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Sida Review

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Programme for Democratic Policing between the  
Rwanda National Police, the Swedish National Police  
Board and the South African Police Service



Programme for Democratic  
Policing (PDP) between the  
Rwanda National Police  
(RNP), the Swedish National  
Police Board (SNPB) and the  
South African Police Service  
(SAPS)

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The views and interpretations expressed in this report are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida.

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Chair of the Strategic Planning Committee of RNP:

*"I don't think that we own the Strategy 2009-2013. I know that we own it."*

SNPS programme manager:

*"The Strategic Planning process with RNP and SAPS has been one of the best working ex-periences in my 25 years of international experience".*

SAPS programme manager:

*"One of the major issues now is how to modernize the basis of RNP".*

## 1. Abbreviations

BTC	Belgian Technical Cooperation
CID	Criminal investigation
CLADHO	Grouping of Leagues and Associations for the Defence of Human Rights
CPC	Community Policing Committees
CSE	Crime scene examination
EC	European Commission
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, Germany
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
PDP	Programme for Democratic Policing
RNP	Rwanda National Police
SAPS	South African Police Service
SC	Steering Committee
SNPB	Swedish National Police Board
SWAp	Sector Wide Approach
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
USAID	United States Agency for International Development





## 2. Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations

### 2.1 Executive Summary

Political commitment to strengthen the justice sector and to build capacity and professionalize Rwanda National Police (RNP) has been a high priority for the government since it formed RNP in 2000. The RNP leadership is enthusiastic about developing its capacity, including police skills and tool boxes for policing, and strengthening the strategic and long term planning skills of the police.

The most important impact of the tripartite cooperation between the Swedish National Police Board (SNPB), the South Africa Police Service (SAPS) and Rwanda National Police (RNP) seem to have been in the form of mind-setting and feeding new and professional ideas into RNP and to help shape the strategic thinking of the police leadership. Almost all planned projects and activities have been accomplished, only few projects were not implemented. As far as could be established, most project objectives were achieved to a satisfactory level of accomplishment.

The team found that the human rights approach was stronger in the projects than the tripartite partners had anticipated, but that the rights aspect was incorporated as a routine element not labelled 'human rights'. Its relevance can be increased by mainstreaming standard operational procedures into all areas of work of RNP.

Much remains to be done which is to be expected by a new police organisation that was established recently under very difficult and challenging conditions. The tripartite partners, and in particular RNP, have done everything they possible could to ameliorate this situation and should continue to do so.

Focus for the tripartite police cooperation in the third phase should be on strengthening the strategic direction and implementation of the new Police Strategy. Particular attention should be given to anchoring the knowledge and police skills acquired in the first two phases of the Programme for Democratic Policing (PDP) in the police as such as well as in the police schools and academy. In this way it would be ensured that the various police functions are being professionalized at all levels in the police and that respect for human rights are further internalized.

The next level of implementation will probably be even more challenging and the results more difficult to obtain. Therefore it will be critical to address the broader layers of police leaders in RNP that are less educated and master English less well than the top leaders of RNP.

As more donors are now supporting RNP, cooperation with donors and the NGOs supporting RNP should be intensified and made regular.

### 2.2 Conclusions<sup>1</sup>

#### General

On the whole the PDP has been very successful. By far most of the activities have been executed according to the plan or with a slight delay. As far as the team could establish, most project objectives were achieved to a satisfactory level of accomplishment. However, lack of reliable data made it difficult to verify objectively and the team had to rely on the information given by the interviewees and on the site visits. Considerable progress has been made in the safety and security of the population and in building confidence in the police. The evaluation team assesses that the PDP has contributed considerably to this progress.

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<sup>1</sup> For an assessment of the individual project components, please consult annexes 3–10.

The strong commitment of the government of Rwanda and the chiefs of police of the three countries were decisive for the successful realization of the PDP.

The tripartite cooperation has been a major asset in the implementation of the PDP. The cooperation allowed RNP for informed choices of strategies and activities, and the input from three different worlds – Rwanda, South Africa and Sweden – offered different experience and knowledge. This input capacitated RNP to make well considered choices for its future development.

The PDP substantially helped covering the first needs of the RNP in its development. Given the progress of the RNP in these six years, a more systematic approach to its further development is now indispensable. The well designed Strategic Plan is a good starting point for that.

### **Strategic Planning**

The 2009–2013 Strategic Plan and the implementation plan 2009–2010 are excellent tools for the broad development of RNP in all aspects of policing. The baseline study provides an equally good and improved set of data for the implementation. The Strategic Plan is instrumental for donor management and helps RNP to direct donor initiatives.

### **Training**

Training has rightly been added to the programme in 2006 as most projects have a strong training component. Training activities and training of trainers have been conducted with professionalism and are valued highly by the participants. However, there is no provision yet in the RNP for anchoring the knowledge and skills acquired in the PDP.

Theoretically train-the-trainer programmes have a high potential for sustainability. In practice trained officers have often been transferred to other functions not relevant for the qualifications obtained. The capacities of trained officers are therefore not utilised optimally. The management of human resources should be strengthened and the police rotation system should be reviewed. Also, there should be a systematic reflection on the system for education and training and its relation with policing and police management.

### **Criminal Investigation**

The objectives of training and delivery of equipment have partly been reached. According to the trained CID and the police experts the quality of criminal investigations and of CSE work has improved. As PDP training concentrated on supervisors and managers, it has not reached the level of the investigators. This hampers further improvement. The equipment of the interview rooms provided by PDP is not up to standards, their use is unclear.

A number of limitations for further strengthening criminal investigation, not all within the scope of the PDP and which RNP agree on, have been identified which may put the sustainability at risk. These are:

- There is no budget available for the replacement of used tools in the CSE area.
- Trained trainers are relocated so that their acquired skills are not utilized and there have been no subsequent training to replace those transferred.
- CID has no place where its quality is maintained and its skills kept and ameliorated, such as a specialized branch of the police school or the police academy
- CSE and forensic work lack a basic but well equipped forensic laboratory with qualified personnel.
- There are no standards or procedures for criminal investigation and no minimum standards for reporting.

BTC has carried out a needs assessment and will support RNP in the implementing of the next phase.

## **Accountability**

A large part of the objectives of the accountability project has been reached. The Inspectorate of Services plays an important role in the implementation of ameliorations in the RNP and training in internal investigations has helped strengthening the inspectorate. The role of the Inspectorate will become even more important once the operational standards are being adopted and promoted.

The delay in drafting a manual for operational procedures is justified by the discovery of the differences in the legal systems of Rwanda and South African. The publication, however, now becomes a matter of urgency.

The objective of establishing model police stations has not been realized. According to the police advisers in PDP, this is not a priority for RNP.

## **Community Policing**

In the community policing project, SAPS and SNPB have succeeded in playing a strategic advisory and supporting role in the design and implementation of a RNP community policing system that fits to the Rwandese situation: relatively low costs and high impact. A law has been passed and the objectives have been reached.

Systematic training of CPC and liaison officers would improve the effectiveness of the community police at local level.

## **Management**

Project management, middle and strategic management courses have fulfilled a basic need for knowledge and skills in police leadership. They have been very useful for that purpose and the objectives have partly been reached.

The absence of a set of requirements regarding type and level of knowledge and skills needed may have limited a more focused training. The train-the-trainer approach in management training have led RNP staff to operate as assistants in management training courses but most argue that they do not feel competent to function as trainers. An assessment of the need for further competence building should be carried out.

Knowledge and skills in the field of management are not yet anchored in the police educational system.

## **Women Empowerment & Addressing Violence Against Women**

RNP has build up some competences in women capacity development and is promoting the goal of including more women in the police. In addition, this goal should support the RNP aim of addressing victims of violence against women in society in general – which is a key human rights challenge. The aim is that there should be enough female police officers to address the female victims and handle their complaints.

With inspiration from SAPS, RNP in 2008 established a women empowerment network for female police officers, and it was also planned to establish a mobile career centre that should help recruit more female police officers – which has not yet been established. Still the capacity of RNP to address female victims of violence is very weak.<sup>2</sup>

## **Human Rights**

The human rights approach in the tripartite projects was well incorporated as a routine element with a low profile.

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<sup>2</sup> See appendix 6 on criminal investigation for more information.

### **PDP Management**

The tripartite partners have excellent collaboration both in the steering committee and in the programme management team. The commitment on the political level, in the SC and in the management team is exemplary. The administration and documentation has improved considerably in recent years and is up to standards. Data collection is still a challenge, but it is being improved. The administrative burden for RNP still seems to be very high and should be revisited.

There is limited access to internet in RNP hindering a swift communication with its partners.

### **Cost Sharing**

The system for cost sharing has been a good way of ensuring equal partnership, local ownership and sustainability. In general, the funding mechanisms seems to function well, even though the administration from Sweden probably is more costly than if activities in Rwanda had been administered locally.

### **Donor Coordination**

Donor coordination is probably the weakest point in the PDP. There is a need for strengthened collaboration between RNP, police institutions and police advisors, both within and outside the tripartite structure; RNP, donors and NGOs supporting RNP; and donors and NGOs supporting RNP. Some cooperation should be at high level, but most should be at a practical level. It should be those that have 'hands on' in the projects, be it in criminal investigation, training of the legal police, in management or in community policing.

There is also a need for sharing information about projects, having an overview of who is doing what, circulating project documents and evaluations, to discuss implementation, to monitor police performance, and to get updated written overviews of donor and NGO input.

There are indications that the transfer of the criminal investigation project to BTC has not been running as smoothly as it should, due to RNP's prompt transfer of the project to BTC, phasing PDP out without planning for a transfer period. Even though the BTC advisor has been visiting SNPB, the project seems to have been through a standstill period.

### **Reporting**

Reporting and monitoring is not yet up to standards. In order to direct day to day policing adequately, better reporting is necessary. Next to that a simple but effective monitoring system to monitor implementation of the Strategic Plan is indispensable.

### **Languages**

Almost all of the leading police officers related to PDP are English speaking. This puts a question to how the PDP reach out to the French speaking part of RNP that supposedly must be the largest group of police officers in RNP. Unfortunately the team did not get the opportunity to look further into this question, but suggest that the tripartite cooperation discuss this issue.

## **2.3 Recommendations**

The recommendations are based on the evaluation taking the point of departure in the TOR. Other relevant projects and plans for the future have not been taken into account.

### **General**

PDP and the tripartite cooperation should continue in the present form. It may be considered to place advisers with RNP for specific projects for an agreed period of time. Collaboration with other actors in regard to relevant sub-components or component transferred to other donors should be strengthened.

The PDP programme should shift focus to:

- i) The specification and support for the implementation of the Strategic Plan;
- ii) Strengthening the reporting and monitoring capacity for RNP as such;
- iii) Maintaining, anchoring or transferring of PDP projects to other donors;
- iv) Anchoring training, education and human resource development, with due consideration to staff rotation policies in order to enable that police officers trained will be able to utilise the training received in their present positions.

In order not to lose pace, ongoing PDP projects should continue. They can be integrated into the Strategic Planning in the course of its development.

### **Strategic Planning**

The tripartite collaboration should be directed towards the realisation of the strategy.

RNP could develop an inventory with a description of all its projects based on the Strategic Plan and prioritized according to its importance. RNP working groups could describe and specify the projects for the inventory which at the same time would enhance ownership and commitment.

This would be a strong point of departure for donor support, as they would have to choose their input from the project inventory according to the RNP priorities.

The strategic office should report directly to the commissioner general. A Change Manager may be appointed (or an expert placed in a transitional period) assisting in the implementation process.

The strategy should be introduced at all levels of RNP in order to explain the why's, what's and how's. Specifically, there is a need for in-service training at district level in order to compile plans for the implementation of the strategy.

### **Reporting**

A reporting and monitoring system aligning and harmonizing donor requirements should be established in order to ensure that the administrative burden will be as low as possible for RNP.

To verify reports and indicators, a statistical office should be established, gathering data from the police districts and police stations. Sufficient human and physical resources must be allocated to this activity, including adequate infrastructure and proper training to individuals that will be placed at the office.

### **Training & Education**

Experience gained from the training programme will help RNP in systematically managing human resources. An initial step could be to develop a plan for education and training linked to the management of human resources, taking the point of departure in the Strategic Plan. PDP should join forces with other donors who are contributing to RNP in the same field.

At the same time, PDP should continue to integrate training in ongoing projects in order not to lose momentum.

Human resource development linked to training and education would ensure that police functions are mainstreamed. A manual for recruitment, placing and promotion, circulation and retaining police officers in specialized jobs would further strengthen the capacity of RNP.

## **Criminal Investigation**

In order to make CID activities sustainable, donor contracts with RNP should in the future contain conditions for the provision of budgets for running costs, including replacement of used goods and instruments, and for that officers trained in a specific field should perform functions related to the training received, at least in a minimum period.

CID training should be preceded by a needs assessment, before training of managers and investigators in specific skills, procedures and reporting.

For the sustainability of future programmes in the field of CID, a specialized section at the police training institute should be established. A forensic laboratory adapted to Rwandan conditions is necessary for anchoring specialized knowledge and skills in the field of crime scene investigations and forensics.

## **Accountability**

The publication of Standard Operational Procedures will have to be supported by training and systematic inspections in order to assure compliance. The inspectorate should be strengthened for that purpose.

Further training in internal investigations is recommended in order to maintain support to this important function.

The introduction of model police stations is only useful if the model can become standard throughout the country. Given the budgetary consequences decisions in this respect should be considered thoroughly.

## **Community Policing**

Training of the community liaison police officers and the CPC in their role in community policing should be a key priority. If e.g. NGOs contributes with specific training elements, SNPB/SAPS could be attached in an advisory role assisting in the design and implementation of the training. The community police training should be tied to the educational and training system in order to anchor the added knowledge and skills.

The relationship between the RNP and the local defence units should be monitored carefully, in particular with regard to access to justice and the protection of human rights, and preventing corruption to develop.

## **Management**

Assist the management of Human Resources in drafting requirements (TOR) for the various management levels in RNP in order to ameliorate the effectiveness of the management training.

Continue activities in the field of management training and use RNP trained trainers as co-trainers until they have built up enough knowledge and self confidence. Anchor knowledge about police leadership and management in RNP by enhancing the capacity of the RNP educational system in this field.

Assist in building libraries and police relevant documentation.

## **Women Empowerment & Addressing Violence Against Women**

The programme needs to be strengthened considerably with regard to the empowerment of female police officers and addressing violence against women. PDP should appoint dedicated female police officers to run this project component, and, if possible draw on French speaking police consultants (as the head of this programme is only French speaking<sup>3</sup>).

A budget for running costs should be included for the establishment of a mobile career centre.

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<sup>3</sup> Alternatively simultaneous translation should be available throughout the project implementation.

## **Human Rights**

Focus on integrating human rights and rule of law in the training and education, and in the mindsets of each and every police officer must remain strong. The effect can be increased by mainstreaming standard operational procedures into all areas of RNP work.

## **PDP Management**

The administrative burden of reporting needs to be unified and aligned with the requirements of donors to the justice sector, so that focus could be on improving the quality of the reporting.

It recommends that smooth internet facilities are installed in the key RNP offices of cooperation so that smooth communication is facilitated. It would save time and travel expenses if coordination increasingly would take place via Skype.

## **Cost Sharing**

It should be considered to establish an account in Rwanda so that refunding of local expenses could be administered locally. RNP may run this itself. This would require that safe procedures for spending are established. It may be considered to house longer term experts in guest houses with good facilities and internet access.

## **Donors**

Donors, NGOs and RNP should consider to elaborate standards for collaboration, sharing of documents and evaluations (some perhaps only in the closed circle<sup>4</sup>), and a regular update of project information.

Coordination and collaboration should be strengthened at three levels between:

- RNP, the police institutions and the advisors that it is collaborating closely with, both within and outside the tripartite structure. Within each sub-area where SNPB and SAPS are involved, regular meetings should continue to take place.
- RNP, donors and NGOs supporting RNP.
- Donors supporting RNP. Local donors regard Sida as the lead agency for support to RNP and therefore encourage Sida to continue to organise donors meetings, preferably regularly.

It may be considered to invite police advisers working for other donors to relevant technical meetings of the tripartite cooperation, in particular the BTC police adviser. It has also been suggested that a four-partite group is established between RNP, SNBP, SAPS and the BTC Dutch police adviser for a one year transitional period, particular with regard to the criminal investigation project.

RNP and PDP should look at how they can ensure a flexible and efficient collaboration with new donors and NGOs that wish to support RNP in areas that are also the focus of the tripartite cooperation. In particular, they should ensure harmonization and smooth overlap in transition periods when new donors take over, so that results already obtained are not lost.

## **Languages**

One way of remedying for the obvious barrier of leading French speaking officers with regard to foreign police cooperation may be to include in PDP police officers from SNPB and SAPS that speaks French.

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<sup>4</sup> It is not all donors that have a policy of publishing evaluations.

### **3. Objectives and Methodology**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

The review of the Swedish support to the tripartite Programme for Democratic Policing (PDP) between the Rwandan national police (RNP), the Swedish National Police Board (SNPB) and the South African Police Service (SAPS) took place over the period from 14 April to 19 May 2009. The evaluation team presented by COWI, comprised Ms Birgit Lindsnæs, institutional and human rights specialist as team-leader, and Mr Piet van Reenen, consultant, former Chief of Police, and police expert.

The team spent two days in Uppsala and Stockholm, eight days in Rwanda, and yet another day in Stockholm.

During the course of the mission, the team held talks with RNP officials, met with ministerial and external stakeholders, foreign experts, NGO representatives, international organisations and Swedish trainers and project managers. A meeting was held with donors in Kigali, and a debriefing meeting took place on May 4 with RNP, Sida Kigali and the consultants.

Without the professional, kind and effective assistance from the Sida office in Stockholm, Mrs Anne Ljung, the Sida office in Kigali, Mrs Malin Ericsson, the Sida project assistant, Mrs Brice Mukashema, and the project manager in RNP, Mr Jimmy Hodari, the team would have been unable to undertake the evaluation as efficient as was the case.

The team wants to express its gratitude to all assistance rendered and to all persons met for their cooperation. The views expressed in this report, however, are solely those of the team and can not be taken as representing neither Sida's nor other stakeholders' viewpoints.

#### **3.2 Objectives and TOR**

The overall aim of this report is to evaluate the implementation of the Programme for Democratic Policing (PDP) from the time of its inception in 2003 up to date according to the TOR. This institutional cooperation programme is implemented through a tripartite arrangement between the Rwandan National Police (RNP), the Swedish National Police Board (SNPB) and the South African Police Service (SAPS). The main emphasis of the evaluation is on the period of tripartite cooperation, e.g. from 2005 up to date.

The main objective of PDP is to strengthen the institutional capacity of RNP to deliver quality services to the community as a professional police based on democratic values in respect of the rule of law and human rights.

A total amount of 29 million SEK has been allocated to the programme since its start-up in 2003 to the end of the programme in 30 June 2009, and is thus the largest donor support to a policing in Rwanda to date.

The Sida cross-cutting themes will be incorporated in the assessment of the programme components, except for those that have major overall importance for the programme.

#### **3.3 Evaluation Criteria and Methodology**

The evaluation shall make an assessment of the achievements, accomplishments and shortcomings, impact, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the programme against its expected results as indicated in the programme documents from its inception in 2003 to 2009, e.g. for its six years of operation.



The evaluation will be based on the TOR and Sida's evaluation manual of which the overview of the main criteria is attached as Annex 1 and 2.

Based on this analysis, the Swedish strategy for Police Cooperation and Governance support, the Rwandese Strategy for a Sector-Wide Approach to the justice sector (SWAp), the Strategic Plan for RNP 2009–2013 as well as recommendations for the next phase of the Tripartite cooperation will be specified.

The analysis is based on a desk study of documents, consultations and interviews with stakeholder as specified in the programme in Annex 3.

To some degree, the absence of quantitative data and the difficulty in separating the impact of RNP initiatives from those of PDP is a limitation to the evaluation. The evaluation can therefore only assess the perceived impact in some of the projects areas.

### **3.4 Reporting and Sources of Information**

Desk research was carried out for the six main areas of tripartite cooperation: The strategic cooperation, cross-cutting issues, the overall programme management and the tripartite cooperation as such. Relevant project documents consulted are: TOR's, contracts, log-frames/project documents, progress and activity reports, minutes of meetings, project baseline information (2005, 2009), mid-term review (2007), statistics, and strategies for the justice sector and for the RNP (2005–2008; 2009–2012). The material was received from Sida, SNPB (Uppsala and Stockholm, and RNP without limitations.

Although there were shortcomings in the beginning of the programme the reporting gives, in general, a good understanding of the dynamics of the tripartite cooperation and the programme components. The reports and the strategies have increasingly been drafted by RNP and local consultants adding to RNP ownership and capacity building.

Some reports are uneven in format and it should be considered to establish a standard model for reporting. Project reports do not follow a stringent log-frame format. The last and useful baseline study, annual project report and PDP report improve the overview of project activities to exemplify what project has been carried out and what not, and what new activities have been added.

Documents relevant for the evaluation were willingly made available by Sida, SNPB and RNP, ministries, donors and NGOs consulted. However, activity and travel reports do not seem to be shared by all institutions involved in the cooperation, which prevents transparency.

Output indicators are clearly identified and verifiable indicators have been established in the new RNP strategy. This should facilitate the formulation of indicators for the third phase of the tripartite cooperation.

In order to establish a framework for the review of projects, a number of government documents and strategies, and NGO reports were reviewed to assess whether the PDP projects have been relevant in the particular context. This is particularly the case in terms of human rights, gender, anti-corruption and HIV measures, since these are Sida mainstream priorities.

### **3.5 Structure of the Report**

The main findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation are to be found in the main report. More detailed elaborations, findings and tables are put in the appendices. The executive summary, the main conclusions and recommendations are in chapter 2. Chapter 3 deals with the technical parts of the report: the objectives and the methodology and chapter 4 gives information on elements of

the Rwandan context of the programme, including human rights, health care and HIV. Chapter 5, 6 and 7 of the report contains the main findings of the programme, the tripartite cooperation and donor coordination.

Apart from the interpretation of Sida's evaluation criteria for this evaluation, the annexes contain the programme of work and the people interviewed, and the specific analyses of the six plus one intervention areas of PDP, observations regarding human rights in the context of the programme and a table with an overview of the programme activities per project, including planned and realised activities.

The documentation relevant for the programme is fairly comprehensive, and not all is referred to in this report. The key documentation is referred to in the footnotes.

## **4. The Rwandan Context**

### **4.1 Governance**

Taking into consideration the difficult and insecure conditions in Rwanda after the genocide in 1994, the government has managed relatively well to work its way towards creating peace and security and embarking upon the process of transforming the justice sector. A number of indicators suggest that Rwanda has achieved a remarkable progress since the adoption of the new Constitution in 2003. According to the World Bank, the most remarkable improvements have been achieved in terms of government effectiveness, where the score for 2007 is 39.8 compared to 12.8 in 2002 and control of corruption is 55.8 compared to 35.4.<sup>5</sup>

The net enrolment in primary schools has risen to 95% and the gender gap in literacy was close to zero in 2006.<sup>6</sup> Women are represented by more than 50% in the lower house in parliament.

With the adoption of a new constitution by referendum in 2003, the government took steps towards equitable power sharing and making the justice sector institutions accountable. There are strong indications that the government is intensifying the focus on justice sector reform and professionalising the police, particularly because a comprehensive justice sector strategy and a new police strategy was adopted in 2008.

### **4.2 The Justice Sector**

The genocide completely destroyed the justice sector and wiped away key human resources. The number of educated lawyers, prosecutors and judges left were less than fifty for each of these groups. The university had to increase the intake of law students at an unusual high level, having very little capacity and with almost no books available for the students. In addition, there was no system for using defence lawyers in courts or paralegals advisors before a new system gradually was established towards the end of the 1990ies. Few donors supported the rebuilding of the justice sector, except for human rights and UN organisations. This was partly due to uncertainty as to which direction Rwanda would develop. At the same time the new government was struggling with how to deal with peace and reconciliation and the 125,000 genocide prisoners.

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<sup>5</sup> [http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc\\_chart.asp](http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_chart.asp).

<sup>6</sup> [http://www.mdgmonitor.org/factsheets\\_00.cfm?c=RWA&cd=](http://www.mdgmonitor.org/factsheets_00.cfm?c=RWA&cd=), Rwanda, 1 November, 2007

Because of this past, the justice sector is still suffering from a severe capacity and competence gap. An increasing number of lawyers have now graduated from the law faculty (even though the total numbers are still low), thus making it possible for the government to require a legal background for filling some of the position at e.g. the prosecutors office. In the meantime, positions have been filled by staff with no or other educations, some having been trained by NGOs and foreign experts.

The constitution sets up an independent judiciary. As part of the reform, the number of judges was reduced from 700 to 250, in order only to allow the most competent judges to remain in office. The public prosecutors office has been re-established and decentralised, and are now financially independent. Among the new laws adopted is a new penal code (2004), followed by a revision of the civil procedures.<sup>7</sup>

### 4.3 Justice Sector Strategy

In November 2008 the government adopted its second justice sector strategy, named “Justice, Reconciliation, Law and Order Sector Strategy and Budgeting Framework”. It is a comprehensive and impressive document (137 pages), drafted with input from 14 justice sector institutions, including the ministry of interior, to which the police refer, the national human rights commission, the ombudsman and the national police. NGOs also contributed to the strategy, including the bar association, the judicial defenders body, and local and international NGOs working with justice and reconciliation. The Ministry of Justice chair and is secretary for the work.

The strategy maps out the justice sector and its complexities in all relevant aspect, including the overall strategy for the police. The Strategic Plan for the police fully links up to the justice sector strategy with only one deviation, as far as the team could identify. The justice sector strategy provides for an “operational approach for RNP supervision of the Local Defence to be fully operational in 2010”<sup>8</sup> which is not yet contained in the RNP strategy.

The justice sector strategy should be commended for establishing transparency and clarity and for sharing key information available such as figures, tables, statistics, overall budgets and examples of expected cooperation with donors, including Sida, UN organisations and NGOs.

A difficult challenge will be to ensure that the justice sector chain will function in all its’ links, including the weak ones, and to capacitate the formal justice institutions such as the prosecutors, the courts, the legal defence, the detention and the prison system.

The greatest challenge for the justice sector strategy is probably how it will manage to deal with the informal justice system that is still deeply rooted in the life of the ordinary people. The strong focus on education combined with public information that is already part of the strategy is probably the best way to address this challenge.

### 4.4 The Police

According to a highly placed police officer interviewed, Rwandan Patriotic Front, that formed the government after the genocide, had three challenges in 1994: First to stop the genocide by military means, secondly to police the country in a transitional period and thirdly to create a police out of a military tradition. By appointing a police commissioner from the pre-1994 time, the government managed to get control over the then existing three police forces, namely the Gendarmerie, the Police Communale and the Police Judiciaire.

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<sup>7</sup> Justice, Reconciliation, Law and Order Sector Strategy and Budgeting Framework, Republic of Rwanda, 25 November 2008, p. 96.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, p.131.

In 2000 the government took the first real reform initiative and merged the three police forces into one, named Rwanda National Police (RNP). In preparing the merger, officers from the former police forces were selected and transferred to RNP, in addition to adding new recruits from outside. Most of the leading police officers in RNP today have been trained in the former Gendarmerie or has a background in Rwandan Patriotic Front.

The impact of establishing a new police, combined with the adoption of a new constitution and laws, has been very visible since around 2003/4. This is confirmed by all stakeholders interviewed, including a prosecutor, critical NGOs and foreign advisors living in Rwanda throughout the period. They agree that there have been a positive improvement in the behaviour of the police and that safety and security in the streets are high even at night. This is confirmed by a survey stating that “RNP has earned the widespread respect of the Rwandan people, with over 85% questioned expressing a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the police”<sup>9</sup> and by monitoring institutions<sup>10</sup>.

According to expat advisors in the executive, RNP today is the most efficient institution among the justice sector institutions. The capacity to plan and implement change has improved considerably in recent years and RNP is quick to respond to requests.

There are between 6,000 and 7,205 (the figures differ in the justice sector strategy) police officers in RNP and about 90,000 volunteers in the Local Defence.

Beneath the top management level, however, the competences are very thin and the level of education low.

Among the top managers, most leaders are relatively young with a university education, but with varying degrees of track records and little access to mentors or more experienced colleagues. That the leaders are young may turn out to be an advantage to the reform process because they may be more open to new ideas than elderly leaders may have been.

An outstanding issue is how RNP deal professionally with the Local Defence that was set up after the genocide for community protection and now is under the operational control of RNP, including in relation to its firearms, and the District Mayors.<sup>11</sup> According to the Joint Governance Assessment abuses reportedly are rare since they were brought under the control of the police in 2004.<sup>12</sup> However, this is difficult to assess because a proper monitoring system is not yet working.

The long-term challenge will be to transform RNP into a democratic police service and to get away from the old military style of operation that still remains part of the police culture (but perhaps not part of the culture of the top management).

## 4.5 Human Rights

Rwanda is still recovering from its civil war from 1990–1994 and its subsequent genocide. The human rights situation has to be seen in that perspective. Rwanda’s formal human rights commitment is high. The country has ratified nearly all of the international conventions as well as the regional instruments.<sup>13</sup> Focus is now on the incorporation of human rights in national legislation.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>9</sup> World Values Survey Rwanda (forthcoming) as quoted in the Rwanda Joint Governance Assessment: Government of Rwanda and Development Partners, final draft, 23 July 2008.

<sup>10</sup> US State Department Country reports; Human Rights Watch; Amnesty International; Freedom House; Rwanda National Human Rights Commission, and the Ligue Rwandais pour la Promotion et la Defense des Droits de l’homme.

<sup>11</sup> Justice, Reconciliation, Law and Order Sector Strategy and Budgeting Framework, Republic of Rwanda, 25 November 2008, p. 56.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, p.54.

<sup>13</sup> DIHR, Rwanda and human rights, [www.humanrights.dk](http://www.humanrights.dk)

<sup>14</sup> Justice, Reconciliation, Law and Order Sector Strategy and Budgeting Framework, Republic of Rwanda, 25 November 2008, p

The new constitution contains guarantees concerning most human rights, though some are formulated more restrictively than in the treaties that Rwanda has ratified. Rwanda reportedly took concrete steps to advance human rights, which resulted in a June law that abolished restrictions on political party organizational efforts at local level, and a dramatic drop in reports of torture and abuse of suspects and passage of legislation that significantly expedited the Gacaca process.<sup>15</sup> In April President Kagame pardoned former president Pasteur Bizimungu.

Nevertheless human rights abuses reportedly still do occur. Extrajudicial killings by security forces allegedly increased in 2008.<sup>16</sup> The police was said to sometimes impose collective punishments, including beatings on residents of communities in which the property of genocide survivors had been damaged. Prison and detention center conditions remained harsh, although overcrowding decreased significantly during the year. Prolonged pre-trial detention was still a problem, and government officials were said to have attempted to influence judicial outcomes, mostly regarding the Gacaca.<sup>17</sup> Violence, in particular against women, is said by RNP to be a big problem.

These are challenges to be addressed by the government or by the police.

#### **4.6 Health Care, incl. HIV**

All employed by RNP has free health care and police hospitals are headed by the police itself. RNP has a comprehensive HIV policy that links up to the governments' HIV strategy. There is a rehabilitation centre for HIV infected persons. However, malaria is perceived as a bigger problem than HIV and is also treated at the police hospitals. The PDP did not focus at police health or HIV.

#### **4.7 Corruption**

That the government is trying hard to combat corruption is confirmed by a World Bank survey and its Worldwide Governance Indicators. These indicate progress in 2007 compared to 2002 where the government's control of corruption has increased to 55.8 from 35.4.<sup>18</sup> The Ibrahim Index published in 2007 designated Rwanda as the country in Africa which has improved most in comparison to 2002 data,<sup>19</sup> which is confirmed by TA. According to TA's CPI index, Rwanda's performance decreased in 2008: It scored 2.5 in 2006, 2.8 in 2007 and 3.0 in 2008,<sup>20</sup> indicating that corruption is still perceived as being serious by its sources in Rwanda.

In overall terms RNP is said not to be corrupt and seems in this way to have won the trust of many. This was confirmed by NGOs spoken to. RNP has launched a campaign with a badge "no corruption" visible at police stations. RNP trained police officers in the HQ in the prevention of corruption and 250 police officers have been dismissed because of corruption allegations in the last few years.<sup>21</sup> The team was informed that dismissals for corruption charges are published in news papers and police stations in order to set an example.

RNP reports itself that petty corruption is an increasing problem, particularly in the traffic police and among the volunteers in the Local Defence. The team was informed that the RNP Inspection actively is trying to curb this development.

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<sup>15</sup> Most of the genocide cases are dealt with in the Gacaca tribunals that consists of laymen. One of the tasks of the police in this relation is to protect witnesses.

<sup>16</sup> US State Department report 2008

<sup>17</sup> US Department of State, Rwanda, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100499.htm#>

<sup>18</sup> [http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc\\_chart.asp](http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_chart.asp).

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.moiibrahimfoundation.org/index/single.asp?countryid=35>.

<sup>20</sup> [http://www.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/\(1= best score\)](http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/(1=best%20score))

<sup>21</sup> "Rwanda: Police Train on Corruption Prevention, AllAfrica.com-Washington, USA, 02 December 2008. Quote from the acting commissioner general.

## 5. Assessment of Programme

### 5.1 Overall Findings

#### Assessment

The overall assessment of PDP is that it has been very successful.

It has been difficult to measure to what extent the overall objective has been achieved, namely “to strengthen the institutional capacity of RNP to deliver quality services to the community as a professional police organisation based on democratic values in respect of the rule of law and human rights”. PDP has in a very substantial way contributed to the strengthening of the institutional capacity of RNP and to create a better understanding of the rule of law and human rights. But it has not been realistic to define an objective or a set of indicators that can qualify RNP’s ability to “deliver qualified services to the community and being a professional police organisation based on democratic values” given the context and challenges. It would need much more capacity building to reach this part of the objective that should have been a long term goal.

Most project objectives in the six areas of tripartite cooperation have been reached, and have been completed on time or with slight delay, some have been only partly achieved. The effectiveness and efficiency were reasonably good in the many projects. Human rights have been integrated as a cross-cutting component in most projects, in terms of training in legal safeguards and in the prevention of police violence. Thus the approach was indirect with a low profile and in a rule of law language.

In the first crucial phases of building a national police, the SNPB/SAPS support was vital for enhancing the level of knowledge and skills in all major areas of policing. It has allowed the RNP to formulate its own needs and strategic objectives. Even though the development of the strategy plan was not amongst the six main areas of cooperation, this area of cooperation has probably been the most important success of the tripartite cooperation. This success would not have been possible without the input of the operational components.

The 2009–2013 Police Strategy and Annual Implementation Plan fits well into the government’s broad justice sector strategy and came about as a result of the tripartite collaboration.

According to the RNP police leadership, the tripartite cooperation has inspired them to move in a strategic direction at a level of thinking that RNP was not introduced to before. An important incentive to the RNP leadership has been that the collaboration has been an important eye opener which has enabled them to be inspired by the way SAPS and SNPB are thinking. The cooperation has enhanced the capability of RNP to take decisions about how to move forward. At the same time RNP itself has strengthened its determination to build up a professional and inclusive police. Without the RNP’s leadership’s dedication, the success of the cooperation would not have been achieved.

#### Relevance

The bilateral cooperation between RNP and SNPB (2003–2005) and the tripartite cooperation between RNP, SAPS and SNPB (2005–2009) have been timely, relevant and successful. PDP was timely because RNP recently had been established and because donors at that time were hesitant to support RNP in a comprehensive way<sup>22</sup>. Given the lack of capacity at all levels in RNP, there has been a large demand for assistance and training and, perhaps more importantly, for partnerships and sparring with other police services.

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<sup>22</sup> Generally speaking donors are hesitant towards supporting police institutions in a substantive way because physical human rights abuses often are committed by the police

## **Statistics**

There was little statistics available in the first PDP phase. This has improved in the second, but statistics are still weak. The team supports the proposal of building up a monitoring and evaluation system in RNP, including a statistical unit. This is also a priority in the justice sector strategy.

## **Donor/Expert Input**

The donors expressed the view that they see Sida as the lead donor to RNP in Rwanda. Sida, and more so SNPB/SAPS, have built a relationship of mutual trust with the RNP. Moreover they have covered most areas of policing in the past programmes.

## **Impact on Society**

The perceived impact of strengthening RNP is high. The consolidation of RNP is said to have taken place since 2003/4, strongly supported by government initiatives. Stakeholders agree that there has been a visible and positive improvement in the police behaviour. This has impacted the feeling of safety and security of the ordinary people. To what extent PDP has been decisive for this development cannot be ascertained, but PDP has definitely contributed.

Impact on RNP According to expat advisors in the Ministry of Justice, RNP is the most efficient institution among the justice sector institutions, capable of planning and implementing changes. Commitment to professionalise RNP and to strengthen the rule of law and human rights is a high priority. The RNP is enthusiastic in developing capacity, including police skills and tool boxes, and in strengthening the strategic planning tools. It has been strongly indicated that PDP contributed to the positive development of RNP, even though only perceived impact can be established.

## **Effectiveness**

The objective of PDP to strengthen the institutional capacity of RNP has been achieved and more than that, because PDP in addition has helped develop the strategic thinking and direction of RNP. This can not be measured by indicators but is the perceived effectiveness gathered from interviewing a large group of police officers. This conclusion is shared by external stakeholders.

## **Efficiency**

In general the implementation of the programme has been efficient. RNP would like the procedures for spending funds to be more flexible as they find that the procedures are cumbersome. Also, some RNP officers were of the opinion that it has not been all experts that matched the needs and in this way more funding than necessary were spent. The team can not assess this view but suggest that the SC should discuss the criteria for selection of and qualifications of police officers visiting Rwanda to deliver training.

## **Sustainability**

RNP is conscious about the fact that there is a general resistance to new concepts and tools among lower rank police officers. The policy of RNP is therefore to implement changes gradually and step-by-step. The long-term sustainability of the tripartite contribution will depend on the ability of RNP to take the strategy and the goals reached so far further so that all levels of RNP can act professionally independently of their top-leaders. This will depend on RNP's capacity to implement the strategic plan in particularly with regard to the anchoring of the new policing concepts, knowledge and skills that have been introduced by PDP.

A detailed description and analyses of the PDP projects and mainstream of human rights is attached as Annex 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 as well as a table representing all project activities planned attached as annex 11.

## 6. Tripartite Cooperation

### 6.2 Programme Management

**Steering Committee** The strong commitment of the SC has been decisive for a well functioning programme. It meets twice a year 2–3 hours. The meeting is led by the Commissioner General and is attended by project managers, high level RNP police officers, project sponsors and a financial officer, SNPB and SAPS. Sida attends the meetings as an observer. The meetings are planned two weeks ahead. Some participants describe the discussions as frank and open with room for disagreements, while others think that they are rather formal. Issues that may cause dispute would normally be solved before the meeting. Some complains that the meetings often have been delayed by several hours and thus put SC under time pressure. The SC meetings are efficient in the sense that if a decision has been taken, it can be trusted that it is implemented.

#### **PDP Management**

The joint project management team (PMT) forms the centre of the tripartite cooperation. It is chaired by the RNP project manager and the Swedish and South African counterparts are members. Progress, annual plans and SC meetings are prepared and discussed. The main task is to realise the project activities and coordinate the contributions of the different parties to the projects. Much coordination occurs via mail and telephone. The PMT has developed into an effective and efficient coordination mechanism.

#### **Project Coordination Unit**

Programme management is an art that has to be learned. The learning process has accelerated with the development of PDP from a limited first phase in 2003–2005 to a full fledged tripartite programme later on. Especially the creation of the project coordination unit in RNP has improved the programme management. Members of the unit have been trained in project management by PDP and should be up to standards now. The head of the unit has a vital place in the tripartite programme. It is essential to have a back up for the head of the unit who knows PDP and its partners well in order to maintain the level of experience and trust in case the head of the unit is transferred.

#### **Strategic Plans**

The availability of a Strategic Plan helps steer tripartite decisions. It helps RNP to maintain control over the various development activities and limits the risk of donor support which does not fit into a wider RNP policy.

#### **Sweden & South Africa**

In the tripartite structure the contribution of the three partners is equally important. They have to be able to gather experts and facilities at the right time and to get them in place and have to help prepare training and exchange events. Their planning and preparation makes the coordination of the three lines of activities work. This requires the counterparts to have a position in their own police services in which they are able to reserve resources and experts for the required periods of time. This sometimes complicated coordination is mastered well. The relationship of trust that they have developed is as important as the technical planning skills they have.

#### **Data Shortage**

A handicap in planning and monitoring is the absence of data. This handicap cannot be easily overcome as it requires the change of administrative processes in the police organisation and the introduction of monitoring instruments. Currently the possibilities of monitoring and evaluation are limited. Inside RNP the increase of the quality of administrative processes and the introduction of low cost monitoring instruments can contribute to solve this problem.



## **Administration**

Programme administration is in good order, but not all documents were available in digital form. Progress reporting have sometimes been exceeding the period of six weeks agreed upon. There have been delays in sending invoices from the RNP to the SNPB causing problems in the payment by the SNPB to service providers. The team recommends RNP to create such conditions as to assure a timely delivery of agreed upon reports and invoices. At the side of RNP there are concerns about the complicated procedures in financial administration and the procurement of equipment and other facilities. This should be looked into by the tripartite project management team.

## **Efficiency**

The team was struck by the repetition of general policies and information in the project documents, by the administrative burden of reporting and by the differences of requirements from donors. Unifying the administrative requirements would be imperative. A practical weakness is the limited and slow access to internet in the RNP project unit, given that the tripartite partners should to be able to communicate swiftly.

## **6.2 Cost-sharing and Spending of Funding**

### **Assessment**

The tripartite collaboration is based on a cost sharing principle which is specified in agreements between Sweden and Rwanda and between South Africa and Rwanda. The three parties finance their own salaries. Thus there is no top-up of salaries which is a healthy principle. RNP pays for study halls, local transportation and accommodation for its own staff in connection with activities carried out in Rwanda. Sida/PDP finances cost for activities.

### **RNP and SAPS**

A memorandum of understanding was already agreed upon between South Africa and Rwanda on 5 December 2002. The agreement is in principle unlimited unless one of the parties terminates the MoU. South Africa finances their own salaries, and Sida finances other costs such as daily allowances, travel, accommodation, etc., involved with its assistance to Rwanda. According to the information the team received, there is no separate budget for this cooperation that mainly takes place in the form of human resources input and providing some limited amount of equipment.

### **RNP and SNPB**

The MoU between Sweden and Rwanda was signed 17 May 2003 and runs up to 31 December 2009, several extensions included. The activity period runs until the 30 June 2009. The agreement specifies the areas of cooperation, which includes crime investigation, in particular crime scene examination; strengthening the system for institutional accountability; increased management capacity; and improved community policing; and, since 2007, internal training capacity development; and women empowerment; and, since 2008, support to smaller projects, including statistics. The total budget for the period is 29 million SEK. It covers the activities approved by Sida, including full costs recovery of SNPB, and specified expenses for RNP and SAPS.

### **Impact**

The model of cost sharing seems to work well, if the donors do not chose to apply a basket-funding model or give budget support. In particular for RNP that in this way remains relatively independent of foreign donors. At the same time RNP has gained its strategic strength from the cooperation for a relatively low price seen in a donor perspective and perhaps also from a RNP perspective.

### **Effectiveness**

Cost sharing is an effective way of collaborating as there is no or little administration connected within the areas of cost sharing.

In one case there was a rather unfortunate phase out of PDP/take over by a new donor, BTC. RNP decided to phase out the tripartite project on criminal investigation, in the teams view to prompt, without consideration to how fast the new donor could take over and ensure that what was gained in the former project phases would be retained. The team has been informed that RNP decided that BTC should take over because they were willing to finance this project at a larger scale than PDP. Criminal investigation should also, according to the agreement between Sida and RNP, be sustainably and thus be phased out in 2008–2009. From the point of view of RNP it seemed to be a logical step to phase out the tripartite cooperation if a larger donor in terms of funding was willing to take over the project. However, RNP should have coordinated the takeover much more carefully, ensuring that the project would have continued at the same high pace as before which it didn't<sup>23</sup>.

### **Efficiency**

Administration includes the formulation of terms of references and activity reports for each of the activities, writing progress reports every six months and administration of invoices. Each activity demands a term of reference to enable PDP to follow up on the outcome of each activity. The format of activity reports meets this requirement. Standardised templates for this have been developed in co-operation with RNP. There have been some critics by RNP as to the efficiency of the administration of the Sida funding (that are not affected by the cost sharing model). RNP thinks that the procedures are cumbersome and that the funding sometimes is spent in the procedures instead of on activities (because bills are reimbursed from Uppsala/Stockholm). SNPB argues that these procedures are necessary in order to make sure that the funding is spent correct, and that the banking procedures in Rwanda sometimes delays payments.

### **Sustainability**

The cost sharing principle is a sound and sustainable way of collaborating which ensures that one party will not be dependent on another and that equity and balance in the relationship between the three parties are ensured.

### **Paris Principles**

That Sida channel funding to RNP through SNPB is not fully in line with the Paris Principles. Donor experience from Rwanda tells that there in general is a low capacity to absorb donor funding. Also there are few accountants. Sida, however, seems to be open to discuss this issue.

### **Needs**

When Sida started to fund RNP, they were among the few donors to RNP. Now there are, thanks to the efforts of the tripartite partners, an increasing number of donors interested in supporting RNP. It would be useful if Sida could adapt its policy to the new situation that would permit the tripartite partner to collaborate more closely with donors outside the tripartite group.

## **6.3 Lessons Learned**

### **Political Commitment**

An overall precondition for the success of the tripartite cooperation is that there has been a stable political support from all three participating countries. This is shown by the participation in the SC at a high level by RNP and SAPS, and at a relatively high level by SNPB, and by the contribution with both human and economic resources to the collaboration from all three countries.

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<sup>23</sup> The police adviser recruited by BTC did visit Stockholm and the SNPB did agree in supporting the transfer as much as they could, despite some administrative regulation that hindered BTC in drawing more substantially on SNPB. RNP should therefore have initiated a carefully planned hand over process and dialogue with the involved parties.

In addition, the Swedish government has adopted a five year strategy for police collaboration, which gives SNPB a strong entry point, backed by substantial funding from Sida.<sup>24</sup>

### **Long Term Perspective**

All tripartite police institutions have got a long term political commitment from their government to the collaboration. The programme operates within a relatively long time frame (three years), but with a thinking that goes beyond (10–15 years have been mentioned by Sida).

### **Trust**

According to RNP, SNPB and SAPS, trust and confidence building and personal relations stands out as the main condition and factor explaining the success behind the tripartite collaboration. It has been essential for the success that all three partners know each other well. The practical cooperation between the project managers was a main factor behind confidence building.

It took about two years to build trust and common commitment between RNP and SNPB. In the first years of collaboration there were misunderstandings and disagreements that later on were used as a point of departure for more constructive dialogues.

The enlargement from bilateral to trilateral collaboration took place in 2005. The bilateral cooperation between SNPB and SAPS formed the platform for the tripartite programme, but all three parties had been working together before on a bilateral basis (e.g. SAPS and SNPB; SNPB and RNP; and SAPS and RNP). That the three parties knew each other beforehand was important as they already knew each others strengths and weaknesses.

### **Decisions and Distrust**

Transparent and accepted decision-making procedures have been put in place. Distrust requires prompt and decisive interventions in order to replace distrusted colleagues. Once it has become clear that trust or a professional working relationship could not be established, the SC and the PM seem to have accepted to replace experts that didn't perform in the way expected by RNP. However, in the early phase of the PDP, there are reports about experts placed in the programme that RNP was not satisfied with and that seem to have stayed on for longer time than wished.

### **Project Management**

At the level of project management, most projects seem to have been managed very well, even though there seem to have been some weak projects that would need strengthening if continued. It may be a weakness of the tripartite cooperation that such a relatively complicated management system with many project components may loose projects that are not in the heart of the overall cooperation.

### **Win-Win Teams**

A major factor behind the success is the complementary personalities and professional skills of each of the team members. In addition there is a common factor, namely the capacity to cooperate, to compromise, the professional knowledge about policing in general, and the prior experience with police cooperation in an African context. Also, members of the team have sufficient authority within their own organisations to mobilize resources for the programme with entry to the chief of police level.

### **The Three Parties**

Another key factor to the success has been the overall composition of the tripartite team: i) A European partner with modern technology skills and expertise, tradition for democratic, transparent and service oriented policing and access to advanced transnational police cooperation. ii) An advanced African partner with profound experience in change management and in policing African communities, with

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<sup>24</sup> SNPB collaborates with the police in ten countries. International Development Cooperation of the Swedish Police, SNPB, April 2009. Handbook for International Development Cooperation, SNPB, September 2008.

the point of departure in an inclusion and gender policy. iii) A local Rwandan partner with recent experience in merging police institutions and with highly advanced knowledge of the local context. The different inputs in the Rwandan context offer RNP a choice in options for the development of projects and strategies.

### **Working Division**

At the same time the joint management and working division within the tripartite collaboration contributed to clarity and thus avoiding overlap. SNPB was responsible for criminal investigations, including crime scene examinations and forensics, institutional accountability and training (added in 2006), and SAPS for management, community policing and women empowerment (added in 2007).

Both SNPB and SAPS contributed enormously to the strategic thinking, in-service training and training of trainers of RNP.

RNP says they profited particularly by SAPS in terms of gender issues, police management (because SAPS has a similar ranking system as Rwanda) and community policing.

RNP pointed particularly out to criminal investigation, accountability and the development of a simple Microsoft excel, monitoring and evaluation system as particular contributions by SNPB.

### **No Dominant Coalition**

PMT discusses issues on an equal footing and in a professional way. The Rwandan project manager felt comfortable with the contributions of the other two project managers, and did not feel manoeuvred into a minority position. The same goes for the other two PM.

### **Stability**

A consequence of the trust established has been that the team members have stayed on in PDP. The present PMT has been working together since 2005 and have thus ensured stability in the management of PDP.

### **Languages**

Most, except one, of the leading police officers related to PDP that the team met are English speaking. The question is how PDP reach out to the French speaking colleagues in RNP that supposedly are the largest group (as English only recently became a spoken and official language). SNPB officers interviewed made clear that the participants in training must be English speakers or there has to be translation facilities available. PDP has translated a good deal of manuals into French in order to reach the French speaking colleagues in RNP.

## **7. Donor Coordination**

### **Assessment**

Donor coordination is according to the donors themselves weak. The RNP project management unit is responsible for donor coordination and is planning to organise donor meetings once or twice a year. From the point of view of RNP, RNP will coordinate donor support and prioritize according to the Strategic Plan and the Annual Implementation Plan. For RNP it is important that donor support is predictable and that donors accept a clear working division so that overlap is avoided and scarce resources are utilized in the best possible manner.

A challenge for RNP is the lack of long-term commitment on the side of many donors and NGOs supporting RNP. Only funding from Sida and BTC are longer term. Other donors such as GTZ, UNDP

and UNIFEM operate from year to year. RNP has been very satisfied with their input and says that all donors that RNP has chosen as their partners have been doing an excellent job.<sup>25</sup>

Donors and NGOs consulted would like to see a more transparent administration of donor funding, including an overview of input, activities and economic resources involved. This request is to some degree met in the RNP Annual Implementation Plan 2009–2010, and through the annual donor roundtable meetings that RNP chair. Sida, which is seen as the lead donor within the area of policing, also organise donor meetings when the tripartite partners meet in Rwanda and inform RNP about the discussions of these meetings afterwards.

However, donors do not feel that they have a full overview of donor activities and argue that such information should be updated on an ongoing basis.

Lack of transparency earlier on has led to donor uncertainty as to how RNP decides on and prioritizes donor collaboration, as well as the financial contribution of each donor has been unclear. In some cases the tripartite donors did not understand why, when and how RNP decided to initiate cooperation with new donors within the focus areas of the tripartite cooperation. RNP has reportedly been reluctant to inform Sida about incoming funding because RNP feared that Sida might have withdrawn – not being aware of the fact that many donors prefer to be part of a broader donor coalition which often gives a stronger legitimacy to the cooperation.

Donors fear overlap in activities and are arguing that better planning, communication and transfer of experience could help new donors to provide better input, and, in one case, if a period of overlap had been discussed, avoiding a stand-still in the implementation of a project that is now taken over by a new donor. RNP could profit from a more open communication because donor coordination ease planning and might help RNP in securing more long term funding.

### **Impact**

The impact of donor support will probably be improved if donor coordination is strengthened. Donors could help build donor trust in RNP and may thus increase much needed and concerted support to RNP.

### **Sustainability**

A stronger donor support not only to RNP but also to the justice sector, thus strengthening the chain of justice, the rule of law and human rights, may in the long run promote justice and stability in Rwanda and thus sustainability. According to Sida, the Swedish engagement in Rwanda is long term, probably 10–15 years. Sida will therefore not yet plan an exit strategy.

### **Effectiveness/Efficiency**

Systematic coordination, dialogue, team work and problem solving will in the end lead to a higher degree of effectiveness and save RNP and donor time and money. The team has noted that RNP has already been improving this situation by publishing an overview of donor collaboration in the Annual Implementation Plan. This is a very good initiative and can eventually lead to a much better planning and collaboration between parties that wish to support RNP in its efforts of creating a professional police.

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<sup>25</sup> Donors and foreign institutions that have been cooperating with or are planning to give input to RNP mentioned are BTC/CTB, Canadian Peacekeeping, EC, GTZ, Rheinland Pfalz/Germany, SAPS, Sida/SNPB, UK Embassy, UNDP, UNIFEM and USAid. NGOs also contributed to the training and monitoring of the police, often at district/community policing level: Advocats sans Frontiers, CLADHO (human rights umbrella NGO), Norwegian Church Aid and Réseau Citoyenne, as well as Public Rwandan institutions such as the Human Rights Commission and the Gender Ministry.



# Annex 1 Terms of Reference

## **Terms of Reference for an external evaluation of the tripartite Programme for Democratic Policing (PDP) between the Rwandan National Police (RNP), the Swedish National Police Board (SNPB) and the South African Police Service (SAPS)**

### **1. Evaluation Purpose**

The overall objective of this assignment is to evaluate the implementation of the Programme for Democratic Policing (PDP) from the time of its inception in 2003 up to date. This institutional cooperation programme is implemented through a tripartite arrangement between the Rwandan National Police (RNP), the Swedish National Police Board (SNPB) and the South African Police Service (SAPS). The emphasis of the evaluation shall be on the period from 2005, when the tripartite cooperation was initiated, up to date.

The review shall assess the achievements (effectiveness, efficiency and relevance) in relation to set-out objectives and plans, as well as provide recommendations for future areas of cooperation in a planned new phase of cooperation between the three police organisations. The new phase is tentatively planned from the second half of 2009 until the end of 2012.

Although the evaluation may not be able to fully assess the sustainability and impact of the PDP at this point in time, a discussion should be included on these issues.

The review shall also, in a separate section, analyse the main lessons learned from tripartite cooperation in terms of programme results, but with a special focus on tripartite cooperation as an instrument for collaboration.

### **2. Intervention Background**

The institutional cooperation between the Rwandan National Police (RNP) and the Swedish National Police Board (SNPB) started in 2003. In 2005 the South African Police Service (SAPS) joined the cooperation, resulting in the present tripartite programme referred to as the *Programme for Democratic Policing (PDP)*.

Sida has allocated a total amount of 29 million SEK for the programme, including evaluation activities, since the start. The activity period of the current agreement for the cooperation comes to an end on 30 June 2009. Thereafter a new period of cooperation is planned, stretching tentatively until 31 December 2012.

The main objective of the cooperation is *to strengthen the institutional capacity of RNP to deliver quality services to the community as a professional police organisation based on democratic values with respect of rule of law and human rights*.

Originally consisting of four areas of collaboration, the programme today includes six main areas of cooperation, namely:

- Criminal investigations including crime scene examinations and forensics;
- Institutional accountability
- Training (added in 2006)
- Management

- Community policing
- Women empowerment/capacity development (added in 2007)

In addition, some other activities have been initiated during the last year aiming at creating a system for project baseline information, as well as a broader system of reliable statistics that can be used as a monitoring- and evaluation instrument for the work of the police in Rwanda. SAPS and SNPB have also supported RNP in the process of developing the now finalized Strategic Plan for 2009–13.

The tripartite cooperation is a work-in-progress programme which means that detailed activities are identified year by year after review of results from the previous year.

The three collaborating police organisations are all actively engaged in the project implementation. SNPB is the leading partner to RNP in the first three areas listed above, and SAPS the leading partner in the last three, to a certain extent reflecting the complimentary experience and expertise of the two organisations. The division of project areas is however not rigid, and SAPS and SNPB collaborate jointly with RNP in several areas, as well as with the overall project planning.

Within all project areas there have been a mix of different capacity building activities such as training (including a train-the-trainers approach), workshops, study tours and various visits with exchange of knowledge. In some areas the capacity building activities have been matched with equipment and infra-structural development.

In 2005 a Base line study was conducted by a Swedish consultant and at the end of 2007, an independent mid-term review was commissioned within the programme by PDP's Project Management Team. The review was performed by a consultancy firm in Kigali.<sup>26</sup> In its conclusions, the review pointed out that tripartite cooperation is a progressive form of collaboration between partners, and that the programme demonstrated both tangible achievements as well as challenges. The overall assessment by the review was that the programme had reasonably well met its main objective, although there were a number of results still remaining at the outcome level. The review found that RNP's institutional capacity has developed during the years of cooperation, especially its organisational and management capacity. Some of the general challenges that were mentioned by the review, and also by the annual report on the PDP for 2007, were e.g. the language barrier, uneven education level amongst RNP-staff that has been trained, inconsistencies of adhering to the method of training the trainers (ToT), and delays and discontinuity in programme implementation.

The current phase of cooperation was originally intended to come to an end in May 2008. Based on a proposal from the three partners, Sida however decided to extend the cooperation with 13 months, until June 2009. Apart from certain delays in programme implementation, the main reasons for not entering into a longer phase of cooperation in 2008 were the fact that the new Strategic Plan for RNP had not been finalized, as well as the process of creating a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) for the justice sector in Rwanda. These two processes were deemed good entry-points for the preparation of a new, longer phase of tripartite cooperation.

The Strategic Plan for 2009–13 has now been finalized and was launched at the end of 2008. A justice sector strategy has furthermore been developed and the SWAp for the justice sector is currently in the last stages of finalization. In regard of a programme proposal for a continuation of the PDP, for which this evaluation is an important input, it is crucial that such a proposal is aligned to the objectives of the new Strategic Plan and the justice sector strategy. Furthermore, although there are already some donors engaged with RNP, it is expected that there will be more partners coming in to support RNP now that the Strategic Plan has been finalized. Harmonization- and coordination aspects are thus important features to take into account in the design of the PDP in the next phase of cooperation.

<sup>26</sup> GEOCOFI & ASSOCIATES, evaluation report on Program for Democratic Policing (PDP), dated 9 February 2008.



Finally, during 2008 Sida has developed and drafted a new, five-year country cooperation strategy for Rwanda where it is proposed that police cooperation remains one of the prioritized areas of Swedish cooperation with Rwanda. The Swedish government has not yet taken a decision in regard of the strategy and at this point in time it is not clear when such a decision will be taken. In the mean-time the old strategy has been extended until the end of 2009.

### **3. Evaluation Questions**

The evaluation shall assess the achievements, accomplishments and shortcomings of the Programme for Democratic Policing from its inception up to date against its expected results as spelled out in the project documents. The main emphasis of the evaluation shall be on the period of tripartite cooperation, i.e from 2005 up to date. More specifically it shall evaluate the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of the implementation of the programme. Based on this analysis, and the Strategic Plan for RNP during 2009–13 as well as the strategy for the justice sector, it shall provide recommendations for the next phase of cooperation between the three partners.

A separate section of the evaluation report shall furthermore deal with lessons learned of tripartite cooperation as an instrument for collaboration. The aim of this section is to provide lessons learned and possible recommendations that can be considered more generally applicable for future tripartite arrangements.

The review shall, but is not limited to, address the issues listed below. It shall:

1. Analyse to what extent the PDP has supported the overall efforts of reform and development of the institutional capacity of the RNP, as well as provide a discussion on the role and image of RNP in relation to society and the population;
2. Analyse the specific progress and results within all the different project areas, and analyse the effectiveness of different working methods (e.g. the train-the trainers-approach) applied within the programme for capacity development;
3. Assess the ambition of the PDP in terms of the number of project areas and project content in relation to budget and resources for the programme, in order to make recommendations on the number and content of focus areas in the next phase of cooperation. It is imperative that the assessment and recommendations are informed by the priorities of RNP's Strategic Plan as well as the strategy for the justice sector. An assessment shall furthermore be made whether there is a possible need to continue certain sub-projects for a limited time in order to ensure the sustainability of project results.
4. Assess the progress of the work with gender issues by RNP (from an internal workplace perspective, as well as an external service delivery perspective), and the contribution of PDP's different sub-projects to this work;
5. Assess the role, including comparative advantages, of the PDP in relation to that of other development partners to the RNP, and the implications in terms of harmonization amongst development partners and coordination by the RNP;
6. Assess the role of the RNP within the new framework of a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) for the justice sector in Rwanda, and possible implications of the SWAp for the next phase of the PDP cooperation;
7. Analyze how and to what extent the programme has addressed the different cross-cutting themes (human rights, gender, the rights of the child, rule of law, HIV/AIDS and a holistic perspective on the criminal justice system) which have been identified as guiding principles in the current programme;

8. Analyze the advantages and possible challenges of tripartite cooperation as an instrument for collaboration including partnership- and mutuality aspects between the three partners, project steering mechanisms and cost-sharing principles within the PDP.

#### **4. Lessons Learned and Recommendations**

The evaluation shall provide recommendations on the basis of the analysis made in relation to the evaluation questions.

Furthermore, on the basis of the analysis of tripartite cooperation as an instrument for collaboration, the main lessons learned and recommendations for possible future tripartite arrangements shall be made in a separate section.

#### **5. Reporting**

The consultant shall make a brief presentation of the preliminary findings to Sida (Development Cooperation Section in Kigali) and RNP before leaving Rwanda. An equivalent briefing shall be held with Sida and SNPB in Stockholm upon return from Rwanda.

The consultant shall submit to Sida, RNP, SAPS and SNPB an electronic copy of the draft evaluation report for feed-back and discussion *no later than 8 May 2009*. After receiving the draft report, the organisations have two weeks for comments and reflections. The draft report shall be written in English and the format and outline shall follow the guidelines in Format for Sida Evaluation Reports (Sida Evaluation Manual). The consultant shall generally adhere to *OECD/DAC quality standards for evaluations*.

Within one week after receiving comments from Sida, RNP, SAPS and SNPB on the draft report, a final electronic version shall be submitted to Sida/Rwanda-Burundi team, RNP, SAPS and SNPB. The final report must be presented in a way that enables publication without further editing. The final report shall be no longer than 30 pages, excluding annexes.

Subject to decision by Sida, the report will be published in the series *Sida Evaluations or Sida Studies in Evaluation*.

#### **6. Methodology**

Information for this evaluation will be collected through document reviews, including RNP's Strategic Plan for 2009–13 and Annual Implementation Plan, decisions and agreements, programme-, project- and evaluation/mid-term review documents, and other documents relevant to RNP's mandate and area of work and other documentation identified as relevant for carrying out the assignment.

Guiding principles should be:

1. triangulation and validation of information
2. critical assessment of data quality and data gaps
3. assessment based on factual findings, reliable data and observations
4. transparency of methods, research tools and sources of information.

Consultations and interviews shall take place with

- RNP's management, programme manager, project sponsors and managers as well as with other staff involved in the various parts of the programme

- SAPS' management, programme managers and short-term technical expertise in the programme;
- SNPB's management, programme managers, international development cooperation staff at SNPB's head office and short-term technical expertise in the programme, as well as Uppsala County Police as SNPB's implementing organisation;
- Sida staff at the Development Cooperation Section in Kigali and Head Office in Stockholm (Rwanda-Burundi team);
- Other relevant development partners to RNP and/or within the justice sector in Rwanda, as well as representatives of civil society and the population

## **7. Work Plan and Schedule**

The consultancy shall start as soon as possible. The expected total time frame is approximately six weeks, including work in the consultant's home country and in Rwanda. A team with a minimum of two consultants is expected, where it is preferred that at least one has experience from work in Rwanda or the Great Lakes region.

Initial meetings with Sida in Stockholm, as well as Kigali, are required to discuss and clarify issues that may arise from the Terms of Reference. An initial meeting shall also be held with RNP.

An inception report detailing the work plan and time frame of the assignment shall be submitted to Sida and RNP no later than 3 days after the initial meetings.

## **8. Evaluation Team**

The proposed consultant(s) shall have the following qualifications:

- Extensive experience of organisational development and institutional capacity building/support;
- Technical knowledge and practical experience of development cooperation within the justice sector, including international police cooperation;
- Technical knowledge and practical experience of evaluation;
- Experience of work in Sub-Saharan Africa;
- Work experience of at least 5 years gained at corporate/NGO/public sector level;
- Good English writing skills

Merit:

- Experience of work in Rwanda
- Knowledge and experience of tripartite cooperation in the field of development cooperation
- French language skills

Attachments:

1. Format for Sida Evaluation Reports (Sida Evaluation Manual)
2. OECD/DAC Quality Standards for Evaluations

Stockholm, 10 March 2009

## Annex 2 Sida Evaluation Criteria

The following is an overview of Sida's evaluation criteria which are adapted to the present evaluation of the PDP and the tripartite cooperation:

Criteria	General Definition	Adapted for this evaluation for the PDP and the Tripartite cooperation
Effectiveness	The extent to which a development intervention has achieved its objectives, taking their relative importance into account.	Has the intervention achieved its objectives or is it assessed that the intervention will achieve its objectives.
Impact	The totality of the effects of a development intervention, positive and negative, intended and unintended.	An analysis of the results of the bilateral and tripartite strategic cooperation and its various project components, and the perceived impact on the functioning of RNP and the society as a whole.
Relevance	The extent to which a development intervention conforms to the needs and priorities of target groups and the policies of recipient countries and donors.	The relevance of the programme for reforming RNP in relation to Sida's as well as Rwanda's justice sector reform and police strategies.
Sustainability	The continuation or longevity of benefits from a development intervention after the cessation of development assistance.	The expected longevity of the interventions based upon measures taken to ensure sustainability. Reflexion on the vulnerability of the various project interventions, the justice sector reform and on the prospects for democratic policing.
Efficiency	The extent to which the costs of a development intervention can be justified by its results, taking alternatives into account.	Could interventions with a comparable effectiveness have been made cheaper or otherwise more efficient?

## Annex 3 Programme and Interviewees

### Monday 20 April

11–17 Tommy Bringholm and colleague, Uppsala, SNPB

### Tuesday 21 April

09–13 Magdalena Tham-Lindell, SNPB HQ, and Niclas Carlsson, SC member, SNPB colleague, Stockholm, SNPB

13–16 Anne Ljung, Stockholm Sida, and Malin Ericsson, Kigali, Sida

### Monday 27 April

10:30 Jimmy Hodari, Programme coordinator Tripartite Programme

11:30 Mary Gahonzire, Acting Commissioner General

12:00 Jimmy Hodari

14:45 Supt. Morris Muligo, Director Criminal Investigation, scientific police

17:00 Jimmy Hodari

### Tuesday 28 April

08:45 Jimmy Hodari

09:00 Felix Namuhoranye, Director Training, Chair Strategic Planning

11:00 Emmanuel Butera, Community Policing

12:00 Theos Badege, Director Accountability

15:00 Kamali Throphilus, Director of Planning

16:00 Annonciata Mokahigiro and Alzele Nyurazeyimana, Director and coordinator, Women's net work

17:00 Acarias Uwimana, Director Legal and Human Rights

18:30 Jimmy Hodari, Felix Namuhoranye, Theos Badege, Criminal Intelligence

### Wednesday 29 April

11:00 Ahimana Ansoelmoe, Deputy, Police Academy

14:30 Police Station and Detention

16:00 Police Station, Judicial Police

17:00 Review of findings for inception report

### Thursday 30 April

07:30 Karol Limondin, Legal Aid Network, Danish Inst. for Human Rights, Rwanda

8:30 Donor meeting with USAID Paul Kaiser; EC Véronique; GTZ Christina Muehlhaus

13:45 Ulrich Leist, Foreign Adviser and Alophonsine Mirembe, JRLOS coordinator, MINIJUST

15:00 Penelope Kantarama, Permanent Sec, MININTER, PS

17:00 Draft inception report

**Friday 1 May**

- 11:00 Appolinaire Mupinganyi, Programme Manager, and Francis Umurungi, project coordinator, Transparency International, Rwanda
- 13:00 Leslie Haskel, Human Rights Watch
- 15:00 Draft inception report

**Saturday 2 May**

- 09:30 Draft debriefing
- 10:30 Criminal investigation team, Police HQ
- 14:00 Felix Namuhoranye, Director Training
- 16:00 Draft debriefing

**Sunday 3 May**

- 09:00 Draft debriefing
- 16:00 Richard Muhumuza, Prosecutors Office
- 18:00 Malin Ericsson, Sida, Kigali

**Monday 4 May**

- 8.30–11 Debriefing RNP, Mary Gahonzire, Acting Commissioner General, about 10 leading RNP officers, and Malin Ericsson, Sida

**14 and 15 May**

- Jos Verpaalen, BTC, Senior Police Adviser, Amsterdam
- Johan Griesel, SAPS, Senior Police Adviser (via Skype)

**Tuesday 9 June**

- 11.30 Presentation of report, Anne Ljung, Sida Stockholm; Tommy Bringholm, Uppsala, SNPB; Magdalena Tham-Lindell, SNPB HQ; and Swedish consultants regarding Lessons Learned in PDP.

## Annex 4 Strategy

### Assessment

The RNP has adopted two strategies since the (re)establishment of RNP in 2000: The Strategic Plan 2004–2008 and the Strategic Plan 2009–2013. An Annual Implementation Plan for 2009–2010 is adopted on the basis of the Strategy 2009–2013, and shall be followed up by annual implementation plans. The PDP programme has produced input and expert knowledge for the plans.

Both strategies are clear in their aims and highly relevant for the development of RNP. They include the key policing areas that have been in focus for the bilateral and tripartite cooperation and also the mainstream areas prioritized, namely the rule of law, human rights, women in the police, fight against corruption and HIV.

The seven members Strategic Planning Committee for the 2009–2013 Strategic Plan was lead by the director of education who was also in charge of the strategic process and a key drafter in collaboration with police advisors from SNPB and SAPS. Each activity in the strategy has a sponsor, e.g. a manager responsible for the implementation. The 2005 plan was mainly drafted by the SNPB and SAPS experts.

### Impact on RNP

In particularly the 2009–2013 strategy has had a strong impact on the thinking and ownership of the top- and department level management of RNP. According to all RNP top-level managers interviewed, including sponsors, the consultative process of assessing the challenges, giving input to the strategy and planning the implementation has been an eye opener for each and every leader involved and for mind-setting the top-level of RNP.

It is argued that there was not the same degree of ownership to the first strategy because it was not tailor-made and was drafted by a foreign police officer. On the other hand it did probably help forming the direction taken by RNP.

It is argued that regardless of the level of education, the RNP leaders have been through a mental transformation process and that their thinking has been shaped by the strategic formulation process which helped creating consensus. Some even argue that they now are “masters of the new thinking”.

RNPs interviewed argue that it will take a very long time to change the minds of the individual police officers at the lower levels, “The guy at the road, e.g. the traffic police, and at the police station should understand the reasons for implementing the strategy. He or she may not understand the Strategic Plan as such but should be able to understand what we want of him. Also, we would want all in RNP to own the strategy.”<sup>27</sup>

### Effectiveness

The intervention achieved its objectives in the sense that it helped creating consensus about having one – and only one – strategic direction for RNP.

The plan is general in nature and in most areas the strategy should be specified and further developed. Its strength is the systematic way in which the development of the RNP has been approached. If one looks for instance at the training area, the advantages of a systematic approach become apparent. There is no long term capacity building strategy in terms of an overall education and training plan for the RNP that also takes the conditions and consequences outside the realm of training into account. The analysis and design of police education and training would have to be done with the same rigor as the creation of the Strategic Plan. The creation of a education and training plan could be a good exer-

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<sup>27</sup> Source: Interview with RNP staff.

cise in Strategic Planning which the Commissioner General and the top-leadership of RNP agree upon.

### **Efficiency**

The strategic process of RNP has been efficient both in terms of man hours used and the costs involved. It is hard to imagine that less human and economic resources could have been spent for this process.

### **Sustainability**

RNP claims that they lack resources to implement the strategy. For the implementation to be sustainable, assistance to RNP should be tailor-made and adapted in such a way that it can work in the local context. The absence of budgets for the replacement of equipment is a threat to sustainability and may kill the project.

### **Donor/Expert input**

SNPB played a major role in developing the first Strategic Plan 2004–2008, to which also other partners contributed. For the Strategic Plan 2009–2013, the weights shifted so that RNP became the leading force. SNPB contributed with the programme manager and expert in strategic policing, and SAPS with five experts. They are all members of the SC (in total seven).

RNP praises Sida, the SNPB and SAPS for sponsoring the strategic process and for encouraging RNP to take the full ownership for the strategic process, particularly with regard to the new Strategic Plan just adopted.



## Annex 5 Training and Capacity Building

### Assessment

This part of the programme has been added in 2006. Its objective is to assure that RNP has the institutional capacity in place to successfully take over the work of foreign assistance<sup>28</sup>. Training has been a major part of the PDP programme ever since its start. In most projects of the programme training of trainers courses have been conducted in order to facilitate RNP staff to take over training activities. The courses have been received well. In most, but not in all, fields RNP staff is able and feel confident to train without further assistance. In the field of management training those trained only feel able to assist in training courses but not running the training themselves. In other fields experts have been transferred to other posts thus leaving too few experts to train.

Awareness raising and formulating need for further training were another aspect of the training project. It has been a good preparation for a more systematic approach to training.

The focus on how to mainstream human rights, gender and accountability in the education of recruits and in the in-service training should be designed and strengthened

### Donor/Expert input

Experts are positive regarding the training and the level of participation of RNP officers.

### Effectiveness

The methods used predict a high effectiveness: Direct training, training of trainers, workshops, study tours and site visits. The used methodology assured the transfer of knowledge and skills and the practical exercises simulated the real life situations, often in real teaching settings, and therefore increased self confidence and teaching skills of the participants. In practice trained trainers are not often used to train others.

Training in skills in which equipment is essential, has to be given when the equipment is there. Otherwise there is a risk that the training can lose effectiveness. The skills are mainly lost when it takes too long before the equipment is present. This handicap was according to RNP officers interviewed felt strongest in the field of CSE, where CSE kits were needed.

### Efficiency

The trainers of trainers' courses seem to have been efficient in terms of introducing new methodologies and mind-setting of the RNP trainers, that needed input from more experienced police services from abroad. The use of South African trainers is cost effective as they do not have to travel so far.

### Sustainability

The sustainability is unfortunately not very high yet. The trained trainers are often transferred to other assignments and the acquired skills are therefore lost for training purposes. RNP's capacity to execute their own training of trainers' activities is weak and the police training institutions have little capacity to become centres of knowledge and support and to build training skills. Therefore imported knowledge is not yet anchored in the RNP as an institution.

### Impact

The potential impact of the ToT courses as such is considerable, especially when the courses taught are of direct relevance for the trained officers. Keeping in mind the observations under the heading of sustainability, expectations for impact are not high unless the training are carried on in terms of anchoring the training and education in a systematic way.

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<sup>28</sup> For full text see: PDP document "Project Proposal Including Yearplan for Project Year One", approved final version 24-12-2004.

**Needs**

The need for train the trainer courses and education is still high in all area's of policing. Future needs will have to be assessed in relationship to the transfer policy of RNP.

Knowledge and skills in the different areas of policing and in the art of training itself, that have been brought in by the PDP programme and via other programmes, is not anchored in the police system. There is no place or centre to find documentation, expert knowledge and training capacity on police relevant subjects. Professional policing can not be built without such anchoring.

There is a need for a systematic reflection on education and training and its relationship with capacity building and other elements of management of the RNP. From this perspective the part of the project that aims at awareness raising and future needs can be seen as an initial exercise in the design and implementation of an education and training strategy that also include the police training schools and academy.

## Annex 6 Criminal Investigations

### Assessment

This project has been a centrepiece of the programme since 2003. The objectives can be summarized as follows: capacity is achieved to conduct successful criminal investigations and to collect all traces from scenes of crime in a professional way and provide sufficient basis for conclusions and expert opinion<sup>29 30</sup>.

The project consists of two elements: Crime scene examination (CSE) and investigation of major cases. Investigation of domestic violence and sexual child abuse is a third element, but has been moved to another project. It fits into the Crime Reduction paragraph of the Strategic Plan 2004-2008 of the RNP. I. The lack of reliable statistics is a handicap for the evaluation of this part of the programme<sup>31</sup>. For that reason the statistics used have to be read with reservation and merely as illustration. Crime rates are believed to be low, but historical data are not available so trends cannot be described<sup>32</sup>. It is not possible to relate this state of affairs to the PDP programme.

In general the objectives of this part of the programme have been achieved to a certain degree. The capacity to conduct criminal investigations is somewhat enhanced, but still needs a lot of improvement. Traces can be collected from scenes of crime, but not all and the professional level of forensics in RNP is insufficient. The public prosecutors office and the RNP itself report an increase in professionalism in criminal investigations. The feeling of security of the population has increased tremendously and people can walk the streets of Kigali safely in day and night. The period between 2003 and 2005 is indicated as the turning point in this respect. Participants and stakeholders state that that the RNP programme in the field of criminal investigation has contributed to the decrease of crime. There is no supporting evidence for this statement.

The emphasis in this project was mainly on CSE work. Although much still needs to be done, this part has been a success. The same can be said for the courses regarding the investigation of major crimes courses. They were the first introductions into dealing with major criminal investigations, an added skills and awareness of needs. But these were not embedded in a wider programme of CID improvement, nor on analysis of the actual situation of the CID and thus have remained isolated initiatives. For that reason of CID work is still badly in need of further improvement. The Public Prosecutors Office

<sup>29</sup> For full text see: PDP document "Project Proposal Including Yearplan for Project Year One", approved final version 24-12-2004.

<sup>30</sup> The ToR for the SNPB 2004 formulates a different objective: to assist in "improved criminal investigations including crime scene examinations".

<sup>31</sup> See for instance UNODC, Crime and development in Africa, Vienna June 2005.

<sup>32</sup> R. Winslow, A Comparative Criminology Tour of the World, "The crime rate in Rwanda is low, with the important exception of murder. An analysis was done using INTERPOL data for Rwanda. For purpose of comparison, data were drawn for the seven offences used to compute the United States FBI's index of crime. Index offences include murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. The combined total of these offences constitutes the Index used for trend calculation purposes. Rwanda will be compared with Japan (country with a low crime rate) and USA (country with a high crime rate). According to the INTERPOL data, for murder, the rate in 1999 was 45.08 per 100,000 population for Rwanda, 1.00 for Japan, and 4.55 for USA. For rape, the rate in 1999 was 35.93 for Rwanda, compared with 1.47 for Japan and 32.05 for USA. For aggravated assault, the rate in 1999 was 114.31 for Rwanda, 15.97 for Japan, and 329.63 for USA. The rate for motor vehicle theft in 1999 was .31 for Rwanda, compared with 34.01 for Japan and 412.70 for USA. (Note: data were not reported to INTERPOL by the USA for 1999, but were derived from data reported to the United Nations for 1999) No total could be given for the index crimes because data for three crimes, robbery, burglary, and larceny were not given for Rwanda".  
<http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/rwinslow/africa/rwanda.html>.

still expresses concerns over the still poor quality of many investigations and case files. They still have to be sent back regularly for ameliorations<sup>33</sup>

The third element regarded the investigation of domestic violence and sexual child abuse. Investigators were trained in interviewing and interrogations and on investigative techniques and two rooms in which interviews can take place in a somewhat adapted surroundings were created.

One of the weaker points of the programme was the sequencing of the different elements in the programme. Especially the time between different phases of a training programme was seen as too long, lowering the effectiveness of the different components. A second handicap is the scope of the programme especially in the field of tactical CID work and CID management. Too few officers were trained, limiting the overall increase of skills.

### **Donor/Expert input**

The option for RNP officers to consult CSE officers in Sweden via email was not used. The team has not found whether that was because there was no need for such consultation, or due to limited email access.

### **Effectiveness**

Training and equipment for CSE have greatly enhanced the capacity of RNP for collecting and analysing evidence. Both Police and Prosecutors Office report improvement in the quality of reports and dossiers in criminal cases, while stressing at the same time the need for further improvement. Also the domestic violence and child abuse unit get important support in their investigations from the CSE officer's reports. RNP CSE officers have been able to help solve cases that would have been left unsolved without their analyses according to CSE officers and local police officers in the country side value the support and advice they get from CSE officers on crime scene work. The 30 CSE kits in selected police stations and two off road vehicles with specialized CSE equipment have been indispensable for CSI training and work. When delivered directly after a course, the effectiveness is believed to increase further. As has been observed in other countries, the availability of scientific evidence can decrease the use of interrogation techniques that violate the rule of law. There is no hard evidence that this has contributed to the improved treatment of suspects, but NGO's report such improved treatment.

The training of CSE trainers' course had limited effectiveness as only three of the trained officers actually work in CSE work and can be used as trainers. The others have left the police or have got other assignments. A further limiting factor is the lack of forensic expertise in RNP. The prosecutor's office complains that forensic evidence is rarely truly presented at this moment.

Investigation of major cases was a relatively minor part of the CID programme. The courses as such have satisfied the needs of the RNP CID management. They were of a good quality and raised the professional level of the officers involved. The number of courses, however, was too low to make a real difference resulting in too few officers being trained and investigators were not trained. The Public Prosecutor reports that in 2007 a third of the cases submitted for prosecution had to be rejected, because of inadequate preparation by the Judicial Police<sup>34</sup>. This too has limited the effectiveness of the SNP/SAPS efforts in this area. These courses were not part of a wider training programme for CID personnel. Thus stakeholder observation from 2009 that the quality of criminal investigations and the level of judicial knowledge still need to be enhanced is still valid<sup>35</sup>.

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<sup>33</sup> La Coopération Belge du Développement, Technical and Financial File, Support to Crime Investigations for fair administration of justice and good Governance Rwanda, p.11.

<sup>34</sup> The Republic of Rwanda Justice, Reconciliation, Law & Order Sector Strategy and Budgeting Framework, January 2009 – June 2012, Nov. 25 2008, Kigali.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, p.66.

The effectiveness of the part of the project aiming at the enhancement of the investigation of domestic violence and sexual child abuse could not be established. This element is a part of a much wider programme including a.o. various forms of awareness raising, prevention and, publicity and a help desk in which other external partners take part as well. It is impossible to assess the effectiveness of the PDP part. The public prosecution is satisfied with the increasing professionalism of this part of CID work. There is some doubt about the interview rooms. The team has seen one of them. The reception room was we furnished, the interview room was bare, only furnished with two old desks and a third room, where mirror confrontations could take place was obviously not in use. The greatest value of the rooms was that it had an entrance separate from the police station, from which it was a part.

### **Efficiency**

The use of SNPB and SAPS trainers has according to the police officers trained in most cases been efficient.

### **Sustainability**

The distributed Crime Scene Investigation Manual has secured the standards and procedures set in the courses and thus contributed to the impact of the courses. The absence of a place where knowledge and experience regarding CID work and CSE work can be kept, cherished and taught limits the sustainability of the project. At this moment specialised knowledge is in the heads of experienced CID and CSE officers and team leaders. There are different ways to institutionalize expertise and quality of CID work. A well manned forensic laboratory is an option, a specialized training institute or a department in an existing training facility is another.

Tools like fingerprint powder and ink are said not to have been replenished. Without budgetary room for replacement, of instruments toolkits and vehicles the prospects for impact and sustainability are low. If such budgetary space in future years cannot be agreed upon with the RNP, the team advises to discontinue the CSE project.

### **Impact**

Taken the limitations into consideration, the impact of the CSE project is already considerable. It is however limited by the problems with replacement of equipment. CSE training has been an entry to awareness-raising of the requirements of professional CID work amongst RNP officers. This can be called impact.

The courses on major investigations have been too limited in numbers of trained officers to make a substantial difference. Impact is to be expected when the courses are continued, put in context and expanded to the level of CID officers.

### **Needs Assessment**

Investigation of major cases has to be based on a common set of operational principles, practices, techniques and equipment formulated and used in all CID work, both in specialized and in more regular CID work. The team did not find evidence that this set off principles, strategies and tactics is available. A more systemic approach on quality enhancement in the area of CID is indispensable. The BTC project may take this into account.

Good CSE work is founded upon the availability of highly skilled forensic scientists and a well equipped laboratory. Without such foundation CSI work remains relatively simple. This foundation is lacking to a considerable extend in Rwanda till now. Only 4.5% of the cases needing forensic examination were provided with such evidence in 2007<sup>36</sup>. A good forensic laboratory with academic staff is needed. For CSE work to flourish it has to have a place where knowledge and equipment is concentrated and which can support CSE work, making forensic police work and CSE work a vested specialization in the RNP.

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<sup>36</sup> RNP Baseline study 2009 p.42.

## Annex 7 Accountability

### Assessment

Accountability has been a part of the programme right from the start in 2003.<sup>37</sup> The projects objectives are that RNP has increased in transparency, improved its monitoring and follow up system of quality service delivery, has harmonized and set standards of police performance and has a clear and transparent system of internal investigation in place<sup>38</sup>. Public confidence in the police is high. In a recent survey 86% of the population had “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the Rwanda National Police<sup>39</sup>. Interviewees state that trust in the police has increased considerably during the last five years. However, in a strict sense the relationship of growth of trust with the PDP project activities cannot be established. The objectives have been reached in part. The Baseline Study 2009 contains a number of data and a critical question and answers chapter that is remarkable. An Inspectorate of Services carrying out inspections and doing internal investigations has been set up and is operative as is a complaints registry. A follow up and monitoring system on quality services is not in place yet. A manual with standards for operations has been drafted but has not been finalized or published yet.

The accountability part of the programme has contributed considerably to the development of notions of modern democratic policing in the RNP. The awareness of the place of accountability in democratic policing is a condition for the development of managerial, organisational and practical instruments. Standard operational procedures are necessary both to tie police behaviour to specific standards. Expertise and procedures for internal investigations are ways to correct breaches of norms and operational standards. In the context of the whole project it is of extreme importance and well designed and carried out.

Together with the baseline study, the Strategic Plan is excellent both as plan and as process. It is comprehensive, logical, well researched and it makes a good foundation for the implementation of change in the police. Its level of acceptance is high amongst RNP senior management

### Donor/Expert input

Experts report a great willingness from the government and of the top of the police to fight non-integrity. Reports of citizens and NGO's on non integrity are taken seriously and the public is encouraged to report ill doings. Officers are punished and dismissed for crimes and breaches of internal regulations, and these measures are published in newspapers (and picture of dismissed officers are distributed over police stations). Unanimous is the observation that the behaviour of police has improved considerably since 2003/4.

**Effectiveness** RNP Respondents report that taking part in courses on accountability were the first confrontation with notions of modern democratic policing they had and they put high value on these courses as part of their development as senior officers. Training in internal investigation enhanced the quality of the officers and their investigative capacity. The courses and visits helped create the Inspectorate. As a result of its establishment more than 250 officers are said to have been dismissed due to reported non-integrity.<sup>40</sup> The team has, however, not been able to look into the concrete reasons behind these cases. The website of the RNP contains instructions regarding the lodging of complaints and explains how they are dealt with. This information is also distributed via other channels in the country.

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<sup>37</sup> See final report phase One 2003–2004

<sup>38</sup> or full text see: PDP document “Project Proposal Including Yearplan for Project Year One”, approved final version 24-12-2004.

<sup>39</sup> .World Values Survey, Rwanda, quoted in the Joint Governance Assessment Report from 2008.

<sup>40</sup> “Rwanda Police Train on Corruption Prevention”, quote from acting Commissioner General of RNP, Mary Gahonzire, AllAfrica.com, Washington, 2 December 2008.

Putting accountability in the context of quality systems is a modern way of integrating accountability notions into police management and managerial systems. This part of the project has suffered from delay. To make such a quality system operational requires a thorough and widespread knowledge of quality thinking and the operating of quality systems in the RNP. If that condition is not met, the RNP will have problems taking ownership of quality systems.

The central importance of operational standard setting justifies a thorough design and review process. The draft is now adapted to the Rwandese legal system, a necessary adaptation. Speed is required now as the operational standards are indispensable for operational leadership, for internal investigations, for quality control and for the development of police education and training. Delay hampers the effectiveness of the other developments.

### **Sustainability**

It is too early to comment on sustainability. The creation of an Inspectorate is a promising development. RNP finance the inspectorate themselves, and the tripartite cooperation assist in training and implementation of the strategy behind.

**Impact** The potential impact of this project is very high, as it would influence all areas of work of the police, and in particularly the credibility of RNP.

### **Needs Assessment**

It is advisable to look into the size and system of inspections in order to assess how its effectiveness could be optimized. The team has not been able to do that. The connectedness with other aspects of policing has to be followed up upon.

## Annex 8 Management

### Assessment

The overall objective of this project is to acquire sufficient management skills to provide for professional service delivery to society<sup>41</sup>. As most senior officers had no prior training in modern management concepts and skills before, this was a first confrontation with these insights for many of them. The courses were eye openers and increased awareness on the requirements of police management and most want to learn more, revealing a willingness to improve. There were three types of courses: project management, senior management and emerging management for young police managers. The aspects of management which were covered in the courses were dealt with in a comprehensive way. Often they were related to police work.

### Effectiveness

The effectiveness of the courses can be observed in different ways. Participants and stakeholder reported: changes in the management of meetings, the initiatives to delegate powers to staff, changes in communication with staff, attention for planning aspects, a better understanding of strategic methodology, and the motivation and appreciation of officers, etc. Next to that the courses have created a need and as eye openers the courses were a great success. The skills that were taught in the project management course were so essential for police managers in their daily work that it senior management says it should become an obligatory course for all managers.

A handicap was the different levels of prior schooling of the officers, most had secondary school education and some had been educated on university level, but many did not have higher education. That did reduce effectiveness. For future management courses to remain effective, they will have to become more attuned to the requirements of the job and perhaps to the prior education of the students. Job descriptions and educational requirements for levels of management and specialisations can also focus courses.

### Efficiency

The training was according to the participants relatively well planned. The training material was relevant, but some of it seemed to be oriented towards businesses and not the police.

### Sustainability

Sustainability cannot be assessed yet. The train the trainer approach has resulted in a pool of trainers. Transfer does not take into account who has been trained and most trained trainers would like to start as an assistant management trainer.

### Impact

Impact cannot be assessed yet.

### Needs

Job descriptions and the formulation of educational requirements for different jobs would help increase the quality of management courses as they could be made more attuned to the needs of various groups of police officers.

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<sup>41</sup> For full text see: PDP document “Project Proposal Including Year Plan for Project Year One”, approved final version 24-12-2004.



## Annex 9 Community Policing

### Assessment

The overall objective of the community policing project is that local commanders communicate with the society in order to solve problems affecting public safety. The support of the SNPB and SAPS in the design of a community police model consisted of assistance to the RNP in the choice of a model for community policing by awareness raising courses, a study tour to South Africa, providing information on other systems, advising in the comparison of different models and the training of managers in crime prevention, partnership policing and community policing. The design has been guided by an assessment of the needs of the RNP. RNP has chosen its own variety of the SAPS model and called it the Community Policing Committees (CPC), the members of which were elected by the local population after a law on CPC's was adopted by the government by ministerial decree No. 02/10/2007. They are assisted by a RNP community liaison officer. Until June 2008 14,953 CPC's have been established and 10 of them have been trained as a pilot project<sup>42</sup>

### Donor/Expert input

The CPC structure is believed to be a new way for the RNP to relate to villages. Experts value the philosophy behind the community policing as it implies a new relationship between police and the society. There is some concern regarding the control of the local defence units which are now under the authority of the police, but they are not part of the CPC project. Nevertheless this concern might be taken into account in a future training of CPCs.

### Effectiveness

The PDP support to the RNP community policing has been valued highly by the RNP. The community policing activity did not form part of the bridging year, but despite this, RNP sent officials to South Africa on their own cost to undergo training. In this way it took a form in which the ownership of RNP was maintained, while at the same time giving essential information, experience and guidance for the choice. The PDP project has been instrumental to the design and the roll out of CPC throughout Rwanda. The team found that the model chosen by RNP fits very well into the local security arrangements in Rwanda, its local government (Umudugu) and its mediation structures (Abunzi)<sup>43</sup>.

With relatively modest assistance and with high efficiency the project has given vital input for the creation of a CPC model. It is a vehicle for the implementation of other preventive police elements to the grassroots level. The team has not been in the field and has not been able to assess its effectiveness.

### Efficiency

The efficiency of the PDP contribution has been high. It has been a strategic assistance which allowed the RNP to select and design its CPC structure and it led to legislature to be put in place.

### Sustainability

Given the structuring in the CPC and their integration into local communities and the tradition of local conflict resolution, the chances for sustainability are high.

**Impact** It is too early to be outspoken on the impact of the CPC. Its potential impact on police community relations, on the prevention of crime and the participation of the population in such prevention and on the style of policing is high. The high public trust in the police mentioned earlier is relevant here as well.<sup>44</sup> The reasons for the high scores are unknown and data for the past has not been presented to the team. The introduction of the CPC might have contributed to this high score.

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<sup>42</sup> RNP Annual Implementation Plan 2009–2010, P.5,

<sup>43</sup> RNP Baseline study 2009, p. 19.

<sup>44</sup> World Values Survey in Rwanda, quoted in the Joint Governance Assessment Report from 2008

### **Needs Assessment**

SAPS and SNPB have been concentrating on training and advice. They have not assisted in the field. The burden of training the great number of CPC's for instance is a cause for concern. The quality and integrity of the CPC system is greatly enhanced by the training of the CPCs in their duties, options for action and cooperation with the police and other local entities and their legal limitations. The exchange of experiences in community policing and the creation of a support unit can ensure and further improve the CPC quality. Training of community liaison officers can help them better support the CPC's. A condition for a possible further assistance of PDP cooperation is that the training is extended to the countryside and that rule of law elements are introduced there firmly as well.

## Annex 10 Women Capacity Development

### Assessment

The primary objective of women capacity development within RNP is to increase the number of female police officers and help women advance to higher positions. RNP had 9.7% female police officers in 2008 and the goal is to reach 20% by 2013.<sup>45</sup> Except for the commissioner general, most of the female police officers occupy low positions. At the first advancement level (Cadet), 83 out of 298 were women in 2009, and 250 women out of 1558 have been recruited for basic training in 2009, doubling up from last year.

RNP is strongly promoting women capacity development and has developed some capacity in this field. The activities have included campaigns targeted at men, providing services to other government agencies and village visits. However, the challenge is huge, so there is still a long way to go to meet this goal.

The RNP women capacity development strategy links up to the RNP strategy of addressing violence against women. For more information on this project component, please consult appendix 6 on Criminal Investigations.

### Donor/Expert Input

In 2007 the tripartite cooperation was invited to help strengthening the objective of increasing women in policing. The support included training and workshops, and inspiration from in particularly SAPS. After a study tour to SAPS (financed by RNP), RNP decided to establish a “women empowerment network – champions for change”, inspired by the South African model. The network and its steering committee were established in 2008, lead by the acting Commissioner General, who is the patroness of the network. The aim is that all women in RNP shall become members of this network.

RNP is also planning to establish a mobile career centre, inspired by the South African model, with assistance from the tripartite cooperation. SAPS had offered to bring in a container, but confusion appeared as to which vehicle that would serve the purpose. SAPS will now bring in a consultant to help clarifying how to move on.

**Impact** The input from the tripartite cooperation has been at the level of exchanging ideas and exposing RNP to gender work in South Africa. The establishment of the women empowerment network is an outcome of the tripartite cooperation.

The women empowerment network has the potential to build the self-confidence of women within RNP and thus make an impact on women in policing. This would require a high level of support from the RNP leadership and human – and probably also economic – resources to realize the activities deemed necessary for a vibrant women’s network.

The women desk is eager to establish the mobile career centre. The team finds that the establishment of a mobile career centre may turn out to have an important effect on the overall goal of recruiting more women from the regions to RNP.

It is, however, too early to establish a direct impact from the tripartite cooperation on the RNP women capacity development programme. Gender capacity was already being build up by RNP before the cooperation began. Also, there has been a strong input from other donors such as UNDP and UNIFEM<sup>46</sup>, doing training and capacity building in the regions.

<sup>45</sup> Justice, Reconciliation, Law and Order Sector Strategy and Budgeting Framework, Republic of Rwanda, 25 November 2008, p. 118.

<sup>46</sup> Training of women police officers in career development and gender based violence.

### **Effectiveness**

The women network and a mobile career centre both have the potential to contribute to an increased recruitment and inclusion of women participation in RNP. However, the input of the tripartite cooperation has not yet been sufficient to achieve these objectives.

### **Efficiency**

The team was informed that several activities were delayed, in particular the assistance to establish a mobile career centre and a study visit to South Africa which were important for the RNP goal. RNP paid for the study tour to South Africa, which is of course a positive contribution on the side of RNP themselves, but perhaps also a sign of the tripartite SC not prioritizing this project. The team was also informed that the establishment of the network took longer time than RNP had wished and that there were many delays in the project.

### **Sustainability**

Inclusion of women in RNP progress steadily through the systematic efforts by its leadership and its women desk. However, it is unclear if the tripartite programme contributes to these efforts in a systematic and highly prioritized way – which is necessary if the programme shall contribute further to the sustainability of the women capacity building project.

### **Needs**

The women desk in RNP would like to continue and strengthen the women capacity building component in terms of communication, study visits and the design of reference manuals. If it should be included in the next stage of the tripartite cooperation, the parties would have to look into how this component could get more focused attention. Perhaps this component should be run by women police officers with strong experience in this field, and with some degree of independence from the other programme components.

If there will not be an upgrade of the focus of this important component, the team recommends that Sida discontinue the women capacity development component. In taking the decision, the input and plans of other donors should be taken into account, including the possibility of strengthened donor collaboration.

## Annex 11 Human Rights

### Assessment

RNP has been focusing on professionalising and improving the behaviour of the police in its contact with the public. Information and training has focused on topics such as control of arms, the prohibition against torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, compliance with the maximum time of detention before a detainee shall be brought before a judge, the right to a legal defence, on police behaviour and on improving accountability and complaints procedures. These areas relate to the civil rights that are in the core of police work.

### Donor/Expert input

Human rights are indirectly integrated into the tripartite cooperation via a rule of law language. Foreign experts say that RNP is reluctant to address human rights directly. Human rights are addressed via the operational approach, in training components and in the Strategic Planning. The criminal investigation, accountability and women empowerment projects are good examples of this.

Impact Observers argue that the behaviour of the police has improved considerably since the government enforced new legislation following the adoption of the new constitution in 2003. There are still big challenges ahead of RNP. According to legal aid providers and a head of a police station, detainees do not systematically get access to legal aid which is pertinent for legal protection of persons in custody. According to the justice sector strategy this is to be improved. The team believes that RNP is strongly dedicated to professionalise the police further, even though the impact during the next phases probably will appear slower because of the overall lack of trained and educated human resources in the lower layers of RNP.

### Effectiveness

The tripartite approach to human rights is a good choice, namely to address human rights via contributing to the professionalising of RNP. The interventions have, given the difficult circumstances, been effective in addressing this goal. The justice sector strategy supports both a direct and an indirect human rights approach, which is likely to be more effective than blaming<sup>47</sup>.

### Efficiency

To integrate human rights in all project components is cost efficient.

### Sustainability

In order to ensure long-term sustainability where each and every police officer knows his rights and duties, two conditions must be fulfilled: The first is that the governments must have a continued commitment to furthering the rule of law, human rights and democratic governance; and the second is that RNP should anchor this strongly in the education and in-service training.

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<sup>47</sup> This said, in all democracy it is important to have vibrant NGOs that monitor state violations of human rights.

## Annex 12 Programme Activities 2003–2009

HY1 = first half year of the planning year.

HY2 = second half year of the planning year.

**Table 1 Activities Criminal investigation and Crime Scene Examination 2003–2009**

Activities	Plan	Realis.	Comments
May 2003–May 2004			
C.1 training seminar on Criminal investigation	HY2	HY2	
C.2 Specification procurement and delivery of CSE kits and some other equipment for basic examinations in a laboratory environment	HY2	HY2	
C.3 training seminar for crime scene examiners	HY2	HY2	
C.4 Training seminar on criminal investigations re child abuse and domestic violence	HY2	HY2	
May 2004–May 2005			
June 2005– May 2006			
A.1 Provision of an off road CSE vehicle	HY1	HY2	
A.2 Two week CSE training	HY1	HY 1 or 2 not specified	Training the trainers concept
A.3 Three week practical application of crime scene examination including crime scene management and crime scene coordination	HY1	HY1	
A.4 Establishment, equipping and furnishing of two interview rooms in different police stations to cater for cases such as sexual child abuse and domestic violence	HY1	Yes no date	Delay because of disagreement between partners on place of interview rooms. Rooms are there, part of the equipment is not
A.5 Two week training on the topic of child abuse and domestic violence	HY2	Yes no date	Train the trainers approach
A.6 Two week training programme on introduction of criminal investigations	HY1		Opted out by RNP. Done by RNP itself
A.7 Study visit to Sweden on the topic of computer related crime and Cyber crime	HY2		Deleted from the programme
A.8 A one week study visit to Sweden on the topic of twinning CSE including management, child abuse and domestic violence	HY2	Yes no date	
A.9 Tent for training at RNP headquarters	HY1	After HY2	
May–Dec 2006			
Jan–Dec 2007			
			Different plan year: "Project proposal Including activity plan for Project Year Two"
A.10 A three-week training programme (two in Rwanda and one for preparations) on the topics of domestic violence and sexual child abuse based on the training-of-trainers concept.	HY1	HY1	
A.11. A four-week training programme (two in Rwanda, one in RSA and one for preparations) on the topics of domestic violence and sexual child abuse (implementation of the result of activity A 10). The training programme shall be conducted in tandem by Swedish instructors and the RNP trained trainers	HY2 HY2	HY2 HY2	

Activities	Plan	Realis.	Comments
A.12 A two-week basic training programme on crime scene examinations based on the training-of-trainers concept. fulfilled by RNP trainers with the supervision of SNPB experts	HY1	HY1	
A.13 A two week in Rwanda (and one for preparations) training programme on the topic of investigation of major cases	HY1	HY2	no clear indication when
A.14 A two-week in Rwanda (and one for preparations) training programme on the topic of investigation of major cases.	HY2	HY2	
A.15 A two times two-week training programme (and one for preparations) on the topic of investigation of major cases. 1. 2.	HY2 Hy2		Replaced by A17
A.16 Procurement of equipment and means of assistance for laboratory examinations.	HY2		Replaced by A17
A.17 Provision of 30 units of crime scene examination kits that are to be used in the field.	HY1	HY2	Decision of Steering committee in 2007
A.18. Provision of an off-road vehicle adequately equipped for crime scene examinations	HY1	HY2	
A19 Functional application of Crime Scene Examinations in Sweden	HY1	HY1	
<b>June 2008–June 2009</b>			
A20 Crime Scene Investigation manual translated into French in order to be used for training within RNP and thereafter printed and distributed within RNP	.HY2	HY2	
A. 21 A bridging activity to hand over the CID experiences from SNPB and SAPS to BTC			Has taken place in Sweden. Not found in report

**Table 2 Table Management Activities 2003–2009**

Activities	Plan	Realis.	Comments
May 2003– May 2004			
A.1 Workshop on project management	HY1	HY1	
A.2 Workshop on project management	HY1	HY1	
A.3 Study tour to South Africa	HY2	HY1	
A.4 Workshop on institutional and organizational development	HY2	HY2	Vision and strategy for RNP delivered
A.5 Follow up and planning workshop	HY2	HY2	
<b>May 2004–May 2005</b>			
May 2005–May 2006			
May –Dec 2006			
C.1 Four week training on police management (25 participants)	HY1		Delayed. RNP considered the training a duplication of GB. Management training program
C.1 Four week training idem (25 participants)	HY2		
C.2 Strengthening performance evaluation management. Strengthening internal monitoring system on police performance	HY2		Idem
Jan.–Dec 2007			
C. 3 Four weeks Management Training in Rwanda for RNP Emerging Leadership.	HY1	HY1	

Activities	Plan	Realis.	Comments
May 2003– May 2004			
C.4 Two times one week Management Training for RNP Executive Development	Hy1	HY1	Second part postponed till 2008 as C7
1	HY1		
2			
C.5 Performance Management			
1	HY2	HY2	Not completed at RNP request
2	HY2		
June 2008–June 2009			
C.10 Emerging leadership training	HY1	HY1	

**Table 3 Accountability 2003–2009**

Activities	Plan	Realis.	Comments
May 2003– May 2004			
B.1 Workshop on principle accountability issues	HY1	HY1	
B.2 workshop on system for institutional accountability in the RNP	HY1	HY2	
May 2004–May 2005			
June-2005–May 2006			
B.1 Two week training program on Internal investigations	HY2	HY2 and after	Visit of an expert to prepare the internal invest.training. Delay because of changes of RNP sponsors
B.2. Two week study tour on the topic of Quality service deliveryl	HY1	??	Delay because of changes of RNP sponsors
B.3 Drafting and publication of police standards manual	HY2		Drafted by external consultant. Not ready yet
B.4 Strengthening of registration of complaints	HY2	HY2 and after	Visit of and expert to prepare the registration. Delay because of changes of RNP sponsors
May–Dec 2006			
Jan–Dec 2007			
B.5 Publication and institutionalization of Police Standard Manuals (PSM), commonly known as Standard Operating Procedures – SOPs former	HY1		Approval was delayed. See B 3.
B. 6 Service Delivery Improvement programme on two model Police Stations (Kigali and Ruhango) using the PSMs.Service Delivery Improveent programme on two model Police Stations (Kigali and Ruhango) using the PSMs.	HY1	HY2	Not implemented. Changed into an extension of B5 activites
B. 7. A two – week training programme (one in Rwanda and one for preparations) on the topic of accountability. The training programme shall be conducted in accordance with the training-of- trainer’s concept.	HY1	HY1	
B.8 A two-week training (one in Sweden and one for “coaching”) programme on the topic of organisational accountability.	HY2	HY2	
B.9 A one-week twinning programme on the topic of accountability.	HY2	HY2	



Activities	Plan	Realis.	Comments
B.10 Consideration of the draft PSM by the RNP target group and present the draft of the Police Standard Manuals to RNP for approval.	See b.3B.5	HY1	
B. 11 Printing of the PSM	HY1		When draft is approved. See B3.
B. 12 Explain LFA as a tool and use it to identify the needs of the "new" project	HY1	HY1	
B. 13 Preparation of the 5-year RNP strategic plan for the period beyond 2008	HY1	HY1	
<b>June 2008–June 2009</b>			
B.14 A one-week consultation activity in Rwanda on the topic of Police Standard Manuals	HY1	HY2	
<b>June 2008–June 2009</b>			
B.15 A one-week activity in South Africa on the topic follow up on the Strategic Planning process	HY1	HY1	
B.16 Translation, layout and printing into French of the Strategic Plan.	HY1	HY1	
B.17 Consultative meeting with RNP stakeholders on the Strategic Plan	HY1	HY2	
B.18 Launch of the 5-year RNP Strategic Plan and explaining it to stakeholders.	HY2	Nov. 2009	

**Table 4 Police Education and Training 2005–2009**

Activities	Plan	Realis.	Comments
A.9 Establishment of a simulation area at the police training school in Gishali	HY1	not clear	Changed into training tent RNP headqu.
<b>June 2005–May 2006</b>			
<b>May–Dec 2006</b>			
<b>Jan–Dec 2007</b>			
E.1 A three-week twinning programme (Two in Rwanda and one in Sweden + preparations) on the topic of accountability.	HY2 HY2		The report says it was a twinning activity on basic training
E.2 A one-week in Rwanda (and one in Sweden or RSA for preparations) twinning programme on the topic of project management. The training programme shall be conducted in accordance with the training-of-trainers concept.	HY1	HY1	
E.3 A one-week in Rwanda (and one in Sweden or RSA for preparations) training programme on the topic of project management. The programme shall be conducted in tandem between the Swedish instructors and RNP trained trainers.	HY2 HY2	HY2 HY2	
E.4 ?????			
<b>June 2008–June 2009</b>			
E.5 Revising the syllabus for basic training, harmonization with professional policing programme in RNP.			
E.6 Follow up E.4 and 5 in Rwanda and Sweden			
E.7 Renovation of building for Training purposes at new RNP headquarters in Kigali	HY1		

**Table 5 Gender issues**

Activities	Plan	Realis.	Comments
Jan– Dec 2007			
G.1 3-day visit to Rwanda National Police to align planned activities of the RNP Women's Network with the objectives of the Rwanda National Police	HY1	HY1	
G.2 -The establishment and launch of National and Provincial Women's Network structures during a one week national workshop; Election of National and Provincial Champions; drawing up of terms of reference for the Women Network in the Rwanda National Police; identify challenges by women in the Rwanda National Police; identify barriers and compile solutions.	Hy2	2008	Postpone to 2008
G.3 -The research and scoping for the establishment and launch of one mobile and one permanent Career Centre within the Rwanda National Police; determine organisational structure for Rwanda National Police and collect information on careers and career paths within Rwanda National Police;  Design of marketing brochures and posters and printing thereof; design a Career Quest using Hollard's Theory of six personalities linked to different work areas/jobs in the Rwanda National Police. determine equipping needs for Career Centre	HY2		Postponed to 2008
<b>June 2008–June 2009</b>			
G.3	See G2 2008	HY2	
G.4 Launch of National, district and regional women's network structures	See 2008	HY2	
G.5 Establishment of a mobile career center			Still under consideration

**Table 6 Community Policing 2002**

Activities	Plan	Realis.	Comments
May 2003–May 2004			
D.1 Training seminar and workshop on community policing principles	HY2	HY2	
May 2004–May 2005			
2005			
D.1 One week Community policing workshop for senior and middle managers	HY2	HY2	By SAPS later added to the year programme
D.2 One week study visit to south Africa on community policing forums	HY2	HY2	
May –Dec 2006			
Jan.–Dec 2007			
D.2 Crime prevention strategies			
Three times one week sessions in Rwanda	HY2	HY2	
1.	HY2	HY2	
2	HY2	HY2	
3.			

**Table 7 Cross cutting issues**

Activities	Plan	Realis.	Comments
May 2004–May 2005			
Paper reflecting on experiences first year			
Seminar on future cooperation		HY2 2006 HY1	Not found in planning
Project formulation exercise for a three party cooperation		HY1	
Project car Vitara		HY1	
May–Dec 2006			
June 2008–June 2009			
F.1 Extract information needed from relevant sources of information to create an information base that coming projects can measure against. The activity shall link the coming new PDP project to the new Strategic Plan.	HY1	HY2	
F.1 Linking future focus to ongoing project area's	HY1	HY1	
F. Area F Mid Term Review 1) To review the progress of the programme up to date in relation to outputs, objectives and expected impact; 2) To establish a baseline benchmark to be used for assessing the progress of the cooperation and of RNP in the future; 3) To provide strategic recommendations that can feed into the formulation of the next phase of cooperation and, to some degree, to the strategic planning of RNP.	HY2	HY2	Produced in 2008
A.19. Monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the strategic plan.	HY2	HY2	A.19 appears twice

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## PROGRAMME FOR DEMOCRATIC POLICING BETWEEN THE RWANDA NATIONAL POLICE, THE SWEDISH NATIONAL POLICE BOARD AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE

The most important impact of the tripartite cooperation between the Swedish National Police Board (SNPB), the South Africa Police Service (SAPS) and Rwanda National Police (RNP) seem to have been in the form of mind-setting and feeding new and professional ideas into RNP and to help shape the strategic thinking of the police leadership. Almost all planned projects and activities have been accomplished, only few projects were not implemented. As far as could be established, most project objectives were achieved to a satisfactory level of accomplishment.

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