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Sida Decentralised Evaluation

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Implementation Evaluation of the Cooperation Strategy with Kenya 2009-2013

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AE	Aid Effectiveness
AEF	Aid Effectiveness Group
AES	Aid Effectiveness Secretariat
AfDB	African Development Bank
AP	Administration Police Service
ASAL	Arid and Semi-arid Lands
ASCU	Agricultural Sector Coordination Unit
ASDSP	Agricultural Sector Development Support Programme
CEDAW	Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
CRM	Changieni Rasilimali Facility
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSUDP	Civil Society Urban Development Programme
CSUF	Civil society urban forum
DFID	Department for International Development
DHR	Democracy and human rights
DPF	Development Partnership Forum
DPG	Donor Partnership Group
ERS	Economic Recovery Strategy
EU EOM	European Union Election Observation Mission
GCG	Government Coordination Group
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GJLOS	Governance, Justice and Law and Order Sector programme
HAC	Harmonisation, Alignment & Coordination
HDI	Human Development Index
HiH	Hand in Hand
HRBA	Human rights-based approach
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
IE	Implementation Evaluation
IEBC	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
KHRC	Kenya Human Rights Commission
KISIP	Kenya Informal Settlement Improvement Programme
KJAS	Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy
KOICA	Korea International Cooperation Agency
KMP	Kenya Municipal Programme
KWSP	Kenya Water and Sanitation Programme
MAF	Mutual accountability framework

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MoLG	Ministry of Local Government
MTP	Medium Term Plan
NALEP	National Agriculture and Livestock Extension Programme
NARA	The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Process
NIMES	National Integrated Monitoring & Evaluation System
NLC	National Land Council
NRE	Natural resources and environment
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation & Development/Development Assistance Committee
PDA	Poverty and Development Assessment
PFM	Public Finance Management
PS	Permanent Secretary
SADEV	Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
SNPB	Swedish National Police Board
SWG	Sector Working Group
UACA	Urban areas and cities act
UD	Urban development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
US	United States
USAID	US Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WRUA	Water Resource User Associations

Preface

This Implementation Evaluation was commissioned by the Embassy of Sweden in Kenya, as part of a broader assignment to evaluate the implementation of the Swedish Strategy for Development Cooperation with Kenya 2009-2013 and to get a better understanding of poverty and vulnerability in Kenya. The other part of the assignment was to undertake a Poverty and Development Assessment (PDA). This Implementation Evaluation builds on the findings of the PDA (that is published as a separate report as part II of this Implementation Evaluation).

The Implementation Evaluation was undertaken by Indevelop through Sida's framework agreement for reviews and evaluations between January-October 2013.

The independent evaluation team consisted of four members:

- Angela Christie, Team Leader
- Ian Christoplos, Evaluator
- Johanna Bergman-Lodin, Evaluator
- Michael Hauer, Evaluator

Indevelop's Project Manager for the assignment was Anna Liljelund Hedqvist, who was responsible for coordination and management of the PDA and the Implementation Evaluation process. Dr Adam Pain provided external quality assurance to the reports.

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Executive Summary

The purpose of this Implementation Evaluation of the *Cooperation Strategy with Kenya 2009-13* is to assess the extent to which Swedish development cooperation has been relevant, effective, efficient, sustainable and has achieved appropriate outcomes. The Strategy has been implemented during a volatile period when the roles and responsibilities of the institutions that are to eventually be responsible for carrying development processes forward were in flux. During the Strategy period Sweden used the impetus of the new Constitution to promote much needed planning, institutional development and policy reforms. At the end of the Strategy period the focus increasingly shifted to capacity development to enable the government and civil society to begin implementing new approaches in a manner that reflects human rights principles of participation, transparency, accountability and non-discrimination.

Implementation of the Strategy has been a difficult process. The Strategy was designed at a time when international and Kenyan commitments to the aid effectiveness agenda appeared strong. During the years that followed, these commitments waned and the Embassy was forced to explore other means to retain a focus on Kenyan ownership and leadership when donor readiness to join basket funds and other harmonisation mechanisms evaporated.

The Government of Kenya's readiness to allocate resources to Swedish-supported programmes that reflect the needs and perspectives of the poor has been mixed. Support to civil society and the UN to capacitate, encourage and maintain pressure on the government to respect and implement the provisions of the Constitution has been essential and effective, but government commitments to address poverty have varied across the different sectors.

Support to the Natural Resource and Environment sector reflects this mixed picture. Expectations that other donors would join sector-wide approaches in agriculture and water have failed to materialise, but Swedish efforts have nonetheless contributed to enhancing governmental policy coordination. Governmental budgetary allocations for recurrent costs of poverty-oriented service provision, initiated with Swedish support in agriculture and water, have been insufficient. Sweden has taken a leading role in mobilising civil society to contribute to, and advocate for, legislation and institutional development related to land, with particular attention to ensuring that the provisions of the new Constitution are reflected in legislation and the creation of transparent institutions. It is too early to judge how these institutional changes will be understood and respected in practice, especially in the 47 new county governments created through the devolution process. Agricultural support is now creating interfaces for working with these new local government structures, but weak integration among programmes in agriculture, water and land has meant that the potential of using these new structures to achieve Sweden's overall sectoral objective is uncertain.

In Urban Development, Sweden began by supporting civil society to develop new participatory models for enhancing services and planning investment in the informal settlements. Progress in this sector has been slow in terms of rolling out and expanding upon these models but, at the end of the Strategy period, there are positive signs emerging of how local government and even the private sector are learning from these pilot efforts. Sweden has had an overall key role in ensuring that the lessons from recent years are used to inform the new county governments and remind them of the importance of participatory planning of their new urban centres and considering how to recognise and deal with informal settlements.

The Democracy and Human Rights sector exemplifies the importance of adapting to the changing context. At the start of the Strategy period there were expectations that the sector-wide approach for the Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector would continue, which it did not. The importance of coordinated support was made painfully apparent by the violence of 2007-8. Regrettably, aid effectiveness commitments soon evaporated in the international community. Sweden was able to reassess the situation and ultimately build a strong portfolio based on developing public capacities and civil society engagement within a new and integrated set of initiatives focused on judicial, police and prison reform. This built on the foundation of earlier effective efforts within the Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector, and was harmonised with the work of other donors which remained active in the sector through bilateral programmes. Sweden also provided timely and effective assistance to electoral reform. What started with a “mixed bag” of many different projects has crystallised into a clear and effective approach, wherein human rights principles are prominent.

A human rights-based approach is evident in different ways throughout the portfolio. In Democracy and Human Rights, there is a relatively clear theory of change whereby participation and transparency are expected to lead to accountability and (to an extent) non-discrimination. Participation features most strongly in the other two sectors. In both urban and rural development, the prevailing elite dominance and skewed power relations have meant that the extent to which this participation has led to genuine accountability can be sometimes questioned. Non-discrimination has been strongly promoted in relation to gender equality, but less so with regard to other forms of discrimination, where the Embassy has had difficulty finding appropriate entry points. Gender equality has been addressed in different ways within the portfolio through mainstreaming, targeted efforts and dialogue. Challenges have been encountered, but the Embassy has been consistent and persistent in overcoming what has sometimes been weak initial ownership for these objectives among partners.

A notable strength of the Embassy’s work, in general, has been the use of dialogue, informed by a solid analysis of the political economy of Kenyan development. The Embassy has been bold in raising difficult issues and taking risks in proactively working to influence attitudes and practices, particularly in relation to gender equality and pressuring for the voices of the poor to be heard. Sweden is recognised as having a strong capacity to convene a broad range of government, civil society and international actors to discuss difficult issues. Sweden is perceived as an “honest broker” and, as a result, clearly “punches above its weight” in the Kenyan policy discourse.

While this is strong at national level, there have been difficulties in consistently applying this political economy perspective at micro-level, where some programming seems to be based on insufficiently tested assumptions about how benefits will reach the poor. Poverty in Kenya is associated with the quality of governance of access to land, water and financial resources. The Swedish portfolio reflects this, but it is not consistently clear how interventions can, or are, actually impact the local dimensions of this governance. In many cases this relates to the transitional context during the Strategy period, when these governance structures have been in flux. Furthermore, despite the volatile events that have characterised the Strategy period, economically, politically and climatically, attention to the ways that programming has impacted the resilience and rapidly-changing risks and opportunities facing vulnerable populations has seldom been explicitly reviewed.

This is related to challenges faced by the Embassy in translating its implicit analysis of the political economy of Kenyan development into more explicit assessments and outcome reporting. These documents still often tend toward relatively technocratic analyses, with limited attention given to the external risks that may affect whether benefits will reach the poor and whether the government will eventually shoulder its duties toward vulnerable sections of the population. Outcome analysis is weak, as both the Embassy and partners are apparently over-burdened with demands for activity and output level monitoring, which leads to less attention being paid to overall results.

The recommendations of this evaluation can be summarised as follows:

1. **Focus on the perspectives of the poor through an emphasis on inclusion and resilience:** Current efforts to highlight the provisions in the Constitution for more inclusive development should be continued, while also devoting new attention to the need for a resilience perspective that reflects the repeated shocks, uncertainties and climatic, economic and political volatility that characterise Kenya today.
2. **Rather than sectors, focus on a limited number of cross-sectoral issues:** Two areas where this is particularly important are land and water, as both have implications across the rural-urban divide; and as both have broader links to human rights, governance and inclusion.
3. **Address volatility in the economy, climate and political context in a flexible and inclusive manner:** In order to maintain relevance in relation to the perspectives of the poor, it is necessary to focus on the governance of (currently frail) systems to respond to and mitigate a range of climatic, economic and political shocks by, e.g., restructuring the portfolio to ensure that enhanced recovery capacities are built-in to all programming in high risk areas and rethinking the current division of responsibilities for humanitarian and development programming between Sida Stockholm and the Embassy. This could also include looking for a niche related to governance for climate change adaptation.
4. **Engage in the emerging devolution processes through entry points established in the current portfolio:** The Embassy should take stock of emerging institutional entry points for engaging with county governments, and where pi-

lot initiatives suggest that additional entry points could be established. Based on this mapping, the Embassy should find ways to engage with the counties in such a way that sectoral silos are overcome and learning is maximised.

5. **Continue to move beyond policies and plans to focus on capacities and processes that enhance governance, especially at county level:** As Kenyan legislation, policies, plans and institutional structures fall into place, efforts should continue to move towards developing capacities for implementation. This is particularly important in support of the devolution process and helping to ensure that the legal reforms that have been supported in recent years are actually understood by those who need to act and implement them.
6. **Find ways to ensure that the private sector can contribute to more diverse livelihood opportunities throughout the portfolio:** Programming should recognise that the private sector is central to expanding livelihood opportunities, particularly for youth and women. Entry points to encourage the growth of such opportunities include enhancement of (a) rural-urban economic linkages, (b) financial services that provide needed capital for poor people's own investments, and (c) mechanisms by which private sector actors can better manage the risks in investing in difficult environments, such as urban informal settlements and the ASALs.
7. **Make a political economy perspective explicit in results frameworks:** Sweden needs to better apply its strong political economy perspective in programming, through clearer and more critical theories of change regarding how efforts may or may not lead to pro-poor outcomes within prevailing elite-led development trajectories. Steps should be taken to overcome possible technocratic assessments, particularly by ensuring that risk assessments give due attention to the "external risks" in the wider political economy.
8. **Recognise that a rights-based approach to development in Kenya demands a focus on equitable access to resources and services:** Sweden needs to adapt approaches to the emerging forms of resource governance and constellations of duty bearers and service providers related to devolution and the changing roles of the public and private sectors and civil society.
9. **Maintain a flexible approach to funding anchored in critical indicators based on clearer and more dynamic theories of change:** Future Swedish development cooperation results should be measured based on indicators that can highlight the extent to which institutional reforms are translating into broader changes in practice and reflecting emergent challenges and opportunities.
10. **Keep sustainable commitments and scale in focus:** Greater attention is needed concerning how pilots, demonstrations and services may be sustained and scaled-up and/or what lessons can be derived from these initiatives. Critical assessment is needed of ownership among duty bearers and how to sustain advocacy from institutions representing rights holders.

Chapter 1: Introduction

The purpose of the Implementation Evaluation of the *Cooperation Strategy with Kenya 2009-13* is to assess the extent to which Swedish development cooperation during the period has been relevant, effective, efficient, sustainable and has achieved outcomes that are likely to lead to intended impacts. The evaluation also includes an examination of the overall content and design of the Swedish sectoral portfolios in order to assess coverage, coherence and the extent to which the portfolio appears to be based on a plausible theory of change. Specifically, the evaluation focuses on:

1. progress towards overall Strategy objectives, sector objectives and the extent to which contributions reached planned results and had unplanned effects;
2. the main issues for the Swedish dialogue with Kenyan stakeholders and to what extent dialogue contributed to achieving results against the overall Strategy objective and the sector objectives;
3. the effectiveness, efficiency and channels of assistance (government, civil society, multilateral) as well as aid modalities (sector programme/project/core contributions/programme-based approach).

The full terms of reference (ToR) for the assignment are attached as Annex I. These ToR also include a *Poverty and Development Assessment* (PDA), which was conducted alongside the evaluation and is published as part two of this assignment. The PDA aimed to provide a better understanding of Kenyan poverty and its causes, manifestations and consequences, leading to an identification of development challenges, opportunities and potential agents of change. A summary of the findings and conclusions are presented below.

1.1 APPROACH

The full methodology for the evaluation is described in the inception report attached as Annex II. The analysis has been informed by desk review, focus group discussions, interviews and in-depth case study analyses.¹ Emphasis has been on questions raised within the ToR, which the evaluation team has framed using the OECD/DAC criteria for evaluation. The evaluation focuses on Sweden's three priority sectors natural resources and environment (NRE), urban development (UD) and democracy and human rights (DHR). Nine case studies representing these sectors were selected collabora-

¹ A full list of stakeholders interviewed or participating in the focus group discussions is provided as Annex III.

tively from a list of all contributions made during the period 2009-13 for close analysis using selection criteria set out in the inception report. The lists of the case studies and contributions are included as Annex IV. The report is presented in five parts:

- Chapter 1 describes the evaluation purpose, approach and report structure and includes a summary of the findings from the PDA as a backdrop for analysis.
- Chapter 2 summarises the objectives of the Cooperation Strategy.
- Chapter 3 presents the evaluation findings under the following sub-headings:
 - *Relevance*
 - *Effectiveness, outcomes and impact*
 - *Efficiency and aid effectiveness*
 - *Sustainability*
- Chapter 4 draws conclusions in relation to the evaluation questions, presents recommendations for the next strategy period, and proposes lessons learnt from the Kenya experience for Swedish development cooperation internationally.

The weak outcome reporting for much of the portfolio was an overarching limitation in the evaluation. The reporting is relatively clear regarding the many achievements at output level, i.e., the immediate, tangible results of these interventions. In many cases these consist of new legislation, management systems and services provided. Regarding outcomes in terms of changes in behaviour and attitudes, immediate changes for the beneficiaries and the combined results of different activities, the reporting is mixed. Many reports say little about this or are based on vague or questionable lines of attribution from the activities and outputs. Most reporting does not delve into impacts, which is entirely appropriate given the short-term timeframes involved and the limited investment/high cost of gathering relevant data. When impacts are described, these are often based on very small data sets and questionable analytical methods.

In interviews with Embassy staff, a clear picture emerges that pressure for an ever-increasing quantity of reporting has had detrimental effects on reporting quality, as time available to work with partners to coach them regarding how to report on outcomes has been insufficient. Due to this lack of outcome reporting, this evaluation draws heavily on the subjective perceptions regarding outcomes, as described by Embassy staff, partner organisations, other stakeholders and outside observers. The evaluation team has been impressed by the quality and critical reflectiveness of the implicit understanding and analysis of outcomes achieved, even though this has not been sufficiently presented in formal reporting.

1.2 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE PDA

A Poverty and Development Assessment was carried out as part of this evaluation assignment between January-May 2013. The PDA is published separately as part II of this publication and the main findings and conclusions from the PDA are presented below.

Kenya is one of the largest economies in Africa and, despite a number of significant political, economic and climatic shocks and setbacks, it has been able to maintain modest but positive growth over the past two decades. This seems not to have led to a

major reduction in poverty. Social development performance has been lacklustre. Wealth, power and access to resources remain highly skewed. There is a large, long-standing and growing gap between the political/economic elite and the population in general. Impunity of public officials remains a formidable challenge. New institutional reforms suggest promise for addressing these inequities, but the political commitments for moving from proclamation to practice regarding rights, participation, transparency and accountability remain largely untested.

The root causes of poverty in Kenya are complex and related to access to financial, land and water resources, basic services, power and livelihood choice. Inequality is linked to geography, ethnicity and gender. Both rural and urban poverty are associated with limited capacities to deal with converging livelihood shocks. In rural areas these shocks may be climatic and are manifested in food insecurity. Urban poverty is linked to access to wage labour, health and sanitation and exposure to violence. Periods of growth have made inroads into urban poverty, but less so in rural areas. Persistent poverty is linked to the failure to accumulate assets and to downward spirals caused by recurrent shocks and disasters. Escapes from entrenched poverty are primarily associated with livelihood diversification.

Changes in the Kenyan economy are creating opportunities for such diversification. Kenya is a regional business hub and major tourist destination. Investments are attracted by Kenya's innovation capacities, a relatively well-educated workforce and a growing and increasingly inclusive financial market. Regional markets are growing rapidly and Kenyan entrepreneurs are taking advantage of these opportunities. Kenya is active in the East African Community regional integration process. In urban areas young professionals are creating a dynamic climate for investment and growth. Agriculture is likely to remain central to Kenyan development, and horticulture has grown significantly. Many households are taking advantage of new opportunities and diversifying their production. Despite a problematic security situation, the relatively peaceful recent elections gives cause for cautious optimism (despite considerable lingering tensions and significant concerns related to terrorism). Devolution and other institutional reforms may lead to enhanced public accountability, more equitable distribution of resources, greater gender equality, and demand-driven service provision.

The new Constitution represents a formal commitment to reform in areas that are key to moving towards enhanced respect for human rights. There is still a significant disconnect between people's constitutional rights, their awareness of these rights and public officials' commitment and capacity to act on their new duties. Corruption is a major concern, and new policy commitments may not overcome vested interests in maintaining the status quo. Poor governance, patronage politics and impunity may continue and perhaps even be reinforced in new ways by the devolution process. Kenya's actions to live up to existing African commitments for investing in key sectors related to poverty alleviation have been insufficient. Robust monitoring will be vital to tracking the extent to which policies are put into action and what this means for poverty reduction.

The landscape of development cooperation is changing; new partners with different priorities are engaging with government; new aid modalities are also emerging, such

as guarantees and credit mechanisms; and commercial relationships are becoming more important. The principles and practices of aid effectiveness, in terms of ownership, transparency and accountability, remain critically important. Systems are in place to monitor and promote aid effectiveness through donor coordination. Despite stated government intentions to take greater control over the aid agenda, there are no indications of significant moves towards budget support or related modalities.

Sweden's Strategy for Development Cooperation in Kenya 2009-13 focuses on human rights and democracy, natural resources and urban development. Sweden has a strong and unique role in development cooperation due to its extensive knowledge of Kenya and strong trust and credibility with the Kenyan Government and civil society. These factors combine to create conditions conducive to dialogue, even on difficult issues. These include a just and equitable distribution of resources, notably land, and the human rights perspective.

Kenyans today retain hope that the new Constitution will deliver much needed reforms and that public institutions may regain their intended role after years of ethnic politics and elite capture. However, the handling of the 2013 post-election disputes and other recent setbacks to reform have shaken what was a growing optimism. People are pessimistic because the economy is not yet on course to deliver gains that will result in poverty alleviation and improvement in their living conditions. There is cause for this pessimism, as Kenya's current performance in terms of maintaining acceptable nutritional standards, access to clean water, controlling endemic violence and increasing gender equality are not reflective of a country that is seen as a leader in African development.

Discussions about the nature of poverty when developing this PDA revealed two contrasting perspectives that impinge on future commitments to addressing poverty alleviation from a rights-based perspective. First, there is a clear recognition that the Government of Kenya (GoK) must be more accountable to its citizens. The constitutional reforms, devolution process and – especially – efforts to address land issues, are expected to create a new set of stronger accountability between duty bearers and rights holders. The other, less promising development, is a tendency to focus less on poverty. The weak sustainability and waning GoK commitments to finance programmes and services directed towards the poor, and the failures of both development and humanitarian programming to reduce the effects of recurrent shocks that generate poverty, have led to cynicism. Many assume that it is impossible to fundamentally change Kenya's political economy. Such assumptions reinforce the power of elites and maintain inequality. While there are grounds for such fears, there are dangers if these attitudes provide a justification to ignore the factors that create vulnerability. This can then become an excuse for withdrawing services from difficult areas and turning a blind eye to land dispossession, if it is argued that attention to the perspectives of the poor is a relic of a failed development model. If the poor disappear from the political landscape, their rights will be in danger.

Chapter 2: Sweden's Strategy for Development Cooperation

The overarching goal of Swedish development cooperation with Kenya is **a Kenya where all poor women, men, girls and boys have the opportunity to improve their living conditions and where their human rights are realised**. Sweden's *Strategy for Development Cooperation with Kenya (January 2009 – December 2013)* is based on an agreed division of labour between donors committed to the *Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy* (KJAS). The Strategy represents Sweden's contribution to the results targets set out in Kenya's own poverty reduction strategy (the *Medium Term Plan*; MTP).² To support the three MTP pillars of economic, social and political development, Sweden focuses contributions within three sectors (see Table 1). The Strategy also details the amount of aid to be provided to Kenya for the 2009-13 period.³

Table 1: Sweden's sectoral priorities (as identified in the Development Cooperation Strategy)

Natural Resources and the Environment (NRE)	Democracy and Human Rights (DHR)	Urban Development (UD)
Improved management of natural resource utilisation with a focus on sustainable growth that benefits poor people, specifically: - reform aimed at access to water resources, - clean water - increased productivity and the commercialisation of agriculture. (all the above to include attention to land reforms).	A more efficient state that respects and promotes human rights and the rule of law, specifically: - institutional development and reform in the justice sector - improved public financial management.	Improved urban planning which allows for the participation of poor residents, specifically: - development of an urban policy; - improved land-use planning in urban areas; - better planning of the urbanisation process with particular focus on slum areas.

Additionally, and in line with commitments made under the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness,⁴ Sweden's process objectives in support of this are:

² The Government of Kenya's primary document outlining the consensus on policies, reform measures, projects and programmes that the Grand Coalition Government is committed to implement during 2008-2012. The MTP takes over from the *Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation, 2003-2007*.

³ SEK 350m per year, excluding humanitarian aid, regional programmes and support via Swedish framework agreements.

⁴ The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness attempts to change the way donors and developing countries do business. It sought to establish as a norm that aid recipients should forge their own national development strategies with their parliaments and electorates (**ownership**); for donors to support these strategies (**alignment**) and work to streamline their efforts in-country (**harmonisation**); for development policies to be directed to achieving clear goals and for progress towards these goals to be monitored (**results**); and for donors and recipients alike to be jointly responsible for achieving these goals (**mutual accountability**).

- One common mechanism for performance and commitment monitoring across the KJAS and Kenya's MTP 2008-13
- Transition to sector programme support (government to government support under programme based approaches rising to 80 per cent of aid expenditure)
- Increase in donor development resources channelled via Kenyan government systems (an increase to 66 per cent of aid expenditure)
- Utilisation of national systems wherever possible
- Coordination of activities with other donors

In support of this cooperation, key dialogue issues are:

- Economic growth
- Just and equitable distributions of resources and opportunities
- A human rights perspective in policy-making and policy implementation
- The fight against corruption and impunity of high-level officials and politicians
- Reforms to address the root causes of the post-election violence in 2008

In terms of aid modalities, the Strategy proposes:

- No general budget support
- Programme-based approaches to be the predominant form of government to government cooperation
- The possibility of loans and guarantees⁵ in sectors receiving Swedish aid

In terms of aid channels, the Strategy proposes:

- Two thirds of aid allocated via the GoK
- One third of aid to civil society⁶

This evaluation discusses achievements and lessons learnt against the objectives listed above. This involves covering development cooperation broadly, sectoral priorities specifically and assessing against the process and dialogue objectives, modalities and aid channels identified for the Strategy period. It includes the identification of those which appear to offer the greatest potential for effective and efficient cooperation.

It is important to highlight that the Strategy document reflects priorities and perceptions that prevailed in the turbulent period of 2008-2009. It is also based on a confidence that existed while developing the Strategy, that a gradual roll-out of the aid effectiveness agenda, with strong emphasis on channels such as basket funds and sector wide approaches, was likely. The conditions for moving towards greater harmonisation and alignment have shifted in the intervening years. It is thus important to recognise that in this respect, and in other ways, the assumptions upon which the Strategy was anchored have not always proven accurate.

⁵ Ordinance concerning Financing of Development Loans and Guarantees for Development Cooperation (2009:320) applies.

⁶ Note that a substantial portion of Swedish support to civil society was to be channelled through UNDP, UNICEF and UNIFEM.

Another important aspect of the origins of the Strategy is the fact that it was formulated amid demands for greater sectoral focus in the interest of aid effectiveness, specifically to reduce the number of sectors where Sweden was active from nine to three. This was obviously a difficult process and the three “sectors” that ultimately emerged effectively became “umbrellas” retaining many components of the original nine sectors.

In order to understand the make-up of the Strategy, it is also important to recognise how the Strategy grew out of earlier experience and trends, as well as Sweden's long history of engagement in certain sectors in Kenya. Programme design during the period of the Cooperation Strategy, in many respects, reflects long-term trajectories, relationships and assumptions about the “right way forward”. This is very positive in terms of ownership and mutual understanding; but it also has a downside. Some interviewees noted that the long history of Swedish engagement in the NRE sector has created path dependency and that Sweden has become locked into certain modalities and relationships; this has blocked a readiness to look critically at whether ‘we are doing the right thing’ in relation to overall modalities, as programming decisions tend to focus more on ‘doing things right’ within existing channels and modalities. This view was backed by Embassy staff, one of whom reported: “...*at the beginning of the Strategy period, the strategy for NRE was actually just a description of what Sweden was already doing. There was not even one single “instruction” in the Strategy that called upon us to make any changes whatsoever in the portfolio.*”

Chapter 3: Findings of the Evaluation

3.1 RELEVANCE

3.1.1 The Cooperation Strategy in the Context of Kenyan Development

The Cooperation Strategy was developed at a time of ambiguity and change in the period leading up to the promulgation of the new Constitution and in the aftermath of the 2007-8 post-election violence. The Strategy was a high-risk endeavour due to the fact that the institutional structures and policies that were to guide Kenyan development in the future were in flux. Inevitably, this introduced a significant (and unavoidable) risk that Sweden would invest in processes that would not be aligned with Kenyan priorities or windows of opportunity for institutional reform by the end of the Strategy period. There were also risks that these emerging policies would not reflect Sweden's commitments to focus on the perspectives of the poor and the principles of non-discrimination, participation, transparency, and accountability. The Strategy was not explicitly designed to be transitional but, in this ambiguous phase in Kenyan development, it was not entirely clear how best to locate contributions due to the merging/streamlining of ministries and the shifting responsibilities from national to the future county level government levels. Many civil society representatives were unsure of where they should focus their advocacy efforts.

Sweden's Strategy blended direct and indirect approaches to support the poor by both investing in services, including water, sanitation, agriculture, social protection and policing, and in striving to influence broader policies and institutions of governance within prevailing (and in some ways highly problematic) elite-led development trajectories. This dual approach reflects Kenyan and Swedish policies alike, since both reflect a desire to show concrete results in terms of services reaching intended beneficiaries and also an intention to achieve outcomes that could contribute to broader processes of justice, respect for human rights, increased gender equality, macro-economic growth, commercialisation and 'modernisation', some aspect of which are expected to indirectly yield benefits for the poor. In some cases the relevance of indirect approaches to poverty alleviation is expected to be assured through geographic targeting, which may be built on problematic assumptions given the pervasive power of the elites throughout Kenya.

The key point of leverage for ensuring the relevance of development cooperation efforts in relation to both Kenyan and Swedish policies has been the roll-out of the new Constitution. More than anything else, this document has provided a mandate for Sweden to support the growing voice of rights holders as they learn about, reflect over and place demands on duty bearers.

3.1.2 Country Cooperation Strategy Alignment with Kenyan National Policies

i. Vision 2030

In line with a commitment to alignment within the broader scope of aid effectiveness, Sweden has sought to match its contributions to local priorities, as expressed in Kenya's overarching strategy *Vision 2030*, most clearly regarding objectives relating to land reform, agricultural development, water and sanitation, and urbanisation.⁷

ii. Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy

With regard to aid effectiveness, Sweden harmonised its contributions with those of other development partners as expressed in the KJAS. The KJAS summarised the core commitments of 17 development partners to the GoK's development strategy *Vision 2030* for the period 2007-12. Sweden's sectoral role in division of labour terms was identified as presented in Figure 1. Roles were also specified for each partner in relation to democratic governance and programme management.

Figure 1: Sweden's Roles and Priorities within KJAS

ROLE & LEVEL OF ACTIVITY	Sector (or sub-sector)
Lead or Potential Lead	• Democratic Governance • Urban, Local Government & Decentralisation • Water & Sanitation
Active Donor	Agriculture & Rural Development Gender Land
Delegated Partnership	• Environment • Social Protection
Phasing Out	• Education • Health & HIV/AIDS • Roads & Transportation

Comparing Sweden's Cooperation Strategy focus areas and these sectoral commitments and responsibilities suggests the following:

- In the **Natural Resources and Environment (NRE)** sector, Sweden's focus is on access to clean water, agricultural productivity and commercialisation as well as land reforms.
- In the **Democracy and Human Rights (DHR)** sector, Sweden opted for a focus on justice, law, public financial management and public sector reform.
- In the **Urban Development (UD)** sector, Sweden focuses on policy, planning, access to housing and civil society advocacy.
- The focus on gender equality cuts across the three sectors.

⁷ Vision 2030 sections 3.7, 4.2, 5.3 and 5.5

The KJAS came to an end in 2012 and the development partner *Aid Effectiveness Group*⁸ (AFG) is drafting a chapter on Aid Effectiveness for the new MTP II (2013-2017) that will replace the KJAS. The advantage of having these commitments included in the MTP II is that aid effectiveness principles would then be firmly established in a GoK planning document rather than in a separate development partner initiative.

iii. Alignment with sectoral policies

There has been great attention to alignment with policies related to the Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector programme (GJLOS). Less attention has been given to alignment with emerging policies related to climate change, where the Embassy has made modest efforts to follow developments.

3.1.3 Alignment with Development Partner Activity

In terms of the potential for thematic cooperation, Table 2 lists the main development partner activities within Sweden's priority areas:

Table 2: Development Partner Activity⁹

Priority Area	Development Partner Activity
Democratic Governance	PFM (Canada, Denmark, EU, World Bank, IMF, JICA, GIC, AfDB, Norway, USAID); PSR (Canada, EU); Elections (Canada, Denmark, Norway, UK); National reconciliation (Norway); Anti-corruption (Denmark, EU); Accountability for service delivery (UK); Constitutional Review (Canada); Devolution (EU); Police (UK); Access to Justice (EU, WB); Human Rights (Norway)
Urban, Local Government and Decentralisation	Canada, Denmark, EU, Norway, UK, France, WB.
Water and Sanitation	France; AfDB; EU; Finland; Germany; IFAD; IFC; Italy; Japan; KOICA; The Netherlands; UNICEF; UNHABITAT; WB
Agriculture and Rural Development	Denmark, EU, WB; Financial Access (UK);
Land	USA; Japan; EU; Germany; FAO; IFAD; UNDP; World Bank
Gender	Canada, Denmark, EU, World Bank, Norway, UK, France

Assessment of the extent and efficacy of the collaboration between development partners (given the wide spectrum of sub-sectors within each sector) is beyond the scope of this evaluation.

3.1.4 Relevance of Sectoral Portfolios

The evaluation team has sought the views of key stakeholders on the relevance of the sectoral portfolios using focus group discussions and one-on-one interviews. Their views of the relevance of Sweden's intended outcomes are summarised here. The statements in the headings for each section are from the Cooperation Strategy.

⁸ A technical group at the level of Heads/Deputy of Agencies and senior technical officers from both Development Partner Agencies and Government ministries. It is co-chaired by the Government and a Development Partner.

⁹ Sweden has some engagement in climate change and broader environmental sustainability topics as well, as a cross-cutting theme, but it is not listed here as this engagement is modest.

i. NRE: Improved management of natural resource utilisation with a focus on sustainable growth that benefits poor people.

The very diverse range of these sub-sectoral portfolios makes it difficult to generalise about the relevance of activities in relation to an overall (essentially umbrella) objective. There was therefore general acknowledgement among interviewees that the overall relevance of this wide array of sectoral objectives cannot be assessed as a coherent whole since, for example, the Strategy is not designed with a focus on inter-linkages between access to clean water and the commercialisation of agriculture. Furthermore, some of the portfolio is only indirectly linked to the overall sectoral objective. For example, land sector reforms may have significant impact on natural resource management, but the ways that this sub-objective have been pursued have more to do with human rights, livelihoods and food security than productivity and commercialisation. Indeed, respect for the land holding rights of smallholders may, in some contexts, stand in the way of greater commercialisation by slowing land acquisition by large commercial actors, particularly in regions where smallholder production is subsistence oriented and likely to remain so after the land sector. This relates to the growth with equity challenge raised in the PDA and specifically how “sustainable growth” is a condition but by no means a guarantee of “benefits [to] poor people”.

Accepting that these outcomes do not need to form a coherent whole to have individual strategic relevance, interviewed experts and stakeholders repeatedly stressed how the strategic relevance of these sectoral objectives is dependent on the extent to which specific technical support is coupled with a focus on overall governance outcomes. There were diverging views regarding what trajectory is relevant in terms of development support. Vision 2030 and chapter five of the new Constitution put NRE at the centre of development, but these intents can be interpreted in different ways. Some interviewees described large commercial farms, a shift to reliance on private investment and a shift away from subsistence (maize) production as essential. This would seem to be supported by the indicators chosen for National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System (NIMES), developed with Swedish support, that focus on production and commercialisation rather than on poverty. They note that relevance in relation to alignment with *de facto* government policies means accepting a certain elite and urban bias. Even those who call for retaining a focus on poverty alleviation tend to note that a narrow focus on the poor will not be effective in dealing with those who actually control resources. This relates back to the need to focus on governance, i.e., the way that the relations between competing resource users are managed, rather than just pushing for more services for the poor. It also raises a question highlighted in the PDA around the extent to which development partners are prepared to focus on greater inclusion rather than just targeting the poorest.

Another factor to be considered when judging the relevance of the NRE portfolio is the extent to which it is related to conflict and conflict resolution. Stakeholders who were consulted believe that contributions to the sector must be built on an awareness of how any changes will impact, and be affected by, prevailing conflicts over access and use of resources. Some questions were also raised about the extent to which Sweden has found coherence between initiatives in relation to natural resource conflicts within the national

portfolio with broader regional efforts, as some of the issues relate to trans-boundary resource use.

A major outstanding question with regard to relevance is whether Swedish efforts to develop rural institutions, such as agricultural extension and Water Resource User Associations (WRUAs) will be aligned with emerging roles allocated through the devolution process. Hopefully the institutional development processes supported by Sweden will gain new impetus as newly elected politicians look for ways to show that they are providing concrete benefits for their constituents. The dynamics at this level are, however, hard to predict. This is a question that relates to Sweden's entire contributions portfolio, i.e., whether Sweden has invested in the "right institutions" in relation to changing governance structures. The Embassy has been recognised as having the in-depth knowledge and engagement regarding the Kenyan political economy to follow these changes, but that new complexities are emerging due to devolution.

Within the case studies that the team assessed for NRE, the evaluators reached the following conclusions regarding relevance:

- **Water:** The *Bridging Programme to the Ministry of Water and Irrigation* is in line with Sweden's lead KJAS commitment and intent to focus on sectoral planning and coordination, provision of rural water and sanitation services and water resource management for community-based service provision. By working in the poorest rural locations within the Water Service Boards, this contribution has also targeted the poor.
- **Land:** The contribution to *LNSA (Land Sector Non-State Actors)* has supported civil society advocacy to influence interpretations of the new constitution, the National Land Policy and legislation with an explicit focus on land rights and reform.
- **Agriculture:** The contribution to *Act! and the Changieni Rasilimali Facility (CRM)* is an example of a programme that is clearly aligned with the need to develop organisational and technical capacities among non-state actors for directly addressing the sectoral objective and commitments in Vision 2030.

The relevance of the *Financial Services Deepening programme (FSD)* is difficult to assess, as this programme is not focused on the sectoral objective of managing natural resource utilisation. FSD is really an initiative that is designed to impact poverty and stimulate inclusive growth across sectors. However, there is an explicit emphasis within the project documentation on access to financing to facilitate the commercialisation of the agricultural sector. FSD's work is based upon the "making markets work for the poor" (M4P) approach, which could be seen as relevant to "sustainable growth".

ii. UD: Improved urban planning which allows for the participation of poor residents

Interviewees highlighted the importance of the Swedish focus on urban development in light of increasing urbanisation in the country and the need to ensure that urban development becomes a priority for the new county governments. Indeed, one suggested it was a rather "bold effort", given many other donors' focus on rural areas. As

with the natural resource and environment sector, stakeholders also recognised that urban development is actually an umbrella term rather than a coherent sector.

Interviewees recognised the logic of the focus on planning, given the uncertainties related to the transitional national context leading up to devolution. They also noted that better planning could be a way to promote broader alignment in the donor community in a sector that has been prone to fragmentation and duplication of efforts. However, they also felt very strongly that a planning focus was becoming less appropriate in the new context at the end of the Strategy period, when institutions and policies must be tested in terms of actual implementation, with one pointing out that “We can spend our lives making policies and touring [the world] for good practices. But at some point you have to do it [i.e. implement] in your own context, and we don’t. We stop at advocacy.” In relation to this, however, another respondent highlighted that “It is not for [donors] to implement, it is for us.”

Stakeholders who were interviewed gave a strong endorsement of Sweden’s governance focus, which is seen as appropriate in terms of holding together different elements of development in informal settlements and in encouraging attention to urbanisation in the new counties. It was noted that some activities, ostensibly placed in the NRE sector, were also relevant for governance and service improvement in urban areas, especially resource tenure through support to the land sector. Another cross-cutting issue that was raised, and that ties into the discussion on land tenure, was rural-urban linkages and the need to recognise the rural-urban interface in relation to interventions.

The relevance of the UD portfolio is manifested in both of the two case studies that were selected:

- The primary goal of the Civil Society Urban Development Programme (CSUDP) is the coordination and mobilisation of civil society voice in order to better influence policy development and service delivery. This initiative is relevant in that it aims to empower citizens to engage as active participants in a rights-based approach to planning.
- The Kenyan Municipal Programme (KMP), which is a local government led initiative (supported by the World Bank), aims to enhance local government capacity and improve service delivery while emphasising community participation. This programme is highly relevant in light of the current devolution process.

Furthermore, the case studies illustrate how the make-up of the UD portfolio has more explicit inter-linkages and potential synergies than the NRE portfolio, in that it supports participation and voice from civil society and capacity development in local government which, together, may lead to greater accountability.

iii. DHR: A more efficient state that respects and promotes human rights and the rule of law

Sweden’s DHR sector is very broad. For the purposes of this evaluation it is broken down into the following sub-sector portfolios: rule of law, human rights and public

sector reforms. Rule of law is by far the largest and incorporates a wide range of initiatives.

The relevance of this sector should be considered in the context of the commitment from Sweden to support efforts to address the failures to respect human rights and democratic processes which were made tragically apparent in the post-election events of 2007-8. Those events triggered government efforts to identify needed reforms and Sweden's contributions were designed to support these efforts. Furthermore, the development of strong public institutions is stressed in Vision 2030 and, in that respect, the DHR rule of law portfolio.

Stakeholders saw Swedish efforts within the human rights sub-sector as having been long-term and agile enough to respond to changing windows of opportunity in a timely manner – without losing a broad perspective. Examples of a positive response to emergent opportunities to support Kenyan adherence to principles of human rights can be found in several programmes, particularly in relation to policy and practice related to gender equality, where the new Constitution created opportunities for legislative reforms and the creation of new bodies that can hold duty bearers to account. Some interviewees noted that citizens have increasing expectations in relation to respect for human rights and rule of law, and that Sweden's position as a leading donor with consistent commitments in these areas was highly relevant in relation to supporting (and prodding) the government to live up to these expectations. Within the case studies selected for DHR, the evaluation team found good alignment:

- The Support to Electoral Reforms and Electoral Process contribution can be said to be timely and relevant to the national agenda, as expressed in Vision 2030 and the MTP, responding specifically to Kenya's priorities within the political pillar. The project is also aligned to the Cooperation Strategy, which emphasises the importance of strong and robust institutions and democratic, well-functioning political parties for stable and democratic development.
- The Support to National Police Service in Kenya contribution is aligned to the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Process (NARA) that followed the 2007 post-election violence and identified police reforms as one of several reforms requiring urgent implementation. This has been integrated into the political pillar of Vision 2030 and the MTP.
- Support to the national monitoring and evaluation system, NIMES, is relevant in that it tracks the implementation of the MTP of Vision 2030. The indicators developed for NIMES only align with Sweden's results matrices in a limited way and can be said to supersede them.

3.1.5 Relevance in the Context of Future Poverty Alleviation Efforts

The extent to which it is appropriate to measure effectiveness in terms of services directly reaching the poor, as opposed to assessing whether a dynamic and inclusive economic development process is in place, which may ultimately benefit the poor, is contested in Kenya today. One interviewee stated that "Focusing on the poor is no longer fashionable". Fashions aside, the nature of the portfolio, with a mix of direct and indirect poverty alleviation investments, suggests that this measurement should

be made from both perspectives, and that relevance will ultimately depend on synergies within this two-pronged approach.

Poverty alleviation in the future will increasingly be handled through a devolved institutional structure and there is a high level of uncertainty with regard to how policy and institutional capacities will manifest themselves at county level. This includes serious questions about how resources will flow and whether county authorities will give priority to ensuring inclusive service provision (especially in urban areas, in which responsibilities are somewhat of a “grey area” in the devolution process). Capacity at county level is noted by many stakeholders as being very limited, but the challenge is one of both capacity development and political commitment. Across the sectors, stakeholders called for a move by donors away from what they referred to as “technocratic” approaches to capacity building. As noted in the PDA, poverty is a consequence of exclusion and therefore structural and process specific in nature, rather than the consequence of technical shortcomings.

Despite all that was reported on the benefits of development cooperation for the poor and the value of enhanced service delivery, many stakeholders emphasised that the best way to impact the poor (including women and youth) was through the creation of employment opportunities. This implies finding convergence and coherence between efforts to promote inclusive economic growth and dialogue based on evidence regarding the political economy of current patterns of exclusion in Kenya. Employment generation is not a direct Swedish priority, but the extent to which Swedish support to urban services or agricultural value chains, for example, ultimately leads to the creation of livelihood opportunities for those who would otherwise be excluded is an important impact indicator, even if the Swedish contribution to this aim will in many cases be modest and indirect.

3.1.6 Conclusions on Relevance

The Strategy was developed at a time of ambiguity and change in the period leading up to the promulgation of the new Constitution and in the aftermath of the 2007-8 post-election violence, when there were major but uncertain risks and opportunities ahead. The Strategy was a high-risk endeavour due to the fact that the institutional structures and policies that were to guide Kenyan development in the future were in flux.

Sweden’s Strategy blended direct and indirect approaches to supporting the poor by both investing in services and in striving to influence broader policies and institutions of governance within prevailing elite-led development trajectories. Portfolios have been structured in a two-pronged manner, with policy formation, planning and (particularly in the latter part of the Strategy period) capacity development efforts combined with direct engagement in services and social protection, some of which involves geographic targeting. There is an appropriate mix of engagement, but the complex and broad nature of support has meant that it is not always apparent whether potential synergies among different types of interventions have been achieved. The perspectives of the poor are most apparent when initiatives directly reflect poor people’s concerns about governance of access to resources and services. The perspective is sometimes weak when efforts are based on unquestioned assumptions about which development trajectories are likely to have the greatest impact on poverty.

The key point of leverage for ensuring the relevance of development cooperation efforts in relation to both Kenyan and Swedish policies has been the roll-out of the new Constitution. This has provided a mandate and inspiration for Sweden to support the growing voice of rights holders as they learn about, reflect over and place demands on duty bearers to live up to these new commitments.

It is difficult to predict how the relevance of the portfolio will be proven in the long-term, as the roll-out of the Constitution is still underway. Poverty alleviation in the future will increasingly be handled through a devolved institutional structure and there is a high level of uncertainty with regard to how policy and institutional capacities will translate to county level. The portfolio is, in many ways, well placed for following and supporting respect for human rights and the perspectives of the poor in this process; but uncertainties remain.

More generally, with regard to relevance, the evaluators conclude that Sweden's overall Strategy cannot be judged as a coherent whole, given that it was in many respects an umbrella for a range of initiatives wherein sectoral aims were often abstract. However, the contributions within the portfolios can be said to be both aligned and strategic. From the nine case studies selected from within the portfolio of contributions for the period, the evaluation team also found significant alignment and relevance across the diverse set.

3.2 EFFECTIVENESS, OUTCOMES AND IMPACT

In an evaluation of a cooperation strategy such as this, wherein the focus is on achievements in relation to overall change processes, it is useful to consider effectiveness within broader assessment of outcomes and contribution to impact. This is in order to clarify what has happened in relation to these processes as a whole. For this reason the report brings together the three “results” criteria of effectiveness, outcome and impact under this sub-section.

In this section a number of examples are presented to illustrate the achievements and also the systemic obstacles to effective development cooperation in Kenya. Where the evaluators have noted trends, this is explained, but it should be stressed that in a large and diverse portfolio such as this, it is not possible to rigorously or quantitatively assess how prevalent these trends and systemic obstacles are in the portfolio as a whole.

3.2.1 Natural Resources and the Environment

In the NRE sector interviewees mostly stressed results of programming that had begun before the period of the current Strategy, especially NALEP and the Kenya Water and Sanitation Programme (KWSP). These results grow from Sweden's engagements over the past decades, starting with a focus on soil conservation. In these areas the effectiveness during the Strategy period is thus difficult to isolate and assess. The following case study of the Kenya Water Sector Bridging Programme is an example of a programme wherein the actual outcomes can be best understood within the longer-term trajectory of Swedish development cooperation in Kenya.

Box 1 Case Study: Kenya Water Sector Bridging Programme

The Bridging Programme builds on a long period of Swedish financing to the water sector, most recently the KWSP. It has three objectives, each directed to a different institutional partner within the Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI): (1) support to MWI for sectoral planning and coordination; (2) Provision of Rural Water and Sanitation Services through the Water Resource Management Authority (WRMA) i.e., undertaking its core work in rolling out Catchment Management Strategies and developing WRUAs; and (3) Water Resources Management, through the Water Sector Trust Fund (WSTF) for community-based service provision. The programme has combined efforts to provide services and maintain institutional reform momentum while preparing for what has been hoped will be a new sectoral support programme. There have been a number of significant achievements:

The **Water Sector Coordination** component has achieved consensus on a road map for the future. Legislation has been drafted, but not yet approved by parliament. A pension scheme has been developed and operationalised, which is seen as central to slimming the current bureaucratic structures.

The **WRMA component** reports significant outcomes in engaging with WRUAs in the preparation of plans and monitoring processes.

The **WSTF** includes direct service provision through a number of WRUAs and has resulted in services being provided to poor rural areas.

A number of key concerns have been raised with regard to this contribution:

1. The Bridging Programme has demonstrated progress in moving toward creating conditions for a future sector-wide approach, but if other donors do not show a readiness to engage in the near future, these modalities may prove relatively inefficient, with costs outweighing (hypothetical) benefits.
2. Progress is being made in institutional reform, but devolution will force new ways of working with the WRMAs and WRUAs. This suggests the need to constantly review approaches to institutional reform as entry points for working with new structures emerge.
3. Even though the services provided can be seen as ultimately working in favour of a human rights-based approach and reflect the priorities of the poor, in a broader perspective GoK ownership of these goals and overall performance in the sector are not encouraging. Close analysis is likely to be required (and increasingly important in light of climate and demographic change). Reliance on line ministry structures to carry out these analyses is not likely to yield significant results.

Although the Bridging Programme for the water sector has been effective in providing services, strengthening WRUAs and initiating a measure of institutional reforms, the real measure of the effectiveness of these efforts will only become apparent within a broader perspective of whether overall service provision (and again, government allocations to cover the costs of this service provision) has increased. There is evidence of an overall decline in commitments to the provision of basic water and sanitation services, which overshadows Sweden's successful but – by nature – limited inputs. Sweden has, despite many years of support, had limited success in influencing the attitudes of high-level Kenyan decision-makers to make good on commitments to provide appropriate budgetary allocations for on-going rural water services. In other sectors the Embassy has tried to address such deficiencies by supporting CSOs to advocate for strong commitments, but no appropriate partner could be found in this instance.

An area where significant effectiveness can be noted, largely within the Strategy period, is the land sector. Despite a low level of interest from government, Sweden has engaged a surprisingly wide array of non-state actors to exert pressure for reforms and the effectiveness of their efforts is visible with regard to influence on the new Constitution, establishment of the National Land Council and various legislative reforms. This is an area that bridges Sweden's urban and rural portfolios. However, within the land sub-sector, technical support through Lantmäteriet has been less effective. Technical assistance has been provided without sufficient engagement from governmental counterparts. Similar problems have also been noted in the water sector, where effective support to strengthen technical capacities has in some cases not been matched with effective organisational and attitudinal change.

Another area where Sweden has begun to generate results within the Strategy period is in increasing access to financial services. FSD has had very impressive initial results in establishing innovative and scalable financial services. Although there is little evidence to confirm that the programme has contributed to the overall goal (sustainable improvements in the livelihoods of poor households through reduced vulnerability to shocks, increased incomes and employment), targets for the use of financial services by more people and a shift in the financial market as a whole in service availability and products have been achieved. A focus on financial services has been seen as a better way to increase the broader impact of Swedish support, given the lack of government commitment to continue or scale-up the small scale investments of past agricultural programmes such as NALEP. It is not yet clear that there is a linkage to effectiveness in relation to the sectoral objective (whether these services will be taken up by farmers or enterprises linked to natural resource management) and, indeed, it is widely acknowledged that demonstrating this linkage is challenging from a methodological perspective. Furthermore, there is little evidence to indicate that this type of approach will be effective in reaching the very poor and/or those living in ASALs; and indeed it appears that this is not intended.

Environmental sustainability is given surprisingly little explicit attention in the NRE portfolio (given Sweden's history of strong involvement in these issues in Kenya).. Sweden's engagement in climate change efforts has been modest. This deficiency appears to be related to failures to recognise the cross-sectoral implications of these topics, which is indeed a problem within Swedish development cooperation more generally. With regard to resilience, the division of responsibilities, wherein humanitarian programming is managed from Stockholm, appears to be counter-productive with respect to working towards a more joined-up approach to addressing extreme climate events.

NRE Summary Outcomes

In terms of access to natural resources and improved management, there has been progress in achieving outcomes *within* Swedish financed interventions (especially service provision). However, the extent to which these outcomes will contribute to impact on the lives of those receiving these services must be seen within a context where overall access to resources and services may be declining. Access to water among the most vulnerable populations seems to be declining, even though the specific services financed by Sweden have yielded excellent direct impact. Despite major progress on formal structures for protecting land rights, abuses remain widespread (and may also be worsening); and evidence of ownership of gender equality concerns among governmental partners remains weak. Some core reforms (e.g., the water bill) have yet to be passed, and the extent to which other reforms will lead to desired changes is uncertain. Despite excellent progress in formal reforms in the land sector, and some successful and innovative small-scale pilot projects, interviewees acknowledge that this has yet to lead to significant improvements in the *de facto* security of resource tenure of the rural poor. The potential for achieving intended impacts may have more to do with issues of corruption, informal abuse of power and general ignorance about these new formal institutions in the rural areas than a lack of formal institutional structures.

Sweden's message regarding the impacts that it is concerned with is complicated by the fact that the current objective of improved management through sustainable growth that benefits poor people builds on a series of questionable implicit causal assumptions. As noted in the PDA, there are some aspects of agricultural growth that are more likely to benefit the poor than others. Also, food security and resilience (not explicit Swedish objectives) may be essential to achieving benefits for the poor, but they may not be achieved with a primary focus on growth or if these concerns are effectively seen as 'humanitarian' and therefore excluded from mainstream development efforts.

Within efforts to develop systems and capacities in the sector, it is often difficult to confirm the extent to which these have led to outcomes in relation to attitudinal change and organisational processes that are likely to contribute to poverty alleviation, gender equality and respect for human rights. Systems established by FSD have been able to demonstrate impressive outcomes in enhancing overall access to financial services and extending the reach of these services. They acknowledge, though, that they have not found an effective means of reaching poorer members of communities. The leaders of LSNSA acknowledge that it is doubtful that their efforts have thus far led to concrete impact in enhanced respect for the resource tenure rights of the poor beyond the limited scope of the pilot activities. A plausible link between the outcomes that they have achieved and ultimate impact depends on future trajectories; and the short-term funding they have received has not drawn attention to how to build on the experience of these pilots in the future.

Finally, with regard to gender equality and environmental sustainability, there have been impressive outputs in terms of absolute and relative numbers of women beneficiaries. However, it is more difficult to discern the ultimate outcomes in relation to stakeholder commitments to enhanced gender equality in the portfolio, nor to the effects of improved participation and access to various services on women's lives. Similarly, it is difficult to discern the outcomes regarding enhanced resilience in relation to climate change. Nonetheless, the evaluation team can conclude that stakeholders feel that Sweden has helped to maintain and strengthen the position of Kenyan actors that share Sweden's commitments to human rights in relation to natural resource management during the transitional period of the current Strategy, even if, in many respects, the limited scale of Swedish support has not been able to stem an overall deterioration of the situation.

Box 2: Examples of NRE Effectiveness

- The Community Project Cycle of Project of the Kenyan Water Services Trust Fund has brought water closer to many households, as well as increased water reliability and quality. Some households have also noted an increase in income, which they attribute to this project. Many households report that the incidence of diarrhoea has decreased.
- KWSP has contributed to increasing the capacity of the private sector as service providers, the formation of more than 200 WRUAs, and developed Water Resource Management Rules, including the introduction of payment for water.
- HiH has contributed to strengthening existing enterprises, the establishment of new enterprises and creation of jobs in rural areas, which has increased incomes among programme participants, of which 80% are women.
- FSD has significantly contributed to the development of an improved enabling policy and regulatory environment for micro financial services which also, to some extent, reach poor clients.
- LSNDSA has contributed to three important land laws which were passed by the National Assembly of Kenya: 1) the Land Act 2012; 2) the National Land Commission Act 2012, and 3) the Land Legislation Act 2012.
- The Project on Improving Land Administration in Kenya (PILAK) has contributed to enhancing transparency through supporting a national system for unique land parcel identification, which was included in the new land legislation acts that came into force in 2012. Officers from the ministry benefitted from technology transfer by experts from Lantmäteriet in Sweden.
- The Civil Society Facility for Natural Resources has contributed to increasing engagement of citizens in policy discussions on natural resource management at national and county level through the establishment of networks that provide platforms and forums for these discussions. People have also been sensitized on climate change laws and strategies to adapt to climate change.
- The Integrated Food Security in the Arid and Semi-arid Lands Programme has somewhat contributed to improved income opportunities, water access and food security in targeted ASAL communities.
- Through ASDSP, County Coordination Units have been established to facilitate the role out of new approaches on a national basis.

3.2.2 Urban Development

Sweden's human rights-based approach lies at the heart of what has been achieved with regard to slum upgrading in the UD sector. Stakeholders reported that awareness of rights has changed their "language of defence" and awareness of realities has changed the "language of service" – for example, banks are increasingly recognising that they may be able to locate clients in slum areas.

The link between the UD outputs achieved in the current Strategy and the outcomes that will be required in the future, particularly in the 47 urban county seats being created as part of devolution, remains to be proven. It is as yet too early to assess whether institutional reforms designed to support urban development in existing and experienced city governments will be transferable to new and inexperienced urban officials, particularly where the delineation of responsibilities between county governments and the urban centres within those counties remains unclear. In this regard Sweden's UD efforts have been instrumental in keeping urban development on the devolution agenda during this period of uncertainty, even if the ultimate outcomes of these efforts are unclear.

In terms of achievements in the sector, key policies have been formulated (though some remain "on the desk" of key decision makers). Governmental ownership of reform processes has been difficult to promote due to the fact that UD is a geographic, rather than a sectoral, category. Platforms such as the Local Urban Forums (see Box 3) have been established but in some respects they are owned by everyone and no one. Rights-based perspectives are apparent in the sense that participation has started to become institutionalised and local people have been successful in demanding com-

pensation for illegal evictions. The criticised focus on “planning”, noted above with regard to relevance, may actually be more of a semantic issue as the more transparent and participatory planning processes, and subsequent empowerment, may in fact constitute the main outcomes in a rights-based perspective, rather than the plans per se. In this context, the distinction between plans and planning is critical. Plans for investments and services in the past were seen to be somewhat “mysterious” (according to one interviewee), whereas new planning processes have increased transparency. Actual service provision has begun to yield more widespread results, which are likely to impact gender equality, e.g., street lighting, water and sanitation.

Box 3 Case Study: Civil Society Urban Development Programme (2009-13)

The purpose of the CSUDP programme is ‘strengthened and coordinated partnerships for policy advocacy and service delivery in selected urban areas’ premised on three core approaches, namely: (i) To identify, strengthen and **coordinate** urban CSOs, networks, coalitions and selected local authorities for effective delivery of the urban development programme; (ii) To facilitate and promote pro-poor **basic service delivery** by inculcating the rights-based approach on both the duty bearers and rights holders; and (iii) To **influence policies** to improve governance, promote integrated urban planning and slum upgrading options with particular emphasis on economic empowerment.

Achievements to date include:

- Improved coordination among urban CSOs, government, networks, private enterprises and local authorities through the establishment of the multi-stakeholder urban dialogue platforms, Civil Society Urban Forum at national level and the Local Urban Forums in the 15 urban areas where the programme has been implemented.
- Strategic partnerships created with, for example, the Kenya Informal Settlement Improvement Programme (KISIP), the Association of Local Government Authorities in Kenya and the National Urban Development Policy Secretariat at the Ministry of Local Government.
- Process changes – for example urban development planning and interventions have become more participatory and geographically inclusive.
- Heightened public attention to slum upgrading efforts and needs have been achieved through the urban journalist forum.
- A database of 943 screened CSOs from the 15 urban areas has contributed to increasing the legitimacy of CSOs vis-à-vis state actors and programmes such as KISIP and KMP.
- Demonstration projects of various basic services related to shelter, water and sanitation have been successfully implemented by IPs with financial support and technical backstopping related to the rights-based approach from CSUDP.
- CSUDP has successfully influenced and driven milestone urban policies such as the National Urban Development Policy and the Urban Areas and Cities Act. This was achieved through active participation of CSOs under the Local Urban Forums.

UD Summary Outcomes

There have been considerable delays in moving from planning components and actual implementation of service provision activities. With CSUDP there has been more success due to the modality of building on the work of CSOs, which were already engaged in service delivery to establish demonstration projects. At the end of the Strategy period evidence of increased implementation based on learning from the CSUDP experience is emerging. KISIP has initiated infrastructure investments in select slums through a scaling up of CSUDP demonstrations. Even private sector investments are being mobilised, partially as a spin-off inspired by these efforts.

Such investments also create a *de facto* formalisation of informal settlements. KISIP has achieved a statement of intent from GoK. In the past, GoK did not even acknowledge that slums existed. The formalisation is generating *de facto* government commitments to act.

Another important outcome that has begun to be achieved at the end of the Strategy period is the diffusion of experience to the new country governments. This is extremely important as responsibilities for urban development in general, and the planned development of the new urban county seats in particular, were not clear. Sweden's support in this has been timely and strategic.

Box 4: Examples of UD Effectiveness

- Contributed to improved coordination among various stakeholders through the Civil Society Urban Forum and 15 Local Urban Forums established by CSUDP in its programme areas.
- Increased legitimacy of CSOs vis-à-vis state actors and programmes, such as KISIP and KMP, through the development of a database of 943 screened CSOs in the 15 urban areas supported by CSUDP.
- CSUDP demonstration projects of various basic services to show the government and private sector what works for the poor. These have been successfully implemented by partners with financial support and technical backstopping in the HRBA from CSUDP. Some are now scaled through KISIP as well as the private sector.
- Demonstrations with quick impact to show what can be done, incl. storm water drainage/protection, street lighting, bike paths, solid waste management, etc. in select counties.
- Successfully influenced and driven milestone urban policies such as the National Urban Development Policy and Urban Areas and Cities Act.
- Reduced slum evictions due to key policy and legislative influence together with coordinated advocacy, training and public awareness campaigns empowering slum dwellers to demand respect for their rights.
- KMP has built capacity in 14 counties to do physical planning.
- KMP has developed a model for fast-track county level integrated development plans (guidelines). With pressures to expand to all counties, KMP has now done interim plans in 43 counties.
- KISIP is supporting the development of comprehensive socio-economic and physical plans that will lay the foundation for providing land titles. 5000 title deeds already provided in Mombasa. Titles in name of head of household only though.
- Resettlement Action Plan; KISIP is linking with LSNSA and CSUDP to develop resettlement guidelines that can be translated into law.

3.2.3 Democracy and Human Rights

Sweden's support to the DHR sector has been very broad, covering human rights, electoral reform, police and prison reform, PFM, justice, law and order. Within PFM, Sweden has contributed to a number of institutions becoming more functional, particularly the Revenue Authority and the Audit Office. The newly published "*Strategy for Public Finance Management Reforms in Kenya 2013-18*" represents a significant achievement in terms of commitment to reform – and includes a results matrix for monitoring progress. This reform strategy provides development partners with an important opportunity to locate critical indicators of government commitment and good governance and represents a step forward from other PFM strategies, which were said to be too focused on best practice rather than what would work in practice. Sweden has made a significant contribution to the evolution of national monitoring and accounting commitments and processes, most significantly through NIMES (see Box 5).

Box 5 Case Study: National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System

This contribution focuses on transparency and accountability of government by supporting the establishment and implementation of NIMES as an essential component of the government's efforts to improve the effectiveness and quality of government. It is implemented by Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate (MED) of the Ministry of State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030. Under NIMES, monitoring and evaluation activities are organised on a decentralised basis at all levels of government. Every institution or body which spends public resources has a responsibility to facilitate monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of its programmes. This includes Ministries, Department and Agencies (MDAs) at national and sub-national levels. Stakeholders from the MED report that NIMES is being institutionalised across government, enabling connections between strategic plans and annual work plans and facilitating performance contracting. Performance-based reporting schemes are under consideration. MED views Sweden's support as very helpful and directed towards capacity-building support covering areas such as indicator identification, progress reporting, guidelines development, annual report preparation, public expenditure reviews and surveys, training for staff, development of policy on monitoring and evaluation (which previously was not regulated), development of project inventory system (a computer-based information system) and the popularising of what NIMES does. The plan for MTP II is to include human rights indicators and county monitoring indicators which will be "owned" by Governors. NIMES has the potential to (and reportedly does) facilitate parliamentary discussion, budget decision making and reflections on project investments amongst policy makers and budget holders. Furthermore, decentralisation of power offers new opportunities to build local level monitoring and evaluation capability to enable both performance management and external scrutiny.

Regarding the justice, prisons and police reform components of the DHR portfolio, Sweden was said to have "rolled with the punches". This comment related to Sweden's experiences in supporting the Governance, Justice and Law and Order Sector programme (GJLOS), which was a core initiative led by Sweden at the start of the Strategy period. Sweden worked hard to secure basket funding for GJLOS as a sector wide approach (SWAp), but with diminishing engagement from other donor partners. GJLOS has now been acknowledged by government as a sector in its own right and its mandate has been amended to focus more specifically on policy and regulation. In the future this should result in GJLOS being mainstreamed into government processes, including annual work-planning and allow sectoral investment plans to be drawn up and budgetary funds drawn down. As a consequence of the failure to obtain commitments to GJLOS as a SWAp, Sweden shifted its focus to a portfolio focused on individual programmes related to the judiciary, prisons and police reform, wherein significant results have been achieved.

DHR Summary Outcomes

As described above, the emphasis within the DHR portfolio has primarily been on capacity development and legislative reform, with some attention to awareness raising and the undertaking of some specific tasks (e.g., related to the elections). There is strong evidence that the first stages of these outcomes have been achieved. It can in turn be plausibly assumed that these capacities and reforms have contributed to greater respect for human rights. Electoral reform has contributed to the (re)establishment of legitimacy of democratic institutions, and there is some perception that Sweden has empowered people to voice demands for their new rights to be respected.

Through the support to GJLOS, PFM and the Kenya Human Rights Commission, Sweden has contributed to strengthening democracy- and human rights-related legislation in Kenya and to changing attitudes and behaviours related to democracy and human rights in Kenya. Public authorities have been motivated as they have received modern equipment and training; where there has been a will to change increased

knowledge about democracy and human rights among individuals has led to institutional change.

This has been matched by increased awareness amongst citizens of their rights; attributable to Sweden's long term commitment to civil society. Increased public awareness of human rights has in turn provided a foundation for broader participation; one manifestation of which is that citizens more often demand respect for their rights. This can be attributed to the support to civil society, which has expanded the democratic space in Kenya.

Box 6: Examples of DHR Effectiveness

- Where the Kikuyu Police Station Community Policing Project has been implemented improved relationship between the community and the police can be noted; i.e., changed views of police force amongst community members and changed police behaviour.
- Through the support to the UNDP Child Protection Programme, the child protection system has been strengthened in several districts, including through the Orphans and Vulnerable Children Cash Transfer programme, district emergency committees, local child protection committees and child rights school clubs.
- The electoral support through UNDP contributed to substantial increase in voter participation and gender parity in the number of registered voters in the general elections in March 2013. However, the elections were marked by substantial allegations of various irregularities.
- Amkeni Wakenya has contributed to creating effective linkages between national policy and grass-roots as well as mainstreaming citizen participation and inclusion of marginalised communities, persons with disabilities and women, e.g. through increasing citizens' awareness on administration of justice, by supporting the establishment of Justice Centres designed to enhance access to justice for the poor and vulnerable, by supporting the establishment of County Oversight Committees to monitor the county governments, and by supporting civic and voter education ahead of the 2013 elections.
- Sweden has contributed to Kenya's efforts to fight corruption and impunity through support to the strengthening of Kenya's national audit capacity of government institutions, a strengthening of the rule of law and access to justice for all Kenyans; and a greater public scrutiny of corruption and impunity (including Kenya's handling of the ongoing ICC cases involving the President and the Deputy President of Kenya).
- A joined up approach to reforms in the judiciary, prisons and policing has increased awareness of the broad need for reform in the sector.

3.2.4 Outcomes in Institutional Development and Governance

As highlighted above, the lynchpin of Sweden's focus during the Strategy period can be briefly summarised as one of supporting the roll-out of the new Constitution. Outcomes are thus overwhelmingly concerned with the steps that have been taken to institutionally anchor the vision of the Constitution in: (i) the legal and judicial reforms necessary for carrying out this vision, (ii) commitments to use devolution to move democracy closer to citizens through transparency and participation, (iii) mechanisms to ensure respect for gender equality, (iv) commitments to sustainable management of natural resources and (v) the rule of law. Together these institutional change processes are expected to prevent a return to the violence of 2007-8 and contribute to formalised commitments to respect human rights and strive towards more inclusive and sustainable economic and social development.

As noted when discussing relevance, there are wide conceptual gaps in the Strategy regarding how the broad and diverse initiatives are expected to contribute to sectoral outcomes. In this section the evaluation assesses the effectiveness of the steps taken, through individual projects/programmes and through dialogue, towards achievement of these outcomes. Effectiveness overwhelmingly consists of the creation or strength-

ening of institutions that can manage on-going processes of reforms in policies and practice. Sweden's support to CSO engagement with policy and planning processes has enabled non-state actors to take an agile role in adapting their position as structures and opportunities have changed. Swedish efforts have in many cases directly contributed to developing fora (with a legal basis) for increasing awareness of opportunities and addressing conflicts as they arise. This occurs at national level, e.g., in the creation of the National Land Council and building of policy formation institutions such as the Agriculture Sector Coordination Unit (ASCU); and also at local level, e.g., through the WRUAs and Local Urban Forums. Supporting institutions that can underpin a new culture of participation is viewed by the evaluators as a key development achievement of recent years. Furthermore the individual institutional development initiatives supported by Sweden have resulted in considerable ripple effects. The National Land Policy (2009), for example, is seen to have had a fundamental effect on the formulation of the Constitution, the National Climate Change Response Strategy (2009), the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (2010) and the Environment and Land Court Act (2011).

Even if the main institutional development outcomes can be seen at national level, there are also examples of micro-level institutional change. Sweden's support to the second phase of the NALEP has aimed to encourage active participation in a range of Common Interest Groups working with agricultural extension agents. Government sources cited this example of how public services are working in a more pluralistic manner and engaging with civil society.

A major driver of institutional development has been the use of dialogue to link the outputs of individual interventions to broader institutional development aims. A clear example of this is how the Embassy has used dialogue to encourage broader learning from the experience of CSUDP in relation to participation and gender equality within other much larger urban development programmes such as KISIP and KMP. In the UD sector interviewees stressed the effectiveness of Sweden's dialogue efforts in convening discussions across sectors relevant to informal settlements and across the divisions between public agencies, civil society and the academic community. In NRE Sweden has used both programming and dialogue to highlight growth and inequality issues in the agricultural sector, as well as entrepreneurship, and access to credit. This has led to an increased focus on access to credit and improved business and marketing strategies in the new government Agriculture Sector Development Strategy.

Overall, interviewees noted that prudent development cooperation within a rights-based perspective implies a focus on good governance. Outcomes are particularly apparent where civil society has been mobilised to encourage, enable and demand good governance. In NRE, for example, CRM and LSNSA are focused on mobilising non-state actors to work together with the public sector to enhance transparency, participation, openness and accountability (there is less evidence that these programmes have raised significant attention to non-discrimination).

Despite these positive examples, in interviews it emerged that Sweden is sometimes perceived as having over-focused on key, but sometimes narrow, technical aspects of natural resource management in particular, through legal reforms, institutional mod-

els, land registration, etc., but that these technical inputs have not consistently led to governance outcomes that reflect accountability from duty bearers. In general there is a view that some progress has been made in changing the attitudes within the public sector that must underpin broader governance reform, but stakeholders express concern that transparency and respect for the rights of women, youth and marginalised populations remain weak.

Ownership is an essential aspect of governance and accountability. Within the DHR sector, Sweden has supported Child Protection Centres – which now have strong government ownership, as evidenced by commitment from government to set up four more. GoK is also covering 60 per cent of the costs of cash transfers.

Sweden has been the main donor assisting with the introduction of a number of systems which have the potential to deliver long-term governance transformations across Kenya. These include but are not limited to:

- The implementation and strengthening of systems supporting child rights systems enabling cash transfer and enhanced social protection schemes¹⁰
- Support for NIMES leading to an increased profile within government and among development partners
- Support for the introduction of digital land registration systems

Systems such as these can secure participation and the evidence base that should enhance transparency and accountability. In all the above, Sweden appears to have selected its systems contributions well.

3.2.5 Outcomes in Relation to Human Rights

A human rights based perspective involves looking at outcomes in terms of non-discrimination, accountability, transparency and participation, and also within an analysis of rights holders and duty bearers. The findings suggest that, particularly when enhancing services (e.g., policing, financial services, agricultural extension, water), rights holders are often described in reporting as beneficiaries or recipients of these services. In the DHR portfolio, results in terms of enhanced accountability (current or plausible future changes) to rights holders are clear, whereas in NRE this perspective is less common.

In much of the portfolio there is little evidence of attention to non-discrimination, though interviews reveal considerable evidence of outcomes related to gender equality (discussed separately in the following section). NRE and UD targeting tends to be limited to geographic areas (informal settlements, ASALs, poor districts, etc.) and

¹⁰ UNICEF's thematic report on Child Protection (March 2012) states: "Although the GOK budgeted 40 per cent of the USD 32 million for 2011, it is unclear whether this level of support is sustainable and as such, there continues to be a reliance on external sources, such as from DFID, World Bank, and other entities".

gender, whereas potential ethnic discrimination within these areas is largely not explored. This is problematic given the ethnic dimension of political issues in Kenya. The poverty level of the rights holders that are to be targeted is sometimes noted, but generally not. One positive example of efforts to address ethnic discrimination is the UNICEF Child Protection Programme. When ethnic rivalries prevented children from attending nearby schools, the programme established mobile schools that could cater to these discriminated groups.

Within a HRBA perspective, Sweden has achieved the greatest outcomes across the three portfolios in relation to participation. During the evaluation process, in all three sectors, a wide range of achievements relating to citizen participation in policy formation and development practice were identified by stakeholders – down to specific paragraphs that were included in policy documents and legislation as a result of Sweden’s support to civil society engagement. Policy achievement outcomes are related to community mobilisation and capacity development, through which the stage has been set for enhanced future participation as these policies are implemented. Furthermore, this participation has been described as a form of empowerment in itself, even where it has not led to immediate outcomes in relation to policies and practice.

UD stakeholders interviewed made particular note of Sweden’s understanding that participation implies a recognition that citizens are best placed to define their needs – for example what should be meant by “adequate housing”. The National Urban Development Policy and the Local Urban Forums were cited by stakeholders as making an important contribution to the vibrancy in civil society at a national level as these initiatives have overcome barriers between government and civil society. Slum upgrading policy developments, including eviction and resettlement bills, have been important not only for what they establish, but for the way this has been carried out. Bringing people together has demonstrated the potential results to be achieved through participation.

Overall, the team finds that programming based on a human rights-based perspective is sometimes constrained by failures to factor in the power relations between different groups of rights holders and duty bearers. Even if the choice of programmes is generally highly relevant in terms of addressing human rights issues, the subsequent implementation (or at least the reporting on the implementation) does not demonstrate the implications of power relations for moving from outputs to wider outcomes in terms of greater respect for human rights.

3.2.6 Outcomes in Relation to Gender Equality

The approach towards gender issues, as well as the contribution towards gender equality, varies across programmes. Both GJLOS and NALEP report results relating to gender issues in terms of numbers of beneficiaries or women staff, but these are not linked to outcomes in relation to attitudinal changes. In GJLOS it is noted that the number of women police officers has increased, but the outcomes of this change are not discussed. An impact assessment of NALEP (limited to two districts) suggests that there was no difference in gendered access to education, health and income between NALEP and non-NALEP households, but did not further explore whether the programme had contributed to gender equality in any other ways and did not refer to

the baseline that could have revealed to what extent this had also been the case before the launch of the programme. It should be noted, however, that there seems to be a substantial gap between what has been reported and what has happened on the ground – something that became clear through interviews with Embassy staff where many examples of outcomes were cited.

When the Embassy has identified programmes that are failing to address gender in satisfactory ways, they have responded well. The Kikuyu Police Station Community Policing Pilot Project (National Police Service) is an illustrative example. No consideration of gender issues was made in the design of the project and there were no gender specific indicators to measure impact on women and men, as disaggregated groups (or on other groups, e.g., people living with disabilities, youth, elderly, etc.), yet some crimes target women more than men, such as sexual assaults, which suggest that such considerations are important in this type of project. When this problem was identified in an evaluation, the Embassy came in to rectify these deficiencies and great improvements are now reported by the Embassy staff.

There are also exemplary programmes that have done substantial work on gender equality both internally and in their specific activities. One example is the support to the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC). They have created local networks working with gender equality, including issues of female genital mutilation and other sexual crimes and offences. They also actively participated in the work on the new Constitution, which has an integrated gender perspective. It is noted that gender equality is increasing in Kenya and that KHRC has contributed to this. They have been vocal in the human rights debate, especially on women's rights. Hand-in-Hand (HiH) is another illustrative example. They have had a strong gender focus in their targeting, although it has not always been fully systematic, and 80 per cent of the direct beneficiaries are women. But as with other programmes, many results are only presented in terms of numbers of beneficiaries (outputs) rather than outcomes. The Community Project Cycle is a final example of an approach through which impact has been achieved in relation to gender equality in various ways. Reports state that increased economic activity was reported as one of the most significant impacts in half of the groups surveyed. It was further noted that the approach had brought water closer to households, which has contributed to decreasing fetching time and increased access (in terms of quantity). Also water reliability has improved, and improvement in water quality was also noted. Seventy-five per cent of women reported that the incidence of diarrhoea amongst children has decreased. It also seems that awareness of good hygiene practices has increased, but at the same time it was noted that the new knowledge is not always implemented.

It is also clear that some of the areas where change has been slow or limited, this is related to Sweden being a small donor, rather than deficiencies in working systematically with gender issues. KMP and KISIP are two examples where this seems to be the case. Both programmes pay limited attention to gender. Hence, gender analysis has not been systematic to date. The Embassy is responding by now undertaking a gender gap analysis in relation to these two programmes. This will hopefully provide a tangible tool for further discussion and for reminding their partners – Kenyan and

other donors – of their commitments to gender as institutionalised by the new Constitution and associated policies and emerging legal frameworks. Consequently, Sweden’s role is sometimes to be an irritant and keep gender on the agenda, even if progress is limited.

3.2.7 Conclusions on Effectiveness, Outcomes and Impact

Significant achievements have been made during a volatile and difficult Strategy period. This is the consequence of an ability to identify strategic entry points, to maintain allegiance to core principles, to create an enabling platform and space for engagement and discussion, and to respond flexibly to a changing and uncertain environment. Support to interactions between civil society and GoK has had impressive results. The Embassy has combined approaches that strongly emphasise the provisions of the new Constitution with considerable political awareness.

The umbrella nature of the NRE “sector” and the fact that a major part of the portfolio only addresses natural resource issues indirectly has meant that, even though the results of the individual projects have been significant, results in relation to the sectoral objective have not been in focus. The different sub-sectors have developed well individually, but without an overall strategic vision. Activities related to land have achieved significant institutional development outcomes. In water and agriculture, new and appropriate approaches have been developed and significant services have been provided to poor communities, but GoK commitments to maintain these services have been insufficient.

The UD sector has been effective in strengthening planning and encouraging participation of poor residents of informal settlements. Projects have been particularly slow in starting, but the general direction is in line with intentions and obstacles are finally being overcome at the end of the Strategy period. Challenges lie ahead in seeing how plans will be implemented and planning processes diffused to the new counties. Initial activities in linking to the devolution process have been promising.

Sweden has achieved its aims in DHR. Here again, the “sector” is actually an umbrella for a range of activities. Despite the broad nature of the sector, the opportunistic approach of choosing important initiatives during this transition period in Kenya’s history has been appropriate, as Sweden has been able to achieve quick results by building on Kenyans’ own desire for rapid reforms after the tragic events of 2007-8. Synergies among judiciary, police and prison reforms seem possible. Overall, despite a rather fragmented portfolio in the aftermath of the collapse of commitments to GJLOS, there are strong signs of an emerging crystallisation of efforts.

Sweden has leveraged its trust among Kenyan stakeholders and has largely made a good selection of partners in relation to policy formation so as to make impressive contributions to policy reform in a short period of time. As a small donor, Sweden undoubtedly “punches above its weight” in this regard. Challenges remain with regard to the commitments and devolved capacities to implement these policies in the coming years.

Gender equality has been incorporated throughout the portfolio through a three-pronged approach using direct targeted programmes, mainstreaming and dialogue. In most cases this combined approach has created synergies. Where the Embassy has encountered a lack of ownership, efforts have been redoubled, often with good effect.

Environmental sustainability is surprisingly overlooked given Sweden's history of strong involvement in these issues in Kenya. Resilience efforts have been mounted as required, but in a largely reactive rather than proactive manner, with little cross-fertilisation between humanitarian and development efforts. Sweden's engagement in climate change efforts has been limited.

Despite certain deficiencies and a Strategy with unclear objectives, Sweden has made a strong contribution towards achieving most aspects of the overall strategic intentions. As such, Sweden can be credited with having played a considerable role in the improved prospects for development compared with the state of affairs at the start of the Strategy.

There are two problematic aspects of the theories of change for achieving intended outcomes. First, some programmes tend to take assumptions for granted regarding the efficacy of the intended “solutions” to poverty alleviation, without due analyses of who it is that actually benefits from, for example, access to credit, formalised land tenure or agricultural commercialisation. Despite a high degree of political and economic awareness, some of the programming appears to have underestimated how power relations may skew intended benefits at micro level. Second, there is sometimes a lack of clarity regarding how small pilot or demonstration activities will eventually be scaled up or contribute to broader learning.

3.3 MODALITIES AND AID EFFECTIVENESS

3.3.1 Aid Effectiveness

Sweden's commitments to aid effectiveness have been “put to the test” in Kenya in a variety of ways. At the start of the Strategy period there were hopes and assumptions that the international community's relations with GoK could become a model for the aid effectiveness agenda, with a gradual shift from a fragmented, poorly harmonised and donor-driven aid to SWAs, basket funds and alignment with KJAS. Despite concerted Embassy efforts to support such a process, the aid effectiveness agenda has not progressed due to shifts of donor and GoK priorities, and pressures to “show results” from individual projects. As will be described below, Sweden has ultimately found ways to retain a focus on the underlying values of harmonisation and alignment, even if the modalities and channels associated with the aid effectiveness agenda have not been viable. The efficiency of investing such a large effort in what ultimately could be characterised as “kicking a dead horse” can and should be questioned.

During the Strategy period Sweden intended to increase the proportion of government-to-government support provided through programme-based approaches to 80 per cent and ultimately increase the proportion of all donors' development resources channelled through Kenyan Government systems. In 2010, to help ensure the efficient

allocation of these funds and in line with the principles of aid effectiveness, the GoK and its development partners agreed upon a Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF) which included a number of indicators of success to support the partnership. According to the principles of aid effectiveness, the GoK is responsible for defining clear, country-owned programmes (e.g., sector programmes or strategies) and establishing a comprehensive budgetary framework that captures all resources (both domestic and external) while development partners commit to take steps towards using local systems for programme design and implementation, financial management and monitoring and evaluation. The responsibility for donor co-ordination and harmonisation of donor procedures is shared between the government and development partners. Sweden actively seeks a more coordinated and harmonised approach within all sectors, mainly through the sector working groups, but the interest from other development partners is low. The perception of corruption and lack of trust in PFM systems have been identified as major bottlenecks for donors to increase adherence to a programme-based approach.

According to an OECD-DAC report from 2011,¹¹ two-thirds of Sweden's aid to Kenya was programme based, while major donors like the World Bank and the United States operated almost completely outside the programme-based approach. This reflects donor policies regarding financial control and fiduciary risk rather than an overt rejection of aid effectiveness principles. Nevertheless, this disconnect between government and donors (which also sustains disconnects within government) does not appear to be helped by the way that some donors pursue the “results agenda”, which can create incentives to work with smaller projects delivering visible, short term and easily communicable results. The “search for quick wins” risks further exacerbating aid fragmentation, which according to a study undertaken by the OECD and GIZ between 2005-09¹² is increasing in Kenya (fragmentation increased from 13.9 donors per sector in 2005 to 19.0 in 2009).

At the start of the Strategy period efforts to promote aid effectiveness in NRE and DHR centred on moving towards SWAp and/or basket fund arrangements for GJLOS, water and agriculture. In UD, primary attention was given to greater harmonisation and government ownership. GJLOS was seen as a centrepiece of aid effectiveness, not the least due to the importance of a harmonised and GoK owned process of reforms after the events surrounding the 2007 elections. Ultimately neither donors nor the GoK showed ownership for GJLOS as a basket fund. In 2010, GJLOS lost momentum due to structural challenges (lack of an enabling constitutional and legal framework) and weak GoK leadership. It came to be perceived as a training fund instead of coherent sector support, as was originally intended. As a result, when

¹¹ OECD-DAC, 2011, Country Chapter Kenya.

¹² OECD-DAC, 2011, Country Chapter Kenya.

the programme ended, there was no incentive among donors and government to enter into a new sector-wide phase. After much fruitless effort, the Embassy accepted this state of affairs and developed a coordinated package of initiatives focused on reforms in the judiciary, police and prisons. This may appear to be a failure in relation to the aid effectiveness agenda, but it can also be seen as a constructive way to use other means to develop GoK ownership while maintaining a strong Swedish focus on HRBA and gender equality.


Efforts to maintain the momentum towards a sectoral approach in the water sub-sector, which began with KWSP, through the BP have been problematic. Implementation of this programme has gone slowly. Even if there have been achievements in many specific elements of a future SWAp, it seems that the rest of the donor community is more interested in meeting their own service provision targets, and here again, the prospects for greater aid harmonisation are limited at the end of the Strategy.

The Agricultural Sector Development Support Programme (ASDSP) is referred to as a SWAp, and in line with this the component supporting the Agricultural Sector Co-ordination Unit is an example of support to GoK sectoral leadership. However, due to a failure to engage other donors in ASDSP, the other components of ASDSP appear more as Swedish financed programmes. As such, ASDSP could be characterised as being a “quasi-SWAp”.

3.3.2 Channels and Modalities in the Swedish Portfolio

The total value of the Swedish portfolio during the Strategy period was SEK 1 283 million, distributed by sector as presented in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Total value of Agreed Contributions



The three main channels used in the Swedish portfolio to date are the GoK, CSOs and UN organisations. The GoK is used as a channel for more than half of the agreed contribution value. In the beginning of the Strategy period Sweden assessed which aid channels and modalities would give the greatest impact and at the same time reduce the risk of corruption. This assessment pointed out the UN system as a reliable channel, in particular within DHR since:

- The UN system was considered a corruption risk mitigation strategy, in particular when it comes to Government support, as Sweden does not have full confidence in the GoK's PFM system.


- UN agencies offer a lower transaction cost as the UN could offer one comprehensive agreement. This applies in particular to the civil society support channelled through UNDP.

Furthermore, interviewees noted that several UN agencies have particularly strong Kenyan offices, which has meant that Sweden's traditional commitments to multilateral approaches can be met without any compromises in programme quality.

Sweden recently signed an Umbrella Cost Sharing Agreement with UNDP Kenya, including components that were previous stand-alone contributions. This agreement is expected to work as a model for further support through the UN system and is expected to lower transaction costs and increase efficiency. A recently conducted evaluation of Swedish DHR support concludes that distributing funds through intermediary organisations such as “UN-agencies leads to better coordination with both the UN and other partners that are channelling their support through multilateral channels. However, there is a risk that Sweden's agenda and priorities become less visible”.¹³ On the other hand using intermediary organisations can give Sweden extra leverage in the dialogue with the GoK.

As seen in Figure 3, the support channelled through Swedish institutions to a Kenyan institution (twinning), through the private sector and through the World Bank represent the smallest shares of the portfolio. The twinning projects mainly focus on technical support between the Swedish public agencies and their Kenyan counterparts.

Figure 3: Agreed Contribution Value per Channel¹⁴



Channels and modalities in the NRE portfolio include:

- Direct government support
- Institutional cooperation (twinning)
- Core contributions to the private sector

¹³ SADEV, 2012.

¹⁴ The CSO Facility Ankemi WaKenya is included in the UN part. UNDP is contracted as fund manager for the facility.

- Support to Kenyan CSO partners through civil society facilities
- Trust funds

Most of the support in the NRE sector is direct support to the GoK. This relates to the nature and long history of the NRE portfolio in agriculture and water.

In the UD portfolio funds are provided through:

- Direct project support
- Trust funds
- Support to Kenyan CSO partners through civil society facilities

In UD most of the contributions are channelled through the GoK, often with the World Bank as an intermediary. A majority of this support goes to the large KMP implemented by the Ministry of Local Government. Although Sweden's share of the KMP is relatively small, using the World Bank as a channel gives Sweden leverage in policy dialogue with the GoK. Furthermore, Sweden assesses the risk of corruption to be lower when using the World Bank as a channel, compared with direct support to the Government. Support to civil society is channelled through a civil society umbrella facility, which gives Swedish support broad coverage.


Channels and modalities in the DHR portfolio include:

- Direct support through government channels
- Indirect support to government (mainly channelled through UN agencies)
- Institutional cooperation (twinning)
- Support to Kenyan CSO partners through a civil society facility
- Direct support to civil society organisations
- Pooled funding


Due to the reasons mentioned above, the UN has been assessed as a reliable channel and 68 per cent of the DHR portfolio is channelled through UN agencies. Institutional cooperation is limited to twinning between Swedish and Kenyan police.

In terms of modality, Sweden understands its options to be general budget support, sector programme support, project support, support to organisations and development loans and guarantees. The mid-term review of the implementation of the strategy concluded at the time that Kenya was assessed not to be eligible for Swedish general budget support.¹⁵ The main modality used throughout the Strategy period has been project-type interventions (62 per cent of the total share). The second largest modality used is core contribution and pooled programmes and funds representing 36 per cent of the total share (see Figure 4).

¹⁵ Embassy of Sweden, 2010.

Figure 4: Overall Portfolio per Modality

As seen in Figure 5, there are no major differences between the modalities across the three sectors.

Figure 5: Modality by Sector

As noted above, Sweden has been a strong advocate of basket funding. A successful example of Swedish engagement in a basket funding arrangement is electoral reform support, wherein support was channelled through UNDP and a coordination and consultation mechanism was established. The purpose of this set up was to ensure that different forms of electoral assistance would complement each other and reduce risks of duplication. This arrangement brought all actors in electoral assistance together, which enabled improved information sharing and joint management of external risks.

Several stakeholders felt that some innovation is needed with regard to funding modalities – particularly to support flexible and accessible funding for CSOs. Within all sectors in the Kenya portfolio Sweden is supporting different civil society facilities with the purpose of achieving broad and timely outreach and efficiency. Furthermore, support to civil society has been seen as an appropriate channel to encourage public sector accountability. In the NRE sector as well as the UD sector, Sweden channels funds to a civil society organisation hosting the facility, while the DHR sector channels support through UNDP’s civil society facility, Amkeni WaKenya. In the NRE sector Sweden supports civil society through the CRM Facility and the LSNSA. The UNDP civil society facility is designed to be accessible and reach out to smaller organisations, including organisations with low administrative capacity. Therefore UNDP accepts handwritten applications and focuses on distributing small amounts of

funds. However, UNDP is still considered to be rather bureaucratic and the facility is limited to one-year project support. This is considered by partners to be a constraint for the development of these organisations. Partners also highlight that core support is important for small CSOs.

3.3.3 Dialogue as a Core, but 'Invisible' Modality

The development cooperation dialogue has two principal aims: to ensure that Swedish policies have more impact and, using the dialogue as an instrument, to facilitate the achievement of the Strategy objectives and thereby strengthen implementation of the national development plan.¹⁶ The Cooperation Strategy sets out four priority dialogue issues: 1) Economic growth; 2) Just and equitable distribution of resources and opportunities; 3) A human rights perspective; and 4) Agenda 4.¹⁷ In addition to these issues the Strategy also mentions the new Constitution, electoral law, land reforms, reconciliation, nation building, corruption, impunity and climate change as important issues for the dialogue. Embassy staff report that gender equality has been given very high priority within dialogue efforts. By contrast, the effectiveness of the dialogue related to climate change has been very limited as the reduced attention to environmental issues in the interventions and weak cross-sectoral attention within the Embassy has meant that Kenyan and international partners have not perceived Sweden to be a major actor. The evaluation team has noted that no dialogue plan or strategy directly related to the dialogue issues has been developed during the strategy period. This makes assessment of the effectiveness of dialogue objectives difficult.

Sweden has also continuously supported Kofi Annan in his dialogue and the African Union high-level panel. This is seen as particularly relevant to peace-building initiatives given the need for joint approaches in the potentially volatile informal settlements. Other donors that take a narrower project focus were said to be unable to exert such influence. Dialogue on institutional development has not just been a matter of Embassy advice to other actors. Sweden has also demonstrated an ability to convene universities, CSOs and government to roundtable discussions on institutional change. This convening power relates to Sweden being perceived of as an “honest broker”.

Sweden takes part in joint donor dialogues to pursue Swedish principles and priorities vis-à-vis both the partner country and other donors. The EU coordination group is also an important forum for dialogue. Sweden has also been involved in a dialogue

¹⁶ Government Offices of Sweden, 2010.

¹⁷ Agenda 4 is one component of the National Accord Reconciliation Agreement that was signed by the Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) on 28th February 2008 in light of the constitutional and political crisis. This process was mediated by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan as a measure of restoring sustainable peace, stability and security in the country. The main agenda items were to address the crisis, reconcile communities and mitigate against future conflicts. Agenda item four more specifically include principles on (i) constitutional, institutional and legal reform; (ii) land reform; (iii) poverty, inequity and regional imbalances; (iv) unemployment, particularly among the youth; (v) consolidation of national unity and cohesion; and (vi) transparency, accountability and impunity.

directly with the GoK. Between July 2010 and September 2012, Sweden co-chaired (with the World Bank) the DPG and this provided Sweden with an important dialogue platform and position of influence, particularly in prioritising aid effectiveness and anti-corruption. The Swedish Minister of Development Cooperation, Gunilla Carlsson, visited Kenya three times during the Strategy period. These visits have been used as dialogue opportunities to emphasise Sweden's position regarding elections, human rights, gender equality and political leadership.

Dialogue is also conducted through the sectors where Sweden is active. The Swedish involvement in the major reform programmes has created joint dialogue opportunities on democracy and human rights as well as on the political context of the programmes. The sector working groups provide for interaction with all the key actors involved in the programme. Despite the demands on time, Sweden has taken the lead at different times in specific sector working groups, such as PFM, agriculture, access to credit, anti-corruption, and the civil society fund for democratic governance (“Amkeni WaKenya”).

Swedish dialogue is where the Embassy's deep understanding of the political economy of Kenyan development is most effectively used to link specific programmes to broader governance agendas, especially regarding how to ensure that the Constitution is put into practice. An emerging efficiency related question regarding dialogue is how this will be translated into engaging in 47 dialogues about 47 different political economies as part of the devolution process. It is naturally too early for this evaluation to provide answers to this question, but it is important to stress that the dialogue modality will face new challenges in the coming years.

3.3.4 Conclusions on Modalities and Aid Effectiveness

Overall, the evaluation team judges that Sweden has, despite an enormous set of challenges in maintaining aid effectiveness, identified strategic entry points for collaborative contribution. This alone provides justification for some lack of coherence across the sectoral strategies. Dialogue has been an efficient way to raise attention to key Swedish priorities across these many topics. Sweden has successfully taken on a strong role (in relation to the scale of its support) in donor coordination and has had a particularly strong convening role. Less success can be noted in stemming overall deterioration of commitments to aid effectiveness in the international community.

Problems have existed with regard to fragmentation in the portfolio. This appears to be due to two factors. The first is the fragmented nature of the Strategy itself, with some initiatives seemingly reflecting historical trends in Swedish development cooperation more than future visions. The second is the Embassy's pragmatic (but effective) approach to ‘picking up the pieces’ of aid effectiveness when commitments to this agenda from national and international partners waned.

Support for national monitoring systems has proven to be a small but necessary “step in the right direction” to ensure that GoK and development partner attention is focused on critical decision points, essential budgetary reprioritisation and indicators of enhanced governance.

Civil society support, often through facilities through which to channel support to smaller organisations, has proven to be an efficient way of strengthening participation and has also proven effective in pressuring for public sector accountability. When CSO support has been linked to capacity development initiatives directed toward the public sector, this combination of channels has proven highly effective. Difficulties in finding national CSOs to take on such a role in water and agriculture have proven to be a limiting factor.

The mix of modalities has been largely appropriate for achieving the objectives of the Strategy. Working through UN agencies has been a good way of reducing transaction costs. Basket funds, where they have been maintained, are generally effective and a way to retain some focus on aid effectiveness principles. Working with direct support to GoK institutions has had positive results.

3.4 SUSTAINABILITY

3.4.1 Institutional Challenges

This section of the report considers the extent to which it can be plausibly assumed that Sweden is contributing to sustainable outcomes in relation to emerging Kenyan development trends, with particular attention to changes in attitudes and practices. The formal commitments to human rights included in the Constitution constitute a potential foundation for sustainable reform. However, the ways that the Constitution will be interpreted and applied remain uncertain.

Overall, the evaluation cannot derive unequivocal or overarching conclusions on the sustainability of the outcomes of Swedish contributions made during the 2009-13 period, due partially to the transitional or short-term nature of many of the interventions. Such sustainability could perhaps be better judged if the portfolio in the Strategy period had been assessed in the context of much longer-term development cooperation efforts, but such analysis was not within the scope of this evaluation.

Processes toward sustainability vary greatly. In many projects the focus is shifting away from policy and planning processes, which were emphasised at the start of the Strategy period and more towards capacity development. This is appropriate as sustainability is reliant on the strengthening of key organisations and the creation of an appropriate institutional environment for continued reforms and commitments from duty bearers. The extent to which capacity development outputs are leading to sustainable service delivery outcomes is difficult to assess. In many projects, there is insufficient evidence to draw conclusions regarding whether or not people being trained are applying (or able to apply) new knowledge and more effective procedures - particularly if this involves changes in norms, attitudes and readiness to question prevailing economic, patriarchal and ethnic power structures. There is outcome evidence that organisations are re-structuring or reforming mandates to enable more efficient, transparent, accountable and non-discriminatory ways of working. It is not yet clear, however, how many of the new and reformed institutional structures are now

receiving the financial and human resources needed to operationalise these new mandates on a wider scale.

It can be noted that the shift in emphasis in the Swedish portfolio from policy formation to capacity development parallels a shift in governmental focus from policy formation to implementation. As such capacity development is being emphasised at the same time as partners in government and civil society are themselves “experimenting” with how to implement relatively new aims within the new institutional environment. The sustainability of the capacities developed will be dependent on the success of these “experiments”, and it is too early to draw conclusions about this process.

The issue of translating project-level outputs into sustainable outcomes is related to the effectiveness of Swedish dialogue with the GoK and development partners. Stakeholder interviewees note that in most cases Sweden’s dialogue has greater influence on government policies and commitments to finance and learn from projects than would be expected given the relatively small amount of funding provided in relation to overall investments.

3.4.2 Sectoral Sustainability Challenges

- i. *NRE: Improved management of natural resource utilisation with a focus on sustainable growth that benefits poor people*

NALEP had achieved great increases in service provision, and there was evidence of impacts on production and profitability as well, but it is not clear whether such sectoral performance has been maintained since the closure of the programme, given the reluctance of the government to take over the recurrent costs of these services afterwards. Sweden has a close and trusting relationship with the Agricultural Sector Coordination Unit, which bodes well for influencing the government in relation to Swedish objectives. However, the extent to which this dialogue will lead to sustainable governmental commitments to focus on rural poverty alleviation will be related to higher level government commitments to invest in pro-poor agricultural policies (and agriculture in general), and progress in this respect has been limited.

- ii. *UD: Improved urban planning which allows for the participation of poor residents.*

The UD sectoral objective emphasises a means (planning) to achieve an intended outcome (participation of the poor). Planning processes have become more transparent and participatory, largely due to Swedish support. In the current situation, when many aspects of this improved planning are on the verge of being rolled out, there are positive indications that the plans (and especially the systems and structures for planning) and demonstration projects may sustainably contribute to the intended outcomes in terms of greater and more inclusive participation when the plans are then implemented and the demonstrations contribute to broader learning.

The sustainable outcomes of any demonstration project are related to the capacities and commitments to broadly diffuse and replicate these initiatives. The evaluation has not been able to assess whether this has been achieved.

iii. *DHR: A more efficient state that respects and promotes human rights and the rule of law.*

Sweden can be said to have effectively contributed to sustainability by significant support to the momentum towards broader participation stipulated in the Constitution. This is exemplified by support to civil society (including efforts in other sectors, such as UD), which has empowered people to successfully demand compensation for illegal evictions and other human rights abuses. Sustainability of outcomes of pilot efforts, such as has been used in some components of support to police reform, will only be sustainable if government agencies are able and committed to learning from and applying aspects of these programmes in their own broader on-going reform efforts. Despite positive initial outcomes, it is too early to judge whether this will lead to sustainable changes. By contrast, GoK commitments to scaling up and covering recurrent costs of pilot child protection programmes initiated through UNICEF have been very strong, with, as noted earlier, 60 per cent of financing coming from the government.

The nine evaluation case studies were assessed for sustainability. Table 3 below provides a very rough guide to achievement based on the evaluation team's assessments.

Table 3: Case Study Sustainability Assessment

Case Study	Sustainability
CSUDP (UD)	Evidence of local ownership and leadership; spaces used likely to continue after the project; some dependence on external financing (especially in relation to demonstration/pilots).
KMP (UD)	Some evidence of support from government for the programme in the longer term but reform takes time and it is not clear that government will fund this programme if required beyond the donor funding period.
M&E Capacity/NIMES (DHR)	Strong local ownership; reporting increasing in regularity; plans for extension.
National Police Service (DHR)	Concerns have been expressed about both high level and lower level commitment to the reforms that this capacity building initiative envisages.
Electoral Reform (DHR)	The constitution and various legislative changes enhance the possibility of long term sustained transformation. Linked reforms (judiciary and security sector reforms) will also add support.
Bridging Programme (NRE)	There is evidence of ownership for the road map and the new ways of working with WRUAs. Continued reliance on donor funding is a cause for concern.
LSNSA (NRE)	Evidence that influence on institutions and policy is likely to lead to results which will be sustained. Ownership is very strong among the LSNSAs. However, ownership for the specific modality is weak.
CSF NR (NRE)	Dependence on donor funding, but from an increasing number of sources; sourcing and acting on advice on how to strengthen the programme.
FSD II (NRE)	FSD argue that private sector provision of financial services is more likely to be sustainable than government provision. This is a demand driven initiative.

	Moderate		Good
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3.4.3 Conclusions on Sustainability

Several programmes may have achieved sustainable outcomes in enhancing the accountability of duty bearers to rights holders, either through direct support to developing the capacity of service providers, or through strengthening the watchdog functions of civil society actors. It is not possible to verify the extent to which these initiatives have led to changes in attitudes or the prevailing power structures across the three sectors. The informal power structures and dominance of the elite in Kenyan society may stand in the way of sustainable changes in attitudes and practices. It has not been possible to assess whether the outcomes achieved in capacity development have proven effective in overcoming these potential structural impediments to achieving sustained impact. Furthermore, the shift in emphasis in the Swedish portfolio to capacity development parallels new governmental “experiments” in implementation amidst the new institutional environment. It is too early to draw conclusions about the sustainability of these “experiments”.

At the end of the Strategy period Kenya’s formal commitments and institutional structures bode well for realisation of the overall goal of Swedish development cooperation in Kenya and the principles that underpin this goal. Sustainability will depend on continued adherence to the new Constitutional commitments to address the complex nature of poverty and respect human rights principles. To become sustainable, these principles will need to be anchored in practice and in the norms of public service provision, natural resource management, urban development and the democratic process.

The ultimate sustainability of planning, policy, pilot and bridging initiatives will become apparent when the results of these initiatives are rolled out. As such, it is difficult to assess the sustainability of the portfolio at this time. There are some indications that concern is warranted, particularly in service provision efforts where GoK commitments to making financial allocations to maintain, much less build upon, these models has been weak. There are also positive examples where demonstrations and pilots have led to broader learning and GoK financial allocations.

Chapter 4: Conclusions, Recommendations and Lessons Learnt

4.1 CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions briefly bring together the evaluation findings in relation to the questions in the ToR.

Relevance:

- *Are the different sector portfolios well-designed to reach the poorest, most underserved areas?*

Portfolios have been structured in a two-pronged manner, with policy formation, planning and capacity development efforts combined with direct engagement in services and social protection, some of which involves geographic targeting. There is an appropriate mix of engagement, but the complex and broad nature of support has meant that it is not always apparent whether potential synergies between these two types of interventions have been achieved.

- *Has the prioritisation based on Vision 2030 and KJAS led to relevant support?*

Support has been relevant in terms of demonstrating the value of Kenyan ownership and leadership during a period when commitments to aid effectiveness have, in many respects, been on the wane. Sweden's approach of investing major efforts in promoting harmonisation and alignment has not resulted in the desired influence on the broader development community. Despite considerable fragmentation in programming at the start of the Strategy period, a significant degree of crystallisation has emerged over time. In many respects this is primarily driven by a convergence of programming processes around how to best implement that aims of the Constitution. Given the uncertainties that exist regarding international relations with Kenya in the post-2013 election period, an agile yet principled approach to alignment continues to be important.

- *How has the rights perspective been applied within each sector?*

The application of a Kenyan owned rights-based perspective has been driven by using the Constitution as a mandate and a point of leverage to build on emerging empowerment trends. The different projects within the different sectors have applied a rights-based perspective to varying degrees and through a broad range of approaches. Participation has been particularly strong in NRE and UD, and accountability has been strong in DHR. Non-discrimination has generally been weaker, with the exception of gender equality.

- *How have the poor people's perspectives been applied within each sector?*

The differences relate more to individual projects rather than sectors. The perspectives of the poor are most apparent when initiatives directly reflect poor people's con-

cerns about governance of access to resources and services. There has been insufficient critical reflection over prevailing assumptions about which development trajectories are likely to have the greatest impact on poverty, particularly with regard to local level power dynamics and relations.

- *How have thematic priorities been incorporated into each sector?*

Gender equality has been incorporated throughout the portfolio through a three-pronged approach using direct targeted programmes, mainstreaming and dialogue. In most cases this combined approach has created synergies. Where the Embassy has encountered a lack of ownership, efforts have been redoubled, often with good effect. Environmental sustainability is surprisingly overlooked (given Sweden's history of strong involvement in these issues in Kenya). Resilience efforts have been mounted as required, but in a largely reactive rather than proactive manner. This appears to be related to a dysfunctional division of responsibilities between the Humanitarian Department at Sida Stockholm and the Embassy in Kenya. Sweden's engagement in climate change efforts have been modest.

Effectiveness:

- *What are the main results achieved against outcomes in relation to the sector objectives?*

The umbrella nature of the NRE "sector" and the fact that a major part of the portfolio only addresses natural resource issues indirectly has meant that, even though the results of the individual projects have been significant, results in relation to the objective have not been in focus. This is related to the fact that the different sub-sectors have developed well individually, but without an overall strategic vision.

The UD sectoral support has been effective in strengthening planning and encouraging the participation of poor residents of informal settlements. Projects have been slow in starting, but the general direction is in line with intentions. Challenges lie ahead in seeing how plans will be implemented and planning processes diffused to the new counties.

Sweden has achieved its aims in DHR. Here again, the "sector" is actually an umbrella for a range of activities. Despite the broad nature of the sector, the opportunistic approach of choosing important initiatives during this transition period in Kenya's history has been appropriate, as Sweden has been able to achieve quick results by building on Kenyans' own desire for rapid reforms after the tragic events of 2007-8. Synergies among judiciary, police and prison reforms seem possible.

- *Did contributions deliver as planned?*

A significant proportion of programming has been delivered as planned, though some initiatives (particularly those being largely implemented through GoK institutions) have been very slow in getting started and bridging efforts have gone on longer than intended. This is particularly true in UD and NRE.

- *What are the experiences and lessons learned from policy work?*

Sweden has leveraged its trust among Kenyan stakeholders and has largely made a good selection of partners in relation to policy formation, so as to make impressive contributions to policy reform in a short period of time. As a small donor, Sweden undoubtedly “punches above its weight” in this regard. Challenges (and a degree of scepticism) exist with regard to the commitments and (devolved) capacities to implement these policies in the coming years.

- *Has dialogue strengthened the results of the contributions?*

Dialogue with civil society and GoK has had impressive results, particularly in strengthening focus on outcomes. The Embassy has combined approaches that strongly emphasise the provisions of the new Constitution with considerable political awareness. The approaches which have involved convening a three-way dialogue among the Embassy, GoK agencies and civil society appear most effective.

Efficiency:

- *What have been the challenges and successes with regard to donor cooperation?*

Sweden has successfully taken on a strong role (in relation to the scale of its support) in donor cooperation and has had a particularly strong convening role. Less success can be noted in stemming the overall deterioration of commitments to aid effectiveness in the international community.

- *Why are different sectors using different cooperation channels?*

The evaluation notes a significant degree of path dependency in the NRE sector, with the choice of cooperation channels largely determined by a tendency to build on old partnerships. This has been positive in terms of leveraging long-standing relations to ensure ownership. However, less strategic and structured attention has been given to identifying which channels are most appropriate for meeting future challenges. Where the Embassy has identified CSOs that can mobilise the voice of rights holders and hold duty bearers to account (primarily in UD, DHR and land), this combination of channels has proven highly effective. Difficulties in finding national CSOs to take on a similar role in water and agriculture have proven to be a limiting factor.

- *What are the relative benefits of different aid modalities?*

The mix of modalities has been largely appropriate for achieving the objectives of the Strategy. Working through UN agencies and civil society facilities has been a good way of reducing transaction costs and risks of cooperation. Basket funds, where they have been maintained, are effective and a way to retain some focus on aid effectiveness principles. Working with direct support to GoK institutions has had positive results.

Sustainability:

- *Are the contributions sustainable?*

The ultimate sustainability of planning, policy, pilot and bridging initiatives will come when the results of these initiatives are rolled out. The shift in emphasis in the Swedish portfolio from policy formation to capacity development parallels a shift in governmental focus from policy formation to implementation. As such, capacity de-

velopment is being emphasised at the same time that partners in government and civil society are themselves “experimenting” with how to implement relatively new aims within the new institutional environment. It is too early to draw conclusions about the sustainability of these “experiments”. Therefore, it is difficult to assess the sustainability of the portfolio at this time. There are some indications that concern is warranted, particularly in service provision efforts where some impressive project-level results have not been matched by GoK commitments to making financial allocations to maintain, much less build upon, these models.

- *Has the prioritisation based on Vision 2030 and KJAS led to sustainable support?*

Here again, it is too early to make a definitive judgement. Kenyans have genuine ownership of the new Constitution (commitments to Vision 2030 have been more difficult to assess), and are committed to holding their government to account for its implementation. Sweden’s alignment with these priorities has thus been highly appropriate, as it has built on existing momentum in this regard.

Impact:

- *What impact has been achieved towards the overall strategic objectives?*

Sweden has made a strong contribution towards achieving the overall strategic objectives. As such, Sweden can be credited with having played a considerable role in the improved prospects for development, as compared with the state of affairs at the start of the Strategy. As such, outcomes contributing to prospects for genuine change are good, even though the overall economic situation remains mixed, the political situation is, in some respects, not encouraging, and poverty is not being alleviated at a satisfactory rate. It should be noted, however, that the sectoral objectives are not amenable to impact assessment due to their “umbrella” character.

- *What is the collective (aggregated) contribution of case studies to the Strategy?*

The case studies illustrate the range of successful and less successful initiatives. Their findings can be seen as indicative, but cannot be aggregated in a meaningful manner.

- *Is there a systematic approach to formulating a theory of change?*

The theories of change within the portfolio vary greatly. Some are clear and derive from a systematic and reflective consideration of how to move forward in relation to political and economic trends. There are two problematic aspects of the theories of change. First, some programmes tend to take assumptions for granted regarding the efficacy of the intended “solutions” to poverty alleviation, without due empirical analyses of who it is that actually benefits from, for example, access to credit, formalised land tenure or agricultural commercialisation. Second, there is sometimes a lack of clarity regarding how small pilot or demonstration activities will eventually be scaled up or contribute to broader learning. Some learning about how to scale up has emerged during implementation, leading to *ex post* theories of change. This is positive, but greater outcomes could presumably be achieved if there had been more attention to scaling up questions in the design phase.

Furthermore, even if progress has been made in moving toward approaches reflecting overall theories of change within (and sometimes among) the three sectors, the prospects for this were bleak when the strategy was designed. At that time the demands for a reduction from nine to three sectors resulted in the creation of “sectors” that actually more resembled umbrellas than definable sectors per se.

4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations, derived from both the evaluation and the PDA, are presented so as to summarise and provide overall direction for future efforts. The broad scope of this evaluation has meant that it would be inappropriate to present more specific recommendations at programme level. These recommendations are framed so as to be useful in an unfolding policy context, given uncertainties regarding both Kenyan and Swedish policies and priorities in the future.

1. Focus on the perspectives of the poor through an emphasis on inclusion and resilience

A focus on the perspectives of the poor demands greater clarity in overall objectives and the associated theories of change in relation to both directly targeted programming and efforts to influence the broader policy and institutional context. Synergies should be pursued by continuing current efforts to highlight the provisions in the Constitution for more inclusive development, while also devoting new attention to the need for a resilience perspective reflecting the repeated shocks, uncertainties and climatic, economic and political volatility that have characterised Kenyan development in recent years. Related to this, there is a need for rigorous but flexible monitoring and evaluation systems, with appropriate baseline analyses and indicators, to look critically at the extent to which theories of change regarding the benefits of development initiatives prove to be inclusive and whether these processes support the livelihoods of those who are most vulnerable to recurrent shocks.

2. Rather than sectors, focus on a limited number of cross-sectoral issues

Sweden should reassess the sectoral character of its Strategy to find more appropriate ways to identify and strengthen critical synergies across the portfolio. Two areas where this is particularly important are land and water, as both have implications across the rural-urban divide; and as both have broader links to human rights, governance and inclusion. Similarly, there is a need to address the silo thinking that fails to provide a basis for supporting livelihood diversification or that delinks land, water and food security support, or that effectively treats urban and rural development as separate issues (despite the fact that Kenyan households are themselves focusing their efforts on “straddling” this divide). This will be essential in order to give greater emphasis to climate change and resilience, anchored in the perspectives of the poor.

3. Address volatility in the economy, climate and political context in a flexible and inclusive manner

The PDA describes how poverty is related to poor people’s capacities to deal with a range of shocks and take advantage of rapidly changing urban and rural opportunities.

Kenyan history suggests that a linear development path is unlikely to emerge for the foreseeable future. In order to maintain relevance in relation to the perspectives of the poor, it is necessary to focus on the governance of (currently frail) systems to respond to and mitigate a range of climatic, economic and political shocks. This also means addressing recurrent shocks, disasters and conflict by designing development programming (e.g., identifying appropriate indicators) to reflect explicit factors that reduce people's vulnerability to acute hazards, economic downturns and conflict. This may involve restructuring the portfolio to ensure that efforts to enhance recovery capacities are built-in to all programming in high risk areas, rather than being dealt with through add-on components or hurriedly designed recovery investments. Such a focus would require rethinking the current division of responsibilities for humanitarian and development programming between Sida Stockholm and the Embassy. This could also include looking for a niche related to governance for climate change adaptation. Sweden has many partners and mechanisms in place in the current portfolio which could be used as a starting point for such a refocus.

4. Engage in the emerging devolution processes through entry points established in the current portfolio

Sweden's forte has been and is likely to remain in strengthening of Kenyan institutions. Sweden's central role in supporting new policy frameworks has created the necessary trust and knowledge through which it can work with devolution within prevailing trajectories and relations. The Embassy should take stock of emerging institutional entry points for engaging with county governments (e.g., through ASDSP, the existing UD portfolio, judiciary reform), and where pilot initiatives suggest that additional entry points could be established (e.g., police reform, land, social protection). Based on this mapping the Embassy should find ways to engage with the counties in such a way that sectoral silos are overcome and learning is maximised. The potential for finding cross-sectoral synergies and efficiency gains may be found for efforts to enhance attention to HRBA, gender equality and resilience where these efforts coincide geographically, but special attention should be given to ensure that the search for these synergies and efficiency gains does not lead to a focus on dynamic, high potential areas alone.

5. Continue to move beyond policies and plans to focus on capacities and processes that enhance governance, especially at county level

As Kenyan legislation, policies, plans and institutional structures fall into place, efforts should continue to move towards developing capacities for implementation. This is particularly important in relation to finding ways to support the devolution process and helping to ensure that the legal reforms that have been supported in recent years are actually understood by those who need to act and implement them. Sweden has a potentially unique and important role in encouraging attention to the perspectives of the poor and the principles of non-discrimination, participation, transparency, and accountability, especially when confronting the limited capacities at county level regarding their new responsibilities. Sweden should focus on understanding and contributing to the capacities that support the implementation of new policies, be this at central or local levels. This should reflect Sweden's declared global emphasis on human re-

source capacity, organisational development and the creation of an enabling institutional environment. There remain many ambiguities about who will be responsible for what, and how both vertical (devolution) and horizontal (pluralistic and multisectoral) coordination will play out over the coming years. As a trusted partner, Sweden has a unique potential convening and perhaps even brokering role in bring together different actors to confront these uncertainties and attain consensus on ways to move forward.

6. Find ways to ensure that the private sector can contribute to more diverse livelihood opportunities throughout the portfolio

Programming should recognise that the private sector is central to supporting economic growth and development. Many stakeholders raised concerns relating to the instability of livelihoods reliant on the informal sector and rising unemployment and subsequent alienation – particularly among the young. Private investments are needed for livelihood diversification and local economic development, and these need to be facilitated. It is now widely recognised that poverty is best alleviated through efforts to expand available livelihood choices, particularly for youth and women, and these choices will primarily be generated by the private sector. Entry points to encourage the growth of such opportunities involve finding ways to enhance: (a) rural-urban economic linkages, (b) financial services that provide needed capital for poor people's own investments, and (c) mechanisms by which private sector actors can better manage the risks in investing in difficult environments such as urban informal settlements and the ASALs. A means to pursue this must be a closer dialogue with the business community to be able to recognise such opportunities and design initiatives that create appropriate incentives for private sector development that generate new livelihood opportunities.

7. Make a political economy perspective explicit in results frameworks

The main reason that poverty prevails in Kenya is political and institutionalised decision making which favours the elite. The achievement of outcomes and impact reflecting the perspectives of the poor and HRBA requires attention to the forces behind exclusion and the opportunities, within the prevailing political economy, to enhance inclusion. The Embassy is aware of how formal structures can provide a smokescreen behind which informal practices undermine reform, particularly reforms in relation to gender equality, equitable access to land and water resources, and the ethnic politics that have plagued Kenyan development. Sweden needs to better apply this awareness in programming through clearer and more critical theories of change regarding how efforts may or may not lead to pro-poor outcomes within prevailing elite-led development trajectories. Steps should be taken to possibly overcome “technocratic” assessments, particularly to ensure that risk assessments give due attention to the “external risks” in the wider political economy. This can be facilitated through close partnerships with relevant think tanks and civil society.

8. Recognise that a rights-based approach to development in Kenya demands a focus on equitable access to resources and services

Sweden has a comparative advantage stemming from the current portfolio (and its long history in Kenyan development cooperation) to build on existing efforts that fo-

cus on securing more equitable access to (and tenure for) land and water resources in both rural and urban areas. However, the playing field for determining who has access to resources and services is changing. This is related to diverse factors ranging from devolution to large-scale land acquisition to climate change. In the future there will be a need to closely monitor the impact of such trajectories for access to basic public services and defending the rights of the poor to access land and water resources. Sweden will need to adapt approaches to the emerging new constellations of duty bearers and service providers, as well as shifting environmental and economic conditions. These efforts need to be cognisant of how new county authorities are struggling to meet the expectations of their constituents, define their roles and balance their budgets.

9. Maintain a flexible approach to funding anchored in critical indicators based on clearer and more dynamic theories of change

Sweden needs to more closely focus on what success means in the dynamic and volatile context of Kenyan development, and then be flexible as it evolves its own theories of change in the way it allocates funds. Gender equality is not a sector, and neither is PFM. Both will require effective vertical and horizontal linkages. It is therefore important that, in the future, Swedish development cooperation results are measured based on indicators that can highlight the extent to which institutional reforms translate into broader changes in practice and reflect emergent challenges and opportunities. The commitments in the new constitutional, legal and policy frameworks can suggest some areas where a baseline can be established. Flexibility is needed to follow Kenyan actors as they struggle to implement these new commitments amid the inevitable surprises that will arise.

10. Keep sustainable commitments and scale in focus

GoK commitments vary for covering recurrent costs and scaling up Swedish-funded initiatives. It is necessary to focus greater attention on how pilots, demonstrations and services may be sustained and scaled-up and/or what lessons can be derived from these initiatives. Critical assessment is needed of ownership among duty bearers and how to sustain advocacy from institutions representing rights holders. It is particularly important to critically assess and address serious risks that financing services may inadvertently encourage perception that “the poor” (or the inhabitants of the ASALs, the informal settlements, women, youth, pastoralists, etc.) are a responsibility of the donors and not the government. Even where success is recognised, broader commitments to scaling-up the lessons of many existing projects has been mixed. This suggests the need for more attention to following up on the theories of change, through which individual projects (especially pilots) are expected to lead to profound institutional change and GoK ownership.

4.3 LESSONS LEARNT

1. The Embassy wisely recognised the necessity of transcending the directives in the original Strategy document to find new, creative and pragmatic ways to ensure that Sweden’s vision for development cooperation (based strongly on pluralistic national ownership and HRBA) could be maintained during a tur-

bulent period. This suggests that Sweden should recognise that even the new results strategies will inevitably become “out of date” in contexts such as that in Kenya, and should not become a straightjacket that leads to wasted resources and efforts when it becomes clear that certain approaches and priorities are no longer viable.

2. Currently, global commitments to the aid effectiveness agenda appear to be waning. The Kenyan experience illustrates the importance of critically reflecting on when it is wise to redirect attention from what may be unviable mechanisms of aid effectiveness back to Swedish core values regarding national ownership, promotion of a dynamic interplay between the state and civil society and broad and transparent dialogue on HRBA, policy change and governance. These core Swedish aid effectiveness values preceded the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and should again be brought to the fore when broader international commitments to the aid effectiveness agenda are weak.
3. Aims for quantity and quality of reporting are not easily reconciled. Sweden’s intentions to strengthen outcome reporting are only likely to be achieved if demands for quantities of reports are reduced so as to make what is most important for reporting clearer to partners and to enable Embassy staff to themselves pay greater attention to assessing and reflecting on outcomes achieved.
4. More explicit attention to outcomes is not just a reporting issue, or something that must be addressed by elaborate and time-consuming impact evaluations. This can also be achieved by closer dialogue and engagement with national and regional think tanks that can help to place an understanding of outcomes in the context of national and international development trends.
5. The experience in dealing with the problematic political and economic context in Kenya suggests the importance of ensuring that these contextual factors become central to programme assessments, not the least risk assessment. The emphasis in current Sida guidelines on “internal risks” should not be allowed to lead to naivety regarding the “external risks” in countries where prevailing power relations may skew benefits away from the poor.
6. If resilience is to come to fore in a more cross-cutting manner in Swedish programming, the division between management of humanitarian issues from Stockholm and development issues in the Embassies must be reassessed.

Annex 1 – Terms of Reference

Draft Terms of Reference for an Implementation Evaluation of the Cooperation Strategy with Kenya 2009-2013

1. Background

Sweden has a history of development cooperation in Kenya that goes back half a century. This legacy of long term engagement constitutes one of the building blocks that the cooperation rests on. Development cooperation is governed by the Cooperation Strategy (2009-2013) which is aligned to the Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS) 2007–2012, signed by 17 Development Partners in collaboration with the Kenyan Government. The objective of the KJAS is to support the government's efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the targets that the government has set for long-term development in Kenya in its Vision 2030. In addition the government's Medium Term Plan (MTP) 2008-2012 is the first in a series of successive five-year medium term plans which governs implementation of the Kenya Vision 2030. The second MTP is currently being drafted by the government in consultation with its development partners.

The overall objective of the Cooperation Strategy (2009-2013) is “a Kenya where all poor people are given the possibilities to improve their livelihood conditions and where their human rights are realised”. The perspectives of poor people on development and the rights perspective are mainstreamed in the implementation of the development cooperation. The three main sectors of cooperation are: Natural Resources and the Environment, Urban Development and Democracy and Human Rights. The total volume of the current Strategy was originally 350 MSEK which was later increased to 400 MSEK after a Mid-term Review in 2011.

In view of the upcoming end of the current Cooperation Strategy in 2013, an implementation evaluation divided into two parts will be undertaken. The results of these analyses will be fed into the new Cooperation Strategy (‘Results Offer’) (2014-2018).

2. Purpose

The purpose of the evaluation of the implementation of the Strategy for development cooperation with Kenya 2009-2013 is to assess to what extent the Swedish development cooperation during the period has been effective, efficient, relevant¹⁸ and sustainable and what impact has been achieved.¹⁹ More specifically:

¹⁸ The relevance of the Strategy for development cooperation with Kenya has been reviewed in a Mid Term Evaluation (2011) and a Portfolio analysis (2012), which both concluded that the composition on the portfolio is relevant.

¹⁹ OECD/DAC recommended evaluation criteria.

Part I

The purpose of the PDA is to: 1) contribute to a better understanding of poverty and vulnerability and its causes, manifestations and consequences in Kenya, 2) identify and draw conclusions on fundamental development challenges and opportunities, thereby identifying needed development efforts, 3) map the main development partners including identifying possible agents for change, for sustainable development including analysing the role of development partners and cooperation in Kenya and in particular Sweden's role.

Part II

Building on the findings from the Poverty and Development Assessment, the purpose of the Implementation evaluation of the Strategy for development cooperation with Kenya is to identify what results have been achieved, and what Sweden should propose to do in the upcoming cooperation period. More specifically, the evaluation will inform the priorities in the next cooperation period by assessing: 1) the progress towards the overall Strategy objective, the sector objectives and the extent to which contributions reached planned results and possible other outcomes and results, 2) the main dialogue issues and to what extent dialogue contributed to achieving results against the overall Strategy objective and the sector objectives, 3) the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of channels (government/civil society/multilateral) as well as aid modalities (sector programme/project/core contribution/programme based approach). The conclusions drawn and the main lessons learnt will serve as a basis for the development of the future 'Results Offer'.

3. Scope of work and methodology

The overall scope of the work will be divided into two parts:

- I. Poverty and Development Assessment
- II. Implementation evaluation of the Strategy for development cooperation with Kenya 2009-2013

The PDA will be conducted first followed by the Implementation evaluation.

3.1 Poverty and Development Assessment

3.1.1 Methodology

The consultant will mainly through a desk review, synthesise and analyse relevant existing information about fundamental development challenges and opportunities facing Kenya since its first democratic elections in 2002. The development should be described in relation to the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (ERSWEC) 2003-2007 and its successor, Vision 2030. More specifically the development should be judged against the targets set in the first Medium-Term Plan 2008-2012 (MTP) which governs implementation of the Kenya Vision 2030. The assessment should result in a report summarising conclusions made and give recommendations on a way forward for Swedish development cooperation.

3.1.2 Specific tasks

1. Identify and compile the most relevant sources of information on poverty and key development challenges facing Kenya (e.g. the Kenyan Government's analyses and development strategies (Annual Progress Report of MTP), World Bank Assessments,

- UNDP National Human Development Reports, analyses by other cooperating partners, academic studies etc.). Consult relevant sections at the Embassy, Sida and key development partners to identify possibly information sources and/or knowledge gaps.
2. Synthesise and analyse the relevant existing information identified above about fundamental development challenges and opportunities facing Kenya since 2002.
 3. Organise a workshop for the Embassy and Sida (relevant departments/staff) and key stakeholders in Kenya from government, civil society, cooperating partners and universities. The purpose is to discuss and assess the reports on poverty and the key development challenges identified under task 1 and 2, to come to a common understanding and draw conclusions. Specific tasks for the consultant includes:
 - i. Prepare background material (e.g. summarise conclusions from the reports identified under scope1, prepare discussion themes, assign tasks to relevant sections at the Embassy/Sida departments)
 - ii. Facilitate an open discussion and debate
 - iii. Document the workshop discussions and conclusions
 4. Write a synthesised PDA with the conclusions from the desk study and the workshop as a starting point. The PDA shall consist of the following six main sections:
 - i. **Country context.** Short description of the fundamental economic, social-cultural, environmental and peace and security context in Kenya including basic power relations and the relevant political developments.
 - ii. **Who are the poor and vulnerable?** Assessment of key issues: “Who are the poor and vulnerable?”, “Where do they live?” and “What are their characteristics of their poverty?” including a special focus on gender. The assessment should be based on a multi-dimensional understanding of poverty.²⁰
 - iii. **Opportunities for development.** Internal and external factors influencing Kenya’s development. Main constraints, challenges and opportunities to development. What are the main risks? How could these risks affect the Swedish development cooperation? How should Sweden relate to these risks?
 - iv. **The Government’s commitments and actions.** Assessment of the Government’s commitments and actions in the areas of poverty alleviation, human rights and democracy, gender equality, national strategy for development, economic policy, public financial management system, environmental sustainability including climate change and fight against corruption. What is the actual budget provided? How has pro-poor budget allocations been made and what have they resulted in?
 - v. **Mapping of the development cooperation and its key actors in Kenya.** Analysis of key development partners (also identify and reflect on new actors and identify “agents for change”), sectors and financial flows of development

²⁰ Perspectives on Poverty, 2002, Sida.

cooperation and what have they achieved? Which development partners are engaged in which areas? Is there over or under financing in some areas? How does the coordination work and what are the challenges?

- vi. **Make an assessment of Sweden's role.** What are Sweden's strengths, weaknesses and possible comparative advantages (why and in what way?). What is Sweden's strategic role? How can Sweden act as a catalyst and/or innovative?
- vii. **Conclusions.** Summarise and draw conclusions on: i) fundamental development challenges and opportunities on the key issues discussed in the previous chapters, ii) the strategic role of development cooperation and feasible aid modalities including which risks exist and to what degree they affect the overall effectiveness, iii) strategic role for Swedish support in the forthcoming cooperation strategy period.

3.2 Implementation evaluation of the Strategy for development cooperation with Kenya 2009-2013

3.2.1 Methodology

The consultant will through a desk review and case studies on specific contributions in combination with field visits, analyse relevant existing information about results achieved against the Strategy and sector objectives during the Strategy period using the results matrix as a support. The consultant should conduct interviews using a participatory approach with the Embassy staff and with a selection of key partners in Kenya. The results assessment should be based on the continuous follow up (such as Strategy reports and programme reports) and evaluations done during the Strategy period. Kenya's own annual follow up the Vision 2030 (more specifically the MTP I) and studies/evaluations of the Millennium Development Goals, sector program reports, policy documents and other assessments/reports done by other Development Partners, reputable think tanks and NGOs should be used. The evaluation should result in a report summarising conclusions made and give recommendations on a way forward.

3.1.2 Specific tasks:

1. Prepare a sampling criteria for the case studies and identify two-three contributions that best represent each sector, and if relevant, other contributions of strategic importance. Assess the main results on the level of outcomes and in relation to the sector objective and where possible also assess what impact has been achieved towards the overall Strategy objective. Did the contributions deliver as planned? Are the contributions effective, efficient, relevant and sustainable?
2. Are the different sector portfolios well designed to reach the poorest, most underserved areas (e.g. for Natural resources sector the Arid and Semi Arid Lands (ASALs), Northern Kenya, refugee-receiving areas)? Note for example the need for integrated interventions to improve resilience/livelihoods in rural areas, are the current contributions equipped to help make this happen?
3. Is there a systematic approach to formulating a 'Theory of Change' (e.g. community mobilisation and participation in water resource management and water and sanitation services, increased income for small-scale farmers, public participation in plan-

ning of urban services, advocacy for reforms in all these sectors)? And is it achieving expected results?

4. Analyse how the rights perspective and the poor people's perspectives of development have been applied within the sectors. Provide concrete examples and analyse the results of the measures. This should be done by analysing application of the principles of *non-discrimination, participation, transparency and accountability*.
5. Analyse how each thematic priority (Environment and climate, Gender equality and Democracy and human rights) has been integrated in the different sectors, provide concrete examples and analyse the results of the measures.
6. Assess the main dialogue issues that were identified in the Strategy and the results achieved in relation to the sector objectives and the Strategy objective. Have the right platforms been used? Have dialogue strengthened the results of the contributions and/or have the contributions facilitated a more in-depth dialogue? Were the dialogue issues identified relevant?
7. What are the experiences and lessons learnt from policy work, actors possibilities to drive change, the government's/civil society's/private sector's and the public's role?
8. Identify challenges/successes with strengthening donor cooperation in line with the Paris Agenda.
9. Analyse why the different sectors are using different cooperation channels and analyse what channel is most effective and efficient (government (national/regional/local level), civil society and multilateral). Also assess the different aid modalities (sector programme/project/core contribution/programme based approach). Should the Swedish development cooperation strategically limit itself to sector-based approaches, and/or allow some area-based initiatives or other better alternatives?
10. Aggregate the results information from the case studies in the sectors and assess and draw conclusions on the collective contribution to the impact at the overall Strategy objective level.
11. Have the prioritisations in the Swedish Strategy which builds on Vision 2030 and KJAS led to relevant, feasible, and sustainable support to improvement of a basis for change and improved structures that can encourage and strengthen individual's poverty reduction including their rights?
12. Identify lessons learnt and assess what the implications will be for the upcoming development of 'Results offer' in relation to direction, focus, dialogue and selection of the forms of cooperation and partners? What is Sweden's strategic role in the upcoming strategy period? Summarise and give recommendations on a way forward.

4. Outcome

In the start-up of the assignment an brief Inception report including a work plan for the assignment and a description of how the chosen methods relates to the assignment in practice should be prepared.

The expected outcome for Part I, the PDA, is an interim report including a short executive summary (max 2 pages) in Swedish and English. Following the completion Part II, the Implementation evaluation, a final report in English including the main findings from the PDA,

with analysis, conclusions and recommendations and a short executive summary (max 4 pages) in Swedish and English, should be submitted.

5. Draft Time table and reporting

1. Contract signed by end of November 2012

Part I Poverty and Development Assessment

2. Gathering and compilation of information during December/January 2012-2013
3. Interviews and workshop in Nairobi mid January-February 2013
4. Draft report mid February 2013
5. Final interim report end of February 2013

Part II Implementation Evaluation

Timeframes for Part II will be agreed upon at a later stage, however planned to tentatively start in March 2013.

6. Desk review and information gathering March 2013
7. Case studies and interviews in Kenya April 2013
8. Draft report mid May 2013
9. Final report end of May 2013

6. Qualifications

The team should consist of senior and junior experts.

The senior consultant should:

- Have relevant academic background;
- Have experience from organising, leading and reporting on similar assignments;
- Have experience from preparing and structuring interviews and preparing and facilitating workshops;
- Have experience and knowledge of development cooperation;
- Have excellent knowledge of English (written and spoken)

Merits:

- Experience and knowledge of development cooperation in Kenya;

The junior consultant should:

- Have relevant academic background
- Have experience from participating in similar assignments;
- Be efficient and organised;
- Have excellent knowledge of English (written and spoken)

Merits:

- Experience and knowledge of development cooperation in Kenya;

References:

- Poverty and Development Assessment-Guidance and Outline, Sida
- Strategy for development cooperation with Kenya 2009-2013
- Mid-Term Review 2011

- Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS)
- Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (ERSWEC) 2003-2007
- Vision 2030
- Medium Term Plan 2008-2012 and Annual Progress reports of the MTP
- Draft MTP 2013-2017
- Strategy reports, 2009-2012
- Portfolio Analysis 2012

Annex 2 – Inception Report

1. Executive Summary

This Inception Report summarises the evaluation team’s understanding of the scope of work relating to the Implementation Evaluation of Sweden’s Cooperation Strategy with Kenya 2009-13. The report sets out the team’s response to the questions posed in the Terms of Reference and explains the broad approach and more detailed methodology the team will use to address these questions. A work plan including key dates for events and delivery of outputs is presented at the end of the report. A list of questions relating to process and timing which required the Embassy’s attention has been included in section 5 for ease of reference. This was used to facilitate effective collaboration between the submission of the draft and final versions of this inception report.

2. Assessment of scope of the evaluation

2.1 Background to the evaluation

Sweden’s Development Cooperation with Kenya is governed by its *Cooperation Strategy 2009-13* which is aligned to the *Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS) 2007-12*, (signed by 17 Development Partners²¹). The KJAS in turn is aligned to the specific objectives set out in Kenya’s Medium Term Plan (MTP) 2008-12 and more generally to the targets identified in Kenya’s Vision 2030. The diagram below places Sweden’s Development Cooperation Strategy chronologically in relation to Kenya’s own key planning frameworks.



²¹ Governments of: Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, African Development Bank, European Commission Delegation to Kenya, United Nations, World Bank Group.

Sweden's three main sectors of cooperation within this current 2009-13 Strategy are: Natural Resources and the Environment, Urban Development and Democracy and Human Rights. The total volume of support provided in 2012 is 400MSEK (just over US\$60m).²² This evaluation has been commissioned and will be carried out in the spirit of Sweden's overall approach to development cooperation as expressed in the Country Strategy. This states that cooperation should be characterised by “*a proactive approach ... to adapt aid initiatives to changing conditions – while keeping within established parameters – and seize opportunities to support changes as they occur*”. It is on this basis of a commitment to informed proactive support, that Sweden has chosen to combine a *Poverty Development Assessment* (to assess changing conditions) with an *Evaluation of the Country Strategy* (to identify where assistance is working best), since it is through the combined findings of these two exercises that the most relevant opportunities for meaningful support will be identified.

2.2 Purpose of the evaluation

The overall purpose of the evaluation is:

“to assess to what extent Swedish development cooperation during the period (2009-13) has been effective, efficient, relevant and sustainable and what impact²³ has been achieved”.

This purpose is framed in terms of OECD DAC's five key criteria for evaluation as defined below.

DAC Criteria	Focus
RELEVANCE:	The extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group/recipient.
EFFECTIVENESS:	A measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives.
EFFICIENCY	The extent to which aid uses the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results.
IMPACT²⁴	The positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended; this involves the main impacts and effects resulting from the activity on the local social, economic, environmental and other development indicators.
SUSTAINABILITY	Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn.

The specific questions posed within the ToR²⁵ for this assignment are matched against the DAC criteria in section 3 of this report to determine the relevance of the questions with re-

²² Increased from the original MSEK350 after a mid-term review in 2011.

²³ Given the 5 year time period it's probably a bit ambitious to focus on Impact and so the focus will be mostly on Results, although impact will be included whenever possible.

²⁴ See footnote 3.

²⁵ Attached as Annex I

gard to the overall purpose. Limitations identified by the study team – also explored in section 3 - have implications for evaluability.

2.3 Specific objectives

Within the Terms of Reference, the evaluation requirement is presented in two parts:

1. A **Poverty and Development Assessment**
2. An **Implementation Evaluation**

It is intended that the results of both of these analyses will be fed into Sweden's new *Results Strategy* for 2014-18.

Broadly, the **Poverty and Development Assessment** will have succeeded if it:

- Provides a basis for the country team to synthesise evidence and assume an overarching perspective on how it intends to respond to poverty and vulnerability in Kenya;
- Reaches conclusions on fundamental development challenges and opportunities (and in particular needed development efforts);
- Maps development partners in terms of their role as agents of change;
- Identifies against this backdrop, Sweden's particular added value.

Broadly, the **Implementation Evaluation** will have succeeded if it assesses:

- Progress towards Sweden's overall strategic objectives, sector objectives and the extent to which results (planned or unplanned) have been achieved;
- The extent to which dialogue has contributed to the achievement of strategic and sectoral objectives;
- The effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of channels for aid (government, civil society, multilateral) and aid modalities (sector programme, core contribution, programme based approach).
- Contributions which have led to achievements that align particularly with the PDA findings and which can be built upon within the new Results Strategy.

2.4 Scope of work for the Evaluation Assignment

The overall scope of work is framed by the two parts of the assignment as described above and each will involve four types of activity:

- Synthesis of the documentation available for the PDA and for the evaluation (results assessment);
- Workshops/focus group discussions to present and expand on findings generated through the PDA desk work initially and later through the combined PDA and evaluation/results assessment;
- Case studies to explore how the sector portfolios reflect the underlying causes of poverty analysed in the PDA, to assess the efficiencies/effectiveness of different modalities and channels, and to expand and deepen the findings of the results assessment as part of the evaluation;
- Report writing to produce an interim PDA report initially and later a Final Implementation Evaluation Report (incorporating the main findings from the PDA).

The **PDA** component of the work will involve synthesis, interviews, a validation workshop and report writing. The report will be presented following the structure set out in the Terms

of Reference which appropriately draws on Sida's *Poverty and Development Assessment Guidelines* and Annex I to these Guidelines: *Outline of a PDA*:

1	<i>Country context.</i>
2	<i>Who are the poor and vulnerable and what are the factors that lead to poverty and vulnerability?</i>
3	<i>Opportunities for development.</i>
4	<i>The Government's commitments and actions.</i>
5	<i>Mapping of development cooperation and key actors in Kenya.</i>
6	<i>Sweden's role.</i>
7	<i>Conclusions.</i>

This will produce an overarching PDA report designed to inform the forthcoming Swedish Results Strategy 2014-18. The focus of the PDA will not be particular sectors but the underlying causes of poverty, structural obstacles to development as well as triggers for development in Kenya (rather than a general facts and figures summary, which would tend to illustrate the symptoms of poverty). The PDA will seek to connect these findings on underlying causes and development triggers to the overall development partner landscape and so assist Sweden's strategic decision making with regard to the identification of future cooperation priorities and associated key results.

The **implementation evaluation** will involve synthesis, focus group discussions, interviews with partners and stakeholders, a validation workshop and report writing. The work will incorporate two approaches:

- an analysis of results recorded against the strategic and sectoral objectives and targets set out in the results matrix and
- a closer look at selected case studies from Sweden's sectoral portfolios in order to more deeply explore specific contributions.

In line with the Country Strategy, the evaluation will focus on three sectors identified in the current cooperation strategy: democratic governance, natural resources and the environment, and urban development.²⁶ The final evaluation report will provide evidence related to impact, sustainability, effectiveness, efficiency, relevance and design (including a consideration of the Theory of Change)– in line with the overall purpose and the specific tasks outlined in the ToR. The relationship between the specific questions asked in the ToR and the overall purpose are explored more fully in section 3 below.

2.5 Work plan and timeline

A detailed work plan is provided as Annex II and highlights the following key dates and deadlines:

²⁶ Even though the Country cooperation strategy outlines three main sectors of development cooperation, it should be noted that according to OECD DACs sector definitions the Embassy's development cooperation engagement rather spans across 8-9 sectors.

15 February:	Submission of Inception Report to Embassy
21-22 March:	PDA Validation Workshop, Nairobi
25-27 March:	Sector Focused Group Discussions/ interviews, Nairobi
19 April :	Draft PDA
30 April:	Final PDA
w/b 13 th May	Case Study Interviews, Nairobi
w/b 20 th May	Results Validation Workshop, Nairobi
31 May:	Final Draft Report
15 June:	Final Report

The evaluation team recognises the need to be flexible with regard to these dates and timings, particularly given the possibility of disruption in the period around elections in Kenya. Furthermore, holidays and absences may well require some of the dates proposed above to be changed. The Embassy has been invited to suggest changes in order to find best-fit with wider commitments and circumstances (see section 5 below). In order that there is appropriate time for workshop and meeting preparation, any change to the March events should be later rather than sooner.

3. Relevance and evaluability of evaluation questions

3.1 Relevance of evaluation questions

The framework below aligns questions raised in the ToR with the DAC criteria incorporated in the overall purpose statement and provides a headline on the approach/method that will be used to answer them. These approaches are explained more fully in section 4.

DAC Criteria	Questions (from ToR)	Approach (Method)
Effectiveness	- What are the main results achieved against outcomes in relation to the sector objectives? - Did contributions deliver as planned? - What is the experience and lessons learned from policy work?	Desk review Focus group discussions Interviews Validation workshop
Efficiency	- Has dialogue strengthened the results of the contributions? - What have been the challenges and successes with regard to donor cooperation? - Why are different sectors using different cooperation channels? - What are the relative benefits of different aid modalities?	Desk review Interviews. Validation workshop
Relevance	- Are the different sector portfolios well-designed to reach the poorest, most under-served areas? - Has the prioritisation based on Vision 2030 and KJAS led to relevant support?	Desk review Focus group discussions
Sustainability	- Are the contributions sustainable? - Has the prioritisation based on Vision 2030 and KJAS led to sustainable support?	Desk review Interviews Focus group discussions
Impact	What impact has been achieved towards the overall strategic objectives?	Desk review Focus group discussions

	○ What is the collective (aggregated) contribution of case studies to the strategy?	Validation workshop
Design	○ Is there a systematic approach to formulating a theory of change? ○ How has the rights perspective been applied within each sector? ○ How have the poor people's perspectives been applied within each sector? ○ How have thematic priorities been incorporated into each sector?	Desk review Interviews Focus group discussions

3.2 Evaluability of the questions

The evaluability of the questions listed above is best judged against the balance between existing secondary data sources and time available for the team to gather data through interview.

Initial reflections on data availability suggest some possible limitations to our work. Our response to these anticipated limitations is to balance our approach from the start blending desk research²⁷ with data gathering through interviews, group discussions and workshops and case study review. In this way we intend to get as far as possible towards providing robust answers to the questions posed while at the same time alerting the Embassy to any gaps in the evidence base which could in future be filled through enhanced reporting or recording arrangements.

However, it appears prudent to point out at this stage that despite the intent to consult as widely as possible (through individual interviews and group discussions), time available for new data gathering will inevitably be limited and it will be unrealistic to expect that the team will be able to fill major data gaps through interviews and group discussions or that significant inferences can be drawn from aggregations based on a case study approach.

Also, the evaluation team notes that some of the issues may have a bearing on the relations between development interventions and the humanitarian portfolio, with the budget for the latter managed directly by Sida, Sweden. The team has sought clarification regarding the extent to which the evaluation should follow up on these aspects and has been guided to look at the role humanitarian assistance plays in relation to the overall and more long term work of the development cooperation section. A number of interviews have been suggested with key stakeholders.

The next section of the report presents the blended approach to evaluation, which we believe provides the best match between data available and overall objectives.

4. Proposed approach and methodology

This section of the inception report explains the proposed approach to each part of the assignment, the Poverty and Development Assessment and the Implementation Evaluation.

²⁷ Which will include the findings of the portfolio analysis conducted in 2012.

4.1 Poverty and Development Assessment

(a) PDA desk review:

The PDA will draw conclusions regarding who is poor in Kenya, what factors generate poverty and vulnerability, why poverty persists and the best ways to support development. The team recognises that this document should provide a core, user-friendly tool to use as part of an on-going process of ensuring that Sweden's development cooperation portfolio is coherent and sends a clear and unified message to outside stakeholders regarding Swedish values, policies and priorities, and how Sweden sees its comparative advantage in contributing to Kenya's Vision 2030.

The Swedish Poverty and Development Assessment Guidelines specifically state that *"The PDA shall be carried out by the country team... rather than by external consultants... The ownership and driving force behind this process shall be the country team."* Therefore, it will be important to ensure that ownership of the final document is within the country team and the work of the evaluation team is seen as supportive of this process. The team anticipates that the PDA will be used by the country team in dialogue with partners and as an input to the upcoming Results Offer proposal which will feed into the new Results Strategy for Kenya. As such, the PDA support provided by the evaluation team will, as much as possible, be approached in such a way as to contribute to the country team's own assessment and understanding.²⁸ The evaluation team will use the validation workshop and other interviews to contrast and discuss the draft findings of the PDA in relation to the underlying theories of change that have informed Swedish development efforts in recent years. The expectation will be that the final PDA will reflect a critical analysis, on the part of the country team, regarding how to achieve greater relevance in the future strategy.

As part of the inception phase the evaluation team has produced an initial matrix of the issues which might be covered by the PDA, potential data sources and dimensions of analysis. This is already a substantive multi-page document (which when finalised will be provided to the Embassy as a useful resource for future data searching); an extract is provided below:

Chapter	Issues to be covered	Data Sources	Potential dimensions of analysis
Who are the poor and vulnerable?	Discussing the poverty concept	UNDP National Human Development Reports WB Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment Freedom House Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA-IV) WB Handbook on Poverty and Inequality (http://issuu.com/world.bank.publications/docs/9780821376133)	Multi-dimensional concept: poverty as lack of resources + lack of power + lack of choice The dynamics of poverty Context specific and relational aspects of poverty Local perceptions of poverty Poverty and food security in rural/urban areas Migration and urbanisation
	Mapping of	WB (2009) Kenya Poverty and Inequality	Underlying causes for lack of

²⁸ By contrast, the evaluation will present the evaluation team's own independent assessment.

	the poor and vulnerable and the characteristics of their poverty	Assessment World Bank Index KNBS / Kenya Population & Housing Census, Economic Survey, Statistical Abstract, Integrated Budget Household Survey etc. 2008-2009 Demographic and Health Survey Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA-IV) Freedom House	resources Underlying causes for lack of power Underlying causes for lack of choice
	Mapping of where the poor and vulnerable live	2008-2009 Demographic and Health Survey	Spatial characteristics: Rural poverty (esp. ASAL) Urban poverty (esp. slums) +regional GINI coefficients

From this initial matrix it is apparent that a large quantity of data is available. The team cannot at this time assess the quality of this data. The task of the team will be to sift through these data and present highlights which meet the requirements of the Embassy country team - which is that the focus of the PDA should be more broadly on underlying causes of poverty in Kenya as well as triggers for development. Given that the reports listed above are likely to primarily describe who the poor are (i.e., the symptoms of poverty), rather than the underlying causes for their poverty, the team will delve into the source material for these studies and will use initial discussions with Kenyan researchers to identify additional key texts from recent academic research into poverty and development in Kenya. The team expects to be able to identify a set of assumed major underlying causes (causal assumptions) of poverty in the country related to the three poverty dimensions used in the PDA, namely: lack of resources, lack of power and lack of choice. On this basis, the team will (1) prioritise what is included (2) extrapolate and synthesise information against these priorities (3) take into consideration how the different sectoral analyses can feed into a coherent cross-sectoral analysis given the convergent nature of poverty and development risks in Kenya (i.e., related to political instability, non-inclusive development trajectories, resource scarcity and natural/climatic hazards), (4) distill some broad conclusions on where and why developmental change is currently underway in Kenya and where there is greatest need and opportunity to support change (recognising that the two may not be the same), and (5) identify gaps and biases in current research into poverty and development in Kenya so as to suggest where Sweden should focus on additional analyses and policy formation support in the future. In discussions with the Embassy it has already been noted that the reports produced by UN agencies, the World Bank and Kenyan ministries are largely sectorally focused and the added value of the PDA should lie in analysing the convergence of factors that lead to persistent poverty and vulnerability.

The team recognises that a major challenge, given the quantity of data available, will be to synthesise findings within a document of a user-friendly length and format.²⁹ The outline

²⁹ The Embassy has suggested that the PDA *Interim* Report should be a max 25 pages in length with an Executive Summary of 2-3 pages; the full *Final* report (which will include the evaluation) should be a max of 50 pages in length with an Executive Summary of 2-3 pages. Additional information should be placed in appendices.

proposed in the ToR appears appropriate for this purpose, but may require some shift of emphasis to reflect the core poverty and development concerns in the Kenyan context.

(b) Mapping of development cooperation and its key actors in Kenya

Some document gathering and interviews will be necessary to gather up-to-date evidence on key and new development partner activity in Kenya, with a focus on their vision, activities and logic, sectoral priorities, level of financial flows, preferred channels and modalities and record of achievement. This information will be collated in order to reach some broad conclusions on general tendencies across the donor community and potential political influences on this; plus which sectors and issues are over and under financed, how co-ordination is working (or not) and what appear to be the key challenges introduced by emerging patterns of finance. South-south actors and the "new" actors in this arena are also relevant and will be included. This part of the PDA process should help inform the team's conclusions on Sweden's relative strengths and weaknesses (comparative advantages) to potentially determine most appropriate (and possibly innovative) entry points that might catalyse development progress. The 'Assessment of Sweden's Role' and 'Conclusions' chapters of the PDA report, will be further updated following the Implementation Evaluation.

(c) PDA validation

A five page summary of the emerging findings of the PDA will be distributed to a select group of participants one week before two half-day validation workshops to be held on March 21 or 22. The half-day workshops will consist of Embassy staff and key informants respectively. Both workshops will largely follow a similar format focused on the following key questions:

1	Do the findings accurately summarise the fundamental development challenges and the factors that generate poverty in Kenya today?
2	Do you agree that the groups identified as most marginalised are marginalised for the reasons given?
3	What does the nature of the social, political and economic trends described imply regarding the relationship between duty bearers and rights holders?
4	What are the implications of the convergence of different risks facing the poor in Kenya today and how can their capacities to manage, e.g., recurrent drought be supported, either through more vulnerability aware development programming or greater coherence between humanitarian and development efforts?
5	What are the areas of clear convergence (and potential divergence) between Swedish policies and priorities and the Kenyan Vision 2030?
6	How are the current changes underway in Kenya (decentralisation, merging of ministries, post-election developments) likely to impact on the findings reported in the PDA?
7	Do you agree that with the conclusions on where there is greatest activity and opportunity for development support; why do/don't you think this will make a difference?
8	How should the Embassy use this document in its dialogue with the Government of Kenya and with other international cooperation partners?

(d) PDA Report

The PDA Report will be presented following the structure outlined above and in the ToR.

4.2 Implementation Evaluation

(a) Results Matrix: desk study

Using an analysis of the alignment among the findings of the PDA, the Country Strategy and the Results Matrix as the starting point, the evaluation team will assess a broad range of available secondary data to build on the findings of the Portfolio Review³⁰ (already completed) to address the relevance and design questions presented in the ToR. The documentation review will in particular seek to understand and compare the theories of change that have emerged in the different initiatives and analyse the extent to which these constitute an evidence based and coherent perspective by the country team on how its portfolio is addressing key development concerns, particularly how poverty is perceived and conceptualised. The draft PDA will be used as a tool to stimulate reflection.

To note that a working assumption of the evaluation is that, given the volatile situation in Kenya in recent years, the original country strategy may be in some respects a ‘historic artefact’ in 2013.

In order to collate evidence on effectiveness and impact, the team will (1) review selected texts that have been identified during the PDA process that directly relate to the thematic outcome objectives in the country strategy; (2) review documentation provided by the Embassy prior to the evaluation getting underway; (3) alert sector leads to gaps in information available to identify any other possible sources.

In order to assess efficiency, the team will (1) review available recent analyses of the role of different actors in Kenyan development cooperation, with special attention to new donors and emergent forms of cooperation, also the role of dialogue in Kenyan development cooperation; (2) review the findings of the PDA; (3) review documentation on Swedish development cooperation in Kenya, with an emphasis on the selected case study projects (criteria presented below) and other reports that critically analyse the results and challenges of using different channels and modalities; and (4) review monitoring data collected as part of the follow-up to the results matrix.

(b) Channels and Modalities

A key area that will be explored, primarily through critical analysis of the documentation available but also through interviews, will be the modalities and channels of delivery for development cooperation, with a focus on the relative efficiency and effectiveness of these modalities and channels and the extent to which they support ownership and sustainability. It should be noted, however, that the team is unlikely to be able to gather data to allow for a verifiable comparative analysis. However, the following aspects will be explored in order to draw conclusions about how the Embassy may be able to make more effective use of its resources through better selection of channels and modalities in relation to intended purposes.

The following four issues will be explored (partly through interviews with Embassy staff):

³⁰ Portfolio Analysis of the Development Cooperation with Kenya, Michael Hauer. 2012

- Partner and modality selection in relation to the purpose of the funded initiative: How rigorous are the assessments of potential? Are different options compared and valued? Are transaction costs discussed against the added value of the intermediaries? Are strategic alliances sought? Is there a set of criteria used for assessments? What consideration is given to selecting partners with a focus on high risk geographic areas?
- Quality/ value of services provided and the extent to which this is related to the nature of the support channel and modality: To the extent possible, the team will strive to discern the extent to which a given modality or channel is more or less effective in terms of technical assistance, dialogue facilitation, policy advice or other types of tasks.
- Extent to which dialogue with and via partners has facilitated alignment with Kenyan priorities and donor harmonisation: The team will explore how choice of channels and modalities has reflected and buttressed Swedish commitments to aid effectiveness and has contributed to broader aid harmonisation.
- Utility of the current results matrix: Through discussions with the Embassy staff, the evaluation team will assess the extent to which the results matrix has been utilised and if it has been found to be a useful and relevant tool for monitoring and dialogue with partners, with an intention to identify ways that it may be improved in the future.

The team will develop a semi-structured interview schedule in order to gather and collate this information.

(c) Selection of the case studies

Contributions (projects or programmes) for case studies will be chosen from each of the three sectors in the country strategy (three from Natural Resources and Environment, two from Urban Development and three from Democratic Governance and Human Rights). This selection will be made during the PDA phase in dialogue with the Embassy. The following criteria are proposed for selecting the case studies.

1. Contributions will have been decided upon³¹ between 2009 and 2010 to reflect priorities in the current strategy and will have progressed to the extent that a significant level of outcomes has been achieved.
2. The contributions will have been evaluated and/or had MTRs conducted that have focused on outcomes. It will also be important that a full range of other documentation is made available to the evaluation team for the selected contributions as soon as these are chosen.
3. The contributions will represent a range of modalities and channels,³² including to the extent possible (1) direct funding to Kenyan governmental institutions, (2) support to

³¹ That is does not need to be a new contribution but could also be a decision to continue and existing one.

³² We understand that the Embassy is using three main channels: 1) Government, 2) Multilateral organisations and 3) Civil society, plus two additional, less used, channels: 4) Private firms and 5) Swedish institutions (twinning pro-

Kenyan, Swedish and/or international CSOs, (3) support channels through multidonor modalities, (4) support involving Swedish public agencies, (5) support involving an international consulting firm³³ as a partner, and (6) support through UN agencies.

4. Representatives of key stakeholders will be present in Kenya and/or Sweden and available for interviews during the period of the evaluation missions.

It should be noted that these criteria will lead to a selection that will be skewed to bypass ineffective initiatives. This selection is deemed necessary as it is important to have a basis for understanding and comparing the nature of actual outcomes, rather than analysis of the extent to which outcomes have been achieved at all. Furthermore, it is hoped that the selection of cases will provide data that can indicate trends. The cases will provide a basis for contrasting different channels and modalities, but the number of cases will not be sufficient to draw firm and generalisable conclusions regarding the advantages or disadvantages of a given channel or modality.

It is envisaged that the Embassy provides the team with a list of eligible cases based on these criteria - from which we select 8 as case studies for the assignment.

The evaluation will look at both the case studies and the overall portfolio through the same basic lens, but the case studies will also involve greater analyses of issues related to efficiency and effectiveness of different channels and modalities. The depth of the case studies will ultimately largely be related to the quality of the available documentation in terms of its evidence-base and outcome focus as time for interviews will be limited. No visits to project sites or interviews with primary beneficiaries are envisaged. We expect to produce a 1-2 page summary of each case study, which will be included as annexes in the overall evaluation report. The main report will synthesise these findings with the review of the portfolio more generally. Experience from other country strategy evaluations suggests that it may not be possible to have a clear comparative structure through which to analyse the highly varied initiatives (and varied quality of reporting), but that certain trends or consistencies between case studies are likely to emerge.

(d) Evaluation: preparation

Before starting the analysis the team will compare:

- (1) the outcome objectives from the country strategy,
- (2) the outcomes reported in the documentation reviewed, and
- (3) the development trends and emerging strategic concerns suggested by the PDA.

These will be used to develop a set of initial working hypotheses regarding (a) the adherence of the portfolio to the country strategy, (b) the relevance of the current strategy to Kenyan goals (Vision 2030) and needs, and (c) emerging unexpected outcomes of Swedish support.

jects). According to the contribution management system PLUS, the Embassy is using mainly three modalities namely: 1) Specific programme managed by an organisation, 2) Sector programme pooled funding, and 3) Project support (twinning is classified as expert cooperation).

³³ This would apply in very few cases.

These will be explored in relation the overall portfolio, but with specific analysis of the selected case study initiatives. These findings will guide the subsequent evaluation.

(e) Data collection

Data will be collected through interviews and focus group meetings with relevant stakeholders and informed experts (i.e., non-stakeholders with an in depth understanding of trends in the three sectors), including partners (consulting firms, government institutions and CSOs) and other donors. Regarding the latter, the evaluation team includes those individuals who have been supported by Sweden in relation to policy analysis and development. The Embassy will be asked to inform stakeholders about the evaluation, and/or provide the evaluation team with project/programme and other stakeholder contact details. The team will request recommendations from the Embassy to determine participant and interview lists.

Shortly after the validation workshop for the PDA, the evaluation team will hold six focus group meetings –three with stakeholders (one per sector) and three with informed experts (again, one from each of the three sectors). The workshops will be followed by in-depth semi-structured interviews with stakeholders from the eight selected projects and other selected key informants (including Kenyan government staff, other donor representatives, and researchers with an overview of the sectors). Interviews will also be made with programme officers at the Embassy. Some interviews will be undertaken during the first team visit and others will be undertaken in the second visit in May.

The focus group meetings and subsequent interviews will largely follow a participatory outcome harvesting approach,³⁴ whereby the evaluation team will collect and compare ‘outcome descriptors’, i.e., the perceived outcomes and potential outcomes of Swedish support. The stakeholders will be asked about the ‘formal’ theories of change that have guided the initiatives and the implicit assumptions about how these programmes have or were expected to contribute to Kenyan development. The other key informants will be asked about their perspectives on the relevance of these theories of change in light of the broader trends in Kenyan development and in Kenyan development cooperation.

Those involved with policy analyses on behalf of the Embassy will be encouraged to reflect on if and how their work has contributed to better understanding of how the portfolio can contribute to addressing core development challenges. The original outcome objectives will be assessed in relation to three, triangulated sets of perceptions; those of the Embassy, project/programme stakeholders and informed experts. The overall approach will be informed by current thinking on causality and contribution analysis.³⁵

In summary, the approach will include the following steps:

- The desk study of existing documentation described above.
- The two focus group meetings for each sector – described above – that will consist of (a) project stakeholders and (b) informed experts (non-stakeholders). The workshops with stakeholders will primarily discuss:
 - the accuracy of the outcome objectives from the Country Strategy

³⁴ See 2012. Ricardo Wilson-Grau and Heather Britt. *Outcome Harvesting*, Ford Foundation.

³⁵ See for example ILAC Briefing 26 (Oct 2012): Making Causal Claims, John Mayne

- the extent of achievements in relation to these outcomes
- the extent to which outcomes achieved and intended reflect the nature of poverty, in Kenya.
- the extent to which Swedish support recognises the rights of marginalised populations and their potential for empowerment, and how the Embassy works with partners to engage with duty bearers to ensure that these rights are in focus (with special attention to the extent to which the Embassy's dialogue efforts have proven an effective means to achieve these aims).
- the extent to which achievements can be attributed to Swedish support, or to what extent the Swedish support has contributed to these achievements.
- the accuracy of the initial working hypotheses developed in the literature review.
- The findings of these focus group meetings will be used to develop a deeper understanding of results in relation to the questions posed in the Terms of Reference for the assignment. These will be verified and fleshed out through the individual interviews and case studies.

(f) Validation of findings

It is anticipated that the team will prepare a draft evaluation report before the visit in May when a series of further interviews plus the validation workshop will allow the team to further develop/verify their findings.

(g) The evaluation report

The evaluation report will be presented in three parts:

- i. A summary of the PDA findings.
- ii. Country Strategy Evaluation
 - a. Approach to the Evaluation
 - b. Results of the Evaluation
 - i. Design
 - ii. Effectiveness
 - iii. Efficiency
 - iv. Relevance
 - v. Sustainability
 - vi. Impact
- iii. Recommendations for the new Cooperation Strategy

4.3 Report deadline

The final PDA is due on 30 April.

The final Evaluation report is due on 15 June 2012.

4.4 Team Roles and Responsibilities

Angela Christie as Team Leader will have overall responsibility for the PDA and Evaluation. She will coordinate the team to deliver both reports on time and to a standard which meets the requirement of the Terms of Reference, liaising with Embassy staff as appropriate. Angela will lead the PDA process and the overall Evaluation plus both validation workshops.

Johanna Bergman-Lodin, will lead on the research effort towards delivery of the PDA and will also lead the outcome harvesting exercise supporting the evaluation of the urban sector component of the portfolio and the associate case-study analyses.

Ian Christoplos, will lead on the outcome harvesting methodology and associated focus group discussions. Ian will also lead specifically on the assessment of the natural resources and environment portfolio and associated case studies.

Michael Hauer, will lead on the Development Partner review as a key component of the PDA; Michael will jointly deliver the two validation workshops and lead on the outcome harvesting focus group meeting for the democracy and human rights component of the portfolio plus analysis of associated case studies. Michael will play a key role in the conduct of in-country interviews and stakeholder management.

5. Questions/Clarifications

We have received and incorporated feedback on the following:

1. Does the inception report overall meet the requirements and expectations of the Embassy?
2. In terms of the timing and number of events planned, are these reasonable within the broader context of other Embassy commitments?
 - PDA Validation Workshop: two half day workshops 21 or 22 March.
 - Interviews with Embassy staff 21 or 22 March.
 - Sectoral Focus Group Discussions: six half day workshops – one for programme stakeholders/one for experts in each of three sectors w/b 25 March.
 - Interviews with Embassy staff and other key stakeholders end of w/b 25 March.
 - Interviews with Embassy staff and other key stakeholders end of w/b 13 May.
 - Evaluation Validation Workshop: w/b 20 May.

Note that changes to the proposed dates for the PDA validation workshop and focus group meetings should be later rather than sooner to allow appropriate time for desk study and preparation. The team suggests the possibility of w/b 1 April for the PDA validation, focus group meetings and interviews.

The evaluation team is open to suggestions from the Embassy on how to ensure a collaborative approach to this assignment to maximise utility and ownership of both the process and result.

Work Plan

	Total	AC	MH	JBL	IC	NE	January			February				March				April				May				June				July	
							3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
Inception Phase																															
Team introductory meeting	4	1	1	1	1		▲																								
Data collection	10	1	5	4			—	—	—	—	→																				
Development of an evaluation design for Part I and II and agree on work plan and report preparation	10	5	1	2	2		→	→	→	→																					
Submission of an inception report											▲																				
Part I : PDA																															
Further consultation with key stakeholders on relevant data	6	2	4								→	→																			
Desk review	14	3	7	4							→	→	→	→																	
Data analysis and synthesis	15	5	4	4	2							→	→	→	→																
Validation workshop in Nairobi (incl. preparation, facilitation and documentation), proposed dates 20-22 March; plus interviews	6	3	3													▲															
Writing of PDA	15	10	3	1	1													→	→												
Submission of draft PDA																				▲											
Submission of final PDA																					▲										
Part II : Implementation Evaluation																															
Evaluation design amendment	5	2	1	1	1							→	→	→						→	→										
Data collection (sector analysis)	6		2	2	2						→	→	→	→																	
Data collection (case studies)	6		2	2	2							→	→	→	→																
Outcome harvesting workshops	19	5	2	4	5	3											▲					→	→	→	→						
Interviews in Kenya	4	2	2																				→	→							
Data analysis	5	2	2	1																											
Validation workshop in Nairobi, tentative date	2	1	1																					▲							
Report writing	15	9	3		3																		→	→	→	→					
Submission of draft report																										▲					
Feedback from Sida																											▲				
Finalisation of the report	3	2	1																									→			
Submission of final report																													▲		
Total days	145	53	44	26	19	3																									

Initials: AC=Angela Christie, MH=Michael Hauer, JBL=Johanna Bergman Lodin, IC=Ian Christoplos, NE=National Experts

Key Dates

21 Jan kick off	
15 Feb final inception report	
18-22 March PDA Validation workshop Nairobi/Interviews	
25-29 March Focal group discussions for evaluation/Interviews	
19 April draft PDA	
30 April final PDA	
13th May (the week of) Interviews Nairobi	
20th May (the week of) Evaluation Validation Workshop	
31 May draft final report	
15 June final final report	

Annex 3 – Stakeholders Consulted

PDA II & Evaluation

Name	Position
Ahmed Hussein	Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Development
Alex Raymonds Oduor	ICRAF
Alexandra Montealegre	USAID
Alfredo Teixeira	Country Director UNDP
Ali Hersi	Regional Director, Society for International development
Alice Nderitu	Commissioner, NCIC
Alistair Fernie	Head, DFID
Anders Rönquist	Head of the Kenya Section at the Swedish Embassy
Anna Tuveesson	Swedish Embassy
Anne Ljung	Swedish Embassy
Anthea Manasseh	AFD/French Embassy
Anthony Kariuki	CEO, ACT!Non-State Actors Facility
Atsango Chesoni	ED, Kenya Human Rights Commission
Carolyn Averbeck	UNDP
Cassius M. Kusienya	KISIP Co-ordinator, Ministry of Housing
Charles Abugre	Regional Director, Africa UN Millennium Campaign
Dean Cira	World Bank, Environment officer
Dickson Khainga	Senior Analyst, Kenya Institute for Public Policy research and Analysis
Edward Kariu	CSUDP
Eliud Kinuthia	Kenyan Police
Ezra Chiloba	UNDP Kenya,
Felix M'Mboyi	Cerds Consult
Fredrik Sjömark	Swedish Police Advisor
Geoffrey Mwau	Economic Secretary, Treasury
George Wasonga	Co-ordinator, Maji-na-Ufanisis/CSUDP
Gituro Wainama	Director, Social Political Pillar Vision 2030
Gustav Asplund	ABAKO, Adviser, Urban Sector
Irungu Houghton	Oxfam
Jason Lakin	Senior Technical Liaison, International Budget Partnership
John Ndiritu	Swedish Embassy
John Kabutha	CIDA
John Wachira	National Cooperative Housing Union
Josephine Mwangi	Swedish Embassy
Joshua Mariti	UNHABITAT
Josiah Omotto	Umande Trust
Julia Konberg	German Embassy

Juliana Benedetti	Embassy of Brazil
Julien Bouzon	European Commission, Delegation to Kenya
Justin Muriuki	Coordinator, Agriculture Sector Coordination Unit
Karen Rono	Development Initiatives
Katja Dietrich	Slum prevention and housing policy officer, Housing policy section, shelter branch, global division, UNHABITAT
Kimanthi Kyengo	Water Bridging Programme
Leonard Vahlsing	German Embassy
Lina Palmer	Swedish Embassy
Maria Hauer	Swedish Embassy
Maria Notley	Technical Advisor, Water Services Trust Fund
Monica Asuma	Ministry of Finance, Aid Effectiveness Secretariat
Moses Kiambuthi	ISK
Moses Kiambuthi	CEO, Institution of Surveyors of Kenya
Mwenda Makathimo	Executive Director, Land Development & Governance Institute
Nardes Hagos	UNMC
Nicholas Imbugwa	Swedish Embassy
Nicolas Ngeche	Swedish Embassy
Nigel Tricks	Oxfam Kenya
Odenda Lumumba	National Coordinator, Kenya Land Alliance
Odindo Opeata	Haki Jamii (Economic and Social Rights Centre)
Ole Thonke	Denmark
Patrick Adolwa	NUDP Co-ordinator, Ministry of Local Government
Paul Gubbius	World Bank
Pauline Ngari	CEO Hand in Hand Eastern Africa
Peris Mangira	Ministry of Lands
Phanuel Matseshe	Water Services Trust Fund
Philip Kisoyan	Program officer, NRM/GEF, FAO
Ragnar Gudmundsson	IMF
Robert Gakubia	CEO, WASREB (Water Services Regulatory Board)
Romani Kiome	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture
Shadrack Omondi	CEO, Resource Conflict Institute (RECONCILE)
Stefan Muller	AfDB
Steve Ouma	Pamoja Trust
Tim Colby	CIDA
Titus Katembu	EU Delegation
Victor Ogutu	KMP
Walter Odera	AFDB
Wolfgang Fengler	Lead Economist, World Bank
Mr. Yao	Embassy of China
Mr. Zhang	Embassy of China
Zebib Kavuma	Country Programme Manager, UNIFEM

Annex 4 – Co-operation Strategy Contributions 2009-13

List of Case Studies

Title	Sector	Implementer	Period	Value of Agreed Contribution (SEK)
Civil Society Facility NR	NRE	ACT! (Act Change Transfer) – formerly PACT)	Apr 2011 - Apr 2015	110,000,000
Bridging Programme - Kenya's Water Sector	NRE	Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI)	Jan 2011 - Jun 2012	45,000,000
Financial Sector Deepening Trust Kenya II	NRE	KPMG	Jan 2011 - Dec 2015	50,000,000
Land Sector Non-State Actors (LSNSA)	NRE	Kenya Land Alliance (KLA) and the LSNSA network	Oct 2012 – Mar 2014	5,000,000
Support to Electoral Reforms and Electoral Process in Kenya	DHR	UNDP (in collaboration with Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission IEBC)	Oct 2009 – Dec 2011	17,000,000
M&E Capacity Building	DHR	Ministry of State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030	Mar 2011-Dec 2014	32,000,000
Support to Police Service in Kenya: Swedish – Kenyan Police Cooperation	DHR	Swedish National Police Board and the Police Reform Implementation Committee	Mar 2010- Dec 2013	17,649,994
Civil Society Urban Development Programme (CSUDP)	UD	Maji na Ufanisi (along with other organizations)	Dec 2009 – Dec 2012	48,500,000
Kenya Municipal Programme	UD	Ministry of Local Government, Government of Kenya	Jan 2011- Sep 2014	97,500,000


List of All Projects

Title	Sector	Implementer	Period	Value of Agreed Contribution (SEK)
Transport Police Taskforce	DHR	Government of Kenya	Aug 2009 - Mar 2010	686
Communication Police Reform	DHR	Government of Kenya	Dec 2009 - Dec 2010	600,000
OHCHR Kenya 2010-2011	DHR	OHCHR UN High Commission Human Rights	Jan 2010 - Sep 2013	8,000,000
Police cooperation Kenya	DHR	Government of Kenya	Mar 2010 - Dec 2013	-
Police cooperation Kenya	DHR	Government of Kenya	Mar 2010 - Dec 2013	17,649,994
Human rights studies RWI	DHR	Government of Kenya	Apr 2010 - Dec 2010	12,129
SF police reform implementation committee secretariat	DHR	Government of Kenya	Jun 2010 - Mar 2011	339,000
Kenya Human Rights Commission	DHR	KHRC	Sep 2010 - Dec 2012	5,100,041
GJLOS bridging 2010-2011	DHR	Ministry of Finance	Nov 2010 - Dec 2013	2,599,544
UNOPS/CLO	DHR	United Nations	Mar 2011 - Dec 2013	7,400,000
IDLO/lawdrafters	DHR	Misc	Oct 2011 - Dec 2013	2,500,000
RWI Kenya 2012-2013	DHR	Raoul Wallenberg Institute	Jan 2012 - Aug 2014	8,000,000
OHCHR Kenya 2012-2013	DHR	OHCHR UN High Commission Human Rights	Jan 2012 - Sep 2016	8,000,000
Judiciary Reform	DHR	Deutsche Gessel. Int. Zus. GIZ	Oct 2012 - Jun 2014	15,000,000
SF - SID Change Conference and Follow-up	DHR	4Society for International Development	Aug 2009 - Mar 2012	3,000,000
Peace, Reconciliation & Conflict Mitigation	DHR	UNDP Development Programme	Nov 2010 - Sep 2014	15,000,000
UNDP Umbrella Cost Sharing Agreement	DHR	UNDP Development Programme	Aug 2011 - Dec 2014	-
UNDP Umbrella Cost Sharing Agreement	DHR	UN Development Programme (UNDP)	Aug 2011 - Dec 2014	124,000,000
UNDP Umbrella Cost Sharing Agreement	DHR	UN Development Programme (UNDP)	Aug 2011 - Dec 2014	-
UNDP Umbrella Cost Sharing Agreement	DHR	UN Development Programme (UNDP)	Aug 2011 - Dec 2014	-
Folke Bernadotte Academy	DHR	Folke Bernadotteakademin	Dec 2011 - Jun 2014	1,104,000
UN Women 2012 - 2014	DHR	UNWOMEN Int.	Dec 2012 - Dec 2015	30,000,000
Public Expenditure Review(PER) 2011/2012	DHR	Misc	Aug 2011 - Jun 2013	1,500,000
Kenya Census 2009	DHR	UN Population Fund	Jul 2009 - Dec 2011	15,500,000
Electoral reform Kenya	DHR	UN Development Programme (UNDP)	Oct 2009 - Dec 2011	17,000,000
M & E Capacity building	DHR	Government of Kenya	Mar 2011 - Dec 2014	32,000,000
EISA Kenya	DHR	EISA Electoral Inst.Sust.Dem	Apr 2014 - Jun 2014	9,700,000
International IDEA	DHR	IDEA, Intl dem & electoral ass.	Aug 2012 - Dec 2013	4,600,000


Civil Society Facility NR	DHR	PACT Partners Community Transf	Apr 2011 - Apr 2014	110,000,000
Sub-total DHR Sector				438,605,394 34 per cent
Water Bridging Support Programme	NER	Government of Kenya	Jan 2011 - Jun 2012	45,000,000
Kenya Land Reforms Programme	NER	Ministry of Lands/Housing KEN	Aug 2011 - Sep 2014	46,800,000
STRATEGIC FUND 2011-2013	NER	Government of Kenya	Oct 2011 - Dec 2013	-
STRATEGIC FUND 2011-2013	NER	Government of Kenya	Oct 2011 - Dec 2013	-
STRATEGIC FUND 2011-2013	NER	Government of Kenya	Oct 2011 - Dec 2013	-
STRATEGIC FUND 2011-2013	NER	Government of Kenya	Oct 2011 - Dec 2013	12,000,000
Hand in Hand International	NER	Misc	Oct 2011 - Dec 2013	5,000,000
FSD Kenya II	NER	KPMG	Jan 2011 - Dec 2015	50,000,000
Agriculture Sector Support	NER	Government of Kenya	Jan 2012 - Jun 2017	350,000,000
KCB Agriculture Guarantee	NER	USAID	Sep 2012 - Sep 2019	2,000,000
Multi-party Agriculture Guarantee	NER	USAID	Sep 2012 - Sep 2019	2,000,000
Kenya Land Alliance	NER	Kenya Land Alliance	Mar 2009 - Oct 2012	-
Kenya Land Alliance	NER	Kenya Land Alliance	Mar 2009 - Oct 2012	17,897,356
LSNSA - Land Election and Peace Bridging Programme	NER	Land Develop Govern Inst LDGI	Oct 2012 - Mar 2014	5,000,000
Sub-total NER Sector				535,697,356 42 per cent
Health Refund	Other		Jan 2010 - Dec 2010	- 2,088,198
Lantmäteriet - MOL	UD	Lantmäteriverket	Nov 2009 - Oct 2013	40,480,750
STRATEGIC FUND 2011-2013	UD	Government of Kenya	Oct 2011 - Dec 2013	-
Civil Society Urban Development Programme	UD	Maji na Ufanisi	Dec 2009 - Dec 2012	48,500,000
Urban Knowledge Project - World Bank	UD	World Bank	Dec 2009 - Dec 2012	7,000,000
National Urban Development Policy	UD	Government of Kenya	Apr 2010 - Oct 2012	12,500,000
Technical Assistance - Ministry of Housing/KISIP	UD	Hifab International AB	Jul 2010 - Jan 2013	3,300,000
Technical Assistance Land - Kenya	UD	Orgut Consulting AB	Jan 2011 - Dec 2011	3,200,000
Kenya Municipal Programme	UD	Government of Kenya	Jan 2011 - Sep 2014	97,500,000
Refund from ILUSP (3100013801)	UD	Misc	Aug 2011 - Dec 2011	- 2,484,346
Kenya Informal Settlements Improvement Project	UD	Government of Kenya	Oct 2012 - Dec 2014	75,000,000
UN Habitat - SUD Project Kenya	UD	United Nations	Dec 2012 - Jun 2015	15,000,000
World Bank - Strategic Urban Partnership Kenya	UD	World Bank	Dec 2012 - Jun 2015	9,000,000
Sub-total UD Sector				308,996,404 24 per cent

Annex 5 – Alignment with NIMES

DHR Alignment with NIMES



NRE Alignment with NIMES



Annex 6 – Bibliography

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Implementation Evaluation of the Cooperation Strategy with Kenya 2009-2013

This evaluation of the Swedish Strategy for Development Cooperation with Kenya 2009-2013 assesses the extent to which Swedish development cooperation has been relevant, effective, efficient, sustainable and has achieved appropriate outcomes. During the Strategy period Sweden used the impetus of the new Kenyan Constitution to promote much needed planning, institutional development and policy reforms. The Strategy was problematic due to the broad scope of its objectives, which reflected a difficult process of moving towards greater sectoral focus. The Strategy was designed at a time when international and Kenyan commitments to the aid effectiveness agenda appeared strong. These commitments subsequently waned, but the Embassy was successful in identifying other means to retain Kenyan ownership and leadership. At the end of the Strategy period efforts increasingly shifted to capacity development to enable the government and civil society to begin implementing new approaches in a manner that reflects human rights principles. The evaluation concludes that impressive outcomes have been achieved, but that attention to the perspectives of the poor will require greater clarity in overall objectives and the associated theories of change in relation to both directly targeted programming and efforts to influence the broader policy and institutional context.

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