

# Assessment of Sida Support Through UNDP to Liberia Recovery and Rehabilitation

**Hans Eriksson**



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**Sida Evaluation 2008:50**

**Sida**

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# Abbreviations

|          |                                                                             |
|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| AIDS     | Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome                                         |
| APNAC    | African Parliamentarian Network Against Corruption                          |
| BPRM     | US Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration                             |
| CAAR     | County Assessment and Action Report                                         |
| CBRD     | Community Based Rehabilitation and Development Project                      |
| CBRP     | Community Based Recovery Project                                            |
| CCU      | Community Credit Union                                                      |
| CDSC     | County Development and Steering Committee                                   |
| CDA      | County Development Agenda                                                   |
| CDC      | County Development Committee                                                |
| CDD      | Community Driven Development                                                |
| CDF      | County Development Fund, Liberia government                                 |
| CDP      | County Development Programme EC                                             |
| CPA      | Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2003                                          |
| CRC      | Community Rehabilitation Component EC                                       |
| CST      | County Support Team UNDP                                                    |
| DD       | Disarmament, Demobilization                                                 |
| DDC      | District Development Committee                                              |
| DDRR     | Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, Rehabilitation                  |
| DSRSG/RC | Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General/Resident Coordinator |
| DFID     | Department for International Development Great Britain                      |
| EC       | European Commission                                                         |
| ECOWAS   | Economic Community of West African States                                   |
| FAO      | Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations                     |
| GC       | Governance Commission                                                       |
| GRC      | Governance Reform Commission                                                |
| GEMAP    | Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme                     |
| GRC      | Governance Reforms Commission (changed to Governance Commission in 2007)    |
| IDP      | Internally Displaced Person                                                 |

|          |                                                                                                                                    |
|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| IGA      | Income Generation Activities                                                                                                       |
| IMO      | Information Management Office                                                                                                      |
| IRC      | International Rescue Committee                                                                                                     |
| LACE     | Liberia Agency for Community Empowerment                                                                                           |
| LEGF     | Liberian Emergency Governance Fund                                                                                                 |
| LISGIS   | Liberian Institute for Statistics and Geo Information Services                                                                     |
| LIPA     | Liberian Institute for Public Administration                                                                                       |
| LCD      | Local Community Development, EC project in the programme Post conflict Rehabilitation of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons |
| LCEP     | Liberia Community Empowerment Project WB                                                                                           |
| LCIP     | Liberia Community Infrastructure Project USAID                                                                                     |
| LDLD     | Liberia Decentralisation and Local Development Project, UNDP                                                                       |
| LRDC     | Liberia Recovery and Development Corporation attached to the Presidency                                                            |
| M & E    | Monitoring & Evaluation                                                                                                            |
| MDG      | Millennium Development Goals                                                                                                       |
| MIA      | Ministry of Internal Affairs                                                                                                       |
| MPW      | Ministry of Public Works                                                                                                           |
| MoU      | Memorandum of Understanding                                                                                                        |
| NTGL     | National Transitional Government of Liberia                                                                                        |
| PAC      | Project Appraisal Committee of CBRP                                                                                                |
| PRS      | Poverty Reduction Strategy                                                                                                         |
| RC-DSRSG | Resident Coordinator- Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General                                                    |
| TRC      | Truth and Reconciliation Commission                                                                                                |
| UNCDF    | United Nations Capital Development Fund                                                                                            |
| UNDP     | United Nations Development Programme                                                                                               |
| UNMIL    | United Nations Mission in Liberia                                                                                                  |
| WB       | World Bank                                                                                                                         |
| WFP      | World Food Programme                                                                                                               |
| UNHCR    | UN High Commissioner for Refugees                                                                                                  |
| UNICEF   | UN Children Fund                                                                                                                   |
| XC       | Ex-combatants                                                                                                                      |

# Executive Summary

## Introduction

The purpose of the evaluation was “to support choice of path in the future collaboration between Sida and UNDP”. The evaluation should provide Sida with an independent opinion on the effectiveness of the projects/programs and the achieved results of UNDP as well as assess the extent to which Sida-UNDP agreements has been met.

The evaluation covers the time period from 2004 to 2007, during which Sida contributed to 5 specific projects in Liberia through Trust Fund arrangements with UNDP:

- Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration program, DDRR
- Community Based Development Recovery Program, CBRP;
- County Support Team Project, CST;
- Governance Reform Commission GRC;
- Truth and Reconciliation Committee, TRC;
- The RR component of the DDRR, for which UNDP is responsible organises rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants through formal education and vocational training implemented by mostly local NGOs.
- The CBRP aims to strengthen the local governance and existing traditional governance structure in communities and support rehabilitation of social infrastructure and initiate income generation projects.
- The CST aims at strengthening the management of the counties by rehabilitating physical infrastructure, provision of vehicles, computers etc, as well as capacity development of key county officials, line ministries and civil society organisations.
- The Purpose of the GRC (name changed to Governance Commission GC in 2007), is to promote good governance, develop public sector reforms, prepare bills for the legislature to combat corruption, ensure transparency and accountability in governance, and promote a good relationship between the State and the civil society at national and local levels.
- The TRC support is to be used for hearings, psycho-social support, witness security and protection and research and analysis of the war crimes and violence connected to the Liberian civil war.

Three of these projects have been implemented directly by the UNDP (DDRR, CBRP, CST), while the GC and TRC are implemented by those government institutions.

## Findings

The evaluation found that the five Sida-supported projects were relevant to the post-conflict context and in keeping with the priorities outlined by the Liberian government for the evaluation period.

The UNDP has managed the 12 Sida agreements for 5 different projects between 2004 and 2007 paid through the UNDP – Sida Trust Fund in an acceptable manner.

UNDP staffing resources appear adequate to achieve the management of the Sida-funded projects. See further details under each project.

The rate of disbursement/expenditure of the Sida funds for all the 5 projects and 12 agreements is 74%, which is considered satisfactory in a post-conflict environment. According to UNDP financial expenditure data the total amount spent until 31.12.07 is 106,5 MSEK compared to total Sida – UNDP agreements of 144 MSEK,

*However there are a number of deficiencies which need to be addressed:*

- The staff knowledge and experience is rather focused on operations management and less on strategic planning, monitoring and reporting of results. This has led to lack of planning documents, annual work plans, less attention to progress and financial reporting
- A few projects and especially the CBRP suffered from unclear design with several versions of objectives and targets, which has made it difficult to assess the performance.
- Reporting procedures: The activities have been implemented and reports exist in different forms, though not in the format agreed with Sida. Many of the achievements reported are cumulative rather than related to a particular year. This makes it difficult to see how the projects have progressed and what results have been achieved. The existing financial reporting is not certified and signed by the UNDP comptroller. *It is obvious that the reporting procedures according to the Sida-UNDP agreements must be followed more strictly by UNDP.* However, the evaluation shows evidence that the funds have been spent for the intended purpose. One exception is the CBRP, where income generation activities IGA, have not started. Sida should have been informed and approved the changed orientation, at least on yearly basis.
- The implementation of most of the projects has been delayed and 3 project agreements (CBRP, GC, CST) have not respected the 6 to 9 months extra time limits offered for the use of Sida funds. However, the total overdue spending of 874 495 USD equivalent to 6,1 MSEK represents less than 4,2 % of the total Sida disbursements of 144 MSEK.
- Some critical remarks from donors as the WB on the UNDP financial management have been followed up. Interviews with the WB staff concerned confirmed the opinions that financial reports are often slow and sometimes not correct.
- Recognising some strategic and management weaknesses UNDP has recently addressed some of the problems. A functional review has been undertaken by the Country Director with the view to streamline the use of the human resources to better re-align with the new Country programme.

## Summary of Recommendations

- It is recommended that Sida should formally request UNDP to provide a narrative report for the CBRP where the progress achieved is compared with an annual plan with specific targets and budget, so as to enable Sida to decide if it wishes to continue supporting the CBRD in the future.
- It is recommended that Sida insists that the UNDP-Monrovia follows the agreed reporting procedure for each individual project, both progress and financial reports, where the implemented activities should be compared with the planned expected results/outputs stated in advance. Deviations should be explained explicitly. UNDP should also provide an annual work plan and budget for each project, annual financial statement certified by UNDP controller for the expenditures of each project. This is especially necessary for bigger projects.
- One agreement for each of the CBRP, GC and CST projects have used Sida funds after the stipulated final date. It is recommended that Sida addresses a formal note to UNDP asking for an explanation why no requests have been sent to Sida asking for an extension of the time limits to use the Sida funds.

- It is recommended that Sida for bigger projects like CBRP make multi-annual agreements and request annual work plans and budget break downs to be prepared for Sida approval. This would facilitate a follow up of project performance.

It is recommended that Sida in future considers alternatives to Trust Fund contributions:

- Joint funding of programmes with direct transfer of funds to projects, which offers lower administrative costs. Several of the 5 themes available (food security, gender-based violence, HIV/AIDS, youth employment, rule of law) fall within the Sida future priorities.
- Co-funding programmes or a whole sector with other donors. For example the LDLD decentralisation support is presently co-funded by UNDP, UNCDF and EC, and executed by UNDP. Additional funding to regional and local investment funds is easy to add by a separate agreement.



# 1. Introduction

Sida has commissioned the consultant Mr Hans Eriksson from TUPO (Sweden) to make an assessment of Sida funded projects managed by UNDP in Liberia. 5 projects under 12 different agreements during the period 2004 to 2007 were included in the assessment.

## 1.1 Purpose of the Evaluation

According to the Terms of Reference (annex 1) the overall purpose of the evaluation is to support the choice of path in the future collaboration between Sida and UNDP. Moreover, the evaluation should provide Sida with an independent opinion on the effectiveness of the projects/programs and the achieved results of UNDP as well as assess the extent to which agreements have been met.

**Questions to be answered by the evaluation are the following (from the ToR):**

### *Administration*

- a) Has UNDP met the conditions outlined in the agreements?
- b) Is the institutional capacity and resources of UNDP in Liberia sufficient to achieve the goals set out?

### *Efficiency*

- a) Is the costs of the interventions justified by the results?
- b) Was the intervention economically worthwhile, given possible alternative uses of the available resources?
- c) Has the evaluated intervention been managed with reasonable regard for efficiency? What measures have been taken during planning and implementation to ensure that resources are efficiently used?
- d) Which best practices can be drawn? Positive examples.
- e) What can be improved?

### *Other donors*

- a) What experience do they have from working with UNDP?

### *Alternatives*

- a) Does UNDP provide alternative forms of cooperation than through the trust fund?
- b) If so, are these considered cost-effective and relevant?

## 1.2 Methodology and Approach

The methodology employed by the evaluation is consistent with the approaches set out in Sida's *Evaluation Manual* and its guiding principles and procedures (as outlined in *Sida at Work*, 2005). The evaluation has been done by analyzing secondary sources both in Sweden and in Liberia and by collection of primary data from meetings, interviews with UNDP staff, government institution staff, beneficiaries and representatives of other donors.

The evaluation budget included payment for 20 working days only. Needless to say, this presents a serious limitation to the scope of the evaluation work. In fact the main part of the work was conducted by the consultant during June 2008.

One week was devoted to study and analysis of documents, (Sida-UNDP agreements, project documents, Sida Liberia annual reports, project progress reports, visit reports etc), and coming to an agreement with UNDP and Sida on the work plan and field visit programme. Another 10 days was used in Liberia for meetings and field visits to completed and ongoing activities. The meeting programme and field visits was agreed with Sida and UNDP before departure, but it had to be amended and finalized with UNDP on arrival and further complemented during the visit by other meetings. Meetings were held with UNDP directors and different UNDP staff as well as with government institutions (ministries and commissions) directly involved in the implementation of the projects, and with donor representatives for the World Bank, The European Commission, US AID the British DFID). A 3 days field visit was undertaken to the 2 biggest counties Bong and Nimba where most of the field activities have taken place. Meetings and interviews were held with government county administration staff and the different UN agencies coordination teams.

A debriefing with presentation of findings and conclusions for the future was held with the UNDP staff on the last day. The UNDP Country Director was not present but almost all project managers. The consultant also participated in the inauguration of the Gborpalu county administration building together with government, UNDP staff and a Sida delegation, which also visited rehabilitated schools and clinics.

A final synthesis from meetings and interviews, field visits and analysis of primary and secondary data against each evaluation criteria has provided a holistic evaluation of the UNDP performance as a whole.

The structure of the report follows to a great extent the approach outlined in the ToR and the outputs indicated in the Inception Report/Tender. The report includes an overview of the UNDP support to Liberia and the UNDP management. All the 5 projects in the Sida – UNDP agreement in Liberia are separately evaluated, followed by a summary of findings on UNDP administrative and financial management directly related to the questions set out in the ToR as described in the introduction above. The last chapter contains conclusions and recommendations for Sida management and possible future support.

In addition to the specific tasks in the ToR the consultant has added one chapter with updated information on Decentralisation, as it is one of the most important priorities of the Liberian government: “To build capacity within local government and progressively shift economic and political power to the counties and communities, so they will be empowered to participate effectively in decision-making and take control of local issues and development processes”. The exclusion and marginalisation of the majority of the population has been one of the most important reasons for the civil war. Good governance in decentralised institutions is one key area for the Governance Commission. Several donors (UNDP, WB, EC, USAID) support local government and community development and a donor harmonization in alignment with the government policies is necessary. Of the Sida supported projects, the Community Based Development Recovery Program CBRP and the County Support Team Project CST are important in advancing the decentralization process.

## 2. Background to the Sida Support in Liberia

### 2.1 The Liberian Context

Liberia has never been colonised. The state was formed in 1822 thanks to a Colonial society in the US which took control of a part of the land along the coast and put ashore liberated slaves. These people declared independence in 1847 and introduced the same Constitution as in the US, with three branches, the Legislature (Congress, Senate and House of Representatives), Judiciary and Executive. One political party, the True Wigh Party for the liberated slaves has dominated the political scene. In the Constitution it is stated that only a person of Negroid origin can become citizen. These Americo-Liberians, descendents to the liberated slaves, have been a ruling class and have oppressed other ethnic groups living in the interior dense forest areas. The Americo-Liberians have regarded them as inferior aborigines or indigenous people without the same rights to property and democracy.

The economy is based on exploitation of natural resources where the export incomes have had a tendency to end up in the pockets of a small elite. All payments from foreign companies for concessions transit the President's office, the Executive Mansion. The American rubber company Firestone has through the largest concession in the world exploited rubber since 1926. Large rain forests with exotic trees are logged by foreign companies. Three important iron ore endowments have been exploited as concessions and gold and diamonds are also found in important quantities. Flag of convenience ships have since many years been a profitable business. However this activity is in reality managed from abroad and the money has never reached Liberia's economy. This dual economic structure has contributed to a country, which even compared with other African countries shows among the highest disparities in living conditions between a small urban elite and the majority of the population.

After a military coup in 1980 against the ruling settler regime, led by an indigenous sergeant, life guard to the president, several coup attempts tried to change the power balance again. Civil war broke out in 1989, when rebels entered the Nimba county in the north, leading to 14 years of chaos, plunder, and violence which did not finally end until the arrival of international peacekeepers and the signing of the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2003. An estimated 250,000 lives were lost, 464,000 Liberians became internally displaced (IDPs), over 350,000 sought refuge in neighboring Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone

The damage and negative consequences of the conflict were enormous. Commercial and productive activities ceased as various warlords looted and vandalized the country. Families were shattered; entire communities were uprooted; and social, political, economic and traditional systems of governance were destroyed. There was a massive exodus of skilled and talented individuals from the country. The economy completely collapsed. GDP fell a catastrophic 90% between 1987 and 1995, one of the largest economic collapses ever recorded in the world. Agricultural production dropped as people fled their farms and the supporting infrastructure collapsed, mining and timber activities shut down, rubber plantations closed, manufacturing essentially stopped. Basic infrastructure was destroyed. There was no electricity or piped water in the country for 15 years.

The origin of the conflict can be traced to two broad factors. First, the exclusion and marginalisation of the majority of the population from institutions of political power and access to key economic assets. The constitution was designed for the needs of the Americo-Liberian settler population. Land and property rights for the majority of Liberians were severely limited. Political power was concentrated in Monrovia and primarily at the Presidency. Secondly, economic collapse helped fuel the crisis. Liberia's economy showed a steady growth through the 1960s and 1970s. By 1980s all indicators pointed to a coming crisis. Unemployment and consumer prices, and particularly food prices rose at alarming rates, growth stagnated and political tensions rose sharply.

After decades of economic mismanagement and 14 years of brutal civil war, Liberia has been at peace since 2003. Free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections were held with the support of the international community in 2005. The new government with Africa's first elected female president was inaugurated in January 2006.

The initial strategy by the new government supported by its international partners, a 150-Day Plan and the interim Poverty Reduction Strategy PRS, aimed at inclusive economic recovery and the restoration of basic social services. Both were organized around a framework with four basic Pillars:

- Expanding peace and security;
- Revitalizing economic activity;
- Strengthening governance and the rule of law; and
- Rebuilding infrastructure and providing basic services.

The economy is expanding rapidly with economic growth over 9% in 2007<sup>1</sup>. Roads and buildings are being rebuilt, health clinics and schools are re-opening, infant mortality rates are falling, incomes are growing and agricultural production is increasing. The Government is introducing policies to promote peace, accelerate reconstruction and development, and build strong systems of governance. Liberia has made progress towards economic and political reforms. An economic reform package GEMAP Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme, supported by several donors, to curb corruption in state institutions and corporations, has started to give positive results which have been recognized by the international community. However, expectations from the population for concrete peace dividends remain high.

Liberia's Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), adopted in April 2008<sup>2</sup> after a broadly based consultative process with Liberian citizens never seen before, articulates the Government's vision and major strategies for inclusive and sustainable growth and development during the 3 year period 2008–2011. This period is of critical importance as Liberia shifts from post-conflict stabilization to laying the foundation for inclusive growth, poverty reduction, and progressing toward the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Although two-thirds of Liberians live below the poverty line, Liberia has made progress in fighting poverty since the end of the conflict. However, Liberia is not expected to achieve the MDG on poverty by 2015, although several sub-targets will be reached on time, as shown below:

- Halving the proportion of people that suffer from hunger;
- Eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education;
- Reducing by two-thirds the under-five mortality rate;
- Halting the spread of HIV and AIDS; and
- Halving the number of people without access to safe drinking water.

## **2.2 UNDP Support to Liberia**

After the CPA was signed in Accra in August 2003 by all warring factions, the UN Security Council resolution 1509 in 2003 established a peace-keeping force of 15,000 deployed men and women from more than 30 countries, one of the biggest in the world. The UN Mission in Liberia, UNMIL, took over from the existing ECOWAS force. Thanks to UNMIL the security situation is now stable. The troop count down started in 2007 and by 2008 around 3,000 will have left the country.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> At Work together United Nations in Liberia

<sup>2</sup> Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy May 2008

<sup>3</sup> At Work Together, United Nations in Liberia 2008

The UNDP is the coordinating agency of all UN recovery operations in Liberia. The UNDP Country Director is also the Resident Coordinator for all UN agencies.

The four UN agencies UNDP, UNICEF, WFP and UNHCR have agreed on a Joint Action Plan for Community Based Recovery and Restoration of Social Services in Liberia.. The purpose has been to harmonize programme interventions that support the transition from relief and humanitarian interventions to longer term MDG-based recovery and development objectives, in line with the post conflict transitional planning framework. A joint technical team for planning and implementation has been set up.

The UNDP country office is supported by a Service center using the Direct Execution DEX modality, which means that UNDP is executing projects on behalf of government agencies. This arrangement is only present in countries where government structures have been weakened by crisis. The work includes finance, procurement, human resources, training, transport, contracting, asset management and audit. In Liberia 3 Trust Funds are managed through DEX: DDRR Fund (for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration), Liberian Emergency Governance Fund (LEGF) and The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

UNDP is also co-funding a micro-finance project, through the Liberian Strategy for Financial Inclusion 2008–2012.

A new UNDP Country Programme Action Plan document was prepared in 2007 for the period 2008–2012, based on two pillars, democratic governance and pro-poor policy and economic development.

## **2.3 Sida Support to Liberia Through UNDP**

Sida channels a substantial part of its support to Liberia rehabilitation, an amount of 144 MSEK for the period 2003 to 2007, through UNDP. Sida contributes to specific projects through a UNDP Trust Fund, which funds the implementation of projects agreed between the Liberian government and UNDP.

The following projects have received support from Sida:

- Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration program, DDRR
- Community Based Development Recovery Program, CBRP;
- County Support Team Project, CST;
- Governance Reform Commission GRC;
- Truth and Reconciliation Committee, TRC;

The RR component of the DDRR, for which UNDP is responsible, organises rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants through formal education and vocational training implemented by mostly local NGOs.

The CBRP aims to strengthen the local governance and existing traditional governance structure in communities and support rehabilitation of social infrastructure and initiate income generation projects.

The CST aims at strengthening the management of the counties by rehabilitating physical infrastructure, provision of vehicles, computers etc and capacity development of key county officials, line ministries and civil society organisations.

The Purpose of the GRC which changed name in 2007 to Governance Commission, GC, is to promote good governance, develop public sector reforms, prepare bills for the legislature to combat corrup-

tion, ensure transparency and accountability in governance and promote a good relationship between the State and the civil society at national and local levels.

The TRC support is to be used for hearings, psycho-social support, witness security and protection and research and analysis.

### **3. Update on Decentralisation**

The Minister of Internal Affairs Ambulai Johnson Jr has confirmed the government's commitment to pursue the decentralization process. The Governance Commission would in July 2008 present a new Decentralisation policy. One aim is to rationalize the roles of the District and County Development Committees (DDC/CDC) so that all new projects use these existing committees to ensure popular participation in the planning and implementation of priority projects.

The government funded and managed County Development Fund, CDF, has started its activities. Liberia has a low human resource capacity standard, even compared with a post-conflict country as Sierra Leone. The decentralisation process must start through learning by doing as no previous capacity or experience exists in the country. The first funds to locally selected priority infrastructure projects in the districts and counties (so far mostly rehabilitation of official buildings) have been implemented in 2007. The government has decided to give the support in form of building materials and not in cash. The materials appeared to be very standardized and not adapted to the local needs which created problems with low implementation efficiency. For 2008 the government has decided to allocate a budget of 5,5 million USD for county development. The counties have been requested to open bank accounts in Monrovia to receive the allocation of 366 000 USD per county directly from the Ministry of Finance.

The number of districts has proliferated over the last years. When CBRP started in 2004 they counted 73 districts, in which DDCs were re-established or created. These districts were a mix of constituency districts and administrative districts but according to the recently adopted Poverty Reduction Strategy there are now 127 recognized administrative districts and the boundaries are being drawn officially. However this may not be the last change in this sensitive political issue.

The European Commission has prepared a new programme to support the decentralization, the County Development Programme CDP, funded by 25 million EUR.

- community development project LCEP, co-funded with the WB and executed by Liberia Agency for Community Empowerment (LACE) with 8,5 million EUR.
- county and district level infrastructure rehabilitation and maintenance, (rural roads and water supply in Monrovia) called Agriculture Infrastructure Development AID, co-funding with WB, and executed by Ministry of Public Works with an amount of 10 million EUR.
- Liberian Decentralisation and Local Development Project LDLD on county and district support to participatory planning of local infrastructure, co-funded with UNDP and with an amount of 3,1 million EUR.

## 4. Evaluation of UNDP Projects Funded by Sida

Since 2003 Sida has supported 5 different projects managed by UNDP through a Trust Fund agreement. The distribution is shown in the table below

**Table 1 Project and status wise distribution of the 12 Sida/UNDP agreements (MSEK)**

| Status                                                   | DDRR      | CBRP      | GC       | CST       | TRC      | Total        |
|----------------------------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|--------------|
| Ongoing from 2007 allocation but implemented during 2008 |           | 17,3      |          | 13,2      | 7        | <b>37,5</b>  |
| Completed                                                | 39        | 53,7      | 7        | 6,8       |          | <b>106,5</b> |
| <b>Total</b>                                             | <b>39</b> | <b>71</b> | <b>7</b> | <b>20</b> | <b>7</b> | <b>144</b>   |

**Table 2 Year and Project-wise distribution of the 12 Sida/UNDP agreements (MSEK)**

| Year         | DDRR      | CBRP      | GC       | CST       | TRC      | Total      |
|--------------|-----------|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|------------|
| 2003         | 4         |           |          |           |          | <b>4</b>   |
| 2004         | 10        | 18        |          |           |          | <b>28</b>  |
| 2005         | 25        | 23        | 2        |           |          | <b>50</b>  |
| 2006         |           | 15        | 5        | 10        |          | <b>30</b>  |
| 2007         |           | 15        |          | 10        | 7        | <b>32</b>  |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>39</b> | <b>71</b> | <b>7</b> | <b>20</b> | <b>7</b> | <b>144</b> |

Sida has disbursed a total amount of 144 million SEK under 12 different project Agreements: 3 agreements concerning DDRR for a total of 39 millions SEK during 2003–05, 4 agreements to CBRP for a total of 71 million SEK during 2004–08, 2 agreements to CST for a total of 20 million SEK 2006–08, 2 agreements to GC for a total of 7 million SEK during 2005–07 and one agreement to TRC for an amount of 7 million SEK 2007–08.

### 4.1 Demobilisation, Disarmament, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Project

#### 4.1.1 Project overview

The DDRR project was approved in November 2003 by the National Transitional Government of Liberia, and the policy committee of the National Commission for the DDRR. The UNMIL was in principle responsible for implementation of the Disarmament and Demobilization phases while a UNDP team has covered the Reintegration and Rehabilitation phases under a Trust Fund arrangement.

There were 2 sources of funding for the Reintegration component of the DDRR programme, i.e. the UNDP administrated multi-donor Trust Fund and the Parallel Funding mechanism. The latter includes direct support through UNICEF, USAID and EC etc.

Contributions to the UNDP Trust Fund came from 8 countries and the EC (EC, USAID, Britain, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Ireland) as basket funding. The total Sida support amounted to *39 million SEK*, which is equivalent to 5,4 million USD. This represents 9% of the total amount of 61,9 million USD received from 2004 to 2007 by the Trust Fund. The Swedish contribution is higher than those from Denmark and Norway but lower than US (17,9%) and EC (16,8%) which are the main contributors.

The overall objective of the programme is to support the consolidation of national security and peace through the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of fighters from the various factions.

#### **4.1.2 UNDP management capacity**

The RR components of the DDRR programme are directly executed by UNDP. There is a team of 3 staff working with the RR phases. They are involved in the planning and the negotiation of contracts with implementing partners, mostly national NGOs to undertake different kinds of training, monitoring and reporting.

#### **4.1.3 Achievement**

##### *4.1.3.1 Physical progress*

A total number of 101 000 ex-combatants were registered, of which 99 000 became eligible for reintegration assistance, a much higher figure than expected.

The slow progress of the security sector reform to support an acceptable security framework created a vacuum in the implementation of the DDRR process.

Funding from 2005 has been used also during 2006 with integration of ex-combatants into a civilian life with formal or non-formal education or vocational training. The reintegration part of the DDRR, has involved more than 45 000 ex-combatants. Other organisations have organised training and education for approximately 36 000 ex-combatants. As per December 2006 the number of beneficiaries from both funding sources was 73.880, leaving a number of 25.120 without any support. During 2006 the number of XCs under the UNDP Trust Fund increased from 38.631 to 60.258 beneficiaries.

The total resources of 61,9 million USD received from 2004 to 2007 by the Trust Fund have permitted to cover 62 000 XCs and together with other parallel programmes (UNICEF, IRC, other NGOs) all the DD phases and 80% of the RR up to mid 2007. 24 000 have been enrolled in formal education and 25 000 in skills training, agriculture and apprenticeship.

During the demobilization stage 43% of the XCs expressed preference for enrolment in formal education, 50% for vocational skills training, 4% for agriculture and 3% for employment opportunities. After consultations with donors and against the background of funding constraints, it was decided to promote community-based reintegration which reduced the vocational skills training to 29% and increased the enrolment in agriculture to 25% of the XCs

The number of participants in formal education reached 22 092 (13% female) using 366 schools mostly in Montserrado (68%). Among the reasons for this concentration can be mentioned poor roads and educational infrastructure in rural areas. After monitoring visits the number of drop outs was around 10%, which shows a successful integration in the school institution.

The number of XCs in agriculture was 12.154 using 7 implementing partners. This relatively high figure can be explained by the fact that, despite the low preference for agriculture among the XCs (only 4% of the DD XCs), it was strongly suggested by key stakeholders in the PAC (Project Appraisal Committee of CBRP) that the RR component should place emphasis on agriculture as an effective mean to facilitate integration at community level. However, later participation records showed a high drop out, an evidence that the beneficiaries were less motivated to be involved in agriculture for a sustainable livelihood.

The number of XCs in skills training and apprenticeship amounted to 13.376 persons and they were assisted by 17 implementing partners. The basic technical skills training was composed of carpentry, auto mechanics, building construction, electrical wiring, refrigerator repairs, general engine repairs and welding. Masonry, auto mechanics and carpentry were the most popular trades for male while female preferred tailoring. The support lasted 8 months, theory combined with on-the-job training. This was proved not to be sufficient for some trades.



*Ex-combatants having been trained in carpentry.*

5 out of 7 XCs resettled in their counties of origin, demonstrating a high degree of social reintegration and acceptance of XCs in their communities.

The mandate of the National Commission of DDDR was expanded in 2006 with an increased national ownership under new leadership. An action plan was elaborated to address some critical gaps related to the Social Integration and Psycho-Social measures. The UNDP Reintegration Field officers have supported the 6 NCDDRR referral and counseling offices around the country.

UNDP has used national NGOs to implement the formal education and the skills training. The quality has varied considerably and the results have in some cases not been positive. The reasons are lack of technical knowledge and experience of administrative and financial management.

The Mission met with the programme director of YMCA, one of the successful NGOs, engaged as implementing partner. YMCA started to build relationship with the XCs already in 2003 with a clean up campaign which engaged 700 persons, offered food and sport events for free work. They were also offered counseling before the disarmament started.

YMCA replied to calls for proposals to assist in the Rehabilitation and Reintegration process and sent an application for apprenticeship and not formal education. The UN standard framework was 8 months without flexibility. However, YMCA wanted also to include counseling, literacy and HIV/AIDS information. The application was firstly approved by the RR programme unit, but not accepted by the financial section, because it required extra funding. The YMCA outreach team visited the training facilities every day to check on the attendance, which in YMCA's case was very high. Other NGOs accepted less than the limit of 75% attendance rate among the XCs but still paid them their allowances. Sometimes the NGO staff was even threatened by the XCs if they did not accept to pay. YMCA organized the training in several small training institutions close to where the participants lived in order to reduce the travel costs. This may also have positively impacted on the attendance rate, as the 30 USD per month should cover both food and travel costs.

Another reason for the greater success of YMCA compared with other NGOs is that it is permanently working with social activities while many other NGOs were created only to implement this project. The cooperation with UNDP, application and reporting etc has functioned well.

Many of the XCs obtained an employment after the end of the training. A follow up later concluded that 60% continued to work, 30% did other job and 10% were idle.

YMCA is convinced that the agriculture training failed because the XCs did not want to be considered as farmers and not used to hard work. Many of the XCs had had people working for them and had often cash to spend. YMCA means that the XCs have a better chance to be successful selling petrol, telephone cards, be drivers etc in the communities than to become farmers.

YMCA would have desired that the DDRR programme organized a follow up workshop for implementing organizations to learn from the experience of each others. However this has not been done so far, probably because of lack of funds.

#### *4.1.3.3 Financial execution*

Sida has contributed to the DDRR Trust Fund with a total amount of 39 million SEK through 3 agreements with UNDP, 4 million SEK in 2003, 10 million SEK in 2004 and 25 million SEK in 2005, which represents an equivalent of USD 5 374 718 received. The UNDP DDRR financial update per February 2007 shows the following Sida contributions:

|                   |                  |
|-------------------|------------------|
| 2003              | 527.009          |
| 2004              | 1.347.709        |
| 2005              | 3.500.000        |
| <b>Total US\$</b> | <b>5.374.718</b> |

The Sida contribution has been used for the following items:

|                                                 |                  |
|-------------------------------------------------|------------------|
| Support to set up the Joint Implementation unit | 487.971          |
| Support to the disarmament and demobilization   | 1.247.879        |
| Support to training of demobilized combatants   | 3.240.741        |
| UNDP fees 8%                                    | 398.127          |
| <b>Total</b>                                    | <b>5.374.718</b> |

### **4.1.4 Assessment**

#### *4.1.4.1 UNDP performance*

UNDP has allocated 3 staff to work permanently with the implementation of the DDRR since the beginning. They have all experience from similar work in other countries. They have produced annual reports describing well the implementation and highlighting the experiences. The last one covers 2006. However, this report has not been given to Sida but was obtained on request by the Consultant. The experiences from the implementation will be used to reshape the design of the RR process for the remaining 20% XCs who still are waiting for their training. Some of the NGOs selected have not had the necessary capacity for a good implementation. The vocational trainings have not been linked to employment promotion, a lesson which will be considered for the concluding batch of XCs.

All Sida funds have been spent.

#### *4.1.4.2 Relevance*

The DDRR programme which Sida has co-funded to 9% of the total contributions is highly relevant and very crucial for the fragile peace and stability in Liberia.

#### *4.1.4.3 Efficiency*

One important point to assess is to what extent UNDP has fulfilled of conditions in Sida-UNDP agreement. The Sida support of 39 million SEK has been used for the intended purpose, based on reports, interviews with staff, implementing partners and beneficiaries.

However, regular progress and financial reports to Sida has not been produced in the manner agreed. The Mission obtained the 4<sup>th</sup> and last Trust Fund Activity Report for January to December 2006. An update by February 2007 of the total Sida contribution of 5.374.718 USD was received, though, no annual expenditure reports.

The project implementation has been hampered by the financial gap, caused by pledges from USA and EC of 8,7 million USD which have never been disbursed. These donors have preferred to use their funds for other type of direct support. 20% of the XCs have been waiting for the RR training grants since 2004.

Bad road accessibility has delayed and increased the delivery cost of services for all kind of training. The DDRR programme continues to face critical challenges with implementing partners, especially their capacity in financial management, reporting and quality of services.

The forced enrolment of XCs in agriculture, decided by the PAC, affected negatively the participation rate which was lower than formal education and skills training. In certain agriculture projects implementing partners (IPs) accepted the participation of community members, sometimes in return for access to land. In some cases older XCs registered for formal education but sent instead their children.

It has proved difficult for refugees to participate together with XCs in the same training as the conditions are different. The RR programme rules have stipulated certain allowances specifically for the XCs while other conditions concern the participation of refugees. The participation in formal education with a large difference in age may be difficult. However, it should be possible to mix XCs and returnees in skills training, which would be part of the local reconciliation process.

#### *4.1.4.4 Effectiveness*

The implementation of the RR components has been delayed, partly because of the high number of XCs. UNDP has used national NGOs to implement the training activities. Experience has shown that their capacity varied and some of their performance has not been so effective. Lack of trainings materials and tools impacted also negatively on the quality of the training. The grant received from the RR Component was often not enough to cover all costs.

All XCs have still today not received their training and allowance promised. Of those who attended the skills training, a high number have not been able to earn a decent living. One explanation is that the training has not been linked to employment promotion. However, this problem may not be surprising in a country with a generally very high unemployment rate. Especially in Lofa and around Monrovia the local population is complaining about the rising level of insecurity and crime, where XCs are involved.

The rate of subsistence allowance to XCs is much debated and varies between countries. In Liberia a rate of USD 30 per month was agreed, slightly lower than the official minimum wage rate for labour of 2 USD per day. Cash support has proved to provide a flexible and cost-effective means of assisting XCs to meet pressing family needs. The cash allowance was also linked to 75% participation in the training programme and was an effective means in tracking the participants during the critical post-demobilization phase, even though the attendance rate was in many cases difficult to enforce.

Despite these shortcomings combined with the impression of injustice between the XCs and other war affected groups and the high risk for institutionalization of assistance, the strategy chosen by the DDRR

programme in Liberia is considered successful by an UNDP office outcome evaluation in February 2006, which concluded that the quality of outputs from training was good and the intended outcomes from paid employment was likely to ensure peace and stability. In June 2006 a multi-agency mid-term evaluation of the DDRR programme conducted by an independent consultant indicated that the challenge of reintegrating 100 000 XCs in a country with 85% unemployment rate is enormous. The success of socio-economic reintegration needs to be measured against the macro-economic reality of Liberia. Therefore it concluded that the DDRR programme has performed satisfactorily towards consolidating national security.

#### *4.1.4.5 Impact*

Because of the civil war a whole generation of mostly young boys has neither received any formal education nor necessary skills training. Thanks to the DDRR programme many of them have now been socially and economically reintegrated.

The mid term evaluation in June 2006 included a survey among the beneficiaries. 81% of the respondents believe their knowledge and skills will serve them in the future. 75% state that they are using their start up tool kits. 46% claimed to still be unemployed. Of those with an employment the average earning per day was around 2 USD.

The question is whether the attendance rate and the social integration had been better if the XCs had been integrated in normal skills training as soon as possible. This has not yet been tried but is advised as a recommendation from this mission.

The Mission visited a small number of those who received training in carpentry, car mechanics and tailoring in Monrovia. They had set up small workshops (2 to 8 persons), run as cooperatives or owned by the former trainer. The 8 months period of skills training seems to be sufficient to perform a reasonably good quality work. Wages are distributed every day when the clients have paid. Like all small entrepreneurs the incomes vary very much but are generally small. However all interviewed confirmed that it was enough to survive. None of the workshops visited had any control over their incomes and expenditures as no cash books and book keeping existed. No training in management was included and no inventory book kept for the tools obtained.

#### *4.1.4.6 Sustainability*

The Liberian government created in 2003 a National Commission for DDRR to take the ownership of the whole process. However, because of limited capacity the UN and other organizations have in reality driven the DDRR process. The DDRR programme will be completed in 2008 when all XCs have received their agreed training and allowances. Therefore a DDRR process is not intended to last forever.

#### *4.1.4.7 Lessons learned*

As post-training employment remains a major problem, the training strategy for the remaining XCs will include support for employment referral, promotion of self-employment and creation of employment opportunities to consolidate national security for sustained development.

Experiences from the first cycles of training within the RR components have lead to some important lessons, which will re-orient in particular the organization of the skills training. Skills training will be tried in mixed groups together with other youth from the same community, which will hopefully improve the local reconciliation process. A greater emphasis will also be put on the link between the training and employment. The existence of suitable work opportunities in the local community will influence the choice of skills training in addition to individual interest.

#### *4.1.4.8 Comparison with similar RR interventions in other post-conflict countries*

The Mission interviewed UNDP staff, who had worked in other post-conflict countries as Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia, Cote d'Ivoire etc

Sierra Leone has passed through the same RR process during 2002 – 04. 15 000 UN soldiers maintained the peace but has now been reduced considerably. The whole RR process was funded by the World Bank, and UNDP did not set up a Trust Fund. The RR process was implemented by the government. While the beneficiaries waited for their allowance, government organized training and employment creation.. The rate paid to the XCs was higher 60 USD instead of 30USD in Liberia, even though the cost of living is higher in Liberia. The number of XCs was only 30 000 in Sierra Leone compared with 100 000 in Liberia. The high number and lack of resources may explain the reason to the lower rate in Liberia. The distribution between formal education, skills training and agriculture was the same for both countries. Liberia has been more successful in supporting female XCs. In Sierra Leone more difficulties were faced to have access to land. The capacity of national NGOs as implementing partners was higher in Sierra Leone than in Liberia. International NGOs like Accord and World Vision are more expensive and have not been used in Liberia.

In Cote d'Ivoire 3.000 child soldiers have successfully been offered training in mixed groups together with returnees in 2006. A World Bank Fund paid demobilization grants to 1000 XCs but no training allowance has been given. This was based on experience from Liberia that old XCs preferred to send their children. After the skills training the programme negotiated successfully with private sector companies to employ the XCs against reduced government taxes.

#### **4.1.5 Conclusion for the future**

Many stakeholders agree that it is only thanks to a strong UNMIL presence that the civil peace is maintained. The situation is still fragile and the remaining XCs need to benefit from the RR programme.

The highest number of XCs is found in the north, Lofa and Nimba counties. Many of the XCs have still not received any training and even many of those which have received training have faced problems to find employment and earn an income. Instead several XCs have turned to criminality for survival. The population is harassed and complains about increasing insecurity. The UNMIL is planning a gradual withdrawal. It is therefore urgent to complete the whole RR process and it is urgent to ensure the social re-integration.

Another example of the fragile and latent situation is that groups of boy soldiers from Liberia are still under command in Cote d'Ivoire according to an ongoing WB study. These could under certain circumstances in the future be a threat to peace and stability. The boys should be encouraged to return home and be part of the DDRR process.

The remaining RR components still need to be completed for all the XCs. Norway has decided to contribute another 7 million USD, which would eventually cover the remaining 20% XCs. The DDRR Project will be completed in 2008. An updating of the remaining XCs has been completed in May 2008, resulting in only 7251 XCs validated and more than 10 000 non-validated. The validated ones will be interviewed about their social reintegration and socio-economic situation and their needs for various type of training will be assessed. Many XCs who stayed earlier in Monrovia has now returned to their home communities. Based on a unit cost of 800 USD per XC the Norwegian contribution will not be sufficient to cover all those entitled. Either the unit cost will have to be reduced to 600 USD per XCs from an already low 800 USD or around 1.900 persons will still not be covered. The gap represents an amount equivalent to 10 MSEK.

In this last cycle of training the DDRR programme plans to link up closer with the CBRD (Community Based Rehabilitation and Development Project) and the ongoing national recovery process. ILO is planning a new vocational training programme. It will cover the technical assistance but the XCs allowance is needed from the DDRR.

## **4.2 Community-based Rehabilitation Project**

The Sida support to rehabilitation and reconstruction at community level through the CBRP is the largest contribution to Liberia. It amounts to a total of 71 MSEK under 4 agreements with UNDP (18+23+15+15 MSEK) from 2004 to 2007. The first 3 agreements have been fully executed while the use of the last support of 15 MSEK has just started. CBRP had to be closed in December 2007 and a new CBRD started from March 2008 with more emphasis on development than recovery. The funds will be used for social infrastructure in the last 5 counties which have not so far received any social infrastructure support. The main difference in approach is that the projects must be selected among the priority projects in the county CDAs, composed of district priority projects, identified after consultation at district level.

### **4.2.1 Project overview**

The overall goal of the CBRP is to contribute to lasting and durable peace in Liberia by fostering social cohesion and engaging communities in the identification and management of their needs.

The original project document from 2003 had a budget of 1,1 MUSD for 2 years 2004 to 2005 with 2 clearly defined outcomes linked to specific outputs:

- Perceptible peace, stability and increased capacity of local communities to deliver basic services with the specific outputs 30 DDCs (District Development Committees) in 5 counties, 15 Women Community Centers, and 600 DDC officials trained.
- Enhanced livelihood opportunities and income generating activities in target communities with the specific outputs of 750 persons from 30 district trained in income generating activities and 1000 self employed through income generating activities.

The project specific objectives are described in several places in different ways over the years and the project has expanded gradually to all 15 counties as additional funding has been agreed.

According to the original Project Document from 2003 the objectives are expressed as:

- Enhancement of community security, peoples' confidence and self-respect;
- Restoration and strengthening of community governance structures, build their capacities and support the participation of marginalize groups, including women;
- Promotion of skills acquisition and enhancement of self-employment;
- Improvement of access to basic social services;
- Reintegration of IDPs, returnees, refugees and ex-combatants as well as their effective relationship with host communities; and the
- Promotion of peace and reconciliation at the level of the community.

#### Expected Outcomes:

- Perceptible peace and stability and increased capacity of locals communities to deliver basic services and
- Enhanced livelihood opportunities and income generating activities in target communities.

Participatory demand driven development approach: The CBR project has chosen to revive the District Development Committees (DDC) existing before the civil war as entry point to assess the needs in the area. This is done through planning, monitoring and reviewing all the activities. DDC takes overall co-ordination responsibility of the activities to be implemented by the CBR project and other agencies in an area. In order to provide a wide participation the DDCs include representatives of existing DDC government officials (District Commissioner), NGOs, CBOs, civil society, tribal and women and youth. Over 80% of all projects have been identified by the DDCs and the rest by UN agencies.

Micro-projects are implemented with support provided by national NGOs (through MoU) and in collaboration with UNHCR and government agencies. The maximum size of projects is USD 30.000,-.

#### *Main planned activities of the development approach:*

##### DDCs:

- Form or restructure the DDC, drafting of ToR;
- Renovation of DDC premises;
- Initiation of revolving fund for DDC for day-to-day maintenance;
- Set-up of income generating activity for DDC;
- Training for DDC members in planning and management;
- Development of DDC action plans based on priority needs of communities;

##### Basic Services Rehabilitation:

- Identification and prioritisation of social service infrastructure
- Training of DDCs and related agencies for rehabilitation
- Rehabilitation.
- Provision of food for workers.

##### Micro-enterprise development:

- Selection of community members for small scale enterprises and farms;
- Business training;
- Development of business plans;
- Provision of resources;
- Skills development and vocational training centres developed;
- Group formation and training for micro-credits;
- Provision of micro-credits

### *Project Beneficiaries:*

- 50 DDCs and 600 DDC members benefit from training in planning and management of recovery activities;
- Community leaders, local authorities, CBOs and implementing partners benefit directly or indirectly from the activities.
- 100 000 people benefit from 100 rehabilitated social service institutions;
- 200 participants under the skills training;
- 1000 people in 30 districts trained in micro-enterprise development and improved farming skills, and self-employed;

A concept paper officially establishing the DDCs (District Development Committees) was approved by the government breaking the way for an efficient partnership with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, making the DDCs the only entry point for recovery and development activities.

### **4.2.2 UNDP Management capacity**

3 project managers (project manager, engineer supervisor, project assistant) work with the CBRP at UNDP HQ. One international TA worked for 2 years (mainly to prepare training modules for the DDCs and implementing partners and not directly attached to the project management) and left in 2007. CBRP has opened 4 field offices for supporting the DDCs, monitoring and supervising project activities. The roll out strategy has been to cover all 15 counties with 5 counties a year and move the field team to 5 new counties after completion of the first cycle of DDC training and the construction of the approved social infrastructure projects.

A project appraisal committee, PAC, composed of UNDP, other UN agencies, the government, other donors, has met every month to approve project proposals from the DDCs. UNDP has worked in partnership with government institutions, other UN agencies as UNHCR, FAO UNICEF, WFP and WB to complement CBRP project activities. Joint assessment missions are organized with UNHCR and an agreement has been signed with UNICEF to provide furniture and study materials in the schools.

### **4.2.3 Achievement**

#### *4.2.3.1 Physical progress*

As the approach has been demand driven, based on proposals coming from the districts after sincere consultation with the communities, the type of schemes and the speed of implementation may vary from one district to another.

The CBRP started its activities in 5 counties in 2004–05, out of which 4 have the highest number of returnee community resettlements, Lofa, Bong, Nimba and Grand Gedeh.

Based on data from various documents, the CBRP is composed of 3 components::

- I. Community capacity building and organizational structure
- II. Economic livelihood through micro enterprises development
- III. Social infrastructure

Component 1 on community capacity building and organizational structure has been implemented in all 15 counties. 17 DDCs were restructured in 3 counties and another 56 DDCs established in the other counties, making it 73 DDCs in all 15 counties. CBRP has trained 1,022 DDC members (33% female) and 60 local government officials, CBOs and local NGOs in participatory community planning and development. All DDCs received motorbikes and furniture, typewriters, stationeries, etc. In addition

over 2 800 community members have benefited from training in masonry, carpentry and installation of hand pumps. CBRP supported 2 community led peace initiatives in Grand Gedeh county facilitating conciliation and social cohesion in 2 districts before the DDCs could be established.



*Rehabilitated school, Gokai public school, Suakoko district, Bong county*

Component II on improved livelihood through IGAs and credit etc has only been implemented to a limited extent. Seven community credit unions with 2 052 members have been re-established and 42.000 USD of credits been disbursed. No real IGAs have been supported.

Component III on rehabilitation of socio-economic infrastructure has advanced well. 47 national NGOs were recruited as implementing partners and key staff offered training in project management.

Within component III a total number of 331 projects has been implemented within the CBRP during 4 years 2004 to 2007. The distribution of the infrastructure investments have been as follows. 256 km of rural roads have been rehabilitated. 859 social infrastructure facilities have been restored for a total cost of 3.941.249 USD to the benefit of over one million rural population. Nimba, Bong, Grand Gede and Lofa counties have received the highest number of projects, 98 bridges, 92 schools for 50 000 students, 17 clinics covering a population of 200 000 persons, one hospital, 10 market buildings, 363 safe water wells, and 279 latrines. A estimated total number of 550,000 rural Liberians are now benefiting from these facilities.

The total CPRB resources spent by county for approved micro projects are shown in the table below.

**Table 3 Distribution of approved projects and project values per county, USD**

| County           | Approved projects | Total costs                   |
|------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------|
| Bomi             | 7                 | 83.945                        |
| Bong             | 60                | 1.088.566                     |
| Gbarpolu         | 8                 | 80.680                        |
| Grand Bassa      | 4                 | 103.893                       |
| Grand Cape Mount | 28                | 237.392                       |
| Grand Gedeh      | 63                | 820.472                       |
| Grand Kru        | 3                 | 81.040                        |
| Lofa             | 55                | 1.184.494                     |
| Margibi          | 4                 | 75.363                        |
| Maryland         | 9                 | 114.532                       |
| Montserrado      | 4                 | 49.332                        |
| Nimba            | 69                | 1.286.422                     |
| River Cess       | 11                | 197.256                       |
| River Gee        | 3                 | 57.005                        |
| Sinoe            | 3                 | 86.410                        |
| <b>Total</b>     | <b>331</b>        | <b>5.546.795 <sup>4</sup></b> |

The table shows that the counties with highest population Bong, Lofa and Nimba, which also are the counties with the highest number of returnees, have received the highest amounts of support from the CBRP. Concerning the number of projects Grand Gedeh is in the second place after Nimba.

**Table 4 Distribution of number of facilities per type and county**

| Type of project/<br>county | Nimba      | Bong       | Lofa       | Grand<br>Gede | GrCape<br>Mount | Gbar-<br>polu | Montser-<br>rado | River<br>Gee | Mary-<br>land | Bomi      | Total      |
|----------------------------|------------|------------|------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|------------------|--------------|---------------|-----------|------------|
| Roads                      | 24km       |            | 133km      | 79km          |                 |               |                  |              |               |           | <b>17</b>  |
| Bridges                    | 9          | 12         | 58         | 16            |                 | 7             |                  | 2            |               |           | <b>102</b> |
| School                     | 27         | 27         | 32         | 12            | 8               |               |                  | 1            | 2             |           | <b>111</b> |
| Clinic/hospital            | 2          | 2          | 8          | 1             | 5               | 1             |                  | 6            |               | 1         | <b>20</b>  |
| Market places              |            | 2          | 4          | 4             |                 |               |                  | 6            |               |           | <b>12</b>  |
| Water wells                | 145        | 111        | 10         | 52            | 45              | 3             | 6                |              | 2             | 13        | <b>393</b> |
| Latrines                   | 98         | 99         | 11         | 48            | 27              | 3             |                  |              | 4             | 7         | <b>303</b> |
| <b>Total</b>               | <b>305</b> | <b>253</b> | <b>256</b> | <b>212</b>    | <b>85</b>       | <b>14</b>     | <b>6</b>         | <b>15</b>    | <b>8</b>      | <b>21</b> | <b>941</b> |

The table shows that those counties receiving most returnees also have the highest number of projects, Nimba 305, Lofa 256, Bong 253 and Grand Gedeh 212, while the other counties only have received a few. This reflects a good distribution according to needs. It should be noticed that Market places and Water wells show the number of facilities and not the number of projects which may give a wrong impression that these types of social infrastructure dominate.

<sup>4</sup> Includes an amount of 577.051 from BPRM

**Table 5 Distribution of expenditures per county, including training and peace-building (USD)**

| Sector/<br>Projects          | Bomi         | Bong             | Gbar-<br>polu | Gr.<br>Bassa  | Gr. Cape      | Gr. Gedeh      | Gr. Kru       | Lofa            | Margibi       | Maryland       | Montser-<br>rado | Nimba          | River Gee     | Rivercess     | Sinoe         | Total            | Total Cost       |
|------------------------------|--------------|------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|------------------|------------------|
| Access<br>Roads/<br>Bridges  | 0            | 1                | 3             | 0             | 0             | 5              | 0             | 4               | 0             | 0              | 0                | 4              | 0             | 0             | 0             | 17               | 384 111          |
| Education<br>– Schools       | 0            | 27               | 0             | 0             | 8             | 12             | 0             | 32              | 1             | 2              | 0                | 27             | 2             | 0             | 0             | 111              | 2 664 905        |
| Health<br>- Clinics/<br>hosp | 1            | 2                | 1             | 0             | 5             | 1              | 0             | 8               | 0             | 0              | 0                | 2              | 0             | 0             | 0             | 20               | 207338           |
| Markets/<br>Comm.<br>Halls   | 0            | 2                | 0             | 1             | 0             | 4              | 0             | 4               | 0             | 0              | 0                | 0              | 1             | 0             | 0             | 12               | 190 182          |
| Water &<br>Sanitation        | 3            | 24               | 1             | 0             | 12            | 35             | 0             | 4               | 0             | 4              | 1                | 32             | 5             | 0             | 0             | 121              | 1 147 119        |
| Peace-<br>building           | 0            | 0                | 0             | 0             | 0             | 2              | 0             | 0               | 0             | 0              | 0                | 0              | 0             | 0             | 0             | 2                | 20 490           |
| Training                     | 3            | 4                | 3             | 3             | 3             | 4              | 3             | 3               | 3             | 3              | 3                | 4              | 3             | 3             | 3             | 48               | 932 650          |
| <b>Total</b>                 | <b>7</b>     | <b>60</b>        | <b>8</b>      | <b>4</b>      | <b>28</b>     | <b>63</b>      | <b>3</b>      | <b>55</b>       | <b>4</b>      | <b>9</b>       | <b>4</b>         | <b>69</b>      | <b>11</b>     | <b>3</b>      | <b>3</b>      | <b>331</b>       |                  |
| <b>Total Cost</b>            | <b>83944</b> | <b>1 088 566</b> | <b>80 680</b> | <b>103894</b> | <b>237393</b> | <b>820 473</b> | <b>81 041</b> | <b>1184 494</b> | <b>75 363</b> | <b>114 531</b> | <b>49 322</b>    | <b>1 86423</b> | <b>197256</b> | <b>57 005</b> | <b>86 410</b> | <b>5 546 795</b> | <b>5 546 795</b> |

The total amount includes support of 577.051 USD from the BPRM. The American support was used for quick impact in communities receiving returnees in Grand Cape Mount and Lofa counties. 22 schools, 10 health clinics, 47 water wells, 27 latrines and 4 secondary roads were built.

The Sida support amounts to 4.016.604 USD for social infrastructure when the peace-building and training components of 20.490 USD respectively 932.651 USD are subtracted.

The table shows that the main recipient counties Bong Lofa and Nimba also have been allocated the highest budget.

#### *4.2.3.2 Financial execution*

The Swedish support for 2004, 2005 and 2006 amounted to 18, 23 and 15 MSEK respectively, a total of 56 million SEK equivalent of 8.015.795 USD. The latest agreement for 2007 amounts to 15 MSEK. An update of the expenditures per 31 May 2006, received by the Mission, was sent to Sida showing a total expenditure of 3.575.994 USD for the first two agreements 2004 and 2005. Total expenditures by December 2007 when the CBRP officially ended, gives the following use of the Sida contribution:

|                                               |           |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------|
| Strengthening local community structures      | 932.651   |
| Rehabilitation of basic social infrastructure | 4.016.604 |
| Peace building                                | 20.490    |
| Training of CCUs for livelihood               | 9.000     |
| Staff supervision etc                         | 2.395.786 |
| UNDP overhead GMS ISS                         | 641.264   |
| Total USD                                     | 8.015.795 |

The Mission requested an extract from the UNDP financial system for the Sida support to the CBRP which shows the following total annual amounts were spent:

|           |              |
|-----------|--------------|
| 2005      | 2 546 011,27 |
| 2006      | 3 779 104,32 |
| 2007      | 2 346 585,45 |
| Total USD | 8 671 701,04 |

This amount includes USD 427.886,09 from UNDP core resources and USD 577.051 from BPRM, which gives a balance of USD 7.666.763,95 which is the total expenditure against Sida funding for the three years. The balance of USD 349.031,05 for the total Sida contribution has been transferred to 2008 to complete ongoing activities.

### **4.2.4 Assessment**

#### *4.2.4.1 UNDP Performance*

One important point is to what extent UNDP has fulfilled the conditions in Sida-UNDP agreement. The management of the CBRP project by UNDP staff in Monrovia and in the field has been acceptable despite delays in the implementation, which is common also in many other donor supported projects in Liberia. Many important social infrastructure schemes have been implemented through a participatory demand driven approach, which is often one reason for a slow start of implementation.

The close coordination with other UN agencies has been very successful. The UNHCR has contributed to link the emergency support to returnees and the recovery phase. UNICEF has offered complementary support to the social infrastructure constructed by the CBRP. For example UNICEF have provided school books, materials, furniture and teacher training in schools rehabilitated or constructed by CBRP. However, the Mission visited one school, completed in 2007 where UNICEF had not provided furniture/benches. This will be investigated after a contact with UNICEF.

The project document, including project objectives and quantitative outcome to measure progress, exists in several versions, which is very confusing. The well intended quantitative targets are not broken down in annual sub-targets and the project activities started without full funding. This makes it impossible to realistically compare performance with objectives and expected outputs.

CBRP has changed orientation, in the sense that it has concentrated on social infrastructure, not at all on income generation activities, IGAs, and very little on women centers as set out in the original objectives. This change may well depend on the shifting demand from the communities but Sida should have been informed. The decision to leave out completely the IGAs, except a few community credit unions, CCUs in two counties, may be acceptable in the first round of activities but should have a higher priority in the future, as revitalization of the local economy through employment and income generation is one of the key pillars in the PRS.

Project reporting required according to the Sida-UNDP agreement has only been partly made. The last common progress report and summary of financial expenditures for the 3 ongoing projects CBRP, GC and CST was presented per May 2008. A special report was also prepared for a Sida mission in September 2007. Many of the achievements reported are cumulative rather than linked to a particular period which makes it difficult to see how the project has progressed. No comparison with expected outputs is possible.

Concerning financial management, a balance of USD 349,031.05 was transferred to 2008 to complete ongoing activities. However, this amount should have been spent before 31.12.07 according to the Sida-UNDP agreement. On the other hand the latest Sida contribution of 15 MSEK for 2007, which is also planned to be used during 2008, could be spent until 30.9.09.

#### *4.2.4.2 Relevance*

The support to the re-establishment of local authorities with local community participation mechanism, DDCs, the rehabilitation of social infrastructure and the promotion of IGAs, though very limited, in the refugee receiving communities is very relevant for a successful repatriation and rehabilitation of local communities and contributes to peace and stability. It is compatible with the new President's initial 150-Day Plan and the interim PRS, aimed at inclusive economic recovery and the restoration of basic social services.

#### *4.2.4.3 Efficiency*

A total number of 331 social infrastructure projects have been implemented for an average cost of 13.500 USD, 73 DDCs established in 15 counties with over 1000 members (15 per DDC) being trained during 4 years must be considered acceptable. The social infrastructure projects have only been implemented in 10 counties and the remaining 5 counties will be covered from the new CBRD project in 2008. As comparison the EC funded Local Community Development Component within the Programme Reintegration of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons implemented 180 small projects during 2 years 2004 to March 2006 for an average amount of 20.000 USD.

However, the CBRP has been slow in the start of implementation and the project planned for 2 years has been extended and finally closed in December 2007. The latest Sida agreement of 15 MSEK is funding a new project CBRD which started in April 2008. The first task is to complete remaining

ongoing projects from the CBRP. It will then concentrate on funding social infrastructure project in the remaining 5 countries in the south-east, which have not been cover so far. However it should be remembered that the demand driven community approach is always slow to spend resources in the beginning and many projects are approved but not implemented in the end. Similar experience is found in projects funded by the WB (LACE/LECP) and EC (LCD. Therefore by funding projects already selected and approved, a donor will be able to support implementation of additional projects to a low delivery cost. For example the latest Sida support from 2007 to be used in 2008, will implement 39 projects remaining from the CBRP within the CBRD,

However, there are other factors which have influenced the results obtained. Weak capacity of implementing partners, contracted for the construction work, has impacted on the quality and caused delays. Bad roads have delayed implementation and made monitoring more difficult. Shortage of construction materials (tin sheets, cement etc) has also negatively influenced the speed of implementation. In the beginning the security situation also stopped the expansion to new counties.

The first component related to *capacity building of DDC is impressive*, but the *quality* of the training according to some DDC members interviewed has *not been sufficient* and more and other type of training is necessary. The EC project CRC tried to work with the DDC but found it more efficient to work directly with the District Commissioner who consulted with the communities in the way he preferred. Also the project staff itself has recognised that the capacity and functionality of the DDCs is not what is required to well perform its tasks. However, this does not mean that the decision to choose DDCs as entry point for community participation was wrong but rather that the training offered or the trainers involved were not sufficient. In addition the motivation among the DDC members has not been at the highest level. It should be remembered that no compensation for the work done or support to operation and maintenance cost of the motorbike has been offered by the CBRP. The working conditions for the District Commissioner and the DDCs have not been improved as no rehabilitation of the District Commissioner office was planned within the CBRP.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> component concerning Promotion of sustainable livelihood through skills training, rural employment creation and micro-enterprise development has only been implemented to a very limited extent. The main reason has been that the communities have given priority to schools, clinics and other social infrastructure but the CBRP staff should have been more pro-active in the dialogue. The progress in the creation of women community centres and enhancement of women capacity has also been limited. Only 2 centers have been re-established in Bong County. Concerning the credit sub-component only 6 community credit unions have obtained support.

Therefore the Mission concludes that the 2<sup>nd</sup> component has hardly *not produced any results*. As the CBRP is demand driven it seems obvious that all DDCs have given highest priorities to investment in social infrastructure while IGA and employment creation has not received proper attention. Income and employment promotion is considered as the most urgent area to address today in the transition to development following the adopted PRS. Therefore this component must receive more attention in an eventual future Sida support or be the subject of a separate new project. This also corresponds well with the Sida strategy to promote small scale agri based enterprise development.

The design and management of CBRP is done in a way that all decisions on social infrastructure projects, prepared by the DDCs with the assistance of CBRP county based staff, have been taken at central level by a Project Appraisal Committee, PAC. The number of projects can therefore vary very much between districts and counties depending on the capacity and commitment of the DDCs and not related to real needs. Anyhow the counties with the highest number of returnees have benefited from the highest amounts of project resources. In some cases social disputes have hampered the work of the DDCs and special peace and conciliation efforts have been necessary to undertake by the project.

The *administrative cost* including project staff and operational costs amount to 35%, which is considered quite high compared to other similar projects (WB, EC) and must be possible to reduce. In the original 2 year Project document for 2004 - 2005, an administrative cost was calculated to about 10%. The same staff resources would be able to handle a higher number of social infrastructure projects and devote more time to promote IGAs and women community centres.

#### 4.2.4.4 Effectiveness

Restructuring and establishing new DDCs in all 15 counties, using local NGOs in building local capacity, has promoted community participation in planning and implementation, though sometimes at the cost of inefficient leadership.

Although capacity building for the DDC members has been offered, their real capacity and motivation still need to be strengthened. The DDCs have been given a motorbike and official materials but no support for operation and maintenance of the motorbikes. Also, no compensation has been given for the work done in community consultation, because there was no provision in the project design.

In general the Mission believes that the CBRP Project has to a great extent fulfilled the first objective to "strengthen local community structure in planning and management of recovery and reintegration interventions". There are shortcomings in the implementation which are gradually being overcome by "learning by doing", the only possible approach in the recovery stage in a post conflict situation. The experience gained will certainly be useful in the future expansion of the CBRP.

The decision to work with DDCs as entry point in the communities and with local NGOs as contractors in view of building local capacity has been important in the CBRP. NGOs have been trained and strengthened but need in some cases to be more professional to ensure adequate quality.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> outcome "Enhanced livelihood opportunities and income generating activities in target communities" in the project objectives has *not been achieved*. The staff must be more pro-active or a separate project designed to address the important area of income and employment promotion at community level.

#### 4.2.4.5 Impact

The rehabilitation of social infrastructure facilities in communities has greatly facilitated the return of displaced population to their home communities. However, the impact has been constrained by low national capacity at all levels, poor road infrastructure etc.

At the community level, ethnic tension have sometimes negatively influenced social cohesion, and ineffective leadership structures in some cases has led to limited participation by beneficiaries in the selection, design and implementation of projects.

Although projects have contributed to the restoration of basic social services in beneficiary communities, there is need for a more participatory, comprehensive and integrated approach to development. The low extent to which the income generating and employment creation component has been implemented, has reduced the impact of the project. The special attention to social awareness, participation and capacity building for women has had limited impact.

The long process and participation in the project selection has contributed to create increased local ownership which offers a better chance that the benefit of the projects will be "inclusive" and last longer.

The Mission visited 2 primary schools and one bridge construction which were completed in 2006. These facilities were well used and managed and very much appreciated by the population. A visit to 2 clinics in Gbarpolu being inaugurated in June 2008 did not make it possible to appreciate the real

benefit for the populations. Health teams were appointed to work and equipment provided. The consultant believes that the impact should be evaluated at a later stage as part of a post-completion monitoring from the CBRD project.

The impact on the local economy has been limited as very few resources have been used to promote income and employment activities as planned in the original Project Document. The demand driven approach has favoured social infrastructure projects in the first round of projects.

#### *4.2.4.6 Sustainability*

These social infrastructure investments will last for a long time. The impression is that the communities will operate and maintain them properly. The capacity building offered to the members of DDCs has been important but further training and change of mentality is necessary in order for these local structures to play their role and ensure inclusiveness and participation by traditionally marginalized groups as youth, women and now ex-combatants etc.

#### *4.2.4.7 Lessons learned*

Some of the lessons learned from the implementation of the CBRP and which have been considered in the design of the new project CBRD, are shown below:

- Building capacity at district level is time consuming for the project officers and adequate personnel are required
- Capacity building is crucial in community driven initiatives in post conflict areas
- Community participation in project identification and implementation may delay implementation but assures ownership and sustainability
- Coordination and information sharing among implementing partners is important
- Weak monitoring causes implementation delays and produces low quality outputs

### **4.2.5 Conclusion for the future**

The CBRP closed in December 2007 and was followed by a new project CBRD, funded from the latest Sida contribution of 15 million SEK.

The work plan of CBRD foresees to complete 39 ongoing projects by mid 2008. The remaining Sida support is expected to be used by the end of the year in the 5 remaining counties in south-east which have so far not been covered by social infrastructure investment. Promotion of income and employment activities at community level is crucial for long term inclusive development, peace and stability. This should have a special attention in eventual future Sida support.

## **4.3 Governance Commission**

### **4.3.1 Project overview**

The role of the Governance Commission GC is to prepare reforms and design systems to be presented to the Legislature for adoption. Its mandate is to design policies and programmes to promote democratic governance, national cohesion and a common vision

The overall objective of the UNDP/Sida support has been to contribute to building national capacity and facilitate public sector reforms through national institutions such as the Civil Service Agency (CSA), the legislature and institutions of transparency and accountability.

### **4.3.2 UNDP management capacity**

UNDP has a team of 2 persons working with the governance issues. The agreements between UNDP and Sida for support to GC are based on project proposals for specific activities within their work plan. In most cases the UNDP support to GC are co-funded from various sources. Completion and financial Reports for all UNDP support has been sent by the Governance Commission to UNDP, but the reporting procedures to Sida has not been followed according to the Sida-UNDP Trust Fund agreement.

### **4.3.3 Achievement**

#### *4.3.3.1 Physical progress*

The progress of the GC programme can be measured in eight key areas: Public Sector Reform, National Integrity and Anti-Corruption, Leadership and Youth Initiatives; Decentralization; Judicial and Legal Reform; Legislative Strengthening; and Land Reform.

The results obtained are;

Under Public Sector Reforms, comprehensive proposals have been prepared for the restructuring of Ministries, Central Management Agencies and State Owned Enterprises.

Under National Integrity a National Anti-corruption Policy, a National Anti-Corruption Strategy was approved by the President in December 2006.

Under Leadership Development And Youth Initiatives, a National Leadership Development Programme and a National Youth Policy was developed. Leadership training and civic education for youth and public servants was undertaken by civil society partners.

Under Decentralisation, the preparation of the Decentralisation policy is ongoing. A draft will be presented in 2008.

Under Judicial Reform, a draft strategy is under review during 2008.

Under Legislative Strengthening, a lessons learned workshop on Enhancing the Budgetary Process in Liberia was held in February 2007. Equipment has been provided to the Legislative Resource center. A legislative strategic plan has been completed.

Under the Security sector, an assessment has been done and results sent for consultations after which a Security policy been approved by the Cabinet. A draft Defense Act has been funded by the USAID, and DFID provided funding for security sector reform strategy.

As part of the activities of the GC the following reports and documents have been produced:

- Reforming Liberia's Legal and Judicial System, Towards enhancing the Rule of Law, An Issue Paper by Philip A.Z. Banks, December 2006
- A strategy for Legal and Judicial Reform, January 2008
- District Development Committees, A preliminary Assessment by Regina B Teah Staff GC
- Decentralisation and local governance for Liberia, Notes to assist a policy discussion by GC October 2007

An Act to establish the Governance Commission as a statutory body has been submitted and approved by the national legislature in October 2007. This has empowered the Commission to effectively coordinate policy formulation.

After the adoption of the Anti-Corruption Strategy in December 2006, it has been decided to go forward to adopt an Anti-Corruption Commission Act, which will create an implementation body with

5 Commissioners responsible for investigation, prosecution and for elaborating a strategy for prevention. The Act is approved by the House of Representatives and was in June 2008 debated in the Senate.

A Code of Conduct for public servants and the Corrupt Offences Act is also being debated in the Senate.

The Sida support included the recruitment of 2 international public sector reform specialists, who provided support to the GC over a cumulative period of 8 months at a cost of U\$ 100,000 each. Additionally a Judicial Reform Specialist was recruited to provide support to the GC for the period of 7 months at a cost of U\$ 67,000. One governance specialist from the International UNV worked for 6 months. The Sida support covered the subsistence cost and the Canadian government directly paid the salary.

#### 4.3.3.2 Financial execution

UNDP Monrovia received 2 MSEK equivalent of 285 000 USD in 2005 and 5 MSEK equivalent to 679 340 USD in 2006, giving a total of 964.340 USD. As it was not possible to spend all the funds of the first agreement before the deadline of 30 June 2006, a balance of 134 823 USD was carried over and used later.

The 1<sup>st</sup> Agreement of 2 MSEK equivalent to 285.000 USD was a co-funding with UNDP and Denmark for a total of 895.000 USD. An update per 31 May 2006 showing total expenditures of 285 000 USD was sent to Sida. The total Sida support was used to the following activities:

|                                                                                                             |                |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|
| National civil service census                                                                               | 71.920         |
| Review of Institutional Mandates and Structures and functions of Ministries and Central Government Agencies | 21.000         |
| Consensus building                                                                                          | 56.000         |
| Decentralisation                                                                                            | 55.000         |
| National Integrity System                                                                                   | 22.500         |
| Leadership Development Programme                                                                            | 8.496          |
| Developing a National shared Vision for Liberia                                                             | 7.056          |
| Legislative Capacity Building Support                                                                       | 43.000         |
| <b>Total USD</b>                                                                                            | <b>285.000</b> |

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Agreement amounting to 5 MSEK equivalent to 680 000 USD was a co-funding with UNDP, EC, WB, AfDB DFID, Denmark within a total amount of 3.135.000 USD. The UNDP part was fully funded from the Sida contribution. It was disbursed in 2006 but used partly during 2007. The total amount was used for:

|                                                                                                                                                                                       |                |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|
| National long term perspective studies                                                                                                                                                | 200 000        |
| Public sector reform (National civil servants census, job descriptions/personnel profile, Code of conduct for civil servants)                                                         | 200 000        |
| National integrity system (define anti corruption policy and strategy, enact anti corruption legislation and define institutional arrangements, public dialogue with legislature CSO) | 50 000         |
| Leadership development Programme. (ToT in leadership development, integration of leadership training into key Ministries and public sector agencies programmes)                       | 50 000         |
| Decentralisation (consultation, design systems shared constitutional authority)                                                                                                       | 25 000         |
| Juridical service reform                                                                                                                                                              | 25 000         |
| Legislature capacity building                                                                                                                                                         | 50 000         |
| Security sector reform (security sector governance)                                                                                                                                   | 25 000         |
| Land reform (review of land laws)                                                                                                                                                     | 25 000         |
| Operation of GC (establish GC as statutory body, technical Support secretariat, travel)                                                                                               | 30 000         |
| <b>Total USD</b>                                                                                                                                                                      | <b>680 000</b> |

The amount of 680 000 USD represented the UNDP part funded by Sida of a work plan and budget presented by GC for 2006/07.

The Mission requested an extract from the UNDP financial system for the Sida support to the GC which shows the following total annual amounts spent:

|                  |                     |
|------------------|---------------------|
| 2005             | 93 676,05           |
| 2006             | 376 619,20          |
| 2007             | 612 720,12          |
| <b>Total USD</b> | <b>1.083.015,37</b> |

The overspending compared with the total amount received from Sida 964.340 USD is explained by the fact that it also includes a smaller contribution from the UNDP core funds.

#### *4.3.3.3 Problems*

A concern expressed by the chairman of the Governance Commission was that the UNDP co-funding arrangement does not allow the GC to know what areas the different donors are interested in. He meant that a direct dialogue with Sida is desirable to agree on future priorities.

### **4.3.4 Assessment**

#### *4.3.4.1 UNDP performance*

Both the technical progress report and the financial reports from the Governance Commission to UNDP exist. The reporting requirements in the Sida-UNDP agreement have however not been followed by UNDP. Regular progress and financial reports have been provided, although not the agreed format. The last common progress report and summary of financial expenditures for the 3 ongoing projects CBRP, GC and CST was presented to the Mission per May 2008. A special report was also prepared before a Sida mission in September 2007 but does not seem to have reached Sida HQ. But the progress of implemented activities and related expenditures has been clarified and the funds have been used for the intended purposes.

Concerning financial management, the Mission received extracts from the UNDP financial system showing yearly expenditures. A balance of USD 134 823 on 30.6.06 from the first agreement of 2 MSEK equivalent to 285 000 USD was carried over to next period which is not according to the Sida-UNDP agreement. An email correspondence between UNDP Monrovia and UNDP HQ asked whether the balance should be refunded to Sida, but it was left and used later for its purpose. The transfer of funds from UNDP HQ arrived late.

Even if UNDP has not accomplished the reporting requirements of the Sida-UNDP agreements, the Mission believes that the new organizational set up in UNDP with one staff responsible for the donor reporting on the Trust Funds will facilitate the communication both with the Swedish embassy in Dakar and the Sida HQ and hopefully improve the reporting procedures. A permanent Sida presence in Monrovia would of course further improve the regular follow up both on the dialogue with the GC and with UNDP on financial reporting.

#### *4.3.4.2 Relevance*

The Sida support to the Governance Commission is highly relevant as it contributes to the urgent needs for public sector reforms and training at central level where successful implementation of good governance and anti-corruption measures is necessary. It is fully compatible with the President's initial 150-Day Plan and the interim Poverty Reduction Strategy, aimed at strengthening governance and the rule of law.

#### *4.3.4.3 Efficiency*

The Sida support to the Governance Commission has been spent according to applications as part of co-funding with other donors but with some delay. Reports describing the activities implemented have been obtained by UNDP after project completion.

All GC activities have been implemented correctly but the implementation has been constrained by lack of *manpower*. Most of the qualified manpower is out of the country and institutions of learning in-country which should be producing the national manpower needs are constrained by lack of modern facilities and equipment. There is a pressing need for national manpower to take ownership of and drive the reform process. There are many competent nationals in the Diaspora who would be prepared to come back if reasonable conditions were met. In order to bridge this gap the UNDP together with others have initiated two national capacity building schemes to provide qualified Liberian nationals from the Diaspora to participate in the reform processes. These initiatives are the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nations (TOKTEN) and the Senior Executive Scheme, SES, which aims to bring qualified Liberians into the public service. The experience so far expressed by some senior civil servants is that the recruitment process is long and expensive, so only limited funds remain to pay salaries. However the costly process and limited impact was not confirmed by UNDP.

#### *4.3.4.4 Effectiveness*

It has been difficult to assess the effectiveness of the specific Sida funded activities and to what extent the objectives have been attained. Strategies and policies have been drafted and Acts proposed and passed the Legislature. Proposals for public sector reforms have been presented. The Sida support has been used for many different small activities which have been co-funded with other donors. A joint donor evaluation may be needed to ensure that the outcome is acceptable.

#### *4.3.4.5 Impact*

No clear impact of the work can yet be seen as most of the Acts passed by the Legislature needs to be followed up by drafting and adoption of strategies and policies. Many of these concern change of mentality and behaviour like the anti-corruption strategy, which takes time.

#### *4.3.4.6 Sustainability*

Sustainability of the Acts passed in the Legislature and the strategies and policies elaborated to implement them remains to be followed up.

### **4.3.5 Conclusion for the future**

The Sida support to the GC has been implemented satisfactory and progress and financial reports delivered to UNDP.

The GC is interested in future Sida support. The Chairman mentioned the need to design a monitoring and evaluation system and increase its capabilities to follow up the application of laws passed in the Legislature. This is within the mandate of GC but there is today little attention on the application of the laws after they have been passed by the Legislature. Other priority areas are to make the new Anti-Corruption Commission operational. Pending decision by the House a Land Reform Commission will also be set up soon.

## 4.4 County Support Teams

### 4.4.1 Project overview

According to County Support Teams project document the objectives are to strengthen the management of the counties with improved functioning of the administrative offices and capacity development of key county officials, line ministries and civil society organisations.

To support recovery and decentralization, the UN has created County Support Teams (CST) in each county to ensure a coherent UN approach, supporting Government, in particular the Superintendent's office, and building capacity of government institutions so that they can increasingly take over responsibility for security, reconstruction and development.

The project focuses its support on 3 areas:

- restoring functionality of county administrative buildings/transportation,
- developing capacity of county officials, and
- building county information and data management capacities.

### 4.4.2 UNDP management capacity

UNDP has a team of 2 persons working with the County Support Teams in Monrovia and 3 persons at county level.

The project is coordinated and managed by UNDP and works through UNMIL in all 15 counties. One UNV staff working for UNMIL Civil Affairs is coordinating all work at county level and supports the County Superintendents on a day-to-day basis. The project builds on the county efforts of other UN agencies in support of relevant Government institutions.

The CST is guided by a joint steering committee, co-chaired by the minister of Internal Affairs and the UN Regional Coordinator. It is supported by government – UN working groups and a UN technical team.

### 4.4.3 Achievement

#### 4.4.3.1 Physical progress

The CST project has restored functionality of administrative buildings, provided transportation vehicles and built capacity of county officials through the civic education training.

#### *Component 1: Restoring functionality of administration buildings and transportation*

The County administration buildings have been rehabilitated in 14 of 15 counties. Solar panels, generators, one pick up vehicle have been delivered to each county. The district commissioners have been provided with 26 motor cycles etc. The planned rehabilitation in all counties will be completed with ongoing resources.



*Rehabilitated administrative building, Sanniquelli city, Nimba county*

### *Component 2: Capacity building of county officials*

A capacity building plan of the local administration staff was developed with three focus areas, namely:

- Civic Education, (leadership, national identification, transparency, accountability, human rights, gender and governance)
- Skill Based Training by LIPA (Institute for Public Administration), the main implementing partner (participatory planning, computer literacy, leadership, administration skills, project planning, management-monitoring-evaluation, decentralisation and local governance, conflict solution)
- Millennium Development Goals training: gender analysis, prevention of sexual exploitation, county based human rights training

As part of the civic education, a local government training needs assessment was undertaken, to guide the identification of further skill-based training. UNDP signed a contract for LIPA training in the period September 2006 to December 2007 for an amount of 295 000 USD, distributed as follows:

|                     |         |
|---------------------|---------|
| Civic education     | 130 000 |
| Training assessment | 7 500   |
| Skills training     | 115 000 |
| Computer training   | 154 000 |
| Evaluation          | 5 000   |
| Overhead            | 22 000  |

The County Support Teams have also participated actively in the preparation of CDAs by organising district consultation through DDCs and 15 county consolidation workshops followed by the production of 15 CDA documents.

### *Component 3: Strengthen County information and Data management capacity*

A monitoring system with monthly meeting and reporting system CAAR (County Assessment and Action Reports) has been set up.

In order to follow up on the County Development Agendas (CDAs), which are the county priorities within the adopted PRS, County Development Steering Committees CDSCs have been created, led by the superintendents and with representatives from the Line ministries and development partners.

County Support Teams have also assisted county administration to collect county specific data, and produce County Information Packs (CIPs)

As part of the "E-county in a box" 2 laptops, printer scanner photocopy machines have been delivered to each county.

Information management offices, IMOs, have been set up in 7 counties. They have received equipment and human resources for data collection and information management about returnees. IMOs will provide support to the PRS information system at county level. LISGIS as part of its deconcentration strategy will join IMOs in 7 counties. In addition joint IMO and LISGIS offices have been established in two pilot counties and thanks to a Norwegian support all 15 counties are expected to be covered during 2008, implemented by NRC and UNHCR. After the end of 2008 no funding is yet ensured to continue these activities.

#### *Beneficiaries of CST interventions*

- 1,200 local government officials, including Superintendents, Mayors, Commissioners, Chiefs and Line Ministry Representatives in all 15 counties participated in county-based civic education training gaining awareness of their civic responsibilities,
- 193 county officials, including Superintendents, Development Superintendents, gender coordinators, ministry staff, traditional leaders, UN and NGO staff, participated in Gender and Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse training aimed at enhancing skills and knowledge on the process of integrating gender in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of county activities,
- the Ministries of Planning and Economic Affairs and Internal Affairs were supported with the conceptualization and preparation of County Development Agendas (CDAs) in all 15 counties, aimed at guiding county decision-making and feed into the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS).

#### *4.4.3.2 Financial execution*

CST received a total amount of 3,9 MUSD during 2006-2008 out of which the Sida contribution was 2,672.000 USD. The rest came from UNDP and Action 2 contributions.

The first Sida contribution of 10 MSEK in 2006 equivalent to 1.365.000 USD was spent during 2006 (416 665 USD) and 2007 (556 871 USD). An unspent amount of 391 464 USD was carried over to 2008 The contribution was spent as follows during 2006 and 2007:

|                                         |         |
|-----------------------------------------|---------|
| Administrative buildings/transportation | 545.641 |
| Capacity building                       | 192.598 |
| Information and data management         | 74.223  |
| Management and administration           | 161.074 |
| Total USD                               | 973.536 |

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Sida grant of 10 MSEK in 2007 equivalent to 1.307.000 USD has been used as follows together with the unspent amount of 391.464 USD from 2007.

|                                                                            |             |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| Administrative building/transportation                                     | 505.332     |
| Capacity building                                                          | 795.529     |
| Information and data management                                            | 392.813     |
| Management and administration                                              | 329.800     |
| Support to the rehabilitation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs premises | 75.000      |
| Total projected expenditure 2008 USD                                       | 2.098.464   |
| Balance available                                                          | – 1.698.464 |
| Funding gap for 2008                                                       | 400 000     |

These figures include both actual and projected expenditures during 2008. It shows a deficit of USD 400 000, for which additional funding is needed.

#### **4.4.4 Assessment**

##### *4.4.4.1 UNDP performance*

The UNDP staff at Monrovia office and county level working directly with CST has played an important role to coordinate all intervention of the UN agencies at county level.

The UNDP has implemented the CST activities planned in the 3 components in a flexible and need based way. However, the implementation has experienced major delays during 2007 and part of the first Sida contribution had to be carried over to 2008.

The reporting has not followed the format in the Sida-UNDP agreement. Several progress reports have been produced at different occasions (May 2007, May 2008) but the activities implemented have not been compared to an annual work plan. The last common progress report and summary of financial expenditures for the 3 ongoing projects CBRP, GC and CST was presented to the Mission per May 2008. A special report was also prepared before a Sida mission in September 2007 but does not seem to have reached Sida HQ.

Concerning financial management, the balance of USD 391 464 from the first agreement 1.5.06 to 30.4.07, should have been spent before 31.12.07, thus violating the Sida-UNDP agreement. No request to carry it over to 2008 has been sent to Sida or seen by the Mission. The second contribution is no problem as the agreement states that it could be spent until 30.09.09.

##### *4.4.4.2 Relevance*

The County Support Teams project is most relevant because it has been unique to bring UN family together at county level. Support to the re-establishment of local government authorities at county level is necessary to show the returning refugees that the government is serious of pursuing an inclusive recovery and development policy. It is fully compatible with the President's initial 150-Day Plan and the interim PRS, aimed at inclusive economic recovery and the restoration of basic social services.

##### *4.4.4.3 Efficiency*

The role of CST has been crucial to the successful common approach within the UN family, from UNMIL civil affairs to all UN agencies, to support the rehabilitation of the local authorities at county and district level.

The CST has been efficient to identify urgent needs to assist the government establish authority at county level with staff and equipment, capacity building in human rights and civic education and information management. CST is a good mechanism to strengthen government and to monitor PRS with information on progress indicators.

#### *4.4.4.4 Effectiveness*

The rehabilitation of the county administrative buildings, delivery of equipment and training of county staff have been an effective and rapid response to the need of the local authorities to become functional again. The joint UN efforts have been crucial to the success. The early capacity building of the county administration staff has contributed to effective transfer of responsibilities to the county authorities.

The consultation process, which resulted in the County Development Agendas at county level as a preparation to the Poverty Reduction Strategy, was very successful. The people, who earlier felt marginalized took ownership of the process, participated in high numbers in the consultations both at district and county levels. As part of a future decentralization policy the role of CST will be to support the new government body at county level, County Development Steering Committees, CDSCs, to coordinate, follow up and elaborate a new reporting system.

The CST project has provided equipment but no government funds are available to cover recurrent costs for the county administration. The lack of government funds for the operation of generators and maintenance of vehicles have kept the dependence on external assistance. UNHCR is presently paying for the gasoline to the generators but has now decided to cut that spending. Neither the Ministry of Internal Affairs nor the Line Ministries, which are gradually de-concentrating their activities to county level, have contributed to the operational and maintenance budget. This creates a big problem to the efficient use of the deployed government staff as well as the equipment delivered by the CST. The Mission was informed that computers delivered in Nimba County are not installed as the generator is still not yet delivered.

#### *4.4.4.5 Impact*

The Sida support to the County Support Team project has been instrumental for local government to reestablish authorities at county level. The capacity building has contributed to increase the country administration ability to operate its affairs, but more and continued training is needed to obtain a lasting impact. The government needs to support the operational and maintenance of the equipment delivered in order to ensure an efficient use.

#### *4.4.4.6 Sustainability*

The County Support Team project support to local government at county level, represented by the county administration and the Line Ministries, has established a well functioning coordination system together with all the UN agencies and other donors, the CAAR. This system will now be replaced by the government led system CDSC, linked to the monitoring of the PRS, which will make the government take full ownership of the whole process.

### **4.4.5 Conclusions**

The Sida support to the County Support Team project has been instrumental for local government to reestablish county authorities and build the first element of its capacity. The CST is also a unique vehicle to get all the UN agencies together at the county level, drawing on their respective comparative advantage in support of the Government. CST was presented as an example of “Integrated mission approach to the local level in Liberia“ within the “Good practice ideas in cross UN support to post-conflict local governance” series. This means that The CST has been recognized by UN Peace Keeping Operations as a best practice model for post-conflict countries.

According to the UNDP Resident Coordinator there is still a need for CST to continue capacity building at county level and to coordinate reporting mechanism for CDAs as part of the monitoring of the implementation of the PRS. His opinion is that the Sida support has contributed to bringing coherence between UN agencies at county level to work together with the mandate to restore national authorities at the local level, and this innovative support must continue.

However, there may be other options for support to local government. The Mission believes that the CST project could be phased out during 2009, to concentrate more support on the setting up and management of the information system to assist the new CDSCs to monitor the implementation of the PRS, including training of national staff linked to the IMOs on county data and information management capacity.

Another option is that CST continues its infrastructure support but shifts it towards districts. Ongoing training with LIPA as implementing agency should be completed in 2008 and additional capacity building of county officials could be taken over by the UNDP and EC funded Decentralisation and Local Development Project (LDLD) with a very strong capacity building component, which will be rolled out to all 15 counties.

## **4.5 Truth and Reconciliation Commission**

### **4.5.1 Project overview**

According to the Project Document the objectives of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission are to promote national peace, security, unity and national reconciliation.

The terms of Reference for the TRC working group, core responsibilities are:

- Policy guidelines and advice
- Organisational support on financial program and administrative issues
- Coordination with donors and fund raising
- Reporting

The activities and expected outputs are:

- hearings
- psycho social assistance to hearings process
- statement taking
- witness security and protection
- inquiry

A technical advisory group of 3 persons from ECOWAS and one from the UN Commission on Human Rights assist the national staff with international experiences.

The TRC is composed of 8 commissioners. They are supervising the work in the regions and are responsible for different thematic areas. The TRC is structured in one section for gender, one for inquiry and 15 county offices. It has 67 core staff employed and 33 contracted staff, out of which 50 work in the headquarter. All staff are paid by the government. The inquiry unit forms the core of the Commission's work. It is staffed by 12 researchers in analysis of thematic and institutional studies, 11 investigators inquiring into well known window cases and 6 transcribers.

#### **4.5.2 UNDP management capacity**

It needs to be stated that the psycho-social support, the witness security and protection and the research and analysis are integrated sub-components of the hearings and not separate components. Therefore Sida can not express a clear preference how to use the Sida funds as was written in the project agreement with UNDP.

UNDP has set up a team of 2 persons managing the support for TRC.

#### **4.5.3 Achievements**

##### *4.5.3.1 Physical progress*

The Sida support of 7 MSEK equivalent to 1.1 million USD has been a main boost to start the operations and has made it possible to complete the hearings and document all witnesses in all 15 counties. 5 vehicles and 15 motor bikes are included in the Sida support.

Until today TRC has obtained two other smaller contributions, 500 000 USD from Danida and 500 000 USD from the USAID. The Danish support was used for 3 international technical advisors from ECOWAS, 2 from Ghana and one from Nigeria. They assisted with work plan, legal issues and policies but left after quite a short time. Their assistance contributed to overcome the institutional problems faced in the beginning. 68 000 USD of the Danish support was spent for vehicles and the rest on 36 transcribers of the inquiries. The support from USAID was used to employ 125 statement takers for 2 months during the hearings.

In addition the EC is funding a study on conflict mapping engaging an international expert and 35 national researchers.

After initial intensive media campaign and outreach activities to invite volunteer witnesses, individual hearings in all counties have almost come to an end. Of the total number of witnesses 551, 445 are victims and 31 perpetrators and 75 thematic/ institutional. They have been divided according to 14 themes as military and political history of conflict, nature of conflict, root causes, role of foreign actors, religious impact, impact on children, women etc. All hearings have been documented by audio/video coverage.

##### *4.5.3.2 Financial execution and new advance request*

So far one advance of 365 125 USD has been transferred to TRC and one financial report for 353 817 USD has been presented to UNDP.

A request for a 2nd advance June to August 2008 was prepared together with a work plan including consultation in all 64 districts on their opinions on issues as reparation/ compensation, prosecution, amnesty and reconciliation. The consultations will result in county reports which will be presented at a National Conference in November. Diaspora hearings will take place in the USA and Ghana. Key actors, including the President will be invited to witness. The conclusions of National Conference will be included in a report which will be the conclusion of the inquiry process.

#### **4.5.5 Assessment**

The Sida support has been instrumental for the actual start up of hearings and all related activities. The funding will be sufficient up to the National Conference in November 2008

##### *UNDP performance*

The support has just started so it may be a bit early to assess their full performance but it seems as they are doing a satisfactory work.

The first advance of the Sida contribution of 7 million SEK equivalent to 1,1 million USD was disbursed in the end of 2007 and the activities started in January 2008. A quarterly work plan has been elaborated by TRC, checked by the UNDP project managers against the Project Document before disbursement. So far one advance has been transferred to TRC and one financial report has been presented to UNDP together with one progress report..

#### *4.5.5.2 Relevance*

The support to the TRC is very relevant and important in the reconciliation and healing process to avoid similar conflict in the future.

#### *4.5.5.3 Efficiency*

The implementation of TRC activities is progressing well according to work plans and expected results are produced gradually. The narrative and financial reports have been prepared timely by TRC and a new request for a 2nd advance is being elaborated.

UNDP has fully fulfilled the conditions in Sida-UNDP agreement so far. Once the financial resources arrived from UNDP HQ, UNDP-Monrovia rapidly disbursed a first quarterly advance according to agreed work plan.

#### *4.5.5.4 Effectiveness*

The funds are well used according to work plans and the implementation is progressing well towards the achievement of the project objectives.

#### *4.5.5.5 Impact*

Many persons both victims and perpetrators have voluntarily come forward in the hearings and the whole process is being followed by the population with great attention. The contribution of the TRC to peace and reconciliation will only be possible to assess after the whole process is over.

#### *4.5.5.6 Sustainability*

The TRC is a temporary event with no specific sustainability requirements. The lasting effects of a successful completion of the TRC processes will contribute to peace and reconciliation among the Liberian population, which is the most important factor for a progressive and inclusive development in the country.

## **5. UNDP Administrative and Financial Management**

This chapter tries to respond to the questions in the ToR related to Administration, the overall UNDP management capacity and efficiency. The assessment of the project managers and project field staff has been done under each project.

### **5.1 Assessment of National NGOs as Implementing Partners**

The quality and speed of the implementation of the social infrastructure projects in the CBRP and the training component within the DDRR depend on the capacity level of the national NGOs engaged in the reintegration and reconstruction work. In general the capacity level of the national NGOs in Liberia is extremely low, even compared with Sierra Leone. Most donors agree to this. The situation is not or should not be surprising when the country is coming from a very long civil war. It has left one

generation without school and not used to a normal work. The people have no trust in government authorities and the rule of law. Many of the national NGOs have very weak administrative capacity and financial resources. Most of the staff work as volunteers or with extremely low pay. The NGOs are often created for the purpose to participate in the recovery and reconstruction work. They have rarely other economic resources than the funds obtained from donors earmarked for specific projects. Like the unemployed and those working in the informal sector, these organisations live from day to day. When they receive advances from a donor funded project, it happens that some of the money is advanced for other urgent matters (private or other projects) and the rate of implementation is reduced.

The delays in project delivery are often caused by the fact that many NGOs want to obtain contracts from many donor funded projects and their capacity easily becomes stretched.

In a post-conflict recovery situation with low NGO implementation capacity, it is not possible to expect a high standard of all project interventions. Many projects start with zero experience and little guidance. It is only through “learning by doing” improvement will progressively be achieved.

## 5.2 Administration of Sida Trust Fund

The Sida assistance to UNDP is regulated in the agreement ‘UNDP - Sida Trust Fund for Assistance to UNDP Specific Activities’ established in September 2000. Thereafter specific administration agreements have been signed for one or several projects together. Refer to Annex 2-4 for details.

*a) Has UNDP met the conditions outlined in the agreements?*

The short answer is that UNDP has not met all conditions outlined in the agreements..

There have been deviations from the agreement especially in the reporting and in the financial procedures.

### *Utilisation of Funds*

The implementation of most of the projects has been delayed and *3 project agreements concerning CBRP, GC, CST have not respected the 6 to 9 months extra time limits offered for the use of Sida funds.* Funds have been carried over and spent at a later stage. According to expenditures data obtained from the UNDP financial system, it appears that the first agreements for GC and CST have not respected the spending deadline. For GC an amount of 134 823 USD was carried over after 30.6.06 and for CST an amount of 391 464 USD carried over from 30.12.07 to 2008. In the 3rd agreement for CBRP a balance of 349 031 USD was carried over from 31.12.07 to 2008 which is not according to Sida-UNDP agreement. See table 6 below.

The total overdue spending of 875 318 USD equivalent to 6,1 MSEK represents however less than 4,3 % of the total Sida disbursements of 144 MSEK, including the first contribution to DDRR of 4 MSEK in 2003. It must also be mentioned that frequent delays in Sida disbursement to UNDP is one reason for delayed implementation and spending. For example, the first disbursement for CBRP, although signed in 2004, was received in 2005. However, this is obviously not an excuse for UNDP not sending formal requests to Sida asking for extended time limit. Informal information to visiting Sida staff is not sufficient.

**Table 6: Project contributions by Sida versus Spending**

| Project | Sida Contribution | Agreement Period   | Contribution must be spent before | Observation                      |
|---------|-------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| CBRP    | 18 MSEK           | 1.12.04-30.11.05   | 31.5.06 – 6 months period         |                                  |
| CBRP    | 23 MSEK           | 1.6.05 – 31.5.06   | 31.12.06 – 7 months period        |                                  |
| DDRR    | 25 MSEK           | 1.3.05 – 28.2.06   | 31.8.06 – 6 months period         |                                  |
| GC      | 2 MSEK            | 1.1.05 – 31.12.05  | 30.6.06 – 6 months period         | balance 134 000 USD carried over |
| CBRP    | 15 MSEK           | 1.5.06 – 30.4.07   | 30.12.07 – 8 months period        | balance 349 031 USD carried over |
| CST     | 10 MSEK           | 1.5.06 – 30.4.07   | 30.12.07 – 8 months period        | balance 391 464 USD carried over |
| GC      | 5 MSEK            | 1.5.06 – 30.4.07   | 30.12.07 – 8 months period        |                                  |
| CBRP    | 15 MSEK           | 1.11.07 – 31.12.08 | 30.9.09 – 9 months period         |                                  |
| CST     | 10 MSEK           | 1.11.07 – 31.12.08 | 30.9.09 – 9 months period         |                                  |
| TRC     | 7 MSEK            | 1.12.07– 31.12.08  | 31.7.09 – 7 months period         |                                  |

### Reporting

In the Sida-UNDP agreement (App 2 Article 11) two kinds of reporting is set up: Program/Project reports and Trust Fund reports – the latter not covered by this evaluation. The Program/Project reporting shall include

- a. Annual work plans
- b. Substantive reports: 1. Yearly reports on results and 2. A final narrative project report within 6 months of project completion
- c. Financial reports: 1. Annual financial statements within 6 months and 2. A final financial report within 6 months of project completion

#### *Annual work plans*

As has been pointed out earlier, work plans with expected outputs have not been produced, which have created difficulties for external parties to review the progress of the projects against plans.

#### *Substantive reports*

Yearly: The substantive reports have been produced periodically with a better frequency than agreed, but not yearly. The DDRR has prepared a common annual report for all donor funds. The progress of CBRP, GC and CST is described in a common narrative report “Sida – UNDP cooperation in Liberia” including a summary of expenditures per project. In addition UNDP has prepared 4 “Brief Update of Sida contribution to UNDP” reports from October 2005 to November 2006, containing a table with activities implemented and results obtained as well as funds spent. The consultant has not seen any Brief Update report for 2007. These reports have covered DDRR, CBRP, GC and CST. The TRC contribution started 2007, it has not yet produced any report to Sida.

**Table 7 Kind of existing Reports with reporting periods for the different projects**

| Project | DDRR Trust Fund Activity Draft Report                    | "Sida – UNDP cooperation in Liberia"                | "Brief Update of Sida contribution to UNDP"         |
|---------|----------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| DDRR    | Volume IV<br>Jan–Dec 2006<br>Joint report for all donors |                                                     | October 2005, January 2006, May 2006, November 2006 |
| CBRP    |                                                          | Sept 2005, Oct 2006, March 2007, Sept 2007 May 2008 | October 2005, January 2006, May 2006, November 2006 |
| GC      |                                                          | Oct 2006, March 2007, Sept 2007, May 2008           | October 2005, January 2006, May 2006, November 2006 |
| CST     |                                                          | Oct 2006, Sept 2007 May 2008                        | November 2006                                       |
| TRC     |                                                          |                                                     |                                                     |

There are also shortcomings with these reports as the activities implemented mostly are described in a cumulative way not related to a specific period. Therefore it is difficult to assess the quality of implementation. Nothing is mentioned of problems encountered and how/if they have been tackled.

Final: No final report within 6 months from the end of the projects has been produced. The DDRR is finished, and the annual report for 2006 may be considered as a final report. The two GC supports have also ended, but for such a small project the last report, describing the accumulated activities and funds spent may possibly be considered a final report. If the meaning of the Sida-UNDP agreement is that an official final report should be delivered after the end of each project agreement (there are 12 of those), then the lack of final reports is severe.

### *Financial Reports*

Annual/Final: The project financial reports have been delivered but not in the format required. They have been included in the two kinds of reports mentioned above. No reports have been certified and signed by the UNDP comptroller. The periodical Brief Update reports only mention the Sida contribution and accumulated funds spent. No outgoing balance from one period is shown, which is used as incoming balance in the next report. Once all funds have been spent, there is a summarised expenditure report specifying how the funds have been used.

However, the evaluation shows evidence (see under each project) that the funds have mostly been spent for the intended purpose – with the exception of CBRP, where Income Generation Activities IGA has not started.

### *Conclusion*

UNDP has deviated from the reporting procedures specified in the agreement.. It is unclear if this has been caused by misunderstanding of the personnel concerned or by simple negligence. The consultant has not been informed as to what extent Sida personnel in charge has followed up on deviations from reporting procedures, as they have occurred.

### **Project Execution**

The 5 projects differ in procedures and execution modalities. Some projects like GC, TRC have received smaller amount for specific activities often within a co-funding arrangement with other donor contributions. DDRR has received basket funding in a separate Trust Fund, where the Swedish funds contribute to a big common programme of over 60 MUSD. The CST and the CBRP projects are based on documents with certain specified objectives and with a multi year budget, but the projects have started with the first Sida contribution even if under-funded. Some funds are used for activities which were not planned and some activities have not been funded at all (CBRP was planned for 2004–2005 for a certain budget and with specific project objectives but has in reality only implemented

certain activities like DDC training and social infrastructure projects, and expanded them in more counties over several years). This flexible management and change of priorities make a traditional assessment and evaluation difficult. Nevertheless in a post-conflict situation and during a recovery phase where the realities change constantly, flexibility is necessary to a certain extent.

Project documents have been prepared, but objectives have changed, especially for the CBRP, which has not been reflected in a revision of the project. The CBRP project document includes project objectives and outcomes and quantitative targets but exists in several versions over time, which is very confusing. The well intended quantitative targets to measure progress are not broken down in annual sub-targets. The project activities started without full funding, which makes it impossible to realistically compare performance and achievements with objectives and expected outputs.

The smaller projects (GC, TRC) are implemented over a short period and no annual work plans should normally be needed. However for bigger projects like CBRP and CST, where activities are implemented over more than one year, annual work plans and budgets are needed for proper follow up of performance and achievement.

### Efficiency of expenditure

The rate of disbursement/expenditure of the Sida funds for all the 5 projects and 12 agreements is 74%, which is considered satisfactory, especially in a post-conflict environment. According to UNDP financial expenditure data the total amount spent until 31.12.07 is 106,5 MSEK compared to total Sida – UNDP agreements of 144 MSEK, including the first support to DDRR of 4 MSEK in 2003. Data for each project is shown in the table 7 below.

**Table 8 Project wise rate of expenditure**

| Project      | Sida contribution<br>MSEK | Expenditures<br>31.12.07 MSEK | Percentage | Comments                            |
|--------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|------------|-------------------------------------|
| DDRR         | 39                        | 39                            | 100        |                                     |
| CBRP         | 71                        | 53,7                          | 75,6       | All planned to be spent in 2008     |
| GC           | 7                         | 7                             | 100        |                                     |
| CST          | 20                        | 6,8                           | 34         | All planned to be spent during 2008 |
| TRC          | 7                         | 0                             | 0          | All planned to be spent during 2008 |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>144</b>                | <b>106,5</b>                  | <b>7</b>   |                                     |

The 3 agreements for DDRR and the 2 agreements for GC have been fully completed and TRC is ongoing. Of the remaining projects the balances for CBRP and CST are expected to be spent during 2008.

*b) Is the institutional capacity and resources of UNDP in Liberia sufficient to achieve the goals set out?*

Short answer: UNDP staff resources appear to be adequate to achieve the management of the Sida-funded projects. See further details under each project.

The overall role of UNDP in the Sida-UNDP agreement is to ensure an effective management of Sida resources for the respective project so the resources are used for the purpose agreed.

### Organisation, management and coordination

It should be remembered that the UNDP is the only donor agency with implementation and procurement capacity, a separate department for DEX direct execution, which is used for CBRP, DDRR and CST. The GC and TRC are government executing agencies, receiving advances and reports regularly how the funds are used according to project proposals, followed by request for a new advance.

The UNDP project managers follow up in a reasonably good way that the projects reporting procedures for external executing bodies as GC and TRC are respected. The UNDP project managers/coordinators for the directly executed DDRR, CBRP and CST projects are well managed and various progress reports are drafted. The problem is the reporting to Sida.. The activities have been implemented and the reports exist in different forms, though not in the format agreed with Sida. The Consultant believes that UNDP has the capacity to provide these reports for Sida, but the changing environment and ad hoc planning especially for the CBRP and the CST projects make it necessary with a high degree of flexibility. In any case Sida should be better informed of important changes and decisions in advance. A permanent Sida presence in Liberia would also facilitate a closer dialogue and follow up of the implementation progress.

The staff knowledge and experience is rather focused on operations management and less on strategic planning, monitoring and reporting of results. This has led to lack of adequate planning documents, annual work plans, less attention to progress and financial reporting according to agreed format.

Some critical remarks from donors as the WB on the UNDP financial management have been followed up. The WB has used UNDP for some of its project implementation. Interview with WB staff concerned confirmed the opinions that financial reports are often slow and sometimes not correct, which gives reason to doubt the UNDP capability (sufficient staff and knowledge).

Recognising strategic and management weaknesses, UNDP has recently addressed these problems. A functional review has been undertaken by the new Country Director with the view to streamline the use of the human resources to better re-align with the new Country programme. The new organization from 2008 will be more efficient and result-driven. One special assistant will work with all special donor co-funded contracts and Trust Funds.

### 5.3 Efficiency

#### *a) Is the costs of the interventions justified by the results?*

The CBRP has a high administrative cost (delivery cost) for planning and monitoring (35% of the total expenditures compared to budgeted 10%) compared to other similar projects. The other 4 projects have reasonable costs.

The cost of the intervention as a whole is reasonable in the Liberian context, and is justified by the results as described under each project. But the CBRP cost for administration is out of proportion.

#### *b) Was the intervention economically worthwhile, (cost-effectiveness) given possible alternative uses of the available resources?*

*The intervention as a whole has been worthwhile. In the period covered, there have not been realistic alternatives for Swedish support to the Liberian recovery process other than a cooperation with UNDP.*

The Consultant found that all projects evaluated have been relevant in the present recovery situation in Liberia. They address support to reintegration and rehabilitation at community level for returnees and they assist the newly elected government to regain its authority at county level as part of a decentralisation process both for Line Ministries and the first attempts to a trustworthy local government able to show results and be accountable before the local population. At national level support to the necessary efforts to change the mentality and role of the public sector to become more service oriented and promote good governance and introduce anti-corruption measures are equally important to ensure peace stability and inclusive development reducing poverty. The Mission believes that there are no obvious and better alternative use of the funds, which would offer a higher impact on the beneficiaries (returnees) in this early recovery and transitional phase. A good donor harmonisation has been ensured

on priority actions even if the coordination during implementation in the field could have been better, especially at community level between the LCIP/USAID, CRC/EC, LACE/WB and CBRP/UNDP. Different procedures and sometimes working in the same areas with the same thing may have reduced the efficiency. However the coordination and exchange of information between all UN agencies and other interested donors under the leadership/ownership of the government at county level has been very successful and reduced the delivery costs and increased the results of the interventions.

c) *Has the evaluated intervention been managed with reasonable regard for efficiency? What measures have been taken during planning and implementation to ensure that resources are efficiently used?*

*The UNDP project managers and project field staff have managed the intervention with a satisfactory efficiency. See more details about UNDP capacity and assessment of UNDP performance under each project.*

The delays and sometimes low quality in the implementation noticed for the DDDR and CBRP can be explained by the relatively low capacity and experience of the national NGOs as implementing agencies. Other donors however also face the same problems of slow implementation at field level. This is not surprising in a country coming from a long civil war with a whole generation without normal education and qualified development work and many of the intellectual elite living as refugees in the Diaspora. For the CST and CBRP changes of priorities and adhoc planning have been necessary to adapt to the changing needs. This implementation reality should not be interpreted as inefficient management. However necessary planning documents should have been prepared.

There are measures taken to ensure efficient use of resources. UNDP has introduced an improved coordination between CST, CBRP and GC projects, which will ensure more efficient use of the resources. The centrally placed Project Appraisal Committee takes decision on CBRP project proposals coming from the communities, and the DDCs. The project field staff is responsible for monitoring the NGOs involved in the construction work for efficient implementation. The DDCs have been trained to take decision on priority projects and also play a role to supervise the construction. However additional training and improved motivation is necessary to achieve a more efficient implementation.

d) *Which best practices can be drawn? Positive examples.*

*The use of the District Development Committee as entry point for community participation by CBRP has been successful. The DDC will have an official status in the coming Decentralisation policy. The most important is to ensure that the returnees, marginalized groups (youth, women, XCs, disabled) are really involved in the decision making process.*

*Community driven development approach in CBRP is very important and increases the participation among beneficiaries taking ownership of the projects, even if it may often create delays in the implementation. However, a more democratic participation in the DDCs to ensure an inclusive development, aiming at avoiding the elite capturing the project resources, is more important than a fast implementation of social infrastructure to show good physical results to donors.*

e) *What can be improved?*

*Administrative and financial issues.*

The UNDP adherence to the reporting system in the Sida-UNDP agreements and more emphasis on result based reports against objectives and targets in the project documents. More attention must be drawn to the agreement periods and the project implementation before the time limits. If delays arrive, formal requests must be addressed by UNDP to Sida for amendment of the agreement.

### *Project related improvements*

In order to increase efficiency in the decision making process of the CBRD community projects, decisions can be decentralised to county level. The CBRD should in the future work more directly with income generation and employment promotion through support to micro enterprises (management, book keeping, skills training, credits) in the private sector. Also the administration cost must be diminished.

In the future there is a need to *harmonize procedures for the various local development funds*; the government County development Fund, the LDLD Local development Fund and the CBRD funding through decisions by the DDCs, EC/CRC funding in 3 counties, the LACE funding of community based social infrastructure. Employment is recognized as a big problem by the government related to poverty reduction and must receive a higher priority from the donor community. If the employment situation is not improved there are risks that a long lasting peace and stability will be threatened.

## **5.4 Other Donor Experience from Working with UNDP**

### **World Bank**

It is worth remembering that UNDP is the only donor with procurement capacity in a difficult environment. The WB is using UNDP procurement and financial management services to execute all their projects<sup>5</sup>. Special Project Implementation Units have been set up within key ministries, for example in the MPW for road rehabilitation.

The WB has been satisfied with the services in the beginning but recently become more critical about UNDP management capacity in Liberia. Late progress reports and inadequate financial reporting have been more frequent. UNDP staff seem to be overworked or lacking competence.

The WB supported Liberia Agency for Community Empowerment LACE implements directly the LCEP community development project. LACE has positive experience of working with the UNDP managed projects CST and CBRP at field level. The LCEP approach addresses larger social infrastructure projects identified by communities with the support of local facilitators at community level and implemented by national contractors. The CBRP on the other hand supports smaller projects decided by the DDCs at district level. LACE believes that both strategies are needed and are complementary. In many places LACE is also cooperating with DDCs which are revitalized by the CBRP support.

In 2006 a workshop on experience of Community development was organized jointly by UNDP and WB with presentation of LACE/LCEP and UNDP/CBRP projects together with the USAID/LCIP and EC/LCD projects. This workshop was a success with mutual learning from experiences.

### **European Commission**

The EC is funding a community development project called Community Infrastructure Component CRC within a larger programme working in the 3 counties Nimba, Bong and Lofa. The CBRP and CST projects are also active in the same counties. CBRP established the DDCs in 2006 at the same time as CRC approached the same structure. The experience of the DDCs is that although the members have received training, capacity building and one motorbike, no support was given to the operation and maintenance and no compensation for their work. Therefore their motivation to do a good work is limited. CRC has paid them to do supervision work during implementation of construction work through national and local contractors. In the end CRC cooperated directly with the District Commissioner in project identification, after which he consulted with the DDCs and communities.

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<sup>5</sup> The LCEP is executed separately by the LACE, a WB supported Liberian autonomous government agency

There has been no direct cooperation between CRC and the CBRP, like meetings workshops etc. The EC international consultant has produced one comparative report of the CRC and CBRP. CRC county facilitator staff attends the county coordination meetings which CST is organizing. The experience of this vast coordination between all UN agencies and other projects active in the county is very positive. CRC has also supported capacity building of county project planners, superintendents (development) etc, and also a study visit to Uganda to learn from its decentralisation process. The CRC has cooperated well with the CST in Bong Lofa and Nimba by funding the district and country consultations leading up to the County Development Agendas and the PRS.

## **DFID**

DFID has no direct experience of cooperation with UNDP.

British DFID works in 4 different areas: security sector reform, governance, health and water & sanitation. In addition it has offered support through the international NGO IRC in community development in Lofa County from the security sector support. DFID would appreciate to participate in the Working group on Community and local development, where UNDP could take the lead together with the Ministry of the Interior. In the Governance sector DFID is involved in civil service reforms, anti-corruption strategy with direct support. In the Legal sector DFID would be interested in future cooperation with Sida.

## **5.5 Alternatives to Trust Fund**

*Does UNDP provide alternative forms of cooperation than through the trust fund? If so, are these considered cost-effective and relevant?*

According to Sida reports, Sida will need to consider different modalities to support the Liberian government. Parallel to that, Sida will continue to encourage UN initiatives such as Multi Donor Trust Funds (MDTF), organised under the Resident Coordinators office and used for everything within the areas of recovery linked to the PRS. One major objective for Swedish support to Liberia today is to facilitate the bridging between the humanitarian aid, transitional and development support.

There are alternatives to Trust Fund contributions. One alternative represents the UNDP Joint funding of programmes with direct transfer of funds to the project, offering a lower 5% administrative cost. This new strategic multi-donor fund, managed by the UN Resident Coordinator, will build UN coherence and donors will have a single entry point. The Liberia joint programme have 5 different themes:

- food security with 5 UN agencies,
- gender/based violence,
- HIV/AIDS,
- youth employment,
- rule of law.

In addition to this Strategic Fund Sida can also contribute with experts in the fields of gender and peace building.

Another alternative in the future would be co-funding of programmes or a whole sector with other donors. For example the LDLD Decentralisation support is presently co-funded by UNDP, UNCDF and EC and executed by UNDP. Additional funding to regional and local investment Fund is easy to add by a separate agreement.

## 6. Conclusions and Recommendations

### 6.1 General

All the 5 Sida supported projects managed by UNDP have shown a *satisfactory performance*. But the CBRP is *delayed* and has *not worked* with the *income and employment creation* activities, and also has high administration costs (35% against projected 10%). The DDRR has been able to cover 62000 ex-combatants which represents 80% of the RR component, even though some training has not been up to standard and the training not linked to employment promotion. Thanks to an additional Norwegian support it will be completed in 2008 for the remaining 20% of the XCs, which have not received their training and allowances. The support to GC has been successfully completed but further assistance to continue its highly important work is needed. The CST has played an important role to coordinate all UN interventions at county level and support the local government re-establishment and capacity building but the latter activities could normally be continued through the new LDLD programme and therefore the CST could concentrate on information management related to monitoring of the PRS and be phased out after 2009. The TRC has started its work in 2008 and has produced its first quarterly progress and financial report. It is progressing as planned. It will conclude its work this year but may need a minor additional support.

Concerning the UNDP administrative and financial management of the Sida funds according to the agreements signed for the different projects, there are 3 cases (CBRP, GC, CST) where the time limit for the use of Sida funds has not been respected. This total overdue spending of 874 000 USD equivalent to 6,1 MSEK represent less than 4,4 % of the total Sida disbursements of 140 MSEK.

The consultant has concluded that the *reporting* procedure in the Sida-UNDP agreement *has not been followed*. However, the evaluation shows evidence (see under each project) that the funds have been spent for the intended purpose.

The rate of disbursement of the Sida funds for all the 5 projects and 12 agreements is 75,6%, which must be considered satisfactory. The total amount spent until 31.12.07 amounts to 106,5 MSEK compared to Sida disbursement of 144 MSEK, including the first support to DDRR of 4 MSEK.

### 6.2 Recommendations

It is *recommended* that Sida insists that the UNDP-Monrovia follows the agreed reporting period for each individual project, both progress and financial reports, where the implemented activities should be compared with the planned expected results/outputs stated in advance. Deviations should be explained explicitly. UNDP should also provide an annual work plan and budget for each project, annual financial statement certified by UNDP comptroller for the expenditures of each project. This is especially necessary for bigger projects.

One agreement for each of the CBRP, GC and CST projects have used Sida funds after the stipulated final date. It is recommended that Sida addresses a formal note to UNDP asking for an explanation why no requests have been sent to Sida demanding an extension of the time limits for use of Sida funds.

It is *recommended* that Sida for bigger projects like CBRP make multi-annual agreements and requires annual work plans and budget break downs to be prepared for Sida approval. This would facilitate follow up of project performance.

It is *recommended* that Sida in the future considers alternatives to Trust Fund contributions:

- Joint funding of programmes with direct transfer of funds to the project, which offers lower 5% administrative costs. Several of the 5 themes (food security, gender-based violence, HIV/AIDS, youth employment, rule of law) fall within the Sida future priorities (private sector, employment in agricultural sector, human rights, good governance).
- Co-funding programmes or a whole sector with other donors. For example the LDLD Decentralisation support is presently co-funded by UNDP, UNCDF and EC, executed by UNDP. Additional funding to regional and local investment Fund is easy to add by a separate agreement. Another example is the WB funding of road infrastructure, including maintenance together with EC and others.

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