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Sida Review

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Sida Evaluation of the Foundation Propaz, Guatemala

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List of Abbreviations

ADP	Asociación de Amigos del Desarrollo y la Paz
APNC	Academia de la Policía Nacional Civil
CAS	Consejo Asesor de Seguridad
CNAP	Consejo Nacional para el Cumplimiento de los Acuerdos de Paz
COCODE	Consejo Comunitario de Desarrollo (Community Development Council)
COMUDE	Consejo Municipal de Desarrollo (Municipal Development Council)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DED	German Development Service
GTZ	German Technical Cooperation
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODHAG	Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala
OEA	Organisation of American States
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PB&CM	Peacebuilding and Conflict Management
PCM	Project Cycle Management
PCON	Programa de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz y Conciliación Nacional
QTZ	Quetzales
REDAC	Red Departamental de Atención a Conflictos
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SIPMES	Sistema Integral de Planificación, Monitoreo, Evaluación y Sistematización
SMEP	Small and Medium Enterprises
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USD	US-Dollar

Executive Summary

Synopsis of the Evaluation Purpose and Methodology

The purpose of the evaluation was threefold. First, it is to assess in a systematic, transparent and objective way to which extent the Foundation Propaz has achieved the objectives set out in the 2005–2008 Strategic Plan and contributes to

- reduce manifest tensions and prevent violent conflict and
- building lasting and sustainable peace in Guatemala.

Second, the evaluation team should elaborate concrete recommendations to Propaz to enhancing the achievements of results and effectiveness for conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Finally, the evaluation should serve as an input for Sida's upcoming discussion on whether to continue its financial support to Propaz or whether to phase out the funding.

The evaluation team applied the following tools during the assessment:

- Document review;
- Conflict analysis;
- Interviews with key stakeholders in Guatemala;
- A SWOT-workshop with Propaz;
- Workshops with beneficiaries and target groups.

The whole assessment was undertaken with a high sense of transparency, confidence and cooperation. Despite the good collaboration with all actors involved in the process, the team always regarded its impartiality as a guiding principle for the evaluation. The assessment was undertaken between October and November 2008 with a subsequent reporting phase. The final report was delivered to Sida in January 2009.

Main Evaluation Findings

Relevance

Foundation Propaz's interventions are relevant in the field of conflict resolution and mitigation.

In Alta Verapaz, the training course ("Diplomado") for facilitators to manage agrarian conflicts and conflicts related to land were adapted to the situation in the province and has been appraised as highly positive by the target group members. In Cahabón, the capacity building process for community facilitators was in the process of termination when the team visited the location. Participants of the workshop have stated their improved ability to manage family and community conflicts and to reduce conflictivity related to interfamilial violence and the abuse of alcohol. As these conflicts have been identified as significant for the communities, the intervention can be evaluated as relevant for reducing violence on a micro-level.

The activities of Propaz reflect the theoretical framework of the organisation, as stated in the Strategic Plan 2005–2008 that focuses on a long-term approach and the inclusion of all sectors of society to strengthen capacities for conflict transformation and peacebuilding to for a dynamic and peaceful social change.

When looking at the Foundation's practical conversion of the analytical framework, we identified nevertheless a gap between theory and practice. A key driving factor of conflict in Guatemala is the absence of structures and institutions for public mediation, as most of the relevant conflict potentials appear on the macro level. Propaz argues that a focus on the meso-level will have the most effective impact, but we have some doubts that the trickling effects to the micro- and macro-level are really achieved. We see the need for the organisation to establish clear exit strategies to its programmes and activities, which shall include a phasing out period and a follow-up phase. The follow-up phase can be used to assess the outcome of the projects and – if necessary – further capacity building elements.

Effectiveness

Propaz has highly professional and experienced personnel and most staff members have worked in the sector of peacebuilding and conflict management for several years. The didactical material produced by the Foundation is of high quality and adapted to the needs of the target groups. Some of the materials have been translated into the local language and are being used by the beneficiaries in implementing their own activities. REDAC and the Association Jun k'olal in Huehuetanango have applied the design for the early warning system into their own approach and elaborated ways of closer collaboration with each other.

The team has identified a well developed capacity to draw up lessons learnt from activities. The intervention design (planning phase) contains a chapter that particularly deals with critical factors for the implementation and how to respond to these (*"Respuestas a los factores impulsores/opositores"*). However, we saw a certain lack of transmitting the experiences into organisational knowledge. The interchange amongst the working areas in Propaz has much potential for improvement, as the formal structures for organisational knowledge management are not yet functioning. Regular M&E meetings are taking place, nonetheless the SIPMES consists of too many bureaucratic steps to guarantee a controlled implementing and monitoring process.

Impact

The most visible impact of the activities of Propaz the team could identify was related to the personal and community level. Nearly all approached beneficiaries reported a change in their attitudes, behaviour and perceptions related to conflict situations and gave examples for successful conflict resolution in their communities as a result of the capacity building they have received from Propaz.

The impact of the sensitization and communication area (*Area de Sensibilización Ciudadana*) is quite difficult to measure, as we talk about activities to generate awareness and understanding as well as to provide spaces for reflection.

The contribution to the public discussion was most visible where Propaz has produced issue-related outputs, as for example the “Testimonies for Peace”, which have contributed to the public discussion on the implementation of the Peace Agreements.

Most of the positive outcomes can be traced to an individual or group level. A sufficient long lasting impact on community level to guarantee the sustainability of the structures can not yet be verified.

The team concludes that Propaz achieves its main impact in conflict situations between equally strong (or weak) parties; the limit of impact is to be seen in conflicts between unequal parties or stakeholders. Propaz is recognized as a reliable actor and impartial stakeholder for management and resolution of conflicts, not only at personal or community level. Although Propaz is undertaking its activities with a high grade of sensitivity for the local conflict and cultural context, this is done in an informal way. Propaz is aware of possible unintended consequences of its interventions, but the different concepts of conflict-sensitivity (Do-No-Harm – DNH, Peace and Conflict Assessment – PCA) are not formally integrated, neither in the theoretical fundament nor in the concrete implementation of activities.

Sustainability

Technical sustainability was assessed in the interviews with direct beneficiaries and in the two workshops in Cobán and Cahabón. Sustainability was visible for the *Café Ciudadanos* in Cobán, where a group of young leaders has continued these activities, thus providing a platform for discussing of local topics of interest amongst students and local leaders. The activities in Huehuetenango have created a dynamic that is being supported by the two key actors REDAC and Association *Jun k'olal*.

The main problem for continued activities in future was the lack of resources, as reported by both organisations. In Huehuetenango, actors have clearly taken over the ownership on the activities. For Cahabón, it is still too early to make a similar statement, as the capacity building activities had just been terminated when the evaluation team arrived.

The team identified the lack of financial sustainability as the most serious issue in the assessment. Despite several recommendations to the Foundation by a former evaluation¹ as well as the main donors Norway and Sweden, Propaz has not diversified its financial portfolio. The team hereby would underline the necessity for Propaz for urgent action and the immediate establishment of a fundraising strategy that allows the Foundation to continue its activities on a mid- to long-term commitment.

¹ See: Joint Review of Co-operation between NORAD/the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Guatemala, the PROPAZ Foundation, by Scanteam, Oslo, February 2005. Minutes of the meeting at the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Guatemala between Foundation Propaz, the Royal Norwegian Embassy and Sida, 19.05.2008.

Efficiency

Propaz was generally identified as a reliable and credible organisation that uses its funds in a responsible manner. Propaz is undertaking various efforts to professionalize its management and internal communication. Propaz has recently hired a consultant to improve monitoring capacities, which allows the Foundation to analyse its activities by disaggregating data on geographical impact and beneficiary reach.

The organisation has a lean management structure due to its size. Nonetheless, the team identified a need for more participatory decision-making processes and a more horizontal management with a higher level of participation and information flow amongst the different administrative levels. The team recommends to Propaz to undertake a strategic budget design for 2009 with a financial allocation that reflects the strategic priorities of the organisation and responds to the need for immediate action in the fields of public relations, fundraising and market/needs analysis.

Coverage

The sectoral coverage of Propaz has been relatively broad, which on the one hand has enabled the organisation to reach a large number of beneficiaries also under difficult conditions. On the other hand, this has led to the lack of a clear institutional profile, even more as the Foundation continued to use an approach that did not necessarily connect the working areas practically with each other. The identification of strategic intervention sectors is necessary to prepare Propaz for a more competitive environment, as donor funding in Guatemala is being reduced and international development actors begin to prioritize other countries for their support.

The geographical coverage of Propaz outside the capital Guatemala-City is mainly focused on two other areas in Guatemala: Alta Verapaz (Cobán and Cahabón) and Huehuetenango (San Mateo). The team found a certain lack of consistency and justification for the intervention in Alta Verapaz. There is without doubt a necessity to work on land conflicts and the reduction of violence in the municipality, but there is no clear justification why this region has been chosen over other areas in Guatemala with a similar level of violence and comparable conflict characteristics.

Coherence/Coordination/Linkages

Informal network structures can be found in Guatemala-City, as most of the important actors of the civil society – working on conflict management or peacebuilding – are active here. Propaz has made use of strategic connections to facilitate the access to target groups, as we could verify in the case of Cobán, where a close collaboration with the local NGO ADP has taken place. As a result, contacts to local government officials were made to grant acceptance of the intervention in Alta Verapaz, which has proved to be a prerequisite to start activities on the Conflict Management System (*Sistema de Gestión de la Conflictividad*). We see further potential for the organisation to identify strategic partners. Mainly at local level, alliances should be formed to coordinate with existing initiatives, additionally to avoid double efforts of local and national organisations. First steps are taken by Propaz to establish closer relations to the media, mainly at local level. Propaz has cooperated with the local radio station in Cahabón to disseminate information on their workshops and activities. The Foundation plans to make more use of this approach with additional programs for public discussion of topics, such as peacebuilding and conflict management.

Cultural/Gender Sensitivity

Propaz has implemented only a few specific activities on gender itself, much more identifying the gender aspect as a crosscutting issue to promote gender equality as one element of their activities. At the organisational level, there is a clear under-representation of women in the decision-making structures. All area coordinators are male staff members. The number of female participants differs from activity and local context. We identified the highest participation of women (about 50%) in the urban context of Cobán with the target group of young students. Less female representation was identified in the work with community members in Cahabón, where the participation rate of women was only about 20%. Indigenous actors are recognized as target group and supported in their autonomous approaches to work on community conflicts, as we could prove in the case of the cooperation with actors from the association *Jun k'olal* (United for Peace) in San Mateo Ixtatán. The analysis and investigation of traditional structures of conflict management is not yet established. There is active interaction with the indigenous beneficiaries. However, in regards to the number of indigenous organisations that are active in Alta Verapaz, Propaz has only reached a limited interaction with these actors.

Lessons Learnt

Sida and the Norwegian MFA have provided core funding over several years to the Foundation Propaz. This has strengthened the autonomy and independence of the Foundation. Mainly in the last phase of the support to Propaz, the Foundation has not responded to the requests of the donor organisation. Core funding at that stage seemed to have counterproductive effects. We believe that a balanced mixture between core funding and project related funding at this stage would have helped either Propaz or the donor agencies to implement their objectives in a more efficient way.

Propaz has experienced various challenges to transforming the Foundation into an independent institution. Thus, we consider technical support as part of a change management in almost the same manner as important as the provision of financial support to keep the institution and its activities going.

Although Sida has provided substantial long-term support to Propaz, there is little visibility of the donor organisation in the activities of Propaz. Visibility can be an important element to strengthen interventions of Propaz in critical conflict environments. Sida and Propaz can gain mutual benefits from the implementation of a joint visibility strategy.

Changes in the environment (external factors, donor priorities, political dynamics) require a timely management response. In the case of Propaz, many efforts have been undertaken to modify the design of core areas (SIPMES, organisational manual). However, the implementation of procedures was not fully achieved. A balanced approach to manage project implementation and organisational development at the same time is therefore essential for the progress of the institution.

Working on conflict in Guatemala is a difficult and sometimes even dangerous task. External factors can fundamentally limit the margin of action and have an influence on the performance of the organisation and the outcome and impact of its activities.

Recommendations

Based on our findings and conclusions, the team gives the following recommendations to the Foundation Propaz and the Swedish cooperation:

Either Propaz as well as Sida need to discuss in how far the gender aspect can be strengthened on a programmatic and activities level. As violence against girls and women is a major conflict issue in Guatemala, the topic needs more strategic attention.

Visibility can support either the security for Propaz as the perception of Sida as an important donor in Guatemala. In case of a continued cooperation between Sida and Propaz, the team recommends to develop a joint visibility strategy.

Recommendations to Propaz

Propaz immediately needs to begin to draw up a fundraising strategy with a realistic timeframe for implementation to acquiring new donor funds until the end of 2009. This strategy could be drawn up with the help of external consultants, but needs to produce results already in the second half of 2009.

Closely related to the question of fundraising is the external recognition of Propaz. The team recommends the design and establishment of a professional public relations strategy that will enable the organisation to present itself to possible donors and strategic partners.

The team recommends to Propaz to undertake a strategic budget design for 2009 with a financial allocation that reflects the strategic priorities of the organisation and responds to the need for immediate action in the fields of public relations, fundraising and market/needs analysis.

We recommend the reduction of Propaz' activities to two main areas: capacity building and conflict transformation, whereas in the latter Propaz should substantially engage in macro level conflicts to tackle effectively the root causes of conflict.

The evaluation team recommends to Propaz to widen and eventually focus its range of activities to the macro level (*nivel cupular*), which would enable the organisation to impact on the structural level and the root causes of conflict more effectively.

To make the SIPMES M&E system working, we recommend to revising the current approach and the herein defined procedures. We further recommend to undertake an assessment of the available time resources of the staff members to reduce the SIPMES to a realistic size, which will make the implementation and the success of the system attainable.

Conflict sensitivity needs to be regarded as integral part of all activities and project designs of Propaz. As the organisation will continue to work in conflict settings, we recommend to analyse the possible unintended consequences and of interventions to reduce the risk of negative effects on the conflict context.

We recommend to identifying further activities and decisions about geographical coverage on a catalogue of criteria that can be based on indicators like accessibility, needs for support, level of conflictivity (disaggregated by specific conflict issues) and actors already active in the location or region based on updated strategic conflict analysis.

As Propaz actively includes indigenous beneficiaries into its activities, we recommend to undertake more in-depth investigation on traditional methods of conflict mitigation and to culturally adapt Propaz' interventions to the local context.

Closer cooperation with other actors in the field of conflict management and public mediation is needed, as conflicts on a macro-level need coordinated activities, synergy and joint strategies of the relevant institutions and organisations in the country. Collaboration with state institutions is necessary, as the macro-level conflict potentials can only be tackled with the involvement of the national government.

In the cooperation with REDAC and the Association *Jun k'olal*, we recommend to Propaz and the respective organisations to find a balanced way of interaction that preserves the independence of the indigenous Association. Propaz should be aware of a possible risk of a too strong dominance of REDAC in its relation to the indigenous association.

Recommendations to Sida

Sida should continue its support to Propaz while applying certain – and jointly agreed – conditions. As already discussed during the evaluation, this can include an initial 6-month period of funding by Sida with the option of further support if the agreed measures are implemented.

We identify Propaz as an important counterpart for Sida now and in the future, we recommend a discussion between the two institutions on strategic sectors of interest and possible areas for support. Both partners have a long-standing history of cooperation and partnership that is based on trust and confidence. This constitutes a unique fundament for further cooperation if mutual interests can be identified.

Sida should take into account the strengthening of local initiatives for conflict management and public mediation. The creation of an NGO Grants Fund can help to keep organisations with a close connection to the population at place and strengthen the civil society's capacity to act as a watchdog and for advocacy. Apart from this, Sida has a very good reputation as donor organisation; channelling funds only through multinational agencies will decrease the appearance and the visibility of Sida as international actor for peace and development in Guatemala.

1. Introduction

1.1 Background and Overall Purpose of the Evaluation

Since the signature of the Peace Accords in Guatemala in 1996, Sida and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have continuously supported the Foundation Propaz. Formerly created by OAS for the promotion of reconciliation, peacebuilding, conflict management and dialogue, the Foundation Propaz has since 2003 been an independent national foundation.

The four areas of work of Propaz are: (i) communication and awareness-raising; (ii) education and capacity-building; (iii) facilitation and; (iv) institutional strengthening. Propaz' work on the promotion of dialogue and peaceful resolution of conflict between and within different sectors and groups in Guatemalan society has been considered by Sida and the MFA to be highly relevant for the consolidation of peace and democratic development in the country. The lack of an institutionalized and impartial public space for dialogue between different actors of the Guatemalan society has made this work even more relevant.

The purpose of the evaluation was threefold. First, to assess in a systematic, transparent and objective way the extent to which the Foundation Propaz has achieved the objectives set out in the 2005–2008 Strategic Plan and contributes to

- reduce manifest tensions and prevent violent conflict and
- building lasting and sustainable peace in Guatemala.

Second, the assessment should elaborate concrete recommendations to Propaz how it can enhance the achievement of results and be more effective in terms of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Finally, the evaluation should serve as an important input for Sida's upcoming discussion on whether to continue its financial support to Propaz or whether to phase out the funding. The evaluation team was asked to undertake an examination of the totality of activities undertaken by Propaz Foundation during 2005–2008 in the four working areas, with a specific focus on the impact upon preventing violent conflict and building peace.

The evaluation team would like to express its thanks to everyone who generously gave their time and assistance during the course of the evaluation, in particular Sida, the Norwegian Embassy and the Foundation Propaz. The findings and judgements expressed in the report are those of the evaluation team alone.

1.2 Evaluation Criteria and Key Questions

On a general level, the evaluation methodology reflects international best practice for evaluations, where the OECD/DAC and Sida evaluation criteria are reflected in the analytical approach. We like to emphasize on the participatory approach to the evaluation as outlined in Sida's evaluation manual *"Looking Back, Moving Forward"*. The team applied this by integrating Propaz right from the beginning into the evaluation process, thereby following the idea of partnership between the team and the organisation with mutual responsibilities and benefits. Propaz was informed and consulted about the course of the experts' work and the preliminary findings throughout the process. The approach also included the participation of Propaz' staff in the workshops with beneficiaries. A meeting with management and staff members of Propaz took place on the first day (27.10.08) of the research phase in Guatemala.

Propaz gave a first overview of its work, achievements and challenges. The evaluation team subsequently informed the participants on the methodology of the assessment, the evaluation tools and the different steps to be carried out in the course of the evaluation. The meeting closed with a joint discussion of open questions and the clarification of pending issues.

The key questions for the assessment focused on the issues of Relevance, Effectiveness, Impact, Sustainability, Efficiency, Coverage, Coherence/Coordination/Linkages and Cultural/Gender Sensitivity of Propaz' work and interventions.

Additional dimensions in the evaluation comprise competition and synergy as well as demand- and supply-driven services. The team drew up an evaluation matrix and proposed the use of specific evaluation tools. The evaluation looked at whether the activities funded were relevant with regard to the overall context and efficient on the background of the funding period. The team was aware of the importance of gender and cultural sensitivity as part of the evaluation and integrated these topics in the methodological approach of the assessment.

1.3 Evaluation Methodology

The team made use of *document review* approaches as well as on-site collection of information in two locations where Propaz is implementing activities. Document review was used to assess progress, results and intended outcomes of the programmes and projects. The team also looked at the financial statements, narrative programme reports to donors, the strategic documents, project proposals and activity reports. The team was granted access to documents from Propaz, Sida and the Royal Norwegian embassy in Guatemala.

The *conflict analysis* was elaborated during the field phase and served as basic document mainly for analyzing the relevance of Propaz' intervention and the relevance of the strategic objectives presented in the Propaz Strategic Plan for 2009–2012. Due to practical questions, the analysis was limited to an overall overview of recent conflict dynamics and causes in Guatemala. Regional or local conflict issues were only integrated where they seemed to be necessary for the understanding of the overall situation.

The team conducted *in-depth interviews* with the management and staff of Propaz to discuss key elements and dynamics of the organisation (internal key factors) and the environment (external key factors). The results of the interviews were used as an additional source of information. Furthermore, the interviews gave an insight into the work and structure of the organisation, its approach as well as staff tasks and capacities. The interview sessions also contributed to strengthen the confidence between evaluators and the organisation.

Semi-structured interviews with external key informants were based on a set of guiding questions. The use of guiding questions ensured that the interviews stayed focused on the main issues, but allowed interviewees to express and discuss matters they identify as relevant.² The team conducted these meetings as one-in-one personal interviews and group interviews (e.g. with personnel from the police). Stakeholders have been contacted on the national and local level to obtain information from donors, beneficiaries, end users and government representatives regarding relevance, quality and impact of the activities of Propaz. The team had to split up for some appointments to cover as many external resource persons as possible. In total, the team has interviewed more than 40 representatives in Guatemala-City and Alta Verapaz.

The team decided to conduct a *SWOT workshop with Propaz* for analysing the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of and to the organisation. The SWOT tool was considered relevant for strategic discussions and was linked to the task of elaborating recommendations for the future orientation

² The guiding questions are attached as Annex C to this report.

of the organisation. The SWOT was undertaken by separating the staff into two groups, each group then elaborated a single SWOT matrix, segregating different organisational levels. All staff members of Propaz' Guatemala office took part in the activity. The results were then jointly discussed in a plenary session together with all participants. The SWOT tool – apart from generating information for the evaluation team – was also used to provide a service to the organisations for future strategic discussions.

The team also conducted participatory *workshops with beneficiaries* of Propaz in selected communities. The methodology is based on the conflict mapping and outcome definition tool that has been designed by Channel Research and has been successfully applied in several evaluations. In a first step, the participants (target groups of Propaz) developed a conflict timeline, whereas in a second step the intervention of Propaz and its outcomes are tracked back to the conflict dynamics to determine the change that has been achieved. A third step consisted of a discussion with the target groups on the sustainability and in how far the beneficiaries had been strengthened to undertake activities on their own. Similarly, the issues of impact, gender and cultural sensitivity formed part of the discussions with the workshop participants. A total number of 50 participants formed part of the two workshops in Alta Verapaz.

The team was not in the position to visit all beneficiaries, target groups and geographic locations of Propaz' activities, we had to sample from two regions where Propaz is active, which were the capital region and the communities of Cobán and Cahábon in Alta Verapaz.

The team undertook the evaluation in *three phases*:

- A. The *inception phase* during which any outstanding aspects of the TOR were clarified. Relevant documentation was identified and provided to the team in this first stage by Sida and Propaz. The team produced an inception report to Sida, outlining in detail the approach and tools to be used in the evaluation
- B. The *research phase* during which the key data collection and analysis took place in Guatemala. A start-up meeting with Sida, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Propaz was held in the Swedish Embassy in Guatemala on 27.10.2008. Following the document review, the team prepared the tools for key informants. The implementation phase was of two weeks' duration and was finalized with a presentation of the tentative findings in a meeting with Sida, the Norwegian MFA and Propaz on 07.11.2008.
- C. A *report writing and presentation phase*. Following the research phase, the findings were synthesised and a single draft report was developed (this report). After receiving the comments on the first draft, the consultants will submit the final evaluation report to the commissioning organisation.

The whole *evaluation process* was undertaken with a high sense of transparency, confidence and cooperation. Propaz supported the team in preparing the visits in Alta Verapaz and has facilitated the contact to the target groups. There was a transparent and cooperative atmosphere between all actors involved in the process, which enabled the team to cooperate and discuss openly the findings and critical aspects of the assessment. The administrative support granted to the team was especially important to facilitate the contact to government officials in Guatemala. Despite the good collaboration with all actors involved in the process, the team always regarded its impartiality as a guiding principle for the evaluation.

The team would like to draw attention to some of the *limitations* of the assessment:

- Time constraints: The evaluation was relatively ambitious in terms of its TOR and the time available to the evaluation team. In particular, the time available for the investigation phase in Guatemala was limited to a period of two weeks, including the field visits in Alta Verapaz. The team could not visit remote communities, as this would have exceeded the timeframe for the evaluation. Thus, meetings and interviews with direct beneficiaries were held in the district capitals.

- The limited time affected in particular the SWOT workshop with Propaz. All sides expressed the need to discuss more in-depth the findings and opinions expressed by staff members and the management. We invite Propaz to use the results of the exercise as a starting point for an internal strategic discussion
- Although external stakeholder consultations were limited, the team could interview a number of representatives from nearly all relevant sectors. Some interviewees cancelled the appointments on short notice and we could not meet with members from the economic community.

Despite these constraints, it was possible to conduct the evaluation as planned and without further obstacles.

2. Description Foundation Propaz

In 1994, the Government of Guatemala asked the Organisation of American States (*OEA – Organización de los Estados Americanos*) to provide technical support for the design of a programme to strengthen capacities for peacebuilding and community conflict resolution. The OEA undertook an extensive consultative process to analyse the root causes of conflict. Between 1995 and 1996, the pilot project “Programme for the Prevention and Resolution of Community conflicts in Guatemala” was implemented with the financial support from the government of Guatemala and the governments of Canada and the United States. In June 1996, the OEA approved the creation of a special programme to consolidate democracy, peace, reconstruction and reconciliation in Guatemala. The programme was then renamed “Culture of Dialogue – Program for the Development of Resources for Peace-Building in Guatemala” (OEA/PROPAZ). In 1996, a letter of understanding was signed by the OAS and the governments of Guatemala, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, which enhanced the Program to provide technical support and training to State institutions and civil society institutions at a national level. On December 29, 1996, the Peace Agreements were signed and put an end to the 36-year civil war in Guatemala. The OEA/PROPAZ programme supported peacebuilding in Guatemala through the support for dialogue and conflict resolution, through trainings and workshops and through capacity building measures for communication, negotiation, conciliation and mediation skills. In 2003, Propaz became an independent foundation. Since September 1996, Sida has supported the Foundation Propaz. In 2005, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Sida signed a co-financing agreement to support the institution with an amount of 8 Mio NOK and 7,5 Mio SEK for the period December 2005 to November 2008. Propaz is working in four specific areas:

1. Sensitization and awareness raising
2. Education and capacity building
3. Facilitation
4. Institutional strengthening.

The Foundation works under four main institutional objectives:

1. Contributing to the participation of the public to a culture of peace and no-violence as well as strengthening dialogue as a fundamental principle of democracy;
2. Developing new skills, knowledge and capacities for dialogue, participation and conflict management;
3. Contributing to strengthening the public sphere for dialogue and negotiation for specific conflict situations;
4. Generating external and internal conditions to consolidate the Foundation Propaz to achieve a sustainable, independent and impartial institution.


At present, Propaz has two main geographical areas of intervention: San Mateo Ixtatán in Huehuetanango in the northwestern part of Guatemala and Alta Verapaz in the eastern part of the country. The number of staff members currently deployed at Propaz is 29, including two international experts from the German Development Service for the area for sensitization and the area for facilitation of the Foundation.

Institutional Area ³		Sensitization Area		Capacity-Building Area		Facilitation Area		Administration and Finance		Documentation Centre	
f	m	f	m	f	m	f	m	f	m	f	m
2	3	2	3	1	2	3	5	3	4	1	–

Table: Staff profile of the Foundation Propaz (f = female, m = male staff)

The highest decision-making panel of the Foundation is the General Assembly, whereas daily management decisions are made at the level of the Executive Directorate, represented by the Executive Director.

Organisational Chart Foundation Propaz



*Consists of Work Area Coordinators, Responsible Administrative and Financial System and the Executive Director

Implementation of activities is directly undertaken by the staff of the three work areas for facilitation, capacity building and sensitization. Propaz operates mainly from the capital and visits regularly its intervention areas, Cahabón is the only location where Propaz has established a regional office with 2 staff members.

³ Staff of this area includes 2 short term consultants.

3. Evaluation Findings

3.1 Relevance

Foundation Propaz's interventions are relevant in the field of conflict resolution and mitigation. In Alta Verapaz, the training course ("Diplomado") for facilitators to manage agrarian conflicts was adapted to the local situation in the province and has been rated as highly positive by the beneficiaries. In Cahabón, the capacity building for community facilitators was in the process of termination when the team visited the location. Participants of the workshop have stated their improved ability to manage family and community conflicts and to reduce conflictivity related to inter-personal conflicts and the abuse of alcohol. Facilitators gained respect inside their communities and have been approached by conflict parties to facilitate the settlement of disputes. As these conflicts have been identified as significant for the communities, the intervention can be appraised as relevant for reducing violence on a micro-level.

This mainly refers to individuals or the community level with conflict parties in a symmetric relation (e.g. neighbours, some forms of family disputes, but not domestic violence). Improved capacities to deal with conflict at this level were satisfactorily described by beneficiaries in Cahabón. In addition, it was obvious to the team that the intervention of Propaz is of importance for the community facilitators themselves, as it guarantees a constant communication with the civil society. This is in particular relevant for Cahabón, where currently no other CSOs are active due to restrictions imposed by the local mayor. Thus, Propaz is the only non-governmental organisation there having contact to the communities and being present with a local office.

The activities of Propaz reflect the theoretical framework of the organisation, as stated in the Strategic Plan 2005–2008 that focuses on a long-term approach and the inclusion of all sectors of society to strengthen capacities for conflict transformation and peacebuilding to for a dynamic and peaceful social change.⁴ The document which forms the theoretical base for Propaz' intervention is the Strategic Plan 2005–2008 (*Planificación Estratégica*) which contains a chapter on the general situation in Guatemala and the effects of the armed conflict on society and political structures. The chapter includes also some aspects of the economic situation (e.g. Free Trade Agreement), although no statistical data have been used to analyse the socio-economic dynamics. A more extensive analysis of the national context can however be found in the yearly working plan of Propaz (chapter "*Análisis prospectivo sobre el contexto*"). Propaz has identified the main actors for peace and conflict in Guatemala, although these actors are not automatically identified as target group for Propaz' interventions at a national level. Apart from the general actor identification, local actors are identified through conflict diagnostics, which form part of the planning phase of each intervention ("*Diagnósticos de la conflictividad*"). Propaz has designed specific activity strategies ("*Diseño de Procesos*") to justify its activities in a region. These strategies contain a section on the local conflict situation, although these sections lack certain analytical depth, as local conflict factors and dynamics are not examined closely.

Propaz' theory of change refers to a broad understanding of peacebuilding and a constructive approach to conflictivity, taking into consideration the necessity to act on a short-, mid- and long-term approach. Propaz emphasizes hereby on the historical context of conflicts and recognizes the lack of capacity of involved actors for conflict management as an obstacle for creating dialogue and spaces for peaceful interaction.⁵ The effects of the deteriorating security situation and the difficult relation between the government and the population are recognized as important factors that cause violence

⁴ "Por tanto, el cambio histórico no es de corto plazo, sino un proceso de acumulación desigual y combinado." Foundation Propaz, *Planificación Estratégica* Octubre 2005–Septiembre 2008, p. 17.

⁵ See for example Propaz' detailed analysis of conflicts and conflictivity in the Central American region ("*Building sustainable capacities in the prevention and management of conflicts in Central America: antecedents, challenges and main dilemmas*")

and impede the peaceful management of high-profiled conflicts. As the team has shown in the conflict analysis, especially asymmetric conflicts between actors with diverging access to power and information pose the largest risk for the social and economic stability in Guatemala.⁶ Thus, we agree to Propaz' analysis of the main factors and causes for violence in Guatemala. When looking at the Foundation's conversion of its analytical findings into activities, we nevertheless identified a gap between theory and practice. We identified a key driving factor of conflict in Guatemala in the absence of structures and institutions for public mediation, as most of the relevant conflict potentials appear on the macro level. Neither the state nor other non-state actors possess of sufficient capacity to strengthen interaction and communication amongst the respective conflict parties. Nor do they show the willingness to enter into the arena of public mediation in high-profile conflict scenarios. Propaz argues that a focus on the meso-level will have the most effective impact, but we have some doubts that the trickling effects to the micro- and macro-level can really be achieved. On the one hand, the chosen target groups in Alta Verapaz and San Mateo do not have the potentials to act as intermediaries for conflicts taking place at a macro level (which includes the representation of affected communities in a stakeholder dialogue). On the other hand, Propaz itself is not directly operating on this level, despite its high reputation and recognition as an independent institution for conflict management.

Whilst the situation in Guatemala has developed specific dynamics related to new areas for conflict (for example the use of agricultural land for the cultivation of biofuel crops), Propaz is still very much dedicated to its objective of generating resources for peacebuilding, which was part of the institution's concept when OEA-Propaz was founded in 1996. What is missing in the theoretical justification is a clear identification of limited entry points for Propaz in the prevailing context. Instead of applying a broad concept of peacebuilding and conflictivity, the evaluation team has the impression that a more narrow approach with a clear identification of Propaz' potentials and subsequently the identification of currently important conflict areas would be a more useful response to the conflict scenario. Likewise, this could increase the relevance and the impact of Propaz' intervention into strategically identified macro-level asymmetric conflicts and prevent the gap between strategy and implementation that we identified. Despite a more focussed strategic justification of Propaz' intervention, this would also enable the Foundation to focus on more 'grounded' objectives and enhance transparency on with which resources, goals and expected outcomes an identified conflict is being tackled.

The planning process of the interventions contains conflict diagnostics, which analyze the situation of the target groups, their needs and the specific necessities and activities to respond, but without specific regards to the conflict dynamics in detail. In the same sense as the organizational strategy is based on a theoretical fundament, the interventions have a justification that refers to the local context and the situation of the target groups. The activities in Cobán and Cahabón are based on a process design that formulates in detail each step of the intervention, objectives and expected results. However, as target groups are not a homogenous sample, disaggregated information on the composition of the target groups are missing. It was of specific importance for the team to identify the integration of local authorities in these processes. This was possible in Cahabón, where the vice-mayor and representatives of the PNC have indicated their involvement in Propaz' activities. The presence through the established local office was mentioned as a positive factor, which allows the support of Propaz' local staff for immediate intervention in conflicts.

We see the need for Propaz to establish clear exit strategies to its programmes and activities. These should include a phasing out period and a follow-up phase. The follow-up phase can be used to assess the outcome of the projects and – if necessary – further capacity building elements. Additionally, this phase needs an integration of the target group for the M&E process to achieve a qualitative and independent feedback on the services provided to them by Propaz.

⁶ From the evaluation team's own perception, these are: land conflicts, the security situation, feminicidio, conflicts in the economic sector, mining and large industries. See Annex A "Conflict Analysis"

3.2 Effectiveness

Propaz counts with highly professional and experienced personnel, most of the staff members have worked in the sector of peacebuilding and conflict management for several years. Target groups appraised the trainers for their empathy and commitment to the work as well as the close contact they keep with the beneficiaries. In the same sense, Propaz has achieved a high reputation as being an impartial actor for conflict mitigation, a circumstance that has been positively pointed out by several interview contacts. Trainers and target groups established a constructive and confidential relation; this could be verified in the workshops and through the expressed demand for more such input.

The didactical material produced by the Foundation is of high quality and adapted to the needs of the target groups. Some of the materials have been translated into the local language and are used by the beneficiaries for the implementation of conflict resolution activities on their own. Thus, the didactical material has technically supported local efforts for peacebuilding at a micro-level. Community facilitators have taken leading roles and are accepted as contact persons for conflict resolution in the local environment. In several case studies, that have been reported to the team by community facilitators, they made reference to the skills and techniques that have been trained in the capacity building workshops with Propaz. Apart from this more technical input, the team could identify the transfer of the strategic input by Propaz to the structural level. REDAC and the Association *Jun k'olal* in Huehuetanango have applied the design for the early warning system into their own approach and elaborated ways of closer collaboration with each other. Furthermore, they could report several incidents where their early intervention has prevented the outbreak of violence in communities or between individuals.

We analysed Propaz' achievement of objectives as stated in the yearly plans and the strategy documents. When analysing each objective, we assess that objectives one (*"Contributing to the participation of the public to a culture of peace and no-violence as well as strengthening dialogue as a fundamental principle of democracy"*) and two (*"Developing new skills, knowledge and capacities for dialogue, participation and conflict management"*) have been achieved. The achievements in the respective working areas have supported the general objectives, as described in the respective sections of this report. With objective three (*"Contributing to strengthening the public sphere for dialogue and negotiation for specific conflict situations"*), it is quite more difficult to trace the success, as those activities have not focussed on specific conflict settings, but more general on the issue of conflictivity in a broader sense (for example the Diploma for Agrarian Conflictivity).⁷ We see a similar problem for the relation between concrete activities and defined objectives. The latter are too unspecific to be used as reference for the verification of achievements. As the objectives focus on the public sphere (*esfera pública*) or the participation of citizens in general (*ciudadanía participativa*), it is difficult to assume that such objectives do strengthen the strategic implementation or supported the identification of expected results for the Foundation itself. Narrowing down the objectives could improve the strategic alignment of the Foundation Propaz. Instead of focussing on a variety of sectors where conflict is taking place (*"sectores confrontados vinculados a situaciones de conflictividad"*), it would be more effective to identifying a limited number of key sectors and design the activities in relation to these intervention areas.

Objective four (*"Generating external and internal conditions to consolidate the Foundation Propaz to achieve a sustainable, independent and impartial institution"*) has only partly been achieved. Here we refer in particular to the issue of financial sustainability to consolidate Propaz. We have analysed these factors more in-depth in the respective chapter "Sustainability" of this report.

⁷ As Anderson/Olson state in their publication, this is a common phenomenon: "Agencies describe their work as building the positive preconditions for peace. But it became clear through RPP that there is no agreement on what or how much needs to be built to create a peaceful society, and peace means different things for different people. As a result, the benchmarks for such positive-focused peace practice are highly idealized conditions of social harmony that do not exist in most countries that are at peace!" Mary B. Anderson/Lara Olson, *Confronting War – Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners*. CDA, Reflecting on Peace Practice Project (RPP), Cambridge 2003, p. 50f.

The team has identified an existing institutional capacity to draw up lessons learnt from recent activities. The intervention design (planning-phase) contains a chapter that particularly deals with critical factors for the implementation and how to respond to these (*“Respuestas a los factores impulsores/opositores”*). However, we saw a certain lack of transmitting experiences into the organisational knowledge. The exchange amongst the working areas in Propaz has much potential for improvement, as the formal structures for organisational knowledge management are not fully established. The M&E system (*SIPMES – Sistema Integral de Planificación, Monitoreo, Evaluación y Sistematización*) is a very well elaborated tool and can be seen as a sophisticated structure for internal planning and evaluation.⁸ However, in practice the complexity of the system has limited the integration into the organisational management. We saw that some elements for M&E are being used and regular meetings are taking place. But the SIPMES consists of too many bureaucratic steps that are needed to guarantee a controlled implementing and monitoring process. Although the theoretical framework is outlined in detail, we recommend to reducing the SIPMES design to a few clearly designed steps. Additionally, the organisation should undertake a pre-assessment to analyse how much time staff members could invest for M&E and respectively adapt the design to the resources available. This is even more necessary as there were clear indications for an existing work overload of staff members and limited capacities to deal with additional tasks due to the assigned tasks and responsibilities.

Propaz’ efforts to apply the Results Based Management (RBM) approach have been hampered by some critical factors. First, the staff capacities (time, technical knowledge) have not been sufficiently developed to fully integrate RBM. The links between the planning, implementation and monitoring phase and the reporting stage have been designed, but time constraints and a lack of coordination between the three working areas has limited the possibilities to learn and adjust. Whereas PROPАЗ focuses very much on the implementation of technical procedures (reporting formats, monitoring sheets etc.), the important link between evaluation results and strategic design is still weak. Planning and design have to take into account existing resources and crucial findings from the RBM reporting phase (managing resources and results). Furthermore, if a result based management approach would have been fully applied before, the critical factor of financial diversification would have been tackled much earlier and respective action could have been taken timely. Although decision making in the Foundation is based on a participatory philosophy, a critical factor for the full implementation of an RBM is the lack of new structures inside the organisation that respond to the necessity for increased communication and exchange. These structures have not yet been created.

It is quite unclear how Propaz will undertake a performance reporting based on the evaluation of priorities and expected results. Such proceedings would need baseline studies and statistical data about the intervention context, the socio-economic situation of the target groups and other quantifiable information. Only then it will be possible to measure and verify the outcome of the activities after a defined period. We understand that one major problem of Propaz for applying the RBM is the limited number of staff and the rising demand, thus limiting time to train and capacitate the Foundation’s employees. However, and as lessons learnt form an integral part of the RBM, it is more likely that a lack of project adjustments might result in a negative performance or create unintended negative consequences.

From an evaluation point of view, the monitoring component is a significant element because it provides necessary quantitative and qualitative data to assess the different levels of a programme, to measure results and goal achievements of the organisation and adjust activities to a changing environment. Regular monitoring and evaluation is also an important tool for the donor to measure the use of resources by the counterpart organisation. Monitoring is a mutual process, involving donor organisation, service deliverer and beneficiaries and implicates the necessity for information gathering at different levels of a programme. Thus, a clearly identifiable project cycle management process would give

⁸ SIPMES – Sistema Integral de Planificación, Monitoreo, Evaluación y Sistematización.

the organisation the capacity to apply immediate changes and transform project experiences into the internal management context.

Another important factor to improving effectiveness is the participation of target groups in the M&E process, either by self-monitoring or through joint evaluations with Propaz. The participatory monitoring does not form part of the Foundation's formal M&E structure. The SIPMES includes some basic elements to include feedback from beneficiaries (e.g. the report format for the *Café Ciudadano*), but specific definitions for a continued and process-oriented participatory M&E approach need to be integrated. Beneficiaries only participate in evaluations by giving a direct feedback after a set of activities (workshops or trainings). Apart from improving the effectiveness of the organisation, a more participatory approach can have a positive impact on the sustainability of activities, as the ownership of beneficiaries and the Foundation's capacity to respond to changing needs of the target group is strengthened.

3.3 Impact

The most visible impact of the activities of Propaz was identified at the personal and community level. Nearly all approached beneficiaries reported a change in their attitudes, behaviour and perceptions related to conflict situations. Most of them gave examples for successful conflict resolution in their communities because of the capacity building activities with Propaz. The target groups were also capable to identify the changes that have happened due to the intervention of the Foundation. As even more important we assess the change in the relation between local authorities and the population, as this is often characterized by mutual distrust and a high level of conflictivity. In contradiction to the impact on the individual and community level, there are only a few facts that indicate a sustainable impact on the structural level. At present, state actors and public entities do not form part of the direct target group of Propaz. Former collaboration with the PNC has come to a halt because of changes of personnel in the PNC and an internal reorganisation of the police forces.

When looking at the impact of the sensitization and communication area (*Area de Sensibilización Ciudadana*), we looked at activities to generate public awareness and understanding as well as to provide spaces for reflection. The contribution to the public discussion was most visible where Propaz has produced issue-related outputs, as for example the "Testimonies for Peace", which have contributed to the public discussion on the implementation of the Peace Agreements. This series (published in the daily newspaper *El Periódico* and as DVD) has received a very positive feedback from resource persons we contacted during the evaluation. When analysing activities like public discussion forums or the *Cafés Ciudadanos*, we assessed the collaboration with local radio stations and the media. There is a demand for such activities, community members of Cahabón for example expressed their interest in radio programmes that deal with conflict management and peacebuilding or issues for the development of their community in general. While comparing the effects of the media activities with the needs for conflict management as pointed out in our conflict analysis, it becomes certainly more difficult to identify the strategic impact of the area. Only a few activities could be undertaken, as Propaz assessed the collaboration with the media as too expensive. The work area counts with qualified personal, a closer collaboration with the other work areas in Propaz can generate positive effects on the achievement of expected results. Under the existing management structure, the three areas working parallel to each other. A joint approach is needed where each area contributes to achieving more narrowly defined objectives and expected results.

Most of the impact can be traced to an individual or group level. A sufficient long lasting impact on community level to guarantee the sustainability of the structures can yet not be verified. Some change has happened as a specific result of positive conflict interventions, as the programme activities supported social relationships in the communities. However, external resources are still needed to continue the activities of the community facilitators. Without external input, the structures are most likely to disap-

pear. The team concludes that Propaz achieves its main impact in conflict situations between equal stakeholders; the limit of impact is to be seen in conflicts between unequal parties (asymmetric conflict). In the given context of Guatemala, asymmetric conflicts do have the most destructive potential for violence and are often directly linked to the root causes of conflict.

The definition of impact as used by Propaz is closely linked to a specific understanding of social change as a complex process that needs to be tackled with short-, medium- and long-term activities. Changing the problems and relations – in the understanding of the Foundation Propaz – can be achieved by a short- to mid-term approach, whereas changes in sub-systems and structures can only be achieved by applying long-term measures. Propaz distinguishes between different forms of impact related to the level where it should be achieved. Additionally, impact is defined as the potential for transformation and possible capacity of actors to change their reality.⁹ The OECD/DAC definition of impact instead is less detailed and more process-oriented: “Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended”¹⁰ This definition can be applied without regards to the structural level or the duration of the respective project itself, but focuses on the evidence for change as the result of a development activity. Although the DAC definition is less detailed, it comprises possible *unintended* consequences of a development intervention. The evaluation team suggests to Propaz to using defined indicators for impact in each project design, so that the Foundation can demonstrate the actual change on the conflict environment as well as on structures and individuals that has been achieved due to the intervention.

The link between the individual level and the structural level is only possible if key actors inside relevant institutions are targeted. Decision makers can transform individually acquired knowledge and skills into a structural context, thereby changing existing structures or generating new procedures. The inclusion of key representatives in Cahabón might have a similar effect on a local level, if follow-up activities are taken into account. Structural impact requires structural change, in so far there is no automatism in the transfer of individual/personal changes to a socio-political level. Such a change would need a sophisticated long-term approach with the involvement of most of the key actors of society. As far as we can see, this would even surpass the capacities of a large organisation like Propaz. The change Propaz promotes can take place (and takes place) at a micro-level, where social interaction has been positively influenced by the intervention of the Foundation.

Propaz is recognized as a reliable actor and impartial stakeholder for management and resolution of conflicts. Propaz has a very specific knowledge and experience for public and community conflict mitigation, which is mostly related to its high profile as formerly being OEA-Propaz with an official mandate. Thus, arbitration and mediation form a part of an organisational portfolio that would allow Propaz to act also on high-level conflict scenarios. These can be conflicts especially in the mining and energy sector or direct involvement in land and forest conflicts (land use and distribution, logging activities and its effects on communities). Propaz argues that it mainly works on the medium level, as activities on this level have an impact into both, the micro and the macro level.¹¹ The team understands the logic behind Propaz’ argumentation, but we consider the organisation more potent and capable to going beyond this strategic limitation. The medium level might guarantee a feasible access to actors and an easier-to-trace impact, but the root causes of conflict will not be tackled effectively at this level.

It is understandable that an organisation like Propaz has to act with extreme caution and sensitivity, as interventions in conflict contexts in Guatemala are not free of danger. However, if Propaz is accepted by the conflict parties and a set of procedures has been agreed to, the Foundation could be an impor-

⁹ See Propaz, Diseño Preliminar del SIPMES, p. 24 and Propaz, Planificación Estratégica Octubre 2005–Septiembre 2008, p. 17f.

¹⁰ See DAC Evaluation Glossary, June 2002.

¹¹ “... la Fundación Propaz privilegia el nivel intermedio, pues desde él tenemos mayores posibilidades de influir en la base y, a la vez, en la cúpula, lo cual aumenta ostensiblemente nuestras posibilidades de incidencia en la dinámica de cambio.” Foundation Propaz, Planificación Estratégica Octubre 2005–Septiembre 2008, p. 18.

tant mediator at a higher level. A mediation process includes the possibility for the mediator to leave the process if rules are not applied or agreements about the process are violated, which would give Propaz a safe base to operate without the tension to get involved in the conflict issue itself. Thus, we recommend to Propaz to widen and eventually focus its range of activities to the macro level (nivel cupular), which would enable the organisation to impact on the structural level and the root causes of conflict more effectively.

Although Propaz is undertaking its activities with a high grade of sensitivity for the local conflict and cultural context, this is done in a none-formal way. Propaz is aware of possible unintended consequences of its intervention, but the different concepts of conflict-sensitivity are not formally integrated, neither in the theoretical fundament nor in the concrete implementation of activities. Conflict sensitivity is much more included non-formally on behalf of experiences and the knowledge of the local context and environment. The topic of conflict sensitivity forms part of a wider discussion in the development community and has resulted in concepts like Do No Harm (DNH) or the Peace and Conflict Assessment (PCA). These concepts include an analytical framework to analysing activities of service and resource deliverers when acting in a conflict situation, thus to avoid negative impacts on the dynamics of the conflict. An outstanding example was the outcome of the capacity building activities in Cahabón on the traditional structures for conflict management, as the role of the newly trained community facilitators partly – and unintended – affected the involvement of traditional resource persons (especially elders) by limiting their participation. Similar experiences could be avoided in future by integrating the conflict sensitive approach to development through a pre-check of possible consequences on community structures and processes. Another example is the integration of women into project activities; here conflict sensitive approaches can help to understand the effects of an outside intervention on gender roles and perceptions. Whereas CSOs should understand themselves as progressive forces or agents for change, given gender contexts and discrimination of women are often accepted as part of an existing cultural environment. Conflict sensitivity can support the understanding of and the discussion on gender roles in culturally diverse environments.¹²

“Do No Harm” as a participatory instrument is widely used and can easily be transferred to local partner organizations. It is based on an analysis of the conflict context in the specific area where the intervention takes place. Partner structures are enabled to observe conflict, to analyse it and to discuss the relationship between conflict and the development intervention in the specific case. Conflict sensitivity includes the identification of actors and factors that can contribute to peacebuilding in the context of the project or program. It also contributes to reducing risks related to conflict escalation, or to creating awareness about these risks. Therefore, the team recommends to Propaz to integrate these concepts systematically into the design and implementation of its activities.

3.4 Sustainability

Technical sustainability was assessed in the interviews with direct beneficiaries and in the two workshops in Cobán and Cahabón. We could identify sustainability for the *Café Ciudadano* in Cobán, where a group of young leaders has continued the activities on their own, thus discussing local topics of interest amongst students and local leaders. Nonetheless, the activity itself has a very limited impact, as sensitization and public awareness raising will not automatically lead to activities that tackle the identified

¹² Conflict sensitive approaches to development are intended to mainstream methods for identifying peace and conflict factors in projects and programmes at the planning and implementation phase. Although defined as a cross cutting approach for programs and activities that take place in a conflict or post-conflict environment, conflict sensitivity needs to be implemented on the basis of a designed strategy which highlights the specific steps to be undertaken. All development and peace related interventions need to be analyzed in regard to their intended and unintended effects on the conflict situation and the role of stakeholders involved in these conflicts, for example through the transfer of resources or the implicit messages coming along with the project implementation. In an environment where potentials for violence are persistent, conflict sensitivity has to be regarded as a fundamental concept to be included into all phases of an intervention into a specific conflict context.

problems. The capacity building has led to a reproduction of newly acquired skills, techniques and methods by the beneficiaries in regards to conflict management. The activities in Huehuetenango have created a dynamic that is being supported by the two key actors REDAC and the Association *Jun k'olal*. The main problem for continuing these activities in the future was the lack of resources, which both organisations suffer from. They identified a continued need for external donor contribution to finance their activities, as the support by the German GTZ – which has contributed before – is phasing out. Community facilitators in Cahabón are less dependent on financial resources for their conflict management activities, as a compensation for their intervention can be negotiated at community level.


In Huehuetenango, actors have taken over the ownership on the activities. For Cahabón, it is still too early to make a similar statement, as the capacity building activities were just to terminate when the evaluation team arrived. The design of the longer-term interventions includes a strategy to hand over the capacity building process and the structures created to the target groups (e.g. the process in Cahabón). Although this is not explicitly named as exit strategy, elements to follow-up the process are integrated (e.g. updates for facilitators, monitoring visits). What needs to be strengthened further is the capacity for dialogue, constructive discussion and multi-stakeholder participation of the target groups as a prerequisite for successful interventions in a conflict.

The sustainability of Propaz is underlined by the high demand for the foundation's services and products, which can also be seen as an indicator for the quality of its activities. In contradiction to this, there is only a very limited visibility of the Foundation in the national context of Guatemala. Despite its high capacities, the profile of Propaz is not widely recognized outside its areas of intervention, which poses a substantial limit for the acquisition of new funds and additional donor support. Propaz needs to establish a professional public relations strategy to raise awareness on its activities.

Closely linked to the topic of visibility is the question of the financial sustainability of Propaz. The team identified this topic as the most serious issue in the assessment. Despite several recommendations to the Foundation by a former evaluation¹³ as well as the main donors Norway and Sweden, Propaz has not achieved to diversify its financial portfolio. The following table and graph illustrate the high financial dependence of Propaz from a single donor institution:¹⁴

Donor contributions to Foundation Propaz for 2008

Donor	Qtz	%	USD
Norway/Sweden	6,421,713	92	802,714
DED	486,000	7	0,750
Foundation Propaz	80,029	1	10,004
Total	6,987,742	100	873,468



The team has discussed this highly critical fact several times with the management of Propaz, which was aware of the risks and the implications for the future of the Foundation. Nonetheless, there was no comprehensible explanation why measures to identifying and acquiring additional financial support were not undertaken. The Foundation finds itself in a situation where its further existence depends on

¹³ See: Joint Review of Co-operation between NORAD/the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Guatemala, the PROPAZ Foundation, Scanteam, Oslo, February 2005; Minutes of the meeting at the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Guatemala between Foundation Propaz, the Norwegian Embassy and Sida, 19.05.2008.

¹⁴ Source: Fundación Propaz, Presupuesto 2008, page 1.

the decision of Sida to continue its financial contribution. This puts either the donor as the requesting organisation into an unhealthy relationship. The team hereby would underline the necessity for Propaz for urgent action and the immediate establishment of a fundraising strategy that allows the Foundation to continue its activities on a mid- to long-term commitment. We fear that the situation might lead to severe problems for the organisation. Even if donors can be committed to contributing to the budget, it may take until mid-2009 before these funds are available (apart from the fact that the elaboration of a fundraising strategy itself will take additional time). The team recommends to Propaz and Sida to discuss the options and opportunities for a next funding phase and to agree on a timeframe for necessary actions to be taken by Propaz for the diversification of its funding and revenue sources.

The 2005 evaluation proposed the possibility to creating a business entity, – Propaz Inc. – in addition to the Foundation to generating income through consultancies and the commercialization of its activities. Although we mainly agree to the recommendations of the 2005 evaluation, the team does not see a realistic option for Propaz to charge its services in a sense that it will generate sufficient funding to support the financial sustainability. In 2007, Propaz generated incomes from consultancy-like activities of only 128.705,– QTZ (about 16.000,– USD). Furthermore, if Propaz should be engaged in high-level conflict mitigation, this could negatively affect the impartiality of Propaz, especially in a highly politicized environment like Guatemala. Rather than widely commercializing its services, Propaz should identify its areas of core competency and opt for offering these to government entities and the donor community. Enabling Propaz to do so would need the implementation of a more market-oriented approach and an analysis of market needs and strategic priorities of donors. The team understands the considerations of Propaz to applying a business-oriented model, which would considerably change the theoretical approach. However, and in the given context, the organisation does not have many options left to prevent itself from perishing from the national context.

3.5 Efficiency

Propaz was generally identified as a reliable and credible organisation that uses its funds in a responsible manner. The audit reports from 2005–2007 reflect this image, the comments of the 2007 financial audit are mostly related to procedural issues as the late redeem of cheques or the repetitive hiring of consultancy services without observing the necessary two-months period. Generally, the team sees these issues as of minor concern for the transparency on the overall budget spending. Propaz is undertaking various efforts to professionalize its management and internal communication. Propaz has recently hired a consultant to improve monitoring capacities, which allows the Foundation to analyse its activities by disaggregating data on geographical impact and beneficiary reach. The consultant was preparing a database that contains information on the activities, which can be quantified and analysed in relation to geographical coverage, relevance or gender.¹⁵ Working procedures are formulated and have been established according to the organisational procedures manual.¹⁶

The 2008 budget looks balanced at a first glance. All four areas have budget allocations of between 16,2% and 22,2% of the total budget.¹⁷ What seems quite unclear to the team is the budget line for the institutional strengthening (*fortalecimiento institucional*) which represents 22,1% of the overall financial resources. Adding the 19,1% assigned to the administration, a total of 41,2% of the overall budget is allocated to cover internal costs of the Foundation. The team does not question the necessity for institutional strengthening in general, especially as we have seen some of the positive results related to the systematization of information. The budget line comes without detailed explanation of the use of funds and the concrete activities financed here under. Additionally, the relatively equal allocation of funds to the three areas does not reflect a strategic budget approach, in which certain areas have priority against

¹⁵ “Sistema de Gestión de la Información”, the graph in chapter 4.2.6 is taken from this database.

¹⁶ Fundación Propaz: Manual de Políticas y Procedimientos.

¹⁷ All figures taken from: Fundación Propaz, Presupuesto 2008.

other activities. The sensitization component (*sensibilización ciudadana*) proved to have a very limited impact, nonetheless receives 19,2% of the overall budget. The team recommends to Propaz to undertake the strategic budget design for 2009 with a financial allocation that reflects the strategic priorities of the organisation and responds to the need for immediate action in the fields of public relations, fundraising and market/needs analysis. This would also decrease the demand for activities and the workload for the staff, as a clear profile of the Foundation should focus on a maximum of two main activity areas.

A critical factor for the work of Propaz is the political environment in which its activities take place. The organisation depends on the political goodwill of local authorities who still have the power to limit the access of CSOs to their administrative territory or can impede activities through political pressure or intimidation. As the case of Cahabón illustrates, the political goodwill of the local authorities can be a decisive factor for the scope of activities that an organisations can implement. It is obvious that any critical position concerning the local government or even simpler issues can have drastic consequences for the respective CSO. Although considered as illegal, the practice of banning organisations from the access to beneficiaries has not had any consequence for the local political administration so far.

Decision-making processes inside Propaz are established in the procedures manual under chapter 16, where coordination necessities and responsibilities are defined. Due to its size, the organisation has a relatively lean management structure. Nonetheless, the team identified a need for more participatory approach to decision-making and a more horizontal management structure with a higher level of participation and information flow amongst the different administrative levels. More transparency on decision-making procedures can increase the level of ownership of staff on internal processes and the development of the institution. This can respectively affect the work efficiency by avoiding frustration and disintegration of staff members.

3.6 Coverage


The sectoral coverage of Propaz has been relatively broad, which on the one hand enabled the organisation to reach a large number of beneficiaries also under difficult conditions. On the other hand, this has decreased a clear institutional profile, even more as the Foundation continued to use an approach that did not necessarily connect the working areas practically with each other. The identification of strategic intervention sectors is necessary to prepare Propaz for a more competitive environment, as donor funding in Guatemala is being reduced and international development actors begin to prioritize other countries for their support.

The activities in Cahabón are based on the experiences made in the processes in Huehuetenango, although these are not simply a replication. Propaz has integrated some lessons learnt into the new activities design, mainly the necessity to conduct a pre-assessment, to undertake a needs assessment and to guarantee the participation of the beneficiaries.¹⁸ However, we felt that the process of evaluating the experiences in Huehuetenango could have been done in a more systematic and detailed way. Whereas much emphasis has been put on the planning process, only little attention has been paid to the question of sustainability and respective experiences in Huehuetenango.

The geographical coverage of Propaz outside the capital is mainly focused on two other areas in Guatemala: Alta Verapaz (Cobán and Cahabón) and Huehuetenango (San Mateo). The following graph gives an overview of the geographical distribution of activities:¹⁹

¹⁸ See: Propaz, Formato para Diseño de Proceso – Sistema de Gestión de la Conflictividad de Santa Maria Cahabón, Alta Verapaz.

¹⁹ Graph elaborated by Propaz, “Distribución de la acción de Propaz”.



Propaz has already existing contacts to NGOs in Alta Verapaz. Most important for the implementation of activities was the collaboration with the Cobán-based organisation ADP. Due to the ethnic composition of the local population, beneficiaries in Cahabón are exclusively members of indigenous communities (apart from the representative of the local radio station and the police agents). This has supported the objective of integrating indigenous target groups into the activities portfolio of the Foundation.

Regional conflicts include land disputes and a conflict between local communities and a mining company.²⁰ Thus, we found it interesting that Propaz has not yet integrated the topic of conflicts around mining activities into its projects with the target groups. Agrarian conflictivity however has been in the focus of Propaz, as local representatives participated in the “Diploma on Agrarian Conflictivity”.

The team found a certain lack of consistency and justification for the intervention in Alta Verapaz. There is without doubt a necessity to work on land conflicts and the reduction of violence in the municipality, but there is no clear justification why this region has been chosen over other areas in Guatemala, where a similar or even higher level of violence and comparable conflicts characteristics exist. We therefore recommend to prepare future activities and decisions about the geographical coverage on a catalogue of criteria that are based on indicators like accessibility, needs for support, level of conflictivity (disaggregated by specific conflict issues) and actors already active in the location or region. Although we identified these critical aspects, we found it positive that Propaz has a clear regional limitation for its capacity building area and the area of facilitation. Both areas work closely together in the processes in San Mateo Ixtatán (Huehuetenango) and Santa Maria Cahabón (Alta Verapaz). The regional limitation is a prerequisite to achieve a basic impact. The evaluation team has the impression that a similar geographical limitation could support the impact for the sensitization areas as well.

3.7 Coherence/Coordination/Linkages

Linkages of Propaz with other actors have been created mainly in the regions where the organisation implements activities. Informal network structures can be found in Guatemala-City, as most of the important actors of the civil society – working on conflict management or peacebuilding – are active here. Propaz has made use of strategic connections to facilitate the access to target groups, as we could verify in the case of Cobán, where a close collaboration with the local non-governmental organisation ADP has taken place. As a result, contacts to local government officials were made to grant acceptance for the intervention in Alta Verapaz. This has proved to be a prerequisite to start activities on the Conflict Management System (*Sistema de Gestión de la Conflictividad*). Furthermore, ADP has facilitated the

²⁰ See Annex A “Conflict Analysis”.

identification of beneficiaries for the sensitization area, especially for conducting the *Cafés Ciudadanos* in Cobán. This type of cooperation had fewer effects on the impact; instead, the synergies were more visible during the implementation phase. Confidence building has been eased and the access to the beneficiaries has been made less time-consuming for Propaz. In so far, the effects of coordination proved to be more essential for strengthening the efficiency of the Foundation then for the outcome or impact.

Whereas claims for stronger cooperation with other civil society actors have their justification, it has to be admitted that the situation in the civil society in Guatemala has changed significantly over the last 2–3 years – and even more after the takeover of power by President Colóm. Several organisations have disappeared from the scenery due to the retreat of important donors and a decrease of the support to CSOs. Because of declining donor contributions, the situation has become much more competitive than cooperative. Additionally, many actors of former NGOs have taken positions in the government or related institutions.²¹ Historical antagonisms amongst civil society actors still present an obstacle for closer collaboration in the sector. These factors have resulted in a less dynamic interaction of Propaz with national actors of the same working area. Despite these challenges, we see further potential for the organisation to identify strategic partners. These can be agents for change – progressive individuals or institutions in the government or state institutions – or local NGOs that do not compete for resources in the capital. Universities could also form part of such strategic partnerships. Mainly at local level, alliances should be formed to coordinate with existing initiatives, additionally to avoid double efforts of local and national organisations.²² High profile conflicts need coordinated measures from different actors who need to join their efforts to increase the impact on the conflict. Apart from creating synergy, such external alliances are necessary to support the transition of the organisation and its survival.

First steps are taken by Propaz to establish closer relations to the media, mainly at local level. Propaz has cooperated with the local radio station in Cahabón to disseminate information on their workshops and activities. As the radio plays an outstanding role for information in remote communities, we see these efforts as eminently important for keeping the contact with beneficiaries in these areas. The Foundation plans to make more use of this approach with additional programs for public discussion of topics as peacebuilding and conflict management. We encourage Propaz to continue in this sense and look for relations with media actors with a national coverage, such as newspaper and TV-stations. This can contribute to a broader recognition of the “brand” Propaz in sectors where the organisation has not yet a major outreach (as for example the business sector).

3.8 Cultural/Gender Sensitivity

Propaz was also assessed for the gender and diversity policy and practice, either in the organisational set-up as for their project activities. Gender is being considered as an important factor in the strategic documents and the intervention design.²³ In contradiction to this, Propaz has implemented only a few specific activities on gender itself, much more identifying the gender aspect as crosscutting issue to promote gender equality as one of several other elements of their activities. At the organisational level, there is a clear under-representation of women in the decision-making structures. All area coordinators are male staff members.

²¹ Another prominent case is the police archive (*Archivo de la Policía*), where recently discovered historical documents need to be revised and catalogued; many activists of former NGOs are employed there. Competition amongst CSOs culminated when USAID implemented its Human Rights and Reconciliation Project in 2001 and coordination structures for the Human Rights work were established in Guatemala. To acquire funds, some NGOs changed their programmatic profile and integrated Human Rights into the organisational portfolio, even without having worked on this issue before.

²² See Annex D for a list of other organisations and institutions working on peace and conflict in Guatemala.

²³ See: “Propuesta operativa de la Fundación Propaz para la incorporación de la perspectiva de género y multi/interculturalidad

To promote gender equality and indigenous rights in their strategy, the organisation has appointed a staff member with the task to mainstream gender and cultural sensitivity into the organisation's profile. This was successful to a certain degree, but there is still a lack of transforming the concepts into the concrete activities of the three working areas. Propaz has undertaken an in-depth analysis of the discriminatory situation of women, especially in an indigenous context. The specific discriminatory situation of women is however not adequately considered in the design of the intervention or the analysis of the conflict context. The number of female participants differs from activity and local context. We identified the highest participation of women (about 50%) in the urban context of Cobán with the target group of young students. Less female representation was identified in the work with community members in Cahabón, where the participation rate of women was only about 20%.

Gender should thereby not only be understood as strengthening of women or their positions, in a society with a high rate of domestic violence and a specific legislation on feminicide, men need to be regarded as target group to reduce violence and raise awareness on the (legal and social) consequences of violence against women and girls. It is important to point out the difference between the concept of mainstreaming and the concept of gender as a crosscutting issue. Mainstreaming gender implicates to regard it as a main criterion in the planning, implementation and evaluation phase. The team believes that Propaz can take a more pro-active role in promoting gender equality. The team agrees to the opinion that community facilitators for conflict management or mediation need to be accepted by the community members, which mostly prefer male representatives in these positions. Instead of reacting in the same direction to these circumstances, Propaz should transfer part of its activities directly into the communities and actively promote gender equality there.

From our impression in the workshops in Alta Verapaz, it was obvious that women can play an important role for constructive conflict resolution. They are accepted as actors in this field. There is no explicit convocatory strategy to tackle in particular women as a target group. Records of accomplishment for lessons learnt do exist, but their use by staff members is very limited. Thus, knowledge management for these two sectors cannot efficiently take place, as the necessary processes and structures are not integrated into the concrete. Propaz has identified the integration of women as a main obstacle for their activities in Cahabón, but there is no strategic response to increase the participation of this group in the concrete activities.²⁴ Nearly all participants of the workshops in Cobán and Cahabón have responded positively to the question of increased knowledge on gender issues and the acceptance of an increased participation of women. Especially in Cahabón, the statements have not resulted in a change in the ratio of female beneficiaries in the workshops. Because of traditional roles and a strong male dominance (*machismo*), the concrete significance for women as conflict facilitators in the communities is still highly limited.

Indigenous actors are recognized as target group and supported in their autonomous approaches to work on community conflicts, as we could prove in the case of the cooperation with actors from the association *Jun k'olal* (United for Peace) in San Mateo Ixtatán. This organisation was founded by indigenous members in Huehuetenango and cooperates with REDAC. Propaz should be aware of a possible risk of a too strong dominance of REDAC in its relation to the indigenous association, as REDAC seems to be a quite more potent actor, also in relation to access resources. We recommend to Propaz and the respective organisations to find a balanced way of interaction that preserves the independence of *Jun k'olal*.

The analysis and investigation of traditional structures of conflict management is not yet established. Although indigenous beneficiaries are targeted with capacity building activities, there is no direct link

²⁴ See Propaz' own analysis of obstacles to the process: "La situación patriarcal y machista que aún impera en la región que se manifiesta con la baja asistencia de mujeres a los talleres porque tienen hijos que cuidar o los hombres no autorizan la participación de sus esposas." Formato para Diseño de proceso, Sistema de Gestión de la Conflictividad de Santa María Cahabón, Alta Verapaz, 01.07.2008, p. 6.

between traditional ways of conflict resolution and the intervention of Propaz. Propaz considers these structures as an important factor and mentions the issue several times in the intervention design for Cahabón, but there was no evidence that these structures have influenced the design of Propaz' intervention. The indigenous target groups responded positively to the capacity building activities. There was diverse response to the way in which the intervention has changed the dynamics for conflict management in the communities in relation to traditional structures. Propaz was not aware of these effects, which are closely linked to conflict sensitivity and the analysis of intended and unintended consequences of the interventions. Thus, we clearly identify a need for more investigation on traditional methods of conflict mitigation to culturally adapting Propaz' interventions to the local indigenous context.

Propaz actively interacts with indigenous beneficiaries. However, in regards to the number of indigenous organisations that are present in Alta Verapaz, Propaz has only reached a limited interaction with these actors. Either for the field of gender as for cultural sensitivity, we recommend to Propaz to identify more actors in Guatemala that have a specific profile in these two areas for an increased exchange of experiences and a discussion of the existing approaches and theoretical concepts. As Propaz has already a long experience in working with indigenous actors (as OEA-Propaz and recently in the work with the commissions for indigenous rights – AIDPI), both sides could gain from such professional dialogue.

4. Evaluative Conclusions

The general conclusions are based on the findings of the assessment, the feedback received from external resource persons, the results of the two workshops in Alta Verapaz and the SWOT-workshop with Propaz.

Propaz is an important and relevant actor in the sector of peacebuilding and conflict mitigation in Guatemala. The high demand for its services underlines the quality of the products and the high reputation of Propaz enjoys in Guatemala and on a Central American level. The staff counts with sufficient experience to convert the theoretical approach of the Foundation into relevant action that is based on needs analysis and assessments of the local or sector-related conflict situation. The history of Propaz as well as its numerous interventions make it an experienced organisation that can be an important counterpart for the Swedish Cooperation in future.

The obstacles we identified are mostly of technical nature or related to design of the intervention. Propaz is working below its real potentials. We see the organisation capable of tackling the macro level in order to work effectively on the root causes of conflict. The main challenge and principle obstacle for the future of Propaz is the limited donor portfolio, which poses the most serious threat to the future of Propaz with its actual structure. If there is no immediate reaction of the organisation to this situation, the Foundation might not be able to continue its activities after 2009. This situation is also caused by the lack of applying small changes over a longer period. Currently, the organisation faces the need to apply a number of more significant changes in a very short time, which may be an overburden for the management and the staff likewise.

Apart from acquiring new funding sources, Propaz needs to apply a more proactive, business-like approach to face the rising competition in the civil society. This includes external relations as well as the internal management approach. The Foundation has to generate specific demands and look for opportunities to gain a certain fixed percentage of its income through commissioned activities. However, there is no realistic possibility for a complete financial autonomy, as Propaz cannot transform into a consultancy company. Without partly being financed through donor or state contributions, Propaz will not be able to continue its activities.

5. Lessons Learnt

The well-established relation between Sida and the Foundation Propaz can be seen as an exceptional example of a long-term support for peacebuilding and conflict management in Guatemala. Based on the results and findings of the assessment, we would draw up the following lessons learnt of this cooperation:

- Sida and the Norwegian MFA have provided core funding over several years to the Foundation Propaz. This has strengthened the autonomy and independence of the Foundation. This was only possible because of a relationship based on mutual trust and confidence. Nonetheless, it is visible that core funding is a limited tool to guarantee the implementation of strategic objectives of the donor organisation. Sida – as any other international donor – supports national initiatives with the aim to strengthening key sectors in Guatemala. The outcomes of this support need to be validated to guarantee an effective and sustainable use of these funds. Mainly in the last phase of the support to Propaz, the Foundation has not responded in the expected manner to the requests of the donor organisation, although several times a reaction on the financial portfolio was requested. Core funding at that stage seemed to have counterproductive effects. We believe that a balanced mixture between core funding and project related funding at this stage would have helped either Propaz as the donor agencies to implement their objectives in a more efficient way.
- Propaz has experienced various challenges to transforming the Foundation into an independent institution. As the 2004 evaluation already pointed out, several internal aspects needed prioritized action. While Sida continued to provide funding for the Foundation, it would have been important at that time to examine further possibilities to strengthening the technical capacities of Propaz, e.g. the provision of external experts or the elaboration of a detailed management plan how the necessary changes have to be applied.²⁵ Thus, we consider technical support as part of a change management in almost the same manner as important as the provision of financial support to keep the institution and its activities going.
- Although Sida has provided substantial long-term support to Propaz as a main donor, there is little visibility of the donor organisation in the activities of Propaz. Visibility can be an important element to strengthen interventions of Propaz in critical conflict environments through a visible international backing and should thereby not be confounded with publicity. As more and more donors are withdrawing from Guatemala, visibility is also an important sign for rural communities that they are being supported by the international community in their efforts to achieve a basic development. Sida and Propaz can gain mutual benefits from the implementation of a joint visibility strategy.
- Changes in the environment (external factors, donor priorities, political dynamics) require a timely management response. In the case of Propaz, many efforts have been undertaken to modify the design of core areas (SIPMES, organisational manual). However, the implementation of procedures was not fully achieved. First, because of a work overload that inhibited the staff to deal with new and more complex operational procedures. Second, and even more important, the management has prioritized the implementation of project activities with less emphasis on the structural change of the Foundation. This has put the institution at risk, thus a balanced approach to manage project implementation and organisational development at the same time is essential for the progress of the institution.

²⁵ Although this has been provided by Propaz, the *modus operandi* of the Foundation has not changed. Usually modifications at strategic and operational level would have needed a more intensified approach which also would have looked at necessary changes of the Foundation's internal structure.

- Working on conflict in Guatemala is a difficult and sometimes even dangerous task. Intimidations, killings of human rights activists and the deteriorating security situation pose a serious threat to CSOs and its staff. Local political actors can restrict the operational access to geographical areas and target groups. These external factors can fundamentally limit the margin of action and have an influence on the performance of the organisation and the outcome and impact of its activities. As it was pointed out in the SWOT workshop with Propaz, the challenging working environment in the country has also a psychological effect on staff members, as the conditions generate a feeling of insecurity and vulnerability.

6. Recommendations

- Based on our findings and conclusions, the team gives the following recommendations to the Foundation Propaz and the Swedish cooperation:
- Either Propaz as well as Sida need to discuss in how far the gender aspect can be strengthened on a programmatic and activities level. As violence against girls and women is a major conflict issue in Guatemala, the topic needs more strategic attention.
- Visibility can support either the security for Propaz as the perception of Sida as an important donor in Guatemala. In case of a continued cooperation between Sida and Propaz, the team recommends to develop a joint visibility strategy.

6.1 Recommendations to Propaz

- Propaz immediately needs to begin to draw up a fundraising strategy with a realistic timeframe for implementation to acquiring new donor funds until the end of 2009. This strategy could be drawn up with the help of external consultants, but needs to produce results already in the second half of 2009.
- Closely related to the question of fundraising is the external recognition of Propaz. The team recommends the design and establishment of a professional public relations strategy that will enable the organisation to present itself to possible donors and strategic partners.
- The team recommends to Propaz to undertake a strategic budget design for 2009 with a financial allocation that reflects the strategic priorities of the organisation and responds to the need for immediate action in the fields of public relations, fundraising and market/needs analysis.
- We recommend the reduction of Propaz' activities to two main areas: capacity building and conflict transformation, whereas in the latter Propaz should substantially engage in macro level conflicts to tackle effectively the root causes of conflict.
- The evaluation team recommends to Propaz to widen and eventually focus its range of activities to the macro level (*nivel cupular*), which would enable the organisation to impact on the structural level and the root causes of conflict more effectively.
- To make the SIPMES M&E system working, we recommend to revising the current approach and the herein defined procedures. We further recommend to undertake an assessment of the available time resources of the staff members to reduce the SIPMES to a realistic size, which will make the implementation and the success of the system attainable.

- Conflict sensitivity needs to be regarded as integral part of all activities and project designs of Propaz. As the organisation will continue to work in conflict settings, we recommend to analyse the possible unintended consequences and of interventions to reduce the risk of negative effects on the conflict context.
- We recommend to identifying further activities and decisions on geographical coverage on a catalogue of criteria that can be based on indicators like accessibility, needs for support, level of conflictivity (disaggregated by specific conflict issues) and actors already active in the location or region based on updated strategic conflict analysis.
- As Propaz actively includes indigenous beneficiaries into its activities, we recommend to undertake more in-depth investigation on traditional methods of conflict mitigation and to culturally adapt Propaz' interventions to the local context.
- Closer cooperation with other actors in the field of conflict management and public mediation is needed, as conflicts on a macro-level need coordinated activities, synergy and joint strategies of the relevant institutions and organisations in the country. Collaboration with state institutions is necessary, as the macro-level conflict potentials can only be tackled with the involvement of the national government.
- In the cooperation with REDAC and the Association *Jun k'olal*. We recommend to Propaz and the respective organisations to find a balanced way of interaction that preserves the independence of the indigenous Association. Propaz should be aware of a possible risk of a too strong dominance of REDAC in its relation to the indigenous association.

6.2 Recommendations to Sida

- Sida should continue its support to Propaz while applying certain – and jointly agreed – conditions. As already discussed during the evaluation, this can include an initial 6-month period of funding by Sida with the option of further support if the agreed measures are implemented.
- As we see Propaz as an important counterpart for Sida now and in the future, we recommend a discussion between the two institutions on strategic sectors of interest and possible areas for support. Both partners have a long-standing history of cooperation and partnership that is based on trust and confidence. This constitutes a unique fundament for further cooperation if mutual interests can be identified.
- Sida should take into account the strengthening of local initiatives for conflict management and public mediation. Apart from supporting the government and state institutions, conflict potentials can only be reduced if local organisations are taken into consideration for international support. The creation of an NGO Grants Fund can help to keep organisations with a close connection to the population at place and strengthen the civil society's capacity to act as a watchdog and for advocacy. Apart from this, Sida has a very good reputation as donor organisation; channelling funds only through multinational agencies will decrease the appearance and the visibility of Sida as international actor for peace and development in Guatemala.

Annex A – Conflict Analysis

Preface

The following conflict analysis forms part of the evaluation of the Foundation Propaz in Guatemala, commissioned by the Swedish International Cooperation Agency Sida in October 2008. The main purpose of the analysis is to provide an overview on the main actors, factors and dynamics of conflict in Guatemala as analytical basis to appraising the relevance of Propaz' activities. The text shall also serve as guiding document for the elaboration of recommendations to Propaz and the Swedish development cooperation for their future cooperation in Guatemala. We focus in our analysis on those sectors where we identify a rising potential for violent conflict and which pose – from our point of view – a reasonable threat for the development process and the social and economic stability of the country.

1 Introduction

Guatemala suffered from more than 30 years of internal armed conflict, which has been the most violent and long lasting war in Central America. The armed confrontation produced more than 200.000 victims of arbitrary executions and forced disappearance, 200.000 refugees and one million internally displaced persons. More than 600 indigenous communities in the highlands of Guatemala were destroyed and nearly a million members of the male population were forced into so-called civilian self-defence patrols (*Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil – PAC*). Not only the long duration of the conflict but also the use of extreme violence against the civilian population, massive forced displacements and the use of paramilitary structures have had effects on the Guatemalan society that persist after the signature of the peace agreement in 1996. In Guatemala, the social, economic, political and cultural conflicts are of complex nature and form part of the national political, social and economical context. These conflicts are partly based on historical dynamics that can be traced back to the colonial era in Guatemala. These conflicts do not form part of a progressive and constructive process; they are much more of a destructive nature and hamper the development of the country. The disputes are product of the antagonism, of the intolerance, discrimination, racism, exploitation of the work, the extreme poverty and a system of inoperative justice in the country. The social cohesion in the country has been affected. As a result, the political, social and economic sectors are fragmented.

Assuming the weak structures for non-violent negotiation and balance of interests, the situation in Guatemala is characterized by a 'negative peace'. Although the armed conflict has ended, the socio-political conditions and the security situation do not guarantee a peaceful environment. Instead, the political, cultural and economic violence is still persistent and thus undermining the spirit of the peace accords. Social justice and the broader concept of human security takes into account the necessity to tackle the (structural) root causes of conflict and create alternatives to violent disputes. Conflicts are processes among diverse actors and sectors with the same or different levels of power (symmetric or asymmetric relation). Whereas the individual or personal level can be targeted through a low level of intervention (mainly micro level), tackling the structural root causes of conflict needs much more emphasis on institutions and processes with an integrated approach in particular at the meso and macro level.

1.1 Socio-economic indicators ²⁶

Guatemala had a total population of 13,35 Mio inhabitants in 2007, which makes it the country with the highest population rate in Central America. Population growth is steady with a 2,5 per cent annual rate. The country's GDP has constantly risen over the last years with an annual growth rate of 5,7% in 2007.

Economic development	2000	2005	2006	2007
GDP (current US\$) (billions)	19,29	27,29	30,19	33,43
GDP growth (annual %)	3,6	3,5	5,1	5,7

School enrolment is with 94,4% high, whereas the primary completion rate of 77% (2006) indicates a significant drop-out of elementary school students before finalizing basic education. The adult literacy rate is with a 69,1 per cent one of the lowest in Latin America, vast inequalities in schooling related to ethnicity, gender and poverty are still existent. Indigenous adults have less than half the schooling of non-indigenous adults (2.5 years of education compared with 5.7 years); within this group, indigenous women are most affected by illiteracy.

Even though the figures show a slight improvement for the economic indicators, the situation in Guatemala is still characterized by the social and economic exclusion of the indigenous population, a high level of violence and impunity and the lacking efforts of recent governments to tackle the root causes of poverty and conflicts in the country.²⁷ The main burden for a sustainable development can be identified in the lasting effects of the internal armed conflict (1960–1996), leaving behind a deeply divided society and imposing a culture of violence, which threatens any efforts to establishing a democratic and participative political system. The Commission for Historical Clarification (*CEH – Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico*) defined the armed conflict in Guatemala as genocide against the indigenous population.²⁸ Systematic and massive displacement of the indigenous population have destroyed the social relationships and formed part of a counterinsurgency strategy to eradicate the cultural identity of the affected indigenous population and control them by military and civilian means. The central term that has been used as official doctrine to justify the operations against the civilian population was the so-called “annihilation of the internal enemy” (*aniquilamiento del enemigo interno*), which was directed against any person or movement that intended to disrupt the existing order (*romper el orden establecido*).

A central question for the further development of the institutional capacities in Guatemala is the role of the state in a situation where the country is facing a continued fragmentation of the civil, political and economical structures.

²⁶ The statistical data in this section are taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators database and from UNDP statistics.

²⁷ The U.S. Department of State describes the conditions in the country as follows: “Human rights and societal problems included the government's failure to investigate and punish unlawful killings committed by members of the security forces; widespread societal violence, including numerous killings; corruption and substantial inadequacies in the police and judicial sectors; police involvement in kidnappings; impunity for criminal activity; harsh and dangerous prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; failure of the judicial system to ensure full and timely investigations and fair trials; failure to protect judicial sector officials, witnesses, and civil society representatives from intimidation; threats and intimidation against journalists; discrimination and violence against women; trafficking in persons; discrimination against indigenous communities; discrimination and violence against gay, transvestite, and transgender persons; and ineffective enforcement of labor laws, including child labor provisions.” US-Department of State (2008).

²⁸ See *Informe de la CEH, Vol. III J Genocide*, p.366: “In consequence, the CEH concludes that Guatemalan state agents – during the counterinsurgency operation in the years 1981 and 1982 – have committed acts of genocide against the Mayan population in the regions Ixil, Zacualpa, north of Huehuetenango and Rabinal” [translation by SJ].

2 Main areas of conflict

We focus on this section on the conflicts with the highest potential for violence or social and economic destabilisation. These are generally asymmetric conflicts, where the conflict parties do have unequal access to information, negotiation and power. We have not taken into account symmetric conflict at micro-level (e.g. interpersonal/family conflicts at community level), as long as these are not part of a structural cause of conflict. For example, violence against women happens often on a micro-level, but is a result of structural and historical factors. Thus, most of the identified recent conflict areas are relevant at the meso- to macro level.

2.1 Land conflicts

The topic of land ownership and land distribution remains one of the central and unresolved conflict factors in Guatemala with a long history, dating back to the colonial period and the expropriation of indigenous land in the late 1800's. The attempts for an agrarian reform came to an abrupt halt in 1954, when a CIA-backed military coup ended the liberal reforms and established a military dictatorship. The question of land distribution and agrarian reform was a root cause for the outbreak of the armed conflict. Although the peace agreements have been signed in 1996, land matters still represent the main conflict area in the country.

Despite several efforts and the creation of respective agencies and catastral pilot projects, fundamental changes on the land dynamics are still pending. Displacements of rural and indigenous communities are a continued problem. For 2007, there were 49 officially registered cases of forced evictions in rural areas.²⁹ Limited access to justice, partiality of the justice system and a lack of public assistance for the peaceful resolution of land disputes has directly influenced the situation of affected communities. Guatemala has the largest rural population in Central America; over 60% of the inhabitants depend on agriculture to survive.³⁰ The lack of access to land and unresolved cases of land ownership has a negative impact on rural development. As a side effect, migration to the United States from the rural areas in Guatemala has increased. Land conflicts in Guatemala can be classified into three main categories:³¹

- Disputes over competing property rights and perceptions of property rights, which represent about 64% of the active conflicts in Guatemala;
- Occupations of property legally owned by another party, which represent about 16% of existing conflicts;
- Boundary disputes, covering conflicts between individuals and/or between communities. These conflicts represent about 14% of existing conflicts in the country.

The land crisis in Guatemala has worsened due to external competition for agricultural products on the world market, such as coffee from Vietnam. Potentials for violence are high, as poor peasants have frequently taken over lands that they claimed, thus clashing with the National Police or private security forces. Killings of indigenous leaders, destruction of property by security agents or forced resettlements of peasants are continuing, as the Guatemalan governments have failed to implement the recommendations of the Peace Agreements. In the indigenous culture, land has also a highly symbolic value.³² Hence, disputes around land are not only resource-based conflicts; they contain strong elements about indigenous identity and culture. The oligarchic structure of Guatemala's economy is reflected in the

²⁹ Amnesty International (2008), p.2.

³⁰ Viscidi (2004).

³¹ See MSI (2005), p. 4f.

³² "Land has not only been the main resource for survival from subsistence agriculture (mostly corn and beans), but simultaneously a collective good intimately connected with the symbolic order, culture and tradition. Shared possession of land is an important source of solidarity and has a decisive role for identity construction because it connects past, present and future." Kurtenbach (2008), p. 4.

agrarian sector, where land ownership is in the hands of several large families who oppose any effort to reform the agrarian sector. Since the signature of the Peace Agreements, Coos with the help of the international donor community have undertaken numerous activities to support local initiatives and national initiatives to resolving conflicts and redistribute land property. New conflict potentials arise from multinational agro-business companies, focusing on the cultivation of bio fuel crops (African oil palm, sugarcane) and genetically manipulated cash crops. As the potential for geographically limited violence in relation to land disputes is probable, these efforts need to be continued on two levels:

- Support for local initiatives and institutions that deal with land conflicts and the peaceful settlement of land disputes;
- Pressuring the government to implement an agrarian reform program that tackles the unequal distribution and the access to land. Without a comprehensive government programme, land conflicts will remain to be a long-lasting conflict potential in Guatemala.

2.2 Crime, organized crime and public security

Looking at the official statistics and crime rates, the figures reflect the rising insecurity and the lacking capacity of the state to tackle criminal activities. As a reaction to these dynamics, the population has formed so-called security neighbourhood committees (*comités de vecinos para la seguridad*) to prevent crime, secure their direct living environment, and protect themselves from personal direct violence.

These committees may provide a basic structure for prevention through control and deterrence, but lynching of criminals or suspected persons is a still existing and growing phenomenon, which is directly related to the impunity and the weak justice sector. The lack of Rule of Law and the low capacities of the police and the justice sector to deal with the large number of crimes lead to a wide impunity.

A major problem is the link between organized crime and the security forces. Due to the weak justice system and low salaries for police officers, the implication of police and security forces in criminal activities is a widespread problem. The attempts to reduce the insecurity caused through the youth gangs by force has had no major effect but was even counterproductive, as part of the police took advantage of the situation and strengthened their links to the criminal gangs.³³ For the government under President Alvaro Colom, the fight against impunity needs to be a priority to stabilize the situation and to avoid a collapse of the state institutions and administration.

The insecurity has brought Guatemala close to the situation of a 'failed state', as the authorities are losing the capacity to control or influence the security situation. Lynching and a wide cultural acceptance of violence as a means to manage conflicts are direct results of the missing rule of law, a perpetual impunity and the distrust of the population in the official structures to fight crime and protect their rights. In 2008, the official number of people killed in Guatemala was 5.781, only about one per cent of the killings resulted in a conviction.³⁴

Drug-related crime and organized crime, formerly a problem mostly related to urban areas, has now reached the community level. The organized crime has established multinational structures, whereas the efforts to fight crime are still limited to national boundaries. Transnational Crime Syndicates have established close ties with local criminal structures to securing trafficking routes.³⁵ The few efforts to countervail organized crime have been highly politicised and therefore with limited success, as the

³³ See: Demoscopia S.A., p. 85ff.

³⁴ See: Amnesty International, 2008 Annual Report for Guatemala.

³⁵ "[A]s transnational-organized crime encroaches upon the country, small violent gangs, known as *maras*, are beginning to join forces with the foreign syndicates. Gang members usually hire on as contract killers, extortionists and drug dealers. ... Transnational incidents include frequent border crossings into Guatemala by the heavily armed and extremely well trained private army of the Gulf Cartel, Los Zetas. Working as enforcers for the Golfo Cartel, Los Zetas have infiltrated Guatemalan territory in order to recruit trained Guatemalan military specialists into their fold as well as protect favored land routes. One particularly bloody encounter in Guatemala left eleven people dead in March, 2008. Guatemala's proximity to Mexico has transformed the porous 954 mile long border between the two nations into a very important strategic link for the cartels; something the government of each of these countries must urgently address." COHA-report (2008b).

example of the US-led Counter-Narcotics Plan for Mexico and Central America shows.³⁶ The existence of so-called parallel groups inside the security sector and the public administration in Guatemala with close links to the organized crime has foiled the efforts to fighting impunity and improving the security situation. Although the issues of organized crime and crime prevention are highly sensitive, there are some possibilities for CSOs to work on the security situation. Human Rights and anti-corruption trainings for the police, sensitization workshops for the youth and the work with media representatives and journalists are potential measures. This work can include social and political analysis on causes and effects of organized crime as well as the prevention of lynching and the establishment of early warning systems with CSOs as watchdogs. Efforts to reintegrate ex-gang members into the society and preventive projects with street children have had some positive results in the past, but broader effects can only appear if these activities form part of an overall government strategy to tackle organized crime. Crime and organized crime are one of the most important factors for social and political destabilisation in Guatemala, due to several reasons:

- The involvement of local politicians and security forces in the organize crime undermines the state's authority and its capacity to fight against these structures and destroys the confidence of the population in the police and the justice system;
- The rising number of vigilante justice and lynchings destabilizes the local security situation and aggravates the culture of violence;
- Impunity as a result of the weak rule of law and missing capacities as well as corruption in the justice system leads to an increased number of criminal offences, consequently further deteriorating public security;
- The organized crime has taken over a stronghold on communities, either through repression but also by supporting development activities to safeguarding their operating range and making communities allies for their illegal activities;
- Organized crime undermines development activities, poses a threat to human rights and justice and impedes activities of the civil society in areas where criminal groups are operating.

In fact, it has to be admitted that CSOs are too vulnerable to work with a high profile on these topics, as their capacities to impact on the situation are very limited. The inauguration of the independent National Institute of Forensic Sciences in December 2007 is one effort to strengthen the capacities of the police, but due to its limited human and technical capacities, the impact on impunity will remain low.

2.3 Violence against girls and women

Girls and women are generally the most vulnerable part of the population in an armed conflict. Raping, killing and kidnapping of girls and women – and here in particular the indigenous population – was part of a systematic strategy applied during the civil war in Guatemala. The effects of the repression and abuses are still present, apparently visible in the large number of cases of domestic violence and homicides with female victims. In the period between 2003 and 2007, there were 2093 officially registered cases of assassinations where girls or women have been victims. On a mid-term perspective, the number of capital crimes against the female population has risen over the last years:³⁷

Year:	2003	2005	2006	2007
Killings:	383	517	603	590

³⁶ See several reports on the results of the counternarcotics operations for Mexico and Central America on the US-Governments Accountability Office's website http://www.gao.gov/transition_2009/agency/dos/sustaining-counternarcotics.php

³⁷ Figures taken from COHA-report (2008a).

As a reaction to this situation, the Guatemalan parliament has approved a law against femicide (*Ley contra el feminicidio*) in April 2008, acknowledging the situation of girls and women who suffer from various forms of physical, psychological and structural violence and discrimination. Although the origins of these specific forms of violence can be identified in the patriarchal and male dominated Guatemalan society, “... none of these theories explain why so many women are brutally tortured before and after death.”³⁸ Trafficking and the abuse of girls and women form part of the organized crime, often with the involvement of the security forces.

- Despite several efforts to strengthen the situation of girls and women, they remain one of the most vulnerable groups for crime, human trafficking and homicide.
- Because of cultural reasons, the access to education and economic resources are highly limited for the indigenous female population.
- The culture of *machismo* is widely accepted as an integer part of man’s behaviour (and misbehaviour). The dominant role of men is seen as naturally given, violence against women (including domestic violence) is not perceived as a crime, but as the right of a man to castigate a ‘misbehaving’ woman.
- Women, mainly indigenous women, have very limited access to justice. Additionally, the National Police often neglects to investigate cases of femicide or domestic violence.

Working on the issue of domestic violence, the root causes of femicide and violence against girls and women need to include local political, judicial and religious authorities, the police and the media (e.g. local radio stations). CSOs that work on the topic often become victims of aggression and violence themselves, as there is quite a strong resistance to changing historically consolidated gender roles and grant women the same access to power and resources.

2.4 Conflicts in the economic sector

Economic disparities between the ladino and indigenous population in Guatemala have created a situation of economic exclusion of the indigenous community. The control of the main industries in the country is still in the hands of a small number of influential families, thus creating dynastic structures where access to and distribution of industrial wealth and production is strictly controlled and limited. Since recent years, some change is happening in relation to the economic participation of the indigenous community in the formal economy. More and more small businesses (in particular trading of goods) in urban centres are run by indigenous businessmen and -women. In particular, indigenous women have organized themselves around micro-enterprises and cooperatives. This change is most visible in the country’s capital Guatemala City and the district municipalities.

Economic conflict potentials are linked to the industrial sector and the relation between business companies on the one side and workers and trade unions on the other side about wages, working conditions and the recognition of minimal working standards for employees. Such conflicts are dispersed in the whole country. Intimidations and death threats up to assassination are part of the systematic violence against trade unionists in Guatemala. The level of aggression against union leaders has surged between January 2006 and mid-2008. During this period, at least eight murders, one attempted murder, two drive-by shootings and one gang rape against trade unionists took place. “To this list we could add countless death threats, break-ins, physical and psychological abuse by management, and unlawful dismissals”.³⁹

CACIF, the Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations (*Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras*) is one of the most

³⁸ COHA-report (2008a).

³⁹ See: Guatemala Fact-sheet on Violence by the AFL-CIO, 24.04.2008.

influential power brokers in the political sphere. The association has direct influence on the political course of the government and keeps a grip on parties and presidential candidates. CACIF is dominated by representatives from the ladino business oligarchy and forms a strong opposition against attempts for land reforms or the idea of social property.⁴⁰ The exploitation of labour force in Guatemala has a long tradition, dating back to the colonial times and followed by the multinational agro-businesses (e.g. the United Fruit Company) with a strong influence on political dynamics and the repression against trade unions and political activists. As the oligarchic structures remain in place, any government in power has extremely limited possibilities to change in the overall economic landscape in the country towards an equal distribution of wealth. Conflictivity in this sector will persist high because of several factors:

- The weak Guatemalan economy is highly vulnerable and affected by the turbulences of the global economic dynamics;
- The state is still not in the position to ensure minimum labour standards or to guarantee security for trade unions and activists;
- The dynamics for economic exploitation continue to exist, oligarchic structures have a strong influence on and control of the political dynamics;
- The state and the industrial sector are linked by a paternalist relationship that is kept alive through corruption and the distribution of material/immaterial benefits;
- Despite positive dynamics for SMEPs, the indigenous population continues to be excluded from the main economic sectors.

Main actors are the business community and trade unions, as well as the government, which provides the legal framework to deal with conflicts and to guarantee standards. Conflicts in the economic sector happen mainly between parties of unequal strength or access to power. In Guatemala, the state is not in the position to guarantee the execution of labour laws and provisions. Thus, it is necessary to strengthen the weaker party's capacities for negotiation and provide neutral platforms for the mediation of conflicts. Legal assistance as well as the provision of opportunities for negotiation is essential to reducing asymmetric conflict potentials.

2.5 Exploitation and extraction of mineral resources

The rising demand for raw materials has made the exploitation and extraction of mineral resources more relevant, even in areas where formerly uneconomic mines have been closed down. Especially large-scale open pit mines lead to a major destruction of natural resources and have significant impact on the ecological situation of affected communities. Side effects of large mining operations are mainly deforestation, water contamination and the pollution of the soil and air. Conflicts around mining activities are typically asymmetric. Mining companies work often in close cooperation with the state authorities, whose interest are focused in the generating of revenues from the mining activities. In the case of Guatemala, these are about only 1% of the benefits, which the company gains from its exploitation activities.

Mining activities also generate conflicts inside the affected communities, as some community members expect labour and a regular income from jobs that are provided by the company. Furthermore, local politicians often support mining, as they profit from direct (corruption) and indirect benefits (support for development activities, infrastructure, and political support).

⁴⁰ CACIF refused for example to participate in the 1994 Civil Society Assembly (ASC) and stressed that "... collective systems of ownership have never in practice been as successful as it was claimed they were". It refuted past attempts at redistributive land reform and, on the grounds of technical efficiency, called for the privatization of the few remaining communal or municipal lands." See: Conciliation Resources (2007), p.13. See also Sánchez, p. 18: "... [CACIF] has long exercised political power directly. ... Indeed, it is difficult to name another business association in Latin America with as much influential veto power over public policy as the CACIF To understand the private sector's role in the political system, it is must be noted that the Guatemalan oligarchy remains possibly the most reactionary business sector in the entire hemisphere."

A prominent case for the negative effects of gold mining is the Marlin Mine in Guatemala, Goldcorp's largest Central American operation to extract silver and gold. A part of the mining activities was to be located in the municipality of Sipakapa, San Marcos. The community has resisted the claims of Goldcorp to expand the mining activities.⁴¹ Despite an official referendum organized by the residents of Sipakapa and based on the ILO Convention 169 (emphasizing the right of indigenous communities to be consulted before industrial activities take place), Goldcorp continued its efforts to undertake exploration activities. On May 8th, 2007 the Guatemalan Constitutional Court decided that the consultation was unconstitutional. "Analysts in Guatemala have speculated that the decision by the Magistrates of the Constitutional Court could have been influenced by political, economic and commercial interests."⁴² Interestingly, Goldcorp claims to be the largest taxpayer in Guatemala. The conflict around the Marlin Mine has resulted in a lawsuit against community members which were found guilty and sentenced to two years in prison.⁴³

As the exploitation of mineral resources is one of the major income resources for the Guatemalan state and the demand for mineral resources is rising, it is likely to happen that mining activities will increase. Obviously, neither the government nor the mining companies have made any visible effort to guarantee basic accepted proceedings or take into account mechanisms to managing diverging interests of communities and multinationals. The mining sector constitutes a major potential for violent conflict in Guatemala. The international discussion on mining activities has focused on the social and ecological compatibility of mining activities and enhanced integration of communities.⁴⁴ In September 2007, families of Santa Maria Cahabón and other communities have organized public resistance against mining activities and blockaded their own lands where the Canadian mining company Skye Resources began exploitation activities, as they were granted government-allocated concessions.

Local resistance against mining activities is growing, supported by national and international NGOs. Nonetheless, as mining companies are backed by the government and possess private security forces, potentials for violence are high.

2.6 Large infrastructure projects (Megaproyectos)

In the same sense as mining has become a rising conflict potential in Guatemala, large infrastructure projects (the so-called *megaproyectos*) inhibit the potential for the outbreaks of violence. These projects often cause social and environmental impacts, arising from the need to resettle communities and the destruction of natural environment. Recently, the 100 Mio Dollar project to create a hydroelectric facility in Rio Hondo/Guatemala has been halted by a referendum. The Constitutional Court has decided that the companies have to reformulate the project with new environmental and socio-economic studies. Although this has been seen as a success for the local initiatives, Rio Hondo is only one of several other huge projects in the country to generate hydroelectric energy. The weak capacities of the state to mediate conflicts of interest and the large number of affected communities (in the case of Rio Hondo, about 20.000 people would have to be resettled) increase the risk for violent conflicts. Just as in the mining sector, the construction of hydroelectric plants constitutes an asymmetric conflict potential.

⁴¹ The yearly average water use of Marlin Mine is estimated with a figure of 2.175.984.000 litres of water. See: Rights Action (2007), p. 3.

⁴² Rights Action (2007), p. 10.

⁴³ "In January people from communities around the mine presented a petition about problems the mine is causing them. On leaving the offices they were then attacked by mine security staff, suffered some injuries, but escaped and reported the matter to the police. Later that day about 600 community members blocked the road to the mine in protest. The blockage stayed in place for ten days until the company agreed to negotiate about their concerns. However, the company then initiated proceedings against community members for incitation to delinquency, threats, coercion, and minor injuries. On 11 December two community leaders were found guilty of causing injury and were sentenced to two years in prison." See: http://gsn.civiblog.org/blog/_archives/2007. There is a more detailed description of the case on the website: <http://acoguate.blogspot.com/2007/12/juicio-de-la-empresa-minera-montana.html>.

⁴⁴ Several documents on this discussion can be found on the website of "On Common Ground Consultants Inc." under <http://www.oncommonground.ca/publications.htm>.

Usually, projects of this size are accompanied by a comprehensive public mediation process.⁴⁵ Capacities to implement such complex processes do not exist in Guatemala, thus a third party interventions to mediate and provide a neutral platform for communication and negotiation are a necessary means to avoid violent conflict and to guarantee the participation of affected communities. CSOs can play a significant role in such a process, although most NGOs are reluctant to act on such cases due to the political and security environment. The prospects for peaceful settlements of this kind of conflict are relatively low, thus the international donor community should focus on strengthening organizations and movements, which could act as public mediators.

3 Main conflict and peace stakeholders

3.1 The Catholic Church

Clerical representatives have played an important role in backing the struggle for justice and social inclusion in Central America and Guatemala. The most prominent case in Guatemala can be identified in the bishop of Guatemala, Monseñor Gerardi. The Catholic Church has conducted an investigation on the human rights violations and war crimes committed during the armed conflict as a reaction to the official investigation by the CEH, which has not published the names of the perpetrators. The REMHI (*Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica*) report was elaborated since April 1995 under the supervision of the Office for Human Rights of the Archbishop – (*Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala ODHAG*) which served as technical secretariat for the investigation – and was published in January 1998. Two days after the publication, Bishop Juan Gerardi, who was also director of the ODHAG, was murdered. The ODHAG itself implemented a number of activities related to peacebuilding and reconciliation in the post-conflict setting in Guatemala. Since then, the role of the Catholic Church as stakeholder in the recent context has continuously decreased; its role in the challenging security environment has not been as significant as it was in the direct aftermath of the peace accords. The Catholic Church has nevertheless become an important actor in supporting local and regional movements, which oppose mining activities.

3.2 Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)

Whereas the civil society has played a crucial role in supporting peacebuilding, reconciliation and reparation in the aftermath of the peace agreement, the recent dynamic is much more characterized by a fragmentation and increasing competition for donor funding, as more and more international donors are withdrawing from the country. A lack of cooperation and collaboration between actors of the civil society as well as the fact that the number of NGOs and CSOs has decreased in recent years has additionally had a direct impact on communities that previously profited from related development activities. Another problem is the geographical concentration of strong NGOs in the capital Guatemala-City. Most of these organisations provide non-permanent assistance to local communities and actors without being part of the local setting. This often leads – and in particular in the work with indigenous target groups – to a paternalist approach, where beneficiaries only have little possibilities to participate in the project design. There is an urgent need for long-term support to local NGOs and initiatives, as these often lack the resources to work in a sustainable manner on topics with a local relevance. A critical factor is the declining provision of resources to CSOs by the donor community and the strategic focus on the state as main recipient of funding.

3.3 The security sector

The military in Guatemala was one of the most powerful institutions, the militarization of the society formed part of a national strategy to control and restrict the political and public sphere. Having left behind most of its role and public presence because of the peace accords, the military remains a domi-

⁴⁵ See for example the public mediation process around the extension of the Vienna International Airport (http://www.viemediation.at/jart/prj3/via-mf/data/doks/03presse/ergebnisse_eng_lo.pdf).

nant power within the country. Even the newly elected President Alvaro Colóm – having historical ties with the civil society and ideologically much closer to a social-democratic profile than his predecessors – had to increase the defence budget to keep the military as an allied force to his political administration.

The armed conflict had generated a style of lawlessness state for the military, in particular for the Special Forces that have been created to operate as counterinsurgency elements. The so-called G-2 was the most prominent one, known for its severe human rights violations, torture and systematic killings of (armed and unarmed) opposition group members. While these structures have been dismantled, members of the G-2 and other special units continue to form part of the security problem of the country. Partly operating as clandestine groups or contracted by the organized crime, these individuals or groups continue to threaten the social and economical stability.⁴⁶ The military has officially accepted its new role in a democratic society, but behind the official picture the military continues to play an influential role in the political power structure of the country.

The police still lack professionalism and is furthermore affected by a high level of corruption. The security sector reform has not generated consolidated structures that guarantee the democratic development as well as individual and collective rights.⁴⁷ Missing capacities for criminal investigation increase the level of impunity and the involvement of the police in activities of the organized crime impeded the generation of trust and confidence between the population and the police forces. The latter are more perceived as a threat to individual security than a warrantor for the public security.

Private security forces are deployed by farmers and large industries and are responsible for various human rights violations against the local population. The private security industry is a fast growing economic sector in the country and the Central American region. Due to a lack of legislation and control, these private forces often are responsible for human rights violations up to the point of extrajudicial killings. Their main task is to guarantee individual demands for security, as demanded by multinational business, mining companies and international agro-business corporations.

3.4 Government and state institutions

It is obvious that the several governments in place after the signing of the peace accords have not achieved to improve the security situation, in particular in relation to organized crime, public security and human rights. Recent governments have focused on managing the status quo and consequently reinforced social and economic disparities. The National Plan on Reparations (PNR – Programa Nacional de Resarcimiento) has not been fully implemented, due to several turnovers in its administration and intransparent bureaucratic procedures and delays in the disbursements of funds. Another serious problem can be identified in the sustainability of political decisions, as each electoral period has brought a different party to power.⁴⁸ Corruption and mismanagement of funds have affected the confidence in the democratic institutions in the country, thus creating a tense relationship between the population and the state authorities.

The political parties (although they become more evident during election periods) in Guatemala represent specific group interests, mainly of economical nature and have failed so far to strengthen national identity or social cohesion. *“Parties are more typically electoral bodies, created to please their financial supporters and buttress the career of particular candidates. They constantly fail to represent ordinary people, in general, and indigenous people, in particular.”*⁴⁹

⁴⁶ As one G-2 officer explains in an interview: “The government could say ‘It must stop’. They could say that, but the G-2 *elementos* have grown accustomed to kidnapping and killing and continue to do so. They continue to do so.” Schirmer, p. 290.

⁴⁷ Chávez, p.5.

⁴⁸ “The impact of corrupt political appointees and fractured leadership in the executive branch is compounded by some of the same challenges facing the legislative branch: No political party has remained in power from one presidential term to the next.” McCollim/Taylor, p. 6.

⁴⁹ Lembke/Lövfing, p. 6.

The recent dynamics of conflict in Guatemala tend to undermine the state authority and erode the state's monopoly of legitimate violence. Development strategies for Guatemala need to integrate security aspects, the fight against corruption and confidence building measures between government institutions and the population as an important topic to improving the development situation. The wider concept of "Human Security" has to include the state, individuals and communities as beneficiaries.

3.5 The justice sector

The weak justice sector and the phenomena of Impunity has affected the security situation in Guatemala and led to a rise in ordinary and organized crime in the country. The official statistics reflect a dramatic picture of a further deteriorating situation where the population is threatened by youth gangs ("maras"), criminal groups operating in drug and human trafficking, corruption in the state and private sector and individual violent incidents as result of the increasing impunity.

Corruption in the justice sector, inefficient procedures, weak capacities (human and technical resources) as well as the lack of political will to institutionalize the process of transitional justice are the main factors for the weak rule of law in the country. Politicized trials have further weakened trust and confidence of the population in the legal system. As a result, cases of self-justice are becoming a usual phenomenon in Guatemala, increasing the level of violence.

3.6 Indigenous people and communities

The Indigenous Rights Accord forms part of the Guatemalan Peace Process and points out that Mayan culture, identity and religious practices are to be guaranteed and protected. Although the document has been signed by the URNL, the government and the United Nations, its implementation is far from being realised.

More than 60% of Guatemala's population are of indigenous origin. This population has suffered from severe human rights violations, displacements and the destruction of the social and cultural structures. Whereas the armed conflict has been officially recognized as genocide on the indigenous population, the perpetrators have not been brought to justice and some are still leading figures of today's political environment in Guatemala.⁵⁰ Impunity and the unwillingness and/or incapacity of the state to guarantee justice for the crimes committed are critical elements in the process of the peace consolidation in Guatemala. The quest for reconciliation cannot be separated from bringing to justice the perpetrators and responsible groups for the genocide and the human rights violations.⁵¹

4 Geographical distribution of conflict

The areas where these conflicts are highly manifested are Alta Verapaz, Quiché, Izabal, Petén and Huehuetenango. The causes for conflict vary; Alta Verapaz for example is an area with high conflict potentials around land use and properties. There are also large exploration projects and exploitation of minerals as nickel, undertaken by international companies. Likewise, the construction of hydroelectric and the use of agricultural land for the cultivation of biofuel (African palm and sugar cane) constitute new focuses of conflict in this region.

In Petén and Izabal, most of the conflicts are related to the use and agricultural exploitation of Protected Areas, although there are a considerable number of conflicts for land occupations of private property.

⁵⁰ The most prominent figure is Rios Montt, who is responsible for the worst human rights violations during the mid-1980's.

⁵¹ " ... [E]l perdón tiene un proceso, en el cual tiene que llegar el momento ... en que alguien señalado de violaciones a los derechos humanos y crímenes de lesa humanidad pueda pedirnos, frente a frente, ese perdón, para poder perdonarlo. Porque yo sé y estoy segura que ningún sobreviviente, ningún familiar de las víctimas guarda rencor sino que simplemente queremos que se nos trate con dignidad y también queremos que muchos de los responsables de los crímenes, que están tipificados como delitos, algún día puedan ser llevados a juicio." Programa Nacional de Resarcimiento, p. 22.

In Huehuetenango, most of the conflicts focus around municipal limits. In Quiché, main conflict areas exist about territorial boundaries among neighbours, municipal limits and the construction of hydroelectric power plants.

5 Main conflict areas in Guatemala and their impact on peace and development

Conflict areas	Conflict types	Main conflict actors	Effects of conflict	Impact on peace and development
Conflicts around mineral and natural resources (incl. water) Large infrastructure projects	Resource-based conflicts; Asymmetric conflict type.	Mining companies Rural population Local and regional political representatives and administration Civil Society and NGOs, supporting the local resistance INGOs, observing, monitoring of the situation and effects and advocacy Catholic Church International consulting firms	Environmental pollution and destruction of natural resources Social unrest Local outbreak of violence Privatization of former community water resources	Environmental pollution destroys economic potentials of small farmers Environmental destruction leads to rising conflict potentials Devastating effects on the local health situation Weak legislative framework ("Mining Act") impedes balance of interests Conflicts further weaken the negotiation position of communities
Conflicts around land use and property	Resource-based conflicts and conflicts on identity; Asymmetric conflict type.	Large scale business companies (Agro-businesses) Private Security Forces Indigenous People Land owner ("Finceros")	Violent confrontations between claimants Armed confrontations between private security guards and population Threats against peasants (up to assassinations and extrajudicial killings) Tensions between claimants and local government	Limiting planning processes and mid- to long-term development Slowing down economic dynamics of rural communities Reducing the sustainability, as investments are not undertaken Unclear property rights form obstacle for economic activities Migration to United States
Struggle for political power and interests	Political conflicts; Mainly asymmetric conflict type, can become symmetric between stakeholders at local level.	Local administration Mayors Political parties Politicians	Mismanagement of financial resources Corruption, also related to electoral processes Political affiliation instead of political participation Electoral violence Political repression and assassinations	Slowing down the democratization process and limiting political participation Development needs are not taken into account Corruption leads to a wide mistrust in state administration and affects the relation between population and political elite Obstacle for mutual efforts to form development alliances


Conflict areas	Conflict types	Main conflict actors	Effects of conflict	Impact on peace and development
Consequences of the armed conflict and the genocide	Ideological conflicts; Asymmetric conflict type	Affected communities Catholic church Victims of the conflict Indigenous population	Destruction of social structures and infrastructure Displacements of affected communities Distrust and climate of repression Ongoing Human Rights violations Psychological effects and traumatising Femicide	Negative social impact cuts local development potentials Insecurity affects investment climate for private business Culture of violence destabilizes the social and economic situation Weak public security and mistrust
Conflicts related to the civil society sector	Competition-related conflicts; Symmetric conflict type.	CSOs Donor community INGOs	Division of the civil society sector Lack of coordination and synergies amongst CSOs Ideological disputes Competition for donor support	Weakening the civil society as progressive actor for development Donor driven activities, not related to the development needs Rising competition between stakeholders of the civil society
Conflicts related to the business sector	Competition-related conflicts; Symmetric conflict type, can become asymmetric, if SMEs are getting involved	Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) Co-operations Large business companies Multinationals Government Trade unions	Tensions between settled businesses and new competitive players Business climate is negative, foreign investments are not undertaken Climate of repression against trade unions and activists	Unequal competition Hampering the economic development Slow progress of the small and medium business-sector Unequal distribution of wealth, social conflict Low tax revenues Standards are not applied, low wages and exploitation of labour force
Public security	Symmetric as well as asymmetric, depending on the actors involved	Organized Crime National Police Victims of crime, girls and women Private Security Forces	Femicide Impunity and rising levels of crime Undermining the state authority and erosion of the state's monopoly of legitimate violence	Development is hampered due to illegal and criminal activities Communities are threatened by organized crime

Table: The 15 most violent municipalities in Guatemala (2006): ⁵²

No.	Municipio, departamento	Población	Homicidios	Tasa de homicidios pc 100,00 habitantes
1	San Benito, Petén	33,161	67	202
2	San José Acatempa, Jutiapa	12,993	21	162
3	Coatepeque, Quetzaltenango	104,3731	164	157
4	San José, Petén	3,972	6	151
5	Sta. María Ixhuatán, Jutiapa	21,586	32	148
6	Santa Ana, Petén	16,182	23	142
7	Flores, Petén	34,238	48	140
8	Sto. Domingo Xenacoj, Sacatepéquez	8,798	12	136
9	Puerto Barrios, Izabal	89,645	114	127
10	Magdalena Milpas Altas, Sacatepéquez	9,232	11	119
11	Palín, Escuintla	40,731	48	118
12	Morales, Izabal	94,710	106	112
13	Amatitlán, Guatemala	91,831	102	111
14	Ayutla, San Marcos	30,401	33	109
15	Guatemala, Guatemala	1,071,391	1,167	108

Graph: Rate of Homicide per 100.000 inhabitants for American countries: ⁵³


Tasa de homicidios por cada 100,000 habitantes de algunos países de América (20059)



⁵² UNDP (2007), p.27


⁵³ UNDP (2007), p. 22.

Graph: Municipalities and homicides in Guatemala per 100.000 inhabitants: ⁵⁴



Graph: Evolution of femicide in Guatemala between 2001 and 2006: ⁵⁵

Femicidio en Guatemala



Fuente: Datos de la Policía Nacional Civil.

⁵⁴ UNDP (2007), p.26.

⁵⁵ UNDP (2007), p.30.

Table: Dynamics of selected basic socio-economic indicators for Guatemala: ⁵⁶

	Year	Guatemala
Urban population (in % of total)	1975	36.7
	2004	46.8
Migration (Central Americans living in the United States, in thousands)	1970	17
	1980	63
	1990	226
	2000	327
Coffee (in % of total exports)	1990	25.9
	2000	18.8
Importance of agrarian sector (in % of economic active population)	1980	59.3
	1990	58.2
	2000	56.8
Importance of informal sector (in % of economic active population)	1988/89	53.7
Poverty rate (share of population living below the poverty line, in % of total population)	1980	63.9
	1990	75
	2001/02	60.2
Population living below poverty line (in millions)	1980	4.6
	1990	6.9
	2001/02	77.0
Remittances in mio. US\$	2002	596
	2002	1,600
	2004	2,592
	2006	3,626

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⁵⁶ Source: Kurtenbach, p. 23.

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Annex B – List of Resource Persons Interviewed

Individual interviews:

Name	Organization	Position	Location
Aguilar, Isabel	IBIS Denmark	Responsible for the Youth Investigation Programme	Guatemala
Aguilar, Mariel	UNDP	Director UNFPA	Guatemala
Albizures, Miguel-Angel	FAMDEGUA	President and Journalist	Guatemala
Anckermann, Alfredo	CAFCA	Coordinator Social Area	Guatemala
Balán, Miguel	Asociación de Juristas para el Desarrollo de Alta Verapaz	Ex-coordinator of JADE	Cobán
Berganza Bojorquez, Ferdy Noel	Congress of the Republic	First Vice-President Directive Committee	Guatemala
Bernzen, Agnes	DED – German Development Service	Coordinator Civil Peace Service	Guatemala
Caal Maquin, Enrique	Municipality of Cahabón	Vice-Mayor	Cahabón
Catalán, Raúl Aldana	APNC – Police Academy	Vice-Director Internal Studies APNC	Guatemala
Coy, Elena	SAA – Secretaría de Asuntos Agrarios	Regional coordinator	Cobán
Coy, Roberto Arturo	ADP – Asociación de Amigos del Desarrollo y la Paz	President and legal representative	Cobán
del Cid, Walter	CNAP	Advisor to CNAP	Guatemala
del Valle Escobar, Ruth	COPREDEH	President of the Commission	Guatemala
Escobar, María Mercedes	IBIS	Programme Advisor Governance Fund	Guatemala
Escribano, Carmen Rosa de León	IEPADES – Instituto de Enseñanza para el Desarrollo Sostenible; CAS – Consejo Asesor de Seguridad	Executive Director IEPADES; Coordinator CAS	Guatemala
Euler Pacay, Edgar Romeo	Mercy Corps	Programme Manager	Cobán
González, César Enique	Community Radio Cahabón	Director of the Community Radio; Director of the institute “Ricardo Arjona”	Cahabón
Gonzalez, Maria Patricia	IEPADES – Instituto de Enseñanza para el desarrollo sostenible	Responsible Peacebuilding and Security Sector Reform	Guatemala
Guzmán, Nelson	Youth Association in Cobán	Beneficiary of Propaz and Assessor for Natural Resources	Cobán
Herrarte, Rafael	PNR – Programa Nacional de Resarcimiento	Assessor for institutional development	Guatemala
Holmberg, Dr. Björn	Swedish Embassy	Sida Country Director, Head of Mission	Guatemala
Idema, Harman	Dutch Embassy		Guatemala
Instefjord, Ida	Royal Norwegian Embassy	First Secretary	Guatemala
Mass, Carlos	SAA – Secretaría de Asuntos Agrarios	Assessor “Round Table for Rural Development”	Guatemala

Name	Organization	Position	Location
Medina, Lill-Ann Bjaarstad	NORAD	Former vice-secretary of the Norwegian Embassy in Guatemala	Telephone interview
Moerth, Miguel	Lawyer	Former coordinator of the peace programme of the Swiss Embassy in Guatemala	Guatemala
Monzón, Ivan	Visión Mundial	Project Manager	Guatemala
Morales, Fernando	CAS – Consejo Asesor de Seguridad	Technical Secretary	Guatemala
Nicolau, Luisa Fernández	ODHAG	Responsible Conflict Transformation Area	Guatemala
Pascual, Daniel	CUC	Coordinator	Guatemala
Rosal, Renzo	Soros Foundation	Assessor	Guatemala
Sánchez, Marco Tulio	SAA – Secretaría de Asuntos Agrarios	Assessor for the SAA	Guatemala
Soberanis, Catalina	UNDP	Political Advisor	Guatemala
Soto, Hector	CAFCA	Director	Guatemala
Stanzel, Birgit	GTZ-PCON	Coordinator	Guatemala
Tamm, Jacob	Sida	Programme Official Peace and Security	Guatemala
Torres, Maria Antonieta	IBIS	Coordinator Governance Fund	Guatemala
Tuyuc, Rosalina	CONAVIGUA – Coordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala	Coordinator	Guatemala
Vaagen, Lars	Norwegian Embassy	Ambassador	Guatemala
Wulff, Klaus	IBIS	Regional Director	Guatemala

Group interviews:

Name	Organisation	Position	Location
Elder Barrios	Academia de Policía Nacional Civil APNC	Official 1º	Guatemala
Braulio Bolaños		Official 1º	
Andrea Mérida		Ex Official, retired	
René Mérida	Asociación de la Red Departamental de Atención de Conflictos REDAC, Huehuetenango	President	Guatemala
Virginia del Valle		Speaker	
Santiago Cano		Member of REDAC	
Andrés Santizo	Asociación Jun k'olal "Unidos por la Paz (San Mateo Ixtatán, Huehuetenango	President	Guatemala
María Alonso		Associate	
Sebastián Alonso		Associate	
Andrés Qumez		Associate	
Antonio Mendoza		Associate	
3 Police agents of the PNC	PNC Cahabón	Police agents on duty	Cahabón

Annex C – Guiding Questions

List of guiding questions for the semi-structured interviews with external resource persons:

- How was the first contact to Propaz established?
- Are you aware of the specific objectives of Propaz’ work and activities?
- How do you rate the overall quality of the institution(s) work and approach?
- How do you rate the specific quality of the products and services provided by Propaz?
- How high a profile (visibility) does Propaz have in Guatemala?
- In how far do you see the work of Propaz as relevant in the given context in Guatemala?
- What is your perception of the advantages and drawbacks of the institution?
- How would you describe the impact of the products/services of Propaz?
- How has Propaz connected to other actors of the civil society/to the government (national, local)
- Are there other organisations/institutions providing similar outputs/services?
- How do you see the actual relation of government and civil society organisations?
- What are in your opinion today’s most relevant conflict dynamics in Guatemala
- Who are the actors that can be influenced/can’t be influenced?
- What are your suggestions and/or recommendations to Propaz?

Annex D – List of Selected Organisations Working on Peace and Conflict in Guatemala

In the following, we list a number of organizations in Guatemala that work on peace, conflict and human rights in Guatemala:

ADIPAZ – Asociación del Desarrollo Indígena a La Paz

Contact: Arnoldo Ical Ba, President, San Pedro Carcha, Alta Verapaz

Phone: (+502) 79515871/792050575

E-mail: adipazong@yahoo.es

ADIVIMA – Asociación para el Desarrollo Integral de las Víctimas de la Violencia en las Verapaces, Maya Achi

7^a. Avenida 2-06, Zona 2, Rabinal, Baja Verapaz

Phone: (+502) 79388230, Fax: (+502) 79388687

E-mail: adivima@yahoo.com

ADP – Asociación de Amigos del Desarrollo y la Paz

4^a. Calle 1-70, Zona 3, Cobán, Alta Verapaz

Phone: (+502) 79521623, Fax: (+502) 79521623

E-mail: info@adpverapaz.org

Website: www.adpverapaz.org

Agrupación de Mujeres Tierra Viva

3^a. Avenida 10-18, Zona 1, Guatemala-City

Phone: (+502) 22537244/22517372/22513761, Fax: (+502) 22513537

E-mail: tierraviva@guate.net

Website: www.tierraviva.org

AMECCAV – Asociación Mesa de Concertación Civil de Alta Verapaz

7^a. Avenida 2-16, Zona 1, Cobán, Alta Verapaz

Phone: (+502) 79417076

Email: hagamosuncobanlimpio@yahoo.com

ANH – Asociación Nuevos Horizontes

9^a. Calle 9-38, Zona 1, Quetzaltenango

Phone: (+502) 77614328/78231042

E-mail: Honoris17@hotmail.com

Website: www.ahnh.org

Asociación Comunicarte

4a calle 4-63, Zona 1, Guatemala-City

E-mail: asociacioncomunicarte@gmail.com

Website: <http://asociacioncomunicarte.blogspot.com/>

Asociacion de Justicia y Multiculturalidad

5ª. Calle 10-39, Zona 3, Quetzaltenango

Phone: (+502) 77636327, Fax: (+502) 77636327

E-mail: justicia@inteln.net.gt

ASOMIVID – Asociación de Mujeres Ixiles Víctimas de la Discriminación

7ª. Avenida, Zona 4, Canton Vitzal, Nebaj, Quiche

Phone: (+502) 57691990

E-mail: cedillo094@yahoo.es

CAFCA – Centro de Análisis Forense y Ciencias Aplicadas

2ª. Calle 6-77, Zona 1, Guatemala-City

Phone: (+502) 22303545/22303549

E-mail: cafca@cafcatemala.org

Website: www.cafcaguatemala.org

CALDH – Centro para la Acción Legal en Derechos Humanos

6ª. Avenida 1-71, Zona 1, Guatemala-City

Phone: (+502) 22510555, Fax: (+502) 22303470

E-mail: caldh@caldh.org

Website: www.caldh.org

CEMAYA – Centro de Estudios Maya

3ª. Calle 2-70, Zona 1, Patzún

Phone: (+502) 78398290

E-mail: rafaelcoyote@itelgua.com

CIEPROD – Centro de Investigación, Estudios y Promoción de Derechos Humanos

20ª. Calle 13-37, Zona 11, Colonia Villas La Joya, Guatemala-City

Phone: (+502) 24344766

E-mail: fmendez@terra.com

COICAPEP – Coordinadora de Comunidades Indígenas Campesinas para la Educación por la Paz

10ª. Calle A 13-51, Zona 3, Quetzaltenango

Phone: (+502) 7767-7222, Fax: (+502) 7767-7222

E-mail: coicapecp@emailgua.com

COMADEP – Cooperación Mesoamericana para el desarrollo y la Paz

5ª. Calle 0-35, Zona 1, Guatemala-City

Phone: (+502) 2203101

E-mail: comagua@concyt.gob.gt

COMG – Consejo de Organizaciones Mayas de Guatemala

4ª. Calle 12-20, Zona 11, Colonia Roosevelt, Guatemala-City

Phone: (+502) 2440-8984

E-mail: comg@inteln.net.gt

CONAVIGUA – Coordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala

8ª. Avenida 2-29, Zona 1, Guatemala-City

Phone: (+502) 22537914/22325642

Website: www.conavigua.org.gt

CONGAV – Coordinadora de Organizaciones No-Gubernamentales de Alta Verapaz

Contact: Marvin Chinchilla, Coordinator, Cobán, Alta Verapaz

Phone: (+502) 79514586

E-mail: coordinadora.ongs@gmail.com

Website: www.congav.org

CONGCOOP – Coordinación de ONG y Cooperativas

2ª. Calle 16-60, Zona 4 de Mixco, Residenciales Valle del Sol, Edificio Atanasio Tzul, Guatemala-City

Phone: (+502) 24320966/24314638/24310261, Fax: (+502) 24334779

E-mail: congcoop@guate.net

Website: www.congcoop.org.gt

ECAP – Equipo de Estudios Comunitarios y Acción Psicosocial

2ª. Avenida 1-11, Zona 3, Colonia Bran, Guatemala-City

Phone: (+502) 22321430/22536071

E-mail: ecap@guate.net.gt, ecap@itelgua.com

Website: www.ecapguatemala.org

FAFG – Fundación de Antropología Forense de Guatemala

Avenida Simeon Cañas 10-64, Zona 2, Guatemala-City

Phone: (+502) 22887297/22887302, Fax: (+502) 22540882

E-mail: fafg@fafg.org

Website: www.fafg.org

FAMDEGUA – Asociación de Familiares de Detenidos-Desaparecidos de Guatemala

2ª. Calle “A” 7-13, Zona 2, Guatemala-City

Phone: (+502) 2329432

E-mail: famdegua@guate.net

GAM – Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo

8 Calle 3-11, Zona 1, Guatemala-City

Phone: (+502) 22519037, Fax: (+502) 22200606

Website: www.gam.org.gt

INTRAPAZ – Instituto de Transformación de Conflictos para la Construcción de la Paz en Guatemala

Universidad Rafael Landívar, Vista Hermosa III, Campus Central Zona 16, Guatemala-City

Tel (+502) 2426-2626

E-mail: info@url.edu.gt

Website: http://www.url.edu.gt/PortalURL/Principal_01.aspx?s=82

PRODESSA – Proyecto de Desarrollo Santiago

Calzada Roosevelt Km 15, Zona 7, Mixco, Guatemala-City

Phone: (+502) 24354786

E-mail: chileverde@yahoo.es

www.prodessa.net

ODHAG – Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala

6ª. Calle 7-70, Zona 1, Guatemala-City

Phone: (+502) 22850450, Fax: (+502) 22328384

E-mail: ddhh@odhag.org.gt

Website: www.odhag.org.gt

SERJUS – Servicios Jurídicos y Sociales

12 Calle 30-40, Zona 7, Colonia Tikal 1, Guatemala-City

Phone: (+502) 4739157/4738662, Fax: (+502) 4739865

E-mail: serjus@gua.gbm.net, serjus@inteln.net.gt

Website: <http://www.alforja.or.cr/quees/centros/serjus.shtml>

UNAMG – Unión Nacional de Mujeres Guatemaltecas

7ª. Avenida 4-73, Zona 1, Guatemala-City

Phone: (+502) 22328011/22324960

E-mail: unamg@terra.com.gt

Annex E – Methodology and Results for the SWOT-workshop with Propaz

A.) Methodology for the SWOT-workshop with Propaz:

Proposed timeframe: 3,5 hours

Time	Activity	Objective	Participants
15 min	Introduction to the SWOT tool and the specific purpose of the analysis	Presentation of the tool and the analytical process.	Consultants
30 min	Presentation and discussion of the key elements to analyze: Decision making Policy Strategic framework Approach External settings Needs respond [Further proposals]	Agreement on the major topics to be analyzed in the process.	Consultants and participants
90 min	Group work (2 groups) Policy level group Finance and admin group	Analyzing Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats of/to the organisation.	2 groups of participants
15 min	Coffee break		
60 min	Presentation and discussion	Presentation of the SWOT-matrix of each working group; Discussion of the results, positive and critical points, contradictions.	Each group in plenary All participants
[210 min]	End of the SWOT-analysis		

B.) Result of the SWOT-workshop with Propaz:

Management and technical group

Strengths	Weaknesses
Flexibility and adaptation to different contexts; Contents of the activities responds to the necessities of the country	External requests exceed possibilities and resources
Presence in some municipalities of the country	No auto-sustainability in the processes
Staff continuously updates its knowledge	Limited time for lessons learnt and strengthening of capacities
Macro-conceptual methodology on conflict and peace-building, based on the concept of no-violence	No local staff (exception: Cahabón)
Experiences and competences of staff	Lack of basic alignment (líneas básicas)
Human resources qualified and committed	Monitoring systems needs to be improved
Credibility and recognition on national and international level	Fragmentation of work areas impedes the development of holistic processes
Creativity and constant reflection	Few agility to adapt to the actual context
Clear institutional principles and values, based on a strategic document (PLAE); Vision is based on nature, public sphere and interdependence	Wide amplitude of work topics
Processes are based on a long-term vision	Few investigation and monitoring
	Financial model
	Overload of roles
	There is no real democracy
	Lack of time to approach new thematic issues
Opportunities	Threats
Requests from civil society and the state	Withdrawal of donors
Credibility for peace topics	New interests and demands of cooperation agencies and the vision of Propaz
Establishment of networks and alliances	Insecurity for the future design of processes and projects
Strengthening of local powers ("poder local") and the public sphere	Structural violence: poverty, exclusion, organized crime, parallel powers
Inclusion of peace and conflict topics	Decreasing finances
Contribution to good governance	Drop-out of qualified staff
State needs support and processes and public accountability	Few financial backing can lead to project-oriented focus ("proyectismo")
Law on decentralisation	Immediate need of products in the requests
Possibility to extend coverage and to decentralise services	Loss of credibility in dialogue processes
Identification of new donors and new actors	Polarisation between state and society
Institutionalization of local peace	Conflicts exceed the services Propaz can offer
Necessities of the population	Lack of experience to measure qualitative impacts
Peace Agreements as fundament for the work	

Administrative and finances group

Strengths	Weaknesses
Competent staff, qualified and committed	Little participation in the work of the technical areas (field visits, accompany)
Team leader of the administrative and finances system (SAF) is member of the Internal Advisory Council (CCI) and strengthens relations to the Executive Council and donors	Limitations and obsolescence in cars and other technical equipment
Efficient accountability system, existing Manual for Procedures	Multiple requests but incomprehension in the answer to these demands
Periodical evaluations by audit company which feed back into the SAF	Lack of capacity in particular for the presentation and elaboration of projects
Good interpersonal relations	
Opportunities	Threats
Audit reports do not report irregularities	Global financial instability
SAF shall increase its field visits to know the work of the technical areas	Limited understanding of investment in human resources in the Foundation Propaz
Capacity building for the Foundation Propaz	Foundation Propaz does not have proper infrastructure ("instalaciones propias")
Capacity building in particular for administration and finances	Insecurity and deteriorating security environment can affect the development of Propaz' activities
Help counterparts in topics related to administration and finances	Lack of donor diversification and other financing models

Annex F – Methodology and Results for the Workshops with Beneficiaries

A) Methodology for the workshops with beneficiaries of Propaz:


Proposed timeframe: 6,5 hours

Time	Activity	Objective	Participants
30 min	Opening procedure of the workshop: Introduction words by Propaz and representative of participants Presentation of participants and the evaluation team Purpose of the evaluation and the workshop	“Breaking the ice”, confidence building between team and participants Transparency on purpose and intention of the event	Beneficiaries, Consultants, Propaz representative
30 min	Explication of the methodology: Timeline with focus on conflicts Eminent events and dynamics Defining the structural causes of conflicts Relation between events, dynamics and intervention Discussion on procedure with participants: Questions, suggestions and changes to the methodology	Agreement on the major topics to be analyzed in the process. Understanding of the process Agreement on the procedure and establishing participation of participants	Beneficiaries, Consultants
60 min	Establishing the conflict timeline Identification of starting point Identification of major events on national/regional/local level	Identification of key conflict events and historical evolvement of conflicts	Beneficiaries, Consultants
15 min	Coffee break		
45 min	Identification of relations and structural causes of conflicts	Identification of root causes of the conflicts, external elements and internal (community) dynamics	Beneficiaries, Consultants
75 min	Lunch break		

Time	Activity	Objective	Participants
90 min	Analysis of the intervention	Relevance of Propaz' intervention	Consultants
	Short explication	Analysis of key issues, such as sustainability, impact, quality of services	Participants
	Group work (split-up of participants group to be decided according to participant's profile and the working areas of Propaz)		
	Analysis of activities		
	Quality of outputs		
	Outcome and use of products		
	Changes achieved by the intervention		
	Validation of long-term changes		
	Sustainability of input		
30 min	Presentation of results of each working group with subsequent discussion	Discussion on the results and agreement on the intervention analysis	Plenary
15 min	Closure of the workshop	Debriefing of participants	
	Wrap-up of the event		
	Way forward		
	Closing by Propaz, evaluation team and representative of participants		
[390 min]	End of the workshop		

B.) Results of the workshop with beneficiaries in Cobán, 03.11.2008:

- Conflict timeline and main conflict areas, as developed by the participants



- **Group work: Results of the workshop in Cobán**

1. Why do you think the work of Propaz is relevant?

Group 1A: Because Propaz creates spaces of expression for young people and makes us aware on the role we can play in society.

Group 1B: It is important because it focuses on sensitization to create a change in attitudes

Group 2: Propaz makes public topics of social interest, from different point of views which has an influence for change and on the processes for the construction of a better society.

2. How does Propaz respond to your needs and necessities?

Group 1A	Necessities and demands	Response	Impact
	Strengthening of values	Establishment of dialogue processes	In our way to act and to think
	Free expression	Giving us the opportunity to participate and express our opinions	In our personality
	Self-confidence	Making us conscious of what we are and what we can do	In our self-confidence and self-knowledge

Group 1B: Creating a interdependent auto-didactical platform through the process of capacity building.

Group 2: The solution of problems related to the recent situation (“problemas coyunturales”) and for historical, political and other problems; Through a specific didactical methodology which is adapted to the respective topic.

3. How do you describe the quality of the products and services Propaz provides?

Group 1A: Excellent, as Propaz achieve its objectives and is committed to achieve a positive change in the youth. They have created a positive attitude amongst the young people, making them committed and responsible, which often neither at home nor in the school is being achieved.

Group 1B: Of excellent quality because of the human resources; Preparing and delivering an updated methodology and resources.

Group 2: The methodology and the materials are adapted to the capacities of the facilitators and the participants. Strengthening of knowledge as well as the facilitators and the participants enrich exchange their experiences; Equal treatment of the participants and attention to a sense of humanity (“atención a la parte humana”)

4. What changes did you realize with the intervention of Propaz?

Group 1A: There where definitely changes, dialogue, tolerance and respect form part of our coexistence now. We have learned to know ourselves, others and to look different at our environment.

Group 1B: Revolutionizing and developing our ideas, strengthening capacities and attitudes (communication, self-confidence, trust).

Group 2: Widened sensitization of the participants for the causes and effects of agrarian problems. Prioritization of dialogue for resolving conflicts in the agrarian sector. Increased participation of the society in the topic of agrarian conflicts. Agents for multiplication and change have been strengthened. There is an increased participation of women in CMTIERRAS. Increased participation and strengthening of the public sphere.

5. How do you apply the new capacities and knowledge acquired?

Group 1A: We believe in ourselves and in what the young generation is capable to do. We have recognized the cultural diversity, we do respect each other, we look for spaces for expression and to participate there and we take care of the protection of our natural environment.

Group 1B: In our daily life and in social spaces.

Group 2: Spread the knowledge through methodologies in our organizations either in the urban as in the rural areas.
Adapting the methodology and generating changes for daily practices.

6. What would happen if Propaz would not provide services anymore?

Group 1A: We don't know, as the topic of youth in the society is extremely wide. We believe we can be multipliers ("agentes multiplicadores"). We believe it would be important to continue the processes of dialogue of understanding in relevant topics like:

- Youth and family;
- Youth and political participation;
- Youth and economy;
- Youth and tourism as source of sustainable development;
- Youth and drug addiction.

We hope we can count with the help and support of the sensitization team of Propaz.

Group 1B: We have the fundament but we still need a professional support like this of the organisation and the methodological input to generate changes in society.

Group 2: Weakening of the spaces created and would put in risk the planned processes in the public sphere. Disintegration of the human capital

7. How do you describe the sustainability of Propaz' intervention?

Group 1A: For the moment none, but we hope that after the success in the first process Propaz will continue its work with the youth in Alta Verapaz.

Group 1B: For the moment, there is no follow-up because the process is terminating now. But because of the initiative of GAP, there is a suggestion to continue the processes for the citizen's sensitization ("sensibilización ciudadana").

Group 2: During three years there was sustainability of the workshops in Alta Verapaz through new processes (in particular through the Diploma ACAAV).

8. In how far is Propaz' methodology participative?

Group 1A: Yes, as for the whole process the interests of the youth to participate and learn were taken into account. The methodology allowed that we could express ourselves and life together in a healthy way ("conviveramos sanamente"). We never got bored.

Group 1B: The whole methodology was participative, spaces for all and everyone.

Group 2: With the design of the workshops and the participation of local organizations. The diverse opinions as well as different political and ideological positions have been taken into account.

9. Are there indigenous stakeholder in your organisation?

Group 1A: Yes, equality has been a promoted value during the whole process.

Group 1B: Yes, as the convocation process was not restricted.

Group 2: Yes, about 80%.

10. How do you rate the participation of women and indigenous groups in the activities?


Group 1A: We have all lived together with respect and even more without discrimination on gender and ethnicity. We have obtained many friendships.

Group 1B: There was an important participation for intercultural coexistence and inter-ethnic relations.

Group 2: Yes, at a low level, it is not enough so it is suggested to work on this topic.

C) Results of the workshop with beneficiaries in Cahabón, 05.11.2008:

- Conflict timeline and main conflict areas, as developed by the participants



- **Group work: Results of the workshop in Cahabón**

1. How did you get to know the Foundation Propaz?

- Group 1:
- Through information by the vice-mayor
 - Through information by the CoMuDe
 - Through communication with Carlos [Sarti, director of Propaz]
 - Through information by the CoCoDe
 - Through information by women's organizations
 - Through the public media (radio stations)

- Group 2:
- Through meetings with the vice-mayor
 - We have also heard about them in the local radio station
 - Through gathering with the coordinators [of Propaz]

2. What changes have happened due to the arrival of Propaz?

- Group 1: It has changed our live between men and women and our living in peace and harmony. They have taught us to live in coexistence and in dialogue with our family and our community. We have a good relationship to the local authorities.

- Group 2: The change that could be seen is that the men don't drink alcohol. We are putting into practice not to have problems with our neighbours and family members.

3. How did you resolve existing conflicts before Propaz arrived?

- Group 1: With the help of the local authorities (assistant judge, municipality, peace judge and the public prosecutor's office).

- Group 2: With the help of the judge, the municipality, the police, the public prosecutor's office and the CoCoDe.

4. How do you resolve conflicts today and what has changed in that sense?

- Group 1: We are now developing ways how to resolve conflicts in our community. We are saving time and make our efforts more efficient ("economizar hacia las demás personas"). There is a good relationship with the community leadership.

- Group 2: We can already change small conflicts in our communities.

5. Have you been informed about what Propaz was planning to do?

- Group 1: Yes, they told us how to live together in harmony and understand each other. We were consulted for the design of the activities. They have taught us how to mediate and negotiate conflicts. This is a fundamental base of its objectives, as the vision of Propaz is to mediate conflicts.

- Group 2: They have explained to us that they will help us to reduce conflictivity ("combatir el conflicto"). They have also counted on us as facilitators.

6. How do you rate the participation of women?

- Group 1: There is a good participation of women. Women have been trained to becoming facilitators.

- Group 2: The participation of women is about 25% in each region. We expect that there will be more participation of women.

Annex G – Schedule for the Research Phase

Date	Activities
22.10.	Flight SJ to Guatemala (arrival 19:35h in Guatemala-City)
23.10.	13:00 – Meeting of the evaluation team
24.10.	Delivery of final version of the inception report to Sida
25.10.	Weekend
26.10.	Weekend
27.10.	09:00 – Meeting at the Swedish embassy 14:00 – Meeting of the evaluation team with Propaz staff
28.10.	08:00 to 13:00 – Propaz, interviews with management and staff members 14:00 to 17:00 – SWOT workshop
29.10.	09:00 to 15:30 – Interviews with external stakeholders 16:00 to Joint interview with representatives from REDAC and the Association JUNKOLAJ
30.10.	09:00 to 18:00 – Interviews with external stakeholders
31.10.	09:00 to 17:00 Interviews with external stakeholders 17:00 a 18:00 Internal discussion evaluation team
01.11.	Weekend (national holiday)
02.11.	08:30 – Trip from Guatemala City to Cobán, Alta Verapaz 14:00 to 16:00 – Interviews with external stakeholders in Cobán
03.11.	09:00 to 16:00 Workshop with beneficiaries in Cobán
04.11.	08:30 to 13:30 Interviews with external stakeholders in Cobán 14:00 – Trip from Cobán to Cahabón
05.11.	09:00 to 15:00 Workshop with beneficiaries in Cahabón 16:30 – Interviews with deputy mayor, PNC
06.11.	09:00 – Participation in closing event with community organizers 2008 11:00 – Return to Guatemala-City 17:00 – Meeting evaluation team/preparation of the first findings
07.11.	10:00 – Presentation of the first findings to Sida, Propaz and MFA 18:00 – Return Team to home base

Annex H – Terms of Reference

Evaluation of Foundation Propaz, Guatemala

1. Purpose of the Evaluation

The purpose of this evaluation is threefold. First, it is to assess, in a systematic, transparent and objective fashion, the extent to which Foundation Propaz has achieved the objectives set out in the 2005–2008 Strategic Plan and, at a wider level, contributes to (i) reduce manifest tensions and prevent violent conflict and (ii) building lasting and sustainable peace in Guatemala. Second, the evaluation should provide concrete recommendations to Propaz as to how it can enhance the achievement of results and be more effective in terms of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. These will serve as an input to the elaboration of the Propaz Strategic Plan for 2009–2012. Finally, given that financial support to Propaz from the two main donors, the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (Sida) and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), will end by this year, the evaluation will be an important input for Sida's upcoming discussions regarding whether the support to Propaz shall continue or be phased out. The MFA, following the decision to phase-out Norwegian development cooperation from Guatemala, has already announced the definite end of its support to Propaz by the end of 2008.

The evaluation will examine the totality of activities, with a focus on their impact upon preventing violent conflict and building peace, undertaken by Propaz Foundation during 2005–2008, which constitutes the current phase of Swedish and Norwegian support. The assessment will be done in accordance with the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and efficiency)⁵⁷. The specific OECD/DAC criteria for conflict preventing and peacebuilding interventions (coherence, linkages and coverage) will also be considered⁵⁸.

2. Background

Sida and the MFA have supported Propaz since the signing of the Guatemalan Peace Accords in 1996. Originally a program created by OAS, promoting peaceful resolution of conflicts through mediation and dialogue, in 2003 the Foundation Propaz became an independent Guatemalan national foundation and it has been working as an autonomous entity since then.

In 2005, MFA and Sida signed a co-financing agreement for a total amount of 8 000 000 NOK and 7 500 000 SEK for the period December 2005 to November 2008 in a second phase of core-support for Propaz. This support is based on the 2005–2008 Strategic Plan of the Institutional Strengthening of Foundation Propaz. Apart from Norway and Sweden, Switzerland also provides core-funding to Propaz. Other donors, such as Soros Foundation and GTZ have provided support to specific projects.

The 2005–2008 Strategic Plan defines the overarching goal of Propaz Foundation as to “contribute to the consolidation of peace process, the establishment of participative democracy and the strengthening of the public sphere in Guatemala, promoting processes of awareness-raising, capacity building and facilitating the creation of spaces of dialogue, analysis and transformation of conflicts and formation of citizenship”.

⁵⁷ The criteria are defined in accordance with the OECD/DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management (see attachment).

⁵⁸ See OECD/DAC (2008) “Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities” (www.oecd.org/dac/conflict).

The specific objectives of Propaz include:

- (i) to contribute to the making of a participative citizenship which is more conscious as to the importance of dialogue both as a value in itself and as a fundamental democratic practice for the transformation of conflicts in the public sphere;
- (ii) to develop knowledge, abilities and new attitudes based on dialogue, participative citizenship and prevention, resolution and transformation of conflicts;
- (iii) to facilitate spaces of dialogue and negotiation in the public sphere which promote the construction of agreements within and between sectors in situations of conflict.
- (iv) to create internal and external conditions that ensure the consolidation and sustainability of the Propaz Foundation and that promotes it as an independent and impartial institutions in the management of social conflicts.

The four areas of work of Propaz are thus: (i) communication and awareness-raising; (ii) education and capacity-building; (iii) facilitation and; (iv) institutional strengthening.

Sida's and MFA's decision to continue to support Propaz in 2005 was taken as promotion of dialogue and peaceful resolution of conflict between and within different sectors and groups in the Guatemalan society – a society characterised by deep inequalities, intolerance and exclusion of groups of the population – was understood to be crucial for the consolidation of peace and democratic development in the country. Propaz work was regarded as all the more relevant given the lack of an institutionalized and impartial public space for dialogue between different actors of the Guatemalan society.

As Propaz included among its stated aims to promote participative democracy and expressed the importance to focus on excluded groups, the support to Propaz was also intended to contribute to poverty reduction and have an impact on some of the key drivers of conflict in the country.

Moreover, the decision to continue a second phase of support to Propaz in 2005 was informed by an evaluation commissioned by Norway in 2004 to assess the first phase of the support, which rated the overall performance and impact as high and emphasized the credibility, impartiality and legitimacy of Propaz' activities in a highly polarized environment. However, the evaluation also recommended Propaz to take action to improve impact at the socio-political level, improve results-based management and address the issue of institutional sustainability.

Commissioning an evaluation of Propaz at this moment is considered to be appropriate for various reasons. First, an objective assessment of Propaz performance during the current strategy period is critical to improve its relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and impact and sustainability in the coming years. Moreover, given that the current agreement between MFA, Sida and Propaz is ending by the end of 2008, and that MFA has announced that it will not continue its support to Propaz, the evaluation will help Sida to decide on future funding.

3. Scope, Questions and Recommendations of Evaluation

3.1. Scope

The evaluation will examine the totality of activities undertaken by Propaz Foundation, with focus on their impact upon preventing violent conflict and contribute to peacebuilding, from the start of the current phase of Swedish and Norwegian support until the present date, from December 2005 until September 2008⁵⁹.

3.2. Evaluation Questions

The evaluation is expected to address the following set of questions:

Relevance?

- a) What is the relevance of the assumptions, goals and the proposed theory of change of the Propaz Foundation in relation to the causes, key dynamics and driving factors of conflicts in Guatemala? Does Propaz base its work on an accurate and up-to date conflict analysis? Do activities and strategies fit the objectives? What is the relevance of Propaz work as perceived by its beneficiaries and particularly so in relation to the needs, priorities and demands of Guatemala's indigenous peoples and women? To what degree is Propaz capable of adapting theory and method to the national context and to the specificities of partners and beneficiaries?

Effectiveness?

- b) To what extent has Propaz achieved its stated objectives and expected results? What have been the key factors contributing to or hindering the achievement of the objectives? In case Propaz has failed to achieve its aims, is this due to flaws in theory and assumptions, in implementation or external factors?
- c) What steps have been taken to improve the results-based management of Propaz? With what results? How are results and goal achievement of Propaz activities measured and monitored? In this sense, evaluators are requested to assess SIPMES, the organization's monitoring system.
- d) To what degree does Propaz learn from its experiences in one region, when it moves to the next one?

Impact?

- e) What has been the impact of Propaz in terms of preventing violent conflict and building peace on the specific level (communities, municipalities and institutions where Propaz have acted, including also considerations of impact of each specific area of work) and on the general level (national level, referring to the impact of the totality of Propaz' activities, including possible synergies between the different areas of work, between partners and with initiatives or other actors exogenous to Propaz)? Have the efforts prompted people increasingly to resist violence and provocations to violence? Have Propaz had any impact on the key drivers of conflict in Guatemala? In these terms, how does Propaz compare to other initiatives promoting conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Guatemala?⁶⁰
- f) Particular attention should be given to assess the impact of work area (i) of Propaz – communication and awareness raising. Who do the activities implemented in this area reach? Where? Why? Are they the right people?

⁵⁹ While the evaluation is to assess the overall performance and impact of Propaz, evaluators will be requested to focus on certain areas of work of Propaz. However, these will be defined once the tender process has been completed and need therefore not be specified in the evaluation proposal.

⁶⁰ Evaluators should be sensitive to differences in the conceptualization of impact between Propaz and OECD/DAC and propose a common definition which could guide the Propaz 2009–2012 Strategic Plan.

- g) Considering that Propaz works to promote changes in attitudes, behaviours, relationships and practices, what steps have been taken, to ensure that changes at the individual/personal level transfer to changes in the socio-political level? For example, have the efforts resulted in creation/reform of political institutions or mechanisms to handle grievances that fuel conflicts in Guatemala⁶¹?

Sustainability?

- h) Have durable structures, processes and institutions which strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease the likelihood of violent conflict been created as a result of Propaz efforts?
Has a meaningful “handing over” or exit strategy been developed with local partners, actors or communities that enable these partners to build or continue their own peacebuilding initiatives?
Do local organizations and authorities have ownership of the activities promoted by Propaz?
- i) Which steps have been taken, or are planned, to ensure the institutional sustainability of Propaz?

Efficiency?

- j) Does Propaz deliver its outputs and outcomes in an efficient manner (results against costs)? How does Propaz compare in costs to other options (programs or organizations) for achieving the same goals?
How cost-efficient is the general management of the intervention (steering, management, personnel)?
- k) Do the resources invested by Propaz in monitoring, internal competence-development and institutional strengthening balance the results obtained as a result of these investments?

Coverage?

- k) What is the geographical coverage of Propaz in Guatemala? Does the geographical orientation and location of Propaz help/restrain the organization to/from attaining its objectives? Does it enable/disable the organization’s capacity to keep abreast with and relate their work to the expressed needs, priorities and demands of indigenous actors? Are the resources invested in particular regions – as opposed to others – proportional to the level of conflicts in these regions?
- l) Does Propaz learn from experiences in one region when it moves to other?

Coherence / Coordination / Linkages?

- m) Does Propaz co-ordinate with other organizations, policies and programmes in the field of peacebuilding and conflict prevention in Guatemala? If this is so, has this contributed to greater impact of Propaz activities? If this is not so, how can Propaz activities be better coordinated with other initiatives to achieve a greater impact?

Cultural / Gender Sensitivity?

- n) Is Propaz sensitive to the specificities of the indigenous peoples and communities where it works?
In terms of language, customs and methods? How do methods of conflict resolution promoted by Propaz interact with traditional and other locally established conflict resolving mechanisms?
What is the relationship, if any, between Propaz and indigenous organizations and movements?
- o) In what ways does Propaz work to promote gender equality and the human rights of women?
With what results? Do activities take into consideration the intersectional discrimination that indigenous women often are exposed to? With what results?
- p) What efforts have been done by Propaz to improve the work in these areas over time?
With what results?

⁶¹ For further guidance on evaluating linkages between the individual/personal changes and socio-political changes, evaluators are requested to consult, “Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners” (Anderson and Olson, 2003).

3.3. Lessons Learnt and Recommendations

The evaluators are requested to identify lessons learnt as well as to make concrete operational and strategic recommendations to improve the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability and coherence of Propaz in the Guatemalan context of violent conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Recommendations should also be made with regards to suitable future focal areas of Propaz (generalists/specialists? national/local? reactive/proactive?) and, in the light of the present dependency on donor funds, in terms of developing a strategy for financial sustainability. The recommendations will serve as important inputs for the upcoming strategic planning process of Propaz.

Evaluators should also provide recommendations to help Sida decide whether or not to continue support Propaz.

4. Process and Methodology

The methodology of the evaluation will be proposed by the evaluating team. However, it is expected that the team adheres to the following three phases:

Inception Phase (1–2 weeks)

- a. Desk review of existing project documentation, including Propaz 2005–2008 Strategic Plan, yearly reports, self-evaluations, cooperation agreements, donor assessment memorandums and decisions, evaluation of earlier phase of supports, donor multi-annual strategies, etc.
- b. Conflict analysis. The evaluators are expected to undertake a simple, given the time frame, desk conflict analysis in order to understand the causes, context and dynamics of conflict and peace in Guatemala and thus to be able to evaluate the relevance, effectiveness and impacts of Propaz.
- c. Elaboration of inception report. Should contain a revised proposal for the evaluation, including interpretation of the evaluation questions, methodology for data collection and analysis and an evaluation work plan. The conflict analysis should be attached to the report. The inception report will be approved by Sida, with the no objection of MFA. The approval of the report is a condition for starting the next phase.

Research Phase, Guatemala (1–2 weeks)

- a. Start-up meeting with Propaz, Sida and MFA in the Swedish Embassy in Guatemala where the evaluation team will present the content, methodology and work plan.
- b. Data collection and analysis. The evaluation team will conduct interviews with embassy and Propaz staff, national partner organizations, institutions and authorities, other key informants (national experts on conflict prevention and peacebuilding, indigenous and women organizations, etc) and beneficiaries as well as make field visits to a sample of Propaz projects.
- c. Presentation of tentative findings, conclusions and recommendations in meeting with Propaz, Sida and MFA.

Final Report Phase (1–2 weeks)

- a. Elaboration of first draft of final report, to be sent via e-mail to Propaz, Sida and MFA for commentaries and observations.
- b. Elaboration of final report of evaluation, to be presented via e-mail to Propaz, Sida and MFA. The final report will be approved by Sida, with the no objection of MFA.

5. Evaluation Management

The evaluation team will report directly to the evaluation management group, which will be constituted by a member of Propaz (Carlos Sarti, Director, e-mail: carlos_sarti@propaz.org.gt), a member of Sida (Jacob Tamm, Program Officer Peace and Security, Embassy of Sweden in Guatemala, e-mail: jacob.tamm@foreign.ministry.se) and a member of MFA (Idar Instefjord, Chargé d’Affaires, Embassy of Norway in Guatemala, e-mail: Idar.Instefjord@mfa.no). The committee will be responsible for attending the different requests and demands of the evaluation team as well as making comments on the draft reports.

The evaluators will be selected by Sida. MFA and Propaz should express in writing their “no objection” to Sida’s selection of evaluators. Sida is responsible for the full cost of the evaluation.

6. Reporting

The evaluating team should present the following reports to Sida and MFA:

- Inception report, containing a revised proposal of the evaluation (questions, methodology and work plan). This should be sent via e-mail to the evaluation management group for comments. Once incorporated, the report will be sent by e-mail to Sida for approval and for the no objection of MFA.
- Oral presentation of tentative findings, conclusions and recommendation of evaluation. Should be presented at the end of the field mission in Guatemala.
- First draft of final report, containing findings, conclusions and recommendations. The draft is to be sent to the evaluation management group for comments.
- Final Report (max 40 pages + attachments). The final report will be approved by Sida with the no objection of MFA. The final report should correspond to the following format:
 - Executive Summary;
 - Introduction;
 - Description of Foundation Propaz;
 - Findings;
 - Evaluative Conclusions;
 - Lessons Learnt;
 - Recommendations;
 - Annexes (terms of reference, methodology for data gathering and analysis, conflict analysis, references, etc).

The reports shall be delivered in English. The language of work during the field mission in Guatemala shall be Spanish. The reports shall be written according to the OECD/DAC terminology for evaluation and results based management (see attachment).

7. Principles

The evaluation shall adhere to the draft DAC Evaluation Quality Standards (see attachment). The final report will be reviewed according to these standards before approval.

8. Evaluation Team

The evaluation team should consist of two consultants. The team should:

- have extensive and verifiable experience in the use of methodologies for impact analysis of peacebuilding and conflict prevention activities (such as peace and conflict impact assessment) and conflict analysis;
- have experience in evaluation of peacebuilding and conflict prevention interventions in Central America and/or Latin America;
- have good knowledge of the Guatemalan context and, preferably, one of the consultants should be of Guatemalan nationality;
- have expertise in work with indigenous peoples;
- be gender balanced and be able to conduct gender sensitive analysis;
- be fluent in Spanish and English (written and spoken).

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Sida Evaluation of the Foundation Propaz, Guatemala

The evaluation consists of two main parts. First, it assesses the extent to which Foundation Propaz, a Guatemalan CSO, had achieved the objectives set out in the 2005–2008 Strategic Plan and wider contributed to prevent violent conflict and building peace in Guatemala. Second, the evaluation team elaborates recommendations for Propaz to enhance the achievements of results and effectiveness. The evaluation assessed Propaz to be a relevant actor in Guatemala demonstrating a number of important results in the areas of resolution and mitigation of conflicts. However, greater focus in terms of objectives and expected results would improve effectiveness and enhance the impact of activities. Being dependent on the funds of one donor – Sida – improving financial sustainability was raised as a critical issue for the future of the organization.

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