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Sida Decentralised Evaluation

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Evaluation of the Life and Peace Institute – LPI

Final Report

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**Final Report
March 2012**

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The views and interpretations expressed in this report are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida.

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TABEL OF CONTENTS

ACRONYMS	3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	5
1. INTRODUCTION.....	7
1.1 EVALUATION APPROACH	7
1.2 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY	7
1.3 LIMITATIONS.....	8
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT	9
2. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF LPI PROGRAMME	10
2.1 LPI.....	10
2.2 LPI'S SIDA SUPPORTED PROGRAMME.....	11
3. FINDINGS.....	12
3.1 RELEVANCE.....	12
3.2 EFFECTIVENESS.....	16
3.3 SUSTAINABILITY	20
3.4 EFFICIENCY	21
4. EVALUATION CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED	23
4.1 RELEVANCE.....	23
4.2 EFFECTIVENESS.....	23
4.3 SUSTAINABILITY	24
4.4 EFFICIENCY	24
5. RECOMMENDATIONS.....	26
5.1 EXPANSION OR CONSOLIDATION:	26
5.2 METHODS AND TOOLS:	26
5.3 POLICY WORK AND AWARENESS RAISING:	27
5.4 CROSS FERTILISATION OF THEORY AND PRACTICE:	28
5.5 DONOR RELATIONS:	28
ANNEX 1 - LPI'S PEACEBUILDING WITH REGIONAL PARTNERS PROGRAMME	29
ANNEX 2 - LPI'S ETHIOPIA PROGRAMME.....	38
ANNEX 3 - LPI'S SOMALIA PROGRAMME	45
ANNEX 4 - LPI'S SUDAN PROGRAMME	54
ANNEX 5 - LPI'S DRC PROGRAMME	59
ANNEX 6 - LIST OF PERSONS MET	72

Acronyms

AACC	All Africa Conference of Churches
AAU	Addis Ababa University
ACTS	Alternatives for Conflict Transformation in Somalia
ACRL	African Council of Religious Leaders
ADEPAE	Action pour le Développement et la Paix Endogènes
APC	Action pour la Paix et la Concorde
ASP	Action Solidaire pour la Paix
AU	African Union
CBO	Community Based organisation
CCAP	Comité de Coordination des Actions de Paix
CCI	Cadre de Concertation Intercommunautaire
CDM	Cadre de Dialogue et de la Mediation
CENI	Commission Electorale Nationale Independante RDC
CNDP	Congrés National du Peuple
CPA	Common Programme Activities
CSO	Civil society organisation
CT	Conflict Transformation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EPLO	European Peacebuilding Liaison Office
EPRDF	Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU	European Union
FARDC	Forces Armées de la Republique Democratique du Congo
FDLR	Forces Democratique de Liberation du Rwanda
FECCLAHA	The Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa
HAB	Horn of Africa Bulletin HAP Horn of Africa Programme
ICCO	Inter-Church Organisation for Development Cooperation
ICD	Inter Community Dialogue
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IFA/zivik	Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen – Civil Conflict Resolution
IGAD	Inter Governmental Authority on Development.
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IRCK	The Inter-Religious Council of Kenya
LFA	Log-Frame Approach
LPI	Life & Peace Institute
MONUSCO	Mission de l' Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NCCK	National Council of Churches of Kenya
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee
PAR	Participatory Action Research
PDC	Peace and Development Committee
PDSC	Peace and Development Centre
PME&L	Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation & Learning
PRP	Programme with Regional Partners
RBA	Rights Based Approach
RIO	Réseau d'Innovation Organisationnelle
SD	Sustainable Dialogue
SMART	Specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and timely (indicators)

Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SONAD	Sudanese Organisation of Non-violence and Development
SPL	Somali Peace Line
SWCC	Somali Women Contact Committee
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
TNG	Transitional National Government; Somalia
ToR	Terms of Reference
ToC	Theories of Change
UN	United Nations
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlement Programme
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
US	United States

Executive Summary

As part of Sida's decision-making process for the support to LPI's 2010-12 programme, it was decided to include a mid-term evaluation of the programme.

According to the Terms of reference (ToR) and the agreed Inception report the objectives of the evaluation are:

- To provide the basis for Sida and LPI to jointly assess the relevance and effectiveness of LPI's conflict transformation programme – (as defined in the Sida appropriation for 2010 to 2012)
- Support LPI to further develop its programme for the implementation period 2012-2015
- Facilitate Sida's future decisions regarding continued support with an emphasis on the quality of LPI's capacity development efforts

The overall objective of the Sida supported LPI programme is: *“That LPI has enhanced the role of civil society in peace-building and that its partners are able to contribute in a professional way to peaceful development and change through conflict transformation theory and practice.”*

To contribute to the overall objective, LPI has selected three interrelated strategic priority areas:

1. Civil society support and engagement,
2. Policy work and awareness raising,
3. Cross fertilisation of conflict transformation theory and practice.

The evaluation looked at relevance, effectiveness, sustainability and efficiency and attempted to apply a methodology, which included participation of LPI and partners, documentary research, key informant interviews, observations and community consultation, validation, triangulation and a chain of evidence. The evaluation included visits to Kenya, Ethiopia, DRC and Somaliland. The assessment of the Sudan programme was performed through document research and interviews with LPI staff in Sudan as visas to Sudan were not obtained. Other limitations to the evaluation were the limited days and resources allocated in relation to the depth and breadth of LPI's work. Most informants can be viewed as 'stakeholders' as they were directly or indirectly involved, such as community members in conflict transformation work, but some independent informants were interviewed to avoid a possible bias in the findings. Another challenge was that most of the programmes assessed were started recently, from 2009 and onwards. Moreover, although the evaluation period was only approx. 2 ½ months, LPI's programme was developing during this period and thus it was challenging to evaluate a 'moving target'.

The main findings are the following:

Relevance:

LPI's programme is assessed to be relevant to the difficult and complex situation in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes where LPI works. LPI staff have a good understanding of the difficult situations, and they are further assisted by LPI's rigorous use of the Participatory Action Research (PAR) and conflict transformation (CT) tools. LPI has also made a relevant choice of partners, which all have peace building and CT as important priorities of their work.

Effectiveness:

The focus on capacity building of local organisations has proven effective in relation to the overall programme objective of contributing to the decrease of local conflicts. Combining PAR and CT, LPI has now a clear strategic outlook and vision of success, building on a coherent theory of change. Based on the training received from LPI, the partners have contributed successfully to the resolution of a few local conflicts (mainly until now in DRC) and have started CT processes in Kenya and Somalia which are promising.

The situations in Ethiopia and Sudan are difficult for LPI, given the approach chosen to strengthen civil society, since the space for CSOs has been narrowed in both countries recently, and it still remains to be seen if this will change in the near future.

Sustainability:

It is difficult to draw verifiable conclusions regarding the sustainability of the LPI programme, as most of the country programmes and partners are relatively new. However, the CT processes initiated are assessed as having a good chance of being sustainable as they have involved the major parties in identifying root causes and have empowered local actors to engage in CT processes. Nevertheless, it is necessary to monitor the CT work done in order to be able to prove the long-term sustainability of the CT process.

The capacity of the local partners in PAR and CT methodologies has increased and it is assessed that several partners are able to continue to carry out CT processes with local communities provided that they can continue to obtain funding and retain staff and provided that LPI increases its capacity building efforts in organisational development when needed. There has, however, not yet been much consideration as to how the knowledge acquired by the local partners of CT processes can be sustained and updated in the organisations and in the countries where LPI works once LPI cease to operate there.

Efficiency:

Based on the information provided to the evaluators and their general experience with programmes of a similar nature the team assesses that the programming costs are justified in relation to the outputs, but some of the country offices have too few programme staff, which may be considered efficient, but which could influence negatively on effectiveness and sustainability.

The main recommendations are the following:

Overall:

- Sida should continue funding LPI, but in such a way that transaction costs – for LPI as well as for Sida – are limited and allow LPI the necessary flexibility to be able to adapt to the difficult political and security contexts in which LPI operates in the field
- LPI should consolidate its programme over the remaining funding period

Methods and tools:

- The PAR processes as used by LPI should be clearly described and the first results should be documented
- The PME&L manual should be continuously updated as planned based on experience and it would benefit LPI's work if the monitoring system was clarified and improved.
- The partnership criteria tool should be strengthened to emphasise organisational and management structure in order for LPI to include organisational development as an important part of their capacity building, and the capacity building of partners should lead to more programmatic funding of partners.

Policy work and awareness raising:

- When the policy decision makers are included in PAR processes the policy work and awareness raising is effective, but it is not always possible to include national and especially international decision-makers actively in PAR processes. Therefore they need to be engaged in another way in which LPI should improve its strategies together with its partners.

Cross fertilisation of theory and practice:

- While LPI should continue its cooperation with Uppsala University and the Kroc Institute in the US, LPI should consider how it can further secure local ownership of the methods e.g., with local universities and/or build a 'community' of local CT organisations.

Donor relations:

- LPI should continue to give priority to and promote funding for the entire programme or, at least, for each country programme and should attempt to engage groups of donors at the overall programme level as well as at country level, while clearly distinguishing between lobby/ information and fund-raising work.

1. Introduction

As part of Sida's decision-making process for the support to the 2010-12 programme it was decided to include a mid-term evaluation of LPI's work in the agreement. Sida requested Indevlop to undertake the evaluation.

According to the ToR and the approved Inception report the objectives of the evaluation are:

- To provide the basis for Sida and LPI to jointly assess the relevance and effectiveness of LPI's conflict transformation programme – (as defined in the Sida appropriation for 2010 to 2012)
- Support LPI to further develop its programme for the implementation period 2012-2015¹
- Facilitate Sida's future decisions regarding continued support with an emphasis on the quality of LPI's capacity development efforts

The evaluation has – based on the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria - a focus on

- Relevance
- Effectiveness
- Sustainability
- Efficiency

1.1 Evaluation Approach

The evaluation was conducted from mid-November 2011 to January 2012 by Finn Skadkaer Pedersen (Team Leader), Andre Kahlmeyer and Pontus Modéer. It included a study of documents provided by Sida and LPI and interviews of a large number of stakeholders and some independent observers (see annex 6 and annexes to the country assessments).

In practical terms the time-line of the evaluation was as follows. 1) Limited desk study of relevant documentation provided by Sida, Mid-October 2011. 2) Inception meeting with Sida and LPI, 20th October 2011. 3) Inception Report finalised (finally approved 26 November 2011). 4) LPI provided relevant documents, 24th October 2011. 5) Study of documents and planning of field trips, early November. 6) Field trip to Somaliland, Kenya and Ethiopia 18. November – 2 December 2011. 7) Field trip to DRC, 15-20 January 2012 (Initially an attempt was made to travel to DRC in December where some programme officers were interviewed at the border, but the evaluator was not allowed entrance to DRC) 8) Interview on Skype with LPI Sudan. 9) Initial draft report presented to LPI at meeting in Uppsala, 1 February 2012. 10) Draft report sent to Sida and LPI, 13 February 2012. 11) Comment received from LPI and Sida (February – March). 12) Comments incorporated and Final draft report sent to Sida and LPI on 23.March 2012. 13) Meeting to discuss Final draft Report scheduled for 30 March 2012.

1.2 Evaluation Methodology

To assess the data gathered, the team applied the evaluation framework which was presented in the Inception Report²

The methodology contained the following principles for the evaluation:

1. A Participatory Approach.

LPI and its partners have been considered active participants in order to enable LPI and the organisations to improve their work by understanding the background for findings and recommendations. It was consequently attempted to have an open dialogue with LPI, so the findings were understood by LPI as they evolved and were likely to be acted on.

¹ According to LPI it was in December 2011 agreed with Sida to apply for a four-year period 2013-2016.

² Dated 26.11. 2011

2. Documentary research.
Documents presented by Sida, LPI, and partners, mainly concerning programme-related documentation and from open sources, e.g. analyses of the conflicts, policies and other relevant material.
3. Key informant interviews.
LPI staff, staff of partners, community members, diplomats, representatives of international organisations and other observers.
4. Observation and community consultation.
Observation of CT processes in communities and interviews with groups of community members involved in LPI initiated Participatory Action Research (PAR) activities – mainly in DRC and Kenya.
5. Validation.
The findings of each country assessment were presented to LPI staff and discussed with these, and initial findings were also validated informally with partners and when possible with independent observers.
6. Triangulation.
Comparison of information from various sources, methods and researchers – reports, interviews, observations - and from various countries.
7. Chain of evidence.
Several findings from various sources point to the same conclusion, which lead to a recommendation.
8. Risks and limitations.
Security situation and other factors hampered access to field information in Somalia and Sudan and there are, therefore, a risk that excessive extrapolation from the locations which were visited e.g. community interactions in Kenya and DRC.

In relation to each of the evaluation criteria; relevance, effectiveness, sustainability and efficiency, questions were formulated and presented in the Inception Report, and were used during the field-work for organising interviews and ensuring that the various aspects of the four criteria were sufficiently covered.

In practical terms the questions concerning relevance, effectiveness, sustainability and efficiency has guided the evaluation, and have also guided the presentation and content on the chapter on Findings (chapter 4) and the questions guided the following practical activities:

- Document research
- Interviews of stakeholders and observers
- Observation of LPI initiated community processes
- Interaction and group interviews with community members
- Analysis of research results for each country and draft country assessments
- Finalising assessments based on comments and additional information
- Comparing research from the various countries in order to collect the major findings on overall level and collect these into a comprehensive report
- Receiving comments to draft reports from LPI, internal quality assurance, and from Sida
- Finalisation of report

1.3 Limitations

This evaluation involved a limited number of days in relation to the depth and breadth of LPI's work in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes regions.

The most important limitation is that many of the interviewed persons were 'stakeholders' in the programme. They were mainly staff of LPI in Uppsala or in country offices, members of partner organisations or members of communities involved in the programme.

Mainly due to limited time and availability it was only possible to interview other informants independent to the programme in DRC and in Kenya. But interviews were conducted with observers, such as staff at Sida, who are not directly involved in the programme, but also with representatives of various embassies and of other international organisations, who can be considered independent observers. Most information is, however, from what can be termed 'stakeholders' who therefore have a 'stake' in the programme, and there may consequently be a potential bias in some of the findings.

In addition, the team did not manage to obtain a visa for Sudan, and the assessment of the Sudan programme is based only on document research and interviews with LPI staff in Sudan by Skype.

The team also encountered difficulties in entering DRC, which made two trips to DRC necessary. These difficulties also meant that the time for the intended finalisation of the draft report was extended.

Although the evaluation period was prolonged, the actual evaluation period was less than 2½ months, which is not long for an evaluation including five countries, but it was long enough to see that there were developments and changes in the thinking and methods of LPI, which is bearing witness to the fact that LPI is a dynamic organisation. This, however, does impose the challenge of evaluating 'a moving target'.

Another major challenge was the fact that, although LPI has a history in the countries it works in presently, the programmes and partners evaluated were relatively new, mainly starting from 2009 and onwards. It is difficult to establish verifiable conclusions on effectiveness and sustainability of conflict transformation work when most of the programme and partners are new. The fact that the programme is most advanced in DRC has meant that the information from DRC has formed the basis for many of the findings, but the information from DRC has to the extent possible been verified by information from other LPI country programmes.

1.4 Structure of the report

The report consists of six chapters. After a chapter on 'Background and Overview of the LPI Programme', the chapter on Findings presents the attempt to answer the evaluation questions in relation to each of the evaluation criteria; relevance, effectiveness, sustainability and efficiency. The two final chapters provide conclusions and recommendations, respectively.

Annex 1 – 5 of the report contains assessment notes for each of the regional/country programmes of LPI: The Peace building with Regional Partners in Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and DRC.

The content in this report builds extensively on the findings in the country assessments and can be considered as a synthesis of the findings in the country assessment reports. Although the synthesis report is written in such a way that it can be read without reading all of the country assessments, much of the argumentation and evidence for the findings in the evaluation report are to be found only in the country assessments in order to make the evaluation report too long.

The evaluation team would like to extend its sincere gratitude to LPI's staff in Sweden and in the regions, which has provided the team with excellent support and logistical arrangements throughout the evaluation period. Our work has also benefitted from LPI's patience, high responsiveness and a keen interest in learning from this experience. Also LPI's partners, embassy and community representatives provided valuable information and the team extends its gratitude to them as well.

However, it must be stressed that the content of this report and conclusions can only be attributed to the evaluation team and - unless expressly stated - not to any other persons or organisations.

2. Background and Overview of LPI Programme

2.1 LPI

The Life and Peace Institute (LPI) is an international and ecumenical center, which, through a combination of research and action, supports non-violent approaches to conflict transformation.

LPI's vision is *"a world where peace, justice and non-violent relations prevail through people's active work and commitment"* and its mission is: *"LPI supports and promotes non-violent approaches to conflict transformation through a combination of research and action that entails the strengthening of existing local capacities and enhancing the preconditions for building peace"*.

LPI was founded in 1985 as a result of an international conference concerning the churches' response to conflicts in the world.

Since its inception, LPI has carried out programmes for conflict transformation in a variety of countries, conducted research, and produced numerous publications on non-violent conflict transformation and the role of religion in conflict and peacebuilding.

The main focus of LPI's programmes has been on Africa, with LPI's Horn of Africa Programme being established in the early 1990s. Other initiatives have been carried out in Congo-Brazzaville, Croatia and East Timor.

The Institute is a registered foundation in Sweden with the Christian Council of Sweden as a parent body.

Its governing system consists of an international board of directors with 15 members constituted so as to provide balanced representation, taking into account e.g. denominational membership and gender, as well as expertise within such disciplines as peace and conflict studies, political science, theology, and other relevant areas. The board meets once a year to develop guidelines concerning the Institute's programmes, structure, management, research, and other activities.

An executive committee consisting of members of the international board meets on a regular basis and is responsible for preparing and implementing the board's decisions and accepts the annual budget, adopts the implementation plan, and approves new major programmes.

A proposal is presently being considered to make the board structure more efficient by only having one board so that, in effect, the executive committee becomes the LPI-board³.

The responsibility for the day-to-day planning, coordination, and administration of LPI rests with the Executive Director supported by a Senior Management Team based in Uppsala, Sweden. The office in Uppsala has approximately 12 employees and roughly 25 employees are engaged in LPI's peace-building programmes in three field offices: Nairobi, Khartoum and Bukavu and a programme with two staff working in Addis Ababa.

During 2007-08 LPI underwent a major restructuring, especially of its regional offices. By 2008 LPI's new board reaffirmed and strengthened the focus on Africa and accepted a new strategic plan in May 2009.

³ According to LPI the proposal has been accepted and the change of LPI statutes and governance structure is now in place. From the start of 2012 a board of 7 who will meet five times a year (sometimes by Skype or similar virtual means), see <http://www.life-peace.org/who-we-are/structure/our-board> (visited 27. 02.2012)

The LPI Strategic Plan 2010-2015⁴ guides LPI's development and includes the strategic priorities that are further interpreted and elaborated in the Implementation plan 2010-2012 (similar in content to the Application to Sida) and in separate annual plans.

2.2 LPI's Sida supported Programme

Sida has supported LPI almost since its start and is presently funding LPIs programme for 2010-2012 with a total of SEK 68.5 million and is by far the biggest donor to the programme.

LPI's agreement with Sida is very complex and includes funding from a) the country unit for DRC, b) from the Sudan unit C) from the Somalia unit d) from the Humanitarian Department as well as e) from the Regional Cooperation in Africa budget line.

The programme has the following **overall objective**:

"That LPI has enhanced the role of civil society in peace-building and that its partners are able to contribute in a professional way to peaceful development and change through conflict transformation theory and practice."

LPI works with a theory of change *"through a combination of research and action that strengthens local capacities for peace-building which will contribute to a world where peace, justice and nonviolent relations prevail."*

To contribute to the overall objective LPI has selected three interrelated **strategic priority areas**:

1. Civil society support and engagement,
2. Policy work and awareness raising,
3. Cross fertilisation of conflict transformation theory and practice.

These strategic priorities are crosscutting for the programme's six **sub-programmes**:

1. Common Programme Activities,
2. Peace-Building with Regional Partners;
3. DRC Programme;
4. Ethiopia Programme;
5. Somalia Programme;
6. Sudan Programme.

For each of these programmes, a set of expected results has been developed. These expected results are presented in Annex A of the Agreement between LPI and Sida.

The programme is implemented in cooperation with civil society organisations in Kenya, DRC, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan and furthermore with academic partners in Ethiopia and Sudan. LPI states that as conflicts in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa regions are largely interlinked, LPI's work with these organisations is built on a thorough understanding of regional dimensions and with continental and regional partner organisations.

⁴ LPI's new board at the end of January decided to extend the plan to 2016
Evaluation of LPI

3. Findings

3.1 Relevance

Relevance is understood as: The extent to which the LPI programme is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor - including LPI objectives, Sida objectives and international agreements and conventions such as UNSCR 1325 and the Human Rights Convention.

Overall: LPI's programmes are assessed as being relevant to the difficult and complex situation in the Horn of Africa and DRC, where LPI works.

LPI staff has a good understanding of the difficult situations, and this is further strengthened by LPI's rigorous use of the Participatory Action Research (PAR) and conflict transformation (CT) tools.

3.1.1 Sida policies, Sida country priorities and international conventions

The Swedish Government explicitly values and promotes the importance of civil society capacity development in developing countries *"based on these organisations' own priorities"*. In its *"pluralism policy"* the Swedish government stipulates that irrespective of the situation (whether authoritarian, fragile or democratic) *"civil society actors have a unique ability (...) to act as agents of change"*⁵. It is furthermore underlined that: *"Swedish civil society organisations will contribute to capacity development in civil society organisations in developing countries"*.

As LPI's objective is to build capacity of civil society organisations working on conflict transformation, this is in line with the Swedish Government's general development policies.

In addition, LPI's country programmes are generally found to be in line with Sweden's strategic country priorities⁶. This is mainly due to the Swedish Government's clear general policy to support the creation of conditions for sustainable peace and reconciliation in countries affected by conflict.

In relation to international conventions, the team specifically assessed LPI's work with regard to the role of women and girls in 'conflict resolution and peace processes'⁷ as formulated by the UN Security Council⁸, with regard to basic human rights principles as expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, in relation to this, whether LPI applies a Human Rights Based Approach (RBA) to its work.

LPI has, for some time, been trying to formulate a gender policy and is reportedly close to finalising this⁹. The team found that LPI and its partners did use a gender sensitive 'lens' even in the absence of a formulated strategy. Although the evaluators are not gender experts, the draft is assessed as being of good quality, based on a solid understanding of the issue. It is including the relevant UNSCRs and covers three – mutually non-exclusive - strategies for a gender-sensitive approach to conflict transformation, which are all relevant to LPI's work. However, it needs to be developed more clearly (e.g. as an integrated part of the other tools, especially the PAR) to become a practical instrument for LPI staff, relevant for the work of LPI.

⁵ Government Offices of Sweden (2009), "Pluralism – Policy for support to civil society in developing countries within Swedish development cooperation".

⁶ It should be noted that Sida and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are presently considering its future policy towards Sudan, and that although Sida in Kenya does not directly support conflict resolution and CT, it supports efforts for improved governance and supports the Kenyan government's 'Vision 2030' and mid-term plan, which explicitly mentions reforms related to the underlying causes of conflict.

⁷ The UN resolutions use the terms 'conflict resolution and peace processes', where LPI use the concept of 'conflict transformation'. While there may be conceptual differences, LPI's work is clearly part of what the UN resolutions refer to.

⁸ Such as formulated in UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) see http://www.un.org/events/res_1325e.pdf and subsequent relevant resolutions reaffirming this: no. 1820 (2009), 1888 (2009) and 1889 (2009).

⁹ A draft, dated 04.10.11, of "LPI Gender Strategy" was shared with the evaluators.

Concerning the use of RBA to its work, LPI is reluctant to engage in this. The reason is that LPI is careful not to formulate principles, which might jeopardise its conflict transformation work. LPI representatives stressed that they sometimes have to engage with parties in a conflict, which have no respect for or are even against human rights principles (e.g. Islamists in Somalia).

Nevertheless the team observed that LPI staff and its partners did include elements of RBA in its work (e.g. inclusiveness of duty-bearer as well as rights holders in PAR). This was, for example, observed in the PAR work performed by NCKK and LPI in the Tana Basin River project in Kenya. This appeared to be based on shared values among LPI and their partners, which, as mentioned, are not comprehensively developed and formulated on paper.

LPI does not hide the fact that it is an ecumenical organisation and therefore has its roots in Christianity, and LPI staff claims that this does not affect its ability to facilitate conflict transformation work where partners and stakeholders do not share the same religious belief as LPI. It seems inconsistent that LPI claims that having policies on internationally accepted human rights principles could jeopardise its peace work, while at the same time arguing that belonging to a specific religious belief does not. It may be that the 'beliefs' are not what is important, but that LPI's facilitation of such processes with partners are inclusive of all relevant stakeholders and are unbiased.

3.1.2 Relevance of partners and capacity development of local organisations

All LPI's local civil society partners were assessed to be relevant seen in relation to the objective of 'enhancing the role of civil society in peace-building' and are assessed to be among the most relevant for the areas in which LPI has chosen to work. All organisations have peace and conflict resolution as the area of interest or, as in the case of the Kenyan partners, have this as a major interest area and a track record¹⁰ to prove it.

In Sudan there is a direct partnership with two community-based organisations (CBOs), whereas in Somalia a partnership with a CBO (Somali Women Contact Committee - SWCC) was originally attempted, but terminated because it became difficult to implement due to the weaknesses of the CBO. While the role of CBOs in conflict transformation is unquestionable, it is not clear whether it is relevant for LPI to have CBOs as direct partners or to have them as indirect partners through local and national NGOs. However, the argument raised by others¹¹ that supporting NGOs may establish them as 'gate-keepers' need to be considered seriously in order to avoid this negative effect¹².

It is, however, noteworthy that only one partner in DRC; (Reseau d'Innovation Organisationelle –RIO), and the two partners in Kenya, NCKK and IRCK, are part of the regional ecumenical and inter-religious networks, which LPI has been engaging with for many years and with whom it has a 'natural' affinity especially in relation to the relevance of regional exchange through regional ecumenical structures.

The capacity development of the NGO partner organisations has mainly concentrated on increasing their CT capabilities and, to a lesser extent, their general programme management capabilities. This is clearly relevant in relation to the objectives of LPI.

Although the diagnostic tool, which LPI uses for partner selection, called "partner criteria" as criterion 9, contains questions concerning structure of partner organisations, it seems that in some cases LPI has

¹⁰ One of the evaluators has closely followed the work of NCKK from 1999 to approximately 2008. The first three years managing Danish support to NCKK from the Danish embassy in Nairobi and subsequently by at least annual visits to NCKK in relation to consultancy work in Kenya. For a history of NCKK see <http://www.nckk.org/index.php/about-nckk/history-of-nckk.html> Similarly the evaluator has followed the work of IRCK although with less direct contact.

¹¹ In the case of SWCC and SPL see p. 52 below.

¹² Could possibly be identified and avoided by using a 'do-no-harm' lens.

paid little attention to whether the organisational governance and management structures actually work (e.g. Somali Peace Line, possibly for ASP in DRC and potentially for IRCK in Kenya).

Among the academic partners in Ethiopia (Addis Ababa University - AAU) and Sudan (Peace and Development Centre (PDSC) at Dalang University), it is assessed that the partner in Sudan is more relevant to 'enhancing the role of civil society in peace-building' as it is training NGOs in peace-building, while this is not the case in Ethiopia. Likewise PDSC may be relevant to cross-fertilisation activities as they engage with communities involved in CT work – at least to the extent where this is allowed by the government.

3.1.3 Participatory conflict analysis and locally-driven conflict transformation

The PAR process comprises actors from all conflicting groups and ensures that they are involved in the research and thereby determining which conflict issues are given priority. As expressed by participants in the Tana River Basin in Kenya and especially in DRC the constant feedback of research findings into the communities as well as the community's exposure to the perceptions of other groups of stakeholders generate willingness to meet the opposite sides and discuss the conflict issues. Thus, the conflict transformation process is triggered by PAR, which prepares the ground for further conflict transformation activities. Thorough conflict and context analysis through PAR constitutes LPI's main programming approach¹³. That the issues identified in the research are relevant for the community representatives is ensured by the participatory research approach.

An important element of the approach is its intended flexibility and potential to evolve and develop over time. As conflicts are analysed and become transformed by the local communities themselves, and as awareness is raised on how to deal with and solve conflicts communities are expected to be enabled to identify more diverse conflict roots or react to a changing conflict environment. However, the PAR is a time-consuming approach and although it does provide for flexibility, there may be a problem in reacting with sufficient swiftness to new evolving dynamics¹⁴. This does not take away the relevance of the PAR as a basis for CT work, but suggests that the tool may not be as useful to acute conflicts as it is to conflicts of a more chronic nature. Although it is not stated directly, LPI seems implicitly to be aware of this as the conflicts they and their partners are involved in presently are all of a more chronic nature. In this context it should also be noted that the PAR process encourages the communities to look for solutions to more long-term causes, which should lead to ending the cycles of violence often encountered in more chronic conflicts.

According to LPI staff and partners using PAR in DRC, vulnerable groups, and especially women, have over time become empowered through conflict analysis, and have been able to speak in public spaces and thus identify conflict issues, which are significant to them, e.g. stigmatisation and sexual violence. Although this claim should not be accepted at face value, there were examples of women from communities with a traditional paternalistic culture who were participating actively in meetings with the evaluators in Kenya as well as in DRC. This is indicating that PAR might positively affect the possibilities for women to be more active participants.

¹³ The Sustainable Dialogue (SD) for University students in Addis Ababa University may also become a systematic tool once the research on this is finalised, but is less relevant in relation to LPI's objective and the dialogue with Imams. Elders and women in Somalia is relevant in the situation, but cannot be considered to be a programme approach at the same level as the PAR.

¹⁴ E.g. one of the evaluators met with community representatives engaged in a PAR process the day after a bomb had exploded in a nearby town, allegedly planted by Al Shabaab. Consequently the representatives from the Somali community were unable to travel as police and other Kenyan security forces targeted Somalis at roadblocks for search and interrogation. While it was difficult to immediately react to such a sudden change in the conflict dynamics, it was not clear how the PAR process would deal with this in the short run

Full PAR processes have only been carried through in the DRC, while being under way in Kenya and having just started in Somalia and Sudan. It is consequently too early to fully assess the relevance of the tool. But according to LPI staff and partners who are using them, as well as interviewed community members in DRC and Kenya, the PAR processes together with the conflict transformation analysis (inspired by Lederach et.al.)¹⁵ have been relevant not only to analyse the conflicts and their root causes, but also to initiate dialogue between antagonistic communities in order to transform the conflict.

3.1.4 Track 2 approach

In conflict resolution and peace work reference is often made to track 1, 2 and 3. Track 1 is conflict resolution at a national and/or international level, including officials of government, leaders of rebellious groups, and international actors (e.g. AU and UN); track 2 involves actors such as Civil society organisations, traditional and religious leaders and other local leaders, while track 3 level also includes local community members who are directly involved in solving local conflicts.

In every country LPI is using a 'track 2' approach by building capacity of local partners. This has proven to be a relevant approach in relation to the partners assisting – 'accompanied' by LPI – in 'track 3' processes using PAR.

Whether supporting 'track 2' is a relevant approach in relation to 'track 1' processes cannot be confirmed. There has been engagement by LPI and local partners at 'track 1' level, but as yet mainly in an ad hoc and reactive way (e.g. DRC when politicians in the capital wrongly accused LPI and partners of omitting one stakeholder in the PAR process). The new Alternatives for Conflict Transformation in Somalia (ACTS) project is an attempt to engage 'track 1' actors – national government, Islamists, national organisations and regional actors - in a PAR. This project might be a way of testing a new way of engaging at 'track 1' level.

3.1.5 Regional exchange of knowledge, link with relevant regional institutions and links to regional processes

In its documents, for example in the application to Sida, LPI implies in places¹⁶ that there is a causal connection between the conflicts in the countries where it works in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region. To what extent there is a causal link between conflicts in the Horn and in the Great Lakes is questionable. While on one hand there are clear links between conflict in Somalia and the two conflicts in Kenya, in which LPI partners engage, it is conversely difficult to see what links they, in turn, have to the conflicts in Bukavu. And even inside the African Horn, little causal connection seems to exist between the conflicts being dealt with in e.g. South Kordofan and in Mogadishu.

This is important for the relevance of LPI's regional work. If there is no causal link between the conflicts, it is difficult to see the relevance of trying to influence them at a regional level in a joint effort. It appears, however, to be the intention to engage regional structures - the inter-religious and the ecumenical – in the efforts to influence e.g. AU and IGAD. Even if there might be an overall causality between the conflicts it is an issue if the work at 'track 2 and 3' level, which LPI and partners support, makes it meaningful to engage at a regional level in order to influence conflict resolution at this level. However, this does not mean that there might not be a specific conflict situation e.g. Somalia, where it would be relevant to influence regional organisations, when these are actors in the conflict e.g. AU and IGAD.

¹⁵ John Paul Lederach of the Kroc Institute of University of Notre Dame in the US is a researcher who has written widely on conflict transformation, e.g. "The Little Book on Conflict Transformation". 2003. Good Books. Intercourse.

¹⁶ See e.g. section 4.3 "Context Analysis" under the chapter on "Peacebuilding with regional Partners Programme" pp.21 ff It is stated here that the region is "... a tapestry of interlocking armed conflicts, humanitarian crisis and human suffering..."

This should not detract from the fact that there are clear similarities between the root causes and triggers of conflict, in which LPI and partners are engaged, e.g. land conflicts, pastoralists versus agriculturalists, the presence of small arms, etc. The objective of exchange of knowledge regionally is therefore seen to be relevant mainly among the LPI “family” due to the similarities of the causes of conflict. Presently the exchange of knowledge is relevant to improve and inspire LPI programmes and methods across the countries. This has, until now, mainly involved the LPI staff in the countries and headquarters, but is at least as relevant for the partner organisations.

Consequently the intention of creating links to relevant regional institutions to, for example AU and IGAD, is not seen to be relevant as a joint exercise. The relevance of influencing at ‘track 1’ level should be related to the specific conflicts which LPI and its partners are engaged in i.e. mainly on a national level but where regional organisations are directly involved such as in Somalia these could be lobbied in relation to the specific conflict.

The relevance of the regional exchange of knowledge is for LPI to learn from other conflict transformation efforts, share experiences and disseminate useful methods.

3.2 Effectiveness

Effectiveness is understood as: The extent to which the LPI programme attains its objectives i.e. it has enhanced the role of civil society in peacebuilding and partners are able to contribute in a professional way to peaceful development and change through conflict transformation in theory and practice.

Overall the evaluation team finds that the focus on capacity building of local organisations has proven effective in relation to the overall programme objective of contributing to the decrease of local conflicts. Combining participatory research and peacebuilding theory, LPI now has a clear strategic outlook and vision of success, building on a coherent theory of change.

Based on the training received from LPI, the partners have contributed successfully to the resolution of a few local conflicts (mainly until now in DRC) and have started CT processes in Kenya and Somalia, which are promising.

The situations in Ethiopia and Sudan are difficult for LPI given the approach chosen to strengthen civil society as the space for CSOs has been narrowed in both countries recently, and it is still to be seen if this will change in the near future. While it can be argued that there is a need for INGO presence in both countries to assist in raising awareness about the situation (LPI’s number 2 strategic priority), the scope for cross fertilisation of theory and practice (strategic priority 3) is also limited as there are severe restrictions on the practice side.

3.2.1 Local partners’ capacity

Those partners who have been involved since 2009 and earlier, such as the three partners in DRC and SPL in Somalia, but also a few of the newer ones, e.g. NCK in Kenya (and according to LPI staff also PCDS in Sudan), have, based on the interaction with these and based on the documentation provided, built up a solid capacity to employ PAR and CT methods. Until now the partner organisations have been ‘accompanied’ by LPI in their PAR and CT work. But based on the observations of their work in ‘action’ in DRC and Kenya, it is assessed that in the not too distant future – possibly within the timing of the second part of the present Sida application – two out of three partners in DRC as well as NCK in Kenya are likely to be able to function as professional CT centres in their countries. They will be able to work through their own local structures in communities and partner with relevant local and community-based organisations, although they will still need LPI for quality assurance and development of theories and methods.

Over recent years the number of partners has been reduced in almost all countries, in some countries considerably (e.g. DRC). The number in each country (one in Somalia, two in Kenya, three in DRC, three in Sudan and presently one in Ethiopia) is effective for LPI to work with and based on the team's observations and interviews with LPI staff at the relevant field offices, this limited number, means that solid capacity can be built in these organisations and the necessary 'accompaniment' can be done.

LPI's attempt to build links between academic institutions and CSOs, e.g. in Ethiopia and Sudan is potentially appropriate, but because of the limited space for CSOs in Ethiopia and Sudan the effectiveness is presently questionable. But the idea of local academic institutions functioning as providers of training of CSOs and to further develop the methodologies, as LPI is doing presently with international researchers, is potentially good and could serve as a model for national ownership and sustainability of methods and capacity development. It would be important, however, to ensure that the academic institutions are providing a valuable service for CSOs and are not conducting pure academic research.

3.2.2 PME&L, PAR and other tools

The **PME&L**¹⁷ has been developed over recent years and is, in its present form, a comprehensive tool, which has been made accessible to LPI staff and partners.

The PME&L contains conflict analysis methods, theories of change, basic logical framework approach (LFA) methodology and results based planning, monitoring and evaluation tools. While the conflict analysis tools are specific to LPI and its partners, the LFA and results based tools as described in the PME&L are general tools for development work, especially by NGOs and the PME&L and are not adapted specifically to the use of LPI and partners.

Although it is too early to conclusively determine that it is an effective tool, the indications are good as everyone interviewed who has been trained in its use were positive and stated that it either already had or that it would improve the work of LPI country offices and of local partners.

The PME&L is a working draft and will be adapted as more experiences are gained concerning its usefulness. It has proven to be potentially useful for improving LPI's work with partners, although there is clearly room for improvement, especially as to how the LFA should be used by LPI and its partners. Some partners stated that they found it very 'heavy' and difficult to comprehend and asked for it to be written in a more accessible language, and suggested that some of it, which is specifically related to the conflict transformation theories, could be translated into local languages (e.g. Kiswahili). As mentioned above the LFA part of the PME&L is still generic and not specifically related to the use by LPI and its partners or in CT work (and has a few factual mistakes¹⁸). Especially the chapter on monitoring does not give proper guidance to the LPI's field offices, e.g. at the Kenya office all monitoring of partners is based on self-assessment tools. While partners' own perception of their improved capacity is useful to know, it does not necessarily say much about how the capacity is implemented in CT work.

One issue concerning monitoring, which is more a matter of principle and a question to which the PME&L does not yet provide an answer, is what LPI should monitor? Capacity building of partners, for which LPI is responsible, the success of CT work, which is the responsibility of partners, but which is the ultimate aim of LPI's objective, or, even more relevant, to what extent the theory of change, which links the two is valid?

¹⁷ The edition reviewed by the evaluation team is the "Working Draft for Application" March 2011.

¹⁸ E.g. p. 36 where OECD/DAC's 'Impact' is compared to LPI's 'vision of success', where LPI's 'vision' is rightly similar to the 'development objective' in OECD/DAC terminology. Impact is the realised effects and not objectives or 'visions'.

As mentioned above **PAR** is an innovative and unique approach to peace building combining research, analysis and conflict transformation action, which gives grounds for LPI's and its partners' conflict transformation work in a thorough and solid analysis of the conflict and its context and, at the same time, forms the basis for and triggers a participatory dialogue and peacebuilding process.

In DRC the evaluators have seen an initial draft description of the PAR process as used by LPI, but it is unclear what the status is of this draft. The PAR process is not described in the PME&L, although the CT theories used by LPI are. But the team has observed the PAR being implemented in practice – in DRC and Kenya, respectively - and based on this, it has been observed to be a potentially effective tool for CT work. The usefulness and effectiveness still need to be documented and the conflicts in which it has been used need to be monitored for the long-term sustainability of the use of PAR and CT processes.

LPI uses a tool for assessing partners called “**Partner Criteria**”. This is quite a comprehensive tool, but as in the case of Somalia Peace Line, Action Solidaire pour la Paix in DRC, potentially in the case of IRCK in Kenya as well as the two community partners in Sudan, it is either not consistently used or the need to analyse if the organisational governance and management structures are ‘healthy’ is not sufficiently stressed in the tool.

Finally, it should be noted that the LPI office in Nairobi has been able to establish a valuable partnership with SPL, despite the fact that they are not able to travel to Mogadishu. This has been done without any ‘tool’ as to how this should be done but through ‘trial and error’. The difficulties and problems encountered have nevertheless been overcome.

In the past LPI was active in developing the internationally well-known tool of ‘Do-No-Harm’. The evaluators found little or no evidence that this tool is being used. Especially in DRC, it was found that its use could perhaps have contributed to an improved understanding of the conflict situation and could also be effective in the partner selection in general¹⁹.

3.2.3 Sub-regional dimensions of conflict

In the DRC assessment (see annex 1) the evaluation team writes: *“LPI’s partner’s research and work is very aware of the cross-regional dimension of the conflicts they are dealing with..... In short, conscious that the sub-regional nature of conflicts needs sub-regional collaboration and solutions, LPI is currently trying to reach out towards other Centers for Conflict transformation in neighboring countries. However, this sub-regional aspect of LPI’s work could be even more strengthened if LPI would be able to further scale up its programs in the Great Lakes Region”*.

Likewise, there is an increasing awareness in Kenya that the two conflict areas, in which LPI's partners work, are influenced by what happens in Somalia and vice versa given the Kenyan military engagement in Southern Somalia. The very recently initiated ACTS project may in part be an answer to this issue. While the effectiveness of the work of LPI and its partners could perhaps be improved by the awareness of the cross-border dimensions of conflict it raises two questions: Can and should LPI expand to relevant countries across borders? This would probably entail taking on the building of capacity of new partners and therefore demand further resources. And can PAR practically be carried out across borders with limited resources? Given the difficulties already encountered by international LPI staff in DRC of crossing borders it has to be considered whether these practical difficulties can be overcome and whether the transaction costs for the partners and LPI are worth the effort.

¹⁹ The issue of creating ‘gate-keepers’ by supporting NGOs and not CBOs directly (discussed in relation to SPL) is also an issue, where a ‘do-no-harm’ lens would be useful.

3.2.4 Policy-level work and awareness raising

Most of LPI's policy-level and awareness raising work takes place within the framework of the PAR. LPI and its partners involve stakeholders and sensitise them on conflict dynamics. The stakeholders are local and traditional authorities, community leaders, civil society actors, but also provincial and sometimes national authorities and even sometimes members of the international community in the PAR and subsequent conflict transformation process. Especially based on the DRC experiences it is assessed that this part of the awareness raising has been effective.

LPI states that it needs to develop a clear strategy for policy work: *"The process of developing a clear strategy for networking and policy work is still in the process of definition within the Institute. What the Institute has learned so far is that the research process – with all its technical aspects from the development of a protocol, tools for data collection, actual collection, analysis and so forth – needs to be paralleled by a policy process where stakeholders and decision makers are involved from day one and with clear roles and power. The policy process is equally important as the research process for successful work"*²⁰.

As it is not always possible to involve the relevant stakeholders at national or international level in a PAR process, LPI and its partners try to engage with these in other ways but as stated this is not yet based on a strategy. Therefore information of 'track 1' actors at national and regional levels has, as mentioned above, been ad hoc and reactive and therefore its effectiveness has been limited.

It should be noted that several European embassies have been well briefed by LPI staff, and this has proven valuable in relation to fundraising, but engaging with European embassies is not sufficiently effective in engaging decision makers at a national level (although they may use the information in the political dialogue with national actors, not least the government) and policy-work and fundraising are often not compatible.

Several of the partners, including the partners in DRC, NCKK and IRCK in Kenya as well as SPL in Somalia, have the potential of influencing national decision makers in addressing conflict issues at a national level, and should be supported by LPI to enhance that role.

The effectiveness of the regional inter-religious and ecumenical partners (i.e. ACRL, FECCLAHA and AACC) being instruments for regional policy work and for dissemination of CT methods and tools to local inter-religious and ecumenical organisations in the region is questionable based on interviews in Nairobi and based on LPI's own SWOT analysis from 2009²¹. While the national members in the region may be useful organisations for CT work given their broad membership base in local communities, the regional organisations are neither willing nor able to prioritise policy work and dissemination in an effective way. Presently, AACC's and FECCLAHA's cooperation with LPI consists of being members of the editorial board for the Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB). The HAB is being used as a tool to promote peace building and CT in the Horn, which, according to interviews of diplomatic representations, is quite effective. To what extent it is effective in influencing policy decisions has been impossible to verify.

3.2.5 Cross-fertilisation of theory and practice

LPI states in its application to Sida that:

"LPI engages in knowledge transfer, and makes the conflict transformation knowledge and experiences of LPI and its partners available for peacebuilding practitioners and research communities. At the same time, it gathers relevant theories and experiences from other contexts and organisations, and communicates them within LPI and to its partners".

²⁰ Application to Sida, p. 32f

²¹ "SWOT analysis for re-conceptualisation of PRP programme" dated 2009.07.07
Evaluation of LPI

The first PAR processes in DRC in 2010 and 2011 resulted in a first research and analysis cycle. Thus, LPI will now reflect upon its experiences with this analysis and peacebuilding tool and draw lessons for the future practice of peacebuilding with this tool.

LPI has traditionally collaborated closely with Uppsala University in Sweden and more recently with the Joan B Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies in the US and LPI is planning for these to assist with the documentation of efforts.

This cooperation has been useful for developing methods and has the potential to become even more useful in the future²².

It should also be noted that an academic cooperation has been established between Addis Ababa University (AAU), Uppsala University and Otario University in New Zealand, in relation to research of the impact of the Sustained Dialogue Project on students in AAU. Ethiopian researchers involved expressed their satisfaction with the academic cooperation, but it is too early to determine to what extent it has been effective in cross fertilisation.

In Sudan the Peace and Development Centre (PDSC) at Dalang University and two CBOs were initiating a PAR process in South Kordofan State, but it is presently unlikely that this cross fertilisation will be effective due to the political and security situation.

3.3 Sustainability

Sustainability is understood as: The likelihood of continuation or longevity of benefits from the LPI programme after the cessation of donor funding.

It is difficult to evaluate the sustainability of the LPI programme, as most of the country programmes and partners are relatively new, which is an effect of the changes in LPI from 2008 and onwards.

3.3.1 CT processes

Most of the present programmes and the applied methodologies are less than three years old, and only a few PAR and CT processes have been through the 'whole cycle'.

The assessment of the evaluation team is, however, that the CT processes initiated have a good chance of being sustainable as they have involved the major parties in identifying the root causes and have empowered local actors to engage in CT processes. Clearly the conflicts are not new and may resurface, so it is necessary to follow-up on new dynamics in the conflict areas by the partners in order to be able to prove the long-term sustainability of the conflict transformation process. In theory it is the strength of the PAR process that it should provide the involved with the opportunity to try to find solutions to more deep rooted problems and hereby avoid the resurfacing of the conflict.

3.3.2 Partners

The local partners have had their capacity built especially in PAR and CT methodologies and based on the team's observation of the partners' work in the field and interviews with staff, the team assesses that two out of three partners in DRC, and at least one partner in Kenya, will, in the near future, be able to continue to carry out CT processes with local communities with very little support provided they can retain the present staff and continue to obtain funding. Some of them, e.g. NCCK in Kenya, may be able to raise their own funds and several partners have the potential, if assisted, to do their own fund-raising and thus not rely on funding from LPI in the future. But this is an aspect of capacity building, which has not yet been prioritised by LPI.

²² A very recent example of this is the production of a book with articles on alternatives to the design of an inclusive peace process in Somalia <http://www.life-peace.org/resources/publications/other-publications/> (visited last on 28.02.2012) which will be followed up by a conference in Bruxelles and Nairobi respectively.

Besides fund-raising capacities, some of the apparently strong partners in CT issues and project management have weak governance and management structures, which may threaten their sustainability.

Presently there is little or no attention given to how to sustain the knowledge of methodologies in a relevant local institution outside LPI and the partners, but cooperation with local universities is on course in Sudan and Ethiopia.

3.3.3 The LPI programme

The sustainability of LPI's programme has been improved by increasing the number of donors, bilateral (e.g. Norway and Belgium), multilateral (EU) as well as other INGOs (e.g. Brot für die Welt).

There is, however, a need for LPI to be able to document that the LPI approaches work and to document the results of the supported projects in order to attract more donors to the full programme and not only to discreet projects. This again is related to the clarification of the status of the monitoring system, mentioned above. LPI needs to be clear on what and how they wish to measure their work. Clearly defined outcomes and outputs of the theory of change, which LPI uses, are important to convince potential donors of LPI's and its partners' professionalism and seriousness. It is assessed that it would be useful to ensure that such a monitoring system does not only include capacity building of partners through self assessments, but should also include the actual results of the partners being capacitated as well as indicators on the awareness raising and cross fertilisation in order to 'prove' that the whole LPI approach works.

3.4 Efficiency

Efficiency is defined as the outputs - qualitative and quantitative – being justifiable in relation to the inputs.

The financial management and a detailed study of costs of LPI and the programmes was, as agreed with LPI and Sida, not a focus for the evaluation. Based on the information provided to the evaluators and their general experience with programmes of a similar nature the team assesses that the programming costs are justified in relation to the outputs.

3.4.1 Support to partners

LPI provides funding to its partner organisations, including payments of programme staff, field visits and production of reports. This is necessary and justified if the objective is local capacity building, especially in a start up phase as is currently the case.

Presently, the contracts with most partners are for specific projects for a relatively short period of time and based on LPI's requirements and procedures. While this may be necessary in a start up phase it increases transaction costs especially for the partners although also for LPI.

3.4.2 LPI efficiency

Considering its own human and financial resources, LPI is currently working with an optimal number of partners. The strategy of close accompaniment and concentrated support for its partners is more efficient with the present limited number of partners, as these partners may then in turn be able to train others, with or without the assistance of LPI.

In addition, LPI has developed a PME&L system and makes use of it in its own programme planning and follow-up tools to monitor its capacity building programme and its work in general. In 2010 -11 LPI has introduced this system and approach to its partners and according to partners interviewed this will also increase efficiency of their work, although, as mentioned above, the monitoring tools need to be further developed and refined to LPI needs.

While the funding from other donors increases sustainability, it has high transaction costs as it mainly consists of project funding, which in turn requires its own monitoring and reporting.

The funding from Sida consists of six different funding sources, and as a consequence there is little flexibility for transfer of funds between the different budget lines, this further contributes to extra financial management work and increases transaction costs.

The evaluation has focused mainly on the country programmes, as this is where the actual work on conflict transformation takes place. It has not been possible, given the limited time and resources, to make a thorough evaluation of what is called the 'Common Programme Activities', but much of the support of the common programme activities to the field activities are mentioned above and in the country assessments, and it is assessed that the support from the CPA has contributed significantly to the efficiency of the work of LPI in the field.

While the evaluation has not looked specifically at the publications, e.g. 'New Routes', the content of the web-sites, etc., and the general administrative support to field offices in, for example, financial management, it is worth repeating that country offices and partners expressed satisfaction with the support they had received in training in PME&L and other tools from the 'common programme', and appreciated the work on strategy development, development of tools and of programme 'cross-fertilisation' as well as joint planning, which comes out of the 'common programme'.

In a period where LPI has re-calibrated its work and developed new tools, the cost of the 'common programme' seems justified. However, headquarters, where the bulk of those working on the 'common programme' are placed, has about a third of the total LPI staff. While that may be justified presently, there were a few voices stating that there was too little strategy development and planning taking place horizontally between country offices and between partners across borders from the respective countries. Instead processes were vertical between country offices and headquarters and from headquarters back to countries.

The work of the country offices is assessed as being efficient, but in at least one of the country offices (Nairobi) it was assessed that it was too efficient as the limited staffing for the Somalia and Kenya programmes could potentially limit effectiveness and threaten sustainability²³. Also in Ethiopia is the present management set-up efficient for the present situation, but will not be efficient for a longer period.

²³ The evaluators have been informed that this is being addressed.

4. Evaluation Conclusions and Lessons learned

The overall conclusion is that the relatively drastic changes initiated in 2008 have paid off, and LPI is now becoming a professional INGO specialising in CT. Innovative methods are being rigorously employed and relevant partners have been trained in these methods and if they can obtain their own funding and retain their staff, they will be able to use the methods independently of LPI in the future after a period of supervision from LPI. There is, however, a need to document the results of the first full 'cycle' of the PAR and CT processes finalised in the DRC and finalise a few similar processes in other countries, e.g., Kenya and Somalia, in order to more conclusively prove that the approach works.

4.1 Relevance

LPI's programmes are assessed as being relevant to the difficult and complex conflict situations in the Horn of Africa and DRC, where LPI works.

LPI rigorously applies the PAR processes and conflict transformation theory and these processes are perceived as relevant by the participating communities.

LPI's programmes are relevant to the Swedish government's overall development policies and to the Swedish policies for the specific countries in which LPI works. LPI is working with respect for international conventions and agreements, but because it has been necessary to engage with all actors in conflicts LPI has been reluctant to develop specific policies concerning Rights Based Approaches, and is presently instead finalising a gender strategy.

LPI partners with relevant organisations and has been able to assist in building their capacity in relevant conflict transformation methods and has accompanied them in implementing the tools.

The focus on the 'track 2' approach has proven to be relevant especially in relation to 'track 3' level interventions and is potentially relevant in relation to 'track 1'.

Regional exchange of knowledge and links to regional institutions and processes are relevant inside the LPI 'family' as many of the conflict root causes are of a similar nature. The regional causal links between the conflicts that LPI deal with are difficult to establish, except between Somalia and Kenya.

4.2 Effectiveness

The focus on capacity building of local organisations has proven effective in relation to the overall programme objective of contributing to the decrease of local conflicts. Combining participatory research and peace building theory, LPI now has a clear strategic outlook and vision of success building on a coherent theory of change.

The tools used by LPI have proven to be effective, at least in the short run. PAR is an innovative and unique approach to peace building, combining research, analysis and conflict transformation action. As is presently planned the results of its initial use will be documented and the PAR process will be described so it can be shared for replication and further cross-fertilisation.

The PME&L contains conflict analysis methods, theories of change, basic logical framework approach (LFA) methodology and results based planning, monitoring and evaluation tools. It has been developed over recent years and during 2009-2011 it has been presented to the country offices and partners. It is too early to determine conclusively whether it is an effective tool. Indications are good as those interviewed who have been trained in its use were positive and stated that either it already had or it would improve the work of the LPI country offices and local partners. The PME&L is presently a working

draft and still needs to be improved, especially in relation to how LPI wishes to use the LFA, including how it wants to be measured, i.e. defining clear results (outputs and outcomes) and monitoring tools.

The 'partner criteria' section has been used to select effective partners but could be more effective if it stressed also 'healthy' organisational governance and management structures as an important criterion.

The effectiveness of the tools may increase if they are supplemented by 'Do-No-Harm' criteria.

Policy-level work and awareness raising were found to be very effective when done inside the PAR processes. Outside the PAR the policy work and awareness raising were carried out on an ad hoc basis and reactively by LPI and its partners and was consequently less effective. The role of regional inter-religious and ecumenical structures will not be effective as it was envisaged in the original plans for the programme.

After the restructuring of the programme from 2008 and onwards cross-fertilisation has been done mainly inside the LPI 'family' and with Western researchers, and it has been identified that there is now a need for documenting and analysing the experiences of the PAR and CT processes, which have been through a full cycle. Cross-fertilisation between academics and practitioners has historically involved the University in Uppsala and recently the Kroc Institute in the US. This is planned to continue and has been useful already and has the potential to become much more effective, especially when the cooperation with Kroc has been tested.

In Sudan and Ethiopia, cooperation with local universities has been started, but it is presently doubtful whether or to what extent there will be cross fertilisation between theory and practice given the limited room for putting the theory into practice.

4.3 Sustainability

It is difficult to draw verifiable conclusions regarding the sustainability of the LPI programme, as most of the country programmes and partners are relatively new.

The CT processes initiated are assessed as having a good chance of being sustainable as they have involved the major parties in identifying root causes and have empowered local actors to engage in CT processes. But the conflicts are not new and may resurface, so it is necessary to follow-up in order to be able to prove the long-term sustainability of the CT process.

The capacity of the local partners has increased in PAR and CT methodologies and it is assessed that they are able to continue to carry out CT processes with local communities provided they can continue to obtain funding and retain staff and provided LPI increases its capacity building efforts in organisational development when needed. There has, however, not yet been much consideration as to how the knowledge acquired by the local partners of CT processes can be sustained and up-dated in the organisations and in the LPI countries once LPI ceases to operate there.

The financial sustainability of the local partners has not yet been a priority of LPI's capacity building.

4.4 Efficiency

Based on the information provided to the evaluators, and in the perspective of similar programmes observed by the team in the past, the team assesses that the programming costs are justified in relation to the outputs.

The support to partners is efficient seen from LPI's point of view but could be more efficient for the partners if more consideration was given to the partners' own programme and procedures.

Although approximately a third of LPI staff is based at the headquarters in Uppsala (which at first would seem to be excessive) this has been justified in that they have provided necessary development of methods and tools through the 'common programme' activities. Also they have provided strategic direction and planning in the re-structuring of the programme, which has taken place during the recent three- to four-year period.

It is assessed that field offices are efficient, but at least the field office in Nairobi could with limited additional staff increase effectiveness of its two programmes (Somalia and Kenya). The LPI management set-up in Ethiopia also needs to be reconsidered.

5. Recommendations

To Sida:

The overall recommendation is that LPI should continue to be funded, but in such a way that transaction costs – for LPI as well as for Sida – are limited and allow LPI the necessary flexibility to be able to adapt to the difficult political and security contexts in which LPI operates in the field.

The following recommendations are for consideration by LPI:

5.1 Expansion or consolidation:

1. Although the programme, which LPI is presently engaged in, is only three to four years old it has already produced good results, but in order to ensure that this is sustained it is recommended to consolidate the programme over the remaining period of the Sida funding. LPI could consider concentrating on where the major successes have been produced, i.e., DRC, Somalia and Kenya. Depending on developments concerning the space for CSOs in peace building and CT in Ethiopia and Sudan it should be seriously considered whether it makes sense to continue in these countries. It is a difficult decision, as both countries have serious potential conflicts, which could benefit from LPI's work. However, if civil society is hindered from acting effectively the LPI strategy and approach cannot function. If it is decided to close these country programmes, the resources might instead be considered to be used to gradually expand the sub-regional work around DRC and over the Somalia-Kenya border, provided that Sida is able to show such flexibility concerning its funding of LPI.

5.2 Methods and tools:

2. Although the evaluators have been impressed by the initial results produced by LPI and its partners by the use of the PAR tool, the evaluators have only seen an initial description of the PAR process as used by LPI. Nevertheless, it appears that PAR processes used in e.g., DRC and Kenya are very similar. It is, therefore, recommended that LPI - as planned and as soon as possible – describes its PAR process as it is presently employed to enhance sharing and 'cross-fertilisation' discussions and further refinement. This should be done in conjunction with the documentation of the most developed processes in DRC. Once the description and documentation have been concluded, it is vital to share the experiences more widely to further develop theory and practice. Considering the perceived uniqueness of the tools, more should be done in the coming years to exchange with academics and especially practitioners on an international level. The European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) might provide a forum for knowledge sharing in addition to LPI's already established academic partners: Uppsala University and the John B Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.
3. When the PAR has been described and possibly refined producing small accessible manuals in local languages with the purpose of informing local organisations , which are potential partners of LPI's partners, might be considered in PAR and CT processes.
4. The present PME&L tool is a solid basis for a LPI manual on how LPI works, plans and monitors its activities. The PME&L should continue to be a working document and be updated with new 'learnings'. There is still some generic material in the PME&L, especially concerning the LFA, which should be adapted to LPI use. This is especially relevant in relation to monitoring, where it is recommended that monitoring takes place at each of the various levels of the Theory of Change, which LPI uses. In addition, clearer guidance on LPI results with SMART indicators would greatly assist LPI in presenting concise applications and report clearly on results to its donors - such as Sida.

5. It should furthermore be considered to include an improved 'partner criteria' and the PAR description as part of the PME&L to have a comprehensive LPI-manual.
6. LPI should not become either a women's rights or a human rights organisation as this could jeopardise its reputation for neutrality and objectivity in its CT work. It is, however, recommended that LPI develop *internal* tools in relation to gender - as is presently being finalised - and on Rights Based Approaches. Both tools may be useful for LPI in order to improve its analysis of conflict situations as well as improving the 'partner criteria' assessment tool of partners.
7. LPI recognises that any development intervention, starting with the mere presence of an international organisation, has the potential to unintentionally reinforce local conflict dynamics and as LPI has been part of developing the 'Do-No-Harm' approach in the past, this approach should be reincorporated, strengthened and made more explicit in the partner selection and in the implementation of programmes.
8. The 'partner criteria' tool should be strengthened to better emphasise the organisational, governance structure of partners, such as representation, integrity, neutrality and other relevant issues of the organisational structure. When necessary the partner capacity building should include organisational development of partners and should include fund-raising methods to ensure sustainability of the partners.
9. The partnership approach used by LPI should result in more programmatic funding of partners and be based on the partners' strategies and procedures, when these are assessed to be in line with the overall objectives of the partnership and generally accepted management criteria.
10. As LPI and its partners work in very difficult conflict areas, it is likely that it will not be possible for LPI staff to travel to the conflict affected areas at all times, either because of security concerns (as in Mogadishu until recently) or because of government restrictions (as in South Kordofan State presently). Consequently, it is recommended that, based on the good and bad experiences concerning its work in Mogadishu and South-Central Somalia, LPI should develop a 'remote control' tool-set through which partners can be supported without LPI staff necessarily having to travel there. Besides 'remote control' of support to capacity building the tool should also contain practical ways of ensuring regular monitoring and reporting.

5.3 Policy work and awareness raising:

11. Through the PAR process all involved stakeholders become more aware of the causes of conflict and engaged in their solution, but although such PAR processes sometimes also engage national decision-makers, it is mainly a 'track 3' process. Information of national and international decision-makers is recognised by LPI as being important, but this has in practice been done in an ad hoc and reactive way. While there appears not to be any easy solution to a more planned and strategic approach to policy work and methods for engaging national and international stakeholders, a strategy and plan for this should be consciously considered and developed by LPI. 'New Routes' and not least the Horn of Africa Bulletin should be more targeted and consciously included in this plan.
12. More specifically information and lobbying in relation to regional structures (e.g., AU and IGAD) should not be a top-priority for LPI particularly when it comes to 'joint' lobbying given that there are little causal relations between the conflicts in which it is engaged. LPI should concentrate on building the capacity of its partners to engage with the relevant decision-makers at 'track 1' level

in relation to the specific conflicts they work on, this could include lobbying of regional structures, if such regional structures are actors in the specific conflict.

13. While LPI emphasises that the traditional ecumenical and interreligious regional partners function as tools for policy work and dissemination of methods, it is difficult to envisage that they can and or will play this role presently. While LPI should not give up on these traditional partners, who might become useful in the future, other avenues need to be explored. This could be with other like-minded INGOs (maybe some of the partners in EPLO).

5.4 Cross fertilisation of theory and practice:

14. LPI has traditionally had a close cooperation with the University in Uppsala concerning conflict resolution and has recently developed good relations with the Kroc Institute, University of Notre Dame in the US. Recent cooperation with Kroc has resulted in a publication concerning Somalia²⁴ and meetings concerning this are planned to take place in Brussels and Nairobi later in 2012. The cooperation with relevant research institutions in Europe and the US should be continued, with the consideration that the cooperation should always contribute to the CT work 'on the ground' and not merely become an intellectual exercise.
15. LPI should, in addition to the cooperation with US and European research institutions, consider how local ownership of the methods can be secured. This may be done by engaging with local universities and/or build a 'community' of local CT organisations.

5.5 Donor relations:

16. While the expansion of donors for LPI that has taken place is good for sustainability, it may be bad for efficiency as the new funding is mainly funding for projects. LPI should continue to give priority to and promote funding for the entire programme or at least for each country programme and should attempt to engage groups of donors at the overall programme level as well as at country level.
17. LPI should continue to engage with Sida to find a solution to the present structure of funding from six Sida sources, which limits flexibility and increases transaction costs on both sides.
18. While there may be an overlap between the potential funders of LPI and potential decision-makers in the conflicts that LPI is dealing with (e.g., European funders have an influence in UN organisations, and are in dialogue with the host country), LPI should in its information work clearly distinguish between lobby and information work concerning the conflict transformation work and the fund raising work. A specific fund raising strategy should be finalised (based on already existing draft).²⁵

²⁴ J. Lederach et al. "Somalia. Creating Space for Fresh Approaches to Peacebuilding" Life & Peace Institute 2011.

²⁵ Draft dated 03.01.2012

ANNEX 1 - LPI'S PEACEBUILDING WITH REGIONAL PARTNERS PROGRAMME

1. Introduction

This note presents the findings of the assessment of LPI's Peacebuilding with Regional Partners (PRP) Programme and forms part of the evaluation of LPI commissioned by Sida.

One of the evaluators visited Kenya from 22nd to 28th of November 2011. The evaluator interviewed a number of stakeholders and other informants: LPI's partners in Kenya, regional ecumenical and inter-religious organisations and diplomatic missions (see annex 1). The evaluator in addition had the opportunity to engage with community representatives who were participating in one of the projects.

The interviews were based on the list of questions presented in the Inception Report, but interviews were conducted in a semi-structured dialogue with the interviewees.

The evaluator wish to thank all persons met, for sharing their experiences and opinions in relation to LPI and especially the staff of NCCK, who made the visit to Machakos possible and facilitated the meeting with community representatives involved in the PAR process for the Tana River Basin.

2. Background

Programme content

In the application to Sida the 'vision of success' is formulated as follows:

"The partners' institutional resources and operational capacity to engage in non-violent conflict transformation are strengthened so as to become effective agents of change that, together with LPI, engage in conflict transformation research and action as well as policy work and cross-fertilisation of conflict transformation theory and practice".

Expected results are:

1. *"1. The Secretariats of the partners and national organisations in the areas targeted by the programme are able to analyse, strategise and act in conflict transformation.*
2. *LPI and partners have engaged in joint initiatives of research and action that are aimed at non-violent conflict transformation at the local level as well as policy making at the national and regional levels.*
3. *Innovative methodologies and tools for conflict analysis, scenario planning, monitoring and evaluation of conflict transformation interventions are developed in synergy with other LPI programmes and partners, and are made available to conflict transformation practitioners, the research community and other interested stakeholders."*

Partners are supposed to comprise the following:

The African Council of Religious Leaders (ACRL); The Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA) and its national member organisations in the countries targeted by the programme; The All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC); The National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and The Inter-Religious Council of Kenya (IRCK).

The programme is intended to be a regional programme, targeting Central Africa and the Horn of Africa, with a special focus on Kenya.

At the time of the evaluation the conflict transformation (CT) activities were only taking place in Kenya, together with two partner organisations; NCKK, which is a member of the AACCC and FECCLAHA, and IRCK, which is a member of the ACLR. (NCKK is also member of IRCK and through this of ACLR).

The aim of the PRP is that the capacity building of the two Kenyan organisations will be used as 'models' for other ecumenical and inter-religious national organisations in the region, and that possibly the regional organisations will be able to facilitate this.

Context

As also argued in the LPI application to Sida, conflicts in Kenya have severe consequences for the region as shown by the post-election violence in 2007/8, because transport and trade to Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan, DRC and parts of Somalia go through Kenya.

The post-election conflict is mainly centred in the Rift Valley and is by no means the only simmering and potential violent conflict in Kenya. Several conflicts in the various parts of Kenya at times turn into violence with considerable loss of life.

Kenya is presently in a precarious transitional period. There is a new constitution in place, which sets the scene for the elections in 2012. The new constitution envisages - among other important changes - a new decentralized governance structure, which will influence and hopefully improve regional and local governance inside Kenya. Several of the more influential Kenyan politicians are accused and will be tried by the International Criminal Court and the Kenyan army is involved in a military action in Southern Somalia, which has dragged on for longer than expected. These overall issues influence the many conflicts between communities in Kenya caused by e.g. limited natural resources (land, water, grassing) leading to tensions between pastoralists and agriculturalists, and inter-ethnic and religious divisions.

At the time of the visit by the evaluator to Kenya²⁶ there were only two LPI partners in this programme: NCKK and IRCK.

LPI has chosen to concentrate on two conflict areas: the Tana River Basin with NCKK and Marsabit with IRCK.

LPI and its two partners have for their joint efforts consciously avoided the Rift Valley, which has attracted much attention, and where many peace efforts have been made after the violence erupted following the elections in 2007/08.

Meetings and other planning during 2010 had initiated both of the partnerships, but the project activities only started in 2011, and contracts were signed in 2011 between LPI and the two partners.

Both of the projects deal with conflicts that have been on-going for decades and which have occasionally led to violence in the past and could do so again unless they are addressed.

3. Findings

Overall the findings confirm that LPI is partnering with two relevant and strong organisations, (although NCKK is more experienced and stronger than IRCK) which are influential members of their respective regional ecumenical and inter-religious organisations.

²⁶ Although AACR and FECCLAHA that are both members of the editorial board of the Horn of Africa Bulletin (HOB))

Together with LPI the two partners have selected two conflict areas for their conflict transformation work. Both of these are complex conflicts and as such the LPI tools and the capacities of the partners will be tested.

Only the project in the Tana River Basin with NCK had started with the implementation of the first phase of the PAR process. The initial research had been done and was soon to be presented to a validation workshop with the involved representatives from the communities.

The IRCK project in Marsabit had not yet started at the time of the visit, but the IRCK staff had been employed and trained and initial information on the communities had been collected.

Consequently, the following is mainly based on the initial findings of the NCK project.

Relevance

The projects are relevant for the situation in Kenya and with relevant partners.

Relevance in relation to Swedish policies and relevant international conventions and agreements

The objective of the LPI PRP programme of strengthening local partners' ability to engage in conflict transformation work is similar to the overall programme and as argued elsewhere, there is a clear match between Swedish development policies concerning the role of civil society in developing countries and of strengthening their capacity through the support of Swedish NGOs.

The Swedish government's policies²⁷ in relation to Kenya do only indirectly address conflict transformation. The summary of the Swedish country strategy for 2009-13 states:

"The overarching goal of Swedish development cooperation with Kenya is a Kenya in which all poor people have the opportunity to improve their living conditions, and where their human rights are realised. The overall strategic dialogue issues are: economic growth, just and equitable distribution of resources and opportunities, a rights perspective in policymaking and policy implementation, the fight against corruption, and implementation of vital reforms to address the historical obstacles to development that lay at the root of the violent outbreaks at the beginning of 2008. Development cooperation with Kenya will be focused on the following sectors: democratic governance and human rights, natural resources and the environment, and urban development. Aid will be provided for implementation of key reform programmes and support will at the same time be extended to civil society in order to generate pressure for their implementation".

It may be argued that the support to capacity building of key Kenyan organisations involved in CT work is supplementing Sweden's support to local NGOs, which in Kenya is administered by UNDP, UNIFEM and UNICEF. Especially the UNDP's Civil Society Democratic Governance Facility²⁸ supported by Sweden may be argued to be in line with the LPI support at its attempts to galvanise civil societies demand for governance reforms including the government's contribution to solving conflicts.

LPI's support is seen to be in line with the overall policies of the Kenyan government such as the 'Vision 2030'²⁹ and the 'Mid-term programme' which both make specific reference to the necessity to tackle root causes of conflict in Kenya as a means for sustainable development. While LPI and its partners do not 'tackle root causes' it facilitates processes where these are identified and where possible solutions at community level are found.

²⁷ Swedish governments's country strategy for Kenya <http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/574/a/93986>

²⁸ <http://www.ke.undp.org/index.php/projects/civil-society-democratic-governance-facility>

²⁹ <http://www.vision2030.go.ke>

Engaging with NCK staff showed that they were well aware of human rights and gender issues and they were not afraid of voicing their views about these in their PAR facilitation, as observed in Machakos in Kenya. This engagement sparked off interesting discussions - with traditional and religious leaders contributing together with women - of women's role in conflict transformation and also about the responsibility of officials in protecting the rights of the population while they also stressed the obligations of community members to contribute to protecting vulnerable groups and behave as responsible community members and assist in conflict resolution.

This example of an open discussion at community level of the role of women and of rights, which also included traditional leaders of communities of patriarchal cultures and Muslim Imams, did not underpin LPI's reluctance to develop policies concerning rights and use RBA - on the contrary.

Relevance of partners and capacity development of local organisations

Both of the partners are highly relevant.

NCK has since the early 1990s been an important advocate for improved governance in Kenya and for human rights principles as well as for more pro-poor development. It has a network of member churches, which covers the whole country and through this has been able to mediate in many local conflicts. NCK is represented in relevant national committees and councils dealing with conflict resolution and national reconciliation.

Through its local inter-religious councils, IRCK has built a reputation of being able to mediate in conflicts with religious overtones.

NCK is very conscious that it is sometimes perceived as not being neutral because it is a Christian organisation. Therefore, in some cases they have summoned inter-religious councils to assist in their conflict mediation work. However, generally they were found to be accepted by the community members also those of other religious persuasions for their work as they e.g. respected and included relevant religious leaders in their work and was seen doing so in the PAR process observed.

Conflict analysis and PAR

The evaluator participated in a meeting with representatives from three of the four main Tana River Basin ethnic groups that had been through the first part of PAR and would participate in a validation workshop in the near future regarding the initial research done. Also the interviewers, who had collected information from community members, were present.

The community representatives explained that they had initially been sceptical about the project, as there had been various peace initiatives in the past, also one led by NCK, as these initiatives had led to little change. Therefore several representatives admitted to having been reluctant to participate, but after the initial meetings where the methods and approach had been explained they had agreed to participate, and they were now quite enthusiastic about the process and looking forward to the next step, which is the validation of the findings based on the interviews with community members. They found that the approach taken in this project had, for the first time, allowed them to express what they themselves found were the major issues and now they had an opportunity to understand what the 'opposing' communities found to be their main concerns. This enabled them to have an exchange of opinions and possibly find a compromise.

Based on the meeting with the community representatives, which lasted several hours, the tools employed by NCK and learned from LPI, PAR and CT, can be tentatively judged as relevant for the participating communities, but it is too early to draw any firm conclusions based on the short time the project has been implemented.

The evaluator had a discussion with NCKK programme staff after the meeting with the community representatives concerning the flexibility of the PAR process in order to learn about new changes in the situation. The discussion was triggered by the fact that the fourth ethnic group, which had been invited to the meeting, did not show up. This group was the representatives of the Somali community. Apparently they had attempted to reach Machakos, but had not managed to do so because police and security forces had targeted Somalis travelling and held them up at roadblocks. The reason for this was a bomb that detonated in a near-by town, allegedly planted by Al Shabaab.

Obviously the research is done within a specific period of time and can take in new developments, but the discussion as to whether the tool is sufficiently flexible to include sudden changes ended inconclusively.

LPI also has a tool called scenario planning and it may be wise to use this in the volatile situation, in which Kenya will be for the coming year at least; with an upcoming verdict from ICC, a new constitution with devolved structures and not least an upcoming election.

Track 2 approach - advantages and disadvantages

Partnering with strong organisations with networks all over the country gives a possibility for these organisations to successfully facilitate PAR and CT processes at community level and both organisations have representation at a national level, which might also be used for relevant intervention at 'track 1' level.

Programme approach and link with regional processes

The intention of using the two relatively strong national Kenyan organisations as 'models' for other national organisations, which are members of the regional ecumenical and inter-religious bodies, is a relevant way of proceeding. But based on the relatively little interaction with headquarters of these regional bodies, it is difficult to imagine how these will be relevant as facilitators of such a regional dissemination of methods and experiences. Probably other channels would have to be identified.

Effectiveness

Local partners' capacity

NCKK is a solid organisation with a network of member churches covering the whole country. NCKK has a long track record in various development and advocacy projects and has at times played a constructive role in the democratisation of Kenya. Since the beginning of the 1990s it has also been involved in peace efforts, some of which have been successful and others less successful. NCKK is listened to also at a national level.

Concerning organisational development, there is probably little that LPI can teach NCKK, but NCKK staff expressed an eagerness to learn the tools for CT from LPI and was excited about the PAR process, which they had initiated. The three staff persons involved in the project - paid by LPI - showed very good skills and understanding and were supported by high-level management of NCKK and by local programme officers in the field.

NCKK is a partner, which in a short time has proven to be effective in the initial phases of the PAR and CT work in the Tana River Basin. It is likely that after 'accompaniment' by LPI in the Tana River Basin project NCKK will be able to continue their CT work - with minimal support from LPI. NCKK should also be able to fundraise for their CT work, but they probably need to be able to document their accomplishments in the field and may need LPI's assistance for this as well as an introduction to relevant donors.

The IRCK had at the time of the interview not yet started the PAR process in Marsabit, but staff had been employed and had been trained by LPI, and were confident that they would be able to facilitate a PAR process with the assistance of LPI.

IRCK is a less established organisation than NCKK and although high-level management is actively supporting this project – the Executive Director participated in the meeting with the evaluator – it is necessary for LPI to assess how the organisation as such performs and look closely on governance and management structures.

Sub-regional dimensions of conflict

As described by the example above concerning the Somali community, the conflict in Somalia has an effect on the conflicts in Kenya. This has become increasingly clear with the activities of the Kenyan army in Southern Somalia. It may increase the effectiveness to take this dimension into consideration and possibly build links between the Somali and Kenyan partners.

Policy-level work and awareness raising

NCKK is represented at the 'National Steering Committee on Peace-building and Conflict Management' and other relevant national committees, as is IRCK, although to a lesser extent. This provides the potential for effective policy level work.

The churches and religious leaders may also, although with caution, be used to build awareness of the CT work among the population at large.

The effectiveness of the regional inter-religious and ecumenical partners (i.e., ACRL, FECCLAHA and AACC) as instruments for regional policy work and for dissemination of CT methods and tools to local inter-religious and ecumenical organisations in the region is questionable based on interviews in Nairobi and based on LPI's own SWOT analysis from 2009³⁰. While the national members in the region may be useful organisations for CT work given their broad membership base in local communities, the regional organisations is not either willing or able to prioritise neither policy work or dissemination in an effective way.

Presently AACC and FECCLAHA's cooperation with LPI consists of being members of the editorial board for the Horn of Africa Bulletin (HAB). The HAB is being used by LPI as a tool to promote CT and peace building work in the Horn, which it according to interviews of diplomatic representations is found useful. To what extent it is effective in influencing policy decisions has been impossible to verify.

Cross-fertilisation of theory and practice

The work of the partners in Kenya is based on the PAR and CT methods developed by LPI. According to the LPI staff the experiences of the application of these in DRC, where they are most advanced in their implementation, is informing the use in Kenya.

The Horn of Africa Bulletin is also according to LPI's application to Sida, seen as a tool for cross-fertilisation in the region. To what extent this has worked is difficult to assess, but based on the issues of the Bulletin studied it provides analyses of conflicts in the region and news related to these, but it does not provide much information on LPI's own experiences or the experiences of similar peace initiatives.

³⁰ "SWOT analysis for re-conceptualisation of PRP programme" dated 2009.07.07

Sustainability

The sustainability of the programme is difficult to assess as it has been started relatively recently, but provided that the PAR process continues as started in Tana River Basin and if NCCK is able to retain the committed staff, the expected sustainability of the NCCK project is good. So is the possibility of NCCK as an organisation to be able to carry out its own CT work after a period of support from LPI.

It is difficult to assess the sustainability of the IRCK project in Marsabit as this has not yet started 'on the ground'. LPI need not only support IRCK in its CT work, but also 'keep an eye' on their organisational development to ensure sustainability.

The present PRP programme is almost exclusively funded by Sida and it is probably difficult to fundraise for a Kenya programme, which is only in its up-start phase. There are, however, concerns among staff in several European embassies that the conflict threat in Kenya will be exploited by unscrupulous politicians in the build up to the next elections and therefore there might be possibilities to raise funds from these embassies, when more of the CT work has been documented.

Efficiency

Also efficiency is difficult to assess given the limited time of the projects.

Although the partners appear relatively strong and self-confident and they expressed they were content with the support they had received from LPI, the fact is that the LPI office has a limited capacity, as it is also responsible for the important programme in Somalia. It is reason for concern that no programme officer is specifically assigned to the PRP programme and can support its work and assist in documenting results to be shared with other national members of the regional networks.

LPI's partner agreements are presently short-term and based on LPI procedures. This adds to transaction costs for not least the partners.

4. Evaluation Conclusions and Lessons Learned

Although it is too early to conclude on two projects, which are only in their initial phase, a few points can be emphasized.

Overall conclusions:

The conflicts in Kenya - and the threat they cause to effect neighbouring countries - are sufficiently serious to deserve their own LPI country programme.

- The selected partners are relevant and have a potential for being effective and their work may become a model for other national members of regional ecumenical and inter-religious organisations.
- Presently the regional ecumenical and inter-religious organisations are not likely to be able to disseminate the methods and models.
- Both partner organisations are sufficiently recognized and represented in relevant national bodies to not only use the capacity building at 'track 3' level but also at 'track 1' level.
- Staff of the partners has been trained in the relevant methodologies and are keen to apply them.
- The NCCK project has started well with a potential for being successful.
- Efficiency is good, but the human resources in LPI-Nairobi are limited, (this is reportedly being addressed).

5. Recommendations

1. LPI should reconsider the regional dimensions of the programme. There are sufficient arguments, also in the LPI documentation, for LPI having a specific national programme in Kenya and not subsumed under a regional programme.
2. The regional dimension is relevant but should be a shared responsibility among all the country programmes and not especially of the programme in Kenya. The partners in Kenya as members of regional ecumenical and inter-religious may in the future, when they have successfully implemented their own programmes be assisted, probably with LPI partners in other countries, to disseminate the tools and models to members of their regional organisations.
3. A regional programme as intended with the AACC, FECCLAHA and ACRL is probably not going to materialize in the short run according to the few interviews with representatives from these organisations, and there is a need to reconsider if these structures can become effective instruments for LPI as regional ‘bearers’ of regional cross-fertilisation and for spreading the tools and methods. While LPI should maintain a relationship with these structures, LPI should at the same time try to identify more dynamic structures (e.g. ecumenical or church based international development organisations or like-minded non-confessional INGOs). However, the evaluators are aware that an easy answer does not seem to exist (as proven by the SWOT exercise from 2009).
4. Regional cross-fertilisation has been limited outside the internal LPI ‘family’ and ways to improve on this have to be identified. The “Horn of Africa Bulletin” is one of the few instruments for regional cross-fertilisation, and it has mainly been used to present articles of scholars not related to the work of LPI. There are possibly no other magazine that concentrates on conflicts in the Horn of Africa, but there are other organisations, which publicise research on the Horn, e.g. Institute for Security Studies and the International Crisis Group. Some researchers said that they had found the Bulletin useful and some embassy staff members and LPI partners agreed. It should be considered whether HOD may be used in a more targeted way to gain more practical CT documentation while ensuring a division of labour with other research publications and organisations.
5. The Kenya programme – comprising the partnerships with NCKK concerning the Tana River basin and with IRCK in Marsabit – should be continued as started, and could probably benefit from:
 - a. LPI to support their work at the national advocacy level including
 - b. Assistance in developing possible scenarios not only for the two project areas, but also for Kenya being in this volatile situation with an upcoming verdict from ICC, a new constitution with devolved structures and not least an upcoming election
 - c. LPI should carefully observe if IRCK’s has a need for organisational development
 - d. LPI should move away from project funding to programme funding and assist partners in fundraising efforts as soon as the partnership is on a sound footing.

6. List of people met in Kenya

LPI:

Michele Cesari, Resident Representative

Wangari Mwangi, Manager of Programmes

Patrick L.K. Magero, Research & Analysis Advisor

Shamsia W. Ramadhan, Programme and Communication Advisor

Dr. Marleen Renders, Research Advisor

Peter Langat, Financial and Administrative Advisor

Ali Iman Ahmed

Edwin Gitonga Mugambi

Swiss Embassy:

Michael Cottier, First Secretary, Regional Affairs

NCKK:

Susie Ubutu, Programme Director

Caroline Mwai, Programme Officer, Conflict Management and Peace Building

Tom O'Mboyi, P.O. PME&L

Philip Okul, P.O. Research and Analysis.

Jennifer Mbatia, Regional Coordinator, Lower Eastern Region

IRC-K:

Dr. Francis Kuria, Executive Director

Linus M. Ntigai, Programme Officer, Monitoring & Evaluation

Hassan Mohamed Mutubwa, Programme Officer, Peace & Conflict Transformation.

AACC:

Arthur N. E. Shoo, Director, Empowerment and Capacity Building

ACRL:

Dr. Mustafa Ali, Secretary General.

Tana River Basin project representatives, Machakos:

Meeting with five community representatives from each of the three communities:

Kamba,

Orma

Wardei

Somali were absent

Plus representatives of the interviewers of the base-line study.

ANNEX 2 - LPI'S ETHIOPIA PROGRAMME

1. Introduction

As part of the Sida sponsored evaluation of LPI one of the evaluators visited Ethiopia from 28th of November to 1st December 2011. The three full days were spent in Addis Ababa where various partners of LPI and observers were interviewed (see list of interviewees attached as annex 1).

It should be noted that the interviewed mainly represent partner organisations and very few can be described as ultimate beneficiaries or as objective observers of LPI's work.

The interviews were based on the questionnaire presented in the inception report³¹.

2. Background

Context

While this is not the place to present an analysis of the political situation in Ethiopia, it should be noted that there are trends in the political developments which affect the possibility for LPI to contribute positively to its objectives. Several independent observers³² noted that generally the space for activities not controlled by the government and/or party – at least partly – was constantly narrowing and not only in the political sphere. Even though the economy is growing at an impressive rate, independent observers noted that the party is increasingly controlling the economic sphere. With regard to the political sphere the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) tightened its grip after the closely contested elections in 2005. This was recently illustrated by the fact that EPRDF and a small coalition of affiliated parties won 99.6 percent of all parliamentary seats in the May elections 2011, which - according to Amnesty International - "fell short of international commitments"³³. Some independent observers noted that Prime Minister Meles Zenawi - and with him part of the "old guard" – are planning to hand over power to a new younger cadre, which might be one of the reasons for this tightening of control.

One immediate effect on LPI of this narrowing of political space is that official legal status of LPI in Ethiopia has not been granted. After the introduction of the Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP) legislation in 2009, organisations – national as well as international - with objectives related to Human Rights, Governance and Conflict resolution and receiving more than 10% of their income from foreign sources cannot legally work in Ethiopia - or rather will not receive permission to operate. Exceptions seems to be if organisations work quietly on such issues, based on a substantial service provision programme e.g. in education, health, rural development or food aid. LPI has applied for legal status in Ethiopia but a decision has still not been taken - although LPI representatives informed the team that they have had indications of a positive attitude among highly placed officials.

Clearly the present programme and especially the planning for the future is affected by this issue, not least because the Sida representatives in Ethiopia clearly stated that they see the legal registration as a condition for LPI's presence in Ethiopia and for continued Sida funding for the Ethiopia programme.

³¹ Inception report 26.11.2011

³² Members of diplomatic missions and of international organisations based in Addis Ababa but having no relations to LPI or its partners

³³ <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/ethiopia/report-2011>

Programme content

LPI formulates the objective of the Ethiopia programme as follows:

“The programme leads to the capacity-building of Ethiopian academia and student clubs in conflict transformation theory and practice, through local CSO partners if development permit, in order to bolster the impact of local universities and other local partners in their context when it comes to peace and conflict related matters”.³⁴

The expected results - each related to a project presently being supported - are:

1. University students are equipped to affect dialogue initiatives within and open an analytical arena.
2. Peacebuilding practice and theory on impact assessment is improved through input from international and Pan-African networks
3. Local universities are strengthened in their capacity to contribute to a peaceful society.

Re 1:

The Peace Club at Addis Ababa University (AAU) has been supported since 2009. The Peace club includes app. 150 - 200 students annually at the AAU main campus (out of an approximate total of 10.000 students) and arranges bi-weekly moderated meetings for students to discuss and understand differences in ethnicity. The project has been progressing well and there are ongoing efforts to have the university pay the expenses of running the Peace Club, which is now being fully implemented by the students themselves.

Re 2:

In parallel to the Peace Club, LPI facilitates a research project called “Identity and Dialogue”, which includes researchers from AAU as well as from universities in New Zealand and Sweden. The results of the research were presented recently (November 19, 2011) at a research validation workshop in Addis Ababa. An international summit for similar student-led peace building initiatives in Zimbabwe and the US was arranged after the visit of the evaluator on December 16-18, 2011 with the aim of sharing and documenting best practices and lessons learned to be fed into future programming. The learning from the summit as well as 2009-11 AAU dialogues is in the process of being documented in a practitioner-oriented publication on the subject ‘universities as peace building arenas’ and is forthcoming in early 2012.

Re 3:

Concerning the strengthening of capacity of the AAU in conflict transformation research, LPI staff - Dr. Tarekegn Adebo – has since 2009 been seconded to the Department of Political Science and the Institute for Peace and Security to develop syllabi and curricula for courses and seminars. This arrangement is ongoing. Two publications concerning traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution in Ethiopia have been published in cooperation with the Ethiopian NGO Peace and Development Centre (PDC) and the National Council of Elders – a council of prominent Ethiopian figures engaged in national level mediation on the basis of Ethiopian peace-making traditions. A third consolidated TMCR-publication is underway.

In addition to these Sida funded activities in Ethiopia, LPI has conducted an evaluation of the peace work of Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), followed by a successful training course of NCA programme staff and partners. LPI has also entered into a contract with the German organisation “Broot für die Welt” (BfdW) concerning a mapping exercise of civil society peace building efforts in Ethiopia for which LPI intends to include the improved research capacity at the AAU.

³⁴ Sida application 2010-2012. In the Progress report to Sida for 2010 the objective is slightly reformulated to “The Ethiopia Programme aims to strengthen and enlarge civil society space for conflict transformation research and practice in order to promote an inclusive and comprehensive process of non-violent conflict transformation in Ethiopia”

3. Findings

Overall the findings confirm that LPI has largely carried out the activities as presented in the application to Sida. It has not been possible to include capacity building of national CSOs and include the Haramaya University in Dire Dawa, due to the political situation in Ethiopia.

Relevance

The situation in Ethiopia, with a limited and possibly narrowing space for independent civil society organisations working with conflict transformation, as well as the lack of legal registration of LPI, raises a fundamental question: Can LPI contribute meaningfully and substantially to “strengthen and enlarge civil society space for conflict transformation research and practice” or do the conflict resolution methods and capacity provided – in a modest way - facilitate and possibly contribute to the legitimisation of the present regime?

Just like many other international organisations working in Ethiopia, LPI is constantly assessing the situation and are aware of the hard choices which have to be made.

Relevance in relation to Sida’s policies

LPI’s programme objectives and activities in Ethiopia are in line with the Swedish government policies and priorities for Ethiopia as confirmed by the representatives of the Embassy as well as by studying relevant Swedish policies³⁵. Support to research and to increased capacity of universities is one of Sida’s priorities in Ethiopia, as is democracy and human rights.

Relevance of partners and capacity development of local organisations

Presently the main partner is **AAU**. This goes for all three projects: the Peace Club, the research programme as well as the strengthening of research and training in conflict transformation.

While support to the AAU in lowering ethnic tensions among students and building capacity of conflict transformation research and practice is relevant, it is not the most relevant in relation to the overall objective of LPI. But in the present circumstances AAU is one of the few possible partners for LPI. However, LPI’s choice to include a government university as a part of civil society is unusual and the lack of space for civil society organisations dealing with conflict deserves reflection. Although critical observers agree that universities do have certain autonomy and to a certain extent are able to conduct independent research, it is at the same time admitted – also by university staff interviewed - that criticism of government by academia would probably create problems.

The relevance of AAU as a main partner might have increased if AAU was able to support peace initiatives in Ethiopia through the relevant departments and institutes and to strengthen institutions and organisations working on community (or track 3) level. This is, however, not the case presently.

Concerning track 1, the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) at AAU is engaged in conflict research, mainly related to conflicts in Africa outside of Ethiopia (but is currently also undertaking a large national conflict mapping endeavour together with the upper house of Parliament, the House of Federation). This research is being used to inform and influence policies and decisions concerning African conflict interventions. Apart from the staff secondment of Tarekegn Adebo, LPI’s cooperation with IPSS has been limited, although continuous, probably mainly because IPSS is supported by much bigger governmental donors such as Germany (GIZ) and Denmark.

A previous close partner, **PDC** – the Peace and Development Centre – is a legally registered local peace organisation, but is awaiting exemption from the CSP provided by the executive branch of

³⁵ For an overview see: <http://www.sida.se/English/Countries-and-regions/Africa/Ethiopia/Our-work-in-Ethiopia/>

government in order to receive funds from outside Ethiopia for its peace work. During the interviews the staff at PDC expressed that they expected this to be forthcoming soon, partly due to PDC's good relations with government. PDC has been relatively inactive in recent times, mainly due to the exemption issue, but also because of management issues. Recently, however, a new and younger, well-educated management had been employed. PDC appears to be potentially a relevant partner – especially because of its links to the Council of Elders – and may become a future main partner if the exemption issue is solved.

NCA and BfdW are potentially relevant partners in Ethiopia. NCA's support and cooperation with the IRCE – the Inter-Religious Council of Ethiopia and other local church organisations could for LPI be a potential inroad for more effective support to peace transformation efforts at 'track 3' level. NCA has a relatively big development operation in Ethiopia including provision of water wells – boreholes – in rural areas.

The present partners are not the most relevant in general, but probably the most relevant of the possible partners. AAU may be able – with the support from LPI – as may NCA and its partners e.g. IRCE - to play a more constructive role and utilize the LPI tools and knowledge at track 3 – in relation to community conflicts in a development context e.g. around natural resources and inter-religious conflicts. Presently there are few of the "most marginalised groups" in Ethiopia that are affected by the programme although those are the intended LPI beneficiaries.

Conflict analysis and PAR

The interviewed researchers at the AAU found the LPI methods relevant and were grateful for the support in the form of methods and increased research capacity, but also admitted that besides the Peace Club, the practical implementation of the methods had been few.

According to NCA and PDC representatives LPI's approach to conflict transformation is relevant for organisations working in mainstream development, i.e. service provision, as the conflict potential in Ethiopia is high given the diversity in culture, religion, etc. among the various communities. LPI's approach to CT could pave the way for such service provisions as being part of a conflict transformation process, or ensure that the development efforts do not enhance the conflict potential, in which case a 'Do-No-Harm' approach might also contribute to the analysis.³⁶

Track 2 approach - advantages and disadvantages

The LPI approach in Ethiopia may at present be one of the only ways of operation for LPI, but it is questionable if it contributes sufficiently to the objectives of LPI to justify continuation. Working mainly with the AAU does not seem sufficient, unless LPI can facilitate that the conflict methods transferred to AAU are being applied more practically at level 3.

Although it is presently difficult to find civil society partners relevant for LPI's work, there are potential institutions, which may be able to work at community level, e.g. the Council of Elders and inter-religious and ecumenical organisations. These are potential partners with whom LPI already has had some cooperation.

Programme approach and link with regional processes

Addis, being host to the AU and to a number of regional organisations, provides LPI in Ethiopia with a unique possibility for using its experience and knowledge of crises in Africa to influence decision-makers in the AU and other regional organisations such as IGAD.

³⁶ For a discussion of LPI and 'Do-No-Harm' see especially the DRC assessment.

According to LPI staff in Addis as well as in Nairobi this is, however, not being utilized at the moment and LPI has not seriously considered this until recently. Representatives of the Embassy of Sweden suggested that LPI should seek accreditation to the Peace and Security Council of the AU, as this would also facilitate a legal presence in Addis.

Effectiveness

As already indicated above, the programme has not been effective at the overall level in relation to strengthening civil society's role in peace building, mainly because of 'external' factors, but it has been effective in implementing the three projects defined in the application to Sida.

Local partners capacity

In relation to conflict transformation in Ethiopia the AAU programmes are only at best indirectly effective as they do not reach the 'marginalised' groups, and little capacity has been built among civil society.

There has been built capacity at the AAU, but it is not certain that this will be used for the benefit of the intended target group and to organisations and institutions relevant for conflict transformation work.

PME&L and other tools

LPI's tools, including the PME&L - as recently presented to NCA staff and partners – are relevant for development work in Ethiopia according to the NCA, and also other Ethiopians involved in peace work (e.g. PDC and IRCE) confirmed this.

The extent to which it is relevant to academia is questionable. It was stressed by interviewed academics that the exchange of experiences with other researchers was useful, especially in Sweden, but also the conflict analysis tools used by LPI.

Sustainability

The three projects implemented are on the way to become sustainable.

The students are running the Peace Club themselves and have an understanding with the AAU administration, who may consider funding the relatively limited costs related to running it, which is mainly covering training of the moderators and minor running costs.

The research project is about to end, but there are already plans for continued cooperation between the involved universities.

Regarding the capacity building at AAU, the interviewed persons confirmed that the curriculum concerning peace studies had been improved and that new methods had been adapted. But it was more difficult for the interviewed to identify what effect that would have in an Ethiopian context. Some interviewed persons appeared to have a more or less 'mechanistic' belief that improving students' knowledge of conflict transformation methods would automatically translate into the solution of more conflicts and to less violent conflict in the long run in Ethiopia. Very few had considered alternative scenarios for the use of conflict resolution methods, such as government officials using these as part of the government or party agenda.

Efficiency

Besides Dr. Adebo, who is attached to the AAU, LPI's presence in Ethiopia consists of one person, Hannah Tsadik, who has served in different capacities since 2008 (currently as programme manager). She basically performs the roles of the programme manager, administrator and all other

necessary functions and works out of her home. Despite being an expatriate, she speaks Amharic and appears to be well connected and with a good understanding of the local context.

Under the present insecure circumstances this is an efficient way of running the programme, but it is not a long-term solution.

4. Evaluation Conclusions and Lessons Learned Conclusions and Lessons

- LPI's programme in Ethiopia has progressed as planned and generally conforms with the Sida application of 2009. Under the challenging situation, with LPI awaiting the decision concerning its legal situation, this is a noticeable achievement.
- However, for understandable reasons, both the relevance as well as the effectiveness of the Ethiopia programme - in relation to the overall objectives of LPI and to the situation in Ethiopia - is questionable, especially as the main and almost exclusive partner, the AAU, is not the most relevant and effective organisation in relation to the strengthening of civil society engaged in conflict transformation.
- The sustainability of the individual projects is promising and the programme management is under the present conditions efficient as a short-term arrangement.
- LPI's recent cooperation with NCA and BfdW has shown promising potential.
- While the support to improve the capacity of the AAU is in line with Sida policies it is doubtful whether it will lead to an increase of capacity among civil society for conflict transformation.
- Mainly thanks to an efficient programme manager, it has been possible to implement the programme according to plans under the difficult circumstances, but the management set-up is not sustainable for a longer period.

5. Recommendations

1. LPI has been awaiting the legal decision for a long time and should set a dead-line for its patience towards the achievement of this decision and already now start planning for the two basic scenarios a) legal status obtained and b) legal status not obtained.
2. LPI needs to make a decision in principle if it will continue work in Ethiopia if the legal status is not obtained.
3. If it is decided to continue working in Ethiopia without the legal status, it seems that several possibilities should be explored. Possibilities, which are not mutually exclusive, include:
 - a. If PDC is granted exemption from the CSP, it might be possible to have staff seconded to PDC as has been the case previously.
 - b. It might be possible to second staff to NCA and/or other ecumenical international organisations
 - c. Mainly use presence for regional cooperation. There appears to be two options for this a) Obtain consultative status with the AU, b) Second staff to IPSS to document experiences of LPI's work in Africa and inform and influence AU and other regional organisations.
4. If legal status is obtained, it may be possible to work more directly with civil society organisations (e.g., community organisations, ecumenical, inter-religious organisations, Council of Elders etc.) in close cooperation with PDC and NCA.
5. Regardless of whether legal status is obtained or not, it is important for LPI continuously to monitor the balance between unwittingly being co-opted by a repressive regime and maintaining and widening space for independent civil society in engaging in conflict resolution.

6. List of people met in Ethiopia

LPI:

Hannah Tsadik. Programme Manager

Dr. Tarekegn Adebo. LPI seconded personnel to Addis Ababa University, AAU

Norwegian Church Aid – NCA:

Svein Arne Lende . Country Representative

Dawit Kebede. Programs Manager

All African Council of Churches – AACC:

Rev. Iteffa Gobena. All African Council of Churches Ecumenical Envoy to the AU)

Addis Abeba University – AAU:

Prof. Habtamu Wondimu. Dean, College of Education and Behavioral Science

(Dr Yacob Arsano. Associate Professor, Dept. of Political Science and International Relations – telephone conversation)

Yonas Adeye. Acting Director, Institute for Peace and Security Studies

Eremiyas and Zinabu. Students from the AAU Peace Club. Secretary and Board member

Legal expert:

Debebe HaileGebriel. Legal expert on civil society law and operating environment; and LPI legal consultant

Embassy of Sweden:

Abdi Fom. Head of Development Cooperation at Embassy of Sweden

Lena Schildt. First Secretary; Regional Cooperation: Peace and security

Peace and Development Centre – PDC:

Ayten Anemaw – Executive Director.

In addition a few Ethiopian and international observers, who has no relations to LPI or its partners, have been consulted concerning the general political economic situation in Ethiopia.

ANNEX 3 - LPI'S SOMALIA PROGRAMME

1. Introduction

This note presents the findings of the assessment of LPI's Somalia programme and forms part of the evaluation of LPI commissioned by Sida.

As the security situation did not allow travel to Mogadishu and to the South Central part of Somalia, where the programme activities take place, and as it is presently difficult to obtain visas for Somalis to Kenya, LPI kindly arranged for the meetings and interviews with the Somali partners to take place in Hargeisa in Somaliland.

The interviews and meetings were supposed to take place over two days, Sunday and Monday 20th and 21st November 2011. Due to unplanned rescheduling of flights out of Mogadishu they were concentrated to only the Monday, but as all made an effort to accommodate the need for in-depth interviews, the time on Monday was spent very efficiently and the Sunday was used for a longer informal back-ground briefing by the LPI Resident Representative in Nairobi (Michelle Cesari) and the Manager of Programme (Wangari Mwangi).

Interviews took place with the following (see list of persons met in annex 1):

1. Four representatives for Somali Peace Line
2. Two representatives for the Elders' Council in Mogadishu
3. Two representatives for the Imams' Mosques in Mogadishu
4. One representative of Somali Women's Contact Committee (SWCC)
5. Two representatives from LPI in Nairobi

The interviews did not strictly follow the evaluation questionnaires³⁷, but interviews were conducted more as 'semi-structured' conversations. However, care was made to ensure that all the questions were covered to the extent possible. It should also be noted that many of the interviews were undertaken using interpreter.

It should be noted that the fact that the meetings took place in Hargeisa and were not possible in Mogadishu meant that it was impossible to interview and consult members of the affected communities and other important stakeholders.

Additional interviews were conducted in Nairobi the following week with representatives responsible for Somalia in selected embassies and with representatives of other INGO's working in Somalia. The evaluator also participated in a meeting in Nairobi with the Somali NGO Zamzam.

2. Background

Context

The mission to Somaliland and Nairobi took place a few weeks after Al Shabaab had left Mogadishu and the Kenyan army had started its operations in the Southern part of Somalia.

According to the representatives from SPL the retreat of Al Shabaab had opened up for more possibilities for peace work especially in Mogadishu, but it had also opened a power vacuum, which made the situation unstable and therefore the need for peace work at the grass-root level even bigger.

³⁷ See Inception Report

While the participants were still uncertain as to what effect the Al Shabaab retreat and the Kenyan operation would mean in the long run, they all agreed that a new dynamic was being created and a hesitant optimism existed among most people that in the long run the new dynamic would mean a more peaceful South Central Somalia.

Programme content

The objective – also called ‘Vision of success’ - of the Sida funded Somalia project is:

“Processes of non-violent conflict transformation centered on local sustainable structures are active in Mogadishu and targeted areas in South Central Somalia, complemented by policy work at the national, regional and international levels”³⁸.

Expected results:

1. Partners are able to analyse, strategise and act in conflict transformation
2. Partners have capitalized on their research and analysis initiatives by engaging in policy work on national, regional and international level.
3. The experience of the partners – both with regard to learning about the context and about the application of CT methodologies in that context - have been shared with practitioners, academia and donor agencies. This will benefit a necessary cross-fertilisation of theory and practice.
4. Innovative methodologies and tools for conflict analysis, scenario planning, monitoring and evaluation of conflict transformation interventions are developed in synergy with other LPI offices and partners and are made available to CT practitioners, the research community and other interested stakeholders.

LPI’s main partner in the Somalia programme is the Somalia Peace Line (SPL). A Somali NGO based in Mogadishu and working in South Central Somalia.

The project, which SPL implements, is a so-called “track 2” project. LPI’s support is mainly to build capacity of SPL and fund their peace transformation efforts. SPL then in turn supports traditional Elders, Imams and women’s groups in Mogadishu and targeted areas of South Central Somalia.

Sida is by far the biggest funder of this project providing SEK 22,238,000 for three years 2010-12, EC has promised € 290,000 for two years 2011-12, Church of Sweden SEK 400,000 and Norway NOK 150,000.

The second project, which has very recently started is called “Alternatives for Conflict Transformation in Somalia – ACTS”. This is a PAR project involving all major stakeholders nationally as well as internationally in the research and with an envisaged parallel policy process of the stakeholders.

The objective of the ACTS project is:

“Alternative options for non-violent conflict transformation in South Central Somalia have been generated and considered by key stakeholders inside and outside Somalia through a process of participatory research.”³⁹

LPI received confirmation that the ACTS project will receive full funding (approximately USD 420.000 for 16 months) from the Norwegian embassy during the evaluator’s visit to Nairobi.

³⁸ “Sida application 2010-2012” p. 65ff

³⁹ Project proposal – undated

As the project is only starting up and is not funded by Sida, it will be included only to a limited extent in this report.

3. Findings

Overall the findings confirm that the activities of the programme have been carried out as planned. This is no small achievement given that LPI-staff has not been able to visit Mogadishu and South Central Somalia. But LPI has found constructive ways of supporting SPL and monitoring the project.

Relevance

Sida and international conventions

There is a clear match between Swedish policies in general and Sweden's policies in relation to Somalia on the one hand and LPI's objectives in relation to the Somalia programme on the other hand. This is confirmed by representatives of the Swedish embassy in Nairobi as well as by comparing relevant policies.

Sweden's present objective for development cooperation is formulated as follows⁴⁰:

"Sweden's engagement in Somalia is aimed at promoting lasting reconciliation, stability and the re-establishment of effective governance".

LPI's objective of *"Processes of non-violent conflict transformation centered on local sustainable structures are active in Mogadishu and targeted areas in South Central Somalia..."* is clearly in line with this.

The Swedish government is presently developing a new Somalia-strategy, as the latest strategy is dated July 2009⁴¹. The support to Somalia is in this strategy linked to the UN facilitated Reconstruction and Development Programme which relies on the cooperation with the TFG. It is according to the representative from the Swedish embassy in Nairobi expected that LPI's Somalia programme will also be relevant in relation to the updated strategy.

Relevance of partners and capacity development of local organisations

SPL's organisational mission is formulated as follows⁴²:

"The Somali Peace Line (SPL) is adamantly committed [to] the empowerment of Somali People through facilitation of necessary attitude change to equip them with proper knowledge and skills that enable Somali people to solve their internal problems through dialogue"

LPI has partnered with SPL for approximately four years. According to the Resident Coordinator and according to LPI reports, LPI made a mapping of possible partners for peace transformation in South Central Somalia before entering into the partnership. It was found then that SPL was the best choice. According to the Elders, Imams and the SWCC representative there are no other organisations with such a clear mandate and long experience working with peace building in Mogadishu and South Central Somalia.

Also embassy representatives and representatives of other INGOs interviewed in Nairobi confirmed that SPL was an NGO with a solid track record and all agreed that this was a relevant organisation for LPI to partner with. They also agreed that strengthening traditional conflict resolution mechanisms such as the Elders Council and Imams and strengthening grass-root women groups is a relevant strategy for peace work.

⁴⁰ http://www.swedenabroad.com/Page_96124.aspx

⁴¹ See http://www.swedenabroad.com/SelectImageX/187877/Policy_Framework_Somalia.pdf

⁴² <http://www.tubta.org/tubta.php?catid=Organizational%20Mission> (last visited on 12.01.2012).

LPI reported that they had received criticism of a more theoretical nature for working through organisations like SPL as they were hereby strengthening “urban elite” local NGOs, and assisting them in being “gate-keepers” with the consequence of limiting the space for more spontaneous civic engagement in peace-building. This is a concern that LPI had considered addressing by partnering directly with e.g. SWCC. LPI reported that this was not carried through as it was realized that there were too many complications involved in creating a joint understanding with SWCC on basic concepts, methodologies, etc. and also in basic management principles such as financial accountability, monitoring and reporting. SPL was in a much better position to assist SWCC in these areas.

Based on the interviews and documents studied, and noting that the direct beneficiaries in local communities of the peace transformation support were not consulted, it can be concluded that SPL is most probably the most relevant partner for LPI for this programme and in turn the Elders Council, the Imams and SWCC are relevant organisations to work with through SPL for conflict transformation in South Central Somalia.

Conflict analysis and PAR

The SPL representatives during the interviews proved to have a very good understanding of the methods used by LPI for peace transformation and they all found the tools for conflict analysis and PAR useful in their difficult work. But they also noted that it was sometimes a challenge to fully use the tools in the environment in South Central. Scenario planning had to be constantly updated given the rapidly changing situation in the project area, and although cumbersome, SPL representatives saw the value of doing this.

The representatives of SPL, Elders, Imams and SWCC all agreed that they had benefitted from the training they had received on conflict transformation either directly (only a few) from LPI or indirectly through SPL. Especially some of the Elders gave examples of how this training had changed their behaviour – not only in peace work but in general - from making decisions as soon as a problem was presented to a situation where they listened to the various sides and tried to see the situation from several angles before making the decisions.

On the other hand LPI and SPL noted that the drastically changing situation in Mogadishu and surrounding areas had been a challenge in relation to the tools used, i.e. scenario planning, analysis etc., and they were now again faced with a new situation, for which it was necessary to analyse and redevelop scenarios.

LPI and SPL representatives were excited to have developed and formulated the ACTS-project, which could provide a better analysis of the situation and hopefully involve key actors in promoting solutions to the conflict.

Based on the limited interviews with some of the stakeholders it can be concluded that the tools for conflict analysis and PAR used by LPI and taught to SPL are relevant also in a situation, which has drastically changed over the recent months.

Track 2 approach - advantages and disadvantages

The ‘track 2’ approach – to build capacity of a local civil society organisations, which assist communities in conflict transformation, ‘track 3’ – and to advocate for peace support initiatives at the political level (e.g. among decision-makers among the conflicting parties) – are probably the only ways LPI can support peace transformation in Mogadishu and South Central Somalia in the present situation.

While the interviews indicate that good progress is being made on 'track 3', it is more difficult to determine what the influence is on 'track 1'. LPI and SPL representatives noted that SPL has easy access to the Somali TNG and other political actors in Mogadishu, especially through their well-connected chairperson. To what extent this was used and furthermore to determine if it had had a positive influence is difficult to assess.

Programme approach and link with regional processes

Based on reports and interviews with embassy representatives, LPI meets quite often with embassies which may be potential donors for the programme and LPI, and when possible SPL staff is participating in these meetings. Also, when possible, LPI attempts to integrate Somali partners in their delegation when invited to meetings concerning Somalia (e.g., UNPOS).

The embassy representatives interviewed all expressed that they were happy with this contact and with the information provided.

However, LPI mainly appear to be targeting embassies which may be potential funders and who only indirectly influence decisions concerning peace in Somalia in relevant international fora. The meetings are generally ad hoc and with each individual embassy at a time.

LPI is attempting to link up with some relevant international actors, but has not done this in a systematic way and based on an analysis of who should be targeted and in what ways. The Western mainly European embassies are probably not the most relevant seen from a stakeholder perspective. Relevant organisations such as AU and IGAD are examples of organisations, which have an important role to play in peace in Somalia, as are countries like Ethiopia and Uganda. LPI and SPL are not presently targeting such organisations and embassies. The ACTS project may form the framework for LPI to analyse the key international and regional stakeholders and create links to them.

Although the representatives of the Inter-religious ACRL and the AACC were aware of the programme in general, it was assessed that the Somalia programme is not integrated into regional processes in LPI's inter religious and ecumenical network except through the Horn of Africa Bulletin.

Effectiveness

As indicated above it is a notable achievement that LPI has managed to implement the Somalia programme as planned through a difficult period and build a solid partnership with SPL being a respected and trusted local NGO. With the training and financial support SPL has been able to support and build capacity among Elders, Imams and SWCC. To what extent this has contributed to peace building in Mogadishu and South Central Somalia was difficult to assess because of the restrictions on travel, and information on this remains therefore mainly anecdotal.

Local partners capacity

According to SPL's website, SPL's governing structure is as follows:

"The General Assembly is the highest body of SPL. It has a governing body, which comprises 9 executive members elected by the general assembly. The executive committee supervises the managing team in Somalia, mobilizes the required resources and ensures effective management of the organisation.

*Management team comprises a deputy chairman, programme officer, admin and finance officer, training & reconciliation officer, child protection and human rights officer, project managers and support staff that manages Somalia office. The managing team reports back monthly to SPL's Executive Committee"*⁴³.

⁴³ www.tubta.org (visited on 12.01.2012)

SPL has existed since 1995 and given that it has existed for more than a quarter of a century it is of concern that it was difficult to establish how its governance structure works. Although they were key members of the management team, the interviewed SPL representatives could not clearly explain the governing structure, give examples of who is in the governing body or when the last General Assembly meeting had been held.

The SPL representatives explained that the Board – the Executive Committee – mainly consisted of diaspora Somalis, who provided advice, but did not have influence on daily matters. The important decision-makers were, according to the SPL representatives, the Chairman and the Management team.

The SPL representatives noted that the strength of SPL was its inclusiveness – i.e., not based on narrow clan lines, its accountability in financial matters and to its partners, and its relevance to the problems faced by the communities it serves.

LPI staff explained that the existing chairman of SPL had recently accepted a post within the TFG structure and consequently had had to resign as chairman of SPL (at least temporarily) and that SPL suffered from a temporary leadership crisis.⁴⁴

However, at the secretariat level, SPL has well-educated and experienced staff, which was confirmed by the quality of the four representatives interviewed. The programme officers at the various embassies interviewed in Nairobi confirmed that SPL is among very few effective and efficient Somali NGOs working in Mogadishu and South Central Somalia, and SPL was consequently also popular with donors.

SPL is presently receiving donor support from UNICEF (Community Mobilisation on Child Protection in Emergency Situations), from the Danish Refugee Council (Protection of Internally Displaced Persons - IDPs) and from Novib/Oxfam (for strengthening youth organisations in peace building). SPL had also previously received funding from the Mennonites (for peace education in schools) and from others.

SPL representatives explained that although all the funded projects fall inside the – rather broad – mandate of SPL, the projects were administered according to the wishes and guidelines of each of the donors and consequently there was no concerted SPL strategy and no joint project management and monitoring in place. The short-term and rather erratic funding was identified as a major problem for SPL and for the sustainability of their programmes. They complimented the partnership with LPI – which they estimate is presently providing approximately 1/3 of their funding – for being a real partnership, which does not only fund activities over a multi-year period, but also provides capacity building mainly in the form of training. They also explained that LPI was assisting them in a process of formulating a new up-to-date strategy.

After some discussions the SPL representatives agreed that it would be useful to have one programme with different components according to a cohesive SPL strategy. Donors might then either provide core funding to the whole programme or, if they wished, they could fund specific activities but inside a concerted programme with one management and monitoring system. The SPL representatives expressed scepticism as to the willingness of donors to accept such a programmatic approach.

Given the situation in South Central the only way to work with peace initiatives presently is considered by LPI to be through local partners without a LPI presence. This poses obvious difficulties

⁴⁴ This was another reason – besides the evaluation – for LPI to arrange for the meeting in Hargeisa.

for LPI in order to monitor the programme closely and to assist with capacity building on a continuous basis. Nevertheless, LPI had managed to train SPL staff in the various tools - mainly as included in the PME&L - and had, although not without difficulties, been able to implement the monitoring procedure while being at a distance.

All of SPL's staff regretted that LPI could not come to Mogadishu and while they reported having benefitted greatly from the training, which had taken place outside of Somalia, they also expressed that the training would be even more useful if it was followed up by on-the-job training and they would like LPI staff to be able to do this as soon as the situation allows.

While a few elders' and SWCC representatives had participated in training activities organised by LPI, the Elders' Council in Mogadishu the Imams and SWCC are not direct partners of LPI, but benefits from support provided by SPL. The representatives of the three groups unanimously praised the training in conflict transformation, which they had received from SPL. While the Elders Council and the Imams had received some – mainly financial – support to improve their organisations and meet regularly, this was not the case for SWCC, which according to the representative and confirmed by SPL, had branches in most of South Central (approximately 54 branches according to the SWCC representative) and consequently had a big potential as a tool of involving women in peace transformation at least in the areas not controlled by Al Shabaab. Although it had been difficult to conduct a PAR in the project area due to the insecurity, conflict analysis and scenario planning was regularly done, and although it was poorly documented, SPL representatives praised its usefulness, but also realized that in a constantly changing situation like in South Central Somalia and Mogadishu it was a time-consuming effort.

In conclusion, the project has been effective in providing training to key staff of SPL (and a few from the indirect partners) in the topics included in PME&L. This has greatly contributed to raising the capacity of conflict transformation work.

Sustainability

From the findings presented above the main issue concerning the sustainability of the project is found to be the weak organisational structures of the involved organisations, not least the SPL and SWCC.

The fact that SPL is relying on a weak governance structure and donor defined projects and procedures is threatening the sustainability irrespective of how well qualified staff it can attract presently.

SWCC has great potential, but it appears that presently it does not have the basic infrastructure in place to be able to apply its potential when the possibilities might come up.

LPI has managed to attract other important donors to the Somalia programme, e.g., EU and Norway, which diminishes its dependence on Sida.

Efficiency

The LPI office in Nairobi works efficiently (see also report on the PRP-programme). However, there is only one Somali speaking person in the secretariat and this person mainly works with administration. While SPL staff understands and speaks English, few of the other stakeholders do, and while there is no indication that SPL staff wishes to 'filter' information, the use of interpreter, sometimes SPL staff, is not efficient when it becomes possible to have better interaction with communities in Somalia.

While the increase in donors is a commendable achievement, it increases the administrative burden as the funding is not programme funds but for specific projects, which requires separate reporting and financial accountability.

4. Evaluation Conclusions and Lessons Learned

- LPI's Somalia programme has progressed as planned and as described in the Sida application of 2009, aside from minor details. Given the difficult situation in Mogadishu and South Central Somalia this is a notable achievement.
- The programme is highly relevant given the situation in the project area, and with the changing situation, due to the retreat of Al Shabaab from Mogadishu and the Kenyan operation in the South. The programme, may become even more relevant, as the retreat of Al Shabaab may open up for new conflict dynamics, which needs to be tackled at community level.
- SPL is a relevant partner and, compared to other Somali organisations, also very effective. It appears, however, that its governance structure is weak, which may be a potential threat to its continued relevance.
- The LPI tools included in the PME&L were identified by the interviewed stakeholders as being relevant for their work.
- The partners of SPL in this programme are relevant and in line with LPI's theories and approach (e.g. elders and religious leaders). SWCC has a good potential for playing an important role in the future, but is organisationally weak.
- The sustainability of the programme is an issue mainly because of the weak governance structure of SPL and in turn also that SWCC is very weak.
- Many useful contacts to Western embassies especially from a fund-raising perspective have been established and are being maintained by holding individual information meetings when relevant.
- A second LPI project in Somalia (ACTS) has just been financed and started. This is, as realized by LPI, a high-risk endeavour, but may potentially support the 'track 2' project by bringing in the major internal and external stakeholders at 'track 1' level in a PAR process.

5. Recommendations

1. Capacity building of local civil society organisations in Somalia should not only concentrate on what is in the PME&L but should be approached according to an assessment of the entire partner organisation. In the case of SPL there is a need for assistance on organisational development focussing on SPL's governance structure and in addition support to develop a more programmatic approach based on a SPL strategy⁴⁵. LPI should consider assisting SPL in approaching SPL's donors in order for SPL to have these jointly supporting a coherent programme based on SPL's own strategy and procedures. It might also be useful for LPI and SPL, based on the present positive cooperation, to develop the overall MoU between the organisations to include more long-term results and clear roles and responsibilities in the partnership.
2. In turn also Elders Council and especially SWCC need serious organisational development, starting with developing a clearer strategy for each. SPL should be capacitated to assist in this.
3. LPI has been relatively successful in training SPL staff and in monitoring the programme despite the situation where it has been almost impossible for LPI staff to travel to Mogadishu. LPI Nairobi should document how it has been able to manage 'remote control' of the programme and consciously develop tools for this, as this might be useful for LPI in other situations (e.g. Sudan) where it is impossible or difficult to visit the project area.

⁴⁵

It is commendable that LPI is assisting SPL in developing such a strategy.

4. LPI should more consciously develop policy and advocacy work in relation to the Somalia programme, based on an analysis of what it wants to achieve and what is considered possible. Fund raising concerns should be separated from this. This will include focusing on more non-Western embassies and on regional organisations. The ACTS project might be a platform for such a strategy.
5. LPI should consider adding a Somali speaking Programme Officer to the secretariat, who can stay in Mogadishu for longer periods, when the situation permits.

6. List of people met in Somalia

LPI:

Michele Cesari, Resident Representative
Wangari Mwangi, Manager of Programmes
Patrick L.K. Magero, Research & Analysis Advisor
Shamsia W. Ramadhan, Programme and Communication Advisor
Dr. Marleen Renders, Research Advisor
Peter Langat, Financial and Administrative Advisor
Ali Iman Ahmed, Edwin Gitonga Mugambi

SPL:

Fatima Aden Idle, Programme Manager
Elmi Hassan Yousuf, Financial Manager
Mohamud Mohamed Ibrahim, Programme Officer, Track 2
Muktar Elmi Iddle, Researcher – ACT

Elders Council:

Abdillahi Ahmed Robleh, Haweye
Ahmed Mohamed Pari, Diar

Imams:

Hassan Mohammed Mohamoud
Mustafa Sheik Mohammed Ahmed

SWCC:

Safiya Abukar Karani, Focal point, Benadir

Norwegian Embassy:

Dorcas
Jan Petter Høltedahl, Somalia responsible

Swedish Embassy:

Mathias Krüger, Counsellor, Head of Development Cooperation for Somalia.

Swiss Embassy:

Michael Cottier, First Secretary, Regional Affairs

Saferworld:

Mads Frilander, Somalia responsible.

Zamzam:

Two representatives

ANNEX 4 - LPI'S SUDAN PROGRAMME

1. Introduction

This note presents the findings of the assessment of LPI's Sudan programme and forms part of the evaluation of LPI commissioned by Sida.

As it was not possible for the evaluation team to obtain a visa for Sudan in time for a mission to visit Sudan, the assessment is based on study of relevant documents and a Skype-interview with the LPI Resident Representative, who is on maternity leave, and the Acting Resident Representative. The LPI representatives kindly offered to provide names and telephone numbers of representatives of English speaking partners, which could be contacted. Due to the finding that the relevance and effectiveness of the programme is mainly affected by the political obstacles, it was assessed that contacting partners would not be likely to provide information which would change these.

It is necessary to stress that the findings are consequently based on limited and secondary sources and must be read with this in mind.

2. Background

Context

The situation in Sudan is difficult, with an abundance of serious, open and potential conflicts. The main project area for LPI and its partners in Sudan in 2010 and 11 has been in South Kordofan State.

The conflict in South Kordofan is extremely complex and involves competition over natural resources, center-periphery issues, contested borders with South Sudan and not least conflicts between farmers and pastoralists.

Programme content

During the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s, LPI worked in South Sudan supporting the people to people peace processes, but based out of the Nairobi office. Following the evaluation in 2006/7, it was decided that it was important to be closer to partners and therefore have direct presence in country. The office opened in 2009 and the first Technical Agreement (TA) was signed in January 2010 for the project in South Kordofan.

The present programme was initiated in 2009 and it was envisaged, according to the application to Sida, that the Sudanese Organisation of Non-violence and Development (SONAD), would be a main partner. SONAD is a national Sudanese NGO, which has been engaged in non-violent work for many years supported by LPI. In 2009/2010 LPI assisted SONAD in producing a study of its peace building experiences in Sudan⁴⁶. According to LPI staff, SONAD has subsequently entered into a period of self-reflection and has therefore not been the main partner of LPI. As it has a presence in several of the conflict areas in Sudan, it has a potential for becoming an important partner for LPI again in the future as SONAD now has an office in Juba in addition to the office in Khartoum.

A partnership with the Sudanese Organisation for Research & Development (SORD) and Khartoum University was initiated and the partners introduced to PAR, which may be further developed through a PeaceWomen project in the future focusing on women from South Kordofan in IDP camps around Khartoum.

⁴⁶ "Transforming Relations. Peace Building Experiences of SONAD in Sudan". Kenneth Fannan Korayi and Scopas Mägyä Elias. SONAD 2010.

The main programme for LPI in 2010-11 has been to work with academic and CSO partners in South Kordofan State to support peacebuilding, using PAR methodology and linking an academic institution with CSOs. In 2010, an initial context analysis and partner selection was carried out. Three partners were identified: one academic institution; the Peace and Development Centre (PDSC) at Dalang University and two CSOs with affinities to farming communities and pastoralist communities respectively: the Justice Confidence Centre (JCC) and Adlan for Development. Subsequently a number of partner capacity building activities in relation to the PAR were carried out. During 2011 the research team selection criteria was finalized following a delay whilst awaiting the signing of the Technical Agreement for 2011 between LPI and the government.

In May 2011 elections were held in South Kordofan and in June 2011 fighting broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and SPLM-North. As a result, the PAR process was put on hold and LPI staff was not allowed to visit the project area. The office of one of the CSOs was closed by government security and staff called in for questioning. Instead a number of planning meetings and training activities with the partners have taken place in Khartoum. LPI staff and the three partners have participated in a PME&L workshop and the two CSOs have been involved in an organisational capacity assessment, which has led to the development of an organisational development action plan for implementation support from LPI in 2012.

In August 2011 LPI initiated a Peacebuilding Working Group for members of the Sudan INGO Forum together with another INGO. This working group has started coordinating activities and has shared methodologies.

In addition the partner, PDSC, has been assisted by LPI in training other Sudanese NGOs in conflict transformation tools.

Towards the end of 2011 LPI staff from Sudan participated in the research conference in Addis Ababa on Sustained Dialogue in order to assess if a similar activity would be relevant and feasible in Sudan.

3. Findings

Relevance

Overall the Sudan programme is assessed to be relevant for the situation as there are a large number of conflicts – open as well as potential – in Sudan and methods being used, according to the members of the Peacebuilding Working Group as reflected in minutes of meetings, presently fall short. LPI has chosen initially to focus on a complex conflict in South Kordofan and inside that the conflict focus is on a specific project area. If allowed, LPI may contribute to the partners being able to analyse and eventually contribute to transforming it. However, whether that effort will have an impact on the overall conflict in South Kordofan and indeed on conflicts in other parts of Sudan remains to be seen – even if partners with a more national reach get trained.

Relevance in relation to Sida policies and international conventions

According to information from Sida staff in Stockholm the Swedish government is currently considering whether to continue engaging in North Sudan, apart from humanitarian assistance.

Internationally there are sincere concerns about the conflicts in Sudan, even though the South Kordofan conflict has not received as much attention as the Darfur crisis despite the fact that it may possibly become just as serious.

Relevance of partners and capacity development of local organisations

Based on the documentation studied⁴⁷ and interviews with LPI staff, the partners in South Kordofan - PDSC and the two CSOs are relevant to the conflict in South Kordofan. PDSC has shown not only an academic interest in the partnership but also a willingness and ability to use and share conflict transformation methodologies concretely with other civil society actors.

SONAD and SORD have the potential for securing a more national outreach of the CT tools and for possible influencing national level issues.

Building capacity of conflict transformation of local and national NGOs as well as academic organisations is relevant provided they are allowed to use their capacity in real conflicts. This is an important caveat given the situation in Sudan.

Conflict analysis and PAR

During the interview the LPI representatives proved to have a good understanding of the conflicts in Sudan and especially in South Kordofan based on their analyses.

According to available information the partners have welcomed the LPI approach and methods to conflict transformation and at least PDSC appears to have been able to make them their own to the extent that they can now train CSOs. But the methods have yet to be tested in reality in Sudan.

Track 2 approach - advantages and disadvantages

Strengthening local NGOs and academic institutions in CT methodologies in Sudan may be relevant, but, as indicated above, if it cannot be used in practice, such as presently in South Kordofan, it will obviously have limited impact. It may presently be more important to concentrate on a track 1 strategy on influencing the government to open space for CSOs and lobbying for that CT activities may take place in conflict areas.

The INGO forum and especially the Peacebuilding Working Group is giving priority to this advocacy work. However, since May 2011 CT work has been almost impossible to implement, especially in South Kordofan State.

Training local actors in performing CT on track 3 level is potentially good but “the proof of the pudding is in the eating”, and if eating is restricted, there will be limited proof.

Programme approach and link with regional processes

Based on the received reports little appears to have been done on influencing regional networks and sharing experiences regionally outside the LPI family. But the positive development of the Sudan programme has been influenced greatly, it appears, by the regular meetings between LPI country directors and headquarters, where the programmes in Ethiopia, Somalia and DRC have provided inspiration for the content of the programme in Sudan.

Effectiveness

Effectiveness is extremely difficult to assess without having directly engaged with partners and beneficiaries in Sudan. The following is consequently mainly observations based on the documents studied and the interview with LPI staff, and they may therefore be of limited value for the programme.

⁴⁷ Besides the applicatio to Sida and the LPI annual report to Sidafor 2010. Minutes of meetings and workshops with partners were studied.

Under the given difficult situation in Sudan the programme has been able to identify and enter into new partnerships and train partners, which appear to have good potential for making the programme effective. That is in itself an important achievement. Whether the potential will be realized in relation to practical CT work in Sudan remains to be seen.

Local partners' capacity

According to available information capacity, especially of the South Kordofan partners, has been built, especially in PAR and the PME&L, and the partners have found it useful. PDSC is being linked up with other donors (UNDP) and performs training of other NGOs in Sudan.

Apparently the fact that activities in South Kordofan were stopped has led to the participation of especially the two CSOs in a more thorough capacity assessment. This assessment has entailed necessary organisational development to be undertaken.

This is commendable, but might not have happened to the same extent if the CT activities had not been halted and the result might have been that the planned activities would not have been effective in case of a limited organisational capacity of the CSOs.

Sustainability

The sustainability of the programme apparently depends on whether there will continue to be the space for CSOs to be able to work and to enter into CT activities.

If the security situation continues to worsen and the Sudanese government decides to further limit the space for civil society actors – international as national – to engage in the conflicts then the LPI programme as presently established might not be sustainable. The LPI staff argues that academic institutions e.g. PDSC, might be able to continue functioning and even expand their CT work even in a situation where space for CSOs is closing.

A more practical issue is that the weak organisational capacity of the involved CSOs in South Kordofan may have threatened sustainability of the CT activities if these had been carried out before organisational development interventions had been made.

Whether continued organisational development of the two CSOs is effective without being sure that CT work can be applied in the near future and without LPI being able to accompany them is questionable.

Efficiency

Also efficiency is difficult to assess at a distance as has been necessary with the Sudan programme.

Based on available information, the slender LPI set-up in Khartoum is probably sufficient in relation to the level of activities and numbers of partners presently. From the small organogram of the LPI office it is not clear if there is a person who is specifically responsible for advocacy work. LPI has clarified that this function lies with the Resident Representative but will be increasingly supported by the local Research and Analysis Programme Officer.

The LPI staff has received training in the PME&L by staff from headquarters and hopefully it will be able to train new partners in the future with limited support from headquarters. Also PDSC may be used as trainers in CT tools.

4. Evaluation Conclusions and Lessons Learned

- Overall the Sudan programme is assessed to be potentially relevant for the situation as there are a large number of conflicts – open as well as potential – in Sudan and presently only very few INGOs prioritise CT work. Based on a context analysis of conflicts in Sudan, LPI has chosen initially to focus on a complex conflict in South Kordofan and inside that conflict on a specific project area. If allowed, LPI may contribute to partners analyzing and eventually contributing to transforming it, but whether that will have an impact on the conflict in South Kordofan overall and indeed on conflicts in other parts of Sudan remains to be seen – even if partners with a more national reach get trained.
- Under the given difficult situation in Sudan the programme has been able to identify and enter into new partnerships and train partners, which appear to have good potential for making the programme effective. That is in itself an important achievement. Whether the potential will be realized in relation to practical CT work in Sudan remains to be seen.
- Sustainability is mainly threatened by the political developments where the space for civil society actors – national as international – may be narrowing. But this may be partly mitigated if academic institutions are allowed to operate.
- Efficiency appears to be good, to the extent this has been possible to assess.

5. Recommendations

1. Given the volatile political situation LPI should consider, based on scenario planning, to develop a clearer strategy for their Sudan programme, which would – under the various scenarios – provide clearer priorities between e.g. partnerships for practical CT work, organisational development of partners, and national, regional and international advocacy for creating space. LPI should in this context also consider when the situation becomes untenable for having an LPI office in Khartoum and develop a strategy for support to national partners in such a situation.
2. Given that possibilities for civil society engagement in conflict transformation in Sudan is limited LPI should develop a clearer strategy together with partners, and if possible with other INGOs, for lobbying and advocacy internationally and in Sudan for opening more space.
3. LPI should take its partner criteria assessments seriously and document the assessment done and ensure that necessary organisational development is carried out before starting PAR processes as well as in parallel to CT training and implementation of PAR. Whether it is effective in relation to CT work in the project area to continue with organisational development of the two CSOs without being able to apply these skills should be considered.
4. As the conflict hotspots, like presently in South Kordofan, may become no-go zones for INGOs, either because of real security concerns or because the government does not want international 'interference', LPI should develop 'remote' management and support tools, in order to ensure that national partners continue to be engaged. This could build on experiences from LPI's work in South Central Somalia.

ANNEX 5 - LPI's DRC PROGRAMME

1. Introduction & Background

As part of the evaluation of LPI, an evaluator met LPI DRC staff and its main partners in Cyangugu, Rwanda, in December 2011 and visited the project region in DRC in January 2012, meeting and interviewing various partners of LPI, local and traditional authorities as well as LPI staff in Uvira, Bukavu and Kalehe (list of interviewees attached).

It is not the place here to comprehensively present a political context analysis, but it should be noted that Eastern DRC is a very complicated, multi-layered and fragile conflict environment, involving external powers, armed groups, as well as pastoral, social, ethnical and land conflicts as well as problems arising from a large refugee population. It should also be noted that several political developments increasingly present obstacles to NGO work in DRC. Corruption and arbitrary acts by authorities are common and a known impediment to LPI's work in DRC. These problems appear to have deteriorated over the course of the last half a year and at the time around the elections. Both LPI's country director in DRC as well as the evaluator faced problems with passport issues at the DRC border. Interviews with international actors confirmed that already three months up to the elections, cooperation with the government became increasingly difficult, as government focused all its energies on the elections⁴⁸. This situation had not changed at the time of the evaluation as the country was still awaiting the publication of the parliamentary election results through CENI. The country found itself at a standstill⁴⁹. In addition, hundreds of cases of human rights violations were reported during the election period. Political parties were targeted and members locked up or subjected to ill-treatment. Political actors increasingly manipulated the police, intelligence and justice sectors. At the time of the visit LPI's Country Director was still waiting for his passport that authorities confiscated in December 2011, hampering his ability to travel in and outside the country and participate in regional LPI and donor meetings. Furthermore, it was impossible for the DRC evaluator to enter the country in December despite a valid visa. Thus, initial interviews with LPI's partners took place in Cyangugu, Rwanda in December 2011. After the field visit to Kalehe and interviews with the local government and police inspector, the LPI team and evaluator were asked by the local administration for their passports for 'registration' purposes.

In terms of physical security, the situation also severely worsened in North and South Kivu. In the beginning of January 2012, a series of massacres in the districts of Shabunda (South Kivu) as well as in Walikale/Masisi (North Kivu) committed by the *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR), killed dozens of people, destroyed villages and displaced hundreds of villagers⁵⁰. In fact, it appears as if three years after the rapprochement between the Presidents Joseph Kabila and Paul Kagame and their first joint operation, a military solution is not in reach. Three unsuccessful military operations, including the still ongoing "Amani Leo" have since been launched against the Rwandan rebels FDLR, as well as the opening of direct negotiations between the Congrès National du Peuple (CNDP) and the Kinshasa government. However, the integration of the combatants of the former Congolese armed groups into the FARDC did not establish state authority in Eastern Congo. The FDLR largely avoided direct confrontation with Congolese forces, and was only to a limited extent weakened in North Kivu, yet dispersed, in both Kivus⁵¹. Abuses by FARDC soldiers and reports of mass rapes and sporadic killings from both sides have meant that many operations have been carried out without MONUSCO support⁵².

⁴⁸ Interview with Hugo de Vries, Coordination Officer, MONUSCO, Unité d'appui à la Stabilisation, 17/01/12.

⁴⁹ See blogs.taz.de/kongo-echo/2012/01/14/ein-land-nimmt-auszeit/

⁵⁰ See <http://french.peopledaily.com.cn/96852/7696793.html> and blogs.taz.de/kongo-echo/2012/01/17/schmutziger-krieg-in-kivu/.

⁵¹ Spittaels, Steven and Filip Hilgert (2008): Mapping Conflict Motives in Eastern DRC, Antwerp, IPIS.

⁵² See Crisis Group International <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-issues/conflict-in-congo.aspx>

While these developments only reinforce the need for peace work that touches on the roots of the problem, it should be kept in mind when assessing LPI's work that these developments currently make any work in the Kivu provinces very difficult and the expectations concerning their possible impact as well as their sustainability should be adapted to that fragile situation.

Programme Content

The overall objective of LPI's programme in DRC and its strategy of civil society engagement for the implementation period of 2010-2012 is: *"LPI's partners in the DRC may contribute to the decrease of local conflicts and tensions through their professionalization as centres for conflict transformation and in that manner become more effective change agents in the local context"*.

To achieve this objective and vision of success, LPI focuses on three interrelated strategic priorities: 1) Civil society support and engagement; 2) Policy work and awareness raising; and 3) Cross-fertilization of conflict transformation theory and practice. In short, LPI works through a combination of research and action that strengthens local capacities for peacebuilding. Regarding these strategic priorities, mid-term outcomes have been formulated that will be assessed in this evaluation:

Mid-term outcome 1: *"LPI has contributed to an increased general organisational capacity among partners as well as an increased capacity among partners within the area of conflict transformation (CT)."*

Mid-term outcome 2: *"LPI contributes actively through their and their partners' work to policy work and awareness-raising about the problems in Eastern DRC."*

Mid-term outcome 3: *"Through the thorough documentation, reflection and exchange of LPI's and partners' experiences in CT with those of practitioners and academics, LPI contributed to a cross-fertilisation of CT theory and practice."*

LPI's main partners currently are *Action Solidaire pour la Paix (ASP)*, *Reseau d'Innovation Organisationnelle (RIO)*, and *Action pour la Paix et la Concorde (APC)*. Through the use of Participatory Action Research (PAR), LPI's three partners are able to engage the conflicting parties in an analysis of the conflict and feedback perceptions to the different parties, thereby triggering a process in which solutions can be sought. PAR involves all major stakeholders in the conflict analysis as well as the transformation process. Acknowledging that peacebuilding needs to address all levels of society, LPI in DRC thus works with a coherent multi-track approach, however, focusing on the middle and grass-roots levels and targeting in particular (but not exclusively) local and customary authorities, community leaders and civil society actors.

2. Findings

The findings confirm that LPI is on track with achieving its programme objective of supporting local civil society actors in North and South Kivu to become professional conflict transformation actors, contributing to local peacebuilding processes and thus to the decrease of tensions on the local level (but with a potential to escalate to broader levels). Significant progress has been made since a major reorientation of LPI's peacebuilding programme in DRC in 2008. This is particularly due to the application of the innovative research and peace action tool; PAR.

Relevance

Relevance concerns to what extent the LPI programme is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor – including LPI objectives and Sida objectives.

Swedish policies and country priorities

LPI's DRC country programme, focusing on peacebuilding, taking a bottom-up approach and supporting local civil society in its contribution to conflict transformation, is fully in line with

Sweden's general development policies as well as the agency's strategic priorities for DRC. On the one hand, Sweden explicitly values and promotes the importance of civil society capacity development in developing countries *"based on these organisations' own priorities"*. In its *"pluralism policy"* the Swedish government stipulates that irrespective of the situation (whether authoritarian, fragile or democratic) *"civil society actors have a unique ability (...) to act as agents of change"*⁵³. Thus, the policy postulates: *"Swedish civil society organisations will contribute to capacity development in civil society organisations in developing countries"*. On the other hand, among the most important strategic priorities of Sida for DRC currently features strengthening the *"conditions for sustainable peace and reconciliation"*. Hereby, Sweden places special importance on *"women's opportunities for increased participation in the peace and reconciliation processes"*⁵⁴.

Participatory conflict analysis and locally-driven conflict transformation

The following is based on the evaluator's meeting and interviews with all staff members of all three main partners, some of them were met two or three times. The evaluator has also studied the last two conflict analyses that came out of the PAR process and are about to be published.

The relevance of LPI's conflict transformation work is ensured through the application of the PAR approach. PAR is a participatory conflict analysis process first implemented in LPI's work by the DRC programme. Implemented through LPI's three partners, the local population and all relevant stakeholders comprising actors from all conflicting groups are involved in the research, thereby determining which conflict issues feature highly in the analysis. The constant feedback of research findings back into the communities, namely the community's exposure to the perceptions of other conflict and stakeholder groups, generates the willingness to meet the 'other' and discuss the conflict issues. Thus, the conflict transformation process is triggered by PAR, which prepares the ground for further conflict transformation activities. Thorough conflict and context analysis is not only an important element of LPI's programming approach, but constitutes its programming approach. Moreover, the relevance of the conflicts treated in the research and analysis is ensured by a participatory research approach.

An interesting element of the approach is its flexibility and potential to evolve and develop over time. As conflicts become analysed and transformed by the local communities themselves and awareness may be raised on how to deal with and solve conflicts, communities are enabled to identify more diverse conflict roots or react to a changing conflict environment. Moreover, taking a more long-term perspective, vulnerable groups such as women might, according to LPI and Partner staff, become empowered in conflict analysis, and in the future speak in public spaces and thus identify conflicts such as sexual violence that are significant to them.

The conflict transformation processes initiated through PAR in North and South Kivu tend to focus on land issues (pastoral and land conflicts). The significance of land issues is supported by a wide range of academic research, highlighting the importance of access to land as a major structural and root cause of conflict⁵⁵. In fact, the structural organisation of land access and control has turned land into an asset of economic and political power and has marginalized large parts of the rural population, intensifying local competition. Customary land rights, which are the norm across some 97% of the country, are not adequately defined or protected in the land law. Reform of land laws is vital, though the political, economic, and social inequalities and structures around land - through

⁵³ Government Offices of Sweden (2009), "Pluralism – Policy for support to civil society in developing countries within Swedish development cooperation".

⁵⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sweden (2009), "Strategy for development cooperation with the Democratic Republic of Congo, April 2009 – December 2012".

⁵⁵ See, for example, Vlassenroot, Koen and Chris Huggins (2005): Land, migration and conflict in eastern DRC, in: Huggins, C. and J. Clover (eds.), From the Ground Up: Land Rights, Conflict and Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, Pretoria, ISS, pp. 115-194.

which land access is mediated - must also be reformed. Indeed, land is a resource with multi-dimensional aspects; it is community territory, an economic resource, a source of administrative revenue, and a social asset. The history of the 'Banyamulenge', for instance, is to some extent a story of local struggles for land and the 'rents' accruing from land, yet at the same time point at structural roots of political exclusion⁵⁶.

Competition around land was transformed into violence between ethnic communities when local elites from the early nineties started to mobilise entire communities on the basis of ethnic belonging and collective land rights. Thus today, conflicts, for example, around access to agricultural and pastoral land still often become violent. In addition, inter-community tensions in South Kivu have been further fuelled by claims related to the return of Congolese refugees from Rwanda and Uganda⁵⁷.

Thus, LPI's 'track 2 and 3' approach, focusing on local level dynamics and land conflicts, fills a vacuum as LPI is among the few organisations that stress local conflict resolution⁵⁸: There is a consensus evolving among the international community. As expressed by MONUC representatives, that the emphasis of stabilization and peacebuilding efforts in DRC has been on national dynamics associated with armed groups, however, there has been an insufficient understanding of how local dynamics - in particular those linked to the control of land - feed into the existence of armed groups and continue to drive violence and conflict in Eastern DRC. To conclude; LPI and its partners are on track of realizing their potential and filling this vacuum. The capacity of local communities has been built to solve local level conflicts, solutions have been found to land conflicts by local communities with the help of LPI, and local dynamics and links to armed groups have been successfully analyzed by the CCIs, however, the potential of LPI and its partners has not yet been fulfilled with regard to working with armed groups and more effort needs to be done here in the future.

Partner Selection

The three partners selected are among the most relevant in the Kivus as they are mainly committed towards conflict transformation. Before 2007, the partners included a variety of development and human rights NGOs as well as unions and syndicates. Out of 44 NGOs in 2007 and then 7 in 2009, three organisations with an explicit peacebuilding focus were selected at the beginning of 2010 for closer 'accompaniment', in order to be able to concentrate time and resources. NGOs focusing on development issues and human rights, two interrelated but nevertheless different topics, were not funded any more. The three partners were not necessarily the most capable ones, but the ones focusing exclusively on LPI's field of work. As the main goal is the NGOs' capacity development, it was pointed out by the national director of LPI in DRC that it is not the task of LPI to fund already fully capable organisations but to contribute to capacity building.

However, the selection process was done in a rather implicit fashion and the criteria - though relevant and context sensitive - should become more explicit and formalized to ensure their systematic use in future LPI programming.

Effectiveness

The evaluation looks at the extent to which the LPI programme achieves its objectives, e.g., did its work enhance the role of civil society in peacebuilding? To what extent are partners able to contribute in a professional way to peaceful development and change through conflict transformation theory and practice?

⁵⁶ Vlassenroot, Koen and Chris Huggins (2005): Land, migration and conflict in eastern DRC.

⁵⁷ Sylla, Oumar (2010): Land and property disputes impeding return and reintegration, *Forced Migration Review*, Issue 36, Nov 2010

⁵⁸ There are not many donors focusing on local level conflict resolution. Others include International Alert, Pax Christi etc. with whom LPI cooperates.

The focus on local capacity building has proven effective in relation to the overall programme objective of contributing to the decrease of local conflicts. Combining participatory research and peacebuilding theory, LPI DRC today has a clear strategic outlook and vision of success, building a coherent theory of change. LPI's partners contributed successfully to the resolution of certain local conflicts and the decrease of inter-community tensions and are on track of reaching their objective to function as professional conflict transformation centres.⁵⁹

LPI's Capacity Building Programme

LPI supports three civil society organisations to become professional conflict transformation centres. The three NGOs receive training, mentoring and learning-on-the-job support in the areas of financial, administration and human resource as well as programme management. The trainings are given by either external consultants or by LPI staff (technical advisors, administrator as well as the financial, program and country director). In addition to these trainings it was noted by LPI staff that much more important and time-consuming is the continuous support and accompaniment of the partners work, particularly when it comes to the planning and implementation of their conflict transformation programmes.

The training needs are established in cooperation with the partners. Usually twice a year LPI assesses its partner's performance and progress with a "diagnostic" checklist. It then discusses its assessment with the partners, jointly identifying needs and potential areas of improvement, resulting in the production of a training plan. This process has been followed through successfully in 2010 and 2011. In addition, LPI's partners usually also assess LPI in a "diagnostic". While this was successfully completed in 2010, the process was not followed through sufficiently in 2011 due to other priorities. However, while this is an innovative mode of communication 'on an equal footing', it has to be ensured that this process is sufficiently followed through.

Overall, the partners' capacities improved notably but also vary widely. Regarding RIO and APC, financial reporting happens on time using a clear reporting tool. Thus, while RIO and APC show good results and improved their financial and administrative management clearly over the course of 2010 and 2011, ASP - having to cope with high levels of staff turnover being one reason - still showed serious weaknesses in the first half of 2011⁶⁰. However, it has to be noted that the former director resigned in August 2011 and major progress was noted by LPI staff since then⁶¹.

One of the problems hampering closer accompaniment of ASP through LPI is the distance between Bukavu and Goma. While the other two partner organisations have offices in Bukavu, ASP's work is more difficult to follow and intervene in case of problems and emergencies.

The Partners' Contribution to Conflict Transformation

All partners' conflict analysis and transformation capacities increased during the evaluation period: All three partner organisations have successfully concluded a first research cycle of their PAR processes. At least two partners are on track with achieving their goal to function as conflict transformation centres independently of LPI soon.

RIO

In the beginning of 2010, RIO concluded its first round of research as part of the ongoing PAR process in cooperation with ADEPAE (the "duo")⁶². After analysing the conflict lines and issues,

⁵⁹ See, for instance, the establishment of 'pistes' for cattle to solve land conflicts between farmers and pastoral people. Photographic evidence can be found in Annex.

⁶⁰ Interviews with LPI on the 17th of Jan 2012. In addition, documentary evidence on financial reporting was presented to the evaluator.

⁶¹ Assessment of LPI's Country Director on the 17th of January 2012.

⁶² While a first research report was finalised in the beginning of 2010, a first draft was not published due to the objection by the Banyamulenge community (see point 3.2.5). The final version was published a few weeks ago, in the beginning of 2012.

feeding back the different perceptions and opinions of the actors and gaining the trust of the different parties, the communities expressed the desire to engage in a dialogue. An *Inter-Community Dialogue* (ICD) was organized in March 2010 with members of four different communities in conflict, namely the Babembe, Banyamulenge, Bavira and Bafuliiru communities, including traditional and local authorities, as well as members of the international and political sphere. With close accompaniment of LPI and training in conflict analysis, mediation and negotiation, the ICD agreed on an action plan and the establishment of more permanent *Cadres de Concertation Inter-Communaires* (CCI) to follow-up on the action-plan. Four different CCIs were created in Uvira, Bukavu, Minembwe and Baraka with between 15 - 17 members that meet twice a month to analyse and discuss the conflict context and issues. Twice a year all four CCIs meet to reflect upon their experiences.⁶³

The action plan and the CCIs deal with three different levels of conflict, namely land conflicts, governance issues and armed groups, but focus in particular on conflicts around access to land between cattle breeders and farmers⁶⁴. To find solutions to this type of conflict, a CCI sub-committee *Comité de Mitigation et de Règlement des Litiges* (CMRL), comprising farmers and cattle breeders, was established. Thanks to these efforts, an agreement was reached, regulating the demarcation of land and the introduction of special routes – so called ‘pistes’ – from the highlands to the lowlands⁶⁵. In addition a customary tax-system is in the phase of being tested. At the moment, attempts are made to transform the accord into provincial law, however, party politics and problems of harmonization with national law prolong the process⁶⁶.

While “the sensitization of armed groups” has been identified as another area of action for the CCIs, less progress has been made on issue due to its scale and sensitivity. Members of the CCIs are part of *Comités de négociateurs*. A first encounter with the Yakutumba group is planned for 2012. While a few armed groups (including FRF, Zabuloni and Kapopo) have been integrated already, it is difficult to attribute the success to the work of the CCIs.

To conclude, with the help of LPI and its capacity building programme, LPI’s partners were able to successfully implement a PAR process in Southern South Kivu, draft a first conflict analysis report, trigger a dialogue process between conflicting parties and initiate and facilitate a conflict transformation process. The programme in Southern South Kivu demonstrates successfully how conflict transformation centres can contribute to the resolution of conflicts. Civil society engagement and reinforcement on the side of LPI is an important and necessary ingredient in this process.

APC

Similar successes can be reported from Kalehe territory in South Kivu. In 2011, APC’s PAR process led to a Round Table conference in June 2011, sharing its results with local and provincial government officials, traditional authorities and other actors of the communities in conflict. During this round table conference, all conflict actors signed an ‘act of engagement’, including an action plan that is expected to be implemented in 2012 and further on⁶⁷.

In addition, with the help of the UN Pooled Fund, a LPI project was implemented in Kalehe and Mwenga to focus on an individual level and individual intra-community conflicts. The implementing partner of LPI in Kalehe is APC and RIO in Mwenga. Due to large groups of returning refugees and

⁶³ Meeting and interviews with CCI Uvira members and members of RIO on the 16th of January 2012 in Uvira, South Kivu, DRC. Participation and observation of one CCI Uvira bi-monthly reunion.

⁶⁴ See the conflict analysis of the “duo” and its partners, published in the beginning of 2012.

⁶⁵ See photographic evidence in annex.

⁶⁶ Interview with one CCI Uvira member on the 16th of January 2012.

⁶⁷ See the documentary of LPI on the APC-led Round Table conference of June 2011.

IDPs, conflict between returnee and host families are common and often become violent. *Cadres de Dialogue et de Mediation* (CDMs) were established and trained in conflict resolution, mediation and negotiation methods but also administrative and management tasks, comprising elected members of both groups and of all ethnicities. There are 13 CDMs in place in Kalehe territory today which individually meet two times a week and are all supported by LPI's implementing partner APC⁶⁸. Four are supported by LPI via APC and others are funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Belgium, UN HABITAT and IFA/Zivik.

All CDMs function on a voluntary basis. According to Marie, a CDM representative met in Bushushu, the CDMs are a huge success: *"Today people knock on the door of CDM members in the middle of the night if they face a conflict. The CDMs enjoy the trust of the local communities"*. One of the biggest advantages of CDMs in comparison to the public judicial system is that it is free of charge. With the conclusion of the project in 2011, APC and its partners are still in the process of reflecting about the future structure of the CDMs from 2012 onwards, but some of them will evolve into follow-up structures of the PAR action plan⁶⁹.

To conclude, these examples demonstrate the impact LPI's partners' conflict transformation work has and can exert on peacebuilding processes in the Kivu provinces and DRC more broadly in the future. Overall, the evaluators found a very deep understanding and knowledge of the conflict issues, parties and dynamics on the side of the partners as well as of CDM and CCI members respectively. Moreover, the commitment interviewees demonstrated to engage in dialogue and peacebuilding processes despite daily obstacles such as long distances, lack of transport and infrastructure and ongoing insecurity and violence is remarkable. LPI's approach to civil society engagement and conflict transformation is innovative, proved successful and promising and thus a scaling up and roll-out to other territories in the Kivu provinces or other provinces of DRC should be considered within the possibilities of LPI's financial and human resources.

PAR: An innovative and promising tool

The impact of the PAR process and subsequently initiated conflict transformation processes are promising. The two different PAR processes of RIO and APC proved: PAR is more than a research tool. In fact, research can be a conflict transformation tool. The engagement of all conflicting parties in the conflict analysis creates space for shared findings and dialogue.

All three civil society partners of LPI are at different stages and particularly the PAR process of ASP proved slow and painstaking. However, one has to add that PAR is a locally-driven and process-oriented rather than an outcome-oriented approach, making it difficult for LPI to pressure its partners and partnering communities for rapid results and outcomes. Thus, the process might appear slow at first from an outsider perspective, but may prove more sustainable and successful on the long-run. LPI gave the impression that it is mastering this delicate balance between guidance, pressure and waiting for self-initiative on the side of the partners' very well.

How inclusive and how participatory is the PAR process really? The question remains open how well the research results really reflect the opinions of the 'people' and not only of an educated elite, as two interview partners hinted to this fact by suggesting *"we are different, we are all intellectuals"*⁷⁰. How different would their perspectives be from that of 'the people'?

⁶⁸ See photographic evidence in annex.

⁶⁹ Meeting and interviews with members of APC and all 13 CDMs in Bushushu, Kalehe territory, on the 18th of January 2012.

⁷⁰ Interview with CCI members in Uvira, South Kivu, DRC, on the 16th of January 2012.

The sub-regional dimension of conflicts and conflict transformation work

LPI's partner's research and work is very aware of the cross-regional dimension of the conflicts they are dealing with. The partners conducted research visits to Burundi and Tanzania to interview refugees over there or deal with the issue of returning refugees from Rwanda. In addition, LPI is conducting context analyses on the phenomenon of "*les vaches sans frontières*" (cows crossing the DRC-Burundi border). In short, conscious that the sub-regional nature of conflicts needs sub-regional collaboration and solutions, LPI is currently trying to reach out towards other Centers for Conflict transformation in neighbouring countries. However, this sub-regional aspect of LPI's work could be even more strengthened if LPI would be able to further scale up its programmes in the Great Lakes Region.

Gender

The partners also made tangible progress to include a gender perspective into their programming. All partners have more or less 30% female staff and also the local dialogue forums such as CCIs and CDMs have female members. However, the shortcomings of participatory processes become visible with regard to gender. While it is important to increase women's representation to ensure that their perspectives on the conflict are taken into account and sustainable solutions for all sides are found, it is similarly important to respect the outcome of participatory processes and have community members with influence on board. One CCI female member said that out of nine women that presented their candidature before the CCI, only three were chosen⁷¹. Nevertheless, the women present at the CCI and CDM meetings proved outspoken, were listened to and were indeed able to bring a women's perspective into the meetings, hopefully altering men's and communities' perspectives on the importance of female participation on the long-term⁷².

Policy-level work and Awareness-raising

Most of LPI's policy-level and awareness raising work was done within the framework of the PAR. On the one hand, LPI and its partners involve all stakeholders such as local and traditional authorities, community leaders, civil society actors, but also provincial and even national authorities as well as members of the international community in the PAR and subsequent conflict transformation process and sensitize them on conflict dynamics. For instance, provincial governors and other provincial authorities are usually participating in the Dialogue Forums. On the other hand, awareness-raising and sensitization is an important aspect of LPI's partners' work. For instance, the CDMs implement radio programmes about conflict dynamics and their work to reach out to more numerous community members and remote communities.

One example of very successful national policy-level work was the reaction of the TRIO and LPI to the rejection of the Banyamulenge community of the Southern South Kivu PAR report. A group of high level politicians in Kinshasa published an open letter, accusing the TRIO and LPI of being partial and having already published the report without consent of the Banyamulenge community. At first the accused answered with an open letter, to correct the erroneous explanation. When the situation deteriorated, running the risk to spoil the delicate dialogue process, a delegation travelled to Kinshasa to clear the misunderstandings, resolve the conflict and generate support for the ongoing dialogue process. All communities were given the opportunity again to formulate their views on the report and could subsequently be taken on board.

The experiences of the Southern South Kivu conflict transformation programme demonstrate the importance of working with a coherent multi-track approach, also targeting the national level and potentially having an organisational presence in Kinshasa. Not only administrative processes might

⁷¹ Interview with one female member of the CCI Uvira on the 16th of January 2012 in Uvira, South Kivu, DRC.

⁷² Participation and observation of a bi-monthly reunion of the CCI Uvira on the 16th of January 2012 in Uvira.

be resolved more rapidly with the backing of a Kinshasa liaison office but misunderstandings such as the above mentioned could have been reacted to much quicker or even prevented in unfolding if a Kinshasa office was tasked with more permanent national level advocacy and lobbying work.

Finally, LPI is part of several international coordination bodies to share its analysis and knowledge of the conflict in the Kivu province as well as its experiences in peacebuilding. Moreover, LPI - according to several international actors and interview partners - is a very committed player when it comes to coordination challenges that plague the international community particularly in the DRC. LPI is not only an active member of the humanitarian cluster 'protection' but chairs the sub-cluster 'Inter-community Dialogue' and pushes for improved coordination and cooperation within the field of peacebuilding. It cooperates with international donors and partners such as MONUSCO, UN-HABITAT, Search for Common Ground and International Alert. For a specific 2-year project, LPI shared bi-weekly reports on the situation in the Kivus with International Alert as well as contributes to a database monitoring the security situation in the Kivus, collecting information on security incidences.

To conclude, LPI and its partners contributed to increased awareness and a better understanding at the international level on track 1 and 2 peacebuilding issues. They engaged policy-makers at all levels of the peacebuilding process. However, an office in Kinshasa as well as a more systematic rather than ad-hoc approach to national level advocacy and lobbying could strengthen the multi-track approach of LPI.

Cross-fertilization of theory and practice

The PAR is a very innovative and unique approach combining research, analysis and conflict transformation action that should be shared with practitioners and academics. It not only grounds LPI's and its partners' conflict transformation work in a thorough and solid analysis of the conflict and its context but it at the same time forms the basis and triggers a participatory dialogue and peacebuilding process. In 2010 and 2011, all PAR processes accomplished a first research and analysis cycle. However, certain problems remain such as the inclusiveness of the process with regard to gender and 'the people'. Thus, it is now on LPI to reflect upon its experiences with this analysis and peacebuilding tool in its 'living document' and to draw lessons for the future practice of peacebuilding.

Once this process is concluded, it is vital to share the experiences more widely to further develop theory and practice. Considering the uniqueness of the tool, more should be done in the following years to exchange with academics and practitioners on an international level. The *European Peacebuilding Liason Office* (EPLO) might provide a forum for knowledge-sharing as it comprises many international peacebuilding NGOs that do similar dialogue work but lack a comprehensive participatory research approach that creates the space for dialogue and engagement between the different conflicting parties.

Finally, LPI staff rightly pointed out that the institute and its partners developed a thorough understanding of land conflicts that is vital to further elaborate and share with academics within the DRC as well as on an international level. The POLE Institute as well as local or regional universities might be starting points for engagement.

Efficiency

Efficiency concerns whether the outputs – qualitative and quantitative – are justifiable in relations to the inputs?

While the evaluator did not assess the financial management of the programme, however, the programming costs appear justified in relation to the outcome. LPI provides core funding to its partner organisations including payments of programme staff, field visits and production of reports. This is necessary and justified if the objective is local capacity building and human and organisational development.

Considering its own human and financial resources, LPI is currently working with an optimal number of partners. The drastic reduction of the number of partners from around 40 to three increased LPI's impact in terms of capacity reinforcement of partners tremendously. The strategy of close accompaniment and concentrated support for its partners appears more efficient than the former strategy of reaching a greater number of organisations. However, the question remains how and with what resources a scaling-up, comprising more civil society organisations, and roll-out of the programme into other areas could be achieved if the goal is to contribute to peacebuilding outside of the Kivus?

In addition, LPI has developed a PME&L system and makes use of it in its own program planning and follow-up to monitor its capacity reinforcement program and its work in general. In 2011 LPI also introduced this system and approach to its partners and even its partners' partners and the PAR process, allowing LPI to monitor the effectiveness and impact of its capacity development measures and increasing effectiveness as well as efficiency.

Sustainability

Sustainability is related to the question of how likely is the continuation or longevity of the LPI programme after the cessation of donor funding?

Local ownership is one of the elements determining the sustainability of a development intervention. It is at the same time an important and constituting principle of LPI's work in DRC. Local ownership is ensured through the PAR process, which not only involves all stakeholders to a conflict in the research and analysis of the conflict context but thereby generates the aspiration among all parties to engage in dialogue. If not completely locally-driven, a locally-initiated conflict transformation process is thus started. To sustain the process, LPI offers capacity building support and various trainings in financial and administrative management but also in mediation, negotiation and conflict resolution skills. Regarding their capacities, at least the partners RIO and APC are on track of achieving the programme objective to function as professional conflict transformation centres independently of LPI soon. According to LPI's national director, this objective might be achievable by 2014. Indeed the two local partners have the capacity to manage activities and engage efficiently and professionally with relevant local and national stakeholders. However, while organisational structures are in place, sometimes initiative and leadership is missing – a weakness identified by LPI's national director of DRC. Moreover, the sustainability of the partnership with ASP is questionable due to the partner's weak organisational capacity, but some progress has been noted by LPI over the second half of 2011.

Nevertheless, any civil society work always depends on resources and funding, this is true for LPI as well as its partners. How likely is the continuation of activities once Sida's funding ceases? LPI's standing and positive reputation within the international donor community in DRC is likely to ensure LPI's ability to attract other funding. LPI was for instance able to partner with International Alert and CEEAC in a small project, as well as with the UN Pooled Fund for a bigger project. LPI's program in DRC has also attracted full program funding by the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for several years and submitted an application to ISSSS (International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy).

In addition, LPI has a clear 'exit-strategy' regarding their engagement of partners. Thus, LPI's capacity building programme also comprises training in fundraising strategies and proposal writing. Subsequently, all of the partners diversified their donor funding, both RIO and APC receiving even more funding by other donors than from LPI.

Finally, LPI has sufficiently recognized risks and opportunities for long-term engagement. For instance, the organisation identified the need for more national level lobbying and advocacy as an important step of taking the programme to the next phase.

3. Conclusions

- LPI's peacebuilding approach is relevant. Its relevance is ensured through PAR - a locally driven participatory conflict analysis process, placing the conflicting parties at the heart of the knowledge-production process.
- LPI's focus on solving land issues is supported by a wide range of academic research, highlighting the importance of access to land as a major structural and root cause of conflict. There is a consensus evolving that the emphasis of stabilization and peacebuilding efforts in DRC has been on national dynamics associated with armed groups, however, there has been an insufficient understanding of how local dynamics - in particular those linked to the control of land - feed into the existence of armed groups and continue to drive violence and conflict in Eastern DRC. Thus, LPI's track 2 and 3 approach, focusing on local level dynamics and land conflicts fills a vacuum.
- LPI's programme in DRC is effective and has made important progress since the last evaluation in 2007. Partners' capacities have been built and at least two of them contributed successfully to the resolution of local conflicts and the decrease of inter-community tensions. RIO and APC are on track of reaching their objective to function as professional conflict transformation centres. As ASP has now dealt with several internal issues, there are also clear indications of progress of this partner.
- Sustainability is one of the core characteristics of LPI's research and peacebuilding approach, placing participation of all relevant and respected stakeholders, including local and traditional authorities, and inclusion of all conflicting parties and communities, at the heart of its approach, thereby generating local-ownership. In addition, fundraising strategies form part of the trainings curriculum for partners. Subsequently, two of them successfully engaged in a diversification of donor-funding.
- PAR proved to be a unique research and conflict transformation tool that proved very effective in creating space for shared conflict analysis, trust and dialogue.

4. Recommendations

1. LPI acknowledges that building peace is a multilayered process that cannot be reached with a project level approach but needs to include all levels of society. However, LPI's peacebuilding work proved much stronger on track 2 and 3. An office in Kinshasa tasked with a more systematic rather than ad-hoc approach to national level advocacy and lobbying could be one way to strengthen the multi-track approach of LPI.
2. The successful application of PAR demonstrated that research can form the basis for conflict transformation. The 'living document' of LPI regarding its experiences with PAR should be completed and widely shared with a local and international community of peacebuilding practitioners and academics. Certain questions such as its 'inclusiveness' should be openly discussed.

3. Considering the effectiveness and impact of PAR and professional conflict transformation centres, a rolling-out to other provinces or neighbouring countries within the scope of LPI's resources should be considered in the medium-term. Regarding the cross-regional dimension of the conflicts and considering that LPI's partner's research is therefore often oriented towards Rwanda and Burundi, rolling-out to other countries would allow to more systematically strengthen the sub-regional aspect of LPI's work.
4. Regarding the sustainability of LPI's partners, more attention needs to be paid in the future to the issue of a more pro-active approach and self-initiative of the partners. Currently, they still rely a lot on LPI and its advisors for their work.
5. LPI should apply a Do-No-Harm approach to its work particularly in the partner selection (and reduction process) and more widely in the implementation of programmes. "Do No Harm" principles could be developed similarly in a participatory way (based on examples collected during the PAR process).
6. Referring to the potential selection of future partners and where they are based, LPI should reflect upon these experiences and consider other forms of partnerships such as placing 'peace consultants' within partner organisations for short-term periods (see, for instance, the common approach of the 'civil peace service'⁷³).
7. Conflict transformation centres and inter-community dialogue should play a bigger role in the future in the integration of armed groups due to the links between land conflicts, ethnic identity and armed groups and the ability of armed groups to mobilize on the basis of ethnic identity and the organisation of land tenure.
8. LPI should observe and reflect on how inclusionary and participatory the PAR process really is and how well the research results really reflect the opinions of the 'people' and not only of the educated elite.
9. In the future, sensitization and trainings on gender issues should be an important programming component if the level of female representation in CCI is to be raised.
10. LPI DRC should increase the exchange with academics and practitioners on an international level. The *European Peacebuilding Liason Office* (EPLO) might provide a forum for knowledge-sharing as it comprises many international peacebuilding NGOs that do similar dialogue work but lack a comprehensive participatory research approach that creates the space for dialogue and engagement between the different conflicting parties.

⁷³ See the concept of civil peace experts of the civil peace service: <http://www.ziviler-friedensdienst.org/en> and www.en-cps.org.

5. List of people met in DRC

	Organisation	Interviewee	Position	Date
1	Life & Peace Institute DRC	Pieter Vanholder	National Director DRC	Bukavu & Kalehe 17-19/01/12
2		Loochi Muzaliwa	Programme Coordinator	Uvira, Kalehe & Bukavu, 16 -19/01/12
3		Eméry Mudinga	Technical Advisor	Uvira, Kalehe & Bukavu, 16 -19/01/12
4		Oswald Muderwa	Technical Advisor	Uvira, Kalehe & Bukavu, 16 -19/01/12
5		Jean-Louis Nzweve	Technical Advisor	Uvira, Kalehe & Bukavu, 16 -19/01/12
6		Claude Iguma	Former Program Coordinator	Cyangugu, 17/12/12
7	MONUSCO	Joseph D. Grah	Civil Affairs Officer, OIC - CAS	Uvira, 16/01/12
8		Hugo de Vries	Coordination Officer, Unite d'appui à la Stabilisation (UAS/SSU)	Bukavu, 17/01/12
9		Paulus Van Bronswijk	Civil Affairs Officer	Bukavu, 17/01/12
10	UN-HABITAT	Jean Emmanuel Mihigo Mupfuni	Expert Foncier Provincial	Bukavu, 17/01/12
11	Comité de Coordination des Actions de Paix (CCAP)	Mionda Lucela Francois	Executive Secretary	Uvira, 16/01/12
12	Réseau d'Innovation Organisationnelle (RIO)	Jaidi Alo-I-Bya Sango	Researcher	Uvira, 16/01/12
13		Jean-Dominique Kimengele	Project Coordinator	Uvira, 16/01/12
14	Action pour la Paix et la Concorde (APC)	Déo Buuma	Executive Director	Cyangugu, 17/12/12
15		Sosthène Malyaseme	Program Coordinator	Kalehe, 18/01/12
16	Action Solidaire pour la Paix (ASP)	Muchanga Kiitsi	Board President	Cyangugu, 17/12/11
17		Sage Mulinda	Program Coordinator	Cyangugu, 17/12/12
18	Cadre de Concertation Intercommunautaire (CCI)	Deo Mujafiri, ESONGO, ADEPAE,	Researcher – Analyst, member of the CCI Bukavu	Uvira, 16/01/12
19	NGO USENI	Hur Waki, NGO USENI	Animateur ADEPAE, member of the CCI Uvira	Uvira, 16/01/12
20	Cadre de Dialogue et de Médiation (CDM)	Representatives of the 13 CDMs, Kalehe territory		Bushushu, Kalehe territory, 18/01/12
21	Local authorities		Local Administrator	Uvira, 16/01/12
22	Local authorities		Local Administrator	Kalehe, 18/01/12
23	Local authorities		Police Inspecteur	Uvira, 16/01/12

ANNEX 6 - LIST OF PERSONS MET

See lists of persons met during the visits to the countries in each of the country assessments.

Inception meetings 20th and 21st October 2011 in Uppsala and Stockholm

Life and Peace Institute:

- Executive Director Peter Karlsson Sjögren
- Communications Director Tore Samuelsson
- Programme and Research Advisor Nikki Slocum-Bradley
- Programme Advisor Charlotte Booth
- Programme Advisor Amanda Ree

Sida:

- Programme Manager Jonas Bergström, Dep. for Programme Cooperation-
- Programme Manager Petra Smitmanis Dry - DRC
- Programme Manager Camilla Bengtsson - Ethiopia
- Linnea Ehrnst, Department for Conflict and Post-conflict

In Uppsala; 1. February 2012: Short debriefing.

- Michele Cesari -RR Nairobi
- Natalie Groom - RR Khartoum
- Hannah Tsadik - Programme Manager Addis Abeba
- Linda Forsberg - Programme Advisor
- Henrik Halvardsson - Programme Advisor
- Charlotte Booth - Programme Advisor
- Tore Samuelsson - Communication Director
- Jenny Svensson - Programme Director
- Peter K Sjögren - Executive Director
- Valter Villko - Programme Intern - note taker
- Lena Furberg - Facilitator, and also previously acting Executive Director LPI 2008-2009



EVALUATION OF THE LIFE AND PEACE INSTITUTE – LPI

The mid-term evaluation of Life and Peace Institute's (LPI) Sida funded programme for 2010 to 2012 had the main objectives to provide the basis for Sida and LPI to jointly assess relevance and effectiveness of the programme. The evaluation covered LPI's conflict transformation work in DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan. The evaluation overall assessed that LPI's work is relevant and effective. The evaluation furthermore presented a number of recommendations of ways in which LPI may improve its work; including that LPI should consolidate its work over the next few years, describe the methods LPI uses and document results of LPI's conflict transformation work. It is recommended that Sida should continue funding LPI in a way, which allows LPI the necessary flexibility to be able to adapt to the difficult political and security contexts in which LPI operates in the field.

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