, Sida ref: RELA 2003-3235, component 61000692, UNDP ref: COL/03/U39/A/JA/34. December 5, 2003
- Additions to the Agreement Sida ref: RELA 2003-3235, dated: November 4, 2004, December 10, 2004 and October 31, 2005

- Agreement Asdi-UNDP, Sida ref.: 2005-2695, component 61000778, UNDP ref: COL03/U39. September 22, 2005.

UNDP

- Proposal “Sida-UNDP Partnership program for peace”, 2003
- REDES Program, *Propuesta Proyecto Medios de comunicación y conflicto*, August 23, 2004
- REDES Program, *Propuesta Área de Desarrollo Humano (Informes regionales de desarrollo humano)*, August 23, 2004
- UNDP Proposal “Partnership program for peace in Colombia”, August 2005.
- REDES Program Reports 2004, 2005
- Human Rights Reports, 2004, 2005
- Report “*El Conflicto: Callejón con Salida*”, – National Report for Human Rights for Colombia – 2003. www.UNDP.org.co/indh2003
- UNDP “BRSP/BCPR Pilot Small Grants Program on Strengthening the Capacity of CSOs in Post Conflict Environments”

Annex 2 List of Persons/Agencies Met

Evaluation Mission “Asdi-UNDP Program for Peace”

Date	Place	Activity	Participants
Tuesday, August 15	Bogotá	4pm Review agenda 5.30 pm meeting with Adelina Paiva	GT/AP GT/AP/MK
Wednesday, August 16	Bogotá	7.30 am Briefing in Swedish Embassy 9.00 am Introductory workshop about REDES program	REDES Team/MVD
Thursday, August 17	Bogotá	8.30 am meeting on methodology Reading of documents	GT/AH/AP/DB
Friday 18	Bogotá	Meetings with REDES Team: – Financial issues – Analysis of partners – Monitoring indicators – Civil Society regional focal points – Thoughts on “power” relationships in the regions, appropriation and dependency, creation of different references, etc.	
Saturday 19	Bogotá	Read document Finalize Inception report	
Sunday, August 20	Btá – Sincelejo	2.30 pm Fly to Montería Transfer to Sincelejo by car	GT/AP/AH
Monday, August 21	Montes de María	AET (meetings with Governors and Mayors of Sucre and Bolívar)	GT/AP/AH
Tuesday, August 22		– Meeting with young people – Meeting with Mons. Nel Beltran – Meeting with FRDPMMA	GT/AP/AH
Wednesday, August 23	Sincelejo – Btá	Morning: Humanitarian Round Table 1.55 pm Flight Corozal – Bogotá	GT/AP/AH
Thursday, August 24	Btá – Villavicencio	– Workshop with REDES counterparts – other meetings to be decided	MK/AP/AH
Friday, August 25	Villavicencio – Btá Btá – Cartagena	– Workshop with REDES counterparts – other meetings to be decided 5.30 pm Flight Villavicencio – Btá (E.Schaper) 7.40 pm Flight Btá – Cartagena (E.Schaper) 9.30 pm Noche montemariana (E.Schaper)	GT/AP
Saturday 26	Villavicencio (A.Rudqvist) Sincelejo (E.Schaper)	Meetings with beneficiary focal groups (e.g. ANUC, UniLlanos, Gobernación, Defensoría, Iglesia católica, centro agro-provinciales, businessmen/associations, etc.) and/or visits by road Meetings with beneficiary focal groups (Red Montemariana, Red de Comunicadores, Youth, CRRR, Constituent Regional Assembly (Asamblea regional Constituyente), businessmen/associations, academia, etc.) and/or visits by road	MK/AH GT/AP

Date	Meeting	Evaluators	Responsible for organizing meeting	Place	Accompanied by REDES
Sunday 27	Villavicencio (A.Rudqvist) Sincelejo – Bogotá (E.Scheper)	Meetings with beneficiary focal groups and/or visits by road (continued) 2 pm Flight Villavicencio – Btá (A.Rudqvist) Meetings with beneficiary focal groups and/or visits by road (continued) 2.30 pm Transfer Sincelejo – Montería 5.30 pm Flight Montería – Btá (E.Schaper)			MK/AH GT/AP
Monday 28 8.30am	EU Delegation (A.Koetsenruijter/ I.Burrull/M.J.Rincon/ J.Ariza)	A.Rudqvist, E.Scheper, M.C.Moreno	Duccio	DCE	DB/AP
Monday 28 2.30pm	Red Prodepaz (J.Moncayo)	A.Rudqvist	Duccio	UNDP	GT/AP/DB
Monday 28 4pm	OCHA (R.Rosende)	A.Rudqvist, E.Scheper, M.C.Moreno	Duccio	OCHA	GT/AP
Tuesday 29 8.30am	Consenso de Cartagena (Consensus of Cartagena)	E.Scheper	Annika	UNDP	MPG/AP
Tuesday 29 9.30am	REDES – Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation	A.Rudqvist, E.Scheper, M.C.Moreno	Alberto	UNDP	AH/BP/EW/SM
Tuesday 29 10.30am	REDES – Knowledge Management	A.Rudqvist, M.C.Moreno	Borja	UNDP	BP/AP
Tuesday 29 11.30am	CINEP (M.García)	A.Rudqvist, E.Scheper, M.C.Moreno	Borja	CINEP	BP/MK/AP
Tuesday 29 3pm	Augusto Ramirez Ocampo	A.Rudqvist, E.Scheper, M.C.Moreno	M.Paulina	UNDP	MPG/AP
Wednesday 30 10.00am	UNODC (S.Calvani)	A.Rudqvist	Mauricio	UNODC	MK/AP
Thursday 31 8am	Representatives of Punto de Encuentro (Indepaz, CNC, Asamblea por la Paz, Conferencia Episcopal)	M.C.Moreno	M.Paulina	UNDP	MPG/AP
Thursday 31 9am	Asdi	A.Rudqvist, E.Scheper	Gabriel	Asdi	
Thursday 31 10am	DNP (A.Davila, L.Garcia)	M.C.Moreno	Duccio	DNP Piso 6	GT/AP
Thursday 31 12.00am	Fundación Social (A.Gomez)	A.Rudqvist, E.Scheper, M.C.Moreno	Nora	UNDP	NEP
Thursday 31 2.30pm	Programs (L.D.Campos)	A.Rudqvist, E.Scheper, M.C.Moreno	Duccio	UNDP	DB/AP
Thursday 31 3.15pm	ART GOLD (O.Castelletti/Z. Pallares)	A.Rudqvist, E.Scheper, M.C.Moreno	Duccio	UNDP	DB/AP
Thursday 31 4.30pm	Acción Social (E.Murillo/A. Escobar)	A.Rudqvist, E.Scheper, M.C.Moreno	Duccio	Acción Social	GT/AP/DB

Friday 1 9am	Resident Representative UNDP (B.Moro)	A.Rudqvist, E.Scheper, M.C.Moreno	Duccio	UNDP	AP
Friday 1 10am	ADH (M.V.Duque)	E.Scheper	Duccio	ADH	AP
Friday 1 12pm	UNFPA (M.Kaidbey/L. Wattenberg)	E.Scheper	Gabriel	UNFPA	MK/GT/AP
Friday 1 1pm	OAS (S.Caramagna, R. Nordgren)		Sandra M.	Usaquen	AP
Friday 1 2.30pm	ACNUR (R.Meyer)	A.Rudqvist, E.Scheper, M.C.Moreno	Sandra M.	ACNUR	AP
Friday 1 4pm	Huipaz	A.Rudqvist, E.Scheper, M.C.Moreno	M.Paulina	UNDP	Mauricio, Alessandro
Friday 1 4.30pm	OACNUDH (J.S.Aguilera)	E.Scheper	Duccio	UNDP	AP
Friday 1 6.00pm	NCRR (E.Pizarro/ A.T.Bernal)	A.Rudqvist, E.Scheper, M.C.Moreno	Gabriel	UNDP	GT/AP
Saturday 2 9am	Coordinator, REDES (A. Preti)	A.Rudqvist, E.Scheper, M.C.Moreno	Alessandro	UNDP	AP
Saturday 2 11am	SURF (J.M.Salazar)	A.Rudqvist, E.Scheper, M.C.Moreno	Duccio	UNDP	AP
Saturday 2 Sunday 3	Preparing draft report	A.Rudqvist, E.Scheper, M.C.Moreno		Bogotá	
Monday 4 8.00am	A.T.Bernal	A.Rudqvist, M.C.Moreno		UNDP	MPG/AP
Monday 4	Bilateral Meetings with REDES staff	E.Scheper		UNDP	
Monday 4 11.30am	Talk on NCRR	A.Rudqvist, E.Scheper, M.C.Moreno		UNDP	REDES team
Monday 4 3.30pm	De-briefing: presentation of preliminary draft report	A.Rudqvist, E.Scheper, M.C.Moreno		UNDP	REDES team
Tuesday 5 4.30pm	Swedish Ambassador and Donors (Holland and Spain)	A.Rudqvist, E.Scheper, M.C.Moreno		Asdi	
Tuesday 5 6.30pm	End of Mission				

Participating agencies in the Humanitarian Round Tables (Mesas Humanitaria) in MM and Meta

Humanitarian Round Table (Mesa Humanitaria) Meta	Humanitarian Round Table (Mesa Humanitaria) Montes de María
Social And Community Organizations: Asociación de Usuarios Campesinos Dptal. Comité Intergremial de las Organizaciones Sociales. CORDEPAZ. Campaña Colombiana contra Minas. Comité Departamental de Derechos Humanos Comité Permanente para los DD-HH de los Estudiantes de Unillanos, Fundación Eclipse Corporetoños Fundación Restrepo Barco Convidame Cabildo indígena de Mesetas (Resguardo Villa Lucía) Organización Indígena Unuma (Puerto Gaitan) Cabildo indígena Vitoto Villavicencio Organizaciones de afrodescendientes (Nuevo Milenio, AAMEN, Teresita Vidal, Fundafrov) Asociación de Municipios del Ariari AMA – CEPROAMA Fundación Kolping Confederación General de Trabajadores del Meta CGT Benposta Red de Jóvenes Competentes Redecom Grupo Cultural Samanazo Corporación Encuentro CPGA Agroparques Comité de Solidaridad por la Paz de la Julia	Social and community organizations Fundación Restrepo Barco Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris FRDPMMA. Asociación Social para el Desarrollo Comunitario Ceprod Agricultores del Caribe AGRITEC Colectivo de Comunicaciones Línea XXI Montes de María Corporación Raíces Redepaz, Sucre. Red Asvidas Personería del Guamo (Bolívar) AETMMa. Acción Comunal y Cooperativas Campesinos (Los Palmitos) Cabildo Menor Indígena de san Onofre. Red de Jóvenes de San Jacinto (Consejo de Juventud). Red Montemariana. Red de jóvenes de los Montes de María Red de Comunicadores Populares de los Montes de María Red de promotores de Derechos Humanos de los Montes de María. Fundación para el Desarrollo Social y comunitario FUDESCO FUNDIMUR FUNDACION TOMAS MORO ESAP
Church Pastoral Social de Villavicencio Pastoral Social Regional	Church Diakonía De la Paz.
Institutions Defensoría del Pueblo Regional Meta. Procuraduría Provincial. Oficina de Paz de la Gobernación del Meta. Personería Delegada para los DDHH V/cio Empresa de Turismo de la Alcaldía de Villavicencio.	Institutions I.C.B.F. Regional Sucre. Acción Social. Sucre Cámara de Comercio de Cartagena Cámara de Comercio de Sincelejo Consejo Regional de Empleo CRE – SUCRE Defensoría del Pueblo (Sucre – Bolívar) Comisaría de Familia de San Juan Nepomuceno (Bolívar) SENA Alcaldía de Morroa. Programa de la Vicepresidencia para los DD HH y DIH
Academia: Escuela Superior de Administración Pública (Programa de Derechos Humanos). UniverSidad Nacional abierta y a distancia (UNAD). Comité de Derechos Humanos de la UniverSidad de los Llanos. Unillanos	Academia: UniverSidades de Cartagena, Los Llanos y Sucre
Leaders of the 18 municipalities	Leaders of the 15 municipalities
Accompanying entities International Committee of the Red Cross Colombian Red Cross (sec. Meta).	Accompanying
60 people	60 people
US\$ 2,5000	US\$ 2,5000
18 months	18 months

Annex 3 Methods of Evaluation of REDES

The general aims of the present evaluation are to establish what REDES has achieved in respect of the general and specific objects established within the framework of the program. This means examining the relationship and coherence between the inputs of the project and the activities carried out by REDES, and the final outputs, as well as the significance and effect of these outputs in relation to the achievement of the general and specific objectives of the program. In other words, how the outputs have been turned into results (*outcomes*) at the end of the program. It is important to point out that this evaluation talks about results before impacts since the perceivable effects are seen first after the completion of a program, whilst the impact is not seen in a concrete and measurable way until years after the end of the project.

Collection of the Information

The collection of the information for this evaluation essentially took place in the centre (Bogotá), in the regions (Meta, Montes de Maria, Medellín) and locally, essentially through visits and interaction with the communities, authorities and link organizations in different forms to the program. In addition some categories of regional and local informants were not participants in the program. The information and the data that constitute the basis of the evaluation analysis were collected from primary sources (direct observation, individual and group interviews) secondary sources (project documents, statistics and planning system and monitoring of REDES program, the Colombian National Report of Human Development, as well as additional relevant material). The collection of the information was done as follows:

- project document examination and additional relevant material;
- interviews with key informants in Bogotá (especially with representatives of UN organizations and relevant national institutions) and in the regions, participants in the project or representing other relevant sectors or institutions;
- collection of primary information in the field by means of direct observation, interviews and participation in diverse events of the program.

After an initial stage in Bogotá the evaluation team carried out a series of visits and interviews in the regions included in the program and then returned to Bogotá to carry out a series of complementary interviews with informants already interviewed and additional informants, to analyze the collected information, to present drafts of the report and preliminary conclusions (*briefings*) to interested parties (BCPR, Swedish Embassy, UNDP Colombia) as well as to incorporate into the report the suggestions and observations that emerged from the presentations.

Selecting Informants

Selecting informants (i.e. those interviewed) was done on the basis of participation and representation mechanisms of the regional programs of Peace and Development and the REDES staff in charge of the technical support in the regions.

The selection of informants for the present evaluation was done mainly by means of *purposeful sampling* that is selection of cases, interviewees or informants rich in information and strategically important for in depth interviews. If the objective, for example, is to evaluate in which way and how much the activities (for example, reduction of poverty, peaceful coexistence) of a project has affected a given group and area and in what way the intervention can be corrected or improved, the *purposeful sampling*

would be centered on obtaining a deep understanding of the necessities, interests, impediments and incentives of a limited number of informants strategically selected (groups, families, individuals, institutions, organizations) and how the activities of the project have affected these categories of people, according to their own perceptions and with respect to the afore-mentioned variables.

In contrast, sampling by means of quantitative methods of data collection depends on representative samples that allow them to be generalized in a more numerous population. In the present evaluation such information was obtained from secondary sources. From the referred to information to key informants obtained from REDES, the central institutions of Bogotá and the regional programs, the selection followed the strategy of *chain or snowball sampling*, that means asking initial informants or key experts of a subject or particular issue, to suggest additional informants and sources of information.

Examples of other strategies of purposeful sampling are: selection of *extreme or divergent cases* focused on outstanding successes and relevant notable failures as lessons for improving on more typical cases or to reduce risks; selection according to a certain criterion (*criterion sampling*) that implies selecting and studying cases that respond to certain determined criteria. For example, subprojects within which certain critical incidents have happened.

Analysis of the Information

In order to diminish distortions and bias and to strengthen the validity and the trustworthiness of the judgments and the conclusions of the evaluation, on the one hand, the achievements or results of the project (according to the perceptions of the beneficiaries and secondary sources) were compared with the norms of the typical changes that happened to the population in Meta. In addition these judgments and perceptions were presented to experts, staff, participants in the projects and other interested parties. In other words, the results actually obtained are compared with the results that are normally expected in this kind of exercise.

In addition, during the data collection stage and in the analysis of the information, the different perspectives and perceptions are compared and cross checked (triangulated): from informants, primary and secondary sources of information as well as quantitative and qualitative information. The work of collecting and analyzing information happened during intense and permanent interaction between the evaluators to cross check perspectives, knowledge and interpretations and to correct initial perceptions and interpretations. The information that emerged from field work was compared with the information from the secondary sources and other opportune institutions and sources.

Based on a summary of the findings found in the course of the evaluation, data and empirical observations obtained during the analysis of the secondary sources and the field work in Bogotá and the regions, the findings were analyzed from several points of view, including the perspectives and priorities of the interested parts, the criterion of the evaluators as well as the objectives and criteria of the program and the evaluation established in the terms of reference. The presentations of the preliminary results of the evaluation to the REDES team and to the personnel of the Embassy of Sweden in Bogotá produced observations and suggestions that were incorporated in the evaluation report. Unless otherwise specifically mentioned, the observations, judgments and criteria in the evaluation report are products of this process of collection, triangulation and analysis of the information.

Annex 4 Characterization and Dynamic of the Regions

Meta

The department of Meta is located in the central part of Colombia and is one of the regions with the greatest potential in the country. Meta is among the four largest petroleum producers in the country with nearly 10% of national production. The royalties in 2003 were more than COP\$140,139 million, of which the government of Meta received 66.84. In agriculture, another important economic sector for the Department, there has been a shift towards permanent cultivation and agro industry as much in land area as in the value of the production. In 1975 this represented 80 percent of this value, whereas in 2001 it was reduced to 50 percent.

In different periods throughout almost 70 years in the history of Meta, the origin of the violence has been the social and economic conflicts that have been part of its evolution. The absence or limitations of the political and institutional channels of conflict resolution via control led to successive periods of violence. In the 1980s the first paramilitary groups appeared and made a mess of the peace process between the government of Belisario Betancur and the FARC in the middle of the violent extermination of the Patriotic Union. In recent years (1994–1996) hundreds of farmers and coca growers marched together to ask the National Government to suspend chemical fumigation and to speed up, instead, regional development programs. Recently there was also a confrontation for control of the municipalities in the *zona de distension*, within the framework of the military offensive *Plan Patriota*. Yet, the confrontation between the different state, anti-state or parastatal armed groups, has tended to create its own dynamic linked to the control of land and populations, and has eliminated the boundaries between what is social, what is illegal and what is political.

As a result of those processes, the precarious governability of the regional and local administrations itself is threatened by the attempted expansion and embedding of the armed illegal structures within the administrative, functional and political set up of the municipal administrations. Corruption is widespread and a source for skepticism and ungovernability, both locally and regionally. Following the cease fire and truce agreements with the FARC in 1984, the political configuration of the department was transformed. The Patriotic Union, the party of the left, became the leading political force in the most important populated areas of the department. This situation led to some traditional political sectors trying to regain political control by means of terror and a “dirty war “. This was carried out by self defense groups created by some cattle dealers and landowners, with the active participation of drug traffickers, and sometimes with the support of units of the Army. Between 1985 and 1991 there were some 3,000 political murders in the Department.

Within this context “war without rules” is the norm and the armed groups are the first to violate International Humanitarian Rights. Presently the coercion, the threat and the fear come together as factors which inhibit democracy. In general the “law of silence” reigns, facilitating crimes against the dignity of people, life and freedom. Meta is the department with the 4th highest problem of antipersonnel mines. The increase in the forced displacement is one of the most serious consequences of the prolonged and complex situation of violence and the human rights crisis which has been around in the Department since the beginning of the Eighties.

Political violence caused the massive displacement of the civil population from municipalities like Vista Hermosa, El Castillo, Mesetas, San Juan de Arama, Puerto Lopez, Puerto Rico and Granada. Until 1990, the number of people displaced by the political violence was estimated at 10,000. But just between 1985 and 1990 approximately 1790 (43% peasant farmers) people were displaced. The forced displacements in recent years have increased, as a result of: the intensification of the conflict in the

region because of the “ antiterrorist “ war declared by President Uribe on the guerrillas; the confrontation between the guerrillas and the paramilitaries; and the violent confrontations between paramilitary groups, such as those who freed the “Carranceros” against the “Buitragueños” of Casanare.

According to official records of the *Red de Solidaridad Social* (Network of Social Solidarity), from 1997 to May 2004²⁷ the number of displaced people in the Department rose to 39,259; the ten municipalities with the greatest number of expelled population were Mapiripán (5,644 people),

Vistahermosa (4,575 people), El Castillo (3,716 people), Uribe (3,011 people), Mesetas (2,706 people), Puerto Rico (2,344 people), Lejanías (2,302 people), Puerto Concordia (2,176 people), Puerto Lleras (1,960 people) and La Macarena (1,929 people). The destiny for these displaced people is Villavicencio (in neighborhoods such as like La Nora or La Reliquia) and Bogotá.

Montes de Maria

This is a region located on the coast of the Caribbean that includes 17 municipalities: 10 in the department of Sucre with Sincelejo as its capital and 7 in the Department of Bolívar with Cartagena as its capital. The land in this region has traditionally been dedicated to agriculture and cattle ranching²⁸. Agriculture is dominant in the high mountains and the big cattle ranches are prevalent in the valleys and flat areas, together with intensive tobacco growing. During the 70s, the high concentration of rural property gave rise to a strong peasant farmer movement which launched a series of invasions of large estates in the area. In the 1970s and the early 1980s *Incora*²⁹ acquired and appropriated some large ranches, which brought about a change from growing tobacco towards wheat, in smallholdings of between 1 and 2 hectares.

The area has not been affected by the planting of illicit crops and therefore food production is not the reason why there is a problem of providing enough food for the population. The food problems occur in the rural districts of the region when the rural communities are forcefully moved as a result of the internal conflict. When there are economic blockades and the rural population is confined, the scarcity of food forces the inhabitants to leave their land or to sell them to the first buyer, which brings about further food shortages.

The region of Montes Maria is located in a strategically geographic position for the regional and national economy. For many years it has been used as a corridor for drug trafficking (mainly coca paste or cocaine produced in Serranía de San Lucas and lower Cauca) as well as illegal transporting of arms, precursors and contraband. This has caused territorial disputes by diverse groups on the margin of the law, that find refuge in these lands use them as routes for the various illicit activities mentioned above. Another consequence is that the illicit activities strengthen illegal organizations generally connected to the paramilitaries and feed the general corruption in the local institutions and authorities. Since the 1980s armed groups, created by the drug trafficking, have been operating and from 1997 have presented themselves as a regional expression of paramilitarism. The lack of access to education, added to the limited work opportunities in the face of the abandonment of farming activities because of the violence and the armed conflict, contributes to a flourishing criminal activity and the violence in Montes de Maria, particularly between the young people, who are enlisted into the armed illegal groups and are paid a wage. In 2000, the region had an unemployment level of 21 percent.

²⁷ *Red de Solidaridad Social, Registro Único de Población Desplazada por la Violencia*, Report, May 2004.

²⁸ The main crops are yucca, machine dried rice, manually dried rice, traditional corn, corn, sorghum, black tobacco, cotton, sesame and yams. Cattle ranching is one of the most important activities. It is estimated that there are around 780.000 heads of cattle in the region.

²⁹ Instituto Colombiano de Reforma Agraria.

The occupation of the area by illegal groups began in the 1970s when the region was used as a refugee area. From the end of the 1990s the FARC, the ELN and the ERP (dissident faction of the ELN) have fought with the paramilitaries for control of this strategic region that contains natural corridors, rear-guard areas and outposts. Additionally, such control enables access to economic resources, using the agricultural and cattle centers of the region (extortion and kidnapping), access to the main highway running to the West (that moves 80 percent of the freight that is moved between the interior and the Caribbean Coast), access to the pipeline (Araucan-Coveñas) that finishes at the port terminal in the Gulf of Morrosquillo.

In the 2002, Montes de Maria was declared a Zone of Rehabilitation and Consolidation. At present the national government, using the Marines, the Caribbean Naval Force, the national police and groups of soldier peasant farmers, has a controlling presence and the guerrillas have withdrawn to the mountainous zones. Nevertheless, the armed groups pressurize the civil populace through social and economic instability, massacres, the laying antipersonnel mines and forced displacements.

The violence in the region has been increasing since 1996. From that time, the armed conflict, the selective murders, the indiscriminate killings and the kidnappings began to increase, with a dramatic rise between 2000 and 2001. The Human Rights and International Humanitarian Rights violations are linked to the confrontation between armed groups and their attacks against the civil population. The intention by the paramilitaries to consolidate their presence in an area that for a long time has been under the influence of the guerrillas, is seen in the successive massacres and forced displacements of the civil populace.

In the last three years the decrease in the number of victims of massacres, selective murders and indiscriminate killings coincided with the amount of military control the paramilitaries had and with the alliances they built up with the more influential politicians in the region. The increase in the number of homicides in the first quarter of 2003 in the municipalities of Sucre indicates that the paramilitaries were consolidating their presence in Sucre at that time.

The region is characterized by one of the highest indices of displacement in the country. Between 2002 and 2005 the Displacement Intensity Index(IID) rose from 7.3 to 9.4 percent while the Index of Displacement Pressure (*IPD*) rose from 11.27 to 12.18 percent, therefore becoming the Department with the third highest³⁰ in the country. The municipalities that received the greatest number of expelled people in 2004 were Sincelejo, Carmen de Bolívar and San Onofre. The municipalities with the highest number of people expelled from them were Carmen de Bolívar, San Onofre and Ovejas.

³⁰ The IID reflects the percentage of displaced people that leave a given area and the IPD represent the displaced people that arrive, as a percentage of its total population. The figures are based on the data on forced displacement of the Sistema Único de Registro de la Red de Solidaridad Social (please refer to UNDP, Hechos del Callejón, no. 14, May 2006)

Annex 5 Youth Networks and Small Farmers' Network Case Studies

Case 1. Youth: Prevention of Recruitment

The objective of this component is to formulate and to begin an integral strategy of territorial intervention in Montes de Maria oriented at stopping the youth becoming involved in the armed conflict. This strategy is centered on incentives to the local, rural socioeconomic, educative, cultural activities such as businesses, actions and initiatives that groups of the rural population promote culturally, socially and productively, for adding value to physical, financial, cultural, social and natural assets with emphasis on youth initiatives. Results obtained in 2004 in the face of this objective were: identification of the main risks and protective factors against the forced involvement and recruitment of the youth population; formulation of an interventionist strategy by the territorial institutions and the participant organizations in the project centered on the diminution of the risks associated with the involvement of the youth in the conflict armed starting with: the drafting of a chart showing the risks and the protective factors; design of a road for dialogue about public policies centered on overcoming rural poverty, the recovery of depressed areas and in conflict and the mitigation of the effects of the violence on the people and institutions of the region; beginning the systematization of experiences and lessons of the pilot project, identifying methodologies, tools, instruments and good practices that can be used in a social context and be replicated. This systematization will contribute to the implementation of this component in other regions where REDES operates. It will also be a relevant input into the design of public policy. In this component a dynamic and effective coordination has been achieved with other agencies of the United Nations such as UNICEF and UNFPA.

The lines of action which were prioritized for 2005 were the following:

- Execution of activities identified in Montes de Maria, with the intention of preventing the recruitment of the youth in the region. These activities include those of a socioeconomic nature as much as educative, cultural, organizational, etc.
- Final systematization of the experiences undergone, generating public policy inputs.
- Extension of the component to Oriente Antioqueño y Meta.

Montes de Maria

In 2005, the REDES Program began to work on the issue of the prevention of the involvement the youth in the armed illegal groups in the region of Montes de Maria. The most important result has been the implementation of a strategy of territorial intervention, which allows for a system of incentives oriented towards the valuing of youth and their surrounding communities. This facilitated the building of an alliance between the *Fundación Red Desarrollo y Paz de los Montes de María* and the Organization of International of Migration (OIM), for the implementation of the project School of Youthful Leadership (*Escuela de Liderazgo Juvenil*), technical assistance to the nine Technical Farm Institutes and the ethnic groups project with the indigenous leaders of the municipality of San Antonio de los Palmitos.

For 2006 what is being sought with the local administrations is a dialogue about public policies related to the promotion of the rights of children and youth in the area. This process has the support of the Association of Territorial Entities (AET), which will enable the creation of a greater commitment by the mayors of the 15 municipalities of Montes de Maria in integrating the component for the young people in their development plans. In 2006 the purpose of this component is the consolidation of the territorial structure of the Network of Young People (*Red de Jóvenes*), which will enable an agenda to be

made for the young people with the purpose of rebuilding the policy in the territory. In addition, with the collaboration of the Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco, a series of micro-projects are being implemented which are directed at the children and youth in the peripheral areas of the region. These projects are about things such as community mothers, children's homes, environmental education for young people, waste management, folk dancing (cultural activities), the "Banda de Paz" as well as the project *Construcción de los Sueños* which is aimed at preventing child prostitution.

Meta

Strengthening of educative alternatives for the integral development of children and adolescents as a strategy for preventing the effects of the armed conflict in five municipalities of the department of Meta

The initiative arose as a measure to fight the increase in the recruitment of minors by illegal armed groups (especially the FARC) in Meta and to contribute to solving the problem of this type of recruitment in Meta. It also started because there are institutions interested in helping deal with the problems of children and youth in Meta. The recruitment of minors is more of a problem in the departments of Putumayo, Caquetá, Meta and Guaviare. The social conflict and the complex political situation existing there especially affects children and young people and is seen in the number of children and the young who abandon school, amongst other signs. According to the evidence from field work and observations of the technical team in previous projects, it is estimated that there are around 11,000 children in Colombia who have been recruited by the illegal armed groups. The Project has had meetings and conversations with other institutions (*Defensoría, ICBF, Diócesis de Granada, Pastoral Social*) and the mayors of the region have spoken of their political will to collaborate.

The objective of the project is to generate opportunities and alternatives for minors who are at risk and are vulnerable in the middle of the armed conflict, giving that the recruitment of children and adolescents is important in areas with armed illegal groups who are causing armed conflict in the municipalities of Granada, El Castillo, Mesetas, Vistahermosa and Puerto Lleras, all in the department of Meta:

Progress and results in respect of children and young people:

- Making some young people reflect who arrived at the project with just the seed of an idea
- Planting of a seed in those young people who arrived at the project "clean"
- Strengthening the "walls" round the young people by means of protective and enabling actions concerned with the rights of children and young people, thereby impeding their being taken over by armed groups or lead into illegal activities
- Gestation of early changes in attitudes and behavior, accepted by young people, parents and teachers. It is still too early to say that the ideas have been inwardly digested by those concerned.
- Children and young people are more committed to their academic responsibilities and make greater use of these opportunities and other spaces for learning and training

Institutional progress and results – more working together between:

- Local organizations and institutions, in elaborating MVRO
- *Cordepaz, ICBF*, mayors' offices: possibility exists that mayors define policies, programs and projects for the benefit of this population and are included in the Development plans and budgeted for
- To prevent recruitment requires many concerted institutional actions and investments, that are long term (five years minimum).

The difficulties faced by the project have been the following:

- Gathering of beneficiaries
- Lack of greater institutional sensitivity towards subject of children and adolescents
- Lack of support of some teachers and parents
- Harassment by FARC in Mesetas
- Transport difficulties

Strengths of the project:

- The willingness of mayors
- The collaboration by educational institutions, the church, PAB
- Meeting of adolescents in December and additional paint workshops in Castillo and Granada

Basic training in human rights and local governability, ANUC, Meta

The specific objective of this activity by ANUC is to give training in basic concepts on human rights, public policy and local governability, to a group of young peasant farmers in Meta and the promotion of the organization that will stimulate participation of young peasant farmers in getting rights for the young people and the peasant farmer families. The training has been developed in several sessions. The first dealt with looking at the rights from the perspective of the young people: freedom, autonomy and acceptance; the second dealt with rights and mechanisms for demanding them; and the third was “rights, a condition of public policy.” Participating municipalities have been: El Dorado, Cubarral, Guamal, San Martín, Fuentedeoro, Puerto Lleras, Granada, San Juan de Arama, Villavicencio, Puerto López, Cabuyaro. The initiative emerged in order to promote the young peasant farmer organization within the framework of the conflict in Meta, poverty and lack of development, lack of opportunities for young peasant farmers and the fact that young peasant farmers are leaving the land for the cities.

Subjects dealt with included: young peasant farmers in relation to rights; local governability and public policies and success; greater Knowledge about rights; participation; clarity about what is public policy; work in the municipalities with young people; the need for organization; and the importance of human rights for the young people. At the same time it has revitalized the organization of young people; it has made more visible the humanitarian crisis of the young peasant farmers; it has galvanized into action ideas between the young peasant farmers; it enables spaces to be created to build peace in the countryside. Strengths of the project have been: the dynamic participation of the young people inside ANUC; the interchange of knowledge and the respect for the ideas of the participants; the sharing of common interests; and to foresee future actions and to make people aware of the spaces for participation by the young people such as the Youth Council (*Consejo de Jóvenes*).

Threats exist: from the conflict in places where the young peasant farmers are; from ignorance about the institutionality of the rights of the young people; the lack of projects and public policies for the young peasant farmers as well as problems surrounding sexual and reproductive health.

Case 2. Department of Meta Association of Peasant Farmers (Asociación Departamental de Usuarios Campesinos del Meta)

Strengthening of Asociación Departamental De Usuarios Campesinos del Meta (ANUC Meta) and revival of peasant farmers association in Montes de María

Alternative development and illicit crops

One of the most serious problems for the department of Meta is the existence and expansion of illicit crops that are directly related to the armed conflict, because they constitute a fundamental source of financing for the different armed groups. The struggle for the control of the coca growing areas is a factor that it widens and intensifies the armed conflict in the region. The access by the armed groups armed to large profits and capital produced by the coca economy contributes in a decisive way to the military and economic strengthening of these groups and the coca economy also affects, through corruption, the public administrations, the local governments and the judicial apparatuses, thereby worsening the already critical conditions of governability and quality of the local governments. As a sequel to the expansion of the coca growing economy, a strong increase has been seen during recent years in land purchases and, due to investments and asset laundering by paramilitary-cum-drugs traffickers. This process directly threatens the existence and the stability of the economy of the medium and small peasant farmers.

In order to deal with the problem of coca in Meta, REDES and *Cordepaz* have carried out a study of the coca economy in the department of Meta and in order to continue this, within the scope of NETWORKS and the III Laboratory of Peace in Meta, an Integral Alternative Development project has been formulated and so have activities for strengthening farmers organizations in the most important coca growing area of the department to deal with in a serious and determined way the problem of illicit crops. The first actions consisted of establishing relations with three organizations of peasant farmers (basically associations of small producers recognized by the municipalities and department) who are located in the worst affected coca growing areas.

In conjunction with these organizations, social projects are being prepared with a strong productive component to respond to the commitment by the farmers to gradually and voluntarily replace illicit crops. The identified productive projects will have to be adapted in terms of transfer of technology and investigation of the ecological conditions of the tropical rain forest and to have a strong environmental component (agro-forestry adjustments, silvo-pastoral models). Fundamental to this is the knowledge and the accumulated experience of the provincial centers and organizations such as *Corpoica* and *Cormacarena*; in addition the productive culture of the inhabitants is basic in the zones where the projects are under way as well as the understanding of the potential demand of the local markets that can be supplied with products from the alternative development projects. Contact has been made with the regional and local institutions in the Departments which are specialists in technical assistance, such as *Corpoica*, *Fedecacao*, *Centro Provincial Agroparques*, *SENA* and *Puertos del Ariari* for the preliminary technical support activities (soil tests, visits and crop and capacity identification), prior to the start of production activities, relevant to the necessities of the farmers and to the potential of the market.

A key element in the substitution agreements that take place consists of replacing the “cash flow” generated by the illegal crops. Fumigation and forced eradication bankrupt the producer and have a negative impact on the economies of the municipalities. This is the reason for opposition from the inhabitants to the strong measures³¹ that in addition constitute a humiliation for the small producers. What is proposed, consequently, is a manual, gradual and voluntary substitution by these producers. The legal income must replace that coming from coca and, over time, become permanent. The situation concerning ownership, possession or tenancy of land is an important factor concerning strategy

³¹ In private, traders, transporters and local authorities regret the use of these measures by the national Government.

and this pilot project. Given that the land has recently been colonized and is the scene of disputes because of access to land by tenant farmers, ranchers, indigenous people, agricultural investors, displaced people, workers or day laborers, etc, it is important to rely on the State to introduce mechanisms (individual or collective ownership, recognition of councils, indigenous areas, etc.) that allow a stable occupation of the land and the recovery of the land for using productive processes suitable to the ecological conditions and the environment. At the same time, it is crucial that the communities and the producer associations obtain a certain amount of autonomy in the face of the armed illegal groups (FARC and the AUC) to advance development processes, when replacing illegal crops. For this the intervention by international organizations (e.g. United Nations, European Embassies, etc.) and local organizations (e.g. Catholic Church, Universities, Scientific Research Centers, etc.) is crucial in providing a permanent accompaniment to the communities that decide to participate in the alternative development project.

This, without a doubt, is one of the most important and strategic projects of REDES and *Cordepaz* in Meta. The small producers in the coca growing areas are one of (if not the) most vulnerable groups in Meta, exposed to the pressures and threats from the different armed groups. The illegal crops in turn constitute a key element in the internal armed conflict in Meta and the country as a whole. The policy of the government towards this issue has been a failure and the interventions of UNODC have had a marginal effect as they have been regarded as too subject to and too close to the controversial policy of the government and without a greater methodological change. Therefore, this pilot project pilot that is based on permanent interaction with and participation by the small producers constitutes an important chance to renovate the alternative development, with an impact on all the Peace Laboratories in Colombia.

There has been a permanent conflict in Meta for more than 50 years, fed by the poverty, the social exclusion and the lack of institutional recognition of the needs of the small farmers in the department. This situation has been worsened because of the worsening of the armed internal conflict and the use of peasant farmer producers in certain areas in illicit crops. Numerous peasant farmers have been assassinated or removed from their land by armed groups, which has contributed to a marked concentration of land occupation in this region where the demand for land was already historically.

In spite of an intense and deadly persecution of union leaders and organizations in Meta during the two last decades the *Asociación Departamental De Usuarios Campesinos del Meta (ANUC)* has managed to survive as a peasant farmer organization farmer throughout the Department. The association is made up of local peasant farmer organizations of: peasant farmer producers; peasant farmers without land; day laborers; men, women and young people of the land organized according to their interests and needs. There are active associations of ANUC in 10 municipalities of Meta as well as inactive associations in 8 municipalities. Certain activities of the organization are also carried out in the municipalities of Lejanías y El Dorado. The most important activities are:

- To obtain from the State the recognition, protection and guarantee of the rights of the peasant farmers;
- To look to improve the local governability, as a condition for development and Peace;
- To push forward legitimate rights of access to land and other means of production by the peasant farmers;
- To promote the comprehensive nature of production by peasant farmers as a way of life (secure access to food, and economic and social security);
- To promote forms of association and solidarity of the peasant farmers.

ANUC has been incorporated into several of the spaces supported by REDES for enabling citizen participation, such as the Regional Employment Council of Use, Humanitarian Round Table (*Mesa Humanitaria*), the Social Forum among others to create awareness of social problems, the socialization of the study of land problems and the economy of coca growing and the alternative development in Meta). In addition it has obtained support from REDES for detailed initiatives and activities. In the education day “Right to Land” there was reflection and a presentation on this problem including clarification of peasant farmer property (title deeds, plots of land), the demand for land in the Department (displacement and peasant farmers without land) as well as institutional supply (limited to the problem of seized land and termination of ownership) that has been inadequate for the peasant farmers. Under the name of “Right to Land, Path to what is demandable” a series of activities is taking place to look at this problem one that merits permanent and continuous actions, such as:

- Peaceful resistance to protect acquired rights;
- Responsible legal claims when rights are vulnerable or not being looked at;
- Agreement or permanent negotiation in the search of solutions;
- Collective management;
- Legal action and reparation when relevant;
- Mobilization as an instrument to accompany the claims.

In order to argue for and to document each of the raised cases above, a *Mesa de Tierras* (Land Round Table) has been formed to respond to the legal support needs for orienting what is demandable. This problem is being publicized as an issue in Meta and not just for peasant farmers in that the land and the peasant farmer economy is part of food security and sovereignty. In order to continue the process a concrete plan of action has been adapted:

1. By 30 of June, prepare the arguments and documents for each case.
2. During the month of July look for lawyers to study the cases and make recommendations on legal action to take.
3. On 12 August, meeting to find out the recommendations and to agree on action to take
4. On 20 of September a mobilization or gathering of peasant farmers in Villavicencio, (target of 1,000 peasant farmers). An event that will seek to be a national and departmental Community Tribunal on the right to land to be headed by the President of Colombia and the departmental government
5. To look for mechanisms to publicize the problem visible and to denounce irregularities.

Basic training in human rights and local governability

The specific objective of this activity by ANUC is to give training in basic concepts on human rights, public policy and local governability, to a group of young peasant farmers in Meta and the promotion of the organization that will stimulate participation of young peasant farmers in getting rights for the young people and the peasant farmer families. The training has been developed in several sessions. The first dealt with looking at the rights from the perspective of the young people: freedom, autonomy and acceptance; the second dealt with rights and mechanisms for demanding them; and the third was “rights, a condition of public policy.”

Institutional strengthening ANUC Meta

This activity has as its objective “a consolidated ANUC in Meta that represents and defends the legitimate interests of the peasant farmers and with the capacity to formulate political and socio-economic proposals influencing public policies” and specifically:

- To technically and organizationally strengthen the *Asociaciones de Usuarios de Campesinos* in eight municipalities in the Department of Meta
- To identify and to formulate four regional projects on the peasant farmer economy for presentation at the III Laboratory of Peace

In Montes de Maria, where the peasant farmer movement was dealt a hard blow by the paramilitaries and most of its leaders were assassinated or had to leave the region due to threats, REDES has initiated contacts with the leaders that remain in the area and has started a process of reviving the movement that in the 1970s and early 1980s was the strongest peasant farmer organization in Colombia. A meeting of leaders of peasant farmers of Sucre took place in Sincelejo on 12 May 2006 called “Remembering our future” and a larger meeting is being prepared with participation by leaders and representatives of peasant farmers from neighboring departments of Cordoba, Magdalena, Bolivar and Cesar to take place in Sincelejo in October of this year.

It is important to emphasize that these activities of accompaniment and support to the peasant farmer movements in Meta and Montes de Maria are part of what is the real priority for REDES, the Programs of Peace and Development and the Laboratories of Peace in Colombia. In these activities one is working directly with the most vulnerable groups, the direct victims of the violence of the armed conflict, and the symbolic comparative advantage of the UN and the PDP is being used to reinforce these activities of support and training. The value of this work is unquestionable and it would be advisable to widen and deepen it in both regions in the future.

Annex 6 SURF Urban Security Indicators

SURF urban security research indicator framework

Social capital deficit indicators	Risk factors	Domestic and gender based violence	Socio-urban insecurity context	Inefficient public order (police) and rule of law	Presence of organized crime
– Non compliance with co-existence norms – Lack of confidence in authorities – Cultural intolerance for violent behavior – Lack of confidence in others – Poor interpersonal relationships	– Public display of violence – Conflicts between social groups (racial, social) – High number of available fire arms – Irresponsible consumption and trade of alcohol and drugs – High number of youth involved with violent groups	– Gender based violence – Martial violence – Violence against minors	– High number of socially vulnerable groups – Invaded public space/areas – Deteriorated zones – Deserted public space/areas – Transit problems – Subnormal urbanizations and absence of basic public services – Social context that maintain violent practices or commission crime	– Inefficiency of police service – Insufficient police presence and equipment – Inadequate regional and temporary distribution of police forces – Perception of insufficient rule of law – Organized crime exists in co-existence and urban security – Lack of confidence in authorities	– Personal revenge killings (Muertes lesiones personales) – Violent organized crime – Small arms readily available

Overarching indicator: Weak institutions

Insufficient information

Lack of coordination scenarios

Weak civil governance to provide security

Weak link of related institutions

Lack of mechanisms to inform urban population.

Annex 7 Content of the Right to Development

1. The Right to Development:

- is an “inalienable” “human right” of “every human person” and “all peoples” (Article I, DHRD);
- “to exercise” “full and complete sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources” (Preamble, DHRD);
- in pursuit of “their economic, social and cultural *development*” (Preamble, DHRD).

2. Development is Defined as:

- “a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals” (Preamble, DHRD);
- “in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized” (Article 1(1), DHRD).

3. Component Rights of the Right to Development:

Most human rights have several components and/or related rights. The component rights of the human right to development include:

- Rights of Participation.* Every person and all peoples are entitled to “active, free and meaningful participation in development” (Preamble, DHRD) and as an “active participant” (Article 2, DHRD) “contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development” (Article 1(1), DHRD).
- The Right to be “the central subject of development* (Article 20, DHRD) which “aims at the constant improvement” of human well-being (Preamble, DHRD). This constitutes the right to people-centered, human development where people and their well-being come first, ahead of all other developmental objectives and priorities.
- The Right to “fair distribution”* of the benefits from development (Preamble, DHRD).
- The Right to “non-discrimination in development”* without distinction of any kind such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status” (Preamble, DHRD).
- The Right to Self-Determination.* “The human right to development also implies the full realization of the right of peoples to self-determination, which includes...their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources” (Article 1(2), DHRD).
- The Right to “the free and complete fulfillment of the human being”* with “full respect” for “human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Article 1(2), DHRD).
- The Right against trade-offs.* Every human person and all peoples have the right to “the implementation, promotion and protection” of “all human rights and fundamental freedoms”, “civil, political, economic, social and cultural”. (Article 6(2) and Preamble, DHRD). “The promotion of, respect for and enjoyment of certain human rights and fundamental freedoms cannot justify the denial of other human rights and fundamental freedoms”. “All human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent” (Preamble, DHRD).

Obligations of States (Individual)

The Declaration on the Right to Development specifies several obligations of States:

1. *“To ensure full exercise and progressive enhancement of the right to development”* (Article 10, DHRD), which includes:
 - *“the right and duty to formulate appropriate national development policies”* (Article 2(3), DHRD);
 - *the duty to “undertake, at the national level, all necessary measures for the realization of the right to development”* (Article 8(1), DHRD);
 - *the duty “for the creation of national conditions favorable to the realization of the right to development”* (Article 3(1), DHRD). The World Summit on Social Development refers to this as the commitment to create “enabling environments”.
2. *To ensure “active free and meaningful participation”* (Article 2(3), DHRD) and to “encourage popular participation in all spheres as an important factor in development” (Article 8 (2), DHRD).
3. *To “eliminate the massive and flagrant violations of the human rights of people and human beings”* (Article 5, DHRD) and to eradicate “all social injustices” (Article 8(1), DHRD).
4. *“To eliminate obstacles to development resulting from failure to observe civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights”* (Article 6(3), DHRD) and the related duty that “the promotion of, respect for, and enjoyment of, certain human rights and fundamental freedoms cannot justify the denial of other human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Preamble, DHRD).
5. *“Promoting, encouraging and strengthening universal respect”* for all human rights and fundamental freedoms (Article 6(1), DHRD).
6. *“Not to discriminate on basis of “race, sex, language or religion”* (Article 8(1), DHRD)
7. *To “ensure that the resources released by effective disarmament measures are used for comprehensive development”* (Article 7, DHRD).

Obligations of States (Collective)

Several of the above obligations of individual States apply as well to States, collectively. The Declaration on the Right to Development also specifies several collective duties of States:

1. *The Duty to cooperate:*
 - “in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development” (Article 3(3), DHRD);
 - “to eliminate the massive and flagrant violations” of human rights (Article 5, DHRD);
 - to promote “universal respect for and observance of, all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all” (Article 6(1), DHRD).
2. *The Duty of “full respect for the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”* (Article 3(2), DHRD).
3. *The Duty “to take steps, individually and collectively to formulate international development policies with a view to facilitating the full realization of the right to development”* (Article 4(1) and Article 10, DHRD).
4. *The Duty to “promote the establishment” “of international peace and security and, to that end”, “to achieve general and complete disarmament” and to use the resources so released “for comprehensive development”* (Article 7, DHRD).

It is important to note that the United Nations system represents the main mechanism through which States can fulfill their above collective obligations. It is also important to note that Article 10 of the Declaration calling for steps to be taken at national and international levels “to ensure the full exercise and progressive enhancement of the right to development” and Article 4(1) calling for the formulation of international development policies to facilitate “the full realization of the right to development”, while addressed primarily to States, also implicate the UN and its specialized agencies.

Annex 8 Relevant Millennium Declaration objectives regarding deadly conflict prevention, vulnerable group protection and gender equality

Objectives / principles	Values and principles	Peace, security, disarmament	Human rights and democracy	Protecting the vulnerable
Key objectives	"To establish a just and lasting peace all over the world in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter." (p.1)	"To free our peoples from the scourge of war, whether within or between States" (p.3)	"To promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development." (p.6)	"To ensure that children and all civilian populations that suffer disproportionately the consequences of natural disasters, genocide, armed conflicts are given every assistance and protection so that they can resume normal life as soon as possible." (p.7)
Resolutions	-Key values: freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and shared responsibilities; -Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and -Respect for the <u>equal rights</u> of all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.	-Strengthen the respect for the <u>rule of law</u> in national affairs; -Increase UN effectiveness in <u>maintaining peace and security</u> through provision of resources and tools for conflict prevention and peaceful resolution of disputes; and -Implement <u>treaties</u> such as arms control, disarmament and of international humanitarian law and human rights law.	-Strengthen capacity to implement principles and practices of democracy and respect for human rights, including minority rights; -Combat all forms of <u>violence</u> against women and to implement the CEDAW; and -Promote more <u>inclusive political</u> processes, allowing genuine participation by all citizens.	-Expand and strengthen the <u>protection of civilians</u> in complex emergencies; and -Encourage implementation of the <u>Convention on the Rights of the Child</u> and protocols on children in armed conflict and on the sale of children.
MDG targets	"Give greater opportunities to the private sector, non-governmental organizations and civil society to contribute to the realization of the UN's goals and programs." (p.9) (Goal 8, target?)	Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development	-Target 4: Ratio of literate women and of seats held by women in national parliament); -Target 12: Commitment to good governance, development, and poverty reduction.	

Source: Scheper, E. E. (2005) - Gender Equality, Human Rights and Freedom from Despair; Towards a Strategic Stakeholders' Partnership to Prevent Violent Conflict in Asia. (Paper presented at the UN Conference on Gender Mainstreaming and the MDGs, Gender Equality, Human Rights and Peace workshop, Islamabad, March 28-30, 2005)

Annex 9 REDES Stakeholder Matrix

Stakeholders	International Agencies	Government	Academia	National CSOs	Private Sector	Local CSOs
HQ / International	ASDI, Catalylnia, Holand, UNDP BCPR	--	--	--	--	--
National	UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, OCHA, IOM, UNIFEM, UNHCR, UNODC, World Bank, EU, SIDA, G24, USIP	DPN, Accion Social, Procuraduria, Observatorio de minas, ministries	Los Andes	CINEP, Punto E., Consenso de Cartagena, Redprodepaz FRB, Redepaz, Asapaz, IMP, Planeta Paz, Indepaz, Synergy	--	--
Regional (Provincial)	UNICEF, UNFPA, UNCHR	AET, Gobernadores, Procuraduria, Defensorias, ICBF, Comites de Accion contra minas (incl. Armed Forces)	Cartagena Los llanos Sucre	CNRR, Madres de la Candelaria, Fundacion Social	Camera Comercio in Sincelejo and Villavicencio	Fundacion MM, Red Montemariana, ANUC, Cordepaz, Red de Jovenes, Red de Comunicadores
Local (Municipal/Community)	-	Alcaldes	--	--	--	Red de jovenes, ANUC, small producers, local leaders, religious leaders, CBOs

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