



2010:16

UTV Working Paper

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# Evaluation of Sida's Humanitarian Assistance

## Case Study Report Kenya



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**Sida**

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The views and interpretations expressed in this report are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida.

**UTV Working Paper 2010:16**

Commissioned by Sida, Secretariat for Evaluation.

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**Date of final report:** December 2010

**Printed by:** Edita

**Art. no.** SIDA61372en

**ISBN:** 978-91-586-4162-4

**URN:NBN:** se-2010-58

This publication can be downloaded from:

<http://www.sida.se/publications>

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
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# Table of Contents

<b>Foreword .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Abbreviations .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Acknowledgements.....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Executive Summary .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Section 1: Introduction.....</b>	<b>14</b>
1.1 Overview of humanitarian situation in Kenya.....	14
1.2 Sweden's humanitarian funding to Kenya.....	14
1.3 Assessment of Sweden's funding by channel.....	16
<b>Section 2: Evaluation of Sida's strategic goals.....</b>	<b>17</b>
2.1 Promoting the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship.....	17
2.2 Promoting needs based humanitarian assistance.....	20
2.3 Strengthening humanitarian coordination .....	21
2.4 Strengthening local capacity.....	23
2.5 Supporting the link between humanitarian contributions and prevention .....	26
2.6 Reducing the gap between humanitarian support and recovery contributions.....	28
2.7 Strengthening the humanitarian system.....	29
2.8 Strengthening humanitarian principles.....	31
<b>Section 3: Structures.....</b>	<b>31</b>
3.1 Headquarter-field relations.....	31
3.2 Linking humanitarian and development assistance.....	32
<b>Section 4: Effective humanitarian assistance.....</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>Section 5: Conclusions.....</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>Section 6: Recommendations .....</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>Annex A: Emergency Response Fund (ERF) Overview .....</b>	<b>41</b>
<b>Annex B: Methodology.....</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>References and Resources.....</b>	<b>48</b>

## Foreword

In the *UTV Working Paper Series*, Sida publishes background material and annexes to Sida Evaluations and Sida Studies in Evaluation, and other forms of working material which we believe to be of interest for a wider audience. This working paper includes the case study on Kenya prepared as part of the evaluation of Sida's humanitarian assistance (Sida Evaluation 2010:4). For information on other publications prepared as part of the evaluation of Sida's humanitarian assistance please visit [www.sida.se/publications](http://www.sida.se/publications)



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## Abbreviations

ACTED	Agence d'Aide à la Coopération Technique Et au Développement	ADEO	African Development and Emergency Organisation
ASAL	Arid and Semi Arid Lands	BBC	British Broadcasting Cooperation
CARE	Christian Action Research and Education	CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CFW	Cash For Work	CHF	Swiss Francs
COOPI	Cooperazione Internazionale	DEHRP	Drought Emergency Humanitarian Response Project
DFID	Department for International Development	DI	Development Initiatives
DPRR	Disaster Preparedness and Risk Reduction	DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction	ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid department
EHRP	Emergency Humanitarian Response Plan	ERF	Emergency Response Fund
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation	FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FPFK	Free Pentecostal Fellowship In Kenya	FTS	Financial Tracking Service
GB	Great Britain	GHD	Good Humanitarian Donorship
GTZ	German Technical Cooperation	HAP	Humanitarian Accountability Project
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator	HRF	Humanitarian Response Fund
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross	IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development	IHL	International Humanitarian Law
INGO	International non-Governmental Organisation	IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee	KHPT	Kenya Humanitarian Partnership Team
KJAS	Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy	KRCS	Kenya Red Cross Society
LOU	Letter Of Understanding	MFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs
MoSSP	Ministry of State for Special Programmes	MSB	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
MSDP	Makuru Slum Development Project	MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NCCK	National Council of Churches in Kenya	NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council	OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OTP	Outpatient therapeutic feeding programme	PEV	Post-election Violence
PISP	Pastoralist Integrated Support Programme	PMU	PMU Interlife
SEK	Swedish Kronor	SGBV	Sexual and gender-based violence
TOR	Terms of Reference	UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
US	United States	WFP	World Food Programmes
WHO	World Health Organisation		

## Acknowledgements

Development Initiatives is extremely grateful to the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) for its support in organising the field visit to Dadaab and also to ICRC for providing transport for the field visits in Mount Elgon. The team is also very grateful to Sida staff (particularly in the Nairobi Embassy), Sida's partners (including IOM, Free Pentecostal Fellowship In Kenya (FPFK), Concern, Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI), Oxfam GB, GTZ, Medecins Sans Frontiere (MSF) and Save the Children UK for organising project visits), donor representatives from Norway and Germany, the Ministry of State for Special Programmes (MoSSP) and local communities in Kenya who gave up their valuable time to participate in this evaluation.



## Executive Summary

This case study of Sweden's humanitarian support to Kenya is a part of the evaluation of Sida's humanitarian assistance, which will contribute to the revision of Sida's Humanitarian Strategy. This report analyses how Sida's support to Kenya is contributing towards meeting the 8 sub-goals of its humanitarian strategy, and attempts to identify lessons to inform Sida's future humanitarian programming.

The evaluation covers three funding channels for Sweden's humanitarian assistance to Kenya – bilateral funding, the Emergency Response Fund (ERF) managed by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). However, it is not intended as an assessment of the performance of specific funding instruments<sup>1</sup>. It is instead an assessment of whether the various funding instruments employed by Sida are helping it to achieve the goals of its humanitarian strategy. The case study also examined issues that are not covered by Sida's strategic sub-goals but are critical for ensuring the effectiveness of its humanitarian aid to Kenya – headquarter-field relations and linking humanitarian and development assistance.

### **“A situation of chronic vulnerability and poverty”**

The 2010 Emergency Humanitarian Response Plan (EHRP)<sup>2</sup> underlines the fact that what connects the different emergencies affecting Kenya is a situation of chronic vulnerability and poverty, particularly in the Arid and Semi-Arid Land (ASAL) areas and urban informal settlements. Growing urban poverty and the increasing incidence of extreme weather events are exacerbating this vulnerability and point to the urgent need for disaster risk reduction activities and better links between development and humanitarian assistance. Otherwise it is left to the humanitarian sector to try to address problems of chronic vulnerability with short-term assistance.

### **Sida's humanitarian funding to Kenya is mainly bilateral**

Of Sida's SEK 89.8 million in humanitarian aid to Kenya in 2009<sup>3</sup>, it channelled SEK 24.8 million to Swedish and international NGOs through framework agreements and SEK 52 million for projects in the EHRP (all to UN agencies, with the exception of SEK 4 million for an Oxfam GB project). Sida is one of two donors (Norway being the other) to the Emergency Response Fund that OCHA established in June 2009. As of June 2010, it had contributed a total of \$1.7 million<sup>4</sup>.

Kenya is a significant recipient of CERF funds – the fourth largest recipient from 2006–2010<sup>5</sup>. Sweden is a significant donor to the CERF – the third largest, after the United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands, in terms of total contributions from 2006–2010<sup>5</sup>. It is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) rather than Sida that finances the CERF but this case study has included CERF funding because Sida asked Development Initiatives (DI) to examine the complementarity of Sida and MFA funding.

### **Good Humanitarian Donorship largely delivered though some improvements needed**

The 8 sub-goals of Sida's humanitarian strategy are all drawn from the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). Its first sub-goal focuses specifically on:

- Timeliness, flexibility and predictability of funding

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<sup>1</sup> The sections on the CERF draw on a review of CERF funding to Kenya that Development Initiatives undertook in February–March 2010.

<sup>2</sup> UN (2010) *Kenya Emergency Humanitarian Response Plan*. Available from: <http://ochaonline.un.org/humanitarianappeal/webpage.asp?Page=1822>

<sup>3</sup> Sida's Humanitarian Assistance to Kenya during 2009.

<sup>4</sup> OCHA's Financial Tracking Service (FTS).

<sup>5</sup> OCHA's Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) [www.cerf.un.org](http://www.cerf.un.org)

- Supporting quick response to rapid onset disasters by providing unallocated funds to suitable organisations
- Encouraging and supporting a long-term perspective in partners' programming.

While Sida's funding through framework agreements tends to be timely compared to funding from other donors, partners have experienced delays with project funding recently (though Sida funded the response to post-election violence and the food crisis of 2008–09 very quickly). For example, in 2009, apart from an allocation of SEK 5 million to the ERF in January<sup>6</sup>, Sida did not provide any funding for projects in the EHRP till July.

NGOs and UN agencies were united in agreement that Sida's bilateral funding is very flexible. NGOs, in particular, felt that Sida understands the need to respond to changing situations on the ground. When Sida's funding is channelled through UN agencies to implementing organisations, though, it can lose some its flexibility.

Sida's multi-annual funding helps its partners to take a longer-term approach but framework agreements with Swedish or international NGOs do not necessarily translate into longer-term funding for local NGOs.

The ERF was set up to provide timely and flexible funding to sudden onset emergencies. In practice, its timeliness has been mixed but OCHA Kenya felt that this had improved since the finance unit in Geneva had hired dedicated staff. The ERF can also be flexible about adapting to changing situations though some of OCHA's administrative rules can be restrictive. ERFs are not designed to support longer-term approaches as they provide small amounts of funding for a maximum of 6 months. In Kenya, though, OCHA has used ERF funding to support pilot projects to address food insecurity in Nairobi's informal settlements and leverage longer-term funding. This has led to differences in views within the ERF Technical Review Board as some members believe that it should focus solely on emergency life-saving activities. The projects also had a limited impact because the NGOs were unable to secure longer-term funding.

An analysis of CERF Secretariat data<sup>7</sup> showed that it had processed applications very quickly once it had received the final proposal from UN agencies. However, an analysis of timelines for 10 randomly selected projects showed that the time taken to implement grants varied, as did the time taken to sign agreements with implementing NGOs. UN agencies in Kenya have found CERF funding flexible in allowing them to claim costs retroactively and allowing agencies to adapt to changing needs. Despite the attempts of some UN agencies to streamline their funding procedures, NGOs that implemented CERF grants identified several challenges with the funding they received. These are not linked to CERF funding specifically but apply to funding channelled through UN agencies more generally. The CERF is predicated on the notion of rapid, short-term, life-saving activities so it is not designed to support longer-term approaches. This is a challenge in Kenya because disaster mitigation and preparedness activities may well save more lives than reactive responses to crises in the long run but the CERF cannot fund them.

#### **Recommendations:**

- Multi-annual framework agreements are useful instruments for implementing GHD principles in chronic emergency situations. Sida should support more of these agreements and ensure that they translate into longer-term, more predictable funding for the local partners of Swedish and international NGOs that have multi-annual agreements.

<sup>6</sup> Sida's 'decision on contribution 2009–001016' Support to Humanitarian Emergency Response Plan – Kenya 2009.

<sup>7</sup> Development Initiatives (2010) *Independent Review of the Value Added of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) in Kenya*. Available from: [www.devinit.org](http://www.devinit.org)

- NGOs receiving funding channelled through UN agencies find that these are not as timely and flexible as the funding that the UN agencies receive. The funding also tends to be short-term and specific, which would make it difficult for NGOs to take a longer-term approach. Sweden should work with like-minded donors to ensure that UN funding procedures for NGOs are more effective and reflect better the conditions that the UN agencies themselves enjoy.
- Sweden should monitor the timeliness of the implementation of projects that it funds (including through pooled funds such as ERFs/HRFs and the CERF).
- Sweden should work with like-minded donors to enable the CERF to support longer-term approaches in chronic emergencies.

### **Responding to needs, yes, but how are these needs being prioritised?**

Sida produces assessment memos to justify its funding decisions and, in Kenya, these draw heavily on the EHRP documents. The EHRP states the criteria used to select and prioritise projects but it is not clear how Sida decided to allocate funding to Kenya or how it selected specific agencies and projects/activities from the EHRP.

The ERF does not carry out its own needs assessment but relies on applicant organisations. OCHA encourages applicant NGOs to work together on targeting beneficiaries when appropriate.

UN agency projects need to be in the EHRP to be eligible for CERF funding. Cluster lead agencies are responsible for consulting sector working group members to identify priority projects. However, NGO perceptions of inclusiveness varied across sector groups, with the Nutrition Technical Forum cited as an example of good practice. For under-funded emergency allocations, the Kenya Humanitarian Partnership Team (KHPT) provides guidance on priorities but sector leads play a dominant role in deciding priorities and selecting projects for funding. This means that a potential conflict of interest is inherent in the process since those applying for funds make the allocation decisions. As a result, the process tends to become a bargaining process with each sector lead trying to maximise the share for his/her own sector. The Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator has tried to include the Ministry of State for Special Programmes (MoSSP) in the allocation process by inviting comments on the priorities decided by the KHPT, which is an example of good practice.

### **Recommendations:**

- At global level, Sida needs to develop or adopt a severity of crisis model to guide the determination of geographical funding envelopes, to ensure that its funding for each emergency is truly in proportion to the severity of needs.
- Sida also needs to develop clear criteria for allocating funding within a crisis.
- The KHPT should find ways to reduce conflicts of interest in the CERF allocation processes, learning from approaches in countries such as Indonesia and Zimbabwe. At the very least, it should provide stronger and more specific direction to sector leads on priority sectors and activities.

### **Coordination needs to be strengthened, particularly between humanitarian and development aid**

In Kenya, humanitarian aid is coordinated by sector working groups co-chaired by a government line ministry and the global Cluster lead agency. In addition, the Kenya Humanitarian Forum brings together UN agencies, NGOs, donors and the government in fortnightly meetings. Development actors have their own coordination structure as part of the Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy, also with various sector working groups. However, some sectors, such as health and water, are vital in both forms of assistance and short and long-term support needs to be linked. Otherwise, the international community may fail to address problems (such as cholera outbreaks) holistically and humanitarian aid may inad-

vertently undermine development efforts. One challenge is that some donors treat humanitarian assistance as a single sector, which makes it more difficult to link to specific sectors on the development side.

Although donors have found the Kenya Humanitarian Forum useful, those consulted for this evaluation felt that it would be beneficial to have a Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) group. The absence of such a forum means that donors may be unaware of important funding decisions by their colleagues (e.g., Norway and Sweden were unaware that they were both funding the ERF until they found out through OCHA). The establishment of an Advisory Board should help with the ERF but donors felt the need for broader collaboration.

One of the challenges with CERF funding is that NGOs often did not know that the projects they were implementing were CERF-financed. Government representatives also pointed out that, after initial discussions about allocating CERF funds, they had no idea about how much had been approved for a given sector or how, when and where CERF funds had been used. This is partly because the capacity and engagement of the government line ministries that co-chair the sector groups is often weak.

### **Recommendations:**

- Like-minded donors should establish a GHD group (as there is in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)) to strengthen their collaboration or, at the very least, set up a mechanism to keep each other informed of their funding decisions.
- Sida's Kenya Country Team (development and humanitarian staff) should advocate for development actors and KJAS structures to take systematic account of humanitarian issues.
- Sida should participate actively in the ERF Advisory Board and encourage OCHA and the humanitarian coordinator (HC) to ensure that it meets regularly and discusses strategic issues related to the ERF.
- OCHA Kenya should ensure that information on CERF funding by sector and project is presented to the sector working groups. It should also find ways to disseminate the report from UN agencies about how they have utilised CERF funds to relevant government ministries.
- Donors (including Sida) and UN agencies could work to strengthen government capacity to coordinate humanitarian assistance, particularly through the sector groups.

### **Local humanitarian capacity in Kenya is located in NGOs and the Red Cross**

In Kenya, the government's capacity on humanitarian issues is much weaker than on development issues. Therefore, the vibrant NGO community and the Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS), which came into prominence during the PEV, are the strongest examples of local capacity. Swedish NGOs with framework agreements tend to work through local NGOs (particularly faith-based organisations). If these organisations are rooted in the community, they can have a greater impact than the physical assistance they provide (such as reducing tensions between groups in conflict). This is an example of Sida's funding supporting existing local capacity rather than strengthening it but is still good practice.

Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) projects in the Dadaab camps (camp management training and youth education) have strengthened the capacity of refugee communities directly. However, due to the lack of continued support and the Kenyan government's rules on the movement and economic activity of refugees, project participants have limited opportunities to make use of their capacities.

Sweden is one of the only donors to provide consistent support to the Regional Office of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Kenya. The predictability of this contribution has enabled the delegation to engage in medium-term capacity building activities with the Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS), which came into prominence during the post-election violence.

Although the ERF is able to finance local NGOs, to date it has not funded Kenyan NGOs with the exception of the KRCS. The ERF has set a limit of \$150,000 on applications to encourage proposals from small organisations<sup>8</sup> but Kenyan NGOs do not seem to be aware of it. This is a missed opportunity to support local capacity by providing direct funding (which most donors are unable to do). However, it may be that OCHA has not had adequate human resources to promote the ERF.

#### **Recommendations:**

- Sida should continue, and increase where possible, funding through multi-annual framework agreements as these enable international NGOs to work with local partners. However, it should ensure that the flexibility and predictability that the international NGOs enjoy is passed on to local partners.
- Sida should strengthen linkages between its humanitarian and development funding (learning from the DRC experience) to ensure longer-term support for the local community capacities strengthened by the NRC programmes.
- The ERF's failure to fund Kenyan NGOs is a missed opportunity and OCHA should make a more concerted effort to promote the Fund amongst Kenyan NGOs. It should also provide guidance on complying with the Fund's administrative requirements, if necessary. If it identifies specific capacity gaps that prevent Kenyan NGOs from accessing the ERF, it should encourage suitable international NGOs to address these.

#### **Need for investment in disaster preparedness and risk reduction and conflict prevention**

Sida focuses its humanitarian funding for disaster risk reduction (DRR) at the global and regional levels so it is not surprising that the team was unable to find examples of DRR programming within its portfolio in Kenya. There is an urgent need to address the causes of the weather-related emergencies in Kenya so this is a missed opportunity, particularly as 'Natural Resources and Environment' is a priority for Sida's development programme. However, Sida needs adequate staffing to focus on this issue.

Conflict prevention is also important in Kenya due to tensions around land and natural resources as well as the legacy of the post-election violence. Although Sida has not explicitly financed peace-building activities, focus group discussions made it clear that local communities really appreciate the peace-building elements of aid programmes. It could be argued that these efforts have had some impact as, contrary to expectations, Kenya's referendum on the constitution in August (which many feared would result in 2008 post-election levels of violence) was peaceful. Sida's Kenya Country Team Director argued that Sida should invest in reconciliation activities but the Team's budget is already stretched.

The ERF has funded a couple of preparedness projects (for flood preparedness and for the referendum in August 2010). This is a sensible use of the ERF funding given that, as of June 2010, the ERF had only spent just over \$1.2 million of the \$2.6 million that it has received<sup>9</sup>.

The CERF's mandate is to provide short-term, life-saving activities but IOM was able to use a grant for shelter construction to leverage additional funding for peace-building and livelihoods activities.

#### **Recommendations:**

- To ensure the effectiveness of its assistance to Kenya, Sida should ensure that it addresses climate change and disaster preparedness and risk reduction across the humanitarian and development parts of its programme, appointing a staff member with specific responsibility for these issues if necessary.
- Sida should also invest in conflict prevention/peace-building activities as these appear to have had a positive effect and have certainly been appreciated by local communities.

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<sup>8</sup> OCHA (2009) Draft Guidelines Kenya ERF. Available from:

<http://ochaonline.un.org/AppealsandFunding/EmergencyResponseFund/tabid/5507/language/en-US/Default.aspx>

<sup>9</sup> OCHA Kenya (2010) List of projects funded.



- Sweden should work with like-minded donors to ensure that the CERF can finance disaster mitigation, preparedness and prevention activities where these are appropriate. This would enhance its effectiveness and contribute to its life-saving objective.

### **Sida needs to reduce gap between humanitarian and development support**

Sida has encouraged partners to take account of the longer-term implications of their programmes, particularly when the humanitarian officer from Stockholm visited Sida-funded projects. However, it has not established links between its humanitarian and development funding in the natural resources and environment and urban development sectors though it provided bilateral humanitarian funding for Oxfam and Concern's cash transfer programme in 2009 and financed two 'pilot' projects in Nairobi's informal settlements through the ERF. This offers an opportunity to connect its humanitarian and development funding, particularly since the projects financed by the humanitarian side have not been able to secure much needed longer-term development support.

The ERF has tried to support a longer-term approach by funding projects to improve food security in Nairobi's informal settlements. Focus group discussions with project beneficiaries show that both projects made an important contribution because they receive very little other assistance. However, without continued support the project activities (and their effects) are not sustainable. The ERF's emergency remit means that it is not able to provide repeat funding to a project and its 6-month timeframe is too short-term to have a long-term impact on recurrent natural disasters or the chronic problems in the informal settlements.

Due its mandate, the CERF does not fund recovery programmes.

### **Recommendations:**

- Sida should explore options to create linkages between its humanitarian and development funding to Kenya, particularly in country strategy priority sectors of natural resources and urban development. This would help to ensure that activities started with humanitarian funding receive the longer-term support that they require and that short-term activities do not undermine longer-term solutions.
- Sida could make a greater effort to support the recovery elements of projects that it is supporting with bilateral funding.
- When allocating CERF funds, the KHPT and CERF Secretariat should be careful to ensure that they do not support activities that undermine alternative, longer-term solutions.

### **Little support for humanitarian system strengthening**

Sida commits itself to supporting research and methods development under this goal. However, the evaluation found that Sida has not financed any research in Kenya or promoted the dissemination of global-level research that would be relevant for field-level actors. This is despite the fact that case study findings show that sharing research on cash transfer programmes in emergency contexts and a range of other issues would benefit the government and Sida's partners.

The evaluation team did not come across Sida initiatives to strengthen the humanitarian system in Kenya through its bilateral funding. However, at global level, it has encouraged Swedish NGOs to strengthen their humanitarian response capacity and adhere to the principles of the Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP). One framework agreement NGO's local partner in Kenya participated in a HAP workshop in Stockholm. This is a positive step because, in Kenya, the vibrant local NGO community and the Kenya Red Cross Society have shown greater capacity for humanitarian response than the government, particularly during post-election violence in 2008.

**Recommendations:**

- Sida should help to make research on cash transfers available to the government to support it to make informed decisions and begin implementing a cash transfer programme in Nairobi's informal settlements.
- Sida should reflect on how to disseminate global level research better and ensure it is useful and relevant for field operations. It should work closely with its framework agreement partners as well as the research and methods organisations that it finances at a global level to ensure that research builds on real field issues and that the results and recommendations are properly disseminated at field level (e.g., through workshops, short briefings or good practice papers etc).

**Strengthening International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and humanitarian principles**

Sweden's consistent support for the ICRC Regional Office has enabled it to promote IHL through Kenyan universities. Apart from this, Sida has not financed activities to promote IHL and strengthen humanitarian principles. This may be because they are not as integral to humanitarian response in Kenya as they are in countries experiencing open and violent conflict. Sida's other funding channels had also not financed the promotion of IHL and humanitarian principles, probably because such activities are beyond the remit of funds like the ERF and CERF.

**Sida needs to clarify and strengthen headquarters-field relations**

Responsibility for Sida's humanitarian assistance to Kenya rests largely with a desk officer in the humanitarian team in Stockholm and the staff member in the Nairobi Embassy combines responsibility for humanitarian issues with responsibility for several other issues. Field-based staff are asked to provide input into Sida's humanitarian funding decisions but not required to do so since humanitarian issues are an add-on to their normal responsibilities. It is also difficult for field staff members to follow up on humanitarian projects because they do not receive project documents once the humanitarian team has made its funding decisions. As a result, Sida staff members in Nairobi had not engaged with the ERF and were unaware of changes to its management. The challenges are exacerbated when the Stockholm-based humanitarian officer is not available for any reason, as was the case when the evaluation team undertook the Kenya case study.

In Kenya, the Stockholm and field-based staff members working on humanitarian issues have tried to clarify their respective responsibilities but there are still unclear areas. This makes it challenging for field staff to allocate adequate time for humanitarian issues, particularly when they are already burdened with other tasks and responsibilities.

**Recommendations:**

- To ensure that all Sida staff members have access to humanitarian project documents, Sida should make all project-related documents available online. This can be very simple to set up (using existing software packages, including SharePoint) and will make it much easier for field-based staff members to follow up on humanitarian projects.
- Sida should clarify the roles and responsibilities of field-based staff with humanitarian responsibilities vis-à-vis humanitarian staff members in Stockholm, making more effective use of field-based staff. The humanitarian team should ensure that the country team allocates adequate time for humanitarian issues in its annual operational plan and has the staff members to work the stipulated number of man hours.
- Sida's humanitarian officer in Nairobi should play an active role in the ERF Advisory Board and keep staff in Stockholm informed of key discussions.

### **Urgent need to link humanitarian and development efforts**

The fact that it is the *Emergency* Humanitarian Response Plan that provides an analysis of the poverty and vulnerability that has reached crisis proportions underlines the need to establish links between humanitarian and development assistance in Kenya. However, the report identifies the following barriers to effective links:

- Coordination mechanisms for development and humanitarian assistance that operate in isolation from each other (with the KJAS structures on one hand and the sector working groups and the Kenya Humanitarian Forum on the other).
- A lack of linkages within the Government of Kenya, with the MoSSP unaware of how the KJAS structures operate.
- The Government's lack of capacity on humanitarian issues which means that line ministry participation in sector working groups is generally weak and the MoSSP has little information on humanitarian funding to the country and limited engagement in DRR and related issues.
- Separate humanitarian and development functions within donor agencies. This has meant that they have failed to address climate change and other environmental challenges in a holistic way and also missed opportunities to ensure that humanitarian activities do not undermine longer-term solutions to chronic problems.
- Humanitarian funding mechanisms, such as the CERF and ERF, that have restrictions on the use of funds (both in the timeframe for activities and in the types of activities that they finance). Though the ERF has tried to address longer-term urban vulnerability, its inability to fund projects for more than 6 months or provide repeat funding has limited its impact.

Unless donors and the Government of Kenya overcome these barriers and the artificial divide between humanitarian and development assistance, the country will fail to address the chronic vulnerability of its citizens and continue to require significant amounts of humanitarian aid. Social protection programmes present one opportunity for a joint humanitarian-development effort to address vulnerability.

### **Recommendations:**

- Sida could work with like-minded donors to strengthen the government's capacity to manage humanitarian response and the MoSSP's capacity to undertake DRR.
- Donors and the Government of Kenya need to establish effective links between existing humanitarian and development coordination mechanisms or establish a single coordination structure with sector groups that address both sets of issues.
- Donors need to establish better links between their humanitarian and development funding and also ensure that staff members who work on these issues collaborate more closely at Nairobi level.
- Donors and the Government of Kenya should make a more concerted effort to address urban poverty through development assistance and social safety nets (if deemed appropriate) instead of relying on short-term humanitarian aid to address problems when they reach crisis proportions.
- Sida's humanitarian staff should engage with social protection debates in Kenya and encourage humanitarian partners to do so as well.

### **'Elements of effective humanitarian assistance' are similar to Sida's existing sub-goals**

The evaluators asked Team Sweden in Stockholm, NGOs in Kenya and beneficiary communities in the Mount Elgon region to describe the '*elements of effective humanitarian assistance*'. A combination of the responses has resulted in the following ten key elements, which can be used to guide Sida's humanitarian strategy:



1. Using multiple entry points for holistic programming, i.e., complementing Sida's funding to partners with advocacy (e.g., with national partners), joint research and policy work.
2. Ensuring that response is appropriate, given the severity of the crisis and the context
3. Working with effective partners that have a good track record
4. Providing operational flexibility that allows for independence, longer-term vision (including exit strategies) and programmes as opposed to projects. This is particularly important in transitional contexts and in rapidly changing emergency contexts.
5. Supporting sustainable programming, including longer-term approaches that take account of recovery and reinforcing local capacities (local communities or NGOs and/or local structures, depending on the goal of the programme). Promoting local coping capacities and not undermining them.
6. Efficient coordination mechanisms, including donor coordination mechanisms
7. Supporting and advocating for prevention: peace-building and disaster preparedness and risk reduction.
8. Strong beneficiary involvement, including consultation, feedback, information flows and keeping promises
9. A constructive working relationship with local authorities
10. Supporting improvements in quality of response by promoting international standards and lesson-learning.

## Section 1: Introduction

This case study of Sweden's humanitarian support to Kenya is a part of the evaluation of Sida's humanitarian assistance, which will contribute to the revision of Sida's Humanitarian Strategy. Two Development Initiatives staff members and an independent consultant conducted the case study, visiting Kenya from 28<sup>th</sup> June to 9th July 2010. In addition to interviews and project visits in Nairobi, two team members made field visits to Eldoret and the Mount Elgon region as well as to Dadaab. The team has supplemented field visits with a review of various documents, including project documents. In order to provide feedback to the refugee communities in Dadaab, one team member recorded an interview with Star FM in Nairobi, a local radio station that broadcasts in Dadaab as well as Nairobi. The radio station translated the interview into Somali to broadcast it in its news bulletin. Annex B provides a description of the methodology for the case study, a list of those interviewed and a list of the projects that the team visited.

### 1.1 Overview of humanitarian situation in Kenya

The 2010 Emergency Humanitarian Response Plan (EHRP) for Kenya outlines the reasons why the country requires humanitarian assistance<sup>10</sup>. These include:

- The *increasing incidence of drought* (until October 2009, Kenya experienced four consecutive failed rains). This led to a rise in acute malnutrition in most districts in Kenya.
- Cyclical episodes of *localised flooding*
- *Food insecurity in urban informal settlements*. The 2009 Long Rains Assessment concluded that 2.5 million people in urban areas could not meet 50 % of their daily food requirements.
- *Internal displacement*. While most of those affected by post-election violence (PEV) in December 2007 had returned or resettled by October 2009, 35,000 remained in transit, 25,000 had moved to land purchased by Internally Displaced Person (IDP) self-help groups and an unknown number remain displaced in urban areas.
- Ongoing conflict and insecurity. There have been frequent outbreaks of *resource-based conflict in Arid and Semi-Arid Land (ASAL) areas*. Also, the slow pace of progress towards national reconciliation and peace-building following PEV continue to contribute to *tensions and the risk of a resurgence of violence*.
- *Refugees from the violence and humanitarian crisis in Somalia*. The number of Somali refugees had increased to 481,738 as of October 2009 and arrivals continue, despite the closure of the Kenya-Somalia border.

The EHRP underlines the fact that what connects these different emergencies is a situation of chronic vulnerability, particularly in ASAL areas and among the poor in cities, which is making it more difficult for the poor to withstand acute shocks.


### 1.2 Sweden's humanitarian funding to Kenya

Sida's Kenya Country Team is based in Nairobi. This includes a staff member with responsibility for humanitarian issues (though this staff member also has other major responsibilities). The international staff member who had covered humanitarian aid (together with the water sector) left shortly before the case study. She was replaced by a national staff member who is responsible for the agriculture and rural development sector, in which Sweden is a lead donor. He has some experience of covering humanitar-

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<sup>10</sup> Available from: <http://ochaonline.un.org/humanitarianappeal/webpage.asp?Page=1822>


ian issues from 2005–2008. The main responsibility for Sida’s humanitarian funding to Kenya rests with a staff member based in the HUM team in Stockholm<sup>11</sup>.



**Figure 1:** Sweden’s humanitarian funding to Kenya [Source: OCHA FTS]

Sida has provided its funding to Kenya either bilaterally or through the Emergency Response Fund (ERF), established in June 2009. In 2009, Sida gave a total of SEK 89.8 million in humanitarian aid to Kenya. Of this, it gave SEK 24.8 million to Swedish and international NGOs through framework agreements. Of the rest, it allocated SEK 13 million to the ERF. It also made three funding decisions against the EHRP. These were for the following amounts and agencies:

Decision Date	Agency and Sector	Amount
1 July 2009	OCHA – coordination	SEK 2 million
	UNICEF – nutrition and child protection	SEK 4 million
	Oxfam GB – food security and strengthening coping mechanisms in urban settlements	SEK 4 million
13 October 2009	UNICEF – water and sanitation	SEK 10 million
	WFP – food distribution/food security	SEK 5 million
4 December 2009	OCHA – coordination	SEK 2 million
	WFP – food distribution/food security	SEK 25 million
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>SEK 52 million</b>



**Figure 2:** CERF funding to Kenya: 2006–2010 [Source: CERF]

<sup>11</sup> Unfortunately, this staff member was on long-term sick leave when the evaluation team conducted interviews in Stockholm and travelled to Kenya for the case study. This meant that the team did not have a list of Sida’s funding to Kenya in 2010 and the analysis in the report is based mainly on 2009 funding information.

In addition, Kenya is a significant recipient of CERF funds – the fourth largest recipient from 2006–2010. Sweden is a significant donor to the CERF – the third largest, after the UK and the Netherlands, in terms of total contributions from 2006–2010. It is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs rather than Sida that finances the CERF but this case study has included CERF funding because Sida has asked DI to examine the complementarity of Sida and MFA funding and the CERF is clearly an important part of the latter. Figure 1 shows Sweden’s funding to Kenya overall while figure 2 shows CERF funding to Kenya from the start of CERF operations in 2006 to 2010.

### 1.3 Assessment of Sweden’s funding by channel

All the case studies for the evaluation of Sida’s humanitarian assistance have focused on evaluating whether Sida’s funding contributes to meeting the 8 sub-goals of Sida’s humanitarian strategy:

1. Promoting the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship
2. Promoting needs-based humanitarian assistance
3. Strengthening humanitarian coordination
4. Strengthening local capacity
5. Supporting the link between humanitarian contributions and prevention
6. Reducing the gap between humanitarian support and recovery contributions
7. Strengthening the humanitarian system
8. Strengthening the humanitarian principles

This case study covers the three main channels through which Sweden provides humanitarian assistance to Kenya mentioned earlier – bilateral funding, the ERF and the CERF. This case study is not an assessment of the channels per se but rather it seeks to examine the extent to which they help Sida achieve its goals. The findings on the CERF are drawn mainly from a Development Initiatives review of CERF funding to Kenya in March 2010 to avoid duplicating the research.

These three funding channels operate in very different ways so section 2 presents the evaluation findings on each sub-goal separated by funding channel. Section 3 discusses the issues that arose during the case study but which are not covered by Sida’s sub-goals. These are: the relationship between Sida headquarters and field staff and the need to link humanitarian and development funding.

As part of the case study, and to support the development of Sida’s revised humanitarian strategy, the evaluation team undertook a participatory exercise with NGOs and beneficiary communities in the Mount Elgon region, asking “*what are the elements of effective humanitarian assistance?*” Section 4 analyses the responses received against the responses from Stockholm (from the exercise undertaken during Sida’s Humanitarian Days in May 2010). This highlights field priorities that Sida could use to guide the development of its revised humanitarian strategy.

## Section 2: Evaluation of Sida's strategic goals

This section provides an assessment of Sida's portfolio in Kenya, divided by strategic sub-goal. Since the funding channels operate in very different ways, the assessment of each sub-goal is further grouped under the headings of bilateral funding, Emergency Response Fund and CERF. Annex A provides an overview of the ERF as well as a list of grants made in 2010. The Independent Review of the Value-Added of the CERF in Kenya is available at [www.devinit.org](http://www.devinit.org).

### 2.1 Promoting the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship

The 8 sub-goals in Sida's humanitarian strategy are all drawn from the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). Therefore, the first sub-goal, on promoting the GHD principles, focuses on three aspects in particular:

- Timeliness, flexibility and predictability of funding
- Supporting quick response to rapid onset disasters by providing unallocated funds to suitable organisations
- Encouraging and supporting a long-term perspective in partners' programming.

#### Bilateral funding

When Sida provides funding through framework agreements, its bilateral funding is timely compared to that of other donors. Its project funding also used to be timely so, for example, one international non-governmental organisation (INGO) pointed out that it had a project to respond to PEV approved in 24 hours while a proposal to respond to the food crisis in 2008–09 was funded within one month. The UN agencies consulted for this evaluation also found Sida to be a timely donor, for example, when World Food Programme (WFP) Kenya received \$4.3 million directly in 2009.

However, during a focus group discussion with six Sida-funded NGOs, participants reported delays with Sida's project funding since 2009. One INGO submitted a proposal in January 2010 for a project that would run in Dagahaley refugee camp from January–December 2010. Although Sida approved the proposal, as of June 2010, the NGO had not received a signed contract or funding. It was able to use private funding to implement the project but only by diverting it from other activities. In another case, an NGO received a draft contract but the Sida humanitarian officer then went on holiday so the contract signing was delayed and project beneficiaries were left waiting for the start of implementation. Also, in 2009, apart from an allocation of SEK 5 million to the ERF in January, Sida did not provide any funding for UN agencies in the Emergency Humanitarian Response Plan (EHRP) till July. It then funded the EHRP following the Mid-Year Review in October and then made a final allocation to the EHRP in December.

NGOs and UN agencies were united in agreement that Sida's bilateral funding is very flexible when compared to other donors. A local NGO partner of a Swedish NGO explained how Sida allowed the organisation to change the location of its PEV response to ensure that filled gaps and did not overlap with the many other NGOs responding. An international NGO noted that Sida has allowed it to move funding to the under-funded elements of its work, rather than stick to the original proposal. Overall, NGOs felt that, if they provide adequate justification for changes, Sida understands the need to respond to changing situations on the ground. Sida's funding to UNICEF has been almost totally un-earmarked (in 2009, Sida requested UNICEF to earmark the funds). Without this flexibility, the agency would not have been able to fund child protection activities in the Dadaab refugee camps, which are necessary but ignored by other donors.

When bilateral funding is channelled through UN agencies to implementing partners, though, the funding can lose its flexibility. Some of UNICEF's implementing partners pointed to restrictions that made their operations more difficult. In one case, UNICEF had not paid indirect support costs, only field level administrative costs<sup>12</sup>. This had proved a challenge in Dadaab, which is a difficult operating environment in which donors are reluctant to finance security and administrative costs. In another case, UNICEF required the partner to pre-finance implementation and then seek re-imbursement, which proved problematic<sup>13</sup>.

Sida can support its partners to take a longer-term approach. Sida's 2010 funding to UNICEF is for 18 months, which means that UNICEF can integrate longer-term recovery into its response to recurrent droughts and floods. However, WFP noted that, while Sida is willing to finance emergency recovery activities, it has not provided direct funding for recovery. Also, the local NGO partner of a Swedish NGO pointed out that Sida's multi-annual framework agreements with Swedish or international NGOs do not necessarily translate into longer-term funding for local NGOs.

### Emergency Response Fund (ERF)

The ERF was set up to provide timely and flexible funding to sudden onset emergencies. Annex A lists the projects that the ERF had funded as of June 2010. This shows that the ERF has responded to some small-scale disasters, such as fires in Faza in September 2009 or floods in Narok district in May 2010. This ability to respond to small-medium scale disasters ignored by other donors is an important function of ERFs and OCHA is able to provide funding fairly quickly (a couple of NGOs gave examples of receiving funds promptly). However, OCHA's Administration and Finance Unit in Geneva is not always able to fulfil its pledge to disburse funds in 10 working days. In some cases, disbursements have taken a month due to a lack of staff in the unit and competing demands from other crises, such as Haiti. However, OCHA Kenya noted an improvement in the timeliness of disbursements once the unit had recruited staff specifically for ERFs.



Nairobi's informal settlements

The ERF can be flexible and one recipient organisation appreciated OCHA willingness to extend the deadline for the submission of proposals because the NGO had missed the call for proposals. Also, the ERF allowed the NGO to change project activities in order to respond to an unexpected measles outbreak. However, OCHA has administrative rules that reduce the ERF's flexibility. For example, recipients are under pressure to complete programmes by the end of the calendar year even if this gives them a very short implementation period. This is because, if the project crosses over into the next calendar year, OCHA has to issue separate contracts for the two parts of the project.

<sup>12</sup> This should not happen in future since, as of 1<sup>st</sup> January 2010, UNICEF has new guidelines for its Programme Cooperation Agreements (PCAs). These state that UNICEF will allow indirect programme costs of 7 % as well as direct programme costs up to a maximum of 25 % (with exceptions to this cap in extraordinary circumstances where costs (e.g., logistics, security) are extremely high).

<sup>13</sup> According to UNICEF, decisions on funds disbursement are based on a risk analysis informed by a micro-assessment (undertaken by Price Waterhouse Coopers) in line with the UN Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfer (HACT) and analysis of the risk environment and past performance of NGO partners. Pre-financing is also recommended as a way to expedite implementation so that activities are not held back awaiting transfer of funds.



To date, the ERF has only funded NGOs and turned down proposals from UN agencies. Some ERFs have a policy of not funding UN agencies but one member of the Technical Review Board argued that, in order to maintain flexibility, the Kenya ERF should keep the option of funding both types of organisations open.

ERFs are not designed to support longer-term approaches because they provide small amounts of funding (up to \$200,000 in the case of the Kenya ERF) for a maximum of 6 months. In Kenya, though, OCHA has used ERF funding to support pilot projects in informal settlements in Nairobi to leverage longer-term funding. However, the NGOs implementing these projects have not been able to secure this longer-term funding. This has also led to differences in views with the ERF Technical Review Board, with some members believing that the ERF should focus solely on emergency life-saving activities. OCHA Kenya would have preferred to set up a *Humanitarian* Response Fund (HRF) because this would have a broader remit than an *Emergency* Response Fund and be able to bridge the relief-development divide. However, it was over-ruled by OCHA New York.

### **CERF**

An analysis of CERF Secretariat data on processing times shows that the CERF Secretariat has processed applications very quickly once it has received the final proposal from UN agencies. In 2009, the Secretariat approved Rapid Response grant applications in 2–4 days and Under-Funded Emergency window grants in 13–16 working days. Once UN agencies had signed the Letter of Understanding (LOU), the Secretariat disbursed the grants in 4–6 working days.

UN agencies can begin implementation as soon as the LOU is signed and were quick to transfer funds from headquarters to country offices. However, an analysis of timelines for 10 randomly selected projects showed that the time taken to implement grants varied, as did the time taken to sign agreements with implementing NGOs. UN agencies have usually found it difficult to complete implementation of Rapid Response grants within 3 months (the timeframe originally set) so the CERF Secretariat has an informal understanding with the agencies that they can commit funds within 3 months and take another 3 months to complete implementation.

UN agencies in Kenya have found that CERF funding adds value to their operations in several ways, including through flexibility. This has meant allowing UN agencies to claim costs retroactively when they have advanced funds to begin programme activities and allowing agencies to adapt to changing needs. When the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) received its CERF grant in 2009 (LOU signed 2 October), the failure of several successive rains was due to end with the start of the short rains. Therefore, instead of the planned destocking activities, FAO's partners wanted to help communities to re-stock. The CERF Secretariat was flexible and accepted this change of activities.

However, NGOs that implemented CERF grants listed several challenges with funding channelled through UN agencies. Despite attempts by some UN agencies to streamline funding procedures, problems with limited flexibility, limits on indirect support costs, limits on the amount that some UN agencies can grant and very burdensome reporting requirements remain. These are not linked to CERF funding specifically but apply to funding channelled through UN agencies more generally.

## RECOMMENDATIONS: PROMOTING THE PRINCIPLES OF GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP

- Multi-annual framework agreements are useful instruments for implementing GHD principles in chronic emergency situations. Sida should support more of these agreements and ensure that they translate into longer-term, more predictable funding for the local partners of Swedish and international NGOs that have multi-annual agreements.
- NGOs receiving funding channelled through UN agencies find that these are not as timely and flexible as the funding that the UN agencies receive. The funding also tends to be short-term and specific, which would make it difficult for NGOs to take a longer-term approach. Sweden should work with like-minded donors to ensure that UN funding procedures for NGOs are more effective and reflect better the conditions that the UN agencies themselves enjoy.
- Sweden should monitor the timeliness of the implementation of projects that it funds (including through pooled funds such as ERFs/HRFs and the CERF).
- Sweden should work with like-minded donors to enable the CERF to support longer-term approaches in chronic emergencies.

The CERF is predicated on the notion of rapid, short-term activities so it is not designed to support longer-term approaches. Its inability to finance disaster mitigation and preparedness activities is a challenge in Kenya where this may well save more lives than reactive responses to crises in the long run. The CERF's short-term funding also runs the risk of undermining longer-term solutions.

## 2.2 Promoting needs based humanitarian assistance

### Bilateral funding

As indicated in section 1.2, Sida's funding of SEK 52 million to UN agencies and Oxfam GB in 2009 is based on the EHRP<sup>14</sup>. The assessment memos justifying the decisions draw heavily on the EHRP documents (the revised EHRP of March 2009 as well as the Mid-Year Review of July). The EHRP states the criteria used to select and prioritise projects. These include the fact that appealing agencies must be part of existing coordination structures, the project (or the part included) must be feasible in the EHRP's 12 month timeframe and the project must be cost-effective in terms of the number of beneficiaries and the needs to which the project intends to respond. However, it is not clear from Sida's funding decision documents how it decided to allocate funding to Kenya or how it selected specific agencies and projects/activities from the EHRP.

Sida's NGO partners have different approaches to needs assessments. One, for example, is a rights-based organisation so it does not conduct 'needs' assessments but fills the gaps left by the government or other NGOs. The local NGO partner of a Swedish NGO focuses on the number of affected in a given area and then work with them to prioritise the most affected. Another local NGO has established district steering committees in communities to identify gaps in response and target the most vulnerable. For its cash-transfer project in Nairobi informal settlements, funded through the EHRP, Oxfam and Concern established criteria to identify beneficiaries in discussion with community leaders and health care visitors who have regular contact with potential beneficiaries. These included vulnerability criteria.

### Emergency Response Fund (ERF)

Sida's funding to the ERF is completely un-earmarked so OCHA is free to respond to the greatest needs, whatever the type of emergency and wherever it occurs. The ERF does not carry out its own needs assessment as it relies on the assessments of applicant organisations. Like bilaterally funded organisations, the NGOs have different ways of undertaking needs assessment but OCHA encourages them to work together on targeting beneficiaries when appropriate. For example, when the ERF funded

<sup>14</sup> Although Sida lists Oxfam GB as the recipient organisation, this project was implemented jointly by Oxfam and Concern Worldwide.



two NGOs to work in informal settlements in Nairobi, it asked them to coordinate their activities. As a result, they worked with the same health centres to identify beneficiaries.

## CERF

UN agencies need to have their projects in the EHRP to access CERF funding. The Cluster lead agencies are responsible for consulting sector working group members to identify priority projects. However, NGO perceptions of inclusiveness depended on the sector groups in which they participated. They cited the Nutrition Technical Forum as an example of good practice because the lead agency allocated funding on a fair, systematic basis, according to priority areas of need. In at least two other sectors, the NGOs did not know how funding was decided and it seemed to be the sole decision of the UN co-chair.

### RECOMMENDATIONS: PROMOTING NEEDS BASED HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

- At global level, Sida needs to develop or adopt a severity of crisis model to guide the determination of geographical funding envelopes, to ensure that its funding for each emergency is truly in proportion to the severity of needs.
- Sida also needs to develop clear criteria for allocating funding within a crisis.
- The KHPT should find ways to reduce conflicts of interest in the CERF allocation processes, learning from approaches in countries such as Indonesia and Zimbabwe. At the very least, it should provide stronger and more specific direction to sector leads on priority sectors and activities.

The Kenya Humanitarian Partnership Team (KHPT) provides guidance on priorities<sup>15</sup> but sector leads play a dominant role in deciding priorities and selecting projects for funding<sup>16</sup>. This means that a potential conflict of interest is inherent in the process because those applying for funds decide priorities and select projects for funding. Despite OCHA's facilitation role, the KHPT's guidance on priorities and the inclusion of government and NGO partners in sector working group discussions, when sector leads come together to finalise the allocation of CERF funds, the process tends to become a negotiation with each sector lead trying to maximise the share for his/her own sector. Sector leads felt that even if there is a genuine desire to focus on priorities at the beginning of the process, by the end, participants are reduced to bargaining.

The Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator has tried to include the Ministry of State for Special Programmes (MoSSP) in the allocation process by sharing the priorities decided by the KHPT and inviting comments and input. Since the government is trying to place an active role in humanitarian response, this is an example of good practice.

## 2.3 Strengthening humanitarian coordination

In Kenya, humanitarian aid is coordinated by sector working groups co-chaired by a government line ministry and the global Cluster lead agency. These are a merger of the Clusters established after the PEV and the pre-existing sector working groups. In addition, OCHA convenes the Kenya Humanitarian Forum, which brings together UN agencies, NGOs, donors and the government in fortnightly meetings. The meetings include updates on each of the humanitarian sectors as well as presentations on individual projects (usually by NGOs). On the development side, sectors under the Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS) link the work of government, development agencies and the private companies. At present, these two sets of coordination mechanisms seem to function entirely separately with even the MoSSP unaware of the KJAS structures. So, according to a donor interviewee, during the revision

<sup>15</sup> The KHPT is the country-level Inter-Agency Standing Committee with UN agency and NGO representatives and ICRC as an observer.

<sup>16</sup> This section is based on the Development Initiatives (2010) review which focused on the KHPT's role in an allocation from the CERF's under-funded emergencies window. In the case of an application to the CERF's rapid response window, a UN agency may submit a proposal to the KHPT and share detailed information on the crisis so that the KHPT can make an informed decision.

of the KJAS in 2009, a discussion of humanitarian assistance to Kenya was added at the last minute, as an afterthought.

OCHA has argued that some sectors, such as health and water, are vital in both forms of assistance so short and long-term support must be linked. However, some donors treat humanitarian assistance as a single sector, which makes it more difficult to link to specific sectors (such as health) on the development side. This has meant, for example, that donors have not taken an integrated approach to tackling cholera outbreaks. Another interviewee argued that a failure to coordinate the two types of assistance can mean that humanitarian aid undermines development efforts. In the water sector, for example, the Water Services Trust Fund was developing community projects but had its efforts at building ownership undermined by a UN agency providing water for free.

The problem is exacerbated by the fact that donors have an aid effectiveness group with sectoral working groups but staff members working on humanitarian issues do not attend its meetings. Although donors have found the Kenya Humanitarian Forum useful, those consulted for this evaluation felt that it would be beneficial to have a coordination mechanism specifically for humanitarian donors, such as a Good Humanitarian Donorship group. The challenge may be that not all GHD members have a full-time person for humanitarian issues - Norway, Sweden and Germany do not. However, the absence of a donor forum for humanitarian issues means that donors may be unaware of important funding decisions by their colleagues. For example, although the Norwegian and Swedish Embassies are in the same building in Nairobi, neither knew that the other was funding the ERF until they found out through OCHA. It also means that the two donors to the ERF have missed out on opportunities to collaborate to provide strategic direction to the fund (given the difference of opinion with the Technical Review Board on the type of activities that the ERF should support). The establishment of an Advisory Board (see below) should help with the ERF but donors felt the need for broader collaboration. One donor argued that, otherwise, Kenya is “like Disneyland”, with lots of actors playing and donors unaware of what the others are doing<sup>17</sup>.

### **Bilateral funding**

Sida has supported humanitarian coordination in Kenya by funding OCHA (section 1.2 shows two grants of SEK 2 million each in 2009).

As part of donor coordination, the Embassy staff member responsible for humanitarian issues participates in the Kenya Humanitarian Forum, depending on the agenda. S/he only attends if the agenda includes issues that require a donor response. Otherwise, s/he relies on reading the minutes/proceedings of the meeting for information. Sida has also argued for humanitarian issues to be discussed within the Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy structures and for there to be greater links between humanitarian and development coordination mechanisms. However, the person responsible for humanitarian issues in the Nairobi Embassy has very little time to pursue humanitarian issues so Sida has limited capacity to push for implementation of its suggestions.

### **Emergency Response Fund (ERF)**

The ERF has a Technical Review Board to vet proposals submitted to the ERF. According to the ERF guidelines, the Fund “will facilitate the coordination of response activities through enhanced consultation at different levels and involvement of technical staff and coordination bodies in Kenya to avoid duplication and overlap. It will also serve to strengthen and reinforce equal partnership between UN and non-UN partners through equitable access modalities, representation on Review Boards, and transparent decision-making mechanisms.” The Board only has two members at present but OCHA is seeking to enlarge it to ensure better representation and coordination.

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<sup>17</sup> In interview on 29 June 2010.

OCHA has proposed an Advisory Board for the ERF that would meet every 6 months. The KHPT discussed the Boards' potential composition at its meeting on 6<sup>th</sup> May. OCHA suggested the MoSSP, the Ministry for the Development of Northern Kenya and the Ministry of Local Government as well as Norway, Sweden, the Department for International Development (DFID) and the European Commission Humanitarian Aid department (ECHO) to represent donors. The HC warned against having too large a group and also proposed OCHA, WFP, UNICEF, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and two INGOs. Although the Board was due to have its first meeting on 8 June 2010, this was not possible and OCHA was hoping to convene a meeting in early July. This has also not been possible due to the pressures of preparing for the referendum on the constitution in August. The establishment of the Advisory Board will help donors to engage with the ERF. It should also help Norway and Sweden to coordinate their support to the fund.

## CERF

The process of allocating CERF funding supports coordination because sector groups come together to discuss priorities. OCHA has made efforts to ensure that the sector groups meet by requiring that sector leads provide minutes of meetings at which CERF funding was discussed and by sending OCHA staff to the meetings. This meant that some sector groups met for the first time in many months. A World Health Organisation (WHO) interviewee argued that its ability to mobilise CERF funding gives it visibility and authority in the health sector group, which "lubricates" sector coordination and enables WHO to leverage partnerships.

One of the challenges that the CERF review identified was that NGOs implementing projects with CERF funding often did not know this. Government representatives also pointed out that, after initial discussions about allocating CERF funds, they had no idea about how much had been approved for a given sector or how, when and where CERF funds had been used. This is partly due to the weak capacity and engagement of the government line ministries that co-chair the sector groups, which is beyond the CERF's control though it is a critical determinant of the success of sector coordination.

### RECOMMENDATIONS: STRENGTHENING HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION

- Like-minded donors should establish a GHD group (as there is in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)) to strengthen their collaboration or, at the very least, set up a mechanism to keep each other informed of their funding decisions.
- Sida's Kenya Country Team (development and humanitarian staff) should advocate for development actors and KJAS structures to take systematic account of humanitarian issues.
- Sida should participate actively in the ERF Advisory Board and encourage OCHA and the HC to ensure that it meets regularly and discusses strategic issues related to the ERF.
- OCHA Kenya should ensure that sector working groups receive information on CERF funding by sector and project. It should also find ways to disseminate the report from UN agencies about how they have utilised CERF funds to relevant government ministries.

## 2.4 Strengthening local capacity

Strengthening local capacity in humanitarian contexts can take three broad forms:

1. Strengthening the coping capacities of at-risk communities and/or
2. Organisational and technical development of local organisations (faith based, women's groups, NGOs, etc) to provide humanitarian assistance (beyond sub-contracting) and/or
3. Strengthening/rebuilding state institutions/systems (e.g. health system strengthening) to provide the basic services that may be provided by humanitarian organisations in the absence of state capacity.

In Kenya, the government has capacity on development issues and leads the coordination of development assistance as well as strategy development. However, as sections 2.3, 2.5 and 3.2 highlight, its capacity for coordinating and managing humanitarian response is much weaker. Therefore, the vibrant NGO community (including faith-based organisations) and the Kenya Red Cross Society, which came into prominence during the PEV, are the strongest examples of local capacity. The KRCS has a close working relationship with the government but its strong leader has been striving to make the organisation financially independent. These efforts have focused on establishing private sector activities (such as a hotel) that can contribute profits to the KRCS.

### Bilateral funding

Although Sida does not have explicit requirements that its partners should strengthen local capacity, Swedish NGOs with framework agreements tend to work through local partners (particularly faith-based organisations). If these partners are rooted in the community, they can have a greater impact than the physical assistance they provide. The FPFK project in the Mount Elgon region is an example. In 2008, with Sida funding, the NGO distributed food and non-food items to conflict-affected communities in Kopsiro. It brought the committees that had been set up to distribute assistance to the Dorobo and Soi communities together for dialogue. This contributed significantly to reducing tensions between the two groups and was much appreciated by them. This is an example of Sida's funding supporting existing local capacity rather than strengthening it but is still good practice.



NRC youth education project in Dadaab

NRC's camp management training project in Dadaab is an example of strengthening the capacity of affected communities directly<sup>18</sup>. The NGO has developed a toolkit which it used to train refugees in the camp. Modules included an introduction to camp management, the roles and responsibilities of different actors, community participation, protection and technical standards (the concept of globally defined minimum standards rather than the detailed standards themselves). NRC has also developed a coaching methodology (based on techniques from Participatory Rural Appraisal) to help communities to apply the training and use problem solving techniques. The NGO has

established 5 coaching groups in each of the Dadaab camps – food distribution, camp planning, sexual and gender-based violence, coordination and roles and responsibilities. The refugees themselves identified which groups they wanted to establish and having been undertaking initiatives within each group. For example, one of the groups on roles and responsibilities has developed Terms of Reference (TOR) and a Code of Conduct for community leaders. One of the food distribution groups identified various challenges such as the theft of food, recycling of ration cards and the fact that the food distribution area was not disability friendly and has worked with WFP and CARE to address these.

A focus group in Ifo camp made it very clear that this process of training and establishing coaching groups had been tremendously empowering. For the first time, refugees in the camp felt that they could do something positive to help their communities so one interviewee described it as a “lifeline”. Some of the interventions have also been more effective because they have come from the refugees themselves (e.g., members of the Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) group, including men, explaining to parents how female genital mutilation is harmful). Interviewees also felt that, after they had involved

<sup>18</sup> DI will be producing a success story briefing paper on this project as part of the learning element of this evaluation.

young men in their training, the incidence of crimes such as theft and rape had decreased. Thus, the training has had various benefits. Some of those involved in the coaching groups have undergone 'Training of Trainers' so that they can impart their knowledge and skills to others in the camps. To extend their reach, in Ifo, the coaching groups are keen to set up a website through which they can communicate with the other Dadaab camps. However, they lack funding for this as well as to provide any compensation or incentives for participation to coaching group members, all of whom are volunteers.

In addition to the camp management training, NRC has operated a vocational training programme for young Somali boys and girls (mainly from the refugee camps although they have tried to involve young people from the host community as well). The courses range from electrical and electronic engineering, to cooking and tailoring. Due to the rules established by the Kenyan government, though, these trained young people cannot get jobs. So, NRC has been supporting them to establish cooperatives and/or provide services within the camps though it is not clear whether these cooperatives are viable in the long-term, particularly without continued support from NRC.

Sweden is one of the only donors to provide regular direct funding to the ICRC regional delegation (that covers countries not in conflict or recovering from conflict, i.e., Djibouti, Kenya and Tanzania). The predictability of this contribution (CHF 500,000 a year) has enabled the delegation to engage in medium-term capacity building activities with the Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS). These have focused on funding particular posts and sharing technical skills during the implementation of projects that the delegation funds.

### **Emergency Response Fund (ERF)**

Although the ERF is able to finance both international and local NGOs, to date, the KRCS is the only Kenyan organisation that it has funded. OCHA has set a limit of \$150,000 on applications to encourage proposals from small NGOs but Kenyan NGOs do not seem to be aware of it<sup>19</sup>. This is a missed opportunity to support local capacity by providing direct funding (which most donors are unable to do). However, it may be that OCHA has not had adequate human resources to promote the ERF. The staff member managing the ERF has moved to New York for a year and OCHA does not have the resources to replace her so her responsibilities have fallen to a national staff member.

### **CERF**

Strengthening local capacity is not an aim of the CERF, which is focused on life-saving emergency interventions. While CERF recipient agencies do work with the government and implement through local NGOs, the team was not able to assess the extent to which they have strengthened local capacities.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS: STRENGTHENING LOCAL CAPACITY**

- Sida should continue, and increase where possible, funding through multi-annual framework agreements as these enable international NGOs to work with local partners. However, it should ensure that the flexibility and predictability that the international NGOs enjoy is passed on to local partners.
- Sida should strengthen linkages between its humanitarian and development funding (learning from the DRC experience) to ensure longer-term support for the local community capacities strengthened by the NRC programmes.
- The ERF's failure to fund Kenyan NGOs is a missed opportunity and OCHA should make a more concerted effort to promote the Fund amongst Kenyan NGOs. It should also provide guidance on complying with the Fund's administrative requirements, if necessary. If it identifies specific capacity gaps that prevent Kenyan NGOs from accessing the ERF, it should encourage suitable international NGOs to address these.

<sup>19</sup> Although the ERF has set a maximum limit of \$150,000 on grants, it made one grant of \$200,000 to the KRCS.



## 2.5 Supporting the link between humanitarian contributions and prevention

The growing incidence of extreme weather events in Kenya and their impact in exacerbating vulnerability points to an urgent need for disaster risk reduction activities. The Ministry of State for Special Programmes (MoSSP) has a department for risk reduction. Its responsibilities include:

- The formulation, development and coordination of implementation of disaster risk reduction policies and programmes.
- Acting as the chair for the National Platform for disaster risk reduction. (The platform provides a forum for ministries, departments, international and non-governmental organisations to exchange information on issues of disaster risk and management. The platform forms part of the implementation of the Hyogo Framework of Action)
- Acting as a link with regional and international organisations on risk reduction issues especially on best practices.
- Being the national focal point on disaster risk reduction issues.

However, the MoSSP's activities appear to be very limited, as does its engagement with donors (particularly on the development side). According to a list that it provided, it has only two programmes supported by international organisations. These are:

- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) funding for consultancies on various issues (based on an agreement signed by UNDP, the Ministry of Finance and MoSSP). The consultancies aim to produce various documents/reports to strengthen disaster risk reduction issues in Kenya<sup>20</sup>.
- Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) support for training and capacity building in disaster risk management. IGAD is assisting the MoSSP with a consultancy to undertake vulnerability and hazard mapping along major highways in Kenya.

The MoSSP's lack of a clear understanding of how to address disaster risk reduction and related issues may be due to the fact that the ministry is still fairly new and lacks technical staff (as an MoSSP interviewee pointed out).

### Bilateral funding

Given that the strategy behind this sub-goal focuses on funding at a global and regional level, it is not surprising that the team was unable to find examples of disaster preparedness and risk reduction (DPRR) programming within Sida's humanitarian portfolio in Kenya. Yet there is an urgent need to address the causes of the weather-related emergencies so this is a missed opportunity, particularly as 'Natural Resources and Environment' is a focus area of Sida's development programme (see section 2.6). Unfortunately, responsibility for DRR (along with humanitarian aid) has been added to the responsibilities of the programme officer managing agriculture and rural development and climate change is an additional responsibility for the programme officer of Sida's roads and environment programme. As a result, they have been unable to engage substantively with the issues or link them with Sida's humanitarian activities.

Conflict prevention is also important in Kenya due to tensions around land and resources such as water as well as the legacy of the PEV. Although Sida has not explicitly financed peace-building activities, focus group discussions in Eldoret and the Mount Elgon region made it clear that local communities

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<sup>20</sup> Examples of these consultancies include: supporting the approval and enactment of a DRR Policy and Bill by both Cabinet and Parliament; supporting the mainstreaming and operationalisation of DRR policy into sector ministries and districts; developing training modules for mainstreaming DRR in key sector ministries; organising learning and exposure visits for Ministry officials for South-South learning; carrying out risk and hazard mapping and a vulnerability and capacity assessment; and conducting DRR media and advocacy campaigns.

really appreciate the peace-building elements of aid programmes (e.g., IOM's peace-building work based on its shelter construction programme, described below under CERF). It could be argued that these efforts have had some impact as, contrary to expectations, Kenya's referendum on the constitution in August was peaceful. Sida's Kenya Country Team Director argued that Sida should invest in reconciliation activities but the Team's budget has decreased due to the political crisis in Kenya and cannot stretch to such activities. One of Sida's framework agreement NGO partners argued that Sida's governance activities should include funding for civil society rather than focusing exclusively on the Government.

### Emergency Response Fund

As part of OCHA's effort to ensure that the ERF is not restricted to emergency response only, the ERF has funded a couple of preparedness projects. One was a flood preparedness project in the Rift Valley in May 2010 and the other was a grant to the Kenyan Red Cross Society in advance of the referendum in August 2010 which many feared would result in a similar level of violence as the 2008 PEV. This is a sensible use of ERF funding given that, as of June 2010, it had only disbursed just over \$1.2 million of the \$2.6 million that it has received from Sweden and Norway.

### CERF

The CERF's mandate to provide short-term, life-saving activities means that it does not finance disaster prevention activities even though this has the potential to save more lives than a response programme in a context of recurring natural disasters such as Kenya.

Following the PEV, IOM received a CERF rapid response grant of \$500,079 (in September 2008) to build 700 shelters. It used this to leverage additional funding from the Japanese government in 2009 (\$6.3 million) to build a further 8,473 shelters and also undertake peace-building and livelihoods activities. A focus group discussion near Eldoret noted that the IOM 'peace groups' had led to significant improvements in relations between conflicting tribes and this, in turn, had economic benefits. For example, those who had started farming mushrooms with IOM's help were able to sell their produce to the other tribe after working with them in peace groups. This further increased interaction between the two communities. One interviewee grew passion fruit but, before the establishment of the peace groups, the other tribe would not approach him. Now, however, he has taught many from the other tribe to grow passion fruit as well. In addition, the two communities have started attending the same churches and there have also been inter-tribal marriages.



Women participants in IOM's peace groups

### RECOMMENDATIONS: SUPPORTING THE LINK BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN CONTRIBUTIONS AND PREVENTION

- To ensure the effectiveness of its assistance to Kenya, Sida should ensure that it addresses climate change and disaster preparedness and risk reduction across the humanitarian and development parts of its programme, appointing a staff member with specific responsibility for these issues if necessary.
- Sida should also invest in conflict prevention/peace-building activities as these appear to have had a positive effect and have certainly been appreciated by local communities.
- Sweden should work with like-minded donors to ensure that the CERF can finance disaster mitigation, preparedness and prevention activities where these are appropriate. This would enhance its effectiveness and contribute to its life-saving objective.

## 2.6 Reducing the gap between humanitarian support and recovery contributions

### Bilateral funding

Sida has greater flexibility and more appropriate structures than many other donors to link its humanitarian funding to recovery and longer-term development. In Kenya, Sweden's development assistance is focused on the following sectors:

- Democratic Governance and Human Rights
- Natural Resources and the Environment
- Urban Development

As noted earlier, the natural resources and environment sectors offers the greatest opportunity for linkages (particularly in water and agriculture, which are crucial to reduce the impact of the recurring droughts and floods and are sectors in which Sida plays an important role). Also, under urban development, the strategy mentions addressing the problem of growing slums. Sida financed a cash transfer programme through Oxfam and Concern in 2009 with bilateral humanitarian funding as well as two 'pilot' projects in Nairobi's informal settlements through the ERF. So, this also offers an opportunity to connect its humanitarian and development funding, particularly since the projects financed by the humanitarian side have not been able to secure longer-term development support.

Sida intended the Oxfam and Concern cash transfer programme to act as a catalyst for Government of Kenya investment in a social safety net programme in Nairobi's informal settlements. The Government planned to support an unconditional cash transfer programme through international NGOs and WFP. However, it withdrew from this, possibly due to debate about whether conditional cash transfers are a better approach. One of the ERF-funded projects received substantial press coverage and the NGO implementing it argued in favour of conditional (rather than unconditional) cash transfers so this may have given the Government pause for thought.

Though Sida has not funded recovery activities with bilateral humanitarian funding, it has encouraged partners to take account of the longer-term implications of their programmes. In February 2010, Sida's humanitarian desk officer in Stockholm visited the project of the local partner of a framework agreement NGO. The local NGO explained the difficulty of financing the DRR component of its activities through short-term emergency programmes and she suggested that the local NGO submit a proposal to address environmental and DRR issues through its Swedish NGO partner. She also questioned whether humanitarian aid should be the only response to addressing the drought and encouraged the local NGO to think about long-term solutions, for example, improving the food security of pastoralists by helping them to combine farming with pastoralism.

### Emergency Response Fund (ERF)

As noted in section 2.1, the ERF has tried to support a longer-term approach, particularly by funding projects to improve food security in Nairobi's informal settlements (for which it put out a call for proposals in June 2009). Focus group discussions with project beneficiaries show that both made an important contribution since the beneficiaries receive very little other assistance<sup>21</sup>. In the case of the outpatient therapeutic feeding programme (OTP), mothers with severely malnourished babies had seen various improvements in the health of their children. In the case of the emergency livelihood assistance programme, interviewees from the cash-for-work (CFW) component reported being able to purchase food as well as uniforms and school books for their children. The urban agriculture component of this programme provided enough vegetables for a household for a 6-month period.

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<sup>21</sup> Though the beneficiaries of Concern's therapeutic feeding programme can access medical assistance from a clinic supported by German doctors



However, without continued support the project activities (and their effects) are not sustainable. For example, those who participated in the cash-for-work project went back to having no jobs and no money. One interviewee gave the example of using the money that she earned from the cash-for-work project to set up a small business selling porridge. While the project was ongoing, people could afford to buy porridge. However, once it finished, they no longer had money and the business collapsed. In the case of malnutrition treatment programme, there is a risk that children discharged from the programme become malnourished again over time but it was not possible to establish the full rate of relapse because, if a child is re-admitted over three months after leaving the programme, it is treated as a new case. The ERF provided gap-filling financing for this malnourishment treatment programme that enabled the NGO to run the programme for a full year. During this time, the NGO has worked to bring local health providers (the faith-based and community-based organisations that act as health providers under the government's plan) up to speed with government-approved protocols. It hopes that the government and health providers will be able to take over the programme and sustain it but this is not guaranteed.

The ERF's emergency remit means that it is not able to provide repeat funding to a project and its 6-month limit on funding is too short-term to have a long-term impact on recurrent natural disasters or the chronic problems in the informal settlements.

## CERF

Due to its emphasis on short-term, life-saving activities, the CERF does not fund recovery programmes. However, as demonstrated by IOM (see section 2.5), CERF recipient agencies can use the money to leverage longer-term support. It could be argued that it is not the CERF's responsibility to finance every aspect of a humanitarian response but, when allocating CERF funds, the KHPT and CERF Secretariat need to be careful to ensure that they are not supporting activities that create dependency amongst aid recipients and undermine alternative, longer-term solutions.



Concern's outpatient therapeutic feeding programme

## RECOMMENDATIONS: REDUCING THE GAP BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT AND RECOVERY

- Sida should explore options to create linkages between its humanitarian and development funding to Kenya, particularly in country strategy priority sectors of natural resources and urban development. This would help to ensure that activities started with humanitarian funding receive the longer-term support that they require and that short-term activities do not undermine longer-term solutions.
- Sida could make a greater effort to support the recovery elements of projects that it is supporting with bilateral funding.
- When allocating CERF funds, the KHPT and CERF Secretariat should be careful to ensure that they do not support activities that undermine alternative, longer-term solutions.

## 2.7 Strengthening the humanitarian system

According to Sida's humanitarian strategy, this goal means that Sida will support research and methods development in the humanitarian field as well as quality assurance. It will also strengthen Swedish and international humanitarian capacity through strategic secondments of qualified Swedish humanitarian staff to important international humanitarian organisations.

The goal can be interpreted more broadly to encompass the humanitarian reform process (which Sweden has supported strongly). It could be argued that the humanitarian system should be taken to mean local response capacity as well as international organisations.

### **Bilateral funding**

As noted in the previous section, the debate about conditional vs. unconditional cash transfers is one possible reason for the Government of Kenya's failure to establish a cash transfer programme in Nairobi's informal settlements. At least one of the research and methods organisations that Sida finances (the Overseas Development Institute) has undertaken considerable research on cash transfer programmes in emergency contexts. Therefore, it would have been helpful if Sida had backed up its funding for the Oxfam-Concern project with support for making relevant research findings available to the government and partners.

Findings presented in the previous sections suggest that other issues on which practical research findings would benefit humanitarian actors in Kenya as well as the government include: strengthening local capacities, particularly of crisis-affected communities; understanding the implications of climate change for humanitarian aid and how to address the challenges; the effects of conflict prevention and peace-building activities; and financing recovery effectively.

The evaluation team did not come across Sida initiatives to strengthen the humanitarian system in Kenya through bilateral funding. However, one of its framework agreement NGOs pointed out that Sida has encouraged Swedish NGOs to strengthen their humanitarian response capacity. As a result, the NGO is undertaking a global mapping of its capacity (human resources, adherence to standards such as SPHERE etc). Also, Sida has promoted the Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP) amongst its NGO partners and, as a result, this NGO became one of three Swedish NGOs to start working towards HAP certification. The NGO's local partner also participated in the HAP workshop in Stockholm. This is a positive step because, in Kenya, the vibrant local NGO community and the Kenya Red Cross Society have shown greater capacity for humanitarian response than the government, particularly during post-election violence in 2008 (section 3.2 highlights the fact that the government is much weaker on humanitarian than development issues).

### **Emergency Response Fund (ERF)**

The ERF is designed to be a short-term, quick response mechanism so strengthening the humanitarian system is beyond its remit. However, it could do more to support the development of a local response capacity by funding Kenyan NGOs.

### **CERF**

As the CERF is a part of the overall humanitarian reform process started in 2005, it is expected to "strengthen core elements of humanitarian response in underfunded crises"<sup>22</sup>. However CERF funding is only a small proportion of total humanitarian funding so it is probably ambitious to expect it to achieve additional objectives such as supporting humanitarian reform processes and strengthening humanitarian response capacity (even though it is likely to support coordination and the Humanitarian Coordinator's role, as it has done in Kenya).

## **RECOMMENDATIONS: STRENGTHENING THE HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM**

- Sida should help to make research on cash transfers available to the government to support it to make informed decisions and begin implementing a cash transfer programme in Nairobi's informal settlements.
- Sida should reflect on how to disseminate global level research better and ensure it is useful and relevant for field operations. It should work closely with its framework agreement partners as well as the research and methods organisations that it finances at a global level to ensure that research builds on real field issues and that the results and recommendations are properly disseminated at field level (e.g., through workshops, short briefings or good practice papers etc).

<sup>22</sup> See 'What is the CERF?' on CERF website at:

<http://ochaonline.un.org/cerf/WhatistheCERF/tabid/3534/language/en-US/Default.aspx>

## 2.8 Strengthening humanitarian principles

As section 2.4 pointed out, Sweden is one of the only donors to provide consistent support to ICRC's Regional Office in Kenya. This has helped ICRC to promote International Humanitarian Law (IHL) through Kenyan universities. This has included organising essay competitions and creating networks of lecturers interested in IHL. ICRC also runs IHL courses for practitioners in the region and ECHO always sends a couple of participants. Apart from this, Sida does not finance activities to promote IHL and strengthen humanitarian principles directly. This may be due to the fact that IHL and humanitarian principles are not as integral to humanitarian response in Kenya as they are in countries experiencing open and violent conflict.

The evaluation team did not find evidence that Sida's other funding channels had financed activities to promote IHL and humanitarian principles. Such activities are generally beyond the remit of funds like the ERF and CERF.

## Section 3: Structures

This section discusses two forms of structures that pose a challenge to the effectiveness of Sida's humanitarian assistance to Kenya but are not covered by the strategic sub-goals. The first is organisational structure that shapes the relationship between Sida in Stockholm and the Embassy in Nairobi. The other is structures to link humanitarian and development aid in Kenya.

### 3.1 Headquarter-field relations

As described in section 1.2, responsibility for Sida's humanitarian assistance to Kenya rests largely with a staff member in the humanitarian team in Stockholm and the staff member in the Nairobi Embassy combines responsibility for humanitarian issues with responsibility for other issues, currently agriculture and rural development (on which Sweden is the lead donor in Kenya so this is a major responsibility) as well as DRR. This staff member is asked for input when the humanitarian officer in Stockholm is preparing the assessment memos on which Sida's funding decisions are based. This is helpful to ensure that Sida's humanitarian funding does not undermine or contradict its development efforts but the Embassy staff member pointed out that field-based staff are not required to provide input into humanitarian funding decisions. This is because humanitarian issues are an add-on to their normal responsibilities. This means that they only make comments on assessment memos or give feedback on the humanitarian situation if they have the time, as a "by the way".

It is also difficult for field staff members to follow up on Sida's humanitarian projects because they do not receive project documents once the humanitarian team has made its funding decisions (the Embassy did not even have all the assessment memos for the 2009 funding decisions). In the past, the failure to share documentation made it difficult to close files when there was a turnover of staff. It can also create a challenge when the Stockholm-based humanitarian officer is not available for any reason, as was the case when the evaluation team undertook the Kenya case study. As a result, the team was unable to obtain any documentation on Sida's funding to Kenya in 2010, which made it very difficult to identify which partners to interview and which projects to visit. It also meant that no one was engaging with OCHA on the management of the ERF so Sida was unaware that the ERF manager had moved to New York and that OCHA Kenya could not afford to replace her because the office is being downsized. Sida had also missed the opportunity to offer guidance and support to OCHA on its decision to use the ERF to address poverty and vulnerability in urban informal settlements, despite opposi-

tion from members of the Technical Review Board. Hopefully, the establishment of the Advisory Group will enable Sida staff members in Nairobi to interact more with ERF management.

In Kenya, the Stockholm and field-based staff members working on humanitarian issues have clarified their respective responsibilities but there are still unclear areas. For example, the Embassy has staff members that conduct political analyses that could be useful for the humanitarian team in Stockholm. However, it is not clear whether the Nairobi-based humanitarian officer should share these with Stockholm and the staff member does not have enough time for humanitarian work so these reports are not shared.

As the field-based staff member pointed out, if field-based staff members know that what their obligations are on humanitarian issues, they can allocate adequate time in the operational plan. Since humanitarian aid is mentioned in the Kenya development strategy document, the country team allocates a certain number of man hours to humanitarian issues in its annual operational plan. However, the team faced a challenge when the staff member who was responsible for humanitarian issues in the Embassy left in 2010. The country team transferred the man hours allocated to her in the operational plan to another team member. However, the team did not reduce the tasks already allocated to him and this has meant that he has not been able to fulfil all his humanitarian responsibilities.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS: HEADQUARTERS-FIELD RELATIONS

- To ensure that all Sida staff members have access to humanitarian project documents, Sida should make all project-related documents available online. This can be very simple to set up (using existing software packages, including SharePoint) and will make it much easier for field-based staff members to follow up on humanitarian projects.
- Sida should clarify the roles and responsibilities of field-based staff with humanitarian responsibilities vis-à-vis humanitarian staff members in Stockholm, making more effective use of field-based staff. The humanitarian team should ensure that the country team allocates adequate time for humanitarian issues in its annual operational plan and has the staff members to work the stipulated number of man hours.
- Sida's humanitarian officer in Nairobi should play an active role in the ERF Advisory Board and keep staff in Stockholm informed of key discussions.

## 3.2 Linking humanitarian and development assistance

Section 1.1 mentioned that, underlying the various emergencies affecting Kenya is a situation of chronic vulnerability, particularly amongst pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in the ASAL areas and the urban poor. The 2010 EHRP provides stark facts and figures on the extent of the problems:

- In August 2009, the number of people in need of food and other forms of assistance had increased from 3.4 million (in March) to 3.8 million.
- An estimated 1.5 million schoolchildren in drought-affected areas required food assistance.
- As of July 2009, approximately 51,300 children under five had been admitted into supplementary feeding programmes and 8,400 into therapeutic feeding programmes. This was a sharp increase on 2008, when 7,400 children were admitted into therapeutic feeding programmes in the whole year. Still, the coverage of nutrition interventions remained below the minimum standard of 50 % required to provide a demonstrable public-health impact.
- In northern Kenya, there were polio, cholera and measles outbreaks with increasing morbidity, particularly among children under five. Although the government and aid agencies contained cholera outbreaks in 26 districts, it had re-emerged in 12 districts with 4,000 cases reported between mid-September and mid-October 2009.

- The scarcity of water and pasture contributed to frequent conflict outbreaks between communities. As of September 2009, there were 242 deaths in pastoral areas as a result of resource-based conflict and cattle rustling.
- 1.4 million people in Nairobi live below the poverty level of \$2 per day, with poor diets, poor water and sanitation conditions and facing various environmental hazards. People living in urban areas are almost twice as likely to be infected with HIV as their rural counterparts.

The EHRP particularly recognises the challenges of urban poverty, growing due to the lack of sufficient land and livelihood security in rural areas. More than one-third of the urban population in Kenya lives in absolute poverty<sup>23</sup>. The urban poor have limited opportunities for income generation and have been forced to reduce meal size and frequency and also dietary diversity. They engage in harmful coping mechanisms, such as scavenging, sex work and crime (fuelled by very high unemployment and widespread alcoholism).

The fact that it is the *Emergency Humanitarian Response Plan* that provides an analysis of the poverty and vulnerability that has reached crisis proportions in Kenya underlines the need to link humanitarian and development assistance. Otherwise, it is left to the humanitarian sector to try to address the problems with short-term assistance. Sections 2.3, 2.5 and 2.6 highlighted the following barriers to effective links:

- Coordination mechanisms for development and humanitarian assistance that operate in isolation from each other (with the KJAS structures on one hand and the sector working groups and the Kenya Humanitarian Forum on the other).
- A lack of linkages within the Government of Kenya, with the MoSSP unaware of how the KJAS structures operate.
- The Government's lack of capacity on humanitarian issues which means that line ministry participation in sector working groups is generally weak and the MoSSP has little information on humanitarian funding to the country<sup>24</sup> and limited engagement in DRR and related issues.
- Separate humanitarian and development functions within donor agencies. This has meant that they have failed to address climate change and other environmental challenges in a holistic way and also missed opportunities to ensure that humanitarian activities do not undermine longer-term solutions to chronic problems.
- Humanitarian funding mechanisms, such as the CERF and ERF, that have restrictions on the use of funds (both in the timeframe for activities and in the types of activities that they finance). Though the ERF has tried to address longer-term urban vulnerability, its inability to fund projects for more than 6 months or provide repeat funding has limited its impact.

Unless donors and the Government of Kenya overcome these barriers and the artificial divide between humanitarian and development assistance, the country will fail to address the chronic vulnerability of its citizens and continue to require significant amounts of humanitarian aid. One of the key challenges is the government's weak capacity on humanitarian issues, which will need to be addressed as well.

Social protection programmes present an opportunity to address this vulnerability with a joint humanitarian-development response. Kenya has several cash-transfer initiatives ongoing, including:

- The DFID-funded hunger safety net

<sup>23</sup> With estimates that 1.4 million in Nairobi live on less than \$2 a day.

<sup>24</sup> During the Development Initiatives (2010) review of CERF funding to Kenya, the previous Permanent Secretary complained that he had to rely on OCHA for information on humanitarian funding to the country.

- The government's Orphans and Vulnerable Children Cash Transfer (supported by Sida, DFID, the World Bank and UNICEF) which is due to reach 100,000 households by the end of 2010.

Also, the government is developing a Social Protection Strategy and has commissioned a Safety Net Sector review. It would be useful if humanitarian actors engaged with these discussions of social protection, which could be a key bridge between the humanitarian and development fields.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS: LINKING HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

- Sida could work with like-minded donors to strengthen the government's capacity to manage humanitarian response and the MoSSP's capacity to undertake DRR.
- Donors and the Government of Kenya need to establish effective links between existing humanitarian and development coordination mechanisms or establish a single coordination structure with sector groups that address both sets of issues.
- Donors need to establish better links between their humanitarian and development funding and also ensure that staff members who work on these issues collaborate more closely at Nairobi level.
- Donors and the Government of Kenya should make a more concerted effort to address urban poverty through development assistance and social safety nets (if deemed appropriate) instead of relying on short-term humanitarian aid to address problems when they reach crisis proportions.
- Sida's humanitarian staff should engage with social protection debates in Kenya and encourage humanitarian partners to do so as well.

## Section 4: Effective humanitarian assistance

This evaluation also aims to support the development of Sida's next humanitarian strategy. To aid this process, and to guide the setting of overall goals for this new strategy, the evaluation team asked three sets of people the question "what are the elements of effective humanitarian assistance?":

1. Sida, MFA and Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) staff in Stockholm
2. Sida's NGO partners in Nairobi
3. A combination of responses from project beneficiaries in Eldoret/Mount Elgon (affected by PEV and the conflict between the Sabaot Land Defence Force and the Kenyan army in the Mount Elgon area in 2008).

The results are listed in the table below, with an attempt to reconcile them across the different groups. Each group was asked to rate how aid agencies had performed against each element (i.e., to rate the effectiveness of the assistance). In the case of Sida/MFA/MSB, the participants were asked to rate Team Sweden's performance in delivering or working on these elements. Their scoring is presented as 5 stars, with 5 representing a score of 100 % (the scoring for the exercise conducted in Stockholm is presented in the interim report).<sup>25</sup>

<sup>25</sup> This was from beneficiaries of a cash-for-work project to repair a local road.



	Sida/MFA/MSB Stockholm		Sida's NGO partners		Beneficiaries	
<b>Holistic programming</b>	Policy coherence	★★★★☆			Understand & address causes of conflict	☆☆☆☆☆
<b>Resources</b>	Donor Will	★★★★★				
	Timeliness	★★★★☆	– Rapid Response – Long-term funding	★★★★★ ★★★★☆	Timeliness	★★★★☆
	Flexibility	★★★★☆	Flexibility to adapt to changing situations	★★★★★		
	Money	★★★★☆	Adequate project funding	★★★★☆	Sufficient project funding	★★★★☆
	Staff	★★★★★	Dedicated staff & administrative support: – Short-term funding – Longer-term funding	 ★★★★☆ ★★★★★	People to implement project <sup>25</sup>	★★★★☆
<b>Operational</b>	Security and Access	★★★★☆			Protection	★★★★☆
	Communications/ Logistics	★★★★☆			Equipment to implement	★★★★★
	Effective implementing partners	★★★★☆			Community leadership	★★★★☆
<b>Sustainable programming</b>	Local capacity strengthening	??	Reinforce local capacities (local NGOs and/or local structures, depending on the goal of the programme).	★★★★☆	Sustainable response – not short-term solutions  Effective distribution – provide aid directly to affected people	★★★★☆  ★★★★☆
<b>Coordination</b>	Donor coordination	★★★★☆	Coordination with Sida	★★★★★		
	Coordination (funding for)	★★★★★	Between organisations	★★★★☆		
<b>Response design</b>	Needs analysis	★★★★☆			Needs assessment	★★★★☆
	Context analysis	★★★★☆	Do no harm approach	★★★★☆	Planning, with clear goals & objectives  Address longer-term needs	★★★★☆  ★★★★☆
	Quality standards	★★★★☆	Quality assurance (e.g., HAP)	★★★★★	Trust and transparency	★★★★☆
					Impartiality	★★★★☆
<b>Relationship with authorities</b>	Host Country Will (engagement on)	★★★★☆				
<b>Monitoring</b>	Accountability/ follow-up	★★★★☆	Quality assurance systems	★★★★★		
<b>Community involvement</b>	Beneficiary involvement	★★★★☆	Feedback mechanisms	★★★★☆	Beneficiary consultation	★★★★☆
			Support human dignity	★★★★★	Coordination with community	★★★★☆

Combining the results from the different levels yields the following as essential elements of effective humanitarian assistance, which could guide Sida's future humanitarian strategy:

1. Using multiple entry points for holistic programming, i.e., complementing Sida's funding to partners with advocacy (e.g., with national partners), joint research and policy work.
2. Ensuring that response is appropriate, given the severity of the crisis and the context
3. Working with effective partners that have a good track record
4. Providing operational flexibility that allows for independence, longer-term vision (including exit strategies) and programmes as opposed to projects. This is particularly important in transitional contexts and in rapidly changing emergency contexts.
5. Supporting sustainable programming, including longer-term approaches that take account of recovery and reinforcing local capacities (local communities or NGOs and/or local structures, depending on the goal of the programme). Promoting local coping capacities and not undermining them.
6. Efficient coordination mechanisms, including donor coordination mechanisms.
7. Supporting and advocating for prevention: peace-building and disaster preparedness and risk reduction.
8. Strong beneficiary involvement, including consultation, feedback, information flows and keeping promises
9. A constructive working relationship with local authorities
10. Supporting improvements in quality of response by promoting international standards and lesson-learning.

## Section 5: Conclusions

This section draws together the key messages emerging from this case study.

### **Urgent need to link humanitarian and development assistance in Kenya**

The growing incidence of extreme weather events in Kenya is exacerbating the chronic vulnerability that underlies the various emergencies affecting the country. This points to the urgent need for linking humanitarian and development efforts on disaster risk reduction, to ensure that humanitarian aid does not inadvertently undermine development efforts and to address problems holistically. At present, there are several barriers to achieving this, mainly the government's weaker capacity on humanitarian issues and the separation between the humanitarian and development sections of the government and donor agencies. This is reflected in the disconnection between humanitarian and development coordination mechanisms. As a result, it is left to humanitarian actors to address the problems of vulnerability when they reach crisis proportions.

### **Sida has missed opportunities to address underlying causes of emergencies in Kenya**

Unlike most donors, Sida has the structures (country teams) and flexible funding processes to address the full spectrum of humanitarian assistance from prevention and preparedness to recovery. However, the case study shows that it has missed opportunities to support prevention and to link its humanitarian and development assistance to Kenya, despite the urgent need for this. This is partly due to inadequate



staffing for humanitarian issues, climate change and DRR but the Kenya team could learn from good practice in other countries such as DRC.

### **Sida needs to support prevention/preparedness and longer-term approaches bilaterally**

The Kenya ERF has tried to address vulnerability and food insecurity in urban contexts. However, its short timeframe (6 months), small scale and inability to provide repeat funding mean that it has only been able to support a couple of pilot projects that were then unable to secure long-term funding. The CERF's mandate is focused on short-term activities and this prevents it from financing preparedness activities even though these may save more lives in the long run. It is also unable to fund recovery. Thus, the pooled funds through which Sweden channels its humanitarian funding are unable to support prevention/preparedness and longer-term approaches effectively. So, Sida needs to address these goals through bilateral funding.

### **Sida's partners do not necessarily pass on flexibility and longer-term funding to implementers**

Sida's partners (UN agencies and NGOs) appreciate its flexible and multi-annual funding and multi-annual framework agreements support Swedish and international NGOs to work with and strengthen local NGO partners. However, the case study found evidence that Sida's partners do not always pass on the flexibility and longer-term funding that they enjoy to local implementing organisations.

### **Donor coordination on humanitarian issues is weaker than on development issues**

Since donor staff members working on humanitarian issues do not participate in the donor aid effectiveness group that addresses development concerns, the Kenya Humanitarian Forum is their only opportunity for sharing information and coordinating funding. The Forum includes a wide range of humanitarian actors so donors felt that a Good Humanitarian Donorship group or an equivalent coordination mechanism solely for donors would be beneficial. Otherwise, donors risk being unaware of important funding decisions by their colleagues.

### **The Government of Kenya and humanitarian agencies would benefit from the dissemination of relevant research**

The fact that a debate about the merits of conditional vs. unconditional cash transfers may have been a factor in the government's decision to abandon a cash transfer scheme for Nairobi's informal settlements highlights the need for making the extensive research on this issue available to the government and humanitarian agencies implementing such programmes. Disseminating research on other issues, such as addressing climate change, which are also proving to be a challenge for the government and humanitarian agencies at field level, would also be helpful. One of Sida's major strengths as a donor is its willingness to invest in research and methods development and system strengthening. Therefore, it is well placed to support research dissemination.

### **Clarifying responsibilities of field-level staff will enable Sida to make more effective use of them**

The case study demonstrates that Sida's field staff could work more effectively on humanitarian issues if the respective roles and responsibilities of headquarters and field staff were clearer and they could allocate adequate time for humanitarian issues. Also, field staff need access to project documents if they are to follow up on whether Sida's humanitarian funding is achieving the desired results. Without these improvements, Sida is likely to continue to miss opportunities to address humanitarian concerns in a holistic way and to link its humanitarian and development efforts effectively.

## Section 6: Recommendations

The report presented recommendations at the end of sections to demonstrate that they are clearly based on evaluation findings. To make it easier for Sida and other actors to implement these recommendations, this section draws them all together, organising them according to the organisation(s) to which they are directed. Most of the recommendations are addressed to Sida but, since the MFA is responsible for Sweden's global advocacy on humanitarian issues and engagement in international fora, Sida will need to support the MFA in ensuring that its field-level experience informs the MFA's work in these global fora. In these cases, the recommendations are addressed to Sida and the MFA, rather than Sida alone.

### Sida

- Multi-annual framework agreements are useful instruments for implementing GHD principles in chronic emergency situations. Sida should support more of these agreements and ensure that they translate into longer-term, more predictable funding for the local partners of Swedish and international NGOs that have multi-annual agreements.
- At global level, Sida needs to develop or adopt a severity of crisis model to guide the determination of geographical funding envelopes, to ensure that its funding for each emergency is truly in proportion to the severity of needs.
- Sida also needs to develop clear criteria for allocating funding within a crisis.
- Sida's Kenya Country Team (development and humanitarian staff) should advocate for development actors and KJAS structures to take systematic account of humanitarian issues.
- Sida should participate actively in the ERF Advisory Board and encourage OCHA and the humanitarian coordinator (HC) to ensure that it meets regularly and discusses strategic issues related to the ERF.
- Sida should continue, and increase where possible, funding through multi-annual framework agreements as these enable international NGOs to work with local partners. However, it should ensure that the flexibility and predictability that the international NGOs enjoy is passed on to local partners.
- Sida should strengthen linkages between its humanitarian and development funding (learning from the DRC experience) to ensure longer-term support for the local community capacities strengthened by the NRC programmes.
- To ensure the effectiveness of its assistance to Kenya, Sida should ensure that it addresses climate change and disaster preparedness and risk reduction across the humanitarian and development parts of its programme, appointing a staff member with specific responsibility for these issues if necessary.
- Sida should also invest in conflict prevention/peace-building activities as these appear to have had a positive effect and have certainly been appreciated by local communities.
- Sida should explore options to create linkages between its humanitarian and development funding to Kenya, particularly in country strategy priority sectors of natural resources and urban development. This would help to ensure that activities started with humanitarian funding receive the longer-term support that they require and that short-term activities do not undermine longer-term solutions.

- Sida could make a greater effort to support the recovery elements of projects that it is supporting with bilateral funding.
- Sida should help to make research on cash transfers available to the government to support it to make informed decisions and begin implementing a cash transfer programme in Nairobi's informal settlements.
- Sida should reflect on how to disseminate global level research better and ensure it is useful and relevant for field operations. It should work closely with its framework agreement partners as well as the research and methods organisations that it finances at a global level to ensure that research builds on real field issues and that the results and recommendations are properly disseminated at field level (e.g., through workshops, short briefings or good practice papers etc).
- To ensure that all Sida staff members have access to humanitarian project documents, Sida should make all project-related documents available online. This can be very simple to set up (using existing software packages, including SharePoint) and will make it much easier for field-based staff members to follow up on humanitarian projects.
- Sida should clarify the roles and responsibilities of field-based staff with humanitarian responsibilities vis-à-vis humanitarian staff members in Stockholm, making more effective use of field-based staff. The humanitarian team should ensure that the country team allocates adequate time for humanitarian issues in its annual operational plan and has the staff members to work the stipulated number of man hours.
- Sida's humanitarian officer in Nairobi should play an active role in the ERF Advisory Board and keep staff in Stockholm informed of key discussions.
- Sida could work with like-minded donors to strengthen the government's capacity to manage humanitarian response and the MoSSP's capacity to undertake DRR.
- Sida's humanitarian staff should engage with social protection debates in Kenya and encourage humanitarian partners to do so as well.

#### **Sida and the MFA**

- NGOs receiving funding channelled through UN agencies find that these are not as timely and flexible as the funding that the UN agencies receive. The funding also tends to be short-term and specific, which would make it difficult for NGOs to take a longer-term approach. Sweden should work with like-minded donors to ensure that UN funding procedures for NGOs are more effective and reflect better the conditions that the UN agencies themselves enjoy.
- Sweden should monitor the timeliness of the implementation of projects that it funds (including through pooled funds such as ERFs/HRFs and the CERF).
- Sweden should work with like-minded donors to enable the CERF to support longer-term approaches in chronic emergencies.
- Sweden should work with like-minded donors to ensure that the CERF can finance disaster mitigation, preparedness and prevention activities where these are appropriate. This would enhance its effectiveness and contribute to its life-saving objective.

#### **Donors and other actors**

- Like-minded donors should establish a GHD group (as there is in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)) to strengthen their collaboration or, at the very least, set up a mechanism to keep each other informed of their funding decisions.

- Donors (including Sida) and UN agencies could work to strengthen government capacity to coordinate humanitarian assistance, particularly through the sector groups.
- Donors and the Government of Kenya need to establish effective links between existing humanitarian and development coordination mechanisms or establish a single coordination structure with sector groups that address both sets of issues.
- Donors need to establish better links between their humanitarian and development funding and also ensure that staff members who work on these issues collaborate more closely at Nairobi level.
- Donors and the Government of Kenya should make a more concerted effort to address urban poverty through development assistance and social safety nets (if deemed appropriate) instead of relying on short-term humanitarian aid to address problems when they reach crisis proportions.
- The KHPT should find ways to reduce conflicts of interest in the CERF allocation processes, learning from approaches in countries such as Indonesia and Zimbabwe. At the very least, it should provide stronger and more specific direction to sector leads on priority sectors and activities.
- When allocating CERF funds, the KHPT and CERF Secretariat should be careful to ensure that they do not support activities that undermine alternative, longer-term solutions.


#### **OCHA Kenya**

- OCHA Kenya should ensure that information on CERF funding by sector and project is presented to the sector working groups. It should also find ways to disseminate the report from UN agencies about how they have utilised CERF funds to relevant government ministries.
- The ERF's failure to fund Kenyan NGOs is a missed opportunity and OCHA should make a more concerted effort to promote the Fund amongst Kenyan NGOs. It should also provide guidance on complying with the Fund's administrative requirements, if necessary. If it identifies specific capacity gaps that prevent Kenyan NGOs from accessing the ERF, it should encourage suitable international NGOs to address these.

## Annex A: Emergency Response Fund (ERF) Overview

OCHA established the ERF for Kenya in June 2009. To date, it has received funding from only two donors, Norway and Sweden, with Sweden contributing the larger sum, US\$1.7 million. The ERF spent \$1 million in 2009 and carried over \$1.6 million to 2010. OCHA New York has drafted guidelines on the ERF's operation but donors have not had the opportunity to feed into the process. These state that the objective of the ERF is to enable the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) to provide "rapid and flexible funding to urgent humanitarian needs and facilitate coordination of emergency response activities." The fund is not intended to support activities that are outside the scope of humanitarian response or that could be better addressed through development channels. The guidelines provide a list of criteria for project selection and point out that, when selecting projects for funding, the ERF will aim to do the following:

- a) Support rapid response needed at the onset of disasters and crises before mainstream responses come on line. Normally these responses would seek to provide life saving interventions and/or prevent further erosion of livelihoods assets and coping mechanisms of the affected communities.
- b) Strategically fill critical gaps in non-food interventions, geographically or sectorally, within the context of an overall response plan such as the Kenya Emergency Humanitarian Response Plan. Decisions on the use of funds for gap filling will be initiated by the HC.
- c) To provide support to critical early action activities to mitigate emerging needs and prevent escalations in existing humanitarian situations. These activities would promote improved response to early warning information, particularly in the case of slow onset disasters such as drought.



**Figure 3:** Donor funding to Kenya's ERF [Source: OCHA FTS]

The guidelines outline the ERF's financial regulations and restrictions as well as the roles of the various partners – the HC, OCHA (both at headquarters and field level), the Technical Review Board, the Advisory Board and recipient organisations. Although the ERF has a Technical Review Board, as noted in section 2.3, at the time of the field visit, the Advisory Board was not up and running.

The Technical Review Board, comprising UNICEF and IOM meets either virtually or physically to assist the HC in reviewing project proposals. As noted in section 2.1, there have been some differences of opinion between Board members about the types of activities that the ERF should finance (since the projects to address food insecurity in informal settlements in Nairobi do not necessarily fit the criteria in the guidelines, listed above).

To date the ERF has only funded NGO projects (all international, with the exception of the KRCS) though it has received proposals from UN agencies. Section 2.4 pointed out that the ERF suffers from

a lack of visibility amongst NGOs operating in Kenya and OCHA could do more to promote it, especially to local organisations.

The fund has lacked adequate management capacity since the original manager took up a position in OCHA New York early in 2010. Her post has had to be filled by another OCHA staff member who has had to continue with other responsibilities on top of managing the fund. Capacity at headquarters level in New York is also strained due to the fact that staff members have moved either within OCHA or to other parts of the UN system.

The table below lists the projects that the ERF had funded as of June 2010.

Project code	Organisation	Start date	Project Title	End Date	Total
ERF-DMA-0462-001	Veterinaires Sans Frontieres Switzerland	15 July, 2009	Emergency animal health and Slaughter De-stocking in Isiolo District	31 Jan 2010	149,993
ERF-DMA-0462-004	Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI)	16 July, 2009	Emergency livelihood assistance for vulnerable slum dwellers in Nairobi	31 Jan 2010	135,000
ERF-DMA-0462-003	Concern Worldwide	16 July, 2009	Emergency nutrition response in urban slums and informal settlements of Nairobi and Kisumu	31 Dec 2009	135,000
ERF-DMA-0462-002	Pastoralist Integrated Support Programme (PISP)	4 July, 2009	Marsabit Drought Emergency Humanitarian Response Project, 2009 (DEHRP, 2009)	14 Nov, 2009	109,467
ERF-DMA-0462-005	Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS)	25 Sept, 2009	Fire Tragedies in Faza, Lamu	28 Dec, 2009	50,017
ERF-DMA-0462-006	World Vision Kenya	2 Dec, 2009	Turkana Cholera Response Project	2 Feb, 2010	148,000
ERF-DMA-0462-007	Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS)	14 Dec, 2009	Assistance to displaced families in Mau Forest and areas affected by Cholera outbreaks	10 Mar, 2010	200,000
ERF-DMA-0462-008	ACTED Kenya	23 Dec, 2009	Emergency hygiene promotion cholera kits to populations vulnerable to cholera in East Pokot and Turkana South	23/05/10 NCE – 20 July, 10	149,999
ERF-DMA-0462-009	ADEO Kenya	5 May, 2010	Health assistance to victims of flooding in Narok district	15 Oct 2010	57,438
ERF-DMA-0462-010	World Vision Kenya	31 May, 2010	Rift Valley Floods Preparedness project	5 Nov 2010	80,000



## Annex B: Methodology

Section 1 outlined the timeframe for the team's field visit to Kenya and mentioned that, in addition to interviews and project visits in Nairobi, two team members travelled to Eldoret and the Mount Elgon region as well as Dadaab. The table below lists those consulted during this case study.

Name	Surname	Job title/ Organisation
Dr. Adan		Provide International
Luluwa	Ali	Humanitarian Affairs Officer (ERF manager), OCHA
Imelda	Awino	Nutrition, GTZ Dadaab
Duncan	Bell	MSF Switzerland, Dagahaley camp, Dadaab
Marlies	Budde	Department for Economic Cooperation, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Nairobi
Chiara	Camozzi	Project Manager, Nairobi Regional Office, COOPI
Sr. Macrina	Cheruto	Peacebuilding Supervisor, IOM Eldoret
Aeneas C.	Chuma	Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator
Jeanine	Cooper	Head of Office, OCHA Kenya
Florence	Copigneaux	Finance Coordinator ad interim, MSF Switzerland
Phillipa	Crosland-Taylor	Country Director, Oxfam
Giovanna	Federici	Camp Management Training Project, NRC Dadaab
Megan	Gilgan	Chief, field operations and emergency, UNICEF
Abbas	Gullet	Secretary General, Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS)
Susie	Ibutu	Programme Director, National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK)
Annika	Jayawardena	Kenya Country Team Director, Sida
Camilla	Jones	Child Protection Advisor, Save the Children UK, Dadaab
Dr. Milhia Abdul	Kader	Clinical Services Manager, International Rescue Committee (IRC) Dadaab
Bornwell	Kantande	Senior Operations Officer, UNHCR sub-office, Dadaab
Catherine	Khamali	Programme Officer, Diakonia Kenya programme
Japhet	Kiara	Humanitarian Officer, Kenya Country Team, Sida
Gloria	Kisia	Nutrition, UNHCR Dadaab
Christoph	Luedi	Head of Regional Delegation, ICRC
Ibrahim	Maalim	Senior Deputy Secretary, Ministry of State for Special Programmes, Office of the President
Catherine	Marangu	Regional Coordination Assistant, Nairobi Regional Office, COOPI
Vincent	Matioli	Ministry of State for Special Programmes, Office of the President
Jeroen	Matthys	MSF Belgium
Siv Catherine	Moe	First Secretary, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Nairobi
Sumananjali	Mohanty	Programme manager, Oxfam
Musa	Muritiria	Department for Refugee Assistance, Government of Kenya, Dadaab
Anne	Muthoni	Project manager, Makuru Slum Development Project (MSDP)
Ronaldd	Mutua	National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) Dadaab
Natasha	Nadazdin	Emergency Officer, WFP
Anne	O'Mahoney	Country Director Kenya, Concern Worldwide

Name	Surname	Job title/ Organisation
Robert	Odhiambo	National Officer, Emergency Post-Crisis Unit, IOM Eldoret
Alice Oyaro	Okuto	Country Programme Manager-Kenya, Diakonia Regional Office for Eastern & Southern Africa
Lilly	Omondi	Plan Kenya
Elsa	Onyango	Free Pentecostal Fellowship in Kenya (FPFK)
Bernard	Orimbo	Programme Manager, Child Protection, Save the Children UK, Dadaab
Qurat-ul-Ain	Sadozai	Programme Director, Norwegian Refugee Council, Kenya & Somalia
Naeem	Shah	Project Manager, Environment and Livelihoods, NRC Dadaab
Stephanie	Shanler	Project Officer, Child Protection, UNICEF
Aya	Shneerson	WFP
Alex	Tameno	Programme Officer, Roads and Environment, Swedish Embassy, Nairobi
Peter	Thuku	Free Pentecostal Fellowship in Kenya (FPFK)
Claudio	Torres	Project Manager, Nairobi Regional Office, COOPI
Mabonga Kennedy	Wafula	Education Manager, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) Kenya/Somalia
Olivia	Yambi	Country Representative, UNICEF

The table above shows that the team consulted with a wide range of stakeholders:

- Sida's Kenya Country Team staff members in Nairobi
- Donor representatives
- The Ministry of State for Special Programmes
- OCHA, including the ERF manager
- UN agencies and IOM
- NGOs (international and local)

Most of the consultations were interviews with individuals or staff members of a single organisation. However, the team conducted a focus group discussion with Sida's NGO partners (and used the 'spokes' technique presented in section 4 and described in detail below). The team also conducted 14 focus group discussions with beneficiaries of projects funded by Sweden. In addition to these consultations, a team member recorded an interview with Star FM, a radio station affiliated to the BBC and broadcasting in English, Swahili and Somali. The aim of the interview was to inform local communities in the Dadaab area about the Sida evaluation and highlight its key findings. The radio station translated the interview into Somali and broadcast it during its news bulletin.

To complement the interviews, the team visited 12 projects funded by Sweden, either bilaterally or through the ERF and the CERF. The table below provides a full list of the projects that the team visited, including their locations and who the team consulted. The team selected the projects to cover a cross-section of Swedish funding channels and implementing partners (within the constraints of geographical location – for example, ERF-funded projects tend to be located in more remote parts of Kenya such as Turkana and Pokot so the team visited projects in Nairobi instead). The team chose to visit:

- A UN agency project funded bilaterally by Sida (implemented through NGOs)
- An NGO project funded bilaterally by Sida (Oxfam-Concern project)
- Projects funded by Sida through framework agreements and implemented directly (NRC) or through local partners (PMU through FPFK)

- ERF funded projects in Nairobi's informal settlements
- A CERF-funded project (IOM's project in Eldoret)

### Spokes technique

The objective of the spokes exercise is to help participants identify the characteristics of a topic. During this evaluation, the team asked groups at headquarters and field levels to identify the characteristics of effective humanitarian assistance. The team consulted three main groups using the spokes technique – Team Sweden in Stockholm (Sida, the MFA and MSB), Sida partners and aid recipient communities. The results of the exercise with Team Sweden and Sida's NGO partners working in Somalia are reported in section 3.



Male group engaged in spokes exercise

Spokes is a very simple activity. The characteristics that the group identifies are represented as symbols (so that the exercise is comparable across countries and groups). During the evaluation, participants in the exercise were asked to draw each characteristic on post-it notes that were then arranged in a circle. Each characteristic/post-it note is joined to a central point by lines drawn on the ground, or on paper etc to form a wheel. The centre represents 0 or a complete lack of delivery on the characteristic with the top of the line to the characteristic representing complete delivery on it. Participants discuss and mark on each spoke the delivery on the characteristic (translated into stars in the table in section 3). The photograph here shows the results of the spokes exercise with Sida's partners.

Participants have found spokes a very accessible tool that gives them space to think and discuss with others in the group whilst keeping their focus on the issues under discussion.

Projects/sites visited	Objectives	Implementer	Interviews/FGDs
CERF-funded shelter construction project and subsequent peace-building and livelihoods project in Eldoret.	Project information not provided.	IOM	Interview with 3 project staff. 1 FGD with around 22 men (including spokes technique) and 1 with 25 women in Chepkanga.
Mount Elgon Clashes: Emergency Humanitarian Relief Project (2007-February 2008). The project addressed the needs of those displaced by conflict in Cheptais and Kopsiro districts. Financed through Sida's framework agreement with PMU InterLife.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Providing humanitarian emergency relief food (maize and beans) and non-food items (kitchen sets, blankets, mosquito nets) to 2,750 families (16,500 persons) in two divisions of Cheptais (1,057 families) and Kopsiro (1,693 families) respectively.</li> <li>– Facilitating quick recovery from the disaster through provision of farm tools and seeds to 2,750 families.</li> <li>– Providing bursaries to the bright but displaced secondary school students in which 10 boys and 10 girls benefited. The bursaries were shared equally between the two clans.</li> <li>– Empowering stakeholders from both clans in disaster risk reduction and management. This was through a stakeholders' workshop that involved 35 participants.</li> </ul>	FPMK (for PMU InterLife)	Interview with 1 project staff. 1 FGD with around 12 men (including spokes technique) and 1 FGD with 8 women in Kopsiro.

Projects/sites visited	Objectives	Implementer	Interviews/FGDs
Cash for Work project (rehabilitating a feeder road) in Mount Elgon region (Kopsiro, Cheptais and Kaptama districts). Financed by ICRC.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– To assist conflict affected vulnerable families with cash income for them to meet their food and non-food needs;</li> <li>– To build community assets that are beneficial to the community; and</li> <li>– To boost local business in the project area</li> </ul>	KRCS	1 FGD with 15 men and 1 FGD with 11 women (including spokes technique) in Kubra.
Provision of child friendly spaces. UNICEF programme part-funded by Sida.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– To improve the effectiveness of humanitarian actors and government structures to prevent and respond to child abuse, exploitation, violence and neglect</li> <li>– To strengthen community-based approaches and structures to prevent and respond to child abuse, exploitation, violence and neglect</li> <li>– To promote children's healthy growth and development through psychosocial support and fostering children's participation</li> </ul>	Save the Children UK	Interview with 2 project staff members (1 male and 1 female). Over twenty-five children between the ages of five to seventeen were seen playing.
Sida-funded NRC camp management training programme in all 3 Dadaab camps.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Improve quality and raise standards in service delivery and management in the camps through training and capacity building of camp management stakeholders including the host community</li> <li>– Encourage community based initiatives with camp residents and host community participating in identification, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation</li> <li>– Strengthen capacity of Camp Management Agency, Sector Agencies and Community Members in promoting an active role of the community in the management of the camp.</li> </ul>	Norwegian Refugee Council	Interview with 1 project staff member. Focus group discussion with 11 men in Ifo camp.
Nutrition programme in Ifo camp (as part of health services). UNICEF programme part-funded by Sida.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Build the capacity of health facilities to offer quality essential nutrition services.</li> <li>– Prevent and address acute malnutrition in children pregnant and lactating women</li> <li>– Strengthen coordination mechanism in the camps</li> <li>– Strengthen nutrition surveillance systems and reporting on key nutrition indicators</li> </ul>	GTZ	Interview with 2 project staff members in Ifo Hospital, Section N, Ifo Camp. Discussions were held with over ten staff members. Over seventy patients were present on the day of visitation.
Provision of health services in Hagadera camp. UNICEF programme part-funded by Sida.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Provision of primary health care, reproductive health care, emergency and community health programmes</li> <li>– Provision of nutrition programmes (therapeutic, outreach, supplementary feeding) for pregnant, lactating and new mothers and inpatient feeding.</li> </ul>	IRC	Two senior health practitioners (male and female) along with about nine health workers were interviewed.

Projects/sites visited	Objectives	Implementer	Interviews/FGDs
Provision of health services in Dagahaley camp. Sida was supposed to fund project from January–December 2010. Project also funded by Norwegian MFA and ECHO.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– To provide quality health care through four health posts to Dagahaley Refugees and host community</li> <li>– To provide comprehensive primary health care to Dagahaley Refugees and host community</li> <li>– To provide comprehensive Nutrition Program aimed at treatment of acute malnutrition in under fives in Dagahaley refugee camp and host community</li> <li>– To provide Hospital and Health posts with adequate buildings, water / sanitation and waste management facilities</li> <li>– Improved quality of care through sufficiently trained staff in the Dagahaley project.</li> </ul>	MSF Switzerland	Interview with 1 project staff member at Health Post 6, Lagdera District. Discussions with about seventeen patients.
NRC Youth Education Pack project for Dadaab refugee camps and host community. Partly funded by Sida.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Provide access to basic literacy and numeracy skills to youth 15–24 who have limited or sporadic education due to conflict, displacement and refugee impact</li> <li>– Provide access to practical vocational skills training for youth - increasing chances of regular income and livelihood.</li> <li>– Provide access to life skills training for youth, in an enabling environment for personal development and psychosocial support</li> <li>– Provide and facilitate access for girls to education</li> </ul>	Norwegian Refugee Council	Interview with 1 staff member. FGD with 10 girls from different classes in Hagadera camp (food and beverages, tailoring and hair and beauty). Included spokes technique. FGD with 5 boys and 5 girls in Ifo camp (including some from host community). Included spokes technique.
Oxfam and Concern cash transfer project to address food security crisis in urban informal settlements in Nairobi. Funded by Sida. Three phase programme with Sida's funding used for 6-month initial crisis stage involving cash transfers.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– To improve access to food for the most vulnerable households in selected settlements in Nairobi.</li> <li>– To develop longer-term food and income security initiatives.</li> </ul>	Oxfam, Concern and Mukuru Slums Development Projects (MSDP)	Interviews with 2 project staff members. 1 FGD with 7 men (age range: 23–51) from households of 4–8 people and 1 FGD with 7 women (age range: 31–48) from female-headed households. Both FGDs included spokes technique.
COOPI project to address food insecurity in Mathare and Huruma informal settlements (through conditional cash transfers and urban agriculture). ERF funded.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– To contribute to household food security and improved nutrition amongst the most vulnerable in informal urban settlements</li> <li>– To improve access and utilisation of food in vulnerable, urban poor households facing emergency food insecurity in Huruma and Mathare informal urban settlements in Nairobi city.</li> </ul>	COOPI	Interviews with 2 project staff members. 1 FGD with 13 women and 1 FGD with 5 men in Mathare.
Concern project to address food security in Nairobi informal settlements (including through Outpatient Therapeutic feeding Programme (OTP)).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– To provide emergency nutrition response for under-five malnourished children, mothers and vulnerable groups in the urban slums of Nairobi and Kisumu</li> </ul>	Concern Worldwide	Interviews with 2 project staff members. FGD with 9 mothers with babies in the OTP programme at Baraka health centre.

## References and Resources

Development Initiatives is a group of people committed to eliminating poverty.

We engage to promote better understanding and more effective use of the resources available for poverty reduction. We try to empower by putting this information, and the capacity to use it, in the hands of those who will eliminate poverty.

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## Evaluation of Sida's Humanitarian Assistance

This case study was prepared as part of the evaluation of Sida's Humanitarian Assistance (2010:4). It focuses on assessing Sida's funding and work in Kenya and attempts to learn lessons from this to inform the future humanitarian strategy and programming.

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