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Joint Evaluation

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Evaluation of the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ) 2007–2010

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
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EVALUATION OF THE JOINT ASSISTANCE STRATEGY FOR ZAMBIA (JASZ) 2007-10

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 NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	 Sida	 DFID Department for International Development	 USAID FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
			

**Evaluation of the
Joint Assistance Strategy
for Zambia (JASZ)
2007-10**



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Abbreviations

<i>AAA</i>	Accra Agenda for Action
<i>ACP</i>	Agriculture Commercialisation Programme
<i>AfDB</i>	African Development Bank
<i>AGP</i>	Agriculture Growth Partnership
<i>AMC</i>	Aid Management Committee
<i>ASIP</i>	Agriculture Sector Investment Programme
<i>ASSC</i>	Agriculture Sector Steering Committee
<i>ASTF</i>	Agriculture Sector Task Force
<i>BESSIP</i>	Basic Education Sub-Sector Investment Programme
<i>BS</i>	Budget Support
<i>CAADP</i>	Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme
<i>CG</i>	Consultative Group
<i>CP</i>	Cooperating Partner
<i>CPG</i>	Cooperating Partners Group
<i>CSO</i>	Civil Society Organization
<i>CSPR</i>	Civil Society for Poverty Reduction
<i>Danida</i>	Danish International Development Assistance
<i>DFID</i>	UK Department for International Development
<i>DoL</i>	Division of Labour
<i>DPAF</i>	Donor Performance Assessment Framework
<i>EMD</i>	Economic Management Department
<i>ENRMMP</i>	Environment and Natural Resources Management and Mainstreaming Programme
<i>ETC</i>	Economic and Technical Cooperation
<i>FNDP</i>	Fifth National Development Plan
<i>FRA</i>	Fiduciary Risk Assessment
<i>FRA</i>	Food Reserve Agency
<i>FSP</i>	Fertiliser Support Programme
<i>GBS</i>	General Budget Support
<i>GNI</i>	Gross National Income
<i>GoK</i>	Government of Kenya
<i>GRZ</i>	Government of the Republic of Zambia
<i>GS</i>	Governance Secretariat
<i>H&A</i>	Harmonization and Alignment
<i>HAC</i>	Harmonization, Alignment and Coordination Group
<i>HIP</i>	Harmonization in Practice
<i>HIPC</i>	Highly Indebted Poor Country
<i>HLF</i>	High Level Forum
<i>HLPD</i>	High Level Policy Dialogue
<i>HoC</i>	Heads of Cooperation
<i>IHP</i>	International Health Partnership
<i>IMG</i>	Independent Monitoring Group
<i>INGO</i>	International Non Government Organization
<i>JAR</i>	Joint Annual Review
<i>JAS</i>	Joint Assistance Strategy
<i>JASZ</i>	Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia
<i>JSC</i>	Joint Steering Committee
<i>JWGMA</i>	Joint Working Group on Mutual Accountability

<i>KJAS</i>	Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy
<i>KPI</i>	Key Performance Indicator
<i>MACO</i>	Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives
<i>MAG</i>	Mutual Accountability Group
<i>MDG</i>	Millennium Development Goal
<i>MoFNP</i>	Ministry of Finance and National Planning
<i>MoE</i>	Ministry of Education
<i>MoESP</i>	Ministry of Education Strategic Plan
<i>MoH</i>	Ministry of Health
<i>MoU</i>	Memorandum of Understanding
<i>MTEF</i>	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
<i>MTENR</i>	Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources
<i>NDP</i>	National Development Plan
<i>NGO</i>	Non Government Organization
<i>Norad</i>	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
<i>NRDC</i>	Natural Resources Development College
<i>ODA</i>	Official Development Assistance
<i>OECD/DAC</i>	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee
<i>OPM</i>	Oxford Policy Management
<i>PAC</i>	Public Accounts Committee
<i>PAF</i>	Performance Assessment Framework
<i>PAP</i>	Programme Aid Partners, Permanent Aid Policy
<i>PARPA</i>	Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty
<i>PBA</i>	Programme Based Approaches
<i>PD</i>	Paris Declaration
<i>PEAP</i>	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
<i>PER</i>	Public Expenditure Review
<i>PETS</i>	Public Expenditure Tracking System
<i>PITC</i>	Programme and Implementation Technical Committee
<i>PIU</i>	Project Implementation Unit
<i>PRBS</i>	Poverty Related Budget Support
<i>PRSP</i>	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
<i>QA</i>	Quality Assurance
<i>SAG</i>	Sector Advisory Group
<i>Sida</i>	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
<i>SNDP</i>	Sixth National Development Plan
<i>ST</i>	Secretary to the Treasury
<i>SWAp</i>	Sector Wide Approach
<i>TA</i>	Technical Assistance
<i>ToR</i>	Terms of Reference
<i>UJAS</i>	Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy
<i>WB</i>	World Bank
<i>WHIP</i>	Wider Harmonization in Practice
<i>WHO</i>	World Health Organization
<i>WGH</i>	Working Group on Harmonization
<i>ZDAD</i>	Zambia Development Assistance Database
<i>ZEGA</i>	Zambia Export Growers Association
<i>ZGF</i>	Zambian Governance Foundation
<i>ZNFU</i>	Zambia National Farmers Union

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Executive summary

Overview of the JASZ

This report presents the findings of an evaluation carried out in February through May 2010, of the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ), which was developed over the period 2005-07, and which was signed in 2007, to cover a three year period. It was signed by 16 cooperating partners (CPs) and contained a number of commitments to improved aid management, very much in the spirit of the Paris Declaration, which had been signed in 2005. However, it was also the outcome of a number of processes specific to Zambia, which had evolved over the period from 2001 onwards.

The overall purpose of the evaluation is to provide an assessment of the JASZ over the period 2007 - early 2010 which will inform the development of the aid management section of the Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) which is due in mid-2010 and the next JASZ. The evaluation is also intended to serve to inform the Phase II Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration in Zambia, which is scheduled for late 2010. The evaluation examined both design and implementation of the JASZ, and assessed its relevance, effectiveness and efficiency.

The JASZ and aid effectiveness in Zambia

The Aid Effectiveness agenda in Zambia has been taken forward through a series of initiatives since 2001. A significant step was the Harmonization in Practice (HIP) study undertaken in 2002 which identified a number of immediate steps as well as a longer term process to improve aid effectiveness. This initiative was expanded in 2004 to create the Wider Harmonization in Practice (WHIP) group which was based on a memorandum of understanding between GRZ and the main CPs. This recommended the development of a Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) Aid Policy and Strategy and a database on donor assistance. Zambia's Aid Policy and Strategy was developed during 2005 and adopted by GRZ in 2007, though it remained incomplete as a result of a failure to reach agreement with CPs about the coordination framework and implementation process. Zambia also adopted a Poverty Reduction Strategy in 2002, followed by the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) which has provided an overarching development framework for CP alignment.

The JASZ provides a medium-term framework developed by the CPs to manage their development cooperation with GRZ in alignment with the FNDP. It contains principles, commitments and proposed actions that the CPs would undertake across the five pillars of the Paris Declaration, as well as taking forward the Division of Labour (DoL) exercise which was developed as part of the HIP and WHIP processes.

Evaluation Findings

Relevance of JASZ

Although the JASZ is described as a strategy, it does not have many of the key elements of a strategy. It contains no specific targets nor does it define indicators against which its progress could be measured. A work plan was developed in late 2007 and some elements

of this have been implemented but there have been no subsequent work plans and no systematic process of follow up on the commitments made and actions agreed. GRZ is not a signatory to the JASZ or to the work plan, although the success of the JASZ depends critically on government actions.

As an instrument for advancing the Paris Declaration, the JASZ is critically dependent on the activities of the GRZ. However, GRZ, and in particular the Ministry of Finance and National Planning (MoFNP), shows institutional weaknesses in its approach to aid management, which has created difficulties for CPs. The dialogue architecture which has emerged over the period of the JASZ in response to these weaknesses, often does not respect GRZ processes. In important respects, existing consultative mechanisms are driven by arrangements developed by CPs.

Effectiveness of JASZ

Although the JASZ developed a work plan in late 2007, the lack of a systematic process for following it up has made it difficult to assess the extent to which it has been carried out. A Code of Practice for Capacity Development has been established, but there does not appear to be any attempt to track whether or not all CPs are complying with it.

The JASZ steps contributed to a strong sense of harmonization, but requirements of bilateral donors still dictate many actions and a number of important decisions are also made bilaterally. There has been movement towards greater use of the modalities preferred by Government, principally budget support. In 2007, 53% of all aid was channelled either as budget support or through SWApS.

The CPG troika structure, whereby three CPs represent the CP JASZ signatories in dialogue with GRZ, has generally been perceived as successful, though involving considerable work for those CPs in the lead role. A structured system of monthly meetings has been developed, which is open to non-JASZ signatories as observers. This has resulted in much improved information flows.

Mutual accountability is seen as weak by a majority of CPs, and there has been little progress under the JASZ in developing a mutual accountability framework. The establishment of an Independent Monitoring Group has been postponed until after this evaluation, and a government proposal for a CP monitoring framework has not been taken forward. Robust information on resource flows from CPs is difficult to come by, and GRZ efforts to develop a database have not yet been effective.

Processes developed in Zambia have been inclusive of CPs who are unable or reluctant to give budget support. The evaluation team finds that in some ways those CPs who were not part of the Harmonization in Practice processes feel that they have benefited most from the structures set up. Others may feel more frustrated by a lack of progress. The JASZ has been more effective in the area of improved processes than at the level of improved development outcomes.

Efficiency of JASZ

Sector management and coordination has improved amongst CPs, but the Sector Advisory Groups, the main channel for CP/GRZ engagement at sector level, are very variable in performance. Where there are well-established SWApS, the JASZ has built on previous experience to consolidate. For some new sectors, such as environment and governance, the JASZ appears to be providing a model for greater sector-level coordination.

The Division of Labour (DoL) has been a major instrument of the JASZ for rationalising CP sector level engagement. Zambia has progressed further than most of its neighbours in agreeing and implementing a DoL, no small achievement. However, this came only after prolonged discussion between GRZ and CPG, and the end result reflects more the then current commitments and preferences of CPs than GRZ's preferences for the implementation of the FNDP.

The roles of lead, active and background CPs have been interpreted differently by different CPs, which has at times led to tensions. There has been considerable decongestion in some sectors, but this has on occasion been the result of changes in a donor's overall policy focus at global level, rather than a response to the Zambian situation. Some CPs have had difficulty delegating responsibility to a fellow CP (in order to take a background role) often because of their own internal requirements for monitoring the use of funds; in these cases other ways of taking a background role have had to be explored.

Transactions costs for CPs have increased, particularly for those taking a lead position in a specific sector. There is likely to have been some reduction in transactions costs for certain parts of the GRZ. However, staff constraints in MoFNP mean that the demands on their time resulting from aid management and CP interaction are still significant.

GRZ engagement

There is little evidence that the JASZ has promoted greater country ownership at national level. There is quite a fundamental question mark over GRZ leadership, and GRZ ability to influence CP decisions, particularly in the absence of a strategy to implement the GRZ Aid Policy. The GRZ's systems and processes for aid management are weak, and there is no mechanism for taking an effective cross-sectoral strategic view on aid issues. However, in the last few months, the Economic and Technical Cooperation Section (ETC) has been restructured and information on this, and its rationale, has been shared with the CPG. The weakness of GRZ systems has also hindered mutual progress in CPs' using country systems in, for example, financial reporting and addressing fiduciary risk. However, there have been improvements in reporting on development outcomes and the latest Poverty Assessment Framework (PAF) includes four indicators on PRBS donor performance.

There have been missed opportunities for joint progress on the side of both CPs and GRZ. For example:

- The dialogue architecture proposed by CPs in 2007/8 does not appear to have been discussed in detail with Government, and similarly the dialogue architecture proposed by Government, which was taken out of the aid policy, has not been reviewed and made effective.
- The 2009 DoL is still draft and is awaiting Government's response.
- MoFNP's proposed donor assessment framework of January 2009 seems to have disappeared without effective joint discussion between CPs and GRZ.

Both CPG and GRZ have failed to follow up on these initiatives, and the dialogue architecture has been insufficiently robust to create pressure to ensure action.

Recommendations

CPs have to make some basic decisions about where the focus of the next JASZ should be, and base this on a clear understanding of what the incentives are for the various stakeholders to enter into commitments within the JASZ. As discussed above, the current JASZ has focused in practice on the PD areas of harmonization and alignment, often from a unilateral perspective. Little concrete has emerged on a harmonized approach to ensuring that the objectives of the FNDP are met, for example a more coherent approach to supporting the FNDP financially.

The evaluation recommends the following:

Objectives of the new JASZ

The new JASZ should contain a clear statement of objectives:

- to promote the principles contained in the Paris Declaration, of country ownership, harmonization, alignment, management for results and mutual accountability
- to support the implementation of the SNDP for Zambia

It should also identify the actions and commitments necessary to achieve these objectives, along with an assessment of preconditions and risks. In other words, it should contain some expression of an intervention logic which shows how the actions contained are expected to lead to the achievement of objectives. This could be a full log frame, or a less formal statement of the way in which actions are expected to lead to the desired outcomes.

Promoting the Paris Declaration principles

The JASZ should focus on aspects of the PD principles which have not been effectively addressed so far. Although there has been considerable progress on harmonization, and some on alignment, there has been little progress on mutual accountability and on management for development results. These areas should be a priority for the next JASZ. This may require a set of skills which are insufficiently present in both GRZ, and some CPs. In keeping with the spirit of the PD, those CPs who can assist in these areas should be prepared to provide support to improve capacity to undertake effective joint monitoring and assessment, both in GRZ and within the CPG. This will also require better information on aid flows, as was envisaged with the Zambia Development Assistance Database (ZDAD).

In particular the CPG should focus on:

- Revisiting the dialogue architecture, along with GRZ, to agree on a structure which deals not only with High Level Dialogue, but also includes technical dialogue at middle level between technical specialists and ETC in MoFNP and line ministries. This should also take into account the recommendations of the ongoing budget support evaluation, to ensure that one robust system is developed which also encompasses the PRBS processes.
- Working with MoFNP to make the ZDAD a functioning tool for both donors and GRZ in planning and budgeting.

- Developing a joint framework with Government for mutual accountability and managing for results. This should encompass the PAF, and be based on the M&E system for the SNDP.
- At sector level, agreeing a common definition of what is expected from a lead CP, and active CP and a background CP. Background CPs should make it clear what they need in terms of reporting, and if possible enter into a delegated agreement with one of the active CPs.

Support for the implementation of the SNDP

There should be a mapping of CP programmes on the GRZ priority areas under the SNDP, and efforts to ensure appropriate financial and technical support by the CPG. Where CPs do not provide budget support, either at national or sectoral level, it will be important to ensure that CP resources address priority areas as outlined in the SNDP. Implementing the DoL is a major achievement in itself, one that some neighbouring countries have been unable to do to the same extent as Zambia. This has had benefits for both CPs, in terms of an ability to focus their increasingly limited human resources on a number of key sectors, but also for GRZ, in terms of reducing transactions costs, and improving efficiency at sector level. The DoL will have to be revisited in the context of the SNDP, which provides an opportunity for revising the sectoral mapping of donors together with GRZ.

Implementation of the JASZ

The new JASZ needs to have more robust systems in place to ensure progress, incorporating a road map and a simple internal monitoring framework¹. These should not be for the CPs alone, but should be negotiated with Government, with both CPs (collectively and individually) and GRZ taking responsibility for implementation.

The JASZ should have an annual work plan, with realistic targets, to ensure that the CPG and the Troika keep focused on development outcomes, as well as process, and do not get diverted into short-term issues. This work plan should be reviewed annually, to assess progress, and revise, if necessary.

The evaluation recommends that the CPG consider the establishment of a small JASZ Secretariat, funded by CPs, to assist in improved reporting and to address the administrative tasks which are now often carried out by individual CPs.

The JASZ is an instrument of the donor community. However, if the next JASZ is to make progress towards achieving the objectives of Paris and Accra, there must be greater engagement with GRZ. It is desirable that the JASZ is backed up by a new MOU between donors and GRZ, updating the MoU signed as part of the WHIP. The evaluation team feels that it is also important that progress is made in the area of mutual accountability. GRZ has already shown an interest in this area, and it could be an area which could promote joint working. The HAC in Kenya has recently tried to revitalise its engagement with GoK, and has recognised that this is the key to further progress. Unless the CPG can do something similar, the JASZ is likely to remain a CP focused instrument, rather than a mechanism for joint progress.

1) The monitoring system referred to should be for the implementation of the JASZ, and not for monitoring development outcomes, which should be addressed through the SNDP M&E system. CPs should not set up parallel systems for this, but use GRZ systems.

1 Introduction

1.1 Objectives of the evaluation

This report presents the findings of an evaluation carried out in February through May 2010, on the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ), which was developed over the period 2005-07, and which was signed in 2007, to cover a three year period. It was signed by 16 cooperating partners (CPs) and contained a number of commitments to improved aid management, very much in the spirit of the Paris Declaration (PD), which had been signed in 2005. However, it was also the outcome of a number of processes specific to Zambia, which had evolved over the period from 2001 onwards.

The evaluation was commissioned by the evaluation departments of three of the signatories to the JASZ, Irish Aid, Danida and Sida. However, there was considerable engagement with all 16 of the CP signatories during the field work.

The overall purpose of the evaluation is to provide an assessment of the JASZ over the period 2007 - early 2010 which will inform the development of the aid management section of the Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) which is due in mid-2010 and the next JASZ. The timing of the evaluation was agreed accordingly. The evaluation is also intended to serve to inform the Phase II Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration in Zambia, which is scheduled for late 2010. The evaluation examined both design and implementation of the JASZ, and assessed its relevance, effectiveness and efficiency.

During the period when the evaluation was carried out, an evaluation of budget support in Zambia was also taking place. Where possible, efforts were made to share findings and minimise the burden on government officers.

The Terms of Reference (ToR) for the evaluation are reproduced in Annex A. These define the objectives contributing to the overall purpose of the evaluation as:

- To assess the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the JASZ
- To identify lessons learned, best practices and provide actionable recommendations for the design of the next JASZ
- To provide appropriate recommendations in relation to the Paris Declaration commitments and processes.

1.2 Methodology

Main elements of the methodology

The evaluation was undertaken in three phases: the inception phase, from January 11th-25th; field work from February 8th-28th; and analysis and write-up from March 1st-24th. A workshop was held in Lusaka on April 30th, which was attended by 14 donors, representatives of GRZ including the Secretary to Treasury (ST) and a representative of civil society. Stakeholders were encouraged to comment on the draft report.

The evaluation matrix which has guided the evaluation is set out in Annex B. This sets out the key evaluation questions and the sources of information and types of analysis that have been used to answer them.

An important issue for the evaluation is that the JASZ does not articulate any framework of indicators or targets against which to judge progress, and no systematic process for monitoring its implementation or its achievements was defined when it was designed. There appears to have been no intervention logic articulated, which would allow a clear link between objectives and outcomes. This limits significantly the conclusions that can be drawn from the evaluation particularly in the absence of any targets that can serve as a benchmark for what might have been expected to be achieved.

A second major issue for the evaluation is that the JASZ is one of a series of closely interlinked initiatives and processes that have been directed towards strengthening aid effectiveness in Zambia. Although 2007 is the formal beginning of the JASZ, many of the processes which culminated in the final document had started significantly before that time. This makes the attribution of causality for the JASZ itself problematic. Section 2 presents a brief description of the processes specific to Zambia and seeks to elucidate which actions and outcomes could be attributed to the JASZ. However, it became clear in undertaking this analysis that not all of these elements have been fully documented, and that there were important differences in the views expressed by those who were active participants in a number of these processes as to both the timing and the linkages between processes.

Section 4 presents an argument for considering that the appropriate counterfactual to the JASZ as it was implemented (as a donor-led initiative to establish joint commitments to improve aid effectiveness) would be a government-led initiative to establish individual commitments by donors to implement the Government of Zambia's (GRZ) Aid Policy and Strategy.

Document review

The evaluation reviewed the official documents of relevance to the evaluation. These included: GRZ documentation (the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP), the GRZ Aid Policy and sector policies where these existed); the Wider Harmonization in Practice (WHIP) documentation, including the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU); the JASZ itself; recent CP strategy documents; existing evaluations and surveys of the PD and CP assistance to Zambia; monitoring reports on the FNDP and Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS); CP Group (CPG) meeting minutes; minutes of meetings relating to the development of the JASZ; reviews of JAS processes in other countries; the global PD evaluation; and academic analyses of the PD process, both globally and in specific countries.

Survey

A web-based survey was carried out of all 16 CPs who are signatories to the JASZ. This was done prior to the field work, and the results formed the basis of the stakeholder interviews with CPs. All 16 responded, and the evaluation team was impressed that in many cases the questionnaire was filled in after considerable discussion amongst a number of project staff, to ensure that country office experience was fully captured. This was particularly useful where the JASZ contact person had not been in Zambia for very long. The full results of the survey are reported in Annex E.

Statistical analysis

It was important to ground the analysis, to the extent possible, in a robust quantitative assessment of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) commitments and disbursements. An initial analysis was undertaken using Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) data. However, this data was rejected by most of the CPs in Zambia as not reflecting the situation on the ground. The team had hoped to use data from the Zambia Development Assistance Database (ZDAD) to provide an alternative source of information on which to base the analyses. However the ZDAD is not yet functional.

During the field work in Lusaka, the Ministry of Finance and National Planning (MoFNP) provided the team with data which had been collected by the CPs as part of the preparation for the recent quarterly IMF mission. These now form the basis for the quantitative analysis. These data are for 2008, and also give assessments of commitments for the second half of 2009 and for 2010 onwards. The information for commitments is incomplete, so only the data for 2008 is used in the text. All the data tables compiled can be found in Annex G.

As a baseline, the analysis has used data provided by CPs during the development of the JASZ. These show disbursements for 2004, and anticipated disbursements for 2005. The data from the OECD/DAC are also included in Annex G.

Field work and stakeholder interviews

During the field work period, interviews were carried out in Lusaka, either individually or in groups, with all 16 of the CPs. Interviews either focused on the JASZ at national level, or on specific sectors. In addition, government staff were interviewed, from MoFNP and from sector ministries. Where possible, the team tried to meet with CP staff who had been in Lusaka since before 2007.

The team benefited from a short mission undertaken by DFID and Irish Aid, focusing on Mutual Accountability. Team members were able to participate in their meetings with Parliamentarians and with civil society. In addition, the team met on an individual basis with additional MPs and civil society organizations.

On return from Lusaka, additional interviews were carried out by phone, both with CP staff who had been in Zambia during the period of the design of the JASZ and with HQ staff on the country desk, who could provide the view from the centre.

Sector case studies

The JASZ works at the level of national engagement with GRZ, but also at the sector level. Five case studies were carried out, to allow an examination of the extent to which the JASZ has contributed to changes in the quality of sector dialogue and changes in aid modality. In depth case studies were undertaken of two sectors, education and agriculture, and broad brush case studies were undertaken of three sectors, health, environment and governance.

The choice of sectors was made to reflect existing analyses and sector evaluations (the Phase I PD evaluation undertook case studies in Health and Water and Sanitation), the number of lead CPs, and the number of overall CPs. The agriculture sector had, in 2006, eight CPs active and three lead donors. The education sector had ten CPs active and two lead donors. In both these sectors there appear to have been changes in CP involvement

over the 2007-10 period. In 2006, Health had nine active CPs, with three lead CPs, Governance had 10 active CPs, with three lead CPs, and Environment had four active CPs with one lead.

The detailed sector case studies were based on a combination of existing document review and data analysis, interviews with engaged CPs, government ministries, civil society and private sector, where relevant. The broad-brush studies were based primarily on interviews. These are presented in Annex H, which can be found on www.evaluation.dk.

Limitations to Methodology

There were a number of limitations to the methodology that the evaluation team could employ. Some of these arose from the nature of the JASZ document itself. It did not contain an intervention logic, i.e. a clear statement of how the activities to which the CPs committed themselves would lead to the stated objectives of the JASZ. Nor was there a clear statement of these activities, with measurable outputs and outcomes which could form the basis for assessing the progress of the JASZ.

A rigorous evaluation assesses outcomes and impact against a counterfactual, i.e. what would have happened in the absence of a particular intervention, or if alternative feasible interventions had been undertaken instead. However, the JASZ evolved out of a series of initiatives, described below, making it difficult to identify a clear division between the pre-JASZ period and the JASZ. It also makes it difficult to attribute many of changes which took place solely to the JASZ. Rather than investing considerable time hypothesising what might have happened in the absence of the JASZ, the evaluation team decided to focus on what the changes were over the period of the JASZ, and the extent to which these resulted from the JASZ process, interpreted broadly.

There were two practical limitations to the evaluation. The first arose from the turnover of CP international staff. Where possible the team tried to meet with CP staff who had been in Lusaka since 2007. In many cases this was not possible, because staff had moved on. The team contacted some staff who were now back at HQs.

Although it was not in the methodology proposed in the inception report, it became apparent to the evaluation team that the body of evidence would be much improved if a survey could be carried out for key GRZ stakeholders at sector level, similar to that carried out for CPs. The team tried to get a list of respondents during the field work period, but, because many of the people who could have assisted were travelling over the three week period, it was not possible. This means that GRZ views on many key issues are based solely on interviews.

1.3 Structure of the report

The remainder of this report is structured as follows. Section 2 examines context for aid effectiveness in Zambia and the processes in Zambia that have led to, and proceeded in parallel with the JASZ. Section 3 discusses the JASZ in more detail, and identifies its main elements and the activities that it has involved. It also includes a brief account of regional experience with JAS and mutual accountability frameworks. Section 4 presents the findings of the evaluation in terms of the answers to the evaluation questions which seek to assess the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the JASZ. Section 5 sets out the overall conclusions of the evaluation, and Section 6 the recommendations for action. Additional material is presented in annexes, including the results of the survey in Annex E.

2 Aid Effectiveness in Zambia

2.1 The context for aid in Zambia

Zambia has historically exhibited a high level of aid dependency with an average ratio of ODA to Gross National Income (GNI) over the period 1990-2005 of 23%. By the end of the Chiluba Government in 2001 there was considerable dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of aid as a result of concerns about governance, corruption, and lack of effective progress in policy and institutional reforms, and by 2001 aid had fallen to its lowest level over the period (representing 10% of GNI).² Assessments of the performance of aid in Zambia over the 1980s and 1990s concluded that it had not encouraged effective reforms or promoted growth and that it may indeed have enabled the continuation of unsustainable policies, through the provision of external funding.

The period after 2001 was regarded by donors as providing a more favourable environment for the use of aid. After President Mwanawasa was elected in 2001, there was a gradual increase in donor confidence associated with a perception of improving governance and more effective steps being taken to address corruption issues, as well as an increasingly active and effective civil society (which had successfully led the opposition to a third term for President Chiluba). Zambia produced a Poverty Reduction Strategy in 2002 and benefited from both HIPC and the Multi-Donor Debt Relief Initiative in 2005 and 2006, reducing outstanding debt from USD 7.2 billion to USD 0.5 billion. In April 2005, an MoU was signed for the provision of Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS).³ The Fifth National Development Plan produced in December 2006 set out a medium development strategy around which donors have sought to align.

Growth improved over this period peaking at 6.3% in 2007. However, since then the economic situation has weakened as a result of the global financial crisis (impacting on copper prices), while donor confidence has been undermined by concerns about fiduciary risk, particularly following a major corruption scandal in the Ministry of Health in 2009, and concerns about the road sector. PRBS disbursements were suspended for some time in 2009.

An evaluation of Norwegian aid to Zambia concluded (p. 14) that:

“Donors are beginning to understand that because transformation has to be generated domestically by deeply rooted forces their impact can be marginal at best. It is important that they put aside a purely normative approach and include political-economy analysis to support their interventions.”

The renewed concerns about corruption and financial mismanagement may be taken as illustrating the continuing fragility of progress towards a more developmental state in Zambia.

2) Norad (2007)

3) There are currently nine Cooperating Partners who have signed the MoU (the European Commission, DFID, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank) while a number of other partners have expressed their interest to join in the short and medium term.

2.2 Initiatives to improve harmonization and alignment

Issues for aid management in Zambia

In early 2000 during the time when the harmonization agenda was taking root at the global level, it was increasingly being recognised that Government systems in Zambia were part of the problem. One of the most important pre-requisites to effective aid management and donor harmonization, it was realised, was a functional and thought-out national institutional framework within which external resources were mobilised and finally utilised in ways that safeguarded the country's priorities. The typical donor-aided project in Zambia at the time received limited guidance from the Government at almost all levels. The lack of cooperation/coordination among different and functionally disjointed wings of Government that include MoFNP, the Bank of Zambia (central bank), sector ministries, and statutory bodies further worsened the situation. Most sector ministries continued to receive aid with only a rudimentary system of reporting to the supposedly central co-ordinating body (MoFNP).

At the macro level, the Zambian Government suffered from serious structural capacity limitations that include weak organizational systems; inadequate and unreliable policy-cum-planning database; and poor financial management and accounting systems that had tended to threaten accountability and, thus, encouraged donors to either include capacity-threatening 'gate-keeping' functions in their aid support and/or simply work around the government system altogether by creating parallel project management and implementation systems and structures, including the running of separate bank accounts for donors' supported projects. Moreover, the analytical capacity of the aid co-ordination institutions in the country was generally limited to the collection of basic data on aid flows with very little effort towards policy-relevant analyses that would have guided Government to better interact with donors in development priority setting. Behind these shortcomings was the lack of adequate, well-trained, remunerated, motivated and experienced personnel that were needed to perform the basic functions of aid co-ordination and management.

The weaknesses in the processes of aid co-ordination and management as described above had resulted in the marginalisation of external resources in national planning and budgeting. Although the periodic Consultative Group (CG) meetings between Zambia and her main external resource providers did allow for a certain degree of dialogue on the setting up of priority areas for aid intervention, such consultations and the timing of the disbursement of pledged resources were still not adequately synchronised. Consequently, not only was it difficult to integrate external aid and national development planning and budgeting but, equally important, counterpart funds required to be sourced from the Government's internally-generated revenue for the purpose of complementing external flows were often non-existent or had to be obtained from extra-budgetary sources. All these factors persistently threatened the effectiveness of aid.

Harmonization in Practice

The state of affairs described above formed the basic rationale for the subsequent calls within Zambia for improved systems for aid management. In response to the Declaration on Harmonization formulated at the first High Level Forum (HLF) on aid effectiveness in Rome in 2003, seven donors in Zambia,⁴ in close collaboration with the Government of Zambia, agreed to come together in support of coordination, harmonization and alignment, marking the beginning of what became known as the Harmonization

4) Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

in Practice (HIP) Initiative. It followed an initiative by the Directors General for International Co-operation of the four Nordic Countries (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland), the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands that met in September 2002 in Helsinki and proposed a joint study on harmonization in Zambia. Ireland later joined in this endeavour. A study⁵ was commissioned by the Lusaka-based donor group in late 2002 to recommend on aid harmonization. The study came up with eleven 'Quick Wins' that ultimately flagged off some of the major initiatives that target the improvement of aid effectiveness in Zambia, including the Joint Assistance Strategy that is the subject of this evaluation. Box 2.1 presents the 'Quick Wins' from the HIP study.

Box 2.1 Quick Wins from the HIP Study

1. Donors adoption of GRZ management systems.
2. Promotion of harmonized approach to country planning behind PRSP.
4. Work towards a more coordinated entry by likeminded donors into budget support.
5. Adoption of sector-wide approach whereby donor funding is guided by a single sector policy and expenditure programme.
6. Donors harmonization of their policies/approaches towards the requirement for counterpart funding.
7. Donor agreement on, and utilisation of, joint reviews of programme support in those areas where there is common interest.
8. Help GRZ develop Aid policy.
9. Improvement of the effectiveness of Technical Assistance (TA).
10. Make GRZ take a leadership role in project and financial reporting and monitoring systems.
11. Development of poverty monitoring indicators.

This HIP study formed the basis of the *Joint Statement of Commitment by Donors and Government to increase aid effectiveness and reduce transaction costs for Zambia* through the adoption of OECD/DAC Guiding Principles and Good Practices. The Joint Statement was signed in March 2003 by the Zambian Government and Directors-General of the seven aid agencies. The parties to the Joint Statement agreed, *inter alia*, (a) to harmonize their aid support and processes, including procurement processes; (b) to increase the share of budget support they provide; and (c) to coordinate their policy inputs.

The HIP study also highlighted the issue of government capacity. Consequently, a consultant was hired to produce a report entitled *Assessment of aid management capacity in Zambia*. This study, released in June 2005, was commissioned by the Economic Technical Cooperation Department⁶ (ETC) and financed by Sida. Its production ran concurrently with the development of the GRZ's Aid Policy and Strategy.

Wider Harmonization in Practice

The HIP Initiative was expanded in 2004 to create the Wider Harmonization in Practice (WHIP) group. This followed the decision of all the remaining major donors in Zambia to join the HIP Initiative. The WHIP MoU that was signed in April 2004 between the Gov-

5) Saasa, O.S. & Jens Claussen, Harmonization in Practice (HIP) Study, Commissioned by DFID, Ireland Aid, Sida, Norad, Danida, DGIS (Netherlands), FINNIDA to recommend on aid harmonization, December 2002-March 2003.

6) Now a section.

ernment of Zambia and the major cooperating partners to Zambia⁷ provided the operational landscape for development cooperation in the country. Both the HIP and the WHIP Initiatives laid the groundwork for the development of the Aid Policy and Strategy for Zambia (see below) as well as the setting up of a Donor Assistance Database for Zambia (ZDAD).

Poverty Reduction Budget Support

The provision of PRBS since 2005 has also provided an impetus to harmonization and alignment. In 2008, the value of this support was the equivalent of USD188.1 million, an increase from 2007 when USD 143.6 million was released. A full PRBS Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) with clear indicators (a mixture of policy measures and results/outcome indicators) is in place. The current PAF was approved by Government and CPs to cover the 2008-10 period. The indicators and targets in the current PAF were selected after a detailed process of consultation between the relevant CPs and sector ministries. As part of the dialogue mechanism, a Joint Steering Committee (JSC) has been formed involving both the Government and CP representatives. Again, through JSC, opportunities have been created for donor involvement in the monitoring and follow up of commitments that are made through General Budget Support (GBS).

The Cooperating Partners Group

The Cooperating Partners Group (CPG) consists of two forums, namely, the CPG Heads of Cooperation (HoC) and CPG Heads of Mission (ambassadors). While the Heads of Cooperation CPG address the operational multi-sector issues as well as strategic development policy issues, the Heads of Mission CPG handles strategic dialogue with Government at the highest level. The overall aim of the CPG-HoC is to facilitate regular and open policy dialogue among CPs themselves and between CPs and Government. The group is responsible for “...overall coordination and promoting aid effectiveness”⁸ and covers both operational multi-sectoral issues and strategic development policy issues. The Group coordinates and prioritizes CPs’ policy positions for discussion and dialogue with Government. It also monitors and reviews the implementation of the JASZ.

Membership in the CPG-HoC consists of CPs that are signatories to the JASZ. Other CPs may attend but only as observers. The CPG-HoC is led by a troika consisting of two bilateral donors and one multilateral agency.⁹ The Troika meet at least once a month (on the first Thursday of each month), ideally one week before the monthly CPG-HoC meeting. The Troika serves as the secretariat of the CPG-HoC. The Troika meets monthly with the Secretary to the Treasury at the MoFNP.

2.3 Zambia’s Aid Policy and Strategy

Main features of the Aid Policy

As recommended in the HIP study, and to address the problems of fragmented aid management discussed in the previous section, GRZ developed its *Aid Policy and Strategy*

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- 7) Cooperating partners that acceded to the MoU included Canada, Denmark, the EU, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, US, Norway, The Netherlands, Sweden, UK, UN system and the World Bank. However, new actors, such as China, and the new phenomenon of ‘vertical funds’ – for which donors set parallel standards of resource management and accountability – have remained outside of the more harmonized/coordinated process, thus weakening it somewhat.
- 8) CPG website, www.cpg.org.zm
- 9) In order to ensure continuity, each donor/agency in the Troika is a member for 18 months: six months as an incoming member, six months as chair and six months as outgoing member.

during 2005 although it was not adopted until 2007. Preparation involved a wide array of stakeholders, including CPs. The Aid Policy seeks to set out in clear operational terms the preferred procedures for aid receipt, application, management, monitoring and evaluation of impact. Box 2.2 gives the highlights of the Aid Policy and Strategy.

Box 2.2 Main Highlights of the Aid Policy and Strategy

1. Zambia shall progressively reduce its dependence on external assistance. Where aid is required, the Government shall give preference to grants as opposed to loans.
2. All external resources given to the Government (both financial and human), shall be delivered, managed, monitored and reported through the existing public sector management system in the same manner domestic resources are handled.
3. The National Development Plan and the national budget shall define the areas where external resources shall be required.
4. Zambia's cooperating partners, to the extent possible, are urged to programme their support to the country over a multi-year timeframe that is synchronized with the financial planning horizon of the Government.
5. Technical Assistance (TA) shall be demand-driven and integrated into the Government's comprehensive national capacity building strategies.
6. Effective project appraisal and aid reporting and monitoring systems shall be developed and fully integrated into the same systems that monitor domestic resources. The National Development Plan shall be the primary reference point for guiding the reporting and monitoring processes in Zambia.
7. The Government encourages its cooperating partners to progressively move towards Direct Budget Support.
8. The Ministry of Finance and National Planning shall be the entry point for all public financial resources from external sources. The Government shall strengthen its capacity for effective collaboration between the Ministry of Finance and National Planning and sector ministries.
9. To ensure the availability of external resources when they are required, the timing of financial commitments by the country's cooperating partners shall be aligned to the Government's planning cycle while actual disbursements shall be synchronized with the national budgets.
10. The Government shall ensure that the procedures for sectors that are in a SWAp mode are synchronized with the National Development Plan monitoring and annual reviews.
11. TA shall be acquired on the basis of a comprehensive and prioritised inventory of the gaps in the country's technical capabilities. The need for TA shall be carefully synchronised with, and be part of, the country's national planning, in general, and human resource development strategy, in particular.
12. TA shall be more demand-driven and responsive to the institutional and human resource capacity needs of Zambia. In this regard, the Government shall develop guidelines on TA solicitation, recruitment, contracting/procurement, management, monitoring of performance and evaluation.
13. The Government and its cooperating partners shall adopt a single monitoring framework that shall stipulate common formats, content and frequency for reporting.
14. Cooperating partners' evaluation, reporting and monitoring missions shall be scaled down, harmonized and synchronized with the time availability of government officials.
15. The Government shall revise the relevant pieces of legislation to ensure that loan agreements with cooperating partners that go above a stipulated financial threshold shall seek Parliamentary approval.

16. The Government shall ensure that Parliament is enabled to discuss and agree on Zambia's overall macroeconomic framework of the budget and the broad functional allocations before the budget is presented by the Minister of Finance.
17. The Government shall strive to have the budget approved by the beginning of the year so as to minimize the occurrence of extended periods of unapproved expenditures by the Executive.

Aid management responsibilities and arrangements

In accord with the Aid Policy, MoFNP is mandated by legislation to coordinate ODA resources in the country. The Minister centrally handles the mobilization and allocation of external resources in the country and negotiates and enters into grants and loan agreements with the country's cooperating partners. On the day-to-day basis, CPs are facilitated to interact with Government at the central level through the ETC Section that falls under the Economic Management Department of the MoFNP. ETC is responsible for aid management. Its responsibilities include the mobilisation of resources from multilateral and bilateral development partners; forecasting the level of external aid that is required for development programmes; maintaining a database on all donor funded programmes and projects; and monitoring financial and operational performance of all existing multilateral and bilateral agreements.

Effective from January 1st 2010, a Desk Officer is assigned to each sector, line ministry and to each donor to facilitate easier communication between CPs and Government. The ETC has three Units, namely, Multilateral Unit, Bilateral Unit, and Donor Coordination Unit. It is the Donor Coordination Unit that is mandated to coordinate cooperating partners. Currently, each donor is assigned two ETC desk officers.

Issues not resolved during Aid Policy preparation

The Aid Policy as it currently stands does not include either an implementation framework or a Framework for Coordination. Originally there were two chapters drafted which addressed these issues, and included a proposed aid management structure within MoFNP and a "dialogue architecture" which addressed coordination and consultation mechanisms both with GRZ and between GRZ and the CPs. These chapters were not adopted as part of the final Aid Policy.

It is difficult at this point in time to tease out fully the reasons for these chapters to be dropped, but concerns were voiced by the CPs in the reference group set up to oversee the drafting of the Aid Policy that the structures proposed involved too many committees, and that the need was for a simplification of structures rather than an increased elaboration. Concern was also expressed that the entry point for CP engagement with GRZ could be at too low a level – an interesting observation given future events, as discussed below.

3 The Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ)

3.1 Objectives of the JASZ

The JASZ is presented (p.3) as “a national medium-term framework (2007-10) which has been developed by the Cooperating Partners to manage their development cooperation with the GRZ in alignment with the Fifth National Development Plan”.

The stated key objectives of the JASZ are as follows:

- a. Establish a shared vision and guiding principles for CPs’ support to the objectives of the FNDP, which is the first stage in meeting the Vision 2030.
- b. Articulate priorities for support during the Plan period.
- c. Replace or better align CPs’ country strategies (including resource allocations) with FNDP priorities, targets and country systems.
- d. Improve aid delivery by achieving a more effective Division of Labour and allocation of CPs’ resources.
- e. Deepen the results focus of assistance programmes.
- f. Simplify aid management and improve aid predictability.
- g. Reduce transaction costs for the Government of Zambia.

The signatories to the JASZ are twelve bilateral donors, the European Commission, the United Nations, the World Bank and the African Development Bank. The Zambian Government is not a signatory to the JASZ, as GRZ argued that the JASZ was a donor document, corresponding to the Aid Policy and outlining how the Donors would support the FNPD.

3.2 Cooperating Partner support to the Fifth National Development Plan

The JASZ document starts with a discussion of the country context and a summary of the FNDP. It then identifies a set of “FNDP Challenges”, set out by sector, and proposes “Priority Responses”. However, the nature of these responses varies. They do not, in general, set out how the CPs will help GRZ address these responses in a concrete manner, but rather identify a number of areas which the CPs feel should be addressed, or, in some cases, a set of principles which should be incorporated into GRZ activities.

The financing requirements of the FNDP are analysed, and projections of ODA flows are set out. These projections indicate an increase in General Budget Support and a slower increase in SWAs for education and health, with a reduction in the overall amount of project and programme grants. The CPs indicate concern about the decline in revenue to GDP and also the pattern of under-execution of the budget that was shown in 2005. A risk assessment and mitigation table is included.

3.3 Commitments to implement Paris Declaration principles

Section 5 of the JASZ (“Working in Partnership”) contains principles, commitments, and proposed actions that the CPs will undertake across the “five pillars of the Paris Declaration”.

The JASZ contains 13 principles, listed under the heading ownership, to guide CPs support to the FNDP in response to the Aid Policy. These cover not only ownership, but also issues of alignment, harmonization, and management for results. Amongst the principles and commitments made are:

- A CP commitment to provide timely, transparent and comprehensive information on aid flows
- CP commitment to link funding to results, and a single framework of conditions and/ or manageable set of indicators derived from the FNDP
- CPs commit to work together to reduce the number of separate duplicative missions
- Development, with GRZ, of a Code of Conduct to guide how CPs will operate with respect to capacity development
- When GRZ re-establishes the planning cycle, CPs will respect the new mission-free period
- Implementation of the Division of Labour (DoL) at sector level
- CPs to work through the Sector Advisory Groups (SAG) to improve various aspects of management at sector level
- CPs to respect GRZ preference for budget support to the extent possible
- Institutionalisation of the NDP monitoring group as the basis for a common donor approach to monitoring support
- Establishment of an Independent Monitoring Group to monitor the annual performance of GRZ and CPs.

3.4 JASZ implementation

Next steps for implementation

Section 6 of the JASZ sets out “a series of next steps to progress towards the outlined results of the FNDP, the Aid Policy and the Paris Declaration.” These are:

Target-setting

- Establish in collaboration with the GRZ missing country-specific Paris Declaration targets for quality procurement systems (indicator 2b); alignment to country public financial management and procurement systems (indicators 5a and 5b); and coordinated country analytical work (indicator 10b).

Paris Declaration sector baselines

- Conduct, with the Government, Paris Declaration baselines for selected sectors addressing in particular alignment and harmonization, including the phasing-out of Parallel Implementation Units (PIUs); the identification of Programme Based Approaches (PBAs); and the integration of ODA into sectoral budget allocations.

Alignment

- Develop together with the Government a Code of Conduct on Capacity Development for CPs to facilitate for example, the implementation of joint analyses of capacity needs; joint training, joint demand-driven technical assistance (TA) pools at sector/programme level; and harmonized scales for allowances and salaries in CP funded programmes.
- Align as needed the mission-free period to the national economic planning cycle.

Harmonization

- Support Government in developing sector programme frameworks and coordinated financial CP responses for all sectors to progress towards PBAs/Sector Wide Approaches (SWAs) while ensuring aid modality complementarity.
- Together with the Government finalize sectoral ToR for donor coordination. Currently, draft sector specific terms of reference have been developed for health, education, decentralisation, tourism/natural resources/environment, agriculture, HIV/AIDS, water, governance, social protection, energy, and gender.
- Together with the Government define the ToR for the SAGs in the various sectors.
- Refine Aid Architecture to address (i) sector/theme compartmentalisation, and (ii) the need to engage with CPs which are not signatories to the JASZ.
- In a sectoral division of labour, cross-cutting issues (HIV/AIDS, Governance, Gender and Environment) are characterized by overlapping mandates of Ministries and Sector Advisory Groups. This leads to an additional challenge for harmonization and further alignment towards Zambia's policies. CPs will evaluate progress in cross cutting issues and if necessary formulate additional safeguards.
- For Zambia, the development of a Memorandum of Understanding regarding support to non-governmental institutions will further reduce transaction costs and enhance aid effectiveness. If possible, targets for harmonizing CP's assistance to non-governmental institutions will be added to the localised Paris indicator list.

Results-based management

- Support finalization of FNDP Key Performance Indicators through SAGs or similar fora.
- Finalize ToR for the CP National Development Plan (NDP) Monitoring Group to strengthen the coordination of CPs' input to monitoring at central (CSO), sectoral, and decentralised levels.
- Inform high-level policy dialogue with joint CP-GRZ executed Public Expenditure Reviews (PER) and Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) or similar.

Mutual accountability

- Develop ToR for the Independent Monitoring Group to review annual CP and GRZ performance.
- Prepare evaluation of WHIP process to be carried out by end of 2007.

3.5 Comparative regional experience

A number of countries in Africa developed JASs at around the same time as Zambia. These are described in more detail in Annex E. The approaches taken have some similarities to the JASZ, but also significant differences. The most important is that the other examples reviewed all have some kind of joint agreement with Government backing up either a JAS or a commitment to support Government's development programme or aid policy. This has taken the form of a MoU, partnership principles or a Statement of Intent, which set out certain basic principles on engagement and are signed by both Government and donors. In Zambia the WHIP had such a MoU, and this is attached to the JASZ as Annex 1. However, it was signed in 2004, and has not been updated to reflect the content of the JASZ. Some JASs have had more formal performance frameworks than the JASZ, but these have focused on Government performance.

Mutual accountability has not been addressed very systematically in any JAS. However, Mozambique has developed a PAF which includes donor performance. This is not fully inclusive as it only applies to those donors providing programme assistance (PAPs) but the number of donors becoming PAPs has gradually increased over the last five years. Rwanda has taken a more inclusive approach and has now developed a Donor Performance Assessment Framework which applies to all donors with an in-country presence. Effective engagement with Government has been an issue with all the JASs reviewed. The donor community in Kenya has taken a bold step to re-engage with Government in order to make more progress with the aid effectiveness agenda. In Mozambique and Rwanda the Government has very much taken the lead on mutual accountability issues.

4 Findings from the Evaluation

The ToR for the evaluation set out a number of questions under three of the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria, relevance, effectiveness and efficiency. The evaluation findings have been set out below, in accordance with these overall criteria.

4.1 Relevance of the JASZ

The evaluation questions relating to the relevance of the JASZ focus, first, on the internal consistency of the design of the JASZ and the extent to which JASZ was based on appropriate assumptions, identified key performance indicators, and included a feasible roadmap for implementation. The second area relating to relevance is the responsiveness of JASZ processes to changes in the national context, capacities and priorities. The third area is the extent to which the design and implementation of the JASZ facilitated the implementation of the Paris Declaration commitments and processes, and the fourth was whether the design and implementation of the JASZ took sufficient account of the cross-cutting issues of Gender, Environment, and HIV/AIDS.

Appropriateness of the JASZ design

It is difficult to describe the JASZ as a “strategy” in the usual sense of the word. One or two CPs tried to use the JASZ as the basis for their country programme, rather than develop a separate external document¹⁰. However, this seems to have proved a frustrating process, and is unlikely to be repeated unless there are dramatic changes to the structure of the next JASZ. There are no structured plans for implementation and no framework for monitoring progress or results.

The JASZ is perhaps better seen as an instrument for implementing the Paris Declaration (PD), rather than the FNDP. Most of its firm commitments are in terms of harmonization and alignment rather than specific support to the FNDP. As such, it needed to be aligned to Zambia’s Aid Policy and Strategy, but important elements of the latter were not completed because of a lack of agreement with donors on important elements of how it would be implemented and the coordination framework for aid.

While the JASZ built on the successful initiatives of the HIP and WHIP unlike these it was not based on a programme of actions agreed with GRZ. The underlying concept of the JASZ as a joint agreement between donors that did not encompass Government (though it relied critically on Government actions to achieve its objectives) is open to question. Although an increasing number of donors had signed the MoU to the WHIP, which is an addendum to the JASZ, this was not updated to reflect the JASZ, and therefore the actions contained in it referred to the period 2004-05.

While an initial work plan for JASZ implementation was developed in December 2007, the implementation of this work plan was not effectively monitored and no subsequent implementation plans (or assessments of progress with implementation) have been prepared. No group was assigned responsibility for tracking the work plan or develop-

10) Although five CPs committed to replace their current country strategies with the JASZ, by 2008 three of them had developed their own country strategies. In two other cases, Denmark and AfDB, short internal documents were prepared for their own regulatory purposes.

ing new work plans. This links to a more general gap in monitoring. Since the JASZ was presented as a response to the FNDP and the PD, the performance indicators specified (in annexes to the JASZ) were the key performance indicators for the FNDP and the PD baseline and targets. No performance indicators specifically for the JASZ were defined, for instance to assess progress (collectively or individually) by CPs in fulfilling the commitments made in the JASZ or in implementing the commitments made.

There was no attempt as part of JASZ preparation to develop and analyse its intervention logic to specify how the actions proposed would lead to the achievement of the objectives and to assess the key assumptions about how the JASZ would achieve impact. The JASZ contains a risk matrix, which identifies risks and mitigating action to the effective implementation of the JASZ. These are divided into country risks, and risks from CPs. The risks are, by and large, properly identified, but are not prioritised as to probability of risk occurring, and size of risk incurred.

Some risks had very high likelihood of occurrence, such as the issue of institutional capacity constraints in FNDP. Yet the mitigation actions appear to be to continue with ongoing capacity building initiatives. Other risks, such as corruption within ministries, did not have a sufficiently well-thought out response mechanism which could be called upon in events such as the corruption scandal in the MoH last year. One of the lessons identified by CPs in the health sector was that it was important to think through responses to these types of scandals in advance, come to a common position, and implement it quickly when the occasion required.

Other risks are associated with CPs, such as an inability or unwillingness to address institutional constraints to harmonized development assistance. There are no clear recommended actions to encourage better CP compliance, other than the need for GRZ to improve system performance. There are no mechanisms for monitoring or updating risks, so no way of identifying changes in risk, except when a major scandal breaks.

In the absence of any clear set of monitorable objectives or implementation arrangements, it is difficult to answer the evaluation question about how JASZ implementation has responded to changes in the Zambian context. As discussed below, the DoL has been developed over time. The concerns about governance and corruption that were highlighted by the problems uncovered during 2009 had an impact on aid disbursement, CP perceptions of feasible aid modalities and on CP-GRZ dialogue, but it is hard to see these as directly related to “JASZ processes” given the lack of implementation plans for the JASZ.

To what extent has the design and implementation of JASZ facilitated PD implementation?

As a donor-led arrangement that is not based on an agreed joint implementation plan with GRZ (or even on a clearly specified plan agreed by CPs), the extent to which JASZ has provided an adequate basis for PD implementation is at best questionable.

One critical aspect that has been revealed in this evaluation is the evident weakness of the Government system at the level of guiding the aid coordination and alignment function, a state of affairs that has had serious adverse effects on the ability of the JASZ to achieve its objectives. The challenges are both structural/organizational and systemic. At the structural level, Government has failed to put in place and/or support an effective system within which external support could be received and utilised effectively. Perhaps the greatest weakness is revealed by the institutional and organizational weaknesses of

the current structures that are meant to discharge this responsibility. Firstly, the ETC of MoFPD is supposed to be the main entry point to the Ministry for CPs. And yet ETC's organization remains far divorced from the emerging aid architecture that calls for a more harmonized and coordinated system and where Government is expected to assume a more proactive leadership role. In fact, the ETC was recently down-graded from a department (headed by a Director) to a section that reports to a multi-tasked Department. This has resulted in a reduction of authority of ETC to dialogue effectively with CPs without having to refer issues to higher authorities. A number of donors have realised this frailty and tend to get round it by dealing with officers that are located at levels higher than the ETC.

Secondly, the current organization of ETC focuses on one-on-one relationships with individual donors rather than in a form that recognises the PD system, which prescribes the accommodation of donor input in a more coordinated and harmonized way. The Multilateral Cooperation Unit within ETC, for example, conducts its business on one-to-one basis with multilateral donors/agencies, as does the Bilateral Cooperation Unit with bilateral agencies. And yet, as revealed above, CPs are coordinated around common principles and strategies as guided by the donor-exclusive CPG. The current structure of ETC remains in a pre-PD and pre-Aid Policy and Strategy mould. This has resulted in a systemic overload on an already over-stretched staff whose day-to-day functions are already quite demanding. Personnel depletion has left the ETC primarily with most positions for Principal Economists remaining vacant.

Thirdly, there are plans to re-orient ETC personnel around sectors rather than around individual donors. As long as the current structure of ETC remains the same, such reorientation of personnel will do little to strategically reposition its structure to respond positively and promptly to the emerging challenges in the aid effectiveness agenda. While it is appropriate that there should be expertise within MoFNP on the policies and requirements of individual cooperating partners, the Government's Harmonization and Alignment Agenda, to the extent that it attempts to bring donors together and make their effort better aligned to the Government programmes, calls for a very different ETC structure, systems and, in some areas, competencies that are yet to be developed. MoFNP has noted that the restructuring referred to above has had an adverse effect but feels that the main issue is to strengthen liaison with sector ministries¹¹ rather than a more general lack of capacity.

Fourthly, the current practice¹² whereby CPs, through the Troika, meets the Secretary to the Treasury (ST) to dialogue with him on a monthly basis in a process that has significantly marginalized ETC is itself a reflection of both the weak ETC system and, perhaps more importantly in the context of the JASZ agenda, a reflection of loss of faith by donors in the existing Government aid coordination system. Equally important, the weak intra-MoFNP dialogue mechanism has resulted in serious weaknesses regarding the ability of the system to process the decisions from the Troika-ST meetings into policy/strategy guides for system-wide improvements. This evaluation established that ETC personnel are merely "invited" to the Troika meetings with the ST and usually take a back seat during the deliberations. They do not participate in the setting of the agenda for these meetings, a state of affairs that is counter to their defined mandate that identifies them as the gate for donor entry into the Government system. There is also clear evidence from

11) Comments by MoFNP to an earlier draft of this report.

12) The evaluation understands that this evolved during the crisis over the MoH scandal last year, and has become institutionalised.

interviews that the ST is not comfortable with the manner in which donors continue to by-pass the director under which ETC falls and, instead, deal with him directly. The fact that this concern may not have been expressed at an appropriate level suggests the outstanding challenges with the current dialogue mechanism between the Government and CPs.

In the light of the above, whether the failure to attend to what is needed – and known from the very beginning – regarding systemic restructuring or capacity enhancement has been a function of capacity limitation on the part of Government; or the unwillingness on the part of donors to push forward what PD Agenda calls for; or of sheer lack of institutional memory on both sides of the aid relationship is perhaps what should be investigated more closely rather than attempting to reinvent the wheel.

Within the Government system, there is no clear mechanism that deliberates, in a formalised manner, the management of aid beyond the more routine government systems and structures. Consequently, collaboration between MoFNP and sector ministries is extremely weak and the discourse between Government and non-state actors in the area of aid effectiveness is absent.

Current thinking among CPs is that Government has not established an appropriate dialogue system that facilitates an effective aid coordination and harmonization agenda. The withdrawn chapters of the Aid Policy and Strategy proposed a framework which could have led to a more effective set of structures, for both GRZ and CPs. However, CPs have improved their own coordination processes, while GRZ, on the other hand, is poorly prepared to provide the requisite coordination leadership (that CPs acknowledge should lie with Government). Consequently, the existing consultative mechanisms are, in important respects, driven by arrangements developed by CPs.

In the withdrawn chapters of the Aid Policy and Strategy, Government stated its commitment to strengthening information sharing through the establishment of a website where the Government and all cooperating partners would have posted aid-related documentation with links to other important sites. The CPG has established its own website although this is limited in terms of both coverage and access. Government has not made a concerted effort to address the dialogue architecture in a manner that would have allowed it to assume leadership in the coordination and harmonization agenda. As discussed above, the structure within the MoFNP is not enabling and it is only Government that can take corrective action. Views differ as to why these chapters were withdrawn; the evaluation simply wishes to note that the lack of follow-up on issues of aid management and aid coordination has resulted in extremely limited, if any, implementation of the Aid Policy.

JASZ and the treatment of “cross-cutting issues”

The discussion of challenges to FNDP implementation in the JASZ identifies several “priority responses” in relation to cross-cutting issues defined as HIV/AIDS, gender, environment, and food and nutrition. In relation to HIV/AIDS, the JASZ notes the possible need for key CPs supporting HIV/AIDS to improve their alignment on the “Three Ones Principle” (One Coordinating Body – One Strategic Framework and One Monitoring and Evaluation System). In relation to gender, JASZ identifies the key priority as focusing on capacity development for gender mainstreaming. For environment, a need for increased funding and enhanced national capacity for environmental planning and mainstreaming based on the use of strategic environment assessment and other tools is identi-

fied. For food and nutrition, the priority identified was improved coordination among Ministries and sector specific institutions implementing Food Security programmes. The principles articulated for CP support to FNDP implementation state (l) that as conditions permit, CPs will continue to promote MDG-related cross-cutting priorities, and (m) that CPs commit to strengthen the application of Environmental Impact Assessments and deepen common procedures for projects and develop and apply common procedures for strategic environmental assessments at sector and national levels.

The survey of CPs (see Table E.13) suggested that half of CPs saw some change in their treatment of gender as a result of the JASZ, while 12.5% saw substantial change in the treatment of HIV/AIDS and 7 out of 16 saw some change. Over two-thirds of CPs considered there was no change in their treatment of environmental issues. Views expressed by CPs about the nature of the changes were mixed. It does appear that strengthened coordination arrangements for HIV/AIDS through the National AIDS Council (and the DoL) had some effect on involvement by donors in the sector. Specific concerns were expressed that the JASZ was very weak on cross-cutting issues and that the DoL effectively treats cross-cutting issues as sectors which are hence left to donors operating in those sectors, rather than there being effective mechanisms for mainstreaming, as well as being dependent on the performance of leads in each “sector”. This has led to some donors becoming active in the cross-cutting sectors to ensure that they comply with their HQ policies. Information is not available on whether progress has been made with the development of Strategic Environmental Assessments as was envisaged in the JASZ.

4.2 Effectiveness of JASZ

The evaluation questions related to effectiveness in the ToR focus on the extent to which the JASZ has helped strengthen GRZ ownership of the development process, the extent to which the key stated objectives of the JASZ have been achieved and the planned activities and outputs of the JASZ been delivered, the extent to which aid effectiveness and mutual accountability has been enhanced, as well as the effectiveness of the management and internal accountability and monitoring mechanisms. Further issues identified were the effectiveness of risk management and of JASZ engagement with CPs who are not signatories to the JASZ and with Civil Society.

The JASZ and GRZ ownership of the development process

CPs considered that national ownership had increased since 2007, with 50% of CPs considering ownership (Table E.1) was fairly strong or strong in 2010 compared to 20% (of those expressing an opinion) for 2007. There was however a high level of disagreement between CPs about the contribution of the JASZ to this change.

Comments in response to the survey noted that ownership was variable across sectors and was dependent on Ministers and some key individuals in MoFNP. As a donor process the JASZ was seen to have limited impact on GRZ. Concerns were also expressed about the extent of implementation of the FNDP. However, by setting out the clear commitment to the PD Principles, the JASZ was seen as to some extent empowering individual donors to push for adherence, including respect for ownership.

While it is difficult to identify clearly how the JASZ itself strengthened ownership, it does appear that the overall process since 2001, including HIP and WHIP, the establishment of the SAGs, and the decision of GRZ to develop the FNDP rather than a second

generation Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) has been based on, and strengthened national ownership. Progress in the articulation of the long-term *Vision 2030*, the establishment of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and the strengthening of the annual budget process have also been positive in this respect.

Achievement of JASZ objectives and implementation of planned activities

The stated objectives of the JASZ are the following:

- a. Establish a shared vision and guiding principles for CPs' support to the objectives of the FNDP, which is the first stage in meeting the Vision 2030.
- b. Articulate priorities for support during the Plan period.
- c. Replace or better align CPs' country strategies (including resource allocations) with FNDP priorities, targets and country systems.
- d. Improve aid delivery by achieving a more effective Division of Labour and allocation of CPs' resources.
- e. Deepen the results focus of assistance programmes.
- f. Simplify aid management and improve aid predictability.
- g. Reduce transaction costs for the Government of Zambia.

However, assessment of progress in achieving these objectives is made more difficult by the lack of either specific and measurable targets relating to these objectives or of a system for monitoring achievement of these objectives. Evidence in relation to each of these objectives is discussed below (with progress in reducing transactions costs being discussed in the following section on Efficiency).

Similarly, the lack of a systematic process for following up on the work plan developed in December 2007 (see Section 3.4) makes it more difficult to assess the extent to which any of the elements on this work plan have been carried out. As far as the evaluation team could tell, the following is the status of the activities proposed within the work plan:

- A Code of Practice on Capacity Development has been developed and was signed in April 2008. It is posted on the CPG website and covers basic principles to which the signatories agree. It also outlines joint action to be taken in collaboration with GRZ and non-state actors. Linked to this, CPs have reached agreement on the use of harmonized scales for allowances and salaries in CP funded programmes. The evaluation team understands that harmonized scales are now being used, though occasionally CPs and GRZ have to be reminded of the agreement.
- There is little evidence that the evaluation team has come across that support to statistical systems is being coordinated as part of the JASZ. There is no sub-group addressing these issues posted on the website.
- There has been movement on support to Non-State Actors, but not in the form of a MoU, rather the development of a governance foundation, which has just been established.

- The mutual accountability group, which will be discussed further below, has gone through a quiet period, but now seems to be coming to life again.
- On sector working group, most sectors seem to have CP working groups with different internal structures. DoL structures were posted on the website for macroeconomics, health, private sector development and governance in late 2007. However, there are more which have not been posted, and there may well have been changes in structures since 2007 for those that have been posted.


Assessment of JASZ impact on CP alignment

Changes to CP strategies and programmes as a result of the JASZ

Although the objective of replacing separate CP country strategies with the JASZ was not realised, 25% of CPs consider there was substantial change in their strategies in Zambia as a result of the JASZ, and 62.5% considered there was some change. These changes related largely from changes in sector engagement (and in the provision of GBS) as a result of the DoL, although in two cases it was considered this was driven more by agency head office decisions than by the JASZ as such.

Despite the absence of formal processes for progressing towards PD and FNPD objectives, CPs may nonetheless have improved alignment or harmonization without a formal coordinated framework to achieve this. The results of the evaluation survey (see Figure 4.1) indicate that CPs feel that there has been some change in the aid modalities used, and perhaps a stronger change in the sector or thematic focus of their country programme as a result of the JASZ. However, there has been no change in budgets, nor has there been any change in their engagement with civil society.

Figure 4.1 Have there been any changes to your country/agency programme in Zambia as a result of the JASZ?



Source: Evaluation of JASZ online questionnaire (2010) results, Question 10. Number of respondents =16

In discussion with CPs, some indicated that changes took place at least as much because of the earlier processes, the HIP and the WHIP, as they did because of the JASZ. For others, the evaluation team was told that the drivers of country programmes are as much based in the organization's headquarters as they are in Zambia, with the JASZ. Telephone conversations with some HQ staff tended to confirm this impression.

Impact of JASZ on aid modalities used by CPs

One of the principles set out under the JASZ was that, where feasible, CPs will progressively use the preferred modalities in the aid policy in their assistance to the public sector. The aid policy is quite clear, that GRZ would like CPs to move towards Direct Budget Support. It has proved difficult to access a table which shows trends in GBS over time in Zambia. The OECD/DAC figures are given below.

Table 4.1 GBS Commitments by donor, Average 2002-05, 2006, 2007, 2008. USD million

General Budget Support									
		Commitments				Disbursements			
Donor	JASZ	2002-05	2006	2007	2008	2002-05	2006	2007	2008
AfDF	1			30.60				0.00	
EC (excl. EIB)	1	47.63	86.80	0.00		55.56	50.40	38.58	
EU institutions	0	0.00				10.35			
Finland	1		14.07	13.69	0.00		0.00	6.84	6.63
Germany	1			13.69	0.00			6.84	6.74
Netherlands	1		8.05	52.02	0.00		8.05	10.95	13.45
Norway	1	7.59	0.00	110.78	0.00	1.92	14.44	18.07	27.97
Sweden	1	4.64	0.00	17.76	0.00	0.00	7.39	14.24	14.64
United Kingdom	1	39.63	0.00	0.00	172.44	8.78	45.90	50.03	50.38
United States	1	1.35	2.88			0.00	0.00		
Total		100.83	111.80	238.54	172.44	76.61	126.17	145.56	119.80

Source: OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System online database (22/01/10)

This shows that overall GBS has increased in amount over the period from 2002-08 and the number of CPs giving GBS has increased. Earlier figures are not currently available from Zambian sources, but Table 4.2 shows data for disbursements for 2007 and 2008, along with commitments for 2009 onwards.

Table 4.2 Share of budget support in total aid (excluding aid to NGOs). USD million

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total aid	524.4	1022.3	1249.4	1264.6	1070.1	1006.2
GBS	146.7	154.5	158.3	159.1	123.8	118.9
Sector Budget Support	2.9	49.0	51.6	45.9	34.3	34.3
BS loan	0.0	32.0	41.1	32.0	36.0	36.0
Total BS	149.6	235.5	251.0	237.0	194.1	189.2
BS as % total aid	29%	23%	20%	19%	18%	19%
SWAPs	127.2	91.2	120.3	114.6	71.6	72.9
SWAPs as % total aid	24%	9%	10%	9%	7%	7%

Source: MoFNP

The amount of GBS is estimated to fall slightly after 2010. Comments made to the evaluation team during interviews show that there is a perception that it might fall rather more than the tables show, in the wake of the health corruption scandal. Financing going through SWAps is also estimated to fall in coming years. This is consistent with projections made in the current MTEF for future support to the Health and Education sectors.

It is difficult to know how much of the move towards BS can be attributed to the JASZ. There was already significant budget support prior to 2007, but as Table 4.1 shows, this increased again in 2007, though possibly showing a down turn since then. There are separate structures for BS as opposed to the JASZ. Last year the HLPD meeting was moved to coincide with one of the PRBS meetings and it is proposed that the same happen this coming year. All CPs providing GBS are members of the macro-economic sector group of the CPG. However non-GBS CPs also attend. PRBS CPs have signed a MoU with GRZ setting out the conditions under which BS is disbursed. There is a clearly structured Performance Assessment Framework which is reviewed every year, and against which GRZ performance is rated. In 2008, the PAF contained 33 indicators, of which 30 measure performance against the FNDP and three measure CP performance in the areas of ODA modalities and disbursements.

Although some CPs are unable, or unwilling, to take the perceived risk of committing to GBS, another measure of greater coherence in aid modalities could be a fall in the number of projects and project implementation units which CPs have established. There is no evidence that the JASZ has had a significant effect on this. The agriculture sector case study indicates that the number of projects in the sector has not decreased, and in fact looks set to increase over the next few years. Similarly there has been no decrease in the number of projects in the education sector, though there does appear to be greater alignment of existing projects with GRZ priorities, particularly for INGOs.

The survey (Table F.4) indicated that CPs felt there had been significant improvement in the extent of alignment on government systems with two-thirds of CPs rating the contribution of JASZ to change as fairly strong or strong. However, CPs considered that there had only been limited improvement in government management capacity (Table F.7), with 14 out of 16 respondents rating capacity as weak or fairly weak in both 2007 and 2010.

Impact of JASZ on harmonization

Harmonization is one area where improvement amongst CPs might be expected. Unsurprisingly, the results of the survey show that harmonization was quite strong in 2007, but was seen to have increased in the period since then, and the JASZ is seen as contributing significantly to this. However, there are some notes of caution sounded in the comments given in the survey.

One CP says: “The JASZ steps contributed to a strong sense of harmonization at the beginning (low fruits). That has faded since then, and it will require deeper changes in the way CPs relate to Government to gain more ground in harmonization”.

Another says: “CPs are harmonized through common mechanisms but bilateral decision-making and requirements still dictate most actions. Also, despite establishment of joint mechanisms, in most cases this has been in addition to rather than in lieu of bilateral interventions.”


There are two PD indicators for harmonization: using common arrangements and coordinating joint missions and sharing analysis. According to the PD monitoring reports, there has been little real improvement in the number of joint missions, though the overall number of missions has fallen. If the experience of the evaluation team is at all typical, there are still numerous missions, particularly involving MoFNP, and although CPs are perhaps better informed about the missions that their colleagues are hosting, there are relatively few opportunities to coordinate work. Many missions result from decisions at HQs, and the country office is only informed late in the proceedings. Ironically, this seems to be particularly true for evaluations, and missions relating to monitoring and evaluating the PD globally.

There is a mission-free period, which has changed during the period of the JASZ in response to a revised National Economic Management Cycle issued by FNPDP in late 2008. It has not been possible to find out whether this has been adhered to, as the evaluation team found few references to it in any of the CPG documentation.

When asked what factors have most constrained their agency in moving towards increased harmonization, the responses indicate that agency budget was not a factor for most. Relatively few felt constrained by staffing levels. However, many found actions by GRZ a constraint, and almost as many found actions by other CPs a significant factor¹³. There was a clear split in terms of internal policies and regulations, with some finding this a moderate constraint, but a similar number facing no constraint from their own regulations (Table F.16).

Where there are strong sector processes, there appears to have been more progress. In education there has been a shared approach to analytical work, and there has been a slight reduction in the number of CP missions. However, the structures in the education sector predate the JASZ by over five years.

Figure 4.2 Extent of harmonization among cooperating partners



Source: Evaluation of JASZ online questionnaire (2010) results, Question 2. Number of respondents = 16

13) For example, one CP staff member said that occasionally both CPs and GRZ bypassed the sector leads and engaged bilaterally, which could lead to mistrust and undermine sector harmonization.

It is notable that in 2009, there was discussion of a joint mid-term review of the JASZ, which would have helped a number of CPs who were using the JASZ as the basis for their country programme. However, discussions took time, and it was decided to wait for this evaluation.

Assessment of the CPG and CPG Troika

One of the main outcomes of the adoption of the JASZ has been the structures set up for more streamlined engagement with Government. i.e. the Troika arrangement. The Troika organizes monthly meetings of the CPG, it circulates an agenda and it then represents the CPs in a meeting with MoFNP. It performs the same function for the annual High Level Policy Dialogue (HLPD) with GRZ, proposing an agenda and representing the signatories to the JASZ with the MoFNP and relevant sector ministers. Considerable effort is put by CPs into reaching a joint position on the areas under discussion.

During our interviews with CPs, there was little criticism of the Troika system. Most CPs appreciate the difficulties that the Troika faces, and the work that goes into the process. Information sharing was particularly appreciated by those CPs who had limited opportunities to engage with other CPs, either because they use limited aid modalities or because they have small programmes. The evaluation team was impressed by the appreciation that was expressed by CPs who had not been part of the HIP/WHIP process that they could benefit from a greater flow of information than they had in the past.

In terms of engagement with non-JASZ CPs, a number of CPs are invited to attend monthly CPG meetings as observers. The evaluation team was only able to arrange a meeting with one of these, and this was the only non-JASZ CP with up to date information on the CP contact sheet. The evidence appears to show very limited interest amongst the non-JASZ CPs with more significant programmes, such as China and India. It seems unlikely that the CPG on their own can find sufficient common interests to encourage greater engagement with these CPs. Unless GRZ takes the lead in this area, they are likely to stay outside of the harmonization processes.

Impact of JASZ on management for results and mutual accountability

A small number of CPs considered that there had been a substantial improvement in the results focus of development assistance in Zambia as a result of the JASZ. However, others considered that the changes that had occurred were driven by individual donor efforts rather than by the JASZ and that there was substantial variation at sectoral level.

CPs assessed mutual accountability as having improved since 2007, but 75% still considered that mutual accountability was weak or fairly weak. A greater focus on donor indicators in the PAF was seen as contributing to improved mutual accountability but that there was a lack of effective systems and processes for strengthening mutual accountability.

A Joint Working Group on Mutual Accountability (JWGMA) was set up in 2007, chaired jointly by Sida, the Netherlands and ETC, MoFNP. Terms of Reference for the JWGMA were developed, which focused on coordinating the monitoring exercise for the PD, coordinating work on an evaluation of the harmonization in practice process in Zambia, and coordinating preparations for the creation of the Independent Monitoring Group.

The JWGMA has taken an active role in the two monitoring exercises for the PD. However, there has been far less progress on setting up a framework for mutual accountability, or indeed for monitoring progress in the implementation of the JASZ. ToR were prepared for an Independent Monitoring Group, in 2008, clearly anticipating that the IMG would start in the first quarter of 2009. However, there has as yet been no progress towards identifying and contracting consultants to undertake the work. It is not clear why this initiative stalled.

There have been other moves towards mutual accountability. Over the last two years, the PRBS PAF has included three indicators of CP performance: the percentage of ODA given as budget support; the amount of PRBS committed which was actually disbursed; and the average delay in months between commitment and actual disbursement. CPs performed well against the second and third indicators, with slight improvements in the second year.

In January 2009, MoFNP sent a letter to the lead of the Troika, with a proposed framework for monitoring CPs in Zambia. It was explained that this proposal built on the PD indicators, but with particular reference to the Zambian situation. CPs were invited to respond to the proposals, in the expectation that a robust monitoring system could be developed. The evaluation team tried to track the response to this initiative. As far as we could see, it was discussed briefly at the March 2009 monthly CPG meeting, and the decision was made to pass it to the JWGMA. There appeared to be no further discussion of the proposed framework. One CP staff thought that the proposal had been withdrawn by MoFNP. However this was raised in a meeting with MoFNP, and, although there had been some complaints made to the EMD, on the complexity of the format, there had been no retraction of the proposed framework. There had been no formal response to the Ministry from CPs.

The ZDAD had been intended as an aid management system, which would track planned and actual donor resource inflows as part of the process of monitoring the FNDP. It was launched officially in 2008, but has not yet been implemented. This evaluation only managed to access data on resource inflows from information that was being updated for an IMF mission. The lack of easily available data on aid flows is a severe constraint on holding CPs accountable to commitments made on improving aid predictability, and also constrains the budgeting process. Where sector level aid flows are unpredictable and unmonitored, it becomes more difficult to plan effectively.

Mutual accountability frameworks should not be restricted to Governments and CPs. Governments should also be accountable to their citizens. There are at least two channels which could be used for this in Zambia: improved accountability through Parliament, and through civil society organizations.


Parliament could hold Government accountable for the use of ODA through the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). At present the PAC only receives the information on ODA which is available in the budget statements. However, it could play a stronger role, depending on any changes under the new Constitution, when it gets passed. One proposal is that any loans proposed by Government over a certain amount should be debated by Parliament. The PAC at present debates the reports of the Office of the Auditor General, and performs an oversight function. This could be extended to provide greater oversight on the use of ODA.

As far as internal accountability and monitoring of commitments made under the JASZ, the JASZ itself has no performance framework, targets or indicators, which means that any attempt to monitor progress, other than using the PD indicators, would have to start from scratch, and set up a baseline against which progress could be monitored. Respondents to the JASZ survey found internal accountability only slightly effective. One respondent commented that: “Decisions still based on HQ priorities and international commitment on aid effectiveness. Consistency at country level is a good thing, but does not have much weight”.

Engagement of JASZ with non-JASZ CPs and with civil society

Civil Society could also be part of an extended mutual accountability framework. Over the last ten years, CSOs have been developing capacity to monitor the implementation of GRZ plans, such as the FNDR, and public expenditure at local level. CSOs are regularly invited to attend SAG meetings. However, their contribution at SAG meetings is often constrained both by the short notice given for analysis of the agenda and papers, and by a shortage of human capacity. The CSPR is one of the organizations often asked to represent CSOs, as it is a network organization. However, there are at least 20 SAGs, and it is difficult for the organization to consult with its members and reach a coordinated position in time to participate effectively in meetings. CPs see CSOs as having fairly weak engagement on development and aid issues (Figure 4.3). There are relatively few CSOs that have the capacity to monitor and hold Government to account.

Figure 4.3 Engagement of civil society on aid and development issues



Source: Evaluation of JASZ online questionnaire (2010) results, Question 8. No of respondents = 16

Since the beginning of 2010, CSOs have been invited to participate in JWGMA meetings. However, in the absence of a clear framework for mutual accountability, it is difficult to see what they are being asked to contribute.

In Zambia, as in other countries, there has been a feeling amongst CSOs that CPs and Government have been focusing on improving alignment and harmonization but that funding for CSOs, in particular to carry out research and advocacy, may have suffered as a result. Significant amounts of support come in to Zambia for NGOs, but much of this is for service delivery, in particular through the Global Fund.

Recently, a number of CPs have come together to support a new organization, the Zam-

bian Governance Foundation (ZGF), which is guided by the principles of the PD, focusing on those areas, such as mutual accountability and improving results focus, which are weak in Zambia. The ZGF offers institutional support, or core funding, to CSOs which have a track record in public policy engagement, and specific project grants or support for capacity building to smaller CSOs who wish to advance their organizational development. This appears to be an alternative approach to the MoU with civil society, mentioned in the JASZ.

However, in order to benefit from any improved capacity amongst CSOs, the CPG will have to develop more effective ways of working alongside CSOs. Views were expressed to the evaluation team that CPs were more interested in hearing about NGO activities, than involving them in joint initiatives.

4.3 Efficiency issues and JASZ

The main efficiency issues identified in the ToR are, first, the efficiency of the management arrangements for sector coordination, including the role and authority of the Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs), and the benefits and challenges and best practices from introduction of the system of lead, active and background donors, and second, whether the JASZ led to a reduction in transactions costs as a result of the DoL matrix and other qualitative changes in coordination practices, including assessing the continued relevance of the DoL.

Sector management and coordination

For most CPs, much of their time in JASZ implementation takes place at the sector level. They may attend the monthly CPG meetings and receive useful information about each others' activities in this forum, and they may contribute on specific topics, but it is the CP sector meetings where they engage in discussions about ongoing technical issues, and where they actively try to promote development outcomes.

It is also clear from our discussions and from the case studies that the processes employed at sector level vary considerably. However, most sectors do appear to have used similar structures to the overall arrangements in the CPG, i.e. a system of lead donors, sometimes a Troika, to represent CPs with GRZ, particularly in the SAGs.

The SAGs are the main formal structure where CPs, CSOs and Government engage. They were first established as part of the process for developing the PRSP in 2001. Since then, they have varied in the number of times they meet, and the extent to which they engage, for example in the budget process. Currently they are in general in a more active phase as the preparation for the SNDP gets underway.

The M&E Department of MoFNP has undertaken two surveys on the performance of the SAGs,¹⁴ based on perception surveys. The 2009 report comments on the much lower levels of satisfaction shown by CPs as opposed to other stakeholders in the performance of the SAGs, and speculates that this may be a reason why there are so many parallel processes supplementing SAG processes such as the joint reviews. It argues that this must be addressed if there is to be any progress towards the Accra Agenda for Action.

14) Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs) Performance Report, April 2008 and July 2009.

The SAGs are supposed to ensure that “intra-sectoral allocation of resources and related expenditures, and ensure annual sector budgets presented to MoFNP reflect sector priorities, and are in line with the Vision 2030, the goals and objectives of the FNDP and are linked to the district plans”.¹⁵ Yet more than one half of all respondents to the survey felt that budget matters were not discussed either adequately or at all in SAG meetings.

The SAG reviews indicate that there is significant variation amongst sectors as to overall satisfaction with SAG management. The health sector comes out as the most highly ranked sector (this was before the 2009 scandals). The governance sector is also more highly ranked, and had improved significantly between 2007 and 2008. This may be related to the establishment of the Governance Secretariat, which was set up in 2007, and has taken on responsibility for managing the SAG.

In the survey carried out for this evaluation, CPs were asked to assess how management of the sector has changed between 2007 and the present day. The detailed results are given in Annex F. The results reflect the management of CP support to the sectors, rather than the SAG structures. Almost all sectors indicate improvements, with perhaps the most striking perceived improvements coming in agriculture, education, HIV/AIDS and macroeconomics.

The case studies show how much variation there is in sector management and organization. Health, education and agriculture have all had sector-wide approaches over a period of years, though in the case of agriculture the sector approach was not seen to have been particularly successful in breaking the dominance of project-based approaches. In health and education, the JASZ appears to have built on the past experience of CP harmonization and alignment, and improved coordination. In these two sectors, adopting the CPG approach has reduced the number of reporting formats the MoE is supposed to use, and has reduced the number of unilateral visits to both MoE and MoH. Although the transactions costs to CPs have increased, there appears to be a feeling that the additional work has resulted in improved analytical support to the ministries, and much greater coordination of shared CP positions on policy matters, which should lead to a greater focus on results.

In environment and governance, both of which are relatively new “sectors” in Zambia, identified as such in the FNDP, the JASZ appears to be providing a model for ways in which CPs can support GRZ activities in a more coordinated manner. At the very least, information sharing is cutting down on duplication in the sectors, and where relevant, providing more coordinated support to the development of GRZ systems.

One issue which was raised in interviews by a number of CPs is the extent to which one sector group knows what has worked or not worked in other sectors. Sector issues generally come to the attention of the CPG as a whole when issues cannot be resolved at sector level. They are then taken forward to the monthly CPG meeting, and if sufficiently serious raised at the monthly Troika meeting with MoFNP. There are two issues here. One is the convening power of MoFNP, which is, in most CPs’ opinion, not of the order of some of the very strong ministries of finance in the region. Although MoFNP officers are supposed to attend SAG meetings, the reviews indicate that their input is fairly weak, if in fact they do attend¹⁶. In many cases raising issues at the monthly meetings may only postpone discussion until the annual HLPD meeting, where Ministers attend. It also

15) According to the ToR for SAGs.

16) When asked about this, MoFNP officials indicate that they are overstretched.

means that there is no discussion in CPG of successful sector experience, wherein one sector can learn from another.

Implementation of the DoL

A key priority for GRZ in strengthening aid effectiveness has been to rationalise and improve the division of labour between CPs. CPs were in particular requested by Government to give assurance regarding their willingness to decongest crowded sectors and use the Lead Donor concept to secure better coordination of aid and arrive at a more rational Division of Labour.

Under the JASZ, a 'lead partner' has been appointed in each sector, thematic area and sub-sector to lead and coordinate the support and contributions to sector/thematic dialogue of other partners that are active in that area. In some cases, a group of donors, through troika arrangement, have collectively assumed leadership. The lead donor concept entails that the lead donor is expected to speak and act on behalf of the other CPs in a given sector, e.g. through the SAG as well as in other sector-related policy discussion forums.

The operationalisation of the notion of DoL among CPs has been applied but not without challenges. After Government identified 19 sectors under the FNDP, CPs were requested by Government to self-assess themselves and indicate the sectors they wished to be active in as Lead CP, Active CP or silent/background CP. The Government sent out their proposals with not more than five donors per sector, covering all FNDP areas. However, results of a consultancy that assessed the feelings of the CPs over the proposed DoL revealed to Government that there were misgivings among CPs regarding moving out of their preferred sectors, particularly from the 'darling' sectors of health and education. After further consultations in a consultative process that lasted more than a year, the final DoL matrix was agreed upon. This is shown in Figure 4.4.

It is clear that donor alignment to the wishes of Government has not been smooth; many CPs aligned themselves to sectors based on their own interests or comparative advantage. Although Government indicated that no sector should have more than five donors, some had much more than this. For example, as many as nine CPs wanted to remain in health; ten in education; ten in governance; and nine in macroeconomics. In a number of sectors, donor interest has been quite marginal. These included Science and Technology with no donor interest at all; and only two for the housing sector. It became clear to Government that there was no dialogue among CPs themselves, in the spirit of harmonization, to agree on how the less popular priority areas of Government could best be supported. The process was characterized by what came to be known as a 'beauty contest' among CPs in their individual drive to capture their preferred slots with little consideration of Government's expressed DoL preferences. This has raised fundamental questions regarding the preparedness of CPs under JASZ to align themselves, in a coordinated and harmonized manner, to the stated preferences and priorities of Government.

The DoL has been perhaps the most visible instrument for implementing the JASZ and the PD in Zambia. Despite the prolonged period of discussion between GRZ and CPs, the final outcome was more a reflection of the current or proposed commitments of CPs, rather than a restructuring of CP engagement to support the implementation of the FNDP.

Impact of the DoL

Table 4.3 shows the disbursements of CPs in 2004, as drawn up as part of the preparation for the DoL discussions. The sectors here are not exactly the same as those shown in the DoL matrix of 2006 because the sectors in the DoL reflect the sectors as included in the FNDP. The table below was drawn up before these had been finalized.

Figure 4.4 Division of Labour Matrix under the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia

	China (proposed)	ADB	BADDA	EC (excl. EIB)	IMF	KUWAIT Fund	OPEC	UN Systems	WB	Canada	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Ireland	Japan	Netherlands	Norway	Sweden	UK	USA	Total lead/active
Agriculture		A		A				A	L			A				A	P	B	L		L	8
Decentralization								A	L		B			L	A	L	B			A	B	6
Education		B	B	A				A	A	P	A	P			L	A	L	A		A	A	10
Energy				B				B	L							A		A	A			4
Gender								L									A	A			A	4
Governance				A				L	A		A	B		A	A		A	L	P	L	A	10
Health				A				L	A	A	P				P	A	A		L	L	A	9
Housing									A										P		A	2
HIV/Aids								L	A	B					B	A	A	A		L	L	7
Macro-economics				L	A			B	L		B	A		A	B		A	A	A	L	B	9
Private Sector Dev.				L				A	L	B	A				B	A	L		P	B	A	7
Social Protection		A						A	B					L						L		4
Science and Tech.									P													0
Tourism								L								A		L		A		4
Water (WR and WSS)		A	B					A	A		L			L	A	A	B					7
Transport		A		L		A	A	A	A	A	A		P			A		B				7
Environment								A	A		B	L						A				4
Total lead responsibilities			3					4	6		1	1		2	1	1	2	2	2	5	2	

XXX: Non-signature to the WHIP MoU L: Lead CP A: Active CP B: Background CP P: Phasing out

Table 4.3 Disbursements in Zambia 2004, USD million (self assessment summary report)

	Macroeconomics including GBS	Agriculture	Tourism (including environment)	Mining	Industry	Energy	Infrastructure (including roads)	Health	Education	Water and Sanita- tion	Gender/HIV/AIDS	Governance	Social protection	Defence and security	Law and order	Foreign relations	Information serv- ices	Unallocated/ other	Total
Canada	0.70							3.86	1.62									0.98	7.16
Denmark		0.25	3.74				10.54	6.46	11.90	2.21	1.70	0.34	3.40				0.25		40.79
Finland		0.40	0.60						3.30			1.95						1.30	7.55
Germany							5.00		0.36	18.60	0.80	6.00	0.52					0.40	31.68
Ireland								5.40	7.67	3.64	3.64	2.34							22.69
Japan		4.27	0.12	0.02	0.54		0.96	4.94	8.31	7.10	4.94	0.89	0.15				0.23	0.97	33.44
Netherlands		3.12						17.60	22.62		1.97	2.14							47.45
Norway		4.63	3.85				3.82		14.32		4.63	3.58						2.32	37.15
Sweden		6.00			1.00	0.65		13.20				3.70						0.45	25.00
UK		0.30	1.30					3.20	17.50	1.30	2.70	9.70	0.20					2.00	38.20
USAID		3.72	1.26		2.13			11.70	5.89		47.73	2.20							74.63
EC		64.11	1.26	0.33	3.64	0.87	10.71	0.50	4.28			0.84	1.27						87.81
IMF		248.10																	248.10
World Bank	20.00	21.15	2.57		3.83	18.22	27.05	9.33	22.25	1.47	7.30	12.01	1.48					3.75	150.41
FAO		1.30									0.20		5.00						6.50
ILO																			No data

	Macroeconomics including GBS	Agriculture	Tourism (including environment)	Mining	Industry	Energy	Infrastructure (including roads)	Health	Education	Water and Sanita- tion	Gender/HIV/AIDS	Governance	Social protection	Defence and security	Law and order	Foreign relations	Information serv- ices	Unallocated/ other	Total
UNDP	0.53		1.05								0.76	0.74							3.08
UNFPA								1.00			0.30	0.05							1.35
UNHCR		0.76	0.08				1.17	1.17	0.77	0.32	0.15	0.34	0.51		0.20			3.35	8.82
UNICEF								3.24	1.75	1.61	0.43		1.96						8.99
WHO								4.05			0.96								5.01
WFP, UNAIDS																			No data
Total	333.74	48.16	13.60	3.66	8.37	18.87	59.25	85.65	122.54	36.25	78.21	46.82	14.49	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.48	15.52	885.81
No of CPs	6.00	12.00	9.00	2.00	5.00	2.00	7.00	14.00	14.00	8.00	15.00	15.00	9.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	2.00		

Key: Lead = Dark shading + bold
Active = Bold
Background = Default text
Phasing out = Italic
Unspecified = Light shading

Table 4.4 Aid by Donor by Sector, 2008 (Grants and Loans), USD million

Donor	Agriculture	Decentra- lisation	Education	Energy	Environment	Gender	Governance	HIV / AIDS	Health	Macro- economics	Other	Private Sector Development	Social Protection	Tourism	Transport	Water	Total
AfDB	7.5	-	0.9	-	-	-	-	-	1.3	32.0	-	-	-	-	-	8.4	50.1
Canada	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.2
Denmark	-	-	11.3	-	-	-	7.3	-	-	-	1.5	0.1	-	-	7.3	11.9	39.4
EU (excl. EIB)	7.5	-	-	-	-	-	1.0	-	17.1	32.9	0.6	18.0	-	-	40.0	1.1	118.2
Finland	2.9	-	-	-	0.5	-	0.5	-	-	-	-	1.4	-	-	-	-	5.3
Germany	-	2.2	-	-	-	-	2.0	-	-	7.8	-	-	-	-	3.8	15.7	31.4
Ireland	-	-	22.1	-	-	0.4	1.4	1.0	-	-	-	-	0.6	-	-	0.6	26.1
Japan	7.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.1	-	-	-	-	-	8.7	1.4	21.0
Netherlands	-	-	23.3	-	-	-	0.1	-	26.9	16.0	-	0.9	-	-	-	-	67.2
Norway	-	-	1.2	-	2.3	0.7	0.3	1.0	-	36.0	0.7	-	-	-	-	-	42.2
Sweden	4.5	-	-	0.4	-	-	2.5	0.7	19.0	16.1	0.2	0.7	-	-	-	-	44.1
UK	-	-	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	52.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	53.0
UN System	-	-	2.4	-	-	0.6	-	0.3	6.3	1.3	2.8	-	2.5	-	-	1.4	17.6
USA	2.9	-	10.8	-	-	1.6	1.0	269.2	31.8	9.3	9.9	1.6	-	-	-	1.0	339.2
World Bank	8.0	-	2.1	-	6.3	-	-	-	7.0	5.0	-	-	-	5.0	18.3	3.9	55.6
China	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11.5	-	11.5
Global Fund	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	44.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	44.7
All donors	41.0	2.2	74.2	0.4	9.0	3.3	16.1	272.3	165.4	177.2	15.6	22.7	3.1	5.0	89.6	45.4	942.5

IAS

Non-
IAS

Table 4.5 Division of Labour 2009

Sector from FNDP	Lead Ministry	China	ADB	BADEA	EC excl EIB	IMF	KUWAIT FUND	OPEC	UN SYSTEM	WORLD BANK	CANADA	DENMARK	FINLAND	FRANCE	GERMANY	IRELAND	JAPAN	NETHERLANDS	NORWAY	SWEDEN	UK	USA	Total Lead / Active
Agriculture	MACO		■		●				●	■			●					●	●	●	■	■	4L / 5A
Decentralization	MLGH								●	●					■	●	■	B					2L / 3A
Education	MoE		B	B	B				●	●	●	●			B	■	●	■	B	B	B	●	2L / 5A
Energy	MEWD		●		B				●	■							●		B	■			2L / 3A
Gender	CO-GIDD								■							●		●	●			●	1L / 4A
Governance	MOJ				●				■	●	●	●	B		●	●	●	●	●	▼	■	B	2L / 7A
Health	MOH		B		●				■	●	●	▼				▼	●	●		■	■	●	3L / 6A
Housing	MLGH, MOL									B										▼		B	oL / oA
HIV/Aids	MOH								■	●	B				B	●	●	●	B		■	■	3L / 4A
Macro-economics	MoFNP		●		■	●			●	■		●	●		●	B		●	●	●	■	●	3L / 10A
Private Sector Dev.	CO-DSC / MCTI		●		●				●	■			●				●	■		▼	●	■	3L / 6A
Social Protection	MCDSS		B						■	B						●					■		2L / 1A
Science and Tech.	MTEVT								●	▼													oL / 1A
Tourism	MTENR									■							▼					●	1L / 1A
Water (WR and WSS)	MEWD / MLGH		■		B				●	●		■			■	●	●	▼				B	3L / 4A
Transport	MWS/MCT		●		■		●	●		●		●			▼		●		▼				1L / 6A
Environment	MTENR								■	●		●	■						●				2L / 3A
Total lead responsibilities			2		2				6	5	1	1	1		2	1	1	2	0	3	5	3	

■ Non-signature to the WHIP MoU ■ Lead CP ● Active CP B Background CP ▼ Phasing out

Comparison of Figure 4.4 and Table 4.3 shows that, in developing the DoL, there was a significant reduction in the number of CPs actively engaged in some of the more congested sectors. In health, for example, the number of CPs disbursing funds fell from 14 in 2004, to nine active with two phasing out in 2006. The position is similar for agriculture and education.

Table 4.4 shows funding in 2008, as indicated by MoFNP figures. Caution should be taken when looking at an individual year, as often flows of funds are lumpy. However, we were not able to access trends of data over a number of years, other than the OECD/DAC data which were regarded as unsatisfactory by CPs. The data shown in Table 4.4 show a very limited support from non-JASZ CPs. However, the data in Annex G indicate that loans from non-JASZ CPs are expected to almost quadruple in 2009.

Care must also be taken in making comparisons with 2004. Table 4.3 contains disbursements from the IMF which are not contained in the data for the later year. However, there are a number of conclusions that can be drawn.

- The overall amount of budget support has almost doubled since 2004¹⁷.
- The overall amount of ODA going to Zambia has not changed much between the two years.
- Support from the USA has increased substantially, but most of this is coming through vertical programmes to the HIV/AIDS sector.
- There are no simple correlations between amount of funding given by a CP to a sector and whether the CP takes a lead role. Again, this may be in part an issue of the snapshot view of the sectors. For example, the Netherlands is a major donor in health, but is planning to move out in 2010, so is shown as phasing out. The UK gives almost all of its ODA in 2008 in the form of budget support, but is a lead in five sectors, including macroeconomics, which includes budget support. In the other sectors, DFID has significant technical capacity in Zambia and is therefore prepared to take a lead role.

The last bullet point illustrates one of the areas which has evolved over the period of the JASZ. The role for a lead CP is seen as one of coordination and representation, rather than one of providing significant funding. However, where CPs have large projects in a sector, they often wish to take an active role because they may have a sector specialist in-country, or they may wish to ensure that they have an active engagement with Government. At least one CP told us that, if they do not have a lead role, they have very little opportunity to meet with GRZ staff.¹⁸

However, it is clear that the roles of lead, active and background have been interpreted differently by different CPs. The team were told that in some cases background CPs still take an active role, and it is difficult to differentiate between them and active CPs. In other cases, active CPs have taken the decision to move into a lead role, as they have felt that the lead CPs have taken insufficient responsibility for ensuring that GRZ produces the kind of information that is necessary to monitor progress, or implementation, in the

17) See Annex G, Tables 3 and 4

18) This came from quite a disciplined CP. Other CPs are less so, particularly if they have a large project, where they may take advantage of this to see GRZ bilaterally.

sector. This has been particularly true for issues of fiduciary risk, where CPs may have quite different standards for acceptable systems.

Some CPs have also had difficulty moving into a background role. CPs may wish to take a background role because they have an interest only in a very specific aspect of a sector, or because they have insufficient staff to play an active role. It may be the case that HQ policy requires that the country maintain funding for a sector which may be seen as congested. In this case the CP may decide to delegate funding through an active CP. In other cases, the CP may have an ongoing project in a sector which they are phasing out from, but which has a number of years to run. In this case, they may wish to pass the project on to another active CP. Usually, if the CPs' systems allow, it is easier to pass funding over to another CP, than it is to pass over a project, where there may be considerable negotiation over eligibility etc. The experience with delegated responsibility has been mixed. Many CPs have found it a very cumbersome and time-intensive process. However, others feel it has merit. Much depends on the internal reporting systems of individual CPs.

The DoL was revised in early 2009 to reflect changes that had taken place in CP programmes or that were planned to take place. Because it has a forward looking element to it, the figures shown in Table 4.4 do not correspond to the placement of CPs in Table 4.5 the current DoL table. Some CPs have put themselves forward to take a lead role on the basis of expected future programmes or loans which were still in the process of being negotiated, or deigned, but had not yet reached the stage of disbursement.

Comparison of the two DoL matrices show that there has been further decongestion in the education sector, where, from a position of fourteen CPs providing funding in 2004, two CPs were phasing out by 2006, and two had taken a background position. By 2009, only seven CPs were either lead or active, and six had taken a background position. This is very much in line with the desire expressed by GRZ for decongestion in certain over-subscribed sectors. However, the figures in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 indicate that there may have been a reduction in overall CP financial support.¹⁹

It seemed on the basis of the Explanatory Note to the new DoL that many of these changes resulted from changes in a country's overall aid programme, or changes in policy focus at a the global level, rather than responses to changes occurring in Zambia. Some sectors, such as housing, were left with severely depleted support. During interviews with CPs the evaluation team tried to find out what were the drivers behind the changes.

It became clear that the situation varied as between multilateral CPs who principally gave loans (AfDB and WB) and bilateral CPs. The positioning of the former very much reflected their loan portfolio, and it could be argued that this reflected GRZ priorities. Certainly these CPs were much more strongly present in the productive sectors than other CPs, with the possible exception of USA. For other CPs, the explanations given seemed much more to reflect overall HQ policies. This should not be overemphasised. The most common explanation given for changes was that a major programme was coming to an end, and support in that area was not expected to continue, and so the CP was stepping down.

19) With all the caveats about donors moving to GBS and the lumpiness of disbursements.

Table 4.6 Has the Division of Labour led to changes in your country/agency's activities in Zambia?

Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes – significant changes	31.3%	5
Yes – some changes	50.0%	8
No	18.8%	3
No opinion	0.0%	0

Source: Evaluation of JASZ online questionnaire (2010) results, Question 18

Table 4.6 shows CPs' own perceptions of how the JASZ has affected their country programmes. A majority think it has resulted in changes, of which a third feel it has resulted in significant changes.

In some cases, there had been a change in HQ policy, to allow only a certain number of focal areas. In others, there was a realisation that the only way that the country office could meet the requirements of HQ for proper engagement with cross-cutting issues, such as gender and HIV/AIDS, which are defined as sectors in Zambia, was to increase their engagement at sector level. Some CPs also had to contend with fitting in vertical initiatives from their home country. The evaluation team was impressed at the creativity with which some CPs addressed this particular issue, in the spirit of the DoL and alignment, by creating links with the sectors in which they were more closely involved. "The JASZ stimulated them to make more links with their focus areas". The JASZ has resulted in "peer pressure not to infringe on other CPs' areas". So for some CPs the JASZ has prompted more discipline in response to central initiatives.

It also became clear in discussions that there was disagreement as to what the DoL was supposed to accomplish. Some CPs believe that the overriding principle behind the DoL was to reduce the number of sectors each CP was involved in. Comments were made that some CPs had complied with this, and were now only active in a few sectors. Others felt that the aim was much less ambitious – simply to have a clear structure for CP involvement, which identified lead CPs and reduced the number of active CPs in some of the more congested sectors. No one seemed to feel that the function of the DoL was to ensure that each of the sectors identified by GRZ in the FNDP should have a minimum level of support from CPs.

A lack of clarity over the role of lead CP also has led to changes in positioning in individual sectors. Sector arrangements differ. In some sectors, such as health, there has been no change in the lead CPs. In others, such as agriculture, the lead CPs have a rotating troika, on the same pattern as the overall HoC group. One CP commented that GRZ seemed to feel that they should only engage in dialogue with the lead CPs, who should therefore be representing all CPs at that level, but that in some cases, they represented their own position, rather than the more general one. Most CPs feel that the lead CP in a sector has to have some technical capacity to bring to bear, but that increasingly this does not have to be specialist to the sector. In some cases it may be more important that at least one CP has financial management skills, particularly if the sector has some kind of basket funding.

There were clearly differences in the attitudes taken by CPs towards fiduciary risk, a particularly important issue at present in Zambia, and particularly for those sectors receiving

significant amounts of sector budget support or basket funding. It was in these sectors, particularly health and education, where most concern was expressed by active CPs over the need for a common approach to monitoring and reporting which met higher standards than had been the case in the past.


There have also been changes in the CP sector presence since January 2009. In some cases this has been envisaged for some time, and was already built into the new DoL matrix, but in others there need to be still more changes. It is also not clear what the role of GRZ should be in recognising changes, a position which is linked to the differing roles that GRZ have taken in identifying lead CPs. In some sectors, the relevant line ministry has taken a very active role in identifying the lead CPs, in others the CPs have made the decision and informed the ministry. The 2009 DoL matrix was sent to MoFNP as a draft, and the CPG has received no response.

Impact of the DoL on transactions costs

It is clear that there has been some rationalisation of CP engagement at sector level as a result of the DoL. It is less clear as to whether the DoL, and the JASZ more generally, has reduced transactions costs for CPs and for GRZ.

The survey carried out amongst CPs asks about various aspects of transactions costs. Figure 4.5 shows the responses.

Figure 4.5 Has the JASZ affected the transactions costs faced by your country/agency in each of the following respects?



Source: Evaluation of JASZ online questionnaire (2010) results, Question 17

Almost all CPs indicate some increase in staff time spent in meetings, with most showing a significant increase. Similarly almost all indicate an increase in staff time in reviews. The main areas where there has been any reduction is in time spent in project and programme management, more likely to be a result of changes in aid modalities, rather than directly as a result of the JASZ.

Much of the increase in time spent in meetings will be as a result of time in sector level meetings. One CP indicated that “to reach a joint position which is not that of the lowest

common denominator takes time”. It was generally agreed that being a lead donor took considerable resources. In some cases, CPs had brought in specialist staff specifically to provide back-up for the lead position.

This was also the case for the CP Troika. The current Troika lead has brought in a new staff member to provide support. The Troika takes responsibility for maintaining the CP website (www.cpg.org.zm), developing the calendar of meetings, writing and posting minutes, and other general administrative duties. Other CPs have employed interns to assist in these processes. Unlike the situation in some other countries, the JASZ does not have a formal Secretariat, but relies on the Troika to carry out basic servicing, though specific tasks may be delegated to other CPs. It is clearly easier for CPs with larger country offices to take on the responsibilities of being in the Troika, though this has not prevented four bilaterals taking this role since 2007.

At the sector level, the costs of taking a lead role vary significantly. In some sectors, arrangements mirror those of the CPG. Health, for example, has 15 technical subcommittees, with each given a lead and active CPs. The education sector has also introduced a DoL system as a result of the JASZ. This has resulted in more work for the lead CPs, but has also reduced transaction costs for GRZ. In agriculture, there has been less success in reducing transactions costs for GRZ, in part because the dominant aid modality is still the project. Also, as the case study indicates, in agriculture, although the troika is supposed to represent the CPs at SAG meetings, in fact many other CPs turn up as observers (and are possibly more active in meetings than that would indicate).

In general, there may have been some reduction of transactions costs for GRZ. However, given the reduction in size of ETC, MoFNP still feels that engagement with CPs takes up an inordinate amount of time, in part because of failure to harmonize CP missions better. The dialogue architecture has resulted in more organized meetings with fewer CPs, but, as discussed above, these may result in less well structured responses within MoFNP, because of the level at which they are conducted. Technical staff at the Director level and below have to be brought into meetings to ensure that higher-level MoFNP staff are properly briefed.

5 Conclusions

5.1 Overview of main findings

The extent to which it is possible to assess the results of the JASZ is limited by the lack of targets or indicators of achievement that would operationalise the objectives, principles and commitments that the JASZ contains. There has been a move towards measuring CP performance in the PRBS PAF, but an attempt by MoFNP to set up a framework in early 2009 has met with no response from the CPG. The JASZ also lacked a fully developed implementation programme. Some of the “next steps” identified as required for implementation have been carried out, but the majority have not. A Work Plan was prepared in late 2007, and again, some elements of this have been carried out and others not.

There could be a number of reasons for this lack of progress. After the lengthy period for developing the JASZ, there seems to have been a lack of energy for taking some of these initiatives forward. The absence of a clear implementation strategy with measurable targets has made the process rather less robust than it might have been. There has also been frustration with a lack of capacity or interest on the part of Government to respond to some of the initiatives which the CPG did take forward. The JWGMA may have suffered in this way.

The JASZ has been judged to be effective in some areas by the CP signatories. These areas comprise information sharing, clearer channels for engagement with GRZ and improved alignment with government policies and systems. However in other areas, progress has been slow or non-existent. There has been little advance on mutual accountability, limited movement towards the use of GRZ preferred aid modalities, and no real internal monitoring.

The evaluation team is of the view that the CPG has struggled to achieve a consensus on some issues and have on occasion had to settle for a less challenging joint position than some CPs would have liked²⁰. This can be for different reasons – differing views on the importance of harmonization as compared to a perceived risk of relying on government systems, or, in some cases, organizational restrictions faced by CPs as to the aid modalities they can employ. Possibly linked to this is the impression given in interviews that those CPs who were at the heart of the HIP/WHIP process have felt most frustration at lack of progress, whereas CPs who are newer to joint approaches to harmonization have indicated greater benefit from being JASZ signatories.

The rotation of agency/embassy staff in Zambia may also be a restricting factor. Few international staff remain in Lusaka from the period of development of the JASZ. In some agencies the institutional memory now resides with long-standing national staff. Some may not have read the JASZ document and are unaware of the various initiatives taken in late 2007, particularly those that came to nothing. Without an understanding of why so little progress has been made in some areas, it will be difficult to develop an effective approach to overcoming these problems.

20) This view was also expressed by at least one CP.

5.2 JASZ achievements

Many of the achievements of the JASZ centre around the development of processes which have streamlined processes of dialogue and information sharing. In general, JASZ has institutionalised structures many of which existed in some form prior to the JASZ, but are now more transparent and inclusive:

- A structured system of monthly meetings has been developed for the CPG, which is also open to non-CP signatories as observers. These address issues of national concern and also sector issues where these have not been resolved at sector level. On the basis of these CPG meetings, the CPG Troika then takes the issues forward to monthly meetings with MoFNP. This pattern is well established, and in recent months, the monthly meetings have been with Secretary to Treasury.
- A similar pattern of preparation has evolved for the annual High Level Policy Dialogue meetings with the Minister of Finance and relevant sector ministers.
- This greater level of coordination amongst CPs and the efforts to develop more coordinated responses to GRZ has resulted in some decrease of bilateral demands on ministries' top management.
- There has been much improved information sharing amongst CPs at the CPG meetings, and also at sector level. This may have led to less overlap in projects, and at sector level, in some cases, information has been shared about successful approaches which have been adopted by other CPs in the same sector.
- Implementation of the Division of Labour Matrix has resulted in decongestion in some sectors and, for some CPs it has encouraged greater focus in their country programmes. It is difficult to assess from the data available the extent to which ODA flows have rigorously followed the positioning of CPs within the DoL. Both the original DoL and the revised DoL reflect both current and future commitments, so there is not a simple correspondence between positioning and aid commitments. In addition, where CPs with a major presence in Zambia give significant budget support, they may choose, or be asked to be present in a sector where they do not provide direct support. Overall, however, there is much greater clarity on CPs' sector involvement, and, for most sectors, a more formal structure of engagement.
- At sector level, there have been genuine attempts to try other methods of shared working, such as delegated responsibility. This has had mixed success, but where it has worked it has allowed CPs to maintain some kind of presence, consistent with their HQ priorities, while respecting the DoL in Zambia. In other cases, an increase in trust amongst CPs at sector level has resulted in creative problem solving, such as using project funds to help catalytic system development.
- The processes developed have been genuinely inclusive of CPs who are unable or reluctant to give PRBS. The evaluation team feels that in some ways those CPs who were not part of the HIP/WHIP process feel that they have benefited most from the structures set up. Others may feel more frustrated by a lack of progress.
- There has been less obvious progress at the level of development outcomes. This has been very variable by sector, and the evaluation found very few concrete examples.

- In agriculture, better sharing of information led to identification of a funding gap for a major project, which one CP stepped up to fill. However, support to GRZ in agriculture still takes the form of a long list of projects, with little coordination. There has been no development of joint approaches since the development of the JASZ, neither amongst CPs nor with Government.
- Although coordination around government leadership has greatly improved in health and education, there is no obvious reduction of the number of projects in health or education.
- In environment, the JASZ has led to a more structured process to support GRZ, but this is still in early stages. Similarly the governance sector has recently restructured their internal DoL and developed a simplified work plan to focus more on priority areas, but it is too early to say if this will have a beneficial developmental outcome.

It is difficult to measure transactions costs in other than in qualitative terms in the absence of an established monitoring framework to provide a baseline and a process for collecting systematic quantitative evidence. In the survey almost all CPs reported some increase in staff time spent in meetings, and a majority indicated a significant increase. The results were similar, if a little less pronounced for staff time in reviews. The costs for the Troika of coordination are significant, and have resulted in some bringing in additional staff to provide back-up.

At sector level, lead CPs also face a heavy work load, but in some cases active CPs appear to have less costs. There is a widely shared view in some sectors that these investments in time – however considerable – have benefited the sector.

GRZ costs may be less than they would be in the absence of the JASZ, but they are still high, particularly in MoFNP, given the small number of staff available. The issue of better coordination of missions does not appear to have been successfully addressed.

5.3 Challenges in advancing the Paris agenda

Although the JASZ addresses all five commitments under the PD, much of the emphasis over the period in terms of actions taken has been on harmonization and alignment.

There is little evidence that the JASZ has promoted greater country ownership at national level. On the basis of the survey, CPs are not very convinced that this has occurred, and at both central and sectoral level, some informants have suggested that the JASZ has allowed CPs to “gang up” against GRZ, e.g. over continuing policy disagreements in the agriculture sector. This does however vary by sector. In education, the relations between CPs and GRZ are particularly collegial and productive. Pooled funding has increased GRZ ownership. In health, this has been less consistently the case, although the health sector has also made considerable progress on harmonization and alignment in the JASZ period.

There is quite a fundamental question mark over GRZ leadership, and GRZ ability to influence CP decisions, particularly in the absence of a comprehensive GRZ Aid Policy that is agreed with (or accepted by) CPs, and given the weakness of GRZ’s systems and

processes for aid management and for taking an effective cross-sectoral strategic view on aid issues. However, in the last few months, ETC has restructured and information on this, and its rationale, has been shared with the CPG.

The weakness of GRZ systems has also hindered mutual progress in CPs' using country systems in, for example, financial reporting and addressing fiduciary risk. However there have been improvements in reporting on development outcomes and the most recent PAFs include three to four indicators on PRBS donor performance.

Changes in the DoL have often been made because of changes in CP HQ priorities. One CP indicated that "HQ trumps country office". It has been suggested by another that this is overly simplistic; that the problem is not that there is a tension between HQ and the country office, but that there is a missing link. Decisions are not made on the basis of country office requirements. For whatever reason, decisions made at HQ often reduce the space for GRZ to show leadership, always supposing that GRZ wishes to take the initiative. Harmonization is hindered by the reporting requirements of CP's HQs and also, it has been suggested, by insufficient trust by CPs in one another, a factor underlying some of the problems with delegating responsibility at sector level.

In relation to information availability and aid predictability, PRBS processes have been more influential than the JASZ in promoting dissemination of information, and improving aid flow predictability, particularly for the social sectors where there has been pooled funding. It does appear though that there has been greater transparency and meaningful information sharing amongst CPs, although GRZ's failure to operationalise the ZDAD has had a negative effect on the possibility of collating consistent information on aid flows.

5.4 Key Lessons

The general view of CPs is that there should be another JASZ, but there is not complete agreement as to what direction it should take. Some feel that it should focus on maintaining and improving the level of harmonization amongst CPs, while others feel it is more important to improve engagement with GRZ. It is agreed that alignment to the GRZ plan, in this case the Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) is important, and should be made more effective, for example by reviewing the DoL in the light of the SNDP.

A small number of CPs attempted to use the JASZ as the basis for their country programme. The document and its processes were not sufficiently well developed for this to work. The more realistic approach has been for country programme documents to incorporate the JASZ and build on it. Some specific lessons emerge:

- Delegated responsibility has proved difficult to implement in many cases, though at least one CP feels that they have managed to delegate and that it has been worth the effort. Other CPs have had to look at other ways of implementing the DoL.
- Linked to this, CPs have not always been effective in communicating with HQ where HQ requirements are constraining harmonization and alignment. JASZ has made some progress, but a number of areas have needed GRZ leadership to be fully operationalised and this has not always been forthcoming.

- There have been no effective implementation plans for the JASZ. In particular, the risk matrix has not been translated into specific contingency plans for when relations with GRZ go badly, or when there are issues within the CP community. If contingency plans had been thought through, then the Troika might not have had to divert so much attention into managing sudden, potentially damaging situations such as the health scandal of 2009.
- There has been no real prioritisation of the weaknesses in PD implementation, in particular of how to manage for development outcomes. There is a danger that the focus on CP joint processes and commitments may have been at the expense of addressing constraints arising from individual CP processes and priorities.
- Mutual accountability and M&E have not taken off. Attempts last year to address some CPs' need for a MTR have been postponed to this evaluation.

In addition, there have been missed opportunities for joint progress on the side of both CPs and GRZ. For example:

- The dialogue architecture proposed by CPs in 2007/8 does not appear to have been discussed in detail with Government, and similarly the dialogue architecture proposed by Government, which was taken out of the aid policy, has not been reviewed and made effective.
- The 2009 DoL is still draft and is awaiting Government's response.
- MoFNP's proposed donor assessment framework of January 2009 seems to have disappeared without effective joint discussion between CPs and GRZ.
- The dialogue architecture does not appear to be sufficiently robust to follow up on these initiatives; both CPG and GRZ have failed to follow up on actions at times.

So far, the JASZ has worked through consent. It has been very inclusive, and has in some ways worked at the pace of the CPs who are moving more slowly towards Paris commitments. There are no sanctions on CPs who do not comply with the generally agreed rules of engagement, e.g. by bypassing the relevant troika and engaging directly with GRZ, or by hosting HQ missions at very short notice. Perhaps the time has come to test the limits of that consent rather more, and develop mechanisms to ensure greater compliance.

6 Recommendations

The JASZ has made some contributions to improving aid effectiveness in Zambia mainly through the improved Division of Labour and the deeper institutionalisation of key principles of aid effectiveness and processes of information sharing and dialogue. However, for the CPG to move forward and make significant progress towards achieving greater aid effectiveness, it is vital that it manages to re-engage with GRZ on aid policy and management issues. At present there is some distrust on the CPG as to GRZ commitment to the PD agenda, and there is frustration in MoFNP resulting from the way in which CPG can, at times, ignore Government systems and hierarchy. Some in GRZ see the JASZ as a document for donors to help them organize themselves better. There are benefits for GRZ, but these are not always appreciated at higher levels. However, without a jointly agreed CP and GRZ framework and vision for improving aid effectiveness that is made concrete through much more specific commitments and action plans that are jointly monitored it is difficult to see that accelerated progress can be achieved, except in some very limited areas.

CPs have to make some basic decisions about where the focus of the next JASZ should be, and base this on a clear understanding of what the incentives are for the various stakeholders to enter into commitments within the JASZ. As discussed above, the current JASZ has focused in practice on the PD areas of harmonization and alignment, often from a unilateral perspective. Little concrete has emerged on a harmonized approach to ensuring that the objectives of the FNDP are met, for example a more coherent approach to supporting the FNDP financially.

The evaluation team recommends the following:

Objectives of the new JASZ

The new JASZ should contain a clear statement of objectives:

- to promote the principles contained in the Paris Declaration, of country ownership, harmonization, alignment, management for results and mutual accountability
- to support the implementation of the Sixth National Development Plan for Zambia.

It should also identify the actions and commitments necessary to achieve these objectives, along with an assessment of preconditions and risks. In other words, it should contain some expression of an intervention logic which shows how the actions contained are expected to lead to the achievement of objectives. This could be a full log frame, or a less formal statement of the way in which actions are expected to lead to the desired outcomes.

Promoting the Paris Declaration principles

The JASZ should focus on aspects of the PD principles which have not been effectively addressed so far. Although there has been considerable progress on harmonization, and some on alignment, there has been little progress on mutual accountability and on management for development results. These areas should be a priority for the next JASZ. This may require a set of skills which are insufficiently present in both GRZ, and some CPs.

In keeping with the spirit of the PD, those CPs who can assist in these areas should be prepared to provide support to improve capacity to undertake effective joint monitoring and assessment, both in GRZ and within the CPG. This will also require better information on aid flows, as was envisaged with ZDAD.

In particular the CPG should focus on:

- Revisiting the dialogue architecture, along with GRZ, to agree on a structure which deals not only with High Level Dialogue, but also includes technical dialogue at middle level between technical specialists and ETC in MoFNP and line ministries. This should also take into account the recommendations of the ongoing budget support evaluation, to ensure that one robust system is developed which also encompasses the PRBS processes.
- Working with MoFNP to make the ZDAD a functioning tool for both donors and GRZ in planning and budgeting.
- Developing a joint framework with Government for mutual accountability and managing for results. This should encompass the PAF, and be based on the M&E system for the SNDP.
- At sector level, agreeing a common definition of what is expected from a lead CP, and active CP and a background CP. Background CPs should make it clear what they need in terms of reporting, and if possible enter into a delegated agreement with one of the active CPs.

Support for the implementation of the SNDP

There should be a mapping of CP programmes on the GRZ priority areas under the SNDP, and efforts to ensure appropriate financial and technical support by the CPG. Where CPS do not provide budget support, either at national or sectoral level, it will be important to ensure that CP resources address priority areas as outlined in the SNDP.

Implementing the DoL is a major achievement in itself, one that some neighbouring countries have been unable to do to the same extent as Zambia. This has had benefits for both CPs, in terms of an ability to focus their increasingly limited human resources on a number of key sectors, but also for GRZ, in terms of reducing transactions costs, and improving efficiency at sector level. This will have to be revisited in the context of the SNDP and provides an opportunity for revising the DoL together with GRZ.

Implementation of the JASZ

The new JASZ needs to have more robust systems in place to ensure progress, incorporating a road map and a simple internal monitoring framework²¹. These should not be for the CPs alone, but should be negotiated with Government, with both CPs (collectively and individually) and GRZ taking responsibility for implementation.

The JASZ should have an annual work plan, with realistic targets, to ensure that the CPG and the Troika keep focused on development outcomes, as well as process, and do

21) The monitoring system referred to should be for the implementation of the JASZ, and not for monitoring development outcomes, which should be addressed through the SNDP M&E system. CPs should not set up parallel systems for this, but use GRZ systems.

not get diverted into short-term issues. This work plan should be reviewed annually, to assess progress, and revise, if necessary.

The evaluation team recommends that the CPG consider the establishment of a small JASZ Secretariat, funded by CPs, to assist in improved reporting and to address the administrative tasks which are now often carried out by individual CPs.

The JASZ is an instrument of the donor community. However, if the next JASZ is to make progress towards achieving the objectives of Paris and Accra, there must be greater engagement with GRZ. It is desirable that the JASZ is backed up by a new MOU between donors and GRZ, updating the MoU signed as part of the WHIP. The evaluation team feels that it is also important that progress is made in the area of mutual accountability. GRZ has already shown an interest in this area, and it could be an area which could promote joint working. The HAC in Kenya has recently tried to revitalise its engagement with GoK, and has recognised that this is the key to further progress. Unless the CPG can do something similar, the JASZ is likely to remain a CP focused instrument, rather than a mechanism for joint progress.

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Annex A Terms of Reference

1 Introduction

The Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ) came into effect in 2007 and is set to expire in 2010. The JASZ has been signed by 16 Cooperating Partners (CPs) to manage their development cooperation with the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) in alignment with the current poverty reduction strategy paper, the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) and Zambia's Vision 2030.

CPs active in Zambia are considering an independent evaluation of the JASZ (hereinafter referred to as 'the evaluation') before entering into a new phase of the JASZ. The evaluation could not only be of value for Zambia, but also for other countries having joint assistance strategies.

The evaluation of the JASZ will be conducted in parallel with the second phase of the evaluation of the implementation of the Paris Declaration and will be coordinated with this evaluation. Close coordination will also be ensured with the budget support evaluation in Zambia.

2 Background

Zambia has traditionally been heavily dependent on aid with a high number of CPs active in the country. As in many other aid dependent countries, support has traditionally been provided through a wide variety of ways putting significant strains on the Zambian public administration. According to an assessment made in 2005 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and European Commission, 2005) several CPs in Zambia provided aid outside the national budget and often through (non-aligned) project support. Sector Wide Approaches (SWAs) were at the time mainly limited to education and health.

As pointed out by Norad (Norad, 2008) the dynamics of engagement between the GRZ and the CPs have changed in the past years in tandem with 2003 Rome Declaration on Aid Harmonization, the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the February 2007 communication from the Commission of the European Communities on the code of conduct on division of labour in development policy. The **Harmonization in Practice** (HIP) Initiative was initiated in Zambia in 2003 and an agreement was signed in March 2003 by GRZ and the so-called Nordic+ Group (Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).

The HIP initiative eventually grew into what is called the **Wider Harmonization in Practice** (WHIP) initiative and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in April 2004 which, in addition to the original signatories, included the UN system and the World Bank and eventually also the African Development Bank, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada, USA, the European Commission and France. In the WHIP MoU the CPs committed *inter alia* to reducing transaction costs for the Government and improving coordination and information sharing.

The GRZ for its part committed to developing an **Aid Policy and Strategy**, which was published in 2005. The purpose of the Policy is to ensure that Zambia has a systematic and coordinated approach for soliciting and managing aid. The Policy identifies weak institutions and low capacity for monitoring as the main challenges for the Government. For the CPs, the Policy points to low aid predictability, weak management of technical assistance, multiplicity of CP reporting and accounting systems and prevalence of uncoordinated donor missions.

To make further progress on harmonization, the CPs undertook self-assessments in March 2005 with a view to developing a **Division of Labour (DoL) matrix**. The matrix sought to address the uneven spread of CPs between sectors with some congested (education and health) and others underrepresented (economic development sectors such as tourism and mining). The matrix gives each CP a focus on no more than a few sectors of comparative advantage. The matrix introduces four roles defined for the CPs: 'lead', 'active', 'background' and 'phasing out'. The idea is that the CPs shall speak through one voice for each sector thus reducing the transaction costs for the GRZ. A final DoL matrix was agreed in June 2006. A total of 17 sectors were identified corresponding with the sectors featuring in the FNDP.

The division of labour matrix eventually became one of the key components of the **Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ)**. Although not a binding document, the JASZ was signed in April 2007 by 16 parties including 12 bilateral donors and the World Bank, the AfDB, the European Commission (EC) and the United Nations (UN) system.

The JASZ can be seen as the CPs' response to the Vision 2030, the FNDP and the GRZ Aid Policy and Strategy. In many ways the JASZ consolidates earlier achievements and restates, for example, many of the commitments made by the GRZ in its Aid Policy and Strategy. It does so by setting out a number of operating principles for the CPs to strengthen local ownership of the development process and enhance aid effectiveness, and better align it to national priorities. The key objectives of JASZ are to:

1. Establish a shared vision and guiding principles for CPs' support to the objectives of the FNDP, which is the first stage in meeting the Vision 2030.
2. Articulate priorities for support during the Plan period
3. Replace or better align CPs' country strategies (including resource allocations) with FNDP priorities, targets and country systems
4. Improve aid delivery by achieving a more effective Division of Labour and allocation of CPs' resources
5. Deepen the results focus of assistance programmes
6. Simplify aid management and improve aid predictability, and
7. Reduce transaction costs for the GRZ

The seven JASZ key objectives are closely related to the commitments of the Paris Declaration. In broad terms objectives 1 – 3 and 6 relate to the commitments to ownership and alignment, objectives 4 and 7 address the commitment to harmonization and objec-

tive 5 relates to the commitment to managing for results. The table below summarises how the various objectives of the JASZ relate to the commitments of the Paris Declaration.

The JASZ objectives in relation to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness

JASZ Objective	Relevance to commitments of the Paris Declaration
1. Establish shared vision	Ownership and alignment
2. Articulate priorities for support	Alignment
3. Align to FNDP and vision 2030	Alignment
4. Improve aid delivery	Harmonization
5. Deepen results focus	Managing for results
6. Simplify aid management and improve aid predictability	Alignment
7. Reduce transaction costs	Harmonization

In addition to providing a country analysis and describing the FNDP, the JASZ outlines the CPs' response by sector in very general terms, a forecast of total ODA resource flows and operational principles for "working in partnership" listed for each of the five commitments of the Paris Declaration. It is specified that Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs) will be serving as the "main entry point" for alignment at the sector level.

With respect to monitoring and evaluation, the JASZ provides for an independent monitoring group (IMG) that will be tasked to "monitor the annual performance of the GRZ and the CPs and their collective operational effectiveness, including under the division of labour". In this context, the document mentions the need for IMG to carry out reviews of three selected sectors per year. Draft Terms of Reference for the independent monitoring exercise exist, but it was decided in the Mutual Accountability Group to postpone the reviews.

The JASZ has no specific results framework as such. Instead the JASZ has in its annexes an Action Matrix related to the WHIP MoU (with most of the target dates in 2004 and 2005), the FNDP Key Performance Indicators (to which the JASZ can only contribute to), and the 12 Paris Declaration indicators with baseline data (2005) and targets (2010) which are being used for the biannual monitoring against commitments of the Paris Declaration.

A limited number of studies have been carried out to date to assess progress against the JASZ objectives. These include i) a study commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and European Commission (2005) which relates mainly to the process of preparing the JASZ in comparison to similar processes in Tanzania and Uganda, ii) a study by the African Development Bank Group (2006) which includes Zambia in a cross-country comparison of JAS processes, iii) Wohlgemuth and Saasa (2008) in a review of aid management in Zambia, iv) the 2006 and 2008 reports on Zambia's implementation of the Paris Declaration (OECD, 2008), v) a country case study prepared for the Ghana High-level Forum in 2008 (GHLEF, 2008), vi) an evaluation of Norwegian development support to Zambia, and vii) assessments available at the website *Harmonisa-*

tion Portal. Zambia (synisys.com/zambia).

Two emerging trends are of importance to the aid architecture in Zambia:

- Zambia's aid flows and **aid dependency are decreasing**. Net Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) received by Zambia dropped from USD 1,165m in 2005 to USD 1,045m in 2007 (OECD, 2009). Wohlgemuth and Saasa (2008) further report that while aid accounted on average for 43% of the total state budget in the period 2000-05, it only accounted roughly 25% in 2007 and 2008. Similarly, budget support as share of national budget has dropped from 30% to 15% over the last five years (2003-2008).
- Despite decreasing aid flows and dependency, the need for coordination is arguably greater than ever before in view of the second trend: **The increasing presence of new CPs in Zambia** operating outside the JASZ – some with significant financial and political influence. These include China, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), the Kuwait Fund, OPEC as well as India, Brazil and South Africa. However it remains to be assessed as to what degree these partners are providing ODA (and thus are of relevance to the JASZ process) or whether the assistance is provided mainly on commercial terms. Some of these “emerging donors” e.g. India, China and Brazil have been invited to attend the CPG meetings as observers.

3 Purpose, Objectives and Target Audience

Purpose

The overall purpose of the evaluation is to provide an assessment of the Joint Assistance Strategy in Zambia (JASZ) over the period 2007– early 2010 which will inform the development of the aid management section of the Sixth National Development Plan (due in mid 2010) and the next JASZ. The evaluation should also serve to inform the Phase II Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration in Zambia, scheduled for late 2010.

Objectives and scope

The objectives contributing to the overall purpose of the evaluation are;

- To assess the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the JASZ
- To identify lessons learned, best practices and provide actionable recommendations for the design of the next JASZ
- To provide appropriate recommendations in relation to the Paris Declaration commitments and processes.

The evaluation will examine both the design and implementation of the JASZ.

Target Audience

The primary target audience is the Government of the Republic of Zambia and the Co-operating Partners who are signatories to the JASZ. A secondary target audience is other donors and agencies active in Zambia but not signatories to the JASZ, and the Core Evaluation and Zambia Country Teams of the Phase II Paris Declaration Evaluation.

4 Evaluation Questions

Evaluation questions will be based on the OECD-DAC definitions of relevance, efficiency and effectiveness.

In the inception phase of the evaluation the consultant will further develop and detail the issues to be covered by the evaluation based on desk reviews of available documentation and provide an evaluation matrix to be approved by the Management Group of the evaluation (see Section 7) and included in the inception report.

A set of preliminary evaluation questions that may be considered for further refinement and prioritisation with the consultant is provided below.

Relevance

- Assess the internal consistency of the design of the JASZ (through establishment of a logic model/theory of change) and analyse to what degree the JASZ took into consideration critical assumptions, identified key performance indicators and included a feasible roadmap for implementation of the JASZ.
- How responsive were the JASZ processes to changes and challenges within the national political, administrative and budgetary contexts and their related capacities and priorities?
- Assess the continued relevance of the JASZ process to the current and emergent strategies and priorities of GRZ and CPs active in Zambia.
- To what extent has the design and implementation of the JASZ facilitated the implementation of the Paris Declaration commitments and processes?
- Has the design and implementation of the JASZ taken sufficient account of cross cutting issues of Gender, Environment, and HIVAIDS?

Effectiveness

- To what extent has the JASZ helped to strengthen GRZ ownership of the development process in Zambia?
- To what extent has the JASZ enhanced aid effectiveness and mutual accountability?
- To what extent have the stated key objectives of the JASZ been achieved?
- To what extent have any planned activities and outputs of the JASZ been delivered?
- How effective has the CPG and CPG Troika been in relation to the operation of the JASZ and to their interaction with GRZ and the wider CP community?
- How effective have the JASZ internal accountability and monitoring mechanisms been?

- To what extent were the internal and external risks to the implementation of the JASZ identified, monitored and managed?
- How effective has the JASZ been in engaging with CPs not signatories to the JASZ and to Civil Society?

Efficiency

- Assess the efficiency of the management arrangements for sector coordination, including the role and authority of the Sector Advisory Groups, and assess the benefits and challenges and identify best practices from the introduction of the system of lead, active and background donors.
- Assess whether the JASZ led to a reduction in transactions costs as a result of the Division of Labour (DoL) matrix and other qualitative changes in coordination practices. Assess the continued relevance of the DoL and the need for updating it.

5 Approach and method

The evaluation will involve a combination of quantitative and qualitative data collection methods with emphasis on the latter.

The following five data collection methods will be used:

1. Desk review
2. Statistical analysis
3. Key stakeholder interviews
4. Survey
5. Case studies

A combination of these techniques will be used to collect data for each of the major issues in the evaluation. The methods have been listed in the order that they should be initiated: The desk review and statistical analysis can be undertaken at the outset on the basis of (immediately available) secondary data. This will help create a stronger foundation for designing and scoping the key stakeholder interviews and the survey. Finally, the data generated from the desk review and statistical analysis, as well as the findings from the stakeholder interviews and the survey, can inform the selection of the specific sectors that will be the focus of the case studies.

The application of the various methods is further elaborated in the sections below.

Desk review

The desk review should *inter alia* inform the development of the logical model for the JASZ and refine the evaluation issues and questions. The review should also be used to ensure that findings from all relevant reviews and evaluations are taken into account when designing the remaining data collection methods. Further, the review should be used to

assess the degree of consistency between CP bilateral strategies and the JASZ. The literature listed in this study should serve as a point of departure for the review but it is expected that additional documentation will be required. The documents to be reviewed include:

- Experiences from JAS process in other countries
- Existing evaluations and reviews of the JASZ process and related processes including mappings of CP presence
- GRZ aid policies and strategies
- CP strategy documents and policies for the JASZ period
- Annual JASZ work plans
- Finalized and ongoing reviews including any IMG sectors reviews and Paris Declaration sector baselines
- PRBS joint assessment reports and other results-based reporting

Statistical analysis

A key input to the evaluation will be a statistical analysis to map changes in commitments and actual ODA disbursements for JASZ CPs in comparison to CPs outside the JASZ. It should be assessed to what extent the analysis can draw on data already available. It may be considered to collect additional data through the survey mentioned below. Subject to availability of reliable and valid data, the statistical analysis should assess as a minimum describe trends regarding:

- Flows of assistance by JASZ signatories compared to donors outside JASZ
- Changes in flow of funds by sector, by CP and by aid modalities
- Predictability of aid flows

Key stakeholder interviews

Key stakeholder interviews will be important to identify and probe some of the underlying factors that either facilitate or block JASZ implementation. The questions should be conducted as individual interviews or with small groups on the basis of semi-structured interview guides. The issues to be probed will follow from the major issues listed in section 4 as well as the findings of the desk review and the statistical analysis but it is expected that the interviews as a minimum should focus on assessing the continued relevance of the JASZ, leadership and commitment of the GRZ and the CPs, assessment of qualitative changes in the relation between the CPs and the GRZ and an assessment whether the current DoL corresponds to the CPs assessment of their respective comparative advantages. It is suggested to include as a minimum the following stakeholders in the key stakeholder interviews:

- Selected members of Parliament
- Ministry of Finance and National Planning and other central and coordinating ministries/ authorities

- Members of the CPG Troika (past and present) and any other CPs who have been JASZ signatories
- Headquarter representatives from CPs involved in the CP
- CPs outside the JASZ
- Civil society representatives

Survey

It is proposed to include a brief survey of all CPs active in Zambia to solicit responses to some of the issues of the evaluation. In addition the survey can be used to collect any additional data for the statistical analysis.

This will not only add significant strength to the findings of the evaluation but will also serve to involve all CPs in a process that they have a keen interest in following. To assess the reliability of the responses, the evaluation can use one or two peer reviewers to assess the consistency of the responses. Responses from the various respondents will be triangulated with responses from the key informant interviews and the case studies.

Case studies

Case studies are proposed to assess in-depth the issues related to alignment and harmonization at the sector level with a view to assess to what extent has the JASZ contributed to changes at the sector level such as changes in the quality of sector dialogue and changes in aid modalities. In summary the proposed purpose of the case studies is to assess the counterfactual: to what extent has the JASZ added value to the process – would the observed changes at sector level have happened anyway?

By selecting only a few sectors the intention is that the evaluation will contribute to a deeper understanding of some of the factors that shape JASZ implementation.

The case studies should, in addition to a more thorough desk review and data analysis, involve interviews with the involved CPs (covering both lead, active and background CPs), relevant public authorities and any relevant civil society representatives.

To maximise the analytical value of the case studies it is proposed that they are selected in such a way that they represent sectors that were already ‘advanced’ in terms of aid effectiveness at the start of the JASZ (for example health or education) as well as one or two sectors where aid effectiveness was less advanced (typically economic development sectors). The selection of sectors should further take into account any recently completed sector reviews so as to avoid duplication.

6 Organization and management

In the spirit of the objectives of the JASZ, and in view of the focus on learning, the evaluation should be undertaken as a joint exercise. The evaluation will be managed by a management group consisting of evaluation units of Irish Aid, Danida and Sida. GRZ will also be invited to join the management group. The management group will be overall responsible for the evaluation, including contracting of consultants, quality assurance, approval of inception and final reports.

In addition, a local reference group will be established. It will be explored whether the Mutual Accountability Group can serve as the local reference group. The reference group will be consulted before finalizing the inception report and the final report. It is also expected that the consultants debrief the reference group at the end of the field work. Finally, it is envisaged that the management group will organize a workshop in Lusaka when the draft final evaluation report has been submitted by the consultant (May-June 2009).

Irish Aid and Danida in Lusaka will coordinate the meetings of the reference group and will also assist in organizing the field work of the consultants.

7 Reporting and timing

Preliminary milestones:

- January 2010: Signing of contract
- 1 February 2010: Draft inception report
- 10 February 2010: Comments from local reference group and management group to draft inception report
- 15 February 2010: Final inception report
- Ultimo February 2010: Field work in Zambia
- 6 April: Draft evaluation report
- Ultimo April 2010: Discussion of draft evaluation report at workshop in Lusaka
- 21 May 2010: Deadline for comments to draft evaluation report
- 11 June 2010: Final evaluation report submitted by consultants
- June/July 2010: Printing etc.
- August 2010: Publishing of evaluation report

Copenhagen, January 12th, 2010

Annex B Persons Interviewed

CPG

Melissa Williams, Mission Director, USAID (Troika lead)
Robert van den Dool, Deputy Head of Mission, Head of Development Cooperation,
Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Troika)
Julio Revilla, Senior Country Economist, World Bank (Troika)
Thembe Bhebhe, Country Programme Officer, Zambia Country Office, African Development Bank, African Development Fund.
Toshihiko Horiuchi, Minister-Counsellor, Embassy of Japan in Zambia
Shiro Nabeya, Chief Representative, JICA, Zambia Office
Chinatsu Endo, Coordinator for Economic Cooperation, Embassy of Japan
Charlotte Norrby, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Sweden
Macleod Nyirongo, Resident Representative, UNDP
Kapil Kapoor, Country Manager, World Bank
Laurie Rogers, First Secretary, (Development), High Commission of Canada
Peter Jul Larsen, Minister Counsellor, Royal Danish Embassy
Francesco Di Mauro, Counsellor – Head of Section, European Union
Kati Manner, Counsellor, Embassy of Finland
Georg Rademacher, Counsellor, Head of Development Cooperation, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany
Gerry Cunningham, Head of Development Cooperation, Irish Aid, Embassy of Ireland
Ambra Sarmati, Commercial Attache, Embassy of Italy
Clare Harris, Economist, DFID, British High Commission
Peter Sievers, Counsellor, Development, Royal Danish Embassy
Opa Kapijimpanga, Director, Zambia-Canada Support Unit
Andrew Szatkowski, Cooperating Partners Group Coordinator, USAID
Olav Lundstol, Country Economist, Royal Norwegian Embassy
Tori Hoven, Head of Development Cooperation, Royal Norwegian Embassy
Karin Sverken, Deputy Country Director, Embassy of Sweden

GRZ

Likolo Ndalamei, Secretary to Treasury, MFNP
Kennedy Mbewe, Principal Economist, Donor Coordination, Economic and Technical Coordinator, MFNP
Paul Lupanga, Acting Deputy Director, Economic and Technical Cooperation Section, Economic Management Department, MFNP
Agnes Musunga, Director, M&E Department, MFNP
Chris Pain, Macro-economic Advisor, GTZ, MFNP

Non-JASZ CPs

Lilia Macedo, Embassy of Brazil

National Assembly

Hon. Emmanuel Hachipuka, Chair, Public Accounts Committee
Hon. Milupi, MP, former Chair, Public Accounts Committee
Hon. E.C. Mwansa, MP, Chair of the Parliamentary Reforms and Modernisation Committee
Hon. Katele Kalumba, Chair of the Parliamentary Steering Committee

Civil Society

Ms Chilufya Chileshe, Jesuit Centre for Theological reflection (JCTR)
Ms Mulima Akapelwa, Zambia Governance Foundation (ZGF)
Ms Barbara Chilangwa Campiagn for Female Education (CAMFED) and Zambia National Education Coalition (ZANEC)
Mr Patrick Nshindano, Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR)
Ms Karen Sichinga, Churchs Health Association of Zambia (CHAZ)
Ms Angelina Mwansa, Media Institute for Southern Africa (MISA)

Sector Case Studies

Bronagh Carr, Development Specialist, Irish Embassy
Arnold Chengo, Chief of Party, Equip2, Ministry of Education
Given Daka, Education Specialist, Netherlands Embassy
Rick Henning, Education Adviser, USAID
Miyanda Kwambwa, Senior Education Adviser, Irish Aid
Dr Felix V Phiri, Director, Planning and Information (Ministry of Education)
Leo van der Zwan, Education Adviser, Netherland Embassy
Henry Chewes Kansembe, Chief Planner, Planning and Budgeting, Ministry of Health
Priscilla Likwasi, JICA (health specialist)
Ippei Matsuhisa, Assistant Resident Representative, JICA (Health)
Dr Chris Simoonga, Acting Director of Planning, Ministry of Health
Angela Spilsbury, DFID Health Adviser
Hitoshi Suzuki, Second Secretary, Embassy of Japan
Veronica Perzanowska, Health Adviser, Swedish Embassy
A.K. Banda, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives
Julius Shawa, Director Planning, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives
John Phiri, Chief Planner, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives
Eva Oholsson, Embassy of Sweden
Lewis Bangwe, African Development Bank
Patrick Cibbamulilo, Senior Programme Officer, JICA
Yukihiko Nakamura, Second Secretary, Embassy of Japan
Alex Mwanakasale, World Bank
Indira Ekanayeka, World Bank
Peter McDermott, Governance Advisor, DFID (lead CP)
Georgina Fekete, Deputy Country Director, UNDP (lead CP)
Michael Soko, Governance Advisor, UNDP
Maria Kawimbe, Governance Secretariat Coordinator, Ministry of Justice
William Chilufya, Civic Engagement and Advocacy Programme Officer, Civil Society for Poverty Reduction

Mutual Accountability Mission

Paul Sherlock, Senior Development Specialist, Policy, Planning and Effectiveness Division, Irish Aid
Sarah Cooke, Head, Aid Effectiveness and Accountability, DFID
Liz Higgins, Irish Aid
Sarah Furrer Social Development Advisor, Aid Effectiveness and Accountability Department DFID

Phone Interviews

Gunnar Boe, Former Head of Development Cooperation (2006-2009), Norway
Chris Murgatroyd, Head of Director's Office, Western and Southern Africa, DFID
Keith Gristock, Zambia country desk, Irish Aid

Annex C Evaluation Framework

Evaluation Question	Indicator/Analysis	Data Collection Method	External factors/ Assumptions
Relevance			
Assess the internal consistency of the design of JASZ	Analysis of JASZ document. Development of intervention logic of JASZ	Document review	JASZ evolved from HIP and WHIP. Role of GRZ in final document
How responsive were JASZ processes to change in the Zambian context? - Have JASZ processes improved engagement with GRZ in terms of frequency and mutual understanding? - Have there been changes in JASZ implementation in response to changes in the Zambian context? - How easy has it been to change JASZ processes?	Analysis of changes and preparation of a time line Changes in JASZ processes	Document review Interviews	
Assess the continued relevance of the JASZ process to current and emergent GRZ and CP strategies and processes - Have there been any changes to CP strategies as a result of JASZ? - Have there been changes in CP monitoring and reporting to head office as a result of JASZ - Have there been changes in GRZ reporting to CPs as a result of JASZ?	Analysis of CP strategies, FNDP Review of CPG minutes	Document review interviews Sector Case studies survey	Identification of key players in the development of GRZ and CP strategies
To what extent has the design and implementation of JASZ facilitated PD implementation?	Cross-referencing of JASZ in PD evaluations	Document review	
Has the JASZ taken sufficient account of cross-cutting issues of gender, HIV/AIDS and Environment? - Has there been a change in CPs' ability or incentives to address issues of gender, HIV/AIDS or environment as cross-cutting issues since the JASZ?	Inclusion of cross-cutting issues in JASZ, and any reviews of JASZ Assessment of inclusion of cross-cutting issues at sector level	Document review Interviews, incl. with CSOs Survey Sector case studies.	

Evaluation Question	Indicator/Analysis	Data Collection Method	External factors/ Assumptions
Effectiveness			
To what extent has the JASZ strengthened GRZ ownership of the development process?	Perceptions of country ownership, including at sector level	Interviews, particularly with Government Survey Sector case studies	
To what extent has the JASZ enhanced aid effectiveness and mutual accountability? - Has the JASZ changed the modalities used by CPs? - Has it reduced the amount of project aid? - Has it made aid more predictable? - Has it improved harmonization?	Assessment of changed in aid effectiveness, as measured by harmonization and alignment at sector level Improvement in aid predictability by CPs. More coordination of missions	Interviews with CPs and Government. Survey Sector case studies	Aid effectiveness is measured by alignment, harmonization and aid predictability.
To what extent has the JSAZ contributed to an improved results focus of assistance programmes?	Analysis of reporting mechanisms, on country programmes, and sector support. Use of coordinated indicators for monitoring	Interviews Analysis of reporting mechanisms Sector joint review processes survey.	FNDP has operational monitoring system
How effective has the CPG and CPG Troika been: - in terms of greater exchange of information amongst JASZ CPs - in terms of more regular and organized engagement with GRZ - in terms of more systematic engagement with the wider CP community	Assessment of whether communications with Government and wider CP community have become more effective	Survey Interviews with CPs and Government	

Evaluation Question	Indicator/Analysis	Data Collection Method	External factors/ Assumptions
How effective have the JASZ internal accountability & monitoring mechanisms been?	Assessment of accountability and monitoring mechanisms	Document review, in particular minutes of meetings and monitoring reports	These are coordinated with other processes, such as GBS and Mutual accountability Group
To what extent was risk effectively managed? - Have CPs faced institutional constraints to increased harmonization? - Has there been any formal dialogue with GRZ and non-JASZ members on dangers of increased indebtedness? - Has there been engagement with GRZ on addressing capacity constraints?	Assessment of implementation of risk matrix in JASZ (table 5.b) Identification of any unforeseen risks	Interviews Survey	CPs carrying out regular risk monitoring as part of their own programmes
How has JASZ engaged with CPs not signatories to JASZ and CS	Mapping of aid donors at sector level Evidence of engagement at sector level	Interviews Sector case studies	
Efficiency			
Assess the efficiency of the management arrangements for sector coordination - has sector management and coordination improved since 2007 - have the number of CPs in the sector been rationalised (either up or down) since the DoL has been introduced? Is donor capacity to address sector issues more effectively used?	Attendance at coordination meetings, number of meetings	Sector case studies Interviews Survey Review of minutes of sector coordination meetings	Evaluation can have access to meeting minutes
How well has the DoL worked in practice?	Analysis of extent to which sector support has come from CPs identified in DoL matrix	Statistical analysis sector case studies	CPs have complied with agreed DoL in a reasonable period of time

Evaluation Question	Indicator/Analysis	Data Collection Method	External factors/ Assumptions
Assess benefits and challenges, and best practice from DoL donor system - Has DoL improved the allocation of CP resources (in terms of funding and HR time)? - Has DoL allowed improved results focus? - Has it simplified aid management for CPs? For GRZ? - Has it been possible for CP country staffing to be adapted to the demands of DoL? - In which sectors has DoL made the greatest difference in terms of better CP matching and rationalisation?	Identify costs involved in DoL to CPs and Government Identify challenges for CPs in complying with DoL Comparison with other DoL exercises	Interviews Survey Sector case studies Document review	
Has DoL led to a reduction in transaction costs? - What costs are associated with the DoL, in terms of staff time in meetings, in reviews, in reporting internally and to HQ?	Perception of transaction costs by donors Perception of transaction costs by Government	Survey Interviews, Sector Case studies	DoL is one of the main instruments of JASZ, over and above PD.
Assess continued relevance of DoL - How has DoL been taken into account in the development of the Sixth NDP? - What is the continuing importance of the CPs in terms of resources and technical input, as a whole and at sector level? - Are there tensions for CPs between their global aid policies and the content of their country programmes?	Draft outline of SNDP Statistical analysis Any contradictions between global policies and commitments under JASZ.		MoFNP has compiled ODA data, and will give the team access.

Annex D Global Aid Effectiveness Context

D.1 The aid effectiveness challenge

The global drive to make external assistance effective emerged in the late 1990s when it became increasingly clear that, in spite of the volume of aid, the expected impact was not forthcoming. Aid agencies, in particular, began to realize that, beyond their legitimate demands from recipient governments to improve their systems and structures, their actions were also contributing to the low effectiveness of aid. The transaction costs that donors imposed on aid recipients by their varied approaches and processes became the focal point of aid discourse and calls for harmonizing their systems became increasingly louder. While some progress had been made towards the harmonization of the work of different international aid agencies in developing countries through, for example, Sector-wide Approaches (SWAs), it was still acknowledged that much more needed to be done. Early assessments²² that informed the debate revealed several challenges. These included the realization that aid processes were still too strongly led by donor priorities and administered through donor channels, making it hard for developing countries to take the lead. In addition, aid was still too uncoordinated, unpredictable and opaque. It was also concluded that deeper reforms in the policies of aid recipients were essential if aid was to demonstrate its true potential in the effort to overcome poverty particularly in order to achieve the agreed international objectives of the Millennium Development Goals.

D.2 Responses: from Monterrey to Rome

Recognising in particular the challenges arising from the tendency of donors to encourage uncoordinated projects, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD decided to establish a special task force to explore and recommend best ways for donors to better deliver and manage aid through the simplification and harmonization of their procedures.²³ The Initiative set itself to offer ‘good practices’ in broad functional areas where donors could enhance their procedures. These are:

- a. Good practices between donors and partner governments (e.g. greater reliance on recipient government systems for aid management);
- b. Good practices between donor agencies in order to avoid unjustified duplication of work;
- c. Good practices within individual donor systems in order to minimize transaction costs as well as strengthening the capacity of donor staff to better manage aid both in-country and at headquarters;

22) Initiatives at the global level have included the OECD/DAC Task Force and Good Practice Guidance Papers on Donor Practices; OECD/DAC’s “Needs Assessment Report” of their “Survey on Partners’ Priorities and Perspectives on Harmonizing Donor Practices;” the OECD/DAC “Donor Accountability Report”; the SPA’s reviews of PRSP harmonization; the World Bank Development Committee work on its “Harmonization of Operational Policies, Procedures, and Practices Information Note;” the EU pilot harmonization initiatives; and the Monterrey Consensus.

23) To make the process inclusive, the views of 16 developing countries were represented.

- d. Best modalities for applying ‘good practices’ by using them as a point of reference rather than a matter of prescription for all development agencies;
- e. Recognizing the importance of simplifying and harmonizing procedures in ways that promote recipient country capacity development; and
- f. How best to monitor changes as a result of aid.²⁴

The aid effectiveness process was developed further in 2002 at the International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico. At that conference, the international community agreed that while providing more financing for development was important this needed to be complemented by action by donors

“... to intensify their efforts and harmonize their operational procedures at the highest standard so as to reduce transaction costs and make ODA disbursement and delivery more flexible, taking into account national development needs and objectives under the ownership of the recipient country.”

The following year, various donors, and partner countries met in Rome at the first High-Level Forum (HLF) on Harmonization. They committed themselves to taking action to improve the management and effectiveness of aid and to take stock of concrete progress before the next meeting.

The Rome Declaration on Harmonization (the product of the Rome meeting) set out an ambitious programme of activities that included the following:

- a. To ensure that harmonization efforts are adapted to the country context and that donor assistance is aligned with the development recipient’s priorities.
- b. To expand country-led efforts to streamline donor procedures and practices.
- c. To review and identify ways to adapt institutions’ and countries’ policies, procedures, and practices to facilitate harmonization.
- d. To implement the good practices principles and standards formulated by the development community as the foundation for harmonization.

D.3 The Paris Declaration

In March 2005 the international community came together again at the second HLF in Paris where over 100 signatories – from partner governments, bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, regional development banks, and international agencies – endorsed what came to be known as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, committing to specific actions that would promote the effective use of aid funds. Overall, the Paris Declaration expresses the international community’s consensus on the direction for reforming aid delivery and management to achieve improved effectiveness and results. It goes much

24) Six ‘Good Practice Papers’ were prepared to address these issues. They are: (1) The Framework for Donor Co-ordination; (2) Country Analytic Work and Preparation of Projects & Programmes; (3) Measuring Performance in Public Financial Management; (4) Reporting & Monitoring; (5) Financial Reporting & Auditing; and (6) Delegated Co-operation.

further than previous agreements in Monterrey and Rome and represented a broader consensus among the international community about how to make aid more effective. At the heart of the Paris Declaration is the commitment to help developing country governments formulate and implement their own national development plans according to their own national priorities, using, wherever possible, their own planning and implementation systems. The Declaration contains 56 partnership commitments aimed at improving the effectiveness of aid. It also lays out twelve indicators to provide a measurable and evidence-based way to track progress, and sets targets for eleven of the indicators to be met by 2010.

The Paris Declaration is based on five mutually reinforcing principles:

- *Ownership*: Developing countries must lead their own development policies and strategies, and manage their own development work on the ground. This is seen to be essential if aid is to contribute to truly sustainable development. Donors, on their part, must support developing countries in building up their capacity to exercise this kind of leadership by strengthening local expertise, institutions and management systems. The target set by the Paris Declaration is for three-quarters of developing countries to have their own national development strategies by 2010.
- *Alignment*: At this level, donors must line up their aid firmly behind the priorities outlined in developing countries' national development strategies. Wherever possible, they must use local institutions and procedures for managing aid in order to build sustainable structures. In this regard, donors committed to make more use of developing countries' procedures for public financial management, accounting, auditing, procurement and monitoring. Where these systems are not strong enough to manage aid effectively, donors promised to help strengthen them. They also promised to improve the predictability of aid, to halve the amount of aid that is not disbursed in the year for which it is scheduled, and to continue to untie their aid from any obligation that it be spent on donor-country goods and services.
- *Harmonization*: Donors must coordinate their development work better amongst themselves to avoid duplication and high transaction costs for poor countries. Donors committed themselves to coordinate better at the country level to ease the strain on recipient governments, for example, by reducing the large numbers of duplicative field missions. They agreed on a target of providing two-thirds of all their aid via the so-called "programme-based approaches" by 2010. This means aid is pooled in support of a particular strategy led by a recipient country rather than fragmented into multiple individual projects.
- *Managing for results*: All parties in the aid relationship must place more focus on the end result of aid, the tangible difference it makes in poor people's lives. They must develop better tools and systems to measure this impact. The target set by the Paris Declaration is for a one-third reduction by 2010 in the proportion of developing countries without solid performance assessment frameworks to measure the impact of aid.
- *Mutual accountability*: Donors and developing countries must account more transparently to each other for their use of aid funds, and to their citizens and

parliaments for the impact of their aid. The Paris Declaration says all countries must have procedures in place by 2010 to report back openly on their development results.²⁵

D.4 The Accra Agenda for Action

In 2008, the Third HLF on Aid Effectiveness took place in Accra, Ghana, with the participation of about 1,700 participants, including more than 100 ministers and heads of agencies from developing and donor countries, emerging economies, UN and multi-lateral institutions, global funds, foundations, and 80 civil society organizations.²⁶ The Accra meeting's aim was to build on the work of the two previous meetings, in Rome and Paris, by taking stock of progress thus far, and to accelerate the momentum of change. The high-level engagement in Accra helped bring about agreement on the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), which was endorsed on 4th September 2008 and that expresses the international community's commitment to further increase aid effectiveness.

Broadly speaking, the AAA called for the acceleration and deepening of the implementation of the Paris Declaration. Drawing largely on evidence from the 2006 and 2008 surveys on monitoring the Paris Declaration, and the first round Paris Declaration evaluation, the AAA identified three main areas where progress towards reform was seen to be still too slow:

- a. *Country ownership:* Developing-country governments still need to take stronger leadership of their own development policies and engage further with their parliaments and citizens in shaping them. Donors must commit to supporting them by respecting countries' priorities, investing in their human resources and institutions, making greater use of their systems to deliver aid, and further increasing the predictability of aid flows.
- b. *Building more effective and inclusive partnerships:* There is still need to incorporate the contributions of all development players, middle-income countries, glo-

25) A first round of monitoring of the 12 Paris Declaration indicators was conducted in 2006 based on activities undertaken in 2005 in 34 countries. A second survey was organized in early 2008 in which 54 developing countries examined progress against the targets at country level. The 2008 Survey covers more than half all the ODA delivered in 2007, approximately USD 45 billion. The third survey relating to the twelve Paris Declaration indicators is due this year (2010). The evidence from the 2008 survey revealed mixed results. On a positive note, more than one third of the recipient countries surveyed had improved their systems for managing public funds; almost 90% of donors had untied their aid; and technical cooperation is increasingly becoming more in line with developing countries' own development programmes. On the other hand, the 2008 survey results revealed that the pace of progress remains too slow to reach the 2010 targets especially at the level of strengthening recipient countries' national systems especially in the field of public funds management. Similarly, donors are still generally reluctant to use recipient country systems. The predictability of aid flows also remains low as only around a third of aid is disbursed on schedule, which makes it difficult for recipient governments to plan ahead. In addition, a first round of evaluation of the Paris Declaration was undertaken and completed in 2008. A second round of evaluation is currently under way.

26) The Accra meeting was the first of three major international aid conferences in 2008 alone. It was followed by the United Nations High Level Event on the MDGs in New York on 25 September 2008. After this Follow-up International Conference on Financing for Development took place in Doha, Qatar in November 2008.

bal funds, the private sector, civil society organizations, etc. into more inclusive partnerships. The aim is for all the providers of aid to use the same principles and procedures so that all their efforts are coherent and have greater impact on reducing poverty.

- c. *Achieving development results – and openly accounting for them:* The demonstration of impact must be placed more squarely at the heart of efforts to make aid more effective. This calls for the need to help developing countries to produce stronger national statistical and information systems to assist them better monitor and evaluate impact. Developing countries committed themselves to making public their revenues, expenditures, budgets, procurements and audits. Donors, in turn, committed themselves to disclosing regular and timely information on their aid flows.

Lastly, it is noteworthy that the Accra Forum took place against a rapidly changing international aid system where new donors such as China and India are making significant inroads in altering the traditionally western-dominated aid landscape. The new entrants bring with them substantially new resources and expertise to the aid process, often under quite different conditions, a state of affairs that up-scales the degree of complexity recipient countries have to contend with in their receipt and management of aid.

Annex E Regional JAS and Mutual Accountability Initiatives

Regional responses to the aid effectiveness agenda

Joint Assistance Strategies have been developed in a number of countries over the past five years, all with the overarching objective to operationalise the commitments made by development agencies under the Paris Declaration, in particular the commitments towards harmonization and alignment. Countries which have developed JASs include Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Ghana as well as Zambia. None of these have, as yet, been properly evaluated, so the discussion below focuses more on process than outcomes.

In addition, this section discusses approaches adopted by countries to issues of mutual accountability, and performance reviews of donor performance. This focuses on Rwanda and Mozambique, neither of whom have JAS, but who have developed performance assessment frameworks as part of their approach to mutual accountability.

E.1 Joint Assistance Strategies

A number of JAS were developed at around the same time in Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia. These were followed shortly after by the development of JAS in Kenya and Ghana. All of these have certain common elements²⁷

- They link the JAS to support for the implementation of national development plans or poverty reduction strategies
- They set out working principles for donor government engagement and progress towards PD principles
- They contain risk assessments
- They contain some discussion of financial support, either in terms of financing scenarios (Kenya and Uganda) or discussion of financial modalities
- They contain some commitment to a Division of Labour or, in the case of Ghana, a sector mapping of donor presence.

Only two JAS contain a results framework and a process for M&E, Uganda and Kenya. The similarities between the Uganda and Kenya JAS are not coincidental – they were developed in part by the same WB staff member, whose location shifted from Uganda to Kenya after the finalization of the UJAS. The results framework in both Uganda and Kenya is very much focused on achievement of results through government plans, rather than monitoring donor performance.

27) Some of this discussion draws on the preliminary findings of the KJAS review, 2010, found at http://www.hackkenya.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_details&Itemid=254&gid=6281

Each JAS is signed by a number of donor signatories; in no case has the Government signed the JAS document. Even in Tanzania, where it is generally felt that the Government took a strong leading role in developing the JAS, the JAS is seen as a commitment by donors. However, in Tanzania the JAS is backed up by an MoU between Government and JAS signatories, which commits both Government and donors to progressing the aid effectiveness agenda in support of the objectives in the Tanzania Poverty Reduction Strategy. Similarly, the KJAS is supported by a set of partnership principles. In Uganda donors and government signed partnership principles as part of the process of revision of the PEAP in 2003, which predated the development of the UJAS, but which address the same issues.

Reviews of these JAS processes show certain commonalities.

- All donor communities have made progress in moving towards greater aid effectiveness, but there is a need for further changes in CP behaviour if the process is not to stall.
- One significant barrier to progress is the tension, found in all countries, between a committed approach to the Division of Labour exercise, which genuinely results in a more focused donor engagement consistent with the level of financial support provided at country level, and priorities set in the home country.
- In all countries, substantial resources have been needed to negotiate the JAS, both amongst CPs and with government.
- Government capacity and ownership are still issues in many countries.

These are all issues identified in this evaluation. There are no obvious or easy solutions which arise from other countries' experiences. However, there have been some recent events in Kenya which are worthy of consideration.

A retreat was held in September 2009 with participants from both the donor community and the GoK. As a result a decision was made to rebrand the previous Harmonization, Alignment and Coordination Group (HAC) as the Aid Effectiveness Group and rename the HAC Secretariat as the Aid Effectiveness Group Support Team²⁸. This would signal a renewed commitment to partnership and mutual accountability. The Support team would be located in the Ministry of Finance, rather than with the UN, as is the current situation²⁹. The ToR commit GoK to providing technical staff to work with the support team in the Ministry of Finance, and sets out a joint annual work plan, with a budget, and responsibilities on the side of both donors and government. This is a bold effort to revitalise the aid effectiveness agenda in Kenya, after a period where it was badly affected by post-election riots and political instability. It is at a very early stage, but it is worth monitoring to see what progress can be made.

The Kenya JAS is itself the outcome of work undertaken by the HAC group, which was organized by a Secretariat. As far as the evaluation team is aware, this is the only example

28) ToR can be found at http://www.hackenya.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_details&Itemid=254&gid=6294

29) Previously the HAC Secretariat function had been shared between the WB and the UN, but the UN took over responsibility in 2009.

in Africa of support to the process being provided by a Secretariat funded by donors³⁰. It is a model worth considering, given the continuity it provides, as opposed to the current situation in Zambia, where the Troika chair has often found the need to recruit additional staff to carry out a combination of administrative and technical duties.

E.2 Mutual Accountability Frameworks

Although neither Mozambique nor Rwanda have JASs, they do have quite well advanced systems for mutual accountability, based on a combination of country and donor performance assessment frameworks.

In Mozambique the processes are focused around the Programme Aid Partners (PAP). A Joint review is held annually with Government on progress towards the targets set in the Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA). However, in tandem with the review of Government progress, there has been, since 2005, an independent evaluation of PAP performance. The PAF contains jointly agreed indicators for both Government and PAPs. The review is carried out by independent consultants, and the PAF indicators, of which there are a total possible 18, focus on the portfolio composition of aid, and the predictability of disbursements. This evaluation has been carried out on a yearly basis; 2009 saw the fifth evaluation. Over the period more countries have joined the PAP, and been included in the PAF evaluation. However, neither the USA nor Japan are signatories to the MoU which is the agreement setting out the principles which underpin the PAP and Government engagement. This is because of the emphasis placed on budget support as part of the PAF process. At present 19 countries are members of the PAP.

It is notable that over the five years of the PAF/PAP there have been improvements on alignment and the use of government systems over the five-year period³¹. Donors are beginning to understand better the need to respect the planning and budget cycle, with increasing alignment of commitments and information flows with the cycle. The PAP Secretariat has developed closer coordination with Government, resulting in strengthened joint work. It is clear from the latest evaluation that aid effectiveness in Mozambique faces many of the same problems that can be seen in Zambia: problems of policy dialogue with Government not being seen as keeping to agreed processes; processes for PAP depending on peer pressure, with no penalties for poor performance; how to extend the processes of alignment and harmonization to other donors without taking a step backwards, are a few mentioned in the PAP evaluation. However, Mozambique has taken greater steps towards mutual accountability, and there is an increasing evidence base on PAP performance which can form the basis for further initiatives.

In Rwanda, the basis for agreement between Government and donors is the Government's aid policy of 2006. This is backed by a Statement of Intent. The Donor Performance Assessment Framework (DPAF) applies to all donors who provide support to Rwanda, and all types of aid, not just programme-based. At present the DPAF applies only to donors who have a presence in Rwanda, but it is intended to extend this to those who do not have permanent in-country presence, such as the Global Fund and GAVI. It

30) There is a similar Secretariat in the Kyrgyz Republic which supports harmonization processes amongst donors. The UJAS contains references to setting up a Secretariat, but as far as the evaluation team can find out, this has never materialised.

31) IESE, Mozambique Programme Aid Partners Performance Review, 2008.

is intended that the DPAF be monitored on a yearly basis, led by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning.

The DPAF³² contains seven clusters of indicators, on flows on finances on budget, on use of government systems, on multi-annual planning and predictability of aid flows, on harmonization of missions and analytical work, on streamlining sector presence in accordance with comparative advantage, on sector specific issues, and a final section for donors who provide budget support. Baselines and targets are agreed with individual donors, and monitoring is against those targets.

This is at a preliminary stage, so it is difficult to assess its effectiveness. However, it is more inclusive than the approach taken in Mozambique, and the indicators vary significantly in some cases.

32) The DPAF can be accessed through http://www.devpartners.gov.rw/docs/index.php?dir=Events%2FDevelopment+Partners+Retreat+%28DPR%29%2F2009_DPR%2FBackground+documents%2F.

Annex F Evaluation of the JASZ 2007-10 online survey

Table F.1 Strength of national ownership

Answer Options	Weak	Fairly weak	Fairly strong	Strong	No opinion	Response Count	Response Rate
Now	6.25%	43.75%	43.75%	6.25%	0.00%	16	100%
In 2007	12.50%	62.50%	18.75%	0.00%	6.25%	16	100%
Contribution of JASZ to change	18.75%	37.50%	31.25%	6.25%	6.25%	16	100%

Source: Evaluation of JASZ questionnaire, Question 1

Table F.2 Extent of harmonization among cooperating partners

Answer Options	Weak	Fairly weak	Fairly strong	Strong	No opinion	Response Count	Response Rate
Now	0.00%	6.25%	50.00%	43.75%	0.00%	16	100%
In 2007	6.25%	25.00%	37.50%	25.00%	6.25%	16	100%
Contribution of JASZ to change	6.25%	6.25%	43.75%	37.50%	6.25%	16	100%

Source: Evaluation of JASZ online questionnaire (2010) results, Question 2

Table F.3 Extent of alignment on government policies

Answer Options	Weak	Fairly weak	Fairly strong	Strong	No opinion	Response Count	Response Rate
Now	0.00%	6.25%	37.50%	50.00%	6.25%	16	100%
In 2007	0.00%	25.00%	56.25%	12.50%	6.25%	16	100%
Contribution of JASZ to change	0.00%	12.50%	62.50%	18.75%	6.25%	16	100%

Source: Evaluation of JASZ online questionnaire (2010) results, Question 3

Table F.4 Extent of alignment on government systems

Answer Options	Weak	Fairly weak	Fairly strong	Strong	No opinion	Response Count	Response Rate
Now	0.00%	25.00%	56.25%	12.50%	6.25%	16	100%
In 2007	18.75%	43.75%	31.25%	0.00%	6.25%	16	100%
Contribution of JASZ to change	0.00%	25.00%	43.75%	25.00%	6.25%	16	100%

Source: Evaluation of JASZ online questionnaire (2010) results, Question 4

Table F.5 Results focus of development assistance

Answer Options	Weak	Fairly weak	Fairly strong	Strong	No opinion	Response Count	Response Rate
Now	12.50%	43.75%	25.00%	12.50%	6.25%	16	100%
In 2007	18.75%	50.00%	25.00%	0.00%	6.25%	16	100%
Contribution of JASZ to change	18.75%	50.00%	12.50%	12.50%	6.25%	16	100%

Source: Evaluation of JASZ online questionnaire (2010) results, Question 5

Table F.6 Extent and quality of mutual accountability

Answer Options	Weak	Fairly weak	Fairly strong	Strong	No opinion	Response Count	Response Rate
Now	18.75%	56.25%	18.75%	6.25%	0.00%	16	100%
In 2007	50.00%	31.25%	12.50%	0.00%	6.25%	16	100%
Contribution of JASZ to change	18.75%	43.75%	31.25%	6.25%	0.00%	16	100%

Source: Evaluation of JASZ online questionnaire (2010) results, Question 6

Table F.7 Government management capacity

Answer Options	Weak	Fairly weak	Fairly strong	Strong	No opinion	Response Count	Response Rate
Now	31.25%	56.25%	12.50%	0.00%	0.00%	16	100%
In 2007	43.75%	50.00%	6.25%	0.00%	0.00%	16	100%
Contribution of JASZ to change	31.25%	43.75%	18.75%	0.00%	6.25%	16	100%

Source: Evaluation of JASZ online questionnaire (2010) results, Question 7

Table F.8 Engagement of civil society on aid and development issues

Answer Options	Weak	Fairly weak	Fairly strong	Strong	No opinion	Response Count	Response Rate
Now	31.25%	43.75%	18.75%	6.25%	0.00%	16	100%
In 2007	25.00%	68.75%	6.25%	0.00%	0.00%	16	100%
Contribution of JASZ to change	43.75%	37.50%	12.50%	0.00%	6.25%	16	100%

Source: Evaluation of JASZ online questionnaire (2010) results, Question 8

Table F.9 Have there been any changes to your country/agency strategy in Zambia as a result of JASZ?

Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes – substantial change	25.0%	4
Yes – some change	62.5%	10
No	12.5%	2
No opinion	0.0%	0

Source: Evaluation of JASZ online questionnaire (2010) results, Question 9

Table F.10 Have there been any changes to your country/agency programme in Zambia as a result of the JASZ?

Answer Options	Yes – substantial change	Yes – some change	No	No opinion	Response Count	Response Rate
Change in size of budget	13.33%	6.67%	80.00%	0.00%	15	93.75%
Change in aid modalities used	6.25%	62.50%	31.25%	0.00%	16	100.00%
Change in sector/thematic focus	37.50%	37.50%	25.00%	0.00%	16	100.00%
Change in engagement with civil society	0.00%	33.33%	66.67%	0.00%	15	93.75%

Source: Evaluation of JASZ online questionnaire (2010) results, Question 10

Table F.11 Have there been any changes to your country/agency reporting to head office as a result of the JASZ?

Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes – substantial change	6.3%	1
Yes – some change	25.0%	4
No	62.5%	10
No opinion	6.3%	1

Source: Evaluation of JASZ online questionnaire (2010) results, Question 11

Table F.12 Have there been any changes in Government of Zambia reporting to your country/agency as a result of the JASZ?

Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes – substantial change	6.3%	1
Yes – some change	31.3%	5
No	50.0%	8
No opinion	12.5%	2

Source: Evaluation of JASZ online questionnaire (2010) results, Question 12

Table F.13 Have there been changes in your country/agency's treatment of the following cross-cutting issues as a result of the JASZ?

Answer Options	Yes – substan- tial change	Yes – some change	No	No opinion	Response Count	Response rate
Gender	0.00%	50.00%	50.00%	0.00%	16	100.00%
HIV/AIDS	12.50%	43.75%	43.75%	0.00%	16	100.00%
Environment	12.50%	18.75%	68.75%	0.00%	16	100.00%

Source: Evaluation of JASZ online questionnaire (2010) results, Question 13

Table F.14 How effective have the CPG and CPG Troika been in terms of:

Answer Options	Not effective	Slightly effective	Moderately effective	Very ef- fective	No opin- ion	Response Count	Response rate
Greater exchange of information amongst JASZ CPs?	0.00%	0.00%	31.25%	68.75%	0.00%	16	100.00%
More regular and organized engage- ment with GRZ?	0.00%	6.25%	31.25%	62.50%	0.00%	16	100.00%
More systematic engagement with the wider CP com- munity?	12.50%	6.25%	31.25%	50.00%	0.00%	16	100.00%

Source: Evaluation of JASZ online questionnaire (2010) results, Question 14

Table F.15 How effective have the JASZ internal accountability and monitoring mechanisms been?

Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Not effective	12.5%	2
Slightly effective	37.5%	6
Moderately effective	25.0%	4
Very effective	0.0%	0
No opinion	25.0%	4

Source: Evaluation of JASZ online questionnaire (2010) results, Question 15

Table F.16 To what extent have the following factors constrained your country/agency in moving towards increased harmonization?

Answer Options	Not a constraint	Slight constraint	Moderate constraint	Severe constraint	No opinion	Response Count	Response rate
In country staff-ing capacity of your agency	37.50%	25.00%	25.00%	12.50%	0.00%	16	100.00%
Policies and regulations of your agency	31.25%	18.75%	31.25%	18.75%	0.00%	16	100.00%
Budget con-straints on your agency	50.00%	18.75%	18.75%	12.50%	0.00%	16	100.00%
Actions by GRZ	12.50%	25.00%	37.50%	25.00%	0.00%	16	100.00%
Actions by other cooperating partners	25.00%	37.50%	31.25%	0.00%	6.25%	16	100.00%
Other (please specify)	0.00%	6.25%	0.00%	6.25%	87.50%	16	100.00%

Source: Evaluation of JASZ online questionnaire (2010) results, Question 16

Table F.17 Has the JASZ affected the transactions costs faced by your country/agency in each of the following respects?

Answer Options	Sig-nificant reduction	Some reduction	No effect	Some increase	Sig-nificant increase	No opinion	Response Count	Response rate
Staff time in meetings	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	31.25%	62.50%	6.25%	16	100.00%
Staff time in reviews	0.00%	6.25%	12.50%	43.75%	31.25%	6.25%	16	100.00%
Staff time in project and programme management	18.75%	6.25%	37.50%	25.00%	6.25%	6.25%	16	100.00%
Staff time in reporting internally	6.25%	6.25%	43.75%	25.00%	6.25%	12.50%	16	100.00%
Staff time in reporting to HQ	6.25%	6.25%	50.00%	25.00%	6.25%	6.25%	16	100.00%
Overall	0.00%	6.25%	6.25%	56.25%	25.00%	6.25%	16	100.00%
Other (please specify)	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	6.25%	0.00%	93.75%	16	100.00%

Source: Evaluation of JASZ online questionnaire (2010) results, Question 17

Table F.18 Has the Division of Labour led to changes in your country/agency's activities in Zambia?


Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes – significant changes	31.3%	5
Yes – some changes	50.0%	8
No	18.8%	3
No opinion	0.0%	0


Source: Evaluation of JASZ online questionnaire (2010) results, Question 18


Table F.19 Has the Division of Labour simplified aid management for your country/agency?

Answer Options	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes – significant simplification	0.0%	0
Yes – some simplification	50.0%	8
No	50.0%	8
No opinion	0.0%	0

Source: Evaluation of JASZ online questionnaire (2010) results, Question 19

Figure F.1 Please indicate for each sector in which your agency has been involved how you would rate the quality of management arrangements for sector coordination currently, and in 2007 before the JAS





Annex G Statistical Data – MoFNP and OECD/DAC

Table G.1 Total aid (actual and projections; excluding aid to NGOs) 2007-12 by donor.
USD million

	Donor	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
JAS	AfDB	4.3	50.1	37.5	111.0	94.9	47.2
	Canada	0.7	8.2	8.8	6.3	5.4	4.4
	Denmark	77.4	39.4	52.8	53.7	54.3	54.4
	EU (excl. EIB)	57.7	118.2	171.3	164.4	122.0	110.3
	Finland	6.8	5.3	31.3	31.7	36.6	35.6
	France	0.8	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Germany	24.8	31.4	38.3	38.2	31.9	16.2
	Ireland	0.0	26.0	36.6	39.9	51.0	69.2
	Japan	11.3	21.0	12.4	13.7	12.0	12.9
	Netherlands	15.0	67.2	100.3	89.5	82.0	84.3
	Norway	30.4	42.2	36.3	39.7	7.3	7.3
	Sweden	31.2	44.1	47.0	37.6	35.7	34.2
	UK	71.9	53.0	51.5	134.5	75.0	75.0
	UN System	8.2	17.6	33.7	13.5	13.5	13.5
	USA	9.0	339.2	310.5	365.9	335.2	335.2
	World Bank	38.5	55.6	88.7	49.7	31.1	26.6
	Total JAS	387.8	918.4	1057.3	1189.2	987.9	926.3
Non-JAS	China	5.3	11.5	76.1	26.1	21.3	0.0
	EIB	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	FTI	0.0	0.0	0.0	30.0	0.0	0.0
	Global Fund	0.0	44.7	60.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
	IFAD	0.0	0.0	3.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
	India (Exim Bank)	0.0	0.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
	Italy	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	JIBIC	0.0	0.0	14.8	1.9	43.4	69.9
	Kuwait Fund	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.4	7.4	0.0
	Nordic Fund	0.0	0.0	6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	OPEC Fund	3.5	0.0	22.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Total Non-JAS	9.4	56.2	192.1	75.4	82.1	79.9
SWAPs		127.2					
Total aid		524.4	974.6	1249.4	1264.6	1070.1	1006.2
Loan element		46.2	106.3	250.0	188.6	198.3	153.7
Loans as % total aid		9%	11%	20%	15%	19%	15%
Aid to NGOs		354.7	367.7	356.9	352.3	342.1	-

Notes: Total aid = grants + loans + budget support + SWAPs (excluding aid to NGOs)

2007 and 2008 actual amounts, 2009-12 projections

Source data did not disaggregate SWAPs data by donor for 2007

Loan element includes loans as part of budget support

These figures do not include donor expenditure on TA out of country (USA and Japan)

Table G.2 Share of JAS and Non-JAS in total aid (excluding aid to NGOs)

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
JAS	74%	94%	85%	94%	92%	92%
Non-JAS	2%	6%	15%	6%	8%	8%

Notes:

Total aid = grants + loans + budget support + SWAPs (excluding aid to NGOs)

2007 and 2008 actual amounts, 2009-12 projections

2007 figures exclude data for SWAPs which were not disaggregated by donor in the source data

Loan element includes loans as part of budget support

These figures do not include donor expenditure on TA out of country (USA and Japan)

Source: MoFNP

Table G.3 Share of budget support in total aid (excluding aid to NGOs). USD million

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total aid	524.4	1022.3	1249.4	1264.6	1070.1	1006.2
GBS	146.7	154.5	158.3	159.1	123.8	118.9
SBS	2.9	49.0	51.6	45.9	34.3	34.3
BS loan	0.0	32.0	41.1	32.0	36.0	36.0
Total BS	149.6	235.5	251.0	237.0	194.1	189.2
BS as % total aid	29%	24%	20%	19%	18%	19%
SWAPs	127.2	91.2	120.3	114.6	71.6	72.9
SWAPs as % total aid	24%	9%	10%	9%	7%	7%

Source: MoFNP

Table G.4 JASZ and Non-JASZ commitments and disbursements by sector, Average 2002-05, 2006, 2007, 2008. USD million

	Commitments				Disbursements			
	2002-05	2006	2007	2008	2002-05	2006	2007	2008
JAS								
Agriculture	51.10	72.67	22.23	17.73	38.87	48.46	49.63	22.59
Education	143.65	74.76	69.17	99.12	92.13	100.83	100.26	68.58
Energy	2.96	0.38	0.89	10.77	20.69	8.35	1.79	0.61
Environment	14.11	4.65	14.43	26.32	6.76	8.19	9.37	5.75
Gender	2.48	0.04	6.21	3.70	1.94	2.13	2.79	3.02
Governance	45.99	77.36	36.80	29.72	45.14	56.31	56.08	38.53
HIV/Aids	84.11	114.87	156.55	32.59	54.81	111.05	126.65	22.02
Health	74.98	257.16	62.47	9.98	87.96	86.97	109.03	38.26
Housing	0.18	0.97	0.29	35.68	0.23	0.21	0.50	0.31
Macro-economics	10.30	53.19	16.35	2.21	16.99	11.72	28.92	14.12
Private Sector Development	33.19	22.13	12.44	1.19	34.16	19.78	24.22	4.10

ANNEX G STATISTICAL DATA – MoFNP AND OECD/DAC

	Commitments				Disbursements				
	Sector	2002-05	2006	2007	2008	2002-05	2006	2007	2008
IAS	Science and Technology	0.06	0.03		0.05	0.05	0.03		0.05
	Social Protection	15.23	2.13	11.12	1.44	14.62	8.46	13.03	9.91
	Tourism	0.09	0.05	0.13	0.04	0.12	0.05	0.13	0.04
	Transport	67.26	67.69	134.80	0.00	54.31	83.54	27.03	11.08
	Water	51.68	53.33	55.48	10.58	43.22	56.39	51.82	24.09
	Other	81.55	72.88	47.79	16.88	73.15	60.89	59.13	21.31
	Support to NGOs	1.05	1.40	3.39	0.22	8.46	0.63	2.15	0.82
	Debt Forgiveness and Debt Relief	446.93	613.66	64.99	0.36	447.14	3477.08	64.91	0.36
	General Budget Support	100.83	111.80	238.54	172.44	66.26	126.17	145.56	119.80
	Total	1227.72	1601.15	954.07	471.04	1107.00	4267.22	873.01	405.36
Non-IAS	Agriculture	9.88	1.12	0.01	0.07	1.83	1.13	0.00	0.00
	Education	2.90	3.26	1.89	1.70	4.86	3.29	1.56	6.11
	Energy	3.01				0.00			
	Environment	0.00			0.46	0.00			0.00
	Governance	4.64		0.00	0.15	0.05		0.01	0.00
	HIV/Aids	28.58	0.37	20.55	0.39	17.11	19.03	20.19	0.14
	Health	19.24	0.97	54.50	0.98	13.39	10.02	27.84	0.95
	Macro-economics	3.92	0.38	0.00	0.00	0.24	0.38	0.00	0.00
	Private Sector Development	47.83	105.84	0.14	0.01	1.04	0.01	0.02	0.20
	Social Protection	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.20
	Tourism	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.01	0.02	0.02	
	Transport	0.01			0.00	11.89			0.07
	Water	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.27	0.02	0.16	0.04
	Other	4.12	1.74	1.46	1.53	23.91	6.22	1.95	1.36
	Support to NGOs	0.39	0.37	0.24		0.35	0.55	0.24	
	Debt Forgiveness and Debt Relief	9.36	65.96	0.15	0.15	9.53	65.99	0.15	0.15
	General Budget Support	0.00				10.35			
	Total	133.90	180.05	78.95	5.43	94.85	106.69	52.16	9.22

Source: OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System online database (22/01/10)

Table G.5 Commitments and disbursements by donor, Average 2002-05, 2006, 2007, 2008

Donor	JASZ	Commitments				Disbursements			
		2002-05	2006	2007	2008	2002-05	2006	2007	2008
AfDF	1	20.06	31.61	53.56		5.87	283.03	19.20	
Australia	0	0.55	0.73	0.86		1.02	0.57	1.13	
Austria	0	0.81	9.31	0.01	0.00	1.11	9.39	0.08	0.03
Belgium	0	4.34	4.80	1.12	2.14	5.41	4.80	1.12	2.17
Canada	1	24.96	1.45	30.21		21.58	8.03	16.16	
Denmark	1	60.84	18.36	98.53	38.04	20.96	42.80	34.29	27.86
EIB	0	25.32	105.70	0.00		0.00	4.72	0.00	
EC (excl. EIB)	1	94.60	175.73	57.22		81.91	113.34	82.40	
EU institutions	0	37.15				45.88			
Finland	1	15.33	16.27	35.69	20.68	3.52	9.13	21.21	15.18
France	1	37.32	95.32	1.11	1.48	37.43	95.40	1.46	1.48
GAVI	0			4.84				4.84	
Germany	1	119.39	330.41	54.98	22.43	132.00	319.43	40.68	42.48
Global Fund	0	47.11	0.00	68.55		29.53	27.77	41.84	
Greece	0	0.07	0.18	0.28	0.39	0.07	0.18	0.28	0.39
IDA	1	100.17	99.74	25.00		179.79	2587.63	70.88	
IFAD	0	6.69				0.00			
Ireland	1	28.77	34.26	34.85	32.93	28.77	34.26	34.75	32.93
Italy	0	10.11	57.45	0.95	1.37	9.87	57.40	0.45	5.35
Japan	1	202.98	24.32	96.61		197.15	30.87	94.61	
Luxembourg	0	0.12	0.01	0.01		0.12	0.01	0.01	
Netherlands	1	42.17	163.54	80.14	94.16	56.91	61.67	71.54	79.33
New Zealand	0	0.47	0.92	0.85		0.58	0.79	0.66	
Norway	1	76.20	57.36	128.75	23.47	53.37	73.67	74.42	67.19
Spain	0	0.35	0.39	0.93	1.05	0.35	0.39	0.93	0.92
Sweden	1	35.26	125.06	22.97	43.97	29.59	52.69	53.69	49.13
Switzerland	0	0.82	0.56	0.56	0.48	0.90	0.68	0.81	0.34
UNAIDS	1	0.47	1.32	2.01		0.47	1.32	2.01	
UNDP	1	2.80	9.14	4.61		2.79	8.85	4.49	
UNFPA	1	2.26	1.27	1.91		2.26	1.27	1.91	
UNICEF	1	5.41	6.25	10.01		5.41	6.21	10.01	
United Kingdom	1	251.63	27.50	10.01	193.90	161.09	96.08	74.01	89.80
United States	1	107.09	382.23	205.91		86.13	441.52	165.29	
Total		1361.63	1781.20	1033.02	476.48	1201.85	4373.92	925.17	414.58

Source: OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System online database (22/01/10)

Table G.6 GBS Commitments by donor, Average 2002-05, 2006, 2007, 2008

Donor	JASZ	General Budget Support							
		Commitments				Disbursements			
		2002-05	2006	2007	2008	2002-05	2006	2007	2008
AfDF	1			30.60				0.00	
EC (excl. EIB)	1	47.63	86.80	0.00		55.56	50.40	38.58	
EU institutions	0	0.00				10.35			
Finland	1		14.07	13.69	0.00		0.00	6.84	6.63
Germany	1			13.69	0.00			6.84	6.74
Netherlands	1		8.05	52.02	0.00		8.05	10.95	13.45
Norway	1	7.59	0.00	110.78	0.00	1.92	14.44	18.07	27.97
Sweden	1	4.64	0.00	17.76	0.00	0.00	7.39	14.24	14.64
United Kingdom	1	39.63	0.00	0.00	172.44	8.78	45.90	50.03	50.38
United States	1	1.35	2.88			0.00	0.00		
Total		100.83	111.80	238.54	172.44	76.61	126.17	145.56	119.80

Source: OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System online database (22/01/10)

ODA data is taken from the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) online database. Amounts are deflated and expressed in millions of 2007 US dollars. The CRS reports for all signatories of JASZ. It does not report on the BRIC economies' donor activities.

The CRS is a project database, and each entry specifies both the sector and the purpose of the particular project. The OECD classification of sectors does not correspond exactly to that of the JASZ framework, hence purpose codes have been used to try to organize the data according to the sectors specified by JASZ. Much of this process was clear-cut, but listed below by sector are those areas which were more open to interpretation. "General budget support", "Debt forgiveness /relief" and "Support to NGOs" were added as sectors. Some purpose codes still did not belong in our framework, and these have been classed as "Other".

Agriculture

Includes "Forestry", "Fishing" and "Rural development"

Governance

Includes "Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security"

Health

Includes "Reproductive health care", "Family planning" and "Personnel development for population and reproductive health". However, "STD control including HIV/AIDS" was added to HIV/Aids.

Macro-economics

Includes "Banking and financial services"

Private Sector Development

Includes "Mineral resources and mining"

Transport

Includes "Storage"

Other

Includes, amongst others, "Statistical capacity building", "Narcotics control", "Communications" and "Humanitarian aid"

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2011:1 Supporting Child Rights – Synthesis of Lessons Learned in Four Countries: Final Report

Arne Tostesen, Hugo Stokke, Sven Trygged, Kate Halvorsen

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Evaluation of the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ) 2007–2010

The Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ), signed by 16 cooperating partners to manage their development cooperation with the Government of the Republic of Zambia, came into effect in 2007 and is set to expire in 2010. The overall aim of the evaluation, conducted by Danida, Sida and Irish Aid, is to provide an assessment of the JASZ – particularly the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the strategy – and to identify lessons learnt, best practices and recommendations to inform the aid management section of the Sixth National Development Plan and the design of the next JASZ. It is the hope that it will also contribute with valuable inputs into Phase II of the Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration.

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