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Sida Decentralised Evaluation

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# Summative Evaluation: Analysis of the results and experiences from Sweden's development co-operation with Timor-Leste

Final Report



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**Final Report  
November 2013**

**Trish Silkin  
Benicia Magno**

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The views and interpretations expressed in this report are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida.

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# Abbreviations and Acronyms

AusAID	Australian development assistance programme
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process (of the UN)
CEGEN	Centre for Capacity Building and Information on Gender Equality
CFS	Child-Friendly School(s)
CNE	Commission of National Elections
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
ECP	Electoral Cycle Project
EMIS	Education Management Information System
EU	European Union
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GoTL	Government of Timor-Leste
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
JSP	Justice System Programme
LO-TCO	Secretariat of International Trade Union Cooperation in Sweden
LTC	Legal Training Centre
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MP	Member of Parliament
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PDHJ	Provedoria dos Direitos Humanos e Justiça
PDO	Public Defender's Office
PSP	Parliament Support Project
RDTL	República Democrática de Timor Leste (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste)
RRF	Results and Resources Framework
SEK	Swedish kroner
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
STAE	Technical Secretariat of Electoral Administration
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMISSET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNMIT	United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

# Preface

*This Summative Evaluation: Analysis of the results and experiences from Sweden's development co-operation with Timor-Leste* was commissioned by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), through its framework agreement for reviews and evaluations. Indevelop AB carried out the review between March and October 2013.

The main purpose of this summative report is to summarise and analyse the results and experiences of Sweden's cooperation with Timor-Leste and provide lessons learnt from the phase out period 2010-2013, as well as results from Sweden's development co-operation with Timor-Leste since 2000.

The independent evaluation team included the following key members:

- Trish Silkin, Team Leader, member of Indevelop's Core Team of professional evaluators
- Benicia Eriana Magno, National Evaluator

Indevelop's Management Team for this evaluation consisted of Jessica Rothman who was responsible for the coordination and quality assurance of the process, while Ian Christoplos provided quality assurance of the methodology and reports.

This final report has incorporated feedback on the draft report from Sida in Stockholm, the Embassy of Sweden in Indonesia, UNICEF and UNDP in Timor-Leste.

# Executive Summary

## **Purpose and scope of the evaluation**

This is the report of an evaluation of Sweden's support to Timor-Leste between 1998 and 2013, and in the context of Sweden's decision to phase-out the programme. The overall objectives of Sweden's development cooperation were to reduce poverty, strengthen peace and stability, and promote democracy and respect for human rights. The programme has been managed from Stockholm and most funding has been channelled to multilateral agencies. Five projects funded during the phase-out covered basic education and work with adolescents, and building capacity in management of elections, justice institutions, the National Parliament, and the PDHJ (National Human Rights Institution).

## **Methodology**

The evaluation was mainly a desk review supplemented by interviews with relevant stakeholders. Terms of Reference describe the exercise as a meta-evaluation but a lack of recent evaluation reports means that this evaluation also drew from project reporting and from external reports. Project reporting has tended to focus at the activity level, and this has limited the confidence with which it has been possible for the evaluation to draw conclusions about the delivery of outputs and outcomes.

## **Context**

Portuguese colonial rule and Indonesian occupation left Timor-Leste with almost no recognisable institutions, physical infrastructure, legal frameworks and policies, or knowledge and skills. Since the end of occupation in 1999, the country has experienced several periods of civil unrest. Through almost the entire period since 1999, the UN has had a major presence, either directly administering the country or providing high levels of support to the Timor-Leste government. Timor-Leste benefits from offshore oil and gas and is classified as a lower-middle income country but is a fragile state with high levels of poverty and poor human development indicators.

## **Volume and composition of development cooperation**

Sida funding for Timor-Leste in the period 1998-2013 totalled SEK 384,825.5 million and involved 76 funding decisions. In the first 5 years of the programme, the Humanitarian Aid and Conflict, Peace and Security sectors were the largest expenditure components, with most funding channelled to the UNTAET Trust Fund and to the UN Consolidated Appeals Process. Between 2003 and 2007, the programme had a mixed character, indicative of a transition from emergency to recovery and state-building. During this period, the Education sector was the largest recipient of funding at 42 percent of the budget. Around one-third of the budget was allocated to Democracy, Human Rights and Gender Equality, including the first



allocations to justice and parliament, and support to the 2007 elections. In the final period of Sida support, Democracy, Human Rights and Gender Equality accounted for around 54 percent of disbursement, mostly for four UNDP projects. Education accounted for around 45 percent of disbursement, mainly for UNICEF's Basic Education programme.

### **Project results**

All Sida-funded projects involved capacity development to a greater or less extent. Results are therefore assessed in terms of how far projects contributed to individual, organisational and institutional capacity development. In the Sida-funded projects a baseline of capacity has been reached but most institutions are far from being able to function independently. The Sida-funded projects have contributed to the following results:

#### *Individual capacity*

- Youth Parliamentarians developed skills in the analysis of social issues and in advocacy on those issues to Timorese government authorities.
- The staff of the STAE and CNE (electoral bodies) were able to perform their management and supervisory functions for the 2012 elections with minimal UN support.
- The number of Timorese judges and prosecutors has increased. Most criminal cases are heard by Timorese judges without international support and they are beginning to handle civil cases.
- The Secretariat that supports MPs in the National Parliament is able to perform routine functions correctly.
- Mentoring has improved the handling of human rights cases and of report-writing in the PDHJ. Staff appear to be concluding cases in a more timely fashion.

#### *Organisational capacity*

- The Ministry of Education has a curriculum framework for basic education (Grades 1-9).
- STAE and CNE had sufficient organisational capacity to manage and supervise the 2012 elections: STAE organised all aspects of the election in an efficient and generally timely manner; CNE fulfilled its task of independently supervising the activities of STAE.
- Central and district courts are functioning and are dispensing justice services.
- The National Parliament is fully responsible for outreach to the public, and is able to manage consultation processes with citizens.
- Systems for more efficient management of human rights cases in the PDHJ are in place and being implemented. A new electronic case management system should enable more effective follow up on recommendations made to public bodies.

#### *Institutional capacity*

- The Ministry of Education has drafted a national policy for inclusive education. UNICEF's CFS model is being finalised for approval by the

Ministry of Education as the approach to be followed for education in Grades 1-9.

- The Youth Parliament has formal status and is recognised by the National Parliament.
- The STAE and CNE ensured that the 2012 elections passed off in a peaceful atmosphere and met international standards; minor infringements noted were not deemed to have compromised the result.
- The establishment of a gender caucus of MPs and creation of a gender secretariat in the National Parliament means that an institutional framework is in place for MPs to promote women's rights and scrutinise legislation from a gender perspective.

Sida's overall portfolio is assessed in terms of its relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. Assessment of impact was beyond the evaluation's remit.

#### *Relevance*

Sida's programmatic choices were consistent with Sweden's global priorities, UNDAF outcomes for Timor-Leste, and principles of good donor engagement with fragile states. Although not determined by reference to Timor-Leste's MDG status, Sida's choices were highly relevant to social and political realities in Timor-Leste, where there is an urgent need to produce a well-educated population, to build an effective state, and to achieve stability. Sida's cross-cutting concern to promote social inclusion was appropriate given prevailing patterns of social exclusion in Timor-Leste.

#### *Efficiency*

Difficulties of operating in Timor-Leste make it difficult to draw confident conclusions about efficiency. Channelling funds to UN-managed projects probably offered the most efficient approach, given low levels of capacity in government and as Sida was managing the programme from Sweden. The costs of international advisers were high but probably unavoidable in the circumstances of the time. Some reports suggest that international advisers could have been deployed more effectively (with associated reduced costs) and that slow recruitment for UNDP posts contributed to delays in implementation.

#### *Effectiveness*

Sida's funding has contributed to Timor-Leste's transition to a state that has functioning institutions and appears to be relatively stable. However, Sida-funded projects have yet to develop strategic approaches to the inclusion of marginal social groups and geographic areas. Projects have made efforts to address specific barriers faced by women but project reports provide limited evidence of outcomes related to gender equity. Exceptions are mainly in the parliament and in addressing Gender Based Violence (GBV). Capacity development project designs appear to have been over-ambitious, with strategies typically under-developed, particularly with regards to identifying realistic benchmarks of progress. This has been a feature of much donor development cooperation with Timor-Leste in the context of the country's many unique capacity challenges.

*Sustainability*

The financial future of the Sida-funded work is uncertain. It has become increasingly difficult for UN agencies to raise funds for their programmes since Timor-Leste achieved lower-middle income status. Several donors are closing their development assistance programmes or are moving to bilateral cooperation. In terms of institutional sustainability, the baseline of capacity that has been reached needs to be consolidated.

*Lessons learned*

Lessons learned that may have wider application are:

- medium-term country strategy and project timeframes are too short for the length of engagement required for development cooperation in fragile states, and need to be adjusted;
- practical guidance is needed on developing design, methodologies and indicators for capacity development in fragile states to supplement existing global principles and approaches;
- capacity development initiatives in fragile states need to be tailored to country-specific capacity challenges; in some circumstances gap-filling may be necessary while physical and human infrastructure is being developed;
- where Sida is channelling funds through multilateral agencies and does not have an in-country presence, it may be helpful to join forces with a like-minded donor in-country in order to pursue dialogue issues; these efforts could be supported by Sida HQ engaging the relevant agencies' HQ.

**Implementation of the phase-out**

The phase-out complied with Sida's phase-out plan and met several of the criteria for a well-handled exit from an aid-dependent country:

- partners were alerted promptly and in sufficient time to mobilise alternative resources;
- the formal decision was communicated at the appropriate political level;
- it was made clear that Swedish support would continue through other mechanisms and that the GoTL could in the future request support in specific thematic areas;
- good communication with partners was maintained through email, telephone meetings and visits.

The evaluation did not present many opportunities to explore possible future cooperation between Sweden and Timor-Leste. There may be potential for investment by firms working in the IT industry; this is likely to be as much about developing knowledge and skills as about provision of IT hardware and software.

# 1 Introduction and Background

## 1.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE ASSIGNMENT

This is the report of a summative evaluation of support provided by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) to Timor-Leste between 1998 and 2013. The evaluation took place in the context of Sweden's decision to phase-out the programme by the end of 2013. The main purpose of the evaluation was to summarise and analyse the results and experiences of Swedish support, focusing mainly on the period 2010-2013. In order to set the context for the assessment of this final period of funding, the report was also to document the earlier phases of development cooperation. Further, the report was to comment on how the phase-out was being implemented. As Sida's development cooperation programme was about to finish, the evaluation was not required to make recommendations unless there were phase-out issues that needed to be addressed in the final year of funding. (See Terms of Reference at Annex 1.)

Sida funding for the period 1998-2013 totalled SEK 384,825.5 million<sup>1</sup> and involved 76 funding decisions, excluding internal decision letters and repeat grants to Frame Agreement CSOs. The Sida programme has always been managed from Stockholm and most funding has been channelled to multilateral agencies. During the early period of funding, grants were made to a wide range of partners including the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), UNICEF, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the Swedish Parliament, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and several civil society organisations (CSOs) (for example, Caritas, the Swedish Red Cross, Svenska Missionsrådet, Forum Syd and LO-TCO<sup>2</sup>). Funding was provided across a range of sectors including Education, Conflict Peace and Security, Democracy, Human Rights and Gender Equality, and Humanitarian Aid, with small grants, mainly to Frame Agreement CSOs, in health, agriculture, infrastructure and market development.

During the phase-out period 2011-2013 Sida support was concentrated in two partners, UNICEF and UNDP, and in the sectors of Education and of Democracy,

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<sup>1</sup> No disbursements had been made in 2013 at the time of the desk review and analysis. A disbursement of SEK 4.5 million for the Justice System Programme was made subsequently. It is included in the total above but does not form part of the analysis in section 2.

<sup>2</sup> The Secretariat of International Trade Union Cooperation in Sweden.

Human Rights and Gender Equality. Five projects were funded during the phase-out period:

- UNICEF – support to basic education and work with adolescents
- UNDP – Electoral Cycle Project (ECP)
- UNDP – Justice System Programme (JSP)
- UNDP – Parliament Support Project (PSP)
- UNDP – Capacity Development for the Provedoria for Human Rights and Justice (PDHJ)

## 1.2 METHODOLOGY

The Terms of Reference describe the exercise as a meta-evaluation (i.e. an analysis and synthesis of the results of Sida support based on findings from existing evaluations of individual projects). At the start of the exercise, however, the only available evaluation reports either pre-dated the phase-out period or were more forward-looking than summative. In the course of the assignment, an evaluation report on the Electoral Cycle Project (ECP) became available and the evaluation team was also able to interview the team leaders for a mid-term review of the Provedoria for Human Rights and Justice (PDHJ) and for a redesign of the Justice System Programme (JSP). In the main, however, the evaluation relied on project reports and on external reports identified by the team, including other donor assessments, a survey of public attitudes towards justice and reports from observer missions for presidential and parliamentary elections in 2012. (For a summary list of documents see Annex 3.)

The review of documents was supplemented by interviews with key stakeholders in Sweden, Timor-Leste and Indonesia. Interviewees included Sida staff, UNDP staff, Swedish diplomats, and donor and Timorese government representatives. Some projects partnered with several institutions and in these cases a purposive sample was made of partners for interview. Timorese informants were interviewed face-to-face in Tetum, the main *lingua franca*, while the other interviews took place by telephone or skype in English. The interviews were intended to complement, triangulate and fill in gaps in information obtained through the document review. (For a list of people interviewed see Annex 4.)

The methodology faced some limitations. The first, as noted, was that at the start of the assignment no current evaluation reports existed on any of the five projects. For this reason, the original timeframe of the evaluation was extended so as to be able to incorporate the ECP evaluation report and at least verbal findings from the PDHJ evaluation and the JSP redesign. An initial document review showed that it would be important to wait for this additional information since project reports contain little or no assessment of results in relation to outcomes. The range of sources on which the evaluation has had to draw and the quality and variability of reporting have affected the extent to which it has been possible to draw conclusions about results. (The quality of reporting is discussed further below in the section on Overall Conclusions and a summary of results reported in annual reports is provided in Annex 5.) A

second limitation was the time needed to retrieve from the archives the documentation relating to the early period of Sida support. In the end, sufficient documentation on each funding decision was identified for a full stock-taking to be made of the pre-phase-out period.

The report has the following structure. This section concludes with an analysis of the country context and a review of Sweden's country strategies. Section 2 presents an analysis of the volume and composition of Swedish development cooperation between 1998 and 2013. (This is supplemented in Annex 6 by an annotated list of all grants made by Sida with a brief description of each project funded up to 2010.) The following section provides an account of the five projects funded during the phase-out, including background on the development of each project, the rationale for Sida funding, and main results. This section of the report is descriptive, reflecting the contents of the main sources of information on each project. The report then offers some overall conclusions. This section presents a synthesis and analysis of the reported results from two perspectives: (1) key results from individual projects are presented in terms of the extent to which they have contributed to the development of individual, organisational and institutional capacities, and (2) the overall portfolio is analysed using a framework of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. This section of the report then identifies some lessons learned from the development cooperation in Timor-Leste that may have wider application. The final section of the report assesses the process of phase-out in terms of its compliance with Sida's phase-out plan for Timor-Leste and according to more general criteria for what constitutes an effective exit strategy.

## 1.3 COUNTRY CONTEXT

Timor Leste is one of the smallest of the current group of fragile states in terms of population (about 1.066 million according to the 2010 census). The country experienced 400 years of Portuguese colonial rule followed by 24 years of Indonesian occupation, during both of which relatively little development took place. It experienced a difficult transition to independence with several serious outbreaks of violence after the end of Indonesian rule. A vote for independence in 1999 was followed by large-scale destruction by the departing Indonesians and their supporters. Widespread violence broke out again in 2006, initiated by protesting soldiers, and in 2008 rebels attempted to assassinate the President and Prime Minister. Through almost the entire period under review, the UN has had a major presence in the country. From 1999 until formal independence in 2002 Timor-Leste was directly administered by the UN, under UNTAET. From 2002 the in-coming government was

supported by the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). The UN withdrew in 2005 but returned in 2006, in response to the outbreak of violence in that year, as the UN Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), providing administrative support and police services. UNMIT withdrew at the end of 2012, after successful presidential and parliamentary elections<sup>3</sup>.

Since 2000, the country has been seeking to build the institutions of a functioning state. The years of colonial rule left almost nothing behind in the way of effective institutions so that, at independence, Timor-Leste lacked any of the requisite physical infrastructure, legal frameworks and policies, or knowledge and skills. In this respect, Timor-Leste appears to differ from some other post-conflict states, for example in Africa, where state-building can draw on a pre-conflict legacy of functioning state institutions and of human capacity to manage them. The economy is growing, based largely on offshore oil and gas, and Timor-Leste is now classified as a lower-middle income country. However, in 2011, it also ranked 134 out of 187 in the Human Development Index; in 2009, 41 percent of the population lived below the national poverty line of \$0.88 a day, and around half the adult population is illiterate, with rates for women higher than those for men<sup>4</sup>. Few Timorese have sufficient education and professional formation to absorb the complex skills and knowledge that are needed to manage modern institutions; there are not only huge gaps in the number of people available for work but also a lack of relevant competences in those who are available.

Social and economic progress in Timor-Leste is constrained by its complex language heritage. The country's official languages are Portuguese and Tetum. Tetum is emerging as a *lingua franca* and Portuguese is the language of parliament and the justice system, and is the medium of instruction in schools. However, only an estimated 5 percent of Government of Timor-Leste (GoTL) civil servants understand Portuguese and few teachers are sufficiently fluent in the language to comply with its use as a teaching language. Moreover, approximately 16 languages are spoken in the country, and many people speak neither Tetum nor Portuguese, particularly those living in rural areas. Bahasa is widely spoken as a result of the Indonesian occupation.

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<sup>3</sup> Since the beginning of 2013, a UN Country Team has been providing development assistance to Timor-Leste

<sup>4</sup> Sources: UNDP. *International Human Development Indicators*.  
<http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TLS.html> AusAID  
<http://www.ausaid.gov.au/countries/eastasia/timor-leste/Pages/statistics-east-timor.aspx#economy>



## 1.4 SWEDEN'S COUNTRY STRATEGIES

During the period under review Sweden developed three country strategies, covering the periods 2003-2005, 2005-2009 and 2009-2011. Although over these years the pattern of Sida spending varied somewhat, the overall objectives of Sweden's development cooperation remained consistent. Objectives for 2002-2005 were to strengthen economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, and peace and stability. Development support was to be provided through multilateral channels. The 2005-2009 strategy followed a similar approach both in terms of sector priorities and channels of support. The lack of a Swedish presence on the ground justified continuing to provide support through multilateral agencies, and UN multi-funded projects were also seen as an effective means of coordinating donor support. The 2005-2009 strategy considered the possibility of providing limited bilateral support if recipients were judged to have sufficient absorptive capacity; in practice no bilateral support was provided. Sweden had provided budget support via the World Bank in 2003 but did not contemplate repeating this because Timor-Leste's oil and gas revenues were higher than expected and government was finding it difficult to absorb these revenue flows.

Sweden's most developed cooperation strategy was for the period 2009-2011. By this point the main components of the country programme were already established and longer-term cooperation was envisaged. As before, the overall strategy objective was to reduce poverty, strengthen peace and stability, and promote respect for human rights. Funding was to be provided to the two sectors of Democracy, Human Rights and Gender, and Education. The strategy had a process objective of strengthening national ownership and developing sustainable national capacity. Dialogue with Sweden's UN partners was to focus on rights, in particular the rights of vulnerable groups in rural areas and of girls and women. The strategy was assessed as consistent with Sweden's policies for global development and international cooperation, and with the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Timor-Leste, which focused on democratisation and social cohesion, including deepening state-building, security and justice; on poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods, with particular attention to vulnerable groups, including youth and women; and on basic social services, including education<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> United Nations Development Assistance Framework. *UNDAF 2009-2013: Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste*.



## 2 Sida Support 1998-2013

This section of the report presents a summary description of the volume and composition of Sweden's development cooperation with Timor-Leste from 1998 to 2013. The Terms of Reference required only the period 2000-2010 to be summarised but this analysis covers Sweden's support from 1998 to 2013 because consideration of the whole period allows a clearer picture to be drawn of how the volume and composition of Sida's funding changed over time. As required by the Terms of Reference, the report also presents a short description of each project funded between 1998 and 2010 (contained in Annex 6) while an evaluation of the projects funded in the period 2011-2013 is presented in the following section of the main report.

Before 1998, Sweden's support to Timor-Leste was limited to humanitarian assistance through ICRC with a value of SEK 2 million. Between 1998 and 2012 Sida's aid disbursements for Timor-Leste amounted to SEK 384.821,634. Sida spending by year is given in Figure 1 below:




Figure 1 shows that the year of lowest spend was 2006 at SEK 11,519,534 and the year of highest spend was 2007 at SEK 38,736,590. A low spending outcome in 2006 reflects the violence in that year, when Sida's planned assessment of further long-term development cooperation came to a temporary halt. 2007 is the year of highest spend because it marked the start of the major period of cooperation when the first grants were made to three of the four UNDP managed projects that have been funded throughout the remaining years of Swedish cooperation. 2007 also marked the start of a new period of funding for UNICEF's activities in Basic Education, following completion of a 3-year project in 2005. The second lowest year of spend was 2012 at

SEK 11,708,184, reflecting the phase-out of development cooperation. Spending in 2012 was a significant decrease on that for 2011 at SEK 30,528,893.

Spending by sector has been concentrated in Education; Democracy, Human Rights and Gender Equality; Conflict, Peace and Security; and Humanitarian Aid. Projects in Health; Sustainable Infrastructure and Services; and in Agriculture and Forestry were funded under CSO Frame Agreements. There was also some funding for Frame Agreement CSO activities in Sida's sectors of concentration. All CSO activities taken together are a relatively small proportion of total funding and do not affect the overall levels and distribution of spending shown in Table 1 and Figure 2 below. Total levels of spending by sector are shown in Table 1 and the distribution of spending by sector is shown in Figure 2:

<b>Table 1: Sida spending by sector 1998-2012</b>	
<b>Main sector</b>	<b>SEK</b>
Health	2,002,784
Education	125,157,300
Democracy, human rights and Gender Equality	131,051,682
Conflict, peace and security	60,486,128
Humanitarian Aid	46,722,162
Sustainable infrastructure and services	46,367
Market development	4,854,676
Agriculture and forestry	850,953
General Budget Support	10,000,000
Other	3,649,582
<b>Total</b>	<b>384,821,634</b>



We can also look at variations in the volume and composition of spending during different phases of the period under review. The simplest way to do this is to divide the period into 5-year phases (i.e. 1998-2002, 2003-2007, 2008-2012), which allows us to compare disbursements in roughly equal periods of time. It is understood that these 5-year periods do not correspond to the timeframes of country strategies. However, they broadly correspond to the period up to formal independence, to a transitional phase of support, and to the main period of cooperation. This periodisation shows that, notwithstanding the variations in inter-annual levels of spending shown in Figure 1, spending has been relatively evenly distributed across the three 5-year periods, with a slightly lower level of spending in the start-up period. The volume of disbursement in these three periods is shown in Table 2 below.

<b>Table 2: Sida disbursement, 1998-2002, 2003-2007, 2008-2012</b>		
<b>Period</b>	<b>SEK</b>	<b>Percent of total spend</b>
1998-2002	100,341,341	26
2002-2007	145,385,780	38
2008-2012	139,094,512	36
Total	384,821,633	100

In terms of the composition of spending, a notable feature of the pattern of disbursement has been a progressive decrease in spending on Humanitarian Aid all through the three 5-year periods, despite the need for humanitarian intervention as a result of riots and displacement in 2006-07. At the same time, there has been a corresponding increase in spending on Democracy, Human Rights and Gender Equality through these three phases, despite low disbursement in 2012. These spending trends are evidence of Sida's increasing confidence that Timor-Leste was becoming a more stable country and of Sida's understanding that investing to make Timorese public institutions more effective would help to consolidate this stability, give citizens greater confidence in systems of governance and help to prevent further conflict. The shares of spending allocated to Humanitarian Aid and to Democracy, Human Rights and Gender Equality are shown in Table 3 below and described in more detail in the following paragraphs:

<b>Table 3: Sida disbursement for Humanitarian Aid and for Democracy, Human Rights and Gender Equality</b>				
<b>Period</b>	<b>Humanitarian Aid (SEK)</b>	<b>Percent<sup>6</sup></b>	<b>Democracy, HR &amp; Gender Equality (SEK)</b>	<b>Percent</b>
1998-2002	29,296,197	29	8,974,699	9
2002-2007	17,122,607	12	48,108,050	33
2008-2012	303,358	0.2	73,968,932	53

In the first period of Swedish support (1998-2002) spending was mainly for Humanitarian Aid and for recovery in the period leading up to and including Timor-Leste's formal independence from Indonesia. The largest disbursement was for the UNTAET Trust Fund for international assistance at SEK 50.5 million within the Conflict, Peace and Security sector<sup>7</sup>. In all, this sector accounted for SEK 56.95 million (57 percent) of spend in this period. A further SEK 29 million (29 percent) was allocated in the Humanitarian Aid sector, the bulk of which was provided in 2000 and was chiefly for the UN Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) appeal, in the wake of violence by Indonesian troops and anti-independence militia. Just under SEK 9 million was allocated to Democracy, Human Rights and Gender Equality (mainly for the 2001 elections and for Frame Agreement CSOs), and several smaller grants were made in a number of sectors to a range of UN and CSO partners. The first grants to UNICEF, totalling SEK 6 million, were made during this period and were for activities under the CAP and for a project aiming to reduce maternal mortality.

Funding in the middle period of support (2003-2007) had a more mixed character, indicative of a transition from a focus on emergency assistance to one concerned with state-building. The Education sector was the largest recipient of funding, receiving altogether around SEK61 million (42 percent) of total spend, of which SEK 60 million went to UNICEF. The introduction of long-term support for education through UNICEF was timed to overlap with the phasing out of Humanitarian Aid through that agency so that continuity was ensured in the transition from humanitarian assistance to development cooperation. Democracy, Human Rights and Gender Equality was allocated just over SEK 48 million (33 percent), which included Sida's first grants to the JSP and the Parliament Support Project (PSP) in 2007. Other allocations in this sector included funding for presidential elections in 2007. SEK17.4 million (12 percent) was allocated for Humanitarian Aid, of which SEK10 million was in response to the civil unrest in 2006. In 2003, Sida provided SEK10 million through the World Bank for General Budget Support. In 2003 and 2004, Sida

<sup>6</sup> As a percentage of total disbursement in the relevant period.

<sup>7</sup> This was for emergency assistance via OCHA, public administration via UNTAET and reconstruction through the World Bank/Asian Development Bank.

provided a total of SEK26 million for Development Posts to support the office of the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative.

In the period 2008-2012, almost SEK74 million (around 54 percent) was allocated to Democracy, Human Rights and Gender Equality, mostly for the four UNDP projects. Education received around SEK62 million (around 45 percent), almost all for UNICEF's Basic Education programme. Small grants were also made for the 2012 elections, for economic monitoring, support to the automation of customs processing<sup>8</sup>, and to CSOs with Framework Agreements with Sida.

### **Contributions outside the bilateral cooperation**

In addition to the analysis above, there are grants that are outside the bilateral cooperation.

#### *SARC (Secondment to the UN Special Representative)*

In 2011 and 2012, US\$209,214<sup>9</sup> was provided for secondment of a Sida staff person to support the work of the Office of the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in Timor-Leste on programmes of institutional reform.

#### *International Training Programme*

Between 1997 and 2012, 35 Timorese attended training in Sweden under Sida's International Training Programme. These included representatives from the PDHJ, the Ministry of Justice and the Secretariat of State for Youth and Sports, each of which has been supported directly or indirectly by Swedish development cooperation. The total cost of Sida's investment for this is not known but may be around SEK 5 million<sup>10</sup>. This programme continues after the phase-out of bilateral cooperation.

#### *Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility*

Funding for the World Bank Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility supporting developing country governments to reform the policy and regulatory environment for private investment. Between 2006 and 2012, activities funded included strengthening institutional capacities in the power sector; support to preparation of business cases for private-public partnerships (PPP) for development of Dili Airport, Tibar Bay Port and the Government Administration Building, and meetings between parliamentarians and private sector representatives to discuss a draft PPP policy and specific projects. Total cost of support to these initiatives was US\$1,974,750<sup>9</sup>.

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<sup>8</sup> The Decision for this is dated 2005.

<sup>9</sup> The SEK value at the time that the grant was made is not available.

<sup>10</sup> The current cost of training is SEK 150,000-200,000 per person but the cost has varied over time.

# 3 Findings: Sida-Supported Programmes 2011-2013

This section of the report describes the results from each of the five projects funded during the phase-out period. Because funding for four of these projects was initiated before the phase-out period, descriptions for each of these includes a brief summary on the earlier period. The description of each of the projects differs somewhat, reflecting the different sources of information available.

## 3.1 BASIC EDUCATION AND YOUTH WORK

Support to the education sector has been Sida's longest funding commitment in Timor-Leste, with the first grant being made in 1998 to Caritas. Support to education through UNICEF has amounted to around SEK137 million in the period 2000-2012, or about 35 percent of total Swedish support to Timor-Leste in those years. Almost uninterrupted funding for UNICEF's education work since 2003 and the scale of that support is indicative of Sida's assessment of its importance: ensuring equitable access to education in Timor-Leste was seen as critical not only for reducing poverty but also for reducing the risk of a return to armed conflict. Support for education in Timor-Leste also fits with Sweden's global commitment to basic education, particularly for women and girls, as a key to economic growth and to political and social development<sup>11</sup>.

In 2003, the Ministry of Education was weak at every level and education outcomes were poor, with only around 50 percent of children reported to be completing basic education. By 2010, there was evidence of some improvement in primary repetition and retention rates but it remains unlikely that Timor-Leste will achieve its Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 2 target<sup>12</sup>. The quality of education remained poor with some assessments concluding that many children spent several years in school without learning to read<sup>13</sup>. Challenges to improving quality included a shortage of learning resources, including text-books (particularly in Tetum), poor infrastructure, under- and unqualified teachers, and large classes, often made up of

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<sup>11</sup> <http://www.sida.se/English/About-us/our-fields-of-work/Knowledge-health-and-social-development/>

<sup>12</sup> Australian Government AusAid. June 2012. *Republica Democratica de Timor-Leste Annual Program Performance Report 2011*.

<sup>13</sup> Independent Evaluation Group World Bank. April 29, 2011. *Timor-Leste Country Program. Evaluation, 2000-2010. Evaluation of the World Bank Group Program*

several grades. While these problems were typical of the whole country, they were significantly worse in rural and more isolated areas.

Sida provided 100 percent of the funds for UNICEF's 2010-2012 programme of Sustainable Education and Development for Children and Adolescents. The two key strategic results for this programme were (i) for all children to complete a full course of quality basic education by 2015, and (ii) to build the capacities of adolescents / young people in literacy and life skills, and skills for effective civic engagement. Sweden's support to this programme stemmed from its close alignment with the 2005 national Strategic Plan for Universal Primary Completion and from Sida's positive assessment of UNICEF's organisational effectiveness. Continued support for UNICEF in Timor-Leste can also be understood in the context of Sweden's role as a long-term and significant donor to UNICEF globally.

Under the basic education component, Sida funds were to support 58 Child Friendly Schools (CFS) in five districts, which aimed to provide quality child-centred education for children in Grades 1-9<sup>14</sup>. Each CFS was to have a package of support including teacher training, learning materials, furniture, construction or rehabilitation of classrooms, and provision of gender sensitive water and sanitation facilities. The CFS were models that were intended to influence the direction of national education policies and strategies. The CFS initiative also fed into a broader UNICEF education strategy, which included support to curriculum and text-book development and to the development of an Education Management Information system (EMIS), and support to the ministry on education policy reform.

UNICEF's final report shows that, by the end of the funding period, the CFS initiative had been expanded from the original 58 to a total of 121 schools, equivalent to over 10 percent of the basic education schools in the country, and had reached more than 36,300 students and more than 1,200 teachers. The report also indicates that some planned outputs for the 58 Sida-funded CFS fell short of what had been intended, with lower than planned numbers of schools equipped with furniture and water and sanitation facilities<sup>15</sup>. UNICEF reporting does not always explain these variances; in the case of water and sanitation, the shortfall in provision appears related to a lack of inter-ministerial coordination.

In the CFS the dropout rate was expected to be reduced by 5 percent during the programme period. Full data on this were not available at the time of the final report but a 2012 survey showed the dropout rate declining by 7 percent since 2009 in a

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<sup>14</sup> A Basic Law for Education in 2008 provided for 9 years of free compulsory education.

<sup>15</sup> Some shortfalls were covered by other funding sources, although CFS not funded by Sida had a less holistic approach than the Sida-funded schools.



sample of selected schools. The report also showed significant improvements in educational achievement: 86 percent of Grade 3 pupils in the sample could read compared with 33 percent in 2009; 78 percent of Grade 2 pupils could also read (no comparative data for 2009). The level of these improvements appears to compare favourably with national progress but differences in reporting on data make direct comparisons difficult.

Development of the Grade 1-9 curriculum was completed, approved by the Ministry of Education and implemented for basic education schools. Tetum text-books for Grades 1-3 were drafted and are under review by the Ministry of Education. The government elected in 2012 put further text-book development on hold pending a review of the existing curriculum. There were delays in developing parts of the curriculum and in production of some text-books, mainly because this was the first time for Timor-Leste to develop its own learning materials, with the added factor of education being bilingual. By comparison with an original target of 50, 69 CFS were furnished with additional learning materials, teaching aids, and sports and other equipment. Teachers in these schools also received additional training in how to apply the CFS methodology in teaching mathematics.

UNICEF has supported the Ministry of Education to draft a national policy for inclusive education, which was pending approval at the end of the programme period. The policy's goal is to "create learner-friendly environments – inclusive, effective, protective, gender-responsive and participatory – at all levels of the education system"<sup>16</sup>. The policy aims to ensure that the education system addresses the needs of girls, children with disabilities, the poor, children living in remote areas and members of ethnic or other minorities.

Progress has also been made on the EMIS, with gender-disaggregated data available up to 2012. Use of the EMIS data for planning by the Ministry of Education is still in its infancy.

UNICEF and Sida have a particular concern to promote girls' education. UNICEF's plans to work with the Ministry of Education on gender equity were put on hold during 2012 because the elections in that year led to some ministerial restructuring. The gender component in the CFS was considered to be weaker than other aspects, in part because of the number of agencies operating in the education sector who were pursuing somewhat uncoordinated approaches to gender equity. Despite these obstacles, and socio-cultural barriers, girls' enrolment at primary level is now higher than boys and educational outcomes for girls are also better at this level. However,

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<sup>16</sup> Jose Monteiro. March 2012. *Panorama: Inclusive Education in Timor-Leste*.



questions of gender equity remain to be addressed, not least because of reported problems of gender-based violence against girls at all educational levels.

The other component of the Sida-funded programme included training for 20,000 young people in life skills, training for 10,000 out-of-school young people in literacy and numeracy, and support to 130 youth parliamentarians and members of student councils to develop advocacy platforms and skills. An important background to this programme was that adolescents were widely perceived as having been responsible for much of the violence in 2006, and in lesser conflicts in subsequent years. It was therefore seen as important to give young people a stronger stake in society and to provide them with skills to resolve conflicts peacefully and to improve their chances of finding employment.

During the programme period, this component worked with 130 youth parliamentarians and 315 members of student councils. The work with youth parliamentarians is judged by UNICEF and by the Timor-Leste Secretariat of State for Youth and Sports to have been the most successful of the three areas of work with young people<sup>17</sup>. Sida's unearmarked funding is credited with having contributed to this since it enabled the programme to respond flexibly to emerging needs and opportunities as the young parliamentarians' capacity developed. The Youth Parliament held its first formal session in December 2010, in the National Parliament, where it agreed a set of recommendations concerning young people which were forwarded to government. Members of the Youth Parliament also submitted a report to Parliament and to the Council of Ministers, based on a fact-finding mission to the Indonesian border to speak to young people there about their living conditions. The Timorese Youth Parliament has been formally recognised by the National Parliament and the GoTL has demonstrated its support through providing a grant of \$300,000.

The life-skills training reached 15,208 adolescents. The training included traditional topics, such as communications and HIV, and also modules on peace-building and pre-parenting that were developed by and for Timor-Leste. The inclusion of pre-parenting responded to young people's concerns that Timor-Leste is a fast evolving society where the older generations' approaches to child-rearing are no longer valid. During the 2012 elections a programme of civic education was run for first time voters<sup>18</sup>; a risk mapping of potential post-election conflict was also carried out and mitigating measures identified. The lack of post-election violence in 2012 suggests that, in combination with efforts made by Timorese electoral bodies, these activities had some degree of success. Discussions are on-going in government about

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<sup>17</sup> Interviews May 17<sup>th</sup>, 21<sup>st</sup> and 27<sup>th</sup> 2013.

<sup>18</sup> This provided an opportunity for coordination with the Electoral Cycle Project.

establishing a budget for life-skills training, although it seems unlikely that this could be incorporated into the school curriculum because of competition from mainstream subjects, particularly given Timor-Leste's unusually short school day.

The least successful part of the programme for young people is judged to have been the literacy and numeracy training. Although actual coverage of the UNICEF programme was on-track, the programme is reported to have been compromised by other agencies offering a different style of literacy training. In particular, Cuba provided a large number of teachers for short-term training with limited objectives (for example, to teach older people to sign their names so that they could draw their pensions)<sup>19</sup>. As the objective of UNICEF's training was to make young people more employable, their literacy and numeracy training was more comprehensive and ambitious. In response to these difficulties, in 2012 UNICEF began an alternative project on a pilot scale, which will be evaluated towards the end of 2013 and decisions made about whether and how to proceed further.

The future of the UNICEF programme is uncertain given the departure of donors from Timor-Leste. Until the end of 2014, the CFS initiative will be funded by AusAID and UNICEF global funds. If no new funding is identified after 2014, UNICEF's work is likely to be significantly scaled back. The Ministry of Education has formally adopted the CFS model as the national approach to early grade education but the Ministry of Education has an insufficient budget to scale it up in its entirety across the whole country. In 2013, AusAID completed the design for an 8-year sector-wide education programme, which may include some support to UNICEF's education work though not necessarily for the CFS. Sweden made efforts to encourage the EU to provide funding for the education sector, but this does not appear to have borne fruit.

## 3.2 ELECTORAL CYCLE PROJECT (ECP)

Sida has provided support to elections in Timor-Leste since 2001, initially through contributing funding to UNTAET for the Constituent Assembly elections prior to the referendum on independence from Indonesia. Between 2001 and 2012, Sida also provided funding for the Swedish members of EU election observer missions. In 2007, Sida provided SEK 3.9 million to support the work of Timorese electoral bodies in managing presidential and parliamentary elections.

Based on the experience of the 2007 elections, the 2010-2012 Electoral Cycle Project was designed to focus on building national capacity through strengthening the

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<sup>19</sup> Interview May 17<sup>th</sup> 2013.

Timorese electoral bodies and elaborating electoral processes and laws. In line with this, project outputs were defined as: (i) enhanced capacity of the Technical Secretariat of Electoral Administration (STAE) and of the Commission of National Elections (CNE) to fulfil their administrative and supervisory mandates; (ii) promote laws and processes that enhance participation, and free, fair and credible elections; and (iii) improved political party institutional capacity, tolerance and communication.

Sida provided SEK 7.7 million for the project, which was approximately 25 percent of the project budget. In its Assessment Memo, Sida noted that, as well as being consistent with Sweden's country strategy, the ECP also benefited from strong GoTL ownership. The Assessment Memo commented that the project's ultimate success would depend on whether it strengthened public confidence in electoral processes. Sida identified a need to follow up how the project included women, youth and voters living in more remote areas, and how far dependence on international advisers was being reduced.

Capacity development for the STAE and CNE involved mentoring and on-the-job training, structured courses provided by international agencies, and study tours for senior staff that provided exposure to election processes in other countries. A 2013 evaluation of the project noted that UN advisers had sufficient and relevant technical expertise and experience, and appropriate language skills, but that they tended to lack experience of mentoring or in skills transfer; and their counterparts in the STAE and CNE stated that they would have liked the advisers to spend more of their time on this aspect of their roles<sup>20</sup>. Nevertheless, results of capacity development appear to have been broadly positive.

The real test of the effectiveness of the ECP was the roll-out of the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections<sup>21</sup>. These elections were managed by STAE and supervised by CNE, with much reduced support from UNDP and UNMIT compared to previous elections: a UN support team of only around 170 staff was deployed, compared with the UN's full responsibility for the organisation of elections in 2002 and a significantly larger UN support team for the 2007 elections. The STAE is reported to have prepared the 2012 elections in an efficient and timely fashion, including obtaining parliamentary approval for a revised legislative framework and finalisation of an updated electoral roll; for its part, the CNE was judged to have provided credible and effective supervision. Voter turn-out in presidential elections of 73.12 percent and in parliamentary elections of 74.78 percent offers *prima facie* evidence of good management by the electoral bodies.

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<sup>20</sup> UNDP. n.d. *Evaluation of United Nations Electoral Support Team (UNEST) Project during the Electoral Cycle 2008 to 2012*

<sup>21</sup> STAE and CNE had successfully organised and supervised community elections in 2009.

The ECP evaluation and all observer reports, both international and domestic, conclude that the 2012 elections met international standards. Election observers' reports also note the calm atmosphere in which the voting took place, particularly compared with previous elections. In its report on the parliamentary elections, the EU attributes this both to a more stable political environment but also to the effective way in which the elections were organised and supervised by the electoral bodies. This included a conflict prevention strategy initiated by the CNE under which political parties signed a national pact for peaceful elections, which was underpinned by training provided by the CNE for local members of political parties on the electoral legal framework, electoral disputes and the code of conduct. In a similar vein, the neutrality of the STAE and of the CNE were not seriously challenged by parliamentary candidates. These findings are supported by the results of a Vox Populi post-election sample survey, which showed that the electorate had a high level of understanding of the electoral processes in which they had participated and that they judged these to have been mostly efficient, free and fair<sup>22</sup>. The EU report also judged voter's understanding of voting procedures as good or outstanding in 86 percent of polling stations observed<sup>23</sup>.

Election observation reports also note areas where the conduct of the elections fell short. For example, the Catholic Church and the CSO La'o Hamatuk drew attention to an overt police presence at some polling stations during the second round of presidential elections and during parliamentary elections<sup>24</sup>. Reports from both the EU and New Zealand delegations observed that during the parliamentary elections the positioning of some voting booths was detrimental to the secrecy of the vote. The Vox Populi survey found that, although familiar with electoral procedures, the electorate was less familiar with its rights to complain and to seek redress for grievances in relation to the application of these procedures. However, all election observer reports concur that infringements noted were minor and did not compromise the validity of the result or the political parties' and electorate's acceptance of the result.

By comparison with previous elections, voter and civic education programmes in 2012 paid more attention to ensuring participation by women and vulnerable groups.

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<sup>22</sup> Cited in the 2013 evaluation.

<sup>23</sup> European Union Election Observation Mission *Timor - Leste Final Report Parliamentary Election 2012*. [www.eueom.eu/timorleste2012](http://www.eueom.eu/timorleste2012) New Zealand Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee. n.d. *Report of the New Zealand observation delegations to the 2012 Timor-Leste general election*.

<sup>24</sup> OIPAS (Observatório da Igreja Para os Assuntos Sociais), May 2012. *Timor-Leste Final Report Presidential Election, 2012*. OIPAS (Observatório da Igreja Para os Assuntos Sociais). May 2012, *Timor-Leste Final Report Parliamentary Election, 2012*. La'o Hamutuk. 26 July 2012. *Relatório observasaun eleisaun Parlamentar tinan 2012*.

These programmes were coordinated with UNIFEM, UNICEF and CSOs. A lack of disaggregated data on voter turn-out means that there is no record of whether the efforts invested in targeting women in civic education resulted in a higher turnout of female voters compared with previous elections. In collaboration with disability CSOs, the STAE made provision for improved access at polling stations. Catholic Church observers and 89 percent of those surveyed in the Vox Populi survey considered that the needs of people with disabilities were met, although UNMIT<sup>25</sup> and disability CSOs felt that problems of access remained at some polling stations and that more could have been done to improve this. Data are available on the proportion of the electorate who voted by district but analysing these data does not appear to be a priority for government or the electoral bodies, and it is therefore not possible to know whether management of the elections ensured that turnout was as high in more isolated districts as in more central ones.

The ECP is now complete. The widely held assessment that the 2012 elections were well-managed has given the government and the electoral bodies confidence that in general they can now manage elections on their own. UNDP has some concerns that there may be a loss in capacity in the electoral bodies before the 2017 elections, particularly in the CNE which is the younger body. As the CNE's members are appointees who serve for only five years, there are also questions about how the knowledge and skills of the current appointees will be transferred to a new group of members.

### 3.3 JUSTICE SYSTEM PROGRAMME (JSP)

UNDP initiated support to the development of a formal justice system in 2003. Up to that point the main means of dispute resolution for most Timorese was the customary or informal justice system, and a 2008 survey found that knowledge of and confidence in the formal justice system was low<sup>26</sup>. The lack of confidence can partly be related to the widely held view that there was impunity for violent offenders, especially those associated with political violence. High levels of public dissatisfaction with the authorities associated with this were judged by the UN to have been a contributory factor to unrest in 2006<sup>27</sup>. Case backlogs in the courts also contributed to a lack of confidence in the justice system.

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<sup>25</sup> UNMIT/UNDP. June 2012. *Compendium of the 2012 Elections in Timor-Leste*.

<sup>26</sup> The Asia Foundation; USAID. 2008. *Law and Justice in Timor-Leste: A Survey of Citizen Awareness and Attitudes Regarding Law and Justice*.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. quoting the UN Commission of Inquiry into the violence.

The design of the 2008-2013 JSP includes supply and demand side features: it involves both building capacity in a range of justice institutions<sup>28</sup> and also stimulating public demand for accessible justice services. Project outputs are: (i) skills and competencies of justice sector actors enhanced; (ii) formal justice system decentralised and strengthened capacities of all district courts to administer justice and protect vulnerable groups; (iii) Prosecution Service strengthened to ensure effective delivery of criminal justice; (iv) capacity of correction services strengthened to uphold public safety and security and meet international minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners; and (v) enhanced access to justice for all and improved public confidence in justice institutions. Given a starting point of an almost complete lack of physical infrastructure and human resources and an urgent need to create a framework for the application of the rule of law, the emphasis in the first phase of support was on building justice institutions.

Sida provided SEK 24 million for the 2007-2009 phase of the JSP and SEK 24.6 million for 2010-2012, bringing its total funding to around 26 percent of the project budget. Sida's primary concern was for the project to promote access to justice, particularly for women, children and young people. However, the 2010 Assessment Memo acknowledged that the project's initial focus on building the justice institutions was a necessary first step towards this. Sida concluded that the previous phase of the JSP had made significant advances in this regard, in terms of developing systems and processes, helping to formulate a legal framework, and building a cadre of legal professionals. As a result, central and district courts were functioning regularly and backlogs appeared to be being reduced, although weaknesses in data collection mean that this was to an unknown extent. The 2010-2012 phase of the JSP planned to give greater priority to demand side activities, which was more in line with Sida policies and priorities. The Assessment Memo drew attention to a tendency for human rights violations to escalate after events such as the attacks on the President and Prime Minister in 2008, and noted that it was vital for the project to address this by intensifying its focus on building confidence in the justice system.

In general, the JSP has continued to have a stronger focus on strengthening justice institutions than on activities concerned with improving access to justice. The improved functioning of district courts is likely to have brought the court system closer to people but mobile courts almost came to a halt after government took over responsibility due to administrative issues and lack of funding<sup>29</sup>. Language is a barrier to access to justice for non-Tetum and non-Portuguese speakers. A political solution needs to be found to this but language policy is a sensitive issue and one that is

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<sup>28</sup> Mainly the Ministry of Justice, the courts, the Prosecutor General's Office, the corrections service and the Public Defender's Office.

<sup>29</sup> Interviews May 13<sup>th</sup> 2013; August 7<sup>th</sup> 2013.



unlikely to be resolved in the short term. In the meantime, the courts have responded by deploying district court judges to areas where they speak the appropriate vernacular or by using local court staff to assist court users. Limited attention has been given to the provision of legal aid, stalled in part by opposition from the Public Defenders' Office (PDO) to a draft law that would allow legal aid to be provided by private lawyers and CSOs as well as by the PDO<sup>30</sup>.

The JSP has addressed demand side issues by running information sessions for community leaders, CSOs, students and women to raise awareness on legal rights and services. Responses to these sessions were reported to be enthusiastic; no assessment has been made of whether legal literacy has increased as a result or led to an increased uptake of services.

No evidence has been presented to show that the JSP has increased access to justice for women. However, progress is being made in ensuring that justice institutions address gender-based violence (GBV), which until now has mainly been handled in the customary legal system where women are at a disadvantage. There is strong political will across government to tackle domestic violence, driven in part by a former Prosecutor-General. In 2010, the National Parliament passed a law against domestic violence, and the resulting attention to the issue has led to a high number of GBV cases being reported to the police. The JSP has partnered with justice institutions, such as the Prosecutor-General's Office, to provide training for the police on what constitutes GBV crime and on improving investigation. The JSP plans to step up its outreach programme to secondary schools, where discussions on GBV have shown positive results, and to use recent research on GBV to inform future access to justice activities.

The Legal Training Centre (LTC) is the body charged with training Timorese legal professionals. The LTC is a postgraduate institution with places for 45 students each year on each of two courses. Until 2012, LTC courses were run relatively infrequently and with no more than 20 students per course. The main reason for this is a historically high failure rate in the LTC's entrance exam, mainly because of applicants' poor or inappropriate basic legal education. (Most applicants were trained in Indonesia on the Indonesian legal system, while the Timorese system is based on that of Portugal.) The LTC responded to this by running courses to prepare applicants for the entrance exam, which enabled 38 students to pass in 2013, with plans for a second exam during the year. Lack of Portuguese and legal Tetum has held back

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<sup>30</sup> The PDO is responsible for providing free legal aid but remains weak and with limited outreach. Its opposition to the draft law stems in part from a reluctance to share responsibility for legal aid with other providers. Beyond these concerns, there are wider issues about whether the CSOs currently providing legal aid services have sufficient expertise and experience.

progress by students, which the LTC has addressed by organising language courses. Women are around 20 percent of the intake and the LTC has made special efforts to encourage female law students at the university to apply, including a gender quota for one of the courses and dedicated bursaries for female students in 2012-13.

It is acknowledged that, even with the current higher intake, the justice institutions will not have sufficient qualified legal professionals by the end of this phase of the JSP. (In addition, lawyers are needed for other bodies, including the National Parliament and the PDHJ, and as trainers for the LTC.) The LTC and justice institutions are currently in discussion to develop a strategy to address this.

Significant progress has been made in reducing the dependence of justice institutions on international advisers. All the teachers in the LTC are internationals and international expertise in the Prosecutor-General's Office and the courts is required for the more complex cases. However, international judges are the minority in the courts, with each court district having only one international to three or four Timorese judges. The latter handle almost all criminal cases alone and are beginning to deal with civil cases unassisted. Where previously there was reluctance by justice sector bodies to discuss reducing the role and number of international advisers – from a concern not to see a dilution in the quality of justice services – a discussion has now started on confining international advisers to capacity building roles and on a transition plan to full 'Timorisation'.

Norway is funding a 2012-2014 transition phase for the JSP. The design of a new project phase for 2014 onwards is under negotiation but its final shape is likely to be determined as much by the availability of financing as by the totality of what needs to be achieved. Funding for the JSP has always been constrained and this seems unlikely to change. The government provides some financial support to justice institutions (including contributions to salaries at the LTC) but tends to prioritise budgetary allocations for the regular work of the justice bodies over expenditure that is regarded as 'extra'. 'Extras' are deemed to include expenditure for activities likely to improve access to justice, such as the costs of the mobile courts and of facilitating judges to work in the district courts.

### 3.4 PARLIAMENT SUPPORT PROJECT (PSP)

Timor-Leste has had an independent parliamentary system for 10 years, its first parliament being the Constituent Assembly formed through UN-sponsored elections in 2002. Sida's first grants to the Timor-Leste parliament were made in the period 2004-2006 and were delivered through the Swedish parliament. Three grants, totalling around SEK1.9 million, covered the costs of meetings between parliamentarians from the two countries. Early discussions explored the role of Members of Parliament (MPs) in relation to budget issues while later ones aimed to strengthen the Timorese parliament in the area of electoral laws and processes, in the context of pending national elections in 2007.



Sida's first support to parliament through UNDP was via a three-year grant approved in 2007 for a total of SEK 18 million. The project focused on developing MPs' capacity to provide oversight of the budget, to scrutinise legislation, and to represent citizens. The project included two further components concerned with gender mainstreaming and with strengthening the secretariat that services the parliament. A 2008 mid-term review concluded that the oversight and legislative support components had performed best and that there was some progress in parliament's outreach to the public and in gender mainstreaming. The component concerned with strengthening the secretariat showed least visible impact. The main reasons for underperformance were seen to be weak parliamentary ownership of the project, as well as external factors including the breakdown in security in 2006 and elections in 2007. The evaluation also concluded that the project design was over-ambitious and that a 10-15 year timeframe from the start would have been needed for parliament "to evolve into a fully effective, efficient and empowered branch of government"<sup>31</sup>.

The 2010-2013 project phase had the same five outputs as before<sup>32</sup> but, with a view to reducing dependence on international advisers, proposed to implement them through a comprehensive integrated capacity development strategy, which previously had been lacking. Sida was also concerned that the previous phase had been too 'expert-driven' and insufficiently grounded in Timorese political realities. Sida aimed to reach agreement with UNDP on some qualitative benchmarks of progress for a parliament that was consistent with local political realities and that could manage without external support.

Sida provided SEK 7.1 million for the PSP in the period 2010-2011, which was approximately 8 percent of the project budget during this period. As well as support to parliament being generally consistent with the country strategy, Sida's support for the PSP was specifically concerned with the need to strengthen parliament as the arena for the resolution of political differences so that a return to violence was less likely. Related to this, the Assessment Memo emphasised the importance of activities that supported parliament's outreach to citizens, particularly since the Timorese

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<sup>31</sup> N. Johnston and A. Stanislaus. 2008. *Mid-Term Evaluation of the UNDP Timor-Leste Parliamentary Project- Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy in Timor-Leste*. Norad. 16/2008

<sup>32</sup> In full these were: (i) Parliament supported with relevant expertise for scrutinising, debating and amending bills, analysing and presenting policy implications, as well as initiating and drafting laws; (ii) consolidation of in-house legal sector specific and gender support systems and processes that enable Members of Parliament to analyse, debate and approve the national budget and provide continuous oversight of government policies, programmes and expenditures; (iii) assist Parliament to improve parliamentary administration and the capacity of the Secretariat to support parliamentary operations; (iv) improved institutional capacity to exercise the democratic representation function by strengthening communication with civil society, expanding information dissemination and promoting greater engagement and awareness among the public, particularly the youth; and (v) support Parliament in development of gender-based agenda that ensures gender equality in legislation and parliament operations.

voting system is by party list so that the connection between voter and MP may be weaker than in constituency-based voting systems.

At the end of 2012, parliamentary committees were reported to be functioning more effectively than before and the secretariat to be capable of carrying out its day-to-day functions. However, MPs were reported as still having weak capacity for oversight of the budget and for formulating legislation, and secretariat staff as still requiring support from international advisers in order to support MPs in these processes. A major sign of progress was that public outreach was fully managed by the parliament and was reported to be satisfactory, for example citizens were being consulted about draft legislation. The National Parliament has also assumed responsibility for some new budget items that will strengthen its capacity, for example by recruiting a cadre of Timorese lawyers as transcription interns and legal drafters, and incorporating their salaries into the 2013 budget. A lack of Portuguese – particularly legal Portuguese – required the legal drafters to go to Brazil for language training.

Noteworthy progress has been made in institutionalising gender in parliamentary structures, assisted by a quota system under which one third of MPs are women. The project contributed by organising relevant study tours and training for MPs (including on gender budgeting), by helping to form a gender caucus among MPs and by setting up a Centre for Capacity Building and Information on Gender Equality (CEGEN) within the secretariat<sup>33</sup>. The National Parliament has assumed responsibility for the staffing and financing of CEGEN, although the Centre has a funding shortfall and lacks staff, particularly appropriately qualified staff.

The National Parliament is still highly dependent on support from international advisers. There are several reasons for this. First, there is no evidence in PSP reporting that a capacity development strategy was developed for this current phase as had been intended or that Sida and UNDP reached agreement on relevant benchmarks of progress. Delays in the recruitment of advisers and campaigning for the 2012 elections slowed project activities. The turn-over of MPs as a result of the elections meant that some capacity was lost and new capacity needed to be built. In addition, the in-coming government brought a change in the policy environment, with implications for the work of parliamentary committees and by extension of advisers. Senior parliamentary figures consider that it will still take at least another decade for parliament to be capable of functioning without external support, not least because of the small number of people (MPs and in the administration) who are competent in Portuguese.

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<sup>33</sup> Interview, May 15<sup>th</sup> 2012.

UNDP envisages that parliament will require further support after the end of 2013 and funding for this is being sought. The EU has provided funding alongside the multi-donor fund to which Sida contributed; this funding is expected to continue up to February 2015. As noted, the National Parliament has assumed responsibility for some recurrent costs.

### 3.5 PROVEDORIA FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUSTICE (PDHJ)

The Provedoria for Human Rights and Justice (PDHJ) began operations in 2006. It is the national human rights institution of Timor-Leste and has been accredited with ‘A status’ since 2008, meaning that it is in full compliance with the Paris Principles<sup>34</sup>. The PDHJ is also the Office of the Ombudsman for Timor-Leste with the mandate to address complaints about maladministration by public sector organisations<sup>35</sup>. The first phase of UNDP support to the PDHJ was for the period 2007-2009, and focused on strengthening the human rights directorate. An evaluation in 2009 considered that there had been a strengthening of the PDHJ staff’s general understanding of human rights, the PDHJ’s capacity for investigation, and relationships between the PDHJ and relevant national bodies. Recommendations for the 2010-2014 phase were to focus capacity building more closely on the rights of identifiable vulnerable groups (such as women, children and minorities), on specific thematic areas (such as use of force, the maladministration of justice), and on specific skills (such as legal analysis, interviewing and mediation).

The outcome for the 2010-2014 phase of support to the PDHJ is: Improved institutional capacity of the Office of the Provedor (Ombudsman) to serve the public and promote public institutions’ actions in line with human rights principles and standards. The project document identifies three outputs that are expected to deliver this outcome: (i) PDHJ staff are knowledgeable about human rights concepts and understand how these concepts are applied in their work; and PDHJ has a workforce skilled enough to implement the institution’s human rights mandate, including the ability to conduct legal analysis; (ii) PDHJ has effective and efficient institutional structures and management systems; and (iii) PDHJ has effective information and knowledge management systems. Outputs (ii)

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<sup>34</sup> The Paris Principles include that: (i) the national human rights institution shall monitor any situation of violation of human rights which it decides to take up; (ii) the institution shall be able to advise the Government, the Parliament and any other competent body on specific violations, on issues related to legislation and general compliance and implementation with international human rights instruments; (iii) the institution shall relate to regional and international organisations; (iv) the institution shall have a mandate to educate and inform in the field of human rights; and (v) some institutions have a quasi-judicial competence.

<sup>35</sup> The PDHJ was also originally responsible for anti-corruption. It lost this function when an Anti-Corruption Commission was set up in 2009.

and (iii) extended the scope of the 2007-2009 project beyond building individual knowledge and skills to include organisational capacity development. During this phase, the scope of the project was also extended to include the good governance directorate. Sida provided support to the project between 2010 and 2012, its funding for this period representing about one third of the project's 2010-2014 budget. Sida's assessment of the project's relevance to Sweden's global and country strategies lay not only in the PDHJ's mandate to promote and uphold human rights but more particularly in its role as a watchdog on the other arms of government. Sida had specific concerns that there was a lack of checks and balances on public bodies in Timor-Leste, about low political participation outside elections, and about a backlog of unaddressed human rights violations. Sida was particularly keen to follow up on project plans to mainstream gender and to see the project encouraging a closer partnership between the PDHJ and CSOs.

When the PDHJ was established there were few human rights specialists in Timor-Leste and few of the PDHJ's staff come from a background of human rights activism. Simply building human rights knowledge and skills and promoting a human rights culture within the PDHJ itself has therefore been quite challenging. UNDP adopted a systematic approach to this with an initial organisational capacity assessment followed by regular capacity assessment monitoring. The project has adopted three main approaches to building capacity: training courses, discussion sessions and mentoring, with training and mentoring being the most important of these.

Reports on training describe the number and type of courses provided each year and the percentage increase in the knowledge of staff as a result of the training<sup>36</sup>. The 2012 report states that the average level of increase in knowledge after training was 32 percent, against the 2012 target of 25 percent<sup>37</sup>. Staff appear broadly satisfied with the training that they have received, and report that courses have helped to increase their knowledge and confidence. Some of the content of training was considered not sufficiently country specific and attendance on courses was also sometimes seen as keeping some staff from their day-to-day work; this was a particular concern with language training.

Mentoring has been particularly appreciated by staff. It has focused on case handling and report-writing, the quality of both of which is reported to have improved. This has also been assisted by the introduction of new systems to streamline handling of human rights cases. There has been a reported rise in staff productivity with the number of

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<sup>36</sup> Increases in knowledge are assessed through pre- and post-training assessment and includes an assessment of whether staff have used the learning in their work.

<sup>37</sup> Pre- and post-training testing includes an assessment of whether staff are applying what they have learned in their work.

concluded cases rising from 1.2 concluded cases per investigator in 2010 to 8.9 concluded cases per investigator in the last reporting year<sup>38</sup>. While this reported increase is impressive, the unreliability of some data for the early period mean that the figures need to be treated with caution. To improve the compilation of and access to data, the project introduced an electronic case management system in August 2012 which is expected to be generating more robust data by the end of 2013. This will not only enable more confident judgements to be made about the PDHJ's performance but will also provide the PDHJ with a more solid evidence base for follow-up of cases with public agencies, for example through being able to show whether and how those agencies respond to PDHJ recommendations.

Capacity development initiatives for PDHJ staff in 2010-2011 focused on women's rights, with particular attention paid to international and domestic rights instruments. Staff are reported to have increased their knowledge of gender rights by 29 percent as a result of these initiatives. In 2011, there was a nine percent increase in complaints made by women to the PDHJ, which may reflect an increase in PDHJ capacity and credibility with respect to women's rights. Nevertheless, results from a survey carried out by the project in 2012, showed that the PDHJ needed to have a more strategic approach to reaching out to women, as well as to other vulnerable groups and minorities<sup>39</sup>.

The project also addresses gender issues within PDHJ staffing through specific measures to support and monitor the participation of female staff in training and other capacity building initiatives. Where necessary, coaching is provided to women ahead of training courses to encourage them to participate equally with their male counterparts. In 2012, a high percentage of women were recorded as having participated actively in project training<sup>40</sup>.

Relationships with CSOs are described as relatively weak, partly because the project has focussed mainly on investigation and case handling rather than on monitoring. The latter is an area where there is more obvious potential for collaboration with CSOs since they are well placed to gather information on human rights, given their countrywide presence and grassroots work with communities. The project made efforts to improve collaboration with CSOs in 2010 and 2011, the value of such

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<sup>38</sup> Interview May 17<sup>th</sup> 2013; Project Annual Report 2012.

<sup>39</sup> UNDP. March 2013. *Human Rights Capacity Building of the Provedoria for Human Rights and Justice. Annual Report 2012*.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid. 78 percent of women were assessed as having participated actively against a target of 80 percent. In follow-up training on case management, 100 percent of female staff were judged to have participated actively; actual numbers are not given.

collaboration being demonstrated when the PDHJ and CSOs submitted a joint Universal Periodic Review report for the UN Human Rights Council in 2011<sup>41</sup>.

An absence of robust evidence on how public sector bodies have responded to PDHJ recommendations makes it difficult to judge whether the project is on track to achieve the project outcome of improving PDHJ capacity to promote adherence to human rights standards by public institutions. The PDHJ has also been cautious about pushing for responses from these bodies after rather hostile reactions to earlier criticism made publicly by the PDHJ. Since then, there has been a tendency by the PDHJ to manage relationships behind closed doors. The need for closer follow-up on recommendations was identified during this project phase: a new unit has been established within the PDHJ for this purpose and, as noted, electronic case management is expected to facilitate more systematic follow-up. To date, the PDHJ has not had a significant involvement in influencing policy in the area of human rights. This is in part because the policy process in Timor-Leste is highly centralised and somewhat opaque, and also because the idea that policy influencing falls within its mandate does not yet have much traction inside the PDHJ.

The UNDP project will be completed at the end of 2014. PDHJ management is confident that the organisation will receive sufficient state funding for the foreseeable future. UNDP is confident that by then the systems required to manage a National Human Rights Institution will be in place. Further support to the professional development of the staff will be needed, but from the start of 2014 this will become the responsibility of the new PDHJ Human Resources Department. Some concerns have been expressed about the PDHJ's institutional sustainability, given staff turnover. In a context where limited human rights expertise exists outside the PDHJ, this means that the need to build basic human rights knowledge and skills in staff is likely to need to be repeated on a regular basis, with significant on-going cost implications.

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<sup>41</sup> The Universal Periodic Review process is a review of the human rights records of a UN Member State, under which each State declares what actions they have taken to improve the human rights situations in their countries and to fulfil their human rights obligations.

## 4 Overall Evaluation Conclusions

This section of the report draws out some themes and issues from the description of results from the five Sida-funded projects given above. It does this using two conceptual frameworks. All the projects funded by Sida during the phase-out period were wholly or in part concerned with developing capacity in state institutions and other bodies and the first framework used is the extent to which projects have contributed to the development of individual, organisational and institutional capacities. The second framework is used to assess the extent to which Sida's portfolio has met criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. The final part of this section considers some lessons learned from Sida's development cooperation with Timor-Leste.

Any assessment of how far projects contributed to capacity development has to be considered in the context of the operating environment. At independence – and to a degree that was under-estimated by most of Timor-Leste's development partners – the country was almost devoid of the physical infrastructure and the legal and policy frameworks required for a functioning state. Levels of knowledge, skills and professional capacity were exceptionally low, even by comparison with other fragile states. Projects were also subject to delays caused by events beyond their control, such as campaigning in the 2012 elections which disrupted the regular business of government. These elections then brought in a new government with associated policy reviews and administrative restructuring that further impacted on implementation.

Most evaluation informants felt that a baseline of capacity had been reached by the end of 2012, and it is particularly noteworthy that there have been results in developing institutional capacity. However, informants also consider that the institutions supported through Sida funding are far from being able to function independently. The Sida-funded projects have contributed to the following results:

### **Individual capacity**

- Youth Parliamentarians developed skills in the analysis of social issues and in advocacy on those issues to Timorese government authorities.
- The staff of the STAE and CNE (electoral bodies) were able to perform their management and supervisory functions for the 2012 elections with minimal UN support.
- The number of Timorese judges and prosecutors has increased. Most criminal cases are heard by Timorese judges without international support and they are beginning to handle civil cases.
- The Secretariat that supports MPs in the National Parliament is able to perform routine functions correctly.



- Mentoring has improved the handling of human rights cases and of report-writing in the PDHJ. Staff appear to be concluding cases in a more timely fashion.

### **Organisational capacity**

- The Ministry of Education has a curriculum framework for basic education (Grades 1-9).
- STAE and CNE had sufficient organisational capacity to manage and supervise the 2012 elections: STAE organised all aspects of the election in an efficient and generally timely manner; CNE fulfilled its task of independently supervising the activities of STAE.
- Central and district courts are functioning and are dispensing justice services, although poor quality data mean that it is unclear how far back-logs are being addressed.
- The National Parliament is fully responsible for outreach to the public, and is able to manage consultation processes with citizens.
- Systems for more efficient management of human rights cases in the PDHJ are in place and being implemented. A new electronic case management system should enable more effective follow up on recommendations made to public bodies.

### **Institutional capacity**

- The Ministry of Education has drafted a national policy for inclusive education. UNICEF's CFS model is being finalised for approval by the Ministry of Education as the approach to be followed for education in Grades 1-9.
- The Youth Parliament has formal status and is recognised by the National Parliament.
- The STAE and CNE ensured that the 2012 elections passed off in a peaceful atmosphere and met international standards; minor infringements noted were not deemed to have compromised the result.
- The establishment of a gender caucus of MPs and creation of a gender secretariat in the National Parliament means that an institutional framework is in place for MPs to promote women's rights and scrutinise legislation from a gender perspective.

The following sub-section of the report draws conclusions about Sweden's development cooperation with Timor-Leste using the standard evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. Assessment of impact was beyond the evaluation's remit.

## **4.1 RELEVANCE**

Sida's lack of presence in Timor-Leste and in the region limited its room for manoeuvre about what it could fund but Sida was nevertheless able to make some relevant programmatic choices. Sida's decisions to fund the sectors of Education and of Democracy, Human Rights and Gender Equality during the main period of



development cooperation were consistent with Sweden's global priorities to promote human rights and the perspectives of the poor. The Sida-funded programme also supported the achievement of the UNDAF outcomes for Timor-Leste, and were consistent with the first principle of good donor engagement with fragile states, which prioritises strengthening the capability of states to fulfil their core functions<sup>42</sup>.

Sida's choices do not appear to have been informed by evidence of the extent to which Timor-Leste was on- or off-track in progress towards its MDG targets. However, Sida's choices were highly relevant to social and political realities in Timor-Leste, where there is an urgent need to produce a well-educated population and to build an efficient and effective state. Although, before 2010, the GoTL had not formulated a national development plan with which donors could align their programmes, Sida funding was aligned with what the GoTL was prioritising in practice in the period in question, which included peace and security, good governance and public sector reform, and investing in quality education<sup>43</sup>.

A cross-cutting objective of Sida's programme was to contribute to promoting peace and stability and preventing a return to violence. This was relevant to Timor-Leste's status as a fragile state that had experienced periodic outbreaks of serious unrest since 1999. Associated with this objective, Sida had a cross-cutting concern to promote inclusion of women, children and young people, and vulnerable groups. This supported the OECD principle of strengthening citizens' confidence, trust and engagement with state institutions. It was also appropriate to Timor-Leste given prevailing patterns of social exclusion. In practice, this focus does not always appear to have corresponded with the priorities of Timorese sector agencies, which have been concerned in the first instance with redressing supply by side deficits by putting in place basic institutional, physical and human infrastructure.

## 4.2 EFFICIENCY

Sida's options in terms of the comparative efficiency of alternative funding modalities were constrained by exceptionally weak government capacity and by the corresponding dominance of UN agencies in the first 10 years of independence. In these circumstances, the option to fund projects managed by UN agencies probably offered the most efficient approach compared to other options. As with relevance, Sida's relatively 'light touch' management of the programme from Stockholm also limited the options that were available.

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<sup>42</sup> OECD. April 2007. *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*.

<sup>43</sup> Timor-Leste IV Constitutional Government. May 2012. "Goodbye Conflict, Welcome Development": AMP Government Snapshot (2007-2012). GoTL. Office of the Prime Minister. April 7, 2010. *On Road To Peace And Prosperity: Timor-Leste's Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030*.

There is insufficient information to judge whether projects were managed efficiently, in terms of costs and timeliness. For the four UNDP projects, the salaries of international advisers were a major budget item but, in the first 10 years of independence, the use of such advisers was unavoidable. At the same time, OECD and donor reports on how technical assistance has been provided suggest that there were inefficiencies in the way that some advisers were deployed. This may apply to some of the advisers working in Sida-funded projects who were reported to lack mentoring skills. Standard criteria for judging timeliness may not apply, given the projects' very difficult operating environment. However, delays in some projects were caused by slow recruitment of international advisers. Reports do not explain whether these delays had consequences for the timeliness of overall project implementation<sup>44</sup>.

### 4.3 EFFECTIVENESS

Compared with its starting point Timor-Leste has come a long way. In less than 10 years it has changed from a territory directly administered by the UN to being a state with functioning institutions and public sector bodies. It also appears to have become a more stable society, with an uncontested change of government through elections in 2012. This would not have happened without international support. As shown above, Sida's funding to UNDP and UNICEF has contributed to this progress, although support to state-building has involved many actors and it is beyond the competence of this exercise to assess the contribution of individual development partners.

Nevertheless, Timor-Leste remains a fragile state, with serious shortcomings in state institutions. Despite significant investment in education, the overall quality of education remains poor. Efforts have been made to extend to the districts the operations of the institutions supported through the UNDP projects, but these institutions remain Dili-centric with a much weaker level of functioning outside. This mirrors findings in OECD reports, which highlighted a donor tendency to fund central institutions in Timor-Leste and to neglect development needs in rural areas, with potentially serious implications in terms of risks of social polarisation. The projects' lack of geographic outreach is replicated in the lack of a strategic approach to the inclusion of women and other vulnerable groups. An exception has been the effective work in the parliament, which has been helped by favourable national policies on a 30

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<sup>44</sup> Towards the end of 2012, the EU concluded that UNDP was demonstrating a low level of efficiency in the project that it was funding to strengthen the National Parliament. This was assessed mainly on the basis of a low level of disbursement of funds.

percent quota of women MPs, and the focus on combating and increasing knowledge around GBV.

The capacity development plans for the UNDP projects appear to have been over-ambitious with original project designs often based on an ‘ideal type’ of what the respective institution should be, rather than on social and cultural realities in Timor-Leste. Typically, also, capacity building interventions lacked a clearly articulated capacity development strategy with well-defined and realistic benchmarks against which progress could be measured. This finding for UNDP is similar to findings from evaluations of other development cooperation programmes in Timor-Leste. OECD assessments of the overall contribution made by Timor-Leste’s development partners to developing government capacity concluded that this contribution had been reasonably positive but that much purported capacity development was both ad hoc and insufficiently rooted in an understanding of the country’s very particular socio-cultural context and political legacy. There had also been significant problems of poor coordination, particularly at sector level where different approaches were being pursued<sup>45</sup>.

For UNDP there is a wider issue about its ability to measure whether progress is being made in capacity development projects. UNDP uses a Results and Resources Framework (RRF) to track and report on projects. This forms the foundation for the budget, and its primary purpose is to identify and sequence the inputs and activities required to deliver project outputs. This means that it is focused at a lower level in the hierarchy of results than is the case with a logframe where indicators, milestones and targets measure whether projects are on track to deliver outputs and achieve the outcome. The RRF format encourages activity-based and somewhat quantitative reporting, and project reports have typically lacked robust assessment of how far capacity has improved compared with the starting point, and what gaps remain to be addressed. The limited focus on outputs and outcomes in project reports also means that the conclusions of the present evaluation are not as firmly grounded as they might have been.

## 4.4 SUSTAINABILITY

Since Timor-Leste’s revenue from offshore oil and gas has begun to come on stream, several donors have closed their development assistance programmes or are in the process of doing so. In addition to Sweden, these include Finland, Ireland and

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<sup>45</sup> OECD. 2010. *Monitoring the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations – Country Report 6: Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste*. OECD. 2011. *2011 Report on International Engagement in Fragile States: Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste*.

Portugal. Major donors that remain, such as Australia, are increasingly moving to bilateral cooperation with the government. These changes in the pattern of development cooperation and UNMIT's departure from Timor-Leste at the end of 2012 have made it increasingly difficult for UN agencies to raise funds for their programmes.

The financial future of the work that the Sida-funded projects has developed is therefore uncertain. The STAE and CNE appear to be adequately funded and the PDHJ also appears confident that it will receive sufficient government support when the UNDP project ends. However, the JSP has always experienced funding shortfalls, which have mainly restricted outreach rather than impacting on the development of basic institutional infrastructure. Similarly, while the government has adopted UNICEF's CFS model and its approach to life-skills training for adolescents, the budgets to expand these remain to be negotiated.

In 2011, an Asian Development Bank evaluation concluded that "it would be unreasonable to expect major capacity-building results in the near future, despite substantial investment by the development partners and the government"<sup>46</sup>. The investment that has been made has resulted in a baseline of capacity being reached but this needs to be consolidated if it is not to be lost. There is a particular need to build on the baseline to strengthen the capacity of state institutions to adopt approaches that are more purposefully focused on the inclusion of marginal social groups and geographic areas.

## 4.5 LESSONS LEARNED

Despite many unique characteristics of the Timor-Leste experience, some of the findings of the evaluation may have wider application. The first is the need for donors to be realistic about the time needed to achieve change and build institutions in a fragile state. Evidence from other fragile states in transition is that this is a process that may take 30 years, by which measure Timor-Leste is not yet half way through. The OECD's principles of engagement with fragile states emphasise the importance of staying engaged for the long-term and of working at the pace of the partner. The standard medium-term country strategy and project timeframes are too short for the length of engagement that may be required, and these timeframes may need to be adjusted.

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<sup>46</sup> ADB-Dili. 2 December 2011. *Closing Capacity Gaps in Timor-Leste: Draft for Informal Discussion*.

OECD principles also stress that donor interventions need to start from context i.e. from an analysis of country-specific social and political realities and from a proper understanding of what this may mean for the starting point for development. There is an associated need for capacity development strategies to be tailored to the specific context, and for relevant indicators to be formulated that are robust enough to guide the strategy. Donors now recognise that this has been a weakness across development assistance to Timor-Leste with an associated underestimation of the challenges of capacity development. However, it is something that they continue to struggle with and where there is a paucity of relevant guidance. While a lot of effort has been made globally to develop capacity development principles and approaches relevant to fragile states<sup>47</sup>, there is relatively little practical guidance on questions of appropriate design, sequencing, methodologies and tools, and indicators. There is a particular need for guidance on developing robust institution-level indicators of progress for ‘good enough’ governance.

All Sida Assessment Memos for the projects funded during the phase-out period identified a series of dialogue issues to be pursued with UNICEF and UNDP. Several of these issues were common to all projects, including the need: to strengthen results frameworks to focus on progress towards outcomes; to improve monitoring of progress in reaching marginal social groups; and to strengthen national ownership and capacity (through focusing on nationalisation of posts and reduction in the number of international advisers). Sida’s dialogue with partners focused in particular on the last of these. In this, Sida, in common with other development partners, may have over-estimated the pace at which international advisers could be replaced by Timorese staff. Given Timor-Leste’s almost complete lack of educated professionals and the time needed for education and professional formation, a higher level of gap-filling by international staff and advisers might have been appropriate than would be acceptable in other development cooperation.

All of Sida’s dialogue issues were taken up in written communication and during visits. However, management of the programme from Sweden presented practical difficulties to following these up systematically, and they remain salient in all the Sida-funded projects. If in similar circumstances Sida were concerned to increase its influence, particularly in encouraging partners towards more inclusive programme strategies, another approach might be to join forces with a like-minded donor that was managing its programme in-country or in-region, and was therefore better placed to pursue the dialogue. To support these efforts, Sida HQ in Sweden is well-placed to engage the relevant agencies’ HQ in dialogue.

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<sup>47</sup> See for example, Merilee S. Grindle. February 2005. *Good Enough Governance Revisited. A Report for DFID with reference to the Governance Target Strategy Paper, 2001*

## 5 Implementation of the Phase-out

Sweden's decision to phase-out its programme of support to Timor-Leste was taken in 2010. The decision was part of the broader process of Sweden concentrating its development assistance in fewer countries in order to use funds more effectively, in the wake of the global economic crisis of 2008-2009. The decision on Timor-Leste did not reflect a judgement on the effectiveness or value of the Sida-funded projects there compared with other countries. However, it was influenced by criteria that were specific to the nature, if not the quality, of the Timor-Leste programme. The first of these is that, since the start of the programme in the late 1990s, Sweden has not been a major donor to Timor-Leste, although as shown in previous sections of this report Sweden has been an important donor for individual projects<sup>48</sup>. Associated with this, the programme had been managed from Stockholm, with no permanent programme management presence either in Timor-Leste or in the Swedish embassy in Indonesia. Moreover, management of the Timor-Leste programme was a relatively small part of the role of successive managers in Stockholm. Timor-Leste's potential to move to lower-middle income status was also clearly apparent at the time that the decision was taken. Sweden's recognised long-term relationship with the independence movement for Timor-Leste was not sufficient to outweigh these other considerations.

The timing of Sweden's decision was unfortunate in that it came immediately after discussions had been held early in 2010 with the UN and GoTL on Sweden's 2009-2011 country strategy, where provisional commitments of SEK40 million a year had been made<sup>49</sup>. In other respects, the process of phase-out was handled well. Partners were informed immediately that Sweden was phasing out its development assistance and that this would mean that funding from 2011 onwards would be at a lower level than had been discussed. Initial indications of funding for 2011, 2012 and 2013 were that they would be SEK 29 million, SEK 10 million and SEK 5 million, respectively<sup>50</sup>. Sida staff successfully argued that such drastic cuts would be inappropriate given the commitments that had just been made and the exceptionally low levels of capacity in Timor-Leste. Funding for the phase-out period was finally set at around SEK 30 million a year, thus ensuring that the continuity of projects was

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<sup>48</sup> Sida's total development assistance to Timor-Leste between 1998 and 2012 was approximately SEK390 million or roughly US\$60 million. This compares with the largest donor, Australia, at approximately US\$390 million for the period 2006-2010.

<sup>49</sup> It also coincided with the new Swedish ambassador's presentation of her credentials.

<sup>50</sup> Sida. May 31<sup>st</sup> 2011. Plan for Phasing Out Sweden's Development Cooperation with Timor-Leste 2011-2013.

not jeopardised. The phase-out plan came into effect in July 2011, with no further disbursements planned after December 2013.

The phase-out process was not as such a formally defined exit strategy, with identifiable milestones and bench-marks. However, it met several of the criteria for a well-handled exit from an aid-dependent country<sup>51</sup>. The first important criterion was that partners were alerted promptly and well ahead of the date for final disbursement. In principle, partners were warned in sufficient time to mobilise alternative resources, though, as noted, future funding is problematic for UN agencies in Timor-Leste. The formal decision was communicated at the highest level, at a meeting between the Swedish Ambassador to Timor-Leste and the Timorese President, where it was further clarified that Swedish support would continue through multilateral mechanisms and potentially through the private sector. The door was also left open for the GoTL to approach Sweden in the future for support in specific thematic areas<sup>52</sup>.

The phase-out plan had stipulated that positive relationships with counterparts should be maintained and monitoring of projects should continue until Sida funding ended. Throughout the phase-out period, Sida has continued in regular discussion with UN partners through email, telephone meetings and visits. The regularity, relevance and quality of the Sida programme manager's communication during this final phase was noted appreciatively by the UN as a positive indicator of Sweden's continuing interest in and engagement with the funded projects. Given the difficulties presented by the Timor-Leste operating environment, UN staff also appreciated Sida's flexibility in not earmarking funds and in recognising that timetables could not always be strictly adhered to. The ending of Sida funding certainly adds to the already severe difficulties that almost all UN agencies face in securing resources for future work. At the same time, Sida's decision to phase-out has been accepted as part of a familiar, if regrettable, pattern rather than being a particular decision requiring explanation and justification.

The phase-out had no obvious or direct impact on government counterparts since Sida's partnerships were with UN agencies, Sida has not provided technical assistance to government and Sida's contacts with government were via the UN<sup>53</sup>. At the political level, some disappointment was expressed that Sweden would no longer

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<sup>51</sup> Anneke Slob; Alf Morten Jeve. May 2008. *Managing Aid Exit and Transformation: Lessons from Botswana, Eritrea, India, Malawi and South Africa*. Sida, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danida, Norad. <http://www.sida.se/exitevaluation>

<sup>52</sup> This meeting was followed up by a letter from the State Secretary in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs in the GoTL.

<sup>53</sup> Some government counterparts only learned through this evaluation that Sida had been funding the respective UN project and were now phasing out.



be providing direct development assistance to the country. The President to whom the decision was communicated (José Ramos-Horta) had forged strong personal friendships with senior Swedish political figures before independence; his disappointment was related less to the significance of Swedish development cooperation *per se* and more to it as an indicator of continuity in the historical support that Sweden had provided to the Timorese people in their struggle against Indonesian occupation.

The evaluation does not recommend any change to the timing of the phase-out, which was appropriately planned to coincide with the last funding cycle. Discussions with UN partners also indicated no requirement to introduce changes to the way that the phase-out was being implemented. In any event, the evaluation's extended timeframe brought it so close to the closing date for the programme that changes were effectively ruled out.

As a follow-on to the phase-out, the Swedish Embassy in Indonesia was interested in knowing whether findings from this exercise might indicate possibilities for future Swedish cooperation with Timor-Leste, including possible commercial links and others. The primary focus of the Sida programme in the governance sector and the mainly desk-based methodology for the evaluation limited opportunities for detailed exploration of areas of future potential interest. However, Swedish IT companies are among those represented in Indonesia and evidence from the evaluation suggests that scope exists for cooperation in IT, particularly in data management. However, the evidence also shows that the needs in Timor-Leste are at least as much in developing knowledge and skills in data processing and management as in provision of IT hardware and software<sup>54</sup>. Plans to develop Sweden's relations with Timor-Leste on a different basis need to consider that there may be a potential reputational risk to Sweden in appearing to piggyback trade interests on the Sida programme, as one of the reasons for Sida's high reputation with its partners in Timor-Leste is that it is seen as an agency that does not 'fly the flag'.

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<sup>54</sup> General observation also shows potential for cooperation between Sweden and Timor-Leste in the power sector, although this finding does not arise from the assessment of Sweden's past programme of development cooperation.



# Annex 1 – Terms of Reference

## **Summative Evaluation Report**

### **Analysis of the results and experiences from the development co-operation with East Timor**

#### **Terms of Reference**

##### **Evaluation Purpose**

In June 2011, Sida replaced the cooperation strategy with East Timor with a Phase Out Plan for 2011-2013. This plan concludes that the bilateral cooperation will be phased out and no more payments will be made after December 2013.

The Phase Out Plan also states that Sida shall produce “a summative report on the implementation of the Phasing Out Plan, including an analysis of the results and experiences observed in the supported projects”.

Therefore, the main purpose of this summative report is to summarise and analyse the results and experiences of Sweden’s cooperation with East Timor and provide lessons learnt, focusing mainly on the period 2010-2013. However, in order to set the context, the evaluation report will also document Sweden’s development co-operation with East Timor since 2000. And lastly, the report will also reflect on the shifted conditions (from long term co-operation to phasing out) and how these have, and are, affecting the phase out plan.

Thus, the report will be concerned with providing:

- 1) a summary of Swedish development co-operation to East Timor;
- 2) an analysis of the results and experiences in the supported projects on-going during the phase out period, based on already existing evaluations, and including consequences for the recipients and implementing partners of the phase out;
- 3) in addition, the report will provide a brief overview of how the phase out plan is being implemented (although running until Dec 2013).

##### **Background**

Swedish development co-operation with East Timor was initiated around 2000 with humanitarian support like Health and Nutrition, as well as Water Supply and Environment Sanitation. From 2003 Sweden supported Education, followed by Democracy and Human Rights.

### **The Phase Out Plan for Sweden's cooperation with Timor-Leste**

The Phase Out Plan, valid as of June 2011, builds on the previous Development Co-operation Strategy 2009-2011. The Phase Out Plan states that Swedish support to Timor-Leste shall remain focused on democratic governance and education, with the following objectives:

#### *Democracy and human rights:*

- To improve access to an efficient justice sector, with special focus on women, children and young people;
- To provide poor people with greater opportunity for democratic participation and improve transparency.

#### *Education:*

- To allow more children and young people, especially girls, to complete a compulsory primary education of good quality.

### **Earlier experiences of Phase-Out Plans**

Part of any systematic approach to phasing out is an appropriate management plan. Once a decision to phase out development co-operation is made, the actions in planning and managing phase out are vital. Experiences from other phase outs show that critical factors for good exit management include strategic communication, involvement of stakeholders, realistic timeframes, respect of legal obligations and commitments, as well as flexibility.

### **Evaluation Questions, lessons and recommendations**

This evaluation report shall reflect on how well Sida has followed the lessons learned in its present phase-out process in East Timor. The three parts entail:

#### **Part 1. Summary of development co-operation**

The report will provide a summary of Swedish development co-operation with East Timor since around 2000. It is not expected for this early development co-operation to be evaluated, but to provide the context for understanding the challenges the newly independent country faced and how this co-operation evolved into its final phase.

Questions which should be reflected on are:

What has been Sida's role in supporting the development of East Timor from around 2000 until the decision of phasing out the co-operation? Has this role changed over time?

#### **Part 2. A meta-evaluation**

The second part will be in the form of a meta-evaluation of projects supported mainly during the Phase Out period. Meta-evaluation is here understood in terms of aggregating information of several evaluations. These evaluations include:

- UNICEF recently carried out an Evaluation of the UNICEF *Education Programme* in Timor –Leste, 2003-2009. In addition: UNICEF Progress Report No1 Oct 2010 – Dec 2011.

- UNDP's *Justice System Programme* made an "Independent Mid-term Evaluation, dated 31 August 2011. In addition: UNDP Justice System Programme Annual Report 2011.
- UNDP's *Capacity Development for Provedoria for Human Rights and Justice* will perform a Mid-term evaluation in the beginning of 2013.
- UNDP's *Electoral Cycle* programme will carry out an evaluation after the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections.
- UNDP's *Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy* has to date no plans for an evaluation.

In addition to these evaluations, the meta-evaluation will also be based on annual reports, quarterly reports as well as any other additional material found relevant.

This part should include a summary of the results from each individual program, including lessons learned. In addition, it should also include an overall analysis of the period in regards to relevance and in meeting the objectives of the strategy. Any indication of weaknesses in any of the above evaluations, which might question the evaluation's quality and warrant further studies, should be stated.

In addition, this part of the summative report should also look at the sustainability of results, including the extent to which projects and programmes have been taken over by government or taken up by other donors. The report shall also reflect on any consequences of phasing out the Swedish co-operation for the recipients and the implementing partners.

The Swedish Embassy in Indonesia has expressed an interest in how the overall results (from 2000 to date) can contribute to future Swedish cooperation with East Timor. This could include pointing out possible future areas of interest for Swedish companies and organisations registered in Indonesia (see annexed list). If such areas of interest come up during the interviews, the evaluators should include these in the report.

To the extent possible given the limitations inherent in such a synthesis, the evaluation shall draw conclusions on factors having contributed to success/failure. To this end, a review shall be made of the strategies and approaches that were applied by Sida and its partners, whether they have been successful or if possibly other strategies would have rendered better results. The evaluators shall also consider contextual factors.

### **Part 3. An overview of the phase out plan**

The report shall also provide an overview of the implementation of the phase out plan. The purpose is to conclude if the plan is considered on track and responsibly carried through. This will entail reflecting on how certain factors found critical for good exit management have been considered.

It is possible that this summative evaluation report may make recommendations for adjustments of the remaining period if found necessary. Given that this evaluation takes place rather late in the phase-out period, the evaluators should restrict recommendations

to those that are implementable during the main period and otherwise limit them to a more general nature, of relevance for phasing out in other countries.

In relation to this, some specific questions should be answered:

- Are stakeholders properly involved and informed?
- Does the phase out plan have a realistic timeframe?
- Does the phase out plan not respect legal obligations and commitments in any obvious ways?
- How has the Phase Out been influenced by the fact that the development co-operation to East-Timor has been limited in scope and channelled through UNDP and UNICEF?

### **Methodology**

This assignment will be contracted to an external consultant and carried out mainly as a desk study. In addition to a review of the existing literature and the meta-evaluation, interviews shall be held with selected key staff in each programme in the phase out plan and from the recipient side as found relevant.

Sida does not envision field visits during this review phase. Interviews can be made either over telephone, or via a local consultant in East Timor, with a select group of programme staff and possibly government counterparts. Sida staff can assist in identifying key programme informants as well as to introduce the consultant.

The interviews are not meant to be a form of data collection, but rather a source of additional, complementary or explanatory information. In addition, the interviews shall also be used to get a better understanding of the phase out and its consequences (keeping in mind that most of the interviewees may have biased opinions of this process).

With regard to the meta-evaluation, the consultant may want to consider using the Realist Synthesis approach as laid out by Pawson et al. if found appropriate. This approach has shown to be useful in drawing together literature and studies on a specific topic with the purpose of providing analysis.

The evaluation must be carried out in accordance with the OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality standards.<sup>55</sup> Sida would however like to stress the importance of ensuring methodological rigour. Different techniques for data collection must be used and all techniques must be carefully carried out and replicable, meaning also that they must be documented. Interviews with informants/respondents must be complemented with other relevant sources (e.g. review of documents, media reports, administrative data,

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<sup>55</sup> It should be noted that the evaluation will be assessed and approved based on its adherence to the OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standards.

literature, etc.). The evaluation cross-validates the information sources and critically assesses the validity and reliability of the data. Criteria for selection of any type of method must be made explicit. There must be an explicit logic where recommendations and lessons learnt build on the conclusions. Conclusions are substantiated by findings, which in turn can be understood from the analysis of observations (made explicit). The methodology used must be described and explained in the evaluation report. Any limitations shall be made explicit and their consequences discussed.

### **Work and reporting schedule**

Jan 28 <sup>th</sup>	Draft Terms of references sent to first ranked framework consultant
April 2 <sup>nd</sup>	Consultant contracted
April 8 <sup>th</sup>	Final Terms of references sent
April 8 <sup>th</sup>	Inception report, including any adjustments to the assignment and more detail regarding the methodology applied and limitations.
May 7 <sup>th</sup>	Draft report delivered and presented by the consultant to Sida HQ
May 30 <sup>th</sup>	Final report delivered by the consultant to Sida HQ

Additional dissemination activities in the form of a presentation or workshop may be added at a later date, but is not part of present contract.

### **Evaluation team and estimated scope of assignment**

It is envisioned that an evaluation specialist carries out the bulk of this evaluation, with support provided by a local consultant and perhaps a junior consultant for the first part of the report.

No travel is budgeted for and reimbursable costs will mainly be related to communication costs. Sida calculates approximately four weeks of work for the consultant in writing this summative report.

The report should be published on Sida's publication database.

Project documents, as mentioned above, will be made available to the consultant.

### **Organisation and management**

This evaluation will be managed by the Department for Programme Cooperation at Sida HQ. Sida has informed the Swedish Embassy in Jakarta as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the upcoming summative evaluation report. Both partners will be continuously updated.

# Annex 2 – Inception Report

## 1. Background

### 1.1 Note on the Inception Report approach

This Inception Report is based on a preliminary survey of the availability and content of documentation provided by Sida relevant to a Summative Evaluation of Sweden's support to Timor-Leste, and on decisions made in an inception meeting with the Sida Programme Manager on April 3<sup>rd</sup> 2013.

This evaluation is not a fieldwork-based exercise; rather, most data are expected to be gathered through a desk review of relevant documentation, which will be supplemented by interviews with selected key informants. Consequently, this report focuses on the steps taken so far and on the further steps that need to be taken to ensure the comprehensiveness, quality and effectiveness of the desk review and interviews.<sup>56</sup>

The report should be considered as a record of the decisions taken in the Inception meeting and as a working document for both Indevelop and Sida.

### 1.2 Work completed to date

In the Inception Phase the following activities have been completed:

- Relevant documentation has been transferred to the evaluation team by Sida (see Annex 2);
- Additional project-specific documentation has been identified by the evaluation team (mainly Project Documents and results frameworks); (See Annex 2)
- Additional general documentation relevant to the Sida-supported projects has been identified by the evaluation team (e.g. a survey of public attitudes towards justice and a comprehensive UNMIT report on the 2012 elections);

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<sup>56</sup> The approach adopted in presenting findings from the Inception Phase of this assignment differs somewhat from one that would be adopted were this evaluation to follow a methodology where the main approach to information- and data-gathering is through enquiry in the field. In such cases, a document review is incorporated into the Inception Phase and findings from the document review are included in the Inception Report.

- The evaluation team has made a preliminary assessment and review of the type and content of available documentation; the need for additional documents has been identified;
- The methodology for the evaluation has been reviewed in light of the available documentation, in particular the small number of current evaluation reports available on the Sida-funded projects.

## 2. Methods

The main provisions of the Terms of Reference were included in our proposal responding to the ToR and are not repeated here. The Terms of Reference are attached as Annex 1.

As agreed in the inception meeting, the methodology for the assignment is as follows:

### 2.1 Periodisation

According to the Terms of Reference, the evaluation is to cover the whole period of Sida support to Timor-Leste. In practice, this means mainly the period from 1999 although it is expected that some projects will pre-date this year. The entire period can be divided into the following phases:

- The years up to around 2002 (i.e. the year of Timor-Leste's independence); during this period Sida's support can broadly be described as reactive and responsive to the instability caused by the events surrounding the end of Indonesian rule.
- 2003-2009/10: although these years also saw instability and a continuing need for humanitarian assistance, during this phase Sida initiated long-term cooperation with Timor-Leste; Sida funding for the five UN projects currently being supported was started during these years.
- 2010/11-2013: these years cover the phasing-out of Sweden's support to Timor-Leste (the decision to phase out was taken in December 2010); this phase is the focus for the evaluative aspects of the assignment.

It is expected that the desk review should enable a more precise delineation of the timing of these different phases of support and also their character, based on the type of development assistance being provided.

### 2.2 Focus

As set out in the Terms of Reference, the evaluation has three parts:

1. A summary description of Sida's support to Timor-Leste in the period up to 2010. This will be based on the *L108 Disbursements 1998 and onwards\_2013* spreadsheet and on documentation on the funding decisions listed there, both provided by Sida. It has been agreed that this summary should include for each project/programme:
  - the period of support,
  - the partner,
  - the level of funding, and
  - a brief paragraph on the nature of the support

- if possible, the overall volume and composition of Swedish support during this period will also be presented in graph form.
2. An evaluation of the five UN projects supported by Sida during the phase-out period. As indicated in the Terms of Reference, this part of the evaluation should have a strong focus on lessons learned and should include consideration of the effects on the funded projects of the decision to phase-out Sweden's support.

The Terms of Reference described this as a meta-evaluation (i.e. an analysis and synthesis of the results of Sida support based on findings from existing evaluations of individual projects). However, only two evaluation reports exist, one of which pre-dates the phase-out period and the other of which is forward-looking more than summative. (An evaluation report of EU support to the Electoral Cycles project may also exist in draft.) The evaluation will therefore mainly be based on:

- original project documents and results frameworks,
  - annual and quarterly reports, and the final report on the Electoral Cycle project
  - additional external reports identified by the evaluation team, such as the survey of public attitudes towards justice mentioned above.
3. The third part of the assignment is an assessment of whether the Phase Out plan is on track and being carried through responsibly. Information gained from interviews will be the main source for this part of the evaluation. It is hoped to supplement evidence from interviews with Sida records of discussions held with its UN partners in Timor-Leste prior to and during the phase-out period.

The ToR require the evaluation to consider whether the existing areas of cooperation might contribute to future Swedish cooperation with Timor-Leste, in particular whether there is scope for further private sector involvement. It was agreed that the evaluation would not focus strongly on this issue but would record such possibilities if they present themselves during the evaluation. If sufficient potential appears to exist for future Swedish cooperation with Timor-Leste, the evaluation team should make proposals for designing a subsequent more systematic scoping exercise.

### **3. Information Sources**

#### **3.1 Documentation**

Selected documents on the early period of Sida support have been provided to the evaluation team. Further documentation on this period will be provided by Sida in order to have a complete set of funding decisions for the analysis of Sweden's support in the period up to 2010.

For the five UN projects being funded during the phase-out period, Sida has provided the evaluation team with all the relevant quarterly and annual project reports, as well



as the final report on the Electoral Cycle project. It was agreed that the original Project Documents and Results Frameworks and the Sida-specific Agreements/funding decisions for each of these projects are also needed, in particular to be able to compare original plans with the reporting that has been made in the reports already supplied.

In order to consider how Sida has managed the phasing-out of its support, it would be useful to have a copy of a Phase-Out Management Plan, if this exists, and also records of Sida's discussions with its UN partners prior to and during the period of Phase-Out.

### **3.2 Interviews**

As set out in Indevelop's proposal responding to the Terms of Reference, interviews are intended to complement, triangulate and fill in gaps in information obtained from the desk review. They are expected in particular to shed light on (i) Sweden's specific contribution to the multi-donor funded programmes, (ii) the implementation and implications of Sweden's Phase-Out; and (iii) questions of sustainability (government ownership; extent to which programmes have been or will be taken up by other donors). Specific evaluation questions for these interviews will be identified through the desk review.

The inception meeting confirmed that some interviews would be by telephone and skype and some will be conducted face-to-face. Face-to-face interviews will be carried out by the Timorese consultant and are expected to be mainly with Timorese informants and in Tetum. The inception meeting agreed that the following categories of stakeholder are the most relevant to be interviewed:

- Swedish Embassy in Jakarta: the current Political Officer and possibly his/her predecessor,
- two UN staff per project: the Project Manager and relevant Sector Head and/or his/her predecessor if appropriate,
- Government: at least one staff member/official per project; other stakeholders not directly involved in the projects (e.g. official concerned with donor coordination in the Ministry of Finance; possibly selected participants in the Sida-funded International Training Program),
- Donors: the EU, Norway and Australia were identified as the most relevant.

It was also agreed to ask the Timorese evaluation team member to suggest possible interviewees, based on her local knowledge in particular in the area of human rights.

It was noted that key government staff and officials are often burdened with requests for information from the international community and that the UN has requested that this evaluation exercise should not further unnecessarily overload them.

#### 4. Limitations

As noted in Indevelop's Proposal, a lack of evaluation reports means that the availability and quality of quarterly and annual programme reports (and of other relevant contextual information) are as important for the desk review as evaluation reports. The inception phase has assessed the range, type and quantity of documentation, and has requested additional documents from Sida to fill identified gaps. A first assessment has been made of the quality of reporting and no obvious deficiencies have been identified. The remaining limitation in this regard is that a more detailed assessment of quality (particularly in relation to reporting on outcomes) will only be made as part of the desk review.

While the timetable for the assignment appears feasible, there are some possible delay points. See below Section 5.

#### 5. Next Steps

The following agreements were made on next steps:

*Sida* agreed to take the following actions to facilitate the next stages of the evaluation:

1. To provide the evaluation team with the applicable Project Documents and Results Frameworks for the five UN projects funded during the phase-out period,<sup>57</sup>
2. To provide the evaluation team with Sida-specific Agreements/funding decisions for each of the five UN projects,
3. To provide the evaluation team with the EU evaluation report on the Electoral Cycle project, if it is available,
4. To provide the evaluation team with a copy of the Phase-Out Management Plan, if it exists,
5. To provide the evaluation team with such records as may be available of discussions between Sida and its UN partners prior to and during the Phase-Out Period,
6. To provide the evaluation team with a complete set of documents on the pre-2010 funding decisions,
7. To check the accuracy of the *L108 Disbursements 1998 and onwards\_2013* spreadsheet, which the evaluation team is to work from for the period up to 2010,

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<sup>57</sup> Those found by the Evaluation Team through internet search and listed in Annex 2 may not be the applicable documents.

8. To provide the evaluation team with a list of Swedish companies registered in Indonesia,
9. To provide contact details of interviewees and to inform these interviewees that they will be contacted during the evaluation.

*Indevelop* agreed to provide information on Sida's support to civil society organisations in Timor-Leste (based on a related mapping exercise being undertaken).  
DONE.

## **6. Review of the work plan**

It was agreed that the date for delivery of the Inception Report should be April 8<sup>th</sup> and that Sida would respond by April 11<sup>th</sup>.

In other respects, the revised (March 13<sup>th</sup>) work plan was still considered to be applicable (attached as Annex 3).

Possible delay points are:

- delays in obtaining documentation on the early period of Sida support; assuming that this could be completed in reasonable time, a delay is not expected to slow the overall process because work can continue in the meantime on the Phase-Out Period where documentation is already more complete and where gaps in documentation are more easy to rectify;
- possible non-availability of potential interviewees and/or the main interviewing period coinciding with significant competing demands on interviewees' time; the fact that interviews do not need to be completed within a tightly defined period was felt to allow greater flexibility than would be the case for an in-country evaluation mission.

Trish Silkin  
April 5<sup>th</sup> 2013

## Annex – Revised Work Plan

			2013																
			February				March				April				May				
	TS	BEM	w6	w7	w8	w9	w10	w11	w12	w13	w14	w15	w16	w17	w18	w19	w20	w21	
Inception phase																			
Start-up, preliminary document review, drafting inception report	4	1								x									
Inception meeting with Sida	1																		
Submission of inception report											03/04								
Feedback/no objection on the inception report												09/04							
Data collection																			
Detailed desk review	6	1										x	x						
Interviews	2	4										x	x						
Data analysis and report writing																			
Data analysis	2	1											x						
Report drafting	5	1												x	x				
Submission of draft report																7/5			
Feedback on draft report																	17/5		
Finalisation of report	1																x	x	
Presentation at Sida (optional)	1																		
Submission of final report																		30/5	
Total days	22	8																	

Initials: TS = Trish Silkin, BEM = Benicia Eriana Magno

# Annex 3 – Selected Documents

## PROGRAMME DOCUMENTS

### Education/UNICEF

American Institutes for Research. April 23, 2010. *Evaluation of the UNICEF Education Programme in Timor-Leste 2003-2009*

UNICEF. n.d. *2010 Country Office Annual Report, Timor-Leste, EAPRO*

UNICEF. n.d. *SIDA – Brief update on Programme Implementation in 2011*

UNICEF. March 2012. *Donor Report for the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida). Sustainable Education and Development for Children and Adolescents in Timor-Leste. Progress Report No. 1. PBA: SC/2010/0843. October 2010-December 2011.*

UNICEF Timor-Leste. *2012 Annual Report.*

UNICEF. June 2013. *Donor Report for the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida). Sustainable Education and Development for Children and Adolescents in Timor-Leste. Final Report. PBA: SC/2010/0843. October 2010 – December 2012*

José Monteiro. March 2012. *Panorama: Inclusive Education in Timor-Leste.*

### Electoral Cycle

RDTL/UNDP. February 2008. *Revised Project Document. Support to the Timorese Electoral Cycle.*

UNDP. n.d. *Support to the Timorese Electoral Cycle. Annual Report 2010*

UNDP. n.d. *Support to the Timorese Electoral Cycle. Annual Report 2011*

UNDP. n.d. *Support to the Timorese Electoral Cycle. Annual Status Report of Project Progress September 2010-April 2011 For the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)*

UNDP. n.d. *Support to the Timorese Electoral Cycle. Final Report 2008-2012.*

UNDP. n.d. *Evaluation of United Nations Electoral Support Team (UNEST) Project during the Electoral Cycle 2008 to 2012*

European Union Election Observation Mission Timor - Leste *Final Report Parliamentary Election 2012.* [www.eueom.eu/timorleste2012](http://www.eueom.eu/timorleste2012)

Church Observatory for Social Affairs (OIPAS - Observatório da Igreja Para os Assuntos Sociais). Dili, May 2012. *Timor-Leste Final Report Parliamentary Election, 2012.*

Church Observatory for Social Affairs (OIPAS - Observatório da Igreja Para os Assuntos Sociais). Dili, May 2012. *Timor-Leste Final Report Presidential Election, 2012.*

La'o Hamutuk. Dili, 26 July 2012. *Relatóriu observasaun eleisaun Parlamentár tinan 2012.*

UNMIT/UNDP. June 2012. *Compendium of the 2012 Elections in Timor-Leste.*

Australia Timor-Leste Friendship Network (AusTimorFN) in conjunction with Deakin University's Centre for Citizenship, Development and Human Rights (CCDHR). *Parliamentary Elections 7 July 2012 – Observer Report from AusTimorFN and CCDHR* <http://austimorfn.com/2012/07/parliamentary-elections-7-july-2012-observer-report-from-austimorfn-and-ccdhr/>

New Zealand Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee. n.d. *Report of the New Zealand observation delegations to the 2012 Timor-Leste general election*

### **Justice**

UNDP. 22 December 2008. *Project Document. Enhancing the Democratic Rule of Law through Strengthening the Justice System in Timor-Leste (Revised Justice System Programme.)*

UNDP. February 2011. *Strengthening the Justice System in Timor-Leste. (UNDP Project No. 00014955., UNDP Justice System Programme Update. Annual Report 2010.*

UNDP. March 2012. *Strengthening the Justice System in Timor-Leste. (UNDP Project No. 00014955., UNDP Justice System Programme Update. Annual Report 2011.*

Independent Mid-Term Evaluation Mission. 31 August 2011. *Final Report on the UNDP Justice System Programme in Timor-Leste.*

UNDP. January 2013. *Strengthening the Justice System in Timor-Leste. (UNDP Project No. 00014955. Annual Report 2012.*

Fafo/AIS. 01 August 2012. *Strengthening the Justice System in Timor-Leste Justice System Programme Implemented in partnership with UNDP Appraisal Report*  
The Asia Foundation. USAID. n.d. *Law and Justice in Timor-Leste: A Survey of Citizen Awareness and Attitudes Regarding Law and Justice 2008*

### **Parliament**

UNDP. 21 December 2009. *Project Document 2010-2013. Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy in Timor-Leste.*

UNDP. n.d. *Project Update. Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy in Timor-Leste. (Parliament Project 2010-2013) UNDP Project Code: 00073810. Annual Report 2010*

UNDP. *Project Update. Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy in Timor-Leste. (Parliament Project 2010-2013) UNDP Project Code: 00073810. Annual Report 2010*

UNDP. n.d. *Project Update. Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy in Timor-Leste. (Parliament Project 2010-2013) UNDP Project Code: 00073810. Annual Report 2011*

UNDP. n.d. *Project Update. Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy in Timor-Leste. (Parliament Project 2010-2013) UNDP Project Code: 00073810. Annual Report 2012*

N. Johnston and A. Stanislaus. 2008. *Mid-Term Evaluation of the UNDP Timor-Leste Parliamentary Project- Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy in Timor-Leste.* Norad. 16/2008

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# Annex 4 – Persons Interviewed

## MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Ewa Polano	Ambassador, Embassy of Sweden, Jakarta
Johannes Andreasson	2nd Secretary, Political Officer, Embassy of Sweden, Jakarta

## SIDA

Eva Atterlov Frisell	Programme Officer, Sida
Kerstin Sullivan	Senior Programme Officer, Unit for Humanitarian Assistance

## NORWAY

Marianne Damhaug	Minister Counsellor, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Indonesia
Imah Rahimah	Advisor for development cooperation, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Indonesia

## REPÚBLICA DEMOCRÁTICA DE TIMOR LESTE

Alfredo de Araujo	National Director for Basic Education, Ministry of Education
Afonso Soares	Director of Planning, Ministry of Education
Firminio Dias Quintas	National Director of Policy and Planning, Secretariat of State for Youth and Sports
João Lemos	Chief Department for Youth Capacity Building, Secretariat of State for Youth and Sport
Celito Cardoso	Director of Human Rights and Citizenship Rights, Ministry of Justice
Helder Cosme Marcal Belo	Director for Prison Support
Josefa Alvares Pereira Soares	MP, Secretary-General of the Gender Caucus
José Cornelio	Previous General Director of Research and Technical Information for the National Parliament.
Adelino Afonso de Jesus	Director of Parliament Support, National Parliament
Acilio Manuel Branco	Director General, Technical Secretariat of Electoral Administration
Faustino Cardoso	Former President, Commission of National Elections
Sebastião Dias Ximenes	Provedor for Human Rights and Justice, Provedoria dos Direitos Humanos e Justiça
Aurio Savio	Director General, Provedoria dos Direitos Humanos e Justiça

Valerio Ximenes	Director of Human Rights, Provedoria dos Direitos Humanos e Justiça
Aryanto Nahak Bei Dato	Senior IT Officer, Provedoria dos Direitos Humanos e Justiça

#### **UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME**

Farhan Sabih	Assistant Country Director, Head of Governance Unit
Nasrin Khan	Head of Programme/Chief Technical Adviser, Justice System Programme
Andrew Harrington	Access to Justice Policy Specialist, Justice System Programme
Cesar Augusto Dias Qunitas	Project Manager, Parliament Support Project
Barbara Nazareth Oliveira	Project Manager, Capacity Building for the PDHJ

#### **UNICEF**

Hongwei Gao	Country Representative UNICEF
Takaho Fukami	Chief of Education

Candie Cassabalian	Head of Adolescent and Youth Participation
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#### **INDIVIDUALS**

Miles Young	Team Leader, Justice System Programme Design Team
Jups Kluyskens	Team Leader Evaluation of PDHJ

# Annex 5 – Results Matrices for Sida-Funded Programmes 2010-2013

<b>SUSTAINABLE EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT FOR CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN TIMOR-LESTE (October 2010-December 2011; extended to December 2012).</b>		
<b>Outcome/outputs</b>	<b>Indicators/indicative activities</b>	<b>Reported Progress</b>
Source for logframe: Sida Assessment Memo December 8 <sup>th</sup> 2010. Logframe references MDG, NESP and UNDAF goals. Source for reported progress: Final Report, June 2013		
Outcome 1: Models of 58 Child-Friendly Schools/Eskola Foun created in AVEMO by December 2011 (Aileu, Viqueque, Ermera, Manatuto and Oecusse districts).	Number of Child-Friendly Schools/Eskola Foun models developed as % of planned.	Eskola Foun initiative started in 121 schools.
Enrolment increased by 5% to reach about 800 pre-school children (boys and girls) in 58 schools. Dropout rate in grade one reduced by 5% in 58 selected schools.  700 teachers received training on child-centred interactive pedagogy and acquired skills applied in the classroom.	Number of girls and boys in targeted schools.  Number of grade one girls and boys enrolled in primary schools; RR of grade 1 girls and boys in target primary schools; DR of grade 1 girls and boys in target primary schools.  Number of teachers trained on child-centred interactive pedagogy, disaggregated by gender and education level, as % of planned.	The group work for “Getting Ready for Schools” (GRS) initiative was completed (training modules developed, initial and refresher training conducted covering 25 cover trainers and 150 young facilitators from grades 4-5). Due to the shift of the MOE’s strategy, GRS nevertheless was terminated in agreement with MOE without proceeding for implementation.  Data not available  180 teachers equipped with child-centered interactive pedagogy. Additional 875 teachers were trained with an advanced CFS training on math.  School furniture for 8,900 students and over 410 teachers were procured and is in the process of distribution.

SUSTAINABLE EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT FOR CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN TIMOR-LESTE (October 2010-December 2011; extended to December 2012).		
Outcome/outputs	Indicators/indicative activities	Reported Progress
23,000 children/700 teachers seated on desks and benches/tables and chairs.	Number of classrooms in target schools equipped with basic classroom furniture: desks, benches/tables, chairs, as % of planned. Classrooms qualify as equipped if all of these 3 items are observed in the classroom.	N/A
	3.	N/A
Safe spaces/playgrounds developed in 58 selected schools and child’s right to play and learn promoted.	Number of target schools with safe spaces/playgrounds developed, as % of planned.	18 schools infrastructure was improved through 5 school construction and 13 school rehabilitation
Water, hygiene and sanitation facilities provided in 58 schools.	Number of target schools with adequate water, hygiene and sanitation facilities as % of planned.	
Primary school infrastructure improved in 58 schools and made more child-friendly.	Number of target schools with improved infrastructure and more child-friendly, as % of planned.	
Outcome 2: Basic Education Curriculum implementation monitored and textbooks, learning materials and supplementary readers developed.		
A consolidated curriculum framework for the 3 cycles of Basic Education present in all schools.	Curriculum framework finalised and distributed to all schools.	The curriculum framework for the 3 cycles was developed and disseminated in all schools
		N/A
The 16 school clusters pilot the education project and setting up of academic boards and subject area teams.	Number of targeted schools with functioning academic boards and subject area team organisation as % of planned.	Textbooks of Tetum language for Grade 1-3 were drafted and are currently under finalisation. Due to the MOE’s decision for a comprehensive curriculum revision starting in 2013, it was agreed with MOE to terminate the development of the textbooks for the remaining subjects.
Textbooks in the subjects Tetum language, Arts & Culture, and Physical Education, Health and Hygiene, as well as supplementary reading materials on Environmental Education and Mathematics developed.	Number of Tetum language, Arts & Culture, and Physical Education, Health and Hygiene, as well as supplementary reading materials on Environmental Education and Mathematics printed and distributed, as % of planned..	
		All of the existing 65 school inspectors were trained on CFS and equipped with skills for effective monitoring.

<b>SUSTAINABLE EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT FOR CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN TIMOR-LESTE (October 2010-December 2011; extended to December 2012).</b>		
<b>Outcome/outputs</b>	<b>Indicators/indicative activities</b>	<b>Reported Progress</b>
75 school inspectors are able to maintain and monitor quality of education.	Number of school inspectors trained with skill to monitor the quality of education, as % of planned.	A total of 3,735 students were enrolled in 2011/2012, out of which 523 successfully graduated. 176 teachers were trained to deliver the primary equivalency programme.
65 districts benefit from the roll out of equivalence programmes.	Number of participants, disaggregated by gender and district, registered in equivalence programme.	Learning Corners were established in 69 schools, that includes sports and traditional music and cultural materials. Curriculum framework was presented in all schools
50 schools have received Sports and Traditional Music and Cultural materials for full implementation of the curriculum.	Number of target schools equipped with recreational kits, as % of planned.	N/A
Public awareness of the contents of the new curriculum increased.	Number of national radio broadcasts to raise public awareness conducted	
<b>Outcome 3: Policies are developed to guide the implementation of innovations to increase access, improve quality and reduce dropouts and EMIS strengthened.</b>		
Draft policy developed on Inclusive Education (IE).	Presence of draft policy on IE.	National Policy on Inclusive Education was drafted and is currently under finalisation.
Draft policy developed on Language in Education (LiE).	Presence of draft policy on LiE.	Multilingual Education Policy for Pre-school and Basic Education levels was developed. Due to the sensitivity, the approval is pending.
Draft policy developed on Early Childhood Education (ECE).	Presence of draft policy on ECE.	National Policy Framework for Pre-school Education is developed and approved by MoE.
EMIS strengthened, and efficient collection, processing,	Presence of disaggregated formal and non-formal data	A total of 1,454 MOE staff, including school inspectors, EMIS district officers, superintendents and school directors

<b>SUSTAINABLE EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT FOR CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN TIMOR-LESTE (October 2010-December 2011; extended to December 2012).</b>		
<b>Outcome/outputs</b>	<b>Indicators/indicative activities</b>	<b>Reported Progress</b>
storage and retrieval of data to facilitate evidence-based advocacy and planning ensured.	accessible to public (annual education statistical yearbook).	and administrators in all of the 13 districts were trained annually in 2011 and 2012 on data collection and verification. Computers and motorbikes were procured to support the data management in MOE and the data collection in the field.
<b>Outcome 4: Young people's participation and involvement in literacy and decision making strengthened and life skills-based education provided</b>		
130 youth parliamentarians and members of 42 student councils equipped with skills for effective participation and civic engagement.	130 youth parliamentarians equipped with skills for effective participation and civic engagement. 2 national youth parliaments seatings organised. Youth voices included in programmes and policy processes. 42 student council members equipped with skills for effective participation in school management and better teacher-student relationships.	130 youth parliamentarians and 315 members of 46 student councils were equipped with skills for effective participation and civic engagement
20,000 adolescents equipped with life skills for their protection and effective participation.	20,000 adolescents equipped with life skills.	15,208 adolescents and young people were equipped with life skills in peace-building, pre- parenting, communication, decision-making, management of emotion, STi/HIV/Substance abuse prevention for their protection and effective participation
10,000 out of school adolescents and youth access literacy classes and literacy and numeracy gained.	10,000 out of school adolescents access basic literacy classes.	5,200 out of school adolescents and youth accessed literacy classes and gain literacy and numeracy skills
<b>Outcome 5: Mainstreaming of gender advocated; public, communities and families are mobilised/sensitised on new curriculum and intervention monitored.</b>		
Advocacy for gender mainstreaming and for children to enter school at the rights age; and campaign undertaken to publicise new curriculum.	Number of gender mainstreaming awareness campaigns conducted; number of MoE staff trained on gender issues.	General report on progress. Further work pending findings of a 2013 evaluation of gender work across the sector.
At least 58 communities mobilised and sensitised on the need to ensure the participation and retention of primary grades 1-3	Proportion of people in the target communities who agree on the need to ensure the participation and retention of primary	N/A

<b>SUSTAINABLE EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT FOR CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN TIMOR-LESTE (October 2010-December 2011; extended to December 2012).</b>		
<b>Outcome/outputs</b>	<b>Indicators/indicative activities</b>	<b>Reported Progress</b>
children in school until completion of basic education cycle.	grades 1-3 children in school until completion of basic education cycle.	N/A
58 school communities/PTAs empowered to participate in developing education; and inclusive, safe, academically effective, health and gender responsive schools created.	Proportion of people in the target communities who participate in developing education and inclusive, safe, academically effective, healthy and gender responsive schools.	

<b>SUPPORT TO THE TIMORESE ELECTORAL CYCLE PROJECT (2010-2012)</b>		
<b>Output</b>	<b>Indicator performance 2012</b>	<b>Reported progress</b>
Source: Results and Resources Matrix dated June 30 <sup>th</sup> 2010. Source for reported progress: Final Report		
<b>Output 1: By 2012, capacity developed (through policy and legislation advisory support; advisory services and training) within STAE and CNE to independently conduct credible and transparent elections.</b>		
Output 1.1: Support to the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE)		
Elections administered in fair, credible and autonomous manner by STAE and feature strong participation by voters.	Reduced international support in terms of advisers and support.	<p><i>2008:</i> Reliable and accurate voter roll and electoral database in place; Enhanced capacity of STAE and CNE staff to fulfil their tasks through capacity building activities; Assessment field visits to polling centres/stations, in preparation of the 2009 Suco elections;</p> <p><i>2009:</i> Successful support to the organisation and conduct of 2009 Suco elections; Support to the timely implementation of the operational and deployment plan of sensitive and non-sensitive electoral materials for 2009 Suco; Support to selection and recruitment of 6000+ electoral staff; Design, development and conduct of training programme of</p>
Quality of medium-term operation plans and management systems (compared to previous electoral processes).	<p>Progressive reduction of international advisory assistance.</p> <p>International and national electoral observation reports.</p>	

SUPPORT TO THE TIMORESE ELECTORAL CYCLE PROJECT (2010-2012)		
Output	Indicator performance 2012	Reported progress
		6000 electoral staff; Continuation of assessment field visits to the polling centres/stations.  <i>2010:</i> Enhanced capacity of STAE and CNE staff to fulfil their tasks through capacity building activities;  <i>2012:</i> Improved capacity of STAE to manage and administer and CNE to monitor national elections
Output 1.2: Support to the institutional development of the National Electoral Commission (CNE)		
Elections supervised and monitored in a proper manner by CNE.	Reduced international support in terms of advisers and support.	<i>2008</i> Enhanced capacity of STAE and CNE staff to fulfil their tasks through capacity building activities; Assessment field visits to the polling centers/polling stations, in preparation of the 2009 Suco (community) elections; <i>2010</i> Enhanced capacity of STAE and CNE staff to fulfill their tasks through capacity building activities; <i>2012</i> Improved capacity of STAE to manage and administer and CNE to monitor national elections through: - Effective execution of operational plan during the preparation, organisation and conduct of the Parliamentary elections; - Clear complaint mechanism supported by the electoral monitoring officers and focal points on the ground.
Quality of medium-term and operational plans and management systems (compared to previous electoral processes).	Progressive reduction of international advisory assistance.  International and national electoral observation reports.	
Output 1.3: Support to the electoral process		
Legal reform process in consultative way and following international standards	Progressive revision of electoral laws, towards the national elections.	<i>2011</i> Electoral legal framework and subsidiary legislation revised and in place;
Level of citizen participation in decision-making processes.	Progressive increase of registered voters, particularly in rural	<i>2008</i> Reliable and accurate voter roll and electoral database in place.



<b>SUPPORT TO THE TIMORESE ELECTORAL CYCLE PROJECT (2010-2012)</b>		
<b>Output</b>	<b>Indicator performance 2012</b>	<b>Reported progress</b>
	<p>areas.</p> <p>Accurate and reliable voters' roll as a basic requirement for the organisation of elections.</p>	<p><i>2011</i> Updated voter roll in place;</p> <p><i>2012</i> Periodical voter registration updates conducted at district and sub-district level; Voters registered for 2012 presidential elections = 626,503;</p> <p>Voters registered (May 2012)= 647,814 of which 645,624 are eligible; increase of 48,349 new voters compared to 599,465 voters (June 2010). Total number of voters registered for Parliamentary Election in July 2012 was 645,624.</p>
Level of electoral participation of women in the electoral process as voters and as candidates.	Progressive increase of women registered voters, particularly in rural areas.	<p><i>2011</i> Voter registration gave special attention to women in rural areas.</p> <p><i>2012</i> 49.02% of registered voters were women and 50.98% were men.</p>
Level of electoral participation of most vulnerable groups (elders, new voters, illiterate population, citizens in rural and remote areas) in the electoral process as voters and as candidates.	<p>Increase in most vulnerable groups voter registration numbers (particularly in rural areas).</p> <p>High level turnout in elections compared with international standards in rural and remote areas.</p> <p>Increased number of vulnerable groups registered as (... - gap in results matrix)</p>	<p><i>2011</i> Voter registration gave special attention to elders, illiterate people, first time voters</p> <p><i>2012</i> CNE campaign materials targeted women, elders, youth and first time voters, and PWD (e.g. with Braille manuals, bill-boards targeting PWD).</p>
Level of awareness of the electoral process, level of voter turnout, nature of voting practice.	<p>(... - gap in results matrix)</p> <p>Turn-out in elections disaggregated by gender and districts.</p>	<p><i>2012</i> Total votes cast in 2012 2nd round presidential elections = 458,703 (73.12%); invalid votes = 1.47%; Total votes cast in Parliamentary Election (July 2012) = 482,792 (74.78%); 471,419 (97.64%) valid, and 11,373 (2.36%) were invalid.</p>
<b>Output 2: By 2012, political parties participating more effectively in electoral processes with the provision of training program and services through district Resource Centres.</b>		
Level of preparedness and tolerance of the political parties in	Number of political party members participating in the capacity	<i>2008</i>

<b>SUPPORT TO THE TIMORESE ELECTORAL CYCLE PROJECT (2010-2012)</b>		
<b>Output</b>	<b>Indicator performance 2012</b>	<b>Reported progress</b>
the preparation and organisation of electoral processes as compared with previous elections.	<p>building activities.</p> <p>Number of political party members attending the activities organised in the district resource centres.</p> <p>Increased understanding of the political parties of their role in the organisation and conduct of National Elections.</p> <p>4.</p>	<p>State subsidy for political parties successfully distributed <i>2010</i></p> <p>Enhanced understanding of the political parties of their role at district and sub-district level. <i>2011</i></p> <p>Enhanced understanding of the political parties of their role at district and sub-district level. <i>2012</i></p> <p>4 parties reached the threshold to have the seats in the National Parliament.</p>
Level of preparedness and participation of women members of political parties in the preparation and organisation of electoral processes as compared with previous elections.	<p>Number of women political party members participating in the capacity building activities.</p> <p>Number of political party women members attending the activities organised in the district resource centers.</p> <p>Increased understanding of the women members of political parties of their role in the organisation and conduct of National Elections.</p>	No narrative report.

<b>ENHANCING THE DEMOCRATIC RULE OF LAW THROUGH STRENGTHENING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN TIMOR-LESTE (1 July 2010-31 October 2013)</b>		
<b>Outcome</b>	<b>Outputs</b>	<b>Reported progress against outputs</b>
Source for outcomes and outputs: Annual Reports. (Results and Resources Framework very complex.) Source for reported progress: 2012 Annual Report.		
Skills and competences of justice sector actors enhanced.	Legal Training Centre is fully institutionalised and LTC premises fully equipped for optimal working conditions.	<p>2012 Pedagogic Plan formulated and implemented.</p> <p>F/t international staff deployed at LTC because of lack of suitably qualified national staff.</p> <p>Physical infrastructure generally satisfactory.</p> <p>Processes established for reviewing training materials; evaluating staff; coordinating organisations working with the LTC.</p> <p>Software introduced for a Student Management System, and staff trained in its use.</p> <p>Lack of budget meant that the planned Language Laboratory</p>

ENHANCING THE DEMOCRATIC RULE OF LAW THROUGH STRENGTHENING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN TIMOR-LESTE (1 July 2010-31 October 2013)		
Outcome	Outputs	Reported progress against outputs
		was not implemented.
	Reference and pedagogical materials is available through the creation of the LTC library.	Need identified for library improvement; to be prioritised in 2013. Since 11/2012 students required to work in library 1 afternoon/week to encourage the habit of private study.
	LTC scope of action is expanded to new areas to cover needs of the justice sector.	Relevant pedagogical materials prepared. UN organisations have offered stand-alone training in specific subject areas. These are being absorbed into mainstream curricula.  Courses provided for different existing justice sector actors listed. Joint evaluation mechanism for LTC staff developed and will be operational in 2013.
	Strategic partnerships for training and certifications established with universities and training centres/stations.	Grant mechanism introduced to reduce drop-out by female justice actors; 17 grants awarded. Gender and HR in accordance with international standards mainstreamed in training materials and programmes and, subject to approval, will be introduced in 2013.  Partnerships established with UN Women and UNICEF. Reciprocal partnership with National University of Timor-Leste (UNTL provides Tetum teachers to LTC and LTC provides teachers on criminal and civil procedures).
	Skills and competences of existing judicial actors are improved	LTC still heavily dependent on international staff; to help reduce dependency a ToT course for LTC graduates is planned for 2013.

ENHANCING THE DEMOCRATIC RULE OF LAW THROUGH STRENGTHENING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN TIMOR-LESTE (1 July 2010-31 October 2013)		
Outcome	Outputs	Reported progress against outputs
	<p>through further education.</p> <p>LTC implement a gender equality policy and increase the focus on Human Rights mainstreaming.</p> <p>Assistance provided in the development of a human resources plan for the LTC.</p>	
Formal justice system decentralised and capacities of all District Courts to administer justice and protect vulnerable groups strengthened.	<p>Technical needs of the district and national actors are supported.</p> <p>Institutionalised presence of justice services at district level is supported by international presence in order to ensure district courts efficiency.</p>	<p>JSP support provide to all justice institutions to de-concentrate their functions.</p> <p>IT Units established in all justice institutions; IT staff recruited and undergoing training</p> <p>Integrated Information Management System deployed in all justice institutions, at district and national levels with appropriate staff training; will be fully operational in all courts in 2013.</p> <p>Automatic Data Exchange module being established that will enable case flow and information sharing across all justice institutions; policy decision required on what information can be shared.</p> <p>Support provided to district Courts for translation services but limited because of budgetary constraints.</p> <p>All district courts still dependent on f/t international presence, though judges have reduced their line functions and increased mentoring of national staff.</p> <p>Number of international staff in Prosecution Service reduced (one in Suai).</p> <p>Supported provided to Planning Secretariat for national mapping of justice sector actors; expected to be on-line in 2013.</p> <p>Improved coordination of justice sector actors at district level; coordination with other donors (AusAID) to support implementation of mobile justice.</p>

ENHANCING THE DEMOCRATIC RULE OF LAW THROUGH STRENGTHENING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN TIMOR-LESTE (1 July 2010-31 October 2013)		
Outcome	Outputs	Reported progress against outputs
	<p>Improved and harmonised logistical and administrative support to the justice institutions at the district and central levels.</p> <p>Quality of service delivery at central and district levels ensured through monitoring and evaluation.</p>	<p>IIMS being deployed in all districts for more systematic case management and access to information.</p> <p>Support provided to Planning Secretariat to improve planning, budgeting and monitoring; staff turnover in Secretariat means that use of planning tools less than optimal.</p>
Prosecution Service strengthened to ensure effective delivery of criminal justice	<p>Support to the implementation of the prosecution strategy</p> <p>Measures to reduce prosecution backlog implemented</p> <p>Strengthened working relationship between prosecution and police, especially at the district level</p>	<p>Prosecutor General's Office (OPG) decentralised to 3 new districts (though one of these apparently stalled in Viqueque?); facilitated by recruitment of international staff for line and mentoring functions.</p> <p>Capacity development for prosecution clerks has improved skills in taking statements and registering declarations, freeing up prosecutors for other duties.</p> <p>Support by international staff and freeing up of prosecutors reported to have contributed to reducing backlog.</p> <p>Prosecutors clerks now able to use IIMS; initiatives to improve coordination between clerks and IT specialists..</p> <p>IIMS has improved linkage between Prosecution Service and police.</p> <p>Joint planning between prosecution and police for mobile services contributed to improved case preparation.</p> <p>Regular meetings between all justice sector actors in Suai; periodic meetings in other districts. Suai and Baucau no longer require external support to coordination.</p> <p>Coordination meetings used to upgrade justice sector actors knowledge and skills on electoral crimes (Parliamentary and Presidential elections in 2012).</p> <p>372 serious cases investigated since 2007; 61 cases expected to be pending in 2013 (due to need for specialised instruments, skills and techniques and to witness issues).</p>

ENHANCING THE DEMOCRATIC RULE OF LAW THROUGH STRENGTHENING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN TIMOR-LESTE (1 July 2010-31 October 2013)		
Outcome	Outputs	Reported progress against outputs
	Support provided for Commission of Inquiry pending cases.	
Capacity of Corrections Services strengthened to uphold public safety and security and meet international minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners.	Strategic Plan for corrections implemented and Prison Service capacities improved.	120/198 prison guards participated in training in 2012 (mainly provided by national trainers) as a baseline for a 6-week requalification course to be developed in 2013. IT Inmate Management System operational. Standard Operating Procedures for prisons being formulated; support provided to other operational aspects of the prisons service.
	Improved security infrastructure in all prisons.	Support provided to designs for rehabilitation of Suai prison according to international standards; budget allocation for 2013 approved in principle but requires Parliamentary approval.
	Social reintegration initiatives for inmates.	Strategic Plan for Reintegration Services being finalised by MoJ. Computerised database on prisoners' backgrounds developed (in collaboration with AusAID). IT Inmate Management System operational; funding lacking for expansion of system to support Social Reintegration of Prisoners. As a result of MoU between MoJ and Ministry of Social Solidarity to facilitate family visits, all prisoners visited by end 2012. Support from Caritas Australia for a prison shop and from PDHJ for inmate support. MoU with Office of Public Defender to provide legal advice to prisoners is stalled.
	Inmates with access to health, sanitation, recreation and legal advice.	Partnership established with national hospital to provide psychiatric care for prisoners who need it; 1ary health care also being provided. Coordination between Prisons Service and Office of Public Defender for: outreach in prisons by public defenders; production of information materials for prisoners; training for guards on prisoners' rights to legal aid; regular legal aid sessions for prisoners.

ENHANCING THE DEMOCRATIC RULE OF LAW THROUGH STRENGTHENING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN TIMOR-LESTE (1 July 2010-31 October 2013)		
Outcome	Outputs	Reported progress against outputs
	Quality of Correction Services ensured through monitoring and evaluation.	Prison Integrated Management System established; computerised database established with personal and professional information on guards.
Enhanced access to justice for all and improved public confidence in justice institutions.	<p>OPD supported to fulfil its mandate and develop a national legal aid policy.</p> <p>Legal literacy and awareness for rights holders and duty bearers.</p>	<p>Legal awareness campaigns at central and district levels. Cooperation agreement with Prisons Service drafted on rights to legal aid for prisoners; training provided to guards on prisoners' rights to legal aid. LTC students provided information sessions on rights to prisoners. Public Defender's Office supported to develop a communications strategy to raise public awareness about rights to a Public Defender.</p> <p>Production and dissemination of awareness-raising materials, for key government representatives (including the police), the public, prisoners and prison guards; revision of brochure on domestic violence to increase public understanding of the Law Against Domestic Violence. Outreach sessions conducted across the country by justice institutions for general key government stakeholders (e.g. police), public, youth; some sessions covered by the national broadcast news media increase coverage. Mobile clinics held and plans made for 2012-13, though curtailed because of elections.</p> <p>Upgrading of IT system. Difficulties in handing over USAID-funded land registration project to MoJ. Parliament debated applicable land legislation; land law package vetoed by President and further progress curtailed by elections; land law package revised and put out for consultation; final draft will be prepared for approval by Council of Ministers in 2013.</p>

ENHANCING THE DEMOCRATIC RULE OF LAW THROUGH STRENGTHENING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN TIMOR-LESTE (1 July 2010-31 October 2013)		
Outcome	Outputs	Reported progress against outputs
	Support the development of the legal framework related to land and property.	Literature review on traditional justice systems in relation to domestic violence completed and translated into Portuguese and Tetum; barriers to reducing the level of domestic violence identified.
	Synergies between formal justice institutions and traditional/customary local institutions strengthened.	Pilot project to support economic empowerment of victims of domestic violence (in collaboration with Timorese NGO); lessons learned from this documented.

STRENGTHENING PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN TIMOR-LESTE (May 2010-December 2011)		
Output Targets	Indicators (for 2012?)	Reported progress against indicator
Source for Outputs, Output Targets and Indicators: 2012 Annual Report (NB Outputs, Output Targets and Indicators in Annual Reports are different from those in Results and Resources Framework (n.d.; Ref: FED/2011/267-807)). Source for reported progress: 2012 Annual Report		
<b>Output 1:</b> To support the Parliament with legal, sector-specific and gender expertise for scrutinising, debating and amending bills, analysing and presenting policy implications, as well as initiating and drafting laws. It is also aimed at identifying opportunities to develop national, in-house law-making capacity.		
Continued effective support for legislative process provided by a joint team of legal, sector-specific and gender advisors.	Legislation reviewed and drafted.	Legal advice provided to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- support MPs' role and constitutional mandate. List of bills analysed and debated by Parliament; also new government's programme</li> <li>- participation in Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries summit.</li> <li>- Election of Speaker</li> <li>- Drafting of regulations and formulation of activity plan for Standing committees.</li> </ul>
	Role and functioning of Standing Committees and Plenary strengthened.	On-going support to strengthen performance on Standing Committees (e.g. seminar on anti-corruption tools and mechanisms for MPs).



<b>STRENGTHENING PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN TIMOR-LESTE</b> (May 2010-December 2011)		
<b>Output Targets</b>	<b>Indicators (for 2012?)</b>	<b>Reported progress against indicator</b>
	Office of the Speaker strengthened.	On-going support to strengthen the Office of the Speaker (e.g. on the new legislature and committee structure after elections.)
	Public hearings process consistently supported and strengthened.	Support to develop adequate channels of communication with civil society.
	Parliamentary affairs conducted in compliance with the rules of procedures.	Support to publication of : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Portuguese/Tetum edition of Rules of Procedure/Standing Orders</li> <li>- Timorese Glossary of Parliamentary Terminology</li> <li>- National Parliament's 5 year report</li> </ul>
Improved in-house capacity for scrutinising and amending government bills, as well as initiating legislation.	Legal drafters' curriculum refined and programme under implementation.	Support provided to National Legal Drafters under training in Brazil; support provided to assessment of trainees.
<b>Oversight support</b>		
<b>Output 2:</b> To consolidate the in-house legal, sector-specific and gender support systems and procedures that enable Members of Parliament to analyse, debate and approve the national budget and provide continuous oversight of government policies, programmes and expenditures.		
Continued effective support for oversight process provided by a joint team of legal, sector-specific and gender advisors.	Parliament supported in exercising its oversight function.	On-going support to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- apply oversight tools e.g. in relation to Ministers indicted on maladministration and fraud.</li> <li>- oversight role of Committees e.g. agriculture, education and health, social solidarity etc.</li> </ul>
	Parliament supported in operationalising the Directorate for Research and Services.	Support to the Directorate's capacity development plan.
	Parliament supported in reviewing and analysing Audit Report and process.	Support to review and analysis of the 2011 Audit Report.
Improved capacity of MPs to conduct oversight process.	Parliament supported in comprehensively analysing and debating the State Budget, including from a gender perspective.	Support provided to analysis and debate of 2012 Budget Rectification.

<b>STRENGTHENING PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN TIMOR-LESTE</b> (May 2010-December 2011)		
<b>Output Targets</b>	<b>Indicators (for 2012?)</b>	<b>Reported progress against indicator</b>
<b>Strengthening Parliamentary Administration and Secretariat Functions</b>		
<b>Output 3:</b> To assist Parliament to improve parliamentary administration and the capacity of the Secretariat to support parliamentary operations.		
Improved Secretariat capacity to support parliamentary operations.	<p>Support implementation and functioning of a new Secretariat structure.</p> <p>Support Parliament administration.</p>	<p>Centre for Capacity Building and Information on Gender Equality institutionalised within Directorate of Research Services.</p> <p>8 researchers absorbed as permanent staff into the Office for Analysis and Research within the Directorate.</p> <p>Support to establishment of parliamentary reporting service: recruitment of 16 transcribers (training under EU project).</p> <p>Support to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- development of rules for parliamentary expenses; disposal of Ministers' vehicles.</li> <li>- Publication of Manual on Parliament Administration</li> <li>- capacity development in warehouse management</li> </ul>
<b>Support Democratic Representation, Transparency and Accessibility</b>		
<b>Output 4:</b> Improved institutional capacity to exercise the democratic representation function by strengthening communication with civil society, expanding information dissemination and promoting greater engagement and awareness among the public, especially youth.		
Improved Parliamentary Communications, Accessibility and Transparency.	<p>Support Parliament in communicating effectively and consistently with its stakeholders.</p> <p>Support Parliament in implementing an outreach strategy adapted to the country context.</p> <p>Journalists trained on reporting about parliamentary affairs.</p>	<p>Support provided to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- improved communications, public relations etc. e.g. media coverage, press releases, on-the-job training in drafting.</li> <li>- production of National Parliament Official Gazette</li> <li>- production of MPs' handbook.</li> </ul> <p>Support provided to e.g. production of weekly public radio programme, drafting of civic education materials, including for youth.</p> <p>Legislature has taken over responsibility for outreach activities.</p> <p>Training programme discussed with Parliament and expected</p>

<b>STRENGTHENING PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN TIMOR-LESTE</b> (May 2010-December 2011)		
<b>Output Targets</b>	<b>Indicators</b> (for 2012?)	<b>Reported progress against indicator</b>
	<p>Support establishment of the Division of PR, Communications and Civic Education.</p> <p>Project raises awareness among MPs, donors, government officials as well as the public about its role and objectives.</p>	<p>to start after elections.</p> <p>On-going support provided. National Parliament has now taken over responsibility.</p> <p>Reference to reported activities undertaken.</p>
<b>Gender Mainstreaming</b>		
<b>Output 5:</b> To support Parliament in development of gender-based agenda that ensures gender equality in legislation and Parliament operations		
Support Parliament in taking a gender perspective into account when exercising its constitutional mandate and conducting parliamentary operations.	<p>Support Parliament in providing MPs with access to gender-related analysis.</p> <p>Support the functioning of the GMPTL (Women's Caucus).</p> <p>Support establishment and operation of a gender division under the Research Directorate in the Secretariat.</p>	<p>Project support included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- advice that provisions of draft Gender Equality Law are already within Timorese law</li> <li>- session for MPs on Family Book of the Civil Code</li> <li>- gender analysis of proposals from government on land property rights</li> <li>- training on gender budgeting</li> </ul> <p>Supported GMPTL in on-going activities and specifically:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- in negotiations over budget, which was substantially reduced</li> <li>- to input to the National Action Plan on GBV</li> <li>- launch strategic framework on women's participation in politics</li> </ul> <p>See report above about establishment of CEGEN. Some capacity loss through staff turnover; CEGEN lacks capacity to provide analysis and research.</p>

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT FOR THE PROVEDORIA FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUSTICE (PDHJ) (2010-2012)		
Output	Target	Reported progress
Source for: Outputs and Targets 2012 Annual Report. NB Targets in Annual Report differ from those in results framework. Source for Reported Progress: 2012 Annual Report.		
PDHJ staff are knowledgeable about Human Rights concepts and understand how these concepts are applied in their work.	<p>Training</p> <p>At least 3 trainings held.</p> <p>At least 80% of female participants actively participate in trainings.</p> <p>25% increase in knowledge recorded on the training subject.</p> <p>At least 3 PDHJ actions occur as a result of project training activities.</p>	<p>4 trainings: Human Rights and Elections, Training of Trainers on Human Trafficking, Case Management and NGO Network Training on Human Rights in the Community. 78% of female participants actively participated in trainings, slightly below target. In follow-up training on case management for new staff, active female participation reached 100%.</p> <p>32% average knowledge increase recorded.</p> <p>4 actions: election monitoring report; internal policy proposal on how to strengthen the PDHJ's relationship with its NGO network; review of the preliminary assessment complaint form; strengthening of the relationship and communications channels between regional offices and Dili.</p>
	<p>Discussion sessions</p> <p>4 sessions led by PDHJ staff.</p> <p>Equal participation by men and women.</p> <p>5 discussion sessions result in PDHJ actions.</p> <p>At least 25% increase in knowledge when pre- and post-tests held.</p>	<p>1 of 7 sessions led by PDHJ staff.</p> <p>Average of 45.7% female participants.</p> <p>4 discussion sessions resulted in actions:</p> <p>18% increase in knowledge on child nutrition.</p>

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT FOR THE PROVEDORIA FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUSTICE (PDHJ) (2010-2012)		
Output	Target	Reported progress
	<p>Mentoring</p> <p>50% of reports are of good quality (average of higher than 3.5/5 on the capacity assessment system).</p> <p>75% of staff assess the mentoring as good or very good.</p> <p>New human rights investigators and monitors are able to carry out functions.</p>	<p>Approximately 54% of reports were of good quality: Investigation reports mentored were of good quality after 2-3 rounds of mentoring</p> <p>Approximately 78% of staff participating in mentoring activities rated the mentoring as good or very good</p> <p>100% of new human rights investigators and 100% of complaint staff are able to carry out their functions.</p>
PDHJ has a workforce skilled enough to implement the Institution's Human Rights mandate, including the ability to conduct legal analysis.	<p>80% of legal officers pass training.</p> <p>PDHJ's legal department established.</p> <p>Legal officers are able to read Portuguese laws and make oral interventions in Portuguese.</p>	<p>Mid-term results: 67%</p> <p>The Legal Department will be established in the 1<sup>st</sup> quarter of 2013</p> <p>Legal Officers are able to read Portuguese law and make oral interventions in Portuguese.</p>
	<p>Language classes</p> <p>At least 80% of participants receiving over 50% in their language course.</p> <p>At least 75% of staff participating in a language course.</p> <p>At least 50% participation by female staff.</p>	<p>Mid-term results: 98% pass English and approximately 78% pass Portuguese</p> <p>77% of PDHJ staff are participating in either one or both language courses</p> <p>53% of participants are female</p>
PDHJ has effective and efficient institutional systems and management structures	<p>PDHJ maintains its "A" status as a NHRI</p> <p>PDHJ participates in ICC, APF meetings and SEANF forums</p>	<p>Review of 'A' status in November 2013</p> <p>Contributions to ICC, SEANF and APF meetings in 2012.</p> <p>The Provedoria has accepted the chair of SEANF for 2013.</p>

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT FOR THE PROVEDORIA FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUSTICE (PDHJ) (2010-2012)		
Output	Target	Reported progress
	<p>Strategic plan integrated into annual activity plans.</p> <p>At least one review session of the annual plan held by the PDHJ.</p> <p>At least 2 management actions taken to implement the Complaints Operating Manual standard.</p> <p>At least 2 management actions taken to implement the Administration and Finance Manual</p> <p>Two new departments established as per the PDHJ Organic Law</p> <p>PDHJ human resource policy is developed.</p>	<p>Annual activity plan formulated following the Strategic Plan.</p> <p>Annual plan reviewed to identify challenges PDHJ found in implementing their activities for the first semester</p> <p>4 management actions.</p> <p>No actions.</p> <p>Office of the Inspectorate created.</p> <p>Recruitment strategy developed.</p>
PDHJ has effective information and knowledge management systems	<p>PDHJ Case Management system developed and implemented.</p> <p>PDHJ networking and file sharing implemented.</p> <p>PDHJ training database regularly updated by PDHJ.</p> <p>PDHJ email system established.</p> <p>PDHJ professional development information resource developed.</p>	<p>PDHJ electronic case management system under development.</p> <p>PDHJ shared drive server installed, network resources integrated, intranet started.</p> <p>Review of the training and promotion database under progress.</p> <p>PDHJ email system established</p> <p>Resource not developed yet due to potential in using the Personnel Management Information System (PMIS).</p>

# Annex 6 – Annotated List of Sida Support to Timor Leste, 1998-2013

## Health

*Frame Agreement Forum Syd 1998*

(Ref: 74000030)

SEK91,572

No details available.

*Frame Agreements Svenska Missionsrådet 2000/SMC South 2002<sup>58</sup>, 2003, 2004-2005, 2006-2007, 2008*

(Refs: 74000926, 74001737, 74002589, 74002591, 74300030, 74003290)

SEK357,272; SEK381,608; SEK375,431; SEK249,149; SEK162,873; SEK162,873

No details available.

*Frame Agreement LO/TCO 2007-08. 2010-2012<sup>59</sup>*

(Ref: 74003112, 54000076)

SEK19,527; SEK6,571

No details available

*Frame Agreement Plan Sverige 2011-2013*

(Ref: 54030153)

SEK324,184

No details available.

## Education

*Caritas, East Timor 1998*

(Ref: 41002653)

SEK565,000

No details available

*Frame Agreement Forum Syd 1998*

(Ref: 74000030)

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<sup>58</sup> The Swedish Mission Council (SMC) and the Svenska Missionsrådet (SMR) are the same. For ease of reference, the acronyms used here are those used for each grant in the spreadsheet provided by Sida.

<sup>59</sup> The spreadsheet has an entry for LO/TCO 2005-2006 (Ref: 74002693) with no figure for decision or disbursement.

SEK470,000

No details available.

*Caritas, School building 1999*

(Ref: 41002617)

SEK200,000

In 1997, Caritas Sweden submitted a request for MSEK2.256 to support (i) a vocational school for 240 rural adolescent workers (working with Salesian brothers/Don Bosco); (ii) a youth program for 800 young people; and (iii) printing and dissemination. The decision document dated July 16<sup>th</sup> 1997 recommended funding the request (including costs for administration). However, the only grant made was for SEK200,000 in 1999.

*Caritas East Timor New Account 2000*

(Ref: 41000156)

SEK250,000

No details available

*Frame Agreements Svenska Missionsrådet/SMC South 2000, 2003, 2004-2005, 2006-2007, 2008*

(Refs: 74000926, 74002589, 74002591, 74300030, 74003290)

MSEK1.15; SEK717,736; SEK158,959; SEK156,283; SEK29,157

Included funding for Caritas Sverige support to:

- the Marist Brothers for the Catholic Teachers Training College (Instituto Catolico para Formacao de Professores (ICFP)). The main goal of the project was to improve the quality of teaching of primary and secondary education through in-service training of teachers, principals and school administrators. Training was provided to teachers in Catholic and government schools. Related grants aimed to strengthen training (i) in arts subjects and in human rights and (ii) in agriculture, animal husbandry and handicrafts, with links to local farming communities.
- the Catholic order Comunidade Edmund Rice (CER) for a project to empower the local community in education and village development. The main goal of the project was to develop communities through community education, resourcing schools, community rebuilding, economic development and environmental care. The project was implemented in five villages with a population of 4,500 people.
- the Salesian Sisters For the Madalena Morano Skills Training Centre whose main goal was to promote the life of young women in local villages through vocational training in agriculture, administration, sewing and cooking. A later project phase added support to 200 families in animal husbandry to provide additional income.

*Framework Agreement Plan Sverige 2011-2013*

(Ref: 54030153)

SEK228,225

No details available.



*UNICEF Education for All, Securing Lifelines and Livelihoods for Children of Timor-Leste through Quality Basic Education, 2003-2005.*

(Ref: 7200055401)

MSEK45

Funding for a project to promote the rights of children to quality basic education; to improve child development and future job competencies amongst primary school children, thus contributing to improved human security; to assist the education sector to develop policies consistent with key international trends in education; and to develop integrated models of Child Friendly Schools that benefit children, teachers and parents, through:

- 100 Schools Project to improve enrolment, attendance, quality and learning in primary schools, including development of community contributions and improved school based management;
- Curriculum Implementation Project to improve the quality of primary education.

*UNICEF From Emergency Responses to Sustainable Development for Children and Adolescents in Timor-Leste 2007-2009*

(Ref: 72400047)

MSEK49.47

The programme had three main objectives: (i) an improved policy environment through advocacy and technical support to the Ministry of Education; (ii) improved education quality with teachers in 80 percent of the schools using learner-centred teaching; and (iii) improved capacities of young people to contribute to improved livelihoods and active participation in society. The programme had five components: (i) Measuring and Enhancing Access and Equity; (ii) expansion of the Child Friendly Schools programme; (iii) Primary Curriculum Reform; (iv) Pre-Secondary Curriculum Reform; and (v) adolescents and participation (increased access to HIV/AIDS related lifeskills education; literacy classes for drop-out students; giving voice to adolescents). UNICEF's programme was aligned with the government's *Strategic Plan for Universal Primary Completion to 2015*.

*UNICEF Basic Education Timor-Leste 2010-2011<sup>60</sup>*

(Ref: 51020004)

MSEK29

See main report, Section X.

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<sup>60</sup> Funding was extended to the end of 2012.

**Democracy Human Rights and Gender Equality***Election observation and support 1999*

(Ref: 780000080)

SEK954,119

Costs of Swedish observers at Timor-Leste's referendum on independence from Indonesia. Additional costs incurred when the referendum was postponed.

*Election observation and support 2001*

(Ref: 41002209 )

MSEK1

Contribution to UNTAET's support for independent candidates and political parties in Constituent Assembly elections in August. Support for the costs of transport, administration and publicity. The objective of the support was to help establish a legitimate Timor-Leste Constitution, beginning with free and fair elections for a Timor-Leste Constituent Assembly.

*Election observation and support 1999*

(Ref: 780000082)

SEK104,000

Costs of Swedish observers at Timor-Leste's referendum on independence from Indonesia.

*Election observation and support 2002*

(Ref: 78000106 )

SEK30,132

Costs of the Swedish delegation in the EU observer mission for Timor-Leste's Presidential elections (organised by UNTAET).

*TMP: Tax Consultants 2002*

(Ref: 71000547)

SEK142,711

Contract for a short-term consultancy to provide a second opinion to the Timor-Leste Ministry of Finance on International Monetary Fund proposals for a new tax system and tax administration.

*Frame Agreements Svenska Missionsrådet 2000/SMC South 2002, 2003, 2004-2005, 2006-2007, 2008*

(Refs: 74000926, 74001737, 74002589, 74002591, 74300030, 74003290)

SEK151,571; SEK134,685; SEK248,447; SEK367,523; SEK458,492; SEK81.815

No details available.

*Institute for Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University project 2002*

(Ref:78100096)

SEK524,408

Costs of basic courses in diplomacy for Timorese diplomats.

*UNDP Veterans Commission 2003*

(Ref: 41002254)

MSEK1

Contribution to a UNDP umbrella project “Support to the Commissions for Former Combatants and Falantil Veterans” towards reaching agreement on who are legitimate veterans and defining a set of recommendations on how the needs of veterans can be met. The project was intended to contribute to stability by satisfying the social and economic needs of veterans who lacked skills to compete in the market and who felt that their contribution to independence was being overlooked. The process included nationwide community-level consultations aimed at creating a public consensus around who is and is not a veteran.

*UNDP Development Posts 2003-2004*

(Ref: 41900094)

MSEK26

Sida contributed to a multi-donor project to strengthen government capacity by providing mentors and advisers to key government departments in support of efforts to promote sustainable development and poverty eradication. The project was established by UNDP in response to a government request for international assistance to help redress East Timor's shortage of skilled personnel in management, made at a donor conference in May 2002.

*Planning Riksdag-East Timor 2004*

(Ref: 72600430)

SEK403,807

Costs of a visit to Sweden by a Timorese Presidential delegation. The visit was at the invitation of the Swedish President, made during the celebration of Timorese independence in May 2002. The visit was envisaged as a first step towards a more established cooperation between the two parliaments. The main purpose of the visit was to discuss further modalities and activities in a future collaboration.

*East Timor Parliament via the Swedish Parliament 2005*

(Ref: 72600531)

SEK401,125

Costs of a seminar in Dili between Swedish and Timorese parliamentarians, the first in a planned multi-annual partnership. The focus was to be on how parliamentarians fulfill their roles as representatives, communicators, policy makers and supervisors on budget issues. The topics were to include the budget process, including decision making and monitoring the impact of budget decisions. The purpose of the seminar was to exchange knowledge and experiences and to highlight the respective roles of Parliament, parliamentarians and officials. The seminar tied in with UNDP's work with Parliament and was partly aimed at strengthening that work in agreed areas.

*East Timor Parliament via the Swedish Parliament 2005-2006*

(Ref: 72600435)

MSEL1.1

Costs for a third joint seminar in Dili in October 2005 between Swedish and Timorese Parliamentarians, and for a study visit to Sweden by Timorese Parliamentarians and parliamentary staff in September 2006. The focus of the seminar was on strengthening the competence of the Timorese parliament in the area of electoral laws and processes, in the context of national elections to be held in 2006 or 2007. The purpose of the visit was to further strengthen competence through following the electoral campaign and process. The intention of the Swedish Parliament was also to encourage contacts between Timorese MPs and Swedish political parties.

*Presidential and Parliamentary elections 2007*

(Refs: 78400047 and 78400050)

SEK68,696 and SEK46,680

Costs of Swedish delegations in the EU observer missions for Presidential and Parliamentary elections.

*UNDP Parliament 2007-2009*

(Ref: 72600785)

MSEK17.98

First funding for the UNDP Parliament project. See main report, section X

*UNDP Electoral Cycle 2007*

(Ref: 72600789)

MSEK3.9

Funding to support Presidential and Parliamentary elections in 2007, the first elections organised by the Timorese. The elections were administered by the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE) and monitored and supervised by the National Electoral Commission (CNE), a body that was created for *suco* elections, mandated through the Constitution, and re-established as a permanent body for the 2007 elections. The project focused on strengthening the management capacity of the STAE and strengthening electoral processes through civic/voter education and public outreach, training and material assistance to political parties, training of national observers and party agents and procurement of materials. Support to CNE was to be provided on request.

*Frame Agreements LO/TCO South 2007-2008, 2009, 2010-2012*

(Refs: 74003112, 54030024, 54000076)

SEK522,881; SEK164,633; SEK269,712

Funding for the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) to support the Seafarer Union's development programme. The project aimed to develop capacity for collective bargaining in order to improve port workers' wages and working conditions. Project goals included increasing membership, supporting the autonomous development of the union and increasing women's participation in decision-making structures.

*UNDP Justice sector 2007-2009*

(Ref: 72601005)

MSEK24

First funding for the UNDP Justice System Programme. See main report, section X

*UNDP Parliament support Timor Leste 2010-11*

(Ref: 51020002)

MSEK7.1

See main report, section X

*UNDP Elections Timor-Leste 2010-12*

(Ref: 51020003)

MSEK7.7

See main report, section X

*UNDP Justice Sector Program Timor Leste 2010-13*

(Ref: 51020026)

MSEK24.5

See main report, section X

*UNDP Human Rights Provedor (PDHJ) Timor-Leste 2010-12*

(Ref: 51020110)

MSEK8.1

See main report, section X

*Frame Agreement Plan Sverige 2011-2013*

(Ref: 54030153)

MSEK2.04

The project aimed to enhance child protection mechanisms at local and national levels, increasing children's opportunities to express their views and influence decisions in Community and Village Committees, establishing improved child protection mechanisms at community level in targeted communities. Goals included that Timorese children would live in safer and more secure environments as a result of their increased participation, greater community understanding of child rights and increased systems for protection from violence in school and the community.

### **Conflict, peace and security**

*Institute for Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University 1998 and 1999*

(Ref: 74000356 )

MSEK1.16

Funding was for three components: (a) Sovereignty and Constitutional Prerequisites: a study commissioned in response to a request from the UN Special Representative for Timor-Leste; (b) Intra-Timorese Consolidation: advanced studies in questions of autonomy for 10 political and church representatives in Uppsala; (c) Continuing Indonesian-East Timor dialogue: consolidation of an informal process of dialogue between Indonesian and Timorese representative; two seminars during 8 months with 6-8 participants.

*Institute for Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University 2000*

(Ref: 74001206 )

MSEK2

Funding was for workshops between Indonesian and Timorese representatives to support the activities of the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation and the Constitutional Commission. Sida's contribution was for the costs of seminars, travel, fees and other expenses.

*Institute for Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University 2000*

(Ref: 74001355 )

SEK775,000

Funding for a peace meeting in Singapore in December 2000 (organised at the request of the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation) for Timorese and Indonesian participants to discuss and agree points of principle in relation to the process towards independence, the situation of refugees in East Timor and the conditions for their return to East Timor, and other aspects of the reconciliation process.

*UNTAET Trust Fund 2000-2002*

(Ref: 41000154)

MSEK50

The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established under United Nations Security Council resolution 1272, which was adopted on 25 October 1999. The Security Council established that UNTAET was responsible for the administration of the territory until its independence in 2002. Under resolution 1272 the Secretary-General was required to establish a Trust Fund to finance international assistance. Sida provided a total of MSEK50 for the Trust Fund, including for humanitarian assistance via OCHA, funds for public administration to UNTAET, and for reconstruction via the World Bank/Asian Development Bank.

*Institute for Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University, 2001 and 2003*

(Ref: 74001747)

MSEK4.18

Funding to organise a conference between refugee leaders in West Timor and the CNRT, the umbrella organisation, led by Xanana Gusmao, within the framework of the UN-supported reconciliation Commission, with the aim of involving UNTAS, the largest refugee organisation in West Timor, militia leaders and activists outside UNTAS. The application included further meetings with smaller groups belonging to FPKD, a faction friendly to Indonesia. The funding decision made provision for further contact and dialogue-building activities beyond 2001.

*Support to the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation 2004*

(Ref: 74000198)

MSEK4

Contribution to the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation established under UNTAET. The Commission was a temporary, national and independent

organisation whose purpose was to contribute to reconciliation between Timorese factions active during the Indonesian occupation. The Commission had three areas of activity:

- truth-seeking involving examining both parties' human rights violations from 1974 to 1999;
- establishing a mechanism for community reconciliation where the perpetrators of minor political crimes could atone by performing community service and where victims could testify the abuse they had suffered;
- making recommendations to government for future reconciliation measures and measures to promote human rights.

*Frame Agreement SMC South 2006-2007*

(Ref: 74300030)

SEK78,141

Funding included support to the Life and Peace Institute for work with the Christian Conference of Asia and Progressio (UK) on post-conflict peace-building. The project aimed to support religious institutions to participate in the country's reconciliation process and to provide them with the tools to build a stronger culture of peace. It aimed to develop and deepen cooperation between the different religious institutions and to establish an interreligious forum.

**Humanitarian Aid**

*Statens Räddningsverket for refugee relief 1999 and 2000*

(Ref:74000901, 74000933, 74000914)

MSEK4.43

Emergency grants for Statens Räddningsverket (Swedish Emergency Services) to provide support to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) for refugee relief work in the wake of the departure of Indonesia from East Timor. Statens Räddningsverk supported the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) assessment mission in Jakarta and East Timor. Preliminary estimates put the number of IDPs in East Timor at 150,000 and refugees in western Timor at 100,000. The effort involved military-civilian cooperation and technical support. Sweden provided equipment and personnel for radio-communication.

*Caritas for refugee relief 1999*

(REF: 74000902)

MSEK1.66

A grant to Caritas Sweden for Catholic Relief Services (CRS) for emergency aid to East Timorese refugees in western Timor. The grant was to provide around 7,500 people with cooking equipment, clothing, sleeping mats, blankets, mosquito nets and tents.

*Institute for Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University 1999*

(Ref: 74000937)

SEK300,000

Funding for a seminar in Singapore in November 1999 to further the dialogue between those promoting autonomy and those promoting integration, and to identify



and eliminate barriers to full participation by all political groups in East Timor in the UN-led transition process and in the country's political structure.

*OCHA Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) for OCHA, UNICEF, WHO and FAO  
October 1999-June 2000*

(Ref:74001036, 74001037,74001038, 74001039 )

MSEK9.5

The CAP appeal was for an estimated 500,000-650,000 IDPs in East Timor and 100,000 refugees in western Timor. Sida funds were:

- OCHA for coordination (MSEK1.5)
- UNICEF for school rehabilitation, health, water and sanitation, and other items for children (MSEK2.5)
- WHO for rehabilitation of health facilities (MSEK3)
- FAO for agricultural rehabilitation (MSEK2.5).

*Institute for Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University 2000*

(Ref: 74000963)

SEK245,000

Funding for talks in preparation for an international donor conference in Tokyo in December 1999 organised by the World Bank. Sida funds were for the costs of 13 participants. The Institute for Peace and Conflict Research collaborated on this initiative with the Australia National University.

*International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 2000, 2001 and 2002*

(REF: 74001106, 74001636, 74001837)

MSEK9.41

Timor-Leste's share of global support to ICRC: support for IDPs and returning refugees from western Timor, including protection, for health facilities in Dili and for rural water supply.

*United Nations Joint Appeal for East Timorese refugees 2002*

(REF:74001974, 74001975, 74001976)

MSEK1.25

- UNDP for settlement of refugees in West Timor (SEK500,000)
- UNHCR for information and reunification for refugees returning to East Timor (SEK500,000)
- IOM for costs of reunification and settlement of refugees (SEK250,000)

*UNICEF January 1, 2002 to June 30, 2003*

(Ref: 74001978 )

MSEK5

Interventions to support rehabilitation and reconstruction after conflict in 1999.

Support included:

- health interventions for 27,000 infants, 108,000 under-5s, 135 000 primary school children, 29,000 pregnant women and 160,000 women of reproductive age; activities included (EPI), preventive prenatal care and safe deliveries, identification of malnutrition and nutrition interventions, health information;



- support to education for preschool and primary school children, parents, teacher, school officials; upgrading of the curriculum and educational materials;
- water and sanitation: support to the rehabilitation of water supply, particularly in rural areas, training in community-based operation and maintenance, and health education;
- specialist child protection interventions for children whose vulnerability is increased as a result of armed conflict;
- support to youth development and women's empowerment initiatives.

*UN Flash Appeal 2006*

(Refs: 74003052, 74003053, 74003054)

MSEK10

Contribution to the UN's response to the 2006 crisis when soldiers were dismissed from the army after demonstrating to protest their careers and salaries, although underlying causes were believed to be inequities in treatment between the eastern and western parts of the country. The situation deteriorated into fighting between armed groups which forced about 60,000 families to flee as IDPs and caused some material destruction. Sida's contribution was for:

- UNICEF: films for children and young people and support to work in health (MSEK5);
- UNFPA: initiative to support vulnerable women and the prevention of gender-based violence in IDP camps (MSEK2.5);
- UNDP: for an employment and income generation programme in IDP camps (MSEK2.5).

*UN OCHA Consolidated Appeal Process 2007*

(Refs: 74003136, 74003146)

MSEK5

Contribution to further needs arising from the unrest in 2006. Although reduced, violence continued in Dili, and a significant number of IDPs were unable to return because their homes were destroyed or damaged. There were incidents of attacks on IDPs in camps and of gang violence within the camps themselves. Sida's contribution was for:

- UNDP projects to support livelihood strategies of IDPs and host community women with special emphasis on female-headed households, centred on non-farm income-generating activities (MSEK2.5);
- UNICEF's programmes in education, health, protection and water and sanitation (MSEK2.5).

## Svenska Röda Korset/International Committee of the Red Cross 2012

(Ref: 52040396)

SEK360,000

No details available.

**Sustainable Infrastructure and Services***Frame Agreement Forum Syd 1998*

(Ref: 74000030)

SEK470,000

No details available.

*Frame Agreement SMC South 2006-2007, 2008*

(Ref: 74003112, 74003290)

SEK12,239; SEK3,481

No details available.

### **Market Development**

*Frame Agreements Svenska Missionsrådet 2000/ SMC South 2002 and 2003*

(Ref: 74000926, 74001737, 74002589)

MSEK1.15; SEK134, 685; SEK248,447

No details available.

*East Timor Trade Policy 2002 and 2003*

(Ref: 71000616, 71000616, 71001326)

SEK809,881

Costs for presentation and discussion in East Timor of the findings from a study by ECON AB (Center for Economic Analysis) on options for a future East Timor trade policy.

*ASYCUDA 2005 and 2008*

(Ref: 71001791)

MSEK3.8

Contribution to UNDP/UNCTAD support to the customs authorities to develop and implement Automated Systems for Customs Data Administration (ASYCUDA), a computerised customs management system.

*Frame Agreement SMC South 2003, 2004-2005, 2006-2007, 2008*

(Ref: 74002589, 74002591, 74300030, 74003290)

SEK104,900, SEK62,005; SEK17,888; SEK7,938

No details available.

### **Agriculture and Forestry**

*Frame Agreement Forum Syd 1998*

(Ref: 74000030)

SEK470,000

No details available.

*Frame Agreement Svenska Missionsrådet 2000/ SMC South 2004-2005, 2006-2007, 2008*

(Ref: 74000926, 74002591, 74300030, 74003290)

MSEK1.15; SEK167,978; SEK55,546; SEK8,051

No details available.

*Frame Agreement Plan Sverige 2011-2013*

(Ref: 54030153)

SEK59,650

No details available.

**General Budget Support***General Budget Support 2003*

(Ref: 41002253)

MSEK10

Budget support through the World Bank for the Transition Support Program for the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. The Transition Support Program provided 3 year bridging finance in support of the government's National Development Plan before increasing oil and gas revenues were expected to enable the Government to finance its expenditure program with its own resources. The Transition Support Program had 4 components: (a) Continued poverty reduction planning and quick wins; (b) Governance and private sector development; (c) Public expenditure policy and management; and (d) Power sector.

**Other***Frame Agreement Forum Syd 1998*

(Ref: 74000030)

SEK470,000

No details available.

*Short-term consultancy 2002 and 2003*

(Ref: 41002252)

SEK 345,000

Costs of a short-term consultancy to investigate possibilities for Sweden to provide budget support.

*Frame Agreements Svenska Missionsrådet 2000/ SMC South 2003, 2004-2005, 2008*

(Ref: 74000926, 74002589, 74002591, 74003290)

MSEK1.15; MSEK1.3; SEK14,656; SEK48,545

No details available.

*Economic Monitoring 2003-2007*

(Ref: 41000251)

MSEK1.2

Timor-Leste was included in a contract between Sida and six Swedish universities for economic coverage of selected partner countries in Africa and Asia during the period 2003-2007. Sida support included the costs of monitoring, counseling and mentoring for country specific skills as needed; country reports; and additional missions as needed.

*Framework Agreement LO-TCO 2009*

(Ref: 54030024)

SEK38,382

No details available.

### **Contributions outside the bilateral cooperation**

*SARC 2011, 2012*

(no reference)

US\$209,214<sup>61</sup>

Secondment of a Sida staff person to support the Office of the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative on reform programmes.

*International Training Programme 1997-2012*

(no reference)

approximately SEK 5 million<sup>62</sup>.

Training in Sweden for 35 Timorese from government and CSOs, including the PDHJ, the Ministry of Justice and the Secretariat of State for Youth and Sports.

*Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility*

(no reference)

US\$1,974,750<sup>61</sup>

Funding for the World Bank Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility supporting developing country governments to reform the policy and regulatory environment for private investment. Between 2006 and 2012, activities funded included strengthening institutional capacities in the power sector; support to preparation of business cases for private-public partnerships (PPP) for development of Dili Airport, Tibar Bay Port and the Government Administration Building, and meetings between parliamentarians and private sector representatives to discuss a draft PPP policy and specific projects.

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<sup>61</sup> Cost in SEK not available.

<sup>62</sup> The current cost of training is SEK 150,000-200,000 per person but the cost has varied over time.





## Summative Evaluation: Analysis of the results and experiences from Sweden's development co-operation with Timor-Leste

Sweden's development cooperation with Timor-Leste was initiated in 1998 through humanitarian assistance and was phased out at the end of 2013, at which time the main focus was on support to education and to the justice sector, parliament, electoral bodies and the national human rights institution. Sida funding was provided to UN partner agencies and the evaluation found that the UN projects had made important contributions to developing individual, organisational and institutional capacities in the funded institutions. The evaluation also noted that projects had generally under-estimated Timor-Leste's unique capacity development challenges and that, while a baseline of capacity had been reached, none of the funded institutions was yet able to function independently. The evaluation assessed that Sida's phase-out had been handled well and met most of the criteria for a wellmanaged exit strategy.

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