

Life and Peace Institute's Projects in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo

**Gordon Tamm
Michael Schulz
Ingrid Samset
Malin Nystrand**

**Department for Cooperation with
Non-Governmental Organisations
and Humanitarian Assistance
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Sida Evaluation 04/36

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Authors: Gordon Tamm, Michael Schulz, Ingrid Samset, Malin Nystrand
The views and interpretations expressed in this report are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida.

Sida Evaluation 04/36
Commissioned by Sida, Department for Cooperation with Non-Governmental Organisations and Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management
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Registration No.: 2004-00497
Date of Final Report: December 2004
Printed by Edita Sverige AB, 2004
Art. no. Sida4510en
ISBN 91-586-8499-9
ISSN 1401—0402

SWEDISH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY
Address: SE-105 25 Stockholm, Sweden. Office: Sveavägen 20, Stockholm
Telephone: +46 (0)8-698 50 00. Telefax: +46 (0)8-20 88 64
E-mail: sida@sida.se. Homepage: <http://www.sida.se>

Abstract

– Evaluation of the conflict transformation programmes of Life & Peace Institute in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia

Subject description:

Both programmes are implemented in contexts marked by sporadic but extensive violent conflict. They aim at facilitating ‘peace building from below’ through training and support to civil society and community-based initiatives as well as through promoting local level dialogues. The Somalia project is completed, the DRC project is in its first phase.

Evaluation methodology:

The evaluation is field-based. In DRC it involved semi-structured interviews with representatives from local stakeholders in the two Kivu provinces. For Somalia the evaluation relied on secondary sources (project reports, LPI staff and stakeholder representatives in Nairobi) and a brief visit to Somaliland for randomly selected interviews.

Major findings:

- a) The programme in DRC comprises numerous scattered mini-projects involving many local partners/CBOs. A considerable potential has been created, but the experience must be systematically consolidated. In Somalia the likely impact is considerable, directly through LPI’s pioneering role of strengthening civil society and its focus on women, indirectly through promoting local-level peace consciousness through extensive skill-training. But both programmes (particularly Somalia) lacked a strategy of linking to wider supra-local peace efforts.
- b) Both programmes lacked monitoring, analysis and operationally relevant ‘action research’. Consequently the considerable experience gained runs the risk of being lost and both programmes lack means for internal critical review and corrective measures.
- c) Field management in turbulent/violent contexts need external strategic guidance so as not to get lost in the day-to-day ‘art of the possible’. This is a weakness in both programmes with the mother organisation seemingly unable to establish clear division of roles and responsibilities or effective strategic support.

Lessons learned:

Both programmes have shown that external support to local level peace-building is feasible and can make a difference through infusing peace-building skills and boosting local self-confidence. But this must be accompanied by continuous conflict analysis and review of the relevance of activities promoted, and by active strategic management. Without these there will not be any lessons learned nor may skills be translated into capacity building.

Executive Summary

This is an evaluation of two projects in support of local level peace building - in Somalia and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The projects form part of the global action research programme of the Life and Peace Institute, Uppsala, and have been financially supported by Sida with an aggregate total of SEK 71 million and SEK 5 million respectively.

The project in Somalia was initiated in 1993 and continued up to 2004 (the last two years through a local NGO with administrative and managerial support from LPI). It covered the entire country. The project in DRC was, after initial studies in 2000-2001, launched in early 2002 and was provided an initial one-year support by Sida with a decision on possible future support being kept pending until an evaluation had been carried out. The DRC project covered the two eastern provinces of North and South Kivu.

Both projects were conceived as action research projects, and both were based on a bottom-up approach to peace building. This implied in both cases development, implementation and analysis of models and approaches towards community training and empowerment, towards local level institutional development, and towards strengthening the role and capacity of civil society actors. Both have also been implemented under conditions of intensive violent conflicts hitting the civilian population very hard.

Given the difference in time perspective between the two projects the evaluation was required to assess the *impact* of the project in Somalia, and *effectiveness* (and partly relevance) of the DRC project.

Due to the bad security situation generally prevailing in Somalia, the original field-oriented assessment there had to be dropped in favour of a reliance on secondary and indirect information available in Nairobi. As a consequence the review of the Somalia programme is considerably less rigorous than the one of the DRC project.

The basic perspective from which the evaluation was carried out was that of the field, i.e. activities on the ground, including the regional programme management located in Nairobi for Somalia and in Bukavu for the DRC. Much less emphasis was given to the LPI headquarter in Uppsala and its staff, on the contention that the most important organisational, managerial and administrative level in efforts like these is that of the field. Problems reflecting non-existent or non-effective strategic management or support on the part of LPI/Uppsala have, however, been taken note of in the evaluation.¹

¹ The fact that the evaluation left out an assessment of the efforts made by the LPI HQ in Uppsala was remarked critically upon by LPI in their comments on the Draft report.

Main findings and conclusions

LPI and the Democratic Republic of Congo

Based on document reviews and extensive interviews with field staff of LPI, of its local partner organisation and with other agencies active in the project areas the evaluation led to the following findings and conclusions on the issues specified in the Terms of Reference:

(a) Project design and activities – section B.3.1.

Findings:

- The formal project document served mainly as general guide and was in practice replaced by a flexible operational approach and basket of activities.

Conclusions:

- Although sound in itself the operational approach has resulted in a large number of widely scattered – functionally and spatially – interventions that have strained the capacity of LPI Bukavu to plan, administer, and follow up the portfolio as a whole.
- The lack of a shared formal project document has made the programme and along with it the LPI rather opaque and/or non-transparent when viewed from the perspective of the local partners and peer environment.
- It is imperative to have a document (in French) outlining the objectives, working modality, and main activities and role of LPI – AND to share it with all stakeholders, including the partner organisations.

(b) Selection of partners and participants – section B.3.2.

Findings:

- LPI has so far provided support to a total of 44 local organisations and platforms, out of which 22 were characterised as more stable. The value range of the support is very wide and includes both recurrent organisational support and one-off projects.
- The selected partners comprised mainly ecumenical/faith-based structures and civil society platforms and involved a variety of projects to increase the capacity of local organisations in various ways.
- The process of selection of projects and partner organisations was based primarily on the familiarity and knowledge of the individual programme officers of the LPI rather than on any commonly adopted criteria.

Conclusions:

- However conscientious the internal selection of projects and partners have been it appeared from the outside as a rather spurious and non-transparent over time. As a result it tends to stimulates rife speculation among ‘partners’ as well as the Kivu population at large about possible LPI favouritism and/or political agendas.

- The lack of formalised selection criteria reflecting the objectives of the programme makes it very difficult to promote or assess the relative cost-effectiveness of different projects or interventions.

(c) Ownership and role of local partners and of LPI – section B.3.3.

Findings:

- With respect to the conflict analysis underlying the programme it was found that this is dominated by LPI's own understanding as developed in the situation analysis carried out in 2001.
- Strategic management was found to be generally weak with no clear roles or effective involvement by either local partners or the LPI Headquarter in Sweden.
- Projects are generally owned and managed entirely by the local partner organisations.
- Workshops and trainings on peace building techniques and skills have been generally demand-driven, well-received, and well reported upon.

Conclusions:

- There is a need to generate a more widespread and interactive consultation on the conflict analysis between LPI and its 'partners'.
- There is a need to distil, from the experience gained so far, (a) what aspects of the conflict transformation programme as a whole as well as its supportive structure that can be more systematically owned throughout the partnership, and (b) what themes, issues, and activities that will require continued flexibility and responsiveness and are therefore difficult to share or foster routines.
- The way in which projects as well as trainings and workshops are generated seems highly appropriate. Similarly the reporting from trainings and workshops is very impressive.
- There is a need to close the gap between LPI Bukavu and LPI Uppsala in terms of strengthening the involvement in the programme by LPI as a whole, as well as to ensure that the strategic direction of the programme includes a perception of both 'the trees and the forest'.

(d) Ability to identify and manage impacts – section B.3.4.

Findings:

- The 'impact' or 'result' indicators put forward in the formal project document are too abstract to have been of any practical use.
- There is a lack of systems and procedures for monitoring projects as well as partner capacities. The formats gradually introduced are primarily concerned with *activities* and the extent to which they have been performed in line with the proposal for each specific project. But they are conspicuously silent on information on *results*, e.g. through information along indicators of changed behaviour, of changes in the personal security situation, of changes in food security, etc.

- Although the project was conceived as an instance of action research, it has as yet not produced any practical on-the-ground indicators for assessing positive or negative impacts of the peace-building efforts.

Conclusions:

- The lack of systems and routines for follow-up throughout the programme makes this team very vulnerable both to mistakes and to outside ‘diabolisation’. It also implies a weak strategic guidance.
- There is an urgent need to develop both a system of process monitoring and assessment of results (including likely impacts) over the entire range of LPI-assisted activities, including training. The current lack of such monitoring also reflects a weakness in the ‘action research’ aspect of the programme.

(e) Response of participants involved in activities – section B.3.5.

Findings:

Based on interviews with partner organisations it was found that the following summarises the main perceptions on LPI, its role and its activities:

- Satisfactory or strong aspects of LPI’s work
 - Strengthening of local capacities on conflict transformation
 - Intermediary between local associations and international NGOs
- Weak or problematic aspects
 - Unknown selection criteria
 - Erratic or insufficient institutional support
 - Great variation/time-lag in partner-LPI communication
 - Insufficient sharing of information
 - Insufficient focus on women’s role
 - No monitoring and evaluation
- Controversial role of LPI, particularly related to
 - Changes of civil society coordination in South Kivu
 - LPI’s efforts to deal with the ‘Rwanda issue’

Conclusions:

- The tendency of LPI being regarded as controversial suggests the imperative need for LPI constantly reviewing itself to ensure that it does not become, or can be construed as becoming, a political actor in its own right.

(f) Ability of the Institute to coordinate itself with other actors - section B.3.6

Findings:

- The coordination with other INGOs in the area remains, after some initial efforts on the part of LPI, at an informal level with little or no tangible coordinated or joint activity.
- The ability to coordinate with local and regional specialised bodies is good as shown both by the concrete cooperation LPI has with many of them and by the positive perception these bodies were found to have of LPI.

- The ability to establish working relations with local ‘authorities’ at various levels is well developed and seemingly effective. This is, however, an ambivalent asset as these ‘authorities’ also represent (or are aligned with) parties to the conflict.

Conclusions:

- The fact that LPI remains the only INGO active and present in the two Kivus with an identity and mandate in the conflict transformation field risks catapulting LPI into a prominence and visibility beyond the range and scope of its activities. This imposes a very clear need on the part of LPI to make every effort to lower its profile to avoid becoming (or be seen as) an actor with a political or ‘diplomatic’ agenda of its own.

(g) Action research – section B.3.7.

Findings:

- The LPI has conducted its research activities mainly on four fronts:
 - By trying to get an overview of already existing research on peace-building in the Kivus (2002-2003),
 - By conducting a 3-months fieldwork in Bunyakiri, a territory in South Kivu, and writing up the results in the aftermath (2003-2004),
 - By supporting data collection of local students (2004), and
 - By supporting single studies conducted by partner organisations or consultants.

Conclusions:

- The research efforts so far appear to be primarily aimed at understanding what is going on in different corners of the Kivu provinces. They therefore hardly help the action research programme to decide how to prioritise, how to develop, how to intervene more effectively to transform conflicts in the region.
- The field of research (of whatever orientation and purpose) illustrates the same gap between LPI/B and LPI/U that characterises the strategic management of the programme.
- There is a glaring lack of studies aimed at assisting the LPI/B programme to develop its operational systems and priorities, its quality control and monitoring indicators, or its efforts to develop result-oriented interventions. The tendency to carry out only contextual cases studies (all of them non-longitudinal in design and execution) risks leaving the programme without an analytically founded base for its actual operations.

LPI in DRC – overall findings and conclusions

- Given the very difficult and fluid situation on the ground, the ability of LPI to involve itself in the wide range of activities, projects and partner organisations is impressive in its own right and speaks of a very high commitment of its regional staff.
- There is a general and strong consensus that LPI in DRC offers a professionally sound and much needed support in the area of down-to-earth conflict transformation.

- However, in two critical areas the programme reveals serious weaknesses: strategic management, and action research.
- As it stands the LPI effort in DRC until now makes sense primarily if seen as a period of trial and explorations. But this implies that there must now be a concerted effort by all involved parties to review both the programme activities so far and the carrying network that has sustained them. This should involve:
 - A definition of LPIs organisational or institutional strategy in DRC;
 - Determination of a better notion of complementarity and complementarity with local and international bodies represented in the Kivus;
 - A clearer and more transparent strategic focus and management;
 - A research agenda that is supportive both to the design and follow-up of peace building initiatives at the community level;
 - Methods and systems of monitoring and evaluation;
 - LPI Uppsala to establish an effective involvement in the DRC programme – in terms of its strategic management and priorities, its research agenda, and its contribution to the learning process of how to translate the values on which LPI is founded into practice.

LPI in DRC – recommendations

- Sida should consider, on an urgent basis, a time-bound and conditionalised bridging support.
- The purpose of such support is to allow for:
 - a systematic evaluation of projects, trainings, and organisations so far;
 - using this as a basis for a consultative process among the present partner organisations;
 - identifying areas or on themes where a more systematic approach is possible;
 - developing a strategic management and support structure that effectively makes LPI/DRC part of LPI's overall agenda;
 - developing approaches and interactive procedures between LPI and MONUC.
- An external group should assess the launching and outcome of the bridging period. The findings of this forthcoming assessment may form an input to a possible more long-term support from Sida.

LPI and Somalia

The LPI activities in Somalia started in the early 1990s. It is probably the most well known, and most quoted, example of peace building based on and integrated with civil society actors (rather than on power-holders or warring parties), and has become standard reference for peace-practitioners and researchers on conflict-transformation from the mid-90's on.

Impact assessment

Community level (section C.3.1.)

- There has been marked efforts to make training activities broad-based and inclusive, not the least as regards women.
- There has been a corresponding effort to move beyond district councils and instead reach into the fabric of local society/community itself.
- Both these signified an approach that was more than a bottom-up approach and more of a broad-based popular campaign to strengthen awareness as well as skills throughout.
- LPI showed a remarkable stamina and courage to move away from ‘only’ building local institutions towards an approach better characterised as one of actively supporting and sustaining a critical mass of local peace-builders.

Institutional impact (section C.3.2.)

- One of the focal points of LPI’s initial efforts in Somalia was the institutional support provided to District Councils, although they were given considerably less direct attention over time.
- However, the lack of follow-up of the results of this support has left LPI without any feedback on how to forge links between local/community level efforts and ‘peace writ large’.
- One specific institutional effort has been that of creating a local NGO within Somalia to pursue and further localise peace-building efforts – the Forum for Peace and Governance (FOPAG). There is a need for continued recurrent support to this NGO as well as more systematic attempts to exploit its capacity and experience in terms of the LPI Horn of Africa Programme.

Conceptual impact (section C.3.3.)

- The LPI Somalia programme has provided the larger community of peace practitioners and researchers with operational approaches that show the feasibility of:
 - Involving the civil society and the grassroot levels in peace building
 - Reaching the entire society via a trickle up process from the grassroot level
 - Long-term commitments and presence on the ground
 - Including a gender perspective in peace building
 - Empowerment of people at the local levels

Impact on society (section C.3.4.)

- The failure or inability of LPI to follow-up and analyse the fate of District Councils supported makes it very difficult to assess the impact of the programme on the larger conflict situation.
- It is likely that the example set by LPI in terms of its many interactions with local resource persons on the ground has generated a multiplier effect, including the creation of, or inspiration to, other local NGOs and (in the case of Somaliland) to local and regional government efforts to consolidate the peace process.

Tools and approaches (section C.4.)

- The approach and the tools developed and applied by LPI in Somalia were generally very responsive and contextually defined. The unifying concept was that of building relations on the ground and over time.

- The main shortcoming with the approach was that it was unclear about the role of top leaders in Somalia. Since the community based approach is a trickle up approach, a clear vision of when and how the top levels of society should be approached is needed, but this was not taken up as a strategic challenge.

Research and analysis (section C.5.)

- The LPI did carefully conduct a conflict analysis and had several groups of external as well as internal experts that provided for the so-called blue print for Somalia in 1993. However, very little of a follow up structure was developed.
- When UNOSOM was dismantled in 1995 the original ‘blueprint’ on which LPI’s involvement was based became ineffective. The LPI responded by reformulating its major activities in programme terms, in the process abandoning the old blueprint without creating a new one to take its place as a guide to what ‘bottom-up peace building’ was all about.
- The lack of systematic documentation made it difficult to develop external reviews or internal analysis. Neither did the LPI/Uppsala have a system of reporting and evaluating the activities of LPI/HAP.
- After 1996, when LPI came into its own in Somalia (without the partnership with a UN agency), there were very few studies or research efforts made, leaving the programme without any solid analytical backbone.

LPI in DRC and Somalia

Lessons learned

Strengths:

- A consistent focus on peace-building and conflict transformation (in spite of pressures and ‘temptations’ to move beyond LPIs professional turf).
- Training and capacity development: by and large demand- rather than supply-driven and adapted to suit local cultural and social conditions.
- Tools and techniques: in both cases LPI infused the activities with very appropriate skills that were furthermore developed very much in relation to the situation prevailing on the ground.
- Critical mass: much of the impact which is associated with the strong ‘brand name’ of LPI throughout Somalia as well as the two Kivus stems from the fact that a very large number of people have come in contact with the peace building efforts promoted by LPI.
- Continued presence on the ground: in both cases LPI has been continuously trying to reach out and maintain contact with communities at the margin or in direct conflict situations. This is in marked contrast to virtually all other NGOs that retracted to ‘safer havens’ as and when the conflict situation deteriorated, and is likely to have done much to keep alive, at the local level, the commitment to and hope for a non-violent future.
- Facilitating others more than direct action: with some notable exceptions LPI has continuously tried to support the activities of relevant local others rather than take a front seat.

Weaknesses:

- Strategic support and guidance: the lack of attention to strategic issues ranges in both cases from non-existent or very vague guiding documents, through vague definitions of the role and mandate of the LPI programme management units, to a virtual lack of exposure to peer or outside reviews and reflections.
- Research: both programmes have generated a very meagre output of studies or research papers. Given that action research on peace and conflict is one of LPI's main vehicles for spreading awareness and providing support to peace-building efforts, it is clear that these programmes have been only marginally exploited.
- As a consequence nothing has been generated in terms of result-oriented indicators of peace-building on the ground, whether in relation to LPI's bottom-up approach or otherwise.

Conclusions

- We strongly believe that the LPI mission, as articulated at various times, does provide for inclusion of programmes such as those in Somalia and the DRC – in terms of research, of action, and of action research. In fact, we believe that it is programmes such as these that can give LPI the authority, international recognition, and confidence with which to pursue its mission.
- We are also convinced that the achievements as well as shortcomings of both programmes show that they can make a difference on the ground AND that there are not many organisations with the mission, focus, and commitment necessary to do so.
- We are finally convinced that the present organisational set-up of LPI has become increasingly less appropriate for hosting and owning programmes such as these.

The way ahead

We see two possible scenarios ahead:

A. Rather than trying to re-organise the LPI in order to make such programmes, their liabilities and their obligations, fit better with the organisation, the LPI should take a principled decision not to take them on OR to do so only in alliance or 'consortium' with some other organisation that has the experience and capacity for programme management;

or

B. Establish regional and largely autonomous LPIs, for example by 'franchising out' the 'brand name' of LPI, based on a common set of values and principles that would form part of a binding agreement between LPI Uppsala (or 'LPI International' as it were) and, say, LPI Africa.

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List of Abbreviations

AMREF	African Medical Research Foundation
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CDA	The Collaborative for Development Action (US-based network of NGOs)
DfID	Department for International Development (UK)
DGIS	Department for International Cooperation (The Netherlands)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ESAMI	East and South African Management Institute
FOPAG	Forum for Peace and Governance
INCORE	International Conflict Research, United Nations University & Ulster University
LPI	Life and Peace Institute
LPI/B	LPI team in Bukavu, DRC
LPI/U	LPI main office in Uppsala
LPI/HAP	LPI Horn of Africa Programme
MONUC	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies dans la RDC
MSF	Médécins sans Frontières
TBAs'	traditional birth attendants
ToR	Terms of Reference
ToT	Training (or Trainer) of Trainers
UNOSOM	United Nations Organisation for Somalia

A. THE EVALUATION — BACKGROUND AND APPROACH

A.1. Background

Since its start in 1983 LPI has been involved in a wide range of activities promoting an understanding of the theory and practice of peace building. The internal debate around the focus and mode of operation of LPI has been continuous and often heated, particularly since its field involvement in Somalia. Even so, LPI has over the years emerged as an important partner in Sida's growing programme for conflict management.

The Sida-assisted programmatic LPI-activities in Somalia started already in 1993² and have continued in various forms up to the present. The support to LPI initiatives and activities in the DRC started only in 1999, and in a programmatic form only in 2002. In starting up the DRC programme it was understood by both Sida and LPI that the experience and lessons learned from Somalia would be adapted and used in the DRC as well.

During the period 1993-2002, Sida's total approved support to LPI (core support, limited project funding and programme funding in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo) has amounted to approximately SEK 112 million, with the bulk of it (SEK 76 million) for the Somalia programme alone.

In the early years of the Sida assistance to LPI's Horn of Africa Programme (the mainstay of which was the Somalia involvement) the support was motivated primarily by the desire to impact positively on the peace-building process in Somalia. However, expectations shared by both Sida and LPI came gradually to give an equal prominence to the generation of experiences, analysis and models of peace building of interest for the larger Sida conflict management programme as well as for peace practitioners at large. This is reflected in the ToR for this evaluation (annex 1).

A.2. Purpose, scope and approach

As stated in the ToR the main purpose of the evaluation is to assess the effectiveness and impact of the programmes financed by Sida through the LPI in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. "A key question of the evaluation concerns the extent to which the activities are addressing the conflicts and empowering local capacities to contribute to the peaceful resolution of on-going violent conflict" (ToR, pp. iii-iv).

Given the different time-spans of the two programmes the ToR outlined differences in emphasis and approach between the two:

- in the case of Somalia the thrust was to be on *impact*,
- for DRC the thrust was on *effectiveness*

² LPI received support both from Sida and the Swedish Foreign Office before that, but this was more in the nature of funding meetings and one-off consultations in which LPI played a facilitating role.

In both cases the criteria and theories developed in two seminal publications³ (to which Sida had also provided assistance) were to be used as points of departure:

- (a) 'The evaluation of conflict resolution intervention – Part II', Incore 2003, and
- (b) 'Confronting war – Critical lessons for peace practitioners', CDA 2003.

Apart from an assessment of the two programmes the evaluation was specifically to include a separate paper "elaborating the methodological problems and opportunities in evaluating conflict management projects" (ToR p viii).

Based on the publications, referred to above, as well as documents received from LPI in Uppsala, and interviews with LPI staff, an inception report was presented to Sida and LPI in a meeting on March 2, 2004⁴. At the request of Sida the emphasis in the inception report was on concepts and methodological issues, and was as such intended to be the skeleton of the methodological note to be attached to the final report.

From the outset it was clear that this was to be a field-based evaluation - i.e. one which took as its point of departure not the intentions, plans or even actions of the HQ level of LPI/Uppsala but the dynamics as seen in the field. Insofar as LPI/Uppsala has been included in the discussion it is primarily in relation to its 'footprints' being found (or not) in the management and/or operations on the ground⁵. The analysis and discussion do therefore not take into consideration efforts made at the HQ level that failed to make a dent in the field. The effectiveness or otherwise of LPI/Uppsala had already been assessed through a so-called 'system audit' in 1997, the findings of which continues to form part of the dialogue between Sida and LPI.

At the request of Sida the evaluation started with the DRC, although this was contrary to the logical sequence of LPI building on experience⁶. Due to security problems encountered during the initial phase of the evaluation in DRC (see below) and to the general insecurity in Somalia discussed already during the inception meeting on March 2, 2004⁷, it was decided by Sida, in consultation with LPI and the evaluation teamleader, to put the assessment of the Somalia programme on hold until a possible revised approach could be identified. It was finally agreed that a do-what-can-be-done limited assessment should be undertaken based on interviews with LPI staff and relevant stakeholders in Nairobi. In the event this came to include a short visit to Somaliland by members of the evaluation team.

An evaluation of peace-building activities in contexts of ongoing violent and unpredictable conflict is obviously a balance between prudence and 'need to know', involving a constant revision of methodology and itinerary. There is a grave risk that much of the information is anecdotal or hearsay, or else heavily influenced by more or

³ See annex 2 for a list of references.

⁴ See annexes 3 & 4.

⁵ Our lack of an 'Uppsala perspective' was a point of criticism and concern voiced by the LPI strategic management in Uppsala.

⁶ The request was based on the need to process application for (re-)continued support to the LPI-DRC programme.

⁷ See annex 4, point 5.

less dramatic ongoing events. Apart from constant internal discussions within the team during the field work itself, the best antidote against these risks is probably that of time – to let the information sink in and be digested against the grid of the key variables of the evaluation. But time for digestion is a scarce commodity in any programme evaluation, for fieldwork and reflection alike. With the benefit of hindsight it is clear to us that an evaluation such as this one should have required a longer time period – to some extent for the field work but more importantly for passive (and unpaid!) reflection that the sheer passage of time can provide.

The findings of the team were discussed at several meetings during the course of the evaluation - with LPI partner organisations in DRC as well as with LPI/DRC staff prior to the departure of the team from DRC; with Sida/SEKA and LPI/Uppsala staff after the DRC visit as well as in connection with the draft report. Comments on the full draft report were received from the head of the Conflict Resolution Programme at LPI/Uppsala (see annex 14), but were not deemed by the Teamleader to require any changes in the report⁸.

It should finally be stressed that the evaluation team consciously refrained from putting forward or imposing its own conflict analysis with respect to the situations in DRC and Somalia. Rather than attempting such a one-upmanship vis-à-vis the LPI staff for either country programme⁹, our focus was instead on if, and if so how, LPI had developed (and updated) a conflict analysis to guide its work.

A.2.1. DRC

As noted above the emphasis in DRC was on effectiveness, i.e. the extent to which the programme was on its way to achieve its objectives as well as the likely relevance of its activities in terms of promoting sustainable peace building processes on the ground. The focus here was on:

- the actors involved by, or otherwise interacting with, LPI (who are they, how did they get involved with or selected by LPI, what is their base, what is their view on LPI, what are their relations to others, etc.) and
- the ability of LPI to continuously define, revise, pursue and follow up the purposes and objectives of its activities and interactions.

During the course of the evaluation more than 60 people were interviewed, representing some 20 organisations, including MONUC¹⁰ and locally active international NGOs in both North and South Kivu¹¹. The large majority was, however, from local community based organisations constituting parts of the network making up the LPI programme in the two provinces of North and South Kivu. The interviews

⁸ Comments from the LPI/DRC were received earlier, see annex 8.1. We also received some comments from LPI/HAP in Nairobi, some of which pointed at factual errors in the draft that were corrected in the final version.

⁹ In addition there exist a host of alternative (or at least complementary) conflict analyses in both cases, some of which was availed of by the evaluation team - see annex 2.

¹⁰ The UN peace-building intervention in DRC: 'Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies dans la RDC' (MONUC).

¹¹ See annex 5 for a list of organisations and individuals interviewed by members of the evaluation team.

were carried out both as open-ended group discussions and as structured interviews with individuals. In addition some field projects undertaken by partner organisations with the support of LPI were visited¹².

Before the departure of the team from DRC two debriefings were held: one in Goma (North Kivu) with representatives of LPI partner organisations¹³, and one with the LPI team at its headquarter in Bukavu¹⁴. In addition, the teamleader presented a debriefing note of the DRC assessment at a meeting with Sida and LPI in Stockholm on April 6, 2004¹⁵.

During the initial stage of the evaluation one member of the team met with a serious security incident that had repercussion for the rest of the evaluation¹⁶. As a consequence the members of the team that continued the evaluation decided to restrict field visits to areas/places reported to be safe, which in turn meant that the field method outlined in the inception report had to be handled in a very flexible manner. However, we are confident that with the very extensive number of interviews and meetings we gained adequate insights into the processes facilitated by LPI, as well as into the network of partners that constitute the carriers of the programme. In essence, the security problems did not alter the DRC part of the evaluation, but it did impact on the decision whether to go ahead in Somalia, as discussed below.

A.2.2. Somalia

Due to the trouble encountered in DRC and to the general unstable situation in most parts of Somalia (with the exception of Somaliland and partly Puntland), it was decided that the assessment of the LPI Somalia programme should be carried out through (a) interviews with relevant people in Nairobi – i.e. staff at the LPI office with experience of the Somalia programme, outside stakeholders such as the EC and UN offices dealing with Somalia, as well as former LPI staff having served in the Somalia programme; (b) documents made available by LPI Nairobi and LPI Uppsala as well as interviews with the previous LPI management of the Horn of Africa Programme. It also came to include a brief three-days-visit to Hargeisha in Somaliland. The programme was arranged at a very short notice and had to be adapted to what was possible to do within the span of one week¹⁷.

In addition the assessment of the Somalia programme was constrained by the fact that no field visits could be undertaken (beyond the short visit to Hargeisha town). The very nature of the assessment was also like looking for footprints of activities no

¹² See annex 6 for the DRC itinerary of the evaluation team members.

¹³ See annex 7 for the debriefing note and minutes of the discussion with partner organisations.

¹⁴ See annex 8, with the LPI Bukavu team's response attached.

¹⁵ See annex 9.

¹⁶ On his way towards the Burundi border to meet with the teamleader before returning to Sweden the team member Michael Schulz was kidnapped along with a local LPI staff member by a local Mayi Mayi group. They were summarily interrogated and then taken barefooted into the forest with the obvious intention to execute them. Thanks to quick reaction and intensive lobbying by LPI staff and management as well as by local church leaders and the general command of Mayi Mayi in Kinshasa they were later released and could, somewhat traumatised, return safely home.

¹⁷ Due to the deliberations on whether to undertake any assessment at all of the Somalia programme the time plan was derailed and collided with other commitments of the members of the evaluation team.

longer promoted by LPI. Both of these aspects implied a heavy reliance on the existence within LPI of a systematic documentation that reflected concurrent assessments, analysis and reporting of these activities. However, as will be pointed out, the documentation system is and remains a somewhat surprising weakness in the LPI Somalia programme, given the fact that it was from the very start launched as an instance of ‘action research’.

Our review covers the entire period of LPI involvement, from the early 1990's to 2004. However, we have concentrated (although not limited) our discussion to the years 1996-99, the years when LPI emerged as an actor in its own right outside the earlier alliance with (and umbrella of) the UN special intervention programme for Somalia (UNOSOM). Even though many of the building blocks were laid during the earlier period it was only when the UNOSOM was dismantled in 1995 that LPI had to determine its own priorities and mode of operation. And although the Sida-assisted programme continued beyond 1999 - first directly and as of late 2001 by way of channelling the Sida support to the newly constituted Somalian NGO – much of the energy after 1999 went to creating the new local organisation.

Given the time constraint and the absence of any field-work worth the name, the assessment is therefore very much in the nature of an art-of-the-possible, and should primarily be seen as contribution to the discussion and reflection of the Somalia LPI-experience. One of the direct results of the LPI involvement is that of the local NGO – the Forum for Peace and Governance (FOPAG) - fostered and mentored to carry on where LPI left off. Although this is only an indirect institutional impact of the original Somalia programme it is nevertheless important in illustrating both the strength and weakness of the sustainability aspect of the programme. Members of the team had opportunity to interview and discuss with the FOPAG management, the Chairperson of the Board, and local stakeholders in Somaliland (UNDP, the Somaliland Election Committee, NGOs, and government representatives)¹⁸. We cannot lay claim to having assessed the FOPAG activities even in Somaliland but we are confident that our assessment of the FOPAG dynamics and potential are well founded.

A.2.3. Outline and structure of the report

An evaluation report of peace building in highly volatile conflict situations risks being very voluminous, with much space being devoted to analysis of the contextual dynamics, apart from more or less systematic accounts of actual operations on the ground. As the report is primarily intended for policy-makers and those engaged directly in these (or other similar) programmes, we have opted for a main report that includes the finding, conclusions and recommendations only. A more detailed discussion of the DRC dynamics is offered in appendix A.

The main report is divided into three sections apart from this one (section A).

Section B deals with the assessment of the *DRC programme*, with an emphasis on the actors that are/have been, beside the LPI unit in Bukavu, directly or indirectly involved in the peace building facilitated by LPI. In discussing the effectiveness and

¹⁸ See annex 5 for a list of people interviewed in Somaliland.

relevance (and with that the potential impact) we have focussed on the instruments and procedures by which LPI attempts to facilitate action and capacities on the ground, including the extent to which and how they are used.

An analysis of the context of the LPI programme as well as a more detailed analysis of the field dynamics as found by the evaluation team is given in appendix A.

Section C deals with our discussion, reflection, and partial assessment of the ***Somalia programme***. While the emphasis is on impact, as required by the ToR, we have included an outline of what a more in-depth evaluation would have to involve and possible ways of how to undertake such an evaluation should Sida and/or LPI want to pursue it.

Section D deals with issues common to both programmes, particularly as regards strengths and weaknesses of ***LPI's strategic and managerial approach***. As some of these are clearly related to and dependent on LPI as an organisation – its mission and its capacity to turn this mission into practice, insofar as sustained interaction and presence in the field goes – we include here some observations and conclusions as regards LPI as a whole and its Headquarter in Uppsala.

A.3. The evaluation team

The evaluation was carried out by a team put together by Swedegroup international consultants AB. The team comprised¹⁹:

- Gordon Tamm²⁰, teamleader (overall programme evaluation and operational assessment), DRC and Nairobi/Somalia
- Michael Schulz²¹ (peace building and conflict transformation), DRC & Nairobi/Somalia
- Ingrid Samset²² (socio-political context), DRC only
- Malin Nystrand²³ (organisational assessment and resource management), desk study

In carrying out the evaluation the team members interacted very intensively with LPI staff and stakeholders throughout, including (in the case of DRC) debriefing discussions on main findings. The evaluation process was, not the least due to security reasons, often highly participatory in that analysis and discussions of the information

¹⁹ Originally the team included one additional member for DRC (Maria Eriksson Baaz). She was however forced to drop out due to being victim of an assault just prior to departure for the DRC. The team for Somalia similarly included two more members (Joakim Gundel and Evelyn Lindner), but as the evaluation was drastically redesigned and came to exclude field visits their contracts had to be revoked.

²⁰Senior Partner, Swedegroup international consultants AB

²¹Senior Lecturer and Researcher, Dept. for Peace and Development Research, Gothenburg University (Padrigu)

²²Researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen

²³Researcher, Dept. for Peace and Development Research, Gothenburg University (Padrigu), and Independent Consultant

generated during field visits were often carried out jointly between members of the team and LPI staff and stakeholders – even if guided and in the ultimate analysis owned by the evaluation team.

B. LPI IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)

Properly speaking, the LPI has only been active in the DRC since the beginning of 2002 (although a LPI/HAP team conducted a Sida-funded exploratory visit already in 1999²⁴, followed by a more comprehensive analysis and mobilisation phase in 2001²⁵).

The two Kivu provinces in Eastern DRC, bordering Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, have over recent years been marked by extreme violence and turmoil. In fact, the Kivu provinces are in the very eye of the storm of the lasting conflict in the Great Lakes area, with strong international interests overlapping with local ethnic rivalries and the struggle for post-Mobuto state power²⁶. With the supra-local structures in disarray the LPI bottom-up or community-based approach as developed in Somalia seemed equally relevant here.

However, from the start there were significant differences in approach as well as in priorities and mode of operation between LPI's Somalia and DRC programmes.

First of all, unlike in Somalia, in Congo LPI was not invited in by other international or local actors such as the UN peacekeeping mission (MONUC) active in the region. This meant that from the start LPI was forced to develop its own role and programmatic mission, based on its own understanding of the conflict. Even though this programmatic development included consultation with local actors, the Congo approach differed from the Somalia programme where LPI's role and basket of activities was worked out in close consultation with the UNOSOM. And while in Somalia, the conflict analysis was developed in a gradual and piecemeal fashion in response to the developments in the conflict; in the Congo it was more of a one-off effort, which preceded programme implementation. It also implied that the DRC programme thus evolved largely as separate from the UN (or other international) efforts, based both on a comprehensive initial assessment or 'conflict analysis'²⁷, and on a programme document outlining objectives as well as activities²⁸. This was in marked contrast to the LPI Somalia programme, which in a very real sense was formulated only in 1996, both as regards the programme itself as well as in terms of a more collectively 'owned' conflict analysis.

Secondly, whereas in Somalia the 'warlords' and the regional combatants had been kept at arms length, in the DRC they are part of the broader interaction of LPI. The reason for this was partly that here the LPI was unique as an international peace-building NGO²⁹ whereas in Somalia the supra-local strongmen and their militias were engaged by the other parties in the peace alliance of which LPI was part. But more

²⁴ See Susanne Thurfjell: 'Keeping up the Hope – Assessing local efforts at peace and reconciliation in North and South Kivu, DRC'; LPI, 2000

²⁵ See Hans Romkema: 'An analysis of the Civil Society and Peace Building Prospects in the North and South Kivu provinces, Democratic Republic of Congo'; LPI, November 2001

²⁶ For an overview of the regional conflict and its expressions in the countries involved, see 'A strategic conflict analysis for the Great Lakes Region', Sida 2004

²⁷ Hans Romkema, op.cit.

²⁸ 'Support for Peace building initiatives and reconciliation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2002-2004'; LPI, January 2002.

²⁹ Of the more than 200 NGOs active in the area the vast majority, local as well as international, have a humanitarian or developmental focus.

important was LPI's understanding that in the Kivus the various militias were strongly embedded on the ground and thereby in very direct ways affected - adversely, most often - the situation of the civilian population. As a consequence LPI saw as necessary, even for a bottom-up approach, to establish relations with warring parties and their leaders, in an attempt to contain open violent conflicts and civilian casualties.

Third, in the wake of the collapse of the heavily centralised dictatorship of Siad Barre in Somalia there were practically no locally active organisations or civil society bodies beyond the remnants of traditional clan structures. LPI was therefore, on the ground and within Somalia, as much on its own as LPI in DRC was at the meso-level of the provinces, where few similar international bodies operated. But in DRC there is a very strong and active tradition of local organisations, including so-called CBOs (community based organisations) and churches. While Congo's Diaspora community abroad is a far less important source for peace building activities than the Diaspora is in the Somalia case, there is on the other hand a strong indigenous activist and partly intellectual resource base with roots from the struggle against the Mobuto regime. As a consequence the LPI programme in DRC was explicitly based on the concept of 'partnership' with local organisations and multi-unit 'platforms', from within the civil society as well as the religious community.

B.1. The programme – objectives and components

Based on the identification mission and the situational analysis carried out in 2000-2001, LPI's Congo's programme document for the years 2002-2004 spells out the following objectives:

Overall goal:

To contribute to the restoration of peace and justice in the Kivu provinces in the DRC.

Objectives:

1. To assist the civil society in the Kivu provinces of the DRC in order to broaden and strengthen the ongoing local peace efforts.
2. To encourage and assist the churches, particularly in the Kivu provinces, with the development of a capacity to play a role, in line with its influence on the social life of Congolese people, in the peace building process.
3. To assist grassroot organisations in order to increase their capacity to contribute to non-violent conflict resolution at the local level, and to participate in provincial and national coordination platforms.
4. To document all activities, as well as undertake and facilitate research works focusing on the causes and the specific features of the conflict, and whose results, conclusions and recommendations would influence the development of strategies on the field. This will allow us to learn from the ongoing work, both for immediate use in the Congo and for improving theory and practice globally.

These objectives were to be promoted through:

- a) Organising and facilitating meetings between groups in conflict with each other;
- b) Empowerment of women peace builders through training and facilitation of access to/participation in civil society bodies;
- c) Development of a joint action plan for the civil society through active identification and capacity development of relevant local organisations/bodies, and facilitation of dialogues and interaction between these partner organisations;
- d) Assistance to the churches, particularly regarding their attitudes towards and involvement in peace-building (across parish/ethnic divisions and across denominations);
- e) Community oriented civic education in order to expand the reach and base of the civil society and its organisations;
- f) Research, particularly as regards traditional ways to solve and prevent conflict in communities.

As the project document was rather non-explicit as to concrete activities as well as the role of LPI, Sida decided to provide a limited support of SEK 3 million for the year 2002 only (against the total estimated budget for the two years of SEK 19.4 million)³⁰, pending an evaluation and an improved project document.

B.2. Overview of the project process in DRC

At a general level much of the approach and the activities of the LPI in DRC have a legacy from the Somalia experiences, although not necessarily in a direct or systematic way. A combined perusal of the project documents and the preceding studies make it clear that basically three levels of interventions were suggested: the grassroots level, the coordinating level of the civil society, and the supra-local level of provincial, national and external factors and actors. The approach was built on the assumption that if civil society is activated this will contribute to build peace from the bottom to the top of society. Although the documents between them provide a careful inventory and reasonably clear analysis of all actors involved in the conflicts of DRC, they never gave rise to a detailed documented action plan.

The situation analysis of 2001 had made an inventory of potential partner organisations, and much of the early work consisted of selecting and establishing working relations (including in some cases limited material support) with the viable ones among them. At the time of the evaluation the total number of ‘partners’ was around 50³¹, of which some 20 were deemed by LPI to have a reasonably close and durable ‘partnership’ over time. The basic instrument for ‘partnerships’ was project or activity specific support from LPI to the ‘partner’, based on time-bound contracts and brief project outlines. Apart from providing training and (in some cases) limited material support, the role of LPI was envisaged as recurrent hands-on mentoring

³⁰ The main funding for the programme came from DGIS (the Netherlands) and DfID (UK).

³¹ The exact number depends on the definition of the relation: in some cases it was a sustained interaction with LPI providing training (directly or through others) and limited office support, in others it was a question of one-off interactions/projects that fizzled out for various reasons.

(*'accompagnement'*) to develop the capacity and competence of the often very small local organisations or churches, and to establish some level of quality assurance and continuous feedback.

In most cases the training was undertaken not by LPI staff but by other (local) institutions, with LPI focussing on 'Training of Trainers' within and sometimes outside these institutions. The foci of these training programmes were on methods of conflict resolution, on civic education (including human and more specifically women's rights), and, with respect to civil society bodies, organisational and project management. Although exact figures were not available, it was estimated by us that a total number of some 800 individuals had been given such training since the start of the programme in early 2002. The vast majority of them came from the 'partner' organisations, including churches.

Parallel to the efforts to establish working partnerships were recurrent attempts to negotiate with local political and military leaders and other representatives of the conflict actors in the Kivu provinces. The purpose was to establish local ceasefire agreements that in turn could provide space for actors in the civil society, such as in Bunyakiri and Hombo in South Kivu, situated approximately 80-100 km north of the province capital Bukavu. This implied a very visible exposure of LPI on the local (and partially regional) conflict scenes.

In order to reach across ethnic as well as spatial divisions, the LPI programme unit was purposefully recruited in such a way as to include staff from both the major regions and from across the ethnic spectrum. In a similar vein the strategy as regards selection of 'partners' and projects was inclusive, i.e. relations were established with both dominant and marginal ethnic groups and interests, even at the cost of generating considerable reactions and resentment within the partnership network (and other local and international groups). The main contentious issues circled around LPI's stand and action to enable the return to Rwanda of the Hutu rebels who remain in the Congo since the 1994 genocide, and LPI's inclusion of Banyamulenge (a domiciled extension in Kivu of the Tutsi ethnic complex of Rwanda) in the staff as well as in the project and organisation portfolio of LPI. This will be further discussed under 'Findings' below.

B.3. Findings and conclusions

The first and most glaring finding is the very impressive fact that the LPI team has managed to implement and provide support to local peace building processes and capacities to the extent that it has. In fact, there is no doubt that LPI/DRC has made a solid name for itself as standing for a consistent support to peace, one that is interactive and participatory rather than impartial or procedural. It is also clear to us that LPI staff has established links with, and access to, troubled situations and groups that surpass most if not all other NGOs active in the area. Given the working conditions in the two Kivus, this is indeed a very impressive feat. That in the process the lack of a systematic approach found by this evaluation has tended to be overly justified by the LPI management and team in Bukavu in terms of need for flexibility

and responsiveness should not detract from the fact that the sheer activities have in themselves created and shown the potentials (and not only shortcomings) of the programme.

The findings and conclusions are structured along the issues given in the ToR for the DRC component of the LPI evaluation.

B.3.1. Project design and activities

B.3.1.1. Findings

The LPI programme in DRC follows in the main the objectives and activities outlined in the Project Document submitted to Sida on February 21, 2002. However, if one reads only the Project Document one is hard put to recognise the programme in the field. In practice, the guiding force of the project design and activities has not been the Project Document but the felt need to respond to the perceived dynamics of the conflict, and in particular the moves of the main conflict actors on the provincial as well as sub-provincial ('territorial') level. In fact, the Project Document does not seem to have been used at all except in a general sense of providing overall guidance to the purpose and approach of the programme. This seems to have been a very conscious decision on the part of the expatriate manager of the Bukavu LPI office. The rationale provided to the team was that given the volatile situation and the need for a continuous flexible response to its development, he did not regard it as prudent to tie the staff down to too many prescribed activities. As a consequence the document, although obviously discussed within the LPI team, was not translated into French (even though most LPI staff members were unfamiliar with English), nor was it circulated to the outside world or to the partners.

As it has evolved, LPI/DRC has used a multi-pronged *operational approach* (although not formalised as such) in its actual 'project design':

- *Conflict analysis*: building on the initial study carried out by Hans Romkema, supplemented by a continuous, although non-systematic, monitoring of the moves of the *conflict actors* particularly at the territorial and provincial level. The shift away from an analysis of the conflict dynamics towards what may be called political and military monitoring has left the original analysis and its assumptions intact, and intellectually owned only by LPI.
- *Regional 'coverage'/outlook/perspective*: The programme presence is spread over the entire area of the two provinces. The decision to do so was built in from the start, the rationale being that this border zone was enmeshed in and bound together by multi-layered conflicts of various kinds. It was therefore contended by LPI that peace building, even if from below, had to be done on scale. In this it mirrored the Somalia programme.
- *'Direct action'*: this has been primarily in the field of facilitating dialogues between, and/or active third party negotiation services for, militant groups.

Although obviously not programmatically pursued it has nevertheless provided LPI with a high profile (and at least among certain parties in the conflicts also some credibility).

- *Partner interactions/support*: these have been carried out primarily through time-bound, one-off project support along with equally time-bound and limited financial support to a variety of local organisations, resulting in a fluid notion of ‘partner’ organisations, their main common bond being that they have received support from LPI.
- *Design of activities and projects*: in order to avoid project applications being routinised attempts to get money, LPI has opted for a ‘generic approach’, i.e. one that forces the applicant organisation to develop in their own words the rationale, purpose and relevance for peace-building of their suggested activity. In principle we find this to be a sound approach, although the lack of common understanding of the role of LPI and the strategy of the programme has led to serious delays and misunderstandings in processing the applications. On the other hand it has indeed allowed for a very high degree of flexibility and responsiveness, even if marked by a certain degree of subjectivity on the part of LPI.

While the objectives stated in the Project Document have, in a general sense, been used as guiding the *activities*, those more specifically in support of conflict transformation in the Kivu provinces have a slightly different composition³² and can be summarised as:

- a) Capacity building focussed on local partner organisations through training on peace building and conflict transformation, limited and time-bound institutional (i.e. financial) support to some organisations/platforms, and workshops on issues related to the conflicts;
- b) Technical mentoring of partner activities and projects (‘accompagnement’);
- c) Widening or complementing the reach of existing peace building and civil society organisations to strengthen the voice of the grassroots or margins;
- d) Facilitation of dialogues between armed units of opposing actors to defer or defuse open violent conflict, directly or in response to requests from conflict parties or partner organisations; and
- e) Studies or research related to the conflict.

Of the above a) & b) have been done in direct one-to-one interaction with partner organisations, while c) & d) were largely initiated and pursued by LPI/Bukavu itself. With the exception of one (and the major) study,³³ research has been outsourced to local institutions or resource persons.

³² It may be argued that our summary above of what was actually done was ‘implicit’ in the project document. The activities outlined in the Project Document were, however, very vague. To complicate matters further the budget follow-up presently used by LPI/Bukavu (which is based on contributions from DGIS and DfID but not from Sida) uses yet another classification of activities. See annex 10.

³³ Hélène Morvan et al.: ‘Dans l’ombre des Accords de paix: Le conflit congolais au quotidien’. LPI, February 2004 (draft)

B.3.1.2. Conclusions

This approach and composition of activities have, although being in line with the principles laid down in the project document as also with the general approach pursued in Somalia, resulted in a very demanding situation for LPI, its peers, and its local partners.

First and most immediately glaring is that it has resulted in a large number of widely scattered – functionally and spatially – interventions that have strained the capacity of LPI Bukavu to plan, administer, and follow up the portfolio as a whole.

Second, it has made the programme and along with it the LPI rather opaque and/or non-transparent when viewed from the perspective of the ‘partenaires’ as well as LPI Bukavu’s own peer environment (other INGOs, local specialised NGOs and resource institutions, MONUC, etc.).

Third, although we agree with the need for flexibility and responsiveness we still regard it as imperative to have a document (in French) outlining the objectives, working modality, and main activities and role of LPI – AND to share it with all stakeholders, including the partner organisations. As it is, although it was clear that the Staff was a well-functioning group, the shared base was primarily at a fairly high or abstract set of values. But this is not the same as sharing an operational strategy or operational priorities. The monthly staff meetings could not counter a marked variation among staff in this respect as these were primarily concerned with specific activities/projects, their costs, feasibility and individual merits.

B.3.2. Selection of partners and participants

“Who are these entities that the LPI supports: Communities, associations, or individuals?”

Representative of LPI partner, 25.03.04

B.3.2.1. Findings

At the time of our visit to the Kivus, LPI had provided support to 44 local organisations or ‘platforms’ (i.e. small local networks), excluding academic bodies with which it had established some kind of research collaboration³⁴. Of these, 22 were characterised by LPI staff as being more stable or strong partners, seven were essentially one-off interactions (involving failure of reporting or of implementation), and 15 were yet to be assessed in one way or the other. These partners were spread throughout the two provinces. The value, intensity, and scope of the support varied dramatically from a low of USD 498 for enabling a few members of one organisation to participate in a workshop in Uganda, to a high of USD 80.000 for an inter- and intra-community meeting in South Kivu³⁵ – with a range from recurrent institutional

³⁴ See annex 11.

³⁵ This includes co-funding from NOVIB/The Netherlands and DfID/UK.

(e.g. financial office) support to specific meetings and smaller studies falling in between.

The existing '*partners*' of LPI/B are broadly made up of

- Ecumenical structures (roughly 40%);³⁶
- Civil society platforms (roughly 30%);
- Local NGOs that aim to support capacity formation and local conflict transformation initiatives, particularly in connection with the two structures mentioned above (roughly 20%); and
- CBOs or embryonic NGOs that are deemed to 'give voice' to marginal and/or weakly represented groups or localities (roughly 10%).

The existing portfolio of '*projects*' is broadly made up of one or several of the following types of support:

- Support to reconciliation efforts within ecumenical/denominational structures that are locally influential but have internal divisions that reflect and/or spur the conflicts;
- Extension efforts by existing '*partners*' to reach out and institutionalise local level peace building capacity;
- Time-bound institutional support to a limited number of '*partners*', ranging from specific equipment, office rent or development, to salary of specified technical staff; and
- Travel costs for individuals to participate in outside workshops or trainings.

B.3.2.2. Conclusions

As reviewed by the team in discussions with both LPI staff and recipient organisations, two conclusions could be drawn.

First, in spite of the classification of projects and organisations given above it was difficult to discern any pattern except a certain randomness in the selection of partners and distribution of projects. The basic selection process seemed rather to be (a) the personal assessment or knowledge of the organisation by the individual programme officer at LPI, and (b) his/her relative willingness to forcefully push for approval of a proposal at the periodic staff meetings. One may argue that such a process makes sense in an environment of small and often unknown organisations: familiarity with an organisation certainly provides a better basis for decisions, and competitive vetting in a meeting in turn may make for a better justification of an individual case. But it makes the whole process rather spurious and non-transparent over time, internally as well as from an external perspective. One of the most unfortunate effects of the lack of clear criteria of selection, available to insiders as well as to outsiders of the LPI, is that it stimulates rife speculation among '*partners*' as well as the Kivu population at large about possible LPI favouritism towards those individuals and groups who have connections to single staff members. Such speculation, in turn, complicates LPI efforts to act credibly as a facilitator of local peace building efforts, given the need to be perceived as relatively impartial to do so when coming in from the outside.

³⁶ The distribution is very indicative as many of the organisations carry several hats.

Secondly, without selection criteria directly reflecting the objectives of the programme it is difficult to find out which type of project/organisation in relation to which context carried a better potential for generating programme specific results or impacts. It also makes it difficult to infuse the overall portfolio with sense of cost-effectiveness – i.e. how does one justify USD 80.000 of very scarce resources to, say, a workshop as against USD 800 to, say, institutional support of a ‘partner’?³⁷

B.3.3. Ownership of local partners and role of the Bukavu office

Ownership of a programme or its constituent components may be played out at different levels and in different ways. In the case of the LPI DRC programme, one can discern at least the following levels of ownership:

- *Conceptual ownership*, i.e. who generates the situational or conflict analysis that underpins the programme, and how is it shared?
- *Strategy*, i.e. who ensures that the overall direction of the programme corresponds with the implications of the underlying analysis, and how is it done?
- *Projects*, i.e. what flexibility is there in designing and implementing projects according to contextual exigencies, and who exercises this flexibility?
- *Other activities*, i.e. how and by whom is the need for and design of such ‘collective’ endeavours as trainings and workshops identified and decided upon?

B.3.3.1. Findings

(a) Conflict analysis

One of the more distinguishing features of the LPI partner network is the lack of a common perspective on the driving forces of the conflicts. In itself this can be taken as a healthy sign insofar as no perspective has obviously been imposed. However, the healthiness depends of course on the extent to which this diversity is paralleled by awareness and indeed respect for such differences as one may have, and by efforts to reconcile standpoints and common understandings wherever possible and necessary.

However, we have not found any attempts by LPI Bukavu to foster such dialogues. Indeed the only conflict analysis that is (at times) propounded in programme workshops and meetings is the one contained in the situational analysis carried out in 2001 by the present manager of LPI Bukavu. As a consequence the only conflict analysis that provides a reasonably coherent perspective is the one generated by LPI, one that is to our knowledge not shared with the partner organisations throughout the provinces or the peer organisations in Bukavu except in fragments and occasionally. Opportunities to share and discuss both an overriding (regional) analysis of the situation and the way this relates to the local situation in which most partners find

³⁷ In response to this question LPI Bukavu argued that the funding in this particular case was shared with others (DfID and NOVIB), see annex 8. This is, however, not a question of source of funds but of effective use of any fund at all.

themselves are likely to be one of the more potent ways to generate a sense of common mission, to demonstrate the need for reconciliation between different groups and interests, and at the same time foster tolerance for differing views. Such opportunities have not been availed of in the DRC programme.³⁸

(b) Strategy

As already pointed out the process of selection of activities, projects, and partner organisations appears very non-transparent to partners and outsiders alike. To some extent this is probably prudent in the highly politicised context of the Kivu provinces: LPI is not and should not appear to be a donor but a facilitating and supportive resource group, and any strategy of LPI can always be construed as having an ulterior agenda should one so want to view it. However, the same can be said as a justification for being totally transparent, and it is to us clear that any continuation of the programme must include efforts to make the programme strategy more transparent, more systematic and less the prerogative of LPI.

Lacking a system by which the views of ‘partners’ or other relevant bodies on the ground can contribute to the strategy also means that it remains highly generalized and with an emphasis on flexibility and responsiveness. As the programme as such is founded on the principle of ‘action research’, i.e. signifying systematic efforts towards evidence-based action, this lack of a well-functioning feedback mechanism becomes all the more problematic.

However, it must also be recognised that strategic management does not sit easily with field management – even less so in highly volatile surroundings where the art of the possible has indeed to be developed into an art. This should in itself automatically imply a very active strategic support, guidance and interaction between LPI DRC and LPI Headquarters in Uppsala. We have, however, in our review of the LPI field management and operations, not come across any signs or impressions of such efforts.

There may be several reasons for this – ranging from sheer personality factors, through the dominant knowledge position of the incumbent LPI DRC manager with respect to the Congo context³⁹, to limited capacity or strategic competence at the LPI HQ. We can here only note that the strategic management is a weak point, both as regards substance and ownership.

(c) Projects

The individual projects are formulated and owned by the ‘partners’, sometimes with active coaching from concerned LPI staff. It appears to us that in this respect the approach taken by LPI is basically sound, allowing for contextually adapted projects

³⁸ The need for this was also expressed in many discussions with partner organisations. Some partners expressed an uncertainty or awkwardness about their relation to LPI, including difficulties in defending/explaining in their local context and internally the actions pursued by LPI on other levels/arenas. See appendix A for more detailed accounts of the views and opinions of the partners.

³⁹ Before joining as LPI regional representative in DRC Hans Romkema was for many years in Rwanda and the DRC as a Save the Children representative. In addition he carried out the situation analysis that preceded the programme in 2001.

and activities that are only checked for quality and alignment with the peace building focus of the programme. But there is an existence of a risk that we observed, both on project sites and in discussions with partner organisations. For this to work satisfactorily, the concept of ‘accompagnement’, or practical mentorship, has to be effectively pursued as LPI’s part of the project agreement. With the capacity of the LPI unit in Bukavu stretched thin, with a communication and logistics situation that is even in the best of cases problematic, and with an increasing number of highly scattered projects and partners, this mentorship (including monitoring) has proved exceedingly difficult to live up to⁴⁰.

(d) Other activities

Reviewing the reports of the large number of workshops and trainings promoted through the LPI programme as well as the views and observations made by people and organisations having participated we were impressed by two aspects.

First, we find that most of these events had been supported in response to request from partners and field practitioners in the provinces (rather than being offered or pushed by LPI). This does not mean that quality was always ensured, but it did vouch for a need-defined relevance. Similarly, in such instances that participants and/or LPI found that the quality was questionable; it appeared that the LPI unit made efforts to secure better trainers or improve the training modules. In fact, both trainings and workshops scored high in our interviews with participants and organisations alike. In general the ownership is widely spread throughout the partnership in that the demand is generally articulated through and by the partners, with LPI providing the financial, technical, and sometimes administrative support.

Second, reports from the trainings and workshops seem to have been produced by LPI in every single case and also disseminated to participants and concerned organisations⁴¹. We came across 27 such workshops/trainings and in all cases LPI had put together and disseminated corresponding reports.

B.3.3.2. Conclusions

Based on the findings above we conclude that

- There is a need to generate a more widespread and interactive consultation on the conflict analysis between LPI and its ‘partners’ – not in order to arrive at (or impose) one unanimously endorsed Conflict Analysis but in order to provide the identification of points of common ground, of differences, and to ensure that the variation is both understood and as far as possible respected. Even though it may be difficult to delineate the issues on which a common approach may be needed from the issues on which a variety of views and opinions should be respected, such an effort, if done in a collective and inclusive way, is likely to stimulate a

⁴⁰ See inter alia the observations of the partner representatives during the debriefing by the evaluation team in Goma, annex 7.

⁴¹ It is true that the time-lag could sometimes be considerable and cause some frustration among partners, but we have seldom come across a programme support unit that has managed to compile and disseminate reports as exhaustively as LPI Bukavu.

common sense of direction among LPI and partners alike of their mission, and thus a common ownership of the programme.

- The strategy pursued so far has been largely ‘the art of the possible’ with LPI being the dominant artist. There is a need to distil, from the experience gained so far, (a) what aspects of the conflict transformation programme as a whole as well as its supportive structure that can be more systematically owned throughout the partnership, and (b) what themes, issues, and activities that will require continued flexibility and responsiveness and are therefore difficult to share or foster routines.
- The way in which projects as well as trainings and workshops are generated seems highly appropriate (except for the very non-transparent selection process in the case of the projects). Similarly the reporting from trainings and workshops is very impressive⁴². These reports should in principle constitute a valuable input for assessing the usefulness and impact of trainings and workshops as and when the programme officers attempt to consolidate and incorporate lessons learned for the future.
- There is a need to close the gap between LPI Bukavu and LPI Uppsala in terms of strengthening the involvement in the programme by LPI as a whole, as well as to ensure that the strategic direction of the programme includes a perception of both ‘the trees and the forest’.

B.3.4. Ability to identify and manage impacts⁴³

B.3.4.1. Findings

The ability to identify positive or negative impacts (as distinct from results) hinges on the existence of (a) an underlying analysis of the conflict, (b) reasonably practicable indicators related both to the overall goals as well as to the specific objectives, and (c) a monitoring system that generates reasonably reliable and recurrent information related to the indicators. Last but not least, there has to be a will to use and act on the information generated.

The project document puts forward a number of ‘indicators’ (in the document called ‘expected impact’ and ‘expected results’) against the overall goal as well as against each of the four objectives⁴⁴. It is true that at a very high level of abstraction both the ‘expected impact’ and the ‘expected results’ can indeed be seen as indicators of how the programme may make its presence felt in the overall conflict environment. However, as is often the case in programmes and projects such as this one, the indicators (or expectations) tend to be other ways of expressing the objectives or simply aspects of a desirable end state that bear little concrete relation to the activities promoted⁴⁵.

⁴² With the benefit of comparing the situation in DRC with that of Somalia there is no doubt that the DRC programme is a much-improved version of the Somalia programme in this respect.

⁴³ The ToR required, as separate points, the evaluation to assess the extent to which (a) the Institute incorporates learning based on analysis of project performance, and (b) the relevance of the indicators presented in the LPI proposal. As these issues are inextricably linked to the ability to assess and manage negative impacts we have preferred to include a discussion on them here.

⁴⁴ See section B.1. above, as well as annex 12: ‘Logical framework of the LPI DRC Peace Building Programme’ (as copied from the project document).

Apart from the well-known difficulty of tracing any impact, good or bad, to the concrete activities of an issue-defined programme we do not find that the indicators put forward in the project document have any practical relevance or provide the basis either for strategic management decisions or for lessons learned. But the reason is not only or even primarily their level of generality and abstraction: ‘expected results’ such as “increased confidence and understanding between civil society representatives from different origins” could indeed form the starting point for studies of where, how, and by what means changing practices reflected such growing confidence. Rather, the reason is the lack of any systematic monitoring at all, and a concomitant absence of situation-specific studies and research on something else than the conflicting actors, their relation to the conflict on the ground, or their social and socio-political embeddedness.

Before moving further on these issues it is important to stress that the lack of tools to assess possibly negative impacts does not mean that the LPI management and staff were callous or indifferent to such possibilities. Indeed, we found them to be aware of the risks involved in creating adverse fallouts, including tensions that a sometimes-overt stand on the part of LPI might provoke. We also found that with some exceptions the management and programme officers were willing and indeed able to revise or discontinue a practice or activity if it showed signs of being ill conceived. But the problem is that the ability to assess possible negative impacts lies primarily in the heads and hearts of the individuals comprising the LPI DRC team rather than in any discernible system.

Individual commitments and sensitivities aside, we have therefore not found that LPI as an organisation has the ability to identify negative impacts (even if it may very well have the will and stamina to act on them) except when they become so obvious that any indicator becomes academic. To some extent this is understandable: working in this conflict environment implies a constant brinkmanship where maintaining relations even in the short run tends to be more crucial than medium to long-term assessments of consequences and impact. Insofar as acceptability (across conflicting parties and over the range of civil society organisations and supportive bodies) can be seen as an indicator of *potential* impact – which we believe it should – LPI scores well with a few notable exceptions (see section B.3.6. below as well as appendix A).

The lack of functioning systems of monitoring projects as well as partner capacities were raised and discussed with the programme management. It is true that a format has been developed and in some cases also used. But the information it generates is primarily concerned with *activities* and the extent to which they have been performed in line with the proposal for each specific project. As such these reports may indeed help to strengthen the management information system (MIS) of the programme. But they are conspicuously silent on information on *results*, e.g. through information along indicators of changed behaviour, of changes in the personal security situation, of changes in food security, etc. in the local context hopefully effected by the activities.

⁴⁵ This general phenomenon was one of the driving forces behind the process leading up to the documents produced by CDA and INCORE that the ToR stipulated were to guide this evaluation. But a somewhat brutal assessment of these very comprehensive consultations and inventories is that they could come no further than to point at the need for contextually and situationally specific indicators.

And this is where the lack of operationally relevant studies becomes acute. Although the research component will be discussed separately it should be noted here that none of the studies we came across made any attempt to explore or identify the relations between local conflict situations and how they impacted on (for example) concrete aspects of local livelihood, incl. prices and availability of specific staple food items. Without such studies it appears impossible to develop and test realistic models on how specific peace building efforts may affect living conditions, relations, and behaviour at the community level, and even more impossible to assess likely positive or negative (or zero) impact. And without such empirically based model development and testing it is similarly very difficult to introduce indicators whereby one could assess the effectiveness of specific activities (incl. cost effectiveness) and link the peace building efforts on the ground with a ‘peace process writ large’.

Again, we find the lack of such studies surprising in a programme wedded to the concept of ‘action research’, however that term is defined. As we see it LPI has somehow managed to consistently avoid using the field presence as a fountain for developing evidence based studies on how community-based peace building can in practice lead to positive changes where it matters most – in the daily life of ordinary people.

B.3.4.2. Conclusions

The core of the ability to identify and manage negative impacts lies in the persons now making up the LPI Bukavu team. While this will and must to some extent always be so, the lack of systems and routines for follow-up throughout the programme makes this team very vulnerable both to mistakes and to outside ‘diabolisation’. It also implies a weak strategic guidance.

There is therefore an urgent need to develop both a system of process monitoring and assessment of results (including likely impacts) over the entire range of LPI-assisted activities, including training. The current lack of such monitoring also reflects a weakness in the ‘action research’ aspect of the programme, particularly as regards developing and testing concrete models and indicators of changes in the local livelihood and living conditions related to peace building interventions. Unless both these aspects are upgraded in a mutually supportive way there is little or no possibility to identify either positive or negative impact, and there is a danger that some LPI-assisted activities and/or organisations will be regarded as irrelevant or non-responsive at the grassroots or community level.

B.3.5. Response of participants involved in activities

In virtually all cases the participants involved in the programme activities are representatives or members of the ‘partner’ organisations⁴⁶. As noted above in section

⁴⁶ To these should be added representatives of conflicting parties where LPI had played the role of a mediator. For obvious reasons they did not form part of the people interviewed during the evaluation. Likewise should be added individuals outside the fold of partner organisations that participated in some of the trainings and workshops.

B.3.2, they comprise a wide range of people from virtually all segments of the civil society and from most parts of the two Kivu provinces.

What has not been included in our assessment is what might be called ‘beneficiaries’, particularly individuals and households in communities touched by but not directly involved in the activities promoted or supported by LPI⁴⁷.

B.3.5.1. Findings

Below is a summary of views and observations made by representatives of partner organisations at the territorial and local/community level. Some of these reactions emerged from the individual interviews but were for the most part revisited in the debriefing workshop with partners prior to departure⁴⁸.

Satisfactory or strong aspects of LPI’s work

- Strengthening of local capacities on conflict transformation
- Intermediary between local associations and international NGOs

Weak or problematic aspects

- Unknown selection criteria
- Erratic or insufficient institutional support
- Great variation/time-lag in partner-LPI communication
- Insufficient sharing of information
- Insufficient focus on women’s role
- No monitoring and evaluation

Beyond these observations, many partners pointed out that certain problems also had come up and/or been aggravated during the past year or so. This applied in particular to:

- *The controversial role of LPI*, particularly related to
 - Changes of civil society coordination in South Kivu⁴⁹,
 - ‘Diabolisation’ of LPI and its partners on the ground, in particular with respect to the LPI’s efforts to deal with the ‘Rwanda issue’, i.e. what was perceived as efforts on the part of LPI (primarily its senior management) to soft-pedal the present role of Rwanda in the conflict dynamics in the Kivus particularly and the DRC in general.

B.3.5.2. Conclusions

Many of the views and opinions raised by the ‘partner’ organisations are those that typically reflect the differing perspectives and expectations as between a supporting INGO and its local collaborators, and are as such very commonly found in similar set-

⁴⁷ This was to have been the focus of Maria Eriksson Baaz but had to be dropped when she was unable to participate.

⁴⁸ See annex 7 for notes from this meeting, and appendix A for a more extensive account of perceptions and views on the programme.

⁴⁹ This concerned the active stand by the LPI management as regards the need to reconstitute the leadership of the civil society in Bukavu.

ups elsewhere. This does not mean that they are not serious or that they should not be addressed, but that there is considerable experience available on how to tackle them (incl. setting up maximum limits for lead-time in communications). Even so there are obvious constraints with respect to LPI's capacity to handle and interact with the large number of scattered projects and organisations that should lead to a reconsideration and recalibration of LPI's capacity versus the desired scope and intensity of project and partner interactions.

The perception of LPI being increasingly regarded as controversial is more critical and suggests the imperative need for LPI constantly reviewing itself to ensure that it does not become, or can be construed as becoming, a political actor in its own right. We have no views on the correctness or otherwise of the arguments and views advocated by LPI on the Rwanda issue. But the sharp differences and sentiments voiced by some of the partners further underlines the imperative need for instituting a process of consultations and exchanges of views around the situational analysis as noted in section B.3.3. above.

B.3.6. Ability of the Institute to co-ordinate itself with other actors

The relevant other actors comprise:

- Peacekeeping or coordinating bodies such as MONUC and OCHA;
- Peers such as other INGOs active in the area;
- International, regional, and local specialist bodies such as academic and training institutions; and
- Provincial, territorial, and local representations of authority and administration.

B.3.6.1. General findings

The ability to coordinate with international or local 'neutral' actors with mandates in the conflict management or humanitarian work is not very pronounced. However, it must be stressed that this reflects a very common tendency in any disaster area, namely a quick early proliferation of NGOs that each show a marked eagerness to carve out their own niche rather than establish working partnerships with others.

The coordination with other INGOs in the area remains, after some initial efforts on the part of LPI, at an informal level with little or no tangible coordinated or joint activity. A main reason for this appears to be that, of the INGOs present, LPI is the only one that does not have a humanitarian or developmental mandate and the only one with a specific focus on conflict transformation as such.

The ability to coordinate with local and regional specialised bodies is good as shown both by the concrete cooperation LPI has with many of them and by the positive perception these bodies were found to have of LPI. But even here it was obvious that the lack of transparency of the LPI programme – its underlying conflict analysis as well as its operational strategy and wide array of 'partners' – has generated confusion and in some cases doubts about LPI's 'true' agenda. This was acutely so in the case of

MONUC (see below) but similar innuendos were easy to come across, particularly in Bukavu town.

The ability to establish working relations with local ‘authorities’ at various levels is well developed and seemingly effective. This is, however, an ambivalent asset as these ‘authorities’ also represent (or are aligned with) parties to the conflict, and as such represent the ‘civil’ dimension of their actual or aspired (military) control on the ground. This is not a question of whether they are expressions of or adhere to the national transitional government in Kinshasa or its underlying peace accords. From the perspective of local communities in the Kivus these accords and their embryonic institutionalisations still often represent outside usurpation of powers or a top-down approach, that does not always sit easily with the oft-repeated proclamations of the LPI and the activities it promotes as standing for a bottom-up approach⁵⁰.

B.3.6.2. Conclusions

The fact that LPI remains the only INGO active and present in the two Kivus with an identity and mandate in the conflict transformation field risks catapulting LPI into a prominence and visibility beyond the range and scope of its activities. This imposes a very clear need on the part of LPI to make *every effort to lower its profile* to avoid becoming (or be seen as) an *actor* with a political or ‘diplomatic’ agenda of its own.

In particular this imposes a need for the leading and most visible member of the LPI/B – the expatriate representative of LPI/U – to downgrade his visibility in virtually every area except that of an impartial quality controller of the LPI activities. This does not mean that he should abrogate his responsibility of being the official representative of LPI vis-à-vis local authorities, partners, international agencies and the like. But it does mean that:

- (a) there is a need for a (carefully selected) local deputy, from the area itself, to increasingly act as a spokesperson for the programme;
- (b) there is a need for better and more consistent presentation materials of what LPI and its programme in the DRC stands for, i.e. to depersonalise the message; and
- (c) LPI Uppsala needs to more visible in the programme and the local context in order to clarify that this is not a one-man-show but part of a larger organisation with a mission.

B.3.6.3. LPI and MONUC

A special complication surrounding the work of LPI in the Kivus is its relation (or lack of it) with the regional office of the UN peacekeeping intervention in DRC – MONUC (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies dans la RDC). In many ways this is a classical instance of differences in roles and perceptions of each other, as regards (a) a UN organisation tied by procedural rules as slow-moving routines, but also deeply permeated by an inbuilt mental aversion to direct intervention or exposure, and (b) an activist NGO with few bureaucratic procedures and a certain gung-ho impatient mentality. In this case the differences had at the time of our visit to Bukavu,

⁵⁰ For a detailed discussion of this see appendix A.

as if by mutual tacit agreement and effort, been allowed to deteriorate to a freezing point.

At the root of the conflict lies the issue of the demobilisation and repatriation to Rwanda of the Rwandan militias still at large in the DRC and in particular in the Kivus. Without going into the charges and counter-charges⁵¹ there are some points to be noted.

It was obvious to the team that there exists among local as well as international NGOs active in the area a widespread dissatisfaction with the way MONUC appears to fulfil its mandate, both with respect to maintenance of peace and protection of civilians, and with respect to the repatriation issue. This may or may not be so, and we refrain from any judgement on the issue⁵².

The point, however, is twofold.

First, there does not exist any effective coordinating platform or routine forum for dialogue on the peace process (rather than on administrative matters), either between the MONUC and the NGO community or civil society, or within the NGO community as such. This in itself makes for both confusion, for miscommunication, and for frustration as regards the real and potential points of collaboration and complementarities.

Second, the fact that LPI is (and has actively assumed the role as) the only organisation in the region focussing on peace building and conflict transformation creates its own difficulties. This catapults LPI into being (or feeling itself to be) the spokesperson for the NGO community at large in matters related to the peace and conflict dynamics, a tendency that is aided and abetted by the fact that even the local 'partner' network of LPI is still highly instrumental and dominated by LPI being the 'donor' rather than being *primus inter pares* of an interactive network. Acting as a proxy for a larger group of organisations requires a lot of modesty and caution on the part of the management of LPI, something that was obviously lacking and was responded to in kind by MONUC. Very human indeed, but with very negative consequences for the overall peace building process!

In our view there is no way around the two challenges. First, MONUC (in consortium with the LPI and other province-wide NGOs) must establish a 'peace forum' for dialogue, exchange of views, and not the least familiarisation with each other's practice, roles and mandates. This must be routinised and gradually include all NGOs that can and want to participate. The underlying purpose should be to arrive at a working process of complementarity in the overall peace-building efforts⁵³. Second, it is also clear that LPI must, within its own partner portfolio, seek to keep MONUC informed of the capacity and nature of work done by each partner, and by it self. This

⁵¹ MONUC Bukavu's position was summarised in a note mailed to the Teamleader after a meeting with MONUC staff in Bukavu.

⁵² Recent events in Bukavu seem to underline the validity of apprehensions about Rwanda's involvement.

⁵³ See F. Terry; 'Condemned to Repeat?: The Paradox of Humanitarian Action', (2002)

presupposes, however, that LPI moves forward on creating an interactive network out of the present array of recipient and individually collaborating organisations.

B.3.7. Action research

B.3.7.1. Findings

The LPI has conducted its research activities mainly on four fronts:

- (1) By trying to get an overview of already existing research on peace-building in the Kivus (2002-2003),
- (2) By conducting a 3-months fieldwork in Bunyakiri, a territory in South Kivu, and writing up the results in the aftermath (2003-2004),
- (3) By supporting data collection of local students (2004), and
- (4) By supporting single studies conducted by partner organisations or consultants.

(a) 'State of the art'

The 'state-of-the-art' project, conducted in partnership with the Inter-university Council of Bukavu (CIUB) that includes six institutions of higher education, led to an international symposium held in March 2003. During this symposium, various studies were presented, that discussed questions of peace building in North and South Kivu. According to LPI, however, most studies remained on a theoretical level, and failed to provide guidelines or ideas for potential actions or projects of local partners that could brighten the prospects for peace.

The symposium itself did, however, produce recommendations for future research that could enhance the applicability or the usefulness of the studies for grassroots actors. However, still according to the LPI, a problem after the symposium was that the CIUB itself (1) remained limited geographically and failed to include researchers from beyond Bukavu, and (2) did not come up with research proposals that took the recommendations on applicability into account.

(b) The Bunyakiri study

Meanwhile, the LPI itself had started a more action-oriented research project. In early 2003, Hélène Morvan, who had worked as an intern at the LPI in 2002, was employed as a technical assistant on action research. Together with a local consultant and accompanied by people from a local organisational platform, she spent three months in the Bunyakiri territory in the South Kivu province, collecting information on how the local population related to the military groups in the area. In the aftermath, the findings from this study have been written up and been subject to feedback from various scholars in the region and beyond.

During the evaluation team's stay in the DRC, in late March 2004, a two-day conference was organised to present this research in particular, and to exchange views and experiences on action research in general. The participants at this conference

decided that the Bunyakiri study (expected to be published) must be made available for the Bunyakiri population for potential action, or follow-up activities.

(c) Student support

Partly as a result of the dead-end in the cooperation with CIUB, LPI decided to pursue its intention of supporting research projects that were likely to be of use for the local population or for LPI partners, by supporting individual students who would like to write their final-year thesis or dissertation on local/good governance, religion and conflict, and social justice (topics identified by the LPI), and include data collection in localities in the Kivus in their research.

In early 2004 20 students were selected, who eventually received monetary and counselling support to implement their fieldwork and study. In return, the final results of each study will be made available to the LPI that, if it finds them relevant, may want to use or make these results available for use by partners for purposes of local action.

(d) Studies by partners and consultants

Before 2004 LPI had already ‘outsourced’ studies of pertinent questions to partner organisations or consultants. One example serves to illustrate dynamics of such experiences.

In 2003, the LPI financed the platform ‘Synergie VIE’ for conducting a survey on how willing and interested Rwandan refugees in one area of South Kivu were to return home. It found that a majority of the refugees wanted to return. The study was given quite some attention and enhanced the pressure on the UN’s peacekeeping mission MONUC to move ahead with its mandate of repatriation. However, various issues prevented an effective and sustained repatriation in the months that followed. Synergie VIE therefore suggested conducting a follow-up study of reasons why repatriation still proved difficult. Despite feedback from the LPI on this proposal, the Institute eventually declined to finance it. Synergie VIE therefore consulted with other donors and eventually received support from another INGO to go ahead with one leg of the study, implemented in early 2004.

B.3.7.2. Conclusions

The above snapshots illustrate that the domain of action research has been approached from various angles by the LPI in the DRC. These approaches do not seem, however, to have been guided by a clear idea of what constitutes action research, and what purposes it should have within the LPI. Instead, it is simply hoped that supported research activities will become relevant on the ground at a later stage, and thus that they will qualify as ‘action research’. One may of course argue about the definition of ‘action research’⁵⁴. However, it appears to us that one could legitimately expect that it would infuse and strengthen the analytical basis of programme implementation on one hand, and on the other lead to the extensive field presence being ‘exploited’ for

⁵⁴ See Ingelstam’s (2002) and Kirk’s (2003) assessment of the research sponsored by LPI globally.

studies of comparative and general interest. This has not happened, nor has any research on DRC or the two Kivus been undertaken in collaboration with or as part of the global research programme promoted by LPI Headquarters in Uppsala. This also means that no research carried out or sponsored by LPI DRC relates to or carries forward the research and studies undertaken within the framework of the Somalia programme (or the present ‘sibling’ LPI/Brazzaville).

Contextual studies on conflict transformation, like the one in Bunyakiri, have their merits and functions – in particular if they contribute to construct hypotheses that can be tested in other localities, and if their findings can be of use for local people soon after the fieldwork has been completed.

But, to make action research a more effective instrument for the LPI and for LPI-supported activities, there is a need for studies that would contribute more directly to provide guidelines to the programme of action research, and to LPI conflict transformation interventions. Contextual studies may be a point of departure for such studies, as one may construct models of causality on the basis of the scrutinised case of conflict. Documented relationships between i.e. violence and other variables in that case may give rise to causal hypotheses on the impact of a reduction in violence on the same variables. On the basis of such hypotheses, one may foresee how an intervention of conflict transformation may change the situation in a positive direction. Such causal hypotheses on the effect of interventions could, in turn, provide criteria for priorities on the operative level of LPI.

The research efforts so far, however, appear to be primarily aimed at understanding what’s going on in different corners of the Kivu provinces. They therefore hardly help the action research programme to decide how to prioritise, how to develop, how to intervene more effectively to transform conflicts in the region. In other words, there is a lack of analysis designed to support system development.

While it is often argued that the DRC conflict is unique, any situation has something unique to it as well as something it shares with other similar type of situations. The ‘uniqueness’ argument therefore remains unqualified unless the DRC experience, as reflected inter alia in LPI-supported studies, is more systematically paralleled with other cases of conflict or post-war environments. Such comparative studies would help to grasp more in depth what is special in the Congo case, and to build conflict theory on the basis of those similarities that the DRC may in fact share with other cases of conflict.

Finally, to provide future guidelines for action research activities, a highly underexploited resource to tap from lies in the rich experiences of the LPI’s Horn of Africa programme.

By way of summary we can therefore conclude:

- The notion of action research remains to be operationalised and given a guiding framework.

- The field of research (of whatever orientation and purpose) illustrates the same gap between LPI/B and LPI/U that characterises the strategic management of the programme. Meanwhile, the definition and significance of action research for the LPI/B as an organisational structure remains vague.
- So far the emphasis has been on diagnostic case studies of specific contexts. While valuable in their own right (with no judgement on our part as to quality or design) their main contribution to the conflict transformation programme is likely to lie at a more general level, and this so only if they are repeated to arrive at comparative assessments of variation and constancy of conflict dynamics – and indeed as an illustration of the extent to which the Kivu represents unique patterns of conflict dynamics (as is often argued by those directly involved in Kivu).
- There is a glaring lack of studies aimed at assisting the LPI/B programme to develop its operational systems and priorities, its quality control and monitoring indicators, or its efforts to develop result-oriented interventions. The tendency to carry out only contextual cases studies (all of them non-longitudinal in design and execution) risks leaving the programme without an analytically founded base for its actual operations.

B.4. LPI in DRC - overall conclusions

In spite of the often critical findings and conclusions given above we want to stress that the very fact that there is such a range of activities, projects and partner organisations to assess at all is impressive in its own right, given the very fluid conflict situation and the very difficult conditions under which the programme and its ‘partners’ work. Furthermore, and notwithstanding the critical remarks offered by some of the ‘partners’ there is a general and very strong consensus that LPI offers a **professionally sound and much needed support in the area of down-to-earth conflict transformation.**

However, it is also obvious from the above assessment that there are numerous and serious weaknesses inherent in the programme, as it currently stand. This is so particularly in respect of two broad areas: virtually all aspects of *strategic management*, and the ability of the LPI to place the programme within any reasonable definition and practice of *action research*.

Our analysis therefore leads us to see the programme from two different perspectives. The programme can either be seen as indeed an *operational programme*, i.e. as a presumably mature example of what the LPI is capable of. There is much to substantiate such a perspective: the attitude often conveyed to us throughout our visit that there was little need for further reflection but all the more need for more action; the virtual absence of involvement on the part of LPI Headquarters that in itself conveys the impression that the programme is regarded to have little need of more direct expressions of organisational ownership. However, we are convinced that should this be the perspective prevailing at LPI DRC, LPI Uppsala, or indeed throughout the local partnership of LPI in the two Kivus, then this programme should be closed. There are simply too many inbuilt weaknesses that, without a clear and

concerted will by all involved parties to put the programme on a sound footing, there is little point in continuing.

However, it can also be seen as a *period of trial and explorations*, as a precursor to a more systematic effort at developing an analytically sound and operationally viable supportive process to community-based peace building. From this perspective the weaknesses identified become challenges and even opportunities. In a similar vein the experience gained from the scattered projects and the partnership interactions becomes a source of valuable lessons to be learned and incorporated in a next phase of peace building action research in Eastern DRC. But only if there is a concerted effort by all involved parties to review both the programme activities so far and the carrying network that has sustained them.

But this in turn raises another question.

Does an LPI inspired programme, in whatever form, represent a value added in the context of the DRC conflict – real or potential, in relation to the conflict dynamics on the ground as well as to its institutional and peer environment?

We are convinced that the answer in both cases is yes, on the following grounds:

- The need for a sustained technical, institutional, and financial support to conflict transformation capacity on the ground is acute. The LPI programme so far, with all its imperfections and non-systematic aspects, has shown that such support may be both feasible to give and possible to absorb.
- None of the international or local organisations currently in place have as their focus to infuse this particular capacity.
- There is a need for an international NGO to take an active role in providing such support, both to complement the more cumbersome and diplomatically defined role of UN agencies and other internationally driven initiatives, and to build locally based conflict transformation processes that take their agenda not primarily from the political accords on top but from the conditions and perceptions prevailing on the ground. Again, the experience so far has proved (although with qualifications) that this can be done.

However, based on our conclusion that the period until now only makes sense if seen as one of exploration, the programme is now facing a number of challenges and crossroads, including:

- To define its organisational or institutional strategy: whether to move further as a *programme* or as a *network*;
- To lower the profile of LPI/B as an actor in its own right and determine a better notion of *supplementarity and complementarity* with local and international bodies represented in the Kivus;
- To provide a clearer and more transparent *strategic focus and management*, including a better balance between own and partners' capacity on one hand and the scope and distribution of activities on the other;
- Develop a *research agenda* that is supportive both to the design and follow-up of peace building initiatives at the community level, and to provide evidence-

- based analysis of relevance for the broader and comparative understanding of peace processes, writ small or large;
- To introduce methods and systems of *monitoring and evaluation* that provides for a continuous learning and improvement of the operations; and
 - To define and implement a *management agenda* that minimises the risk of being seen as a political actor and maximises the capacity formation of local conflict transformation.

However, perhaps the most important challenge is:

- For LPI Uppsala to establish an effective involvement in the DRC programme – in terms of its strategic management and priorities, its research agenda, and its contribution to the learning process of how to translate the values on which LPI is founded into practice.

B.5. LPI-DRC: Recommendations

Based on the above we put forward the following recommendations in the context of the Sida-LPI dialogue on possible future Sida support:

- We recommend that Sida consider, on an urgent basis, a conditionalised bridging support for a period of six months starting June 1, 2004⁵⁵.
- The purpose of such support is to allow for
 - (a) a systematic evaluation of projects, trainings, and organisations so far;
 - (b) using this as a basis for a consultative process among the present partner organisations (or those with an ability to partake in and contribute to such consultations);
 - (c) arriving at a strategy, comprising priorities, activities, systems and procedures in areas or on themes where a more systematic approach is possible, and a ‘residual’ to which only flexible and event- or point-specific responses will be feasible;
 - (d) developing a strategic management and support structure that effectively makes LPI/DRC part of LPI’s overall agenda;
 - (e) developing approaches and interactive procedures between LPI and MONUC in order to ensure complementarity as well as supplementarity.
- An external group should assess the launching and outcome of the bridging period. The findings of this forthcoming assessment may form an input to a possible more long-term support from Sida.
- The reason why we believe Sida has a special role, responsibility and interest in consolidating the experience gained by the LPI DRC is that it is the only one of the present and potential larger donors that have the possibility to interact with the entire axis of LPI/B and LPI/U, apart from the fact that LPI constitutes an important element of the very small resource base in Sweden available to Sida’s conflict transformation programme.

⁵⁵ Based on the debriefing discussion between the evaluation team and the LPI/B team on March 29, 2004, and on the specific request from the teamleader of the evaluation a concrete proposal for such a bridging phase was developed by LPI/B (see appendix B). The evaluation team has however not appraised this proposal.

C. LPI AND SOMALIA

Somalia is one of the world's poorest and least developed countries. It has very few natural resources and a population of between 7 and 9 million. Since the fall of the dictatorship of Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia has earned the tragic distinction of being the classical reference point for the concept of a 'failed state' – a society with a seeming inability to generate a viable political structure and recognised centre of power and authority out of a hotbed of primordial loyalties (e.g. ethnicity, locality, livelihood) manipulated and coerced by rival local strongmen/warlords. As such it is also an equally tragic and extreme outcome of the colonial era – built on the legacies (or distortions) of not one but two colonial powers; Britain (in the northern province of Somaliland) and Italy (in the remaining provinces). In addition, contemporary Djibouti was part of pre-colonial Somalia and was formed by a third colonial power, France.

At the same time it is also the first major experience, and failure, of UN combined peacekeeping, peace-building and nation-building interventions – an experience that has left deep imprints on later UN peacekeeping approaches.

Paradoxically enough it is also the most well known, and most quoted, example of peace building based on and integrated with civil society actors (rather than on power-holders or warring parties). The concept of community bottom-up peace building was in many ways born through the Somalia experience, and not the least with and through the efforts of LPI. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the processes in which LPI has been involved became standard reference for peace-practitioners and researchers on conflict-transformation from the mid-90s on.

C.1. History of LPI in Somalia

The LPI activities in Somalia started in the early 1990s as a result of the establishment of a Horn of Africa programme within the LPI (Uppsala based organisation). LPI has been active in Somalia for more than 10 years. Currently (2004), the ties with the local NGO - Forum for Peace and Governance (FOPAG) - that was mid-wifed by the LPI as part of its own exit strategy, are maintained but at a fairly low level. From early on, a conflict analysis was conducted that resulted in the blueprint for peace building in Somalia. From 1992, the LPI was working closely with the UN, who had asked the LPI to organise brainstorming meetings for consultations with various experts, leading eventually to the making of the blueprint. In this analysis, four components were agreed upon:

- 1) The peace must come from within Somali society, involving important actors such as elders, women and civil society at the clan-structured local levels,
- 2) The "warlords" should be marginalised, at least initially, from local peace initiatives,
- 3) Different strategies should be outlined for the different parts of Somalia. The basic concept was to build the peace from below, in a bottom-up approach,

- 4) A long-term commitment was necessarily in order to ensure a sustainable conflict transformation process. Zones of reconciliation on the grassroots level were supposed to create new healthy relationships in order to foster a conflict transformation process.

The conflict analysis as well as the inquiries of peace prospects was conducted in several meetings. However, the meetings were sometimes constituted of expatriates, inside Somalis, or non-Somali experts together with LPI and UN personnel. This could have enabled the LPI to continuously make use of a group with different opinions that could have provided critical reflections of the various LPI interventions as well as analysis of conflict developments. Nevertheless, the LPI basically let the expertise groups dissolve by simply not using them as a resource base. One of the reasons given by LPI for this was that it became time consuming to organise consultant's sessions. Also, the experts were many in numbers and often differed in opinions, making it difficult to use the information in a relevant way in acute situations. However, it seems as a missed opportunity not to use the expertise at least once a year for an annual reflection and external evaluation of the LPI activities.

The intervention of the LPI was, in a broad sense, based on the blueprint, although no detailed plan of action was formulated. The UN altered their position vis-à-vis the blueprint even before it had left the print press. The UN not only dismissed the person responsible for Somalia, but also preferred a "quick-fix" solution to the Somalia problem, which in practice meant to involve the "warlords" in negotiations. Hence, LPI was left partly alone with its blueprint that caused difficulties in implementing their activities. Its main goal was to create a, until then close to non-existing, viable civil society along with local and district councils. Hence, a conflict between top-down peacemaking, pushed forward by the UN, and bottom-up peace building (advocated by LPI) emerged. This also partly transformed LPI from being a non-partisan actor to a strong civil society advocator. In fact, the entire LPI mission in Somalia is seen as one of the pioneering contributions of community based peace-building initiatives and used as an example how the grassroots level could be the engine in peace building.

In 1993, influential Somali players agreed on the need to organise political and administrative structures in such a way that they could serve the Somali people as a whole. Hence, a Transitional National Council, Central Departments, Regional Councils and District Councils should be established. The UNOSOM's political office and LPI took the responsibility to facilitate the formation of District Councils, but also worked with the (re)establishment of the role of the councils of elderly in traditional conflict resolution. Furthermore, a great deal of effort in involving women in the peace building process was made in the form of workshops for capacity building and empowerment of women. Hence, the activities that took place were very much related to the original conflict analysis. Training and empowering women in Somaliland contributed to developing "techniques" that among many capacities included women going en masse in between the fighters in the battle zone. This immediately stopped the fighting. Also, women in Somaliland went to the councils of elders in order to push forward the idea that the women of clans also must be heard and that they constitute more than fifty percentage of all clans.

However, great geographical differences came to the fore. In Somaliland, conflict resolution efforts began in a major reconciliation meeting in 1993 in Boroma sponsored by LPI. This conference excluded warlords and was arranged in spite of the refusal of UN and the international community at large. Almost as a protest against the refusal it came to include the various clans and groups of elderly. After the Siad Barre regime was removed (1991), a power vacuum existed in Somaliland. The socialist experiment tried to get rid of clans and structures of elderly. In Somaliland (British colonial rule), these structures were stronger than in Puntland and the South (Italian colonial rule). So, (re)establishment of councils of elders and resort to use of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms would have taken place anyway. LPI, however, coached the process forward and in a beneficial way. It must simultaneously be reminded that Somalis are “experts in conflict resolution”. They have traditional routines, mainly guided by the elderly, for finding solutions that are acceptable for all conflicting parties (everybody wins). In contrast to other external actors, LPI let the internal dynamics and traditional conflict resolution mechanism have the upper hand. In Puntland and the South, the UNOSOM to a much lesser degree gave space for these activities. UNOSOM did not have the patience for such time-consuming conflict resolution sessions (that could take months to conclude) as they could do in Somaliland.

Due to the failures of UNOSOM in their peace building efforts, in particular the Americans activities, a situation was created in which the entire UN mission became questioned by local ‘warlords’, as well as the local population in Puntland, and even more in the South. The US hunt-down of one of the warlords, general Aideed, in the Mogadishu area gave much social status to him in a situation where the internal forces had begun to bypass him. Hence, when the UN withdrew from Somalia, the LPI activities were reportedly questioned by some local actors and sometimes even seen as part of the ‘suspect’ UN activities.

The LPI activities in the south (Kismayo) included much more of mediation between the various faction leaders. Only with the approval of the faction leaders could LPI begin to build village and district councils. However, the faction leaders today control border areas and ports. The inland (south in particular) is to a lesser extent controlled by faction leaders, where grassroots levels have a greater saying. However, it has been difficult to evaluate why the local political structures initiated by LPI have broken down in the South.

In one sense, after the withdrawal of the UNOSOM in 1995, the original plan, with its bottom-up approach, became close to an overlay creating a more or less reflexive approach to the peace building work. Reflection mechanisms in the LPI organisation were not given much prominence, and many of the actions followed a day-to-day logic within the overall bottom-up framework. The workshops focusing on issues of women’s empowerment as well as conflict resolution continued, aside with the continuation of trying to find ways to strengthen the district councils.

1996 was a year of reflection for LPI/HAP. One of the few existing documents that came forward, which serves as an evaluating input for LPI, was the study conducted

by Wolfgang Heinrich. His study gave inputs for a meeting in Naivasha in Kenya that resulted in a new three years programme. The LPI conclusion was that the programme needed to become enlarged. Not least since the UN had withdrawn the LPI needed to expand its activities. The training for the people taking over in the district councils etc., as well as conflict resolution programmes needed to be implemented, but also be directed towards specific target groups, not least women and other civil society organisations.

However, in 1997 the board of LPI Uppsala took a decision to withdraw from Somalia and hand over the activities to a local NGO. The decision of fostering a process of building a local Somali NGO was taken and implemented gradually from 1999. This organisation, FOPAG, was formed and started to take over former LPI activities in November 2001. Many from the local Somali LPI staff basically moved over to the FOPAG organisation, although a number left the LPI. Thereby, the LPI strategies could continue and the community-based peace building approach could continue to serve as the overarching conflict transformation idea. The idea was that Nairobi should serve as Liaison Office for the FOPAG until they could go ahead on their own. A lot of confusion emerged during this process, mainly due to internal conflicts between the LPI Uppsala and LPI/HAP. Disagreements were related to different perceptions of LPI's role vis-à-vis FOPAG in Somalia. Contradictions in combination with internal organisational problems for FOPAG almost paralysed the organisation.

In Somaliland, local people with conflict resolution skills had already been recruited in the mid 1990s by the local Somali LPI staff. These workers became the base of the team for training etc. They were given initial training in Debrezeit (Ethiopia) followed by a thorough grounding by and exposure to scholars and practitioners such as John Paul Lederach and Hiskias Assefa. Although this obviously gave them a solid platform from which to work, the later expert supportive supervision and guidance was seriously lacking.

Hence, the LPI assumptions or theories had rarely been reviewed and successes as well as mistakes and reflections did not feed back into the planning of new activities. In the beginning of the 1990s, the LPI was clearly one, if not the only NGO, that had the unique capacity to enter as a conflict interventionist, focusing basically on the civil society sector. Hence, there was no competition, but neither did there exist a back up of similar organisations. One question that comes up is if the LPI ever considered spurring other similar external NGOs, besides those very few local ones they already co-operated with, to enter their activities in Somalia. This could also be a relevant reason for building a broader capacity in the Somali context in terms of personnel, skills as well as increase its reach out capacity. The risk of dependency vis-à-vis the UNOSOM was probably one of the reasons that paralysed LPI activities until new initiatives were created in 1996.

However, the LPI activities that have taken place have probably reached many people. An approximation made from participant lists from the various documented workshops and seminars indicate that roughly 10 000-20 000 people have been involved in LPI activities during the years. Hence, a great number of people have been exposed by the empowerment achievements. Certainly, evaluating whether the

participants of the various workshops actually did acquire new skills or if they already had an interest and skills in these kinds of peace building issues before the entering the workshops, is hard to say. Most likely, however, a great number of participants gained confidence and created new networks and relations, whereby the workshops partly contributed to their empowerment. One could claim that in terms of output, the targets for the intervention were partly achieved. Still, the reputation of the LPI is by and large positive and is well known by larger segments of Somali society.

C.2. LPI approach and components

Although LPI's approach evolved gradually during the period 1991 to 1995 it did so with the tacit endorsement of the UNOSOM under its umbrella. During that time the activities promoted and/or facilitated were also very much in the nature of both an art-of-the-possible and a trial-by-error. The 'blueprint' of 1993 still worked as an overall guideline, but there were no programme documents beyond that, specifying the approach and activities.

At the initiative of the Nairobi office of the LPI/HAP, a comprehensive study of the process and achievements of the LPI programme was commissioned in 1995. Based on that, and recognising the need to consolidate and move on without the UNOSOM (which had left Somalia in 1995), a programme consolidation-cum-formulation workshop was held in 1996 in Naivasha, Kenya. This was largely a stock-taking of experiences gained and an effort to define what LPI could do now that it was more or less on its own. The outcome was a number of crucial decisions:

- (1) To scale up its efforts and make it a truly nation-wide programme;
- (2) To expand downwards and outwards to engage more directly the community level and civil society rather than remain focused on the district level institution building and capacity development;
- (3) To make efforts to interact more systematically with humanitarian and relief programmes of other agencies;
- (4) To acknowledge the vital role of women in peace-building.

Although no comprehensive programme document was ever formulated⁵⁶ the following components emerged as the carrying points of the programme⁵⁷:

⁵⁶ There is, however, a draft that was never finalised or endorsed. See E. Habte Selassie, 1996. The components listed below have not carried the same labels over time, and some of them have been elaborated towards the end of the 1996-99 period. However, we have been unable to obtain the underlying decision documents from Sida or the corresponding agreements between Sida and LPI. These should presumably be based on some form of annual Plan of Action that hopefully reflects the activities listed here (taken from the request from LPI to Sida for the year 1999). Again, the reporting from LPI to Sida was very irregular and the headings of the financial reports do not reflect the annual requests or any other programme document we have seen. However, this has reportedly been a matter of continuous dialogue between Sida and LPI/Uppsala and is not further discussed in this report. We can only note with some surprise that Sida seems to have approved annual allocations to the tune of SEK 10-15 million based on very scanty annual requests from LPI.

⁵⁷ The components roughly follow the budget headlines in LPI's reporting to Sida. Sida's total contribution to the programme between 1993 and 2002 amounted to SEK 71 million. In addition, the programme had other sources of funds, including the EU, but these funds and the related programme components have not been reviewed in this evaluation.

- (a) *Capacity building programme* for local administrations, consisting of District Council training, institutional support or on the job training programme with refresher course, and measured material assistance to councils. LPI has developed special training materials and modules for these components.⁵⁸

This is by far the largest of the programme components and accounts together with the sub-components below for 54% of total programme expenditures 1993-2002 (app. SEK 38 million)⁵⁹.

- a. Village Committee and Rural Women Health and Development Workers training as building block for democratic local governance.
 - b. Seminar for Members of Parliament and Council of Elders involving training in democratic principles, procedures and institutional frameworks. LPI has evolved special training materials for this purpose.
 - c. Civic Education programme targeting several groups within civil society. This training package covers a wide range of topics of relevance for civil society groups: conflict transformation, participatory democracy, leadership, human rights, gender, natural resources and conflicts, management and control of small arms proliferation, etc. Again, LPI has developed a Civic Education training manual for the purpose.
- (b) *Programme for Women and Peace*. This is a sub-component of (d) but with an exclusive emphasis on and participation of women. Apart from training and workshops it also includes support to networking between women groups. This activity gradually came into its own since 1996 and has accounted for roughly 2% of the expenditure.
- (c) *Local reconciliation support*. According to programme documents this focuses mainly on strengthening and facilitating traditional and religious leaders and community elders in conflict resolution and reconciliation processes. The basic rationale for this activity is one of responsiveness to local demands and exigencies, and has therefore remained marginal (although important) throughout, accounting for roughly 1% of aggregate expenditure.
- (d) *Advocacy*, mainly emphasising compilation and dissemination of impartial information on the situation in Somalia/Somaliland to the outside world as well as to local and regional stakeholders. A main instrument in this is the publication of the Horn of Africa Bulletin. As a whole this accounts for 3% of the aggregate expenditure.
- (e) *Research, evaluation and documentation*. This should include “(a) research on areas of relevance to LPI peace work and document results on traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution and peace building; and (b) assess the impact of past LPI training activities for district council

⁵⁸ In the pre-1996 years ESAMI management training modules were used, and much of the training was also given by (and at) ESAMI in Arusha, Tanzania.

⁵⁹ The allotment of budget items and costs under different headings has not been consistent in LPI's financial reports over the years. The figures given are therefore approximations.

members of Somali civil society and to use the feedback to improve future project planning and implementation of local level capacity enhancement”. Over the years the budget for this has consistently remained under-utilised and total expenditure accounts for less than 2% of aggregate.

- (f) *Coordination and support.* Apart from providing standing administrative and technical support to ongoing operations in Somalia, the aim was to make the Nairobi office “a resource centre and meeting point for research, communication and interaction among various actors involved in peace and development work in the region; and to strengthen the broader networking capacity of LPI with other church based and development organisations. Together with the LPI/Uppsala overhead this accounts for 38% of the aggregate expenditure.

C.3. Impact assessment – looking for footprints

Impact, i.e. intended or unintended consequences of a programme, is normally assessed through carefully designed field studies in the context in which the programme operates or has operated. Even under the best of conditions this is a difficult task, not the least because of difficulties of relating programme interventions to changes in the context in a manner of cause and effect.

In this case where field investigations were ruled out it must be stressed that the impact assessment becomes very much a question of guesstimates, of informed speculations on the likely outcomes and lasting effects on the brittle local level peace building capacity in Somalia. As pointed out in Section A, even such speculation has to be based on the existence of longitudinal field data or focal studies relating to the interventions pursued or promoted by LPI in Somalia. However, of all the documents made available to us from the Uppsala office or at LPI/Nairobi only 6 can be classified as reporting or assessing results or being focal contextual studies related to LPI interventions⁶⁰. And of these only one refers to events or processes after 1996.⁶¹

Lacking both primary field data, focal studies or monitoring reports our discussion should not be construed or read as an impact assessment in any real sense of the term. Insofar as we have anything to say on the situation on the ground is it through hearsay and interviews with previous and present staff at LPI/Nairobi as well as with people in Hargeisha. Instead of recording footprints, what we can offer is a discussion of presumed footprints, based on the content, volume and direction of activities as they emerge from plans, reports and a highly select set of informants. It is quite possible that a more thorough search for documents in Nairobi as well as in Uppsala might

⁶⁰ B. Helander et al (1994); 'Summary on the status of regional and district council establishments' (1995); Wiebe et al (1995); W. Heinrich (1996); W. Heinrich (1997); Report from the 2nd Naivasha Meeting (1999)

⁶¹ See the report from the 2nd Naivasha meeting. The publication by Paffenholz on LPI and the community-based bottom-up peace building in Somalia (2003) is less an attempt to assess the approach and experience of LPI in Somalia than an exposition of what that approach was and how it developed. Similarly, Warsame's report on the changing roles of women in Somaliland (2002) is, although very informative in its own right, not possible to relate to any LPI activity or approach, nor was that her intention.

have yielded more insights. However, we had to contend with the information made available to us on the assumption that this reflected LPI's institutional memory⁶².

Obviously impact of a sprawling programme, such as the Somalia one, can be discussed from various perspectives. Given the practical constraints surrounding this assessment we have opted for four perspectives or vantage points:

(a) *Community level impact*. This revolves basically around how the LPI promoted activities are likely to have influenced intra- and inter-community relations in their micro-settings. In trying to make sense of the programme and to project possible or even likely impacts we have concentrated on the financially most dominant bundle of activities – training, including workshops. Not because we believe that that is the only or even the most important activity promoted by LPI. But apart from accounting for more than 40% of total expenditure it is also the one that have reached, or indirectly touched, more persons than any other activity.

While we have no way of knowing the quality or effectiveness of the trainings and workshops carried out, we nevertheless believe that it is possible to make some projections on likely impact based on the spread, the intensity, and their thematic foci/target groups. However, even if the training events and number of trainees are the most easy to quantify there are nevertheless serious data gaps⁶³. To overcome these we have made what appear to us reasonable assumptions about trends.

(b) *Institutional impact*. This revolves basically around three different issues. First, the possible or likely impact of LPI promoted activities on local level institutions – be they traditional councils, governance bodies such as district councils, or new or emergent forms of civil society institutions. It should immediately be said that we do not have much data to go by, and to some extent the discussion therefore circles around what type of information is required and how it can be generated.

Second, the fact that LPI sought to midwife and foster a locally run autonomous and successor organisation brings out the issue of the impact at the supportive institutional level. After all, a bottom-up approach can only move upwards if there is either a responsive supra-local framework or a supportive network that can ensure that local bottom-up initiatives do not disappear into a bottom-down process.

Third, the fact that the LPI programme was not only a local or regional initiative but part of the larger LPI mission should presumably imply something for the host organisation – in Uppsala as well as throughout its international network. This is of course somewhat beyond the purview of this assessment given its field orientation and ToR, and we do not have much

⁶² We do, however, appreciate the very systematic and chronologically compiled set of documents made available to us by Sture Normark and Susanne Thurfjell in Uppsala as well as the historical backdrop they provided in our interview with them. Similarly, the LPI/Nairobi staff made valiant efforts to locate relevant documents from archives in disarray due to a recent shift of office location.

⁶³ Again it is quite possible that a longer documentary search would have yielded more accurate or complete data. However, for the purpose of this discussion this is not likely to materially change our conclusions.

direct information to guide such an assessment. Nevertheless we believe that the issue should be raised and discussed as part of an overall impact assessment, not the least within and by LPI itself.

(c) *Conceptual impact.* This revolves basically around the extent to which the experience and findings of LPI's involvement in Somalia has generated spin-offs outside LPI and the programme context – primarily in the community of peace researchers and practitioners. After all, the LPI Somalia programme is one of the longest standing efforts to translate a bottom-up approach of peace building into practice and one that was specifically mooted as an instance of action-research.

This would ideally include a literature and reference search as well as tracer studies of such LPI publications on Somalia as have been published/disseminated. However, this was again beyond the scope of this assignment and we therefore offer only some reflections on what we believe to be the importance of the LPI experience, real and potential.

(d) *Impact on society – peace writ small and peace writ large.* This revolves basically around the extent to which local level or even individual level efforts to promote non-violent transformation of conflict has an impact on the larger process of peaceful nation building. At a certain level this leads to the trite observation that any effort is better than none, or that any dialogue at whatever level is of importance to create and maintain conditions of peaceful transformation of conflicts. However, it is also obvious that hopes created at one level can lead to negative repercussions if they do not find expression or responsiveness at other levels.

C.3.1. Community level impact


When UNOSOM left Somalia LPI took a conscious decision to scale up the programme. While it retained a focus on district councils it downplayed the infrastructural support (e.g. rehabilitation of buildings and provision of basic office equipment/administrative kits) and expanded both the range and coverage of training. This was particularly so as regards 'civic education' (see above) and a more conscious inclusion of women as both carriers and guarantors of local peace-building efforts. Although the unstable security situation obviously made it difficult to organise and make available such trainings everywhere the ambition was quite obvious to cover the whole Somalia.

Looking at the number of training sessions over the years broken down according to target groups/themes we find that a total number of recorded training sessions were 142 between 1993 and 2002⁶⁴. This excludes the year 1996/97 for which no data was available⁶⁵.

⁶⁴ We have relied on the information provided to us which unfortunately does not include number of people trained, except for the years 1999-2002.

⁶⁵ It also excludes training with other funding than Sida; most notably the EU funded training sessions, which, according to data availed to us, were 16 in 1999 and 29 in 2001, including training for youth, women, elders, teachers, artists, local NGOs, as well as business, law enforcement and media training.

Types of training



Two things should be noted here.

First, there is an obvious attempt to make the training activities more broad-based and inclusive, not the least as regards women ('women workshops' and 'TBAs' – traditional birth attendants).

Second, there is a downward or outward effort to move beyond (and even downplay) district councils and instead reach into the fabric of local society/community itself. In parts this reflects the dismaying instability of the district councils faced by manipulations from outside 'warlords' or by internal power struggles. In parts it also reflected a conscious move away from the equally dismaying UNOSOM heritage in which district councils were used as a point of negotiated compromise between the power of warlords and the local community.

Both these tendencies meant that the LPI approach signified more than a bottom-up approach and even more than a community-based approach⁶⁶. It rather became a broad-based popular campaign to strengthen awareness as well as skills throughout the fabric of local society.

If we look at the regional coverage we find that in spite of the turbulence prevailing, over time and over regions, the LPI training programme was remarkably spread all over the country⁶⁷.

⁶⁶ See Paffenholz, op. cit.

⁶⁷ We have used the data for 1999-2002 and projected them into different data sets for the years 1993-96 and 1996-99. In case of Somaliland this remained out of reach for LPI during its association with UNOSOM, due to the unwillingness of the international community and the UN to recognise the 'separatist' tendencies in Somaliland.

Regional spread % of persons trained	1994-1998	1999-2001	Total
Somaliland	0	38	27
Puntland	5	7	6
Mid Somalia	35	33	34
Southwest Somalia	24	6	12
Mogadishu & Shabeella	36	16	21
	100	100	100

Although too much should not be read into the table above as it is based on a number of assumptions and rather uncertain projections there is no doubt that the LPI programme was indeed a national one. It is also clear that mid-Somalia and above all Somaliland have been most heavily covered in recent years, reflecting both the greater momentum of ‘nation-building’ or ‘peace writ large’ in Somaliland and the relatively more stable conditions of the less densely populated (and less resource rich) dry central zones⁶⁸.

We have finally tried to estimate how many people that have been trained or participated in the workshops organised or supported by LPI. Assuming that the average number of participants or trainees reported for the years 1999-2002 holds for the other years as well we arrive at an approximate figure of 6.000 individuals. This is by any yardstick a very impressive figure.

In a social context where oral traditions and close kin ties provide very effective dissemination mechanisms the secondary reach effect of such a vast training process must be considerable. It is not likely that the technical aspects or substance of the trainings or workshops percolated very far⁶⁹. But the fact that such a vast number of people from ‘ordinary walks of life’ had been to meetings where peace-building efforts were discussed in the midst of continuous violence and turmoil is likely to have built up a momentum of its own.

Indeed we believe that with the brittle supra-local institutional framework LPI showed a remarkable stamina and courage to move away from building local institutions towards an approach better characterised as one of actively supporting and sustaining a critical mass of people for whom the notion of local responsibilities and local initiatives for peace building efforts were at least a nominal possibility. And it is in that context we believe that one should interpret the very widespread familiarity with the acronym ‘PLI’⁷⁰ throughout Somalia: it signifies less a knowledge (or appreciation) of the organisation than being synonymous (or associated) with almost any local level peace efforts, whether or not they have any direct relation to LPI.

⁶⁸ Puntland was also affected by the untimely death of the regional LPI coordinator there.

⁶⁹ Our interviews in Somaliland with a few individuals who had participated in workshops sponsored by LPI suggested the virtually nothing was remembered of the technical aspects. This is, however, not very unusual and does not in itself mean that the training was meaningless or even ineffective.

⁷⁰ This seems to be the local version of LPI, standing for ‘Peace and Life Institute’

To the extent that we are right⁷¹ this is indeed a remarkable achievement. And it also accounts for the repeated statements by representatives of other locally active NGOs and Somaliland officials that ‘LPI’ was one of the processes on which continued local efforts was based.

At the same time it is very clear that there is a serious lack of follow-up information of the actual training sessions. We have not come across any study or report that reflect an attempt towards post-training assessment, and unlike the DRC programme there are very few reports from the actual workshops available. Indeed, as one of our informants in Hargeisha put it, he never heard from LPI or the organisers again after the training and even less did he get a report of what had transpired during the discussions provoked by the training. Again this is somewhat remarkable given that (at least for 1999) one of the specific objectives stated for ‘research and monitoring’ was indeed a follow up of effectiveness and relevance of the different training programmes. The failure to pursue this is all the more regrettable as it would have provided LPI (in Nairobi as well as Uppsala) with very interesting cases studies of the potential and constraints of these types of trainings in peace building programmes.

C.3.2. Institutional impact

(a) District Councils

One of the focal points of LPI’s initial efforts in Somalia was the institutional support provided to District Councils. Although they remained within the orbit of LPI’s activities they were, as of 1996, given considerably less direct attention as pointed out in our discussion on the community level impact above. Even so they constitute one of the few supra-level arenas to which the bottom-up efforts could be linked, however much their popular image had been tarnished by the earlier tendencies to allow various ‘warlords’ and local strongmen to partake in the decision-making.

We have no information of the total number of District Councils that have been supported directly or indirectly by the LPI programme over the years but information emanating from UNOSOM indicates that by the end of 1994 60 councils had been formed out of a total of 102 districts in the country (including 20 districts in what was carefully called NW Somalia, i.e. Somaliland)⁷².

The most striking feature of the District Council (DC) support is that there is little or no information available as to how many of those are now in a reasonable working order. LPI continued to provide limited office support/administrative kits up to 2002, but training in the post-1996 years was more focussed on individual councillors than on organisational/institutional training and development. According to information provided by one of FOPAG’s regional managers there were a total of 12 District Councils established in the Kismayo region of which 5 were still in some working order.

⁷¹ Assessing local level connotations of LPI as a concept (or ‘brand-name’) was one of the intended tasks of the aborted field investigations of this evaluation. However, based on our admittedly limited interviews with people in Hargeisha as well as in Nairobi we believe that our interpretation is reasonable.

⁷² LPI’s budget reports indicate that, by 1996, over 100 council offices had been rehabilitated.

Whatever the number of working or defunct District Councils there are two reasons why we find LPI's lack of attention to and analysis of District Council dynamics problematic.

First, the DCs constituted a major focus of LPI's activities in support of strengthening local level governance as an antidote to blatant usurpation of power and overt violence by local and regional strongmen. This may have been a result of LPI's role within the larger UNOSOM strategy but LPI's support to such bodies continued (although in a somewhat changed form) up to 2002, accounting for an aggregate 25% of total programme expenditure⁷³.

Second, one of the very real challenges to bottom-up approaches to peace building is that of forging links with and impacting on 'peace writ large'. An important dimension is then the institutional capacity at the meso-level (i.e. the intermediate level between local society and communities and the macro level of the country as a whole), be it in terms of civil society platforms or in terms of governance. Reliance on traditional clan structures and their mechanisms for conflict resolution is a difficult proposition when these structures were seriously eroded during the colonial era and the dictatorship of Siad Barre in most parts of Somalia (with the notable exception of Somaliland). Whatever the success or failure of these district councils they provide an object to 'lessons learned': merely noting that many of them have collapsed under external or internal pressure begs the issue of why this happened and also the question of what the limits and potentials are of local/meso level institutional development in situations of violent conflict. And as most observers of the Somalian experience have noted: a main problem with the bottom-up approach is exactly its (lack of) links with supra-local institutions and processes⁷⁴.

(b) Forum for Peace and Governance (FOPAG)

One of the most tangible outcomes of the LPI involvement in Somalia is that of FOPAG – the local NGO launched in 2001. Although the decision to 'divest' LPI of its direct involvement in Somalia was taken already in 1997 by the LPI Board it remained virtually on hold until 1999 when it became the main topic of the so-called Second Naivasha Workshop. During the years 1999-2002 the formation of a local NGO to take over, and on its own continue the work so far supported and facilitated directly by LPI in Somalia, was included in the general programme supported by Sida⁷⁵. As of 2002, FOPAG became a legal entity of its own, registered with headquarters in Hargeisha. Sida agreed to assist FOPAG through LPI for an additional one plus one year, i.e. up to the end of 2004⁷⁶.

⁷³ Including administrative kit, office rehabilitation and councillors training.

⁷⁴ Cf P. Lederach and T. Paffenholz

⁷⁵ We have not had access to the underlying programme documents on which the Sida support was decided. It seems, however, that there was no separate budget or programme head for this organisational 'mid-wifing' and that it was 'buried' in the general basket of LPI activities.

⁷⁶ Disbursement of funds from LPI (and Sida) was held up for some 6 months in 2003 due to internal problems at FOPAG resulting in failure to submit proper financial statements.

The core of the staff making up FOPAG consisted of former LPI programme officers. Although there was a considerable enthusiasm to establish an independent local NGO this was partly based on fairly unrealistic assumptions about the potentials of such an organisation. When this was blended with personality problems, internal problems of management and governance, and what was perceived as a negative attitude from LPI the enthusiasm was considerably dampened.

Even if our interaction with FOPAG and its management and staff was very short and basically confined to Hargeisha, it is clear to us that the mid-wifing role and supportive responsibility of LPI (or Sida) is not yet over.

First, although the internal management problems could have been better handled both by the FOPAG Board of Directors and by LPI it was obvious to us from interviews with its peer environment in Hargeisha (government representatives, NGOs, UN agencies) that FOPAG carries considerable professional credibility – even if not always in the same areas as that of LPI – and is seen as a relevant partner particularly as regards strengthening civil society. This provides a good basis on which to sustain and further develop much of the heritage of the LPI Somalia programme.

Second, even if the internal management and governance is gradually being consolidated and put on a sounder footing, it is still only at the beginning of defining its own mission and developing its own strategy – separate from but building on its LPI roots. We strongly believe that while the efforts have to come from within there is a need for continued and recurrent external support in the form of technical assistance from the outside: as a sounding board as well as a strategic mentor. Not until such a mission and operational strategy has been developed and tested does it make sense to cut the umbilical cord with LPI/Sida.

Third, there is a need to tap into and systematically exploit both the capacity and experience of the FOPAG staff in at least two areas: (a) in pursuing (or participating in) the studies and field-based assessments that were scheduled but never carried out during the LPI years, and (b) in regional activities pursued within the framework of the LPI HAP – particularly as regards ToT programmes and civil society support. After all, much of the hands-on competence and experience gained during the LPI Somalia programme no longer resides in LPI/Nairobi but in FOPAG.

(c) LPI

One of the more obvious areas in which to search for impacts is that of LPI itself. The Somalia programme was the first (and still the most financially and substantively important) exposure of LPI to sustained and programmatic field involvement. We do not have much on which to build an analysis of the changes generated within LPI as a consequence of it hosting the programme, nor do we believe that this can or should be done by an external evaluation.

Nevertheless, given the insights gained from looking at LPI through the lenses of its programmes we believe that LPI, as part of its presumably continuous efforts to learn from its experiences and further develop as an organisation wedded to the maxims of

non-violence and peaceful transformation, should explore issues such as the following:

- To what extent has the exposure in Somalia influenced LPI's competence in and orientation of action research (or research generally)?
- To what extent and in what areas have the Somalia exposure influenced its overall strategy and organisational set-up?
- To what extent and in what ways have the experience and competence gained by LPI staff in the HAP/Somalia programme been availed of in other areas/themes in which LPI is or have been active?

C.3.3. Conceptual impact

The LPI experience in Somalia has also had a major impact on research related to peace building and conflict resolution. After the collapse of the Cold War, a dramatic increase of so called internal wars emerged in various places in the South, but also in Europe (Balkans). An immediate security dilemma was faced were ethnic conflicts, ethnic cleansing, etc became the agenda of the day. A need to understand and examine what potentials existed in the local levels of society, or at least how these levels could complement large-scale interventions at the macro level, was imminent. The so-called bottom-up approach as such was not new, particularly within the development domain, but had not yet been explored within the peace and conflict resolution fields.

The LPI activities deserved rapidly the reputation as an international NGO that was able to adapt to local circumstances. LPI was seen as an actor that could play a crucial role in strengthening local civil society in a war-ridden society such as Somalia, but not with a universal recipe in which no cultural fine-tuning existed. On the contrary, LPI made a brand name of being culturally sensitive, and particularly of making use of local capacities. Although monitored from Nairobi, by and large, the local LPI staff in Somalia was running the activities relatively independent.

At the same time, other external experts, not least Professor John Paul Lederach from the Eastern Mennonite University in Washington, came to contribute with advice and research. A local Mennonite organisation, named Mennonite Central Committee, had already been active in Somalia in the end of the 1980s, strongly arguing for a more long-term commitment for peace building. LPI and the Mennonites found common ground and came to develop the bottom-up approach.

The experience from Somalia gave way for developing the understanding of the relationship between short-term crisis management and the long-term peace building processes. Humanitarian assistance tends to have a "quick fix" orientation, with no real focus on the root causes of the problems. At the time of the fall of the Siad Barre regime the UN had left Somalia but the famine and the war that followed created an international concern that resulted in the return of the UN. Relief agencies demanded military protection in order to provide secure food transportation etc. However, in the Somali context it became clear that there was an urgent need to involve the Somalis in the peace building efforts and that these efforts should stem from the local level. In this way, traditional relief and development categories became integrated with conflict resolution perspectives.

The idea was to establish a comprehensive framework and integrated response:

- Acknowledge and be explicit about the connections and dynamic between short and long-term concerns;
- Acknowledge and be explicit about the levels of activity within a conflictive situation;
- Acknowledge and be explicit about the connections between more traditional relief and development activities and conflict transformation and peace building.

Furthermore, the idea was to be rooted in the context:

- Encourage and provide space for peacemaking approaches that emerge from within the setting;
- Encourage and provide space for indigenous peacemakers.

Also, building relationships and understanding across the lines of conflicts and articulate and advocate alternatives for non-violent transformation.

In conclusion, the community based bottom up approach, was, due to the LPI initiative, shown as a possible approach. The failed large scale external involvement and the continued warlordism in the Somalia context have convinced both practitioners and donors as well as the research communities of:

- 1) The need for civil society and the grassroots level to be involved in peace building
- 2) The need to reach the entire society via a trickle up process from the grassroots level
- 3) The need of long-term commitments
- 4) The importance of having a gender perspective in peace building
- 5) The need to empower people at the local level

C.3.4. Impact on society: peace writ small and peace writ large

The challenging question is how individual peace building projects relate to the wider conflict context and how to evaluate this? Furthermore, how shall we attribute observable changes in the conflict situation to a third party intervention (i.e. conflict resolution intervention)? When is the impact of intervention sustainable and after how long time is its impact decreasing? Finally, how should we relate a conflict resolution evaluation to positive and negative unintended effects of the intervention?

A conflict resolution intervention in a war-ridden society conducted by a NGO, in the size of LPI, needs to be assessed in relation to its own goals and objectives. Simultaneously, from a holistic perspective, one could easily argue that any small-scale projects, has some impact on the broader conflict. In general, linkage between the intervention and relevant variables is too complex for making a clear peace impact assessment of small-scale interventions. The LPI, however, had the ambition to approach the entire society in Somalia with the so-called community based approaches (i.e. bottom-up approach). Hence, we have considered the larger impact of LPI activities but also focused on the intended and unintended consequences of LPI's actions.

Establishing a central authority in a collapsed state as Somalia was (is) one of the most urgent tasks. LPI took particular responsibility for the establishment of Regional Councils and District Councils. These local political structures were aimed to complement the forthcoming (central) national structures that were supposed to be established under the supervision of the UN. LPI's countrywide approach was a huge task for a small NGO. To establish one district council meant to first establish the very idea at a popular level in the district. Mostly, a need to reconcile various clans in the local context, often with the help of the traditional elderly structures, and several types of capacity building initiatives (i.e. democracy, conflict resolution, and women programs) had to follow. Also, practical issues such as finding a building where an office with furniture could be placed were time consuming and complicated. Furthermore, although warlords should, according to LPI's conflict analysis, be marginalised, assurance that they would not "interfere" or sabotage the district councils was important. Hence, de facto, via consultations and mediations, the warlords were considered in this process as well. It still remains an open question what the warlords' role should be in these new structures and if they actually did work against the establishment of local political structures. Particularly in the south of Somalia warlords had a more dominant role than in Somaliland and Puntland.

Despite many practical and logistical problems, not least when the UNOSOM withdrew from Somalia, LPI assisted a large number of councils and succeeded in creating a countrywide reputation of being the third party that contributed to building peace for the people. It is of course difficult to assess the sustainability of these district councils based on the few years since the exit of LPI from direct involvement. One could say that the LPI initiatives gave some space for people, within the war zone, to begin to work for a different kind of future. In some areas of Somalia it also gave enough space in order to survive and create a minimum level of security. At the same time, although some of the councils still remain, many of them have collapsed. A variety of reasons to the collapse could be listed. The reasons' accurateness could not be evaluated but are listed as strengthened warlord structures, renewed fractional and clan based tensions, lacking livelihood capacities, external actors (UN and others) pulling out from Somalia, LPI withdrawal, and lack of resources were the most common ones. Also, the failure to build a complementary state structure as well as the low involvement of the top level of LPI in the process have been lifted up as explanations for the collapse of some of the councils. Whatever the exact explanations may be, the mere fact that some of these institutions are still in existence must be seen as a great achievement. Also, FOPAG and others could make use of the relatively good reputation that LPI still has in Somalia in order to give a new momentum to the LPI legacy.

The many capacity-building programmes that have been launched and conducted by LPI over the years is one more important contribution to the empowerment of the grassroots level. If correctly mobilised, most likely, many of these people that were part of these programmes still would be able to mobilise renewed forces for building peace. Hence, these particular LPI skills that were built up are still in existence, but currently not used in an efficient way.

At the same time, due to LPI's capacities in terms of personnel as well as other processes, such as the UNOSOM activities, warlordism and a failed state building project, by and large gave LPI initiated projects less sustainability in the political constructs made in the civil society sectors. However, the period of more than ten years, also created hope and a certain space for people at the grassroots level. The district councils and local councils have not managed to survive the shifting political changes of Somalia. Still, within as well as outside FOPAG today, skills that were acquired via the LPI-organised workshops remain. Only the future can tell if these skills can serve as inputs for renewed local initiatives.

It is certainly unclear if the LPI-activities created a multiplier effect although some organisations, for instance, the Peace Academy in Hargeisha that started in 1999 is partly taking on a similar approach. They work with participant action research studies on conflict analysis. They also have started a parallel forum, a civic forum, where they are facilitators between the various elders and clans. The Peace Academy also confirmed that many times they are approached positively due to positive connotations of people with the previous LPI-activities. However, how far this positive capital of peace building capacity and trust is spread and how it differs from one region to another is an open question.

C.4. The practice of peace-building: tools and approaches

The bottom-up approach developed by the LPI in Somalia was partly developed due to the belief that a war-ridden society needs to (re)establish broken relationships at all levels in society. Change rarely can come from above or from the outside world but must stem from the local level.

One could summarise the LPI approach in five general principles for (internal or external) active involvement in peace building.

First, make a multi-level holistic analysis of the conflict, including causes, actors and patterns. Also, an understanding of conflict dynamics and the ways in which conflict may escalate way out of proportion is needed.

Second, sustainable peace can only be found within the local and cultural context. The idea is that an externally enforced initiative that does not consider the local and cultural context risks to fail and even counteract the peace initiatives. In the Somalia context great effort was placed on giving space for the local forms of conflict resolution. For instance, the elderly structures, particularly in Somaliland, were given a particular role for mediating and finding solutions which all involved clans could live with. LPI became a non-partisan couch that pushed local actors into peace building efforts.

Third, the work has to start at the local community level and, from there, involve the entire society in gradual transformation of the society into a culture of peace. There is a need to build a new structure but to think in processes. In Somalia, the idea was to identify the local needs related to livelihood issues as well as security needs, and from

there mobilise people for implementing these needs. Awareness programs should reach and empower men and women at the grassroots level, traditional elderly structures should pave the way for settling conflicts in a non-violent manner, and the district and community councils should create legitimate authorities at the local level.

Fourth, this is a very broad and long-term peace building effort that can only be made sustainable by the people themselves. Experience from various conflicts show that many years of pre-negotiations on various levels in society, initiated by the people themselves, made it possible for the top-leaders to follow. This in turn created relationships, and confidence on both the vertical and horizontal levels. In the Somalia context, LPI initially took a non-partisan role and let themselves be led by the local players in the various conflict resolution sessions that took place.

Fifth, the role of external actors is to act as a facilitator, strengthening locally initiated efforts for peace and democracy. The LPI had a non-partisan role in the beginning of their activities. However, later in the process, and in particular when the UN started to approach the warlords, LPI became a strong advocator for the civil society.

In conclusion, *relationship building* is the key formula for enforcing a conflict transformation process. Furthermore, the approach include 10 to 20 years future thinking, generational planning, as well as establishing relations with all sectors in society, both on a horizontal and vertical level. The idea is to target leaders and groups, at the grassroots, middle range, and top-leader level who have these relational capacities, and are ready to work for peace building.

In the Somalia context, LPI also faced shortcomings with the approach. Particularly the role in relation to the top leaders in Somalia was unclear. Since the community based approach is a trickle up approach, a clear vision of when and how the top level of society should be approached is needed. Although external powers, such as the UN and Sida, had a clear division of labour vis-à-vis LPI, the relations to internal top leaders, such as warlords and other national figures were more ad hoc based. In fact, it could be argued that the LPI failed to materialise a strategy on how their initiatives should approach this particular level. Since the UN took the role of working with Track 1 it seems as if LPI left this part out. When the UN left Somalia LPI focused more on how they could continue their work rather than developing framework on how to approach the top level of Somalia. This also proves that LPI did rely too much on external actors and did not focus on its internal capacities. The neglect or inability to develop research that was linked to the LPI actions further contributed to a certain dependency on external developments. A strategy that could adjust to sudden changes on the ground could have enabled LPI to more efficient reflect upon their own activities and if necessary rearrange its activities.

C.5. Research and analysis

LPI developed action-research oriented approaches that aim to support the activities on the ground. The idea with action research is to collect relevant data that can give answers on what kind of needs there is among the affected people, as well as

information about the reach out, impact and acceptance of the form of conflict resolution intervention. Hence, a capacity and organisational structure needs to be designed for fulfilling this action research.

Also, the need to have a system for external advice and evaluation is important. External groups or individuals with various kinds of expertise should on a regular basis be consulted in order to ensure an internal capacity of the organisation to be self-critical and reflective over their activities. Furthermore, a system of internal evaluation must be built in such a way that sudden major changes on the ground, or day-to-day concerns, do not risk to downplay the much needed reflection capacity of the organisation. A well-developed documentation system can provide the basis for such a system.

Conflict analysis needs to be made and linked to underlying theories and practices of conflict resolution. The organisation needs to know how to address the theory of change that explains the transformation process from war to peace.

The LPI did carefully conduct a conflict analysis and had several groups of external as well as internal experts that provided for the so-called blue print for Somalia in 1993. However, very little of a follow up structure was developed. The reason for this, according to LPI, was that these groups were too heterogeneous and gave too much contradictory advice. However, some form of consultations could have been developed. The LPI could also have used external experts that on a regular basis (annually) could have evaluated the documentation of LPI's activities.

Despite the fact that LPI undertook this conflict analysis, in the Somalia case they never developed a detailed action plan, a strategy that clearly spelled out the priorities of actions both in long-term and short-term commitments. This seems to have placed the LPI in a situation where day-to-day changes formed intervention activities that provided little room for reflection and self-evaluation. In the Somali case, this lack of feedback system became obvious after UNOSOM left in 1995, and LPI was paralysed by the sudden changes on the ground. The LPI responded by reformulating its major activities in programme terms, in the process abandoning the old blueprint without creating a new one to take its place as a guide to what 'bottom-up peace building' was all about. This is not to say that the activities in themselves were wrong. It means however that the organisation never built a capacity to reflect over its own activities.

LPI could, however, due to the overloaded few employed personnel at the LPI/HAP Nairobi base in the 1990s, as well as the non-existence of support from LPI/Uppsala, only start this documentation process in the very recent years. Hence, a lack of systematised documentation made it difficult to develop these kinds of external reviews. Neither did the LPI/Uppsala have a system of reporting and evaluating the activities of LPI/HAP. It is also surprising to find that LPI in Uppsala never required a more comprehensive reporting of the LPI/HAP activities.

Running a large-scale peace building initiative, covering a whole country, demands a number of people that should be able to develop a whole range of functions within the LPI-organisation. The risk is otherwise that also the organisation becomes trapped in

crisis management due to heavy overtime work and constant time-pressure in a conflict context that can suddenly change; a vicious cycle that can risk the entire conflict intervention activity.

LPI/Uppsala could also have developed an action research oriented structure that could have backed up the activities in Somalia more comprehensively. The only major follow up study that was conducted while LPI still was active in Somalia was the study by Wolfgang Heinrich, the first draft of which was presented to the LPI in 1996. It was also at this time that LPI gave time for a first real reflection and reconsideration over the activities it had conducted in Somalia since the development of the blueprint in 1993. Furthermore, since LPI Uppsala has a platform in which peace research should be a base for its activities it should have been of utmost importance to support the research capacities. These action research forms could also have served as benchmarking instruments to find out on how well the goals had been reached.

Also, the sudden turn that came in 1997 when LPI/Uppsala decided to withdraw from Somalia was never based on research and analysis of the needs and concerns, or what role LPI had played. It is also remarkable that the LPI activities, one of the most cited community based initiatives in the academic peace building literature, is not really documented by the LPI itself. Neither the Nairobi LPI/HAP head office nor the LPI Uppsala has prioritised documentation and reflection over the Somalia experience. This again creates missed opportunities for other similar organisations to gain insights and read about the important LPI activities that took place in Somalia in the 1990s.

Also, Sida as one of the major donors of the LPI-activities should be stricter in their follow-up routines. This applies not only to LPI, but to all conflict resolution organisations supported by Sida. Such organisations, that have, from a normative approach, “good intentions”, may very well due to lack of organisational back-up systems, documentation, research, reflection as well as skilled personnel, end up as unintentionally fuelling the conflict rather than contributing to peace building and reconciliation.

D. THE PROGRAMMES AND LPI

In this section we will try to identify the common strengths and weaknesses of the two programmes. In doing so we also move from the programmes as individual and contextually specific efforts of peace building and conflict transformation towards the programmes as expressions of LPI – its values, the relation between its international headquarter and the operational programme units in the field, and thereby its capacity to host, guide and exploit field programmes such as those in Somalia and DRC.

It should be stressed that our observations and assessments with respect to the LPI as a whole, including its headquarter, is based on a bottom-up perspective: it is the imprint of LPI, or lack of it, at the programme level that concerns us. We have consequently not done any systematic assessment of the LPI headquarter itself or the way it has followed up the programmes⁷⁷.

D.1. Lessons learned

D.1.1. Strengths

An evaluation often tends to highlight problems and shortcomings more prominently than strengths and achievements. This is all the more so when the very aims, objectives and operational context of a programme are in themselves highly problematic or complex as is certainly the case with respect to the two programmes assessed here. But this should not hide the fact that in both cases there are considerable strengths and achievements, even if they are sometimes intangible or difficult to quantify.

a) Focus on peace building and conflict transformation

A temptation to which many NGOs – be they developmental, humanitarian, peace building – succumbs is that of moving beyond their core capacity or mission, through a process of pull as well as of push. In contexts of human disaster or violent conflicts it is often obvious that the local demands and needs require interventions and support of a much broader nature than that which the organisation offers, leading to very strong pull to expand the activities beyond the original mission. On the other side is the availability of funds, with donors often pushing (or tempting) an organisation to take up work simply because it is there on the ground.

We are impressed with the way LPI has handled this, in Somalia as well as in DRC. It is true that in some cases (e.g. the infrastructure support to District Councils in Somalia and the institutional support to some of the partner organisations in DRC) LPI moved somewhat beyond its capacity. But at the same time it did make efforts to ‘relay’ with other more suitable organisations so as to establish strategic links in such

⁷⁷ As stressed in the ToR and further discussed in the Inception Report the evaluation was to be field based and should only touch upon LPI as a whole if and when the field observations at the programme level indicated that an issue pointed in the direction of the LPI and its headquarter (or Board). It is quite possible that LPI Uppsala have made efforts that we are not aware of, e.g. in strategic guidance, follow-up and research. However, the proof is in the pudding and only in such cases that these efforts had a discernable effect at the programme level have they been taken note of.

fields as development, humanitarian interventions, training, etc., rather than expanding its own support beyond that of facilitating peace building efforts. It is obvious that many of the peace building activities promoted by LPI at the community level would have attracted more attention and been more ‘palatable’ had they been accompanied by even limited humanitarian or developmental support. But such attention would in all probability have been counter-productive and distortive⁷⁸, and the very fact that LPI did not pursue that path even when it was the only agency around shows a commendable professional stamina and commitment to the long and hard journey of peace building.

b) Training

In both the programmes, training constituted a major vehicle for strengthening both awareness and skills – in order both to assist local actors to understand and handle situations of conflicts and disputes, and in order to strengthen the capacity of civil society organisations to withstand manipulation by outside forces. In both cases the training sessions were by and large demand- rather than supply-driven and adapted to suit local cultural and social conditions⁷⁹. This does not mean that the trainings were socially neutral as the very strong emphasis given to women training and gender aspects in Somalia shows⁸⁰. Similarly, the training sessions were, as far as could be ascertained, also well documented and at least in the case of DRC fed back to the participants⁸¹.

However, even if the training sessions promoted by LPI have in both cases been very extensive and also very extensively documented, follow-up of these trainings have remained a weakness. But this weakness is more a reflection of the general weakness in monitoring (and research) than of the training as such. At the same time it should be noted that there does not seem to have been a systematic transfer of experience between the Somalia and DRC programmes, either in form of modules or in terms of cross-visits by LPI trainers.

c) Techniques

By techniques we refer to the ways by which LPI tried to build up local competence in conflict transformation (essentially through training modules) as well as to the more direct ‘brokerage’ role between conflicting parties (such as in DRC). In both cases we find that LPI infused the activities with very appropriate skills. Perhaps the main strength here was that these skills were not just mechanically imported from outside experts or textbooks but were developed very much in relation to the situation prevailing on the ground. In Somalia this was very much part of the post-UNOSOM period when LPI had to define its own role and agenda, and in DRC it was part of an assessment of initial efforts to bring in professionally sound but contextually blind outside trainers.

Again (and as with training) the very fact that LPI, *at the level of the two programmes*, has developed and introduced such skills also raises the expectations that LPI, *as an*

⁷⁸ See for example M. Schloms.

⁷⁹ The early ESAMI management training modules for district councils in Somalia are an exception, but they were gradually developed and adapted by LPI into its civic education programme.

⁸⁰ The DRC lags behind in this respect.

⁸¹ As noted in section C.5.2, this was, however, a weakness in the Somalia programme.

international organisation, would document and disseminate the modules and techniques used in the programmes. We hope that this will form part of the future agenda of LPI.

d) Critical mass

One of the most salient features of both programmes is the scale on which they operate. It would have been easy for LPI to delimit and confine itself, geographically and/or functionally. In the wake of the dismantling 1995 of UNOSOM in Somalia LPI made the conscious choice of up-scaling both its coverage and its volume of activities, in spite of the obvious difficulties of doing so. In the DRC the same extensive coverage was built in from the start, with a wide range of supportive trainings and workshops.

We have voiced reservations about the capacity of LPI to follow-up the very widely scattered activities, particularly as regards the DRC programme where the critical function of ‘accompagnement’ or hands-on mentoring by LPI staff has suffered as a consequence. Even so we strongly believe that the underlying notion that peace-building from below has to be entrenched in a critical mass of persons – women and men, young and old – is very sound, whatever the geographical scale one operates on. In fact, it is clear to us that much of the impact which is associated with the strong ‘brand name’ of LPI throughout Somalia as well as the two Kivus stems from the fact that a very large number of people have come in contact with the peace building efforts promoted by LPI rather than with LPI as an organisation. In other words, LPI has become a shorthand concept for a consistent commitment to peace at the local level, sustained by a large number of individuals that at one point or another have been touched by LPI activities, trainings, and workshops.

e) Continued presence on the ground

Another aspect that is equally salient in both programmes is the effort to maintain a continuous presence on the ground. In the case of the Somalia programme this was expressed in the establishment of regional units within Somalia, with Nairobi providing technical, administrative, and financial coordination and support⁸². While the DRC programme is functionally centralised to the LPI/Bukavu office the operations are based on very extensive travels and field visits by LPI staff throughout the two provinces. In both cases this is in marked contrast to virtually all other NGOs that retracted to ‘safer havens’ as and when the conflict situation deteriorated.

Based on our observations in both Somaliland and the DRC we are convinced that the very presence (however sporadic in specific localities) and accessibility of an international NGO and its representatives has done much to keep alive, at the local level, the commitment to and hope for a non-violent future. In addition, it has in both cases enabled (and sometimes forced) sensitivity on the part of LPI with respect to local priorities and conditions.

⁸² These regional units and their staff became the backbone of FOPAG as of 2001.

f) Facilitating others more than direct action

It is true that both in Somalia and in (parts of) DRC, LPI has come to be a household name, suggesting that LPI has become a supra-local entity or force on its own. However, as pointed out above we believe that this widespread familiarity with LPI should be seen exactly as a brand name rather than as recognition of LPI as an organisation – the brand name in this case being associated with external support to, as well as internal/local obligations for, conflict resolution and transformation.

It is also true that in both cases we saw clear signs of the programme – or various aspects of it – being owned by LPI rather than by its local partners or bodies. But this was also very much a reflection of the lack of discernible local partners at all (in the case of Somalia) or lack of capacity and strategy on the part of LPI to develop a functioning network or alliance of equals on DRC.

But in both cases LPI consistently aimed at facilitating the role and involvement of local actors in the peace building process, rather than taking the driving seat itself. One may sometimes have wished for a more professional way of doing this, not the least in terms of facilitating organisational development and support⁸³. But even so it is noteworthy that with few exceptions⁸⁴ both programmes operated very much on the principle of facilitation rather than direct action.

D.1.2. Weaknesses

a) Strategic support and guidance

There is no doubt that many of the operational weaknesses in both programmes could have been avoided or remedied had there been a stronger strategic guidance and support. The lack of attention to strategic issues ranges in both cases from non-existent or very vague guiding documents, through vague definitions of the role and mandate of the LPI programme management units⁸⁵ as well as focus on activities rather than on results in management and reporting, to a virtual lack of exposure to peer or outside reviews and reflections.

It is, for example, striking that the bottom-up approach that relies on the existence and interaction with parallel efforts at other levels in order to have something to link up to was never reviewed or questioned when such other-level efforts were lacking.

In fact, beyond the two Naivasha workshops for the Somalia programme⁸⁶, and beyond the initial studies for the DRC programme we have failed to find any attempt at strategic reviews either of the context (conflict or situation analysis) or of the LPI's role, mandate and direction within that context.

⁸³ The case of FOPAG as the local 'inheritor' of LPI in Somalia is the most notable example. But the varied success of LPI's support to District Councils in Somalia as well as selection and support to local partner organisations in DRC are also illustrations of this.

⁸⁴ For example, we have already noted the instance of LPI taking on the role of an aggressive spokesman of local NGOs in respect of MONUC, see section B.3.6. There are no doubt similar instances in the history of the Somalia programme.

⁸⁵ Cf. the discussion of the so-called 'Nairobi mandate' as documented in various internal notes from the period, as well as the thoughts put forward by Dr Wolfgang Heinrich to the Board and Management of LPI ('Some thoughts of the functional structure of LPI and HAP', Neuenbürg January 1997).

⁸⁶ We do not include the long process of consultations that was an integral part of the early years of the Somalia programme. In fact this period was strategically very intensive and led indeed to the LPI-branded bottom-up approach.

It is to us very curious and disconcerting that the level which should have provided such strategic guidance and support has consistently failed to do so. From a programme perspective the interaction with the LPI Uppsala appears more as one of continuous questioning of whether the programmes should be part of LPI at all than of asking what can be done to support them. We are aware that both programmes have been the subject of soul-searching discussions at the level of the Board – the massive and continuous field involvement, the primacy of research versus action, etc. But we fail to understand why, or how, such internal discussions should translate into a failure of providing an all-out support to and involvement in the programmes once they are onboard. If nothing else both programmes provide excellent opportunities to explore how best the values on which LPI is based – commitment to non-violent transformation of conflicts through action research guided by Christian ethics – can be translated into practice on the ground.

But even if the Board may (and indeed should) subject LPI's commitments to a continuous critical scrutiny, the management cannot afford that luxury. Here also we know that there has been a long-standing internal problem at the executive level. But at the same time the headquarter organisation has had a second level of management for both operations and for research. And both of these areas are the ones that have been the ones with direct responsibilities towards the programmes – coupled with a host of other responsibilities.

It may very well be that LPI has lacked adequate capacity to provide for a strong strategic management. But this cannot have been for lack of resources. Apart from receiving substantial core funding⁸⁷ LPI has from the Somalia programme alone absorbed an overhead of at least 38% of the total programme assistance provided by Sida (23% for coordination and support, including the Nairobi HAP office, and 15% LPI overhead)⁸⁸. This should in itself have made for an obligation to provide effective strategic management support from the home office to both programmes, regardless of whether or not there was an internal debate at the level of the Board or problems with the senior management.

b) Research

For programmes that were launched as examples of 'action research', they are both conspicuously more action than research. Looking at publications there are only three that have emanated out of the Somalia programme since 1996: an evaluation published in 1997, a study on women and peace-building in Somaliland 2002, and an account of the LPI bottom-up approach in 2003⁸⁹. This is by any account a very meagre output for a programme that has cost more than SEK 70 million and lasted 10 years. With respect to the DRC there is as yet only one published research paper⁹⁰ although a case study of local conflict dynamics is on its way⁹¹. Both programmes

⁸⁷ Coming mainly from Sida, the Swedish Foreign Office and the Church of Sweden it has averaged appr. SEK 4 million/year or some 15% of the annual turnover since 1992/93. See annex 13.

⁸⁸ These very large overheads were commented upon in several financial audit reports but have come down considerably since 1999.

⁸⁹ Heinrich op.cit; Warsame op.cit; Paffenholz op.cit

⁹⁰ K. Vlassenroot & H. Romkema

⁹¹ Morvan et al op.cit

contributed smaller case studies to a conference report on traditional methods of conflict resolution in 2002⁹².

Given that action research on peace and conflict is one of LPI's main vehicles for spreading awareness and providing support to peace-building efforts, it is clear that these programmes have been only marginally exploited.

But as we have pointed out in our assessment of the two programmes there is another and to us more serious lacunae with respect to the action research than the lack of publications out of the programmes. If nothing else action research should have implied that there was a very strong and continuous analytical or reflective underpinning of programme interventions. This was in both cases notably lacking. It is true that the pre-1996 years in Somalia saw the active involvement of researchers and peace practitioners, but this was for some reason discontinued. Similarly the HAP office has made attempts to recruit a research officer but was so far only temporarily successful. It is also true that the DRC office has tried to establish research collaborations with local or regional institutes but this has again so far not been very successful. Finally, all this has been done with little or no involvement of or support from the LPI Uppsala research unit, a unit that presumably has as its function to coordinate, guide and facilitate research.

As a consequence nothing has been generated in terms of result-oriented indicators of peace-building on the ground, whether in relation to LPI's bottom-up approach or otherwise. Given the desperate need for such down-to-earth research articulated in the INCORE and CDA publications, in themselves the most comprehensive state-of-the-art inventories to date, given the mission of LPI, and given the premise on which the two programmes was launched as well as the potential they have provided, this is remarkable indeed.

D.2. Conclusion: the crossroads confronting LPI as a programme manager

Based on the rather weak way by which LPI has acted as a responsible host or platform for the two programmes one must therefore ask whether LPI can or indeed should take on such assignments (or conversely, whether Sida should continue to support programmes such as these through LPI).

Without wanting to prejudice a discussion within the Board and between the Board and the management on what the mission and role of LPI should be, we still want to make clear the conclusion we draw from our assessment of its two main field programmes.

- A. We strongly believe that the LPI mission, as articulated at various times, does provide for inclusion of programmes such as those in Somalia and the DRC – in terms of research, of action, and of action research. In fact, we believe that it is programmes such as these that can give LPI the authority, international recognition, and confidence with which to pursue its mission. Within the

⁹² University of Burundi/Bujumbura & LPI, 2002

international community of researchers on and practitioners of peace building there is no doubt the LPI is still best known for the Somalia programme.

- B. We are also convinced that the achievements as well as shortcomings of both programmes show that they can make a difference on the ground AND that there are not many organisations with the mission, focus, and commitment necessary to do so. In both areas LPI has come to stand for a consistent commitment to and connotations with peace and non-violent transformation of conflicts, and has as such become as much a brand name as a programme of activities.
- C. We are finally convinced that the present organisational set-up of LPI has become increasingly less appropriate for hosting and owning programmes such as these. Not only is it very difficult to maintain an adequate level of strategic guidance from afar in any organisation, but in the case of programmes engaged in situations and context of violent conflict the demands are even greater with very high overhead costs as a consequence.
- We do not believe that the weaknesses noted in this respect are due to negligence on the part of LPI Uppsala, but rather to in-built constraints. Large programmes such as these can, for a small organisation like LPI, easily become cuckoo-eggs that fit very uneasily with smaller (but maybe equally important in their own way) undertakings. And the danger is obvious that they are ‘suffered’ or ‘tolerated’ due to the contribution of their overheads to the organisation, creating ultimately an unhealthy dependency (signs of which can be seen in the LPI).

Based on the conclusions above we can see either of following scenarios unfolding:

- (a) Rather than trying to re-organise the LPI in order to make such programmes, their liabilities and their obligations, fit better with the organisation, the LPI should take a principled decision not to take them on OR to do so only in alliance or ‘consortium’ with some other organisation that has the experience and capacity for programme management (e.g. by LPI focussing on the research and possibly training component). This would have the advantage of letting LPI as an organisation pursue whatever agenda and mission it chooses for itself without the possibly distracting liabilities that goes with continued field presence and interventions.
- There are, however, obvious costs associated with such a decision. Apart from the financial one of loosing considerable overheads that helps sustain the organisation, it would also mean a loss of a window to the real world of conflict management on the ground, something we believe is of vital importance for both the mission and the soul of LPI, as well as for its standing in the international community of peace building.
- (b) The other scenario would be to close the gap between the programme presence on the ground and a strategic support level by establishing regional and largely autonomous LPIs. This would involve ‘franchising out’ the ‘brand name’ of LPI, based on a common set of values and principles that would form part of a binding agreement between LPI Uppsala (or ‘LPI International’ as it were) and, say, LPI Africa. It would have its own Board from within Africa (with possible representation from the ‘international’ Board) comprising church leaders and programme professionals that would be the real owners of the

programmes. The role of the LPI Uppsala/International would be confined to assist in donor relations, in providing access to international experience in peace building and research, and to help in disseminating reports and publications.

There are different approaches⁹³ to how to go about this, but they all have one thing in common: a binding adherence to the same value base and mission as expressed through their common 'brand', combined with freedom (and responsibility) to operationalise them in contextually relevant ways.

The advantage here is first of all that the experience gained and the name established would live on and be allowed to gain further momentum, unshackled by the constraints of a central headquarter that could pursue its own parallel but separate agenda. It would also allow LPI to remain and further develop itself as a resource base for donors such as Sida.

It would, however, require a very clear organisational vision as well as strategy, defining each step and moving very gradually – preferably with an active and sympathetic donor willing to assist throughout the process.

While we strongly recommend that LPI and its Board actively and positively consider the second of the scenarios above, we are convinced that it is necessary to take a decision either way.

⁹³ The teamleader has evaluated two very different organisations that have evolved along this path in equally different ways: The African Medical Research Foundation (AMREF) which went from being an international organisation with HQ in Europe to a network of national organisations with its operational (and autonomous) seat in Nairobi; and Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) which comprises a somewhat complex network or 'movement' of autonomous national chapters. See G. Tamm & G. Coony, and G. Tamm et al.

The Democratic Republic of Congo: Contextualising the Work of LPI Bukavu

By Ingrid Samset,
Member of the evaluation team

1. Introduction

In post-colonial Democratic Republic of Congo, armed conflict is a fairly new phenomenon. Despite journalistic accounts of a country in ‘perpetual conflict’, the two recent wars in the DRC lasted for fairly limited periods of time: the first for seven months from 1996-1997, the second between four and five years from 1998-2002. Most of Congo’s post-colonial period has been peaceful, in stark contrast to neighbouring countries such as Angola and the Sudan.

But when war did come to the Congo, it came with a force and at a scale that was virtually unprecedented on the African continent. In the war from 1998-2002, armies from at least seven countries were involved, as well as numerous local militias – the exact number of which it remains difficult to ascertain given constant fragmentation and realignments. As a result of the war between three and six million people died (International Rescue Committee 2003).

Researchers such as (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Hartzell et al. 2001) agree that one factor in particular is likely to complicate peace consolidation, namely the war’s intensity – measured in terms of harm done to combatants, civilians, and society at large. They also highlight that the number of combatant groups matters: The higher the number, the more difficult it is to make sure that everyone will agree on laying down arms. In a comparative perspective, therefore, peace-building in the Congo would be expected to be an extremely daunting task.

This presentation has four sections. First, I outline some key elements from Congo’s recent history and politics, with a focus on how these were articulated in the Kivu provinces, to help understand the context within which LPI has worked. I will here present the two recent wars and introduce the main elements of the settlement on which the process of transition is founded. Second, I highlight some of the political issues that most directly frame the space within which the LPI operates in the Kivus. Third, an illustration of the stumbling blocks the LPI may encounter in this context is given in an outline of the controversy surrounding the restructuring of civil society in South Kivu. Finally, I discuss the potentials and limits of ‘peacebuilding from below’ strategy in light of the new outbreak of fighting in eastern DRC.

2. From Peace, to War, to No-Peace-No-War: Congo's Recent History

2.1 The First War

In 1994 one of Congo's tiny neighbours to the east, Rwanda, experienced genocide. As opposed to the genocide in Burundi in 1993 (Lemarchand 1998), Rwanda's genocide had massive repercussions for the Congo. Previous waves of killings of Hutu by Tutsi and Tutsi by Hutu in Rwanda and Burundi had also led thousands of refugees across the border, yet this time around not only the victims came across, but also the perpetrators. These militias, *Interahamwe* and others, intermingled with the refugees in the camps and, over the years to come, launched a number of armed raids into Rwanda.

Their activities were possible partly as a result of the leniency on the part of Congo's long-standing President Mobutu, who had been a supporter of the regime that the Tutsi-dominated RPF now had overthrown in Kigali. As a result of the raids into Rwanda of the Congo-based Hutu, Rwanda took action by picking a successor to Mobutu, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, and mounting a coalition of forces with which he started to march across the Congo – with Uvira and Bukavu in South Kivu as his points of departure. On their way, this coalition not only killed thousands of civilians, but in particular targeted the Hutu in revenge attacks. As a result, the alleged *génocidaires* fled even deeper into Congo's forests and mountains, where they remained frightened of returning home, had little to live from, and as a result, had little choice but to prey on the local population.

On 17 May 1997 Mobutu's 32 years in power were over. But if the Great Lakes region was ridden by an explosion in genocidal violence, at the national level of the Congolese state a parallel process of implosion of authority was underway. After Mobutu, what would there be? The man with the leopard hat had told the people to 'fend for themselves'; a slogan which in street-speak translates into 'Article 15' of Congo's constitution. Like Louis XV, Mobutu had every reason to say '*L'Etat, c'est moi*' – without Mobutu, there was little statehood left. His successor came in as no support from erstwhile Cold War patrons could secure his position, neither did he have the Mobutu's eye for playing the various internal factions up against one another to remain personally unassailable. Finally, Kabila had been brought to power at the mercy of Rwanda – yet having gained his power, Rwanda became a thorn in his side. Given the internal and external pressures for democratisation, the eastward link turned increasingly problematic. But as Kabila eventually tried to break it, Kigali had already realised he would and started to prepare accordingly.

2.2 The Second War

While the first war can be characterised as a prolonged *coup d'état*, and had as its effect the export of Rwanda's internal conflict into the Congo, the second war is difficult to put into any single box of a classification. It was both a civil war and an international war, simultaneously an 'identity' war and a war about political and economic power – simply put, it was not one war but many wars in one. It started, however, as a classical war of invasion, as Rwanda and Uganda launched a simultaneous attack, in collaboration with local militias that they had initiated, trained and equipped. They invaded both by land across the border and by air, as troops were airborne across the vast country to attack the capital Kinshasa. But as Angola – with one of Africa's strongest militaries – swiftly came to Kabila's rescue, he wasn't toppled. Rwanda and Uganda did keep and consolidate their bases in the north and east, however: Rwanda took control of the Kivu provinces as well as the areas further to the west and south; Uganda of parts of the Congo's north-eastern provinces, Orientale and Equateur. On the other side of the frontline, troops were provided by Namibia and Zimbabwe.

But even though fighting was intense over the first few months of war, in 1999 and 2000 there were few news from the frontlines – but many more news (to the extent that they even reached Western media) from within each front. In the north and east Uganda and Rwanda turned against one another, in the south and west Kabila's allies started to demand returns for their support. In reality, such in-war developments on both sides converge more than they diverge: As the war went on, the warring parties discovered that the country they had come to was reminiscent of paradise. The 'discovery' was not only due to Congo's natural beauty, its welcoming vastness, and its extraordinary abundance of all sorts of natural resources. It also arose from the recurrent experience by warring parties that this natural bounty could be extracted and sold – with profits. Profits, in turn, enabled all belligerents not only to continue to wage their war, but also to reap personal benefits. While they had not seemed to go to war to exploit those resources, the experience of resource exploitation during war seems to have contributed to change their orientation. Instead of fighting for victory, they started fighting for keeping the stalemate.¹

Meanwhile the international community, which first had put its high hopes in the Lusaka peace accords of 1999, turned more sceptical as Uganda and Rwanda, instead of withdrawing their forces, started fighting one another over the diamond town of Kisangani in 1999 and 2000, and later in other border areas between their respective zones of influence. As the prices of coltan rocketed in 2000, enabling Rwanda in particular to reap enormous windfalls as the Kivus are rich in this mineral complex, some timid steps to implement the 1999 agreements were being taken with the first deployment of peacekeepers from the UN mission MONUC. With little peace to keep, however, these 'blue helmets' remained trapped in the logic of war.

To minimise further embarrassment, and inspired by contemporary UN reporting on how Angola's war was being perpetuated by the rebels' diamond trade, the UN started doing its own investigations into the role of natural resources in the 'fuelling' of Congo's armed conflict. What they found was quite stunning evidence on how virtually all parties to the conflict had benefited economically from taking up arms. In spite of loud denunciations and denials from the implicated parties, the repeated 'naming and shaming' of these activities by the international community are likely to have contributed to pressuring the parties back to the negotiation tables in 2001 and 2002.²

2.3 A Fragile Settlement

Given this background, however, it is equally stunning that once they were talking, they were hardly talking about those natural resources. In fact, the peace agreements of 2002, on which the current process of transition is based, hardly problematise or even mention how Congo's abundant natural resources should be regulated, managed, and distributed in a future common polity. This stands in contrast to, for instance, the current settlement of the civil war in the south of Sudan, in which the future sharing of the oil resource has been openly discussed and decided upon. Since this core aspect of the country's economy was left unaddressed, the eventual agreement in the Congo was from the outset very fragile.

However, the negotiations, including the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in early 2002, did raise a host of crucial issues. The merits and achievements of these processes are particularly impressive given the virtual lack of previous forums, with the notable exception of the National Sovereign Conference (CNS) from 1991-1992, in which matters of common national

¹ For further discussion on the role of natural resources in Congo's war, see Samset (2002).

² The reports include United Nations (2001a; 2001b; 2002; 2003)

or sub-national concern could be aired, and in which disagreements could be expressed without fear of retribution. If the aim is to move towards democracy, it should be remembered that Congo only has had one national election ever, in 1960, as a result of which the elected President was killed a few months later by Belgian agents, on behalf of an anti-communist Western world who saw the incumbent as too radical.³

Yet in spite of a virtual lack of an experience with electoral democracy, the Congo has a strong culture of civil society activism. There are many types of dictatorship, and even though Mobutu didn't care much for his subjects, he didn't care much to control them either – as long as they didn't pose a direct threat to him. In Mobutu's Zaire, therefore, the Congolese culture for debate and dissent flourished, and it continued to do so with even greater vigour as Mobutu fell and as prospects for democratic influence did seem to brighten. It is on this basis that one can understand one of the more peculiar aspects of Congo's peace settlement, namely that not only the military and political parties, but also representatives of civil society were present at the talks – and even managed to gain representation in the new transitional parliament. 'Civil society', in other words, became a sort of a political party in itself.

In concrete terms, the settlement of Congo's second war included the following agreements and processes:

- (1) The Lusaka Agreement (July-August 1999),
- (2) The Inter-Congolese Dialogue (February-April 2002),
- (3) The Pretoria Agreement (July 2002),
- (4) The Luanda Agreement (September 2002),
- (5) The Global and Inclusive Agreement (December 2002), and
- (6) The Final Act (April 2003).

Out of these, the Global and Inclusive Agreement was most important as it incorporated conclusions from the previous rounds and laid the basis for a period of transition. This period would end with nation-wide elections of a new government, to be held maximum two years after the transitional government was put in place. Given that the cabinet was installed in July 2003, the elections were to take place no later than July 2005. Beyond the 500-member parliament, the institutions to serve throughout this transitional period include the following:

- At the central political level, a transitional government with one president and four vice presidents. Joseph Kabila, successor of his father who was assassinated in January 2001, remained president while the quartet of vice presidents were to represent other 'main actors', including those of the war. One of these was the RCD, the 'rebel' movement that Rwanda set up when starting the 1998 war, and which it continued to use as a proxy until the war ended. The controversy is, of course, whether the end of the war also implied an end of this patron-client relationship between Kigali and RCD. This debate, in turn, made the RCD vice-president position particularly contested; not least in light of the fact that it was Kabila father's struggle to rid himself of the Rwandan influence at government level which helped spark the war in 1998.
- At the local level, a delegation of political power to the movements which had gained the most prominent positions during the war. In the Kivus, this implied that the control that the RCD had won at the barrel of a gun, as a result of which hundreds of thousands of Congolese people had suffered and died, now was translated into a

³ For elaboration on the murder of Lumumba and on the CNS, see Nzongola (2002).

political control that not only was effective, but also was given global acceptance as it resulted from an internationally guided process of negotiations.

- At the military level, a demobilisation and disarmament of the former ‘rebel’ movements, and the integration of some of the rebels and some of the soldiers of Mobutu’s erstwhile army into a new, national army, with a central command in Kinshasa and regional commands in the various provinces of the Congo.

3. Operating in a Context of Conflict: Factors of Particular Relevance to the LPI

Based in Bukavu, the capital of the province of South Kivu, the LPI finds itself in the eye of the storm of current conflicts and controversies in the DRC. Bordering Cyangugu in south-western Rwanda, this town was the host of the first refugee movements during and after the 1994 genocide, it experienced some of the worst massacres in the early phase of the 1996-1997 war, and from 1998 onwards it turned into a stronghold of Rwandan power. A question that many Bukavu residents shared with us was; to what extent did the situation change in 2002? Today, the RCD still rules, as it did during the war. While during the war its collaboration with Rwanda was unambiguous, after the war it is, ostensibly and according to the RCD, over.

At this point light needs to be shed on the dynamic of the Banyamulenge.⁴ This group of Congolese people has its roots in a relatively secluded mountain area of South Kivu, and they have historical links with the Tutsi people in Rwanda. While a Munyamulenge person would clearly identify herself as a Congolese she would, according to our informants, also go to Rwanda and vote at election time in that country, for instance. The Banyamulenge make up a small minority in the Kivus, still their role has become enormously contested given their apparent collaboration with Rwanda during the wars. Non-Banyamulenge Congolese we met tended to question why the Banyamulenge did not take a clearer stand against Rwanda’s exploitation of the Congo during the war, and why they would not more clearly break their link to Rwanda in light of the damage that country had caused in the Congo. Many of those who would ask these questions also had a ready answer: it is because now, the Banyamulenge enjoy the fruits of their loyalty to Kigali in their positions of power in the RCD. These positions, the argument goes, not only enable them to enjoy military and political power but also to control trade in natural resources and other goods, as well as an increasingly demanding taxation scheme on people at large. The Banyamulenge, on the other hand, claim to be demonised and persecuted on the basis of shallow accusations and speculations.

As an evaluation team only getting a snapshot impression of local dynamics (and as researchers knowing that there are many versions of the same story), it is not up to us to render any judgements on who is right or wrong on these issues. What we did realise, however, was that the RCD’s post-war power, as well as the role of the Banyamulenge people, remained extremely controversial among most of the Kivu population.

In a post-war situation, any international NGO coming in from the outside to provide some sort of assistance will have to be extremely careful in order not to be seen as partial with one side or the other, since popular perceptions of partiality will erode trust from people of the ‘other’ sides. For an NGO entering with the specific aim of contributing to building peace, such vigilance becomes even more pivotal. To us, it seems that issues such as the role of the RCD and of the Banyamulenge are among those that an organisation like the LPI should treat

⁴ For more background on the Banyamulenge dynamics see, for instance, Vlassenroot (2002).

extremely carefully. In the beginning, it should seek to have a low profile in order to get the broader view of as many stakeholders as possible. Second, having got a sense of the variety of views, it will need to design strategies that ensure that it will minimise the risk of being seen as partial, as a result of, for instance, its stance in relation to the most contested issues.

To exemplify, the LPI has chosen (a) to reflect in its staff the ethnic composition of the Kivus by including one Munyamulenge, and (b) to keep in close contact with the RCD authorities of the Kivus, both for logistical purposes and as part of the LPI Bukavu's third party, dialogue, and monitoring activities. While these choices are entirely understandable in and for themselves, they do touch on some highly sensitive issues of the conflict that the LPI has a mission to transform. Therefore, and for purposes of transparency and trust-building, the reasons behind such choices of strategy need to be communicated very well, and continuously, to the environment of peers and partners. The need to institutionalise feedback mechanisms in the LPI – mentioned elsewhere in this report – also applies here, since strategies need to be constantly adapted in line with the experience of whether they serve the overall purpose of the LPI. Hence, if LPI choices on how to relate to the Banyamulenge and the RCD authorities, for instance, prove to cause more harm than good in its relations to the people at large whose peace it is supposed to build, previous choices and strategies may have to be revised.

Essentially, what matters is not the soundness of previous decisions, but the need to gear organisations like the LPI into more of a listening mode. The decision-making process, in other words, needs to become more of a consultative process with the partners and the grassroots whose efforts to transform the conflicts the LPI is there to facilitate.

4. Illustrating the Challenges: The Civil Society Controversy

One issue that repeatedly came up in the evaluation team's discussions with the LPI's Congolese partners concerned the organisation's engagement to support civil society in the two Kivu provinces; more specifically, to support the efforts to coordinate civil society activities. Since this issue illustrates how difficult it can be to reach the intended goals for an international NGO operating in an environment of conflict, we will look into it in some detail. The focus will be on the controversy in South Kivu, on which we received most information.⁵

In the Congo over recent years, civil society has played a very important role as a counter-power to the political and military leaders. Given the lack of democracy under Mobutu and the suspension of potential democratisation during the wars, it has functioned as the main voice of the people, speaking out against their exploitation under dictatorship and occupation.

Within the Congo, the South Kivu province has traditionally been home to a particularly strong section of civil society, whose efforts since the 1990s has been coordinated from a specific office set up for that purpose. This *bureau de la coordination de la société civile* (BCSC) was composed of elected representatives of the ten *composantes* or thematic sections of civil society, each of which functioned as an umbrella body for a large number of organisations. According to representatives of the BCSC, the ten thematic sections were:

- (1) Development,
- (2) Women,
- (3) Youth,

⁵ The versions we received of this story during the relatively short time we spent in the terrain to some extent diverged. In the following effort to cut a long story short, we have tried to reconcile the divergences and to present the overall trends.

- (4) Human rights,
- (5) Science and research,
- (6) Culture, leisure, and sports,
- (7) Humanitarianism and charity,
- (8) Business,
- (9) Trade unions and syndicates,
- (10) Religious confessions.

The last elections for representatives of these sections, 15 in total, were held in December 1997. Due to the war from 1998 onwards many of the representatives had to flee or were for other war-related reasons prevented from doing their normal civil society work. Because of the war, it was also difficult to organise new elections. The fighting thus led to a steady erosion of people from the coordination office, resulting in only two of the original 15 representatives being left as the war came to a close in 2002. The demand therefore arose, both from within the civil society and from external agents seeking to support their efforts, that new elections be held – to replace the representatives who had left and thereby to give the coordination office renewed legitimacy and strength.

Initially, however, the remaining BCSC officials seemed not to agree on whether, and possibly how and when, such elections should be organised. Efforts in 2002 to mediate in the dispute between the two factions at stake, headed by the president and the youth representative in the bureau, eventually failed as in mid-2003 the latter broke ranks – leaving the office with only one of the representatives that were elected back in 1997. A few months later a meeting was organised, supported by the LPI, on how civil society in South Kivu could be ‘revitalised’. At this meeting of 10 October 2003, the decision was made not to organise new elections of bureau representatives, given the resistance and difficulties faced in the efforts to do so thus far. Instead, a so-called *comité de pilotage* or ‘Pilot Committee’ was set up to ‘revitalise’ civil society. This committee was composed of representatives of a few of the *composantes*⁶ and soon started its work, focusing on getting back in touch with people working within the respective sections of civil society on the grassroots. Such people were to be organised in so-called *noyaux* or core groups, which in turn would be responsible of identifying people to represent that particular section in a provincial General Assembly. This Assembly would finally vote in the new representatives for a new coordination bureau. After the grassroots core groups would have been formed and the elections of a new coordination office would have taken place, the Pilot Committee was to dissolve itself – as its main task, namely to pilot the transition from an ‘old’ civil society structure to a ‘new’ one, would have been accomplished.

Not surprisingly, the set-up of a new structure to replace the old one faced intense resistance from the existing coordination bureau, its leaders and allies. They questioned the legitimacy and popular basis of the members of the Pilot Committee, who had not been elected by civil society but rather ‘appointed itself’ to transcend the existing structure, which once had been given a popular mandate through elections. The BCSC’s outrage was exacerbated by the fact that the new Pilot Committee was supported by international NGOs such as the LPI, which previously had supported its own office but discontinued that support (as well as by various

⁶ According to the Pilot Committee itself four sections were represented: development (by the organisations CRONGD and CENADEP), youth (COJESKI), human rights (RADHOSKI), and research (CEDAC). In addition, organisations with a more unclear section identity (ADEPAE and *Groupe Jérémie*) were ‘somewhat involved’ (interview, 19 March 2004). Other informants confirmed this account, and added that ADEPAE was seen as representing the peace/religious confessions section; that it was linked to the Banyamulenge community, and that it had, partly at the LPI’s initiative, replaced COPARE which represented the same section in the original coordination bureau. Some informants linked this process to the fact that a LPI staff member has a leading position in ADEPAE (interviews, 19 and 20 March 2004).

details in the deteriorating relationship between the BCSC and the LPI). It also did not go unnoticed that one of the staff members of the LPI was one of the original 15 elected members of the coordination office. While this person surely had taken up the position due to personal considerations, from the 'old' bureau's point of view this person had been 'taken' by the LPI, away from civil society, to undermine it by creating a new structure.

Although it may look like dwelling on details, I mention this aspect since it illustrates a larger and very prominent dynamic of the Kivus that we encountered in early 2004, namely an environment of mutual suspicion and rumour-spreading. This has probably been nurtured by many years of war in which Kivu's tiny, yet mighty neighbour to the east, Rwanda, had occupied the area and exacted a very heavy toll on the population. It is against this background that we should understand the proliferation of conspiracy theories among the Congolese. In such an environment, organisations such as the LPI that intend to 'support civil society' – which, it should be highlighted, was a key task to undertake in the transition from war to peace faced by the Congo – need to devise an extremely careful and conflict-sensitive approach. Indeed, maximum care should be taken to apply, as patiently and consistently as possible, all the conflict resolution techniques and approaches available when approaching a civil society body faced with internal strife. The case of the civil society controversy in Kivu can thus in many ways be seen as a test case on the applicability and usefulness of the conflict transformation and resolution strategies that organisations such as the LPI propagates.

In this particular context it seems to us that in hindsight, if the *diabolisation* or 'demonisation' of the LPI – which in particular was spurred by its civil society engagement in South Kivu – were to have been avoided, much more patience and *fingerspitzengefühl* should have been used to keep the parties on board in the same boat. For as one LPI staff member acknowledged, no matter how difficult it was to rock the old boat, creating a new one alongside it does represent a duplication of efforts – and a consolidation of a split in civil society. It goes without saying that contributing to splitting civil society is the antithesis to contributing to strengthening it, which was LPI's intention.

Lessons to be learned from this endeavour parallel other recommendations of this report. I will mention four.

One, when intervening to support civil society efforts in communities emerging from intense violent conflict, the intervention must be based on a thorough understanding and respect of all sides' versions and views on the situation. Two, maximum efforts should be made not to alienate any of these sides but, despite their differences, use the conflict resolution and transformation skills to bridge the gaps, and thereby maintain the unity of civil society, which remains badly needed in a post-war context. To succeed, haste must be made slowly.

Three, since civil society per definition is a locally driven body, and since its moral significance in representing the Congolese people cannot be underestimated, organisations such as the LPI should be take extreme care to keep a low profile. Instead of taking a lead in promoting a new structure, a more conflict-sensitive approach would have been patiently to facilitate the transformation and resolution of the conflict over the coordination body by the various parts of the Congolese civil society themselves.

Finally, transparency and good communication procedures are more vital than ever when doing something as politically sensitive as going in, as an outsider, to help transforming the structures intended to represent the interests of the local population. In any society, outsiders' intervention to try and transform locally based structures for representation will be met with (healthy) scepticism. In the post-war context of eastern Congo, marked by 'post-traumatic

stress disorder', generalised suspicion and deep uncertainty, there is no wonder that such scepticism has been particularly prominent. Therefore, it becomes absolutely pivotal that organisations such as the LPI, when trying to support local systems of representation, are crystal clear about why they do it and how they seek to do it, from the very beginning and at every stage throughout the process. The fact that the level of resentment and mutual distrust within civil society in South Kivu remained strikingly high after nearly two years of LPI support of their work bears witness that there is still some way to go before the LPI will be seen as an agent of successful conflict transformation and resolution in the Kivu provinces.

5. Renewed Fighting – and the Potential for 'Peace-building from Below'

After the evaluation team was in the DRC in March 2004, armed conflict broke out again in the Congo.⁷ The eye of the storm was the very town where LPI office is located, Bukavu, of which parts were besieged by the forces of Jules Mutebutsi and Laurent Nkunda from 2-8 June 2004. Mutebutsi and Nkunda claim to represent the Banyamulenge community, have been part of the RCD and close to Rwanda in the past, and now took up arms against the local chapter of the Congo's new national army, the 10th regional command.

In fact, Mutebutsi had already launched a similar, yet shorter campaign in February 2004, just prior to the evaluation team's arrival. Back then, being the second in command in the military region, he and his allies one night attacked the house of his superior, commander Nabilwa, who only just managed to escape and save his life. Mutebutsi subsequently refused to accept the government's demand of having him delivered to Kinshasa. Even though Nabilwa was replaced by another non-Banyamulenge, non-RCD commander, Mutebutsi remained at large in the Bukavu area and the conflict remained unresolved.

While Bukavu was the centre of the strife of late May and early June, the civilian population in larger parts of the South Kivu province was also affected, in particular as a result of the advance of the rebel force of Laurent Nkunda from Goma to Bukavu. Nkunda, who played no significant role in the February events, came from his base in Goma in North Kivu to reinforce Mutebutsi, as the latter's attempt at occupying parts of Bukavu merely had led to a MONUC-brokered ceasefire. It is worth noting, moreover, that the parts of Bukavu that Mutebutsi and Nkunda hence succeeded in controlling together for a while were those that border Rwanda. During rebel control it was thus virtually impossible for MONUC or the Bukavu authorities to detect possible movements of weapons across the border.

Beyond the Kivus, violent protests followed in major cities throughout the country against the MONUC's response to the crisis. The UN peacekeepers had not only failed to prevent this major blow to the transition process. Also, instead of effectively siding with the transitional government and its new national army which it is deployed to protect, it had merely brokered a cessation of hostilities between it and the rebels – which many Congolese argued was an implicit recognition of the rebels' *raison d'être*.

Without going into too much detail on the overall picture, two other aspects need mentioning: (1) the fact that over a space of three months, from March to June 2004, two coup attempts against the transitional government were made in Kinshasa, both of which failed (and both of which were not prevented by MONUC), and (2) as a result of the rebellion in May and June,

⁷ The following outline of what happened is based on a variety of news sources, as well as reports from civil society representatives in the Kivus and from international NGOs. The latter include Human Rights Watch (2004) and International Crisis Group (2004).

Congo's government moved a contingent of 10 000 troops to the eastern parts of the country – a move that was characterised by Rwanda's authorities as a 'provocation'.

At the micro level in the Kivus, the rebellion had disastrous consequences. More than 100 people were killed, many more were raped, physically and mentally harmed, countless individuals were plundered and hundreds had to flee to Rwanda. At a more fundamental level, the incidents obviously increased the level of fear and inter-group resentment, and as such contributed to set back months, if not years, of careful work to rebuild people's trust and confidence in one another and in the future after the war.

It is on this note worth dwelling with the role of organisations such as the LPI. The fact that violence may recur in a peace process should not in itself, of course, discourage peace-building activities by local or international NGOs. On the contrary, it is exactly in intermediary phases, immediately after settlements of armed conflicts have been negotiated, that such activities may be most needed. Nevertheless, the reality is that the more fragile and shaky the settlement is, the more likely it is that NGO efforts to strengthen it will fail. As the May/June events shows, actions by the more powerful stakeholders in a peace process can easily jeopardise gains made by the less powerful stakeholders. Therefore, if there are powerful agents with a clearly demonstrated interest in blocking the process, NGOs, mindful of ensuring a longer-term effect of their efforts, may want to think twice about how to channel their energies. A core question is: is it worth giving a lot of time and money to trust-building and reconciliation activities, when short-term positive results of such activities in the medium term may be shattered by high-level political events?

This question is rendered even more serious by the fact that if bringing people on the 'road to reconciliation' once may be difficult, it will normally be much harder next time around if their efforts to reconcile are rendered meaningless by new violent hostilities. For once peace processes break down, violence and resentment in the new phase of conflict tend to be even more ferocious than in the previous phase – Angola in 1992, Sri Lanka in 1990, and even Congo in 1998 are but some examples. In light of the fact that the human cost of Congo's 1998-2002 war was already extremely high, this trend becomes particularly worrisome.

These perspectives add up to reasons, mentioned elsewhere in this report, that NGOs like the LPI should have a very well reflected strategy as a basis for their engagement. Essentially, the rationale for intervening should not only be that there is a 'need'. It also has to include very realistic considerations of the likelihood that the activities that the LPI possibly could support would not only satisfy that need in the short term, but also that they would be sustainable in the longer term. Even though it is impossible to be certain about the longer-term sustainability of peacebuilding efforts in an immediate post-war situation, this lack of certainty should not allow a 'try-and-fail' attitude either. For if the efforts fail, the effects of new conflict are likely to be even worse than the effects of the previous conflict – and it may be even harder to try again to build confidence and trust in an eventual post-war phase in the future.

Finally, while the May/June events can be interpreted as a sign that 'high-level' work that the LPI has done to negotiate between political and military leaders is needed, an equally strong argument can be made that to influence such leaders, 'chit-chatting' will not be enough. Beyond talks, political pressure is required – and such pressure, to be effective, cannot only come from NGOs, no matter how knowledgeable or hard-working they may be. The pressure needs to come from agents with power to inflict damage on the 'spoilers' of the peace process.

Such agents include national, regional, and international government agencies as well as inter-governmental organisations – NGO efforts alone will not suffice.⁸

Unfortunately, the recent fighting in Bukavu suggests that when countered with relatively effective ‘warmongering from above’, ‘peacebuilding from below’ is a highly vulnerable strategy. For the LPI, a salient question therefore remains: how should it work to promote peace while minimising the risk that efforts will be in vain, taking into serious consideration the strength of the forces working against the peace?

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⁸ An elaboration on the relationship between civil society, NGOs and governmental and inter-governmental bodies in peacebuilding activities was made in the recent and unprecedented debate on this topic in the Security Council. For details, see United Nations (2004).



To: Gordon Tamm
Team Leader of evaluation LPI programmes in DRC and Somalia
Swedeconsult

CC: Claudette Werleigh
LPI CTP director

Tore Samuelsson
Communications Director

Jérôme Gouzou
LPI programme officer DRC and Brazza

LPI Bukavu

From: Hans Romkema
Representative of LPI in the DRC

Bukavu, the 31st of March 2004

**SUBJECT: PROPOSAL FOR BRIDGING PERIOD OF 6 MONTHS FOR LPI DRC
PROGRAMME**

Dear Gordon,

In your briefing notes, you suggest that the DRC programme goes through a six months bridging period during which the weaknesses of the programme need to be addressed. After this period, SIDA would need to make the choice whether to continue supporting or not and if yes, to commit for a prolonged period.

I believe with you that it would be good to straighten a few things out, become more strategic in the choice of partners and activities, as well as change the role of the LPI/B office, including myself. In the meantime we cannot stop the entire programme as the needs continue to exist, it would lead to further 'diabolisation' and also because some of the programmes are really strategic and it would hamper the work after the six months bridging period if we would not continue to act upon them.

Therefore I suggest that we go through a six months process with SIDA money and some degree of involvement and continue the most important activities with DGIS, DFID and ICCO support. For this I will write in the coming week(s) a project proposal. I don't know whether DFID and DGIS accept this procedure, although I suspect they will.

My proposal to you for a six months bridging period assumes that DFID and DGIS will accept to fund LPI parallel to this process. Therefore I will propose that SIDA pays one third of the 'fixed costs' plus 100% of the activities related to the process. DFID and DGIS will then be asked to fund the remainder of the fixed costs plus the programme activities. They will receive a project proposal for (at least) two years.

As time pressure does not allow me to discuss this first in detail with my colleagues in Sweden, this is a proposal from the LPI/B office only and it is very well possible that LPI/U has other views than I have. There are certainly some consequences that need Uppsala's approval before my proposal can be considered as a 'LPI proposal'.

The issues that need to be addressed in the bridging period:

After having read your briefing notes ones again, I summarise the issues that need addressing as follows (I hope I'm not too far off):

1) *The programme needs more focus.*

Currently there are too many different activities what makes it difficult to see where the programme is heading and making it difficult to manage, evaluate its impact and provide the right level of accompaniment to the partners.

2) *The programme needs to become more transparent.*

Partners and outsiders don't understand the choice of partners, the choice of activities the Institute supports or is involved in.

3) *Support to partners needs to be more institutionalised.*

To be efficient, partners need on the one hand a guarantee that they'll be partners of the Institute for a prolonged period and not work entirely on an activity base. On the other hand they also need outright institutional support (financial, training, etc.). Moreover, they need more regular accompaniment and contact with LPI.

Linked to this is the preparation for an exit strategy. Which partners should participate in carrying the programme also beyond a physical presence of the Institute in the region. What role is there for local grassroots organisations, coordinating bodies like the ecumenical structures in the DRC and civil society platforms and finally for a regional structure like FECCLAHA.

4) *The programme did not achieve its objectives on the participation of women in peace building activities.*

The not very pro-active approach did not provide the desired results. This has been realised already for a while and some attempts are being made to change this (LIFOPAD and Uvira) but a more strategic approach is required.

5) *The action-research approach needs to become more institutionalised.*

The programme supports actions and research but those need to be closer linked. Moreover, the research should not only be contextual but should also focus on operational systems, monitoring (indicators) and contribute directly to interventions (result-oriented).

6) *The role of LPI.*

Here there are several issues. One is the central and very visible position of the representative that needs to be diminished. The second is the role of the LP/B office that needs to share responsibilities for the programme with the (key-) partners. And finally also Uppsala needs to become more involved, both on the research side and the CTP.

7) *Relationships with other actors.*

In particular the relationship with the MONUC needs to be improved. Moreover, LPI will launch an attempt to have more regular coordination with actors that work in

fields related to conflict transformation (international agencies like CECI, Law Group, Christian Aid, SFCG and some of the major local actors). LPI will continue to participate in Humanitarian Coordination meetings organised by OCHA.

This set of issues, if resolved, should lead to a better programme with more focus and more ownership for the Congolese partners. If successfully done, the ‘diablisation’ of the programme should diminish⁹.

This process will need the involvement of:

- The entire LPI Bukavu staff (during this period they should remain available for activities linked to the process. As a consequence they will be less available for (other) programme activities and they should therefore reduce the volume of the project portfolio.
- LPI Uppsala (in particular the CTP and Research departments but also the director)
- Local partners
- Resource people (mainly Congolese that will be invited to participate in the different stages/activities linked to the process)
- Consultants
 - o One external to the environment (Swedegroup, Gordon Tamm? If GT is available it would be beneficial for the process)
 - o One Congolese who will be recruited for the entire process period (should remain in contact throughout the period with the ‘external consultant’.
 - o Technical expertise for specific points (gender, action-research, organisational management, PR, etc.). This expertise is not exclusively for the six months period but should also continue to be drawn upon in later stages.

Moreover, to address some of the issues in a lasting way, the LPI/B team needs to be reinforced with:

- An assistant/counterpart to the representative. This counterpart will diminish the visibility and importance of the representative. Will also add to the capacity to overview the programme, provide technical support and maintain a strategic focus.
- An action-research person (extension of Hélène Morvan’s involvement in the programme?) that will both focus on the link between research and action and on the development of research that aims at assisting the LPI/B programme to develop its operational systems and priorities, its quality control and monitoring indicators, or its efforts to develop result-oriented interventions.
- LPI/U needs to be reinforced. Therefore I suggest increasing the DRC programme’s claim on Uppsala staff from 0.5 unit to 1 unit. The task of supporting LPI/B does not necessarily come from one person in the Uppsala office. I can imagine a situation where the DRC budgets covers e.g. time from the CTP, Research and a programme administrator.

Also, the managers in Bukavu, i.e. the Representative and the Administrator will conduct (as planned) evaluations of all staff. These evaluations should shed light on the capacity of the

⁹ This will be an objective. However, there is no guarantee that this will succeed as the extreme polarisation of the (civil) society makes it very unpredictable. It is also possible that it becomes worse when we are going to work with fewer partners and focus the activities on a smaller number of core issues as there will be more of ‘mécontent’ and not everybody may agree with a new focus. LPI will also need to keep a control over the activities of the partners, both to guarantee quality and to avoid ‘un-pacifist’ solutions for conflict.

staff to implement their task, the (additional) support they require from their managers, training requirements, etc.

Output:

I think that the best possible output could be a strategic document that is developed and carried by LPI/B, LPI/U and a core group of partners. This strategic document should include aspects of:

- Policy on a range of technical issues (action-research, gender, institutionalisation of partnerships, bottom-up approach) [input required from LPI/U/HAP/Brazza; development of global strategy plan].
- The scope/focus of the LPI/B programme.
- Policy on partnerships and the relationship of LPI/B with partners.
- Roadmap of how the role of LPI/B will change over time (exit strategy).
- Evaluation/indicators: This is a process that will take more time than six months. Many organisations have put their teeth on this subject but none has come up with a clear-cut solution. As the Great Lakes region will be one of the focus areas of phase-3 of the RPP project, we will work with the RPP over the coming two years. The RPP will bring both expertise and experiences from elsewhere.
- [I need more time and input from others to make this list exhaustive]

Moreover, LPI/B (and partners) needs to present the programme (basically the strategic document) to 'the public' (brochure, open-house).

Standardisation of procedures (project proposals (from partners to LPI/B) and their appreciation, accompaniment, evaluation, link action and research, etc.)

We should also find a way to improve the relationship with the MONUC (through a seminar with the MONUC office in Bukavu?) (We already meet them regularly).

A local resource group.

Clear job-descriptions of all LPI/B staff.

Clearer definition of role LPI/U and LPI/B links with LPI/Brazza and LPI/HAP.

Link with LPI Global Strategic Plan:

Many of these issues should also be dealt with in the LPI Global Strategic Plan. The preparation of this plan is on its way. Important aspects are: the role of the field offices (and LPI/U), the strategic aim LPI has with regional structures like FECCLAHA (with an eye on an exit strategy), policies/visions on bottom-up, action-research, monitoring & evaluation, gender, youth, children, advocacy, etc.


Programmes that need to continue despite process:

As a result of time-pressure I'm not able to consult with my colleagues on this but I opt for giving an indication anyway:

- The peace education programme needs to continue to be developed. (depending on progress of transitional process there needs to be some focus in civic education preparing for elections).
- Action-research. With the current activities developed under the leadership of Hélène this important aspect is taking root.

- We should continue to process that was started in the past months (developing/supporting research through universities but with the involvement with practitioners)
- We could opt to choose one location where we develop the approach of action-research. Bunyakiri seems to be the obvious location.
- Developing research aiming at assisting the LPI/B programme to develop its operational systems and priorities, its quality control and monitoring indicators, or its efforts to develop result-oriented interventions. *[This will be proposed to SIDA for funding]*
- Training of partners: to strengthen their institutional capacity (PRA, project management and conception). Gender and CT.
- Some other key-projects: Governance training (ACODRI/Masisi/Rutshuru). This will help us to understand what can be done in this field that will certainly be an issue that will be retained as an important focus over the coming 5 years.
- Regional ecumenical collaboration (FECCLAHA [in collaboration with HAP] and possibly (after Ebenaezer's evaluation) Great Lakes ecumenical exchange)
- Institutional support to key-partners (the two ecumenical structures and some civil society platforms)
- Possibility to intervene when urgent problems arise
 - 'Extremism' (mainly in towns Bukavu and Uvira)
 - Possible increase of tensions between communities (e.g. Bembe-Banyamulenge, Banyarwanda-Nande, etc.)
 - Deadlock in transition (with range of possible consequences from civil unrest in Bukavu till outbursts of fighting in territories)
 - Maintaining existing contacts with FDLR
 - ??

TIME PLANNING



SEKA/HUM
Björn Holmberg
Maria Bergqvist

2003-10-01

Diarienummer:

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR AN EVALUATION OF THE LIFE AND PEACE INSTITUTE PROJECTS IN SOMALIA AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

SUMMARY

This paper sets out the Terms of Reference for an impact evaluation to be undertaken in the fall of 2003. The evaluation shall assess the impact of the Life and Peace Institute's actions in Somalia (project ended) as well as the effectiveness of the ongoing project in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The projects are to be assessed according to their programme objectives in order to incorporate the lessons into future Sida supported conflict management initiatives.

1. BACKGROUND

The Swedish Development Co-operation Agency (Sida) adopted its first strategy for conflict management and peace-building in 1999. For Sida, 7 of the 22 (32%) most important partner countries in the year 2001 were experiencing ongoing armed conflict through internal turmoil or engagement in warfare in or with a neighbouring country. In addition to these 7 countries, 10 of the 22 (45%) were in a post-conflict transition phase¹.

Given that the overall goal of Swedish development co-operation is to reduce poverty, Sida, as well as other development co-operation agencies, acknowledge the relationship between poverty and violent conflict. For the Agency, conflict management is an integrated part of the poverty reduction strategy.

In 2002, a total number of 156 specific conflict management projects and programmes were supported, where the implementers explicitly were promoting *dialog* and *security* or addressing the root causes of violent conflict (structural instability). The assistance amounted to around 850 000 000 SEK (~108 000 000 US\$).

The support mentioned above is channelled through different actors like the UN system, local actors, Swedish Agencies and international and Swedish NGOs. One of the more important partners over the last couple of years has been the Life and Peace Institute, an international NGO with its head quarters in Uppsala, Sweden.

The Life and Peace Institute, from here on called "the Institute", is combining research with operational projects and strives to unite the two areas in what is called "action research". The organisation has received support from Sida for activities in Somalia, Horn of Africa, Sri Lanka, the

¹ The calculations are based on the database of armed conflicts collected by the Department for Peace- and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and the statistics presented by Sida in its Yearly Report for 2001. Post-conflict situations are calculated on open armed conflicts ending after the Cold War (1989 and onwards).

Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Sudan and the Middle East. The largest programme to date has been in Somalia, and it is now being handled over to local partners. The most recent programme is in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Table 1: Support to the Life and Peace Institute Since 1998

Year	Amount (SEK)
1998	9 700 000
1999	13 674 000
2000	26 250 000
2001	2 551 000
2002	24 351 000
Sum	76 526 000

Somalia

In 1992 the Life and Peace Institute began its support to locally based peace processes in Somalia, to begin with in a consultative role together with the UN. However, when UNOSOM left in 1995, the Institute had established an ongoing support and capacity building program all over Somalia, which later came to be extended also to Somaliland.

The stated aim of LPI's Somalia/Somaliland Program was to identify and support broad-based, long-term participatory peace processes, based in the communities, initiated and owned by the people in those communities. Certain social groups stood out as strategically important, local authorities, elders councils and women, and they became the focus of the capacity building program, which evolved out of the situation on the ground.

The four major components of the programme were:

1. Support to locally initiated elders' reconciliation conferences.
2. Capacity-building/Institutional Support programs for district, and village councils.
3. Capacity-building program for women.
4. Civic Education Program.

The programme in Somalia was handed over to a local organisation, Forum for Peace and Governance, FOPAG in year 2002. However, the Institute continues to give support during the transition period.

DRC

The Kivu area in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo are since many years plagued by a disastrous humanitarian situation, due to a complex and violent conflict situation with a war going on at different but interlinked levels, local, national and regional. The Institute made a study in 2000, at the request of Sida, and the findings strongly supported the idea of setting up a project to strengthen local peace work in the North and South Kivu provinces.

The Life and Peace project started in June 2002 with the opening of an office in Bukavu. The main objective of the project is: *To contribute to the restoration of peace and justice in the Kivu provinces in the DRC.*

The programme objectives are:

1. To assist the civil society² in order to broaden and strengthen the ongoing local peace efforts;
2. To encourage and assist the churches with the development of a capacity to play a role in the

² By civil society LPI mean all individuals, organisations and structures that are neither part of the political, administrative or military authorities, nor of the opposition parties and movements. This definition is drawn from the working sessions organized by LPI in June 2001.

peace building process;

3. To assist grassroots organisations in order to increase their capacity to contribute to non-violent conflict resolution at the local level and to participate in provincial and national co-ordination platforms;

4. To document all activities, as well as undertake and facilitate research works focusing on the causes and the specific features of the conflict, and whose results, conclusions and recommendations would influence the development of strategies on the field. This will allow us to learn from the ongoing work, both for immediate use in the Congo and for improving theory and practice globally.

The Institute has participated, together with Sida, in the global evaluation project on NGO's work with conflict management through the project *Reflecting on Peace Practice*, organised by Collaborative for Development Action. As a result a publication on how to assess and improve effectiveness of peace practice evolved, *Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners, Collaborative for Development Action (CDA), 2003*³.

According to the study, there is a recognised urgency for practitioners and donors to better know the impacts of their efforts in order to learn and improve the programmes. Questions of effectiveness to be asked according to the study include: How do we do what we do better, with more effect, with better effect? How do we know our activities are worthwhile? What, in fact, are the results for the people with whom we work?

In 1998 Sida conducted a Capacity Study of the Institute and an evaluation of their research activities was made in 2002.

However, concerning their field projects only two internal evaluation of the Somalia project has been conducted so far. The institute is planning an internal evaluation of the activities in the Republic of Congo and if timing is suitable it should be co-ordinated with this study.

2. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

The main purpose of the evaluation is to address the effectiveness and impact of the programmes financed by Sida through the Life and Peace Institute. A key question of the evaluation concerns the extent to which the activities are addressing the conflicts and empowering local capacities to contribute to the peaceful resolution of on-going violent conflict.

As such the evaluation aims not only at examine the programmatic goals, but also whether the Institute through its activities makes a contribution, or not, to peace in the region where it works. It involves looking for changes outside the direct activities for which the Institute is responsible.

The evaluation of the Institutes activities in Somalia shall take as its point of departure the internal evaluation of the project made by the Institute⁴, and focus on wider impacts and questions of sustainability. What did or did not come about as a result of actions taken.

The focus of the evaluation of the activities in DRC shall primary be on assessing the effectiveness of the program, focusing on partnerships, relevance and methods and whether specific activities is achieving, or not, its intended goals. However, as far as possible the intermediate impact should also be looked at.

Since the philosophy of the Institute is bottom-up peacebuilding, the main focus groups of the evaluation are the people, communities, churches and partner organisations in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. As such the evaluation shall be undertaken in a participatory

³ The pdf document can be downloaded from: www.cdainc.com

⁴ The study called "Community-based Bottom –up Peacebuilding by Thania Paffenholz.

manner.

Primary users of the study will be Sida, the Institute and the local partners, and special importance shall be given to recommendations and guidelines to strengthen future conflict management work. It is expected that the evaluation will serve as a useful tool for all the programme stakeholders and need to be designed and presented accordingly.

Furthermore the evaluation shall elaborate on the possibilities and limits for Sida supported activities in this field. The principal steering document for this co-operation is Sida's *Strategy for Conflict Management and Peace building* (1999).

2. THE ASSIGNMENT

Somalia: The following criteria for effectiveness developed in "*Confronting War - Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners*", shall be used, in combination with the stated project goals, when generating indicators for measuring the impact of the Institutes projects.

1. If project efforts have caused participants and communities to develop their own initiatives for peace.
2. If the effort resulted in the creation or reform of political institutions to handle grievances that fuel the conflict
3. If the projects prompted people increasingly to resist violence and provocations to violence.
4. If the projects produced results that increase in people's security.
5. The validity of the assumptions behind the original plan.

DRC: Issues concerning the effectiveness of the project performance in DRC shall include to what extent the Institute have achieved the intended goals in regards to:

1. Project design and activities
2. Selection of partners and participants
3. Ownership of local partners and role of the Bukavu office and the LPI representative
4. Means of peace work – working with the right ethics⁵
5. Ability to identify and managing negative impacts
6. Response of participants involved in activities
7. Ability of the Institute to co-ordinate itself with other actors
8. Action Research – is there a direct link between the planned and carried activities at the field and the research at HQ?
9. To what extent the Institute incorporates learning based on analysis of project performance
10. The relevance of the indicators presented in LPI's proposal

In addition the project in DRC should, as far as possible, be assessed by looking at the intermediate impacts using the criteria developed in "*Confronting War - Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners*" and presented above.

The evaluation shall finally:

1. Present recommendations and guidelines to Sida in order to strengthen future support to conflict management projects

⁵ Does the implementation of the projects, personally and programmatically, reflect the ideals and values that it advocates.

2. Analyse the specific methodological problems and opportunities in evaluating impact of conflict management projects based on the experience in evaluating the projects implemented by the Institute and its partners.

4. METHODOLOGY, EVALUATION TEAM AND TIME SCHEDULE

The evaluation has been commissioned by Sida, the Division for Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management (SEKA/HUM).

A project group consisting of the evaluation manager at Sida, SEKA/HUM Björn Holmberg, Advisor on Conflict Management, and Maria Bergqvist, evaluation co-ordinator, directs and supervises all important aspects of the evaluation, including drawing up the terms of reference, the engagement of stakeholders and definition of the evaluation purpose. The Institute is responsible of facilitating contacts and relevant documents to the consultant.

A reference group consisting of the project group, Ulrika Josefsson, (SEKA/HUM) and Gunilla Petrisson (SEKA/HUM) and representatives from the Institute will be of access to the Consultant during the evaluation.

Inception report

The selected Consultant is asked to begin the assignment by preparing an inception report elaborating on the feasibility of the scope of the evaluation, the methodology for data collection and analysis, the detailed and operational evaluation workplan (including feedback workshops). During this stage it is important that information is sought from the Institute's offices in Nairobi and Bukavu, and not only from the office in Uppsala.

After approval by the Sida Project group of the inception report the Consultant shall begin to carry out the evaluation as soon as possible.

4.1 Method

The Consultants should have three documents as their point of departure for the evaluation aside from key documents from the Institute:

- *The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Intervention - Part II: Emerging Practice & Theory*, Incore 2003. This document summarises theory and practice for evaluation of conflict management initiatives.
- *Confronting War - Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners, Collaborative for Development Action (CDA)*, 2003. This document was produced jointly by around 200 NGO's working on conflict management and with the active participation of Sida. It summarises best practices and gives valuable insights on how to make programmes more effective.
- *Strategy for Conflict Management and Peace building*, Sida, 1999 and the discussion paper *Reflections on Development Co-operation and Violent Conflict*, Sida 2003. These documents represent Sida's policy framework for conflict management.

The Consultant shall evaluate necessary background documentation (desk study), but realise that this study at large is a field-based study including proper field visits to the project locations and

partner organisations in Somalia and DRC.

Sida values a participatory approach and the process should include elements of learning for the various stakeholders.

The Consultant shall also, during the evaluation process, invite local stakeholders to at least one feedback workshops per project in order to present findings and conclusions.

Before a *draft report* is submitted to Sida the Institute should be given the opportunity to comment and correct any factual errors.

Central concepts

Central concepts of the evaluation are to be used as follows:

- *Effectiveness*: The extent to which the objectives of a development effort were achieved, or are expected to be achieved. Sida's definition of 'effectiveness' as one of its assessment criteria includes efficiency aspects.
- *Efficiency*: A measure of how rationally resources/inputs are converted to results.
- *Impact*: Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects resulting from a development effort, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.
- *Indicator*: Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect the changes connected to a development effort, or to help assess the performance of a development actor.

4.2 The Consultant

The Consultant assigned to carry out the evaluation should have the qualification, knowledge and experience appropriate to the purpose and scope of the evaluation, including:

- Documented experience of international development co-operation (including competence regarding working for poverty reduction, gender equality, human rights and democracy) and,
- Documented experience on working on conflict management issues as well as on the specific context of Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. These skills can be sub-contracted given the few experts available. Sida shall approve any sub-contracted expertise.
- Working knowledge of Somali and French is necessary for undertaking the field studies. Translators may be used for the purpose.

The Consultant should seek to have a gender balanced team.

4.3 Time Schedule

The time needed for the assignment is estimated not to exceed 30 person weeks, including the time required to prepare the inception report and time for completing the report.

5. REPORTING AND TIMING

A *draft* of the full report shall be presented to Sida's Division for Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management no later than April 1 2004. Sida and the Institute will comment the draft report after which the Consultant shall prepare a *final report*.

The report must include a presentation of the process in drawing up the evaluation design and choosing methodology. It shall also list all contributors to the evaluation (excepting those that have opted for anonymity).

The final report is to be delivered by the Consultant to Sida's Division for Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management within two weeks after received comments.

The report shall be written in English and the final version shall be translated to French. The format and outline of the report shall follow, as closely as feasible, the guidelines in *Sida Evaluation Report – A Standardised Format* (see Annex 1). The report shall be typed on a word processor using Microsoft Word software of at least version year 1997. To facilitate editing and printing the authors shall supply Sida with a CD-ROM, containing one file only.

Together with the *final report*, the Consultant shall submit a separate paper, no more than 10 pages, elaborating on the methodological problems and opportunities in evaluating conflict management projects. This paper shall be based on the experience in evaluating the Institute. File format and delivery should be the same as for the *final report*.

The Consultant shall make a presentation of the results at a seminar at Sida. The presentation should also elaborate on the specific problems, opportunities and methods in evaluating conflict management projects. The presentations outline shall be in the format of a Microsoft PowerPoint presentation (at least version 1997), which should be given to Sida on a CD-ROM together with the final report.

The assignment also includes the completion of *Sida Evaluation Data Work Sheet* (Annex 2). The *Data Work Sheet* shall be submitted to Sida SEKA/HUM together with the final report.

6. OTHER

Sida's Strategy for the internal development of capacities implies that Sida and the Institute personnel should have a possibility to take part of the ongoing work of the Consultant when appropriate.

7. SPECIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS

The tenderer shall possess the compulsory requirements below:

- The tenderer shall offer services in the area of this terms of reference,
- The tenderer shall have documented experience in the area of international development co-operation in general and conflict management especially,
- The tenderer shall state how and when, according to the tenderer, the assignment is to be done,
- The tenderer shall state the working methods employed and underlying assumptions made in order to complete assignment and secure the quality of the completed work.
- The tenderer shall state the qualifications of each and every one of the person/sub-contractors provided by the tenderer and enclose Curriculum Vitae for each and every one. All CVs shall be signed by the person in question certifying the correctness of the information,

Annex 1

- The tenderer shall state the level of knowledge of spoken and written Swedish, English and French, respectively, and other languages of the personnel/sub-contractors allocated to the Assignment,
- The tenderer shall show prior experience from similar assignments executed in up to the three preceding years and at least two references (whose names and telephone numbers shall be stated and the person in question ought to have been notified) shall be named in respect of these (and reference materials for this shall be submitted),
- The tenderer shall state the total cost of the Assignment, specified as fee per hour for each category of personnel, any reimbursable costs, any other costs and any discounts (all types of costs in SEK and exclusive of VAT),
- The tenderer shall submit a proposal for time and working schedules according to the assignment,
- The tenderer shall accept Sida's General Conditions and state whether the draft contract is accepted and set out any reservations as to the unconditional contract conditions (which shall be stated),
- The tenderer should have a gender based team and use a participatory approach and,
- The tenderer should be able to sign the contract no later than November 15, 2003.

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- LPI's Annual Financial Reports for the years 1992-2003

Somalia:

- Regional and District Councils Formation in Somalia, 1994
- Introduction to LPI/HAP Planning Meeting for Somalia, Lake Naivasha Country Club, 23-29 April 1996
- LPI-HAP programme document for 1996-99, by Elias Habte Selassie, June 1996
- Project Document: Civic Education Project, Somalia, September 1996
- Program Document for Somalia/Somaliland 1998 - part of the three-year program plan 1996-1999
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- Life and Peace Institute Women Activities in Somalia from October 1994 to May 1999
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- TOTs: Local Government Council Training Programme, prepared by Ismail Essa Abraar
- Training of Trainers Program: Manual, compiled by Jamal Mohamed Barrow, Mogadishu, Somalia, 29 August 2001
- Process Report of Workshop for FOPAG Board at Maan Soor Hotel, Hargeisa, 31th September - 2nd October 2002

In addition, see separate list of documentation regarding Somalia between 1990 and 1997

DRC:

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- Assessment report: 'Keeping up the Hope: Assessing local efforts at peace and reconciliation in North and South Kivu, DRC', by Susanne Thurfjell, May-June 2000
- Report First Congo trip, on behalf of the Life & Peace Institute, by Hans Romkema, 28 March to 11 June 2001
- Rapport de la consultation d'Elementaita sur les initiatives de paix au Kivu, Une rencontre organisée par L'Institute Vie & Paix, Elementaita, Kenya, 26 au 28 juin 2001
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Evaluation of Life & Peace Institute

Democratic Republic of Congo

&

Republic of Somalia

Inception Report

Swedegroup international consultants AB
February 2004

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Abbreviations

CRE Conflict Resolution Evaluator

CRI Conflict Resolution Intervention

CRIN Conflict Resolution Interventionist

LPI Life & Peace Institute

ToR Terms of Reference

Introduction

This inception report outlines in some detail the methodological approach as well as the workplan that the evaluation team intends to follow. The report is, at the specific request of Sida, heavily biased in favour of positioning this evaluation within a larger context of method development as regards evaluation of peace-building projects and programmes. As such it should not be seen as providing a structure to the evaluation report, nor should it be read as a straight-jacket into which the actual field work will be compressed. Rather it lists various issues and inroads that, depending very much on the situation in the field as well as on the limitations in time and resources available to the evaluation, we will use as one of the guiding grids.

The report is divided into four parts.

Part A part deals with some concerns and underlying issues that, although of only indirect implication for the actual work to be carried out, will nevertheless form a backdrop of the evaluation and may even come to the fore in the final reconciliation and analysis of the information collected.

Part B deals with an 'ideal' evaluation model, distilled partly in response to the comprehensive review of the state of the art provided by Church & Shouldice⁶ as well as on standard evaluation practice. It is offered here as a charter or 'vision' that will guide the work but that we also know will not be possible to pursue in all its aspects. Even so we believe that one important aspect of the evaluation is to review, at recurrent intervals, the relevance and practicality of the various aspects raised in this 'ideal' model. This also means continuously reviewing and prioritising what is included and what is left out, including thereby an assessment of the reliability and validity of our findings. This section can be said to constitute an effort towards a 'theory-based evaluation' put forth as an optimal (if admittedly somewhat unrealistic) approach by Church and Shouldice (2003), and will be revisited in a condensed form as an appendix to the final report.

This model is set against a more mundane field-based approach in **Part C**. Here the stress is on discussing practical information points and techniques during the field investigations. The concern here is twofold. First the constraints that an evaluation such as this one will face - in terms of limited time, field logistics, security, and socio-political sensitivity that goes with dealing with societies and communities under stress or overt conflict. Secondly, it discusses and makes a distinction between the two 'cases' to be evaluated - in terms of contextual differences as well as differences in what is being evaluated.

In a very real sense the final outcome in terms of method development as required by our ToR will emerge from a meeting between the theory-based (or conceptual) approach in part 2 and the field-based (or operational) approach in part 3. This will also form the basis of our possible recommendations for further (or alternative) assessments, e.g. more participatory and locally based evaluation efforts.

In **Part D** we present a workplan and budget. It goes without saying that the timeplan is most firm as regards the outer limits and critical events (e.g. dates for the start and end of the fieldwork, for reports, and for final presentation/workshop)

In addition to this report, we have drawn up a detailed checklist of issues to be probed during our field work (incl. discussions with regional and HQ staff of LPI). This will remain internal to the team during the evaluation process but will be appended to the final report.

⁶Church & Shouldice, 2002 & 2003

A. Underlying assumptions and concerns

The ToR clearly specifies that this evaluation should be field-based, i.e. should deal with the effectiveness, outcomes and impact of the LPI 'interventions' and not with the institutional issues such as the overall strategy, capacity, or value-base of the LPI or its associated partners. While this will certainly form the mainstay of the evaluation we also believe that it will be necessary consider the institutional and organisational framework within which these interventions are played out.

As is often the case, the ToR of this evaluation spans the concerns and agendas of several main stakeholders. On one hand there is **Sida** whose main concern (somewhat crudely put) is whether the financial support to LPI has yielded '*value for money*' - i.e. with a focus on efficiency, effectiveness and impact of the peace-building initiatives funded by Sida.

However, as conflict resolution is also an increasingly important policy arena for Sida and given the vagueness of the results documented so far, Sida's secondary interest is in improving the methodologies and techniques of evaluating peace building efforts. In this its agenda is the same as that of **practitioners of conflict resolution** that reportedly see the *development of evaluative approaches, methods and techniques* as a major challenge.

Third, there is the **Life and Peace Institute** for which these projects or programmes represent an extension of its values, strategies and overall objectives. For LPI the evaluation is primarily an input to further developing its operational strategy and approach.

While we take these agendas as given it is clear that the evaluation may lead us also to comment the role of one or more of these main stakeholders – e.g. on Sida's capacity to communicate its expectations and policies to LPI, on the relevance of special evaluation methods and techniques for conflict resolution efforts, or on LPI's capacity for strategic guidance.

A major concern is of course the practicality of the fieldwork itself, particularly as regards Somalia. As noted in Part C we will use some indicators on the feasibility of the fieldwork, failing which we will develop an alternative approach as a recommendation to Sida. It is therefore essential that the evaluation is carried out in close consultation with Sida/Nairobi.

B. Conceptual approach

“...most current evaluation methodologies use a project-approach, which assumes the intervention is discrete, measurable and will lead to concrete outcomes in a set period of time. However, peace-work tends to involve building relationships, trust and structures that do not easily respond to pre-established and time-limited categories. Most interviewees felt that the evaluation approaches used failed to capture many of the significant factors of working on conflict.” (Church & Shouldice 2002:13)

This note aims at presenting a guideline for evaluations of conflict resolution interventions. It is conditioned by the Terms of Reference for the evaluation of Life & Peace Institute (LPI) activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia funded by Sida. It is based both on a literature survey of some of the most recent and relevant studies/papers/documents on peace work efforts in conflict zones, as well as on documents provided by LPI.

Although it aims to be comprehensive there are some critical aspects that have been left out, primarily due to the fact that the field in evaluating CRIN is new and raise many still unanswered key questions. These questions relate to how to measure micro-macro peace impacts, how to conduct general peace and conflict assessments, how to define “successful” CRI, as well as how long time span we need to follow the CRIN. One purpose of the focus on method development as spelt out in the ToR is to contribute to filling these gaps.

B.1. RESEARCH METHODS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION INTERVENTIONS

Generally speaking, the field of inquiries of conflict resolution interventions is a recent one with relatively few concrete suggestions on how to approach the main issues at stake. The challenging question is how individual peace building projects relate to the wider conflict context and how to evaluate this – how to attribute observable changes? what constitutes a sustainable intervention? how to distinguish intended and unintended effects? (cf. Leonhardt, 2001)

Analysing the CRI of LPI will require a consideration of the following:

Theories of conflict. These deal with causes of conflict and outbreak of violence. The conflict analysis becomes of utter importance since this will influence LPI’s way of designing its activities, what actors that need to be considered as well which course of entry they should take. Should the agency work *in* the conflict or *on* the conflict? In the LPI case, among both stakeholders and staff members, we need to inquire on what values, norms as well as mandate that are given/taken in relation to CRI. For instance, if the ambition of the agencies is to be impartial in the conflict, the difficulties to cope with this role are immense. The LPI clearly spelled out from the beginning that their role in Somalia was to *facilitate*, and in DRC to ‘accompagné’, the peace-work on the ground at the same time as they worked on the conflict and became advocates of civil society. Clearly, in a conflict the CRI agencies must establish mechanisms that constantly give space for reflecting over the role(s) they should take (cf. Paffenholz, 2003:67).

Theories of conflict resolution. These theories explore what needs to be achieved in order to transform the conflict to be handled in a non-violent way. What are the structural issues at stake, are there prejudices and stereotypes that need to be considered and tackled, are there inadequacies in the relationships between the conflicting parties that need to be addressed? The theories usually include one or the other of the model of individual change, the model of healthy relationship and

connection, the model of withdrawal of the resources for war, reduction of violence model, root causes/justice, institutional development, changes in political elites, grassroots mobilisation (cf Woodrow, P. 2002 in Church & Shouldice 2003). LPI works with the assumption that a “bottom-up” approach could gradually draw all sections together into a long-term peace building process. Several questions can be addressed. Was the LPI approach used due to the belief that if enough trust and new relationships were established (i.e. healthy civil society) then other sectors would follow or was it related to an assumption that key issues first were solved in civil society thereby changing the political conditions at the top? Or were there other considerations?

Theories of practice. How can the goals or required changes that are linked to theories of conflict resolution be realised? Here the focus is on the selection of methods of conflict resolution. What methods and techniques does LPI consider and how well do these methods fit in order to reach the overarching goal? Why were these selected and were alternatives considered?

Theories of change. What are the mechanisms through which the desired change(s) can be generated? Great emphasis should be placed on evaluating the underlying assumptions concerning the potentials of change. Agencies often consider approaching key people (top politicians, influential persons, etc.) from various sectors of society or mobilising more advocates (i.e. activating a “critical mass” of people) (cf. CDA, Chapter 7) or a combination of both. Furthermore, how far is the CRI aimed to reach? What impact should the LPI efforts in Somalia and Congo have in terms of change?

Working assumptions about change. How will the particular actions lead to desired change? The actual implementation of each action needs to be linked to the theory of change. How are the series of actions interlinked and related to the overarching idea of change? Which steps did LPI consider? (cf. Church & Shouldice 2003, Lederach 1997)

These above aspects lay the ground for how to approach indicators of CRI.

B.2. ASPECTS TO CONSIDER

The first aspect is related to *effectiveness*, i.e. activities against objectives and through an assessment of roles.


When evaluating the objectives of the project the idea is to “translate” the relatively vague or highly generalised objectives formulated by the conflict resolution intervener (CRI) into more operational “would-be-objectives” that are contextualized to the particular conflict zone/war ridden society.

When focusing on assessment of roles, we intend to identify to what extent the agency of CRI, in our case, LPI, can be seen as non-partisan dialogue platform, a research/documentation/information centre, a network facilitator, a human resource development centre and to what extent they are living up to these roles and to what extent they have organised themselves in order to function according to these roles.

The second major aspect is that of *impact* and its associated concept of *sustainability*. The task is to find out how a) the “project” could be seen as a seed-bed for local initiatives and ownership of peace initiatives, b) the “project’s influence on the responsive and proactive capacity of political institutions, c) the project as a source of behavioural change (non-violence), d) the “project” as a source of attitudinal change (security), d) the relevance of the “project” interventions (assumptions, objectives, mode of operation) given a)-d) above.

In overall terms the analytical process can be depicted as follows

Diagram. The whole CRI process (from Church & Shouldice 2003:37)



B.3. ANALYTICAL SCHEME

Although our proposed analytical scheme is of course related to our specific ToR its base elements are drawn primarily from Church & Shouldice (2003) as well as to a certain extent on Lederach (1997). From Lederach, we have a scheme for how long-term peace building can be activated. Lederach's study is directed to practitioners rather than researchers/evaluators. It gives one outline on how a CRI can be successfully implemented. Lederach has also been one of the contributing persons in LPI preparations and follow up of activities in the Somalia context. From Church & Shouldice (2003) we have used several sets of questions for the CRI evaluation scheme.

The following outlines an 'ideal model' that does not incorporate the rough and tumble of conditions in the field, nor the time constraints that goes with an evaluation contracted by Sida. As such it is offered as a baseline or vision, the deviations from which during the course of the evaluation will be assessed and noted in the final methodological note to be appended to the report.

B.3.1. Goals and assumptions

The first step will be to outline the goals and assumptions the agencies have. Why and how is the agency conducting this particular intervention? In our case, we need to identify why has LPI engaged in peace building activities in Somalia and Congo?

Three aspects are guiding the evaluation of goals and assumptions: appropriateness consideration, theoretical analysis as well as strategic review.

Appropriateness:

When evaluating if the intervention has contributed in most significant possible way we can use the following questions:

- Was an in-depth (realistic, comprehensive, culturally sensitive, rigorous, etc.) conflict analysis conducted?
- Were there direct linkages between the intervention strategy and this analysis?
- To what degree are critical leverage points identified and incorporated into the intervention strategy?
- Are there other intervention strategies that could have contributed in a more significant manner?

When evaluating if the selected activities within the intervention were the most appropriate we can use the following questions:

- Were the activities selected based on or merged with the conflict analysis?
- Were the affected community/individuals consulted?
- Were multiple options considered using standardised criteria?
- Were the activities monitored and re-aligned if and when necessary?

Analytical review

This implies evaluating the way the LPI has used (or not) some version of theories of change and/or associated assumptions that explicitly or implicitly flesh out the intervention strategy.

Questions that will be explored are:

- Have the LPI /its partners its belief in how conflicts are transformed or changes is enabled in a society? If so what?
- Has LPI or relevant practitioners/staff investigated the assumptions by which they operate? If so, what are they?
- Have these assumptions or theories ever been reviewed and fed back into the planning process in light of intervention outcomes and impacts?

Strategic Review:

In evaluating whether the organisation is fulfilling its vision and mandate through its choices of interventions the following questions can be addressed:

- Can the intervention be logically connected to the achievement of the organisational mandate?

- Does the intervention capitalise on the agency's comparative advantage or unique skill set?
- Are there other organisations that have a more expertise in this area?

B.3.2. Process accountability

Under the header “process and accountability” focus is placed on implementation of intervention. The three aspects at focus are: management and administration, cost-accountability and process appraisal.

Management and administration:

When evaluating the operational aspect of the intervention the following questions can be raised:

- How accurately was the projected intervention plan in terms of staff resources, skills required, timelines, and budgets?
- Were adequate direction, supervision and support provided for the intervention co-ordinator and/or administrator?
- Were avenues of communication open and used effectively and consistently between all stakeholders?
- Were all aspects of the intervention well organised?

Cost assessment:

When evaluating how the organisation's is conducting their cost-strategies in relation to the intervention the following questions can be used:

Were alternative options in relation to costs considered when designing the programme?

Does the organisation attempt to utilise economies of scale where possible?

Did lack of planning result in last minute actions that had significantly higher costs?

Were choices made by the agency that were outside the usual costs effectiveness norms justifiable?

Process assessment:

The focus on the agency's effectiveness of the techniques that are utilised can be addressed with the help of the following process questions:

- 1) Did the participants feel that their needs were being considered and addressed throughout the intervention?
- 2) Did the actions exhibited during the intervention reflect the values of the organisation and

the skills and expertise of the staff?

- 3) Did the conflict-affected community feel the process went well?

B.3.3. Focus of change

Here focus is on assessing what difference the intervention made in the conflict context. The societal sectors that should be influenced need to be identified. For instance, they could be individuals, family units, social networks/peer groups, communities or a society at large. A careful consideration must be made when relating to the impact on “peace writ-large”. From a holistic perspective, one could easily argue that any small-scale project, has some impact of the broader conflict. However, most likely the linkage between the intervention and relevant variables are too complex in order to make a clear peace impact assessment of small-scale interventions. The LPI, however, had the ambition to approach the entire society in Somalia and aims at transforming the conflict in Eastern parts of Congo with the so-called community based approaches (i.e. bottom-up approach). Still, we need to evaluate LPI's CRI in relation to were they thought they would have the greatest impact, simultaneously being aware that a decreasing impact may/or may not follow also in other societal sectors. Hence, we need to evaluate LPI's intentions of impact but also consider the unintended consequences of their actions.

Three aspects will here be addressed: outputs, outcomes and impact evaluation.

Output:

When evaluating outputs focus is on measurable results and activities in the intervention. The following question can be used:

- 1) What activities were conducted?
- 2) Who did the intervention reach?
- 3) Were the targets for the intervention achieved?

Outcome:

When evaluating the outcomes focus is placed on the intervention's product.

- 1) What changes were produced as a result of the intervention?
- 2) Was the outcome linked to the objectives?
- 3) Did any unexpected outcome occur as a result of the intervention?

Impact evaluation:

We define impact as the, intended and unintended consequences of intervention's outcomes.

- 1) Is there evidence of the outcome of the intervention being utilised?

- 2) Were there any unintended positive or negative results from this intervention and can they be linked to a discernible element of the intervention?
- 3) Over time, has the original change/impact proved sustainable?
- 4) Was there any evidence that a multiplier effect occurred due to this project?

C. Operational approach

C.1. OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

The evaluation will be carried out within certain given parameters that will determine the extent to which the conceptual approach can be accommodated.

Timeframe. In each of the cases the fieldwork will in practice be limited to two calendar weeks (6 personweeks), with one calendar week set aside for transport/travel. In addition, 7 personweeks have been allotted for preparation (incl. reading up on project documents and background material) and reporting. This means that (a) the method used will have to be very ‘quick and dirty’, (b) indicators will have to be prioritised, and (c) there will be a fairly strict division of labour/foci over the team-members

Context.

(a) DRC is in a state of flux with sporadic and lingering outbursts of violence. However, this will affect more travel between places (some roads being prone to armed robbery) than the possibility of meeting people once one has arrived in a locality. LPI supports a network of local churches on which their ‘bottom-up’ approach to CRI is based. In addition (and unlike Somalia) LPI interacts with regional political leaders, mostly ethnic or clan-based. Although the reconciliation efforts promoted by LPI have as their focus inter-ethnic and inter-community conflicts, an important characteristic of the conflict is the heavy involvement of outside troops and armed gangs with looting and extremely extensive rapes as their primary tools-of-trade. Furthermore, the region has a large ‘refugee’ population that has ‘appropriated’ land with the help of outside militias and troops. This means that a major task for the evaluation is to identify the way LPI has helped (and is helping) to forge working alliances and platforms for dialogue – by whom and how different parties have been identified, the modalities and nature of alliances, the mechanisms of interaction and dialogues, and the incentives/‘rewards’ as well as checks-and-balances as conceived by the interacting parties.

(b) In Somalia armed conflict is still widespread and very unpredictable, with different regions/territories under the control of rival warlords. This will severely curtail movement of the team both between different areas within Somalia as well as in and out of Somalia itself, and also strain the budget (transport being primarily by chartered small planes from Nairobi). It will also affect the possibility of arranging meetings with people at any given place, apart from posing continuous security problems along the way.

Furthermore, LPI’s involvement in Somalia is at present only indirect, through a local NGO midwifed by LPI out of its earlier employees within Somalia. This means that one important focus for the evaluation will be to locate and analyse the current role and working modalities of people trained by LPI, as well as local institutions (council of elders, district councils, women groups) supported by LPI during the years of direct intervention.

Project momentum. In DRC the LPI intervention is still building up. This means that the focus will be on (a) ongoing processes, incl. extrapolation in social/political space and over time; (b) efficiency and effectiveness, i.e. on issues that reflect patterns of resource use (money, people, and

time) as well as articulation and common understanding of what one wants to achieve. In Somalia the LPI's direct intervention is over since the past three years (forced exit by the Board of LPI). The focus is therefore directly on two aspects – impact and sustainability, which in this case are virtually two sides of the same coin. These will be looked at from three perspectives: (a) extent to which the local NGO fostered by LPI is still active, incl. the role, competence, working modalities, and local credibility of its staff; (b) identification and assessment of local institutions trained/supported by LPI, in particular council of elders and women groups; and (c) the larger institutional framework, incl. LPI itself and its working modalities ('lessons learnt and absorbed') as well as the peace-building practice in general (the LPI Somalia intervention being probably the most cited CRI in professional publications around peace-building)

C.2 FIELDWORK METHODOLOGY

As always in severely time-bound evaluations the main issue in both cases is that of selecting points/localities/institutions of enquiry. This will be even more critical given the security restrictions and limited (or unknown) access in DRC and more so Somalia. And as always the ambition is not go for a representative sample but to go for case-specific analyses that illustrate the range and variation (if any) of the activities as well as their impact (if any).

A. DRC

The primary technique to be used here is focal group discussions – i.e. structured discussions with peer groups in selected localities. The localities will be selected to reflect (a) interventions or presence of LPI sponsored activities, as well as 'control localities'; (b) ethnic/social composition (dominant, mixed, transient); (c) severity of conflict history

The group discussions (peers of women, of elders, of neighbours, of local officials) will focus on, or be prompted to generate information on, the following indicators:

- Changes in group interactions (prior to, during, and after conflict/present), e.g. ownership and usufructary rights, exchange (goods & labour), local festivals/rituals,
- Changes in community decision-making (leadership composition, modalities, transparency, sanctions)
- Spontaneous local initiatives, outside initiatives, training & information, with specific reference to reconciliation and peace-building
- Knowledge of and views on LPI or LPI-promoted activities

This will be supplemented by

- (a) individual/household case studies
- (b) identification and mapping of local institutions and political leadership touched by or involved in LPI-promoted activities
- (c) interviews with parallel or 'like-minded' initiatives (UN, bilaterals, NGOs) active in the area as peace-promoters or CRIN
- (d) Standard organisational and management assessment of LPI and its associates

B. Somalia

The fieldwork will depend heavily on the conflict dynamics from day-to-day, and will require considerable ingenuity and flexibility (and cost awareness). It is assumed that visits will be possible to at least three localities/districts/bordering warlord areas where LPI has been active, two of which

should also have some kind of ongoing activity by the local NGO that continues the work started by LPI. Should this not be possible for security/transport/cost/time reasons the team will propose and outline an alternative based on local individuals, to be trained by a Nairobi-based NGO.

The techniques will be roughly the same as that of DRC, with the difference that the focal group discussions will not be based on peers but on people associated with an institution having been trained by or otherwise supported by LPI. In addition, the local NGO staff will be interviewed individually and collectively.

The indicators used will, in comparison to DRC, be much more focussed on

- (a) the fate of techniques, trainings, materials, etc provided by LPI, the extent to which they are still in use and/or replicated, and the extent to which they have spawned or been supplemented/replaced by local initiatives
- (b) the responsiveness, transparency, and composition of local political institutions
- (c) behavioural changes, particularly as regards group and individual interaction (incl. incidence and nature of violence)
- (d) locally induced or introduced measures of personal security (as opposed to outside raids or incursions)
- (e) windows of opportunities caught or passed by LPI in the course of its direct involvement (incl. changes in working modalities in response to local events and conditions)

Equally important will be to undertake some form of tracer study based on the training rosters maintained by LPI. This will be particularly focused on women as they were reportedly the most vocal and active of those supported by LPI, but will also include members of councils of elders.

D. Workplan and budget

D.1. WORKPLAN

February 15 – 28:	Inception period ○ Collection of documents and background information ○ Interviews with LPI staff ○ Preparation of methods and approaches, incl. seminar at Padrigu
March 2	Presentation and discussion of Inception Report
March 8	Michael Schulz & Ingrid Samset travel to Bukavu
March 14	Gordon Tamm & Maria Eriksson travel to Bukavu
March 16	Michael Schulz departs for Sweden
March 25	Workshop with LPI & partner organisations in Bukavu
March 26	Team departs
April 2 submitted	Summary report on main findings and recommendations on DRC to Sida & LPI
April 5	Gordon Tamm, Evelin Lindner, Joakim Gundel departs for Nairobi
April 6	Discussions with LPI staff/Nairobi
April 7	Meetings with other agencies, Nairobi (incl. Swedish Embassy)
April 19	Michael Schulz joins team
April 8-23	Fieldwork, incl. local debriefings on site
April 24	Debriefing workshop with LPI, Nairobi
April 25	Team departs from Nairobi
May 15	Draft report submitted to Sida and LPI
May 19	Presentation & seminar on evaluation report

Note: Planning of fieldwork will for both programmes be done together with LPI staff on site. For Somalia it is assumed that a minimum of two trips from Nairobi into Somalia will be done by charter flights

D.2. BUDGET

The budget has been prepared only for costs (fees for Swedegroup staff remain as in the original proposal)

Item	Unit	Unit cost	Total units	Inception Sweden	Fieldwork		Reporting Sweden	Seminar Sweden	TOTAL
					Somalia	DRC			
Int'l travel - Somalia	Nairobi	airtickets	11 000	4		44 000			44 000
Int'l travel - DRC		airtickets	14 000	4			56 000		56 000
Flights Nbo-Somalia		charter flight	30 000	2		60 000			60 000
Allowance - Somalia		persondays	374	63		23 562			23 562
Allowance - DRC		persondays	661	52			34 372		34 372
Hotel DRC		nights	800	48			38 400		38 400
Hotel Somalia/Nairobi		nights	800	58			46 400		46 400
Local travels - Sweden		traintickets	2 200	10	13 200		2 200	6 600	22 000
Allowance Sweden		persondays	190	21	1 900		1 520	570	3 990
Hotel Sweden		nights	900	9				8 100	8 100
Local assistants/transl.		persondays	600	64		19 200	19 200		38 400
Local travel (Som. & DRC)		transportdays	300	56		16 800	14 700		31 500
Briefing/debriefing workshops						20 000	20 000		40 000
Misc (incl translation costs of report from English to French)									35 000
Total				15 100	183 562	229 072	3 720	15 270	481 724

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Notes from the discussion of the inception report at Sida 2004-03-02

1. What priorities will we make among several issues raised in the comprehensive note on the methodology (section B)?

Answer: For the evaluation work the starting point and concrete emphasis during the fieldwork would be the points raised in section B.2.3 – ‘focus on change’ and in section C. The evaluation work will not (except in the case of Michael Schulz who will be responsible for the methodological ‘sub-project’ within the overall evaluation) start from the theory levels but concentrate on identifying aspects of change on the ground and from there work itself ‘backwards’/‘upwards’ to relevant conceptual levels.

2. The difference between the DRC and Somalia evaluations?

Answer: the focus in DRC is on *actors* involved by or otherwise interacting with LPI (who are they, how did they get involved with or be selected by LPI, what is their base, what is their view on LPI, what are their relations to others, etc) and *effectiveness* (way by which LPI defines, revises, pursues and follows up of purposes and objectives of LPI activities). Somalia the focus is on *impact* - on tracing and identifying direct or indirect ‘footprints’ or ‘remnants’, relating these to the LPI interventions, and see what lessons were learnt/should be learnt by LPI as well as peace practitioners in general – and *sustainability*.

3. What is the relation between the ‘ideal model’ (section B) and the actual evaluation?

Answer: The method development (‘how to evaluate peace-work in real life conditions’) can be seen as a sub-project within the overall evaluation based on the fact that the peace work initiatives have so far been stronger on action than on defining and identifying results. It is an effort that will influence and inject itself into the more regular evaluation process for which the starting point is on the ground realities and patterns of change, but it will also have its own purpose and rationale in which DRC and Somalia will constitute ‘cases’ (rather being foci of evaluation as such). Michael Schulz will be responsible for this sub-project within the team. A separate report on the method development will be annexed to the final report, in which both the original ‘ideal model’ will be assessed for its relevance and a more practical approach (incl indicators etc) will hopefully be put forward.

4. Will we have local members in the team (for relevance and ‘feel’)?

Answer: yes, in both DRC & Somalia we will get local people associated with the team – in DRC non-LPI individuals proposed by LPI but finally selected by us on arrival in Bukavu (and also LPI staff to help in establishing contacts as well as to include a measure of participatory evaluation), in Somalia staff suggested by LPI/FOPAG (the Somali NGO fostered by LPI) and selected by us on arrival. In Somalia the fieldwork will hopefully also be joined by FOPAG staff to promote security etc. In addition we aim at having local debriefing workshops in (a) the various localities visited in Somalia (b) with the LPI staff in Nairobi, (c) LPI and selected partners in Bukavu.

5. What happens if the Somalia evaluation turns out to be impractical and/or partial?

We will then suggest an alternative way of evaluating the Somali experience, dependent on Sida’s/LPI’s interest in completing an evaluation there and in all likelihood relying on local team(s)

within Somalia and mentored/supported from the outside. An outline of such a proposal would then form part of a recommendation from us to Sida/LPI for them to consider and pursue as a separate venture outside the fold of this evaluation.

6. When can we share the main findings, conclusions and recommendations of the DRC evaluation with Sida and LPI?

We will submit (electronically) a summary note on DRC to Sida and LPI on March 31, to be presented/discussed with LPI and Sida on April 2 by one member from the evaluation team. The note may be used by LPI in their dialogue with other donors, should they want to do so.

This note should not be confused with the final comprehensive report that will include Somalia, and it will contain only in a 'brutal' form the main outcome of the evaluation so as to enable Sida and LPI to move ahead with their dialogue on DRC.

Gordon Tamm

2004-03-03

1. People met

A. LPI

Tore Samuelsson, Director of Communication & Coordination
Claudette Werleigh, Director of Conflict Transformation Programme
Hans Romkema, LPI Representative in DRC
Johan Svensson, LPI Representative in the Horn of Africa
Susanne Thurfjell, Senior Programme Officer
Tarekegu Adebo, Project Coordinator (research)
(Sture Normark, previous director of the Horn of Africa Programme)
Regional Programme Officers, Bukavu
 Buuma, Déo, Head of Administration
 Kayira, Tharcisse, Programme officer
 Maunga, Sylvie, Programme officer
 Morvan, Hélène, Research assistant
 Mwavita, Nono, Programme officer
Regional Programme Officers, Nairobi (Horn of Africa Programme)

B. In the Democratic Republic of Congo

Bahati, Bitanga	CODHOP
Bahati, Bruno	BCSC
Bahati, Malala	CCAP
Bahoze, Hamuli	CODHOP
Baumon, Ndabuy	CODHOP
Biringolwa, Solide	Synergie VIE
Bulambo, Jacques	COPAH
Bupiri, Roger	LPI consultant
Engström, Gudrun	NCA
Forongo, Mpirikanyi	ACODRI
Hyawe-Hinyi, Thaddée	BCSC
Kagungulu, Pascal	Héritiers de la Justice
Kahayira, Joseph	NCA
Kajemba, Eric	Radio Maria
Kalimba, Oscar	PADEBU
Kambere Uwaki, Théogène	ACODRI
Kaningini Kyoto, Didace	BCSC
Kubisa Muzenende, Sosthène	LAV
Mangaza, Brigitte	CODHOP
Maroyi Rusengo, Xavier	Catholic church
Mashanda, Murhega	RIO
Mastaki, Trish	CP
Mokoto, Mariamu	CODHOP
Mugangu, Séverin	UCB
Muhemeru, Jean-Bosco	BCSC
Muhima, Shebalewa	CODHOP
Mukis K., Jean Pierre	CODHOP

Mulindilwa, Willy	SOCIWA
Nafranga, Noella	LIFOPAD
Namwira, Maurice	Héritiers de la Justice
Ndakala, Emmanuel	COPAH
Ngalula, Florence	LIFOPAD
Ntabugi, Nono	CP
Ntezy, Honoré	CODHOP
Pablo, Muke B.	CP
Pezi, Alexis	CECI
Ramazani, Kombi	COPAH
Ramazani, Songolo	COPAH
Reid, Timothy	MONUC
Rugarabura, Emmanuel	BCSC
Rukata, Nzigire	LIFOPAD
Safari Bagula, Jean-Baptiste	LAV
Saidia Mulamba, Pierre	BCSC
Sharif, Sharouh	MONUC
Sjølie, Harald and Bjørg	NCA
Walimba, Mas	Mayi-Mayi
Yayote, William	CP
Zilahinua, Vévé	LIFOPAD

C. In Nairobi/Somaliland

Badejo, Babafemi A.	UN Political Office for Somalia
Simkin, Paul	Delegation of the EC in Kenya (Somalia unit)
Font, Mila	Delegation of the EC in Kenya (Somalia unit)
Mörch, Jesper	UNICEF Representative for Somalia
In Hargeisha, Somaliland	
Zainib Mohammed Hassan, GTZ	
Abdirahman Yousuf Arten, Peace Academy	
Ismael Hussein, CONSOGO	
Ismahan Abdisalam, NAGAAD	
Aden Yousuf Abuker, ICD	
Ahmed Gulied, Local govt, Hargeisha	
Ahmed Abdi Dacar, private citizen (returnee from Sweden)	
Fadumo Ibrahim, UNDP (human rights programme)	
FOPAG management and staff	
Sayeed Ahmad, PENHA	
Ahmed Ali Adami, Chariman, Somaliland Electoral Commission	
H.E. Ahmed Ali Hassan, Minister of Justice, Govt of Somaliland	
Journalists and local intellectuals	

Works schedule and itinerary

February 15 – 28:	Inception period ○ Collection of documents and background information ○ Interviews with LPI staff ○ Preparation of methods and approaches, incl. seminar at Padrigu
March 2	Presentation and discussion of Inception Report
March 8	Michael Schulz & Ingrid Samset travel to DRC Interviews and field visits in Bukavu and South Kivu
March 15	Michael Schulz departs DRC
March 16	Gordon Tamm joins team in Bukavu Interviews and field visits in North Kivu
March 25	Debriefing with partner organisations in Goma
March 29	Debriefing with LPI team, Bukavu Ingrid Samset departs for Norway
March 31	Gordon Tamm departs for Sweden
April 6	Debriefing with Sida and LPI on DRC
May 9	Gordon Tamm and Michael Schulz departs for Nairobi
May 10-12	Meetings with LPI management and staff, and stakeholders in Nairobi
May 13-15	GT and MS in Hargeisha, Somaliland Meetings with local stakeholders and FOPAG
May 15	MS departs for Sweden
May 16	GT departs for Sweden
July 2	Submission of draft report to Sida and LPI
July 6 August 23	Discussion with Sida and LPI on draft report Submission of final report
September 3	Presentation and mini-workshop on final report

Rapport d'une réunion avec représentants de partenaires de l'Institut vie et paix

Temps : Jeudi 25 mars 2004, 15h00-19h00

Lieu : Goma, RDC

Présents :

1. Gordon Tamm et Ingrid Samset, membres de l'équipe de l'évaluation
2. 8 représentants d'associations locales qui ont été appuyées par l'IVP :

<i>Nom, prénom</i>	<i>Organisation</i>
Bahati, Mulala	CCAP
Forongo, Mpirikanyi	ACODRI
Kalimba, Oscar	PADEBU
Mashanda, Murhega	RIO
Mulindilwa, Willy	SOCIWA
Nafranga, Noella	LIFOPAD
Ndakala, Emmanuel	COPAH
Rukata, Nzigire	LIFOPAD

1. Objectifs et déroulement de la réunion

Vers la fin du travail au Congo, nous convoquons pour une discussion représentants d'associations locales qui avaient reçu de l'appui en termes de conseil et/ou financement de l'Institut vie et paix. Jusqu'au temps de ce meeting, on avait déjà rencontré un nombre de tels « partenaires » dans des réunions singulières. Sur base des expériences qu'avaient partagées ces différents partenaires, on avait eu de multiples impressions sur une variété de thèmes liés au travail de l'Institut. Prenant compte de ces impressions, de meetings avec l'IVP et d'autres acteurs aussi que nos propres études et discussions, nous avons donc commencé à tirer des conclusions préliminaires.

Pendant notre travail d'évaluation, on avait aussi noté qu'une réunion entre les partenaires et l'IVP avait été tenue du 14-17 juillet 2003. Le rapport de cette réunion apportait une liste de forces et faiblesses de l'IVP comme elles avaient été identifiées par les partenaires eux-mêmes.

Nous avons donc voulu profiter de la présence de certains représentants de partenaires pour discuter notamment deux aspects :

- A. Quels seraient leurs réactions à nos conclusions préliminaires ?
- B. Dans quelle mesure les conclusions et recommandations de l'atelier de juillet 2003 restaient-elles les mêmes, ou avaient-elles été implanté sur terrain ?

Pour adresser ces questions, nous avons partagé les participants du meeting en deux groupes, 4 personnes dans chacun, qui ont poursuivi le débat au long des deux trajets.

Dans ce qui suit, on va présenter les questions plus en détail sur lesquelles les groupes ont travaillé, aussi que leurs réponses telle qu'elles ont été exprimées dans la présentation et le débat en plénière qu'a suivi le travail en carrefours. Le feedback des partenaires est donné en *italics*.

2. Premier groupe : L'IVP et les conclusions préliminaires de l'équipe **QU'EST-CE QUE C'EST, " LE PROGRAMME DE L'IVP " ?**

2 alternatives :

- I. Un programme avec une structure de gestion identifiable au niveau de
- direction stratégique,
 - distribution de ressources,
 - objectifs opérationnels,
 - procédures, etc.

Les issues importantes sont :

- les buts et les objectifs doivent être très clairement formulés et compris par tous
- l'information qui vient du centre dirigeant stratégique doit être aussi très claire
- le centre dirigeant stratégique doit être capable de fournir le nécessaire soutien sur le plan de matériel, ressources, aussi qu'au niveau d'expertise

OU

- II. Un réseau où la direction stratégique n'est pas localisée dans une unité ou centre spécifique mais est exécutée comme un processus de consultations entre les organisations différentes qui constituent le réseau.

Les issues importantes sont :

- le système et les procédures de communication
- les règles, critères et principes qui orientent la sélection d'organisations, projets et activités
- les responsabilités – techniques, de coordination, de formation, d'administration etc – sont diffusées et partagées parmi les partenaires

Réponse : Le groupe a vu l'IVP comme un programme plutôt que comme un réseau. Néanmoins, l'idée d'un réseau horizontale avec l'IVP comme un partenaire parmi les autres, sur un plan d'égalité et de consultations mutuelles, a été considéré intéressant et peut-être nécessaire de poursuivre dans l'avenir ; étant donné que les associations locales probablement vont exister plus longtemps que l'IVP lui-même dans la région.

LA PERCEPTION DE CE QUE CONSTITUE « LE PROGRAMME DE L'IVP » A DONC DES IMPLICATIONS SUR LA QUESTION DE COMMENT ON PERÇOIT LES FORCES ET LES FAIBLESSES DE L'INSTITUT. CI-DESSOUS, NOUS RÉSUMONS LES CONCLUSIONS PRINCIPALES QUE NOUS AVONS TIRÉ COMME ÉQUIPE D'ÉVALUATION, EN VOUS POSANT LES QUESTIONS SUIVANTES :

- Est-ce que vous êtes d'accord avec ces points donnés ci-dessous?
- Si vous n'êtes pas d'accord, pourquoi?
- Quelle est la variation de perceptions à travers les partenaires présents ?

Conclusions préliminaires de l'équipe d'évaluation

D'ABORD, NOUS AVONS NOTÉ LES **FORCES** SUIVANTES:

- (1) **L'ENGAGEMENT** DE L'IVP EST FORT ENVERS LA VALEUR ET NOTION DE TRANSFORMATION DE CONFLIT À TRAVERS LES PARTENAIRES.

Réponse : L'implication de l'IVP est manifeste dans la transformation de conflit à la base et au sein des organisations. Le travail avec les partenaires est réel.

- (2) **La capacité et la compétence** des plateformes et organisations participantes en matière de transformation de conflits sont augmentées, dans quelques cas notamment.

Réponse : Ceci est vrai dans

- *la formation des médiateurs,*
- *la redynamisation de la société civile (formation de noyaux),*
- *la compréhension de la complexité de la paix en tant que processus permanent.*

- (3) Egalement dans certains cas, la volonté et la capacité des plateformes et organisations participantes à traiter non seulement les conflits externes, mais aussi des **conflits au sein de leurs propres associations**, sont renforcées.

Réponse : Ceci est vrai dans la mesure où certaines organisations cherchent à résoudre leurs conflits eux-mêmes, et même certaines associations soutenues par l'IVP se sont regroupées en plateformes d'organisations de paix (communautés villageoises de construction de la paix, COPAH...).

- (4) Il y a une volonté de **partager les expériences et l'information** à travers les divisions.

Réponse : La demande de partager est trop forte, mais elle n'est pas accompagnée facilement. C'est à dire, on a rarement l'occasion de partager les expériences et l'information entre les partenaires, et entre les partenaires et l'Institut.

En même temps, nous avons noté des **faiblesses** générales, parmi elles les suivantes:

- (5) **Le suivi** des activités et projets est en général très faible. Il y a donc un clair risque que l'efficacité soit sub-optimée.

Réponse : L'IVP n'a pas une politique claire d'appui institutionnel, et n'accompagne pas les organisations dans le suivi. Après l'activité, il y a une faiblesse de dialogue.

- (6) Il n'y a pas un système de **monitoring et d'évaluation** de la dynamique des partenaires, les projets et les activités. Il y a donc un risque clair que :

- (a) l'expérience faite ne soit pas exploitée ou poursuivie, et que
- (b) le contrôle de qualité reste très faible.

Réponse : On est d'accord. L'approche d'échange de résultat des activités dans un cadre d'auto-évaluation entre partenaires n'est pas envisagée au sein de l'IVP.

- (7) Il y a un certain degré de confusion et même malentendu sur les critères ou **raisons de sélection** de partenaires, de projets et d'activités. Il y a donc un danger que ceci puisse diminuer l'engagement des partenaires individuels, ou même l'efficacité dans l'ensemble.

Réponse : La politique de l'IVP en termes de sélection est mixte à ce sujet, et ne tient pas compte de certaines réalités du contexte. Le problème que les critères de sélection manquent ou ne sont pas bien communiqués est aggravé par le fait que quelques partenaires soutenus par l'Institut semblent avoir des liens étroits avec membres de l'équipe IVP elle-même.

- (8) Il y a une grande variation en termes d'efficacité de **l'information et la communication** entre les partenaires et l'IVP. Cette variation risque de réduire l'engagement de certaines organisations de même que l'efficacité dans l'ensemble.

*Réponse : Pour la plupart des fois, l'IVP et ses partenaires sont en communication par internet, téléphone, courrier. Les organisations envoient régulièrement des rapports d'activités mais il n'existe pas un organe d'exploitation de ces rapports pour renforcer le feed-back aux organisations, et le suivi des activités. **Au niveau technique la communication fonctionne bien, au niveau contenu elle n'est pas bien développée.***

- (9) Il n'y a pas un effort de trouver ou communiquer une stratégie sur les liens entre **paix et développement**. Cette manque puisse mener à une frustration sur terrain.

RÉPONSE : IL EST DIFFICILE DE PARLER PAIX SANS DES ACTIONS D'URGENCE ET DE MINI-PROJETS DE DÉVELOPPEMENT PERMETTANT DE RASSEMBLER LES ACTEURS ET LA POPULATION, SURTOUT DANS UNE SITUATION DE CRISE PROLONGUÉE. IL N'Y A PAS DE POINTS FOCAL D'ACTIVITÉS COMMUNES DE DÉVELOPPEMENT. POUR RÉCONSTRUIRE LA PAIX, IL FAUDRAIT PAS UNIQUEMENT DES ATELIERS, RENCONTRES, DIALOGUES ET DE SIMILAIRES ACTIVITÉS, MAIS AUSSI ET PEUT-ÊTRE SURTOUT DES PROJETS CONCRETS ET PRATIQUES SUR LESQUELS DES COUCHES DE POPULATIONS OPPOSÉES PUISSENT TRAVAILLER ENSEMBLE. DONC, L'IVP DEVRAIT CONSIDÉRER D'ÉLARGIR SON HORIZON D'ACTIVITÉS QUI PEUVENT MENER À CONSOLIDER LA PAIX.

Autres commentaires du groupe :

- *Les perceptions ont été communes à travers les membres du groupe.*
- *Pour le moment, les assistants de programme à l'IVP tiennent premièrement responsabilité d'axes géographiques. Mais pour augmenter l'efficacité des activités appuyés et les échanges entre partenaires qui travaillent dans domaines ou sur sujets similaires, dans différents endroits, l'Institut devrait considérer de changer cette structure, et laisser son staff se spécialiser et devenir personnes ressources dans un domaine spécifique – à travers des territoires. Autrement dit, pour le partenaires il serait plus utile si le staff de l'IVP avaient été employés au premier lieu sur base de leur connaissance d'axes thématiques plutôt que géographiques.*

3. Deuxième groupe : Perceptions des partenaires, juillet 2003 vs. mars 2004

NOS PRINCIPALES OBSERVATIONS SONT PLUS OU MOINS PAREILLES À LES FORCES ET FAIBLESSES QUE VOUS AVEZ VOUS-MÊMES IDENTIFIÉES DANS L'ATELIER AU MOIS DE JUILLET L'ANNÉE PASSÉE (VOIR 'RAPPORT DE L'ATELIER D'ÉCHANGE ENTRE L'IVP ET SES PARTENAIRES'). AU-DESSOUS ON A EXTRAIT VERBATIM DES DÉCLARATIONS ET OBSERVATIONS FAITES DANS CET ATELIER QUANT AU RÔLE ET RESPONSABILITÉS DE L'IVP:

Forces, faiblesses, opportunités, obstacles par rapport à l'accompagnement de l'IVP :

Faiblesses

- ♦ Non-disponibilité d'un fond souple dans un contexte conflictuel d'urgence.
- ♦ Faible appui institutionnel pour ceux qui en reçoivent.
- ♦ Pas d'appuis techniques / logistiques aux partenaires.
- ♦ Faible collaboration de l'IVP avec les autres acteurs de paix au niveau régional.
- ♦ Faible accompagnement des initiatives féminines.

Forces

- ♦ L'IVP aborde les problèmes réels à la base.
- ♦ Assiste les partenaires dans les problèmes réels rencontrés sur terrain.
- ♦ Respecte ses engagements.
- ♦ Accompagne les partenaires sans discrimination.
- ♦ Démystifie la présentation des projets.

Opportunités

- ♦ Structure souple.
- ♦ Possibilité d'émergence des organisations partenaires.

Menaces / obstacles

- ♦ Risque d'être pris en parti par les pouvoirs locaux.
- ♦ Diabolisation par certains acteurs locaux et de diaspora.
- ♦ Diabolisation de l'IVP par certaines organisations internationales (par exemple concernant l'approche face au DDRRR).
- ♦ Reprise des hostilités pendant l'exécution du programme.

Besoins

- Développement, par les partenaires de l'IVP, des exercices assistés d'autoévaluation et de recherche – action.
- Appui de l'IVP à des programmes annuels ou pluriannuels des partenaires. Ce programme des partenaires sera puisé dans la vision de travail définie par l'I.V.P.

Priorités

En prenant compte les travaux de cette rencontre, qu'est-ce qui est le plus important pour l'IVP et ses partenaires ?

- La compréhension du concept société civile.
- Rapprochement entre partenaires d'une part, et entre eux et le pouvoir d'autre part.
- Appui institutionnel de l'IVP à ses partenaires.
- Le renforcement des capacités à la fois des partenaires et des cadres de l'IVP.
- Disponibiliser un canevas indicatif et critères de sélection des projets.
- Diffuser la philosophie de l'IVP aux partenaires
- Rendre opérationnel les résolutions de cet atelier

Questions

Neuf mois sont passés après que ces déclarations ont été faites.

Qu'est-ce qui a changé ? Est-ce qu'on a eu des améliorations ? Si oui, lesquelles ?

Réponse : Pas grande chose a changé, donc, la plupart des points cités au-dessus restent valables. Toutefois il y a quelques améliorations, telles que :

- *Appuis techniques, au niveau de l'accompagnement. Les cadres de l'IVP ont assisté les exécuteurs des projets en orientant ses stratégies, et l'Institut a appuyé la formation des partenaires en transformation des conflits et gestion.*
- *La collaboration de l'IVP avec d'autres organisations comme la MONUC, le CECI, ALERTE, le centre LOKOLE.*
- *Il y a un début timide d'accompagnement des initiatives féminines. Une cellule féminine a été mise en place dans le bureau de l'IVP. Cette cellule n'est toutefois pas très perçue sur terrain.*

Qu'est-ce qui reste comme auparavant ?

Réponse : Le reste des points mentionnés dans le rapport cité ci-haut, par exemple (1) l'appui logistique reste très rare, et (2) le besoin de renforcer le rapprochement et les échanges entre partenaires reste fort.

➔ Les points suivants, toujours extrait du rapport de l'atelier de juillet 2003, demeurent des besoins ou priorités des partenaires de l'IVP :

- Un fond souple dans un contexte conflictuel d'urgence ;
- Appui institutionnel ;
- Accompagnement des initiatives féminines ;
- Développement par les partenaires des exercices assistés d'autoévaluation et de recherche-action ;
- Appui à des programmes annuels ou pluriannuels, qui seront puisé dans la vision de travail définie par l'IVP ;
- La compréhension du concept société civile ;
- Rapprochement entre partenaires d'une part, et entre eux et le pouvoir d'autre part ;
- Le renforcement des capacités à la fois des partenaires et des cadres de l'IVP ;
- Disponibiliser un canevas indicatif et critères de sélection des projets ;
- Diffuser la philosophie de l'IVP aux partenaires.

Est-ce que il y a des problèmes qui restent ou se sont aggravés ? Si oui, lesquels ?

Réponse :

- *Conflits ouverts au sein de la société civile entre la comité de pilotage et la bureau de la coordination de la société civile au Sud Kivu.*
- *Diabolisation de l'IVP et ses partenaires sur terrain. Ce problème est aggravé surtout puisqu'on ne s'est pas réunis pour le discuter.*

Bukavu, dimanche 28 mars 2004
Ingrid Samset

Evaluation of LPI - DRC

1. Debriefing note

Bukavu, 2004-03-29

This note summarises the main *findings and conclusions* from the visit by the evaluation team to the Kivu provinces carried out between March 8 and March 28 2004. It is submitted to the LPI team in Bukavu to provide (a) a feedback to the LPI/Bukavu and (b) to solicit reactions, questions, clarifications etc from the LPI as an input to the final report.

Although *recommendations* are included they are intended as an input to the ongoing deliberation of a possible for future support by Sida. Recommendations regarding the strategic and operational orientation of the LPI-DRC programme will be given the final report.

The findings and conclusions are structured along the issues given in the ToR for the DRC component of the LPI evaluation.

1. Project design and activities

1.1. Findings

- The project follows in the main the objectives and activities outlined in the Project Document submitted to Sida on 2002-02-21. While the objectives stated in the PD have been used as guiding the activities, the activities in support of conflict transformation in the Kivu provinces have a slightly different composition and can be summarised as:
 - a) Capacity building focussed on local partner organisations through training on peace-building and conflict transformation, limited and time-bound institutional (i.e. financial) to some organisations/platforms, and workshops on issues related to the conflicts
 - b) Technical mentoring of partner activities and projects ('accompagnement')
 - c) Widening or complementing the reach of existing peace-building organisations to strengthen the voice of the grassroots/margins
 - d) Facilitation of dialogues between armed units of opposing actors to defer or defuse open violent conflict, directly or in response to requests from conflict party/ies or partner organisations
 - e) Studies related to the conflict
- Of the above a) & b) have been done in direct interaction partner organisations, while c) & d) largely initiated and pursued by LPI/B, with e) (studies) falling somewhere in between
- In practice the guiding force of the project design and activities has not been the Project Document but the principle of responding to the perceived dynamics of the conflict, and in particular the moves of the main conflict actors on the provincial as well as sub-provincial ('territorial') level.

1.2. Conclusions

- As it has evolved LPI/B has used a three-pronged approach (although not formalised as such) in its 'project design'

- Building on the study carried out by HR, supplemented by a continuous although non-systematic update/monitoring of the moves of the conflict actors particularly at the territorial and provincial level
 - Time-bound and point specific project support along with equally time-bound and limited financial support to a variety of local organisations, resulting in a fluid and varied notion of ‘partenaires’/partner organisations
 - The non-formalised project design stressing objectives along with discrete point and time-specific projects/interventions has allowed for a high degree of responsiveness of the programme
 - However, it has also resulted in (a) a large number of widely scattered – functionally and spatially – interventions that have strained the capacity of LPI/B, and (b) the programme and along with it the LPI being opaque and/or non-transparent when viewed from the perspective of the ‘partenaires’ as well as LPI/B’s own peer environment (other INGOs, local specialised NGOs and resource institutions, MONUC, etc)
 - The ‘bottom-up’ principle that is reflected in activity c) above (widening and complementing the social, ethnic and spatial reach of conflict transformation efforts) and in support of which the other activities have been rationalised is partly jeopardised by
 - the supra-local initiatives taken by LPI/B as regards facilitation of contacts between conflict parties, i.e. activity d) above
 - the non-transparency of LPI/B’s decisions as regards selection of projects and local organisations (see below, point 2)
- Both of these put (and have indeed put) the LPI/B in danger of being attributed a political agenda of its own

2. Selection of partners and participants

“Who are these entities that the LPI supports: Communities, associations, or individuals?”

Representative of LPI partner, 25.03.04

2.1. Findings

- The existing ‘partners’ of LPI/B are broadly made up of
 - Ecumenical structures
 - Civil society platforms
 - Local NGOs that aim to support capacity formation and local conflict transformation initiatives, particularly in connection with the two structures mentioned above
 - CBOs or embryonic NGOs that are deemed to ‘give voice’ to marginal and/or weakly represented groups/localities
- The existing portfolio of ‘projects’ are broadly made up of
 - Reconciliation efforts within uni-denominational structures that are locally influential but have internal divisions that reflect and/or support (??) the conflict
 - Extension efforts by existing ‘partners’ to reach out and institutionalise local level peace-building capacity
 - Time-bound institutional support to a limited number of ‘partners’, ranging from specific equipment, office rent/development, to salary of specified technical staff
 - Travel costs for individuals to participate in outside workshops or trainings

2.2. Conclusions

- The findings above suggest an internal set of criteria for selection of partners and projects. These are, however, not internally formalised nor are they communicated to the outside

world, including to the ‘partners’. As a consequence what may from the inside of the LPI/B appear as selection with a strategic content as to why, when, who and where, from the outside appears as an erratic and arbitrary selection process which, in turn, lends itself to speculations about hidden or personal agendas.

- The lack of systematic or formalised selection criteria in the case of projects makes it difficult to infuse the overall portfolio with sense of cost-effectiveness – i.e. how does one justify USD 80.000 of very scarce resources to, say, a workshop as against USD 800 to, say, institutional support of a ‘partner’? And what is the relative value added of developing a parallel or alternative new structure of a civil society structure versus working on reforming/developing an existing one, however distorted or unpalatable that may be (as is done in the case of church structures)?

3. Ownership of local partners and role of the Bukavu office and the LPI representative

Levels at which ‘ownership’ may be played out:

- Conflict analysis
- Strategy
- Projects
- Other activities

(a) Conflict analysis

Findings:

- overall conflict analysis owned and formulated by LPI/B, with partners having their own and sometimes different analysis that they may or may not try to reconcile with what they hear from LPI/B
- some partners express an uncertainty or awkwardness about their relation to LPI, including difficulties in defending/explaining in their local context and internally the actions pursued by LPI/B on other levels/areas

(b) Strategy

Findings:

- overall operational strategy owned and formulated by LPI/B
- there is no system or platform by which the views of ‘partners’ or other relevant bodies on the ground can contribute to the strategy, not the least because the strategy remains highly generalized and with an emphasis on flexibility and responsiveness
- there is little or no involvement of LPI/U in the strategic discussion or guidance of the programme

(c) Projects

Findings:

- Projects are formulated and owned by the ‘partners’, sometimes with coaching from LPI
- Partners have the full responsibility for implementing the projects, with LPI’s ‘accompagnement’ ranging from requiring routine reporting to more direct field and process support

(d) Other activities (cross-cutting trainings, workshops, etc)

Findings:

- In general the ownership is widely spread through the partnership in so far as the demand for trainings and workshops is generally articulated through and by the partners with LPI providing the financial, technical, and sometimes administrative support

- Reports from these cross-cutting activities are made by LPI and disseminated throughout the partnership

2. Conclusions

-
- There is a need to generate a more widespread and interactive consultation on the conflict analysis between LPI and its ‘partners’ – not in order to arrive at (or impose) one unanimously endorsed Conflict Analysis but in order to provide the identification of points of common ground, of differences, and on ensuring that the variation is both understood and as far as possible respected
- The strategy pursued so far has been largely ‘the art of the possible’ with LPI being the dominant artist. There is a need to distil, from the experience gained so far, (a) what aspects of the conflict transformation as well as its supportive structure that can be given a more systematic form owned throughout the partnership, and (b) what themes, issues, and activities that will require continued flexibility and responsiveness that may not yet be routinized
- There is a need to close the gap between LPI/B and LPI/U in terms of strengthening the ownership of the LPI as a whole as well as to ensure that the strategic direction of the programme includes a perception of both ‘the trees and the forest’

(The role of the LPI representative will be dealt with separately)

4. Means of peace work – working with the right ethics

- not yet reviewed, will be dealt with in the final report -

5. Ability to identify and manage negative impacts

5.1. Findings

- While the ability to identify negative impacts varies (high with respect to LPI itself, low with respect to individual partners and projects), the ability to manage and act on them if and when they appear is uniformly low
- There is no system set in place to monitor or evaluate the individual projects or partners, nor have any such evaluations been done to date
- The focus on LPI's monitoring is to follow the actual or likely negative impacts of events related to the conflicts and actors involved in them

5.2. Conclusions

- The core of the ability to identify and manage negative impacts lies in the persons now making up the LPI/B team. While this will and must to some extent always be so, the lack of systems and routines for follow-up throughout the programme makes it very vulnerable both to mistakes and to outside 'diabolisation'
- There is therefore an urgent need to develop both a system of process monitoring and assessment of results (including likely impacts) over the entire range of LPI-assisted activities, including training. Unless this is done there is little or no possibility to identify either positive or negative impact, and there is a danger that some LPI assisted activities and/or organisations will be regarded as irrelevant or non-responsive at the grassroot/community level

6. Response of participants involved in activities

6.1. Findings

Below is a summary of views and observations made by representatives of partner organisations at the territorial and local/community level.

Satisfactory or strong aspects of LPI's work

- **Strengthening of local capacities on conflict transformation**
- **Intermediary between local associations and international NGOs**

3. Weak or problematic

- **Unknown selection criteria**
- Erratic or insufficient institutional support
- Great variation/time-lag in partner-LPI communication
- Insufficient sharing of information
- Insufficient focus on women's role
- No monitoring and evaluation

Beyond these observations, many partners pointed out that certain problems also had come up and/or been aggravated during the past year or so. This applied in particular to

- *Controversial role of LPI*, particularly related to
 - Changes of civil society coordination in South Kivu,
 - ‘Diabolisation’ of LPI and its partners on the ground, in particular with respect to the LPI’s efforts to deal with the ‘Rwanda issue’. This problem has been aggravated since partners and the LPI had not met to discuss it.

6.2. Conclusions

- Many of the views and opinions raised by the ‘partner’ organisations are those that typically reflect the differing perspectives and expectations as between a supporting INGO and its local partners, and are as such very commonly found in similar set-ups elsewhere. This does not mean that they are not serious or that they not be addressed, but that there is considerable experience available on how to tackle them.
- The perception of LPI being increasingly regarded as controversial is more critical and suggests the imperative need for LPI constantly reviewing itself to ensure that its do not become, or can be construed as becoming, a political actor in its own right

7. Ability of the Institute to co-ordinate itself with other actors

The relevant other actors comprise

- Peace-keeping or coordinating bodies such as MONUC and OCHA
- Peers such as other INGOs active in the area
- International, regional, and local specialist bodies such as academic and training institutions
- Provincial, territorial, and local representations of authority and administration

7.1. Findings

- The ability to coordinate with international or local ‘neutral’ actors with mandates in the conflict management or humanitarian work is not very pronounced. However, it must be stressed that the mistrust and conflict between LPI and MONUC is a two-side affair that is not the least rooted in a widespread dissatisfaction or frustration with MONUC throughout the local NGO, religious, and civil society sections of Kivu
- The coordination with other INGOs in the area remains, after some initial efforts on the part of the LPI, at an informal level with little or no tangible coordinated or joint activity. A main reason for this appears to be that of the INGOs present LPI is the only one that does not have a humanitarian or developmental mandate, and the only one with a specific focus on conflict transformation as such
- The ability to coordinate with local and regional specialised bodies is good as evinced (??) both by the concrete cooperation LPI has with many of them and by the perception of these bodies of LPI. The ability to coordinate with relevant international training and research bodies appears limited and lacks an active involvement on the part of LPI/U
- The ability to coordinate with local ‘authorities’ at various levels is well developed and seemingly effective. This is, however, an ambivalent asset as these ‘authorities’ also represent parties to the conflict, and as such represent the ‘civil’ dimension of their actual or aspired control on the ground.

4. 7.2. Conclusions

- The fact that LPI remains the only INGO active and present in the two Kivus with an identity and mandate in the conflict transformation field risks catapulting LPI into a prominence and visibility beyond the range and scope of its activities. This imposes a very clear need on the part of LPI to make every effort to lower its profile to avoid becoming (or be seen as) an actor with a political or ‘diplomatic’ agenda of its own
- In particular this imposes a need for the leading and most visible member of the LPI/B – the expatriate representative of LPI/U – to downgrade his visibility in virtually every area except that of an impartial quality controller of the LPI activities

8. Action research

8.1. Findings

- The LPI has conducted or sponsored research (or more properly diagnostic studies) mainly on four fronts:
 - (1) An inventory of already existing research on peace-building in the Kivus (2002-2003),
 - (2) A case study of conflict dynamics in Bunyakiri, a territory in South Kivu, and writing up the results in the aftermath (2003-2004),
 - (3) Supporting the data collection phase of relevant thesis work by local students (2004),
 - (4) Single studies conducted by partner organisations or consultants, such as the survey made by Synergie VIE (2002).
- No research has been undertaken in collaboration or conjunction with the research programme promoted by LPI/U. This also means that no research carried out or sponsored by LPI/B relates to or carries forward the research and studies carried out within the framework of the Somalia programme (or the present ‘sibling’ LPI/Brazzaville).

8.2. Conclusions

- The notion of action research remains to be operationalized and given a guiding framework.
- The field of research (of whatever orientation and purpose) illustrate the same gap between LPI/B and LPI/U that characterises the strategic management of the programme. Meanwhile, the definition and significance of action research for the LPI/B as an organisational structure remains vague.
- So far the emphasis has been on diagnostic case studies of specific contexts. While valuable in their own right (with no judgement on our part as to quality or design) their main contribution to the conflict transformation programme is likely to lie at a more general level, and this so only if they are repeated to arrive at comparative assessments of variation and constancy of conflict dynamics – and indeed as an illustration of the extent to which the Kivu represent unique patterns of conflict dynamics (as is often argued by those directly involved in Kivu)
- There is a glaring lack of studies aimed at assisting the LPI/B programme to develop its operational systems and priorities, its quality control and monitoring indicators, or its efforts to develop result-oriented interventions. The tendency to carry out only contextual cases studies (all of them non-longitudinal in design and execution) risks leaving the programme without an analytically founded base for its actual operations.

9. To what extent the Institute incorporates learning based on analysis of project performance & 10. The relevance of the indicators presented in the LPI proposal

Both will be dealt with in the main report. For the purposes of this note see point 5 above.

Overall conclusions

- Taken together the findings and conclusions over specific issues presented above presents the typical features of an **exploratory phase**. Whether intentionally or not, this is the only way in which the current situation of the programme makes sense.
- Does the LPI DRC programme represent a value added – real or potential, in relation to the conflict dynamics on the ground as well as to its institutional and peer environment?
We are convinced that the answer in both cases is yes, on the following grounds:
 - The need for a sustained technical, institutional, and financial support to conflict transformation capacity on the ground is acute. The LPI programme so far, with all its imperfections and non-systematic aspects, has shown that such support may be both feasible to give and possible to absorb
 - None of the international or local organisations have as their focus to infuse this particular capacity
 - There is a need for an international NGO to take a lead role in providing such support, both to supplement the more cumbersome and diplomatically defined role of UN agencies and to mount a build-up of locally based conflict transformation process that take their agenda not from the political accords on top but from the conditions and perceptions prevailing on the ground. Again, the experience so far has proved (although with qualifications) that this can be done
- However, based on our assessment that the period until now has been one of explorations, the programme is now facing a number of challenges and crossroads, including:
 - To define its organisational/institutional strategy: moving further as a *programme or as a network*
 - To lower the profile of LPI/B as an actor in its own right and determine a better notion of *supplementarity and complementarity* with local and international bodies represented in Kivu
 - To provide a clearer and more transparent *strategic focus and management*, incl a better balance between own and partners' capacity on one hand and the scope and distribution of activities on the other
 - To introduce methods and systems of *monitoring and evaluation* that provides for a continuous learning and improvement of the operations
 - To define and implement a *management agenda* that minimises the risk of being seen as a political actor and maximises the capacity formation of local conflict transformation

Recommendations

Based on the above we put forward the following recommendations in the context of the Sida-LPI dialogue on possible future Sida support:

- We recommend that Sida considers, on an urgent basis, a conditionalised bridging support for a period of six months starting June 1, 2004.
- The purpose of such support is to allow for (a) a systematic evaluation of projects, trainings, and organisations so far; (b) to use this as a basis for a consultative process among the present partner organisations (or those with an ability to partake in and contribute to such consultations); (c) arrive at a strategy comprising both priorities, activities, systems and procedures in areas or on themes where a more systematic approach is possible, and a 'residual' to which only flexible and event/point specific responses will be feasible.
- The outcome of the bridging period should be assessed by an external group, the findings of which shall form an input to a more long-term support from Sida
- The reason why we believe Sida has a special role, responsibility and interest in consolidating the experience gained by the LPI-DRC is that it is the only one of the present and potential larger donors that have the possibility to interact with the entire axis of LPI/B and LPI/U, apart from the fact that LPI constitutes an important element of the very small resource base in Sweden available to Sida's conflict transformation programme.

Bukavu, the 31st of March 2004

Dear Gordon,

You suggested that we'd send our comments on the evaluation notes you and Ingrid presented on Monday the 29th of March. As three of the senior staff (Hélène, Tharcisse and Déo) moved to other locations and the other two (Nono and Sylvie) are in the peace education seminar I will do this, essentially, alone. However, we had some discussions about the general impression of all colleagues after you left.

The main comment from my colleagues was that the evaluation team was not considering enough the difficult circumstances in which we have been working over the past years. For example the criticism we have had to consume could hardly be avoided as we have chosen not to stick our head in the sand when sensitive issues are being put in front of us. Similarly the rather scattered programme is a result of a very complex situation that demands everywhere a different approach, different partnerships and different timing. Other difficulties, like the limited support from Uppsala and being the only INGO with a specific focus on the conflict transformation field in the Kivu, you already mentioned.

However, although the general findings are appreciated and considered well founded, the team would appreciate if you'd refer to the difficulties in your presentation, still accepting that the points you raised as issues that need to be addressed. I'll send later a proposal for a process to address the issues you raised.

I went through the text and have just a few comments that I present below. I used your document as a base (your text with the chapter it belongs to) so that you can easily find where it comes from:

2.1. Findings

- *Reconciliation efforts within uni-denominational structures that are locally influential but have internal divisions that reflect and/or support (??) the conflict*

&

6.1. Findings

Controversial role of LPI, particularly related to....

Comment:

To avoid 'supporting the conflict' we made a strategic choice to work with synergies, whether formal platforms or ecumenical bodies or informal. We think that this has been a rather efficient guarantee that LPI did not put fuel on the conflict.

Although a different case, in the aftermath of Michael and Tharcisse's kidnapping Tharcisse wanted to avoid turning the incident in a conflict between ethnic groups, therefore we made the strategic choice not to call for meetings between the ethnic mutuels but we opted for consulting leaders from the area that will together approach the Mayi-mayi group involved.

Basically, we try all the time, in the choice of partners, to bridge gaps between communities or political and military groups. We have no indication that the Institute sparked new or fuelled old conflicts within communities.

Although more on the ‘city-level’, one could say that LPI contributed to tensions within the civil society. The background of that is however not linked to divisions within or between partners but has other reasons. Although these divisions would probably have developed anyway, as there is, fortunately still, a wide range of opinions in the civil society, LPI’s support to the selected partners has possibly accentuated existing divisions and made LPI a target of some CS actors.

Another question is whether these tensions are desirable or not. A positive impact has at least been that some people that have been dominating the CS throughout the wars and made it rather radical in its positioning are now being questioned and opposed by others that have more inclusive ideas.

2.2. Conclusions

- *The lack of systematic or formalised selection criteria in the case of projects makes it difficult to infuse the overall portfolio with sense of cost-effectiveness – i.e. how does one justify USD 80.000 of very scarce resources to, say, a workshop as against USD 800 to, say, institutional support of a ‘partner’?*

Comment:

LPI’s ‘own’ contribution to the \$80,000 Uvira meeting was ‘only’ \$30,000. The rest came from DFID (channelled through LPI in the end) and NOVIB.

[continued] And what is the relative value added of developing a parallel or alternative new structure of a civil society structure versus working on reforming/developing an existing one, however distorted or unpalatable that may be (as is done in the case of church structures)?

Comment:

LPI never created new structures. In one case, CAP-Uvira, local civil society actors, to accommodate LPI, formed a new structure. This did not work out very well, indeed because we had too much of an involvement in its creation.

5.1. Findings

- *There is no system set in place to monitor or evaluate the individual projects or partners, nor have any such evaluations been done to date*

&

6.1. Findings

- *No monitoring and evaluation*

Comment:

I’d say we have a system but it is not sufficiently institutionalised. In the coming months we will take up the efforts of last year where all programme assistants evaluated the activities they accompanied. This is not because of your evaluation but because another year has passed by and we are interested also ourselves in how it went.

Moreover, by spending regular time with the partners, the programme assistants and to a lesser extent myself do monitor the activities of partners.

5. 7.2. Conclusions

- *In particular this imposes a need for the leading and most visible member of the LPI/B – the expatriate representative of LPI/U – to downgrade his visibility in virtually every area except that of an impartial quality controller of the LPI activities*

Comment:

Agreed that it is desirable to downgrade my visibility but I think I should remain more than just a quality controller. Whether I, you, SIDA or LPI like it or not, my function is to represent the Institute and the Congolese partners, authorities, etc. (and the internationals) will want me to exercise this role.

I believe that a set of measures could reduce my visibility:

- To employ a counterpart (or comparable function).
- To communicate better what the Institute stands for through a (presentation) brochure, reports. Also to standardise the programme to a much higher degree than currently the case. This leaving less speculation about any 'hidden agenda'.
- LPI/Uppsala showing its presence more regularly.
- To follow-up on your suggestions to plan, analyse and evaluate the programme with our partners.
- And possibly others?

8.2. Conclusions.

- *Meanwhile, the definition and significance of action research for the LPI/B as an organisational structure remains vague.*

Comment:

This is true, however Hélène, the RION and other research partners and practitioners are working on this and are in the middle of a process that seems promising.

Overall conclusions

- *However, based on our assessment that the period until now has been one of explorations, the programme is now facing a number of challenges and crossroads, including:*

Comment:

I agree that one can see it as an exploratory phase but I'm convinced that can only be the viewpoint from the outside and a technical perspective. Many of the activities implemented by the partners or those in which we took the leadership to a large extent (negotiations RCD-MM) have had too much impact to consider them just as explorations.

Partners and communities would not like to hear or read that the actions within their communities were experimental!

Recommendations

- *The outcome of the bridging period should be assessed by an external group, the findings of which shall form an input to a more long-term support from Sida*

I'd rather suggest that an outside group (Swedegroup?) accompanies this process. Another assessment of this process will cause delays and moreover, it will be beneficial to the process when there is some outside involvement.

Thanks for your balanced report. It will help us to move forward, despite a 6 months bridging period...

Best regards,

Hans.

EVALUATION OF LPI - DRC

6. Debriefing note for Sida & LPI

Stockholm, 2004-04-06

Note:

LPI/B = the LPI Bukavu team

LPI/DRC = the LPI programme in Democratic Republic of Congo

LPI/U = the LPI Uppsala unit (HQ)

This note summarises the main *findings and conclusions* from the visit by the evaluation team to the Kivu provinces carried out between March 8 and March 28 2004. A more detailed version was discussed with the LPI team in Bukavu on 2004-03-29.

Although *recommendations* are included they are intended as an input to the ongoing deliberation of a possible for future support by Sida. Recommendations regarding the strategic and operational orientation of the LPI-DRC programme will be given the final report.

The findings and conclusions are structured along the issues given in the ToR for the DRC component of the LPI evaluation.

A. Summary of assessment according to the ToR

1. Project design and activities

1.1. Findings

- The project follows in the main the objectives and activities outlined in the Project Document submitted to Sida on 2002-02-21. While the objectives stated in the PD have been used as guiding the activities, the activities in support of conflict transformation in the Kivu provinces have, however, a slightly different composition.
- In practice the guiding force of the project design and activities hasve not been the Project Document but the principle of responding to the percieved dynamics of the conflict, and in particular to the moves of the main conflict actors on the provincial as well as sub-provincial ('territorial') territorial level.

1.3. Conclusions

- LPI's approach has allowed for a very great flexibility and responsiveness. However, it has also resulted in a large number of widely scattered interventions which in turn has made the LPI appear opaque and/or non-transparent.
- The 'bottom-up' principle is partly jeopardised by
 - the supra-local initiatives taken by LPI/B as regards facilitation of contacts between conflict parties, i.e. activity d) above

- the non-transparency of LPI/B's decisions as regards selection of projects and local organisations (see below, point 2)
- Both of these put (and have indeed put) the LPI/B in danger of being attributed a political agenda of its own

2. Selection of partners and participants

2.1. Findings

- The existing 'partners' of LPI/B are broadly made up of
 - Ecumenical structures
 - Civil society platforms
 - Local NGOs that aim to support capacity formation and local conflict transformation initiatives, particularly in connection with the two structures mentioned above
 - CBOs or embryonic NGOs that are deemed to 'give voice' to marginal and/or weakly represented groups/localities
- The existing portfolio of 'projects' are broadly made up of
 - Reconciliation efforts within uni-denominational structures that are locally influential but have internal divisions that reflect and/or support (??) the conflict
 - Extension efforts by existing 'partners' to reach out and institutionalise local level peace- building capacity
 - Time-bound institutional support to a limited number of 'partners', ranging from specific equipment, office rent/development, to salary of specified technical staff
 - Travel costs for individuals to participate in outside workshops or trainings

2.2. Conclusions

- The findings above suggests an internal set of criteria for selection of partners and projects. These are, however, not internally formalised nor are they communicated to the outside world. As a consequence what may from the inside of the LPI/B appear as selection with a strategic content as to why, when, who and where, from the outside appears as an erratic and arbitrary selection process which, in turn, lends itself to speculations about hidden or personal agendas.
- The lack of systematic or formalised selection criteria in the case of projects makes it difficult to infuse the overall portfolio with sense of cost-effectiveness. SLIGHTLY UNCLEAR

3. Ownership of local partners and role of the Bukavu office and the LPI representative

(a) Conflict analysis

Findings:

- overall conflict analysis owned and formulated by LPI/B, with partners having their own and sometimes different (or incomplete or imbalanced) analysis that they may or may not try to reconcile with what they hear from LPI/B

(b) Strategy

Findings:

- overall operational 'strategy' owned and formulated by LPI/B
- there is little or no involvement of LPI/U in the strategic discussion or guidance of the the programme

(c) Projects

Findings:

- Projects are formulated and owned by the 'partners', sometimes with coaching from LPI

(d) Other activities (cross-cutting trainings, workshops, etc)

Findings:

- In general the ownership is widely spread through the partnership with LPI providing the financial, technical, and sometimes administrative support WHAT DO YOU MEAN

1. Conclusions

- Ownership is unevenly spread and promoted in partnership UNCLEAR
- There is a need to generate a more widespread and interactive consultation on the conflict analysis between LPI and its 'partners'
- The strategy pursued so far has been largely 'the art of the possible' with LPI being the dominant artist.
- The lack of strategic vision and involvement on the part of LPI/U has left the programme management concentrated on short-term action almost to the exclusion of medium- to long-term processes.
- The role of the LPI representative has been largely constructive and there is no doubt that there would be no programme at all but for his contribution. At the same time the apparent lack of ownership of the programme on the part of LPI/U has meant that he rather than LPI has been unnecessarily exposed

4. Means of peace work – working with the right ethics

- not yet reviewed, will be dealt with in the final report -

5. Ability to identify and manage negative impacts

5.1. Findings

- While the ability to identify negative impacts varies (high with respect to LPI itself, low with respect to individual partners and projects), the ability to manage and act on them if and when they appear is uniformly low
- There is no system set in place to monitor or evaluate the individual projects or partners, nor have any such evaluations been done to date
- The focus on LPI's monitoring is too one of following the actual or likely negative impacts of events related to the conflicts and its actors involved in them

5.2. Conclusions

- The core of the ability to identify and manage negative impacts lies in the persons now making up the LPI/B team. While this will and must to some extent always be so, the lack of systems and routines for follow-up throughout the programme makes it very vulnerable both to mistakes and to outside 'diabolisation'
- There is therefore an urgent need to develop both a system of process monitoring and assessment of results (including likely impacts) over the entire range of LPI-assisted activities, including training. Unless this is done there is little or no possibility to identify either positive

or negative impact, and there is a danger that some LPI assisted activities and/or organisations will be regarded as irrelevant or non-responsive at the grass-root/community level

6. Response of participants involved in activities

6.1. Findings:

Below is a summary of views and observations made by representatives of partner organisations at the territorial and local/community level.

Satisfactory or strong aspects of LPI's work

- **Strengthening of local capacities on conflict transformation**
- **Intermediary between local associations and international NGOs**

2. Weak or problematic

○ **Vagueness in strategic orientation**

- Insufficient communication and capacity
- No monitoring and evaluation

Beyond these observations, many partners pointed out that certain problems also had come up and/or been aggravated during the past year or so. This applied in particular to the sometimes controversial role of LPI/B, particularly related to

- LPI/B's involvement in changes of civil society coordination in South Kivu,
- 'Diabolisation' of LPI and its partners on the ground, in particular with respect to the LPI/B's efforts to deal with the 'Rwanda issue'.

6.2. Conclusions

- Many of the views and opinions raised by the 'partner' organisations are those that typically reflect the differing perspectives and expectations as between a supporting INGO and its local partners, and are as such very commonly found in similar set-ups elsewhere.
- The perception of LPI being regarded as controversial is more critical and suggests the imperative need for LPI/B constantly reviewing itself to ensure that it does not become, or can be construed as becoming, a political actor in its own right

7. Ability of the Institute to co-ordinate itself with other actors

The relevant other actors comprise

- Peace-keeping or coordinating bodies such as MONUC and OCHA
- Peers such as other INGOs active in the area
- International, regional, and local specialist bodies such as academic and training institutions
- Provincial, territorial, and local representations of authority and administration

7.1. Findings

- The ability to coordinate with international or local 'neutral' actors with mandates in the conflict management or humanitarian work is not very pronounced. However, it must be stressed that the mistrust and conflict between LPI and MONUC is a two-side affair that is

not the least rooted in a widespread dissatisfaction or frustration with MONUC throughout the local NGO, religious, and civil society sections of Kivu

- The coordination with other INGOs in the area remains, after some initial efforts on the part of the LPI, at an informal level with little or no tangible coordinated or joint activity. AThe main reason for this appears to be that of the INGOs present LPI is the only one that does not have a humanitarian or developmental mandate, and is the only one with a specific focus on conflict transformation as such
- The coordination with local and regional specialised bodies is good. The coordination with relevant international training and research bodies appears limited and lacks an active involvement on the part of LPI/U
- The ability to coordinate with local ‘authorities’ at various levels is well developed and seemingly effective.

3. 7.2.Conclusions

- The fact that LPI remains the only INGO active and present in the two Kivus with an identity and mandate in the conflict transformation field risks catapulting LPI into a prominence and visibility beyond the range and scope of its activities. This imposes a very clear need on the part of LPI to make every effort to lower its profile to avoid becoming (or be seen as) an actor with a political or ‘diplomatic’ agenda of its own
- In particular this imposes a need for the leading and most visible member of the LPI/B – the expatriate representative of LPI/U – to downgrade his visibility and together with LPI/U set in motion a viable personal/expatriate exit strategy and gradual introduction of a local senior (or downgraded/focussed expatriate) management

8. Action research

8.1.Findings

- The main type of studies undertaken so far have been diagnostic rather than operationally oriented
- No research has been undertaken in collaboration or conjunction with the research programme promoted by LPI/U. This also means that no research carried out or sponsored by LPI/B relates to or carries forward the research and studies carried out within the framework of the Somalia programme (or the present ‘sibling’ LPI/Brazzaville).

8.2. Conclusions

- The notion of ‘action research’ remains to be operationalised and given a guiding framework.
- The field of research (of whatever orientation and purpose) illustrate the same gap between LPI/B and LPI/U that characterises the strategic management of the programme.
- There is a glaring lack of studies aimed at assisting the LPI/B programme to develop its operational systems and priorities, its quality control and monitoring indicators, or its efforts to develop result-oriented interventions. The tendency to carry out only contextual cases studies (all of them non-longitudinal in design and execution) risks leaving the programme without an analytically founded base for its actual operations.

**9. To what extent the Institute incorporates learning based on analysis of project performance
&
10. The relevance of the indicators presented in the LPI proposal**

B(both will be dealt with in the main report. For the purposes of this note see point 5 above.)

B. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

- Given the very fluid conflict situation and the very difficult conditions under which the programme works it is a **remarkable achievement** that so much has been carried out. Furthermore, in spite of the critical remarks offered by some of the ‘partenaires’ there is a general very strong consensus that LPI offers a **professionally sound and much needed support** in the area conflict transformation.
- Taken together the findings and conclusions over specific issues presented above presents the typical features of an **exploratory phase**. Whether intentionally or not, this is the only way in which the current situation of the programme makes sense.

Does the LPI DRC programme represent a value added – real or potential, in relation to the conflict dynamics on the ground as well as to its institutional and peer environment? We are convinced that the answer in both cases is yes, on the following grounds:

- The need for a sustained technical, institutional, and financial support to conflict transformation capacity on the ground is acute. The LPI programme so far, with all its imperfections and non-systematic aspects, has shown that such support may be both feasible to give and possible to absorb
- None of the international or local organisations have as their focus to infuse this particular capacity
- There is a need for an international NGO to take a lead role in providing such support, both to supplement the more cumbersome and diplomatically defined role of UN agencies and to mount a build-up of locally based conflict transformation process that take their agenda not from the political accords on top but from the conditions and perceptions prevailing on the ground. Again, the experience so far has proved (although with qualifications) that this can be done

However, based on our assessment that the period until now has primarily been one of explorations, the programme is now facing a number of challenges and crossroads, including:

- To define its organisational/institutional strategy: moving further as a *programme or as a network*
- To lower the profile of LPI/B as an actor in its own right and determine a better notion of *supplementarity and complementarity* with local and international bodies represented in Kivu
- To provide a clearer and more transparent *strategic focus and management*, incl a better balance between own and partners’ capacity on one hand and the scope and distribution of activities on the other
- To introduce methods and systems of *monitoring and evaluation* that provides for a continuous learning and improvement of the operations

- To define and implement a *management agenda* that minimises the risk of being seen as a political actor and maximises the capacity formation of local conflict transformation

However, perhaps the most important challenge is

- For LPI/U to establish an effective ownership of the programme – in terms of its strategic management and priorities, its research agenda, its contribution to the learning process of how to translate the values on which LPI is founded into practice

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the above we put forward the following recommendations in the context of the Sida-LPI dialogue on possible future Sida support:

- We recommend that Sida considers, on an urgent basis, a conditionalised bridging support for a period of six months starting June 1, 2004.
- The purpose of such support is to allow for (a) a systematic evaluation of projects, trainings, and organisations so far; (b) to use this as a basis for a consultative process among the present partner organisations (or those with an ability to partake in and contribute to such consultations); (c) arrive at a strategy comprising both priorities, activities, systems and procedures in areas or on themes where a more systematic approach is possible, and a 'residual' to which only flexible and event/point specific responses will be feasible; (d) develop a strategic management and support structure that effectively makes LPI/DRC part of LPI's overall agenda; (e) develop approaches and interactive procedures between LPI and MONUC in order to ensure complementarity as well as supplementarity
- The launching and outcome of the bridging period should be assessed by an external group, the findings of which may form an input to a possible more long-term support from Sida.
- The reason why we believe Sida has a special role, responsibility and interest in consolidating the experience gained by the LPI-DRC is that it is the only one of the present and potential larger donors that have the possibility to interact with the entire axis of LPI/B and LPI/U, apart from the fact that LPI constitutes an important element of the very small resource base in Sweden available to Sida's conflict transformation programme.

Based on the debriefing discussion between the evaluation team and the LPI/B team on March 29, 2004, and on the specific request from the teamleader of the evaluation a concrete proposal for such a bridging phase was developed by LPI/B (see attached). The evaluation team is still appraising this proposal and will, depending upon Sida's and LPI's principled response to the above recommendations, submit our comments by April 15, 2004. This would also necessitate a dialogue between LPI, Sida, and the other two main donors DfID and DGIS in order to enable a converging agenda.

Gordon Tamm

2004-04-06

Annex 10

BUDGET DRC PROGRAMME (Sida)			ACTUAL EXPENSES (Dec 2003–May 2004)							
Code	Heading	Dec03–Apr04 (SEK)	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Expenditures (SEK)		Total	Balance
							Apr	May		
PERSONNEL		1 553 275	320 286	209 335	228 064	313 140	285 064	240 064	1 595 955	- 42 680
Expatriate staff (all costs)		708 000	110 140	103 000	118 000	126 800	120 000	120 000	697 940	10 060
01.1.1	LPI Representative (Goma)	225 000	40 000	40 000	40 000	40 000	40 000	40 000	240 000	- 15 000
01.1.2	Programme officer (Uppsala)	115 000	23 000	23 000	18 000	18 000	18 000	18 000	118 000	-3 000
01.1.3	Int. & ext. Consultations Train.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
01.1.4	Int. & ext. Consultations Fac.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
01.1.5	Int. & ext. Consultations Res.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
01.1.6	Staff development	8 000	-	-	-	6 000	2 000	2 000	10 000	- 2 000
01.1.7	Per diems & hotel lodging	90 000	7 140	-	20 000	22 800	20 000	20 000	89 940	60
01.1.8	Progr Asst, Action Research	270 000	40 000	40 000	40 000	40 000	40 000	40 000	240 000	30 000
Local personnel (all costs)		845 275	210 145	106 335	110 064	186 340	165 064	120 064	898 014	- 52 739
01.2.1	Programme assistants	240 000	54 745	22 750	22 750	22 750	22 750	22 750	168 494	71 506
01.2.2	Administrator	96 000	18 970	6 831	6 831	6 831	6 831	6 831	53 125	42 875
01.2.3	Secretary	36 000	10 106	2 949	2 949	2 949	2 949	2 949	24 850	11 150
01.2.4.	Assistant administrator	40 000	10 144	5 237	5 237	5 237	5 237	5 237	36 330	3 670
01.2.5.	Drivers	52 650	18 525	7 684	7 684	7 684	7 684	7 684	56 943	- 4 293
01.2.6	Guards & domestic staff	118 125	55 008	30 390	30 390	30 390	30 390	30 390	206 959	- 88 834
Other staff expenses										
01.2.7	Loc cons (trng, superv, res)	120 000	9 857	15 132	5 500	60 500	60 500	15 500	166 989	- 46 989
01.2.8	Staff development	37 500	3 724	1 186	3 724	25 000	3 724	3 724	41 082	- 3 582
01.2.9	Per diems & lodging	105 000	29 066	14 178	25 000	25 000	25 000	25 000	143 244	- 38 244

ADMIN. & SUPPORT											
02.1	Office rent	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
02.2	Office consumables	36 000	6 380	3 925	6 000	6 000	7 600	35 905	95		
02.3	Office equipment	40 000	304	-	3 000	10 000	13 000	39 304	696		
02.4	Translation services	-	-	722	722	722	722	3 610	-	3 610	
02.5	Audits	30 000	-	11 400	-	-	16 500	-	27 900	2 100	
02.6	Legal services	10 000	3 040	1 596	1 596	1 596	1 596	11 020	-	1 020	
02.7	Invitations/public relations	12 800	20 692	380	-	-	-	21 072	-	8 272	
02.8	Communication expenses	120 000	24 443	19 008	19 008	20 000	20 000	122 460	-	2 480	
02.9	CODAN radios and email equip.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
02.10	Maintenance & repairs	12 500	5 293	1 278	1 500	1 500	1 500	12 571	-	71	
02.11	Security (NGO mobile team)	10 000	1 444	1 444	1 444	1 444	1 444	8 664	1 336		
TRANSPORT		317 750	69 316	22 183	81 500	66 000	66 000	370 999	-	53 249	
03.1	Purchase 4WD vehicles	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
03.2	Purchase minibuses	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
03.3	Maintenance, repair & fuel	75 000	16 079	9 500	12 500	12 500	12 500	75 579	-	579	
03.4	Loc. transport (flights,boat,taxi)	34 000	34 698	3 585	10 000	10 000	10 000	78 282	-	44 887	
03.5	Plane hire	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
03.6	Rent/lease of cars	48 750	18 539	9 098	9 000	9 000	9 000	63 637	-	14 887	
03.7	Int'l travel DRC staff & partners	160 000	-	-	50 000	34 500	34 500	153 500	6 500		
03.8	Repair of partner vehicles	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
SUPPORT TO PARTNERS		245 500	88 069	-	30 818	21 500	126 619	21 500	248 370	-	2 870
04.1	Resource Group	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
04.2	North Kivu partners	80 000	19 380	-	15 000	15 000	15 000	79 380	620		
04.3	South Kivu partners	45 500	53 808	-	34 200	6 500	6 500	45 608	-	108	
04.4	Honoraria res.partners	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
04.5	Honoraria trng & educ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
04.6	Nat'l & int'l conf/training	120 000	14 881	-	-	-	105 119	-	12 000	-	
04.7	Exchange visits with GLR	-	-	3 382	-	-	-	-	3 382	-	3 382

RECONCILIATION MEETINGS										
05.1	Meet's w comm leaders in DRC	422 000	175 809	- 144 234	125 000	150 000	115 000	15 000	436 575	- 14 575
05.2	Meet's w comm leaders outs DRC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
05.3	Community meetings (05.1 & 05.2)	422 000	175 809	- 144 234	125 000	150 000	115 000	15 000	436 575	- 14 575
05.4	Uvira-Fizi-Ikombwe meeting	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EXPENSES OBJECTIVE 1										
		135 000	52 083	64 600	- 25 000	45 000	-	-	136 683	- 1 683
06.1	Prov Civil Society meetings	135 000	46 664	64 600	-	45 000	-	-	156 264	- 21 284
06.2	Kivu meets/CS harmonisation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
06.3	Documentation, filing etc	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
06.4	Train progr Conflict studies	-	-	-	- 25 000	-	-	-	- 25 000	25 000
06.5	Train - coord/PRA/mgmt	-	5 419	-	-	-	-	-	5 419	- 5 419
EXPENSES OBJECTIVE 2										
		411 000	27 058	-	63 250	247 744	32 000	-	370 050	40 950
07.1	Res & meetings expenses	65 000	-	-	25 000	17 000	17 000	-	59 000	6 000
07.2	Seminars w church leaders	220 000	4 256	-	-	215 744	-	-	220 000	-
07.3	Sem's w lower rel leaders	126 000	22 800	-	38 250	15 000	15 000	-	91 050	34 950
EXPENSES OBJECTIVE 3										
		929 000	60 800	64 600	134 000	225 000	285 000	15 022	894 422	34 579
08.1	Train. comm peace workers	210 000	-	-	-	70 000	70 000	70 000	210 000	-
08.2	Dev + printing of pamphlets	140 000	-	-	75 000	65 000	-	-	140 000	-
08.3	Women spec train & projects	180 000	3 800	-	8 000	70 000	70 000	-	151 800	28 200
08.4	Field work peace workers	399 000	57 000	64 600	51 000	20 000	145 000	55 022	392 622	6 379
EXPENSES OBJECTIVE 4										
		358 000	24 303	845	99 500	240 545	35 000	35 000	435 193	- 77 193
09.1	Research fund for DRC cap	225 000	20 763	594	99 500	115 000	35 000	35 000	305 858	- 80 858
09.2	Coll. w University of Gent	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
09.3	Publ of 'Annuaire' + res repts	80 000	2 455	-	-	77 545	-	-	80 000	-
09.4	Expenses Cong. students	48 000	-	-	-	48 000	-	-	48 000	-
09.5	Books & magazines	5 000	1 085	251	-	-	-	-	1 336	3 664

EVALUATION											
10	Project evaluation costs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(Sida will conduct, LPI no expenses)										
EXTERNAL AUDIT											
11	External audit	-	-	3 800	-	-	-	-	-	3 800	- 3 800
SUBTOTALS											
		4 642 825	879 317	230 064	761 085	1 350 191	1 005 445	548 448	4 774 551	- 131 726	
12	BANK CHARGES (1.5%)	48 750	-	-	7 991	14 177	10 557	5 759	38 484	10 265	
13	ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS (5%)	232 141	43 968	11 503	38 054	67 510	50 272	27 422	238 728	- 6 586	
14	CONTINGENCY RESERVE (2%)	128 047	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	128 047	
TOTALS											
	5 051 763	923 283	241 567	807 130	1 431 878	1 066 275	581 629	5 051 762	-	-	

Annex 11

Structure	Axe d'Intervention	Projet	Date	Cout du Project	Assistant
Synergie V.I.E	Bunyakiri, Kalehe, Kalonge, Nindja, Shabunda et Kabare	Programme de paix durable et de reinsertion PPDR Enquete sur repatriement des refugies Hutus rwandais	4/09/2002	3070.00 \$	Hans
ADEPAE	Uvira-Fizi-Kalehe	Recherche sur les modes traditionnels de resolution des conflits aus Sud-Kivu (cas des Babembe, Bafuliro et Bahavu)	4/9/2002	2700.00 \$	Hans
ECC	Uvira-Fizi-Bukavu	• Accompagnement du processus de concertation provincial des Eglises pour la paix • Collaboration entre ECC et les universities FSAR et CIUB • Recherche sur le conflit Babembe – Banyamulenge au sein de la 26^{eme} CMLC	5/9/2002	1100.00 \$	Hans
MESEP	Walungu	Appui participation a un atelier de travail a Gulu (Ouganda)	Aout 2002	498.00 \$	Mwavita
PADEBU	Bunyakiri	Appui aux initiatives de retablissement de la paix	Avec ce projet nous ne sommes jamais arrive a une proposition finale. Quand meme nous avons donne une somme d'argent et car nous collaborons avec PADEBU en plusieurs choses, je propose que Tharcisse essaie quand meme d'evaluer notre collaboration		Tharcisse
CODHOP Plate-forme des confessions religieuses du Nord-Kivu	Goma	- Participation au sommet inter-religieux de Johannesburg -Seminaire de formation aux methodes de pacification Mission prophetique des confessions religieuses et transformation des conflits	Oct 2002	Cette activite etait financiee par LWF. LPI a seulement pre-financie	Mwavita
CIUB Comite Inter-Universitaire de Bukavu	Bukavu	- Inventaire des recherches produites localement dans le domaine conflit/resolution des conflits. - Organisation d'une restitution	Fin 2002 – fev 2003	7200.00 \$	Sylvie
Societe Civile du Masisi/ACODRI	Masisi	Project de sensibilisation ed d'education a la paix entre les communautes ethniques en Territoire de Masisi	Mars 2003	+/- 5000.00 \$	Mwavita

Group des organisations de Rutshuru	Rutshuru	Projet de sensibilisation et d'éducation à la paix entre les communautés ethniques en Territoire de Rutshuru	Mars 2003	5562.00 \$	Mwavita
Société civile de Walikale	Walikale	- Séminaire de sensibilisation sur la construction de la paix en territoire de Walikale - Phase préparatoire	17/12/2003	1550.00 \$	Mwavita
CODHOP	Ville de Goma	Séminaire sur la mission prophétique de clergé dans la transformation des conflits. (Avec Feccleha et Claudette Werlegh)	11/12/2002	5999.00 \$	Mwavita
PADEBU	Bunyakiri	Consolider la cohabitation entre la population, le RCD et les Mayi-mayi	2003-2004	1200.00 \$	
CCAP	Fizi – Itombwe	- Renforcement des actions de paix en synergie dans la territoire Fizi-Minimbwe - Facilitation des contacts entre les groupes armés pour l'arrêt des hostilités	1/10/2002	5300.00 \$	Tharcisse
CCAP	Fizi – Itombwe	- Appui institutionnelle			
AVEVENA	Uvire-Fizi	- Sensibilisation des groupes armés à l'arrêt des hostilités et exaction contre les populations - Organisation des rencontres avec les notabilités du territoire pour qu'ils s'impliquent dans les activités de paix	Mars 2003 - 2004 2/10/2002	500 \$/mois 2900.00 \$	Tharcisse Tharcisse
Coordination de la Société Civile	Bukavu	- renforcement structurel de la société civile - facilitation à l'organisation d'un programme radio sur la paix	7/10/2002	1400.00 \$	Tharcisse & Mwavita
CAVPA	Bukavu	Recherches des étrangers et localisations des candidates au Repatriement Volontaire	Decembre 2002	800.00 \$	Deo
Etudiants des Univ./Bukavu	Bukavu et Burundi	Rencontre des Etudiants à Kisangani	Novembre 2002	1720.00 \$	Sylvie
EBENEZER	Est-RDC, Rwanda et Burundi	- Concertation entre les églises protestantes du Burundi, Rwanda et Est-RDC (co-financement) - Deuxieme concertation (a Bukavu) - Visite a Bunia; leaders des églises du Kivu, Maniema, Kisangani, Rwanda et Burundi	25/10/2002 Mars 2003 Dec 2003	5000.00 \$ 5000.00 \$	Tharcisse
COPARE	Bukavu/Sud Kivu	- Appui institutionnel et accompagnement semi-permanent - Rencontre sur les mécanismes et stratégies de résolution des conflits dans le Sud Kivu	Mensuel depuis 2002 Mars 2004	500.00 \$ 6000.00 \$	Tharcisse
Radio Maria	Sud Kivu/Bukavu	- Appui au programme de paix d'Eric Kajembe (communication plus accompagnement) - Idem	Decembre 2002/Janvier 2003 Mai 2003	+/- 500.00 \$ 1265.00 \$	Tharcisse

Societe Civile Nord Kivu & Comite pedagogique	Nord Kivu	- Differentes rencontres de reflexion autour la question de l'unité, l'organisation et la representativite, conduisant vers une restructuration de la SC - Soutien directe au comite de Pilotage	2002 – 2003	En totale 18000 \$	Mwavita et Sylvie
Societe Civile Sud Kivu & Comite de Pilotage	Sud Kivu	- Differentes rencontres de reflexion autour la question de l'unité, l'organisation et la representativite, conduisant vers une restructuration de la SC - Reunion avec tous les composantes a Centre Olame - Soutien au comite Pedagogique	End 2003 - 2004 2002 – 2003 Oct 2003 End 2003 - 2004	- 1500 \$ 14000 \$	Tharcisse et Mawavita
CARECO	Bukavu	- Rencontre a Nairobi: enfants et conflits	Mars 2003	250 \$	Sylvie
ADAPE	Bukavu / Sud Kivu	- Role de la societe civile dans la transition. Un seminaire a Panzi		5000 \$	Hans/Tharcisse
CIUB	Bukavu/Grands Lacs	- Symposium sur LA CONSTRUCTION DE LA PAIX AU NORD KIVU ET AU SUD KIVU: ETAT DE LA RECHERCHE	Mars 2003	13671 \$	Sylvie
LPI/Search for Common Ground	Kivu (et Ituri/Maniema/Kisangani)	Formation des formateurs (en transformation des conflits). 2 sessions de deux semaines	Apr 2003 Oct 2003	+/- 15000 \$ +/- 15000 \$	Nono
Codhop	Petit Nord (Goma, Masisi, Rutshuru et Walilale)	- Appuie institutionnelle; cet appuie a entre autre servie au developpement des structures dans les territoires - Evaluation des antennes - Restitution Formation des formateurs	Depuis sept 2002 Sept 2003 Dec 2003	500 \$ chaque mois 1800 \$ 3000 \$	Nono
LPI/PADEBU	Bunyakiri	- Recherche-action a Bunyakiri (Helene et Roger)	Fin 2002 / 2003	+/-25000 \$	Hans (et Uppsala/Gent)
COPAH	Uvira	Seminaire de formation et d'information sur le fonctionnement d'une structure oecumenique des droits humains et de pacification	Mars 2003	5000 \$	Tharcisse
CAP	Uvira (territory)	Reflexion sur l'analyse du contexte socio-politique	Avril 2003	2400 \$	Tharcisse
CEPROSCOPE	Kilembwe en territoire de Fizi	- Recherche-action; conflits a Kilembwe, problematique des desplaces (en collaboration avec OCHA) - Restitution et analyse	Nov 2003 Mars 2004	1497 \$ 4600 \$	Tharcisse (& Sylvie)
MESEP & UPDEBU	Bushi/Bukavu	- Etude dans les problemes au sein de la communaut Shi et la preparation d'une rencontre intra-communautaire	Mi-2003	750 \$	Mwavita & Tharcisse
SAPDM	Mwenga, Burhinyi, Itombwe et Luhwinja	- Etude sur les conflits dans le Mwenga et le Bushi de basse altitude - Restitution de l'etude (a Bukavu)	Mars 2003 Aout 2003	1603 \$ 2200 \$	Tharcisse

SOCIWAMA	Pinga (Masisi et Walikale)	- Negociations et reconciliation entre des communautés Hunde et Nyange	2002 – juin 2003	6008 \$	Mwavita
MESEP	Bushi	- Campagne de sensibilisation pour le retour des despalces dans le territoire de Walungu	Mai 2003	700 \$	Tharcisse
RIO	Kivu	- Analyse des action de paix - Symposium sur l'integration de l'education a la paix dans le curriculum des ecoles primaires et secondaires - Symposium ser les materiels de l'education a la paix (tools)	Mi-2003 Juillet 2003 Avril 2004	14000 \$ 10000 \$ 30000 \$	Hans & Tharcisse
CCAP	Fizi – Itombwe	- Rencontre de la societe civile avec des leaders Mayi-mayi a Kazimia et Minembwe - Commission de pacification des Hauts Plateaux	Juillet 2003 Juillet 2003	4500 \$ 1330 \$	Tharcisse
Eglise Methodiste CMLC	Uvira – Fizi – Itombwe	- Appuie a l'Assemblée Generale - Seminaire d'information sur la paix et l'Assemblée - Formation sur les techniques de transformation des conflits avec des leaders des eglises	Aout 2003 Sept 2003 Mars 2004	5000 \$ 3120 \$ 3600 \$	Tharcisse
La jeunesse du monde	Sud Kivu	Restitution de la recontre inter et intracommunautaire d'Uvira	Dec 2003	1300 \$	
ADEOVEKI	Mwenga	Negociations avec Mayi-mayi sur DDRR	Oct 2003	1300 \$	Tharcisse
UGEAFI-SOCOODEFI-ADEPAE	Uvira (Fizi/Itombwe)	Reunion inter et intracommunautaire a Uvira pour les communautés du Sud Sud (co-financement LPI-NOVIB-DFID)	Nov 2003	80000 \$	Hans & Tharcisse
Tripartite GADHOP, WIMA, Coordination	Grand Nord	Reunion intercommunautaire sur la paix durable dans les deux territoires Luber/Beni	Jan 2004	+/- 28000 \$	Sylvie
LIFOPAD	Sud Kivu	- Echange et decentes sur terrain sur les problemes et besoins des femmes dans la pacification - Activite de suivi (prevu)	Fev 2004	980 \$	Nono
LPI & institutions scientifiques	Kivu	Recherche empirique	Nov 2003 – 2004	prevu +/- 6000 \$ +/- 50000 \$	Helene & Sylvie

Annex 12

Goal	Activities	Expected Outcome	Risks & Assumptions
To contribute to the restoration of peace and justice in the Kivu provinces in the DRC	Organisation of meetings between groups in conflict with each other (Banyamulenge-Bembe/Fuliro, Bavira, Banyarwanda-Nande/Hunde/Nyanga Etc.) Facilitation of meetings between well-informed civil society members and members of the international community, Great Lakes countries etc. And further the combined activities under objective 1–4. Above activities will both serve the research and education objectives of the organisation.	F. The civil society in North and South Kivu will become better equipped and active in peace work, and its coordinating mechanisms strengthened. The Kivu civil society collaborates closely with the civil society in the rest of the country; G. The civil society will have developed commitment and some mechanisms to find solutions for the highly sensitive issues of nationality, the attitude towards Congo's neighbours, representation, land, the role of the customary authorities, corruption, etc.; H. The civil society will contribute actively to the building of confidence and the cessation of violence between ethnically, politically or otherwise divided groups that are currently (violently) opposed; I. The programme will contribute to an increased understanding, nationally and internationally about the ways the violence in the Congo and the Kivu in particular can be stopped and how the Congo can be managed in order to obtain a lasting peace, not only for the Congo, but for the entire region; J. The programme will also have an impact in the after-war situation during which the increased unity within the civil society will be an important factor for an efficient rehabilitation of the Congolese infrastructure and for development.	External influences, like a resumption of the war or interference of 'warlords', the impact of the programme might not be measurable or hardly measurable. The civil society organisations, including the churches, find ways to work together with common objectives
	Support (facilitation, technical support and finances) CS meetings at the provincial level and exchange between the Kivu provinces in order to develop a joint analysis and a joint approach for the restoration of peace. Support CS exchange between the Kivu provinces, the rest of the country and the Great Lakes The peace 'coordination structures' will (in coordination the research staff) centralise and circulate information useful for peace actors.	Provincial-Kivu (and ideally also inter-provincial/national) civil society peace programmes/ projects have been developed and widely supported and implemented. Exchange reports, declarations, joint action plans refined and amended, depending on the situation. COPARE and its equivalent in North will develop a filing and documentation centre and will send out regular pouches to the organisations collaborating. Number of Field visit reports.	It is assumed that a growing majority of the CS is ready for developing a joint vision for peace, gradually overcoming their differences and focusing on common goals. This is based on available information but numbers and percentages are only estimates. The 'coordination structures' do have the capacity to fulfil their proposed role.
Objective 1: To assist the civil society in the Kivu provinces of the DRC in order to broaden and strengthen the ongoing local peace efforts			

Goal	Activities	Expected Outcome	Risks & Assumptions
Objective 2: To encourage and assist the churches in the Kivu provinces with the development of a capacity to play a role, in line with its influence on the social life of Congolese people, in the peace building process	The peace 'coordination structures' will organise (in coordination with the research staff) field visits in order to facilitate exchange and learning. An analysis of the training requirements will be made with the assistance of the LPI-CTP unit and the university of Uppsala.	Consultancy report on training needs. Training reports and proven amelioration of the technical capacity of the peace workers (to be evaluated by LPI-CTP staff in collaboration with the local training facilities and the university of Uppsala).	LPI will receive funding for a limited institutional support to the coordination structures. Experienced and qualified trainers will be available both in the Congo and abroad.
	Civil society leaders will receive training in the role of the civil society, coordination, meeting techniques, conflict studies, etc. LPI and the church leadership (where appropriate with the participation of pastors, priests and aics at the grassroots) will develop a plan that should lead to a greater involvement of the churches in peace building. This plan will include the development of technical capacities, objectives, definition of the role of churches and will also include schemes to address some pressing problems. An in dept analysis of the current peace work of the churches (what kind of messages do the 'fiddles' receive, what kind of lobbying is being done). Does this correspond with the mission of the church; is it possible for the churches to go deeper into the root-causes of the conflict. Churches develop strategies and activities appropriate for them and in the general interest of the population. Facilitation of meetings to analyse, solve and reconcile. Seminars, first with the highest church leaders, but later also with the medium and lower level church leaders in order to discuss their positions, roles and mission, Assistance will be required from outside (CETA, FECCLAHA, WCC, Swedish and other collaborating churches and LPI board members and contacts)(it should also be noted that the church leadership in particular Caritas and the Peace & Justice Commissions, will participate in the activities under the other objectives)	Participation of women at the coordinating levels of peace work has increased after one year till around 30–40% and after two years till 4–50% of the total. LPI and the churches will have agreed about how the Institute will accompany the churches in their wish to play a more prominent role in peace building in the east of DRC (documents will be available, although probably confidentially). Number of seminar reports. Reports of church-conflict resolution and reconciliation meetings are available (LPI received already several requests for specific assistance). Strategy papers and sensitisations material for pastors and priests in the parishes are available. Churches develop links with counterparts in the rest of the country and with neighbouring countries. There should be proof (e.g. reports) of regular, border crossing exchange. Churches will become active participants in all peace building activities and will also have their own activities for peace work through the churches, pastors, peace & justice commissions etc.Churches will also promote women in their peace work	The church leadership of the different congregations accept to work together (without exclusion) and use their position as opinion leaders in the communities in the most positive way possible. The churches do accept assistance from the outside. The churches will not be blocked from the outside, e.g. by the more extreme group in the CS.

Goal	Activities	Expected Outcome	Risks & Assumptions
Objective 3: To assist grassroots organisation in order to increase their capacity to contribute to non violent conflict resolution at the local level and to participate in provincial and national coordination platforms	To make an inventory of the currently used sensitisation materials and civic education techniques and propose how these materials can be improved (local consultant advised by university of Uppsala and LP-HAP). To implement a study to establish the traditional ways of dealing with conflict, how these have been affected by the current events and how those can be strengthened. To train the trainers for community sensitisation (civic education). To develop and multiply pamphlets and adapted training materials. To identify community workers that have both the intellectual capacity and support of the community to vulgarise peace messages. To train women leaders at the grassroots to play an active role in peace building, to sensitise the men that women should be part of the reconstruction of the society. To train youth leaders and help them to play a more important role in the analysis, prevention and resolution of conflict. In collaboration with e.g. UNICEF develop strategies, materials and seminars for sensitising school children and the reintegration of child soldiers. To develop a training programme for the grassroots leaders who are or should be key-players in the prevention of conflict and who, ideally should now also play a role in the peace building	Inventory and analysis report of available materials is present. Report on traditional methods of conflict prevention and containment has been published. Training sessions was implemented and well evaluated. Women have a qualitative, quantitative and respected contribution in the peace process. At the beginning of the programme, women will represent at least 25% at all activities. Towards the end of the programme this percentage should have increased, ideally to 50% but at least till 40%. Community based conflict prevention and resolution capacities should be reinforced to the extent that those will be able to prevent new conflict between communities and participate actively in the solution finding exchange between communities.	Insecurity will not disrupt the field work. Trainers were well identified, i.e. both the intellectual capacity, the devotion for the job and the trust within the communities.

Goal	Activities	Expected Outcome	Risks & Assumptions
Objective 4: To document all activities, as well as undertake and facilitate research works focussing on the causes and the specific features of the conflict, and whose results, conclusions and recommendations would influence the development of strategies on the field. This will allow us to learn from the ongoing work, both for immediate use in the Congo and for improving theory and practice globally	LPI will recruit one qualified researcher and signs memoranda of understanding (MOU) for distinct pieces of work with local research capacities. Research capacities in the Congo need to be evaluated by an experienced consultant (if possible within the agreement with the university of Uppsala. An agreement will be signed with the university of Uppsala and if that university cannot supply all the capacity required, other internationally recognised research capacities will be approached (the University of Gent is rather advanced in the Congo). All ongoing activities will be documented. The information collected will be verified by research partners in order to assure that the info collected can be used for research purposes. A bi-monthly magazine will be published (not by LPI but in partnership) in collaboration with the research capacities and local journalists. Consultants will be employed for specific pieces of work. Links will be made with similar research projects in the world, both within LPI and outside. Students and researchers from abroad will collaborate with Congolese Institutes/Universities. At the end of the second year it will be decided whether the information available can be used for a promotion research project.	MOU with local research capacities and University of Uppsala and Gent. Evaluation report of local research capacities available. Detailed research plans will be developed between the Congolese research capacities, LPI, the University of Uppsala and the University of Gent. Documentation available for research purposes. Every one or two months a magazine will be produced about the peace process, both the Lusaka Accords and the local activities. Northern researchers and Congolese produce joint research reports of good scientific quality and in the majority of the cases, for practical use in the field, either in the DRC or elsewhere. Research exchange visits/email (Congo, Uppsala, HAP etc.). Possibly a PhD research project will follow. Documentation centres should be developed, both in Bukavu, Goma and Maniema. One of the centres should be the main one where all documents will be available. This will probably be in Bukavu as Bukavu is the main university town in the east of the DRC. The documentation should be available for all peace workers and other interested persons. The documentation centres will not be in the LPI representation	University of Uppsala have the human resources available. Congolese researchers have the required capacity (a lot of the qualified scientists are working abroad). Authorities allow information sharing (no censure)

Annex 13 – Financial and resource use analysis

A. Summary of activities and resource use in LPI's HAP program 1993-2002

(based mainly on LPI's final reports to Sida as well as internal material provided by LPI)

- Total Sida contribution to LPI's 'Community based building of peace and democracy in Somalia'-program between 1993 and 2002 amounts to SEK 71 million. The summarised resource use per budget posts is shown in the table below:

	199307 - 200206	% of total
Capacity building - training	29 085 426	41%
Administrative kit & rehabilitation of offices	9 249 317	13%
Program for women & peace	1 174 726	2%
Local reconciliation	1 036 748	1%
Capacity building for staff	17 643	0%
Advocacy programme	2 069 271	3%
Evaluation & documentation	1 106 295	2%
Coordination & support	15 975 330	23%
LPI overhead	10 581 516	15%
Contingencies	386 221	1%
Total in SEK	70 682 493	

- The main activity of the program (at least in terms of resource use) is 'capacity building' of the civil society in Somalia, mainly consisting of training activities for district and regional councillors, village councils, rural health workers, women leaders and parliamentarians. Total number of participants in training between 1993 and 2002 is approximately 7000. (The average cost per participant is SEK 4000.) The first years of the program the focus is on basic and executive training for district councillors, but as the establishment of district councils proves not to work according to plans, the focus is shifted in 1997/98 towards village councils and rural health workers (incl TBA's). During the last period of the program (from 1999) training for women NGO leaders and parliamentarians is conducted as well.
- Another large budget post is the rehabilitation of district and regional offices. The rehabilitation includes refurbishment of buildings and provision of an 'administrative kit' including furniture and office equipment. Approximately 120 council offices are rehabilitated, of which approximately 100 before 1997. Average cost per office is SEK 75,000 (which corresponds to the budgeted USD 10,000 per office).
- Other activities in the program are:
 - Women program – mainly in terms of conferences for women leaders
 - Local reconciliation – in terms of contributions to local peace initiatives, such as conferences, meetings, etc. This post is constantly smaller than budgeted, due to lack of initiatives and organisations that fits LPI's criteria for support.
 - Advocacy – this budget post consist mainly of production of the 'Horn of Africa Bulletin' as well as advocacy activities by the HAP director
 - Evaluation & documentation – this post is also constantly smaller than budgeted, several planned studies were postponed and in total only 40 percent of budgeted resources were used.
- The support structure consist of two posts: Coordination and support, which mainly consists of costs for the Nairobi office as well as offices, employers and travels in Somalia; and LPI overhead, which covers costs in Uppsala. The total support structure is rather expensive and amounts to 38 percent of the total budget. The support structure is not only large, but the LPI overhead is also considerably larger than budgeted (meaning that funds have been relocated

from other budget posts). The large budget deviances as regards the overhead have been noted in the auditor's reports, but reference is made to a continuing dialogue between LPI and Sida on the subject.

	Budgeted amount 199307 - 200206	% of total	Actual amount 199307 - 200206	% of total
Coordination & support	17 648 894	23%	15 975 330	23%
LPI overhead	4 195 324	6%	10 581 516	15%

- The LPI overhead in the Somalia program has represented a considerable contribution to LPI's total budget during the program period, in particular until 1998. During 1993-1998 the HAP program was 40 to 60 percent of LPI's total income, with the LPI overhead in the program approximately 10 percent of the total income. Between 1999 and 2002 corresponding figures were 25 to 35 percent as regards the total HAP program and 2 to 4 percent as regards LPI's overhead in the program.

Evaluation/research reports funded by the Sida budget:

- 'The Bottom-up Approach in Reconciliation in the Inter-River Regions of Somalia', Visiting Mission Report by Mohamed Haji Mukhtar & Abdi Mohamed Kusow, Aug/Sept 1993
- 'Building Peace from Below? A Critical Review of the District Councils in the Bay and Bakool Regions of Southern Somalia', by Bernhard Helander (Dr Uppsala University) in co-operation with Mohamed Haji Mukhtar (prof Savannah State College) and I.M. Lewis (prof London School of Economics), based upon field research by Mohamed Haji Mukhtar, commissioned by LPI, April 1994
- 'Building the Peace, Experiences of Collaborative Peace building in Somalia 1993-1996, Wolfgang Heinrich, Nov 1997 (LPI contributed in the initial stage from the Sida funds)
- 'Community-based Bottom-Up Peacebuilding', Thania Paffenholz, 2003

Mentioned in LPI's reports to Sida, but with unknown result ???

- 'Needs assessment study on local administrations', author? (consultant), May 1998
- 'Research on Women's Changing Role and Its Relevance to Peace Building', author?, May 2001
- 'Research on Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms (Somaliland), ??

Summary of budget and resource use in the ‘Community based building of peace and democracy in Somalia’-program between 1993 and 2002, according to LPI’s final reports to Sida

	9307-9606	9307-9606	9607-9712	9607-9712	9801-9812	9801-9812	9901-9912	9901-9912	0001-0206	0001-0206	9307-0206	9307-0206	% of total	% of total
	Budget	Actual	Budget	Actual	Budget	Actual	Budget	Actual	Budget	Actual	Budget	Actual	Budget	Actual
Capacity building - training	5 907 344	6 284 935	4 852 484	5 955 343	6 012 000	4 961 701	5 660 119	4 943 675	8 871 597	6 939 772	31 303 544	29 085 426	41%	41%
Administrative kit & rehabilitation	9 119 350	7 273 317	1 564 000	765 000	1 056 000	902 000	400 000	109 000	200 000	200 000	12 339 350	9 249 317	16%	13%
Program for women & peace	610 560	430 224	197 347	386 420	160 000	3 288			394 520	354 794	1 362 427	1 174 726	2%	2%
Local reconciliation	1 042 000	426 081	433 218	129 941	520 000	138 115	480 480	137 349	246 500	205 262	2 722 198	1 036 748	4%	1%
Capacity building for staff									284 240	17 643	284 240	17 643	0%	0%
Advocacy programme			666 489	350 770	520 000	364 633	876 046	296 947	886 412	1 056 921	2 948 947	2 069 271	4%	3%
Evaluation & documentation	760 000	142 775	273 261	6 495	160 000	12 874	218 400	97 431	1 376 393	846 720	2 788 054	1 106 295	4%	2%
Coordination & support	5 294 046	2 080 227	2 734 872	2 732 320	1 850 000	1 840 794	1 868 950	1 989 803	5 901 026	7 332 186	17 648 894	15 975 330	23%	23%
LPI overhead	798 322	4 564 804	716 256	2 180 983	514 000	1 996 068	1 258 712	931 627	908 034	908 034	4 195 324	10 581 516	6%	15%
Contingencies			752 073	41 135	648 000	345 086	737 293	0	831 278	0	2 968 644	386 221	4%	1%
Overall reduction					-2 440 000	0					-2 440 000	0	-3%	0%
Total	23 531 622	21 202 363	12 190 000	12 548 407	9 000 000	10 564 559	11 500 000	8 505 832	19 900 000	17 861 332	76 121 622	70 682 493		

B. LPI:s core funding

<i>Year</i>	<i>Turnover</i>	<i>Core funding</i>	<i>% of turnover</i>	<i>of which Sida</i>
1992/93	11266	3252	19%	n.a.
1993/94	18174	2606	10%	n.a.
1994/95	11285	2401	13%	n.a.
1995/96	20220	5732	17%	n.a.
1997	19933	5028	13%	n.a.
1998	19693	3431	13%	700
1999	25203	6500	22%	3000
2000	23019	3144	11%	1000
2001	27042	4497	10%	1000
2002	14725	5467	16%	1100
2003	22659	4156	12%	1100

thousand SEK

LPI:s core funding comes mainly from Sida, Swedish FO and the Swedish Church

Comments on LPI's evaluation

I want to start by expressing, first, how grateful we are to Sida to have made an assessment of the LPI's programmes in Somalia and in DRC possible. As stated in the evaluation, it is important from time to time to have an external look at one's work. This will certainly allow us to improve LPI's performance.

It is also important to make clear that, although we may not agree with all the conclusions and recommendations made in the assessment, we do take them seriously. There is no doubt that we consider as challenges and opportunities to improve our work, the critical reflections made by Swedegroup international consultants AB.

We present our thanks to the two entities.

Specific Comments about DRC:

1. It is true that LPI was not **initially** invited by local actors to be involved in DRC; but writing that “*LPI was forced to develop its own role and programmatic mission, based on its own understanding of the conflict*” is exaggerated, and partly wrong. Demands for the presence of an international agency specialised in peace building from local actors have accompanied LPI’s “*comprehensive analysis and mobilisation phase in 2001*”. This led to the Elmentiata meeting, during which members of the civil society from the Kivu Provinces made their own conflict analysis, and developed recommendations that have been the basis for our involvement (Cf. Elmentiata meeting on the web site).

2. We do not agree with the fact that “*in the Congo, (the conflict analysis) was more of a one-off effort*”. Conflict analysis has been a permanent feature of the programme, whether with the staff or during our training sessions. It might have not been documented enough, or systematically integrated and made visible in our work, but there has been a constant effort to deepen and actualise our analysis of the situation in Congo.

Page 10, paragraph 1. "Accompagnement" is much more than a simple "*hands-on mentoring*". It, indeed, consists of:

- Providing advices on issues related to the work and/or the situation;
- Providing assistance (technical, financial, etc) to our partners;
- Maybe the most important, although never mentioned in the evaluation and seldom acknowledged by peace builders, it is **a presence**, side by side with local actors involved in dangerous work. It is a kind of support that is not necessarily visible or measurable, which does not necessarily lead to a financial or structural support, but which is still so important for local actors involved in peace building.

Page 15 footnote related to first paragraph. It is not only a matter of funding. This particular meeting was thought by the local and some funding partners to be strategically important to prevent a new outburst of violence.

Conflict analysis. Similar remarks as above in our first comment can be made. It is not true that "*the only conflict analysis that provides a reasonably coherent perspective is the one generated by LPP*". The training sessions, for example, organised with Search for Common Grounds and gathering most of our partners, had as an objective to develop skills in conflict analysis, but also, from the analysis made by the participants, to discuss their very-often contradictory or totally opposed analysis of the same situation. It often led to harsh discussions and debates between them, but also, in most of the cases, to common understanding of a given issue. The problem is more that we have not been able to sufficiently build upon these analyses and have failed to integrate them fully in our work.

Page 16, Strategy. Lack or absence of strategic support from LPI Uppsala. Our working procedures certainly have to be improved, but writing that "*this should in itself automatically imply a very active strategic support, guidance and interaction between LPI DRC and LPI Headquarters in Uppsala. We have, however, not come across any effort in this direction*" is, once again, a much-exaggerated statement based on fragile, non-complete and/or biased grounds.

The evaluation team has not worked with the staff in Uppsala, and seems to only become the voice of some of the field staff. None of the allegations coming from the field, whether from the LPI staff, from our partners or from other international organisations (the *findings* of the evaluation) have ever been discussed with the management in Uppsala. Still, they are presented as an absolute truth.

The evaluation has brought to light the perception of some field officers in the two places visited. This has a lot of value per se. But, that does not necessarily means that it is conform to reality. While we understand fully the point of view presented by the Evaluation team, the fact that they did not meet and listen to the staff in Uppsala remains a weak point of the assessment (“Qui n’entend qu’un son, n’entend qu’une cloche”).)

The fact is that there have been continuous exchanges between Bukavu and Uppsala during the past two years, whether by phone, email or through field visits from Uppsala staff in Bukavu. During these exchanges, issues related to strategic management have been widely discussed.

It would have been very interesting and useful if the evaluation had showed why some of the strategic guidance given by Uppsala never became integrated in the work in Bukavu. Is it because it was not adapted to the reality, to the needs of our partners? Have they been listened to? We are not pretending that our strategic management is perfect. If weak it is, the one sided way the evaluation presents the facts does not help us to improve the situation.

B.3.7.2 Conclusions “ any research on DRC or the two Kivus has been undertaken in collaboration with...LPI Headquarters in Uppsala”. This is certainly not true. The work done by Helene in Bunyakiri has been discussed and monitored by the CTP and Research staff in Uppsala. Hélène’s Terms of Reference indicate clearly that she reports directly to the Research Coordinator in Uppsala.

Nota bene

Please, note that we have prepared a written document that addresses the criticisms made by MONUC. We have been informed that this part will be withdrawn from the evaluation. This is why it is not included here. But it is ready to be shared whenever necessary.

Comments concerning Somalia

I think that the evaluation would gain by introducing more nuances. Also, by integrating history: following the chronological sequence of events and taking better into consideration the time factor. When it comes to the work in Somalia, there have been different stages and not only the two periods mentioned (with UNOSOM and after UNOSOM).

At the beginning, there were two members of LPI staff involved in the work in Somalia: Sture Normark and Susanne Thurfjell. Even after other staffs were recruited for the work, those two

people have continued for some time to be not only very active, but to be “the mind” behind the work. Both staff belonged to LPI Uppsala.

As the programme in Somalia grew to be the most important (in number of personnel as well as in financial terms), questions were raised about the true mission of LPI: "pure" research versus action. This coincided with the "internal problems" that the evaluation referred to.

In an attempt to "re-centre" LPI's work towards research, the Board took the decision, in 1997, that the activities should be "handed over" to a local institution. This has led to the creation of FOPAG, as explained in the document.

In the meanwhile, in reaction to the internal problem in Uppsala, there has been an attempt to make the field programmes become quite autonomous from Uppsala. A new phase had started with some changes in the personnel but most clearly illustrated by the Nairobi Mandate (1999).

The years after have seen LPI extend its physical presence to the two Congo. This has brought some new dynamism: the necessity to adjust to new realities and, at the same time, to apply some "lessons learned" from the field programmes (in particular from Somalia).

As rightly pointed out by the Evaluation team, this should have opened the door for systematic reflections and analysis of LPI's work. LPI failed to seize the opportunity.

Nevertheless, working on a new Strategic Plan triggered a lot of internal debate. A previous assessment commissioned by Sida and the book written by Wolfgang Heinrich served as guidance tools for the Conflict Transformation Programmes.

A new stage had started of deliberate efforts to introduce more research to the field; to reconcile research and action (to have them work "hand in hand"). But, finding a proper balance is not easy: some people are more interested to research as such, while others are more inclined to "action". We then discovered that finding the proper balance is not the most challenging issue! We are now striving to reach better integration and inter-action of the two components of our peace building work.

It is true that the term *research action* is an expression frequently used by our staff and present in LPI's publications. But while the Evaluators seem to be very clear on the true meaning of Research action and how it should be carried, I must confess that it is an issue that we still struggle with at LPI (not only with the concept; but also on how best to apply it).

[A quick reminder of the steps taken by LPI when starting a programme:

1. Ideally, LPI responds to a local call or request (Concerning DRC, the original request for a study came from Sida and the call for involvement came later from representatives of the civil society and churches in the Kivu)
2. LPI goes to the place; studies the situation there; tries to identify some local peace initiatives and local peace actors.
3. This may lead to a “proposal” that is presented to some “funding partners”.
4. Using ***nonviolent means***, LPI helps strengthen the initiatives of some local actors/partners to *transform* the violent conflict into a situation of mutual recognition, dialogue and understanding.

The “nonviolent means” are **research**, **education** (training) and **facilitation of dialogue**].

The evaluators have raised some important issues that need to be explained:

the issue of **ownership**; the kind of **research needed** at LPI; the **articulation between the headquarters and the other LPI offices**; and the “lack of support “ and “ **Strategic management**“ from LPI/U.

Ownership and the role of LPI

It should be clarified that we have not been looking for an “ownership” of LPI. We believe that **the local people should have the ownership of the programmes**.

This is because we believe that it is the people in the violent conflict that will ultimately solve their conflicts and build sustainable peace. Others (outsiders) can ***help***, they can ***facilitate*** a process, but they cannot and they should not try to substitute themselves to the local actors. The role of LPI is that of a *facilitator*. And this is totally in line with the “bottom up approach:” where participation of the communities is looked for, nurtured, and fully included.

The kind of Research needed:

The evaluators have rightly pointed out that research has, so far, been **weak** in our programmes. They have also signalled that all the research being done, at the moment in DRC, are *contextual* (related to the situation in the ground: the causes of the conflicts, the actors, the reaction of the population to the conflict...). And that none is undertaken on our own intervention or accompaniment as LPI. For the evaluators, it is imperative and expected (from *action/research*) that we monitor our own programmes and come up with *indicators* that will be relevant, not only for LPI but for others in the field of peacebuilding

Comments: This is a point well taken. From now on we will add this dimension to our future work in the different programmes .

The articulation between LPI/U and LPI/B

The evaluators are right when they refer to the need of a view of “the tree” and of “the forest”. When it comes to picturing the situation on the ground, it is obvious that the staffs based in LPI’s country or regional offices know better and probably can more adequately evaluate certain risks. When it comes to seeing the broader picture, to build bridges or to share lessons learned with and from other parts of the world, the staffs based in Uppsala are in a better position. Both perspectives are important and should complement each other. Thus, the need to constantly and systematically inform each other, to exchange views or perceptions, to evaluate and carry the programmes **together**.

The “lack of support” and of “**Strategic Management**” from LPI/U

First, there is a lot of support from staffs in Uppsala that do not seem to be taken into account (administration/finances/communication).

Nevertheless, it is **true** that there is an **urgent need for improvement**. There is a real need for better integration of research and action. When it comes to CTP, the staffs in Uppsala have not been always free or available, because of other commitments (networking, attending, meetings, seminars and others). It is important that LPI takes some measures to reinforce its capacities in Uppsala in order to:

- Fulfil the routine administrative tasks linked to the field programmes;
- Accompany more efficiently the field programmes through a more regular and direct involvement;
- Better monitor the field activities in developing, together with our partners, appropriate evaluation tools;
- Tackle better cross-cutting issues like gender in peace building.

Comments: We recognize the weaknesses (most of them had already been identified by us during internal discussions among staff). We disagree with the *way* that the evaluators present the situation in *black and white* (without nuances) or without explaining why.

While the evaluators have reached some *right* conclusion (for example, the need for a better articulation between the headquarters and the other LPI offices), it is unfortunate that they did not find it important or necessary to talk to the people directly in charge in Uppsala. Neither did they consult documentation available (correspondence, emails) in the Uppsala office.

The evaluation would have been not only more *participative* but closer to fairness and truth.

Claudette Werleigh

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SWEDISH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY
SE-105 25 Stockholm, Sweden
Tel: +46 (0)8-698 50 00. Fax: +46 (0)8-20 88 64
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