



2012:22

Sida Decentralised Evaluation

Jock Baker
Emilia Molnar
Bo Göransson
Björn Ternström
Annina Mattsson

Study of Sida's Support to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) 2006-2011

Synthesis Report

Study of Sida's Support to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) 2006-2011

**Synthesis Report
October 2012**

**Jock Baker
Emilia Molnar
Bo Göransson
Björn Ternström
Annina Mattsson**

Authors: Jock Baker, Emilia Molnar, Bo Göransson, Björn Ternström and Annina Mattsson

The views and interpretations expressed in this report are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida.

Sida Decentralised Evaluation 2012:22

Commissioned by Sida, Unit for Humanitarian Assistance

Copyright: Sida and the authors

Date of final report: October 2012

Published by Citat 2012

Art. no. Sida61540en

urn:nbn:se:sida-61540en

This publication can be downloaded from: <http://www.sida.se/publications>

SWEDISH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY

Address: S-105 25 Stockholm, Sweden. Office: Valhallavägen 199, Stockholm

Telephone: +46 (0)8-698 50 00. Telefax: +46 (0)8-20 88 64

Postgiro: 1 56 34-9. VAT. No. SE 202100-478901

E-mail: info@sida.se. Homepage: <http://www.sida.se>

Table of Contents

Table of Contents.....	2
Abbreviations and Acronyms	i
Preface.....	iii
Acknowledgements	iv
Executive Summary.....	8
1 Introduction and Background.....	14
1.1 History & Background of MSB	14
1.2 Swedish Humanitarian Aid	15
1.3 Sida's Humanitarian Assistance Strategy	16
1.4 Funding MSB.....	17
1.5 Overview of MSB International Operations	18
2 Methodology, Limitations and Constraints	22
2.1 Potential biases	24
2.2 Limitations and Constraints	24
3 Likely Future Trends	27
3.1 Changing Demands in a Changing Humanitarian Context	27
3.2 Policy and strategy changes.....	27
4 MSB Operational Partners	30
4.1 Status of Annual Agreements with MSB.....	31
5 Comparison of MSB with Other Standby Partners	33
5.1 The Standby Partner Landscape	33
6 Relevance.....	37
6.1 Coherence between MSB's International operations and Sida's Humanitarian Strategy	38
6.2 Selection of Partners by MSB.....	39
6.3 MSB's role, comparative advantage, expertise and capacity.....	40
6.4 MSB's Role in Needs Assessments	43
6.5 Understanding of MSB's Role by other Swedish Stakeholders	44
6.6 Conclusions – Relevance	45
7 Efficiency and Effectiveness	46

7.1	Approval Process for MSB International Operations	47
7.2	Value-added of MSB Interventions	50
7.3	Exit Strategies for MSB Interventions	57
7.4	MSB'S Relationship with National Capacities	58
7.5	Conclusions – Effectiveness and Efficiency	58
8	Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting on Results	60
8.1	MSB Approach to Monitoring and Evaluation	60
8.2	Comparisons with MSB Peer Agencies	62
8.3	Conclusions – Monitoring and Evaluation	62
9	Coordination	64
9.1	MSB and the International Humanitarian Partnership (IHP)	64
9.2	MSB Coordination with its Stakeholders	65
9.3	MSB Contribution to Humanitarian Reform	65
9.4	Conclusions – Coordination	66
10	Cross-cutting Issues	68
10.1	Gender	68
10.2	Environment	70
10.3	Conflict-Sensitivity	71
10.4	Conclusions – Cross-cutting Issues	71
11	Conclusions & Recommendations	72
11.1	Recommendations to Sida	73
11.2	Recommendations to MSB	74
	Annex 1 – Terms of Reference	78
	Annex 2 – Inception Report	91
	Annex 3 – UNHCR Partner Case Study	117
	Annex 4 – ICRC Partner Case Study	126
	Annex 5 - WFP Partner Case Study	134
	Annex 6 – Mozambique Field Visit	141
	Annex 7 – Ethiopia Field Visit	155
	Annex 8 – Congo Field Visit	167
	Annex 9 – Comparative Table of Selected Standby Partners	178
	Annex 10 - Monthly salaries and related costs for deployed MSB Staff	189
	Annex 11 – Documents Reviewed	191
	Annex 12 – Persons Interviewed	195

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAR	After-Action Review
ARRA	Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (Ethiopia)
CADRI	Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund (pooled funds managed by the UN)
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CCCM	Camp Coordination/Management
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund (pooled funds managed by the UN)
CHF	Common Humanitarian Funds
CLA	Cluster lead agency
CMC	Crisis Management Centre (Finland)
CTA	Chief Technical Adviser
DFID	(UK) Department for International Development
DRC (1)	Danish Refugee Council
DRC (2)	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ELLIOT	Evaluation and Lessons Learned from International Operations Tool
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ERF	Emergency Response Funds (pooled funds managed by the UN)
ETC	Emergency Telecommunications Cluster
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Coordination Team
HQ	Headquarters
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
INGC	<i>Instituto Nacional de Gestão de Calamidades</i> (Mozambique's National Institute for Disaster Management)
IHP	International Humanitarian Partnership
IOM	International Organization for Migration
KII	Key informant interview
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Sweden)

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

MOD	Ministry of Defence (Sweden)
MSB	Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MSEK	Swedish Krona (millions)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NOREPS	Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development / Development Assistance Committee
PDNA	Post-Disaster Needs Assessment
PER	Personnel Evaluation Report
RC (1)	Red Cross
RC (2)	Resident Coordinator
R & R	Rest and Recreation
RTE	Real-Time Evaluation
SAR	Search and Rescue
SEK	Swedish Krona
SEMA	Swedish Emergency Management Agency
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SRSA	Swedish Rescue Services Agency
THW	Bundesanstalt Technisches Hilfswerk (German Agency for Technical Relief)
TOR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMACC	United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
VOICE	Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies
WB	World Bank
WEM	Workshop for Emergency Management (UNHCR training course)
WFP	World Food Programme

Preface

This joint study was commissioned in 2012 by Sida (Department for Conflict and Post - Conflict Cooperation / Unit for Humanitarian Assistance) and MSB (Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och Beredskap, previously Swedish civil Contingencies Agency). Indevelop was commissioned to conduct this study, which was the first of its kind, through Sida's framework agreement for reviews and evaluations. A Management Group consisting of Sida and MSB staff provided oversight, guidance and coordination throughout the study.

Indevelop carried out this study in cooperation with Channel Research while providing management and quality assurance of the process and deliverables. Jessica Rothman was the Project Manager with overall responsibility for managing the implementation of the study, and quality assurance of the reports was done by Ian Christoplos and Niels Dabelstein.

The independent study team included the following key members:

Mr. Jock Baker, Team Leader: Jock is a senior evaluator who previously worked with UN and NGO humanitarian agencies and led evaluations and studies on various themes including humanitarian reform, climate change adaptation, post-conflict recovery, gender equality programming, disaster risk reduction and humanitarian financing.

Mr. Bo Göransson, Institutional Development Analyst: Bo has a lifetime of experience in international development in management positions.

Mr. Björn Ternström, Human Assistance Expert: Björn has over 20 years of experience from the humanitarian field, both delivery and evaluations.

Ms. Annina Mattsson, Key Expert: Annina is specialised in evaluations concerning humanitarian aid delivery.

Ms. Emilia Molnar, Research Assistant: Emilia has a background in quantitative and qualitative methods and has sound knowledge of research methodology.

Acknowledgements

Indevelop is very grateful to members of the Steering Group from Sida and MSB who worked closely with the team throughout the process, providing useful guidance whenever necessary. Particular thanks are due to Katarina Kotoglou and David Sundström, who ensured that the team were well supplied with relevant information and received all necessary support in their roles as focal points for the study team. Insights and contributions of other staff in the mid-term and final workshops from MFA, MOD, Sida, and MSB were also of considerable value to the team.

The study team also wishes to thank the many individuals who played an important role in assisting us during the fieldwork for this study, notably MSB team members in DRC and Congo-Brazzaville, Mozambique and Ethiopia. Support and insights from MSB HQ staff who joined the teams in Ethiopia (Ulrika Eden) and in the Congo (Britta Ramberg) were greatly appreciated in view of the mutually beneficial learning that took place. Our sincere thanks are also due to all the staff we interviewed at MFA, MOD, Sida and MSB, and partner staff for allocating their valuable time during HQ and country visits.

Executive Summary

The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB)¹ is the country's national authority under the Ministry of Defence (MOD) committed to enhancing and supporting societal capacities and preparedness for, and prevention of, emergencies and crises. In addition to its civil responsibilities, MSB contributes to emergency response at an international level in cooperation with various partners. MSB's international operations can take very different forms, from emergency search and rescue operations following an earthquake to long-term projects aimed at strengthening a country's capacity for handling its own future disasters. The Government's Strategy for the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency's (Sida) Humanitarian Assistance defines Sida's relation to MSB as: financing their international operations, mainly those requested by UN humanitarian agencies, but also for other operations where the unique expertise of the MSB is needed and its assistance required internationally.

A team of consultants were tasked to undertake an independent study to collate and analyse lessons learned in order to provide Sida and MSB with options on how to best support and implement MSB's international operations, and build on their comparative advantage, so as to strengthen cooperation between Sida and MSB and improve monitoring, evaluation and reporting for MSB operations funded by Sida. A deductive mixed methods approach was used, using results from over 100 interviews, observations from field visits to MSB operations in four countries, online survey, detailed case studies of three partners and extensive document research.

While acknowledging that MSB needs to consider various practical and legal issues when fulfilling its mandate, the study team tried to look whenever possible at the point of delivery (i.e. at the level of disaster-affected populations) and used this as the unit of analysis when assessing the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of relevant processes at both a country and the global level.

Humanitarian Reform and the role of Standby Partners

UN agencies that have been recognized for their good humanitarian performances, such as WFP, UNICEF and UNHCR, have long relied on other agencies to implement the bulk of their programs. The 2005 review that laid the groundwork for Humanitarian Reform highlighted this critical role of non-UN partners by recognising that humanitarian agencies can only cover the needs of a large-scale disaster if agen-

¹ Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (MSB) in Swedish

cies work together using their respective strengths to the best advantage. An important aspect of this approach is that UN agencies need to be able to focus on their core mandates, which include crucial coordination roles, and to minimise their engagement in activities that are better suited to partners. Standby partners thus have a critical role in humanitarian reform. They not only provide technical capabilities that partners would have difficulty mobilising themselves, but also avoid over-stretching human resource capacities of partners by using their own roster management capacities, thus increasing the chances of deploying the right people at the right time; this is a critical, if elusive, element of an effective humanitarian response.

Views and Perspectives of Swedish Government Stakeholders

The study team interviewed a series of key informants and reviewed documentation from each of the four main Swedish stakeholders i.e. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and Sida, in addition to staff of MSB itself. There is broad consensus about the high quality of MSB's work, but uncertainty about the extent to which the interventions are strategic and/or in line with the intentions of Swedish humanitarian policies. MSB's mandate and role in the Swedish humanitarian system is partly unclear and partly unknown, as stated by informants from all main stakeholders. The procedures between the operational actors (Sida, MSB and international partners) are cumbersome, with relatively high transactions costs.

Swedish Government stakeholders at both policy and operational levels want clearer links between official humanitarian policies and project selection. The absence of such links and of regular sharing of strategic information related to stated objectives creates a lack of trust; this is not of intentions, but of results between actors.

- There is a lack of coherence between different policies and decisions:
 - MFA support to standby partners (core funding),
 - Humanitarian support given by Sida in major disasters (programme support)
 - Various departments within Sida (humanitarian and "development"), including Embassies and
 - MSB operational support in the form of secondments or other interventions.
- MSB's capacity for international operations is financed by the aid budget. Even though MSB regularly disseminates information about how resources are allocated, the links between allocations and its utilization remain unclear for many key actors.
- MSB operations include secondments, as well as "Global Service Packages" such as fleet management, or mine action and long-term support to capacity building in disaster preparedness at national levels in host countries. However, decision-making procedures are not adequately differentiated, thus leading to cumbersome processes in dealing with small-scale operations such as secondments and insufficient analysis in dealing with larger-scale interventions.
- Sida and MSB are at times under pressure to review and approve proposals so as to meet MSB's commitment to make decisions within 72 hours.

- MSB reporting on interventions tends to be operational, rather than strategic. As one interviewee put it, "*there is significant amount of reporting on trees, very little reporting on the forest*". Sida has, however, not been clear in conveying what kind of, and in what format, information would be suitable.

Views and Perspectives of MSB Partners

MSB currently has long-term standby partner global agreements with the ICRC, the World Bank, and seven agencies from the UN family. Three partner agencies – WFP, UNHCR and ICRC – were selected as case studies and subjected to more detailed analysis by the study team.

MSB technical capacity is highly valued, and often fills a profile not present within partner agencies; although MSB at times has also filled HQ and regional level advisory roles. Seconded staff can also bring in new ideas and cross-fertilise approaches between agencies and programmes. The few cited examples of weak performance appeared to mainly be related to lack of experience of working with UN agencies, or poor interpersonal skills. Where problems occurred, they were usually swiftly dealt with by MSB HQ after being brought to their attention. MSB is seen as flexible, and their personnel – particularly those with prior experience of working with the partner agency – are respected for their ability to integrate relatively seamlessly into partner structures and ways of working without needing to seek the media spotlight.

Trends indicate that there is increasing demand by partners for “Global Service Packages” where MSB deployments do not only consist of staff, but also all, or most of, the equipment and supplies needed to accomplish the assigned task. There is also increasing emphasis, consistent with Sida’s humanitarian strategy, on building national capacities. MSB has accordingly developed new types of partnerships with the likes of the Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative (CADRI) at a global level, and with the Mozambique's National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC) at a national level, as MSB increases its Disaster Risk Reduction activities. While disaster risk reduction (DRR) appears to be a potentially important niche area for MSB, to fill it effectively will require MSB the development of different approaches and skill sets.

Assessing MSB Performance

MSB, and its predecessor SRSA, has developed a sound and solid reputation amongst its partners and peers based on two decades of delivering high quality, flexible and timely support. In some areas, such as resource-intensive technical components of mine clearance operations, MSB is seen as the partner of choice by ICRC and UNMAS. This reputation has been acquired over the years due to their:

- High technical expertise of deployed staff;
- Good standard of equipment;
- Ready access to funds to enable rapid deployments;
- Delivering on commitments made;
- Flexibility, including the ability to integrate into partner teams;
- Needs-based approach;
- Impartiality and respect of codes of conduct; and

- Supporting activities that have positive impacts on humanitarian systems that extend beyond the immediate scope of MSB operations.

Relevance; the question of coherence. In the absence of explicit goals, instructions or other performance measurements linking the Government's and Sida's humanitarian objectives to MSB operations, it is difficult to give a complete answer on the degree or level of coherence. However, even without such objectives, it is evident that coherence could be improved, not least with international partners, through better sharing of information and reporting at more strategic levels. It should be emphasised that doubts within MFA and Sida mainly stem from a perceived lack of alignment with official policies given the absence of clear guidance, goals, yardsticks and subsequent reporting at the strategic level.

Effectiveness and efficiency. MSB is considered by its partners to be highly effective in meeting its operational objectives, but the extent to which MSB is effective in supporting Sida's Humanitarian Strategy *to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity for the benefit of people* is more challenging to assess due to a combination of a focus on providing support to the partner (rather than direct contact with the affected populations) and the lack of clear strategic linkages described above.

Using the OECD/DAC definition of efficiency², the issue of cost effectiveness is an issue that consistently surfaces, particularly when partners are asked to cover costs of MSB deployments (typically when requesting an extension 3 - 6 months after the initial deployment). While most partners agree to partially or fully cover costs, in some cases costs of MSB operations have hindered attempts to hand operations over to the partners, such as in fleet operations in DRC and Haiti.

At the same time, the costs of MSB can be favourably compared to those of UN agencies, and partners clearly see MSB's ability to quickly field high quality technical support as cost-effective. This is particularly the case in the immediate aftermath of a large-scale quick onset disaster and/or if the deployment is part of a significant service package that partners have difficulty putting together themselves.

There is a need for a more systematic discussion at all levels (strategic, program and intervention) of costs and better use of cost sharing. Costs should (also) be reduced through greater involvement of national authorities and the civil society at local levels, including the private sector, along with a more systematic approach by MSB to supporting partners to develop exit strategies and facilitate their implementation.

Monitoring, evaluation and learning. MSB reporting and learning systems currently emphasise operational aspects. While continuing to promote operational learning, at the same time MSB needs to develop performance measurement systems that

² Efficiency a measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time etc.) are converted to results.

look beyond outputs and revise its monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems accordingly. Currently, a lot of data is collected, and too little is used for strategic monitoring and reporting, and for creating learning loops. MSB's ELLIOT system is a promising exception that could potentially be adapted for use for all standby partners.

Coordination and communication. There is a lack of knowledge amongst partners about MSB's capacities. There is a consistent call for a MSB "catalogue of services" that could help them maximise the use of MSB's potential resources; this is viewed as an indicator of a need for a more robust MSB communication strategy.

Areas for improvement

Evidence suggests that a few key changes within the Swedish Government system at both the operational and policy levels could result in significant improvements by creating an enabling environment for MSB operations. These changes require decisions at the policy level, Government, and operational levels, between Sida and MSB, with a focus on strengthening the links between policy and interventions, and on information sharing. They are not technically complicated. They would, if implemented, increase trust, but it would require a certain level of leadership commitment by each of the concerned agencies.

- *A Swedish government strategy.* It should establish the mandate and role of MSB within the Swedish system. It should guide its international operations and help to ensure that deployments are consistent with MSB's core capacities and mandate while supporting Sida's and partners' strategic objectives. The strategy should maintain necessary flexibility. Should it not be impossible to decide upon a strategy in the short term, there is still a need for written instructions, at the policy level, guiding the international operations of MSB.
 - The strategy should provide guidance on the role of core competences: How to develop and adjust them to changing circumstances, and how to link and develop Swedish national capabilities to humanitarian needs. It would help clarify MSB's role at a strategic level with partners in needs assessments, cost sharing, deployment length, and the promotion of exit strategies.
 - An aim of the strategy would be to contribute to interdepartmental coherence and to coherence between policy and operations. This can be achieved through an established structure (e.g. quarterly meetings) for regular information sharing among the four key actors at a sufficiently senior level to provide continued strategic guidance.
- *A robust MSB communication strategy* would be important for implementing the Government strategy. Swedish stakeholders and standby partners need to be aware of MSB's competencies and capabilities as well as its limits.
- *An operational framework* and agreement between MSB and Sida regulating applications and decision-making modalities, financial frames for collaboration with partners, reporting and evaluation procedures. An agreement should possibly cover a three-year period with annual stocktaking of results.

- The framework should provide criteria and priorities for interventions with different partners. These should be guided by MFA and Sida discussions, and agreement on core and programme support to these partners, and subsequently be reflected in MoUs between MSB and partners in order to increase coherence in the Swedish system. The framework should also discuss the development of future core competencies of MSB, based on the humanitarian system's needs.
- *Differentiated* decision making processes between MSB and Sida that reflect the wide range of assignments undertaken by MSB. To reduce transaction costs, the parties should aim at identifying areas where intervention decisions can be made for groups of secondments (defined by partner, thematic, and/or geographic) the framework agreement could also include decisions on the extension of ongoing interventions.
- More complex higher cost operations could ideally be identified in the framework, but normally decisions would be taken by Sida after a regular "project cycle process" where greater attention should be given to both entry (participation in needs assessments) and exit strategies for MSB deployments.
- *Reporting systems* to be differentiated and to mirror decisions. Interventions outside the framework, such as new and large-scale interventions, involvement in sensitive countries (politically, security or otherwise) should continue to be handled on a case-by-case basis.
- *Monitoring and reporting* for longer-term projects and "packages" should be more geared towards outcomes, while taking into account the perspective of affected populations as much as possible.
- *Training in results-based project cycle management* should be a major task for MSB in coming years as a consequence of more differentiated ways of responding and reacting to humanitarian challenges
- *More systematic and regular internal Sida communication* between the Humanitarian unit and the development and thematic departments would increase internal Swedish coherence. Promoting mutually supportive relationships between MSB and Sida at a country level would have both policy and operational benefits.

1 Introduction and Background

1.1 HISTORY & BACKGROUND OF MSB

MSB, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, was established in January 2009, replacing the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA), the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) and the Swedish National Board of Psychological Defence. International operations prior to 2009 were run by SRSA. MSB aims to enhance capacities to prepare for and prevent emergencies and crises while supporting stakeholders to mitigate the impact of the crisis.

MSB's identity is defined by its “*vision, concept and cornerstone*”:

- ***Vision***: A safer society in a changing world.
- ***Concept***: In collaboration with other stakeholders the MSB develops the individual's and society's capacity to prevent, deal with and learn from emergencies and disasters. We operate via knowledge-building, support, education, training, regulation, supervision and our own operational work in close cooperation with the municipalities, the county councils, other authorities, the private sector, and organisations to achieve increased safety and security at all levels of society – from the local to the global community.
- ***Cornerstone***: MSB is an open, competent, and energetic authority, focusing both on the individual and on society as a whole.

MSB is a government agency that falls under the Ministry of Defence. MSB's governance structure does not include a Board (as some agencies like Sida have), but a Council appointed by the Government to advise its Director General. MSB's predominant domestic role in Sweden is to coordinate, plan, forecast, prepare and foresee, if possible without taking over responsibilities from designated actors during an emergency, which are led by concerned local authorities.

MSBs international interventions are largely based on their national capabilities, although some capabilities, such as base camp operations, have been developed through MSB's international mandate without any specific connection to disaster preparedness in Sweden. On the other hand, MSB (and SRSA before that) works with national rescue services at the local level in Sweden, which is a good basis for supporting other countries in improving their capacity to handle disasters locally and regionally.

Staff seconded to partners are only employed by MSB during their deployment. This gives MSB a wide roster, a large pond to fish in, at a relatively low cost.


Although MSB is a government agency, its flexibility and impartiality has led to partners favourably comparing MSB's modus operandi with NGO Standby Partners, such as the Norwegian Refugee Council.

1.2 SWEDISH HUMANITARIAN AID

According to data provided to the study team by Sida, the total amount of international humanitarian aid provided through Sida during 2008-2010 was estimated at SEK 7.5 billion, with SEK 2.27 billion allocated for 2010 alone. Over 50 per cent of Sida's humanitarian contribution is allocated to various UN organizations, with another quarter being channelled via the Swedish Red Cross to the International Red Cross Committee and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

Swedish international aid is channelled through MFA, which is responsible for core support to humanitarian organisations, and through Sida, which provides country and regional support to the United Nations (including UN-managed pool funds), the Red Cross (RC) movement, and NGOs. Sida also funds the lion share of MSB's international operations.

Figure 1 – Sida/MFA Channels for Swedish Humanitarian Aid



In 2011 Sida had multi-year frameworks³ with seven UN organisations valued at a total of 669 MSEK, representing 21% and 13% of Sida's and Sweden's overall humanitarian budgets respectively. Twelve partners accounted for 86% of Sweden's total humanitarian assistance during 2011⁴. Sida channelled 5% of its total humanitarian assistance allocation to MSB during 2011.

³ MSB does not currently have a multi-year agreement. The last multi-year framework agreement with Sida expired in 2009.

⁴ Source: Sida - Amounts in MSEK

Figure 2 - Swedish Humanitarian Aid in 2011 (MSEK)






Figure 3 - Allocations of Sida Humanitarian Aid in 2011



1.3 SIDA'S HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE STRATEGY

Based on the Government's policy for Sweden's humanitarian assistance 2010–2016, the overall objective of Sida's strategy is “...to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity for the benefit of people in need who are, or are at risk of becoming, affected by armed conflicts, natural disasters or other disaster situations”⁵ by providing rapid, flexible and quality-assured support to humanitarian operations. Three areas and eight goals define where attention and resources will be focused: The current strategy places greater emphasis on disaster prevention and recovery in comparison with its predecessor.

⁵ This objective is based on the first Good Humanitarian Donorship principle.

Figure 4 - Sida's Humanitarian Assistance Strategy 2011–2014

MSB's emphasis on building capacities to prepare for and prevent emergencies while playing a "back office" support role for international agencies who are in the front line during an emergency response means that their attention is mainly focused on goals in Areas A and B. The exception is Goal 6 (strengthening national capacities) where MSB has previously not been active but currently is making attempts to focus some of its attention, notably through DRR. As discussed below in the Monitoring and Evaluation section, a relative lack of experience with Area C, notably "Increased participation of the affected population" can be seen to increase the complexity of measuring MSB results or outcomes MSB is, however, increasing its efforts in Goal 8, which will also be discussed below.

1.4 FUNDING MSB

According to MSB letter of appropriation for its administration, 115 million SEK is classified in 2012 as development assistance according to OECD/DAC guidelines. These funds are allocated to finance standby capacity and indirect costs that enable MSB to carry out international activities.

Funding for implementing interventions and projects is in addition to this amount and comes from various external sources including Sida⁶, DFID, the European Union and partners including WFP, UNHCR and ICRC. There are regular meetings between MSB, MOD and MFA, although MFA is not formally involved in determining the funding allocated to MSB for maintaining a capacity for international operations.

Table 1 – MSB Funding Allocations by Year⁷

Year	Preparedness ⁸	Response
2009	121 MSEK	187 MSEK
2010	119 MSEK	177 MSEK
2011	117 MSEK	235 MSEK

MSB also undertakes a number of training and consultative activities that are a critical part of maintaining a necessary level of preparedness, and are funded from sources other than Sida. According to MSB data, MSB hosted over 200 trainings or exercises (including simulations) during 2009 – 2011. MSB was responsible for planning, delivery and evaluation for just over half of these, while OCHA or the EU mainly facilitated the remainder. The most common types of training topics were induction courses, operational management, and Search and Rescue.


1.5 OVERVIEW OF MSB INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

MSB categorises their activities in different ways, partly because of the way the partners define them. In general, however, MSB activities fall into four main categories of interventions implemented through deployment of staff, increasingly as part of Global Service Packages, in support of partner activities. The major activity is Humanitarian intervention, followed by Humanitarian Mine Action, Disaster Risk Reduction and Early Recovery. DRR activities were usually referred to as capacity building in reports from 2007-2008.

⁶ MSB receives funding from several units at Sida, including from the humanitarian budget and country programme budgets.

⁷ Source: MSB

⁸ This amount includes the core allocation to MSB, in 2012 estimated at 115 MSEK.


Figure 5 - MSB interventions by activity 2007-2011 (SEK millions)

Examples of specific contributions by MSB include the following:

- Construction & management of base camps (accommodation/offices)
- Transport and logistics
- Munitions/mine action⁹
- Information management and coordination
- Temporary shelter
- WASH; Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
- Search and Rescue
- Early Recovery, and
- DRR.

MSB roster members are categorised by their competency profiles and by functional area. Since a roster member can be listed under more than one competency profile, the total number of roster members per functional area is larger than the actual number of individuals on the roster.

⁹ Humanitarian mine action has been specified in government instructions as a specific MSB activity, and is part of their humanitarian intervention portfolio.

Figure 6 – MSB Roster by Functional Area¹⁰

1.5.1 Standby Partnerships

MSB has signed standby partner agreements with several organisations, mainly UN agencies, with an objective to strengthen their preparedness and to assist with rapid response in emergency situations. These agreements are intended to clarify the roles and responsibilities between the MSB and the standby partner and include specific regulations, including timeframes for deployment, security regulations, staffing procedures, status of deployed staff, administration and finances, leave entitlements and rest and recuperation, liability, insurances etc.

WFP, OCHA, UNICEF and UNHCR have agreements with between 10-20 standby partners in total, including governmental agencies (like MSB), international NGOs such as the Danish Refugee Council, RedR Australia and Norwegian Refugee Council, and also private sector entities such as Ericsson Response and Veolia. The purpose of standby partnerships is to provide staff specialised in specific technical areas at short notice. They are not intended as a substitute for regular staffing arrangements, but as a short-term means to support and augment existing resources to address:

- Time constraints (The UN or other agency lacks the resources and availability to meet the immediate requirements)

¹⁰ Source: MSB HQ. 2012 figures are as of August 2012

- Surge capacity (Insufficient in-house capacity to respond to operational requirements)
- Technical expertise (Existing skills or resources are inadequate to respond to the assignment and/or emergency)
- Temporary support (The services are limited in time, normally 3-6 months up to 12 months.)

In addition to staff, standby partners can also provide supplies and equipment, increasingly as part of a Global Service Package, including base camps, shelter, trucks, mine action equipment, Information & Communications Technology (ICT), etc

2 Methodology, Limitations and Constraints

The methodology used for this study was an inductive and deductive mixed-methods approach using quantitative and qualitative data gathered from a range of sources as described below. To ensure data integrity and factual accuracy throughout the review process, steps were taken to ensure adequate comparison and triangulation. Each team member was assigned responsibility for specific themes in line with their individual areas of expertise. As these areas were fairly closely aligned with different stakeholder groups, two team members focused on data collection and analysis for Swedish stakeholders, two members on “external” stakeholders (MSB standby partners and peer agencies of MSB) and the fifth member was given responsibility for the collection and collation of data from the MSB database.

A website was established as a virtual reference library housing reference and draft documents, interview notes and analysis tools. During the inception phase, documents received by the team were divided up among the team members for a quick scan of relevant materials. Relevant information was extracted from documents, with details of relevant summary, findings, and document reference. Common issues from documents and interviews were placed in an evidence matrix to organise the data according to lines of questioning to facilitate analysis. During the study more than 80 key reference documents were reviewed, including MSB and Sida documents (applications, decisions, reports, guidelines etc.), Swedish and other policy and strategy documents on humanitarian assistance, standby partnership agreements and MoUs, guidelines, assessments, reviews and evaluations of humanitarian operations and stand-by partnership.

At the end of September 2012, the team had interviewed a total of 103 persons; 69 men and 34 women. 65 were partner agency staff or other external key informants. 38 were previous or present Swedish government officials, Sida or MSB staff, including MSB deployees. During field visits to DRC/Congo Brazzaville, Ethiopia, and Mozambique 19, 20 and 25 persons were interviewed respectively.

While efforts have been made to ensure an appropriate level of rigor and credibility, emphasis was given to maximise learning and utility for key stakeholders in MSB, Sida and MSB partners as directed by the Management Group for this Review.

During the Inception phase, partner staff agreed to facilitate an online survey of users of MSB services to obtain feedback on the performance of MSB deployed staff in the four main operational fields (Humanitarian interventions, Mine Action, DRR and Early Recovery). After testing, the survey link was forwarded by Sida in May

2012 and to focal points to several MSB Standby Partners¹¹ along with a request to circulate it among relevant staff. In the end, only 15 responses were received in total, mainly from OCHA (4) and UNMAS (7). According to partner focal points, the low response rate was probably due to a combination of the summer holiday period and general information overload. While the low response rate is insufficient for any meaningful statistical analysis, comments by the respondents proved useful in triangulating some of the review findings, particularly in relation to mine action interventions.

A Mid-Term Review workshop was held at the end of June 2012 that involved representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, Sida, and MSB. In addition to providing an update on progress of the Review, working groups looked separately at three specific themes: a potential MSB Strategy, a potential MSB Operational Framework, and MSB Standby Partners. Apart from validating and building on findings, to date it was agreed that four follow-up actions could be pursued immediately without waiting for the final results of this Review with appropriate support from members of the study team, namely:

- *Strategy for MSB's international operations*: MoD informed that the intention was to arrive at a Government decision during the autumn on a strategy for MSB. In that context they would also explore options for resolving the budget issues raised during the workshop.
- *Operational Framework on the collaboration between Sida and MSB*: MSB and Sida agreed to work together on the operational framework.
- *Common Standby Partner Performance Monitoring System – ELLIOT (Evaluation and Lessons Learnt from International Operations)*: MSB will explore how ELLIOT might potentially be used as the basis for an inter-agency tool.
- *Field operations*: MSB will investigate how MSB field operations can be improved based on findings from field visits of the study team.

Apart from this Synthesis Report, deliverables include three case studies for standby partners and three country reports¹² that are attached as annexes to this report. The case studies were selected by the Management Group for this Review in consultation with the Review Team based on selection criteria that were designed to strike an appropriate balance between capturing the core activities of MSB and interventions requiring a significant amount of human and financial resources. The standby partners selected were UNHCR, ICRC and WFP and the countries chosen for field trips were the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Republic of Congo, Mozambique and Ethiopia.

¹¹ UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, UNMAS, UNOPS, ICRC, WB, SRK, CADRI, and OCHA.

¹² MSB operations in four countries were visited and a combined report was done for DRC and Congo – Brazzaville.

While acknowledging that MSB is faced with various practical and legal considerations in fulfilling its mandate, the study team has tried to look, whenever possible, at the point of delivery (i.e. disaster-affected populations) and used this as the unit of analysis when looking at relevant processes at both a country and the global level.

2.1 POTENTIAL BIAISES

During the orientation phase, potential biases of review team members were identified so that they could be compensated for when planning and conducting interviews, analysis, developing conclusions and recommendations. Before addressing issues that surfaced, it is worth highlighting the backgrounds of three of the team members. The Team Leader had worked in the past¹³ as a staff member for UNHCR, WFP and OCHA and was thus a periodic “user” of SRSA services during the 1990s. One of the team members has worked for, worked with, or alongside Sida, MFA, MOD and MSB (including at senior positions) before retiring after a long period of government service. A third team member worked for 14 years with the Red Cross before becoming an independent consultant.

2.2 LIMITATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS

- MSB’s restructuring in 2009 makes it difficult to track trends since 2006. Most of the data is thus from after 2009.
- Different information management systems used in MSB and Sida made it difficult to compare data.
- Incomplete datasets. For example, the ELLIOT database has not been functioning since 2011.
- Difficulty in attribution of MSB-specific contributions. Based on an analysis of eight MSB secondments to UN partners, a 2011 evaluation¹⁴ found these deployments had contributed “greatly and successfully”, with some secondees playing key roles within substantial operations. However, it was not possible to tell what the precise contributions of some of the secondees have been to the overall UN operations, as their work is not specifically reported upon. This was confirmed during initial discussions with partners and seems to be due, on one hand, to the fact that MSB staff is embedded in existing operations¹⁵ and reporting is on the operation as a

¹³ The Team Leader’s last staff position with the UN was in 2000.

¹⁴ 2011 Evaluation of Secondments from MSB

¹⁵ This seems to be particularly true with ICRC, where MSB secondees are expected to integrate fully into their structure and operations so as to not compromise their neutral status.

whole and, on the other, to an incomplete performance appraisal system for seconded staff¹⁶. The DFID-led Standby Partner Review showed that other standby partners are facing similar challenges.

- Limited selection of MSB activities observed, given time and budget constraints.
- Summer holidays limited access to stakeholders (by limiting responses to the online survey).
- Insecurity placed severe constraints on the movements of the team undertaking the DRC visit. They were nevertheless able to meet a reasonable number of key informants to complement document reviews and to give a realistic view of recent MSB operations.
- Given that one of the key concerns identified by partners during the Inception Phase was the perceived high cost of MSB personnel, the plan was to try and measure cost-effectiveness. This proved to be challenging for two main reasons. Firstly, while data relating to costs of MSB inputs (e.g. staff, equipment) are presented, the results (“benefits”) in the form of outcomes and impacts are more difficult to measure for the reasons mentioned above. Secondly, due to time constraints and difficulty in accessing relevant data, it was not possible to conduct an in-depth comparative cost benefit analysis for similar agencies. The 2012 DFID-led review encountered similar challenges. It provided some relevant information, but was limited to salary comparisons¹⁷.
- This independent study aims to provide credible findings on how MSB’s internal systems and process supports Sweden’s international humanitarian role, not to make definitive statements about the impact of its interventions in the way that a full-scale evaluation would have.
- A potential limitation was the participation of MSB staff on the team in interviews with external stakeholders. Interviewees were encouraged to speak openly, and while most appeared to have accepted this invitation at face value and readily offered constructive criticism, others may have felt constrained. The team saw no concrete examples where this had occurred and, indeed there were no tangible differences in data collected during interviews with MSB staff and gathered independently (e.g. survey data, interviews where only team members were present). The Management Group for this Review had encouraged the team to adopt this participa-

¹⁶ Preliminary interviews with partners indicated that performance appraisals when seconded are sometimes done, but not consistently. ICRC performance appraisal system does not currently include standby partners.

¹⁷ Salary costs in the DFID study underrepresented actual costs of standby partner staff since they did not include additional benefits in the form of social security payments, which, in the case of MSB staff, increase costs by 30-40%.

tory approach to promote real-time learning. The consensus amongst the team is that any negative influences were more than offset by real-time learning benefits.

- A similar limitation was a risk-averse tendency amongst some partner interviewees who seemed hesitant to speak too openly to avoid compromising their agency's relationship with Sida, who is clearly viewed as a preferred donor.

3 Likely Future Trends

3.1 CHANGING DEMANDS IN A CHANGING HUMANITARIAN CONTEXT

Austerity measures in the developed world have yet to reduce overall humanitarian resources, although some humanitarian donors have signalled potential budget cuts to foreign aid¹⁸. Pressures on budgets, along with increased public debate about aid effectiveness, have provoked a re-examination of the humanitarian system and performance, resulting in pressure on agencies by many OECD/DAC donors to demonstrate the value added of international aid, including humanitarian assistance.

IFRC has highlighted the challenges of dealing with humanitarian emergencies in urban settings as populations continue their migration to cities¹⁹. There is an increasing focus on improving the resilience of vulnerable populations in the face of multiple challenges ranging from longer-term effects of climate change to shorter-term increases in food and fuel prices that have a disproportionate impact on the poor. This has been highlighted in another 2011 IFRC report that focused on hunger and malnutrition.

The 2012 DFID-led Standby Partner Review²⁰ found that changing working environment and humanitarian structures are creating demands for new profiles such as coordination, information technology, disaster risk reduction and psychosocial skills, while raising the bar for "soft skills" such as language, nationality, gender and culture. There also appears to be a trend towards turnkey operations, or Global Services Packages, where the standby partner (or network, as with IHP) takes on responsibility for all critical processes and ensures that they have the necessary tools to accomplish their work.

3.2 POLICY AND STRATEGY CHANGES

Outcomes from the Busan Aid Effectiveness Forum²¹ are likely to be one of the main influencing factors for Sweden and other major donors, notably the emphasis on

¹⁸ Taylor, G. et al. (2012) The State of the Humanitarian System. ALNAP

¹⁹ IFRC 2010 World Disasters Report – Urban Risk

²⁰ Sandison (2012)

²¹ Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation – 2011

http://www.aideffectiveness.org/busanhlf4/images/stories/hlf4/outcome_document_-_final_en.pdf

building national ownership, increasing resilience, greater accountability and focus on results.

Sida and MSB had already started progressing in these areas. The 2010 Evaluation of Sida's Humanitarian Assistance recommended that Sida should consider increasing its support for MSB's disaster preparedness work. Based on stakeholder feedback and observations during the Mozambique country visit along with an increasing focus on increasing resilience of vulnerable populations, it is likely MSB's role will increase in this area although modalities still remain somewhat unclear.

Policy instructions issued by Sida's Director General to include mainstreaming of DRR activities throughout the authority. Sida's current Humanitarian Assistance Strategy has placed a specific emphasis on DRR and Recovery which increases the likelihood of greater engagement of MSB.

Approaches to disaster response are also changing. Sida is among those donors who are putting considerable pressure on WFP to move away from blanket food distributions towards cash-based and market-focused solutions.

National Platforms have already been established in many countries to coordinate DRR efforts. Aren't these platforms natural starting points for MSB and Sida when designing a strategic involvement of MSB in DRR at country level? Couldn't MSB play a major role in supporting the establishment or strengthening of MSB's counterpart agencies in less-developed countries?

Sida Key Informant

3.2.1 How will Sida and MSB need to Adapt?

MSB will need to develop new ways of working both with existing partners and seeking out new partners. Some key adaptations are likely to include:

- Development of more "turnkey" Global Service Packages operations corresponding to their core competencies to support partner activities.
- Increased emphasis on national ownership, which implies much closer working relationships in the future with national governments, other national stakeholders and Sida country focal points.
- Strengthening partnerships with the private sector, academic institutions at a global level²².
- Demand for MSB's traditional logistics capacities to support food distribution is likely to decrease. MSB (and other standby partners) will need to develop means to support WFP to adapt to new market-based approaches.

²² MSB has ongoing cooperation with academic institutions and the SRSA had limited global partnerships with some private sector actors, but these seem to have dropped.

- MSB will need to develop, and support the development of partner, results-based performance systems that measure outcomes, preferably at the level of the affected.

Sida will need to adjust its *modus operandi* and its funding to a partly new humanitarian landscape.


- Crises tend to be more protracted, climate-related and urbanized. Local authorities and communities will take on larger roles: in both quick-onset and chronic crises.
- The challenge for donors is to combine long and short term interventions; to merge perspectives, identify new partners and develop new financing modalities.
- Equally important for *Sida* is to utilize its organisational capabilities, together with its networks and entry points internationally and nationally, in a search for new actors.
- *Sida* will also need to develop, in collaboration with MFA and MSB, clear views on the future humanitarian architecture in this landscape: Who does what? The IHP concept needs to be revisited to meet these new challenges.

4 MSB Operational Partners

MSB currently has long-term standby partner global agreements with the ICRC, the World Bank, and seven international agencies from the UN family of agencies²³. WFP is the single largest partner in terms of budget and numbers of MSB staff deployed, followed by UNHCR, agencies involved in mine action (UNMAS, UNMACC and ICRC) and UNICEF. MSB's partnership with WFP, UNHCR and ICRC were examined in detail as part of this study and case study reports are attached as annexes.

MSB activities with the World Bank and UNDP have been negligible to date, although UNDP interviewees appeared optimistic about increasing DRR-related activities in the future. The Review Team did not receive a response from the World Bank to a request for an interview.

Figure 7 – Budgets²⁴ for MSB deployments for their largest partners



²³ Status of agreements with MSB Partners is provided in the Efficiency and Effectiveness section

²⁴ These amounts include funding from Sida and other sources

4.1 STATUS OF ANNUAL AGREEMENTS WITH MSB

Standby agreements with standby partners were signed by representatives of either MSB or SRSA, depending on the date they were signed. As part of the handover of function from SRSA to MSB, MoD issued a communication, along with an English official translation, stating that all rights and obligations for SRSA were being assumed by MSB. The transition from SRSA to MSB was communicated to standby partners and the study team saw no evidence that UN partners viewed agreements signed by SRSA as problematic in any way.

The format of the agreements vary according to the partner, which can be attributed to the period when the agreement was signed, the variance in Agreement formats used by different agencies and the type of functional skills to which the standby partner was interested in gaining access. Some of the Agreements referenced UN Security Council Resolution 1295. In practice, however, the Agreements largely appear to fill a “reference in case we need it” function, and relationships with partners and approaches appear to be much more influenced by ongoing consultations, joint training and inter-agency lessons learned exercises.

MSB has cooperation agreements with other partners, of which it is worth highlighting here the three-year agreements that MSB signed separately in 2011 with Sida in Mozambique and with the National Disaster Management Agency (INGC) of the government of Mozambique for a three-year DRR-related capacity building project.

Table 2 – Status of MSB Agreements with Standby Partners

	ICRC	UNDP	OCHA	UNOPS	UNHCR	UNICEF	WFP	WB
Signed by	MSB	MSB	MSB	SRSA	SRSA	SRSA	SRSA	MSB
Date Signed	July 2009	Nov 2009	May 2009	Dec 2007	Nov 2007	June 2005	July 2003	June 2011
Expiration Date	July 2011	Not fixed	Not fixed	Not fixed	Not fixed	Not fixed	Not fixed	July 2016 ²⁵
Deploy within	72 hrs	72 hrs	72 hrs	72 hrs	72 hrs	72 hrs	72 hrs	
Max. deployment	3 mo.	6 mo.	180 days	3 mo.	3 mo.	12 mo.	3 mo.	
Gender clause	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Functional Areas to be provided by MSB/SRSA as per Agreements								
EOD/Mine action	●		OCHA ²⁶	●	●	UNICEF ²⁷		
Early recovery		●						
Medical support		●		●	●			
UN base camps		●		●	●			
Office support		●		●	●			
Planning & mgmt of refugee camps				●	●			
Comms support				●	●			
Logistics support				●	●			
Transport support				●	●			
Needs assessment²⁸					●		●	
Training					●		●	
Logistics					●		●	
ICT/telecom					●		●	
WASH					●			
Medical					●			
Mine action					●		●	
Emergency management							●	
Chemical decontamination							●	
Trucking/mechanics							●	
Warehouse mgmt							●	
Site planners							●	
Security							●	

²⁵ Automatic 5 year extension if not terminated by either party

²⁶ Experts on stand-by rosters have appropriate skills profile as specified by OCHA and communicated to MSB.

²⁷ "The Agency shall maintain a roster of staff within the Agency with general skill profiles and other qualifications that match the requirements of UNICEF" (p.3).

²⁸ Personnel expertise (p.2 UNHCR)

5 Comparison of MSB with Other Standby Partners

5.1 THE STANDBY PARTNER LANDSCAPE

UN agencies have standby partnership agreements with various providers, ranging from government agencies to NGOs and, increasingly, private sector actors such as Veolia Foundation or Ericsson. The study has looked specifically at how the following organisations operate their staff secondment functions: RedR Australia, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), German Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW), Irish Aid, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) and the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA)²⁹, and where MSB is vis-à-vis these organisations in serving its UN partner agencies. However, whether the approach of one organisation is more efficient than another is not analysed here, nor would it be easy to assess, given that different organisations vary in their legal frameworks and policy objectives.

5.1.1 Capacity to respond

Standby Partner Budgets - MSB has a budget for standby capacity and preparedness of around 115 MSEK, which appears to be larger than comparable peer agencies. NRC comes closest with an allocation from the Norwegian MFA of approximately NOK 90 million (some 103 MSEK at current exchange rates). MSB is thus comparatively well prepared budget-wise to respond to crises and is less susceptible to challenges faced by other standby partners like DRC and Irish Aid, who often need to look for additional funding for their administration to respond to crises occurring in the second half of their financial year.³⁰ MSB previously had a multiyear agreement with Sida for the funding of its operations, which gave stability, but this has been replaced with an annual allocation reviewed during the year.

Standby Rosters - Germany's THW has by far the largest network of volunteers, with 80,000 registered on their database in 2012³¹. However, only a small percentage of these have ever deployed internationally. Otherwise, MSB has a relatively large roster; some 1,100 members in 2011. Norway's NRC has the most active roster for international deployments, with an average of some 800 members on the NORCAP roster being deployed annually. RedR has the widest range of skill profiles available,

²⁹ DEMA is the Danish equivalent to MSB

³⁰ All data from interviews with secondee agencies – detailed table with all the data can be found in the Annex.


³¹ http://www.thw.de/EN/THW/thw_node.html

lacking only purely medical profiles. Although MSB does not cover a wide range of profiles, MSB has a recognised niche in technical areas and is well known for its skilled ICT and telecoms personnel as well as a strong humanitarian mine action profile. MSB also has a general reputation for providing their teams with high-quality updated equipment.³²

Diversity - NRC is considered by all partners to have the most culturally, linguistically and ethnically diverse roster, with large numbers of French speakers, as well as nationals originating from Africa and Asia. DRC's roster is also relatively diverse, and both agencies have been very proactive in trying to understand where the skills gaps lay internally within UN agencies they work with and designing their rosters accordingly.³³ Swiss Development Corporation, RedR, THW and DEMA restrict recruitment to citizens of their own countries. The Irish Aid roster is limited to nationals of the EU. NRC's roster is open to Norwegians, Africans and Asians, while the DRC roster is open to any nationality.

Although MSB's roster is also open to any nationality as long as they satisfy entry requirements³⁴, out of the more than 1,200 individuals on the MSB roster some 87%³⁵ are Swedish citizens. MSB has recently made serious efforts to align their roster to increased demands by partners for more diverse competencies, notably a demand for Arabic and French speakers with specialist technical expertise and prior experience of working with UN partner agencies to support operations in the Sahel, central Africa, Libya and the Middle East. Increased diversity of the roster is generally viewed as a positive development in MSB since it not only increases the chances of matching the profile with the specific need of partners, but also enhances MSB's own learning.

Figure 8 – Percentage of non-Swedish New Recruits to the MSB Roster³⁶



³² *Ibid.*

³³ Telephone interviews with NRC and DRC roster management staff, June 2012

³⁴ See for more details


³⁵ MSB data as of September 2012

³⁶ Source: MSB data. Percentage for 2012 are as of July 2012

5.1.2 Length of deployment

NRC's average deployment length is just over 5 months whereas DRC's is 3½ months³⁷. During the period 2006-2011 MSB contracts most frequently fell in the range 31-180 days and the average duration of a MSB deployment was 77 days (approximately 2½ months).

Figure 9 – Contract Duration of MSB Deployed Staff³⁸



According to a recent DFID-led Standby Partner Review³⁹, all UN agencies have strong reservations about deployments for shorter than 6 months. Some of the reasons mentioned were:

- Demands of assignments are becoming increasingly more complex and often involve establishing systems and relationships with government and NGO partners, which cannot be accomplished within 3 months.
- Seconded staff take at least 3 months to settle in and optimise performance.
- The UN takes several months to recruit internal staff – gaps will remain after only three months.
- High staff turnover is destabilising.
- The need may be for a temporary specialist who will not be replaced as they are performing an essential but transient need that may require longer than 6 months (e.g. road building to facilitate access).
- Operating environments are often volatile, making it hard to assess staff requirements many months ahead. Several months are needed before the situation has stabilised and a longer-term picture of staffing profiles required emerges.

³⁷ Data provided by NRC and DRC

³⁸ MSB data

³⁹ Peta Sandeson, SBPP Study, DFID, August 2012

- Slow onset emergencies (e.g. the Sahel) and posts with slow outcomes (e.g. capacity building) require longer deployments to meet more complex needs.⁴⁰

While RedR and THW have a maximum deployment length of 12 months, SDC, NRC and DRC have no obligatory cut-off dates. While it is recognised that longer deployment times may leave space for misuse the RedR, Irish Aid, NRC and SDC all prefer 6 month deployments over 3 months.

5.1.3 Cost-Sharing Practices

This study agrees with the findings of the 2012 DFID-led Standby Partner Review that cost sharing could strengthen the partnership by giving the UN more of an incentive to demand quality and at the same time mitigate against the tendency of partners to fill capacity gaps with standby partners which come at no cost. Where the findings of this study differ somewhat from those of the DFID-led review is the suggestion that MSB is more expensive than the UN. As described elsewhere in the report, the DFID-led review compared base salary levels with those of a relatively low grade UN staff member. If more realistic benchmarks are used to take account of staff grades, withholding taxes and allowance, UN staff seem to be more expensive, which should help strengthen the case for cost-sharing.

Interviews with staff from peer standby partner agencies indicated that most of them approach cost-sharing with a similar ad hoc approach currently used by MSB. Exceptions occur where it contravenes the partner's⁴¹ or standby partners⁴² and in the case of Irish Aid and DRC which tend to run out of funds during their financial year so UN partners need to step in. This makes it unrealistic for a common cost-sharing policy can be applied across the board by standby partners. However, similar to the DFID review, a recommendation emerging from this study is that it would be worthwhile to try and encourage a critical mass of "interested" standby partners and their donors to develop a common approach. In the case of MSB, this "critical mass" would be standby partners with similar core competency profiles so as to encourage a situation where partners are selecting the best individual(s) for the assignment rather than just choosing the cheapest option.

⁴⁰ *ibid*, p. 20


⁴¹ OCHA key informants noted that their mandate prohibits cost-sharing with standby partners

⁴² The example of NRC is cited in the 2012 DFID-led Standby Partner Review

6 Relevance

MSB interventions are viewed as being relevant to Swedish humanitarian policy because they are based on the requests of humanitarian partners and the vast majority of deployments are to disaster-prone countries (as illustrated below).

Figure 10 – Countries with multiple⁴³ MSB Deployments (2008 – May 2012)



Based on observations during field visits, interviews and review of lessons-learned documents, there are a number of factors that undermine relevance. Many are linked to gaps in the initial needs assessments, which, for example, resulted in a poorly-designed IHP base camp intervention in Pakistan following the 2010 floods. Other factors include unclear or inadequate Terms of Reference and/or Letters of Agreement with the partner, partner agency management, no prior experience of deployed staff working with a partner agency and a lack of realistic exit strategies.

Strategic direction plays a key role in ensuring the relevance of the intervention and direction comes primarily from the partner agency. This is consistent with the partner's leadership and overall coordination role of the intervention, but a more proactive role by MSB and, in some cases Sida, in supporting the development of certain components of the partner's strategy that lie within MSB's core competencies. This is

⁴³ More than two deployments to a country between 2008 and May 2012, accounting for 87% of total deployments.

perhaps illustrated most clearly by lessons learned from base camp construction where a MSB member joint needs assessments provided essential technical inputs, whereas numerous examples of needs assessment carried out by partners were inadequate. This type of proactive engagement by MSB would not undermine partners, but would rather acknowledge the partner's core competencies and mandate and support them in areas where they lack the necessary capacity, which are often the technical niches filled by MSB. MSB's help in improving joint needs assessments in turn improves the quality of their own interventions, and facilitates decision-making by partners regarding design, implementation and exit strategies.

MSB's involvement in DRR and Early Recovery could also benefit from a more strategic focus, but based on experiences in Mozambique and elsewhere, there is a need for more constructive engagement by Sida, given the strong links with longer-term programming. SRSA defined DRR and Early Recovery as core areas as early as 2005 and initiated a number of large projects in these areas during 2006-2008. MSB has since made efforts to expand its role in these DRR and Early Recovery. While MSB appears to be well positioned to engage with national governments, especially around DRR, this poses several challenges in adapting existing approaches and financing models. It would also need to be based on an understanding and agreement with the main donor, Sida, on MSB's mandate and of these approaches and models.

6.1 COHERENCE BETWEEN MSB'S INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND SIDA'S HUMANITARIAN STRATEGY

As described in the introduction, MSB's emphasis on building capacities to prepare for and prevent emergencies while playing a "back office" support role for international agencies who are in the front line during an emergency response means that their attention is mainly focused on goals in Areas A and B of Sida's Humanitarian Assistance Strategy. MSB is looking for ways to further strengthen their activities relating to Goal 6 (strengthening national capacities), notably through DRR activities as described in the Mozambique Country Report in the Annex. Links in Swedish humanitarian structure would be improved if core funding to UN agencies by MFA, country-level development funding and emergency funding for large-scale relief operations by Sida were complemented by MSB operational support in the form of secondments and larger scale interventions such as mine action, fleet management and camp Management.

Good examples of policy alignment can be seen in the ICRC Case Study, where MSB mine action activities can be viewed as a validation of MSB's ability to meet the critical needs of affected populations using approaches consistent with the humanitarian mandate articulated in Sida's Humanitarian Assistance Strategy. Similarly, in eastern DRC, interviews with WFP staff confirmed that MSB interventions reinforced their role because they felt that MSB had significantly increased their productivity, reinforced existing WFP structures and helped to lower overall costs by busting private sector cartels among transporters.

MSB's DRR activities are another example of overall positive strategic alignment. Based on observations in Mozambique and a review of other related initiatives, MSB will need to adapt further to more effectively support Goal 6 through, for example, engaging more with national capacities, the private sector, with academic institutions, and recruiting MSB national staff to support longer term interventions. While Mozambique offers a favourable environment for building national capacities in DRR, MSB may be challenged to find similar success in other 'priority countries' as defined by Sida.

Many MSB interventions indirectly link with goals in Sida's humanitarian strategy through the support of partners that work directly with disaster-affected populations to achieve those goals. As described in the Ethiopia case study, the construction of base camps in remote locations with little existing infrastructure in the midst of a humanitarian crisis indirectly supports Sida's strategy by providing humanitarian staff an environment to mount a better quality humanitarian response.

Even where such interventions provide critical support to humanitarian agencies, the cost-effectiveness and appropriateness of accommodation and office facilities put in place by MSB was questioned by a number of key informants, especially since in most cases it didn't seem as if local solutions using available materials and context-specific architectural designs had been considered. In Ethiopia, for example, UNHCR is already starting to review options for converting Dollo Ado into a more permanent installation.

Similarly, with the emphasis shifting towards local solutions, Sida is amongst those donors pressing for a reduction in food aid, and is instead promoting market-based approaches that will require MSB to reassess its logistic support capacities. While it is not suggested that market-based and/or local solutions are a "silver bullet" that will be suitable for all contexts, this study found little evidence that MSB was giving these aspects serious consideration during the assessment or design of interventions.

6.2 SELECTION OF PARTNERS BY MSB

MSB has had a long-standing relationship with a number of UN agencies, but humanitarian reform and an increased focus on building local resilience and supporting national capacities has obliged MSB to explore new partnerships.

MSB's main partners have traditionally been UN humanitarian agencies, notably WFP and UNHCR, with whom they are a natural fit. With humanitarian reform came recognition that, while the UN still has an important role to play in a humanitarian response, the potential of individual agencies should be fully utilized to achieve de-

sired outcomes. Six years after humanitarian reform was launched, the UN still maintains a coordination role but, for example, NGOs increasingly have co-lead roles in clusters. Based on observations and interviews, it seems that MSB has been less proactive in changing its approach. With the exception of the partnership with ICRC, MSB continues to prioritise support to UN agencies without giving much consideration to other humanitarian actors, such as NGOs or private sector agencies that are increasing their role in disaster response⁴⁴.

To build local resilience and support national capacities MSB needs to search out new categories of partners. MSB has so far largely remained in its comfort zone, seeking to expand its relationship with UNDP and CADRI in the UN family to augment its interventions in DRR and Early Recovery. Based on a finding in the current study, there has been relatively little progress to date despite the fact that UNDP and CADRI key informants claim that they would like to see greater collaboration. On the other hand, tangible progress towards achieving objectives can be observed in Mozambique where MSB has a partnership with Mozambique's National Disaster Management Agency (INGC). Although MSB has established some links with local universities, a lack of a partnership with the private sector (e.g. cell phone and communications companies) is an obvious gap. A lack of engagement with the private sector was also seen to be a gap in Ethiopia, where MSB/IHP could have helped UNHCR with an assessment of options of hospitality contractors who could manage the base camp.

Sida could potentially support the development of new partnerships, not only through dialogues with MSB but also with regard to contacts with other donors/standby partners at the global level. Embassies could also be proactive in their dialogue with host country officials and identifying local partners when discussing future areas for collaboration, notably in DRR.

6.3 MSB'S ROLE, COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, EXPERTISE AND CAPACITY

Interviews during the current Study echoed findings of the 2012 DFID-led Review that, within the Standby Partner "landscape", MSB stands out for its technical capabilities, often filling useful functions that the partner agencies do not possess. Such a role also means that

DRC provided good support when I worked for them previously. They are flexible and keep track of their personnel. Their main challenge is funding. However, from the first day I joined MSB it was clear that it is not an NGO. MSB has more resources and are well-equipped. I received an excellent induction from MSB and feel that my safety and well-being is taken seriously.

Field-based MSB Key Informant

⁴⁴ Taylor *et al.* (2012)

partners don't need to invest significant resources in "disaster insurance", i.e. standby capacities that are only used every once in a while during a major emergency response. This is particularly marked in areas such as MSB mine action activities, where partners acknowledged that it would be extremely difficult for them to establish and maintain sufficient capacities in the absence of continuous demand.

MSB is perceived as relatively well-resourced and well-equipped. MSB, along with other standby partners, is also valued for bringing an external perspective to help partners find alternative solutions. MSB is the partner of choice for niche technical functions (see below) - as long as Sida pays the bill. Since MSB is widely perceived as expensive⁴⁵ by partners, examples where cost-sharing (or cost recovery) occur could be seen as demonstrating added value.

6.3.1 Humanitarian interventions

Humanitarian intervention activities undertaken by MSB account for the bulk of their activities, and are mainly focused on supporting humanitarian workers during disasters. This category includes the construction and operation of base camps for humanitarian staff, health care, WASH (including water supply, sanitation, water purification, and waste disposal), the deployment of emergency specialists, and transportation (including convoys, mechanics, and driver training).

Modules for base camps may, when transport facilities are available, be worthwhile in terms of timeliness. However, as the logistical difficulties in establishing the Dungu/Ango camps in DRC illustrate, they may be subject to significant delays and extra costs. A lessons-learned exercise with UNHCR yielded the recommendation that MSB approach this as a "turnkey" Global Service Package operation so that MSB assumes responsibility for all critical components of the operation, including logistics. However, some interviewees suggested that local solutions for base camps, similar to the approach used in Chad in 2008-2009, might be further explored as a cheaper, quicker and more appropriate option. Such a solution could potentially have alleviated the problems seen with the subsequent maintenance of facilities and left behind something that could be handed over to the local authorities for their use.

WFP key informants in DRC suggested that the fleet management intervention is expensive, although the willingness of WFP to cost-share indicates that they felt that the resulting increased productivity (compared with the previous private contractor solution) justified the extra cost. WFP interviewees also expressed appreciation for MSB's presence since they had previously experienced problems with private contractors refusing to travel to certain areas due to a lack of capacity, or security concerns. A third positive aspect was the possibility of using MSB to break private sector cartels when prices become excessive.

⁴⁵ As is more fully described in the Effectiveness and Efficiency chapter of the report, partner perceptions that MSB is "expensive" is not necessarily backed up by facts.

A total of 11 respondents to the online survey had direct experience with MSB's humanitarian interventions, and all rated MSB performance highly in all areas (meeting expectations, effectiveness in performing duties, technical expertise, and timeliness). Respondents commented that MSB staff displayed excellent technical knowledge, maintained a professional approach, and were able to learn and adapt quickly to their working environments.

6.3.2 Humanitarian Mine Action

Observations during the field visit along with statements by ICRC and UNMAS key informants and survey respondents indicate that MSB is the partner of choice in the highly technical area of Mine Action. This is due in large part to the fact that preparedness for humanitarian Mine Action activities requires relatively large investments in terms of capacity building, pre-positioned equipment supplies and standby technical capacities. In the case of ICRC, this sort of investment is not consistent with their core competencies. UNMAS, which has a mine action mandate, is focused mainly on coordination and overall management and UNMAS key informants were clear that the agency lacked the capacity to be able to set up and maintain a roster of experts who are available on short notice in the way MSB does, even if they had the funds.

Interviewees characterised MSB interventions in Brazzaville as creative and flexible, thereby increasing the value-added of the intervention. Examples cited include the ability to interact effectively with local Red Cross volunteers and to shift seamlessly between different operational activities including weapons disposal, quality assurance and overall coordination. Similar positive feedback was received regarding MSB operations in Cote d'Ivoire.

MSB can deploy more quickly than UNMAS and consistently brings in the support that we have requested. This is different from NGOs and commercial companies that tend to look after their own interests first and are thus often difficult to coordinate.

UNMAS Key Informant

Nine respondents to the online survey had worked with MSB seconded staff in the field of humanitarian mine action. They considered the overall performance of the MSB deployment to be good (with a rating average of 4 on a 1-5 rating scale) with timeliness receiving the highest rating.

6.3.3 Disaster Risk Reduction & Early Recovery

As described above, MSB has made efforts to expand its role in these areas through the identification of entry points for interventions (as in Mozambique) and by commissioning relevant research, notably a three-year study by Lund University⁴⁶. While MSB appears to be well positioned to engage with national governments, this

⁴⁶ Becker, P. et al.(2011)

requires adapting approaches and financing models because these are long-term interventions that require a project-based approach.

For both operational and structural reasons (that have been well-documented⁴⁷), the Early Recovery cluster has not achieved as much support as other clusters. Rather than pursuing a “traditional” cluster approach, the cluster is currently promoting the use of Early Recovery Advisers, and relevant tools to help integrate early recovery approaches into clusters and other humanitarian reform mechanisms. Findings from the current study suggest that MSB should adopt a similar approach. Rather than treating Early Recovery as a standalone activity, to focus on ensuring that relevant good practice is being integrated into their preparedness and humanitarian response.

UN agencies talk about DRR but are not really working with local governments at field level building their capacity. This is the missing mile.

UN country office capacities are really low, especially in DRR. NGOs work in DRR is only at a community level. MSB is well-equipped to work directly with governments and has a real chance to make a mark in terms of long-term risk reduction, working directly with governments to build their capacities.

The weak spoke in the ‘wheel’ is the UN system. Staff are seconded supposedly for a specific role, but then get lost in the UN bureaucracy ... Working at field level directly with the governments is where they serve their best purpose.

UN Key Informant

6.4 MSB’S ROLE IN NEEDS ASSESSMENTS

MSB’s approach to needs assessment varies according to context. MSB often relies on assessments done by partners, which in most cases is the best option. However, their staff are involved in different ways in needs assessments, but usually in support of a larger assessment such as, for example, joining UNHCR’s assessment team in Dollo Ado, Ethiopia, following a significant influx of Somali refugees or as a member of the UNDAC assessment team following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Where partners have not benefited from support from standby partners during needs assessment, this has resulted in a significant waste of resources, as with basecamp operations in Pakistan after the 2010 floods.⁴⁸

UN managers were generally frank in admitting their limited knowledge about how to design or decide on appropriate exit strategies for base camp and fleet management operations, and at the same time emphasised that they were in any case obliged to focus on refugee operations and had limited time to devote to base camp

⁴⁷ See, for example, Streets, J. (2010) and the IASC (2011) report on an inter-cluster workshop.

⁴⁸ MSB (2011) Kommentarer och förslag utifrån en extern utvärdering av SI-INS verksamhet kapacitetsutvecklingsprojekt. MSB Internal Report

management issues. This suggests that technical expertise of standby partners is not needed only when implementing activities, but also when planning and designing both interventions and exit strategies.

MSB Experiences with Needs Assessments

MSB often faces challenges to put in place the necessary facilities due to lack of adequate information about support needs. In the case of Dollo Ado, this was addressed by deployment of a MSB staff member during the early phases of the operation to join a UNHCR needs assessment mission in July 2011. Looking back over the past 11 months since this was done, this provided an extremely useful starting point to ensure that IHP support corresponded to needs of UN staff. With the benefit of hindsight, however, there were two significant gaps in the MSB assessment. One gap was UNHCR's overoptimistic projections about numbers of international staff to be accommodated and the anticipated lifespan of the operation. The other gap was that an exit strategy options were not considered as part of the assessment.

Ethiopia Country Report

Although MSB seeks to assess interventions prior to implementing them such assessments appear to be technical and do not address the overall relevance of the activities being supported. There is little evidence of systematic attention to crosscutting issues but rather based on an assumption that MSB's supportive role implies that it is entirely up to the standby partner to secure overall quality assurance and coordination. This lack of an "MSB agenda" is repeatedly quoted as a positive thing when discussing secondments, where partners are highly appreciative of the ability of seconded staff to adapt to partner organization priorities during their missions. A more proactive role would involve assessing not only technical/logistical issues but also the overall design of the interventions which are being supported.

DRC Country Report

6.5 UNDERSTANDING OF MSB'S ROLE BY OTHER SWEDISH STAKEHOLDERS

The Swedish government's ability to combine core funding through the MFA with regional/country funding through Sida with the operational capacities provided by MSB have the potential to be highly effective in supporting overall humanitarian efforts. However, support to the humanitarian system is being given through all three modalities without the relevant stakeholder awareness about how others are intervening.

The current system lacks sufficient information exchange and strategic direction to capture the potential for synergies within this structure which, among other problems, gives rise to suspicions that partners are "double-dipping", for example deploying MSB staff in support of a WASH cluster when Sida has already provided core funding to the Cluster Lead Agency. Data collected in support of this finding include focal points in embassies not being fully aware of MSB activities in a country (DRC and Ethiopia) and MSB not being aware of the extent and conditionality behind MFA support to standby partners core funding. An example of a good practice working

model is found in the long-term DRR support to Mozambique, which is fully integrated with country programming.

One reason for this lack of strategic coordination focus is, as mentioned before, the absence of an approved MSB strategy, and continued mutual MSB/Sida frustration over the structure and content of operational planning, budgeting, reporting and monitoring modalities (confirmed in interviews with responsible staff members at both Sida and MSB; the conclusion is further strengthened by the parties requests for facilitation support to develop improved operational modalities).

6.6 CONCLUSIONS – RELEVANCE

MSB stands out for its technical capabilities, often filling critical functions that the partner agency lacks, and is perceived as well-resourced and well-equipped. MSB, along with other standby partners, is also valued for bringing an external perspective to help partners find alternative solutions. Partners may perceive MSB as relatively expensive, but still cost-effective, as indicated by the willingness of partners to enter into cost-sharing arrangements.

Humanitarian intervention activities account for the bulk of MSB activities and are mainly focused on supporting humanitarian workers in various technical areas. The results of these humanitarian interventions have varied in quality and, based on examples observed during field visits, would benefit from a more strategic approach that looks beyond outputs to outcomes. Mine action is recognized as a particular niche where MSB has been able to create relatively costly pre-positioned resources, readily deployable technical expertise, along with MSB's reputation as an impartial agency that responds to humanitarian needs. While MSB appears to be well-positioned to engage with national governments, especially around DRR, this poses several challenges in adapting existing approaches and financing models.

This study found that all Swedish stakeholders do not have a common understanding of MSB's role. At the same time, the Swedish government's ability to combine core funding through the MFA with regional/country funding through Sida with the operational capacities provided by MSB appears to have the potential to be highly effective in supporting overall humanitarian efforts. An updated paradigm is needed for consultations and the funding of MSB interventions that will likely involve periodic strategic-level discussions at a Stockholm level, consultation and joint planning at a country level between MSB and Sida, and funding models adapted to differentiated core MSB activities. MSB (both as MSB and as a key IHP partner) has demonstrated the value of joining interagency needs assessments, since this helps to improve the quality of subsequent MSB interventions. Such assessments could be improved further by providing partners with clear options, along with related pros and cons, to facilitate their decision-making. A key component would be to provide a technical assessment of the capabilities of local solutions in the form of local civil society and/or private sector companies that could eventually take over operations

7 Efficiency and Effectiveness

Evidence from interviews, documentation and observation confirm that MSB has developed a strong reputation for effectiveness in terms of delivering timely and high quality technical support to partners. However, a hands-on approach to operations along with perceived high costs and lack of attention to exit strategies undermine the efficiency of operations.

The existence of two base camps 100 metres apart in Dollo Ado, one for UNHCR and one for WFP, each with their own camp management arrangements and infrastructure appears to have not only had an adverse impact on efficiency, but also had social impacts. A year later, staff from both WFP and UNHCR expressed regret that they had not been constructed together.

This appears to be another reason for IHP/MSB staff to be in a position to clearly lay out options for standby partners, along with their respective pros and cons. This example also raises the question when it may be appropriate for MSB/IHP to advocate for good practice when the standby partner makes a questionable decision that potentially has a significant impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the operation.

Ethiopia Country Report

Other factors affecting efficiency include transaction costs around MSB's engagement in innovative pilot initiatives, such as the DRR project in Mozambique. While this intervention has been very effective in terms of its achieved results, the combination of a lack of clarity about how MSB fits into Sida Mozambique's country program, the exclusive reliance on international staff, and the variable capacity of government counterparts and their UN counterparts has hindered both efficiency and effectiveness.

Another factor affecting the efficiency and occasionally the effectiveness of MSB operations is cases where partners fail to deliver on their commitments. This phenomenon was seen in several forms during field studies, ranging from gaps in UNHCR logistic support in Ethiopia to delays in UNDP provision of support to INGC in Mozambique, so that INGC looked to MSB


to fill resulting gaps. A related challenge is when partners make ill-informed decisions that have longer-term implications, such as the case from Ethiopia in the box above or the base camp needs assessment following the 2010 floods. Some of these gaps can be addressed through more "turnkey" type operations where complete Global Service Packages are provided; but MSB will continue to encounter cases where partners are unable to fulfil commitments that have a direct impact on their operations and will need to build this into contingency plans.

Several interviewees from partners made reference to the period between 2009 and 2011 when Sida and MSB were caught up in reorganisation processes that was aggravated by budgetary restrictions within Sida. Partners spoke of high transaction costs during this period when dealing with MSB that were mainly attributed to the high turnover of staff with a lack of consistent focal points. This is now reported to have improved significantly due to designated focal points for each partner.

7.1 APPROVAL PROCESS FOR MSB INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

As described above, the current decision making process around MSB interventions is viewed as cumbersome and frustrating by both Sida and MSB, to the point that several partner key informants cited delays and apparent confusion; this is especially true for those who had previous experience with SRSA deployments.

Figure 11 – Current Decision-Making Process for MSB Deployments



7.1.1 An Operational Framework for Sida and MSB

As described in the Relevance section above, the current decision-making process around MSB interventions is viewed as cumbersome and frustrating by both Sida and MSB⁴⁹, to the point that several key partner informants cited delays and apparent con-

⁴⁹ Mentioned by many informants and validated in June midterm workshop

fusion; this is especially true those who had previous experience with SRSA deployments. The Terms of Reference for this study recognised this issue, and asked whether it should be possible to revise existing agreements⁵⁰ to facilitate decision-making between MSB and Sida.

From the perspective of improving the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of delivery on the ground, the findings of this study indicate that Sida and MSB should work towards an arrangement that would provide MSB with a greater level of authority, notably for time-bound operations. An example of this is provided by approval mechanisms currently in place for DRC and NRC and their respective donors that differ based on project value. For purposes of clarity this arrangement is referred to below as an “operational framework”. This could be a new document, or it could be an improved version of the existing agreement, but at the end of the day it should be a tool that facilitates decision-making in a way that supports Sida’s humanitarian strategic priorities while providing timely, quality support to partners to meet humanitarian needs.

Meeting the objective of an increased alignment with strategic priorities will be contingent on an agreed strategy, a clear system for priority setting, information sharing systems and user-friendly reporting. To help reduce transaction costs during decision-making processes, the parties should aim to identify areas where intervention decisions can be made for groups of secondments (defined by partner, thematic, and/or geographic). The agreement could also refer to milestones, or decision points, at critical stages during the process, for example, when making decisions about extending large-scale interventions.

There are two areas in particular that are in need of attention. Firstly, MSB needs to adopt a more systematic approach to needs assessments and exit strategies that are related to their core competencies, and to make these an integral component of their operations and project results framework. Secondly, MSB needs to look beyond outputs to the outcome level to be better able to understand their role in terms of the overall operational context and how it is contributing to mitigating the effect of a disaster – including at a community level – rather than relying on partners, who usually lack technical expertise, background and even the time, to do this alone.

Based on the findings and observations during this study, it is felt that the latter issue could be improved by more systematically capturing and communicating lessons-learned; this includes ex-post lessons looking back over several months or even years to better understand the longer-term impacts of the selected options for site planning, construction design, etc. Some interventions observed during field visits appeared to have had some quite positive impacts⁵¹, but did not seem to be highlighted in reports

⁵⁰ ...”the study should look at how the current form of framework agreement can be developed further, for instance on a multi annual basis as well as reporting on a more thematic or organizational level.” ToR section 4.

⁵¹ Examples of significant, but under-reported, impacts include MSB’s simulation work in Mozambique,

or captured as good practice. The lack of attention to exit strategies is, however, a gap in need of urgent attention by MSB. Both these issues are analysed in greater detail elsewhere in this report.

It is anticipated that an operational framework application for MSB would include the following elements:

1. List of MSB Core Profiles⁵²
2. Estimated number of deployments per partner per profile during the year
3. Geographic coverage - countries that are highly disaster-prone, with priority given to Sida programme countries
4. Description of estimated budget requirements:
 - a. Activities funded by Sida's Humanitarian Department
 - b. Activities funded from other sources (other Sida departments, other donors, full or partial cost recovery from partner agencies)
 - c. Activities funded by MSB
5. Broad criteria for prioritised deployments, highlighting any that have particular strategic potential (e.g. information management, simulations, strategic advisory roles).
6. Description of decision-making protocols for different categories of project types (e.g. high value projects would be subjected to a more intensive appraisal process and also require more attention to monitoring).

MSB would need to continue to carry out activities that do not completely fit within the operational framework since it is important to maintain a needs-based approach, rapid response capacity and also allow space for innovation and the piloting of new approaches. An operational framework would attempt to expedite part of the decision-making while discussions and appraisals for activities that fall outside the framework would usually take a bit longer.

As noted above, it should be emphasised that "Operational Framework" does not imply a pre-determined format. It could well build on existing arrangements and funding instruments. Irrespective of form, the study team believes that it would contain a) an agreement or an MoU on what should be done and by whom, that is a joint understanding of intentions often covering more than one year, b) an Agreement on finance (at least initially for one year), reporting, etc. and c) a clause on information and consultation modalities.

which is now owned by the government and is being rolled out on a national scale, and the secondment of a female driver instructor to DRC, which has clearly had an influence on the perspectives of international and national staff in relation to gender roles.

⁵² Core profiles should be based on existing capacities where MSB has a global reputation as "experts" and profiles identified from assessments, taking into account global trends, where MSB has a potential niche and supports Sida's humanitarian strategy.

7.2 VALUE-ADDED OF MSB INTERVENTIONS


For MSB deployments in humanitarian contexts, cost-efficiency is only one of several considerations when measuring added value. Timeliness, quality of intervention, and maximising the use of resources are all important for measuring added value. In the case of very large quick-onset disasters where many lives are at risk, timeliness and quality (at least to minimum standards) will be prioritised over cost-efficiency. The balance usually tips back towards cost-efficiency as time passes and the level of risk for the disaster-affected population diminishes. There are other circumstances, such as the two examples from DRC shown here, where an intervention was perceived to have added value in a chronic context over an extended period. MSB scores highly against timeliness, quality and for the good use of resources at their disposal, but many partners perceive MSB cost to be relatively high.

I arrived on the Wednesday to assess the needs. On Thursday a US team arrived. On Friday I confirmed to HQs in NY, who had already been in contact with MSB, that we needed MSB. ICRC had already deployed an MSB team. MSB arrived one week after the request was sent. There were a lot of different actors during these first weeks and we identified a role for MSB; medical support and coordination, database and mapping, and quality assurance. Quality Assurance has proven to be the right way of working to ensure that we follow international standards. Sometimes we don't do it because we can't afford it.

UNMAS Interviewee
Congo Field Visit


Between 2006 and 2011 MSB staff were deployed for a total of 217,878 contractual days, an average of just over 36,000 per year. By the end of August 2012, this figure had further increased by 24,178 to a total of 242,046 contractual days. The peak came in 2009 with a total of 51,712 when there were a total of 63 emergency response deployments, many of them longer-term, mainly in support of emergency response operations in the DRC, the Philippines, Indonesia, West Bank & Gaza, and Sudan. The figure below illustrates which MSB functional areas have been most in demand by partners.

Figure 12 - Number of Contract Days by Functional Area 2006-2011




This demand profile aligns well with the MSB roster composition in 2012, indicating that resources for preparedness are being allocated efficiently.

Figure 13 – MSB Roster Members as of August 2012



7.2.1 Interface with Partners & Operating Context

Along with the overall operating environment, the interface between the partner and MSB staff tends to be the most critical factor in determining the efficiency and effectiveness of a MSB operation. MSB/IHP staff in general found it relatively easier to work with WFP than with UNHCR in Ethiopia. Based on interviews and a review of the available data, this was attributed to the higher quality of WFP's logistics systems and capacities relative to UNHCR. There have also been more challenges with UNHCR's management. For example, a lack of awareness of UNHCR senior staff in Ethiopia about relevant provisions in the Global Partner Agreement with MSB has contributed to misunderstandings and increased transaction costs when setting accommodation fees and applying R&R policies to MSB seconded staff. Data extracted from ELLIOT (below) show similar trends.

Figure 14 -Obstacles affecting work in MSB Global Operations 2009 – 2012⁵³

Similar to the findings in the 2012 DFID-led Standby Partner Review, effectiveness was also reportedly reduced by inaccurate or generic Terms of Reference, inadequate in-country briefings and confusion in field offices about the secondees' access to UN information management systems, even e-mails⁵⁴. Many performance evaluations are not completed by UN supervisors, thus reducing partners' ability to address performance issues. There has been a consistent appeal to the UN to fulfil their part of the bargain and to share some of the responsibility for the standby partner's effectiveness although, as mentioned elsewhere, the view of this study is that Standby Partners need to take better account of partner capacities and mandates when coming up with realistic solutions.

7.2.2 Value-added of a MSB Team Leader Role

The IHP Team Leader position based in Addis Ababa was established in early 2012, which, in hindsight, was probably much later than it should have been for an operation of this scale. Based on feedback from UNHCR and deployed standby partners, along with observations during the field visit, it is clear that a longer term Team Leader position can play a number of useful roles which significantly add value to high-cost/large-scale interventions by, for example:

- Acting as the main liaison and interface between standby partners and deployed staff to clarify partner commitments and obligations, support the partner in addressing human resource issues and generally maximise the efficiency and effectiveness of deployed staff. In other words, since Team Leaders tend to have a

⁵³ Source: based on perceptions of MSB deployees documented by the Evaluation and Lessons Learned from International Operations Tool (ELLIOT)

⁵⁴ Ibid

good understanding both of protocols and of partners' ways of working, they could help to address many of the problem areas and misunderstandings that consistently surface during deployments, particularly those involving large numbers of deployed staff with a constant turnover.

- Strengthening interagency coordination (more details are provided in the coordination below).
- Systematically monitoring performance against a results framework (including ensuring appropriate attention is given to cross-cutting issues);
- Facilitating the implementation of an exit strategy by the partner.

The TOR for the current Team Leader encompasses only the first two points. The third and fourth points emerged from discussions with MSB staff during the field visit. The Team Leader position certainly cannot be justified for all MSB or IHP operations, but it appears to be a cost-effective proposition for high value operations such as base camps or other longer-term operations.

Partner interviewees expressed a strong preference for standby partner staff that had previous working experience with their agency since their performance was more consistent. This leads to a “chicken and egg” situation where a partner is reluctant to accept a roster candidate due to lack of experience and which makes it difficult to obtain relevant experience. Selecting Team Leaders who have relevant experience can compensate for this to some extent, but MSB could integrate an “apprentice” approach into their capacity building efforts so that less-experienced roster members can be coached by more experienced staff during field deployments. This would not only make new roster members more attractive to the partner, but also help internalise the learning acquired during training.

7.2.3 Cost-Effectiveness

Many partner interviewees commented that MSB deployees are expensive when not fully subsidized by Sida. According to a recent DFID-led review of Standby Partners⁵⁵, MSB was the second-most expensive agency after DFID, with the remainder of standby partners more or less matching P3 Step 1 UN salary levels. However, the figures shown in the DFID review were only base salary levels and did not take additional costs into account. Costs such as accommodation, insurance, hazard pay and travel will be roughly comparable to those of UN staff, while UN staff receives generally higher rates of Daily Subsistence Allowances (DSA)⁵⁶ along with other allowances. The main differences are seen in social security taxes which – in the case of

⁵⁵ Peta Sandeson, SBPP Review, DFID, August 2012, p. 16. Note that basis for calculating daily rates using monthly amounts is not specified.

⁵⁶ <http://www.undp.org.py/workflow/plantillas/temp/Archivo291887133333Doca.pdf>

MSB staff - increase the cost of individual staff by 30-40%, thereby increasing the average daily rate of a MSB seconded staff to around US\$365/day.

Comparisons with the lowest grade of a UN P3 level position are not always accurate; this is especially so because a standby partner in a Team Leader role is comparable to a P4 or, in some cases, even a P5 role for more complex operations⁵⁷. Base salaries of P4 level are an increase of around 20% and P5 over 30%⁵⁸. Depending on the duty station, mobility/hardship allowances and, for UN surge staff deployed for more than 3 months, post-adjustment allowances can double the cost of a UN staff. When these costs, along with higher DSA rates are factored in, overall costs of MSB staff are comparable to, and in hardship duty stations MSB is probably usually less expensive than, UN staff.

Table 3 – Daily Rates of Standby Partners compared to UN P3 Level Staff

Daily Costs of different Standby Partners compared						
Partners ⁵⁹	DFID	DRC	MSB	NRC	Irish Aid	RedR
	£180 ⁶⁰ US\$277	DKK1279 ⁶¹ \$210	US\$234	NOK1090 US\$182 ⁶²	EUR160 US\$201	AU\$ 190 US\$190
% of UN P3 salary ⁶³	140%	106%	118%	92% ⁶⁴	101%	96%
Average Total cost	NA	DKK1858 US\$305	US\$365	NOK2732 ⁶⁵ US\$479	EUR292 ⁶⁶ US\$381	Not Provided

⁵⁷ References used for calculating UN salary rates and allowances are at http://sas.undp.org/webforms/salaryCalculation/SalaryCalculation_UK.asp and http://www.fsu.unib.org/docs/related_documents/contract_reform_guidelines.pdf

⁵⁸ NRC has requested UN partners to start using UN levels that correspond to levels of responsibility, rather than just maintaining a standard P3 Step 1 comparison.

⁵⁹ Data for DFID and RedR from Peta Sandeson, SBPP Review, Dfid, August 2012, p. 16. The remainder of the data was obtained directly from the agencies by the study team.

⁶⁰ Usually taxed at source. Seconded on contracts less than 12 months long will also be entitled to short-term allowances.

⁶¹ Includes basic salary, per diem, and experience allowance but not holiday allowance

⁶² Excludes the following monthly allowances: Overseas USD 2100; Hazard USD 780; Risk USD 1000; Free housing up to USD 1000 per month; Travel, medical, disability insurance (roughly USD15/day); Pension for Norwegian tax payers.

⁶³ Based on a P3 Step1 salary. USD 72,267 GROSS pa = Equivalent of \$198/day

⁶⁴ According to SBPP review, page 16, automatically taxed net @ NOK4280/month This brings down the daily salary to USD 141/day = 71% of UN P3 in real terms

⁶⁵ The estimate total cost is that of a Norwegian secondee. Includes salary, allowances, accommodation-expenses, travel-expenses, administration fee for NRC, insurance, social tax, pension.

⁶⁶ There is a 20% tax deduction, which is a withholding tax, which is taken from the total including expenses. It is not income tax. Irish Aid deployees must declare their income to the Irish Revenue. Only the stipend of €160.00 is subject to income tax. Non-residents can claim a full refund of the withholding tax.

MSB rates are thus relatively competitive relative to other partners. According to DRC, the average total cost per day of a P3 equivalent posting for them ranges between USD 210 – 232 per day, or 106%-117% of a UN P3 salary, depending on the experience of the deployee.⁶⁷ This cost includes basic salary, per diem, and experience allowance but not holiday allowance⁶⁸. This would mean that even the most experienced DRC secondees are cheaper on average than an MSB secondee, from a UN agency cost-sharing perspective. Based on data provided by NRC, the deployment of a Norwegian roster member for a 6 month mission costs roughly USD 85,000 which yields a daily rate (if divided by 180 days) of USD472, a rate that is significantly higher than MSB's. Costs will of course vary depending on the profile of deployed staff⁶⁹, the security context in which the secondee is deployed, and what equipment and supplies accompany the deployment. It should also be noted that MSB withholds tax on salaries for Swedish roster members at source at an average rate of 35%.⁷⁰ NRC and DRC apply similar taxation rates.

Similarly, although UN staff are not subject to withholding tax, net costs will be higher than those used for calculating percentages in the above table, and are likely to be equal or more than MSB net salaries once benefits are factored in, in view of the lowest level P3 salary as a comparator. The perception that “MSB is expensive” seems to be mainly due to Sida's/MSB practice of asking for cost-sharing arrangements more than some of the other standby partners, notably for governmental agencies. THW, Irish Aid, SDC and DEMA normally fund 100% of deployments.⁷¹ Similarly, packages through IHP are always fully funded by the donors of the IHP member agencies and cost-sharing is not usually proposed.

7.2.4 Cost-Sharing for MSB Operations

From a donor's perspective, cost-sharing arrangements have a number of potential advantages. Cost sharing can reduce the costs of individual deployments, allowing for more deployments with the same budget. They force partners to prioritise and, if partners have to pay a share of the costs, this reduces the tendency to ask for deployments to temporarily fill staff vacancies or reduce strain on their own budgets. In practice, however, demands on partners to reimburse costs can potentially reduce the

⁶⁷ List of DRC deployee salaries, compared against UN salary levels and divided per salary category at DRC which depends on how many deployments a secondee has done in the past 13 – 49 months.

⁶⁸ According to new DRC terms, deployees will be entitled to 2.08 days of paid leave per month, and only if they are not able to take their leave they will be compensated in terms of a holiday allowance paid at the end of their deployment

⁶⁹ MSB monthly base salaries range from 40,000 SEK for Level 1 to more than 60,000 SEK for a Level 5. Detailed rates can be seen in the Annex.

⁷⁰ On an average MSB field staff salary, 50,000 SEK/month approx. 17,800 SEK is deducted from the salary (35%). Non-Swedes can apply for SINK- tax (special income tax) and be taxed according to a 25 % flat rate. The amount of employer contributions is the same for non-Swedes as for Swedes.

⁷¹ Interviews with THW, DEMA, Irish Aid and SDC.

number of deployments, and make them less timely, as partners decide whether they can afford. It can also undermine the competitiveness of MSB because partners may choose free roster candidates over more competent ones. For cost-sharing to work effectively, it will be necessary to first agree on a common system with a critical mass of other donors funding standby partners, and to put in place a system that discourages non-compliance.

A viable cost-recovery system is likely to involve the deployment of standby partners without requiring immediate payment, but with an expectation there will be cost-sharing once the agency has had an opportunity to raise funds. To avoid a situation where partners hesitate to request standby partners due to concerns about whether they will be able to reimburse costs, the system should allow for the reduction of (or even write off) reimbursement amounts in cases when fundraising falls well short of expectations. Like most credit schemes, there could be built-in incentives for agencies that have good track records for timely repayment.

Between 2007 and July 2012 there were a total of thirty-seven MSB operations valued at a total of 227 MSEK where cost sharing occurred⁷². Of this 227 MSEK, Sida's humanitarian department's contribution amounted to just over 99 MSEK (44% of the total) and 128 MSEK (56% of the total) was provided from other sources, mainly by partners. This means that some 14% of the cost of all MSB humanitarian operations during the same period was covered from sources other than Sida's Humanitarian Department.


Cost sharing has been most consistent in mine-clearance operations with partners covering 73% of costs, almost 20 MSEK, mainly since ICRC covers 100% of the costs of MSB deployments. The largest contributor to cost-share operations since 2007 is WFP, who provided almost 52 MSEK (56% of the total, in those operations which were cost-shared). As shown in the figure below, cost sharing mainly occurs during extended operations, since Sida usually covers the cost of the first 3-6 months. The exception was the IOM-UNHCR-led evacuation of third country nationals from Libya during 2011, where the European Union covered 47% of the 49 MSEK budget.

Partners paying part of the cost perceive this as high. Several key informants questioned whether intervention design aimed for quality higher than that which would be appropriate under the circumstances. There were also concerns that some of the installations left behind generated maintenance costs which were disproportionate.

DRC Country Report

⁷² MSB data. Note that the cost sharing analysis has included ICRC, even though they are currently funding 100% of MSB operations so there is no cost-sharing as such. The team felt that including ICRC in the cost sharing analysis made sense since a) when MSB began supporting ICRC mine action operations Sida provided most of the funding, b) this could be seen as a cost sharing operation where ICRC covers all MSB's deployment costs and c) ICRC is planning to approach Sida during the next financial year to renegotiate terms and put in place a cost sharing arrangements.

**Figure 14: Non-Sida⁷³ Contributions to MSB Humanitarian Operations
2007 - 2012⁷⁴**



7.3 EXIT STRATEGIES FOR MSB INTERVENTIONS

One of the main obstacles to maximizing the impact of MSB interventions is a lack of coherent exit strategies. The 2012 DFID-led Standby Partner Review found this to be a criticism of UN agencies by standby partners in general, who accused the UN of poor staff planning and weak exit strategies, leaving secondees with no one to hand-over to, thus reducing the impact of their work.

Almost a year after their establishment, there was little evidence of the existence of a coherent exit strategy for either the base camp or the workshop in Dollo Ado... This raises the question why, in a country like Ethiopia with a thriving hospitality/hotel industry, IHP didn't consider the private sector during the assessment or when developing exit strategies. It seems difficult to justify successive contract extensions for relatively expensive international standby partners to manage UNHCR and WFP base camp operations without a clear idea of what would happen after their departure.

Ethiopia Country Report

⁷³ These include contributions to MSB operations other than those received from Sida's Humanitarian Department.

⁷⁴ Through May 2012

7.4 MSB'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATIONAL CAPACITIES

Most of MSB's engagement with national entities, including government authorities and affected populations, is through its partners. However, the team observed signs that this is changing. The clearest example currently is in Mozambique where, instead of an agreement with a UN agency, MSB has signed bilateral agreements first with Sida in Mozambique and then with Mozambique's National Disaster Management Agency (INGC). MSB staff that sit in the INGC office are almost exclusively focused on building national capacity. In DRC, MSB provided on-the-job training to national Red Cross volunteers assisting with mine action in Brazzaville⁷⁵. The fleet management intervention in Goma utilised the services of a DRC private sector company for its local staffing. Over the two years of this engagement, MSB contributed significantly to developing the company's capacity and geographical reach by setting standards and pushing to have services improved and expanded⁷⁶. Looking to the future, MSB will need to look at potential added value for longer-term projects that involve national counterparts, interns and/or national staff to support MSB operations rather than relying on teams of relatively expensive international staff for extended periods.

7.5 CONCLUSIONS – EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY

MSB is considered to be highly effective in meeting its operational objectives, but the extent to which MSB is effective in supporting Sida's Humanitarian Strategy *to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity for the benefit of people* is more challenging to assess.

The issue of cost effectiveness is an issue that consistently surfaced during key informant interviews, particularly in cases when partners were asked to cover the costs of MSB deployments (typically when requesting an extension 3-6 months after the initial deployment). While most partners agree to partially or fully cover costs, in some cases costs of MSB operations have hindered attempts to hand operations over to the partners. While cost effectiveness is often a less significant component of efficiency, they continue to look at ways to address the cost-effectiveness issue. Putting viable exit strategies in place at an early stage and facilitating partner implementation efforts would significantly improve efficiency. Another avenue worth considering is recruiting and training local staff for longer-term interventions.

⁷⁵ ICRC Key Informant Interview

⁷⁶ SODEICO Key Informant Interview

Cost sharing arrangements should continue to be applied as a priority, preferably as part of a common policy with other standby partners to avoid unproductive competition and minimise unjustified gap filling by partners.

In fact, on most cost effectiveness measures, MSB appears to emerge reasonably well despite partner perceptions. UN partners tend to see MSB as expensive once they are asked to pay for them whereas, based on available evidence, MSB appears to be equal to or less costly than an equivalent UN capacity. If the exit strategy issue described above can be addressed, then it can be expected that debates around high costs and deployment length will become much less frequent.

MSB also needs to more effectively use lessons learned from many years working in their core competency areas. For example, base camp expertise would not only improve construction skills, but also:

- Assess options to guide UN agencies charged with establishing base camp and workshop packages. MSB involvement in assessments, similar to that carried out in Ethiopia, would help significantly.
- Local solution options using mainly locally available materials rather than a standard “cookie cutter” approach using containers, building on lessons learned in Chad.
- Consider transitional structures that could potentially be relatively easily converted/recycled into more permanent structures, if appropriate.
- Assist partners to find solutions to interagency collaboration to help increase the efficiency of operations.
- Promote “Green” approaches – e.g. recycling of solid/liquid waste, building materials, use of solar systems, ventilation systems.

Additional cost of a longer-term Team Leader position is justified for high-cost operations involving numerous deployed staff, both to maximise their added value, monitor progress and performance and assist the partner improve effectiveness and efficiency of support interventions.

MSB performance Mozambique has been in line with, if not exceeded, expectations. MSB’s operations are helping Sida in to strengthen the humanitarian and DRR component of their country programme, and this experience provides a financing model for Sida globally which can potentially help to bridge the relief to development gap.

A continuing challenge faced by MSB and other international agencies is the variable capacity, not only of national counterparts but also of international agencies. Exit strategies should include an assessment of capacities and potential of non-government entities, including the private sector, without undermining the lead role of the government in a disaster response.

8 Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting on Results

According to Sida's current guidelines governing contribution management and assessment processes for partners:

Sida's role is to assess and support the partner's capacity for planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation based on the Agreement. It is important to emphasise Sida's limited role as a donor and dialogue partner, i.e. that the operational steering and results based management is carried out by the partner, who should have full ownership of the development intervention. Sida's primary opportunity to influence is to, based on the Agreement, maintain a dialogue and make subsequent changes to the Agreement. Sida's contribution monitoring process comprises the monitoring of: the annual plan and budget, the annual narrative and financial reports, the annual audit and dialogue and payment. Sida (2012) page 21

During the current study, some key informants suggested MSB's status as a government agency meant that they needed be treated differently from other Sida partners who were not part of the government. As explained above, while acknowledging the legislative implications, the study team has conducted our analysis as close as possible to the point of delivery (i.e. disaster-affected populations) and used this lens to look at higher processes. If such a "lens" is put on performance measurement, it appears logical to adopt a reasonably consistent approach with different partners (whether government or non-government) to minimise confusion and to emerge with coherent results, rather than trying to compare apples and oranges.

8.1 MSB APPROACH TO MONITORING AND EVALUATION


Current monitoring and reporting with MSB is highly operational in nature. MSB strength is closely related to its technical excellence in the field in which they are giving support, and it is evident that the assessment of intervention relevance and coherence at a strategic level needs to be improved to be consistent with results-based approaches.

MSB currently depends primarily on partner organisations or Sida to make overall contextual assessment and, partly as a consequence, the organisation does not report on contextual or strategic issues in its monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems.

The monitoring and evaluation of MSB operations can be divided into three categories:

1. Assess performance for individual secondees (Personnel Evaluation Reports – PERs,) and the perspective of the seconded on how the host agency managed and supported him/her (ELLIOT, debriefs or online surveys), and
2. Performance of the overall operation through a combination of reporting, after mission seminars and evaluation (although evaluations are not common).
3. Capturing and synthesising learning at a global level to improve planning and implementation (annual meetings with partners, training, joint monitoring missions).

Figure 15 - Current monitoring and evaluation system



Evidence from this study suggests that currently, the preferred and probably most effective form of learning for MSB deployments is in the form of mission debriefings and seminars that are fed into annual meetings with partners, and used to improve training materials. During interviews, both MSB and partner staff often made reference to meetings and training where learned lessons were related and proposed solutions were presented.

A review of more formal reporting systems, however, suggested that they are less useful and that they are not particularly well used. One exception appears to be ELLIOT, which has a relatively higher response rate and allows standby partners and host agencies to monitor overall performance using a dashboard system that transforms survey results from individuals who have been deployed into anonymous feedback displayed in graphic form. An indicator of its utility is that UNICEF has adapted a version of ELLIOT, has adapted the system and has been applying it to all their standby partners since 2009. ELLIOT data was used as a key reference by the DFID-led Standby Partner Review, which – similar to this study – potentially viewed this as the basis for an interagency system that could be applied across all Standby Partners. Unfortunately, MSB’s ELLIOT system has not been functioning since August of 2011, so the data is now somewhat outdated.

With this exception, reporting systems do not appear to be particularly user-friendly. PERs are not regularly completed and, in agencies like ICRC, not done at all (although there is a verbal debrief). Even some agencies, like WFP, who make concerted efforts to collect PERs expressed some reservations about their validity; except in cases of exceptionally good (or exceptionally bad) performance. Not all partners are given the opportunity of providing feedback on performance of MSB personnel (e.g. INGC in Mozambique). Examples of monitoring reports seen by the team were mainly reporting on the status of operations, some at quite a detailed level, and do not appear to adequately capture successful outcomes of this project that were observed. This seemed even to be the case even for longer-term interventions with fairly clear strategic objectives, such as the Mozambique DRR project.

8.2 COMPARISONS WITH MSB PEER AGENCIES

Similar to the findings of the DFID-led Review, this study found it difficult to assess the direct impact of standby partners on the performance of the UN. The assumption is that timely, quality staff will enhance performance, and the focus is on collecting outputs in the form of numbers and types of individuals deployed.

The DFID Review also found the completion rate of the Performance Evaluation Reports (PERs) following deployments to be fairly low and, similar to this study, encountered serious doubts amongst partner staff about the value of those received as being apart from cases of exceptionally good, or exceptionally bad, performances. PER returns were for NRC 60%, CANADEM 55%, DFID 41%, and RedR Australia close to 90% overall. MSB was the lowest of those compared; only 24% of PERs were reported to be returned.

8.3 CONCLUSIONS – MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The operational focus of reporting has, unsurprisingly, led to a sense of frustration within Sida and MFA who have difficulty in linking monitoring and evaluation reporting by MSB to their humanitarian assistance strategy objectives even though, as described earlier, MSB interventions do link directly to one or more goals in Sida's Humanitarian Strategy. This situation is aggravated by a lack of clear guidance on performance measurement by Sida for MSB at the global level, and poor linkages between MSB operations and the Sida programme at a country level. This is even the case in Mozambique where, although there is excellent collaboration between MSB and Sida at the country level, and the intervention is yielding positive results, there is no clear link with Sida's country strategy for Mozambique. There appear to be a number of options for improvement:

1. Incorporate MSB more fully into Sida's performance measurement system through the provision of appropriate guidance and involvement of key staff in partner capacity building.
2. For the longer term, high cost interventions such as Global Service Packages for base camps or fleet management operations, a results framework should be developed and monitored to track progress, including outcome indicators. Examples of such outcome indicators could be the average percentage of vehicles operating, client satisfaction measured via complaints systems or surveys and periodic assessments of relevant logistic gaps at a beneficiary level. These indicators should be developed with MSB's partners not just to ensure coherence in the system but also to reinforce their own systems.
3. Similarly, strengthen the results framework/logframe for DRR interventions, such as in Mozambique, with appropriate outcome indicators accompanied by relevant M&E systems. The DRR project in Mozambique is a pilot for what has the potential to become an important niche area for MSB and there have been a number of largely *ad hoc* monitoring visits to learn from this experience. It appears timely to conduct a joint MSB/Sida mid-term review of the Mozambique project to assess performance and capture relevant learning to support MSB DRR operations in both Mozambique and at the global level by:
 - a. *Improving the Mozambique project* – agree on areas to improve the project's relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. Afford MSB, Sida and INGC the opportunity to jointly review/revise the results framework so that it is more outcome-oriented and better aligned with Sida's country strategy.
 - b. *Capturing relevant learning* that could be used when designing similar projects in other countries and provide the basis for operational guidance to support the Sida-MSB Operational Framework.

In summary, while continuing to promote operational learning, MSB needs to develop performance measurement systems that look beyond outputs and revise its monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems accordingly. With appropriate support from Sida, a more strategic approach by MSB towards interventions would help partners to increase the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of their humanitarian interventions

9 Coordination

MSB sees its primary role in coordination as promoting coordinated decision-making between competent actors during a crisis⁷⁷. In practice, MSB supports coordination at both a country and the global level through a variety of ways, including operational coordination in the form of ICT infrastructure and information management capacity, and at the global level through supporting UN-led clusters and supporting interagency training.

9.1 MSB AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN PARTNERSHIP (IHP)

Together with DFID and DEMA, SRSA was one of the founder members when the IHP was established in 1995 as an informal network to provide multi-national collaborative support to humanitarian operations of the United Nations, and MSB continues to play a leading role. There are now seven members as Germany, Finland, Norway and Estonia have since joined. With a rotating the chair, the IHP provides a working example of coordinated standby partners, and its most visible activities have been the construction and maintenance of base camps for humanitarian staff during responses to large-scale emergencies.

The UNHCR and WFP base camps in Dollo Ado, Ethiopia constructed in mid-2011 during a large influx of Somali refugees represent a recent example of this collaboration. The Dollo Ado experience demonstrated the usefulness of cost-sharing arrangements and how this partnership could be used to mitigate risks. When MSB stepped in to replace THW at short notice so that operations were not unduly affected, MSB took a decision to assume the IHP lead relatively quickly and take over operations, but there was considerable confusion whether the contract would be signed at the Geneva or Addis level, whether to include the Ethiopian government in the agreement, etc. It eventually took over 3 months to resolve this. As this situation is likely to arise again, it would probably be worthwhile for IHP to agree on a protocol for decision-making with partners.

⁷⁷ <https://www.msb.se/en/Operations/Coordination-support/>

9.2 MSB COORDINATION WITH ITS STAKEHOLDERS

The lack of clarity about MSB's role and range of functions and the numerous requests for a "catalogue of services" has been discussed elsewhere. Such a catalogue would clarify what MSB and/or IHP does and does not do, give a description of entry points for DRR and generally help partners to maximise the collaboration with MSB, particularly the use of their core competencies. However, it should be emphasised that a catalogue would be only one component, albeit a key one, of an improved overall MSB communications strategy.

Several interviewees in DRC cited situations where partners have used MSB to bypass their own budgeting process or procurement systems. Partner key informants acknowledged that instances of gap filling still occurred, while at the same time describing their own efforts to control this. This has created tensions with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Sida particularly in situations where partners have asked for MSB deployments to support activities that MFA defines as part of the core activities for which they have already received core funding from MFA, or programme support from Sida – the term used by MFA and Sida key informants was "double dipping". This has resulted in delays on decisions for requests, and UNICEF and UNHCR cited several rejections. A request from IOM for humanitarian advisers was refused after over a year's wait. However, provided that there is close coordination and information sharing between MFA, Sida, MSB and the partner, it should be possible to deploy MSB personnel into a cluster or advisory role in a way that is in line with the core and programme that enhances, rather than duplicates, support by MFA and Sida (and other donors). This is an area where a Government strategy and a coherent operational framework between Sida and MSB would help considerably.

9.3 MSB CONTRIBUTION TO HUMANITARIAN REFORM

Along with DRC and RedR, MSB has been proactive in filling positions that are potentially quite strategic and influential in partner HQs. A good example of this are the two MSB secondees currently supporting the UNICEF standby partnership team, which is not only supporting UNICEF in better integrating DRR into its WASH activities but has also helped MSB gain a much better understanding of UNICEF's organisational needs. MSB has strengthened and broadened some of its profiles and is now also strong on WASH, emergency specialists, coordinators and generalists, which are profiles specifically targeted at UNICEF. In addition, the Global WASH Cluster Rapid Response Team has two MSB secondees on the team for one year and UNICEF interviewees expressed the hope that these will be renewed. OCHA is also looking to MSB for help in upgrading the predictability of UNDAC in support of the transformation agenda.

Deployment to HQ advisory positions or overall coordination positions in the field are examples of where a MSB/Sida operational framework will need some clarity on criteria to determine whether a) deployments correspond with MSB core profiles and b) they provide strategic support to Sida's humanitarian strategy by filling critical gaps that are hindering partner agencies from reaching their objectives. Using the secondments to the WASH cluster as an example, MSB/SRSA deployments during the period when clusters were being established (2007-2010) made sense since this was a period when there was a lot of confusion and even distrust – particularly amongst NGOs – about the role and functioning of clusters. The second evaluation of the cluster system⁷⁸ showed that the system has now been broadly accepted and NGO partners are filling coordination roles. The evaluation, however, highlighted information management, a MSB core profile, as an area that cluster-led agencies and OCHA continued to find problematic. Continued MSB support to improve information management, both in clusters and overall, therefore seems justified especially since improvements are likely to have a significant positive impact on humanitarian operations as a whole.

Interagency training that is either hosted or led by MSB is an important coordination tool, since these activities not only increase emergency preparedness through enhancing technical skills, but participants also gain a better understanding of how other agencies work and practice together during simulations. MSB is seen as a leading agency in terms of hosting and developing training, together with its UN partners and some of its peer agencies, notably THW and DEMA. It is also considered to have an understanding of the changing nature of the global humanitarian context, investing in key profiles where there is increased demand, such as DRR and information managers. Most MSB training is with other agencies, sharing responsibility for the syllabus and facilitation and is open to other agencies. MSB also hosts training by other agencies, such as training and simulations for UNHCR's WEM course. Roughly 700 participants attend MSB-organised courses annually.

MSB is thus seen as a key partner in contributing to the overall capacity building of the standby partners and for increasing the professionalism of the sector. The use of the ELLIOT learning network is such an example, which could potentially be adapted for interagency use.

9.4 CONCLUSIONS – COORDINATION

MSB does not always participate in country-level coordination efforts and coordination is typically left to the partner organisation with whom they are working. MSB often takes a “back seat” and supports the leadership of the partner. In DRC, for ex-

⁷⁸ Streets, J. *et al.* (2010)

ample, it was claimed that MSB personnel did not attend coordination meetings even when invited, while Sida DRC expressed concern about inadequate integration in overall Swedish DRC humanitarian efforts. There appears to be more substantive engagement with coordination mechanisms where a MSB (or IHP) Team Leader is present.

While there are positive aspects to a low profile approach in terms of putting the partner in front, it is important for MSB to improve communications and raise awareness of MSB project objectives and activities amongst stakeholders. One way of doing this might be to deploy MSB Global Service Packages supported by pooled fund mechanisms, which would clearly be in line with Swedish humanitarian policy. Many MSB interventions, such as information management and coordination support, are specifically designed to support coordination. In a similar vein, interagency training that is either hosted or led by MSB is an important coordination tool, since participants gain a better understanding of how other agencies work

10 Cross-cutting Issues

MSB has a commitment to the inclusion of cross cutting issues into their operations. In practice, during operations there is a certain expectation that the partner will undertake the necessary analysis and provide appropriate guidance, whereas MSB focuses on preparedness in the form of appropriate roster composition and training in cross cutting issues. The attention to different cross cutting issues varies. For example, the 16 respondents to the online survey felt that gender and environment were being integrated fully or to a large extent into MSB operations, whereas other cross cutting issues such as children, disability, HIV/AIDS, conflict sensitivity and accountability to disaster-affected population were given less attention.

10.1 GENDER

Gender and diversity, along with environment, are seen as cross cutting issues to be mainstreamed into MSB operations; MSB has guidelines for integrating both gender and environment⁷⁹ with clear targets to be reached by 2015. According to the gender guideline, the overall objective of MSB's work for gender equality and diversity is to increase the quality and effectiveness of intervention by reaching and involving women, men, girls and boys. The specific goals include (1) taking into account the situation and needs of women, men, girls and boys when designing the operation; (2) women's participation and the utilisation of women's capacity; (3) good understanding of and ability to work for gender equality and diversity among MSB personnel; (4) gender equality and diversity as priority issues in the dialogue with partners. There is currently one full-time gender adviser at MSB HQ and 8 active gender advisers for deployment.

⁷⁹ "Inriktning för arbetet med jämställdhet och mångfald för ökad kvalitet och effektivitet i insatsverksamheten 2011-2015" and "Inriktning för arbetet med miljöintegrering för ökad kvalitet och effektivitet i insatsverksamheten 2011-2015", both dated September 2011.

MSB Gender mainstreaming targets to be reached by 2015


- All major actions have a basic analysis for women, men, boys and girls as part of the starting points for the intervention.
- MSB have developed and actively implemented mechanisms to protect girls and women within the prioritized functional capacities and types of operations.
- MSB have developed work to meet the different challenges and opportunities of women, men, girls and boys regarding a changing climate.
- The proportion of women deployed by MSB is 40%.
- MSB have an active network of organizations working for and with women in the most common partner countries.
- MSB have established and operational partnerships nationally and internationally for women's participation in international operations.
- Work on diversity is clarified in relation to the work on gender equality and gender mainstreaming in the instruments and intervention processes.
- MSB have a diverse toolkit for concrete work on gender equality and diversity. The toolkit will include:
 - Basic training (orientation mandatory for all staff)
 - Specialized courses for relevant staff
 - Expert support and coaching expert staff
 - Support Tools (updated handbook, checklists for gender briefings, reporting templates, checklists for operation management)
 - Network of organizations and experts from other agencies and organizations
 - Other not yet identified tools or instruments.
- MSB have special competence regarding gender equality and diversity in operation management including:
 - Gender Adviser
 - A resource group within the staff with advanced knowledge of gender mainstreaming that can assist in briefings, training, coaching etc.
 - A Gender Field Advisor pool with 20 Swedish and international experts
 - The possibility to define gender expertise as a functional capacity will be explored.
 - MSB will be recognised among the partners as an in their efforts to work methodically and purposefully for gender equality and gender perspective.
- Gender equality and diversity are quality improvement goals and perspective among MSB's priorities within all form of dialogue.
- MSB have specific tools for dialogue work for gender equality and diversity.
- MSB have accumulated practical experience on working with gender equality and diversity in dialogue.

MSB started to work with gender more intensively with the implementation of the UN Security Council's Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, which implies an MSB obligation to apply a gender perspective, in line with Swedish development assistance priorities.

Interviews with key informants, supported by online survey results, suggest that MSB is generally perceived as a relatively gender sensitive standby partner. A gender handbook has been developed by MSB to help staff to apply a gender equality perspective. Roster members are supposed to get training in gender, although EL-LIOT data suggest that only 60% of those deployed have gone through this training. At the MSB's vehicle workshops in Dungu, Kalemie and Goma in DRC, training

courses on environment and on equal opportunities for personnel have been implemented recently. In the course of fleet management intervention in Goma, MSB provided training to WFP and SODEICO staff on gender and environment. The gender training was quoted as being highly appreciated by both WFP and MSB staff members and anecdotal evidence suggests that the deployment of a female trainer appears to have had a positive impact on perceptions of women's roles amongst trainees and other stakeholders.

Figure 16 – Proportion of MSB Contracts Issued to Women 2006-2011



Gender-balanced teams and especially Team Leaders were most often cited by interviewees as a demonstration of good gender practices by MSB. Analysis of MSB shows that numbers of female MSB personnel deployed has increased from 44 (out of a total of 241) in 2006 to 61 (out of a total of 239) in 2011, representing almost a 40% increase in the female to male ratio.

10.2 ENVIRONMENT

The picture on MSB's approach to environment is mixed. The strong emphasis on DRR of MSB interventions in the Mozambique context has not only meant that DRR has been fully incorporated into the project design, but also with the potential effects of climate change along with related environmental factors. As a consequence, the information system being developed integrates current and predicted information on climate hazards (cyclones, floods and droughts) while analysing potential impacts on physical and social vulnerabilities (roads, infrastructure, poverty levels, sector dependencies).

In DRC, MSB is currently conducting a study into "green" approaches to base camps; experimenting with water recycling, solar power and solid waste disposal. National staff from SODEICO was included in MSB training on environmental issues

In Ethiopia, however, there was little evidence that environmental issues had been considered, apart from environmental sanitation, during the assessment or design of the camp. Given MSB's extensive experience with planning and managing base camps, it was felt that they should be in a position to take environmental considerations into account more systematically.

There is currently one full time environmental adviser at MSB HQ, with no environmental advisers on the roster. MSB has identified 10 candidates who will be categorised as environmental field advisers in the near future, three of whom have already been deployed on field missions.

10.3 CONFLICT-SENSITIVITY

While MSB undertake security assessments (as do all standby partners), conflict analysis and operational risk management are largely left to partners; mainly UNHCR, WFP and ICRC. Given these agencies operate regularly in conflict zones, this is a reasonable course of action. However, as MSB develops new partnerships as in Mozambique with national authorities, they will need to be prepared to assume greater responsibility for risk management.

10.4 CONCLUSIONS – CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

Most MSB personnel have received relevant training and feedback from interviewees along with results from the online survey that indicate a reasonable awareness of cross cutting issues. However, with the possible exception of gender, the team uncovered relatively little evidence of specific attention to cross cutting issues during assessments, design or implementation. MSB's approach is mainly to rely on the partner to undertake necessary analysis and to provide appropriate guidance. As described elsewhere in the report, this is not necessarily always a bad thing. The willingness of MSB to follow ICRC procedures, notably with respect to neutrality and conflict sensitivity, has won them considerable respect with ICRC. There are nevertheless areas of MSB core expertise, e.g. base camps, where a more deliberate analysis of cross cutting issues is justified so that they can be incorporated into design and operating arrangements.

11 Conclusions & Recommendations

MSB and Sida find themselves at a challenging moment in their partnership. MSB, and its predecessor SRSA, has developed a sound and solid reputation amongst its partners and peers based on two decades of delivering high quality, flexible and timely support. MSB now needs to build on this reputation and their experiences while adapting the organisation and its *modus operandi* to more effectively support and complement Sweden's humanitarian goals. Required changes include more strategic choices of MSB interventions and an increased focus on building national capacities; this applies not only to governments, but also to other key national stakeholders. MSB needs also to take a more results-based approach by proactively engaging in rolling needs assessments and moving beyond simply “doing” operations to facilitate their own exit strategies in order to increase the chances that partners end up with sustainable solutions. MSB should develop performance measurement systems that look beyond outputs, and revise its monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems accordingly. By adopting more strategic approaches towards their interventions, MSB would also help partners to increase the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of their humanitarian interventions.

MSB also needs to continue to develop new partnerships, including with private sector actors that complement their core profiles. A successful example of innovation is the current MSB project in Mozambique that has since 2009 evolved from a conventional secondment to the UN to its current position as a valuable support role to the National Disaster Management Agency (INGC) achieving a positive impact at the national level. Sida and MSB should look together at replicating similar activities in other Sida country programmes. Not only could MSB help support Sida's efforts to strengthen national disaster management capacities as part of their humanitarian strategy, but such projects would help increase the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of any subsequent MSB (and other standby partner) deployments to these countries during future major disasters.

The Swedish international humanitarian responses, partners and profile have evolved through the years. The four main actors, MoD, MFA, Sida and MSB have different tasks and responsibilities. The system is marked by good will, professionalism and high respect for the roles of colleagues. But it is also characterised by a lack of trust as to the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and alignment of MSB operations, and by decision-making procedures that are perceived as opaque and cumbersome. There is a need to take steps to improve overall trust and transparency, programme coherence and operational flexibility.

Good policy understanding and operational relations between MSB and Sida are necessary to achieve this. Revisions of the present system should promote teamwork and trust, and be adapted to different types of interventions.

Positive changes are possible and many are already underway. Sida should actively support the changes that are needed if MSB is to make its operations more strategic. This should be done through measures such as the sharing of information, new collaborative arrangements, an active search for joint learning, bilateral initiatives and increased support to humanitarian coordination.

Findings from this study indicate that in many cases there is no need to delay decisions on reform. Provided that MSB demonstrates a real commitment to addressing critical gaps in their operations, as described in this report, and Sida and other key stakeholders provide the necessary strategic guidance, agreeing on the necessary adjustments to systems and procedures should be a relatively straightforward process.

Of particular relevance in this respect is the development of a strategy for MSB by the *Ministry of Defence* that is expected to involve close consultation between the four main stakeholders during a process that will eventually culminate in a Cabinet decision. The results of this study suggest that such a strategy must give clear policy guidance to ensure that MSB interventions strike an appropriate balance between supporting both Swedish humanitarian policies and the operational priorities of partners. The MSB strategy will determine its role and *modus operandi* for some years to come. It will be important that consultations take place involving regular stakeholders, not only when designing the strategy, but to monitor implementation once it is in place and to fine tune as necessary.

The *Ministry of Foreign Affairs* has the responsibility to ensure coherence amongst Swedish humanitarian actors and alignment between international humanitarian policies and Sweden's own foreign policy. To achieve the desired level of coherence, there will be a need to systematically share relevant information, including about the scale of collaboration with partners, profile of interventions, cost-sharing modalities and assess potential impacts of Swedish policy directives on MSB's humanitarian mandate.

Such sharing of information, both in the implementation of the strategy and on policies and modalities for collaboration with standby partners and between the main actors, would not only support increased coherence, but also build trust. Joint perspectives and transparency in decisions and intentions would help to create an "enabling environment" for the Swedish humanitarian interventions and operations.

The recommendations below are targeted at *Sida and MSB*, although for some actions, there is a joint responsibility.

11.1 RECOMMENDATIONS TO SIDA

1. Collaborate closely with MSB in developing an effective and user-friendly Operational Framework for MSB, which could take the form of revising the existing agreement between Sida and MSB. This should include policies towards partners and priorities and outline differentiated decision models, with rapid decisions on defined interventions, whereas more long term and complex interventions are handled with normal project cycle management requirements. It should design reporting along with performance indicators linked to the Government

strategy. It should stipulate financing modalities and provide multiyear perspectives and preferably, funding.

2. Sida should keep MSB informed on planned support to standby partners, in order to secure coherence between core, programme and project interventions on various issues such as “double dipping” and cost sharing.
3. Communication within Sida on the role and mandate of MSB should be improved, not least with regard to knowledge at the “development” departments, handling country allocations, and the Embassies. Such information could lead to models where MSB can support the goals in Sida’s humanitarian strategy on building national capacities. This will be a key component of the MSB communication strategy described below.
4. Assist in establishing clear and mutually supportive relationships between Sida and MSB at the country level, including the provision of guidance on how to incorporate MSB interventions into country strategies. One way of doing this is to participate in a joint review of the Mozambique project (see MSB recommendation below).
5. Sida, in close consultation with MSB and hosting partner agencies, should seek agreement with other standby partner donors on a common approach to cost-sharing and how these link to deployment timeframes. Such a system must be carefully designed to minimise transaction costs, facilitate timely deployments and avoid situations where, for example, roster candidates are mainly selected on the basis of cost considerations rather than their competency profile.
6. To create a suitable enabling environment to move ahead, Sida should request MFA to:
 - a. Lead quarterly meetings with Sida and MSB to review progress in implementing programmes and interventions in order to increase transparency and coherence among the Swedish actors.
 - b. Initiate discussions with Sida and MSB to review and discuss Swedish policies and modalities for collaboration with standby partners. The main purpose would be to increase coherence in the different forms of Swedish support to these agencies; core support, programme support and project interventions. The need for coherence concerns a wide range of areas such as the size of collaboration, profile of interventions and cost-sharing principles.

11.2 RECOMMENDATIONS TO MSB

7. Contribute to the development of an Operational Framework by identifying MSB core competencies, humanitarian needs, MSB capabilities, and project cycle management and performance measurement modalities. It should emphasise the need for a proactive facilitation role for MSB to help partners develop and implement viable exit strategies. MFA and Sida policy decisions in core and programme support to partners should subsequently be reflected in MoU’s between MSB and partners in order to increase coherence in the Swedish system. The framework should also discuss the development of future core competencies

of MSB, based on the humanitarian system and needs and clarify approaches to length of deployments⁸⁰ and cost-sharing.

8. Participate in meetings initiated by MoD on monitoring and “fine tuning” of the Government strategy
9. Develop and launch a robust communication strategy to ensure that Swedish stakeholders, standby partners and partner countries are aware of MSBs mandate, competence, *modus operandi* and limits (including drafting a “catalogue of services”).
10. Support humanitarian reform. With good coordination, it should be possible to avoid “double-dipping” (double payment) while deploying MSB personnel in support of humanitarian reform mechanisms that strategically reinforce core funding provided by Sida and other donors.
11. Broaden support to partners beyond day-to-day operations to improve relevance, effectiveness and efficiency (including cost-efficiency) of the partner’s intervention through:
 - a. Participation in needs assessments and support of the partner in developing and executing exit strategies for MSB.
 - b. Development of “centres of excellence” together with other standby partner agencies⁸¹ who also work in MSB core competency areas so to facilitate partner decision-making with informed options from designing interventions to maximising the use of local resources to deciding on viable exit strategies involving local counterparts, the private sector or alternative options.
12. Improve performance measurement systems and results reporting in consultation with evaluation departments in MSB and Sida. Suitable systems will most likely be organised by two main “models”:
 - a. Large-scale/high value interventions (e.g. multi-year projects, global service packages such as base camps) will have a results framework that include outcome level indicators and have a monitoring and evaluation system that will include mid-term reviews and final evaluations, preferably managed jointly by Sida and MSB.
 - b. Smaller value interventions – usually via deployments of one or more roster members – would be monitored through a combined system using relevant information from debriefings, compilations of ELLIOT survey data⁸² and PERs. For more substantial operations (or where there are important lessons

⁸⁰ This is related to the recommendation in the DFID-led Standby Partner Review where UN agencies recommended initial six month minimum deployments.

⁸¹ MSB has made a good start with their “theme seminars” to capture lessons-learned from basecamp construction, etc.

⁸² ELLIOT data would be presented as anonymous “dashboard” of synthesized data, similar to the charts currently on the ELLIOT website.

to be learned), debriefings could take the form of After Action Reviews together with partners and other involved standby partners.

13. Routinely deploy a Standby Partner Team Leader at country level in support of large scale interventions (either as MSB or part of IHP) to support partner coordination, clarify roles and responsibilities, monitor performance against the results framework and facilitate implementation of the exit strategy by the partner.⁸³
14. Review and improve learning systems from a utilisation perspective. Explore with other standby and requesting partners how ELLIOT might be adapted and used as an interagency tool with MSB support. Improve or remove ineffective parts of feedback systems (such as PERs). Adopt an “apprentice” approach so that new MSB roster members can be coached by more experienced colleagues during deployments to the field.
15. Replicate the Mozambique DRR project in other suitable countries. Organise a joint review with Sida of current and potential DRR country projects, starting in Mozambique and visiting 2-3 other Sida programme countries where similar projects could potentially be replicated. Such a review would fulfil multiple objectives by helping to providing strategic guidance and realignment to Mozambique, facilitate MSB-Sida contacts at a country level and capture learning in a systematic fashion so that it can be applied in other countries.
16. MSB should actively seek ways of involving national stakeholders including, but not limited to, national governments. This could be done through developing partnerships with the private sector and the academic community, or looking at recruitment and the training of national staff⁸⁴ to support MSB interventions
17. MSB should improve their financial management systems to “commercial standard”, to reduce transaction costs of partners and facilitate cost sharing.
18. Assist in establishing clear and mutually supportive relationships between Sida and MSB at country level.
19. To create a suitable enabling environment to move ahead, MSB should request MOD to:
 - a. Oversee the development of a MSB Strategy that would culminate in a Cabinet decision. It is suggested that the process leading to this Cabinet decision involve all four main stakeholders. It will be important that such a strategy be sufficiently clear to give policy guidance, ensuring that interventions are consistent with Swedish humanitarian policies and MSB capacity.

⁸³ Note that this does not imply that MSB project management, which currently is done from Sweden, should move out in the field. Neither should this system mean permanent MSB representation in different countries, but only representation to support ongoing operations as long as there is a need.

⁸⁴ While there are precedents for national staff with MSB contracts, national staff with contracts from other agencies could work alongside MSB.

It would define MSB's comparative advantage, limits to engagement and how to further improve their relevance, effectiveness and efficiency.

- b. Convene regular strategy implementation meetings. The launching of the Strategy is the first step. We suggest that MoD convenes regular meetings to review the implementation of the Strategy. It is envisaged that these meetings should focus on the strategy level, and not deal with financial or operational aspects.
- c. Explore with MSB a revised system whereby funds for international capabilities are requested as an element of its regular annual budget procedure/request.

Annex 1 – Terms of Reference

1. Introduction

This study is initiated by Sida (Department for Conflict and Post - Conflict Cooperation / Unit for Humanitarian Assistance) and MSB. No similar study has been undertaken during the ten-year period that Sida has provided support to MSB. It is therefore necessary to conduct a study that takes stock of results and lessons learned in order to provide strategic and operational recommendations for the future. The period to be covered by the study is 2006 – 2011.

The focus of the study will be on: (i) MSB's international operations funded by Sida, including MSB's role, comparative advantage, expertise, capacity, cost effectiveness and cooperation with key humanitarian partners United Nations (UN) agencies, European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) etc); and (ii) on the forms of cooperation between Sida and MSB.⁸⁵

The study will draw upon findings provided by a number of partner (UN agencies) and country case studies. Additionally and where appropriate, desk-based studies on specific issues may be undertaken to supplement the case studies.

This study will be conducted by an external study team that will provide its independent assessment. To its disposal, the study team will have one Sida and MSB staff resource person.

2. Background

Policy and strategy framework

Sida is an authority under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) while MSB is an authority under the Ministry of Defence (MOD). Both authorities are governed by the government's guidelines that describe how the authorities should perform their work as well as the annual Letter of Appropriation that sets out the objectives and how much money the authorities are allocated.

Cooperation between Sida and MSB is further formalised in the Government's 'Policy for Sweden's Humanitarian Assistance 2010 – 2016' (MFA 2010) and the 'Strategy for humanitarian assistance provided through Sida 2011 – 2014' (MFA 2011).

⁸⁵ 'Statskontoret' (the Swedish Agency for Public Management) recently conducted a review that aimed to look at MSB's internal systems and procedures. This study will not duplicate that review, but rather complement it by looking at MSB's international operations funded by Sida.
<http://www.statskontoret.se/upload/Publikationer/2012/201201.pdf>

The Policy for Humanitarian Assistance applies to both Sida and MSB (MFA 2010, p.4). Provision of humanitarian personnel and material supplies are primarily the responsibility of MSB while Sida provides funding to MSB (MFA 2010, p. 21-22). Sida and MSB should further play an important role in Sweden's work with multilateral organisations and the EU, and are required to pass on experiences and lessons learned from their respective areas that can help the Government assume its overall responsibility for humanitarian policy development (MFA 2010, p. 23).

The Government's Strategy for Sida's Humanitarian Assistance defines Sida's relation to MSB as the financing allocated to MSB is for international humanitarian operations and in particular for operations requested by UN humanitarian agencies, but also other operations where the unique expertise of the MSB is needed and its assistance required internationally.... support will continue to be based on assessed humanitarian needs, demands, and the comparative advantages, expertise and capacity of the MSB (MFA 2011, p.13).

While the Strategy for Humanitarian Assistance defines Sida's responsibilities, there is at the moment no similar strategy for MSB.⁸⁶

In addition, MSB has developed guidelines for certain areas relevant to its international operations, for instance gender⁸⁷ and environment⁸⁸. Furthermore, there are also guidelines developed together by Sida and MSB, for instance, within the area of disaster risk reduction (DRR).⁸⁹

Goals, objectives and results

The Letter for Instruction further defines MSB's responsibilities as to maintain preparedness for implementing or supporting rescue and disaster relief operations and to support activities in the fields of humanitarian mine action, the strengthening of disaster preparedness and early recovery (MFA 2010, p.22). MSB's international operations can be categorised into the following areas:

- Humanitarian interventions: secondments of experts, search and rescue, shelter, base camps, transport and logistics, health care, water sanitation and hygiene.
- Humanitarian mine action: rapid response plans for mine action, mine risk education, secondments of experts (for instance, on information management systems for mine action).

⁸⁶ In its Letter of Appropriation ('regleringsbrev') for 2012, MSB have been instructed to prepare a strategy proposal ('strategiunderlag') to be submitted to the MOD by the 31st of March 2012.

⁸⁷ 'Inriktning för arbetet med jämställdhet och mångfald för ökad kvalitet och effektivitet i insatsverksamheten 2011 – 2015' (MSB 2011).

⁸⁸ 'Inriktning för arbetet med miljöintegrering för ökad kvalitet och effektivitet i insatsverksamheten 2011 – 2015' (MSB 2011).

⁸⁹ 'Överenskommelse gällande samarbete mellan Sida och MSB kring katastrofriskreducerande insatser' (Sida and MSB, no date).

- DRR: risk analysis, support to national and local authorities on DRR (policies, strategies, planning etc), early warning systems, support to local search and rescue capacity.
- Early recovery

In 2010, the number of interventions totaled 110⁹⁰ of which, humanitarian interventions, 75%; humanitarian mine action, 7%; DRR, 10%; and early recovery, 7%.⁹¹

While there is no explicit MSB strategy articulating overarching goals, objectives, and expected results, a set of results and indicators for MSB's international operations⁹² has nevertheless been developed. This set can be summarised as follows:

- High quality and needs-based MSB interventions in support of UN and EU coordinated humanitarian interventions.
- Provision of fast and high quality support to women, girls, boys and men affected by disasters such as, search and rescue, shelter etc.
- Contribution to disaster management capacity building of local and national authorities, as well as the Red Cross society.
- Contribute to improved conditions for people that are supported by MSB's interventions at the stage of early recovery.
- Reduced threat from mines and unexploded ordnance to local populations, as well as relief staff through MSB's interventions within the area of humanitarian mine action.
- Contribute to Sweden's position as a leader and respected actor in the area of humanitarian assistance.

Sida's support to MSB

Sida's support to MSB is currently provided through a framework agreement that is renewed on an annual basis, defining the budget, financing and reporting requirements. A request for funding is submitted by MSB for each intervention as needs arise that is either approved or rejected by Sida. Reporting back to Sida is then done against key objectives and goals for each intervention, through quarterly reports and annual review meetings.

Although there are numerous reports generated by interventions annually (reaching up to a hundred per year), presently there is no overarching reporting on a more strategic, thematic or organisational /partner level.

Sida and MSB are discussing how to develop the forms of the framework agreement further, for instance to be established on a multi-annual basis.

During the period 2001 – 2005, financial support to MSB reached approximately SEK30 – 50 million/year. In 2006, support was broadened to also cover DRR and early recovery. During the period 2006 – 2008, financial support increased to SEK95 – 120 million/year. Since 2009, MSB has been supported through a framework agreement with SEK140 million and SEK150

⁹⁰ Excluding conflict resolution.

⁹¹ 'Insatsverksamheten 2010' (MSB annual report 2010, p. 26).

⁹² 'Komplettering till ansökan om humanitär ram för MSB 2009 – resultatindikatorer' (MSB, 2009).

million for 2009 and 2010, respectively. In 2011, the framework agreement was renewed for one year with SEK160 million (Sida Assessment Memo 2011, p.2).

Sida is the single largest source of external funding for MSB (in 2010, 67%) followed by MFA (14%)⁹³, UN (8%), the UK Department for International Development (DFID) (3%), European Union (EU) (2%) and ICRC (2%).⁹⁴

Partners and beneficiaries (including women, girls, boys and men)

MSB has stand-by agreements with a number of UN agencies, for instance the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The most common partners (in terms of number of interventions) in 2010 were WFP (21%), UNICEF (17%), OCHA (15%) and UNHCR (7%).⁹⁵

From the Sida financed international operations the largest partners (in terms of funding) in 2011 were: WFP (28,8%), United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) (13,2%), UNHCR (12,1%), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) (11,9%), the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) (5,2%), UNICEF (5,1%), IOM/UNHCR (4,5%), OCHA (4,1%) and ICRC (3%).⁹⁶

Smaller humanitarian interventions usually involve financial support (SEK300,000 – 1,000,000) to secondments of experts requested from UN agencies. These interventions are difficult to plan in advance and generate a relatively large administrative burden.

Larger humanitarian interventions usually involve logistical support to UN agencies that are provided for humanitarian disasters and emergencies that are relatively difficult to plan for and where needs differ for each disaster. Other humanitarian interventions can include for instance, fleet management and construction of bases, which are usually co-financed by UN partners. These interventions are easier to plan for (often on a yearly basis).

For other interventions (mine action, DRR and early recovery) MSB usually acts as an implementation partner to UN agencies. National and local authorities are furthermore important partners for more long-term capacity-building interventions.

⁹³ This includes support to civil emergency / crisis management, which will not be examined as part of the study. The study will only cover Sida funded MSB international operations. Hence, activities and costs in relation to international operations financed via MSB's administrative budget ('förvaltningsanslaget') – in 2010 approx. SEK118 million (MSB annual report, 2010, p. 28) – will not be examined as part of the study.

⁹⁴ 'Insatsverksamheten 2010' (MSB annual report, 2010, p. 29).

⁹⁵ 'Insatsverksamheten 2010' (MSB annual report, 2010, p. 27).

⁹⁶ MSB 4th Quarterly Report, 2011-12-31, p. 3.

Geographical allocations differ from year to year depending on the crisis and needs. Nevertheless, in 2011, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (23%), Tunisia (18%), Haiti (7.5%), Sudan (6.6%), Ethiopia (6%) and Liberia (5.7%) were the main beneficiaries.⁹⁷

3. Purpose, use and users of the study

The focus of the study will be on: (i) MSB's international operations funded by Sida, including MSB's role, comparative advantage, expertise, capacity, cost effectiveness and cooperation with key humanitarian partners (UN agencies, ECHO, ICRC etc); and (ii) on the forms of cooperation between Sida and MSB.

The primary objective of this study is to provide Sida and MSB staff and managers with lessons on how to best support and implement MSB's international operations using evidence from the last decade of cooperation. A key source for this learning will be the process of interaction between key stakeholders.

Secondary objectives of the study are to:

- provide knowledge and assist in the prioritisation of activity including role, comparative advantage, capacity, and expertise of MSB in its cooperation with partners.
- provide knowledge to further improve cooperation between Sida and MSB and the effectiveness of international operations funded by Sida.
- provide knowledge to further improve the monitoring, evaluation and reporting on results of international operations funded by Sida.

The period to be covered by the study is 2006 – 2011. While Sida has provided support to MSB since 2001, this study will particularly look at the period since 2006 when the cooperation was expanded to also cover DRR and early recovery. Moreover, MSB became a new organisation in 2009⁹⁸, which introduced new ways of working and procedures that have affected the cooperation between Sida and MSB.

Primary intended users of the study are Sida and MSB staff and managers. Secondary users of the study are relevant staff at the MFA and MOD as well as partners (UN agencies).

As the key purpose of the study is to promote learning, it is expected that the study team will find suitable and effective ways for feedback of findings, lessons and recommendations to stakeholders through a participatory approach. This will, for instance, be ensured by having a study team working closely with Sida and MSB staff as well as organising and facilitating group discussions on a number of relevant issues throughout the study process.

⁹⁷ Preliminary figures for 2011 ('Landfördelning per 2011-12-31').

⁹⁸ MSB was founded on 1 January 2009 as a result of a merger between three agencies: the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA), the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) and the Swedish National Board of Psychological Defense. Operations run before 2009 was run by one of these three agencies.

4. Key issues / questions for the study

The issues/questions below are not exhaustive and the study team is expected to further elaborate on these during the course of the study process and in the Inception Report (see below).

Relevance

The study will examine the degree of coherence between MSB's international operations and Sida's strategy objectives and goals for humanitarian assistance. Further attention will be paid to the effectiveness of Sida funded MSB international operations and the extent to which these are supportive of the implementation of Sida's strategy for humanitarian assistance.

The study will examine MSB's role, comparative advantage, expertise and capacity in relation to its partners (UN agencies), NGOs and local and national authorities when implementing its international operations (including humanitarian interventions, humanitarian mine action, DRR (including capacity building of local and national authorities) and early recovery). In this respect, the study will look at financing and activities in the transition between humanitarian assistance and more long term development cooperation.

In the implementation of MSB's international operations (funded by Sida), attention will be paid to issues of efficient use of financial and staff resources (including cost-effectiveness) and how the latter help achieve the desired outcomes and whether and how they complement those of partners (UN agencies).

The study will also undertake to examine when and how and for what type of interventions needs, risk and conflict analysis can be performed; when and how partner's analysis is used; and how it can inform the design and implementation of MSB's international operations (funded by Sida).⁹⁹

Effectiveness and efficiency

The study will further look at how the forms of cooperation between MSB and Sida can be further improved. What are the key experiences and lessons learned during the ten year period of cooperation? What is proving effective and efficient?

The study will pay attention also to issues related to working procedures, forms of dialogue between Sida and MSB but also between Sida, MSB and other actors (including MFA, MOD, UN agencies), decision making (including procedures for approval and rejection of interventions), reporting and follow up. Focus will also be placed on the annual agreements and funding instruments between Sida and MSB and its partners, and how and whether these can be

⁹⁹ This should take into account a gender perspective – different needs based on, for instance, sex require different strategies and implementation. Furthermore, risk behaviour may differ as well, for instance, mine action with a majority of all victims being men.

further developed. In this respect, the study should look at how the current form of framework agreement can be developed further, for instance on a multi annual basis, as well as reporting on a more thematic or organisational level.

Monitoring, evaluation and reporting on results

Another area for the study will be to examine MSB's approach to assessing, monitoring, evaluating and reporting on results.

- To what extent are result frameworks used at a strategic and programmatic level?
- How is MSB working with its partners (UN Agencies) on the assessment, monitoring and evaluation and reporting on results?
- Have there been any systematic attempts to reflect on lessons and results and feed them back for improved design and implementation of interventions?
- How can the forms of results reporting from MSB to Sida be further developed and improved?

Coordination

The study will also look at how Sida and MSB work with other partners (UN agencies, ECHO, ICRC, NGOs etc) in terms of coordination. This will include the work by MSB on cluster coordination. How, in what areas and situations can MSB's work on coordination be further developed? What are MSB's comparative advantage, strengths, and expertise on coordination in relation to UN agencies and NGOs? Where and how is MSB best fit to work on coordination? How is MSB contributing to the overall humanitarian system reforms?

Gender and environment

Finally, the study will examine MSB's approach to gender and environment.¹⁰⁰ What is MSB's competence and expertise within these areas? How is MSB working with its partners (UN agencies) in these areas? How can this work be further improved?

5. Analytical approach

The study will employ a participatory approach aiming to facilitate as well as to analyse and investigate. It will include a combination of data collection methods, including: document review, stakeholder analysis, semi-structured key informant interviews and focus group discussions, data/quantitative analysis (on financial allocations by type of interventions, partners, geography etc.). All data, quantitative and qualitative, will be disaggregated by gender and age, where possible. Survey work may also be undertaken, if applicable.

A multiple case study design will be applied. Partner and country case studies will form an integral part of the study in order to obtain relevant information and generate findings, as well as to develop lessons and recommendations jointly with key stakeholders.

¹⁰⁰ As a starting point looking at: 'Inriktning för arbetet med jämställdhet och mångfald för ökad kvalitet och effektivitet i insatsverksamheten 2011 – 2015' (MSB 2011) and 'Inriktning för arbetet med miljöintegrering för ökad kvalitet och effektivitet i insatsverksamheten 2011 – 2015' (MSB 2011).

The study team should provide an independent assessment where conclusions will be based on evidence gathered from different sources of data and information, including documentation and data analysis, stakeholders, and direct observation and interaction.

Stages of the study

Design, planning and stakeholder analysis

The inception stage should include discussions with key users of the study in order to further develop the focus, issues and questions for the study. During this stage initial contacts with country stakeholders and relevant partners (UN agencies) will be made through short inception visits (2-3 days) to relevant case study countries, as well as partners (UN agencies) based in Geneva, Rome and New York, if necessary.

The study team should apply a utilization focused approach involving key users of the study, as well as develop a plan and schedule for involving them in group discussions on issues relevant to the study. This should also include a plan on how to provide feedback on the study findings to stakeholders that participated in the study process.

A stakeholder analysis should be conducted during the inception stage. Key stakeholders to involve are responsible Sida and MSB operational staff and managers. In addition, it is important to involve relevant staff from the MFA, the MOD, UN agencies and other partners (ECHO, other donors, NGOs etc) throughout the study process. Where possible, the study should also seek to engage with local or national authorities and find suitable ways to involve end-beneficiaries when conducting the country case studies.

During the inception stage, the team should develop a full analytical framework and present an outline of the report format and content for the partner and country case studies, as well as the synthesis report. The Inception Report should further include an assessment on the suitability of desk based studies on a number of relevant issues for the study.

An Inception Report will be prepared for review and approval by the Management Group. It must include:

- a full analytical framework including study questions and assessment criteria /indicators, data sources, lines of enquiry and analytical methods
- a stakeholder analysis
- an approach to a structured document review
- an outline of the report format and content for the case study reports and synthesis report
- an assessment of the need and feasibility of supplementary desk based studies
- a work-plan that includes a schedule for deliverables and a fieldwork activity schedule
- a schedule with a number of group discussions on relevant issues for the study
- a resource allocation framework, including details on inputs and responsibilities for each study team member

The study team should provide an in-depth briefing on the Inception Report to the Management Group (see below) for review and agreement.

While the study is not an evaluation as such, where appropriate, the OECD/DAC quality standards for evaluation will be used as a reference for quality assurance of study products. The study team will be required to address issues arising from the inception review before proceeding with the next stage to ensure there is common understanding and agreement on the way forward.

Document review, data collection and analysis

A structured document review should be undertaken to compile and assess existing relevant policy, strategy, and project documentation as well as reviews and evaluations to ensure that existing findings and lessons are taken into account. The structured document review should also aim to answer specific questions to inform the analytical framework and process (to be developed in the Inception Report, see above).

Sida and MSB are expected to facilitate access to relevant documentation, including: policies, strategies, guidelines, data on financial allocations, assessment memos, applications for funding, quarterly and annual reports, end of project reports, project /programme specific evaluations/ reviews etc. Partners (UN agencies) will also facilitate access to data and documentation, when relevant.

It is expected the project/programme specific reviews/evaluations that have been undertaken by Sida, MSB and/or partners will be made available to the study team.

Quantitative data (type of interventions, partners, geographic allocations etc.) will also be collected and analysed by the study team. Data will be disaggregated by gender and age, where possible.

Key informant interviews and group discussions

Consultations with stakeholders and key informants are expected to be undertaken in Sweden (MFA, MOD, MSB, Sida), Brussels (ECHO), Geneva, Rome and New York (UN agencies), and a selected number of other countries. Telephone interviews as well as surveys should be considered in order to reach as many stakeholders as possible.

The study should be process oriented and the team must therefore seek to organise a number of group discussions on relevant issues throughout the study process. These should include relevant staff from MFA, MOD, MSB and Sida. When conducting the partner and country case studies, similar discussions will need to be conducted with partners (UN agencies), national and local authorities, NGOs as well as end beneficiaries (including women, girls, boys and men), when possible and relevant.

Partner and country case studies

A case study approach should be applied to the study. This will include:

- a selection of two country case studies reflecting different types of humanitarian crises: natural disasters (floods, droughts, earthquakes etc) and/or man-made disasters / complex emergencies (conflicts), interlinked/ simultaneous crises.
- a selection of three partner case studies looking more specifically at MSB's role (added value, comparative advantage, expertise, capacity, working relationship with partner). These can for instance include: IOM, OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNMACC.

When selecting country and partner case studies, one should take into account levels of support and type of interventions. A sample of interventions will be selected and examined in greater detail covering topics such as rapid humanitarian responses, mine action, DRR, and early recovery. These should highlight results as well as lessons learned.

The conduct of the partner and country case studies will be the primary responsibility of the study team who should manage the process in a participatory manner involving relevant key stakeholders.

It is expected that field visits for the country case studies will consist of at least two weeks of field work in country. At the end of fieldwork, a de-briefing will be provided in the field and to the Management Group in Stockholm.

The study team is expected to develop further and present its full approach to the partner and country case studies in the Inception Report (see above). This should take into account availabilities, practicalities, time and resources.

Additional sources of data and evidence

Where appropriate, desk based studies on particular issues (for instance, results frameworks and reporting formats, needs assessments, options for development of the framework agreement) will be undertaken. The need for this will be determined during the inception stage (see above).

Reporting and communication of study findings

Written reports should be developed for each partner and country case study as well as a synthesis report (see below). These should be based on the analytical framework and include conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations. The reports should be easy to read and present findings, lessons, and recommendations in a clear and effective way.

Lessons and recommendations should be developed jointly with key stakeholders through a structured and participatory approach that the study team will facilitate. Recommendations should be practical and operational.

Preliminary conclusions and recommendations should be presented to stakeholders for comment. While the study team presents their independent assessment, if there are fundamental differences of opinion between the study team and stakeholders, these may be annexed as written comments in the synthesis report.

Sida is expected to develop a management response to the study noting actions to be taken as a response to the recommendations contained therein, including the rationale for proposed actions, and any disagreement with conclusions and recommendations.

6. Management and coordination

A selected number of Sida and MSB staff will lead and manage the study on behalf of the Management Group that will select and commission the study team, manage all administrative and financial elements of contracting as well as oversee technical inputs, reporting, quality assurance, approval of reports and other study products, and publication of the study.

Strategic guidance for the operation of the study will be provided by the Management Group, and the study team will be expected to have an effective relationship with all the representatives of the Management Group. The study team will be responsible for progress reporting and implementation of the study to the Management Group by providing briefings as required. One week after contract start the study team will meet with the Management Group for a ‘kick off’ meeting.

Regular meetings will be organised where the Management Group will receive updates from the study team and provide inputs into the study at key stages of the study process.

The Management Group will submit consolidated comments on draft reports and other products of the study within five working days after reception from the study team.

Even though MFA and MOD staff will not be part of the Management Group as such, their input and comment on draft reports and other products of the study, will be requested where appropriate.

For further information on the role and responsibilities of the Management Group, see Annex A.

7. Expected outputs and timing

The study will need to be concluded by September 2012 in order to feed into relevant decision making processes. It is however expected that a number of reports and products will be submitted during the study process.

The study team will be selected and contracted to start work during the week commencing 5 March 2012.

The study process will include:

- Two country inception visits during the inception stage (2-3 days per country)
- Inception visits to Brussels, Geneva, Rome and New York (1–2 days per location)
- Two field work country visits (at least two weeks per country)
- Field work visits to Brussels, Geneva, Rome and New York (5 days per location)

Key stages and dates for the study are as follows:

- Inception Report submitted for comment – 16 April 2012
- Emerging Findings and Progress Report – end June 2012 (to contribute to a workshop with key stakeholders)
- All draft country and partner reports to be completed and submitted for comment - end July 2012
- Draft Synthesis Report submitted for comment – end August 2012
- Final Synthesis Report – end September 2012

During the inception stage, the methodology and approach to the study will be fully developed and the study team will produce an Inception Report for review and approval by the Management Group. This report will be submitted to the Management Group no later than 16 April 2012. The Management Group will facilitate consolidated comments (within 7 working days) to the study team and organise an inception meeting with the study team in end April 2012.

The study team will work against the deadlines set out in these Terms of Reference and the timeliness of the delivery of reports is of importance. Any changes to these deliverables, for instance, issues arising during the inception stage must be agreed with the Management Group. Team composition and timelines will be agreed prior to commencement of each of the country studies, including any follow up visit to the country if major issues remain unresolved.

Other key products of the study include:

Partner and Country Case Study Reports - for each of the case studies the main body of the report will be between 10-15 pages, excluding annexes.

Following the completion of the partner and country case studies and review by the Management Group, the study team will present a Synthesis Report to be discussed further at a workshop aimed at facilitating joint reflection on the findings, conclusions, lessons and recommendations contained therein. The Synthesis Report shall be no more than 40 pages, excluding annexes.

Annexes to the report should give more detailed information, including on the context, results, and methods used in the study (questionnaire / checklist and material from the focus group discussions etc.).

It is the responsibility of the study team to ensure that the report is professionally edited (checked for grammar and syntax, typos, formatting, consistency in presentation of data and references) and be of publishable quality. All reports will be screened for a gender sensitive language and terminology.

8. Team and qualifications

The study team will need to include experts in areas of relevance to the study, including expertise on humanitarian interventions, DRR, humanitarian mine action and early recovery. Moreover the study team must include experts on monitoring and evaluation as well as needs, risks and conflict analysis, gender, environment and climate change. Study team members must have field experience from working with UN agencies in humanitarian contexts. The study team members must moreover have strong facilitative skills and experience from conducting similar studies using participatory approaches. When conducting the country case studies, the study team will need to include national team members with specific country and context knowledge of the humanitarian crises and the local and authorities of the countries under review.

9. Budget and inputs

The total budget (fees and reimbursables) for the study should not exceed SEK1,200,000.

The study will include one Team Leader and 3-4 experts and one junior research assistant, as a core team. Additional experts on particular issues may be included in the team when needed as well as national experts for the country case studies. In addition, the study team will work closely with one Sida and MSB staff resource person.

Annex A: Management Group

The Management Group will combine an advisory and executive function and take key decisions at set milestones in the study process. It will include representatives from Sida and MSB, and be responsible for the day to day management of the study, including contracting of the study team, quality assurance, and approval of study reports and products.

The basic principles for the Management Group structure are to:

- Safeguard the credibility and quality of the study process
- Ensure an efficient study process (within time and budget)
- Ensure appropriate involvement and cooperation of main stakeholders
- Ensure that the study team access the needed information and stakeholders
- Ensure that the results of the study process are disseminated and followed up on.

The Management Group will consider the study findings and help to ensure that stakeholders are appropriately consulted throughout the study process. In this respect, the Management Group will help the study team to access key stakeholders, and ensure that stakeholder views are adequately taken on board in terms of study findings and recommendations.

The day-to-day management (including oversee and approve invoices) of the study team will be assumed by the responsible officer at Sida (as the funding organisation of the study). The chair of the Management Group will circulate study reports and products for comment, organise Management Group meetings and – in consultation with the full Management Group – arrange for approval of study reports and products submitted.

The independence of the study process is central to its credibility. The Management Group will provide critical inputs to the study team, but it is of high importance that its independence is respected. The Management Group can, however, question and comment on study drafts and findings on the grounds of inadequate rigour, factual errors, interpretation of findings, and/or failure to substantiate judgements.

As the study team will work closely with resource persons from both Sida and MSB, the Management Group will in consultation with the study team discuss if and when situations of conflict of interest may arise and how these should be managed.

No substantive decision will be taken without consent of the full Management Group. The duration of the Management Group's mandate runs until the completion of the study and submission and approval of the final study report.

Members of the Management Group

Sida	Per Byman Katarina Kotoglou Minna Örneus
MSB	Johanna Gårdmark Britta Ramberg David Sundström

Annex 2 – Inception Report

2012-04-27

1. Introduction

The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB)¹⁰¹ is the country's national authority committed to enhancing and supporting societal capacities for preparedness for, and the prevention of, emergencies and crises. In addition to its civil responsibilities, MSB contributes to emergency response at an international level in cooperation with various partners. MSB's international operations can be of very different types, from emergency search and rescue operations following an earthquake to long-term projects aimed at strengthening a country's capacity for handling its own future disasters. The bulk of MSB operations are nevertheless concentrated on secondments of professional staff to standby partners to provide timely short-term support to enhance partner capacities.

MSB is an authority under the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) is an authority under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA). Sida administers approximately half of Sweden's budget for development aid, allocated according to three thematic priorities; democracy and human rights, the environment and climate change and gender equality and women's role, with individuals being a primary focus of their assistance. Sida's humanitarian efforts are guided by certain principles, including:

- Considering environmental and climatic aspects
- Co-operating with local authorities and organisations to increase the chance of having an impact in the longer term
- Strengthening the humanitarian principles through information and debate surrounding the Geneva Convention and other civil rights principles
- Reducing the gap between humanitarian support and reconstruction

Both MSB and Sida are governed by relevant government guidelines that describe how the authorities should perform their work as well as the annual Letter of Appropriation that sets out the objectives and funding allocations for each authority. Cooperation between Sida and MSB is formalised in the Government's 'Policy for Sweden's Humanitarian Assistance 2010 – 2016' (hereafter referred to as the "Policy") and the 'Strategy for humanitarian assistance provided through Sida 2011 – 2014'.

¹⁰¹ (Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap in Swedish) (MSB)

This Policy applies to both Sida and MSB, with provision of humanitarian personnel and material supplies being primarily the responsibility of MSB, while the primary role of Sida is to provide funding. However, while the Strategy for Humanitarian Assistance defines Sida's responsibilities, MSB lacks a comparable strategy that defines their own role in the same way, although production of a similar document is currently being considered.

The Government's Strategy for Sida's Humanitarian Assistance defines Sida's relation to MSB as financing their international operations; mainly those requested by UN humanitarian agencies, but also other operations where the unique expertise of the MSB is needed and its assistance required internationally. In addition, MSB organises joint training with their partners and has developed guidelines for certain areas relevant to its international operations, for instance gender¹⁰² and environment¹⁰³, and in collaboration with Sida, disaster risk reduction (DRR) guidelines.¹⁰⁴

2. Purpose, Use, Scope, Timeframe & Target Audience

2.1 Purpose & Use

The primary objective of this review is to provide Sida and MSB staff and managers with lessons on how to best support and implement MSB's international operations.

This review will also attempt to:

- Assist in the prioritisation of activity including role, comparative advantage, capacity, and expertise of MSB in its cooperation with partners.
- Help improve cooperation between Sida and MSB and the effectiveness of international operations funded by Sida.
- Improve the monitoring, evaluation and reporting on results of Sida-funded international operations.

This review will be focused on generating actionable recommendations which will help MSB and Sida bring about appropriate changes in its systems that bear directly on MSB's performance during an emergency response. How can their accountability, internal systems, structures and procedures be reviewed and strengthened, and appropriate leadership skills and organisational culture nurtured and reinforced, in the light of lessons learned?

2.2 Scope

Although MSB also has a substantial domestic programme, this study will only focus on their international operations, which can be categorised as follows:

¹⁰² 'Inriktning för arbetet med jämställdhet och mångfald för ökad kvalitet och effektivitet i insatsverksamheten 2011 – 2015' (MSB 2011).

¹⁰³ 'Inriktning för arbetet med miljöintegrering för ökad kvalitet och effektivitet i insatsverksamheten 2011 – 2015' (MSB 2011).

¹⁰⁴ 'Överenskommelse gällande samarbete mellan Sida och MSB kring katastrofriskreducerande insatser' (Sida and MSB, no date).

- Humanitarian interventions: secondments of experts, search and rescue, shelter, base camps, transport and logistics, health care, water sanitation and hygiene.
- Civilian mine action: rapid response plans for mine action, mine risk education, secondments of experts (for instance, on information management systems for mine action).
- DRR: risk analysis, support to national and local authorities on DRR (policies, strategies, planning etc), early warning systems, support to local search and rescue capacity.
- Early recovery from disasters and crises.

The review will examine cooperation between Sida and MSB, with a specific focus on international operations funded by Sida to assess MSB's role, comparative advantage, expertise, capacity, cost effectiveness and cooperation with its key partners (UN agencies, ECHO, ICRC etc).

2.3 Timeframe

While Sida has provided support to MSB since 2001, this review will mainly be confined to the intervening period since 2006 when cooperation was expanded to also cover DRR and early recovery. Another chronological milestone that will be included in this analysis is the merger in 2009 when the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency was established, replacing the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA), the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) and the Swedish National Board of Psychological Defence.

2.4 Target Audience & Stakeholder Analysis

The primary intended users of the results of this review are Sida and MSB staff and managers. Secondary users of the study are concerned staff at the MFA, MOD and partner agencies.

<i>Stakeholder</i>	<i>Assumed interest in MSB</i>	<i>Assumed interest in the Review</i>
<i>Sida</i>	MSB is a recipient of Sida funding and a key component/tool of Sida's humanitarian assistance strategy	One of two primary stakeholders for this review. Interested in learning emerging from this review at both a strategic and operational level.
<i>MSB (HQ & field)</i>	MSB deployments and activities.	One of two primary stakeholders for this review. Interested in the review for learning and improving the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of MSB international operations.
<i>MSB Partners</i>	Benefit from MSB international operations.	Review provides a learning opportunity that could help improve their collaboration with MSB.
<i>MOD</i>	Oversight responsibility for MSB.	Performance assessment, learning and accountability. Add to learning about MSB international operations and its links with Sida's humanitarian assistance strategy.

<i>Stakeholder</i>	<i>Assumed interest in MSB</i>	<i>Assumed interest in the Review</i>
<i>MFA</i>	MSB's international role.	Add to learning about MSB international operations and its links with Sida's humanitarian assistance strategy.
<i>Swedish Civil Society</i>	Interested in better understanding MSB's international role and how to improve collaboration.	This review will help to clarify MSB international contributions, notably in "newer" activity categories such as DRR and identify areas where collaboration might be strengthened.
<i>Disaster-affected or disaster-prone communities</i>	Although these are the ultimate beneficiaries of MSB/Sida assistance, this group of stakeholders have relatively little knowledge of MSB as an entity.	This review should help facilitate the work of MSB partners (and the implementing partners of MSB partners) to improve the quality and accountability of their assistance to this stakeholder.

3. History & Background of MSB

The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency was established in January 2009, replacing the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA), the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) and the Swedish National Board of Psychological Defense. Operations prior to 2009 were run by one of these three agencies. The task that MSB has set out for itself is to enhance and support capacities to prepare for and prevent emergencies and crises. During a crisis, MSB interventions aim to support stakeholders in mitigating the impact of the crisis.

MSB's identity is defined by its "*vision, concept and cornerstone*":

- **Vision:** A safer society in a changing world.
- **Concept:** In collaboration with other stakeholders the MSB develops the individual's and society's capacity to prevent, deal with and learn from emergencies and disasters. We operate via knowledge-building, support, education, training, regulation, supervision and our own operational work in close cooperation with the municipalities, the county councils, other authorities, the private sector, and organisations to achieve increased safety and security at all levels of society – from the local to the global community.
- **Cornerstone:** MSB is an open, competent, and energetic authority, focusing both on the individual and on society as a whole.

The structure of the Swedish government can be characterised as a collection of relatively small Ministries and implementing agencies with policy functions which have varying degrees of autonomy. With the exception of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance, which between them employ thousands of staff, Ministries typically do not employ more than 200 persons. Agencies similarly vary in size and autonomy and MSB, with a staff numbering around 850, is one of the larger agencies. MSB's governance structure does not include a Board, as some agencies like Sida does, but instead MSB has a Council appointed by the Government to advise its Director General. MSB's predominant domestic role in Sweden is to coordinate and


they avoid taking over responsibilities from designated actors during an emergency, which are led by concerned local authorities.

4. MSB Funding Profile

The total amount of international humanitarian aid provided through Sida from 2008 to 2010 was estimated at SEK 7.5 billion, and at SEK 2.27 billion for 2010.¹⁰⁵ Over 50 per cent of Sida's humanitarian contribution goes to various UN organizations with another quarter being channelled through the International Red Cross Committee and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies via the Swedish Red Cross.

Figure 1 below illustrates how funds were divided between different recipient agencies during 1995 – 2007. While MSB is a relatively minor direct recipient of Sida funding, Sida is by far the largest source of funds for MSB. According to MSB's website, Sida funding to MSB during 2009 amounted 140 MSEK, of which 135 MSEK was eventually disbursed. In 2010 MSB received 150 MSEK from Sida and in 2011 the MSB budget amounted to some 160 MSEK.

Figure 1: Sida Fund Flows 1995 – 2007¹⁰⁶



¹⁰⁵ <http://www.sida.se/English/About-us/our-fields-of-work/Human-security1/Humanitarian-aid/> (accessed April 12, 2012)

¹⁰⁶ This graph will be updated with more recent figures in the final synthesis report. These data are taken from the 2010 Evaluation of Sida's Humanitarian Assistance.


According to MSB letter of appropriation, MSB can use up to 115 million SEK of its administrative budget to finance standby-capacity and indirect costs to enable MSB to carry out international activities which, according to OECD /DAC guidelines, can be classified as development assistance. Funding for projects is additional to this amount and comes from various external sources including Sida, DFID, the European Union and partner agencies such as ICRC. Funds are managed by MOD/MSB's administration and, for projects, by MSB in accordance with agreements with the financing organization. There are regular meetings between MSB, MOD and MFA, but MFA is not involved in detailed management of the core funding (115 MSEK) allocated to MSB for international operations.

5. Overview of MSB International Operations

5.1 MSB International Operations

MSB categorise their activities in slightly different ways, partly because of the way the partners define them. In general, however, MSB activities fall into four main categories of interventions primarily implemented through secondments to standby partners. The major activity is humanitarian intervention, followed by humanitarian mine action, DRR and finally early recovery. DRR activities were usually referred to as capacity building in the reports during 2007-2008. “*Search and rescue*” and “*civil conflict handling*” are also mentioned as activity categories, although these activities are not financed by Sida, but from other sources.

Figure 2: MSB interventions by activity 2007-2011 (SEK millions)



Examples of specific contributions by MSB include the following:

- Construction & management of base camp (accommodation / office for partner staff)
- Needs assessment
- Housing / shelter
- Construction Engineer
- Evacuation
- Humanitarian specialists
- Information and communication work
- Munitions/mine action¹⁰⁷
- Risk analysis and mitigation
- Liaison, IT, Electricians
- Security work
- Search and rescue
- Early recovery (e.g. disaster waste disposal)
- Transport, Vehicles, Logistics, bridges
- Water, sanitation, hygiene, environment

5.2 MSB Standby Partners

MSB has signed stand by-partner agreements with several organisations, mainly UN agencies, intended to strengthen their preparedness and capacity to be able to assist with rapid response in emergency situations. These agreements clarify the roles and responsibilities between the MSB and the standby partner and include specific regulations, including timeframes for deployment, security regulations, staffing procedures, status of seconded SBP staff, administration and finances, leave entitlements and rest and recuperation, liability, insurances etc.

WFP, OCHA, UNICEF and UNHCR have agreements with between 10-20 standby partners in total, including governmental agencies (like MSB), international NGOs such as the Danish Refugee Council, RedR Australia and Norwegian Refugee Council and also private sector entities like Ericsson Response and Veolia. The purpose of standby partnerships is to provide staff specialised in specific technical areas at short notice, not as a substitute for regular staffing arrangements, but rather a short-term means to support and augment existing resources due to:

- Time constraints (The UN or other agency lacks the resources and availability to meet the immediate requirements)
- Surge capacity (Insufficient in-house capacity to respond to operational requirements)
- Technical expertise (Existing skills or resources are inadequate to respond to the assignment and/or emergency)
- Temporary support (The services are limited in time, normally 3-6 months up to 12 months.)

¹⁰⁷ Humanitarian mine action has been specified in government instructions as a specific MSB activity, and is part of their humanitarian intervention portfolio.

In addition to staff, standby partners can also provide supplies and equipment, including base camps, shelter, trucks, mine action equipment, Information & Communications Technology (ICT), etc.

5.3 Approval Process for MSB International Operations funded through Sida's Framework Agreement

While processes can vary depending on the context, decision-making is typically as follows:

1. MSB partner submits a proposal to MSB (often following informal consultations with the partner, particularly on more long term or complex requests).
2. MSB checks whether within their mandate, they have required capacity, funding availability.
3. MSB decides whether or not to proceed further.
4. If MSB decides to go ahead, forward request to Sida.¹⁰⁸
5. If OK is received from Sida, the Swedish Government (MoD) is informed of MSB intended activities in accordance with MSB's letter of instruction.
6. MoD informs MFA.
7. MFA signals "no objection" to MoD.
8. MoD signals "no objection" to MSB
9. MSB proceeds with implementation.

6. Comparative Studies with other Agencies

6.1 Other Standby Partners in the Region

There are several agencies in the Nordic region that offer comparable standby partner services to MSB, including such as Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) in Norway, Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) and Danish Refugee Council (DRC) in Denmark, and Crisis Management Centre (CMC) in Finland. The mandate of all the organisations is similar; to strengthen relief agencies' operational capacities and to enhance the efficiency of international emergency relief efforts in all stages of a crisis.

However, while NRC and DRC are NGOs and emphasise their impartiality during their humanitarian operations, MSB and DEMA are both government agencies and the decision regarding whether they will be deployed internationally is made at the level of the MoD of their respective countries. NOREPS is a partnership between the Norwegian MFA, the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, the

¹⁰⁸ Sida has committed to giving MSB a "Yes/No" response within 24 hours after proposal is received. A Sida program officer can make the decision if the proposal is less than 5 MSEK. For larger proposals up to 15 MSEK, a Sida manager must approve. If the request exceeds 15 MSEK or the intervention is expected to last more than 1 year, an "expanded" request is required.

Norwegian Red Cross, major Norwegian NGOs and selected Norwegian private suppliers of relief goods.

While DRC and NRC are specialised in personnel secondment only, MSB, DEMA and NOREPS also offer goods and services (and sometimes donations of material or equipment). However, even for the latter three the provision of personnel is the largest component of their operations, followed by material supplies.

6.2 European Union Civil Protection Mechanism

The NGO network VOICE has recently highlighted the increased use of civil protection to respond to disasters in non-EU countries during the past 4-6 years, a trend which is expected to continue to increase. Intergovernmental co-operation has been strengthened by the adoption of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, which increases the possibility of using national rescue services for international operations within and outside Europe.

A recent evaluation of the Mechanism found that *‘Sweden and France have had the highest number of experts deployed followed by Denmark and Germany’*.¹⁰⁹ MSB is the agency that represents Sweden on issues connected to civil protection and serious emergencies in the EU.

6.3 MSB and the International Humanitarian Partnership

MSB is also a member of the International Humanitarian Partnership (IHP). The IHP was created in 1995 as an informal cooperation between the UK’s Overseas Development Administration, the (then) Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA), and DEMA. The original objective of IHP was to support UN deployment in sudden-onset emergencies but the partnership today also provides goods and services to other multilateral organisations.

OCHA runs a secretariat for IHP in Geneva and there are no binding commitments between the members. SRSA was previously the most active member of the IHP and was involved in every IHP deployment in between 2001 and 2007.¹¹⁰

7. Assessment of Scope

The review team held preliminary discussions with a total of 16 staff from MSB, Sida, MFA, and MOD including two separate discussions with the MSB/Sida Management Group for this review. Similar discussions were also held in Geneva with two representatives from ICRC and another two from UNHCR.

The review team has so far reviewed almost 100 documents, most of which were made available to them by the Management Group for this review. Among those

¹⁰⁹ Evaluation of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/evaluation/thematic_en.htm#cp, p.20

¹¹⁰ www.ihp.nu, accessed on April 10, 2012

documents which have been particularly useful in providing guidance to the team (along with the preliminary discussions and interviews) were:

1. Policy for Sweden's Humanitarian Assistance 2010 – 2016
2. Sida's Humanitarian Assistance Strategy
3. 2010 Evaluation of Sida's and management responses
4. 2011 Evaluation of Secondments from MSB
5. MSB's Action Plan in Response to the Mid-Term Review of MSBs Demining Activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo 2007 – 2009
6. Bilaga 5 till Anvisningar för verksamhetsplanering på Avdelningen för samordning och insats (SI) inför 2012 (dnr 2011-4612) Inriktning för MSB:s insatsverksamhet 2012
7. MSB quarterly reports
8. Målbild för SI på 5 års sikt
9. Sida assessments prior to decision
10. 2010 European Commission evaluation of the Civil Protection Mechanism and the CP Financial Instrument 2007-2009.
11. 2008 Evaluation of the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS)

Based on all of these sources, the review team has been able to identify the areas that realistically can be focused in this review and developed a detailed methodology taking into account what was already proposed in the TOR, and this is described in the following sections.

8. Review of Scope

8.1 Key issues emerging from the scoping exercise

- *Difficulty in attribution of MSB-specific contributions* – based on an analysis of eight MSB secondments to UN partners, a 2011 evaluation¹¹¹ found these deployments had contributed greatly and successfully, with some secondees playing key roles within substantial operations. However, it was not possible to tell what the precise contributions to overall UN operations have been of some of the secondees, as the secondees' work is not specifically reported upon. This was confirmed during initial discussions with partners and seems to be due, on one hand, to the fact that MSB staff are embedded in existing

¹¹¹ 2011 Evaluation of Secondments from MSB

operations¹¹² and reporting is on the operation as a whole and, on the other, to an incomplete performance appraisal system for seconded staff¹¹³.

- *Links between the performance of MSB and its Partners and Sida's humanitarian assistance strategy* – partners are critical to the success of the MSB system as they determine whether and how MSB products and services are used. This is particularly true of secondments and to a lesser extent for more project-based DRR interventions such as capacity building for national civil protection agencies. The review team will concentrate on client perceptions of MSB performance over time for different types of operations and the links to Sida's humanitarian assistance strategy. While some MSB roles appear to have links with the Sida strategy, as with any support-type of role, there is a question of how MSB is facilitating partner efforts to improve participation with affected populations.¹¹⁴
- *Communication Strategy and Reporting*– some stakeholders in both the Swedish government and in civil society feel that they do not receive sufficient information about MSB decision-making processes, activities, challenges and achievements¹¹⁵. MSB's increased involvement in, for example, longer-term capacity building efforts in DRR is seen by many as a positive development¹¹⁶, but at the same time it has raised additional questions as to what extent these MSB activities are actually aligned with Sweden's international development assistance. The 2011 Evaluation of MSB
- *MSB's structural link with MOD and modus operandi is perceived by some stakeholders as insulating the agency from Swedish foreign aid priorities* – this, along with the attribution and performance reporting issues raised above, has led to question marks about the extent that MSB's activities are supporting these priorities.
- *Most of MSB's UN partners have lead coordination roles* - UN partners of MSB are either cluster lead agencies or have other types of coordination roles (e.g. UNHCR for refugees). The review team will examine the interaction of the cluster coordination system and the supply of goods and services by MSB.

¹¹² This seems to be particularly true with ICRC, where MSB secondees are expected to integrate fully into their structure and operations so as to not compromise their neutral status.

¹¹³ Preliminary interviews with partners indicated that performance appraisals when seconded are sometimes done, but not consistently. ICRC performance appraisal system does not currently include partners.

¹¹⁴ Goal 7 in Sida's Strategy for humanitarian assistance for 2011–2014

¹¹⁵ Quality of reporting has been a source of continuing tension between MSB, Sida and MFA as highlighted by the 2011 Evaluation of MSB that found that "...it is not always possible for MSB to have the information which the Swedish Government requires MSB to have when making decisions whether to second experts..." (page 27)

¹¹⁶ The fifth recommendation in the 2010 Evaluation of Sida's Humanitarian Assistance was that "...Sida should consider increasing its support for MSB's disaster preparedness work..."

- *The functioning of MSB within the international humanitarian system is at times more like an NGO than civil protection agencies in other countries* – the comparative research component of this review will thus not only include other comparable national civil protection agencies, but also standby partners for UN agencies which are international NGOs, such as DRC and NRC.
- *The collaboration between MSB and Sida is perceived as cumbersome by some. It lacks strategic focus, clear links to policy and documentation structures/systems allowing simple/practical overview.* There seems to be a genuine will to find new ways of collaborating based on a joint understanding of priorities. This could be reflected in a redesigned system for the “project cycle”, from screening of requests to reporting and evaluation.
- *The decision making processes between MSB and Sida*, are not differentiated to take into account the wide range of assignments undertaken by MSB, spanning from secondments to more complex and long term tasks such as DRR and early recovery.
- *MSB approval processes are seen as relatively process-heavy and inefficient* – this was an issue that came up in separate interviews with MSB, Sida and partners (who also provided examples of resulting negative effects). There is no clear “ownership” for the process as a whole. As a consequence, no single actor can affect overall process effectiveness – everyone is dependent on everyone else. This has consequences for accountability.

8.2 Issues the review needs to take into account

External Issues

- Changing nature of global humanitarian context (e.g. enhanced national capacities, “new” humanitarian actors, shrinking humanitarian space for international actors).
- Evolution of UN-led humanitarian reform.

Internal (Swedish Government) Issues

- MSB’s restructuring in 2009¹¹⁷, which has introduced new ways of working and procedures that have affected the relationship between Sida and MSB.
- Variance in institutional priorities, processes and structures of MSB, Sida, MFA and MOD.

¹¹⁷ MSB was founded on 1 January 2009 as a result of a merger between three agencies: the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA), the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) and the Swedish National Board of Psychological Defence. Operations run before 2009 were run by one of these three agencies.

- There is increasing pressure on MSB to demonstrate results and value-for-money, especially given the relatively large core funding allocation. Similarly, what are the implications for MSB’s operations stemming from Sida’s increased focus on a results agenda?

8.3 Ongoing institutional processes to be included

- The development of a proposal for a MSB strategy is currently in process. During initial discussions with the Management Group, it was made clear that the current review is expected to be a key reference when designing the strategy.

9. Key questions for the review

9.1 General Context

- What are key trends in the humanitarian landscape that are likely to affect MSB operations during the next five years?
- How has the relationship between MSB and Sida evolved over the past five years? Is this likely to change in future and, if so, how and why?

9.2 Relevance

- What is the degree of coherence between MSB’s international operations and Sida’s strategy objectives and goals for humanitarian assistance? How do MSB roles support implementation of Sida’s humanitarian assistance strategy?
- How does MSB select their partners? How do partner selection criteria link with Sida’s humanitarian assistance strategy? With their “new” roles in DRR and early recovery? How does MSB review/renew their partnerships? Are there other types of potential partnerships that MSB should be pursuing?
- What is MSB’s approach, role, comparative advantage, expertise and capacity in relation to UN agencies, NGOs, the Red Cross/Red Crescent, local/national authorities and/or the private sector with respect to:
 - Humanitarian interventions (disaggregated by category of intervention type)?
 - Humanitarian mine action?
 - DRR (including capacity building of local and national authorities)?
 - Early recovery (activities and material support for the transition between humanitarian assistance and more long term development cooperation)?
- Is there a common understanding between MSB, Sida, MoD and MFA regarding MSB’s comparative advantages, capacities and MSB’s role as a stand by partner, or if not, in what areas do opinions differ from each other?

- How does MSB conduct needs assessments? What sort of analysis (e.g. gender, conflict, risk, etc.) does MSB undertake for different categories of interventions and what is the source? How does such analysis impact on subsequent programming? Are these types of analysis in harmony with Sida policies and approaches?
- What recommendations should be made to MSB to improve the relevance of their interventions?

9.3 Effectiveness and efficiency

- What is the status and functioning of the annual agreements, MoUs and other partnership instruments between Sida, MSB and its partners?
- What forms of cooperation between MSB and Sida are proving to be effective and efficient?
- How efficiently (including cost-effectiveness) are financial and staff resources used to complement those of partners and help achieve the desired outcomes? How do MSB partners and peer agencies perceive MSB's value-added in different intervention types? Would cost-sharing arrangements with partners be feasible? How is core funding received by MSB utilized as compared to Sida project funding?
- What is MSB's value-added in relation to national capacities? How is MSB supporting national capacities?
- How does MSB's effectiveness and efficiency rate when compared with other agencies undertaking similar international operations interventions, such as national/international civil protection agencies, agencies such as NRC and DRC, and other comparable Swedish agencies with framework agreements with Sida¹¹⁸?
- What recommendations should be made to MSB to improve their effectiveness and efficiency? Can MSB transaction costs be reduced? For example, would it be better to have multi-year framework agreements and/or reporting at a thematic level?

9.4 Monitoring, evaluation and reporting on results

- What M&E systems and results-based monitoring systems does MSB use? What are their performance targets and measurement systems?

¹¹⁸ A cost-benefit analysis will be a part of this line of inquiry, although a comprehensive analysis is probably not feasible given the constraints described in the Methodology section.

Have these changed significantly over the past five years? What are Sida's expectations regarding MSB's reporting?

- How do MSB's monitoring and evaluation frameworks and approaches:
 - Link with and support the Swedish government's humanitarian policy, including the results agenda?
 - Link with and support their partners' own results-based/M&E frameworks?
 - Help MSB to measure and improve their performance and communicate results that have been achieved?
- Have there been any systematic attempts by MSB (or other agencies) to reflect on and capture the lessons learned by MSB? To what extent have these lessons been used to improve the design and implementation of MSB interventions? How has MSB contributed to and/or benefited from broader learning on humanitarian practice in the international system?
- What recommendations should be made to MSB to improve M&E and learning? How can MSB results reporting to Sida be further developed and improved? Can MSB further reinforce partner's M&E and learning systems?

9.5 Coordination

- How is MSB involved in coordination at a national (i.e. country) and at a global level?
- What formal and informal working procedures (including approval processes) and other forms of dialogue exist between MSB and its primary stakeholders (including Sida, MFA, MOD, UN agencies)? How are the decision-making protocols, reporting and monitoring functioning in practice?
- How are Sida and MSB working with other partners (UN agencies, ECHO, ICRC, NGOs, etc.) in terms of coordination, including MSB's involvement in cluster coordination?
- What are MSB's comparative advantages, strengths, and expertise on coordination in relation to UN agencies and NGOs?
- Is MSB contributing to the overall humanitarian system reforms and, if so, how?
- What recommendations should be made to MSB to enhance their coordination role?

9.6 Cross-cutting issues (gender, environment, etc.). How is MSB addressing cross-cutting issues in different types of interventions?

- How is MSB working with its partners (UN agencies) in gender? What is MSB's competence and value-added in areas relating to gender?


- How is MSB working with its partners (UN agencies) in environment? What is MSB's competence and added value in areas relating to the environment?
- How is MSB working with its partners (UN agencies) in conflict sensitivity? What is MSB's competence and added value in areas relating to conflict sensitivity?
- How is MSB working with its partners (UN agencies) to improve accountability to disaster-affected populations? What is MSB's competence and added value in areas relating to improved accountability to disaster-affected populations?
- Any other important cross cutting theme not covered by the above (e.g. human rights, older people, HIV/AIDs, etc.)?
- To what extent are MSB's approaches to cross cutting issues consistent with those of Sida and with broader lessons learnt over the past few years?
- What recommendations should be made to MSB to improve its approach to cross cutting issues?

9. Methodology

10.1 Approach

The methodology will be based on both inductive and deductive approaches using quantitative and qualitative data gathered from a selected range of sources as described below. To ensure data integrity and factual accuracy throughout the review process, the team will engage in a number of processes that will allow for adequate comparison and triangulation. Individual team members will be assigned focal point responsibilities for specific agencies and issues to ensure an adequate coverage of documentation, analysis, documentation on key issues emerging from interviews and focus-group discussion while also creating periodic opportunities for validation by key stakeholders.

Although evaluative methods will be employed to ensure an appropriate level of rigor and credibility, at the same time a specific emphasis will be given to maximising learning and utility for key stakeholders in MSB, Sida and MSB partners.



The review will draw on various sources to draw conclusions and identify relevant recommendations, as illustrated here...

The review will take the following steps in researching, data collection, triangulation, analysis, validation and reporting:

10. 2 Scoping and Planning

- Briefing and scoping: Two initial briefings with the Management Group for the Review (MSB and Sida staff).
- Preliminary document research: a comprehensive document review using both internal and external documents, correspondence, reports and relevant data, as well as policies and frameworks relevant to emergency response.
- Preliminary analysis of data gathered through the scoping process and preparation of this Inception Report, which will define the focus of this study following agreement by the Management.

10.3 Data Collection

- Semi-structured and structured interviews, focus group discussions with a range of key interviewees selected so as to obtain a representative range of stakeholder perspectives on MSB activities.
- Semi-structured and structured interviews, both face-to-face and by telephone, with a range of external agencies including cluster members, UN agencies, NGOs, partners, donors, international organisations, and governments.
- In-depth desk review of relevant documents.
- Appropriate comparisons with other agencies, including agencies with similar secondment agreements with UN agencies (e.g. DRC and NRC) and large NGOs who have signed framework agreements with Sida.
- Two country visits to the Democratic Republic of Congo and to Mozambique.

10.4 Data Analysis

- Data analysis and preliminary findings; establishment of time lines to identify key events and key decision-making points.
- Triangulation of findings to determine high, medium and low levels of convergence.
- Analytical workshop for review team.

10.5 Reporting and Validation of Findings and Recommendations

- Face-to-face meetings, including two workshops, with the Management Group for this Review and other stakeholders¹¹⁹ as part of the validation process and to maximise learning by stakeholders.
- To support learning and participation, main findings and observations from interviews with stakeholders in Sweden will be fed back in informal briefings and subsequently discussed at the Workshops. It should also be possible to organise debriefing sessions following the field missions.
- Preparation of the first draft of the report, to be revised based on feedback received in an initial rapid review by selected members of the Management Group.
- Review of the draft report by the Management Group and selected stakeholders.
- Presentation of the provisional findings and recommendations in a workshop involving Management Group members and other participants representing the various key stakeholder groups.
- Circulation of a second draft based on feedback on the first draft.
- Submission of final report.

10.6 Key methods, informants and sources of data

The data collection for this review will be mainly done through purposely selected key informant interviews (KIIs), document research, structured focus group discussions (including workshops) and observations during field visits as detailed out in Table 1 below. The review does not envisage any primary data collection at the level of disaster-affected communities. Any information gathered at this level will be anecdotal and will be triangulated with other data sources. Due to time and financial constraints, there will be a need to carefully select key informants for this review so as to provide a representative sample, with priority given to those stakeholders shown below.

- This being an internal learning review focusing on systemic issues, there is a need to ensure the participation of key directors and managers who were involved in managing/overseeing MSB and Sida's financing and activities.
- An adequate sample of MSB staff deployed covering the range of activities typically undertaken by MSB, with deployments with the three case study partners being prioritized so as to capture both a HQ and field-level perspective.
- Other Swedish government stakeholders (MFA, MOD).

¹¹⁹ Participants to be determined by the MSB/Sida Management Group

- Partner staff (notably those belonging to agencies selected for the three partner case studies) that have had substantive involvement at a HQ level and in the field (user of MSB services) level.
- Staff from comparable agencies (DRC, NRC, Swedish NGOs with Sida framework agreements).
- Other relevant stakeholders (ECHO, DFID).

10.7 Compensating for potential biases

During the orientation phase, any potential biases of review team members were raised so that they could be compensated for when planning interviews, conducting analysis, developing conclusions and recommendations. Two issues that surfaced are worth highlighting here. One of the review team members has worked for, worked with or alongside Sida, MFA, MOD and MSB, including at senior positions, before retiring after a long period of government service. The Team Leader has worked in the distant past¹²⁰ as a staff member for UNHCR, WFP and OCHA and was a periodic "user" of the SRSA during the 1990s.

10.8 Document research

Document research is being carried out in three stages by the review team. During the inception phase, documents received by the team were divided up among the team members for a quick scan of relevant materials, bearing in mind the questions and sub-questions in the TOR. Relevant information was extracted from documents, with details of relevant summary, findings, and document reference.

In the next stage, common issues highlighted in the preliminary documents review will be collated and placed in an evidence matrix to arrange the data according to lines of questioning. This will provide the evaluation team with the scope of issues identified. In the final stage, the scope of issues identified will be further categorised by overlaying the review framework. This will provide a sub-grouping of issues around the key review questions and sub-questions. Once this process is complete the written interview notes will undergo the same process. Any discrepancies between the findings of the document review and interview notes can then be identified at this time and reflected upon by the review team.

Frequencies of identified themes will be assessed using the evidence matrix. This will enable the significance and weight of the issue to be determined. Issues identified as potentially significant to conclusions will be correlated to the location and operational division from which these came. This will allow the review team to link people's perceptions of perceived success and hindering factors to specific areas in the organisation which will help in reducing bias.

¹²⁰ The Team Leader's last staff position with the UN was in 2000.

A further level of quality assurance is that each team member is assigned responsibility for specific themes in line with their individual area of expertise. This will ensure that specific technical issues are not overlooked.

10.9 Online Survey of Partners

During initial interviews with partner staff, there was a willingness expressed to facilitate an online survey of “users” of MSB services, i.e. provide partner staff at both a field and HQ level who benefited from MSB support to provide their feedback on perceived strengths and weaknesses.

10.10 Triangulation of data

Triangulation is a core principle in mixed-method data collection as it ensures that the results are linked up into a coherent and credible evidence base. This review will mainly rely on:

- Source triangulation. Review team members will compare information from different sources, i.e. at various management levels within different functional units (at HQ and in the field), MSB partners, and donors.
- Method triangulation. Team members will compare information collected by different methods, e.g. interviews, focus group discussion, document review.
- Researcher triangulation. Comparison and collation of information collected by different team members during the course of their research.
- Partner agency triangulation. Contrast and compare performance and value-added to different partner agencies.
- Comparator agency triangulation. Contrast and compare the operations, technical support and cost structures of selected agencies.
- Context triangulation. The review will triangulate findings from different country and operational contexts.

Data from each source can then be placed into the review framework to assist in identifying key findings, conclusions and results.

10.11 Timeframe for the Review¹²¹

Review step/process	Date (from-to)	Responsibility
Draft inception report submission	April 17, 2012	Review team members
Feedback on draft	April 23, 2012	Management Group
Inception briefing - Management Group	April 24, 2012	Review team members
Submission of final inception report	April 30, 2012	Review team

¹²¹ See also the attached workplan in the Annex

Review step/process	Date (from-to)	Responsibility
Telephone KII (those in locations which will not be visited)	May 1 – June 22	Introductions by Katrine and focal points in partners; interviews by review team
Sweden-based KII & FGD	May 1 – June 22	Bo & Björn
Draft questionnaire for field visits and online survey (if appropriate)	Week of May 7 th	Review team
New York-based partner KII & FGD	May 14-15	Jock
Geneva & Rome-based partner KII & FGD	May 23 - 30	Jock & Annina
Online survey designed and tested	May 10 th	Emilia
Preparation of Field Visits (DRC & Mozambique)	April 16 – May 11	MSB/Sida to appoint country-level focal point who will work with national consultant team member to prepare for visit.
Field Visit to DRC	May 4 – 15	Led by Björn, supported by national consultant and a member of the Management Group.
Field Visits to Mozambique	June 11 – 20	Led by Jock, supported by national consultant and the residence MSB Team Leader in Mozambique.
Submission of draft “Emerging Findings and Progress” paper (note this will <u>not</u> be a formal report, but rather in a format specifically designed as an input to the mid-term review workshop)	June 26 th	Review Team
Mid-term review workshop with Management and other selected key stakeholders	June 28 th	Hosted by Sida. MG group focal points organize with review team.
Submission of draft country and partner reports for circulation to stakeholders (including Management Group)	July 27 th	Review team
Submission of 1 st draft of Synthesis Report and revised draft country and partner reports	August 30 th	Review team
Comments on 1 st draft	Sept 6 th	Management Group
Stakeholder workshop for presentation, validation and planning for use of findings	Week of Sept 10 th	Hosted by Sida. MG group focal points organize with review team.
Submission of final report	Sept 27 th	Review team

10.12 Limitations of the review

The review team foresees the following limitations when undertaking this review:

- One of countries for the planned field visits, DRC, has an unpredictable security environment which may require plans to be altered at the last minute so it is proposed that contingency planning be done in the form of scenario-planning and the pre-selection of alternative sites in DRC and even, if feasible, making initial contacts with another country as a back-up.
- As previously highlighted in the proposal, the combination of funding and time constraints will not only limit the coverage of review but also have a bearing on how participatory a process this can be, given the transaction cost implications for both the stakeholders and the review team.
- This review focuses on internal systemic issues. It aims to provide credible findings on how MSB's internal systems and process supports Sweden's international humanitarian role, rather than to make definitive statements about the impact of its interventions in the way that a full-scale evaluation would have.
- Cost-effectiveness will be challenging to measure for two main reasons. Firstly, while costs of MSB inputs (e.g. staff, equipment) should be fairly easy to calculate, the results ("benefits") in the form of outcomes and impacts will be more difficult to measure for reasons mentioned above. Secondly, due to time constraints and difficulty in accessing relevant data, it will not be possible to conduct an in-depth comparative cost benefit analysis for similar agencies unless a) such an analysis has already been done and b) the agency is willing to provide this to the review team.

10.13 Potential risks for the review

In the past MSB has commissioned similar reviews and evaluations, but during initial discussions it was felt that these have not always been useful and there is a need to put more emphasis on learning from and using lessons. It may also be challenging to manage expectations of different stakeholders including, for example, about the quality and quantity of reporting about MSB activities.

11. Deliverables

The review will generate the following outputs:

- 1-2 drafts each of the Inception Report, Partner Case Studies, Country Reports and Draft Synthesis Report to the Management Group.
- The Management Group will consolidate all comments before forwarding to the study team.
- This inception report, outlining the review team's understanding of the review, a preliminary sense of the emerging issues or factors affecting MSB's involvement in international operations actions based on the scoping exercise, and its proposed action plan (methods, schedule and timeline) for conducting the main phase of the review.

- Two workshops for the management group and representatives from other key MSB stakeholder groups, a mid-term review at the end of June and another to review findings and conclusions in the draft synthesis report, partner case studies and country reports. Designated focal points in the Management Group will work with the review team in designing the workshop formats and developing presentation materials. As noted in the Proposal, the review team does not plan to draft a formal report prior to the mid-term workshop, but a relevant background paper will be circulated prior to the workshop to help facilitate an informed discussion.
- Second draft versions of Partner Case Studies and Country Reports will be submitted as attachments to the the draft Synthesis Report.
- The review of the initial draft Synthesis Report (“draft zero”) will be limited to only 2-3 individuals to check for factual errors so that these can be corrected before sending a revised draft (“draft 1”) to a wider group of stakeholders to review content and provide feedback. This will only be possible if the first draft is commented on within 1-2 working days, in order to not delay the process.
- The Final Report will be submitted to the Management Group for final approval. Once approved, the report will be proof read and thereafter professionally laid out by Sida’s in-house publication company, Citat, in accordance with Sida’s digital publication standards
- Other deliverables as mutually agreed between the Management Group and the review team, taking adequate account of time/resource constraints and likely value-added. Such deliverables could potentially include an online survey, preparation of presentations for briefings with senior management, etc.

12. Report Outline

To ensure that the Synthesis Report directly addresses the objectives defined in the TOR, it is planned that the report will be structured according to the lines of questioning described in the Methodology Section, i.e.:

<p>Front Section</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Title page • Acknowledgements • Executive summary of 1000 to 1500 words • Table of contents • List of acronyms
<p>Main Report (as per the TOR, the entire report including the Front Section, will be no more than 20,000 words/40 pgs excluding annexes)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Introduction and Background <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Purpose, scope, rationale, target audience and expected use of the review ○ Situating the review, including Sweden’s/Sida’s/MSB’s international role and the humanitarian context (both present and expected trends) ○ Other information and data relevant for this review • Methodology, including a description of limitations and constraints • Description and graphic illustration of decision-making processes of MSB

international operations supported by Sida. This section will include short case studies drawn from the two field visit reports annexed to the report, highlighting those findings that have a particular relevance to the objectives of the review.

- Description of main MSB partners and how they interact with MSB. This section will include short case studies drawn from the three partner case studies annexed to the report, highlighting those findings that have a particular relevance to the objectives of the review.
- Comparisons with other governmental and non-governmental agencies who have similar standby partner arrangements. This section would include a broad agency “mapping” to situate MSB and a specific focus on 2-4 agencies that are most similar.
- Separate sections corresponding to specific focus areas of the study, each with relevant findings, conclusions and recommendations on:
 - Relevance
 - Efficiency and effectiveness
 - Monitoring, evaluation and reporting on results
 - Coordination
 - Cross-cutting issues
- Conclusions (overall analysis and conclusions based on findings)
- List of Recommendations targeted at specific stakeholders

Annexes:

- 1. Three Partner Case Studies** (Case studies of approximately 1,500 words each) Each case study will contain:
 - A description of the partner's humanitarian role and mandate
 - A description of Sweden's engagement with the partner agency, with a specific focus on partnership with MSB
 - Summary of strengths and areas of improvement identified based on prior experience of working with MSB, categorized by focus area of the study, namely:
 - Relevance
 - Efficiency and effectiveness
 - Monitoring, evaluation and reporting on results
 - Coordination
 - Cross-cutting issues
 - Summary analysis, conclusions and (if appropriate) recommendations
- 2. Two Country Visit Reports** (reports of approximately 4,000 words each. Each country report visit annex will contain separate sections on:
 - The country context, including Sweden's role
 - History of MSB engagement in that country and region (may be illustrated with a map)
 - Separate sections corresponding to specific focus areas of the study, each with relevant findings, conclusions and recommendations on:
 - Relevance
 - Efficiency and effectiveness
 - Monitoring, evaluation and reporting on results
 - Coordination
 - Cross-cutting issues
 - Analysis, conclusions and (if appropriate) recommendations
- 3. ToR for the Review**
- 4. Consolidated list of persons met**
- 5. Online survey results**
- 6. Review team itinerary**
- 7. Bibliography**

13. Organisation and Management of the Review

As noted in the TOR (attached as an annex), the Management Group for this review composed of Sida and MSB representatives will combine advisory and executive functions and make decisions at set milestones in the study process. Designated focal points within the Management Group will be responsible for the day-to-day management of the study, including contracting of the study team, quality assurance and timely approval of study reports and products. The basic principles for the Management Group structure are to:

- Safeguard the credibility and quality of the study process
- Ensure an efficient study process (within time and budget)
- Ensure appropriate involvement and cooperation of main stakeholders
- Ensure that the study team access the needed information and stakeholders
- Ensure that the results of the study process are disseminated and followed up on.

As discussed during the meeting with the review team on April 4th, the Management Group may designate a MSB or Sida representative to join one or both of the

field visits. While it was agreed that such an arrangement could benefit the learning aspect, it is on the understanding that it would not compromise the independent nature of the review.

It is understood by the review team that members of the Management Group have been involved in similar evaluations and reviews in the past and thus have an understanding of the importance of timely decision-making and reactions to meet logistic and information needs of the review team in order to help ensure a quality and timely result. The members of the Management Group have committed to provide timely and appropriate support, including adoption appropriate measures to compensate for the fact that some of this review will take place over the summer holidays.

The Management Group has been made aware of specific milestones in the work plans that are particularly time-critical, including:

- Confirmation of field study sites (DRC and Mozambique) and dates of visits. Due to the amount of preparation involved (including recruitment of a national consultant) and the need to ensure that the review supports, rather than interferes with, field operations.
- Logistic support relating to field visits, including designation of a MSB/Sida focal point at country level to work with the national consultant to prepare for the field visits.
- Keeping to their commitment to providing feedback on draft reports within five working days following reception.
- Planning with review team members for workshops and joint meetings.

14. Measures of Success for this Review

The Review Team proposes that the following criteria should be used to assess the overall quality and utility of the review process:

- Engage with a critical mass of staff from MSB, Sida and other key stakeholders during the data collection and analysis, notably those involved in policy-making as well as those at an operational level (deployable MSB staff and partners), to ensure policies and procedures are guided by practical operational considerations.
- Generate robust findings that can be clearly linked to evidence through the quality-assurance process adopted (notably for findings where there are divergent views or are potentially sensitive).
- Based on specific questions outlined in the TOR, establish clear links between the review findings, conclusions and “SMART” recommendations targeted at specific stakeholder groups.
- Using an approach that emphasises consultation and teamwork, contribute to developing a common, widely-shared analysis within MSB, Sida and other stakeholders (including partners) of MSB’s humanitarian response capacities and how gaps identified will be addressed.
- Execution of the above activities in an independent fashion, so as to ensure the credibility of the report findings and recommendations, and professional manner, respectful of the client and the designated role of the Management Group for this review.

Annex 3 – UNHCR Partner Case Study

Case study undertaken by Jock Baker (Team Leader) and Annina Mattsson (study team member)

1. Description of UNHCR's humanitarian role and mandate

The **UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR)** was established on December 14, 1950 by the United Nations General Assembly. The role and functions of UNHCR as set forth in the UNHCR Statute and as elaborated in resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly is to pursue protection, assistance and solutions for refugees. UNHCR has an additional mandate concerning issues of statelessness, as it is given a designated role under Article 11 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. UNHCR has also been requested by the General Assembly to promote the 1954 and 1961 statelessness Conventions, and to help prevent statelessness by providing to States technical and advisory services on nationality legislation and practice.¹²² UNHCR is the lead of the Global Protection Cluster and therefore co-ordinates international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide.

UNHCR's mandate has been amended over time according to resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly to include protecting and providing humanitarian assistance to other “populations of concern,” including internally displaced persons (IDPs) who are “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border”¹²³ and who therefore would fit the legal definition of a refugee under the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol, the 1969 Organization for African Unity Convention, or some other treaty if they left their country, but who presently remain in their country of origin.

122 UNHCR website, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c86.html>, accessed on 20 August 2012

123 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Introduction, para. 2

At the end of 2011, UNHCR reported that 25.9 million people (10.4 million refugees and 15.5 million IDPs) were receiving protection or assistance from UNHCR in some 125 countries¹²⁴.

UNHCR has estimated their funding requirements during 2012 will amount to some USD 3.59 billion, of which USD 3.31 is for programmed activities.¹²⁵ A trend worth noting is that UNHCR witnessed a significant increase in support from the private sector, not only in terms of funding, but also providing support for awareness-raising and technical expertise in addition to donating goods and services. Contributions from corporate donors amounted to some USD 35 million in 2011 while the IKEA Foundation made a three-year pledge of USD 62 million for assistance to refugees in the Horn of Africa.¹²⁶ UNHCR raises additional funds for specific emergencies through Flash Appeals. According to the OCHA Financial Tracking Services (FTS), by the end of August 2012 UNHCR has only been able to secure 12.4% of its appeal requirements.¹²⁷ While the funding gap seems to highlight the importance of the availability of standby partners for UNHCR, the UNHCR standby partnership managers stress that the primary purpose of the standby partnerships is not to fill budget gaps. The purpose is to have a well functioning and centralised preparedness capacity, constituting diversified rosters of rapidly deployable experts to send to address needs in the field.¹²⁸

UNHCR had 7,735 staff members at the beginning of 2012, of which 5,871 were national staff and 1,868 international staff. A total of 960 were based either at UNHCR's Geneva headquarters or at their Global Service Centre in Budapest¹²⁹.

2. UNHCR and their Standby Partners

UNHCR maintains standby agreements with a number of government and non-governmental standby partners¹³⁰ and activates these agreements when:

- There is insufficient capacity on the ground.
- The requirements exceed the local capacity of UNHCR partners in the field.
- It is not possible to provide the needed services through normal procurement channels.

124 UNHCR (2012) 2011 in Review: Trends at a Glance

125 UNHCR website, <http://www.unhcr.org/4f79a4e99.html> accessed on 20 August 2012

126 <http://www.unhcr.org/4df1d08e9.html>

127 http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R31_Y2012___1208300206.pdf accessed on 30 August 2012

128 Interview with standby partnership management team, Geneva, 22 May 2012

129 UNHCR 2011 Annual Report – Introduction <http://www.unhcr.org/4fc880860.html>

130

<http://onerresponse.info/GlobalClusters/Protection/Documents/Guide%20to%20UNHCRs%20Emergency%20Standby%20Partners%20and%20External%20Deployment%20Arrangements.pdf>

2. Description of Sweden's engagement with UNHCR, with a specific focus on partnership with MSB

Sweden is one of the 87 members¹³¹ of UNHCR's governing Executive Committee and regularly participates at state secretary level in annual meetings held in Geneva. Sweden is represented in UNHCR's Standing Committee at a desk officer level¹³².

Sweden has been UNHCR's fourth largest donor since 2008, with annual contributions ranging between around USD 108 million and USD 118 million. In addition, the Swedish MFA provides around USD 93 million (613 million SEK) annually in core funding and Sida adds funding to the Global Appeal and to Flash Appeals. UNHCR's largest donor is the USA, which provided around USD 700 million annually during the same period.¹³³

MSB (and the Swedish Rescue Service before that) have had a long-standing partnership with UNHCR. The most recent MoU with UNHCR was signed with SRSA (not yet MSB) in 2008 that committed SRSA to maintaining a ready-to-deploy standby roster of personnel with expertise in needs assessment, training, logistics, ICT/telecom, WASH, medical, mine action, planning and management of refugee camps, and support for base camps for UNHCR staff.

Over the past few years MSB has seconded most staff as part of service packages as illustrated in Table 1. In their 2008 Guide to Standby Partners, UNHCR lists MSB providing technical support as Logisticians, Electricians, Communications Technicians, IT Technicians, Air Movement Officers, Urban Planners, Road and Bridge Engineers, GIS Specialists, Environmental Specialists, (waste management, hazardous substances), Water and Sanitation Specialists, Assessment Specialists, and Coordination Personnel for UN field offices and reception centres in disaster areas.

Table 1. Number Seconded to UNHCR by Agency Source 2009 - 2011¹³⁴

Source of Seconded Staff	2009	2010	2011
UN (UNHCR staff on temporary duty & UN Volunteers)	75	99	370
MSB	3	3	12
MSB (Government Service Package)	51	6	24
Standby Partners other than MSB	119	128	211
TOTAL	248	236	617

¹³¹ As of July 2012


¹³² Swedish assessment of multilateral organisations - The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR 2008 <http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/3365/a/121956>

¹³³ UNHCR website, <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48f056> accessed 20 Aug 12

¹³⁴ Source: UNHCR EPRS data

While MSB seconded staff accounted for 24% of total surge staff during 2009, the percentage in 2010 was 4% and in 2011 6%. There are several reasons for the lower percentage in 2010 and 2011, including deployed staff that was not included in these figures. Additional details developed in the Relevance section below. However, it is clear that the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and Danish Refugee Council (DRC), due to their refugee-related mandates and focus on protection, are the major source of seconded staff for UNHCR. The two agencies together accounting for 24 - 36% of all staff seconded to UNHCR during the past three years. A glance at Figure 1 below shows this is mainly due to the types of profiles in demand, notably protection- and resettlement-related functions.

Figure 1. Functional areas of standby partner staff deployed to UNHCR 2011 - 2012 ¹³⁵



3. Summary of strengths and areas of improvement:

3.1 Relevance

In view of UNHCR's mandate and operational priorities, MSB secondments to UNHCR can be seen to support Sida's humanitarian strategy as MSB secondments have the potential to increase the capacity of UNHCR to mount a timely and high quality response to humanitarian crises. This is particularly true for large-scale refugee operations where there is a need for MSB's technical expert profiles in construction, logistics, engineering and ICT experts to help in the construction of base camps, and setup and management of vehicle fleet operations.

More generally, UNHCR admits capacity gaps in technical sectors such as site planning, WASH, public health and nutrition. UNHCR staff lacks such skills and recog-

¹³⁵ Source: UNHCR EPRS Data as of July 2012

nises that the need to make greater use of the specific skills and profiles of partners, and standby arrangements, is crucial. UNHCR focal points for standby deployments have a preference for roster members who have been on previous deployments. In summary, while MSB does not have protection experts or other 'soft' profiles more often required by UNHCR on their roster, MSB secondees are considered relevant by UNHCR where a relatively high level of technical expertise is required. UNHCR admit to being 'lawyers, not doers' and therefore recurrently need support in technical areas. MSB is also playing an important role in building the agency's capacity in these technical areas.

According to UNHCR interviewees, the significant drop in the number of MSB deployed staff from 24% in 2009 to only 6% in 2011 is for a number of reasons:

- Global Service Packages (GSP), which includes not just staff, but also significant contributions in the form of equipment and supplies, are often characterised by large numbers of deployments staff for short periods of time. In 2009 MSB deployed 3 larger GSPs with a total of 51 staff. Before 2009, GSP were not fully registered in the UNHCR systems and it is still difficult to count for all very short-term GSP staff deployment since the standby partnership management team has not been systematically informed about all staff movements. Similarly, data provided by MSB provided the number of operations and cost, but it was not possible to calculate the number of individuals deployed.
- The last two years have seen an increase in the involvement of IHP in GSP deployments. It is therefore not always MSB deploying all staff if the GSP is a joint IHP project.
- There was a sharp peak in the number of total deployments 2011, which means that the proportion of MSB deployments has decreased. However, actual MSB deployments were still higher in 2011 than during 2010.
- NRC, DRC, RedR and Irish Aid have all increased the numbers of deployments since 2009.
- The aggregated data only captures the number of deployments but doesn't capture other relevant aspects such as the length of deployment; deployment of one person is the same whether it's for 1 week or 6 months.

It is therefore clear that the reduction in MSB deployments is not necessary linked to a lack of relevance in relation to the profiled needed by UNHCR. It is true that UNHCR has a high demand for protection and resettlement profiles to complement their internal rosters and resources. As these cannot be filled by MSB, because the agency has consciously made the decision not to pursue those two profiles, agencies with a specialisation in protection and resettlement (such as NRC and DRC) will obviously be more prominent partners of UNHCR in those areas. Given the long history of protection expertise in these organisations MSB's decision not to compete in this sector is wise. The types of profiles that UNHCR normally refers to MSB, and where the agency needs significant support, are mainly within technical sectors such as site planners, WASH, ICT, Logistics, Engineers, Information Managers, etc. These profiles, that relate directly to MSB's core competencies, are just as relevant as the 'soft' profiles - only less frequently required.

MSB brings added value to UNHCR since they are well equipped, rapid, have a problem-solving approach and can combine resources (i.e. staff+equipment+logistics). According to UNHCR staff, it makes a huge difference to their operations if UNHCR is allowed to focus on their strengths i.e refugee and IDP activities while an agency such as MSB provides much needed supportive infrastructure, such as offices and accommodation for staff, where UNHCR has fewer capacities.

UNHCR has a comparatively broad range of activities that has to be performed during any specific operation. They have the responsibility for many different sectors and hence the work context and the environment of their operations are often very challenging. In general, they have neither a strong nor a very large logistics apparatus, and hence are weak in this sector. MSB's expertise in all logistics related matters is therefore well appreciated and valued by UNHCR.

3.2 Efficiency and effectiveness


UNHCR staff praised MSB deployments as an effective and efficient way of accessing high quality staff quickly, and noted that many secondees are often familiar with UNHCR systems as many attend WEM training, and other training arranged by other UN agencies. UNHCR currently views the relationship with MSB HQ as very good. A strong preference for standby partner candidates with prior experience of working with UNHCR has meant that selection of standby partners relies to a large extent on personal connections and requests for deployments are typically forwarded by UNHCR to a handful of roster members who have relevant skills.

While UNHCR considers MSB to offer high quality technical staff, UNHCR found that request and approval procedures after the MSB restructuring in 2008 became more complicated, and that dealing with different people caused confusion and delays. UNHCR key informants noted that the situation improved in 2011 after MSB HQ had appointed a single UNHCR focal point and they now have very good relations. UNHCR would like to make greater use of MSB, but find them very expensive when costs are not fully covered by Sida. While cost-sharing arrangements are at times exercised, UNHCR considers that this should be the exception with individual deployments, not the rule.¹³⁶ UNHCR finds the MSB salary level to be high in relation to most other standby partners, while acknowledging that the primary reason for the high cost is that MSB staff pay some 50% tax, while several other countries do not tax humanitarian and aid workers while on mission¹³⁷. Many interviewees also cited a lack of French language skills by MSB employees as a significant gap.

¹³⁶ Comment on this draft report by UNHCR.

¹³⁷ Interviews with UNHCR staff, Geneva, 22 May 2012

Figure 1 – Feedback from MSB staff working with UNHCR compared to partners overall¹³⁸



MSB is well positioned to support key elements of Sida’s humanitarian strategy; their operating environment often determines their effectiveness. Data from MSB key informants (including data extracted from ELLIOT presented in the pie charts in Figure 1) suggest that UNHCR working environments tend to be significantly more challenging than those of other agencies. This is reportedly due to the challenging environments where UNHCR works, where, for example, security conditions present special challenges. For the Ethiopia operation, gaps in UNHCR logistics capacities were identified as a major challenge during an interagency lessons learned exercise. The recommendation was for IHP to run “turnkey” operations that encompass all critical path activities rather than, for example, relying on UNHCR logistics to transport containers to base camp sites.

3.3 Monitoring, evaluation and reporting on results

UNHCR tracks numbers, locations and functional areas of deployed staff, but does not systematically obtain feedback using standardised performance evaluation systems. While the PER format is used as agreed to by all UN agencies, findings are not compiled or analysed for future lesson learning. Annual reporting to ExCom on the use of standby partners focuses on the number deployed of budgets, but does not undertake further analysis.

Field observations in Ethiopia and DRC suggest that it would be worthwhile to develop results frameworks for high value “packages” (base camps, vehicle workshop) that would include some outcome-level indicators to assess the effect of this support on operations. This should not only help to improve the relevance, effectiveness and

¹³⁸ Source: ELLIOT (accessed July 25, 2012)

efficiency of such operations, but should also make it easier to identify appropriate options for an exit strategy.

3.4 Coordination

At the global level MSB coordination with UNHCR tends to be mainly bilateral, rather than within the clusters, for two main reasons. Firstly, according to current humanitarian reform structures, clusters are not implemented for refugee situations and UNHCR has an overall mandate for coordination¹³⁹. Secondly, although UNHCR is co-leading the Camp Coordination/Management (CCCM), Protection and Emergency Shelter Clusters, most of MSB's participation in clusters at both the global and country level tends to be linked to their core capacities, i.e. mainly either with the Logistics and ETC clusters, which are WFP-led, or with the WASH cluster led by UNICEF. UNHCR's leadership of clusters is linked to their protection mandate for displaced persons and provision of this function is not part of the 2008 Agreement. UNHCR interviewees felt that many other standby partners have rosters that support UNHCR's protection activities, and that they would prefer to continue to rely on MSB's core competencies in specific technical areas, i.e. base camps, ICT support, etc.

An example of bilateral coordination at the global level includes participation in the UNHCR Workshop for Emergency Management (WEM), which has often been hosted by MSB in cooperation with other standby partners. During the 2012 session, for example, the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW)¹⁴⁰ provided the IT training component in lieu of MSB.

UNHCR interviewees noted that, while UNHCR is routinely invited to NRC, DRC and Irish Aid induction training, they do not participate in MSB inductions. They had found such involvement useful since it allowed UNHCR to identify significant gaps in relevant knowledge about UNHCR so that they could address these with the partner before being deployed.

3.5 Cross-cutting issues

There is a commitment in the 2008 Agreement with UNHCR to achieving a gender balance in teams of deployed staff and that teams are briefed on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and understand its implications. Apart from gender, there are no other commitments to cross cutting issues described in the existing Agreement.

UNHCR interviewees felt that MSB is sensitive to gender issues, often citing examples of good gender balance and women team leaders. A staff member who had

¹³⁹ An exception are Palestinian refugees, for which the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA) is responsible.

¹⁴⁰ The Federal Agency for Technical Relief, or Bundesanstalt Technisches Hilfswerk (THW) in German, is a civil protection organisation controlled by the German federal government that is also a member of the IHP.

served with UNHCR since the 1980s noted that this had not always been the case with SRSA. She felt that MSB staff was now well trained in Codes of Conduct prior to deploying and this had had a positive impact.

Based on the field visit to Ethiopia, and document review, there appears to be little evidence that environmental issues are being given priority by MSB when, for example, designing and designing base camps. Attention is given to environmental sanitation in a WASH context, but base camps observed could not be described as being environmentally friendly and does not appear to feature in assessments carried out by MSB staff.

An example of a lack of conflict sensitivity was cited in Sudan when MSB staff showed up in the middle of a conflict zone dressed in military-style uniforms. Otherwise MSB roster members are considered to be well aware of the contexts in which they are deployed and understand the sensitivities surrounding work with refugees and IDPs.

4. Summary analysis and conclusions

MSB is not UNHCR's largest standby partner in terms of the number of deployed staff, but MSB is nevertheless viewed by UNHCR as a reliable and competent "go-to" agency for technical support services, notably during large-scale refugee emergencies. UNHCR is not in favour of cost sharing for individual deployments. In addition, MSB staff was seen as 'expensive', and therefore this option is rarely considered.

Monitoring and evaluation systems could be strengthened, not only the deployment of individual MSB staff, but also for high value service packages through the development of results-based monitoring frameworks to improve the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of such operations, but also make it easier to identify appropriate options for an exit strategy

Annex 4 – ICRC Partner Case Study

Case study undertaken by Jock Baker (Team Leader) and Annina Mattsson (study team member)

1. Description of ICRC's humanitarian role and mandate

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an independent, neutral organisation ensuring humanitarian protection and assistance for victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence. It takes action in response to emergencies and at the same time promotes respect for international humanitarian law and its implementation in national law. Established in 1863, ICRC efforts led to States adopting the original Geneva Convention of 1864. As the world changed over the years, ICRC urged governments to adapt international humanitarian law to these changing circumstances so as to provide more effective protection and assistance for conflict victims. Over three-quarters of all States are now party to the two 1977 Protocols additional to the Conventions. Protocol I protects the victims of international armed conflicts, Protocol II the victims of non-international armed conflicts. Additional Protocol III of 2005 allows for the use of an additional emblem – the Red Crystal – by national societies in the Movement.

ICRC undertakes a wide range of activities in fulfilling its mandate:

- | | |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Visiting Detainees• Protecting Civilians• Reuniting Families• Ensuring Economic Security• Water And Habitat• Health• Cooperation With National Societies | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Building Respect For International Humanitarian Law (IHL)• Safeguarding Health Care• Other related activities, including Mine Action, Humanitarian Diplomacy and Communication, Private Sector Relations, Development of International Humanitarian Law and Social Research on War. |
|--|---|

2. ICRC's Approach to Partnerships

ICRC's approach to partnership has historically focused on their interactions with the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) and the National Societies of countries where it conducts operations so that capacities and expectations are taken into account when designing capacity-building activities and planning/programming ICRC interventions. Since 2010, ICRC has become increasingly willing to explore collaborative activities with other humanitarian actors, as long as such partnership is practical in nature and supports ICRC's humanitarian response in a way that is consistent with their mandate.

3. Sweden's Engagement with the ICRC

Sweden figures among the governments that ICRC acknowledges as having made substantial contributions in the form of flexibly earmarked funds.

Table 1. Sweden contributions to ICRC 2006-2011 ¹⁴¹

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
Sweden Government Contribution	55	79	79	70	67	84	433
Overall ICRC Annual Expenditure	1,016	995	1,158	1,117	1,176	1,120	6,582
Percentage of Overall Expenditure	5%	8%	7%	6%	6%	7%	7%

Sweden has been a regular member of ICRC's Donor Support Group (DSG), which is composed of those governments that make annual contributions in excess of CHF 10 million, and there have also been a Swedish representative on ICRC's Group of International Advisers¹⁴².

MSB carries out mine action operations under the leadership of either ICRC or UNMAS. MSB supports ICRC efforts to limit the humanitarian impact that weapon contamination has on civilian populations. ICRC's approach varies according to the context, but typically includes elements of:

- data gathering and analysis
- survey and clearance
- risk reduction
- risk education

ICRC also assists those who have fallen victim to weapon contamination through, for example, physical rehabilitation and with economic recovery projects.

MSB efforts in support of the Weapon Contamination (WeC) programme are primarily focused on reducing the negative impact of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) through the deployment of teams and equipment who are able to undertake mine clearance and, to a lesser extent, information management.

Table 2 – MSB Operations with ICRC 2009-2012

Operation Type and Location	Dates	Budget (MSEK)
Libya: Mine Action (Rapid response)	Sep 2009 – Dec 2011	1.7
Libya: Mine Action (Rapid response)	Apr 2011 – Jun 2012	4.6
Libya: Mine Action (seconded specialist)	Jan 2012 – Jul 2012	0.9
Rep of Congo (Brazzaville): Mine Action	Mar 2012	1.0

¹⁴¹ Source: ICRC Annual Reports for 2006 – 2011. Amounts are millions of Swiss francs (rounded to the nearest million)

¹⁴² Jan Eliasson was a member of this group during 2008-2011.

(Rapid response)

Iraq: Mine Action (Rapid response)	Mar 2010 – Dec 2011	7.9
Ivory Coast: Mine Action (seconded specialist)	Apr– Mar 2011	0.2
Ivory Coast: Mine Action (seconded specialist)	Dec 2011	0.1

When MSB first entered into a contractual relationship with the ICRC in 2006, it was envisaged that this would be for short-term deployments and that Sida would cover all deployment costs. However, the partnership has since transformed into a contractor relationship, with ICRC covering all costs.

ICRC is unique amongst MSB's partners in that ICRC has fully covered the cost of MSB deployments since 2009. When partnership with ICRC first began, Sida initially envisaged providing all funding, as they do with other standby partners. When the ICRC requested teams for longer periods this changed to a contractor relationship whereby ICRC covered all costs.

ICRC deployment does not take place in isolation. ICRC endeavours to ensure that its activities will be complementary with other actors. MSB mine action teams work under ICRC's direction in close coordination with relevant stakeholders, notably the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), for whom MSB also provides direct support as part of the Rapid Response Plan for Mine Action. Such cooperation is illustrated by the recent mine clearance operations in Cote d'Ivoire¹⁴³ and MSB's work with ICRC in Brazzaville, where UNMAS doesn't maintain a permanent presence.

Given that a limited number of actors involved in humanitarian mine clearance operations have the necessary surge capabilities, technical competence and resources to undertake these types of operations along with the close working relationship that exists between UNMAS and ICRC around mine action, it should come as no surprise that feedback from key informants about MSB staff and operations was fairly consistent.

4. Summary of Strengths and Areas of Improvement

4.1 Relevance

MSB secondments to ICRC for mine action directly support the goals in Sida's Humanitarian Assistance Strategy, starting with ICRC's own strong organisational emphasis on a needs-based, principled and coordinated humanitarian response based on International Humanitarian Law. In many ways, the multi-year partnership between ICRC and MSB, with ICRC covering 100% of the costs, is a clear validation of MSB's ability to meet critical needs of affected populations using principled approaches consistent with the humanitarian mandate articulated in Sida's Humanitarian Assistance Strategy.

¹⁴³ <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/2012/cote-d-ivoire-update-2012-01-19.htm>

ICRC, similar to other international agencies, uses the term “partner” in various ways so as to include private sector donors and associations such as Rotary International. However, partnerships involving the regular implementation of ICRC humanitarian activities are almost exclusively confined to Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies. Although increasingly, the ICRC also provides capacity-building support to national bodies that oversee mine action coordination, and management MSB is one of the few, if not the only, exception to this; there are some key factors which have contributed to overcoming ICRC’s initial qualms about working with an agency outside the Red Cross family and developing their partnership with MSB:

- MSB’s willingness to support ICRC’s mandate, follow the relevant code of conduct and work effectively under ICRC supervision. In practice this means that there is relatively little difference between the MSB mine action team’s behaviour and approach from that of ICRC staff. MSB staff are willing to “blend in” and wear ICRC emblems instead of their own uniforms and don’t seek press publicity as some other international agencies do. As with other standby partners, ICRC prefers MSB seconded staff that have prior experience of working with ICRC.
- MSB are looking at adopting ICRC technical Readiness Standing Operating Procedures (RSOPs) for mine action.
- Highly professional approach and level of technical competence.
- A set of mine clearance equipment on standby earmarked for ICRC operations.
- Timely deployments, with decisions by MSB to deploy following a request often taking less than a day.
- Potential availability of Sida funding to offset some of the costs.
- ICRC’s own assessments demonstrated that they could not justify performing mine clearance operations at a comparable level if they did it themselves (UNMAS key informants separately expressed similar views). A similar agreement with NGOs would be problematic since there was a serious doubt whether they would need to be able to mobilise resources to build the necessary capacity. These considerations resulted in ICRC deciding take the – for them – the somewhat unorthodox approach of partnering with an agency that doesn’t belong to the Red Cross/Crescent family.

4.2 Efficiency and effectiveness

MSB mine actions teams are seen as reliable, well equipped and able to deploy with a few days’ notice. Both ICRC and UNMAS key informants highlighted the exceptionally fast MSB decision-making that they had observed.

At the same time, interviewees expressed concern about the capacity limits of MSB that were observed with two MSB teams already in the field and discussions having begun regarding a possible third deployment. In common with other standby partners, ICRC key informants suggested that a MSB “catalogue of services” would be useful in helping them to maximise use of MSB services while helping to better understand MSB capacities.

Concerns were also expressed about the rapid rotation of MSB staff, both at a decision-making level and within the MSB administration. While it was acknowledged that it’s unrealistic for ICRC to personally screen every individual in the team before a deployment, ICRC needs at least to know the Team Leader. MSB teams never deploy without a ICRC WeC coordinator who acts as the managerial interface between the ICRC and the team, oversees all aspects of the deployment and management and

acts as the 'oil between the gears' of the two institutions.¹⁴⁴ This formula has proved to be very effective in terms of implementation, and is also appreciated by the MSB mine action teams. However, ICRC needs to better manage the welcome process - ensuring that MSB staff feel part of the delegation and understand wider programming.

MSB munitions disposal operations during 2012 with ICRC in the Republic of Congo following a devastating explosion in an ammunition storage facility in central Brazzaville provides a good practice example of the effectiveness and efficiency of MSB approaches to mine action. Based on interviews and online survey results, MSB teams were judged to be of exceptional quality as compared with other options, either from the government or the private sector. Interviewees noted that the few problems that did crop up were quickly dealt with by MSB. MSB teams also received considerable praise from ICRC key informants for their productive working relationship with national Congolese Red Cross volunteers in the dissemination and reporting of activities to help reduce the risk of additional injuries among the general population.

While full cost coverage by ICRC facilitates more rapid MSB deployments, ICRC has experienced several administrative difficulties when it came time to settle accounts. Instances were cited of delays in invoicing where requests for payment arrived well after the project termination date. This is a particular problem once the financial year has ended. There were other cases when final costs differ from invoiced costs.

4.3 Monitoring, evaluation and reporting on results

ICRC has a reporting system mainly based on outputs (size of area cleared, number of explosives disabled, etc.), but they do not have a results framework for their mine action programming. An interviewee offered some anecdotal examples of proxy outcome indicators, including an example from MSB's deployment to Brazzaville where there no new casualties were recorded after the team started work. ICRC briefed informally with MSB HQ upon the finalisation of missions and any concerns were raised informally. There is not, however, currently a systematic process to capture lessons learnt, and the focus at the end of missions remains on technical aspects of the engagement which to date have always yielded satisfactory results. However, while there are no specific criteria used in evaluating performance (other than technical skills), when a successful mission is evaluated, lessons are captured from missions that were not so successful. There was, for example, a case when ICRC deployed an MSB mine action individual who was subsequently asked to fill a managerial role in Libya. It was later realised that this was not an appropriate role for seconded staff that, while technically competent, lacked the requisite knowledge about ICRC internal workings; this error will therefore not be repeated.

¹⁴⁴ Interview, ICRC Mine Action Team, Geneva, 22 May 2012

ICRC interviewees said that they carry out performance reviews for their own staff members, but not for MSB teams. However, ICRC is planning to start such a system having recognised the need for a better feedback loop also for seconded staff.

4.4 Coordination

Comparing the results of interviews, the online survey and document research indicate an excellent level of coordination and solid teamwork between ICRC, UNMAS and MSB in the area of mine actions. A joint Mine Action Rapid Response Plan Exercise (MARRPE) exercise has been conducted annually (except in 2012) but interviewees said that they are exploring the possibility of adding additional joint training when partner agreements with ICRC and UNMAS are renewed in 2012. ICRC has in the meantime undertaken an initial training of MSB Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) roster staff in June 2012 – the first of what will be annual trainings. It may be possible to combine these with UN training events. ICRC mine action staff plan to visit Sweden 2-3 times a year to help ensure that MSB staff are aware of how ICRC works and are familiar with their SOPs. ICRC is also seeking to include a limited number of MSB staff in the ICRC ‘integration course’ trainings – the induction training for all ICRC delegates.

4.5 Cross cutting issues

ICRC stressed that operational efficiency takes priority over integrating cross cutting issues into their mine action programmes. ICRC and UNMAS interviewees noted that, given that munitions disposal is a male-dominated field, MSB was acknowledged as helping the overall gender balance of joint mine action operations. According to MSB sources, MSB actively encourages female applicants to join the roster and, although refresher training is provided, MSB does not currently provide basic EOD training. Before being accepted on the roster, staff is therefore required to undergo training by either military or civilian training providers (NGOs or commercial companies).

Conflict sensitivity awareness is well developed in the sense that ICRC’s neutral mandate necessitates that MSB teams blend seamlessly into ICRC structures; they operate and behave in a way that is consistent with ICRC approaches to avoid compromising their neutral mandate. At the same time, some ICRC key informants did express concern about reports that MSB personnel were being requested to debrief to Swedish intelligence officers after returning from their missions. While additional probing by the team found that this was probably just a rumour, it highlights the importance that MSB needs to make consistent efforts to communicate its impartial mandate to its partners.

While drawn from a relatively limited sample¹⁴⁵, our analysis of online survey responses from standby partners who have observed MSB mine action teams supports interviewee opinions that MSB staff display a good awareness of DRR and conflict sensitivity issues.

5. Summary Analysis and Conclusions

MSB's mine action support for ICRC is carried out in close coordination with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), for whom MSB also provides direct support as part of UNMAS Rapid Response Plan for Mine Action (RRP). A good practice example of this cooperation is illustrated by the MSB's work in Brazzaville led by ICRC and in Cote d'Ivoire where the operation was led by UNMAS.

MSB secondments to ICRC for mine action are seen to directly support Sida's Humanitarian Assistance Strategy goals, starting with ICRC's own strong organisational emphasis on a needs-based, principled and coordinated humanitarian response based on International Humanitarian Law. In many ways, the multi-year partnership between ICRC and MSB, with ICRC covering 100% of the costs, is a clear validation of MSB's ability to meet critical needs of affected populations using principled approaches consistent with the humanitarian mandate articulated in Sida's Humanitarian Assistance Strategy.

MSB is one of the only operational partners of ICRC that is not part of the Red Cross/Red Crescent "family" and this is due to a combination of ICRC's appreciation for MSB's willingness to adhere to "blend in" to help ICRC fulfil their neutral mandate and code of conduct along with their proven reliability, speedy deployments and strong technical capabilities. However, it is incumbent that the ICRC ensures the full integration of MSB staff into a delegation, as they can still at times be perceived as outsiders.

MSB teams were perceived to have a good awareness of cross cutting issues and MSB stands out amongst agencies involved in mine clearance as relatively gender equal and encouraging of women to undergo EOD training and join mine action teams.

Identified areas for improvement include increasing the capacity of MSB mine action teams so as to ensure that they possess the necessary capacity to carry out operations and ensure adequate quality control if there are more than two simultaneous deployments. Reducing high turnover of MSB staff both in the field and at HQs could improve effectiveness and efficiency.

While ICRC is covering all costs for deployments, they continue to face challenges in settling accounts due to gaps in MSB systems. Since MSB wishes to encourage cost recovery, it is recommended that MSB consider updating their invoicing systems

¹⁴⁵ Further details of online survey results are available in the main report.

and adopting a more commercial approach with fixed invoicing periods to reduce transaction costs for partners.

Annex 5 - WFP Partner Case Study

Case study undertaken by Jock Baker (Team Leader) and Annina Mattsson (study team member).

1. Description of the WFP's Humanitarian Role and Mandate the WFP's humanitarian role and mandate

The **World Food Programme (WFP)** is the food assistance branch of the United Nations system, and the world's largest humanitarian organisation. WFP provides food, on average, to 90 million people per year, 58 million of whom are children. The organisation works to help people who are unable to produce or obtain enough food for themselves and their families.

The WFP mandate is to eradicate hunger and malnutrition, with the ultimate goal in mind of eliminating the need for food assistance itself.

To achieve this it:

1. Uses food aid to so support economic and social development
2. Meets refugee and other emergency food needs, and the associated logistics support; and
3. Promotes world food security in accordance with the recommendations of the United Nations and the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO)

WFP is responsible for mobilising basic food commodities and funds for meeting transport costs, and for all large refugee feeding operations managed by the UNHCR.

WFP food assistance is also directed to fight micronutrient deficiencies, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, and combat disease, including HIV and AIDS. Developmental Food Assistance programs, such as Food-for-work, help promote environmental and economic stability and agricultural production.

WFP is a member of the United Nations Development Group and part of its Executive Committee.¹⁴⁶

2. WFP and Standby Partners

¹⁴⁶ WFP Mission Statement, <http://www.wfp.org/about/mission-statement>, and interview with WFP Staff in Rome, 29 May 2012

WFP works with a variety of Stand-by Partners that provide them with a roster/register of personnel with specialised competencies and equipment (including as Global Service Packages) not normally maintained by WFP, such as base camp construction, truck fleets and de-mining¹⁴⁷.

The most frequently profiles deployed are:

- Logistics Officers
- Air Movement/Transport Officers
- Warehouse Managers
- Fleet, Workshop & Transport Managers
- Civil Engineers
- GIS Officers
- ICT & Telecommunications Officers
- Programme support

Deployments normally last 3 - 6 months and standby partners are called upon when WFP needs to rapidly and/or temporarily increase staffing levels (such as during an emergency response) and does not have sufficient in-house surge-capacity to meet the operational requirements or when WFP needs particular technical skills for a limited period of time. These technical skill profiles are normally those which WFP staff do not possess, such as engineers, railway experts, mine action experts, specific IT profiles, protection experts etc.

The overall focal point for Stand-by Agreements is the ALITE unit in WFP's Logistics Division. ALITE contacts the partner for the activation of the request, drafts Letters of Agreement, organises trainings for Stand-by Partner personnel, maintains the Standby Partner database, drafts relevant guidelines and reports in addition to handling operational issues relating to roster management and deployments.

3. Description of Sweden's Engagement with WFP, with Specific Focus on Partnership with MSB

Sweden provides support to emergency operations of WFP in the event of extraordinary humanitarian needs as a complement to the core support to WFP. In 2011 Sweden was the eighth biggest donor to WFP with contributions totalling US\$97,492,347¹⁴⁸. The core support is allocated to both emergency and rehabilitation projects and is distributed to countries based on an annual request from WFP.

The core contribution to WFP is handled by MFA. Of the US\$97 million contributed in 2011, \$82 million is core contribution and therefore flexible and the rest is

¹⁴⁷ <http://logistics.wfp.org/partnership/wfp-standby-partners>

¹⁴⁸ WFP website, <http://www.wfp.org/about/donors/year/2012>

divided between standby partners and earmarked contributions (e.g. emergency operations to Niger)¹⁴⁹. According to Sida, Swedish core contribution should primarily be used for life-saving emergency and urgent recovery responses, and be used for the procurement of food aid in developing countries. It is only under special circumstances and for unforeseen major emergencies that Sweden can consider requests for additional contributions that are not covered by the multilateral contribution.¹⁵⁰

SRSA formally signed a standby partnership agreement with WFP in 2003, which was reviewed when SRSA was incorporated into MSB in 2008. According to WFP statistics, MSB represents roughly 50% of all secondments deployed through the standby partnership agreements that WFP has¹⁵¹. Between January 2006 and June 2012 MSB has deployed 321 individuals to WFP operations in over 30 different countries. The average length of these deployments was 107 days, with the longest deployment being 639 days (workshop manager in Kalemie) and the shortest being 5 days (road engineer in Lubumbashi).¹⁵² The majority of the deployments were donated as individuals-in-kind (54%), while the majority of the remaining deployments were contracted through a Letter of Agreement (i.e. part of a service pack such as camp management or truck fleet). Eight persons were deployed under a Reimbursable Loan Agreement (RLA) whereby WFP actually paid fully for their deployment. Most of the RLA's were longer deployments of more than 1 year in duration and they were all deployed in the same mission in Angola in 2006 as part of a logistics team.¹⁵³

4. Summary of Strengths and Areas of Improvement

4.1 Relevance

For WFP it is clear that MSB secondments to WFP are consistent with Sida's humanitarian strategy as MSB deployees increase the competitive advantage and response capacity of WFP in emergencies. As MSB can provide trained staff with specific niche expertise that WFP does not have readily available on its internal rosters, and who are ready to be deployed very quickly, they are essential to WFP's effective emergency response.

MSB's 'classic' profiles of logisticians, civil engineers and ICT experts, as well as the service packages fit very well with WFP needs in the field¹⁵⁴. Across the board, WFP senior staff in HQ and in the field felt that the expertise MSB has on their roster

149 Interview, WFP staff, Rome 29 May 2012

150 Sida, <http://www.sida.se/Documents/Import/pdf/Sidas-Portfolio-within-Multilateral-coordination58.pdf> accessed 10.07.2012

151 Data presented by WFP

152 Ibid.

153 Ibid.

154 The most frequently deployed profiles are: Logistics Officers, Air Movement/Transport Officers, Warehouse Managers, Fleet, Workshop & Transport Managers, Civil Engineers, GIS Officers, ICT & TC Officers, Programme support

is very relevant to WFP missions and that the expertise on offer is of high quality. The technical staff of MSB is considered to be some of the best available through the standby partnership agreements, and WFP often repeat deployments with the same roster members.

The MSB service packages are seen as largely relevant by WFP, although the technical specifications and staff requirements are considered excessive at times. This was specifically true where there was a cost sharing arrangement and WFP was contributing to the funding. An example was given of a request for the budget for the second year of a truck fleet in Haiti where MSB required 7 international staff to run a fleet of 30 trucks. This was seen as excessive in terms of technical requirements and consequently also too expensive for WFP to cover.

Overall, MSB's service offering is highly relevant to all aspects of WFP's service delivery. WFP needs MSB, and other standby partnership, staff to fill the skills gaps at WFP, but also to fill the void between temporary duty (TDY) deployments (usually first 2-6 weeks of an emergency) and WFP full-time deployment (takes 3-6 months). WFP's work is cyclical and as such requires elasticity and flexibility that is difficult to acquire in terms of human resources.

4.2 Efficiency and effectiveness

WFP staff praised MSB deployments as an effective and efficient way of accessing high quality staff quickly. They are often familiar with the UN system and even with WFP specific procedures due to the high number of re-deployments and due to joint training, especially in ICT. Communication with MSB has been fluid over the years and the relationship with the team in Sweden is very good. MSB is seen as a true partner that shares and wants to learn about WFP and the needs of the organisation.

However, while WFP considers MSB to offer high quality technical staff, the request procedures are seen to lack transparency and to take increasingly longer. While in the past a request would be responded to immediately, this has changed in the last year with delays of up to 15 days in some instances.¹⁵⁵ It is well known that Sida must approve each MSB request prior to confirming with the partner, and that this is seen as a cumbersome and inefficient procedure by WFP; speed of response and subsequent deployment is at the heart of the standby partnership agreements. Sida also questions the nature of the deployment (such as the exact duration, the exact details of the task or living conditions) in a manner that not even WFP can always answer, especially if it is an urgent emergency deployment. NRC, DRC nor RedR are required to go back to their donors for approval when making decisions about deployments. The decision, whether to deploy or not, rests with the standby partner. While both DEMA and THW, as similar state agencies as MSB, both have to get an approval by

¹⁵⁵ Interview with WFP Standby Partnership Team, Rome, 29 May 2012

their donor for international deployments, they both get verbal approvals on the same day, which allows them to get back to partners immediately.

MSB deployments and service packages are a very efficient way for WFP to ensure adequate staffing and humanitarian service delivery during emergencies. It is fast and MSB staff comes with their own equipment, which is often the latest, high-end technology available that WFP cannot afford to procure or keep in stock. This not only allows for staff to be operationalised very quickly, but most equipment is subsequently left with WFP after the deployments as in-kind donations. Crucially, most of the time, Sida covers the cost of the deployments. However, when it comes to cost-share arrangements or RLA's, all WFP staff interviewed considered MSB services to be too expensive for the context. One result of this is that WFP has rarely been able to sustain service packages and fleet operations after Sida funding dries up, even if they acknowledge that the service was necessary and of good quality.

In Haiti fleet operations were discontinued because WFP could not find the funds to continue sharing costs. In DRC, WFP has recently taken over the management of the truck fleet after an initial year of cost-sharing with Sida at 50/50. For the second year Sida agreed to provide only 25% of the funding, and WFP could not afford to continue operating at the same levels. Therefore, as of June 2012 WFP is in charge of the fleet management with MSB providing 2-4 deployees for the overall duration of 1 year to assist during which time WFP will have to find full-time staff for the following year. The equipment was donated to WFP so there has so far been no disruption in the service, but the fleet will be running at lower capacity.¹⁵⁶

4.3 Monitoring, evaluation and reporting on results

WFP uses the standard Performance Evaluation Report (PER) as agreed upon by all UN agencies for its standby partner deployments. The process of how to use the report is, however, not harmonised across the organisation. While all field supervisors fill in the report, only a minority of those interviewed do so together with the deployee, as per the official procedure. Most interviewees agreed that it was more of a box-ticking exercise that focuses primarily on the technical capacity of the standby partner staff deployed while failing to capture the real lessons learnt. The report is then sent to HQ in Rome who forwards it to the standby partner in question. A follow up by the standby partner would only occur when a problem exists.

WFP is, however, interested in further developing the M&E aspect of the standby partners and is currently developing the PER system into an online portal where the data can be directly entered by field supervisors. The idea is to develop a number based system where average performance data can be pulled out, while at the same time capturing learned lessons. The WFP ALITE manager also expressed interest in seeing something like the MSB ELIOT system harmonised across the standby part-

¹⁵⁶ Interview with WFP Strategic Fleet Management team, Rome, 29 May 2012.

ners to share experiences more widely and to encourage a debate about common challenges. WFP would also be interested in taking on board the standby partner survey used by UNICEF and MSB.

4.4 Coordination

Some interviewees felt it would be helpful if MSB could be clearer about what they can provide in terms of a catalogue of equipment and expertise, since the impression is that MSB has a wider range of available services and that they have already demonstrated their ability to deliver.

WFP is looking at various ways to strengthen coordination within the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC). WFP has a support team of 15 consultants (FIT-TEST) based in Dubai to provide services to clusters, UN agencies and even governments. Similar to other UN agencies with cluster lead mandates, the ETC cluster is increasing its engagement with the private sector and governments, and currently has partnerships with companies such as Ericsson and Vodafone. The ETC is modularising its support and is asking partners take on specific areas and packages.

4.5 Cross-cutting issues

According to WFP staff, MSB is very gender aware and female deployees, at times, fill traditionally male roles. The example of the female truck-driving trainer for the logistics fleet management package in Uganda was cited. 39 of the 324 MSB deployments to WFP between January 2006 and June 2012 were women.¹⁵⁷ It is indeed considered to be a value added of MSB that they have so many women on their roster and are able to field female Team Leaders. However, MSB does not have a specific gender competence.

There was no mention of other cross cutting issues specifically being highlighted by MSB in its deployments. Conflict sensitivity is not considered to be very high on the MSB agenda as the majority of MSB deployees wear their MSB uniforms when in the field deployed with WFP. This is not considered conflict sensitive either in terms of internal team dynamics, nor in terms of some of the more sensitive contexts in which MSB operates given that the MSB resemble, according to some of the staff interviewed, private military contractor uniforms.¹⁵⁸

While MSB is in general considered to incorporate disaster risk reduction into its deployments, this was not specifically noted by WFP, as DRR is still an emerging concept within WFP itself.

¹⁵⁷ WFP provided statistics

¹⁵⁸ Interview with UNHCR staff member, Geneva, 22 May 2012.

5. Summary of Analysis and Conclusions

MSB is WFP's largest standby partner and WFP finds MSB staff, especially in ICT, fleet management and logistics to be invaluable. The current roster profiles are highly relevant to WFP's emergency needs and MSB is seen as a trusted partner who always delivers. However, WFP finds the current approval process for deployments by MSB and Sida to be non-transparent and cumbersome, and prefers the process of direct responsibility for deployment decisions enjoyed by, for example, NRC, DRC and RedR.

While many of the services provided by MSB respond to the long-term needs of WFP and fill gaps that WFP could not recruit for through traditional channels, especially in terms of the service packages, WFP will not be able to pay for these at the same technical and staffing levels once Sida discontinues its funding (often after maximum 12 months) due to the high cost. WFP and MSB have been unable to agree on 'cheaper' packages with less staff and materials, which has led to WFP taking over the management of these services. As these are recent developments, it is not clear what the impact of this will be on service delivery.

Monitoring and Evaluation using the PERs does not currently capture lessons learnt, but WFP is keen on developing that further and is supported by MSB in this process.

Cross cutting issues are not actively advanced by MSB in their deployments. However, there is a general recognition that the MSB has very good female Team Leaders.

Overall MSB is a valued partner for WFP, and is seen as essential to their service delivery during emergencies.

Annex 6 – Mozambique Field Visit

Field visit undertaken in June 2012 by Jock Baker (Team Leader), Rosario Matavele (National Consultant), Louis Anderson and Lars Johansson (MSB).

1 Executive Summary

This country report for Mozambique is one of three country studies that, together with three case studies of standby partners, will inform a global study of Sida's support to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB). The team for this field visit consisted of a national consultant and two MSB Mozambique staff led by an international consultant. Mozambique was selected as one of the few examples of a longer-term MSB project that is aimed at strengthening a country's capacity for responding to future disaster events.

Mozambique lies in a region cyclically threatened by extreme natural events (floods, drought, tropical cyclones, earthquakes, and epidemics) which occur mainly during the rainy season between October and March each year and is vulnerable to the effects of climate change.

MSB support the National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC) to improve the capacity of the Government of Mozambique to prepare for and respond to natural hazards. The overall expected results of the project are:

1. A functional emergency communications system is operational by 2013
2. By 2013 INGC has a strengthened capacity to coordinate and provide logistical support according to a clearly defined role
3. INGC has the capacity to coordinate disaster response through three fully operational mobile on-site operations coordination centre (CENOE) by 2013

MSB's approach in Mozambique was observed to be closely aligned with Sida's humanitarian assistance strategy, particularly Goal 6 *Strengthened national and local capacity to meet humanitarian needs* while supporting several other objectives, including the focus on DRR. However, Sida's current country programme strategy for Mozambique does not provide adequate guidance on the fit with MSB interventions.

There are a number of innovative, and potentially replicable, elements in this MSB project. This intervention began by seconding one expert funded by Sida HQ to support joint UN and government simulation exercises. The secondee successfully built partnerships and trust with INGC and with UN agencies and the MSB intervention is now in the first year of a three year capacity-building project for the INGC with a long term MSB presence in Mozambique funded by the Sida country programme.

MSB performance has met or even exceeded expectations. MSB's operations are seen to strengthen the humanitarian and DRR components of Sida's country programme, and to provide a financing model for Sida globally that can potentially help in bridging the relief to development gap. This project will also help increase the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of future MSB deployments during a major disaster.

Monitoring and reporting systems do not appear to adequately capture the many successful outcomes of this project and it seems timely to consolidate monitoring and learning activities into a systematic mid-term evaluation to capture learning that is both useful for the Mozambique project (e.g. assist with the development of viable exit strategies) and also to generate useful lessons that could be drawn upon when replicating similar models in other countries.

2 Introduction


Mozambique is located in a region cyclically threatened by extreme natural events (floods, drought, tropical cyclones, earthquakes, and epidemics) that predominate in the months of October to March each year (the rainy season). Historical records on natural disasters in Mozambique show that, over the past 52 years (1956-2008), there were 10 drought events, 20 flood events, 13 tropical cyclones, 18 epidemics and one earthquake. This is the context in which the present Contingency Plan was developed by INGC with support from the UN and other international partners.

This Contingency Plan defines the actions of each sector and each province in the component of readiness and response to the impacts of the most predictable disasters for the rainy and cyclone season. In addition the present Contingency Plan prioritises measures of education, awareness and early warning through the Local Disaster Risk Management Committees, arming them with effective instruments and resources to manage, in an effective and efficient manner, the risk associated with vulnerability to extreme natural phenomena



Figure 1 - Number & Type of Natural Disasters in Mozambique 1956-2008¹⁵⁹

Mozambique is relatively vulnerable to the effects of climate change, both short term phenomena such as tropical cyclones and droughts in addition to the longer term im-



pacts of sea level rise. More than 60% of Mozambique's total population lives along its extensive coastline, much of which is low-lying areas. Livelihoods are largely dependent on local resources, such as rain-fed farming and fishing¹⁶⁰.

2.1 Mozambique's National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC)

Established in 1999 through Government Decree No. 37/99 just before the floods devastated Mozambique's infrastructure and agricultural production in early 2000, the INGC operates under the Ministry of State Administration. Prior to the creation of the INGC, disaster management fell under the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a primary function of channelling foreign aid, whereas the newly formed INGC emphasised coordination, with a direct reporting line to the Prime Minister during a disaster response. Joao Ribeiro has been the INGC's Director General since 2008. He replaced Paulo Zucula who received widespread praise for his leadership of the INGC during the 2007 flood response. The major role and responsibilities of the INGC are:

- Coordination of all disaster management efforts (disaster prevention, disaster preparedness, search and rescue, and humanitarian aid);
- Mitigation efforts (such as collection and analysis of data), undertaking pre-

¹⁵⁹ Asante et al. (2009)

¹⁶⁰ *ibid*

paredness measures (e.g. awareness campaigns), and coordinating disaster response (including distribution of food, tents, and other supplies); and

- Responsibility for the resettlement of persons displaced by natural disasters through the Reconstruction Coordination Office (GACOR).

The INGC has also been a key force in national planning for climate change adaptation and has drafted disaster management legislation with support from the Red Cross that is currently being reviewed by Parliament.

Local Risk Management Committee – Gaza Province

2.2 History of Sida and MSB in Mozambique

Mozambique has been amongst the top 10 aid recipients of Swedish aid for the past two decades¹⁶¹. Sweden's current development cooperation with Mozambique has been largely defined by their 2008-2012 country strategy, which emphasises a rights perspective and the perspective of poor people on development. The Strategy aims to



reduce absolute poverty by promoting a democratic social development and rapid, sustainable and broad economic growth through a combination of budget support for poverty reduction, and targets three main sectors: democratic governance, agriculture and energy. There is relatively little detail in the strategy about disaster risk reduction or humanitarian response (which has been historically financed directly by Sida HQ) but envisages that financing of possible humanitarian relief and recovery efforts will be “channelled through the state budget as far as possible”. Similarly, there is no mention of MSB in the 2011-2014 global Sida humanitarian assistance strategy.

161 Source: OECD/DAC database <http://www.oecd.org/statistics/>

The Swedish Rescue Services Agency was previously active in Mozambique and, in addition to providing logistic support during the 2007 Mozambique flood response, they also organised training on evacuation of disaster survivors. Cooperation between MSB and INGC in Mozambique in the



context of the current DRR project dates from 2008 when MSB seconded an expert to UNDP/INGC with financial support from Sida to assist with the execution of the annual simulation exercise and draft two manuals to provide guidance in organizing simulations¹⁶². The INGC subsequently requested a continuation of MSB cooperation and in 2011 Sida Mozambique signed an agreement with MSB for SEK 19,320,000 for a three year project (Sida 2011) with an objective to improve the capacity of the Government of Mozambique to prepare for and respond to natural hazards. The overall expected results of the project are:

1. A functional emergency communications system is operational by 2013
2. By 2013 INGC has a strengthened capacity to coordinate and provide logistical support according to a clearly defined role
3. INGC has the capacity to coordinate disaster through three fully operational mobile on-site operations coordination centre (CENOE¹⁶³) by 2013

3. Review Objectives

The primary objective of this global review is to provide Sida and MSB staff and managers with lessons on how to best support and implement MSB's international operations. This review also aims to:

- Assist in the prioritisation of activity including role, comparative advantage, capacity, and expertise of MSB in its cooperation with partners.
- Help improve cooperation between Sida and MSB and the effectiveness of international operations funded by Sida.
- Improve the monitoring, evaluation and reporting on results of Sida- funded international operations.

162 One manual was targeted at a community level and other at district, province and national levels.

163 Centro Nacional Operativo de Emergencia "CENOE"

This country report for Mozambique is one of three country studies that, together with three case studies of standby partners, will inform a global study of Sida's Support to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB).

4. Methodology

The methodology for this country visit relied on a combination of document reviews, focus group discussions and key informant interviews. A limited amount of data collection took place at the level of disaster-affected communities, though the team held focus group discussions with two community-level disaster management committees during the field visit to Gaza Province. The Team Leader and Deputy Team Leaders for MSB in Mozambique participated in the field visit and joined most of the interviews. A national consultant with a background in agriculture and agribusiness, who is a native of Gaza Province, helped to round out the team. In addition to providing inputs relevant to the local context and technical skills, he also served as the team's interpreter for community groups. A debriefing session was held with the MSB Team Leader and his Deputy at the end of mission, which helped to fill data gaps, validate findings and recommendations. MSB staff in Mozambique also provided feedback on an initial draft of this report prior to submission to the Management Group. The lists of key documents reviewed and persons interviewed in connection with the Mozambique country visit may be found in Annexes.

4.1 Limitations of the study

This country visit lasted only five days, of which two days were spent outside Maputo in Gaza Province. While this province was the one that had been most affected during 2007 and the – much more extensive – 2000 flood disaster, its relatively easy access to Maputo makes it unrepresentative of many disaster-prone areas of Mozambique where response capacities are reportedly much lower. At the same time, MSB's approach to the DRR project has been to focus initially on building capacity and trust at a central level, and then move out to provincial level; this was just starting at the time this mission took place. However, the MSB team had already conducted assessments in outlying areas and appeared to be appropriately adapting their approach.

It is worth mentioning that the participation of the MSB Team Leader and Deputy Team Leader in interviews with external stakeholders was another limitation. Interviewees were encouraged to speak openly, and while most appeared to accept this invitation at face value and readily offered constructive criticism, others may have felt constrained. The Management Group for this Review encouraged this kind of participatory approach. A related limitation, noted throughout the study, is the risk-averse tendency noticed amongst some standby partner interviewees; they do not want to compromise their agency's relationship with Sida, who is clearly viewed as a good donor.

There was an opportunity for the (independent) Team Leader to do some informal verification and, on balance, it is felt that the benefits of MSB staff to the team significantly outweighed any negative aspects, especially given the relatively short amount of time allocated to collecting and validating data, and that this approach helped to promote real-time learning for MSB staff along with a sense of ownership for findings and recommendations.

Finally, in common with the study as a whole, this review has mainly focused on the period from 2008 on, due in part to challenges in accessing older data and also because of the need to focus on recent and probable future trends.

5. Summary of Findings

5.1 Relevance

We observed MSB's approach in Mozambique to be closely aligned with Sida's humanitarian assistance strategy, particularly Goal 6 *Strengthened national and local capacity to meet humanitarian needs*, while supporting several other objectives, including a strategic focus on DRR. At the same time, Sida's current country programme strategy does not provide much guidance on how the MSB intervention provides support, even though it may be implicit. The country strategy only mentions global Sida support to support any future disaster response, along with potential budget support for the Mozambican government to increase their disaster response capacity.

There are a number of innovative elements in the MSB project in Mozambique. The MSB DRR intervention began relatively modestly with a secondment of one expert funded by the humanitarian section at Sida HQ to support joint UN and government simulation exercises. The secondee successfully built partnerships with INGC and with the UN Country team, and the MSB intervention is now in the first year of a three-year capacity-building project for the INGC with a long-term MSB presence in Mozambique funded by the Sida country programme. The fact that the Team Leader is fluent in Portuguese with an excellent knowledge of the local context has clearly been an important contribution to MSB's achievements, whereas there were reports of other deployed staff encountering challenges with language issues.

Following the initial UN secondment, INGC became the primary MSB partner. Links have been maintained with the UN, notably WFP, given their role as the cluster lead agency for Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC) and logistics. MSB has also established some links with academics working in the area of early warning, climate change and disaster risk reduction. Given the project focus on use of ETC for early warning systems, the lack of a collaborative relationship/partnership with the private sector is a gap¹⁶⁴.

As described above, MSB's DRR interventions began with secondment of a single expert to UNDP. MSB based their intervention in Mozambique on high quality rolling needs assessments. Communications in support of disaster operations were identified as a significant gap by several different stakeholders along with recognition of MSB's comparative advantage in this area. While MSB has used their expertise in telecommunications, IT and disaster simulations to good effect, relatively little attention has been given to information management; this was another area identified by

¹⁶⁴ E.g., <http://www.enlightenmenteconomics.com/about-diane/assets/disasterreport.pdf>

interviewees (and during simulation exercises) as a significant gap. Greater attention to information management, similar to MSB's support to simulations, is likely to have a significant positive impact on Mozambique's overall capacity to prepare for and respond to disasters. Such "strategic leverage" could be achieved while maintaining a relatively focused approach to information management that directly supports MSB's current project objectives.

MSB has succeeded in building trust with INGC by delivering what has been promised using appropriate approaches, contrasting to examples of other agencies cited by interviewees and observed who did not deliver on their commitments to build INGC capacity. In one observed case, the recruitment of INGC senior staff by a UN agency actually appeared to undermine the capacity of INGC, at least in the short term.

5.2 Efficiency and effectiveness

MSB currently has two bilateral agreements in place for its current intervention in Mozambique: an agreement signed in July 2011 with Sida Mozambique and a MoU with INGC signed in November 2011. Based on reviews of relevant documents, observations by the study team and separate key informant interviews with Sida Mozambique, INGC and MSB implementation has overall been in line with expectations. There is a good working relationship between MSB and the Sida staff in Mozambique, which is helping Sida to strengthen the humanitarian and DRR component of their country programme, and to provide a potential financing model for Sida that can help to bridge the relief to development gap.

Table 1 – MSB Interventions in Mozambique since 2008

MSB Intervention	Timeframe	Intervention category	Intervention type	Partner (client)	Financial source	Budget (MSEK)
Training experts	Sep 2008 - Feb 2009	DRR	Preparedness planning	UNDP	Sida HQ framework	1.01
Catastrophe handling	Oct 2009 – June 2010	DRR	Strengthening catastrophe preparedness	Foreign authorities/ bilateral	Sida HQ framework	2.34
ICT-technician	Jan 2010 - Apr 2010	Humanitarian	ICT (modules and secondment within IT)	WFP	Sida HQ framework	0.44
INGC capacity development	Jun 2011- Jun 2014	Disaster risk reduction	Strengthening catastrophe preparedness	INGC	Sida Mozambique	19.32

There have been three simulations focusing on disaster response in Mozambique over the past three years. The first one was UN-led, the second was jointly led by the UN and INGC, and the most recent simulation was INGC-led. While these have clearly been useful in building national emergency preparedness, there is a significant participation by senior political observers and the media and, based on accounts of several key informants, these tend to be stage-managed affairs that minimise risks as much as possible. Such an approach is valuable in promoting political support and mobilising budgetary resources, but the lack of real challenges reduces the potential for learning and improvement.

While the current approach of MSB to ongoing assessment that prioritises INGC leadership and ensures support appears to be working well, there is a need to look at ways to increase impact and ensure sustainability; notably through the adoption of a more strategic results-based approach and the development of a viable exit strategy. A related question is whether MSB should engage national staff for longer-term projects, as this could potentially help to build national capacities and increase efficiency.

MSB's steady and measured approach has resulted in INGC seeing MSB as a reliable partner that delivers what they promise. A number of interviewees noted that, unlike MSB, most international agencies in Mozambique allocate most of their humanitarian resources during times of response, and do not place a high priority on capacity building for disaster preparedness. These factors, along with an awareness by INGC senior staff¹⁶⁵ of the significant capacity and range of services MSB provides around the world, has created expectations in INGC that MSB should help fill capacity gaps in other areas.

It is thus no surprise that INGC perceives MSB as hesitant in dealing with their requests for support. This appears to be due to a combination of the “pilot” status of this MSB intervention, which is trying out new approaches, a lack of clarity about how they fit into Sida Mozambique's country programme, a reasonable concern about how much MSB should take on, and how much MSB should compensate for performance gaps in other international agencies that potentially undermine the ability to meet their (and INGC's) objectives.

A continuing challenge faced by MSB and other international agencies is the variable capacity of national counterparts, both in INGC and national NGOs. Contributing factors to this include: relatively low educational levels in the aftermath of a prolonged conflict, the remoteness of many areas of Mozambique, and higher salaries offered by international agencies that cause staff retention problems for INGC and NGOs.

5.3 Monitoring, evaluation and reporting on results

With an overall goal for this project to “*Contribute towards reducing the vulnerability of men, women, boys and girls to natural hazards in Mozambique*” there is a corresponding results framework and detailed risk management analysis integrated into the project design. However, indicators tend to be output-focused, and observed monitoring and reporting systems resemble those used by MSB for short-term deployments. On the other hand, there is relatively more consultation with Sida at the country level, and annual project management reviews and lessons learned workshops are foreseen in the work plan.

¹⁶⁵ The INGC Director has visited MSB HQ in Karlstadt


The overall impression is that monitoring and reporting systems do not adequately capture the many successful outcomes of this project. This is not aided by the lack of clarity in Sida's country strategy regarding their approach to DRR and humanitarian actions and the links to the MSB project (although consistency with the country and global strategy can be implied). These factors, along with the project's current reputation as a good practice pilot, suggest that MSB and Sida are not maximising the learning potential. A more strategic and outcome-focused approach should also help with identifying viable exit strategies.

Unlike other MSB standby partners, the INGC does not have a formal opportunity to provide feedback on individual performance of MSB staff, which is probably linked to the lack of such a system for secondees.

5.4 Coordination

The disaster management system in Mozambique provides INGC with a mandate for an important sectoral coordination role. UN agencies and NGOs are integrated into this system, although some clusters are being maintained like the logistics and ETC clusters. MSB in Mozambique has shown to be open to coordination with other humanitarian actors, but as illustrated below; their main interface with other actors is as support to INGC's interactions with other actors. MSB's direct engagement with UN-led coordination mechanisms is largely limited to the ETC and the Logistics Cluster - both led by WFP. While the emphasis given to supporting INGC's leadership is appropriate the result is that, with the exception of WFP, MSB has quite a low profile amongst international agencies, most of whom demonstrated a very limited awareness of MSB project objectives and activities.

Figure 2 – Key Coordination Groups for the MSB Project in Mozambique¹⁶⁶



166 Graphic from the 2010 MSB Project Proposal

UNDP also works with the INGC, and other international agencies through a project designed to strengthen national capacities at all levels to reduce the risks associated with disasters, and to mitigate the impacts of disasters on vulnerable populations in the country¹⁶⁷. This ambitious project should be one of the primary forms of international support to strengthening DRR capacities of the Mozambique government, but key informant interviews indicated that UNDP has experienced difficulty in meeting project objectives. One cited example was the extended delay in seconding a Chief Technical Adviser to support INGC. An OCHA deployment of an Information Manager during 2011 to help INGC and the UN set up information systems for early warning and disaster management was reportedly unproductive. As described above, this situation has contributed to expectations within INGC that MSB should expand their capacity building role.

5.5 Cross-cutting issues

The strong emphasis on DRR of MSB interventions in the Mozambique context has meant that DRR has been fully incorporated into the project design, along with the potential effects of climate change along with related environmental factors. As a consequence, the information system being developed integrates current and predicted information on climate hazards (cyclones, floods and droughts) and analysing potential impacts on the physical and social vulnerabilities (roads, infrastructure, poverty levels, sector dependencies).

A baseline assessment for gender to find important points of contact in the area of gender equality and disaster management was reportedly done to identify documentation on how INGC works with gender in the internal organisation and to identify potential entry points in the project where a gender perspective could be applied. There is however relatively little evidence of how this had been applied on gender issues. Gender balance of the team could be a concern; the three current members of the current MSB team are all male, although there have been women members on the team in the past. There were no immediately observable negative impacts, but experiences elsewhere suggest that MSB tend to be respected as a role model for gender equality.

6. Analysis and Conclusions

The conclusion from this brief review is that MSB intervention in Mozambique has yielded some very promising results, and Sida and MSB should together look at replicating and expanding similar activities based on learning from Mozambique in other countries in support of Sida country programmes. Not only could MSB help support Sida's efforts to strengthen national disaster management capacities as part of their

¹⁶⁷ <http://www.undp.org.mz/en/What-we-do/Crisis-and-Environment/Ongoing-Projects/Strengthening-Local-Risk-Management-and-Mainstreaming-Disaster-Risk-Reduction-DRR>

humanitarian strategy, but such projects would help increase the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of any deployments of MSB staff during future major disasters.

6.1 Relevance

Since information management was widely identified as a gap in disaster preparedness capacity, additional support in this area from MSB based on their existing project represents a strategic opportunity to greatly increase the overall efficiency and effectiveness of INGC-led responses. Information management is widely recognised amongst humanitarian actors as one of MSB's niche areas and this in turn suggests that there is some merit in developing criteria for prioritising interventions that:

- Correspond to MSB core competencies;
- Have strategic leverage potential (e.g. relatively small-scale technical support for simulations, information management coupled with communications hardware);
- Expand coverage (e.g. adopt a training-of-trainers approach to encourage replication of smaller scale simulation exercises to achieve greater coverage and mitigate risks);
- Interventions that have a good sustainability potential.

6.2 Efficiency and Effectiveness

Overall MSB performance has been in line with expectations. MSB's operations are helping Sida in Mozambique to strengthen the humanitarian and DRR component of their country programme and this experience provides a financing model for Sida globally which can potentially help to bridge the relief to development gap.

A continuing challenge faced by MSB and other international agencies is the variable capacity, not only of national counterparts but also international agencies that have complementary roles. Attention needs to be devoted to putting viable exit strategies in place, which should include assessment of capacities and potential of non-government entities, including the private sector, without undermining the lead role of the government in a disaster response. On a related note, it would be worth looking at potential value-added for longer term projects of involving national counterparts, interns and/or national staff to support MSB operations.

6.3 Monitoring, evaluation and reporting on results

Monitoring and reporting systems do not appear to adequately capture the many successful outcomes of this project. Indicators for the results framework tend to be output-focused, with monitoring and reporting systems resembling those used by MSB for short-term deployments; although there is relatively more consultation with Sida at country level complemented by annual project management reviews and lessons learned workshops. Sida's country strategy does not adequately articulate approaches to DRR, and humanitarian action and the links to the MSB project are unclear. A more strategic and outcome-focused approach would help with identifying viable exit strategies.

MSB needs to ensure that all their standby partners, including host government counterparts like INGC, are given a formal opportunity to provide feedback on individual performance of MSB staff.

Rather than relatively frequent visits from HQs that increase transaction costs, it would be worth consolidating both monitoring and learning activities into a systematic mid-term evaluation to capture learning for the Mozambique project, assist with the development of viable exit strategies, and generate useful lessons that could be drawn upon when replicating similar models in other countries. The final year of the project should ensure that a significant amount of time is allocated to focus on the monitoring and implementation of the exit strategy.

6.4 Coordination

While it is appropriate for MSB to take a “back seat” and support INGC’s leadership, it will be important for MSB in Mozambique to improve communications and raise awareness of MSB project objectives and activities.

7. List of Persons Met (in Mozambique)

1. Louis Anderson- MSB Country Team Leader
2. Lars Johansson – MSB Deputy Team Leader
3. Joao Ribeiro – INCG Director General
4. Bonifacio Antonio - INGC Officer
5. Elias Massicane – INGC Officer
6. Lola de Castro – WFP Mozambique Country Representative & Chair of the HCT
7. Mohamed Razak - Logistics Cluster Coordinator, WFP Mozambique
8. Benedito Januario - Communications Officer & ETC Cluster Coordinator, WFP Mozambique
9. Joao Jussar - Program Officer, SIDA Mozambique
10. Titos Kuuyour – UNDP DRR advisor
11. Antonio Queface – INGC Advisor
12. Casimiro Sande, Emergency Support Analyst, UN Representative’s Office
13. Virginia Jose Malauene – Head of Technical Department, INGC Gaza Province
14. Abel Malhaieie and members of Local Committee of Risk Management – Chubuto, Gaza Province,
15. Afonso Macucule and members of Local Committee of Risk Management – Guija, Gaza province.

8. List of Persons Met (MSB HQ in Stockholm)

1. Leif Jonnson - Head of Regional Desk for Western, Eastern and Southern Africa Coordination & Operations Department, MSB HQ
2. Carl-Johan Bäckström – Projektledare, Enheten för insatser Avdelningen för samordning och insats Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (MSB)

9. Key References

- Abreu, Casimiro (2009) Mozambique: [National progress report on the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action](#) (2009-2011). INGC.
- Asante et al. (2009) Study on the Impact of Climate Change on Disaster Risk in Mozambique: Synthesis Report. INGC Mozambique.
- GFDRR et al. (2009) Economic vulnerability and disaster risk assessment in Malawi and Mozambique. Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recov-

ery (GFDRR); International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI); RMSI Pvt Ltd.; and the World Bank

- IFRC (2012) [IDRL in Mozambique - International Disaster Response Law \(IDRL\) in Mozambique](#) : An analysis of the legal preparedness of Mozambique for facilitating and regulating international disaster response operations - Summary Version.
- Ministry for the Co-ordination of Environmental Affairs (2007) National Adaptation Plan of Action.
- Mozambique Humanitarian Country Team (2010) Inter-Agency Contingency Plan. United Nations in Mozambique.
- MSB (2010) Strengthening Cooperation for Disaster Risk Reduction in Mozambique. MSB Workshop Report
- MSB (2010) Support to Capacity Development in Disaster Preparedness and Risk Reduction with INGC, Mozambique. Annual Results Progress Report 1/6/11 – 30/11/11
- MSB (2011) National Simulation Exercise (SIMEX). MSB Mozambique internal report.
- MSB & INGC (2010) Concept Note: INGC - MSB Collaboration to address Climate Change Adaptation in Mozambique.
- MSB & INGC (2011) Memorandum of Understanding between the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency and INGC.
- Sida (2011) Arrangement between Sida and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency on Support to Capacity Development in Disaster Preparedness and Risk Reduction during 1 June 2011 to 30 June 2014.
- Sida (2008) Strategy for development cooperation with Mozambique September 2008 – December 2012.
- Queface, A. and Tadross, M. (2009) Main report: INGC Climate Change Report: Study on the impact of climate change on disaster risk in Mozambique. INGC, Mozambique.
- UNDP (2010) Disaster Risk Assessment in Mozambique: A Comprehensive Country Situation Analysis. UNDP Mozambique.

10. Gaza Province Field visit itinerary

Tuesday 12 of June 2012: Maputo, departure time, 09.00 – Xai-xai 12.30, 14.30 – Meeting with INCG regional delegation

Wednesday 13 of June 2012: Xai-Xai departure 8.00, Chibuto 10.00, Guija 14.00, Chockwe 15.00 – Maputo – 19.00. Field observations and meetings with Local Risk Management Committees and other community members.

Annex 7 – Ethiopia Field Visit

Field visit undertaken June 2012 by Jock Baker (Team Leader), Yitbarek Yohannes (National Consultant), Ulrika Eden and Oliver Hochedez (MSB).

1. Executive Summary

This country report for Ethiopia is one of three country studies that, together with three case studies of standby partners, inform a global study of Sida's Support to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) to improve the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of its operations. Ethiopia was selected as a recent example of a country where significant resources have been invested by Sida and MSB, and offers insight into the functioning of the International Humanitarian Partnership (IHP) where MSB plays a lead role. We examined the UNHCR and WFP base camp and UNHCR vehicle workshop "packages" that were provided as in-kind assistance by IHP in Dollo Ado from July 2011 to support an international humanitarian response to an influx of Somali refugees.

MSB has often faced challenges to put in place the necessary facilities due to lack of adequate information about support needs. In the case of Dollo Ado, this was addressed by the deployment of a MSB staff member during the early phases of the operation to carry out a comprehensive needs assessment that was an extremely useful starting point for ensuring that IHP support was effectively meeting the needs of humanitarian staff. With the benefit of hindsight, there were two important gaps that significantly affected operations. One was that UNHCR's projection that the operation would last for less than a year proved overly optimistic. The second gap was that exit strategies were not considered at the needs assessment stage. A year later, there was little evidence of the existence of a coherent exit strategy for either the base camp or the workshop.

Both UNHCR and WFP felt that support provided by IHP/MSB had provided critical support to their humanitarian operations. The construction of the base camp and workshop took place from August 2011 onwards when humanitarian staff were more than fully occupied with coping with a large influx of refugees. IHP/MSB services were generally perceived as being of high quality, timely, flexible and dependable.

Dollo Ado offers a number of examples of potential advantages of IHP collaboration. Examples include cost sharing and MSB stepping in to take over some key ac-

tivities to ensure continuity after the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW)¹⁶⁸ withdrew from Ethiopia after short notice towards the end of 2011.

The assessment of the review team is that the IHP experience in Ethiopia was positive overall; although improvements could certainly be made. MSB should continue to strengthen this collaborative model based on relevant learning from Ethiopia; although they could make more use of lessons to help standby partners make more informed decisions about base camp design, maintenance arrangements and developing viable exit strategies. This IHP experience in Ethiopia also appears to demonstrate the cost-efficiency of a longer-term Team Leader position for high-value operations because of, for example, their ability to address many of the problems consistently encountered in operations where there is high turnover of deployed staff, or by improving quality using performance monitoring systems.

2. Introduction

Ethiopia shares long and porous borders with six countries, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan, and Somalia in a region where political, social and environmental challenges have led to massive displacements. Ethiopia hosts refugees from Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia, with the majority coming from Somalia.

According to UNHCR data, by July 2011, some 67 per cent of the refugees within the country, or 160,000 people, were of Somali origin, representing a population increase of over 75%¹⁶⁹. Six new refugee camps have been opened to accommodate Somalis over the past five years, with two camps in eastern Ethiopia, near Jijiga, and four in the southeast, around Dollo Ado. The number of new arrivals increased dramatically in 2011 due to the combined effects of drought, famine and insecurity in Somalia, with up to 23,000 people arriving per month. At the time of the field visit, the rate of new arrivals in Dollo Ado had decreased to 100-150/day while showing no signs of ceasing.

As of June 2012, the Ethiopian Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) office in Dollo Addo reported 155,000 refugees living in 5 camps.

¹⁶⁸ The Federal Agency for Technical Relief, or Bundesanstalt Technisches Hilfswerk (THW) in German, is a civil protection organisation that is also a member of the IHP that is controlled by the German federal government's Ministry of Interior.

¹⁶⁹ UNHCR Revised Appeal for 2011 <http://www.unhcr.org/4cd95fcc9.html>

Location of Refugee Camps in Ethiopia and surrounding countries¹⁷⁰

2.1 Ethiopian Government

Responsibilities for emergency response are mainly divided between the Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs¹⁷¹ (ARRA) and Disaster Prevention & Preparedness and Food Security Sector (DPP&FS) under the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA).

The Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) is the government structure responsible for the implementation of refugee protection and assistance activities in Ethiopia.

ARRA's Vision: The safety and security of refugees during their stay in Ethiopia and durable solutions to their problems through voluntary repatriation to their respective countries of origin in safety and dignity and their resettlement to other countries.

The Government of Ethiopia enacted the National Refugee Legislation in July 2004 based on the principles entailed in 1951 UN Refugee Convention and its Protocol of 1967 as well as on the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee problems in Africa. ARRA was established in 1988 after an influx of nearly a million refugees from Sudan and Somalia. ARRA implements refugee protection and assistance activities in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner

¹⁷⁰ UNHCR Appeal for 2012

¹⁷¹ <http://www.arra.org.et/>

for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Program (WFP) and other humanitarian organisations.

As of February 2010 ARRA had some 700 employees, and operated in 12 refugee camps, 4 sub-offices, 2 field offices and its Headquarter is in the capital Addis Ababa.


2.2 International Humanitarian Partnership

The International Humanitarian Partnership (IHP) was established in 1995 as an informal network by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) and the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) to provide multi-national collaborative support to humanitarian operations of the United Nations. There are now seven members following the addition of government agencies from Germany, Finland, Norway and Estonia. With a rotating the chair, The IHP provides a working example of coordinated standby partners and its most visible activities have been the construction and maintenance of base camps for humanitarian staff during responses to large-scale emergencies. The UNHCR and WFP base camps in Dollo Ado constructed in mid-2011 during a large influx of Somali refugees represent recent examples of this collaboration.

2.3 History of Sida and MSB in Ethiopia

Ethiopia has been amongst one of the top ten recipients of Swedish foreign aid for several years, although most of this has been channelled via UN agencies and NGOs due to, among other factors, tensions about the government's approach to human rights. Another result of the current relationship with the government is that Sida has not updated their country strategy since the 2003-2007 version where Sida's approach to humanitarian actions is described as *"...for the purpose of alleviating the effects of armed conflict and natural disasters, humanitarian assistance can be channeled via the DPPC, Swedish/international NGOs or UN bodies. Humanitarian aid must be provided in such a way that it does not undermine long-term development of the agricultural sector"*.

Figure 1. Sweden Foreign Direct Aid Flows to Ethiopia 2002 – 2010¹⁷²



¹⁷² Source OECD-DAC (data accessed July 30, 2012)

MSB has a long history of deployments to Ethiopia over the years. The current review has focused on the MSB/IHP support to set up a vehicle workshop for UNHCR and base camps for UNHCR and WFP in Dollo Ado in 2011.

3. Review objectives and methodology

The primary objective of this global review is to provide Sida and MSB staff and managers with lessons on how to best support and implement MSB's international operations. This review also aims to:

- Assist in the prioritisation of activity including role, comparative advantage, capacity, and expertise of MSB in its cooperation with partners.
- Help improve cooperation between Sida and MSB and the effectiveness of international operations funded by Sida.
- Improve the monitoring, evaluation and reporting on results of Sida-funded international operations.

The team for this field visit consisted of a national consultant and two MSB staff, one from MSB HQ and the IHP Team Leader in Ethiopia, who was on contract with MSB. The team was led by an international consultant. Data collection was done by means of key informant interviews (KIIs), document research, structured focus group discussions, observations during a field visit to Dollo Ado and culminated in a debriefing session with the two MSB staff on the team to validate findings and refine recommendations.

3.1 Limitations of the study

This country visit lasted only five days, of which just over a day was spent visiting Dollo Ado on the Somalia Border. The team was able to pay a brief visit to the refugee reception and processing centre on the border, but otherwise did not meet with affected refugee populations.

Another limitation was the participation of the two MSB staff on the team in interviews with external stakeholders. Interviewees were encouraged to speak openly, and while most appeared to accept this invitation at face value and readily offered constructive criticism, others may have felt constrained. The Management Group for this Review had encouraged this kind of participatory approach. A related limitation, noted throughout the study, is a risk-averse tendency amongst some standby partner interviewees; they do not want to compromise their agency's relationship with Sida, who is clearly viewed as a good donor.

Nevertheless, there were some opportunities for the (independent) Team Leader to verify findings, and, on balance, it is felt that the benefits of MSB staff in the team balanced out the negative aspects, especially given the relatively short amount of time allocated to collecting and validating data; this approach helped to promote real-time learning for MSB staff along with ownership of findings and lessons.


Finally, this review has mainly focused from 2008 onwards due, in part, to challenges in accessing older data, and also due to the emphasis in the TOR of the need to focus on recent and probable future trends to promote learning.

4. Summary of findings and analysis

4.1 Relevance

Figure 2. Numbers of newly-arriving Somali refugees into Dollo-Ado camps¹⁷³

MSB has often faced challenges to put necessary facilities in place, due to a lack of adequate information about support needs. In the case of Dollo Ado, this was addressed by the deployment of a MSB staff member during the early phases of the operation to join a UNHCR needs assessment mission in July 2011. Looking back over the past 11 months since this was done, this was overall an extremely useful starting point to ensure that IHP support corresponded to the needs of UN staff. With the benefit of hindsight, however, there were two significant gaps in the MSB assessment. One was UNHCR's projection of both the number of international staff to be accommodated, and that the anticipated lifespan of the operation proved overly optimistic given the high arrival rates and expectations about the early resolution of the conflict in Somalia. The relevant extract from the assessment report is below:



UNHCR estimates that they will have an increase of staff from around 4 to around 20 international staff members based in the area. In terms of national staff, the increase in numbers will be even higher. There will also be several short-term missions such as assessments and official visits etc. It is expected that the above international staffing structure will remain for 8-10 months and then there will be a minor shift from international to national staff as the situation will stabilise. However, there will still be around 10-15 international staff positions for long-term assignments. (Lindqvist 2011, page 5)

¹⁷³ UNHCR (2011)

According to interviewees in Dollo Ado, the number of staff staying in the UNHCR compound over the past year have largely exceeded the upper estimate, and have remained at around 40 (double the projected number) for extended periods. Space is often at a premium and has put a strain on common facilities (notably washing and toilet facilities). It is now clear that UNHCR is likely to have a significant operation for many years to come, and they are now faced with the challenge of building a second base closer to refugee camps. Given Dollo Ado's status as the administrative centre and primary arrival point for refugees, UNHCR is currently planning to convert the existing compound into something more suitable for longer-term use, and they are under pressure from the government to construct permanent structures that can be handed over after refugee operations wind down. In the meantime, WFP is being asked by a number of UN agencies to provide accommodation in their compound.

The other significant gap was that exit strategies (and the related implications for selecting design and management options) were not considered at the needs assessment stage. UN staff openly admitted their limited knowledge about how to design or decide on appropriate exit strategies for base camp and fleet management operations. They also pointed out that they were obliged to focus on refugee operations, and had limited time to devote to base camp or workshop management issues. It is clear that the technical expertise of standby partners is not only needed when implementing activities, but it is also crucial when advising and preparing partners for an eventual handover.

Almost a year after the establishment of the base camp and the workshop in Dollo Ado, there was little evidence of the existence of a coherent exit strategy for either one. According to the IHP Letters of Agreement, UNHCR and WFP were not obliged to nominate or train counterparts, or otherwise progressively assume management of base camps or the vehicle workshop. UNHCR staff reported recurring challenges with organising adequate food catering services. This raises the question as to why, in a country like Ethiopia with a thriving hospitality/hotel industry, IHP didn't consider the private sector during the assessment or when developing exit strategies. It seems difficult to justify successive contract extensions for relatively expensive international standby partners to manage UNHCR and WFP base camp operations without a clear idea of what would happen after their departure.

The vehicle workshop was progressively being handed over to a UNHCR national NGO partner, but the training provided by IHP staff largely focused on vehicle maintenance even while NGO staff lacked relevant information and the management tools to be able to effectively manage operations. As an example, neither the NGO nor the UNHCR Sub-Office were aware of what had been allocated as a budget for spare parts while vehicles sat idle because they had been informed by the UNHCR Branch Office in Addis that there were insufficient funds for spare parts in the budget.

The IHP Team Leader position based in Addis Ababa was established quite late into the operation in early 2012. However, it was clear from observations and feedback from UNHCR and deployed staff that a longer-term Team Leader position can play a number of useful roles, which could significantly add value to deployments by, for example:

- Acting as the main liaison and interface between standby partners and deployed staff to clarify partner commitments and obligations, support the partner in addressing human resource issues and generally maximise the efficiency and effectiveness of deployed staff. In other words, since Team Leaders tend to have a good understanding both of protocols and of partners' ways of working, they could help to address many of the problem areas and misunderstandings that consistently surface during deployments, particularly those involving large numbers of staff with short assignment lengths.
- Strengthening interagency coordination (see the coordination section below for more detail).
- Systematically monitor performance against a results framework (including ensuring appropriate attention is given to cross-cutting issues);
- Oversee implementation of an exit strategy.
 - The TOR for the current Team Leader encompasses only the first two points. The third and fourth points emerged from discussions with MSB staff during the field visit. The Team Leader position certainly cannot be justified for all MSB or IHP operations, but appears to be a cost-effective proposition for high value operations such as base camps or longer-term operations.
 - Both UNHCR and WFP felt that the support provided by IHP/MSB had been critical to their operations. The construction of the base camp and workshop took place from August 2011 onwards when humanitarian staff was completely focused on coping with a large influx of refugees. A suggestion for improvement, made separately by both UNHCR and WFP senior staff, was that they would have preferred that IHP/MSB could have provided them with different options for base camp construction, along with pros and cons, during the initial planning phase, since this would have helped mitigate some of the subsequent challenges. WFP senior management acknowledged, for example, that UNHCR's base camp had been much better designed than WFP's and that they would have preferred to have been presented with more options at an earlier stage.

4.2 Efficiency and effectiveness

Dollo Ado offers a number of examples of potential advantages of IHP collaboration. One such example is of course cost sharing for this multi-million dollar operation¹⁷⁴. Another example is provided by MSB stepping in to take over some key activities, including recruitment of the current IHP Team Leader, in order to ensure continuity after THW ended their mission in Ethiopia at relatively short notice towards

¹⁷⁴ MSB's contribution alone amounted to over SEK 12.8 million

the end of 2011 due to the concerns of the German Federal Ministry of the Interior about the security of deployed staff¹⁷⁵.

MSB staff is seen as competent and flexible and able to hit the ground running. In one case, MSB was actually too timely; due to unforeseen delays in delivery of WFP construction materials IHP/MSB staff arrived on the ground 3 weeks before materials arrived, and the team had to be allocated to other tasks in the meantime, representing a loss of efficiency.

The existence of two base camps 100 metres apart in Dollo Ado, one UNHCR and one WFP, each with their own camp management arrangements and infrastructure appears to have had adverse social and efficiency impacts. According to interviewees from both UNHCR and WFP, this separation was attributed mainly to the poor relationship between the two heads of UNHCR and WFP operations in Dollo Ado when camps were being set up. Management has since changed, and relations between staff of the two agencies were very good at the time of the field visit. Both WFP and UNHCR managers expressed regret that they had not been constructed together. This appears to be another reason for IHP/MSB staff to be in a position to clearly lay out options for standby partners, along with pros and cons. This example also raises when it may be appropriate for MSB/IHP to advocate for good practice when the standby partners makes a questionable decision that potentially impacts the effectiveness and efficiency of the operation.

IHP/MSB services were perceived as being of high quality, timely, flexible and dependable. The only complaints heard from UNHCR interviewees related to isolated cases of seconded staff due to inappropriate attitude and approaches; but there was unanimous praise for their technical performance. IHP made good use of regional procurement options, notably in Dubai, although some challenges were faced with non-standardised supplies and sub-standard quality of some supplies. An indicator of the value that UNHCR places on IHP/MSB seconded staff is their agreement to cover part or all of their costs¹⁷⁶.

MSB/IHP staff generally found it relatively easier to work with WFP than with UNHCR in Ethiopia. Based on interviews and a review of available data, this was attributed to the higher quality of WFP's logistics systems and capacities relative to UNHCR. There have also been more challenges with UNHCR's management. For example, a lack of awareness of UNHCR senior staff in Ethiopia about relevant provisions in the Global Partner Agreement with MSB have contributed to misunderstandings, and may have increased transaction costs when setting accommodation fees and application of R & R policies to MSB seconded staff.

¹⁷⁵ This was the only government standby partner to take such measures.

¹⁷⁶ At the time of the field visit, UNHCR was covering 50% of the cost of the MSB camp manager and 100% of the MSB nurse for the base camp.

4.3 Monitoring, evaluation and reporting on results

Periodic reports are submitted to IHP (through MSB, as the current lead). Reporting systems being used by IHP Ethiopia are standard for short-term deployments with a heavy emphasis on operations and outputs. While assessing the contributions of individual staff to the operation would not make sense, with long-term investment “packages” like high value base camps and vehicle workshops there should be scope to look at developing a relatively simple results framework, which includes outcome-level indicators.

Neither UNHCR nor WFP appear to have been given a formal opportunity to provide feedback on individual performance of MSB staff. There was reportedly a final meeting between IHP and WFP after the compound was handed over towards the end of 2011 when WFP gave verbal feedback to IHP regarding performance and lessons learned. However, the review team could not locate a written record of this discussion.

4.4 Coordination

As mentioned above under the Relevance section, the IHP Team Leader position based in Addis Ababa plays a useful coordination role, notably facilitating the coordination and collaboration between deployed staff and the receiving standby partner. He has also strengthened coordination with other humanitarian agencies through engagement with UN-led clusters and other interagency coordination mechanisms although there appears to be little awareness of the range of IHP activities amongst many international agencies and donors, including Sida in Addis Ababa.

4.5 Cross-cutting issues

There is a commitment in the 2008 Agreement with UNHCR to achieving a gender balance in teams of deployed staff and that teams are briefed on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and understand its implications. The latest Agreement with WFP, signed by SRSA in 2003, makes no mention of gender issues. In fact, apart from the reference to the UN Resolutions, there are no other descriptions of commitments to cross-cutting issues in the existing Agreements with either UNHCR or WFP.

Cross-cutting issues, notably gender, environment and conflict analysis (“do no harm”), are all relevant in the Dollo Ado context. However, based on available evidence, none of these issues appear to have received particular attention during this IHP operation. Apart from the nursing position, very few females were deployed. Two issues surfaced during the team’s brief visit to Dollo Ado in relation to cross-cutting issues, one was about the less-than-ideal (from a women’s perspective) site of the ablution blocks. The other was the relative lack of environmental considerations in the design of the base camp. It was felt that, given MSB’s extensive experience with planning and managing base camps, they should have been able to take environmental considerations into account. As it was, this issue did not even figure in the initial needs assessment.

There was no evidence that IHP/MSB had conducted a conflict analysis (e.g. “do no harm” analysis) or risk assessment when planning their interventions. Rather, the impression gained was that this analysis was left up to WFP and, especially, UNHCR.

Finally, even though the base camp is located on the border where hundreds of refugees pass through each day, there was relatively little evidence of attention being given by IHP to aspects around accountability to affected populations – i.e. the refugees themselves. The focus was rather on providing good support to UNHCR and WFP without, for example, knowing whether or not NGOs – who do the bulk of the humanitarian assistance work – could be experiencing logistics challenges with their vehicles. Workshop facilities were available to NGOs, as long as they furnished the spare parts; but IHP staff weren't aware whether NGOs were experiencing logistics challenges.

5. Conclusions and Analysis

While there are a number of elements of this operation that have had adverse effects on the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the operation, the overall conclusion is that the IHP in Ethiopia provided critical support to standby partners when and where needed. MSB should continue to strengthen this collaborative IHP model, making improvements based on relevant learning that emerged from the Dollo Ado operation.

Some key learning points worth highlighting include:

- Use MSB's (and IHP's) extensive experience and expertise to improve needs assessments and to provide better support to standby partners through providing them with options, along with pros and cons, both for the design of base camps and exit strategies. These options could include an assessment of private sector actors that could potentially assume management of catering and accommodation arrangements and/or identification of counterparts for IHP staff.
- The additional cost of a longer-term Team Leader position is justified for high-cost operations involving numerous deployed staff, both to maximise their added value, to monitor progress against a results framework and to help the partner improve the overall quality of support interventions.
- For these types of high value Global Service Packages (GSPs), a results framework should be developed and monitored to track progress – including outcomes. Examples of such outcome indicators could be average % of vehicles operating, client satisfaction measured via complaints systems or surveys and periodic assessments of relevant logistic gaps at a beneficiary level.

Annexes

List of Persons Met

<i>Partner Agency Staff & other External Interviewees</i>				
<i>Surname, Forenames</i>	<i>Org. and function</i>	<i>♂♀</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>
Yasuko Oda	Head of UNHCR Sub-Office	F	Mon 18 Jun	Dollo Ado
Pauline Fresneau,	Snr, UNHCR Programme Officer	F	Tue 19 Jun	Dollo Ado
Mr Tadelle	ARRA Zonal Coordinator	M	Mon 18 Jun	Dollo Ado
Mart Kait	IHP Workshop Mechanic	M	Mon 18 Jun	Dollo Ado
Project Manager	AHADA, Dollo Ado	M	Mon 18 Jun	Dollo Ado
Njorogo Njununa	UNHCR Site Planner	M	Mon 18 Jun	Dollo Ado
Lucas Mbago	UNHCR Supply Officer	M	Mon 18 Jun	Dollo Ado
Yehualashet Gebremeslkin	IKEA Foundation & former ARRA	M	Fri 22 Jun	Addis Ababa
Stiofainin Nic Iomhaird	UNHCR Reporting Officer	F	Thu 21 Jun	Dollo Ado
Louise Sowe	Head of WFP Sub-Office	F	Tue 19 Jun	Dollo Ado
Nadir Olivier	WFP Camp Manager (CANAD-DEM)	M	Tue 19 Jun	Dollo Ado
Walid Ibrahim	WFP Head of Transport & Ops	M	Wed 20 Jun	Addis Ababa
Lynne Miller	WFP Deputy Country Director	F	Wed 20 Jun	Addis Ababa
Gerard Rebello	WFP Deputy Head of Operations,	M	Wed 20 Jun	Addis Ababa
Moses Okello,	UNHCR Representative	M	Fri 22 Jun	Addis Ababa
Anicet Ndayasaba	UNHCR Sr. Supply Officer	M	Thu 21 Jun	Addis Ababa
<i>Swedish Government Interviewees (MSB, Sida, MFA, etc.)</i>				
<i>Surname, Forenames</i>	<i>Org. and function</i>	<i>♂♀</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>
Oliver Hochedez	MSB-Ethiopia Team Leader	M		Addis Ababa
Torsten Andersson	Counsellor, Sida Ethiopia	M		Addis Ababa
Fredrik Spik	Consular Affairs, Embassy of Sweden	M		Addis Ababa

Key References

- Lindqvist, Per (2011) MSB Assessment - ERT UNHCR - Dolo Ado, Ethiopia. MSB Report – July 2011.
- MSB & UNHCR (2011) Letter of Agreement on Deployment of a Base Camp Support Module to Dollo Ado between UNHCR and MSB, on behalf of IHP. Signed 8 August 2011.
- MSB & WFP (2011) Letter of Agreement on Deployment of a Base Camp Support Module between WFP and MSB, on behalf of IHP. Signed in September 2011.
- OCHA (2012) Kenya-Ethiopia-Somalia Border Region Interventions as of 13 July 2012.
- Sida (2003) Country strategy for development cooperation with Ethiopia: January 2003 – December 2007. Sida Ethiopia.
- UNHCR (2011) UNHCR Appeal for Ethiopia 2011
- UNHCR (2011) Horn of Africa: Somali Refugee Population - October 2011
- UNHCR (2012) UNHCR Appeal for Ethiopia 2012

Annex 8 – Congo Field Visit

Field visit to Democratic Republic of Congo and Congo Brazzaville undertaken in May 2012 by Björn Ternström (Study Team Member), Justine Elakano (National Consultant) and Britta Ramberg (MSB).

1. Executive Summary

This country report for Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) is one of three country studies that, together with three case studies of standby partners, will inform a global study of Sida's Support to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB). The team for this field visit consisted of a national consultant and an MSB HQ staff member led by an international consultant. DRC and Brazzaville were selected because they jointly presented a selection of MSB activities, including emergency Explosives and Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Camp Management (i.e. accommodation compounds for Humanitarian staff), Fleet Management and secondments.

Over the past decades DRC, in particular its Eastern region, has seen repeated cycles of internal conflict, cross-border military operations, and large refugee and IDP populations dealing with fluid and dynamic risks, commonly in situations where they have been separated from the foundations of their livelihoods. MSB activities at the time of the visit included Fleet Management on behalf of WFP and the secondment. Support in the recent past included setting up accommodation compounds in Dongo and Ango (Eastern DRC) and a Mine Action programme in Katanga.

In March of 2012, an ammunition supply facility in central Brazzaville exploded, killing more than 200 and wounding many times more. An area 2 km in diameter was inundated with explosive materials posing a risk to life and limb of anyone who came in touch with them. MSB supplied the ICRC and UNMAS with EOD teams.

Findings

Interventions that were requested by standby partners were broadly in line with Swedish Humanitarian policy. MSB systems for assessments, reporting, follow up were found to focus on technical issues leaving issues of relevance to the Partner organisations.

Overall, resources, both staff and material, were of high quality, timely, flexible and dependable and perceived as being high cost. Partners were found to have accepted cost sharing arrangements, implying that MSB/Sida covered between 100% (secondments, accommodation compounds) and 0% (ICRC EOD team fully partner funded) of the cost of interventions.

MSB had little role in coordinating efforts except for assuring quality control on behalf of UNMAS in Brazzaville.

Exit strategies for large-scale interventions were of inadequate quality. The responsibility for this needs to be shared between MSB and Partners.

The report conclusions and recommendations focus on the need for Sida/MSB to enhance effectiveness by developing a more strategic approach. It suggests to further explore the potential use of existing resources for enhanced DRR capacity building, to expand relations with civil society, to improve stakeholder communication and to expand capacity building for, and the utilisation of, regional resources.

2. Introduction

The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB)¹⁷⁷ is the country's national authority committed to enhancing and supporting societal capacities for preparedness for, and prevention of, emergencies and crises. In addition to its civil responsibilities, MSB contributes to emergency response at an international level in cooperation with various partners. MSB's international operations can take on very different forms, from emergency search and rescue operations following an earthquake to long-term projects aimed at strengthening a country's capacity for handling its own future disasters. The bulk of interventions take place in technical areas such as base camps, logistics, IT etc., part of these expert support areas include secondments of expert staff. MSB is an authority under the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) is an authority under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA).

The Government's Strategy for Sida's Humanitarian Assistance defines Sida's relation to MSB as financing their international operations; this is mainly for those requested by UN humanitarian agencies, but also for other operations where the unique expertise of MSB is needed, and its assistance required internationally. Neither DRC nor the Republic of Congo is a development partner of Sweden. Hence, Swedish involvement is based on humanitarian interventions and support to multilateral efforts.

This country report Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Brazzaville is part of a larger study focused on generating actionable recommendations that will help MSB and Sida improve MSB's performance in future emergency responses. Country visits to Mozambique and Ethiopia are also part of the larger effort. This country report is based on short visits to Goma, Kinshasa and Brazzaville in May of 2012. The visits were conducted by Bjorn Ternstrom and Justine Elakano of Indevlop, and Britta Ramberg of MSB.

The primary objective was to gather on-site information and lessons learned to support practical recommendations for future operations. Primary intended users are Sida and MSB staff and managers. Secondary users of the study are concerned staff at the MFA, MOD and partner agencies.

¹⁷⁷ (Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap in Swedish) (MSB)

3. Methodology

3.1 Approach, data collection and bias

This report is based on short visits made to Goma, Kinshasa and Brazzaville in May 2012. The methodology has included document reviews, individual and group key informant interviews. No primary data collection at the level of disaster-affected communities had taken place. The inclusion of Ms Ramberg, a member of MSB staff, has allowed for highly useful discussion around organisational background. The inclusion of Ms Elekano, an experienced Congolese consultant, has given contextual depth. Mr Ternström, the country lead consultant, is an experienced Swedish evaluator, with extensive CSO and Red Cross background. We believe our biases to be reasonably balanced, and have at times divided the team when conducting interviews; we have not perceived interviewees to be reluctant in sharing.

For practical reasons, no separate stakeholder feedback workshops were held prior to leaving the country. However, MSB staff in Goma/Brazzaville and embassy staff in Kinshasa were given feedback and the opportunity to question the team prior to its departure. A separate debriefing session with staff of MSB and Sida was held a week after the team's return to Sweden.

Lists of documents reviewed and persons interviewed may be found in Annexes.

3.2 Limitations of the study

The greatest limitation has been time related. The team was not able to visit Dungu or Ango and the visit to Goma was short and constrained to Goma town due to the security situation. Some key informants were not in the country at the time of the visit and the Katanga Mine Action project had been closed down. Despite this, the team feels that a sufficient number of key informants were met to complement document reviews and give a realistic view of recent MSB operations.

4. MSB operations in DRC

Recent operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo have been dominated by three major interventions: fleet management, the deployment of accommodation compounds in support of UN operations in Dungu and Ango and Mine Clearance activities in Katanga (the latter not covered by this report as the activities had concluded and the team were not able to visit this area as well in the time allocated). There have also been some individual secondments.

4.1 Fleet management

The first, a fleet management intervention, based in Goma, was established in response to a request from WFP in early 2010. An MSB assessment mission preceded it in February 2010. Eastern Congo was at this time categorised as a humanitarian disaster area by the UN. Logistics operations, in support of large internally displaced people and refugee populations originating from neighbouring countries, were organised by the Inter-agency Logistics Service (ILS) based in Goma. The ILS mandate included providing services to international NGOs, UN agencies and government au-

thorities. The fleet management intervention, valued at MSEK 27 million for 2010 and 11, included the following components:

- overall fleet management for 47 existing tracks
- local offices in five locations and truck workshops in three of these
- 7 to 8 MSB staff and approximately 100 local employees recruited through the services of a local staff management company (SODEICO)

Of the total cost more than 15 million was related to staff expenditures. WFP carried 50% of costs¹⁷⁸ with Sida paying the rest through a cost-sharing arrangement.

The intervention resulted in an increase of deliveries of between four and 500%¹⁷⁹. In June 2011 the WFP requested an extension. The number of trucks had by then been reduced to 30 and a further reduction to 17 was envisaged. The extension was granted until June 2012 and during the final period WFP carried 75% of total costs.

According to the application for an extension of funds dated 2011-08-11, the intervening period was to include WFP identifying a local partner to hand over to and capacity building of that partner by the MSB staff. An ambition mirrored in § 7.19 of the Letter of Agreement signed end August of that year. No local partner was identified and capacity building appears to have been involved primarily SODEICO staff and on the job training of WFP staff. A core element of the latter was in the use of the Fleetwave system for reporting. Central to that training was an individual recruited by MSB from WFP and made responsible for Fleetwave in the MSB structure.

4.2 Accommodation compounds

The deployment of accommodation compounds in support of UN operations in Dongo and Ango in eastern Congo was requested by the UNHCR in 2009 and the WFP in 2011, respectively. These interventions involved establishing container-based office and accommodation facilities for UN and partner organisations staff. Interventions were intended to establish the facilities which were then handed over to the WFP for use and management. The two compounds were established but serious logistical difficulties (related to trucking prefab containers through North Eastern DRC) were encountered in transporting equipment and containers to the relevant areas.¹⁸⁰

The facilities have been handed over in good condition, but later maintenance capacity, in terms of facility management skills, were not sufficiently developed and maintenance costs have been perceived to be very high¹⁸¹. There were question marks with regard to the extent to which the facilities had at all been used¹⁸².

¹⁷⁸ MSB formal intervention decision dated March 2010.

¹⁷⁹ Interview with WFP Logistics Head Dawit Getashew, Goma spoke of significant improvements in performance. Figure quoted is from MSB document “Ansökan om bidrag ur Finansiell ram” dated 2011-08-18.

¹⁸⁰ Partner applications and MSB formal decision documents complemented by WFP logistics Kinshasa and Ms Ramberg.

¹⁸¹ WFP Deputy Country Director, Mr David Schaad.

¹⁸² Interviewees quoting unspecified contacts in Partner organisations.

5. MSB operations in the Republic of Congo

MSB operations in the Republic of Congo have included mine action and individual secondments. On March 4, 2012 a devastating explosion, killing more than 200 people and wounding in excess of 1500, occurred in an ammunition storage facility in central Brazzaville. Two interventions were made in the Republic of Congo at the request of ICRC and UN MAS, which are organisations with which the MSB has stand-by partner agreements.

The ICRC Geneva requested MSB to deploy an EOD team in line with the existing standby agreement, of which the in-country Chef de Mission was not aware. In accordance with the request MSB decided, on March 6, to deploy an EOD team for a short-term assignment, fully funded by the ICRC (estimated costs 1 MSEK)¹⁸³. Assessment and clearance activities were subdivided geographically among several organisations, and the MSB team cleared areas around the hospital and densely populated areas assigned them. In addition to clearance activities, the team worked in collaboration with Congolese Red Cross volunteers to disseminate and report procedures designed to reduce the risk of additional injuries among the general population. The team was offered an extension but returned to Sweden early following ICRC reassessment of the situation¹⁸⁴.

On March 9, the UN MAS requested support in the form of an EOD-team, (expanded and complemented with support staff) and equipment including an armoured front-end loader. The initial deployment decided was for a period from March to August 2012 (estimated costs 7.2 M SEK). At the time of our visit, a second team had replaced the initially deployed team. While the team remains operationally involved in clearance activities, they are also called upon to assist the UN MAS with quality assurance and follow up of all involved mine clearance teams. At the time of the country visit it was not possible to assess how long clearance activities will have to continue¹⁸⁵.

6. Key Findings

6.1 Relevance

Overall, the interventions made in DRC and the Republic of Congo are in line with Sida strategy objectives and Swedish government calls for humanitarian assistance. The team has not assessed their adherence to Partner strategies. Activities are in line with the standby agreements and address real needs. We have not reviewed requests that were refused.

Staff has a relevant professional background, adapts well to policy and culture in host organisations and is seen to contribute to the goals they are asked to implement.

¹⁸³ MSB formal decision document dated March 6.

¹⁸⁴ Interview with ICRC Chef de Mission, Mr Bernard Metraux, Brazzaville.

¹⁸⁵ MSB formal decision documents contradicting by UN MAS regional Programme Manager, Mr Charles Frisby

However, although MSB seeks to assess interventions prior to implementing them, such assessments appear to be technical/logistical and do not address the overall relevance of the activities being supported. There is little evidence of systematic attention paid to cross-cutting issues. This approach appears to be based on an assumption that MSB's supportive role implies that it is entirely up to the standby partner to secure overall quality assurance and coordination. This lack of an "MSB agenda" is repeatedly quoted as a positive thing when discussing secondments, where partners are highly appreciative of the ability of secondments staff to adapt to partner organisation priorities during their missions.

A more proactive role would involve assessing not only technical/logistical issues but also the overall design of the interventions that are being supported. Such analysis would entail more attention to overall coordination, cross-cutting issues, exit strategies and the cohesion of overall Swedish support to the humanitarian system.

It would not be realistic to attempt such analysis prior to each requested secondment by standby partners. However, large-scale, high cost interventions such as long-term fleet management, establishing accommodation facilities or long term mine action programmes (e.g. Katanga, but not Brazzaville) would benefit from greater investment in pre-implementation assessment. Regular reassessment of long-term programmes should include more in-depth analysis of how the intervention design could be improved in order to better fit with overall Swedish policy and host country humanitarian system coordination.

6.2 Effectiveness and efficiency

MSB staff is seen as competent and flexible. Partner opinions of cost efficiency mirror the relevant cost sharing arrangements; from a host organisation perspective that any intervention funded by the Swedish government is of course free. Partners paying part of the cost perceive this as high - at times very high. Several key informants questioned whether intervention design aimed for quality higher than that which would be appropriate under the circumstances. There were also concerns that some of the installations left behind generated maintenance costs that were disproportionate.

MSB services were perceived as being of high quality, timely, flexible and dependable. At times MSB procedures and services were used to bypass cumbersome procurement processes in the host organisation (for example in WFP fleet management spare parts sourcing) and even to lower costs for alternative services by breaking up cartels among private sector suppliers (Goma-based)¹⁸⁶.

In comparison with the previous arrangement with the private sector, the fleet management intervention significantly improved WFP capacity to deliver in eastern Congo. This was related to significantly improved management and maintenance of

¹⁸⁶ Davit Getachew, Head Logistics, WFP Goma.

fleet which itself was seen as necessary in order to reach areas to which private sector contractors would not venture for reasons of inadequate infrastructure or security.

It was noted that MSB's willingness to carry some of the cost of the intervention influenced its ability to support capacity building within the WFP. While MSB was initially treated as a private sector contractor in place to deliver what was requested without comment, the cost sharing arrangement allowed MSB staff to emphasise their mandate as a partner, and introduce improvements in procedures and operational realities applicable to WFP internal systems not only to MSB.

In Brazzaville, the provision of EOD capacity provided UN MAS not only with the ability to be operational but also with the necessary "muscle" to be able to fulfil its coordination role. MSB teams were seen to be of exceptional quality as compared with other potential suppliers, both state-supplied, NGOs and the private sector.

Partner organisation representatives in the field were, in general, not aware of the formal instruments regulating MSB's involvement e.g. standby agreements, MOUs etc. Such formal issues are handled at HQ levels. None of the key persons interviewed had encountered formal difficulties with impact on efficiency.

Based on visited programmes, MSB should consider which circumstances would best enable a shift from best quality to more appropriate (locally-adapted, lower maintenance) quality.

The issue of effectiveness is also related to the issue of relevance. The inadequacy of exit strategies for large-scale interventions is of serious concern. A proactive dialogue with partner organisations regarding capacity building (beyond staff training) and securing post-intervention operating and maintenance sustainability (where relevant) has the potential to significantly increase effectiveness. MSB should consider how it can become better at linking humanitarian interventions to longer-term impact.

6.3 Monitoring, evaluation and reporting on results

Seconded staff integrates into host organisation systems. Performance assessment is therefore dependent on host organisations' ambitions and commonly dependent on the personal and professional ambitions of individual line managers. The sharing of host organisation staff assessments with MSB varies from partner to partner, and MSB does not systematically request such assessments for follow up. Partner organisation line managers do not know if their assessments are shared with MSB or not. There is systematic post-mission debriefing including a lengthy questionnaire. The data from these are only used to a limited extent. However, staff consistently expressed that they are well taken care of and have good relations with all desk officers in Sweden.

Reporting, in interventions involving teams, is weekly and highly operationally focused. In line with MSB's perceived mandate as exclusively supportive to host organisations, there is little if any reference to overall objectives of the programmes in which MSB is involved. As a consequence, reporting is activity-based and focused on the services and equipment that have been requested by host organisations. Reporting on overall developments is primarily security related, and there is little analysis of contextual issues and the relationship between MSB activities and longer-term development issues.

6.4 Coordination

MSB has had no independent role in national or cluster coordination in DRC. This is a consequence of the organisation's purely supportive interpretation of its mandate. Non-technical/practical issues related to programme design and overall objectives are seen as the responsibility of the partner organisation. This lack of an independent organisational agenda is commonly seen as a comparative advantage of MSB by host organisations.

Meanwhile MSB's role as a quality assurer in the Republic of Congo was highly appreciated and could be described to have contributed to the coordination of standards and technical issues.

MSB's interpretation of its role as being purely supportive extends beyond refraining from an active coordination role. Field-level key informants are in general unaware of MSB activities and capacities. Commonly they are even unaware of MSB's existence; the situation is compounded by the organisation's recent name change. This lack of communication regarding MSB involvement not only applies to national authorities, UN agencies and the CSO environment, but also to Swedish stakeholders such as the embassy.

MSB should review whether there are appropriate modalities, acceptable to partner organisations, whereby professional expertise supplied by MSB could be more fully exploited through greater engagement in overall coordination and programme design.

6.5 Cross-cutting issues

Given MSB's primarily supportive role it has very limited impact on cross-cutting issues in programme/intervention design and implementation. There are examples of efforts to emphasise cross-cutting issues e.g. gender by providing expertise for training of both MSB and partner organisation staff. However, these appear ad hoc and in the DRC example involved a short-term mission by Swedish experts rather than linking to regional resources.

Cross-cutting issues are considered in MSB's own activities e.g. recruitment, environmental considerations in technical design etc. We saw no evidence of systematic analysis related to conflict sensitivity which is unsurprising – given MSB's perception of its role as exclusively supportive, implying that such analysis would be the responsibility of the host organisation.

Nevertheless, MSB's impact on cross-cutting issues by role modelling may at times be significant. MSB management style was perceived as empowering; and recruitment processes that included consideration to gender and relations with local staff were cited as excellent. The organisation had little direct contact with affected people and did not take responsibility for accountability. When such interaction did exist, primarily in relationship to volunteers engaged in mine action in Brazzaville, the relationship with was described as professional and respectful.

7. Conclusions and Recommendations

MSB interventions are seen as professional, and supported by high-quality equipment and rapid procurement processes. The organisation is seen as timely, operational, dependable and adaptable. In part, this is a consequence of high quality support systems

in logistics, procurement, staff management etc. With few exceptions, rapidly corrected, management style and personal behaviour are seen to be excellent.

Generous cost-sharing arrangements are appreciated and, when this is not the case, partners' willingness (in some cases) to cover part of or all the costs of interventions are an indication of perceptions of effectiveness.

Operational capacity building aimed at MSB's own staff, partner organisations staff, national volunteers and (in the DRC example) private sector partner company, is systematic and primarily on-the-job training based. There is no attempt to exploit opportunities for capacity building in a broader sense involving, for example, national or local authorities. Given that e.g. a fleet management intervention places highly qualified people in the field for extended periods of time, it should be explored whether they could assist in building the capacity of local municipalities' transport planning, public maintenance organisations etc. An impression was given to the team that MSB staff interpreted their task as strictly following the requested support for the partner organisation. Could not intervention design be more creative and MSB be more proactive in encouraging support to local authorities with the intention of enhancing sustainability?

MSB is seen as outstanding with regard to mine action, with unique capabilities even when compared to other state entities¹⁸⁷. In Brazzaville, they were described as capable of rapid mobilisation, adaptability and flexibility. Their knowledge of and adherence to standards, SOPs, quality assurance etc. was lauded. Their ability to combine operational activities with the quality assurance role creates trust. In the Brazzaville case, access to MSB resources gave UN MAS operational clout allowing it to fulfil its coordination mandate¹⁸⁸.

In secondment cases the full integration of the secondee into the partner organisation and MSB's gap filling abilities were cited as particular strengths.

The encountered weaknesses are primarily related to relevance, coordination and costs. The principle of a purely supportive role as applied to secondees is also inappropriately applied to large-scale interventions. This implies that MSB is not sufficiently addressing its responsibility for overall relevance of the activities that it supports. There is potential for the organisation to take a more proactive role in coordination. At the very least, communication regarding MSB's activities and capacities has the potential to be significantly improved. The organisation's quality ambitions sometimes exceed actual needs in the relevant context.

There is also potential for a better linking between the capacity building of local/national authorities, the private sector and civil society. The operational and activity focused systems for planning, reporting and monitoring make it more difficult for

¹⁸⁷ Despite the difficulties that the Katanga program had encountered, Robbie Roberts, UNMACC had a high opinion of MSBs Mine Action skills overall.

¹⁸⁸ Interviews with Bernard Métréaux, ICRC and Charles Frisby, UNMAS.

this potential to become visible. This lack of a results focus may in part explain the rudimentary nature, or absence of, systematic exit strategies.

Sida/MSB are recommended to revisit the strategic focus of MSB interventions while taking into consideration:

- The potential for strategic investment in building local DRR capacity in connection with humanitarian interventions (e.g. logistics, transport, minor infrastructure, coordination, planning, monitoring)
- More systematic efforts to expand relations with civil society (compare coordination with volunteers in mine action)
- Better communication and policy coordination for more strategic impact
- Capacity building of and strategic contracting of regional capacities (individual and organisational)

List of persons met

Name	Role	Organisation	Group/ Indi- vidual	Date
Ms Lizette Karlsson	Project Officer	MSB Karlstad	I	
Mr Pierre Subille	Security Officer	WFP, Goma	I	7/5/2012
Mr Djuma Kamazi	Fleet Workshop Manager, Kalemie	Acting Team Leader, WFP/MSB Goma	I	Several
Ms Karen Mathenge	Admin and finance officer	WFP/MSB Goma	I	8/5/2012
Mr Crispin Tshiamala	Transport officer	MSB (ex WFP, Fleetwave expert)	I	8/5/2012
Ms Simona Sander	Head of Support	UNMACC-Kinshasa	G	9/5/2012
Mr T. Robert	Head of Operations	UNMACC-Kinshasa	G	9/5/2012
Ms Lucien Kishabaga	Admin ass HR	SODEICO, Goma	I	8/5/2012
Mr Kambale Paluku Roger Mr Mbusu Vusayiro Pascal	Commercial truckers	Gracia-shop Société, Goma	G	7/5/2012
Mr Guy Adoua	Deputy Head of Area Officer	WFP North, South-Kivu and Maniema	I	7/5/2012
Mr Curt Näslund Ms Emma Wingren Mr Bengt-Ake Johansson	EOD team, Swedish members	MSB UNMAS Brazzaville	G	13/5/2012

Mr Oliver Schauer Ms Kerstin Oldgren Degerman				
Mr Margus Kurvits Mr Janek Sonum	EOD team, Estonian members	MSB Brazzaville	G	13/5/2012
Mr Michel Rathqueber	Representative	DEMETER	I	14/5/2012
Mr Djo Moupondo Mr Deo Magomba	Director Commercial HR Officer	SODEICO (company providing local staff to MSB in DRC)	G	10/5/2012
Mr Bernard Métraux	Chef de mission	CICR (ICRC) Brazzaville -Republique du Congo	I	14/05/2012
Mr Gerhard Westerween Mr Jacob Mbaïgolmen	Ass. Reg. Repr. (Protection) Ass. Repr. (Supply)	UNHCR, Kinshasa	G	11/5/2012
Mr Dawit Getachew	Head of Logistics	WFP Goma	I	7/5/2012
Mr David Schaad Mr Christian Fortier	Dep Country Dir Head of Logistics	WFP Country Office in DRC, Kinshasa	G	12/5/2012
Mr Christoff Petit Mr Benoit Vonthron	Logistics officer Operations Manager	UNICEF Brazzaville, seconded from MSB UNICEF Brazzaville	G	15/5/2012
Mr Charles Frisby	Programme Manager	UNMAS (Regional, met in Brazzaville)	I	14/5/2012
Ms Anna Furubom Guittet	First Secretary	Swedish Embassy, DRC	I	12/5/2012

Annex 9 – Comparative Table of Selected Standby Partners

	RedR	Danish Refugee Council	THW	Irish Aid	NRC/NORCAP	SDC	DEMA
Organisational set up, budget	Registered as an NGO. Have a 3 year funding agreement with AusAID for AUD 18 million with a goal of field months/year. Can ask for additional funding if go beyond due to two or more crises in the same year	Have 3 year framework agreement with DANIDA but have to apply for funding every year anyway. It is DKK13 million/year with an additional DKK1-2 million on top. In addition, funding from the UN for those positions they do have the funding but not the person > DRC takes 7% overhead.	National Civil Protection agency under the Ministry of Interior. Operates internationally upon the request from the German Foreign Ministry. Have an annual budget but only for keeping people on standby. Deployments funded on a case by case basis from overall German govt humanitarian budget of EUR95 million (2012) > same budget that NGOs get funding from.	A division of MFA so Government entity. Budget comes from Parliament. The Rapid Response Initiative sits in the Emergency and Recovery section in the Hum Assistance dept. Rapid Response has EUR4.3 million out of total EUR60 million Hum Ass budget. Of this, Standby partnership gets 1.8 million > the rest is for stocks in UNHRD in agreement with WFP. Additional budgets announced at times (e.g for famine in East Africa last year). Can spend money from other budget lines	NORCAP exists since the mid-1990s. Part of NRC, so NGO, and not directly attached to MFA but work closely with them. Get funding for 3 years at a time. NOK 90 million/year. Can ask for additional money if end of year crisis. NRC operates 4 additional thematic rosters: GenCap, ProCap, Mediation support Unit (MSU), NORDEM (special roster on human rights and democracy).	A division of the MFA. Principles of secondments > have to be strategic and linked to political priorities. All divisions and geographical desks can finance secondments if it fits within the strategy. No specific budget related to secondments > each desk decides and money comes from overall division budget.	National Civil Protection Agency under the Ministry of Defense. Do not have an annual budget for international deployment – request for funding for each deployment from the MFA that funds the foreign missions. MOD also needs to approve the deployments. Would prefer to have an annual budget. This is also the MODs preference. Spent roughly 35 million DKK on Pakistan and Haiti in 2010, and be-

ANNEX 9 – COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SELECTED STANDBY PARTNERS

	RedR	Danish Refugee Council	THW	Irish Aid	NRC/NORCAP	SDC	DEMA
				if necessary.			tween 10-15 million DKK in 2011.
Standby partnership agreements	UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, OCHA + WHO new. FAO, IOM and UNOPS in negotiation.	UNHCR (oldest and biggest, 20 years), UNICEF, WFP, OCHA, UNRWA (one per year), UNDP, UNFPA (nothing in past 4 years), IOM (not active), FAO (since 1 Jan 2012). Have been approached by OHCHR and Worl Bank, but DRC ALWAYS short in funding so not keen on taking on more partners.	WFP, UNHCR, currently negotiating with UNICEF.	OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP + UNHRD network for stocks. Testing new partnership with UNMAS.	Serve 15 UN Agencies + IOM. Primarily UNICEF, UNHCR, WWFP, FAO, OCHA, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNDP.	WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNRWA, OCHA, WHO (but not regular), Separate agreement with ICRC.	WFP and UNHCR, looking to formalize MOUs with OCHA and UNDAF. DEMA mainly operate through the IHP on international missions.
'Bouquet' of services	Individual deployments only, no equipment. All profiles except for medical. Includes HQ roles (e.g. Donna Carter at	Individual deployments only, no equipment. Key profiles: Protection and WASH, logisticians, emergency managers, camp	Personnel and equipment + packages through IHP. THW main focus is on anything infrastructure and ICT related. Do not want to compete with NGOs or	Personnel and equipment (through UNNHRD and WFP). Roster established in 2007. Used to do mainly logistics, ICT, telecoms, but now also offer humanitarian affairs officers, nutrition experts, public	Individual deployments only. No equipment, but considering this. Offer most profiles, but NOT pure medical. Mainly: logisticians, ICT, warehouse management,	Individual deployments, sometimes part of project. Have search and rescue packages. Technical profiles like	Individual deployments and packages. Hospital capacity and water installations (but only last resort if no one else is doing it, often upon request by EU or

ANNEX 9 – COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SELECTED STANDBY PARTNERS

	RedR	Danish Refugee Council	THW	Irish Aid	NRC/NORCAP	SDC	DEMA
	WFP Rome). HQ positions very much in line with AusAIDs hum objectives.	managers. Do NOT do: ICT, Public health + nutrition, education (although thinking about it), telecoms, information management. Many strategic deployments: e.g. global protection support cell + UNDP and UNICEF HQ. However, increasing number of non-emergency postings > want to reduce, revert back to original idea of field based, emergency.	other partners. Only for gap filling, second line support for UN/NGOs. No 'soft' skill profiles. Mainly: Engineers, IT experts, water engineers (water pumping, setting up water systems for camps), electricity, and base camps with IHP.	health and GBV. Liaise actively with partners on where the gaps lie.	education, protection, WASH, health, nutrition, humanitarian affairs officers. Prioritise field based. If HQ, must also cover field.	constructions/reconstruction, DRR (SDC general priority). Humanitarian Affairs officers, generalists with good emergency and good UN knowledge. Child protection. Some medical/public health experts but limited. Some IT but limited. Strength – French speakers.	WHO). Logistics, transport, vehicle workshops, offices, base camps. DEMA does not do actual humanitarian delivery but only operate in a support function. Have also deployed materials only.
Size of roster	Only Australian nationals.	350-400 before 'clean up' later in 2012. Have over 700 applications pending. Can be any nationality.	Huge. 80 000 volunteers on roster within Germany, but only small % have been internationally deployed. Only German	Officially 192, but only half are active. Must be EU nationals, must have a tax –clearance from Irish Revenue if Irish.	800 members on roster: Norwegians, Africans (since 2006), Asians (since 2009). MFA and UN partners pushed for bring on Africans and Asians.	Par of internal SDC staff roster (Swiss Core for Hum Aid) > 650 persons. Also advertise for specific postings. All Swiss	Between those deployed by DEMA and the volunteers, the roster size is roughly 700 people.

ANNEX 9 – COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SELECTED STANDBY PARTNERS

	RedR	Danish Refugee Council	THW	Irish Aid	NRC/NORCAP	SDC	DEMA
			nationals.		Not deploy most Africans > MFA wants more Norwegians.	citizens, although working on the possibility of adding people who have work permits in Switzerland.	
Request process	RedR can deploy without approval from AusAID anywhere in Asia Pacific. Used to have to 'ask permission' for outside Asia Pac and for non-urgent emergencies. Have really worked on relationship over past years, now based on trust. RedR can now decide but have informal chats twice/week and send weekly report.	3 person team registers and responds to each request. Aim to give final response within a week (although also have 72h goal, but do not keep track). Decide based on a)Funding, b)Who is asking, c)Available experts, d)Emergency or not. DRC does not have to do to the MFA for approval for any deployments, only if they have run out of money.	Officially request goes to the Foreign Office sectoral contact points, then to THW but partners often call THW at the same time. But simultaneous process: While ministry decides based on budget and 'political will', THW identifies the adequate expert and assesses if there is the capacity to fill the post. Decision at Foreign Office made by official on duty, rarely by more. Usually the two agree: 'You pay, we play'. Have integrated perspectives on most	2 person team. Circulate request to relevant candidates same day ideally. Definite response to UN within same week. Know roster staff well, have interviewed all of them and seen on training. Have political element – Irish Aid government agency. Political consideration always there when deciding on deployment.	Have just reorganised this process. Until April, requests divided geographically. Now, one focal point who sends out requests to advisors who have sectoral responsibilities. Take up to 3 weeks for finalization if not emergency. Discuss each request, especially at the end of the year when budget is tight. Certain categories and regions prioritized based on need and Norwegian politics. E.g yes to South Sudan, no to Botswana. Also discuss relevance vis-à-vis the agency requesting (do	Request comes to focal point who forwards to relevant geographical desk. If geographical desk deems that it fits with strategy and Division priorities, prepares a 'case' with financial and technical aspect. The specific section gets together and decides based on budget and priority.	Request comes through to the International division. This is followed up by getting info from the field – understanding the context and the need. A situation assessment and budget is then prepared and presented to the MFA for which a verbal answer is given the same day. MOD will also approve verbally the same day. Based on that DEMA can get back to the UN agency with a package proposal or a CV.

ANNEX 9 – COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SELECTED STANDBY PARTNERS

	RedR	Danish Refugee Council	THW	Irish Aid	NRC/NORCAP	SDC	DEMA
			deployments – speak regularly over the phone. Decision for Haiti > minutes. However, refugee situations, e.g. South Sudan > too slow.		they really need this or just using free service?). Last few years seen an increase in these non-relevant requests. MFA not consulted and has never questioned NRC on specific deployments. Norad not at all involved.		
Average cost and average length of deployments	Average cost per 4 months deployment: AUD 64,767. Includes all expenses. Field: 6 months ideal length, 9 months max. Exceptionally 12 months. HQ: 12 months non-renewable.	Average cost of 3 month deployment: DKK175.000 Average length of DANIDA funded deployments in 2011: 3.5 months (196 man-months for the year). UN funded deployments longer, vary depending on type of	Varies greatly. German Foreign Office pays regular salaries of volunteers when they deploy internationally (as take brake from actual job to do so). Length: Ideally quick in and out. Individual deployed in emergency situations maximum weeks at a time > then team change. Maximum 1 year per mission.	Average annual deployment cost+ EUR58400 which will be subject to 41% income tax. But Irish Aid withholds 20% for Inland Revenue as credit against their income tax return (except for residents outside Ireland). But all payments not directly to deployee not taxed (insurance, flights, etc). Average cost: EUR160/day + subsistence (varies per country) + cost of accommodation.	Average cost of 6 month deployment of Norwegian to South Sudan or similar: NOK500 000-600 000. Other countries around NOK500 000. Average cost for 6 month deployment of African/Asian: NOK350 000-400 000. All Norwegian deployees have to pay taxes. Length: Only accept 3 months if real emergency.	(Very fluffy) Average cost: CHF90 000 for 6 month deployment which includes all expenses, including salary, DSA, accommodation, travel, insurance etc. Length: Depends per agency. For OCHA can only be max 6 months. Average overall is minimum 6	Varies considerably. Eg. And ICT module with 2 people + equipment for 4 weeks will cost DKK11-12 000 per day. However, joint operations with IHP for UNHCR in Tunisia in 2011 to build and manage offices and accommodation cost DKK21 000 per day. A hospital set up in Pakistan in 2010 for 3

ANNEX 9 – COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SELECTED STANDBY PARTNERS

	RedR	Danish Refugee Council	THW	Irish Aid	NRC/NORCAP	SDC	DEMA
		posting.	Exceptions for Capacity building positions.	Length: Used to be 3 months, now average more or less 6 months with often extension of another 6 months.	Otherwise prefer 6 months with possible extension up to 18 months. This is normal. Sometimes even longer.	months, but prefer longer. No maximum length, contracts are always renewable, but the extension has to be requested by the partner.	months cost DKK190000 per day. The standard salary depends on the pay level in DKK. There are 5 levels within DEMA.
Number of deployments	The first year (2011) of the FWA required RedR to support the deployment of 200 field months; 250 months in year two; and 300 months in year three. In the first year, RedR failed to reach its target. In 2012 they will support over 400 field months. This has been achieved by better processes, improved	2011: 115		2008: 27 2009: 26 2010: 44 2011: 47 (but for 2010-2011 also deployed to NGOs as they asked for assistance. Will not do this again as deployment cost so different).	2010: 1503 person-months 2011: 1659 person-months (figures for NORCAP alone, not including GenCap, ProCap, MSU and NORDEM).		2011: 12 deployments including packages. Most were 1 person deployments, 2 were without any people.

ANNEX 9 – COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SELECTED STANDBY PARTNERS

	RedR	Danish Refugee Council	THW	Irish Aid	NRC/NORCAP	SDC	DEMA
	practices and more commitment from RedR to achieving its objectives.						
Cost-share	Try to negotiate cost-share with UN agencies, especially for extensions where the partners have the money but not the expertise (and take 6 months to recruit).	In 2011 more than 50% of deployments were paid by the UN. The total cost of deployments (including overhead) for 2011 = DKK32 million. DANIDA funded 55 deployments, UN agencies funded 60 (often more in the end of the year when DRC has run out of DANIDA money).	In the MoU with UNHCR there is a clause whereby this could be done, but it has never happened and do not push their partners to cost-share.	No. Once by accident > deployment to Iraq where ECHO ended up paying for the post > got money back. If not paid upfront by UN agency, no use as have annual budget and if money returned in following tax year > will go to overall budget, not to department.		None.	None. MFA sees all standby deployments as in-kind donations.
Trainings	Yes Have 2 compulsory courses for all secondees, and specific sector/agency training.	Yes. DRC has a free 3.5 day compulsory basic training plus specialised options (protection, early recovery,	Host WEM training for UNHCR regularly. This training is VERY important for THW personnel. ICT Management training with WFP in 2012.	Yes Free for all roster staff: a full week induction course: 3.5 days induction 3.5 days security. Hosted 2 trainings in 2012:	Yes Free 4 days training and 4 days induction & 4 days security for all field roster staff. Selected staff: education	NA	No systematic training for secondees going on international missions.

ANNEX 9 – COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SELECTED STANDBY PARTNERS

	RedR	Danish Refugee Council	THW	Irish Aid	NRC/NORCAP	SDC	DEMA
	<p>ings. Induction training paid by the individual roster member (@\$4,000) 5 days training on essentials & 4 days security for all roster members. Plus selected by post: WASH & logistics. RedR has internal training team of 5 people. Provide joint trainings with the UN partners.</p> <p>In 2012 will spend AU\$60,000 on capacity development training for existing Register</p>	<p>camp management) for their roster members</p>		<p>GBV in emergencies for UNICEF > open for all standby partner rosters. Internal surge training for OCHA > only for OCHA internal roster. UN trainings for own roster staff crucial for deployment > opens doors. Purposefully pay their roster staff to attend UN trainings > investment in the future.</p>	<p>and election process. NRC do not host trainings for UN partners. However, send roster staff onto UN trainings regularly.</p>		

ANNEX 9 – COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SELECTED STANDBY PARTNERS

	RedR	Danish Refugee Council	THW	Irish Aid	NRC/NORCAP	SDC	DEMA
	personnel (those already on the RedR Register). Next year this will increase to AU\$80,000.						
M&E function	Debriefing upon returning from the field, but also proactive while in the field. If hear things are going poorly, intervene.	Do not require regular reports from employees in the field. Use the shared UN end of mission report + internal DRC report asking them to rate their mission. Also do a phone debrief upon return and offer psychosocial counseling. Carry out field visits 1/year. Follow up with line-managers in the field only if problems but normally only contact with HQ level.	Very key on more M&E and lesson learning. Foreign Office (since restructuring of international aid in Germany) is asking for success criteria. But value for money if a fraught question when politics is part of the postings > esp Foreign office makes politics with many of the postings. Must take into account for M&E. Case-by-case financial audits of all deployments.	Nothing formal in place. Use the UN common end of mission report format. Debrief employees upon return. Have several repeat deployments > indication of success.	Carry out field visits several time/year. Very important for NRC and for secondees. Secondees also have to report 3 times in 6 months, 1-2 pages. Also encourage them to keep informal control with 'base'. NRC asks secondees NOT to be NRC but to represent fully the UN agency in question. But the choice is theirs. MFA not pushing for visibility through logos but want to read all reports. Send annual report < financial and narrative.	Use the UN common end of mission report. Longer term employees write reports regularly while in the field. Have active discussions with the partners and get regular feedback from agencies. Lesson learnt sessions for missions that were less successful. Involves desks but also the multi-lateral division in charge of partner relations. E.G SDC collaborating closely with UNICEF	No systematic M&E of international missions. However, within the EU Civil Protection Mechanism a lessons learnt system will be developed. This process has been championed by the Danes. Report to MFA after every mission. Do not need to write an annual report however.

ANNEX 9 – COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SELECTED STANDBY PARTNERS

	RedR	Danish Refugee Council	THW	Irish Aid	NRC/NORCAP	SDC	DEMA
						on WASH and education in emergencies. WASH proved very successful, but education in emergencies do not see the impact and have discontinued.	
Other	Pro-active with deployments in priority sectors e.g. DRR. Have DRR expert at UNICEF in Geneva for 9 months. Want to see DRR incorporated into all TORs. RedR would encourage much more closer cooperation and coordination between the different standby partners >	Internal DRC review done in 2009 and DANIDA did an external review in 2010. DRC has external roster for UN agencies to use to bypass their own recruitment policies. The UN comes with their own candidates and DRC incorporates these onto this separate roster. The UN then recruits them through DRC, paying fully for	German Foreign Office has also commissioned study on the standby partners. Also focuses on relationships with NGOs. Want to know what kind of criteria to use to measure success. THW very pleased with IHP involvement. The partnership represents a shared burden which is especially good for longer duration missions (like Ethiopia) and		Sometimes MFA requests for certain persons to be deployed to specific positions > strategic. They then use the NORCAPS system of recruitment but not the roster. Very convenient for MFA. Can do quick recruitment process on the basis of UN request, but normally prefer not to. Precious about the quality of NRC brand.		DEMA is a strong advocate of operating through IHP. DEMAs was one of the founding members. IHP uses the strength of all actors and the UN likes IHP because they have always delivered. Unlike MSB or THW, DEMAs has not been proactive in establishing relationships with the UN partner agencies.

ANNEX 9 – COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SELECTED STANDBY PARTNERS

	RedR	Danish Refugee Council	THW	Irish Aid	NRC/NORCAP	SDC	DEMA
	everyone would win.	them. These do not have quite the same rights as DRC members. Tricky, as part of DRC' brand, but do not go through DRC recruitment process.	large scale missions. Very good when one actor cannot provide all the services.				

Annex 10 - Monthly salaries and related costs for deployed MSB Staff

Function	Base Salary (SEK)	Social Security (SEK)	Total Salary (SEK)
Trainee	25,000	12,500	37,500
Driver	40,000	20,000	60,000
Chef			
HVAC¹⁸⁹			
Camp technician			
Administrator			
Mechanic			
IT	43,000	21,500	64,500
Electrician			
Logistician			
Technician			
Informer			
Economist			
Crisis support			
Priest			
Instructor			
Nurse	45,000	22,500	67,500
Economist (qualified)			
Group chief			
Workshop chief			
Convoy leader			
Acting Chief of Operations	48,000	24,000	72,000
Chief of Staff			
Acting Chief of Staff			
Psychologist			
<u>Level 3:</u>			
Logistician			
HVAC			
IT			
Security			
Chief of Operations	53,000 – 58,000	26,500 – 29,000	79,500 – 87,000
<u>Level 4:</u>			
Logistician			
HVAC			
IT			
Security			

¹⁸⁹ Heating, ventilations and air conditioning

Doctor	60,000+	30,000+	90,000+
<u>Level 5:</u>			
Logistician			
HVAC			
IT			
Security			

Annex 11 – Documents Reviewed

Policy and strategy papers

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden, 2010: *Policy for Sweden's Humanitarian Assistance 2010-2016*.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden, 2011: *Strategy for humanitarian assistance provided through the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) 2011-2014*.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, September 2009: *Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action 2010-2015. Addressing Vulnerability, Climate Change and Protection Challenges*.

MSB. *Underlag till strategi för MSB:s biståndsfinansierade verksamhet*.

Mowjee, T. and Randel, J. 2010: *Evaluation of Sida's Humanitarian Assistance*.

Sida, 2003: *Country strategy for development cooperation with Ethiopia: January 2003 – December 2007*.

Sida, 2008: *Strategy for development cooperation with Mozambique September 2008 – December 2012*.

Sida, 2011: *Arrangement between Sida and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency on Support to Capacity Development in Disaster Preparedness and Risk Reduction during 1 June 2011 to 30 June 2014*.

Sida, 2012: *Sida at Work: Manual for Sida's Contribution Management Process*

Sida and MSB documents

Årlig överläggning mellan MSB och Sida, MSB 2011-12-14

Årlig överläggning om humanitärt ramavtalssamarbete mellan MSB och Sida, MSB 2009-12-08

Becker, P. et al.(2011) A participatory method for needs based capacity development projects and programmes. Lund University.

MSB, May 2011: *Ansökan om avtal för humanitär ram 2011-2013*.

MSB, February 2009: *Ansökan om avtal för humanitär ram 2009*.

MSB. *Komplettering till ansökan om humanitär ram för MSB 2009 – resultatindikatorer*

MSB, September 2011: *Inriktning för arbetet med jämställdhet och mångfald för ökad kvalitet och effektivitet i insatsverksamheten 2011-2015*.

MSB, September 2011: *Inriktning för arbetet med miljöintegrering för ökad kvalitet och effektivitet i insatsverksamheten 2011-2015*.

MSB, February 2011: *Check-list: Environmental and gender perspective in Fleet Management, Haiti*.

MSB, 2009: *Gender equality handbook. Practical advice for international assistance.*

MSB, September 2011: *Inriktning för MSB:s insatsverksamhet 2012 (Bilaga 5 till Anvisningar för verksamhetsplanering på Avdelningen för samordning och insats (SI) inför 2012 (dnr 2011-4612)).*

MSB Kvartalsrapporter / Quarterly Reports from (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011)

MSB, October 2010: *Målbild för SI på 1-5 års sikt.*

MSB, December 2010: *MSB:s handlingsplan för minhantering 2011-2013.*

MSB, 2011: *Insatsverksamheten 2010.*

MSB: *Översikt över MSB:s insatsförmågor 2011.*

MSB, 2010: *Strengthening Cooperation for Disaster Risk Reduction in Mozambique. MSB Workshop Report.*

MSB, 2010: *Support to Capacity Development in Disaster Preparedness and Risk Reduction with INGC, Mozambique.*

MSB, 2011: *National Simulation Exercise (SIMEX).* MSB Mozambique internal report.

MSB Field staff survey

Sida, November 2009: *Överenskommelse mellan Sida och MSB om finansiell ram för humanitära insatser under 2008/09.*

Sida, October 2011: *Sidas slutbedömning av stöd till MSB humanitära verksamhet RAM-2009.*

Sida-MSB. *Överenskommelse gällande samarbete mellan Sida och MSB kring katastrof-riskreducerande insatser.*

Sida decisions on the financial frame for MSB for humanitarian support interventions (2009-2012)

Sida, March 2012: *Tjänsteexportuppdrag i regleringsbrev 2012 för Sida.*

Standby Agreements and MoUs

Agreement between the Swedish Rescue Services Agency and the United Nations Office for Project Services; 2007

Agreement between the Swedish Rescue Services Agency and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; 2007

Agreement between the United Nations Children's Fund and the Swedish Rescue Services Agency for the Provision of Stand-by Personnel; 2005

Memorandum of Understanding between the International Committee of the Red Cross and MSB the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency; 2009

Memorandum of Understanding between the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency; 2011

Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations, acting through its Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB); 2009

Memorandum of Understanding between the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency and INGC; 2011

Memorandum of Agreement between the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency and the United Nations Development Programme for the provision of expertise to UNDP staff operating in post-disaster situations; 2009

Stand-by Agreement between the World Food Programme and the Swedish Rescue Services Agency; 2003

Other

Abreu, Casimiro, 2009: National progress report on the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action. INGC Mozambique.

Asante et al., 2009: Study on the Impact of Climate Change on Disaster Risk in Mozambique: Synthesis Report. INGC Mozambique.

COWI, 2009: *The Danish Refugee Council. External Evaluation of the DRC's Stand-by Roster.*

Channel Research, March 2011: *Evaluation of the Common Humanitarian Fund.*

Channel Research, July 2011: *5-year Evaluation of the Central Emergency Response Fund.*

DanChurchAid, 2010: *External Evaluation of the AECID funded Humanitarian Mine Action Programme of DanChurchAid in Katanga Province, DR Congo.*

DANIDA, 2011: *Evaluation of the Danish Engagement in and around Somalia 2006-10.*

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 2010: *Reviewing and Upgrading Denmark's Civilian Capavity.*

GFDRR et al., 2009: Economic vulnerability and disaster risk assessment in Malawi and Mozambique. Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR); International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI); RMSI Pvt Ltd.; and the World Bank

IASC 2011: Inter-Cluster Workshop: Annex - Early Recovery: The Way Forward. OCHA Geneva

ICRC Annual Reports for 2006 – 2011

IFRC, 2010: World Disasters Report – Urban Risk

IFRC, 2012: An analysis of the legal preparedness of Mozambique for facilitating and regulating international disaster response operations - Summary Version.

Joint Stand-By Arrangements Field Monitoring Missions for 2008 (Kenya & Sudan), 2010 (Yemen & oPt), 2012 (Kenya & South Sudan).

Lindqvist, P. 2011: *MSB Assessment - ERT UNHCR - Dolo Ado, Ethiopia. MSB Report – July 2011.*

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, October 2009: *Evaluation of the UNHCR Joint Organisational Strategy, 2007-2009. Joint External Evaluation.*

Norad, January 2008: *Evaluation of the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS).*

Oscar, L 2011: *Evaluation of Secondments for MSB.*

Sandison, P. July 2012: *A Review of the Standby Partnership Programme. DFID*

Streets, J. et al. 2010: Cluster Approach Evaluation 2 Synthesis Report. GPPI and Groupe URD

OCHA Surge Capacity Section Emergency Services Branch, 2008: *Stand-by Partnership Programme Users' Guide.*

MSB & UNHCR, 2011: *Letter of Agreement on Deployment of a Base Camp Support Module to Dollo Ado between UNHCR and MSB, on behalf of IHP.* Signed 8 Aug 2011.

MSB & WFP, 2011: Letter of Agreement on Deployment of a Base Camp Support Module between WFP and MSB, on behalf of IHP. Signed in September 2011.

Ministry for the Co-ordination of Environmental Affairs, Mozambique, 2007: National Adaptation Plan of Action.

Mozambique Government; 2011: Contingency Plan for the Rainy and Cyclone Season.

Mozambique Humanitarian Country Team, 2010: Inter-Agency Contingency Plan. United Nations in Mozambique.

MSB & INGC, 2010: Concept Note: INGC - MSB Collaboration to address Climate Change Adaptation in Mozambique.

NORCAP, November 2011: *Building Partnership for the Future. Conference Report.*

OCHA; 2009: The Four Pillars of Humanitarian Reform. OCHA Regional Office for West Africa.

OCHA, 2012: Kenya-Ethiopia-Somalia Border Region Interventions as of 13 July 2012.

Taylor, G. et al., 2012: The State of the Humanitarian System. ALNAP

Queface, A. and Tadross, M., 2009: Main report: INGC Climate Change Report: Study on the impact of climate change on disaster risk in Mozambique. INGC, Mozambique.

UNDP, 2010: Disaster Risk Assessment in Mozambique: A Comprehensive Country Situation Analysis. UNDP Mozambique.

UNHCR; 2008: A Guide to UNHCR's Emergency Standby Partners and External Deployment Arrangements

UNHCR; 2011a: UNHCR Appeal for Ethiopia 2011.

UNHCR; 2011b: Working in Partnership. UNHCR Global Report 2011.

UNHCR, 2011c: Somali Displacement Crisis in the Horn of Africa: Population Trends – October 2011.

UNHCR, 2012: UNHCR Appeal for Ethiopia 2012.

UNICEF Questionnaire for Stand-by staff.

Annex 12 – Persons Interviewed

<i>Partner Agency Staff & other External Interviewees</i>			
<i>Names</i>	<i>Org. and function</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Interviewer</i>
Johanna Haener	Emergency Roster, EPRS	Geneva	JB
Urara Furukawa	Emergency Roster, EPRS, Emergency Capacity Management Service, Division of Emergency, Security and Supply UNHCR HQ	Geneva	JB
Christophe Hambye	Head of Unit, External resources Division, ICRC HQ	Geneva	JB
Ben Lark	Head of Weapons Contamination Unit, ICRC HQ	Geneva	JB
Peter Billing	Deputy Head of Unit Civil Protection Response Unit, DG ECHO, European Commission	Brussels	AM
Kirsten Hedstrom	External Relations Officer, Unit A1 Strategy and Policy, DG ECHO, European Commission	Brussels	AM
Diana Burghardt	Assistant Policy Officer, Civil Protection Policy Unit, DG ECHO, European Commission	Brussels	AM
Baker Mahmoudi	Manager of UNHRD Dubai	Dubai	AM
Mohamed Abdiker	Director of Operations and Emergencies, IOM	Geneva	JB
Daniela Kabiljo	Human Resources Management, IOM	Geneva	JB
Makedonka Dona Smoljenovik	Operations Assistant Movement Management, IOM	Geneva	JB
C. Michael Gray	Chief, Resettlement, Movement & Management Division, IOM	Geneva	JB
Ivo Freijssen	Chief, Surge Capacity Section, Emergency Services Branch, OCHA	Geneva	JB
Lubab Al Kahiri	Surge Capacity Section, Emergency Services Branch, OCHA	Geneva	JB
<i>Swedish Government/Authority Interviewees (MSB, Sida, MFA, etc.)</i>			

<i>Names</i>	<i>Org. and function</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Interviewer</i>
Elizabeth Narrowe	Sida program officer for WFP	Stockholm	BG
Leif Jonnson	Head of Regional Desk for Western, Eastern and Southern Africa Coordination & Operations Department, MSB HQ	Stockholm	JB & AM
Carl-Johan Bäckström	Projektledare, Enheten för insatser Avdelningen för samordning och insats Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (MSB)	Stockholm	JB & AM
David Sundström	Verksamhetsansvarig intern utveckling och planering, Enheten för insatser, MSB	Karlstad	EM
Karin Stanghed	Ministry of For Affairs, MFA	Stockholm	BG
Per Örneus	Head of Department, MFA	Stockholm	BG
Sofia Calltorp	MFA	Stockholm	BG
Johanna Gårdmark	MSB	Stockholm	BG/BT/JB
Stina Sjölin	MSB	Stockholm	BG/BT/JB
Brita Ramberg	MSB	Karlstad	BG/BT/JB
Ingrid Winter Norberg	Programme officer for UNHCR, Sida	Stockholm	BG
Patrick Kratt	Programme officer for DRR	Stockholm	BG
Per Byman	Head of. Section, Sida	Stockholm	BG
Minna Örneus	Hum section, Sida	Stockholm	BG
Katarina Kotoglou	Hum section Sida	Stockholm	BG
Tomas Eneström	MoDefence	Stockholm	BG
Leif Jonnson	Head of Regional Desk for Western, Eastern and Southern Africa, Coordination & Operations Department, MSB	Stockholm	JB & AM
Michael Koch	MoDefence	Stockholm	BG/BT
Doris Attve	Sida, Previous Sida Programme Officer for MSB		BG
Helena Lindberg	Director General MSB	Stockholm	BG/BT
Anneli Bergholm Söder	Head of International Department MSB	Stockholm	BG/BT
Kjell Larsson	MSB	Karlstad	BG/BT
Björn Johansson	MSB	Karlstad	BG/BT
Anna-Karin Hamren	MSB	Karlstad	BG/BT

Fredrik Frisell	MSB	Karlstad	BG/BT
Ronak Bozorgi	MSB	Karlstad	BG/BT/JB
Lena Holmgren	MSB	Karlstad	BG/BT
Patrik Jansson	MSB	Karlstad	BG/BT
Mats Lundström	MoDefence	Stockholm	BG
Linda Stensdotter	Training Coordinator, MSB	Karlstad	JB
Jenny Wärja	Training Coordinator, MSB	Karlstad	JB
Åsa Carlqvist	System Specialist, MSB	Karlstad	JB
MSB Pro-gram/Project Manager FGD	Patrik Jansson, Britta Ramberg, Hans Martinsson, Ulrika Edén	Karlstad	JB
MSB DRR FGD	Frederik Frisell, Mr Carl-Johan Bäckström, Marielle Pettersson	Stockholm	JB

Congo Field Visit

<i>Partner Agency Staff & other External Interviewees</i>			
<i>Names</i>	<i>Org. and function</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Interviewer</i>
Benoit Vonthron	Operations Manager UNICEF Brazzaville		BT
	SODEICO in Kinshasa		BT
David Schaad	Deputy Country Director WFP CO in DRC		BT
Christian Fortier	Head of Logistics WFP CO in DRC		BT
Charles Frisby	Programme Manager, UNMAS		BT
Bernard Métraux	Head of mission CICR Brazzaville DRC		BT
Dawit Getachew	Head of Logistics, WFP Goma		BT
Benoit Vonthron	Operations Manager UNICEF Brazzaville	Brazzaville	BT
<i>Swedish Government/Authority Interviewees (MSB, Sida, MFA, etc.) and MSB Deployees</i>			
<i>Names</i>	<i>Org. and function</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Interviewer</i>
Christoff Petit	MSB seconded logistics officer to UNICEF Brazzaville	Brazzaville	BT
	MSB UNMAS team Brazzaville	Brazzaville	BT
Crispin Tshiamala	Transport officer, MSB Goma	Goma	BT
Karen Mathenge	Financial Admin MSB Goma, DRC		BT

Mozambique Field Visit

<i>Partner Agency Staff & other External Interviewees</i>			
<i>Name</i>	<i>Org. and function</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Interviewer</i>
Joao Ribeiro	Director General, INGC	Maputo	JB/RM
Bonifacio Antonio	INGC Officer	Maputo	JB/RM
Elias Massicane	INGC Officer	Maputo	JB/RM
Antonio Queface	INGC Adviser, Maputo	Maputo	JB/RM
Virginia Jose Malauene	Head of Technical Department, INGC Gaza Province	Gaza Province	JB/RM
Abel Malhaieie and members of Local Committee of Risk management	Chubuto, Gaza Province	Gaza Province	JB/RM
Afonso Macucule and members of Local Committee of Risk Management	Guija, Gaza province	Gaza Province	JB/RM
Lola de Castro	WFP Mozambique Country Representative & Chair of the HCT	Maputo	JB/RM
Mohamed Razak	Logistics Cluster Coordinator, WFP Mozambique	Maputo	JB/RM
Benedito Januario	Communications Officer & ETC Cluster Coordinator, WFP Mozambique	Maputo	JB/RM
Casimiro Sande	Emergency Support Analyst, UN Representative's Office	Maputo	JB/RM
Titos Kuuyour	UNDP DRR advisor	Maputo	JB/RM
<i>Swedish Government Interviewees (MSB, Sida, MFA, etc.)</i>			
<i>Name</i>	<i>Org. and function</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Interviewer</i>
Louis Anderson	MSB Country Team Leader	Maputo	JB/RM
Lars Johansson	MSB Deputy Team Leader	Maputo	JB/RM
Joao Jussar	Program Officer, SIDA Mozambique	Maputo	JB/RM
Leif Jonnson	Head of Regional Desk for Western, Eastern and Southern Africa, MSB Coordination & Operations Department	Stockholm	JB/AM

Carl-Johan Bäckström	Projektledare, Enheten för insatser Avdelningen för samordning och insats Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (MSB)	Stockholm	JB/AM
----------------------	---	-----------	-------

Ethiopia Field Visit

<i>Partner Agency Staff & other External Interviewees</i>			
<i>Names</i>	<i>Org. and function</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Interviewer</i>
Yasuko Oda	Head of UNHCR Sub-Office	Dollo Ado	JB/UE/OH/YY
Pauline Fresneau,	Snr, UNHCR Programme Officer	Dollo Ado	JB/UE/OH/YY
Mr Tadelle	ARRA Zonal Coordinator	Dollo Ado	JB/UE/OH/YY
Mart Kait	IHP Workshop Mechanic	Dollo Ado	JB/UE/OH/YY
Project Manager	AHADA, Dollo Ado	Dollo Ado	JB/UE/OH/YY
Njorogo Njununa	UNHCR Site Planner	Dollo Ado	JB/UE/OH/YY
Lucas Mbago	UNHCR Supply Officer	Dollo Ado	JB/UE/OH/YY
Yehualashet Gebremeslkin	IKEA Foundation & former ARRA	Addis Ababa	JB/UE/OH/YY
Stiofainin Nic Iomhaird	UNHCR Reporting Officer	Dollo Ado	JB/UE/OH/YY
Louise Sowe	Head of WFP Sub-Office	Dollo Ado	JB/UE/OH/YY
Nadir Olivier	WFP Camp Manager (CANADEM)	Dollo Ado	JB/UE/OH/YY
Walid Ibrahim	WFP Head of Transport & Ops	Addis Ababa	JB/UE/OH/YY
Lynne Miller	WFP Deputy Country Director	Addis Ababa	JB/UE/OH/YY
Gerard Rebello	WFP Deputy Head of Operations,	Addis Ababa	JB/UE/OH/YY
Moses Okello,	UNHCR Representative	Addis Ababa	JB/UE/OH/YY
Anicet Ndayasaba	UNHCR Sr. Supply Officer	Addis Ababa	JB/UE/OH/YY
Yehualashet Gebremeslkin	IKEA Foundation & former ARRA Official	Addis Ababa	JB/UE/OH/YY
<i>Swedish Government Interviewees (MSB, Sida, MFA, etc.)</i>			
<i>Names</i>	<i>Org. and function</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Interviewer</i>
Oliver Hochedez	MSB-Ethiopia Team Leader	Addis Ababa	JB/YY
Torsten Andersson	Counsellor, Sida Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	JB/UE/OH/YY
Fredrik Spik	Consular Affairs, Embassy of Sweden	Addis Ababa	JB/UE/OH/YY
Ulrika Eden	Programme Officer, Operations Section, MSB HQ	Karlstadt	JB/YY



Study of Sida's Support to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) 2006-2011

This report presents the findings of an independent study that collated and analysed relevant lessons-learned in order to provide options to support and implement international operations while building on MSB's comparative advantage to improve the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and performance monitoring and reporting for MSB operations funded by Sida.

The study found that MSB stands out amongst its peers for its technical capabilities. While MSB is highly effective in meeting its operational objectives it is not always clear how MSB's activities support the overall objective in Sida's Humanitarian Strategy to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity for the benefit of people. Findings suggest that if MSB and Sida take a more strategic approach to technical needs assessments, cost-sharing, development of new partnerships and promoting exit strategies then the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of MSB interventions will increase. The study also recommends that MFA, MOD, Sida and MSB work together to create a suitable enabling environment, notably through developing a MSB strategy and related Operational Framework that would help streamline decision-making processes.

SWEDISH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY

Address: S-105 25 Stockholm, Sweden. Office: Valhallavägen 199, Stockholm

Telephone: +46 (0)8-698 50 00. Telefax: +46 (0)8-20 88 64

Postgiro: 1 56 34-9. VAT. No. SE 202100-478901

E-mail: info@sida.se. Homepage: <http://www.sida.se>

