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Sida Decentralised Evaluation

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Outcome Assessment of Swedish Bilateral Cooperation in Bolivia 2009-2012

Final Report

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April 2013**

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The views and interpretations expressed in this report are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

APMT	Autoridad del Programa Madre Tierra
BBV	Bolivian Stock Exchange
CAF	Corporación Andina de Fomento (Development Bank of Latin America)
CIDOB	Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia
COB	Bolivian Workers Center (Central Obrera Boliviana)
CONAMAQ	National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu
CPE	Constitution of Bolivia (Constitución Política del Estado)
CPR	Civil-Political Rights
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
D&HR	Democracy and Human Rights
ESCR	Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
EU	European Union
FAUTAPO	Fundación Educación para el Desarrollo
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FPMT	Fondo del Programa Madre Tierra
FSTMB	Union Federation of Bolivian Mine Workers (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoB	Government of Bolivia
GruS	Grupo de Socios para el Desarrollo de Bolivia
HR	Human Rights
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
INE	Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (National Institute of Statistics)
LIDEMA	Liga de Defensa del Medio Ambiente
LMT	Ley de la Madre Tierra
MAS	Bolivian Movement for Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo)
MMAyA	Ministry of Environment and Water
MSEK	Million Swedish Kronor
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
NFER	Net Foreign Exchange Reserves
PASAP	Programa de Agua y Saneamiento para Areas Periurbanas
PRI	Programa de Revolución Institucional
REDD	UN Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SME	Small and Medium Enterprise (=PyME in Spanish)

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

TIPNIS	Isiboro Secure National Park and Indigenous Territory (Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Secure)
TGN	National General Treasury
ToR	Terms of Reference
UMSA	Universidad Mayor de San Andrés
UMSS	Universidad Mayor de San Simón
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIR	Bolivian NGO

Preface

This assessment of Outcomes of the Swedish Bilateral Cooperation in Bolivia was commissioned by the Embassy of Sweden in La Paz, Bolivia, through Sida's framework agreement for reviews and evaluations with Indevelop. This Report is the result of an intense period of document studies, interviews with stakeholders and informants in La Paz, Bolivia (31 January through 8 February 2013, with follow-up interviews by the local consultant in the following couple of weeks), analysis and drafting prior to the submission of the Report. The review team consisted of Vegard Bye, Team Leader, Ricardo Calla, national evaluator and Ian Christoplos, Core Team member. Anna Liljelund Hedqvist was the responsible Project Manager with overall responsibility for Indevelop's QA system throughout the process.

The discussion of each of the three principal cooperation areas (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) should be read with reference to the summary of results and challenges in the 17 different contributions, selected by the Embassy for scrutiny and presented, in Annex 2. The discussion is focused on *outcomes* in relation to various strategic *objectives*. The analytic part of the discussion should be read with reference to the discussion of the political, economic and development cooperation context for the Swedish strategy programme in Bolivia, as well as the more specific context for the three cooperation areas, presented in Annex 3.

In the discussion of the OECD/DAC criteria for each of the three cooperation areas, we have found too little material to draw conclusions regarding the efficiency (including cost-efficiency) of the contributions. We have rather chosen to include a special section where we discuss the different aid modalities (Chapter 6), which would be of relevance for the efficiency assessment of the cooperation. Since the Embassy is still waiting for instructions regarding the new strategy, which will have a different modality than the present one, it is difficult to make very concrete recommendations on the basis of this review. We have therefore presented a number of lessons learned that are linked to the conclusions in Chapter 7.

We thank the staff of the Embassy and its cooperation partners, and all other informants, for their time and willingness to share information and their views with us. At the same time it should be emphasised that the responsibility for this Report – including for the accuracy of data presented here – rests with the authors. The findings, interpretations and conclusions do not necessarily reflect the views of the Embassy of Sweden in Bolivia, Sida or the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Foreword

Comment from the Embassy in La Paz on the Outcome Assessment report

La Paz 2013 05 10

In general terms the Embassy finds that the outcome Assessment has been able to identify many of the results from the present Strategy during 2009-2012. Both the positive results as well as some negative ones have been noted and overall, the Embassy agrees with the observations and the analysis in the assessment and has reported to Sida Headquarters and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in similar terms. There are however some specific issues where the Embassy does not agree with the comments and analysis made in the report; this applies for example to the statement that there are few examples of gender being adequately reflected in project and program implementation. Most programs and projects supported by the Embassy have gender strategies or action plans which are being implemented. The Embassy's semi-annual and annual reports over the years have also clearly shown results obtained with regard to gender in all areas.

This disagreement also applies to comments made on the institutional "instability" of the public sector; on the statement regarding a deficient dialogue by the donors with regard to the program for institutional reform; and with the statement that the departamental authorities mainly pertain to the political opposition.

The Embassy does not agree with the consultants' statement that the two guiding perspectives (the rights perspective and the perspectives of poor people) are not explicitly expressed in the Swedish development cooperation with Bolivia. All programs have a rights-based approach and aim at the inclusion and the increased respect of different human rights of the poorest and most excluded part of the population.

Lastly, the Embassy does not concur with the conclusions presented by the consultants regarding dialogue and sustainability. Dialogue takes place at many different levels. The technical and sectorial dialogues are often very successful while the dialogue at a higher and political level is much more difficult. Sustainability is a complex issue and has to do with capacity, institutional strength and continuity among other issues as well as funding, and we find that these aspects were not sufficiently well analyzed by the consultants. Capacity-building is one of the cornerstones of Swedish development cooperation with Bolivia.

Being aware that the time given for the study was extremely short, the Embassy wishes to thank the consultants for their work and express our gratitude for their efforts and dedication to go through such a large amount of material, and for their capacity to analyze and summarize it in such an interesting and valuable way. This input will undoubtedly be very useful for the Embassy's future programming of the new cooperation cycle.

Executive Summary

1. Sweden has been a predictable and loyal development cooperation partner with Bolivia for over 20 years, and has, since 2006, also clearly expressed support to the ethnically inclusive and pro-poor change process under the present government. Flexibility without ties to proper economic or political interests stands out as an important characteristic of Swedish cooperation. But significant challenges are recognised on the Bolivian side: political tensions and limited technical-administrative capacity in public administration, a high degree of polarisation and lack of national consensus, along with the overall development challenges of exposure to international economic fluctuations (although the present economic situation is very good), and a high degree of ecological and societal vulnerability to the effects of climate change.
2. Sweden's 2009-2013 Country Strategy with Bolivia has as its "overall objective (...) for the population to live in a good and healthy environment and to enjoy their human rights and democratic participation". Total annual appropriations have been fluctuating between 200 – 230 MSEK, largely in accordance with the proposed target amount. It was a stated intention to gradually shift the cooperation from project to programme support (presently reaching about two thirds of the portfolio). Another intention of applying sector budget support has been ruled out because conditions have not been seen to justify it. Partnership with public institutions was to have been a priority, but in pragmatic combination with NGO and UN channels. Close donor liaisons with other EU countries and the EU itself, plus Switzerland and Canada, have been practiced throughout the strategy period.
3. The portfolio has been concentrated in three thematic areas: democracy and human rights, education, and natural resources with a specific focus on climate change. The cooperation has also included support to research, support for Swedish NGOs and possible humanitarian assistance.
4. The area of *Democracy and Human Rights* is highly politicised under the present circumstances in Bolivia. A historic change of power relations in favour of the previously marginalised and repressed indigenous and peasant population has occurred. The political participation and promotion of rights for these groups is a fact that cannot be underestimated, and Sweden has contributed positively to this. However, there are challenges when it comes to the effective division between state powers and particularly the independence of the judiciary, rule-of-law principles, effective political pluralism and also a reasonable equilibrium between state and sub-national political units, particularly where the opposition has majority. Sweden and other like-minded countries, with indisputable democracy and human rights records, have an important role to play in balancing support to the historic change process with these concerns.

5. The Review found important outcomes in terms of non-discrimination, where Sweden's support to the Human Rights Ombudsman – defending its autonomy against heavy pressures – is of great significance. As far as a more effective public administration is concerned, not much has been achieved, as the main programme for this purpose failed to reach its more integral objective. Institutional instability, politicisation and a lack of institutional memory continue to be chronic problems, with little space for the cooperation to have significant impact.
6. The historic advances made by the present Government of Bolivia (GoB), in terms of human rights improvements for the discriminated, and not least the indigenous parts of the population, have been underpinned by international cooperation with active Swedish participation. Sweden's contribution here has mostly been outside of central government channels. The government-critical part of civil society is struggling hard to maintain its independent political role, at the price of heavy financial dependence on international cooperation (including from Sweden). There are strong expectations that Sweden will stand by this commitment for a new strategy period, while a broader consideration is also warranted in terms of how state bodies, like the constitutional and electoral courts and the judiciary, may be strengthened as real democratic and rule-of-law watchdogs.
7. In the area of education, where remarkable progress has been made to wipe out illiteracy and provide basic education for all – including girls and indigenous children – bilateral donors, including Sweden, have had a negligible financial role compared to GoB's own budget resources when it comes to current costs (teachers' salaries). However, Sweden and other like-minded donors have contributed decisively to investments (80%) and have thus contributed significantly to this indisputable basic education success story. These donors have, more than anything, contributed to *quality issues* in the education system having been put on the agenda; although much still remains to be done. Work in this sector has been negatively affected by the same institutional instability that has been noted elsewhere in public administration. The education sector has also been characterised by contradictory policies, and, not least, confusion about education targets for indigenous languages. On the positive side, a Joint Commission between the Ministry and the basket donors has created a space for dialogue.
8. Another Swedish objective, based on contributions to the education sector, has been to enhance poor people's access to the labour market, with preference for young women. The main instrument for this has been to support technical and entrepreneurial training through non-governmental mechanisms. Wide and increasing coverage for such education has been achieved, leading to enhanced productive capacities and even the launching of small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) as instruments to combat poverty. An important aspect of these innovative results is that spillover to the public sector is becoming a real opportunity against the backdrop of historical ignorance of such training in the public education sector.

9. Swedish support to natural resource management has increased steeply during the Strategy period. This is partly due to the special appropriation for climate change adaptation. Watershed and water resource management and the provision of irrigation for agriculture, drinking water and sanitation have been the most important contributions in this sector. Irrigation schemes have resulted in improvements for productivity and the livelihoods of the beneficiary population of small rural producers. The National Watershed Plan provides normative support, infrastructure and capacity building, strengthening integral management and the preservation of watersheds with similarly positive effects on land and water resources and agricultural productivity.
10. The most impressive water-related results for Bolivia, with highly relevant contributions from the Swedish-supported donors group, have been in providing access to clean drinking water and basic sanitation for poor people in marginal urban areas. The quantitatively dominant contribution has been through a sector programme coordinated with EU sector budget support. In addition to this, Sweden has supported innovative NGO projects that carry out pilot experiments for basic sanitation (i.e. decentralised sewage treatment systems and dry toilets), which are already having a positive impact on public projects that are also supported by Sweden.
11. Support to sustainable forestry was a key target for Swedish cooperation, but institutional weaknesses and policy contradictions on the Bolivian side obliged Sweden to drop this programme (disbursements were halted after 2011). Sweden has, rather, opted to work through a non-public forest project in the lowlands, with innovative experiments in the building of alliances between indigenous community forestry and commercial actors; this also promises demonstration effects.
12. Based on special Swedish appropriations for climate change adaptation measures, all the contributions in the area of natural resource management have been organised in such a way that they should have an impact in this regard, i.e. in favour of the poor population segments that are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Some of the NGO projects (such as LIDEMA and Baba Carapa) have perhaps had the most explicit focus on climate change. But also, the major public projects in Sweden's natural resource portfolio have integrated this aspect and included climate change monitoring indicators, making it possible to demonstrate concrete progress. All these programmes have a pro-poor approach. However, the Review has found only one of the contributions, the support to the National Watershed Plan, to be of relevance for the objective of reduced vulnerability to natural disasters. This objective may therefore have received less attention in the cooperation than one might have expected.
13. While climate change *adaptation* has been highly visible in Swedish cooperation with Bolivia, *mitigation* was never included in the Swedish strategy and has therefore received less attention. The very recent enactment

of the Mother Earth Law (LMT) in Bolivia may provide an opportunity for a larger contribution in support of the latter aspect of climate change in the future. Considering the importance of the Bolivian rainforest in the larger Amazon context of global climate equilibrium, this legal framework – however incipient – could provide donors like Sweden with a better basis for future potential synergies between NGO and public sector efforts towards climate change mitigation.

14. Throughout the country programme, it has been complicated to find an effective and efficient working relationship with unstable central government institutions. Creativity has been shown in finding workable solutions with central ministries. A combination of good donor coordination and a pragmatic relationship to the selected ministry units that do function sufficiently well has brought considerable results. Many of the donor basket groups are likely to fall apart or be reduced to a minimum after 2013; and Sweden will therefore need to re-think its strategy for donor coordination in preparation for the next strategy period.
15. Sweden has had considerable success with its two-track and multi-level approach of working in parallel with state and non-state counterparts at central and de-centralised levels, in several cases with synergy effects in the same sector. While the public programmes are generally more important in quantitative terms, NGO programmes are often more experimental and innovative in character, even with the potential of impacting the way that things are being done in more bureaucratic, and often unstable, state agencies.
16. General perspectives in Swedish development cooperation about the pro-poor and human rights-based approach and gender perspectives are not explicitly addressed in many programme and project evaluations. Although, they are generally incorporated in programme and project implementation, in a country where, to a large extent, they also reflect official public policy and therefore offer good opportunities for a donor to engage.
17. It is difficult to conclude firmly as to whether Sweden has reached – or is likely to reach at the end of 2013 – its overarching strategic objective during the five-year cooperation programme with Bolivia (quoted in point 2 above). The overall success of water-related projects (water management, irrigation, drinking water and sanitation) will probably have brought the Swedish programme closest to the overarching objective. In human rights and democratic participation, the present GoB demonstrates very impressive progress for the large majority of the population who were formerly marginalised. Sweden, along with other donors, plays an important role in complementing such values where the state shows weaknesses (particularly with regard to the rule-of-law, some civil-political rights and political pluralism). In the education sector, similarly impressive quantitative results have been reached by the GoB that can clearly be seen as fulfilling basic economic, social and cultural rights for the poor majority of the population. Sweden and other donors have played a central role in enhancing education quality as a complement to these quantitative results.

Resumen Ejecutivo en Español

1. Suecia ha sido por más de 20 años una socia de cooperación para el desarrollo con Bolivia leal y previsible, y desde 2006 también ha expresado claramente su apoyo a los procesos de inclusión étnica y a favor de los pobres que lleva adelante el actual gobierno. La flexibilidad sin ligazón a ningún interés económico o político propio se destaca como una característica importante de la cooperación sueca. Pero, significativos desafíos pueden reconocerse en el lado boliviano: Las tensiones políticas, las limitadas capacidades técnico-administrativas del sector público, un alto grado de polarización política, la falta de consensos nacionales, los retos globales para el desarrollo, la exposición a las fluctuaciones económicas internacionales (aunque la situación económica actual de Bolivia es muy estable), un alto grado de vulnerabilidad ecológica y social ante los efectos del cambio climático.
2. La Estrategia de País 2009-2013 de Suecia con Bolivia tiene como "objetivo general (...) que la población viva en un ambiente saludable y bueno y goce de sus derechos humanos y de la participación democrática". El total de las asignaciones presupuestarias anuales han fluctuado entre los 200 a 230 millones de coronas suecas, en gran parte conforme con el monto meta propuesto. Fue una intención manifiesta la de cambiar el enfoque de la cooperación gradualmente de un apoyo a proyectos a uno a programas (que en la actualidad alcanza aproximadamente a dos tercios de la cartera). Una otra intención de implementar una modalidad de apoyo presupuestario sectorial se descartó por considerarse que las condiciones no la justificaban. La colaboración con instituciones públicas se definió como una prioridad, pero en una combinación pragmática con canales de ONGs y de la ONU. Enlaces estrechos para donaciones conjuntas con otros países de la UE y con la propia UE se han llevado a cabo durante todo el período de la estrategia.
3. La cartera se ha concentrado en tres áreas temáticas: democracia y derechos humanos, educación, y recursos naturales con un enfoque específico con respecto del cambio climático. La cooperación también ha incluido apoyo a investigación científica, apoyo a ONGs y posible asistencia humanitaria.
4. En las actuales circunstancias en Bolivia, el área de la Democracia y los Derechos Humanos está altamente politizada. Un cambio histórico de las relaciones de poder a favor de la previamente marginada y reprimida población indígena y campesina se ha producido. La participación política y la promoción de los derechos de estos grupos es un hecho que no puede ser subestimado, y Suecia ha contribuido positivamente a eso. Sin embargo, existen desafíos en lo que respecta a la división efectiva entre los poderes del Estado y en particular a la independencia del poder judicial, al Estado de Derecho, al pluralismo político efectivo y también al equilibrio razonable entre el gobierno central y las unidades de gobierno subnacionales.

particularmente donde la oposición tiene mayoría. Suecia y otros países, con indiscutibles antecedentes democráticos y de respeto a los derechos humanos, tienen un papel importante que desempeñar apoyando de modo balanceado el proceso histórico de cambios en cuanto a estos temas.

5. La evaluación encontró importantes resultados en lo que se refiere a la no discriminación, siendo el apoyo de Suecia a la Defensoría del Pueblo –que se muestra manteniendo su autonomía frente a fuertes presiones– de gran importancia. En lo que se refiere a una administración pública más eficaz, no se ha logrado mucho, ya que el programa principal para este fin no llegó a alcanzar su objetivo más integral. La inestabilidad institucional, la politización y la falta de memoria institucional siguen siendo problemas crónicos, con poco espacio para que la cooperación logre un impacto significativo.
6. Los avances históricos realizados por el actual GdB en términos de mejoras de los derechos humanos de los sectores discriminados y de no menor importancia para el caso de los segmentos indígenas de la población han sido respaldadas por la cooperación internacional con la activa participación de Suecia. La contribución de Suecia se ha dado aquí principalmente por fuera de los canales del gobierno central. Los sectores de la sociedad civil críticos al gobierno están haciendo grandes esfuerzos para mantener un rol político independiente, al precio de una fuerte dependencia financiera de la cooperación internacional, incluida la de Suecia. Hay grandes expectativas que Suecia de continuidad a sus compromisos en un nuevo período estratégico, y considerar una cooperación más amplia también se justifica en términos de cómo otros órganos del Estado, como los tribunales constitucionales y electorales y judiciales, podrían ser fortalecidos como salvaguardas reales de la democracia y la primacía de la ley.
7. En el ámbito de la educación, donde notables progresos se han hecho para erradicar el analfabetismo y para proporcionar una educación básica para todos –incluyendo a las niñas y a los niños y niñas indígenas–, los donantes bilaterales, incluida Suecia, han tenido un papel financiero insignificante en comparación con los recursos presupuestarios del propio GdB en cuanto a los gastos corrientes se refiere (principalmente los salarios de profesores). Suecia y otros donantes han tenido un papel significativo en los gastos de inversión (80%) y así han contribuido con su apoyo a esta indiscutiblemente exitosa historia de la educación básica. Estos donantes han abordado principalmente la calidad de la educación en el sistema escolar como un tema básico en la agenda, aunque falta mucho por hacer. El trabajo en este sector ha sido afectado de modo negativo por la misma inestabilidad institucional que se ha notado en otras partes de la administración pública. El sector educativo además se ha caracterizado por políticas contradictorias, y no menos confusión sobre los objetivos de la educación con respecto de las lenguas indígenas. En el lado positivo, una Comisión Conjunta entre el Ministerio y los donantes de la canasta ha creado un espacio para el diálogo pedagógico y el seguimiento del progreso en el sector.

8. Otro de los objetivos de Suecia, con base en sus contribuciones al sector de la educación, ha sido el de mejorar el acceso de los pobres al mercado de trabajo, preferentemente en el caso de las mujeres jóvenes. El principal instrumento para ello ha sido el apoyo a la formación técnica y emprendedorista a través de mecanismos no gubernamentales. Amplia y creciente cobertura de este tipo de formación ha sido lograda, generando el mejoramiento de las capacidades productivas e incluso la puesta en marcha de PYMEs como un instrumento para combatir la pobreza. Un aspecto importante de estos avances innovadores es que su incidencia en el sector público se está convirtiendo en una verdadera oportunidad, en el marco del histórico descuido sobre este tipo de formación por parte del sistema de la educación pública.
9. El apoyo de Suecia a la gestión de los recursos naturales se ha incrementado considerablemente durante el período de la estrategia. Esto se debe en parte a la asignación especial de recursos para la adaptación al cambio climático (CC). La gestión integral de cuencas hidrográficas y de los recursos hídricos y la provisión de riego para la agricultura, de agua potable y de saneamiento han sido las contribuciones más importantes en este sector. Los sistemas de riego introducidos se han traducido en mejoras para el suelo y en impactos positivos para la productividad y la economía de la población beneficiaria de los pequeños productores rurales. El Plan Nacional de Cuencas proporciona apoyo normativo, infraestructura y mejoramiento de capacidades, fortaleciendo la gestión integral y la preservación de las cuencas hidrográficas y los recursos hídricos, con efectos igualmente positivos para el suelo y la productividad agrícola.
10. Los más impresionantes resultados relacionados con el agua en Bolivia, con aportes muy relevantes del grupo de donantes integrado por Suecia, han sido la provisión de acceso al agua potable y de servicios de saneamiento básico para los pobres de las zonas urbanas marginales. La contribución predominantemente cuantitativa se dio a través de un programa sectorial coordinado con un apoyo presupuestario sectorial de la UE. Por otra parte, Suecia ha apoyado innovadores proyectos de ONGs que están implementando remarcables experiencias piloto de saneamiento básico ecológico (por ejemplo, sistemas descentralizados de tratamiento de aguas residuales y toilets secos), que ya está siendo incorporadas como parte de las políticas públicas en Bolivia.
11. El apoyo a la forestería sostenible ha sido un objetivo clave para la cooperación sueca, pero las debilidades institucionales y las contradicciones políticas en el lado boliviano obligaron a Suecia a abandonar este programa (los desembolsos fueron detenidos después de 2011). Suecia optó por mantener su cooperación a través de un proyecto forestal no público en las tierras bajas, con experiencias innovadoras en la construcción de alianzas para la gestión forestal conjunta entre comunidades indígenas y empresas privadas, también con efectos promotores de demostración.
12. Con base en asignaciones de recursos especiales de Suecia para medidas de adaptación al CC, todas las contribuciones en el ámbito de la gestión de los

recursos naturales se organizaron de manera que ellas deberían tener un impacto relevante en tal sentido; por ejemplo, favoreciendo a los sectores pobres de la población que son los más vulnerables a los efectos del cambio climático. Algunos de los proyectos de ONGs (como LIDEMA y Baba Carapa) han tenido tal vez el enfoque más explícito con respecto del CC. Pero igualmente, los grandes proyectos públicos de la cartera de Suecia para los recursos natural han integrado el Cambio Climático, incluyendo indicadores de seguimiento que hacen posible demostrar avances concretos al respecto. Todos estos programas tienen un enfoque pro-pobre explícito. Sin embargo, la evaluación encontró solo una contribución con relevancia para el objetivo de reducir la vulnerabilidad a desastres naturales. Este objetivo puede haber recibido menos atención en la cooperación que uno pudiera haber esperado.

13. Mientras que la *adaptación* al CC ha sido muy visible en la cooperación de Suecia con Bolivia, la *mitigación* del CC no estaba incluida en la estrategia sueca y por eso ha recibido menor atención. . La promulgación reciente de la Ley de la Madre Tierra (LMT) en Bolivia podría proporcionar una mejor oportunidad para una contribución mayor con relación a este último aspecto del cambio climático en el futuro. Teniendo en cuenta la importancia del bosque húmedo boliviano en el contexto más amplio del papel de la Amazonía para el equilibrio climático global, ese marco legal –aunque sea incipiente– podría otorgar a los donantes como Suecia con una mejor base para generar más tarde potenciales sinergias entre las ONG y los esfuerzos del sector público con miras a la mitigación del CC.
14. A lo largo de la implementación del programa en el país, ha sido complicado encontrar una relación efectiva y eficiente de trabajo con las inestables instituciones del gobierno central. Suecia ha demostrado creatividad en la búsqueda de soluciones viables con los ministerios del gabinete gubernamental. Una combinación de buena coordinación entre los donantes y una relación pragmática con las unidades ministeriales que funcionan con suficiente eficiencia han producido resultados considerables. Muchos de los grupos de donantes en canasta probablemente se desarmarán o se reducirán al mínimo a partir de 2013; y Suecia tendrá por lo tanto que repensar su estrategia de coordinación con otros donantes en la preparación de su Estrategia de País para el período siguiente.
15. Suecia ha tenido un éxito considerable con su enfoque de doble vía y multinivel para trabajar en paralelo con sus contrapartes estatales y no estatales y en los niveles centrales y descentralizados, generando en varios casos efectos de sinergia dentro de un mismo sector. Mientras que los programas públicos son generalmente más importantes en términos cuantitativos, los programas de las ONGs son a menudo más experimentales e innovadores en su carácter, incluso con el potencial de afectar la forma en que se hacen las cosas en las agencias a menudo más burocráticas e inestables del sector público.
16. Los enfoques desde la perspectiva de los pobres y de la equidad de género no aparecen explícitamente en muchos de las evaluaciones consultadas. A pesar

de eso en general son tomadas en cuenta en los programas y proyectos en un país donde, en gran medida, tales perspectivas reflejan las políticas públicas y por eso ofrecen buenas oportunidades para que los donantes.

17. Es difícil llegar a una conclusión firme sobre si Suecia ha alcanzado – o con probabilidad alcanzará hasta finales del 2013 – su objetivo estratégico mayor (citado en el punto 2 arriba). Los exitosos proyectos relacionados con el agua (gestión del agua, riego, agua potable y saneamiento) probablemente son los que más han acercado al programa sueco al objetivo estratégico mayor. En materia de derechos humanos y de participación democrática, el GdB actual demuestra un importante progreso para la gran mayoría de la población que era previamente marginada. Suecia, junto con otros donantes, juega un papel importante en la complementación de tales valores allá donde el Estado muestra debilidades (en particular cuando se trata del estado de derecho, de algunos derechos civiles y políticos y del pluralismo político). En el sector educativo, igualmente impresionantes resultados cuantitativos han sido alcanzados por el GdB que pueden claramente ser vistos como avances hacia la satisfacción de derechos económicos, sociales y culturales básicos para la mayoría pobre de la población. Suecia y otros donantes han desempeñado un rol crucial al hacer destacable la cuestión de la calidad de la educación como un complemento a esos resultados cuantitativos.

1 Approach, Methodology

1.1 APPROACH

This Outcome Review of Swedish bilateral cooperation with Bolivia 2009-2012 consisted of four phases:

The inception phase focused on elaborating the scope and feasibility of the Review and methodology, including a discussion of the methodological choices, design of the analysis, data collection methods and instruments and work plan. The inception phase ended with an initial meeting between the review team and the Embassy on the first day of fieldwork, where final adjustments to the inception report and even to the Terms of Reference (ToR) were agreed upon.

In the *desk study*, the review team assessed a broad range of available secondary data, including an analysis of relevant studies, existing reports, evaluations and other relevant documents. Of particular relevance was the Country Strategy 2009 – 2013, which provided the context for Sweden’s current support as well as a description of intended outcomes. The desk study and the fieldwork focused on a total of 17 interventions that were chosen by the Embassy and specified in the ToR. It should be noted that support to research was not assessed during this assessment.

The *fieldwork* in Bolivia took place from 31 January through 8 February 2013. Primary data was collected through interviews with relevant stakeholders and informed experts, including implementing partners (technical implementation units, government institutions and CSOs), beneficiaries and other donors, and also bilateral meetings with Embassy staff about their respective portfolio responsibilities. The Team had proposed to organise focus group meetings for each of the three areas of work, but it was agreed with the Embassy that this was not realistic given the very short time available for fieldwork. Interviews and meetings involved a total of 45 persons from 27 institutions/organisations, including government partners, implementers, CSO partners, external experts and Embassy personnel. A complete list of interviewees is annexed to this report.

On the last day of the field mission, a debriefing session was held with the full Embassy staff, on the basis of a powerpoint presentation of preliminary findings. Valuable feedback was received.

Analysis and reporting: This report represents the analysis of the review team of the information, inputs and feedback, with cross-checking and triangulation from the primary and secondary sources described above. It should be borne in mind that the assessment was carried out early in the last year of the agreement period, so it is still

too early to draw final conclusions about the outcomes of the full strategy period cooperation. This analysis is intended to be of relevance to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sida, the Embassy and partners, and includes reflections and conclusions on the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of Swedish development cooperation with Bolivia, as well as a number of recommendations.

1.2 LIMITATIONS

During 2012, Indevalop was commissioned to undertake six country and regional strategy reviews. Indevalop is in the process of systematising methods for such reviews. To fully assess outcomes would require a relatively higher level of resources and a somewhat longer time period than what has been available in this case, particularly to strengthen the validation aspect and the utility of the approach.

A review such as this relies on the outcomes described in existing documentation (particularly independent evaluations) and verifies this by exploring the perspectives of different stakeholders and informed resource persons. The team did not have the time or other resources to gather additional data from specific projects, or to rigorously verify the claims made in project/programme documents, or the perceptions presented by informants in interviews. Another important limitation was that there was no time for project site visits. Some implementing agencies report with a heavy activity emphasis, rather than from the perspective of results analysis. Of particular note, the theories of change, by which benefits were intended to reach the population and within which the projects were designed, were often poorly delineated and were not critically analysed in the course of implementation.

The assessment was undertaken at the Strategy level, i.e., of programmatic outcomes within the three overall sectors; but out of necessity, the programme perspective must be seen through specific projects. The assignment was not seen to look at the specific projects, but to use the projects to inform the analysis with regard to overall outputs and outcomes, as well as the effectiveness and relevance of the programming in relation to the Strategy. As a result, the scope and quality of the generalisations reflect the range and comparability of the interventions that were selected for analysis. Specific findings regarding the 17 selected contributions are presented in Annex 2.

Since most of the Swedish contributions are part of basket funds or other pooling arrangements, it is not possible to determine the direct attribution of Swedish cooperation to the outcomes, neither on the project/programme nor sector level. An assessment question about attribution was therefore taken out of the ToR by the Embassy.

2 Sweden's Country Strategy and Cooperation Portfolio in Bolivia

2.1 STRATEGY OBJECTIVES

Sweden describes itself as a middle-size cooperation partner in Bolivia, that is systematically looking for coordination arrangements with other donors, particularly among the EU countries (including the EU Commission). According to the Strategy Document (prepared in 2008), Sweden perceives its foremost comparative advantage in Bolivia to be that the cooperation is not linked to its own economic or political interests and is thus assumed to enjoy a high level of confidence. The fact that the cooperation is flexible and untied, and geared towards thematic areas that are expected to be of high political priority for Bolivia, is assumed to make it highly relevant and ensure local ownership for Bolivia's development.

Sweden appreciates and supports the comprehensive change process that is underway in Bolivia, enhancing the influence of previously excluded groups and making it possible to pursue policies of combating poverty and strengthening democracy. This context is an important motivation for Sweden's continued cooperation with Bolivia: it offers a very good space for two of Sweden's principal international cooperation approaches: that it is pro-poor and human rights-based (see 4.2. below). But Sweden is also conscious of the challenges, most notably political tensions and difficulties to reach a minimum consensus, serious capacity problems in the state sector, and vulnerability to economic shocks and the effects of climate change.

The five-year Swedish cooperation agreement with Bolivia 2009 – 2013 establishes the following objective:

“The overall objective of Sweden's development cooperation with Bolivia is for the population to live in a good and healthy environment and to enjoy their human rights and democratic participation.”

A *process objective* is also defined: “national consensus on poverty reduction and an increase in programme-based approaches to achieve 66 per cent during the strategy period”. Two strategic dialogue issues are given priority: “the importance of a constructive national dialogue about the development agenda and the need for consensus solutions, as well as the need for an environmentally sustainable

development, adaptation to climate changes and a sustainable, egalitarian and efficient application and management of natural resources.”

2.2 THREE MAIN COOPERATION AREAS

The development cooperation in Bolivia was to be concentrated to three areas:¹ (1) democratic governance and human rights, (2) education, and (3) natural resources and the environment, with a focus on climate issues.² Poverty-oriented growth and employment creation was defined as a crosscutting concern within these three areas. Bolivia's development plan and the EU code of conduct on complementarity and division of labour in development policy complementarity³ were considered as framework conditions.

The selection of the three area priorities was based on the following arguments: *Democracy and human rights (D&HR)* are basic conditions for long-term sustainable social development; Sweden draws upon its own comparative advantages and give priority to this sector. *Education* is seen as a key area in order to offset social, political and economic marginalisation and to promote equality and a democratic culture. Finally, concerns are expressed that low consciousness about the importance of the sustainable use and management of *natural resources, environmental concerns and the lack of preparedness for climate change adaptation* may have devastating consequences in Bolivia if urgent action is not taken. The specific objectives of the three cooperation areas are referred to in the respective Chapters below (6, 7 and 8).

In terms of *gender*, the Country Strategy makes some general considerations, both in overall objectives and for each of the three strategic areas. Although some gender aspects have been identified in the performance of each of the three cooperation areas, the independent evaluations, on which this Review has mainly based its assessments, have only sporadically referred to concrete gender-oriented interventions.

2.3 MONETARY VALUES OF THE COOPERATION

The annual amount of the cooperation with Bolivia was set at 180 MSEK in the Strategy Document (of which 40 MSEK was reserved for the research cooperation). In addition, Bolivia was included among the beneficiary countries of a special appropriation for climate change adaptation, with a total amount of 150 MSEK over

¹ A fourth area, Research and University Support, falls beyond the scope of this evaluation.

² It seems that the heading of this area has been slightly modified: whereas "environment" was part of it from the outset, it is now removed as a specific part of the area definition.

³ http://www.dev-practitioners.eu/fileadmin/Redaktion/Documents/Reference_Documents/EU_Code_of_Conduct.pdf

three years (2009-2011), that was later extended for another year (2012) with 50 MSEK. The total annual target amount would thus be 230 MSEK. According to the Cabinet decision in 2009, however, this total target amount was reduced to 205 MSEK. However, in the annual delegation of funds to the Embassy the amount over the years 2009-2012 varied from 195 MSEK to 217,5 MSEK .

Table 1: Total value of Swedish cooperation with Bolivia per year and subject area (2009 – 2011/2012) (in MSEK) including expenditure favoring Bolivia from other allocation accounts⁴ than the account managed by the Embassy

Area	2009	2010	2011	2012
Health	0,3	1,0	1,9	3,08
Education	63,0	59,6	38,4	49,4
Research	33,3	22,6	23,5	22,4
Dem/HR/equality	85,7	67,5	66,7	61,9
Sustainable infrastructure and services	21,2	9,6	25,5	40,2
Agriculture & Forestry	15,0	33,7	65,0	42,3
Other areas (incl Conflict, Humanitarian, Market development, Environment)				12,5
Total	226,2	199,7	227,9	232,3

Table 2 offers some key figures for some of the main single cooperation agreements with Bolivia.

⁴ Source: Sida Annual Reports (respective years)

Table 2: Some main contributions in Sweden's cooperation with Bolivia⁵

Contribution	Agreed amount MSEK	Agreement Period	Coop Partner	Cooperation form
UNICEF Country Programme 2010-2012	55	2010 – 2013	UNICEF	Organisational Support
Admin reform, PRI	40	2009 – 2014	Ministry of the Presidency	Project /pool financing
UNDP Political Parties	37	2009 – 2013	UNDP	Project
HR Ombudsman	37.5	2009-2016	Defensor del Pueblo	Programme support
Democratic Culture	25	2009 - 2014	Fundación UNIR	Organisational support
National Statistics	31.4	2010 - 2014	INE and SCB	Core support
Ministry of Education Strategic Plan 2010-2015	132	2010 – 2014	Ministry of Education	Sector programme /pool financing
FAUTAPO Strategic plan	78	2009 – 2013	FAUTAPO Foundation	Programme support
SOS Children's Villages	8.7	2009 – 2014	SOS Bolivia	Project support
PASAP	89	2011 – 2015	Ministry of Water and Environment	Sector programme /pool financing
"Baba Carapa" Community Forestry	72	2009 – 2017	Fundación PUMA	Project support
PROAGRO; Climate Adaptation	80	2010 – 2014	Vice-Ministry of Water /Irrigation and Rural Development	Sector programme /pool financing
Plan Nacional de Cuencas	10.6	2007 – 2010	Ministry of Water and Environment	Sector programme /pool financing
LIDEMA Climate Adaptation	30	2010-2015	LIDEMA	Project support
Sumaj Huasi	7,2	2009-2013	Sumaj Huasi	Project support

Specific Country Strategy objectives for the three areas of cooperation are listed in the respective chapters discussing the outcome in these three areas (Chapters 6, 7 and 8).

⁵ Sida: L108 Contributions 2009-2012; Sida: L101x Planning Overview; plus various project documents

3 Contributions within the Area of Democracy and Human Rights

3.1 RELEVANCE

Most parts of Swedish cooperation in the area of democracy and human rights in Bolivia are clearly relevant, either in supporting ongoing positive aspects of the government's own efforts or supporting checks and balances where the government's own policies may be more questionable. It has been particularly relevant to work through the Ombudsman, UNICEF (child rights in a broad sense), through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in order to strengthen party democracy, and through a segment of civil society such as UNIR Foundation. The Review has too little information to judge the real relevance of the contribution through the National Institute of Statistics (INE) to Bolivia's statistical capacity. The objectives of the Programa de Revolución Institucional (PRI) programme were clearly relevant.

3.2 EFFECTIVENESS AND OUTCOMES

It is emphasised in the Strategy and other relevant documents⁶ that institutional strengthening is important on both national and local levels, for the purpose of improving democratic mechanisms for the mitigation of social and political conflicts. Efficiency and effectiveness (quality) of public services need to be strengthened, the capacity of the institutions to reach the entire population must be improved, and discrimination, as well as corruption, must be countered.

In terms of human rights, the implementation of international conventions can be seen as a guiding principle. Dialogue with national authorities is to emphasise the strengthening of a democratic culture; respect for rule of law and the countering of corruption are other priorities.

The construction of a reliable state apparatus is seen as key to cope with the country's poverty problem. Bolivian state institutions are considered to be among the most fragile in Latin America, and lead to considerable corruption and a weakening of state efforts. Swedish cooperation is therefore aimed at comprehensive reforms with a view to strengthen public administration.

⁶Some additional elements from the Sida webpage presentation of the Bolivia programme are also included, when relevant.

The first objective of the Swedish cooperation in the area of democracy and human rights has been to contribute to a more effective and transparent public administration with no discrimination.

The 2009 – 2013 cooperation can point to important outcomes towards this objective, particularly when it comes to combating *discrimination* (through the Ombudsman and UNICEF in particular), and for the improvement of *transparency* (also Ombudsman and some important results of the PRI programme: online access to the official *Gaceta*, the new ID card system as well as drivers' license and secondary school diplomas). The work with political parties has also had an indirect effect on these aspects of public administration. By making the parties more inclusive and participatory, this may potentially have a bearing on how they execute political power. In terms of a more *effective public administration*, the outcome has been quite limited, primarily because the PRI ("Programme for Institutional Revolution") has failed in relation to its more integral objectives. The main reasons have been that it is an insufficient political priority and there is weak Government of Bolivia (GoB) ownership for public administration reform. There are therefore serious questions to be raised about the effectiveness and sustainability of this contribution. This programme was intended as a cornerstone contribution to enhance government efficiency and effectiveness.

The improved quality of statistics, to which Swedish cooperation contributed (particularly national accounts, gender and environmental statistics), was intended to contribute to a more effective public administration. The Review cannot independently verify this outcome, but such a relationship may exist. In monetary terms, Swedish cooperation has been of more marginal importance for the Statistics Institute.⁷ The importance of Swedish cooperation has been mainly qualitative. However, the support to INE has included a twinning arrangement (technical assistance) with Statistics Sweden, along with a previous basket arrangement with Canada.

In general, institutional instability and a lack of public memory are chronic problems in Bolivia. Swedish cooperation – like that of most other donors – has not been able to significantly address these structural problems. It is indeed a paradox that limited political priority is attached to the building of a strong and well-functioning state in Bolivia, given the strongly "statist" character of the regime's development model.

⁷ Sweden represented about 1% of INE's totally received cooperation in 2012 including World Bank credits, according to the INE representative interviewed by the Team.

The second Swedish objective has been to increase the opportunities for the full enjoyment of human rights particularly for those who have been discriminated, for instance the indigenous population.

The present Bolivian government has made historic advances in this direction, and has also offered ample space for international cooperation to contribute; and Swedish cooperation has contributed, although mostly outside of central government channels. Swedish support has been quite decisive about maintaining the Ombudsman's office as an autonomous and independent national HR institution that is accessible, in principle, to all vulnerable rights holders all over the country (although even more emphasis on the decentralisation of the institution has been recommended). This has probably been the most effective contribution to human rights in the country, keeping a good balance between Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCRs), Civil and Political Rights (CPRs) and collective rights. Support to UNICEF has also been a positive factor in this regard, by running a broad and decentralised programme focusing on advocacy, legal reform and the monitoring of child rights' implementation by state institutions. Resources provided through the UNIR Foundation and other NGOs have contributed to a positive outcome (we have not studied the Swedish NGO portfolio in Bolivia). Civil society and NGOs play an important role in balancing state power in Bolivia. The autonomous space held by government-critical parts of the non-state sector is under constant pressure and is reliant on international cooperation.

We have not looked at cooperation with the third autonomous state institution that is included in the Swedish cooperation portfolio in the area, the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE). But this is another potentially crucial democratic cornerstone in Bolivia, where international cooperation can have an impact in terms of levelling the playing field for democratic elections.

When it comes to the *gender perspective* in this area, key partners such as UNICEF and UNIR appear to have strong commitments. Technical assistance to improved gender statistics has been an important part of the support to INE. We have noted that the 2012 evaluation of Ombudsman's Strategic Plan 2007-2011 concluded that the institution makes a great effort to promote the equal rights and non-discrimination of women. However, it adds that the gender perspective has only been sporadically incorporated in the defence actions and management activities of the institution. It has, for instance, been stated by a Canadian gender specialist (representing one of the donors) that there is a need to strengthen gender training with the public sector.⁸ It is interesting to note that in the new Ombudsman Strategy (2012-2016), one of 14 policy

⁸ Just Governance Group, 2012: *Informe – Evaluación Final – Plan Estratégico Institucional de la Defensoría del Pueblo de Bolivia (2007-2011)*

areas is “*género y despatriarcalización*”; gender and removal of patriarchal patterns. In the political party project supported through the UNDP, more active participation of women has been achieved, according to the 2012 evaluation of the project.

On balance, when also taking the government channels into consideration, it seems logical to conclude that individual civil-political liberal rights and full respect for pluralism remain under threat. The Swedish portfolio suggests that opportunities exist for addressing these concerns, but efforts could be approached more systematically.

3.3 SUSTAINABILITY

There are varying degrees of sustainability, as far as Sweden’s support in this area is concerned.

UNICEF is clearly sustainable in most of its effort, and Sweden is seen as an important partner (contributing about 15% of the country programme). INE has a very good spread among contribution partners, and, as an institution, it seems to enjoy good government support. There is no immediate danger to its sustainability. PRI, the central government institutional strengthening programme, seems to interest donors more than government and also, less and less, the donors. This has probably not been a sustainable effort. The Ombudsman is financially vulnerable, depending on – almost half of its support – what will be only two foreign donors from 2014 (and Swedish support is continued). Maintaining an independent and critical profile, vis-à-vis Government, is probably at odds with the intention of relying, more and more, on financial support from the state budget. The continued support to the Ombudsman is perhaps most crucial for the sustainability of Sweden’s objectives in this sector; if Sweden’s support is discontinued, the future of this crucial institution for human rights protection in Bolivia will be highly uncertain. UNDP’s work with political parties has, up until now, had no other financial sources, and the sustainability of what has been achieved there is still open to interpretation, since equitable government funding of political parties is, as yet, non-existent in Bolivia, although the new law that is being proposed does incorporate this mechanism.

In general, how sustainable are the achievements for democracy and human rights in Bolivia? The participatory aspects of democratic involvement for the previously excluded majority have gone through a historic improvement that is unlikely to be reversed (in spite of newly emerged conflicts between indigenous and other popular organisations and the Morales government). The institutional sustainability of these results needs more attention, particularly if the present project of developing a strongly state-focused model is maintained. Crucial aspects for a workable democracy such as transparency, accountability and pluralism – including respect for minority views and efforts to reconcile contradictions – are clearly problematic factors in today’s Bolivia. International cooperation can mitigate these dangers to some extent. Civil and political rights are more threatened than economic, social and cultural rights, while collective rights, as demanded by indigenous peoples, paradoxically receive less attention than they did a couple of years ago, due to new GoB agendas.

4 Contributions within the Area of Education

4.1 RELEVANCE

The amounts offered by the basket fund represent a rather small share (less than 5%) of the overall resources that are directed to the education sector in Bolivia, with Sweden contributing about 20% of the total basket funds. In terms of available funds for education *quality* improvements, however – an aspect that had no priority from the state until recently – they represent a substantive portion of the approximately 80% that the basket fund contributes to the total amount of *investment expenditures* that are allocated to the education sector, within which better quality issues are handled. It is likely that the basket fund has been decisive for the GoB's decision to re-introduce quality as a priority in the education sector. The fact that Sweden has maintained equilibrium between quantity and quality contributed to the same balance in the basket contribution. The 2009-2013 cooperation support has had the added value of allowing some continuity to the long-term international cooperation efforts within the area of education, which started in the early nineties.

Furthermore, the contribution of Sweden and other donors to vocational and entrepreneurial training is also highly relevant. The context here is characterised by an education system that has produced a surplus of professionals who cannot find adequate employment in the labour market. A focus on more practical skills is thus highly important in relation to poverty alleviation through the promotion of appropriate job skills.

4.2 EFFECTIVENESS AND OUTCOMES

Sweden intended to address both basic access and the quality of education through its cooperation in this area. The promotion of democratic values is seen as important. Technical education is seen as critical in order to access the labour market and thus to address marginalisation and poverty. Dialogue, equality and non-discrimination, the strengthening of rights consciousness, increased tolerance and the countering of violence are among the values to be promoted in the education system through donor cooperation and dialogue.

Sweden has supported the Bolivian education sector for several years, with the overarching aim of securing the right of all Bolivian children to an appropriate education. In addition to primary education, since 2010, support has also been provided to the programme “*Yo Sí Puedo*” (“Yes, I can”) that was, in its initial four years, mainly financed by Cuba and Venezuela. It aims to eradicate illiteracy in Bolivia i.e. through rural IT centres that reach areas without schools. Since 2010,

support has also been given to a post-literacy window of the same programme, that was set up at the insistence of the basket fund donors.

The country strategy for this area had two objectives, the first of them being formulated as follows:

More girls and boys, particularly among the indigenous peoples, shall finish primary education of good quality

Until the end of 2012, the outcome of the multi-donor contribution where Sweden participates contributed towards this objective as follows:

- Underpinning the successful effects of school access and permanence achieved by the GoB strategies, with important but not homogeneous advances towards gender, class and cultural equity within the school system. In 2006, access to primary school was already very high, with 95.6% enrolment. In 2012, almost total universal coverage was achieved. In 2006, access to secondary school was 80.9%. In 2012, without proper figures at hand, it can safely be stated that between 85 and 90% of youths are enrolled. With regard to permanence, where no proper figures are yet available, while some consider that basic gender-class equity has been attained in the whole of the country, others note that rural girls have higher dropout rates at the end of the high school cycle, which would show a continuation of some gender-class imbalances within the Bolivian school system.⁹
- Supporting a growing – although still incipient – emphasis on quality improvements in the education system.
- Important advancements towards a non-discriminatory education offering equal opportunities, most notably in terms of indigenous peoples' access to, and permanence within, the school system. Lesser advances have been made regarding disabled children, but the issue is now firmly on the education agenda of the country; it is also, in part, due to the efforts of the basket fund donors.
- Constructive contributions to a dialogue (albeit unstable) between basket fund donors and the education sector in order to define the future direction of the cooperation.
- Participating in a Joint Commission between the Ministry and the donors with the purpose of analysing future scenarios and objectives.
- Development of a system of result indicators, with reports that are still limited and insufficient but improving.
- Maintenance within the ME, of a staff of education experts with resources to work for the qualitative improvement of the school system.

⁹ A basically similar situation, with differences in terms of the percentages and figures, was the one in 2006. Figures here used come from:
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/capacity/country_documents/bolivia_determinantes.pdf

An added value of the multi-donor basket fund in support of the Ministry of Education has been the launching of concrete plans and activities regarding education *quality*. It is still the case, however, that the quality has been seriously affected, in the absence of a solid replacement of the previous scheme with the so-called pluri-national multi-linguistic education. Effective progress has been achieved through the design of a more regionalised school curriculum that is slowly starting to be implemented, partly following the government guidelines supported by the basket fund. This has permitted a more culturally differentiated approach with enhanced pedagogical efficiency, taking the rich geo-cultural Bolivian diversity into consideration. However, what has now, in practice, become an institutional policy of *three-language* education has been considered by the specialists to not be very realistic – in light of the serious problems encountered e.g. regarding lack of education material and qualified teachers as well as polemics about indigenous alphabets, even in *bi-lingual* education. Altogether, the prospects of a pro-indigenous education system in Bolivia in their own languages are rather uncertain.

During the first year of the strategy period, education support to the state was seriously hampered by the institutional instability of the Ministry and by the continuation of intensive efforts to change the course of the education system in comparison with the previous period. Relations between the basket fund and the ministry improved gradually from 2010, and were marked by better dialogue and reduced ideological discourse. Relevant advances were also emerging after 2010 regarding the financial and administrative use of the basket fund resources on the part of the ME thanks to intensive efforts by the donors.

Gender equity: The goal of equal access to the basic education of girls compared to boys is close to being achieved in Bolivia, as part of the very impressive results in this sector. Real improvements towards equal *permanence* of girls in relation to boys within the school system have also been made, but there may still be a gap between the number of girls that drop out of schools as compared to boys. Poverty issues affecting female vs. male school permanence are still to be tackled, and cultural factors are still an obstacle to gender equity in public schools. Important advances, thanks to the international cooperation basket fund, have been made in terms of the elaboration of gender equity and girls' rights in school curricula and educational material.

The multi-donor cooperation, which Sweden is part of, in the education sector also has a non-government aspect that is mostly geared towards the following objective:

More poor people, particularly women and girls, will gain access to the labour market

Very effective results have been shown in relation to this objective, which can positively impact the overall Bolivian education system:

- Wide and increasing coverage via programmes such as FAUTAPO and SOS of technical entrepreneurial training – rural as well as urban – for the productive capacities of male and female youth and adults through training

courses, work careers and on-the-job training, and diplomas of various kinds, are geared towards the labour market in different regions of the country.

- The formal certification of vocational training, through agreements with legally-recognised education institutions (in the case of FAUTAPO) or directly (case of SOS).
- The articulation between the vocational training and local/municipal, and in some cases, sub-regional requirements.
- The start-up of individual, family-based or collective businesses, to attend the economic needs of poor or extremely poor population segments or to serve as modules for teaching experience.
- The start-up (through FAUTAPO) of vocational education on post-graduate (master) level for professionals and experts without academic degrees.
- The start-up (through SOS) of vocational training of youth for entrepreneurship with citizen and community responsibility, and with the development of family and social support networks.
- State attention beginning to be paid to these innovative non-state experiences in vocational training and entrepreneurship.

In this way Swedish cooperation has contributed to addressing the long-time lack of attention to vocational and entrepreneurial training in the Bolivian education system. Additionally, these experiences represent replicable models for the public school system. However, the weak institutional and management capacities of the State and the prominence of ideological discourse by the GoB are still short-term obstacles to the good and rapid use of the innovative experiences of the NGOs.

Gender aspects: The technical and entrepreneurship education supported by Sweden and developed through NGO programmes has also been duly monitored to address gender equity, and it can be safely stated that this has contributed positively to enhance female opportunities, even in specific cases favouring women's access to the labour market.

Although this outcome assessment did not make a direct review of Sweden's support to scientific research in Bolivia, the review team has sufficient previous knowledge to conclude that this has represented a high-level contribution, even when judged by international standards. The Swedish cooperation has offered a diversified and, so far, successful programme for research and PhD training with two of the principal public universities in Bolivia, Universidad Mayor de San Simón (UMSS) and Universidad Mayor de San Andrés (UMSA), through agreements with different Swedish universities. A total of 45 PhD degrees have been obtained since 2000, with another 55 in progress (compared to a total of presently 300 PhD titles in the country), and all these high-level academics have returned to Bolivia to stay in the country, where no PhD courses are yet available. The contribution to a relatively limited academic network in Bolivia has been considerable, with strong gender-equity perspective promotion of more women in post-graduate formation.

4.3 SUSTAINABILITY

If Sweden pulls out of the basket funding for the Ministry of Education, along with the Netherlands and Denmark, there will be a need for a full rethinking of how quality enhancement in the Bolivian education system may be supported. Obviously, this depends primarily on government decisions regarding education policy and budget allocations. But while the multi-donor cooperation is still operative, it may bring this issue up through the Joint Commission with the Ministry in order to analyse future education scenarios and objectives in Bolivia.

The Netherlands's decision to end its development cooperation with Bolivia implies a transition process for the basket fund that would likely lead to a discussion about the work of the referred Commission. A more direct participation in the Commission by more high-level representatives of the donors might also be a way to engage with the highest state representatives in the education sector and even, more generally, in government – including parliamentary commissions. Otherwise, if Sweden decides to continue its education sector support to the state, an inclusion of UNICEF and other donors into a future basket fund or similar pooling arrangements should be negotiated.

The Bolivian NGOs will remain highly dependent on international cooperation in the education sector for a long time. In the short term the challenge is to avoid cuts in international cooperation budgets that lead to the cancellation of technical and entrepreneurial training programmes. A Swedish pull-out of the multi-donor funds for the NGOs could have serious consequences for the consolidation of what has been achieved in terms of this crucial education area.

5 Contributions within the Area of Natural Resources with an Emphasis on Climate Change Adaptation

5.1 RELEVANCE

The challenges of climate change *adaptation* in Bolivia, impacting the quality of life and the productive capacities of various segments of the poor and extremely poor population in the country, are crucially relevant in a country with vast arid, dry and semi-dry zones, huge seasonal and regional temperature variations, and, consequently, with a high degree of vulnerability in terms of its water resources.

Global climate change is already producing longer and more intense droughts in the Bolivian highlands, valleys and lowland regions. An increased occurrence of droughts is foreseen in southern Bolivia due to climate change. Heavier tropical rain seasons, producing increasingly devastating floods, are already seriously affecting the northern and central lowlands on an annual basis, and may also affect the northern Amazon and the wet central lowland plains. Integral water management in Bolivia is, and will undoubtedly be, a crucial concern for this part of South America.

Swedish cooperation in Bolivia has a strong emphasis on watershed and water management, forestry, water provision and sanitation. Interventions are geared towards major rural productivity and proper forest management for the benefit of the communities and their adaptation capacity to climate change. In this way, they are well adjusted to the most urgent needs of the majority of the country's population and to development priorities of national as well as sub-national levels of government.

The crucial attention being paid to *water resources* also has high and important derivative beneficial effects on *forest resources*. The country contains an immense space of highlands, valleys and the arid and dry Chaco regions, which may end up being de-populated as a consequence of climate change, thus leading to an even more intensive migration towards the humid areas of the Amazon rainforest and the lowlands, and all the ecological threats this may imply. The provision of drinking and irrigation water in the dry and semi-dry macro-regions is therefore absolutely essential, and Swedish cooperation in the present multi-donor context will continue to be of critical importance.

Looking towards the future, there is a challenge to pay urgent attention to the country's underground water reserves, i.e., their preservation, use and careful management, as well as their storage. The management of aquifers and underground dams may become another important priority, with the same purposes in terms of climate change and the sustainable management of water resources.

5.2 EFFECTIVENESS AND OUTCOMES

Support to climate change adaptation is repeatedly emphasised in Sweden's country strategy for Bolivia, and is also reflected in several project documents, with the purpose of the continued provision of ecosystem-friendly services and sustainable forestry and agricultural technologies and practices. All this is seen as crucial for a development that may reduce poverty as well as lead to improved health, food security and living standards.

Access to safe water and sanitation is a priority area; it emphasises the integrated management of water resources in favour of poor people. The support to potable water and basic sanitation in some of the poorest peri-urban areas through public sector programmes such as PASAP, and through UNICEF in rural areas, is part of this sector strategy.

Employment creation for poor people is emphasised in access to, and the use of, land and forest resources. Public institutions at central and local levels are supported with the purpose of putting long-term plans for sustainable and productive management of natural resources in place. Climate change adaptation is expected to be integrated into these plans.

Bolivia's geographical position, between the Andean highlands and the Amazon, makes the country particularly vulnerable to climate change. People who are already in a weak position are exposed to drought, forest fires and floods on an annual basis. Swedish cooperation is aimed at a long-term environmental policy and the use of natural resources, thus encouraging sustainable development.

Swedish cooperation with Bolivia in the area of natural resources, the environment and climate change during the 2009 – 2012 period is showing clearly effective achievements in relation to the objectives expressed in its Country Strategy. Three objectives were drawn up for this area, and the outcomes that we have observed are listed for each of the objectives:

The first objective was to support an efficient and environmentally sustainable exploitation of water, forest and land.

Various watershed, water management and sustainable agriculture projects are being implemented through the PROAGRO programme in dry and semi-dry areas of the Bolivian highland valleys and the *Chaco* region. These are based on improved and more efficient models and technologies for the use, storage and management of water resources and for better agricultural and land use practices, with improvements for the land and water resources and positive impacts for productivity and the economy of the beneficiary population of small rural producers.

Projects for the integral management and preservation of watersheds and water resources through the National Watershed Plan are also being implemented, with

similar positive effects on adaptation, soil and agricultural productivity. The Sweden-supported Basket Fund has been a crucial element in the implementation of this plan, and Sweden, along with the Netherlands, was instrumental in the initial design of the Plan. Through the Plan, central government provides normative support, infrastructure and capacity building, and its projects aim to link efforts at all administrative levels. These projects are enhancing the dialogue between users, communities, municipalities and the central government, and in some cases even between department and central government institutions. The integral management of water resources and the integral management of watersheds are now part of the policies of the GoB, and are slowly beginning to be implemented on sub-national government levels. The National Watershed Plan is under development with steady improvement and increasing details, gradually involving the participation by sub-national levels of government.

The community forestry project Baba Carapa has consolidated itself in specific locations of the Amazon and lowland forests in Bolivia. The project has shown solid results in organisational development, training and the use of improved systems for communication and information, follow-up, monitoring and measurement of management, exploitation, certification and forest census carried out by the participating communities in association with the commercial sector.

The results achieved in the forestry sector through the Baba Carapa and LIDEMA projects stand in contrast to the expected achievements regarding the National Forestry Plan through the Ministry of Environment and Water. This plan was intended as a parallel to the National Watershed Plan, with more effective publicly-managed sustainable forestry programmes and projects. The high degree of political instability in the Ministry, its lack of political commitment and its low institutional capacity to make use of Swedish sustainable forestry support led to very limited results. Support to the National Forestry Plan was therefore discontinued.

The second Swedish objective was to enhance the access to clean water and basic sanitation.

The provision of clean drinking water and basic sanitation services in peri-urban areas has been significantly amplified – and this process seems to continue at a constant pace. Swedish-supported contributions, not least the PASAP programme, have been quite decisive in this process. Reliable up-to-date approximate figures in this regard will not be available until the findings of the recent national census, that was carried out in December 2012 in Bolivia, are officially published. According to a Ministry of Environment and Water (MMAyA) report, also soon to be officially released,

drinking water coverage reached 78.5% in 2012. Drawing from UNICEF figures and projections,¹⁰ the greater increases in drinking water and basic sanitation coverage clearly correspond to urban and peri-urban areas (where 60% of Bolivia's population lives). Such achievements represent important improvements in the life conditions of ample segments of the poor and extremely poor populations in peri-urban areas, whereas the situation is still very problematic in the rural areas. Clean water and basic sanitation have a particular impact on pregnant women and newborns.

Through the PASAP contributions supported by Sweden, the country has also made important advances in terms of the non-discriminatory provision of drinking water and sanitation and in terms of equal opportunity and collective rights to proper access to services. The MMAyA is progressing with the development of normative frameworks and technical guides, and the ministry has begun to improve its capacities to follow up, monitor and measure result indicators for water and basic sanitation access. The collection of data outside of major urban centres, and particularly from more distant areas and minor population centres, is still quite incipient.

There have been some successful cases of innovative pilot experiments with ecological systems for basic sanitation, and with the management of waste water and water saving schemes, i.e. decentralised sewage treatment systems and dry toilets. These experiments have been launched by NGOs that are supported by Sweden, with significant impact on public sector policies and programming, which are even visible within the PASAP programme.

Where the Swedish-supported contributions, implemented in cooperation with the public sector, have led to positive outcomes (in relation to objective 1 as well as 2), the following factors seem to have been decisive:

- i) the direct linking of the agricultural, soil conservation, food security, pro-poor, social equity, basic sanitation, health and better living standard issues with the high social urgency that the water issue has had in Bolivia throughout its history, particularly since the 2000 "Water War";
- ii) the social pressures and permanent demands from the population for improved and inexpensive access to drinking water and irrigation;
- iii) the political pressure on different levels of government to work together to attend social demands for water provision and management;

¹⁰ The quoted MMAyA report has been circulating unofficially while its figures are crosschecked with the latest census findings. According to UNICEF, in 2001 –when the last national census took place in Bolivia– access to drinking water was around 72%, in 2006 coverage reached around 73% and in 2015 it will be close to 81.8%. Basic sanitation coverage was around 40.7% in 2001, 55.7% in 2006 and will be 71.3% in 2015. In rural areas, however, figures lag behind national averages. In 2001, drinking water coverage in rural areas reached only 46%, in 2006 only 50.6% and will be less than 55% in 2015. Basic sanitation in rural areas covered 31% in 2001, 35% in 2006 and will be below 40% in 2015, a still very unsettling overall situation. http://www.UNICEF.org/bolivia/BOLIVIA_-_Lavado_de_Manos.pdf

- iv) the generally concurring efforts of central and municipal governments to attend to local water demands;
- v) the slow but effective growth within the central government agencies of improved technical capabilities to attend to the water issue;
- vi) the stable leadership of the Viceministry of Water Resources and Irrigation and the sufficiently effective performance of the Dirección General de Planificación of the MMAyA when dealing with the water issue; and
- vii) the strong motivation and professional capabilities regarding the issue within the ranks of the Embassy of Sweden and its donor partners in Bolivia.

On the other hand, the contributions to forest management through NGOs have led to important positive outcomes, basically due to:

- i) their adequately managed interventions;
- ii) their high motivation and professional capabilities;
- iii) their capacity to develop good working relationships with sub-national layers of government (particularly municipalities) as well as local stakeholders;
- iv) their more easily manageable small-scale operations; and again
- v) the motivation and professionalism within the ranks of the Embassy of Sweden and its donor partners in Bolivia.

The third objective was to contribute to reduced vulnerability, particularly for poor people, vis-à-vis natural disasters; and adaptation to climate change.

All contributions within the area of natural resources were supposed to be linked to this objective in one way or another, and documented results have been achieved as far as climate change adaptation is concerned. Adaptation problems related to historical climate variations and present-day climate change in the vast arid, dry and semi-dry areas of Bolivia (covering almost half of the country) are directly linked with existing water scarcity and worsening future scenarios. All successful water management interventions in Bolivia have strong and favourable adaptive implications. All water-related programmes discussed in this Report are fundamental for climate change adaptation.

The LIDEMA project may be the most elaborate effort that is specifically geared towards climate change adaptation, through the most experienced environmental NGO network in the country. Baba Carapa also has strong potential, in this case both for adaptation and mitigation. But the major public sector projects in Sweden's natural resource portfolio have also integrated this aspect and included climate change monitoring indicators, thus making it possible to demonstrate concrete progress. All of these programmes have a pro-poor approach. Thus, on the one hand, the public sector enhanced clean water and basic sanitation provision, improved watershed and water management for better urban and rural (small agriculture) use. On the other hand, through NGO efforts, environmentally friendly agriculture and forest use practices and basic sanitation pilot experimentation were introduced. Climate change social awareness campaigns have been part of these activities.

There have also been contributions for improved planning, and the programming of interventions and monitoring based on measurable results, with indicators for climate change adaptation. With Swedish support, this has been present in the different contributions.

The combined effect of these, and several other contributions within this area, has been to reduce vulnerability in relation to climate change among various segments of the Bolivian population. There has been effective progress in the productive management of water, land and forests – with a perspective for climate change adaptation and mitigation in various localities of the country.

Due to the special appropriation for this purpose, climate change adaptation has been highly visible in the Swedish cooperation with Bolivia, while mitigation has been part and parcel – with lesser amounts – mainly of NGO projects (notably LIDEMA and Baba Carapa). The very recent enactment of the Law on Mother Earth (LMT), creating an Authority (APMT) and a special Fund (FPMT) for the implementation of the law, may provide an opportunity for a larger contribution in support of climate change mitigation in the future. This is most relevant in relation to considering the importance of the Bolivian rainforest, and its dry woodlands, in the bigger context of the decisive role of the Amazon forest to maintaining a global climate equilibrium.

The diverse contributions implemented with the support of Sweden and its donor partners show the possibilities that Bolivia would have if some basic changes were put in place for saving and improving its natural resources. This would include major efforts for water and forest management, for achieving soil improvement and food security, and for a general climate change adaptation that would forestall future risk situations. In order to achieve broader impact, top policy decision-makers would need to change their negative perception of shared responsibilities among all stakeholders for the maintenance of water resources, forests and soils. An excessively centralist approach on the part of the GoB has tended to block further development of the synergies: between central and sub-national layers of government, between the public and private sectors, and between multiple government layers, NGOs, private enterprises, social organisations and local users. The various programmes and projects have produced remarkably positive sub-regional and local outcomes in spite of a frequent lack of dialogue, which has led to mistrust and ideological polarisation among concerned institutions and stakeholders.

The challenge to achieving major progress towards an adequate management of the important rainforests and dry forests in Bolivia in the context of climate change, will oblige Sweden to, quite soon, define if and how to support public sector forestry efforts within the framework of the recently-approved Law on Mother Earth. There are clearly contradictory views within the GoB on how to manage natural resources, but there is an opportunity to produce synergies with important progress in NGO efforts. Thus far, positive outcomes of Swedish contributions to forest management have very much been a consequence of NGO efforts that are fruitfully linked to national government policies, however incipient and contradictory they have been.

Regarding the part of this objective that deals with contributing to reduced vulnerability, the most relevant contribution has been through the National Watershed Plan, which considers disaster reduction to be an integral part its approach. Even so, it has not been the Plan's main purpose. This is different from similar plans in other regions such as Central America, where they were launched, precisely, as the consequence of major disasters. In the other contributions within the area of natural resource management, the vulnerability aspect has not been very visible. So it seems that this part of objective 3 may have received relatively little attention.

Gender impact: The provision of better and more drinking water and basic sanitation – in a country with historically clean water deficits – has direct and highly meaningful impact on pregnant women and newborn infants. Against the backdrop of global climate change, all efforts leading to integral watershed and water management, and to the secure provision of water and sanitation, are relevant to improved mother-child health. Women and children will almost always be the prime victims of problems related to climate change. Water as a human right, which is a concept that is strongly emphasised by Bolivian social movements, is also described as a crucial mother-child right. Food security – in Bolivia, it is highly dependent on scarce water resources – is also vital for mother-child health and survival. Thus, strong Swedish cooperation in the water and sustainable agriculture sectors addresses gender equity.

5.3 SUSTAINABILITY

The prospects for the sustainability of multi-donor water programmes with the public sector – which are apparently relatively solid in the short term – continue to be fragile in the medium- and long-term, since they depend on very personalised leadership in the various sub-units of the Ministry of Environment and Water. There is a possibility of a future disbandment of accumulated technical capacities, although there remain relatively high hopes that they may be kept intact, at least until the 2014 general elections. Capacity deficits of professionals at all levels add to the fragile sustainability, although capacity building is a cornerstone of the Swedish programme.

The negotiation between government and donors about a fair distribution of investment resources in the water sector should be based on an expectation of a gradually increasing share of the contributions coming from the Bolivian public sector, being from the State Budget (TGN), or from department and municipal budgets. The Bolivian NGOs will certainly continue to be very dependent on donor funding. The Bolivian state has no programme for NGO funding, and the high political tension between the GoB and most NGOs makes changes in this regard unlikely.

6 Discussion of Different Aid Modalities

6.1 CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL

The Swedish Country Strategy for Bolivia aims at a gradual change from project to programme contributions, with the latter increasing from 30 to 66 % of the funding during the strategy period (2009 – 2013). Sector programmes and sector budget support were to be encouraged “as far as conditions are in place”. Cooperation with public institutions was to have priority, whereas CSOs and the UN system were seen as complementary.

The process of finding an effective and efficient working relationship with central government institutions has been highly problematic. In one case, with the intended key support to the National Forestry Plan, the programme simply had to be abandoned because the institutional instability and the low implementation capacity of the Ministry of Environment and Water did not permit an acceptable operation of the project. The institutional instability of the MMAyA is, to a large degree, related to a high degree of political and ideological confrontation around environmental policies, as expressed through the Isiboro Secure National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS) conflict.

For the other three sector programmes with this ministry (National Watershed Plan, PROAGRO-irrigation and water management- and PASAP-drinking water and sanitation), pragmatic implementation models have been found: the combination of a strong and independent technical implementation unit and an acceptable counterpart situation in the Ministry (for the Watershed Plan and PROAGRO with the well functioning Vice Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation; for PASAP with the *Dirección General* within the same Ministry).

In the area of education, the partnership with the Ministry of Education has worked quite well, whereas the PRI project for institutional reform (or institutional *revolution*, as it is actually termed) has been much more problematic for similar reasons of institutional instability and a lack of political commitment.

The viability of these arrangements is, in all cases, very dependent on one or two personalities and their continuation in their present positions, which makes the sustainability of the arrangements vulnerable.

Sweden has decided *not* to establish budget support cooperation in Bolivia, even when sector programmes are playing a quite dominant role in the cooperation. However, the PASAP programme is closely associated with sector budget support from the EU Commission; it is actually the only sector programme in Bolivia where

the EU has managed to get a bilateral donor on board as a co-financier. The EU considers that its system of indicator-based monitoring, both as a basis for disbursement and for control of actual execution, is working quite well in Bolivia and contains acceptable measures against corruption.

A significant difference between Sweden's and the EU's financial mechanism in the case of PASAP is that the EU makes its disbursements to the Ministry of Finance (*Tesoro General del Estado*), while Sweden works only with the line ministry with the opportunity to audit the accounts. Sweden and the EU have together formed a technical assistance unit with the EU funding the Head and Sweden an environment expert. Sweden is also part of a Tripartite Committee, along with the EU and the Ministry.

In two other water-related sector programmes (*PROAGRO* and *Plan Nacional de Cuencas*), Sweden is part of a donor consortium with specialised technical implementation units with coordination committees between donors and the Ministry.

All of these three programme arrangements provide an extra guarantee that implementation mechanisms are streamlined as much as possible, and that an indicator-based monitoring system is in place. These implementation mechanisms are probably the best possible arrangements in the complicated cooperation context in Bolivia. The three sector programmes are also functioning reasonably well.

The next level of donor coordination is where there are basket funds but no donor-managed technical implementation units.¹¹ This is the case with the sector programme support to the Ministry of Education and the institutional reform support to PRI. In the latter case there is also a technical implementation unit that is run by the Ministry rather than the donors. This, it seems, has been a less successful sector programme management model.

¹¹ Sweden is part of the following basket funds in Bolivia:

- Ombudsman: Sweden, Switzerland and The Netherlands, previously in this period also Canada (The Netherlands withdraws after 2013; only Switzerland and Sweden remain)
- UNIR: Sweden, Switzerland and The Netherlands plus two NGOs (Sweden and the Netherlands withdraw after 2013)
- PRI: Sweden and Denmark
- Ministry of Education: Sweden, Denmark and The Netherlands (two latter withdraw after 2013)
- Fautapo: Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark and The Netherlands (and several other partners) (two latter withdraw after 2013)
- National Watershed Plan: Sweden, Switzerland, Germany
- PROAGRO: Sweden, Germany
- Baba Carapa: Sweden, The Netherlands (The Netherlands withdraws after 2013)

It appears that the majority of these basket group arrangements – a principal mechanism for donor coordination in Bolivia – will fall apart or be drastically reduced at the end of the present Swedish five-year agreement. The Netherlands is closing its Bolivia programme, and Denmark intends to re-orient its cooperation to other sectors and partners. Canada is reducing its cooperation with Bolivia by half and narrowing its scope to two sectors. The two most important basket partners that will remain along with Sweden are Switzerland and Germany. This situation will probably oblige Sweden to rethink its coordination approach in Bolivia, and, in some cases, this will possibly also be crucial for re-considerations about the viability of some ongoing contributions (e.g. to PRI and the Ministry of Education).

Aid coordination may be adversely affected by the multilateral institutions not being part of the basket funds. Although UN agencies are often reluctant to contribute to baskets if they are based on un-earmarked funding, there could be ways around this problem when it comes to coordination and policy dialogue. This question is particularly relevant regarding UNICEF in the education sector, where UNICEF has its own cooperation arrangement with the Ministry of Education. When we asked UNICEF about this, a commitment was expressed to re-consider the viability of joining the basket with Sweden if Sweden decides to carry on its sector support after 2013. It would seem that the multilaterals could contribute to strengthening the dialogue with government if they, in one way or the other, coordinate their contributions with the bilateral donors within the basket arrangements.

In general, it seems that both the UN system and the International Financial Institutions (World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Development Bank of Latin American (CAF)) prefer to work directly with the GoB, rather than coordinating efforts with the bilateral donors. While they surely have their motives for this choice, and in many cases seem to gain privileged access this way, it would seem that the consequence is a weakening of donor coordination and the policy dialogue space for donors as a whole – and particularly for the bilaterals. Since the general scale of ODA is so limited in Bolivia (approximately 2% of GDP), it can be difficult for the donors to get the government's attention. Given the problems they are up against, e.g. regarding institutional weaknesses and lack of continuity, the GoB would seem to need a more coordinated effort.

There is one overall donor coordination mechanism in Bolivia, the so-called GruS (*Grupo de Socios para el Desarrollo de Bolivia*), with sector coordination committees. The review team heard some quite skeptical views about how efficiently the GruS is functioning, while other informants claim that this depends heavily on the rotating presidency (both of the overall group and the sector committees). In this case, also, there might be space for improvements, particularly regarding the stability of the group.

Summing up, and comparing to, the Country Strategy aims, programme contributions have reached the intended two thirds of the portfolio. A very constructive and complementary balance has been found between public, non-governmental and UN implementation – this is very much in line with the initial aims.

Sweden may need to take a fresh look at the coordination mechanisms before entering into a new five-year cooperation period in Bolivia, particularly with the loss of so many basket partners. For the time being, it is unclear what the options will be.

6.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AND DECENTRALISED LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT

Due to political strife, the relationship between central government institutions, the administrative apparatus of the department governorships and of the larger municipalities controlled by the opposition has, at times, been deeply conflictive. This has made it difficult for international cooperation to achieve efficient coordination between national and sub-national levels of government.

Political confrontation between the GoB and the opposition was particularly acute between 2006 and 2009. The MAS landslide electoral victory by the end of 2009 allowed for more stability in this relationship. In general terms, the GoB now has a reasonably good working relationship with a majority of the governorships and the municipalities of Bolivia.

Political stability, however, does not mean that administrative efficiency characterises the public sector at the national, sub-national and local levels of government. Administrative instability is high at all levels. Second and third layer staff rotation is constant everywhere. Poor administrative procedures, even poorer information and monitoring systems, insufficient administrative and technical capabilities, and very low budget execution are commonplace. This has been a major obstacle for attempts to develop articulation within the cooperation programmes that are oriented at different levels of government. Some specialists contend that administrative inefficiency is a more serious problem than political strife in Bolivia.

Anyway, workable solutions have been found to engage with different administrative levels in several programmes. This has particularly been the case with programmes for drinking water and the provision of basic sanitation, where all levels of government tend to concur more easily. Integral and articulated watershed management and planning have been more difficult due to political rivalry, conflicting regional and local interests and administrative inefficiencies. Agricultural policies, forest and natural resources management and climate change policies, as macro level issues, fall within the mainstream of political controversy, where rational coordination between the central government and de-centralised governments that are controlled by the opposition becomes very complicated. Yet another situation emerges when it comes to undertakings between small rural municipalities, NGOs and central government where coordination is again easier, if not always administratively efficient. For example, the improvement of the quality of education has been a very difficult process in terms of multi-level articulation due to the current ideological controversies.

6.3 COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT CHANNELS

The Sweden-Bolivia country strategy has an interesting combination of cooperation through *central state institutions* (the ministries of Environment and Water, of Education, and the Technical Unit of PRI reporting to the Ministry of the Presidency)¹², *autonomous state institutions* (the Ombudsman's office, National Institute of Statistics, and also the National Election Court which has not been part of this review), *UN agencies* (UNDP, UNICEF and also UNFPA not covered by this review), and finally a number of NGOs (of which this review has assessed several).

Generally speaking, because cooperation with central institutions, in many cases, is quite complicated in Bolivia, it has been particularly important to draw upon this variety of cooperation partners.

Bolivia offers considerable space for NGOs (national as well as international) and for popular organisations. Sweden has made comprehensive use of this channel in its cooperation, as a complement and an alternative where state institutions have had a limited capability or willingness to reach the objectives. In the field of democracy and human rights, they are playing a non-negligible role to uphold and further develop democratic and rights perspectives in Bolivia; and they definitely deserve the support of the international community for that purpose. In the areas of natural resources and education, NGOs have been particularly important because of their innovative character and capacity to address issues with weak government capacity.

6.4 PROCESS OBJECTIVE OF NATIONAL DIALOGUE

The Swedish cooperation strategy has defined it as a process objective to enhance national dialogue and consensus. The Embassy has a dialogue plan that is updated on an annual basis and is adapted to changing political realities. The plan focuses primarily on the Swedish cooperation objectives within the three areas of the strategy plan. As a continuous process where Sweden coordinates its efforts with other donors (mostly other EU countries and the EU itself), it is difficult to see any clear results of this dialogue; it is acting against heavy odds, where international cooperation counts for a very limited share of available resources, and with a government that pays limited attention to the opinions of European or other OECD countries.

¹² There was another programme at the central level – not selected for assessment here – that ended in 2010: an anti-corruption programme where the primary institutions included the Public Ministry (which corresponds to the General Attorney's office); the Contraloría (the Comptroller General's office), the Bank Supervisory body, and the Ministry of Transparency. This programme was supported through a basket fund with Denmark and the Netherlands.

7 Conclusions and Lessons Learned

The following summary of outcomes mostly relates to common efforts where Sweden has participated through basket funds and other forms of coordination. There is therefore no direct attribution to Swedish cooperation, per se.

In the area of *Democracy and Human Rights*, we may draw the following conclusions:

1. The first area objective was to *contribute to a more effective and transparent public administration without discrimination*. We confirm that there are important outcomes in terms of non-discrimination, particularly through the support to the Ombudsman and even through UNICEF. There have also been significant transparency (and anti-corruption) results through the administrative reform programme (PRI). As far as a more effective public administration is concerned, not very much has been achieved, as the PRI programme failed to reach its more integral objective. Institutional instability, politicisation and a lack of institutional memory continue to be chronic problems that limit the space for the cooperation to make a real difference, and even exposing the same cooperation to a serious loss of effectiveness in its own work. It is a great paradox that the statist-oriented government in Bolivia pays so little attention to the construction of an effective and efficient state.
2. The second area objective of *improved human rights enjoyment particularly for the discriminated and not least the indigenous parts of the population*, has, to a large extent, been achieved. The historic advances made by the present GoB in this regard have also opened up important spaces where the international cooperation may contribute. Sweden's contribution here has mostly been outside of central government channels. We have not looked at Sweden's support to the Supreme Electoral Court, which is clearly a relevant partner in this area. The decisive support to the Ombudsman is probably the most important Swedish human rights contribution in Bolivia, but contributions to UNICEF and the Bolivian NGO UNIR are also clearly positive.

Lesson learned (i):

In order to promote an equilibrium among democratic and human rights norms in Bolivia, foreign cooperation must be prepared to take responsibility for those aspects of civil and political rights that have less priority from the GoB. By cautiously identifying opportunities and selecting the most relevant contributions if and when supposedly autonomous state institutions offer reasonable checks and balances to a powerful executive power (primarily the Ombudsman, followed by the constitutional and perhaps the electoral court and selected areas of the judiciary), donors may

make a difference. Simultaneously, it is important to encourage the clearly positive aspects of government efforts to promote participatory democracy and economic, social and cultural rights for the previously marginalised population. It is equally important for Sweden to maintain its support to the government-critical part of civil society which is struggling to uphold its independent political role, countervailing state power in a crucial effort for democratic and civil-political human rights concerns.

The next area of Swedish cooperation has been *education*. The following outcomes may be highlighted:

3. In the area of education, where remarkable progress has been made to wipe out illiteracy and provide basic education for all – including girls and indigenous children – bilateral donors, including Sweden, have had a negligible financial role compared to GoB's own budget resources when it comes to current costs (teachers' salaries). However, Sweden and other like-minded donors have contributed heavily to investments (80%) and have thus contributed significantly to this indisputable basic education success story.
4. The first area objective has been to *assure that more children, not least girls and indigenous, shall finish primary education of good quality*. Sweden and other like-minded donors have been part of underpinning efforts behind the indisputable basic education success story, through their basket fund cooperation with the Ministry of Education. While the basket partners' contribution to *quantitative* results has been limited, these donors have raised the concerns of falling *quality* in the school system as a basic issue. It has been difficult to work effectively in this sector, due to the same institutional instability noted elsewhere in public administration. The education sector has also been characterised by contradictory policies, and, not least, confusion about education targets for indigenous languages. On the positive side, a Joint Commission between the Ministry and the basket donors has created a space for pedagogical dialogue. It is here that the concerns about education quality have been raised.
5. The second education objective has been to *help poor people, again with a priority for females, to gain access to the labour market*. The main instrument for this has been to support vocational and entrepreneurial training through non-governmental mechanisms (primarily the impressive NGO FAUTAPO, in minor scale also through SOS-Bolivia). A wide and increasing coverage for such education has been achieved, leading to enhanced productive capacities and even the launching of SMEs as poverty alleviation tools. An important aspect of these innovative results is that spillover to the public sector is becoming a real opportunity against the backdrop of historical ignorance of such training in the public education sector.

Lesson learned (ii):

Sweden has been part of a consortium providing crucial support to the qualitative aspects of Bolivian basic and public education, representing a dialogue partner in

pedagogical terms with the professional staff of the Ministry of Education. After 2013, the other bilateral donors in this consortium will discontinue their support. If Swedish support to education is continued, Sweden should seriously consider joining efforts with UNICEF and other donors, while also continuing its support to technical education in a way that may bring important NGO influence to the public sector.

The third area of the Swedish Country Strategy has been in the area of natural resources and climate change.

6. The first objective here is a quite comprehensive one of *supporting an efficient and environmentally sustainable exploitation of water, forest and land*. Two major public water management programmes, where Sweden participates through basket funds, are PROAGRO and the National Watershed Plan. The former is an important water management and irrigation programme being implemented in dry and semi-dry areas of *Valles, Norte de Potosí* and the *Chaco* region, based on improved and more efficient models for the use, storage and management of water resources, with improvements for the land and water resources and positive impact for productivity and the economy of the beneficiary population of small rural producers. The Watershed Plan provides an integral management and preservation of watersheds, with similarly positive effect on land resources and agricultural productivity. Both programmes are enhancing dialogue between users, communities and government institutions on all levels, and they represent integral policies of GoB.
7. In terms of sustainable forest use, a two-pronged approach was applied: cooperation thorough the NGOs Baba Carapa and LIDEMA – and support to the National Forestry Plan. The support to the latter failed and was dropped (after 2011), due to a lack of political support and basic institutional incapacity of the Ministry. Baba Carapa, located in specific areas of the Amazon and Bolivian lowlands, has shown solid results in organisational development and innovative mechanisms for a constructive dialogue between forest communities with collective titles and the commercial forestry sector. LIDEMA has designed and started the implementation of a most relevant and technically pertinent programme leading to climate change adaptation in various localities in the highlands and lowlands of Bolivia.
8. Positive direct impacts on sustainable land use in diverse locations of the country are being attained — through the PROAGRO programme, local and sub-regional interventions developed through the National Watershed Plan and the interventions of NGOs. The implementation of improved or innovative models for conserving water resources, enhancing agricultural productivity and the use of forest and other renewable natural resources, is contributing to sustainable land use. This includes better irrigation and water management i.e. through associative and/or family labour patterns and sustainable agriculture. The PROAGRO programme also has a mostly successful component attempting to facilitate market access for farmers who,

through this component, have achieved higher and more diversified productivity.

9. The second objective under this heading has been to *enhance the access to clean water and basic sanitation*. Through a combination of public and non-public channels, Sweden has contributed significantly to impressive results in the provision of both drinking water and sanitation schemes, representing important improvements in the life conditions of ample segments of the poor and the extremely poor population in urban (or what is called peri-urban) areas. The most important contribution has been the basket fund support to the PASAP sector programme, implemented jointly with the sector budget support provided by EU. PASAP has produced important advances within the public sector in terms of non-discriminatory and egalitarian provision of drinking water and sanitation, the development of normative frameworks and technical guides and improved capacities to monitor and measure result indicators. Also, support was provided by Sweden to the multi-donor programme for Water and Sanitation 2007-2011, a UNICEF programme targetting the rural areas. In addition to this, Sweden has also supported innovative NGO projects carrying out ecological pilot experiments for basic sanitation, with potential impact on the public projects.
10. The third objective, linked to the specific appropriation for climate change adaptation, was to *contribute to reduced vulnerability particularly for poor people vis-à-vis natural disasters caused by climate change*. All contributions within this area were linked to the issue of climate change in one way or the other, and successful achievements have been attained. The LIDEMA programme is a highly relevant and well-designed proposal that is specifically geared towards climate change adaptation and mitigation through the most experienced environmental NGO network in the country; and Baba Carapa has made relevant and innovative achievements leading to adaptation and mitigation. But the major public projects in Sweden's natural resource portfolio are also directly relevant for, and linked to, climate change adaptation, including the application of monitoring indicators. All these programmes have a pro-poor approach. Climate Change adaptation has thus been highly visible in the Swedish cooperation with Bolivia, while the need for mitigation and conservation of natural resources has not been addressed to the same extent. However, when it comes what is supposedly the main element of this objective, to reduce natural disaster vulnerability, the Review has found only one Swedish contribution with significant relevance: The National Watershed Plan. It would therefore seem that this aspect has been receiving relatively little explicit attention in the cooperation.

Lesson learned (iii): Sweden has established a comprehensive and well balanced portfolio in the management of water resources for the purposes of climate change adaptation, sustainable agriculture and irrigation, drinking water and basic sanitation in favour of the poor, which for the main part should be maintained. Moreover, in the context of global climate change, scientific research regarding Bolivia's highland and lowland aquifers, support for integral management of

underground water resources, and support for underground water storage urgently needs to be started in Bolivia. Sweden could make a big difference in this regard given its own strong academic resources and technical assistance capabilities.

Lesson learned iv) There may be space for new approaches when it comes to environmentally sustainable forest management, where innovative NGO projects on a minor scale already supported by Sweden may provide examples for more large-scale public initiatives to the extent political will, public policies and implementation capacities allow it. The overall purpose of contributing to climate change adaptation may even be matched by mitigation efforts, considering the importance of the Bolivian rainforest in the bigger Amazon context of global climate equilibrium. It may be worthwhile exploring whether the the new Law on Mother Earth can provide donors like Sweden with a better basis for synergies between NGOs and public sector efforts.

Lesson learned (v): A reshuffle of ministerial and vice ministerial responsibilities in the vulnerable Ministry of Environment and Water is likely in the near future. It would seem to be essential to offer solid training related to efforts across the area to the largest possible number of professionals and technicians both on central government level and even more so in the new department governments and in larger and medium municipalities. These capacities would be important for the sustainability of current efforts, not least for the handling of climate change adaptation issues related to all interventions in the area of natural resource management.

Gender perspective:

11. The Country Strategy has a very clear emphasis on gender, both in its overall objective and in the three area objectives. Thanks to generally good gender equity policies in the country, Swedish cooperation has been able to exploit available opportunities to strengthen the relative position of girls and women. But the review – based principally on independent evaluations of the various contributions – has found relatively few examples of these general objectives being strongly reflected in actual programme and project implementation. Some cases have been mentioned, though: Participation of women in political parties has been strengthened, gender statistics have been systematically established, special attention is paid to the rights of women in human rights projects, although the Ombudsman was found to incorporate this perspective only sporadically (but has made it more explicit in its most recent strategy). In education, steps towards gender equity have also been reflected through programmes that are supported by Sweden. The impressive results in providing drinking water and sanitation have particularly great relevance for girls and women. Women have taken the possibility to participate in the local organisations for water and natural resources, e.g. in the community forestry programme.

Cooperation modalities:

12. Throughout this country programme, it has been complicated to find an effective and efficient working relationship with unstable central government institutions. When it became *too* difficult, as in the case of the National Forestry Plan, the programme simply had to be discontinued. But creativity has been shown in finding workable solutions with the same Ministry of Environment and Water, which is the counterpart in three major water-related programmes. A combination of good donor coordination (one joint execution with the EU and two basket fund mechanisms, in all cases with a donor-driver technical execution unit) and a pragmatic relationship to units that do function relatively well in the Ministry, has led to efficient, rather large-scale, programmes that show good results in accordance with Swedish strategy objectives. A dominant part of the Swedish portfolio – with both central and autonomous state institutions and some NGOs – has been coordinated through different basket fund arrangements, giving the donors a better dialogue position than they would have otherwise had in a country where, particularly bilateral, donors have difficulties engaging with the key decision-makers in government.
13. Sweden has generally had considerable success with its *two-track approach* of working in parallel with state and non-state counterparts, in several cases in the same sector. While the public programmes are generally more important in quantitative terms, NGO programmes are often more experimental and innovative in character, even with the potential of impacting the way that things are being done in more bureaucratic and often unstable state agencies. Equally important has been the *multi-level approach* of working with central and de-centralised government structures whenever it has been possible. These complementary approaches are worth continuing.

Lesson learned (vi): Many of the basket groups which have provided Sweden with the most important donor coordination and policy dialogue opportunities will fall apart or be reduced to a minimum after 2013. Sweden will therefore need to re-think its coordination strategy in preparation for the next strategy period. A closer coordination with multilateral agencies may be one alternative to consider. The complementary and two-track approach of working with state and non-state counterparts is worthwhile continuing, but may have to be fine-tuned to the overall adjustment of coordination with other donors.

Overarching strategy objective reached?

14. The final question is whether Sweden has reached – or is likely to reach at the end of 2013 – its overarching strategic objective during the five-year cooperation programme with Bolivia: “that the population lives in a healthy and good environment while also enjoying its human rights and democratic participation”. As far as the “healthy and good environment” is concerned, we

assume that the overall successful water-related projects (water management, irrigation, drinking water and sanitation), to a lesser extent sustainable forest management, are what we should measure this part of the objective against. Human rights and democratic participation have definitely been improved for the large majority in Bolivia – with or without Swedish contributions – and Sweden, along with other donors, plays an important role in complementing such values where the state shows weaknesses (particularly when it comes to some civil-political rights and political pluralism). The education sector – where impressive results have been made – is not directly reflected in these objectives, but these results may be clearly seen as fulfilling basic economic, social and cultural rights for the poor majority of the population. Regarding the process objective of enhancing national dialogue and consensus, it is difficult to see any clear results of this dialogue; it is acting against heavy odds where international cooperation counts for a very limited share of available resources. The other process objective of supporting climate change adaptation has at least been consistently addressed.

Lesson learned (vii): Although the GoB does not depend heavily on international cooperation in quantitative terms, international donors – among them Sweden – do play an important role on some critical issues as shown in this report, even as a caretaker of important international concerns where the GoB is less interested. There are also issues where they could potentially make an even greater difference, of relevance not only for the country itself, tied to the debates in Bolivia around climate change, environmental degradation and also the future development of the country's energy potential.

15. The two overall perspectives in Swedish development cooperation of *perspectives of the poor* and the *human rights-based approach* are present in the Bolivia country strategy, although not very explicitly. To a considerable degree, GoB policies are in accordance with these concerns and offer good opportunities for donors to contribute, with very positive achievements in poverty reduction and combating discrimination, and the enhancement of political participation for previously marginalised groups. On the negative side, there are clear shortcomings in terms of the division of state power, acceptance of opposition and political pluralism, transparency and accountability, where some Swedish-supported contributions provide important compensatory measures.

Annex 1 – Outcomes Assessment of Selected Swedish Contributions

Area of Democracy and Human Rights

Support to political parties through the UNDP.

The project “Democratic Strengthening of the Political Organizations in Bolivia”, implemented by the UNDP with the technical and financial support of the Embassy of Sweden, sought to promote the democratic institutionalisation of the Bolivian political organisations as a means to strengthen and renew a representative, participatory and pluralistic party system. The project’s duration covered the three-year period between 2009-2013, and was financed with a budget of 37 MSEK. This project provided continuity to a previous project that was executed by the UNDP with the support of IDEA International.

We found the following results and challenges in this project, primarily based on the 2012 evaluation:

Results:

- There was a clear positive impact on the internal functionality of the six political parties that benefitted from the project, in terms of reformed statutes, the expansion of territorial coverage (four out of six down to department and municipal level), and new mechanisms of planning and management (three out of six parties initiated regular training programmes);
- This led to an internal democratisation of the way the parties function, to an increased participation by women, young people and the indigenous, and more transparency in decision-making;
- It also brought about an important discussion about the new law on political parties (an activity undertaken by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal);
- These positive conclusions were shared and confirmed by all the three national, and three sub-national, parties that took part in the project – among them are all the most significant parties in the present situation in Bolivia. This must be seen as highly positive in the present polarised context of the country.

Challenges:

- The project was primarily based on bilateral relations between the UNDP and each party, and thus it was mostly limited to the internal situation of each party. It failed to create a common space for the development of strategies towards common objectives, and the relatively limited number of persons involved implicate a failure regarding the objective of enhanced political pluralism;

- The sustainability of the results is limited because of the present lack of state subsidies to political parties in Bolivia; however the new proposal for a law on political parties proposes that subsidies be given.

The Human Rights Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo)

The mandate of the Ombudsman, established through Bolivia's new Constitution (CPE), is to uphold, promote and diffuse the fulfillment of human rights, individual as well as collective, established by the Constitution, laws and the international treaties. Sweden's commitment to the institution is to support its Strategic Institutional Plan (2007-2011 and 2012-2016) with an amount of 7,5 MSEK for the first period and 30 MSEK for the second period, as part of a basket fund.

Results:

- Sweden has historically been the most stable and important supporter of this crucial public institution in Bolivia, having supported three strategic plan periods since its launch in 1999. The support has been through basket funds, starting with ten donors gradually being reduced to three. Next year there will only be two left (Sweden and Switzerland);
- The most important result is that the *Defensoría* has been able to maintain its institutional autonomy in a situation of serious pressures from the Executive and from elsewhere. The Ombudsman himself, originally elected as a person by whom the Executive expected to be protected from criticism, has stood up for the principles of the institution even when it did not please the highest political power in the country, to a large extent guaranteed by consequent financial and political commitment from the donors;
- The Ombudsman institution has enjoyed exceptional personnel stability in Bolivia at the central level, also to large extent thanks to the long-term and reliable financial support from the donors.

Challenges:

- There is a constant pressure to conform from the Executive. After the end of the previous Ombudsman's mandate it took almost one and a half years to elect a supposedly "loyal" office holder, and when the present Defender's six-year term ends in 2016 the same situation might be expected to occur again. Such long vacancies tend to weaken the institution;
- The financial support of the state (in principle: the National Assembly rather than the Executive) tends to be used as a negotiation chip to exert pressure. The state /cooperation share has gone from 40:60 to the present 53:47, planned (but not realistically expected) to reach 65:35 by 2016. The two remaining donors, among them Sweden, seem set to commit the necessary support for this period, but this shows how vulnerable the institution is;
- Although the institution has a very de-centralised structure with 18 offices around the country, there has been frequent criticism that too much attention has been paid to the central (and capital) level of the institution.

Institutional reform – Programme for Institutional Revolution (PRI)

Brief description: The Institutional Revolution Programme (PRI) has as its objective to “contribute to the construction of a new inclusive, transparent, ethical and highly productive political administration“, to be executed through a Technical Unit (UT). It is financed by Denmark and Sweden through a basket fund totalling 20 mill USD.

Results:

- It is positive – in a situation of serious institutional weaknesses and instability as is the case in Bolivia – to have a programme through the highest executive office (the Ministry of the Presidency) aimed at integral improvements, with the flexibility to look for opportunities to address the problems;
- The establishment of an online *GacetaOficial*, with real time electronic access to all public information, is a significant expression of improved transparency in a country where transparency regarding the management of public affairs has been limited;
- Another very positive gain of the project has been the introduction of digital ID cards and drivers licences. Particularly the access to ID cards – which is, for many people, for the first time to obtain the status as a real *citizen* i.e. through a mobile unit campaign to approach rural areas e.g. in indigenous communities, is very significant progress in terms of basic human rights. The fact that these resources are delivered through a digital system means less bureaucracy, less time consumption and fewer opportunities for corruption.
- The same can be said about the digital and free-of-charge issuance of diplomas for those who finish secondary school. Again, there is an important reduction of time consumption, red tape and corruption loopholes.

Challenges:

- Although these results are important, they cannot hide the fact that there is no real political commitment or priority in the responsible ministry – i.e. in the higher echelons of political power in the country – to make the necessary deep reforms (or carry out a revolution as the name of the institution indicates) to create a more functional, operative and accountable state. The priority rather revolves around endless power struggles.
- This has led to a lack of focus in the Technical Unit of the project (UT-PRI), a lack of priority-setting, a lack of real authority for the unit to engage the rest of the state administration, inadequate communication lines (both to top decision-makers in the Ministry and to those institutions that were meant to benefit from the project). Questions have been raised as to whether the unit should rather lie under another ministry (e.g. Finance or Planning), but that would lead to the required engagement from the top decision-makers, from which political priority would be required anyway.
- As a consequence, the project suffered from very serious under-execution during 2010 – 2012, allegedly with some recent improvements during the most recent months;

- There is also a responsibility on the side of the donors here: have they really been applying the most appropriate dialogue with the relevant authorities to make this project progress? Being a project under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Presidency, this goes back to a more fundamental question about the efficacy of political dialogue between donors and government in Bolivia.

Institutional support to UNICEF's country programme

Sweden has contributed a total of 55 MSEK of non-earmarked programmatic support to the country programme of UNICEF Bolivia (20 MSEK 2010, 20 MSE 2011 and 15 mill 2012).

Results:

- To have provided institutional support to the UNICEF Country programme in Bolivia (approximately 15% of the UNICEF budget) means that Swedish support has contributed significantly to the rights-based work of the UN system in Bolivia (especially to the strengthening of children's rights, but with an impact on the entirety of the most vulnerable part of the population – including the provision of basic services in water and sanitation). UNICEF is very content with Sweden offering non-earmarked support that may, thus, be available for activities that fall outside the priorities of other donors. Sweden, in a way, has been UNICEF's favourite donor in Bolivia.
- UNICEF's very specific indicator system has made it possible to concretise and measure progress related to the projects, and to quantify progress. This progress is more obvious when it comes to basic Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR) as compared to civil-political rights.

Challenges:

- It has been a constant challenge that UNICEF has been unwilling to join the other donors in the basket fund with the Ministry of Education, where Sweden now may become the only donor after The Netherlands and Denmark will withdraw from Bolivia at the end of this year. UNICEF leaders signalled to the Mission, however, that they would be re-considering this policy shortly;
- It may also be a challenge that UNICEF has paid more attention to central level government as a pass-through to municipalities (which are often the main execution level of UNICEF projects) and relatively little to the non-state sector. This may have made UNICEF a less flexible channel in Bolivia than in many other countries.

National Statistics Institute – INE

The main objective of this support has been to strengthen INE's capacity to produce statistics as a way of improving public policy for poverty reduction. A related project provided a twinning mechanism between Statistics Sweden and INE. There has been no independent evaluation of the projects, so the assessment here is exclusively based

on interviews with INE and Embassy staff. For both institutional support and twinning, Sweden has contributed 31,4 MSEK for the period 2010-2014.

Results:

- The Swedish cooperation, including the twinning with Statistics Sweden (SS), has contributed to significant improvements in environmental statistics, gender statistics, to better management of informatics systems and to a change of reference years in the national accounting system.
- Without independent evaluation, it is difficult to judge the extent to which this cooperation has met the expected impact of “contributing to a better capacity to monitor development in Bolivia, and thus to improve public policies”.

Challenges:

- No independent evaluation of the cooperation has been made.
- Approximately 50% of the Swedish technical staff in the project had no knowledge of Spanish, and could thus only work with the assistance of an interpreter. INE might have, in many cases, preferred to recruit Spanish-speaking experts from third countries, but SS’s policy has been that this is only possible if the adequate experts cannot be found in their own institution, no matter the language qualification.

UNIR Foundation

The principal objective of FundaciónUNIR, established in 2005, is “to contribute in the construction of a unified, intercultural and equitable country guided by the values that make it possible for Bolivians to live peacefully together”. Sweden has supported UNIR’s institutional strategic plan 2009-2013 with a maximum amount of 25 MSEK, as part of a basket fund along with The Netherlands, Switzerland and a couple of international NGOs.

Results:

- FundaciónUNIR has been playing a very important role as a dialogue facilitator in the political context of Bolivia, apparently with a strong capacity for constant adaptation to changing necessities and with its autonomy under pressure from government. UNIR has also proven its ability to remain strong after its dominant founding person passed away;
- A new strategy has been developed to intervene more forcefully in the country’s numerous ongoing conflicts. This is another important area of work in Bolivia that has also been questioned by government;
- UNIR has established an analytical unit (“*Observatorio*”), apparently with high analytic capacity, which is strengthening the operative work of the organisation while also providing quality information to the news media (this information might still be better utilised).

Challenges:

- There is constant pressure and questioning from the country's political power;
- The organisation may be spreading its attention too thin, and may thus need to better concentrate and focus its work (e.g. on inter-cultural matters);
- UNIR has great social sustainability but is very vulnerable when it comes to financial sustainability, with its high dependence on a few international donors (from 2013 on only Switzerland and Sweden) – the development of proper sources of income is therefore crucial.

A2.2 Area of Education**Ministry of Education**

Since 2005, Sweden has been part of a basket fund (with Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain and later also the UNFPA), offering programme support to the Strategic Institutional Plan of the Ministry for the 2010-2014 period. The objectives of this Plan are: (i) to offer education to all without discrimination, direct transfers in order to assure the permanence of “Bono Juancito Pinto, adult literacy, infrastructure, equipment; (ii) education quality through intracultural and intercultural education in different national languages, a new education context with regional differentiation, training of teachers, IT; (iii) strengthening of education management through institutional development of the Ministry with its sub-national levels. The Ministry of Education has received a total of 132 MSEK in Swedish support for 2010-2014.

Results

- Underpinning the successful effects of school access and permanence achieved by the GoB strategies, with important but not homogeneous advances towards gender, class and cultural equity within the school system. In 2006, access to primary school was already very high, with a 95.6% enrolment. In 2012, almost total universal coverage has been achieved. In 2006, access to secondary school was 80.9%. In 2012, without proper figures at hand, it can safely be stated that between 85 and 90% of youths are enrolled. In regards to permanence, where no proper figures are yet available, while some consider that basic gender-class equity has been attained in the whole of the country, most specialists postulate that rural girls are the segment of the population with higher dropout rates at the end of the high school cycle, which would show a continuation of some gender-class imbalances within the Bolivian school system.¹³

¹³ A basically similar situation, with differences in terms of the percentages and figures, was the one in 2006. Figures here used come from:
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/capacity/country_documents/bolivia_determinantes.pdf

- Supporting a growing – although still incipient – emphasis on quality improvements in the education system.
- Supporting important advancements towards a non-discriminatory and equal opportunities oriented education, most notably in terms of indigenous peoples access to and permanence within the school system. Lesser advances have been made in regards to disabled children, but the issue is now strongly in the education agenda of the country due also partly to the efforts of the basket fund donors.
- The continuity and permanence of the Education Councils of the Original Peoples of Bolivia (Consejos Educativos de los Pueblos Originarios, CEPOS) created in the country – as part of the Educational Reform process started there in the early 1990s – to strengthen indigenous peoples rights within the education system.
- Constructive contributions to a dialogue (albeit unstable) between basket fund donors and the education sector in order to define the future direction of the cooperation.
- Creation of a Joint Commission between the Ministry and the donors to analyze future scenarios and objectives.
- Development of a system of result indicators, with reports that are still limited and insufficient but in progress.
- Maintenance within the ME, of a staff of education experts with resources, plans and implemented projects for the qualitative improvement of the school system.
- Through the FAUTAPO and SOS programmes – see below – the Swedish cooperation and its partner donors are starting to effectively introduce the pressing issue of technical and entrepreneurship training within the agenda of the education system of Bolivia

The most important added value of the multi-donor basket fund in support of the Ministry of Education has been the launching of concrete plans and activities regarding education *quality*.

Challenges

- Develop an adequate perspective for the improvement of educational quality in the country if Sweden chooses to stop participating within the basket fund / or in the event that the basket fund is reduced to only two donors.
- Incorporation of other donors into any future basket fund or other coordination arrangement if Swedish participation is continued.
- Inclusion of technical and entrepreneurship training within the school system of Bolivia.

Sos-Children's Villages

(the Bolivian chapter of SOS Children Villages) is implanting a project called “Vocational entrepreneurial training with the active participation of families and communities”. The overarching objective has been to offer vocational training to youth in peri-urban areas of Cochabamba and La Paz, in order to provide them with access to the labour market and thereby contribute to the combat of poverty. SOS has

received a total of 8,7 MSEK in Swedish support for 2009-2014.

Results

- Successful technical and entrepreneurship training programme for youths – fully oriented by gender equity goals– implemented through diverse and changing careers designed to improve access to market niches available, without saturating them.
- Development of youth entrepreneurship integrated to development of civic and communal responsibility.
- Development of family and social networks to support youth technical and entrepreneurship training.
- Integration of program to municipalities.
- Direct formal certification of technical and entrepreneurship training provided.
- Transfer of SOS elementary and high schools to the regular Bolivian public school system completed, with sufficient assurance of continued high profile of participation and oversight from the part of neighborhood school boards in programmatic and administrative management of the transferred school units.
- Ongoing SOS Children's Villages Programme increasingly coordinated with municipal and departmental governments and running through concurrent interagency initiatives and investments.

Challenges

- Surviving and overcoming donor funding cuts to expand coverage of the young entrepreneurs programme.
- Expand impact of entrepreneurship and technical training programme within the regular public school system.

Fautapo (Fundación Autapo – Educación para el Desarrollo)

has been implementing vocational training projects in Bolivia since 2005, with Swedish support since 2009 (first concentrating on the Amazon región, later, since 2010 with a five-year Project co-financed with the Netherlands and Switzerland in support of its Institutional Strategic Plan). The objective is to develop productive vocational training, offering opportunities for women, men and youth to leave marginality and poverty behind and enter the labour market, thus also promoting general economic development. Swedish support to FAUTAPO has taken place within two agreement periods for a total of 78 MSEK (2009-2012 , 43 MSEK and 2011-2013, 35 MSEK).

Results

- Wide and with increasing coverage programme of technical entrepreneurial training – rural as well as urban – leading to the enhancement of productive capacities of youth and adults of either gender through training courses, work careers, on-the-job training, and diplomas of various kinds, geared towards the labor market in the different regions of the country.

- Formal certification of training through agreements with legally recognised education institutions.
- The articulation between the technical training and local /municipal /and in some cases sub-regional governments.
- The start-up of individual, family-based or collective businesses, to attend the economic needs of poor or extremely poor population segments or to serve as modules for teaching experience.
- State attention beginning to be paid to these innovative non-state experiences in technical training and entrepreneurship.
- Growing momentum of local productivity areas through organisation of SMEs.

Challenges

- Expand impact of entrepreneurial and technical training program within the regular public school system.

A2.3 Area of Natural Resources and Climate Change

Support to the National Watershed Plan (Plan Nacional de Cuencas) (PNC for its Spanish acronyms): Sweden and the Netherlands already supported the GoB with the design of a conceptual note for the National Watershed Plan in 2006, leading to the presentation, in 2007, of a framework document for the integrated management of water resources by the Ministry of Water, and, later, a five-year plan (2008-2012) with an approximate amount of 108 MUSD. The general objective of the PNC is to improve the life quality of the communities through different components such as watershed management, capacity development for watershed bodies, promotion and diffusion. Sweden is part of a basket fund, along with the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland (and possibly Germany), and from 2010 the EU initiated a budget sector programme to the PNC. The total agreed amount to PNC is 10,6 MSEK for 2007-2010.

Results:

- A major, successful and highly relevant participatory and integral public sector watershed and water resources management programme implemented through various projects and activities throughout the whole of Bolivia, generating increased and improved adaptation to CC in the country, direct and derivative betterment of soils, improved small and medium agriculture, and increased and bettered provision of clean water for urban and rural areas.
- Successful normative development, institutional capacity building, human resources training and infrastructure construction strengthening integral management and preservation of watershed and water resources.
- The concepts and practices of Integral Water Resources Management (IWRM) and of Integral Watersheds Management (IWM) have been solidly articulated to policy and project design at central GoB levels, guiding the implementation of various projects and activities throughout the nine departments of the

country and the flow of diverse multi-level and multi-source investment resources.

- Growing, but still uneven and insufficient, process of articulation of IWRM and IWM within sub-national and local levels of government, with cases showing remarkable advances.
- Largely successful implementation of the NWP through, among others: 1) the financing of pre-investment and investment costs for various IWRM and IWM local and sub regional projects and activities, 2) the financing of soil conservation and forest protection projects and activities, 3) the financing of projects and activities leading to the reduction of risks and vulnerabilities related to lowland watersheds, 4) the financing of the promotion of water security in the face of CC (including the prevention of water pollution, the mitigation of desertification and droughts, interventions within the watersheds of protected areas, environmental management services for water resources), 5) the development of norms regarding watershed and water resources, 6) the development – uneven and generally still at an initial stage – of local capacities within municipalities and department governorships for handling IWRM and IWM, 7) the development of a technically sound monitoring system, 8) the implementation of various trans boundary – Bolivia, in the centre of South America, shares watersheds with Peru, Chile, Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil – watershed management projects and experiences.
- The existence of the NWP is itself a highly successful result of an earlier joint effort of Sweden, the Netherlands and GoB, started in 2007, to develop the general and detailed guidelines of a Bolivian public policy leading to the integrated water resources management in Bolivia, the “Conceptual and Strategic Framework for the National Watershed Plan”. This framework led to the field and desk work of the NWP which started in 2008 and currently in progress. The NWP firmly represents the national policy for the sector, having been incorporated in the National Development Plan (PND 2006-2011) of Bolivia as a priority.

Challenges

- The effective mainstreaming of IWRM and IWM at all national, sub-national and local levels of government and in all social and private uses of water resources
- Urgently articulate and develop policies, projects and activities within the NWP regarding the integral management of aquifers and underground water resources and the construction of underground dams.

PROAGRO (Second Phase) is financed jointly between Sweden (47%) and Germany (53%), with the German agency GIZ being responsible for technical execution. The agreed Swedish contribution for the 2011-2014 period is 80 MSEK. The objective is to achieve food security and improved agricultural production among small producers in dry and semi-dry areas of the country, using water management

and improved water access as a strategic entry point. The objective has been to include 60 municipalities improving substantially the family income of 30.000 small producers and promoting new production management models for 9000 of them, all in all contributing to improved climate change adaptation.

Results:

- A major and successful on-site watershed and water resources management and sustainable agriculture programme in the dry and semi-dry regions of Bolivia generating increased and improved adaptation to CC in the country, reduced vulnerability in relation to CC among small rural producers, direct and derivative betterment of soils, and better earnings and opportunities for small agriculturalists.
- Strengthening, upgrading or successful innovative operation of various water management and irrigation models: 1) Watershed conservation agreements, 2) Protection of watershed and water resources, 3) Reduction of sediments in reservoirs and dams, 4) Water harvesting in Andean region, 5) Forest and water management in the Chaco region, 6) Irrigation technology for efficient use of water, 7) Self-managed small producer irrigation.
- Strong accumulation of on-site scientific, technical and empirical knowledge for the development and dissemination of water management models linked to surface and precipitation water resources.
- Implementation – with unequal but mostly successful or highly successful accomplishments – of various projects and activities resulting in improved water management and irrigation capabilities at a multilevel – family, local, sub-regional, regional and national – scale.
- Improvement of land and water resources through various small agro forestry projects.
- Productivity improvements in the lands and plots of, and enhanced opportunities and earnings for, the small rural producers at various locations in the highland Andean valleys and the Chaco areas of the country, thorough the introduction of better agricultural practices and alternative technologies and through the structural articulation of diverse water management and irrigation models with the material needs and requirements of a sustainable small agriculture and with the economic needs of small agriculturalists.
- Given the complex and large scale of the PROAGRO programme, this short resume only describes its broadest features and outcomes.

Challenges

- Surpass present focalisation on surface water resources and precipitations and initiate lines of intervention regarding aquifers and underground water storage. Due to probably worsening future global CC impacts in Bolivia, it is already urgent to pay strong attention to underground water resources and water management models dealing with underground dams.

PASAP: Water and Sanitation for Peri-urban Areas Program (Programa de Agua y Saneamiento para Areas Periurbanas (PASAP-APS))

This programme jointly financed by the EU (through sector programme budgeting) and Sweden is based on the National Plan for Basic Sanitation. PASAP is implemented on the basis of pre-defined indicators, which also reflects climate change adaptation. The general objective of PASAP is to improve the life of the peri-urban population with an emphasis on the sustainable management of water resources (drinking water and sanitation) in way that is in accordance with climate change adaptation. The Swedish support to the 2011-2014 programme is SEK 80 million (out of a total of SEK 280 million), with additional funding for technical assistance.

Results:

- A major, successful and highly relevant contribution to public sector efforts to increase the provision of clean drinking water and basic sanitation for poor people in marginal urban areas in Bolivia. The quantitatively dominant contribution has been through a sector programme coordinated with EU sector budget support, with relevant attention given to CC adaptive improvements within the water and basic sanitation services provided. The incorporation of water saving technologies and environment friendly sanitation facilities and maintenance are structural policy aims at the central government level, and practical steps in such regard are taking place leading to the – still slow but already evident – transformation of the water and sanitation provision systems in the country.
- The provision of clean drinking water and basic sanitation services in peri-urban areas has been significantly amplified – and this process seems to continue at a constant pace. Up-to-date approximate figures in this regard will not be available until the findings of the recent national census that was carried out in December 2012 in Bolivia are officially published. Drawing from UNICEF figures and projections,¹⁴ the greater increases in drinking water and basic sanitation coverage clearly correspond to urban and peri-urban areas. In 2001 – when the last national census took place in Bolivia – access to drinking water was around 72%; in 2006 coverage reached around 73% and in 2015 it will be close to 81.8%. Basic sanitation coverage was around 40.7% in 2001, 55.7% in 2006 and will be 71.3% in 2015. In rural areas, however, figures lag behind national averages. In 2001, drinking water coverage in rural areas reached only 46%, in 2006 only 50.6% and will be less than 55% in 2015. Basic sanitation in rural areas covered 31% in 2001, 35%

¹⁴ http://www.UNICEF.org/bolivia/BOLIVIA_-_Lavado_de_Manos.pdf

in 2006 and will still be below 40% in 2015, which is still very unsettling overall situation.

- Regardless of this frail situation in rural areas, the achievements in peri-urban areas represent very important improvements in the life conditions of ample segments of the poor and extremely poor urban populations in the country. Clean water and basic sanitation also represent major contributions to pregnant women and newborns.
- Thanks to its technical assistance (TA) support, PASAP-TA has also enabled the central government to begin to improve its capacities to follow up, monitor and measure results indicators for water and basic sanitation access. The collection of data outside of major urban centers and particularly from more distant areas and minor population centers is still quite incipient.

Challenges

- Further improve, even more, the CC adaptive capabilities of the Bolivian systems for the provision of clean drinking water and basic sanitation and increase the coverage of water saving technologies and environment friendly sanitation facilities and maintenance.

SUMAJ HUASI

Sumaj Huasi Foundation is a Bolivian NGO dedicating its work to technical training and alternative methods for basic and environmentally friendly sanitation in El Alto, under the concept of “healthy housing”. Sweden has supported this work since 2007, during the present strategy period with 7,2 MSEK in two agreements, with one of them financed with the climate appropriation. Also several multilateral donors contribute to its work, which is coordinated with MMAYA and other government institutions. The overall objective of the project is to contribute to an increase in life quality and welfare for Bolivian people in peri-urban and rural areas, based on criteria of equity and social inclusion and the objectives of the National Development Plan and those of the Ministry for Environment and Water.

Results:

- Highly successful ecological sanitation pilot project in peri-urban areas of El Alto city, with highly relevant CC urban and peri-urban adaptation effects.
- 897 units of ecological and water saving sanitation facilities – including dry toilets, showers, hand washing basins, and greywater treatment services – properly installed and successfully working in equal number of households.
- Highly successful development of a decentralised sewage treatment system that includes: recollection from households of dry and liquid waste – through El Alto micro entrepreneur enterprises – and an experimental plant for the treatment, recycling and commercialisation of waste converted into organic fertilisers.
- Highly successful project in regards to the development and growth of CC and ecological awareness within segments of El Alto population.

- Project very successfully articulated to the Ministry of Environment and Water and to the Vice Ministry of Potable Water and Basic Sanitation of the country, and to the Federation of Neighborhood Associations of El Alto city. The GoB has recently officially decided to use the pilot project as the basis for the design and implementation of a National Ecological Toilets Program that would provide ecological sanitation facilities to a large number of households – more than 150 000 – throughout Bolivia in the next decade. This can be considered a major direct impact on public policies of the Swedish cooperation programme.
- The project has so far also been successfully replied through other minor pilot experiences – with funds other than Swedish – in dispersed population locations in the departments of Beni, La Paz and Oruro.

Challenges

- Obtain sufficient and ample funding support from donors to consolidate and enhance the experimental processes started in 2009. This is a project with such strong CC adaptive outcomes and demonstrative potentials that it should be replicated in other big peri-urban areas of major Bolivian cities (which is reflected in another project supported by Sweden, the “Node for Knowledge of decentralised sustainable sanitation” project).

BABA CARAPA (Community Forestry)

The project, implemented by the NGO PUMA Fondo Ambiental, has been co-financed through a basket fund (50-50) between Sweden and the Netherlands. The Swedish contribution (2009-2016) is SEK72 million. The principal objective is to contribute to the reduction of poverty through the productive and sustainable use of forest resources under community ownership, in that way also reducing the deforestation rate in the project areas. The intention is to establish territorial management plans for 65 communities, with a total area of 1,1 mill hectares.

Results:

- Successful launching of a Forestry Programme leading to rural community economic improvement and development based on a community-private entrepreneurship business model of high social pertinence, conceptually sound and with relevant impact potentials – if the model is replicated at a large spatial scale – on the *mitigation* of global CC from the part Bolivia.
- Impacts on Bolivian trade and business normative enabling rural communities to become creditworthy legal subjects.
- Effective strengthening of community capabilities for integrated forest management in the programme intervention sites through on-site training and the implementation of up-to-date information flows in radio networks and other channels.
- Successful motivation of and support to the rural communities involved for conducting highly valuable forest censuses and forestry research.

- Successful forest certification processes carried out by the communities supported by the Programme in specific Pando department locations.
- Coordination of processes of community forest management strengthening with municipal planning at the locations of programme intervention.
- Programme with high potentials for conceptual and practical contributions to the new broad policies and objectives in regards to CC set by the GoB within the recently passed Law of Mother Earth (LMT).

Challenges

- Consolidate the sum of: i) the prior dominant profile of Baba Carapa as a strong capacity building and training agency, as a strong local research promoter and information provider and as a strong advocacy agency for joint – communal and private – ecological forest planning, with ii) its developing profile as an effective booster of ecological forest use, productivity and trade as factors pro CC mitigation.
- Effectively achieve capital investment from the private sector to implement the model of forest business with equity being developed.
- By consolidating the relevant interaction processes already achieved with the GoB teams responsible for designing and promoting the LMT, its mechanisms and institutions – that Baba Carapa overcome the impasses that it has suffered with GoB groups that are adverse to the contributions of independent civil society institutions in regards to the environment and CC.

LIDEMA

The Bolivian NGO network LIDEMA is responsible for the implementation of the “*Programme to Reduce the Vulnerability of Livelihoods to Climate Change*”.

Swedish support to LIDEMA has totalled 30 MSEK, which encompasses two agreement periods (2010-2011, 3 MSEK; 2011-2015, 27 MSEK). The objectives of the programme are: (i) to develop and implement replicable measures at grassroots level to reduce vulnerability caused by climate change, (ii) to strengthen the work of local organizations with climate change adaptation.

Results:

- A properly designed *Program to Reduce the Vulnerability of Livelihoods to Climate Change*: technically sound, socially relevant, institutionally solid, with high potential for coordination with municipal and departmental governments and with high environmental relevance for purposes of adaptation to CC. The Programme shows effective upgrading of LIDEMA capabilities to address interventions regarding CC in Bolivia.
- Programme with solid preliminary diagnoses for the initial formulation of adaptation measures in selected intervention locations and for in-depth field surveys to develop appropriate baselines to define local quantitative indicators for results measurement.

- Staff training and upgrading of LIDEMA institutions to launch the Programme.
- Field implementation of the Programme started according to planned schedules with on-site delays, in some cases, due to necessary technical checks and adjustments of model designs in order to reduce risks and improve performances.
- Programme with high potentials for conceptual and practical contributions to the new broad policies and objectives in regards to CC set by the GoB within the Law of Mother Earth (LMT).

Challenges

- That the Programme defines – in each intervention case and as part of the modeling developed – precise local quantitative indicators to measure the reduction of vulnerability to CC.
- Consolidating the relevant interaction processes already achieved with the GoB teams responsible for designing and promoting the LMT, its mechanisms and institutions – that LIDEMA overcome the impasses that GoB has suffered with groups that are adverse to the contributions of independent civil society institutions in regards to the environment and CC.

Annex 2 – Political and Economic Context of Swedish Cooperation in Bolivia

A2.1 THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

Two major processes of political and administrative change have been taking place in Bolivia since 2006 until now, initially within a context of very deep political conflict and later in a stabilised situation with a strong central government and a weakened and fragmented opposition.

The first of these processes, driven by the formation of the MAS (*Movimiento al Socialismo*) government headed by President Evo Morales in early 2006, is the process of design and implementation of a new State Constitution (CPE) and new concurrent legislation. The highlights of this have been the establishment of a so-called plurinational state, an economy with strong regulatory and redistributionist state intervention, and of a democracy that emphasises participatory, rather than representative, institutions. These changes have taken place against the backdrop of heavy confrontations between the government and the opposition.

The current GoB wants to establish a clear alternative to the models of "open market economy" and "pacted democracy" that dominated in Bolivia between 1985 and 2006. Three clear policy tendencies of the current GoB may be identified:

- a) A relative continuity of changes in favour of indigenous peoples' rights was initiated in Bolivia in 1993 through the recognition of the multicultural and multi-lingual character of the country.
- b) The emergence of a partially regulated market economy – with the manifest domination of the informal sector – setting up major redistributionist mechanisms of cash transfers, and implementing a still-ongoing policy of nationalisations of foreign private enterprises. However, the state entrepreneurship taking charge of these enterprises has not proven to be very efficient.
- c) While introducing effective mechanisms in favour of participatory democracy, some serious deficits in the functioning of representative democracy have emerged.

The second process has been driven by the regional opposition of the eastern lowlands of Bolivia, starting even before 2006 and based on the institutionalisation of sub-national autonomous department (province) governments. *Department autonomy* was the main political tool that the regional opposition to President Morales used to limit the overwhelming political power of MAS when the party came to power in January 2006. The opposition did manage to write this principle into the new

Constitution, throughout the tense proceedings of the Constituent Assembly from 2007 to 2009. Department autonomy has thus become one of the major constitutional and administrative reforms in the country. Adding to the previously existing regime of political and administrative autonomy of municipalities that had begun in 1994, the decentralised system of government in Bolivia (which is in some ways comparable to Latin America's larger federalist countries) now also includes the direct election of governors and of department legislatures, and also of access to significant budgets for both *departamentos* and municipalities based on pre-established state budget allocations.

From 2006 until 2009, Bolivia underwent an acute political dispute over the political dominance of territorial areas between the central government and the regional opposition. There was an unstable relative equilibrium of forces between the government block and the opposition, with a significant risk of major violence. The MAS government mobilised a Unity Pact of five main rural organisations,¹⁵ the coca growers unions of Chapare and Yungas in the Amazon foothills, the neighbourhood councils of large cities, and the national labour union organisations of the old school, such as the Bolivian Workers Center (COB) and the Union Federation of Bolivian Mine Workers (FSTMB). The opposition bloc of the eastern "crescent moon" ("*Media Luna*") region was based on the powerful Civic Committees of the big cities of the eastern lowlands and the valleys of Bolivia, among them Santa Cruz. That balance, between 2006 and 2009, was occasionally punctuated by a myriad of more or less violent local conflicts, as illustrated the unsettled power struggle between two powerful antagonists practically dividing regional loyalties between them.

The phase of unsettled standoff between the two political forces dwindled after 2009 due to the constitutional agreement reached between the GoB and regional opposition to incorporate the demand for department autonomies into the Constitution. The adoption of the new Constitution through a Referendum in January 2009 allowed the GoB to install legal and institutional limits to the most unmanageable administrative and political aspects of department autonomy. The central government revealed its intention to advance towards the creation of a "plural one-party" democracy with hegemonic centralist domination. Between 2009 and 2010, the GoB consolidated the political strength of Evo Morales when he was re-elected President for a second term with over 64% of the vote. After the re-election, the GoB then proceeded with political persecution of elected departmental governors and mayors from the opposition by legal means, and forced their resignation in several cases. This was accomplished after the MAS controlled parliament approved a Law of Autonomies

¹⁵La CIDOB, el CONAMAQ, la CSUTCB, la FSMUTCB-BS y la CNIB, por un lado, y las organizaciones de sindicatos cocaleros del Chapare y Yungas.

with articles that enabled the automatic sacking of elected departmental and municipal authorities after the simple presentation, by a public prosecutor, of a formal accusation of corruption or other legal misdeed against a given elected authority. No trial against the accused authority was necessary to get him or her out of office.¹⁶

Thus, central government's power grip grew decisively at the cost of the "Crescent Moon" region, giving way to a period of stability that continues today and is likely to continue beyond 2014, when new national general elections will take place. The MAS has already announced that it will work for the re-election for a third period of Morales as president of Bolivia – in a controversial interpretation of the Constitution.

Stability in Bolivia, however, does not mean the absence of conflict. For example, a dispute erupted in 2011 – this time between the MAS government and its previous political allies in the indigenous organisations the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (CIDOB) and the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ) representing the lowlands and the highlands respectively. This followed the GoB's decision to proceed with the construction of an asphalt mega-highway cutting the indigenous territory and environmental reserve park TIPNIS in two on the border between the departments of Cochabamba and Beni. Two long and exhausting indigenous marches with high political impacts and the massive support of segments of the Bolivian population have led to a serious questioning of Evo Morales' international and local image as the effective representative of the indigenous peoples in Bolivia. This was worsened when the GoB opted to impose a solution to the TIPNIS issue through harsh police and military repression.

On the other hand, the more traditional unions COB and FSTMB have also distanced themselves from the MAS government. Together with other sectors of unionised salaried employees in the country – like the teachers and workers in the health sector – a persistent and continuous wave of strikes, blockades and protest marches against the GoB have been underway since 2010 to demand better wages and generally improved living conditions. Thus, the atmosphere of widespread social unrest that was characteristic in Bolivia while Morales himself was leading the popular protests between 2000 and 2006 has reappeared in the country, thus reducing the credibility of a central government that is once again starting to lose the capacity of managing multi-level social, political and economic conflict.

In this situation, it is interesting to see how the MAS government has moved to re-define political alliances, supposedly within the context of a broader power strategy

¹⁶ The above-mentioned controversial legal articles included in the Law of Autonomies have very recently been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of Bolivia.

for enhanced influence in department and local politics. Rather than building on the alliances with the lowland indigenous movement, which had benefitted from the ambitious common land titling process and represented the strongest ally in the previous confrontation with the agro industrial interests and the department governments of the “Crescent Moon” region, President Morales has now all but skipped this alliance. Instead it has explicitly shifted its support in favour of agro industrialists pushing the agricultural frontier into the rainforest, stimulated migration from the highlands justified by needs for increased food production, and, thus, has also, to a large extent, given up on rainforest conservation. A president that a few years ago had to cancel visits to Santa Cruz for fear of being bullied, is now warmly received and engages in serious business conversations with the private sector that used to treat him as their foremost political enemy.

Moreover, serious and severe cases of public corruption have plagued the administration of Evo Morales since 2007, discrediting the GoB and partially weakening its image. Corruption allegations have emerged in the hydrocarbon sector, within the police, in various state enterprises, within the upper echelons of the Ministry of the Presidency and/or the Ministry of Government or in the Bolivian judiciary.

Nevertheless, the control of the Morales government appears guaranteed to continue for a long period. The GoB draws on broad national mass support and has control of seven out of the nine department governorships, and a majority of the 337 municipalities that exist in the country. The Government controls close to two thirds of the national legislative assembly, has high amount of manoeuvring space within the judiciary and within the national electoral court. Different national and local newspapers, TV channels and radio stations previously in the hands of government-critical owners have fallen under the government’s political control, meaning that the media situation in the country is actually quite balanced.

However, the opposition has remained in charge of two of the five governorships it won through the 2009 elections and of a minority of municipalities. In spite of strong pressures and manoeuvres from the central government, it can still mobilise a considerable mass following within some major cities of Bolivia and in some rural areas of the lowlands. This shows that the opposition has not simply disappeared in Bolivia and that it has enough strength for potential future growth and a political come-back.

A2.2 THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT

The power position of the present GoB is further strengthened because the Bolivian economy is going through one of its best historical periods.

Analytical sources with quite different views on the present day Bolivian economy concur that the country is passing through a macroeconomic bonanza period in terms of the increase in national public and private income. The main reasons for this are:

- a) the relative increase of public revenues over the last seven years resulting from substantive higher “nationalisation” taxation within the hydrocarbon sector, and
- b) the higher value of exports ensuing from the major increase in international prices of the principal raw materials – hydrocarbons, minerals and agricultural crops – produced by Bolivia. Prudent macroeconomic and monetary policies, a major foreign debt relief programme and higher remittances from abroad have also contributed to the overall economic well being of the country.

Throughout the past seven years, the economic growth of Bolivia has averaged 4.7 % and its international reserves grew from less than US\$ 1 billion to more than US\$ 12 billion.¹⁷ Gross domestic product (GDP) reported increases of 4.1% in 2010, 5.2% in 2011 and 5.0 in 2012.¹⁸ As of December 2011, the net foreign exchange reserves (NFER) at the Bolivian Central Bank represented 50% of GDP, the highest level among the countries of Latin America.¹⁹ The growth of most other principal macroeconomic indicators is also evident. Figures from 2010 to 2012 show that public and private expenditure has risen, capital and fiscal balance is positive, current accounts show significant surpluses, production has increased, unemployment has fallen (if only slightly), imports have grown, bank deposits and money demand are on the rise, and the loan portfolio of private banks is expanding.²⁰

Inflationary tendencies that have been created by the bonanza have so far been efficiently checked, although they have forced the central bank to permanently be on guard. Recently, the monetary authority decided upon a major withdrawal of currency from the market.²¹ On the other hand, the substantive amount of foreign reserves in the central bank coffers has led the GoB to start its first-ever major operation of sovereign bond sales in the international financial market.²² Dealings in the Bolivian Stock Exchange (BBV) have also substantially increased, reaching a US\$ 4000 million value by the middle of 2012, which is a 56 % historical record rise in relation to a year earlier.

The most outstanding production increases took place within the services, construction and manufacturing sectors, which are oriented to the internal market. But the volumes of gas exported to Brazil and Argentina have also risen in the past two years after a short period of relative reduction. Mineral production is again slowing down due to lower international prices after some growth years, but is still very high

¹⁷ Link World Bank.

¹⁸ Link Cepal

¹⁹ Link BCB

²⁰ Links Cepal, Milenio

²¹ PaginaSiete

²² Bolivian newspapers, end of 2012.

in comparison to the sector stagnation of the 1990s and early 2000s. Volumes of soybean production and other export crops also show an upward trend, offset at times by annual oscillations of international prices. Coca leaf production growth seems to have been contained, while income coming from illegal cocaine exports has allegedly been on the rise.²³

Public investment has, in the last seven years, grown steadily, and has furthered public and private expenditures. For the fiscal year 2012, the GoB planned a public investment record of US\$ 3252 million.²⁴ By the end of the year, however, the administration officially announced that as a general national average, only close to 60% of that figure had been actually invested. Actual investment figures at sub-national levels – in department and municipal governments – barely reached 30% of budget plans.²⁵ Such weak policy implementation on the part of the public sector remains as an overriding problem through the current bonanza period and has hampered an even better overall macroeconomic performance of the country.

A sharp drop in foreign direct investment (FDI) since the arrival of the current Bolivian government in 2006 is also slowing the bonanza. A climate that is adverse to FDI has been created due to the frequent nationalisation of foreign enterprises. Even local private investors behave cautiously in the middle of the bonanza.

Still, the increases in expenditures and GDP growth have had positive employment effects. The rate of unemployment fell from an average 8% in earlier years to 5.7% in 2011.²⁶ Commerce, repairs, manufacturing, transportation, construction and food catering are the main employment generating sectors. This implies that employment growth is still concentrated in the broad informal sector.

Beyond the macroeconomic outlook, however, the problems of Bolivia are still those of:

- a) underemployment and poverty and even extreme poverty among broad segments of its population, and
- b) the very fragile productivity of its indigenous peasantry and weak industrial urban economies.

The GoB has been addressing the underemployment and poverty issues through a strong and committed redistributive socioeconomic programme of conditional direct cash transfers. Following the example of earlier administrations that were criticised as

²³BCB, Cepal, UNDP

²⁴<http://www.jornadanet.com/Hemeroteca/n.php?a=72306-1&f=20120112>

²⁵http://www.radiofides.com/noticia/economia/Inversion_publica_en_Bolivia_solo_utilizo_el_57_de_los_recursos_asignados

²⁶Link Milenio

“neoliberal” by the present government, the current administration has continued with the same kind of transfers and enhanced the *Bono Dignidad* for the elderly and has created the *Bono Juancito Pinto* for schoolchildren and the *Juana Azurduy* for mother and child care.

In terms of official 2011 figures, 48,5% of the total population is characterised as moderately poor and 24,3% as extremely poor (or destitute). 41% of the population in the country’s urban areas lived in poverty and 15% were exposed to extreme poverty or destitution. In rural areas, the situation was more dramatic: 65% of the population were poor, with 44% was considered extremely poor or destitute.²⁷ In this context, the cash transfer policies being implemented have started to make an important difference, although some analysts consider it optimistic to state that “moderate poverty” still affects half of the population of Bolivia.²⁸ Destitution remains a major problem in the country. The broad issue of the fragile productivity of the rural and urban economy of the country has, so far, been weakly tackled by the GoB.

A2.3. DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

International development cooperation is, overall, of very limited relative importance to the GoB, and represents approximately 2% of GDP. Following the political confrontation with the US (there is presently no exchange of ambassadors between the two countries), USAID is presently a negligible cooperation actor. Cuba and Venezuela were, for several years, the main supporters to basic education providing teachers and financial support respectively, but this cooperation is now mostly finalised. What is left of traditional development cooperation is mostly dominated by EU countries, among them Sweden. Japan remains an important donor as well as Switzerland. South Korea is a new grant donor although the amounts are not known to the Team. Iran and China are commercial partners, whereas three development banks are also important partners: CAF being the biggest lender, followed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and then the World Bank.

Although the GoB does not depend heavily on international cooperation in quantitative terms, foreign donors – among them Sweden – do play an important role on some critical issues, as shown in this report, even as a caretaker of important international concerns where the GoB is less interested. There are also issues where they could potentially make an even greater difference regarding relevance, not only for the country itself, that is tied to the debates in Bolivia around climate change,

²⁷ “Memoria de la Economía Boliviana 2011”, Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas Públicas.

²⁸ The statement comes from the World Bank and certainly raises debate. Link WB.

environmental degradation and the future development of the country's energy potential.

A2.4. AREA CONTEXT: DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The issue of human rights and democracy is a very political subject in most countries, and perhaps more so in Bolivia than elsewhere.

Bolivia has a long history of systematic exclusion of the majority indigenous population. This exclusion continued in spite of both formal de-colonisation and the 1952 national revolution. However, Bolivia has long been a very politicised society, with a radical, strong and militant labour movement (particularly dominated by the miners) and also a relatively well organised – although often divided – indigenous and peasant movement. These social movements have frequently managed to make it difficult for any president representing the traditional elites to keep the country together and exercise effective government.

With the election victory of an indigenous *Aymara*, Evo Morales in 2005, it was generally considered that the excluded majority of the population, for the first time in the country's history, had come to power. Although Morales' political background was as a union leader of the coca producers, he saw himself – and was generally considered – as a legitimate representative of the indigenous peoples of the country. There is no doubt that Evo Morales' election victory was a triumph for popular democracy in Bolivia, and that the majority of the population, for the first time, perceived that a President represented their interests. Morales has since had his popular mandate confirmed twice (in a recall referendum in 2008 and in elections for a second term in 2009 – in these latter cases with well over 60% of the votes). A similar majority of the population approved the new Constitution that was prepared by his government after a long and bitter political struggle with ample participation of previously excluded social groups.

At the same time, those elites that previously dominated political life in the country have lost most of their political power over the national government.

The new Constitution is basically in accordance with most fundamental principles for democracy and human rights. The way government has been practiced has, however, created deficits for representative democracy. There is a tendency to pay more attention to economic, social and cultural rights (ESCRs) rather than the civil-political rights favoured by western countries and the traditional political elite in Bolivia. When it comes to collective (indigenous) rights, supposedly the very trademark of the new constitution, the indigenous organisations have felt deceived by the Government's practice and have therefore broken their alliance with the President. There have been repeated confrontations about the definition of democracy and

human rights, and the extent to which they are fully respected under the Morales' government.

The most important outcome of this confrontation is the tendency to concentrate power in the Executive at the detriment of an effective division between the three branches of government. The Judiciary has lost much of its independence, and the private sector is concerned that Rule-of-Law in the country is under threat. Questions are also being raised about efforts to limit press freedom – although the country probably has a more differentiated media situation than ever – if the access to voice by the previously excluded groups is taken into consideration. There are also concerns about the respect for minority views in the political system, and the willingness to make compromises in the interest of the nation above those of the political majority.

The social movements behind the present government and their political leaders have themselves been the victims of serious human rights violations in the past, and claimed to form a government where human rights would be fully respected. In reality, the deep political confrontations and the re-distribution of power have led to the questioning by some major international human rights organisations of the full enjoyment of civil-political rights, and of the willingness to respect the autonomy of countervailing institutions like the Ombudsman, the Constitutional Court and the Judiciary. There are also doubts about the willingness to exercise power based on good governance principles of transparency and accountability. Parts of civil society that are not fully in agreement with government are frequently threatened.

In this context, it is appropriate that the international community, and not least a country like Sweden (which cannot be accused of having a hidden agenda), make democracy and human rights a cornerstone of its work in the country. Despite several challenges, there are many opportunities for cooperation agencies to work with these issues in Bolivia today.

A2.5. AREA CONTEXT: EDUCATION

The present Bolivian government has worked to undertake a profound transformation of the country's education system. The objective has been to find a model that is very different from the system established in the 1990s, which was seen as a reflection of the so-called Washington Consensus and the neoliberal economic policies.

Five general political decisions were taken with this objective in mind: (i) to reduce the importance of traditional international cooperation, both multilateral (World Bank and IDB) and bilateral; (ii) to seek technical cooperation from Cuba (to a less degree – and mostly financial – from Venezuela); (iii) to elaborate a new legal framework termed “anti-colonial” and “inter-“ as well as “intra-cultural”;²⁹ (iv) to generate a new curriculum to pay more attention to the indigenous and regional diversity of the country; (v) to increase the budget and create incentives for improved access and reduced dropout rates, with better gender, class and cultural equity.

Seven years into the new education regime, the following trends may be highlighted:

- A very high impact of the government policies and conditional transfers (the so-called “*Bono Juancito Pinto*”) on increased school attendance and reduced dropout rates, certainly the most important contribution of the present government to the Bolivian education system. Some experts have warned, however, that this is hardly sustainable due to the high costs of these subsidies.
- A gradual change of concepts, initially disorganised and with strong ideological emphasis, from the previous approach of “Intercultural Bilingual Education” to what is now called “Inter- and intra-cultural *multi-linguistic* education” (still in the process of elaboration).
- The slow and only recently concluded legal framework (*Avelino Siñani* Law) has been questioned and rejected by important sectors of the unionised teachers (the same happened with the reform legislation in the 1990s).
- Important support from Cuba has taken place during the three first three years of this process for a rapid, massive and successful literacy campaign. This campaign did not pay attention to indigenous languages (as in the previous reform), and it consequently led to stronger Spanish language dominance and contradicted the multilanguage discourse of the government.
- A steadily falling international cooperation (multilateral as well as bilateral) in the education sector, and the maintenance or opening up of support to alternative and technical training and post-graduate education.

During these first years of transformations with unquestioned *quantitative* results, less attention was paid to the classical challenge of improving the *quality* of education in Bolivia. Full and equitable access with reduced dropout rates, generalised literacy and the new legal framework underlined these contradictory trends. Also, the lack of attention to technical training – another historical deficiency in Bolivia – persisted. The heavy institutional instability of the Ministry of Education in the first period of

²⁹ In present GoB discourse, “*intercultural* education” refers to an education aiming at strengthened democratic interaction between different ethnic and cultural agroups, while “*intracultural* education” aims to strengthen the identities of each group. The GoB, however, prefers to use the name “nations” when speaking about “ethnic” or “ethno-cultural” groups.

the “change process” (2006-2009) added to these problems. Later on, though with difficulty, improved institutional stability and consistency in the general management of the Ministry did create a better context for educational progress in the country. This has also recently permitted a more efficient framework for cooperation between the GoB and the donors.

A2.6. AREA CONTEXT: NATURAL RESOURCES

The central government has made significant efforts to improve the management of and the access to, water resources, drinking water and sanitation. This has happened in spite of serious problems of stability in the Ministry of Environment and Water (*Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Agua*) in general, and particularly in the Viceministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation (*Viceministerio de Agua Potable y Saneamiento*). In this situation, the donors within the drinking water and sanitation area have pragmatically adapted their counterpart relations to the more stable situation of a third institutional level unit: the *Dirección General* in charge of this subject in the same ministry.³⁰ Furthermore, the Viceministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, (*Viceministerio de Recursos Hídricos y Riego*) has shown a high degree of stability and has become a preferred partner for the donors. A third Viceministry in charge of environmental issues (*Viceministerio de Medio Ambiente, Biodiversidad, Cambios Climáticos y de Gestión y Desarrollo Forestal*), has also lacked sufficient stability.

Policies in terms of the environment, the management of natural resources and forests as well as climate change have been handled in a highly unstable and contradictory manner by the GoB. The government contains different competing interests impinging on the relationship between the environment and economic development, reflecting the interests of the agro-industrial, cattle and coca-growing sectors. Partly contradictory laws and normative frameworks produced by GoB reflect this situation.

The environmental debate in Bolivia is increasingly being politicised and dominated by the polarisation between government and groups opposed to the extractivistic policies (opposition). Political strife has taken place, for example, around the GoB decision to carry out the construction of a main highway across the TIPNIS, a national park and indigenous territory located in the central lowlands of Bolivia, despite the rejection of such a project from the part of the indigenous organisations

³⁰ The Vice Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation supports strong social, economic and political pressures from various parties throughout Bolivia and has become a focus of intense bickering and strife. In order to allow space for managerial efficiency regarding the provision of drinking water and sanitation within the MMAyA, the solution found by top GoB decision makers has been to commission the *Dirección General* with much of the roles and tasks of the Viceministry.

within the TIPNIS and national organisations like CIDOB and CONAMAQ. This has complicated and, at times, obstructed the coordination of environmental and resource management issues between the central government and department governments held by the opposition. Relations have been better when it comes to water issues, and are also better and more fluid between central and municipal governments in the handling of these issues.

Relations between the central government and environmental NGOs have also been contradictory and ambivalent. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has its own team with responsibility for climate change negotiations within the framework of the UN, and this team has taken important steps towards a good dialogue with the NGOs. The recently issued Law on Mother Earth (*“Ley de Madre Tierra”*) is a clear expression of this collaboration. These trends appear to be in contrast with the questioning and harassment which some of the more important NGOs are experiencing from leading GoB policymakers. The future institutional implementation of the Law could open some enhanced space for a better cooperation between the GoB and NGOs if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs team consolidates its strength within the central government regarding the environment issue.

Relevant and persistent actions are being taken by NGOs and academic groups in favour of the environment and biodiversity, with an increasingly important role in climate change adaptation and mitigation with a national as well as a global perspective. Increasing attention is being paid to climate change challenges by GoB, decentralised government levels, NGOs, academics and some social – particularly indigenous – organisations. The intellectual and political debate about climate change is becoming more technical and informed, but with a growing ideological bias. Projects and programmes specifically designed to address climate change issues are still mostly in a preparatory stage, with an important exception being the real progress in terms of water resources.

The carbon certificate mechanism inherent in UN Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) has never been accepted by GoB because of the government’s negative view on what is termed “the commercialisation of the forest”. Partially positive negotiations have taken place, however, between GoB and the UNDP for the use of REDD funds assigned to Bolivia for the development of an “alternative mechanism of integral forest management”, foreseen in the Law on Mother Earth. The cooperation agencies are still generally somewhat sceptical about the application of this law and the institutional stability of the new Authority and the special Fund it has established, except for Denmark, who intends to support this new initiative.

Annex 3 – Terms of Reference

For an Assessment related to:

"Outcome of Swedish bilateral development cooperation in Bolivia during the period 2009-2012 and its relevance for the new results strategy"

1. Introduction

During 2013 Sweden will develop a new results strategy for its development cooperation with Bolivia. Sida in close cooperation with the Embassy in La Paz shall develop a results offer as an input to this results strategy. The new cooperation strategy will no longer be based on sectors, but will instead focus on results areas. As a basis for this work the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs will provide instructions in February 2013, which will include a delineation of results areas for the future cooperation strategy for Bolivia.

As an input for the elaboration of a results offer the need for certain thematic studies and assessments has been identified. The assessment described below is intended to provide the Embassy of Sweden in La Paz with a synthesised analysis of the outcome of Swedish bilateral development cooperation in Bolivia during the period 2009-2012. The purpose is to utilise relevant experience gained under the current strategy when elaborating results, indicators, risks, and defining forms of cooperation and type of cooperation partners in accordance with the instructions.

2. Objective and scope of the assignment

The objective of the assignment is:

to provide the Embassy with an assessment that can be used as a relevant input to the work of elaborating a results offer for the new Swedish results strategy for development cooperation with Bolivia.

The tasks of the assignment are:

Assess the outcome/results of the above mentioned bilateral development cooperation contributions, as indicated in Project Reports and evaluations and in relation to specific objectives and expected results established in Sida decisions and project/programme documents. The findings and conclusions of the assessment shall – before reaching an overall, aggregate level – be sorted by at least the following dimensions:

- programme/project sector
- type of cooperating partner utilised for the channeling, implementation and control of funds
- form of cooperation

The assessment shall cover a selection of contributions from the current cooperation strategy period, i.e. from 2009 to 2012. See attached list of contributions selected.

3. The consultancy team

The team will be composed of two professionals, representing knowledge and experience concerning, among others, the following areas:

- bilateral and multilateral development cooperation in Latin America
- criteria and formats for project design such as the Logic Framework and Results Based Management
- criteria for the elaboration of performance indicators and progress reporting

Interview techniques

4. Sources and procedures

The main sources to be utilised are composed of Sida/Embassy assessments and decision documents, project documents and progress reports and evaluations. In order to get the basis needed for analysis and conclusions, interviews with key persons will constitute a complementary source.

The assignment should start with preparing a more detailed time plan.

5. Reporting

The team shall present its analysis and findings in a written report in English, with the main text not exceeding 35 pages (excluding annexes). The report shall furthermore contain an executive summary of maximum 4 pages to be written in both English and Spanish. The report shall present the methods utilised, difficulties encountered during the assignment, main findings, conclusions and recommendations as related to the themes and dimensions defined under numeral (2) above.

6. Time frame

A draft report of the first stage of the assignment shall be submitted to the Embassy of Sweden in La Paz no later than 1 March, 2013. After receiving comments on the draft report (at latest by 6 March, 2013), a final version of the report shall be presented to the Embassy no later than 15 March, 2013.

ANNEX: REVISED LIST OF SELECTED CONTRIBUTIONS

No.	Sector	Contribution no.	Contribution
1	Education	63000194	Ministry of Education 2010-2015
2		51070045	Fautapo Institutional Support Civil Society
3		51070030	SOS Children's Villages
4	Democracy, HR and Gender Equality	51070001	Political Parties UNDP 2009-2012
5		51070002	UNIR Democratic Culture
6		51070006	HR Ombudsman 2009-2011
7		51070029	UNICEF Country Programme 2010-2012
8		51070031	National Statistics Institute INE
9		51070032	Twinning on Statistics
10		63000151	State Reform (PRI 2)
11	Sustainable Infrastructure and Services	51070017 and 51070039	Water and Sanitation Periurban PASAP
12		51070046	Technical Assistance to PASAP
13		51070015 and 51070041	Water and Sanitation Periurban Sumaj Huasi
14		63000147	Hydro Resources Plan Nacional de Cuencas
15	Agriculture and Forestry	51070018	Community Forestry Baba Carapa, CS
16		51070038	ProAgro phase 2
17		51070053	LIDEMA Climate Adaptation, CS

Annex 4 – Persons Interviewed

No	NAME	INSTITUTION	RESPONSIBILITY
1	Alan Bojanic	FAO	Regional Representative (OiC)
2	Andreas Preisig	FAUTAPO	Gerente General
3	Andrew Scyner	Embassy of Canada	Head of Aid (Counsellor)
4	Anke van Dam	Embassy of the Netherlands	Head of Cooperation, Expert in Education and Emancipation
5	Ann Stödberg	Embassy of Sweden	Chargé d'affaires, Head of Development Cooperation
6	Antonio Aramayo Tejada	Fundación UNIR Bolivia	Executive Director
7	Armando Ortuño Yañez	UNDP	Democratic Governance Team
8	Armando Paredes Auchen	Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE)	Director of Coordination
9	Arturo Beltrán	Embassy of Sweden	Economist
10	Blanca Laguna	Defensoría del Pueblo (Ombudsman)	Administrator
11	Carlos Ortuño	Ministry of Environment and Water	Vice Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation
12	Carmen Barragán	Embassy of Denmark	Program Officer
13	Carmina Antezana	Bankengruppe (KfB) Agencia del KfB en Bolivia	Project Coordinator
14	Diego Pacheco Balanza	Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto	Responsable Técnico Equipo de Negociación Internacional Cambio Climático
15	Eduardo Forno	International Conservation – Bolivia	Director
16	Eva Ohlsson	Embassy of Sweden	Advisor, Natural Resources and Climate Change
17	Eva-Lotta Gustafsson	Embassy of Sweden	First Secretary, Controller
18	Gustavo A Bracamonte V.	Embassy of Canada	Head of Development Cooperation Canada
19	Isabel Ascarrunz B.	Embassy of Sweden	Program Officer, Water, Sanitation and Environment

20	Javier Becerra	Ministry of Environment and Water	Jefe de la Unidad de Planificación
21	Jenny Gruenberger	Liga de Defensa del Medio Ambiente (LIDEMA)	Executive Director
22	John Lok	Embassy of Canada	First Secretary, Cooperation
23	Jorge Javier Cox Mayorga	Ministry of the Presidency, Unidad Técnica del Programa de Revolución Institucional (PRI)	General Executive Director
24	Juan Carlos Suntura	Fundación Sumaj Huasi	
25	Juan Carlos Chavez	PUMA, Fondo Ambiental – Programa Forestal Baba Carapa	Gerente General
26	Juan Gabriel Pérez	Ministry of Environment and Water	
27	Julie Ekstedt	Embassy of Sweden	First Secretary, Human Rights and Democracy
28	Larry Omar Fernandez Palma	Defensoría del Pueblo (Ombudsman)	Coordinador de Gestión Institucional
29	Luca Citarella	EU Delegation in Bolivia	Program Officer
30	Ludwig Guendel	UNICEF – Bolivia	Representante Adjunto
31	Makis Oikonomou	Programa de apoyo Presupuestario Sectorial en Agua y Saneamiento en áreas Periurbanas –PASAP	Head of International Technical Assistance
32	Marco Antonio Loayza Cossio	Defensoría del Pueblo (Ombudsman)	Jefe de Gabinete
33	María del Carmen Siles Zenteno	Liga de Defensa del Medio Ambiente (LIDEMA) (Programa de Reducción de la Vulnerabilidad de los Medios de Vida ante el Cambio climático)	Asistente Técnico Pedagógico
34	Marlene Berrios	PUMA, Fondo Ambiental – Programa Forestal Baba Carapa	Responsable de Comunicación
35	Miguel Ontiveros M.	Servicio Nacional de Meteorología e Hidrología de Bolivia (SENAMHI)	Ex-Director General
36	Peter Bischof	Embassy of Switzerland / COSUDE	Head of Cooperation
37	Ramiro Pillco Zolá	Instituto de Hidráulica e Hidrología, Universidad Mayor de San Andrés	Investigador en Recursos hídricos

38	Rebecca Borda	Embassy of Sweden	Program Officer, Education
39	Roberto Salvatierra Zapata	Ministry of Environment and Water	Director General de Planificación
40	Rodolfo Soriano	Independent consultant	Expert in Rural Development
41	Rolando Villena Villegas	Defensoría del Pueblo (Ombudsman)	Defensor del Pueblo (Ombudsman)
42	Soren Stecher Rasmussen	EU Delegation in Bolivia	Agregado Sección de Cooperación Económica y Temática
43	Trond Norheim	Independent consultant	Forestry expert
44	Thomas Heindrich	GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) / Programa de Desarrollo Agropecuario Sustentable (PROAGRO)	Programme Coordinator
45	Zaida Albino	Aldeas Infantiles SOS Bolivia	Gerente de Procuración y Movilización de Recursos Oficina Nacional

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Outcome Assessment of Swedish Bilateral Cooperation in Bolivia 2009-2012

This is an Outcome Assessment of the Swedish Country Strategy for Bolivia 2009-2013, concentrating on three areas of cooperation. The overall conclusion is largely positive: Sweden and other donors have been complementing the government where its *human rights and democracy* approach has weaknesses; the same is the case when it comes to sustaining the impressive results achieved by the country in basic *education*. Equally impressive expansion of water and sanitation schemes have largely benefitted from Swedish-supported contributions, while general water management has also been enhanced as part of climate change focused support for sustainable exploitation of *water, forest and land*.

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