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Sida Decentralised Evaluation

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Implementation Evaluation of the Cooperation Strategy with Kenya 2009-2013

Part II: Poverty and Development Assessment

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The views and interpretations expressed in this report are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AEG	Aid Effectiveness Group
AES	Aid Effectiveness Secretariat
AfDB	African Development Bank
AIDS	Auto-Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ASAL	Arid and Semi-arid Lands
BADEA	Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
BCA	Brazilian Cooperation Agency
CEDAW	Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
DFID	Department for International Development
DPF	Development Partnership Forum
DPG	Donor Partnership Group
EAC	East African Community
ERS	Economic Recovery Strategy
EWS	Environment, Water & Sanitation
GAVI	Global Alliance for Vaccines & Immunisation
GCG	Government Coordination Group
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoK	Government of Kenya
HAC	Harmonisation, Alignment & Coordination
HDI	Human Development Index
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
IE	Implementation Evaluation
IFMIS	Integrated Financial Management & Information System
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MTP	Medium Term Plan
NIMES	National Integrated Monitoring & Evaluation System
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation & Development
OVC	Orphans & Vulnerable Children
PDA	Poverty and Development Assessment
PFM	Public Finance Management
PS	Permanent Secretary
SID	Society for International Development

SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
STI	Science, Technology & Innovation
SWG	Sector Working Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
US	United States
USAID	US Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank

Preface

This Poverty and Development Assessment (PDA) was commissioned by the Embassy of Sweden in Kenya, as part of a broader assignment to evaluate the implementation of the Swedish Strategy for development cooperation with Kenya 2009-2013. The Implementation Evaluation is published as a separate document and this PDA is published as part II of the Implementation Evaluation.

The Poverty and Development Assessment was undertaken by Indevelop through Sida's framework agreement for reviews and evaluations between January-June 2013.

The independent evaluation team consisted of four members:
- Angela Christie, Team Leader
- Ian Christoplos, Evaluator
- Johanna Bergman-Lodin, Evaluator
- Michael Hauer, Evaluator

Indevelop's Project Manager for the assignment was Anna Liljelund Hedqvist who was responsible for coordination and management of the PDA and implementation evaluation process. Dr Adam Pain provided external quality assurance to the reports.

Acknowledgments
The evaluation team wishes to express its sincere gratitude to the many people who compiled and shared documentation and gave their time for interviews and open discussions. Indevelop specifically appreciates the level of engagement and useful comments received from the Embassy of Sweden in Kenya that added value to the process.

Executive Summary

This **Poverty and Development Assessment (PDA)** is the part II of the Implementation Evaluation of the Swedish Strategy for development cooperation with Kenya 2009-2013. The overall assignment was designed to contribute to the development of the new Swedish Cooperation Framework for 2014-18. This report aims to:

- provide a synthesised and overarching current perspective on poverty in Kenya based on documented analyses and stakeholder discussion
- reach conclusions on fundamental development challenges and opportunities
- map the activity of development partners and against this backdrop identify Sweden's added value.

Kenya is one of the largest economics in Africa and, despite a number of significant political, economic and climatic shocks and setbacks, has been able to maintain relatively strong and steady growth over the past two decades. This has not led to significant reduction of poverty. Social development performance has been lacklustre. Wealth, power and access to resources remain highly skewed. There is a large, longstanding and growing gap between the political/economic elite and the population in general. New institutional reforms suggest promise for addressing these inequities, but the political commitments for moving from proclamations to practice regarding rights, participation, transparency and accountability remain untested.

The root causes of poverty in Kenya are complex and related to access to financial, land and water resources, basic services, power and livelihood choice. Inequality is pronounced and linked to geography, ethnicity and gender. Both rural and urban poverty are associated with capacities to deal with converging livelihood shocks. In rural areas these shocks may be climatic and are manifested in food insecurity. Urban poverty is more linked to access to wage labour, health and sanitation and exposure to violence. Periods of growth have made inroads into urban poverty, but have had little positive impact in rural areas. Paths in and out of poverty are dynamic. Persistent poverty is linked to the failure to accumulate assets and to downward spirals caused by recurrent shocks and disasters. Escapes from entrenched poverty are primarily associated with livelihood diversification.

Changes in the Kenyan economy are creating opportunities for such diversification. Kenya is the gateway to East and Central Africa, a regional business hub and a major tourist destination. Investments are attracted by Kenya's capacities in relation to innovation, a relatively well-educated workforce and a growing and increasingly inclusive financial market. Regional markets are growing rapidly and Kenyan entrepreneurs have experience in taking advantage of these opportunities. In the urban areas young professionals are creating a dynamic climate for investment and growth. Agriculture is likely to remain central to Kenyan development, and areas such as horticulture have grown significantly. Many households are taking advantage of new opportunities and diversifying their production. After a period of decline in the security situation the the relatively peaceful elections give cause for optimism. Devolution and other institutional reforms are generating a potential for enhanced public accountability, more equitable distribution of resources, greater gender equality, and demand-driven service provision.

The new Constitution represents a formal commitment to reform in areas that are key to move towards enhanced respect for human rights. There is still a significant disconnect between people's constitutional rights, their awareness of these rights and public officials' commitments and capacity to act on their new duties. Corruption is a major concern, and new policy commitments may not overcome vested interests in maintaining the status quo. There is a risk that poor governance and patronage politics may continue and perhaps even be reinforced in new ways by the devolution process. Vision 2030 is ambitious and the new Constitution includes clear principles for public spending. Kenya's actions to live up to existing African commitments for investing in key sectors related to poverty alleviation have been insufficient. A robust monitoring system will be vital to track the extent to which policies are put into action and what this means for poverty reduction.

The landscape of development cooperation is changing; new partners with different priorities are engaging with government; new aid modalities are also emerging, such as guarantees and credit mechanisms; and commercial relationships are becoming more important. The principles and practices of aid effectiveness remain critically important in terms of ownership, transparency and accountability. Systems are in place to monitor and promote aid effectiveness through donor coordination. Despite stated government intentions to take greater control over the aid agenda, there are no indications of significant moves towards budget support or related modalities.

Sweden's country strategy 2009-13 focuses on human rights and democracy, natural resources and urban development. Sweden and its partners perceive that Sweden has a strong and unique role in development cooperation due to its extensive knowledge of Kenya and strong trust and credibility with the Kenyan Government and civil society. These factors combine to create conditions conducive to dialogue, even on difficult issues. This includes just and equitable distribution of resources, notably land, and the human rights perspective.

The overall conclusions of the PDA are that Kenya today is characterised by a striking mix of optimism and pessimism. People are optimistic that the new Constitution will deliver much needed reforms and there is some faith that public institutions, such as the judiciary, will regain their intended role after years of ethnic politics and elite capture. People are pessimistic in their views that the economy is not yet on course to deliver gains that will result in poverty alleviation and improvement in their living conditions. There is cause for this pessimism, as Kenya's current performance in terms of maintaining acceptable nutritional standards, access to clean water, controlling endemic violence and increasing gender equality are not reflective of a country that is seen as a leader in African development.

Discussions about the nature of poverty when developing this PDA revealed two contrasting perspectives that impinge on future commitments to addressing poverty alleviation from a rights based perspective. First, there is a clear recognition that the GoK must be more accountable to its citizens. The constitutional reforms, devolution process and especially efforts to address land issues, are expected to create a new set of stronger accountabilities between duty bearers and rights holders. The other, less promising development, is a tendency to see an explicit focus on the poor as not being essential. The weak sustainability and waning GoK commitments to finance programmes directed towards the poor, and the failures of both development and humanitarian programming to reduce the recurrent nature of shocks that generate poverty, have led to cynicism. Many assume that it is impossible to fundamentally change Kenya's political economy. Such assumptions reinforce the power of elites and maintain inequality. While in many respect valid, there are dangers if these attitudes provide a justification to ignore the factors that create vulnerability. This can then become an excuse for withdrawing services from difficult areas and turning a blind eye to land dispossession if it is argued that attention to the perspectives of the poor is a relic of a failed development model. If the poor disappear from the political landscape, their rights will be in danger.

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Poverty and Development Assessment

"A Kenya where all poor women, men, girls and boys have the opportunity to improve their living conditions and where their human rights are realised."

1.1 PURPOSE

This **Poverty and Development Assessment (PDA)** is the part II of an assignment, commissioned by the Embassy of Sweden in Nairobi, designed to contribute to the development of the new Swedish Cooperation Framework for 2014-18.

There are many dimensions of Kenyan poverty, largely related to a lack of access to resources, choice and power. These dimensions are dynamic, being affected by the interplay of changes in the economic context, climatic conditions, political and social conflicts and commitments by the state and international community. The many manifestations, drivers and dynamics of poverty present as a complex set of challenges in identifying priorities for development cooperation. This report is intended to:

- provide a synthesised and overarching current perspective on poverty in Kenya based on documented analyses and stakeholder discussion;
- reach conclusions on fundamental development challenges and opportunities;
- map the activity of development partners and against this backdrop identify Sweden's added value.

This PDA is accompanied by an **Implementation Evaluation (IE)**, that is published as a separate report, which assesses:

- Sweden's progress with regard to its 2009-13 strategic and sectoral objectives, focusing in particular on which results (planned and unplanned) have been achieved;
- the extent to which dialogue has contributed to the achievement of strategic and sectoral objectives;
- the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of channels for aid (government, civil society, multilateral) and aid modalities (sector programme, core contribution, programme based approach);
- contributions which have led to achievements that resonate with the findings of the PDA.

1.2 APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

Details of the approach and methodology adopted for this assignment are set out in the Inception Report included as Annex II. The PDA involved a desk review, interviews with key stakeholders and workshops with Embassy staff and with key development partners. The full bibliography for the assignment appears at the end of this report. It should be stressed that the analyses in this PDA reflect the independent findings and conclusions of the evaluation team and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Embassy.

Furthermore, one overall caveat must be mentioned in relation to the trends described in this report. There are a number of anomalies in the trends for 2012 in sudden increases in public expenditure and other economic indicators. While recognising that the Kenyan economic situation has been volatile for some time, the team attributes these recent anomalies to the election period together with investments in relation to devolution and other aspects of the new Constitution, and therefore does not interpret these as being indicative of general trends.

1.3 POLICIES GUIDING THE PDA

The approach to synthesis which has shaped this PDA report has been informed by a number of key Swedish policy documents and guidelines (see Table 1).

Table 1 : Documentary sources for Swedish National Policy perspectives on poverty and vulnerability.

Swedish Government Policy Document	Perspective
Perspectives on Poverty (2002)	Provides perspectives on poverty as a lack of power, choice and resources, examines these dimensions of poverty and discusses approaches to poverty analysis.
Sweden's Policy on Global Development (2003-)	Explains why a focus on the individual, on choice and on a rights based approach lies at the heart of Swedish policy (and this analysis).
Change for Freedom: Policy for democratic development and human rights in Swedish development cooperation, 2010–2014	Describes the basis for how Sweden takes a normative approach to rights in a democratic perspective. Emphasis is given to creating accountable institutions.
Power Analysis: Experiences and Challenges (2006)	Promotes better understanding of the underlying structural factors impeding poverty reduction as well as incentives and disincentives for pro-poor development.
Increased aid effectiveness (2006-2008)	Explains how the principles of the Paris Declaration should be interpreted from an analytical and development cooperation perspective.
Fighting Poverty in an Urban World : Support to Urban Development (2006)	Explains why the performance of urban areas is a critical factor for poverty prevention and alleviation and how to assess the challenges of supporting the development of urban areas.
On Equal Footing: Policy for Gender Equality and the Rights and Role of Women in Development Cooperation 2010-2015	Explains how gender equality is pursued both as an objective and also as a precondition for sustainable and equitable development more generally.
Guidelines	Direction
Poverty and Development Assessment Guidelines	Provides guidance on the structure and content of the PDA.

Guidelines for Cooperation Strategies (2010)	Describes why it is important to assess the poverty situation, internal and external factors affecting a country's development and the partner country's commitments and measures plus Sweden's comparative advantage as a donor.

From the above, the following perspectives provide the basis for the arguments of this assessment:

- **On Poverty:** Poverty deprives people of the freedom to decide over and shape their own lives - the essence of poverty being not only a lack of material resources but also lack of power and choice; poverty is context specific and dynamic – manifesting itself in different ways and at different times.

- **On Rights:** The Swedish Government applies a rights-based perspective, the central tenet of which is the freedoms and rights of the individual – a view that creating the opportunities for individuals to exercise greater dominion over their own lives must lie at the heart of policy and contributions. Particular emphasis is placed on empowering rights holders to hold duty bearers to account and to create synergies in these relaitonships.

- **On Aid Effectiveness:** Ownership and accountability are central to the aid effectiveness agenda. It is important for external actors to understand and relate to the political, social and economic preconditions for poverty reduction in partner countries. Pluralism, rights, participation, policy alternatives, free debate and a vibrant civil society are seen as key principles.

Chapter 2: Country Context

"Money isn't really the problem"

2.1 ECONOMIC TRENDS

Kenya is one of the largest economies in Africa[1] and, despite a number of signficiant political, economic and climatic shocks and setbacks, has been able to maintain generally modest but positive growth over the past two decades. Kenya is recognised as a **regional hub for innovation, entrepreneurship and high quality human resources**. Kenya has a **strategic location, largely sound macroeconomic policies, a strong human resource base, a vibrant private sector, and is one of the most important tourist destinations** of the region. Kenya is aspiring to reach middle income status[2] by 2030.[3] Oil reserves could also significantly enhance Kenya's economic prospects in the near future.

Kenya's current economic risks and opportunities are influenced by a convergence of major factors. The post 2007 election violence, a severe drought in the following years, combined with the global economic, food and fuel crises clouded the economic outlook.[4] Continued ethnic tensions, the recurrent nature of drought in the region and uncertainties regarding the global economic recovery suggest that these **risks remain, even if the short-term outlook is generally positive.** Since this period, economic growth has begun to improve with GDP growth over 4% in 2011 and 2012. The Kenyan economy has thus been affected by a range of local, regional and global political, financial and climatic hazards. Kenya is vulnerable to recurrent droughts and other climatic hazards at home, regional security threats and reliance on trade with EU partners that are undergoing their own uncertain paths to economic recovery. The tourism industry is vulnerable to security issues in Kenya and the region, as well as economic conditions in the North. At the same time, the Kenyan economy has proven resilient due to an increasingly diversified urban and rural economic base. Growth currently exceeds global averages. Kenyan recovery has occurred in some aspects of the economy, just as other aspects have been buffeted by additional shocks. The extent to which this resilience can be maintained given the growing population, chronic political and security tensions, and deteriorating climatic conditions remains to be seen. The recurrent nature of these shocks nonetheless suggests that future economic development will continue to be as related to ability to rely on different aspects of the economy to rebound from a range of shocks, rather than choice of the "right" overall development policy.

Table 2: GDP Growth in the East African Community (EAC)

	2010	2011	2012	2013 projection
Kenya	5.8	4.4	4.6	5.6
Tanzania	7.0	6.4	6.5	6.8
Uganda	6.1	5.1	4.2	5.7
Rwanda	7.2	8.6	7.7	7.5
Burundi	3.8	4.2	4.2	4.5

KNBS Economic Survey 2013

With regard to distribution of resources, the incidence of poverty (i.e., the poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line) is believed to be rising, from 45.9% in 2006, to an estimated 48% in 2011.[5] However, these trends are disputed with some studies suggesting different conclusions. There is insufficient recent data available to draw definitive conclusions regarding poverty levels since the most recent Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey was undertaken in 2005/06.

Studies on inequality undertaken in the period since 2000,[6] including the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey, have reported Gini coefficients[7] ranging from 0.42 to as high as 0.625[8] with the latest (2005) World Bank estimated Gini of 0.477.[9] **Power and access to resources are highly skewed with widespread collusion between political and economic elites that maintain the status quo.**

Performance in the agriculture sector has been mixed. Export horticulture has maintained its competitiveness and contributed to economic growth and livelihoods.[10] Traditional export commodities also remain important, though these were affected by adverse weather conditions (tea) and producer prices (coffee, dairy) in 2012. Despite general growth in agricultural production, the impact on household food security has varied. In the arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs), which make up over 70% of Kenya's land area, climatic hazards have generated hunger and chronic insecurity, which have repeatedly led to humanitarian crises. During the drought in 2009 there were immense cattle losses. By 2010 more than half of the population was estimated to be food insecure and almost two million people dependent on humanitarian food aid.[11] Net consumers in urban and rural areas are affected by volatile food prices, which are in turn related to both climatic factors affecting domestic production and global cereal prices.

Climate change, and other aspects of environmental change, constitute serious threats to overall economic development. Costs of recurrent droughts are already enormous, with the 2008-2011 drought having costed an estimated 78.9 billion SEK, of which 72.4 billion SEK was for losses in overall economic flows.[12] Floods also cause massive damage. Estimates of future costs of climate change are uncertain, but some suggest that these could cost 2.6% of annual GDP by 2030.[13]

Despite generally positive economic growth, **public perceptions of the economic situation are negative and there has been a steady decline in public confidence in the economy over the past decade.**[14] The reasons for this are unclear, and may be related to rising but unfulfilled expectations of a growing educated and urban population. Also, real wages are declining due to inflation. Nonetheless, Kenyans (particularly in Nairobi and the Central Region) retain significant hope that their quality of life will improve in the future.[15]

In sum the **Kenyan economy has been shown to be, and is likely to remain, fragile.** Despite a number of positive trends, government targets of double digit growth appear highly optimistic and it is more likely that Kenya will continue to experience erratic growth and investment trends.

2.2 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT TRENDS

Kenya's attainments in terms of social development are less impressive than its relatively positive achievements in overall economic development. Between 1980 and 2012 Kenya's Human and Development Index (HDI)16 rose by 0.9% annually from 0.424 to 0.519 today, which in 2013 gives the country a rank of 145 out of 187 countries with comparable data.17 Kenya is classified as having low human development, but it is close to the threshold for classification as medium human development. In a recent report, **Kenya has been classified as a "laggard" in attaining the Millennium Development Goals** (MDGs, see figure 1 below).[18]

Figure 1: 2013 MDG Progress Index Score, Sub Saharan African Countries



(source: One: The 2013 Data report)

Kenya's lacklustre achievements in social development are most glaringly reflected in the nutritional situation. Ten million people are recognised as food insecure in an average year and 35% of children are stunted.[19] Public budget allocations to address malnutrition are limited and agricultural policies do not focus strongly on implications of policies for household food security. **In a country that is aspiring to becoming a middle income "hub for innovation", the enduring and severe malnutrition situation is evidence of Kenya's non-inclusive society and flawed development path.**

Conflict in Kenya is related to a mosaic of ethnic, religious and political factors, which in turn are manifested in a context of growing competition over livelihoods, land and other resources in both rural and urban areas. Ethnicity has long been the major divisive mobilising factor in Kenyan politics, a feature that has its roots in the colonial era.[20] **Regional geopolitical tensions and religious conflicts constitute threats to both economic development and the safety of the populations in the affected areas.** Endemic violence in the vast ASALs, most notably cattle rustling, has both economic impacts and also feeds social divisions as it reinforces negative attitudes that contribute to inter-ethnic tensions and discrimination against pastoralists. Northern Kenya has long been the "epicenter" of human rights violations in the country and the security forces have regularly carried out collective punishment of communities in the affected areas.[21] Urban crime and violence are also pervasive.

Another key social divide is along gender lines, manifested within the household, community, market and the state.[22] Gender norms and practices influence the opportunities and constraints women and men face in these arenas. **Institutional reforms to protect women's rights have had little impact.**[23]

The country has achieved MDG2: free and universal primary education, and made important strides in secondary education. Universal primary education was introduced in 2003 and by 2008, 93% of 6-15 year olds attended school.[24] There are, however, concerns about the quality of this education. Currently, the median number of years of schooling completed is 6.0 years for men and 5.2 years for women.[25] Kenya is also likely to achieve MDG3 on gender parity in education.

Though investments are now being made in secondary education, dropout rates are much higher than in primary education, especially amongst the poorer strata of society. In 2006, the gross enrolment rate in secondary school was only 32.2%.[26] This figure masks huge regional variations. For instance, in North Eastern Province the gross enrolment rate in secondary school was only 6.1% as compared to 47.9% in Central Province.[27] In more marginal regions girls are particularly negatively affected. This is related to a range of factors, including long distance to school which disadvantages girls due to their home care activities, cultural bias in favour of boys, and early marriages and associated parental responsibilities. Although very few Kenyans have completed tertiary education, the number is growing and a middle class made up of mainly young, educated professionals is emerging.[28]

Kenya has average outcomes in comparison to other countries in the region in terms of health service delivery.[29] As with education, the health status of the population varies regionally and this is linked to access to health care and prevalence of illnesses such as HIV/AIDS and malaria.[30] The average life expectancy in Nyanza Province, for example, is 16 years lower and under-five mortality four times higher than in Central Province.[31] Maternal mortality is high.[32] Life expectancy stands at 57 years. Infant mortality is high but falling, as is under-five mortality – childhood vaccination, use of mosquito nets and antenatal care being the major drivers of these improvements. However, **only about 60% of households have access to safe water, and sanitation coverage is estimated at only 50%**,[33] which has negative implications in relation to infant mortality and prevalence of water and sanitation related diseases.

2.3 POLITICAL CONTEXT

There is a great and growing gap between the political/economic elite and the population in general. This gap expanded during the Moi regime when local authorities' responsibilities and capacities for service provision were undermined due to power being concentrated in the executive authorities. Structures for accountability were deliberately weakened to enable accumulation of wealth by the political and commercial elite. Illegal land dealings and gross corruption were commonplace during the Moi regime. Current concerns about the impunity of public officials stem from this period.[34]

Kenyan democracy can be seen to have begun with the first free elections in 2002, but the path since has been problematic and in recent years concerns have been expressed that Kenya could become a "fragile state".[35] **The highly flawed 2007 elections and subsequent violence resulted in a massive humanitarian crisis and significantly damaged Kenya's reputation for stability and rule of law.** In more recent years, two political events have played and will continue to play a critical part in shaping the nature and focus of development cooperation: the 2013 elections and the adoption of the 2010 Constitution. In March 2013, the Kenyan Supreme Court officially and unanimously declared Uhuru Kenyatta the country's next president, upholding the preliminary electoral results. The acceptance of the decision by the opposition, as much as the result itself, was a landmark achievement for Kenya. The election process in 2013 was relatively peaceful and participation rates were high (reported at 86% of the registered voters). However, significant segments of the population, including much of civil society, still question the legitimacy of the elections. Furthermore, the indictment of the newly elected President and Deputy President by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for allegedly being involved in the 2007-8 atrocities has created significant tensions between the new government and the international community.[36]

The election coincided with the implementation of another important milestone, the 2010 Constitution of Kenya which replaced the 1969 Constitution and was approved by 67% of Kenyan voters. **The key changes introduced by the new Constitution include: separation of powers among the executive, legislature and judiciary branches of government; a new Bill of Rights; strong commitments to account-**

able leadership and integrity, and devolution of authority from national to county level. Devolution is widely seen as offering the potential to open up new spaces at the local level for participation and inclusion. The international community has praised the approach that Kenya took to constitutional reform, seeing it as a viable way to address many of the development challenges facing Kenya today. **It is, however, unclear how many aspects of the new Constitution will be implemented,** particularly the devolution process where expectations and responsibilities are likely to overwhelm existing institutional capacities. Development partners are now considering how best to support the institutional development of Kenya's 47 new county governments.

These developments suggest that Kenya may be at a turning point. The signals are mixed. Elements are in place that may stem and perhaps reverse the deterioration in state-society relations that in many respects began in the Moi era and culminated in the 2007 elections and their aftermath. There are indications that the public is demanding accountable governance. The extent to which the new structures being created can deliver against these demands will have profound implications for Kenya's future. This relates to both the political will to carry through reforms and also the capacities to do so, which are particularly limited in the new country administriations.

Political commitments for moving from proclamations to practice regarding equality and rights, participation, transparency and accountability remain untested. This is a particular concern in the informal norms of public service delivery. Kenyans are sceptical of whether the Constitution will be implemented in full, but retain faith that the Constition will lead to better enforcement of laws.[37] A survey also suggests that the Kenyan public is moving away from accepting the ethnic political manipulations of the past, and are regaining faith in national institutions.[38] This is despite the fact that Kenyans still perceive that police torture is widespread, indicating distrust in the commitments of the state to protect human rights.[39] Faith in the reform of the judiciary has grown, but was shaken as a result of the process after the recent elections.

Civil society is playing an important role in these political processes both as a watchdog in relation to duty bearers and as a promoter of policy reform. The role of Kenyan civil society in representing rights holders and strengthening their voice in the dialogue with duty bearers is growing. However, Kenyan civil society remains reliant on international support to fulfil these roles. Accountability to members and structures in rural areas are insufficiently developed.[40] Given the limited absorptive capacity of many national and local government structures, civil society has an evident role to play in service provision as well, but their capacities for providing these services are also limited.

Chapter 3: Poverty and Vulnerability

"There is a need to move beyond technocratic approaches. When the focus is on exclusion we need to focus on those who are historically and structurally marginalised."

3.1 POVERTY PERSISTS DUE TO CHRONIC VULNERABILITY

Sweden defines poverty as a lack of resources, choice and power[41] and recognises that poverty is difficult to pin down in terms of cause and symptom, measurement or solution. Poverty is understood and analysed as a multi-dimensional phenomenon related to gender, age, ethnicity and a range of other factors. The factors that influence poverty change over time and in different geographical areas.

This perspective is particularly relevant in Kenya given the context described in the previous chapter where the well-being of the poor is constantly buffeted by a range of hazards. **To understand poverty is to understand the factors that determine whether or not the poor have capacities to maintain some form of livelihood and recover when crops die in the fields, when tourists stop coming to the resorts, or when a family member falls ill.** The vulnerability of the poor and their resilience capacity are central. The myriad factors that determine vulnerability and resilience capacity fall broadly into the following categories:

Access to resources: In Kenya today per capita income is less than SEK 5,250,[42] half the African average. More than 16 million people in 2006 could not access food to meet their daily calorie intake requirements.[43] Insecure tenure, access and in some areas availability of land and water, in both rural and urban areas, reduce people's ability to deal with the shocks that repeatedly impact on livelihoods. As the population grows and environmental conditions deteriorate the scarcity of these resources is increasing.

Access to basic services: Marginalisation also stems from lack of access to basic public services, due to duty bearers failing to uphold their social contract to serve the poor. Donor investments in service provision for the poor have not proven sustainable and there are indications that these may even encourage the Government of Kenya (GoK) to shift its investments to better off areas. This is a particular concern in the health sector, where donor involvement is greatest. Past attempts to introduce user charges to increase the the sustainability of these services led to drastic reduction in clinic attendance and little positive impact on government revenues.[44] Subsequent reductions in under charges have not yet led to clear increase in access to these services due to confusion about prevailing policies.[45] This could be interpreted as a warning that devolution may lead to disorderly attempts by local authorities to cover costs of services as occurred in earlier decentralisation efforts in Uganda.[46]

Power: Access to resources is largely related to power relations. The lack of benefits reaching the poor from macro-economic growth is related to pervasive elite capture of the benefits from economic development.[47] Since the colonial era, investment patterns have been uneven and have exacerbated ethnic divides and entrenched inequality. Patronage and elitism remain at the heart of national politics and positions of authority are largely held by men. After the 2013 elections, women hold 19% of the seats in the National Assembly (largely due to the allocation of 47 women county representatives) and 28% of the seats in the 67-member Senate (due to the allocation of 16 women representatives). Both houses of parliament thereby failed to meet the one-third quota stipulated in the 2010 Constitution. So did the county assemblies; in total fewer than 100 of the 1450 members elected nationwide were women.[48] Exclusion from positions of authority (and resource control) is also related to disability and ethnicity.

Choice: Weak access to resources and lack of power deprive individuals of the right to shape and make choices over their own lives – particularly livelihood choices. Secure land tenure (in both urban and rural areas) is required if the poor are to have the confidence to invest their meagre resources in new livelihoods. Health status and level of education[49] and technical training[50] are clear determinants of whether or not households are able to find new ways to escape from poverty and respond to livelihood shocks. This is in turn related to their access to services, clean water and and salubrious environment. Choice is also related to migration, and many households have recognised how "straddling" the urban-rural divide, with household members pursing livelihoods in both, is an effective way of spreading risks and taking advantage of a range of opportunities.[51]

Poverty creates poverty. **Poverty is not only multidimensional, it is dynamic and in some cases cumulative. In Kenya this results from the convergence of shocks, generally relating to climate change, conflict and volatile economic conditions.** A struggle for daily survival prevents people from accumulating assets that could enable them to absorb these shocks. Desperation can also encourage behaviour that may undermine longer term livelihood diversification strategies, such as taking children out of school[52] or criminality. The causal relationships are complex. Disasters not only generate poverty but reduce people's ability to manage the other risks that they face and may lead to downward spirals. As such, there is a clear link between the transient poverty that households face when dealing with these shocks, and the reproduction of chronic poverty.[53] Moreover, poverty may also induce disasters (e.g. by contributing to environmental degradation, conflicts over access to scarce resources, etc.). In the poorest parts of the country (Northeast and Rift Valley) there appears to be a correlation between scarce resources, powerlessness and lack of opportunities on the one hand; and persistent violence and political insecurity on the other.[54] The labelling of certain ethnic groups or livelihoods (especially pastoralism) as "the problem" has led to state repression and further marginalisation.[55] These factors suggest that in order to understand poverty one must understand the factors that determine how different individuals, households and communities are vulnerable to a range of hazards and how the resulting exposure to risks vary due to temporary factors and according to where they live.

Poverty leads to food insecurity due to inability to produce food, inability to access livelihoods that allow for the purchase of food, and weak capacity to deal with food price fluctuations. This even includes smallholder farming households, as most are net food buyers. Government responses to the food price crises have been erratic and therefore ineffective.[56] The temporary injections of food aid after droughts, which dominate humanitarian response, have not had a significant impact on the factors that make people vulnerable to recurrent climatic shocks. Food security policies currently emphasise an array of measures to prevent recurrent droughts from turning into humanitarian food security emergencies,[57] but these intentions have yet to reduce Kenya's dependency on food aid. Vested interests and political power struggles have meant that, despite new policies, Kenya remains locked into food security approaches that have proven ineffective in the past.[58]

The nature and structure of poverty in Kenya is changing rapidly. Rapid growth in real GDP from 2003 to 2007 was expected to make inroads into poverty rates and, overall, poverty did decrease from 56% in 2000 to 46% in 2006.[59] However, this period of **rapid growth did not yield significant reductions in rural poverty**.[60] The fact that only a minority of rural households benefitted from the 2003 - 2007 period of high macroeconomic growth has been attributed to the fact that poor households face serious constraints to effectively use their limited assets even in such conducive times, and therefore fail to use economic upswings to establish a basis for more stable livelihoods.[61]

Urban social indicators have also stagnated and in some respects deteriorated over the long term.[62] Urban poverty is correlated to insufficient access to wage labour and informal sector commercial activities. It is also affected by ill-health related to poor sanitation and experience of chronic violence. Insecure residential tenure is also a major issue for the poorest.

After the economic shocks of 2008 and 2009 the Kenyan economy is growing satisfactorally again. Nonetheless, the large majority (approximately 80%) of both urban and rural residents currently perceive that their living conditions are deteriorating, and most are pessimistic about prospects for improvement.[63] This pessimism is a reflection of how, despite economic growth, many aspects of poverty remain entrenched. **Households remain poor, even across generations, due to an inability to mobilise resources to invest in livelihood diversification.**[64]

While there are many people in Kenya who remain poor throughout their lives, a larger group move in and out of poverty as their circumstances change due to an array of environmental, economic and social shocks. Poverty therefore needs to be considered in relation to vulnerability, limits to ability to take advantage of new opportunities[65] and capacity for resilience. A study based on data from the past decade showed that while 70% of households experienced poverty at some point, only 11% were always poor throughout the period.[66] A 2010 report looking at the life histories of poor households nationwide found that people who were able to escape from poverty had maintained their health, were part of male headed households, had parents who had land and were well educated.[67] This suggests that **poverty is related to factors such as a household's capacity to rebound after a family member falls ill, whether they are**

able to avoid having to sell productive assets during a drought and whether they can send a child to school (or combinations of these factors).

Poverty is ultimately related to respect for human rights and people are vulnerable if duty bearers do not acknowledge the rights of the poor. Abuse of power and failure to live up to duties is at the core of poverty in Kenya today. As such, assumptions that macro-economic growth alone will alleviate poverty are unfounded.

Discussions in the course of developing this PDA revealed highly contrasting perspectives on the role of the state in relation to chronic vulnerability and repeated livelihood shocks. **Some observers recognised that the state has a responsibility for social protection, whereas others saw such interpretations of the rights of the poor as constituting a recipe for generating dependency.** Many observers, in both government and academia, do not see the current levels of inequality in Kenya as a problem. Many development programmes have few if any indicators to monitor the expected “trickle down effect”. Expectations that economic development alone will ultimately alleviate poverty, even if there are no signs that this is proving justified, have generated a degree of complacency towards focusing on the chronically poor, and even views that explicit poverty alleviation efforts are not necessary. As will be discussed further below, in official Kenyan policy poverty is classified as a “social” problem, and thus implicitly divorced from economic and political policies. Some criticised development partners for what they perceived of as an undue focus on vulnerability and food insecurity issues in the ASALs, whereas others noted that failures to explicitly focus on addressing the rights of the people in these areas will allow chronic insecurity to continue and fester. Even among those who recognise the importance of poverty alleviation, there was a common view that strategies focusing on escapes from poverty will not reach the most destitute, and that the needs of the chronically poor may be best served by strengthening social services.

Factors encouraging perpetuation of gross human rights violations

- The failure of the first government in independent Kenya to dismantle the repressive state structures established by the colonial government.
- The use of and subsequent enhancement of repressive laws, policies and practices initially employed by the colonial government by the first two post-independence governments.
- The creation of a *de jure* one party state by President Moi’s government, resulting in severe repression of political dissent and intimidation and control of the media. Repression of political speech and the media allowed many violations to occur with little public scrutiny, much less accountability.
- Consolidation of immense powers in the person of the President, coupled with the deliberate erosion of the independence of both the Judiciary and the Legislature.
- The failure of the state to investigate and punish gross violations of human rights, especially those committed by state security agencies. During the entire 1963-2008 period, the state demonstrated no genuine commitment to investigate and punish atrocities and violations committed by its agents against innocent citizens.

Based on the final report of the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission, May 2013

3.2 POVERTY IS DYNAMIC AND RELATED TO SPATIAL FACTORS

Poverty is stark reality for millions of people in Kenya; with a poverty rate between 46-48% and an extreme poverty rate of 20%.[68] The last reliable national poverty survey in Kenya (the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey) was held in 2005/06 and reported an increase in the absolute number of people classified as poor from 13.4m in 1997 to 16.6m in 2006 (even though the relative poverty rates have declined).[69] This survey also reported that 49.6% of the rural population is poor against 33.1% in urban areas.[70] Poverty is also unevenly spread - in some regions of the country, more than 70% of people are poor.[71] Most of the extremely poor live in the ASALs.

The intransigent nature of chronic poverty in the ASALs has led many of the those interviewed to suggest that development partners reconsider their "bias" toward these impoverished areas, by instead investing in higher potential areas where poverty alleviation gains are less expensive and where chances of success are greater. This is not an either-or question. Permanent and temporary migration from areas where poverty is entrenched and where people are struggling with droughts or conflict are viable strategies, but there is no indication that the ASALs are becoming depopulated as a result of such migration. Also, although expensive, water harvesting methods are reducing vulnerability to drought among those who have access to these new technologies. As long as there are significant populations choosing to live in the ASALs, duty bearers have a responsibility to provide basic services and ensure security.

Women are more likely to be poor than men,[72] especially in urban areas (c.f. 46% of female-headed households vis-à-vis 30% of male-headed). In rural areas, where poverty is more persistent, it cuts across household categories (50% of female-headed vis-à-vis 48% of male-headed).[73] Female-headed households are also more likely to be *extremely* poor.[74] However, these conclusions are contested. A recent study suggests that when adjusting for household size, observed income differentials between female- and male-headed households in the country disappear.

Inequality in Kenya is very pronounced. In 2006 the World Bank noted that the ratio of consumption between the top and bottom 10% stood at 20:1 and 12:1 in urban and rural areas, respectively (compared to 5:1 in Tanzania and 3.3:1 in Ethiopia).[75] There are also significant regional variations. In 2005/6 inequality was most severe in the ASAL areas of Turkana, Mandera, Tana River, Kwale and Isiolo.[76] This is linked to geographical patterns of economic development which can be traced back to the colonial era, when resources were channelled into the white settler areas. Uneven investment was compounded upon Independence, when first President Kenyatta and later Moi favoured their own respective ethnic groups and regions. An emerging elite was able to take control over commercial agriculture and today they still retain control over much of Kenya's resources.[77] Thus **both the pre- and post-Independence eras have generated rich and poor areas in the country, with some ethnic groups becoming much better off than others.**[78]

Poverty in Kenya is related to spatial factors of land use, elevation, soil conditions and quality, precipitation, and market access.[79] The factors that define poverty are thus location specific.[80] As earlier noted, poverty is greatest in the Rift Valley and the Northeast,[81] where for some groups conditions are even deteriorating. Pastoralists in particular became notably poorer between 1990 and 2005.[82]

Poverty in rural areas correlates with geographical determinants of natural resource scarcity, above all with access to water and land. Particularly in Northern Kenya, conflicts over land are said to be the main factor driving violence and human rights violations.[83] The poor in some cases shift between nomadic pastoral and sedentary livelihoods. Only one quarter of the land in Kenya is currently arable due largely to water scarcity,[84] and less than 1% of the land is irrigated.[85] Recurrent droughts, some resulting in humanitarian crises, particularly affect smallholders and pastoralists who lack the capital and knowledge to make optimum use of available rainfall. **Increasing investments in capital intensive farming in ASALs suggests that increases in productivity and profitability are possible, and that drought can be managed, but it is unclear whether these investments lead to greater resilience for the poor.** Further analysis is needed to understand whether the commercially successful investments in these areas are generating new livelihoods or reinvestment in the ASALs that provides improved prospects for the residents of these areas.

It should be recognised that, although poverty is not as entrenched in areas where commercial agriculture is well established, it is still a serious problem, and due to demographic trends may be getting worse. Land scarcity is an increasing problem in high potential areas, and two thirds of farmers do not believe that their land is enough for their children to make a living.[86]

Given the spatial nature of poverty and factors related to resource scarcity, migration is naturally an important strategy for the poor. Among pastoral households, access to formal sector employment in a city is a key livelihood strategy.[87] Poverty is decreasing in urban areas,[88] which encourages such migration. Moreover, with rural-urban migration, social networks and informal safety nets deriving from households combining rural and urban livelihoods are important but may be eroding.[89]

Figure 2:Poverty is Linked to Where People Live



Chapter 4: Opportunities for Resilience and Development

"How can we shift the digitalisation of the few to the ground truthing of the majority?"

4.1 KENYA'S DYNAMIC ECONOMY

Kenya is the gateway to East and Central Africa. Mombasa Port is the second largest in Africa, and Kenya's transport network serves a number of landlocked countries in the region.[90] Potential exists for further and deeper regional integration and trade.[91] Common markets offer huge and expanding opportunities. While Kenya is a net importer of goods, the country is already a net exporter of services, mainly targeting the EAC. Small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) are very important to Kenya in regional economic terms and Kenyans are adept at exploiting opportunities in neighbouring countries. The growth in SME revenue can mainly be traced to the sale of goods and services in Uganda and Tanzania.[92] Kenya is one of the most important tourist destinations in Sub-Saharan Africa, and business appears resilient despite security concerns.[93]

Cities are providing an important foundation for an emergent and dynamic class of entrepreneurs, business leaders and public servants, as well as a burgeoning civil society.[94] Urban dynamism has fuelled and been fuelled by the country's economic performance.[95] Many multinational companies and international banks and organisations have their regional headquarters in Nairobi and this has contributed to a strong managerial cadre.[96] Kenya is at the fore in the region in relation to innovative capacity, quality of higher education, development of financial markets and labour market efficiency. Company spending on research and development is high, and scientific research institutions commonly collaborate with the business sector. The higher educational and training system is important in this context. Even though it reaches a small proportion of the population, the quality is deemed good.

An ICT revolution continues apace and there were 30.7 million mobile phone subscribers in the country by end-December 2012.[97] Approximately 20 million individuals are using mobile financial services such as M-Pesa.[98] By the end of 2012, there were 9.4 million Internet subscribers (a 75% increase compared to one year earlier), and 41% of the adult population had access to the Internet.[99]

Migration is an important aspect of how poor people access benefits from this economc dynamism. **Households in Kenya, as elsewhere in Africa, are taking advantage of the new opportunities in urban areas and are finding ways to manage their vulnerability to climatic variability and uncertainty by engaging in circular migration between urban and rural areas and by "straddling" the rural and urban economies with household members engaged in both.**[100]

Despite these positive signs, Kenya's exports of goods and services could only pay for 57% of imports in 2012; a significant drop from 87% ten years earlier.[101] During 2012 inflation was curbed but the current account deficit was over 10% of GDP.[102] This also makes Kenya very vulnerable to externalities, particularly increases in costs for oil imports. Increasing public and private savings and exports are important potential remedies.[103] All this points to the need for export diversification since Kenya's export portfolio is limited (tea, horticulture and coffee alone represent more than 45% of exports; total agricultural exports account for 65%[104]). Furthermore, Kenya scores poorly on the World Bank Doing Business Index as the relative cost of doing business is high.[105] Also the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index ranks the country poorly, 106 out of 144.[106]

4.2 POTENTIAL FOR IMPROVED SECURITY AND REDUCED INEQUITIES

In the past, relative security made Kenya attractive for investment compared to some of its neighbours. Today the picture is mixed. The 2008 post-election violence revealed the fragility of Kenya's democracy and highlighted the inherently destabilising nature of the socio-political system that has characterised the country since Independence. Furthermore, the situation in Somalia is creating regional insecurity. Somali pirates and the terrorist group Al-Shabaab have increased transport and therefore trade costs for Kenya due to cargo ships having to find alternative routes. The actions of these groups have also had a negative impact on the tourism industry.[107] Urban crime rates remain high, with insecurity and violence primarily affecting the informal settlements.

However, there are significant positive developments. The M-Pesa mobile phone banking system has made financial transactions safer. The March 2013 elections were largely peaceful. New institutions are being put into place that may lead to reduced inequities and enhanced respect for human rights. The new Constitution commits Kenya to a redistribution of power through 47 new county governments, each with elected Governors and County Assemblies. Integrity, anti-corruption and ethics are high on the public agenda.

Devolution holds promise for enhanced service delivery and state-citizen accountability. Revenue raised nationally will be shared between National and County governments, with the 47 county governments sharing a minimum of 15% of total state revenue. This is also intended to address some of the regional inequalities created along ethnic lines. However, there has been some concern expressed that this could exacerbate regional inequalities and further marginalise some ethnic groups and or fail to mitigate ethnic conflict.[108] Positive impacts of devolution will rely on the development of strong and appropriate human resource, financial and technical capacities at county level, and an electorate that demands equity and a focus on the needs of the poor. This capacity will need to extend beyond the public administration to include a strong civil society that acts as a watchdog on the new institutions as well as providing services.[109]

The new Constitution is one of the most progressive on the continent in that it includes several provisions for enhanced gender equality and representation. Besides the new Constitution, Kenya has over the years taken various legislative, judicial, administrative and programmatic actions to eliminate the discrimination of women. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and other international and regional conventions have been signed and ratified; a Policy of Gender Equality and Development has been drafted; National Plans of Action agreed on; laws have been passed; commissions established; funds earmarked; projects launched; and programmes gender mainstreamed.[110] Several civil society organisations focus on gender issues and a burgeoning of women's associations at the community level have emerged. Despite all this, progress toward changing attitudes toward gender equality has been slow. One observer interviewed stated that "a lot has been achieved, but not much has changed."

4.3 AGRICULTURE AND LIVELIHOOD DIVERSIFICATION

Agriculture remains an important sector in terms of its share of GDP (averaging between 20 and 25% in recent years[111]), contribution to export earnings (65%) and employment (45%).[112] Commercial agriculture is important for economic development and job creation, while smallholder farming remains an important source of food security for millions of households. In addition to traditional export products (coffee and tea) there has been notable success with the development of horticultural produce for export. **It is likely that the agricultural sector will continue to be central to both economic performance and the livelihoods of the poor for the foreseeable future.**

Vision 2030, that describes Kenya's roadmap for the future, identifies agriculture as a priority sector for development, and agriculture secured approximately 5% of the budget for 2012/2013.[113] The government sees possibilities to increase the productivity of smallholders by increasing access to improved technology and improving farm management practices.[114] The link between agricultural development trajectories and poverty alleviation is complex. Some smallholders are increasing their access to markets, for example through new contracting arrangements with commercial actors, storage investments and by taking advantage of improved market information. They may also be able to hold new county authorities to account for service provision, which has been uneven in the past. For much of the rural population, especially in high potential areas, the livelihood opportunities offered on larger commercial farms, combined with employment in agricultural processing, are likely to be increasingly important in relation to smallholder production in the future.

In rural areas there is evidence that households with sufficient labour resources to diversify into other rural income generation activities when agricultural conditions are difficult, and to invest additional labour in additional crop production when this is possible, are better able to cope with climate variability.[115] A study drawing on detailed interviews with households that have risen from poverty between 1990 and 2005 noted that these households mainly attribute their success to having diversified their income sources, obtaining formal public or private sector employment, making changes in relation to crop and or livestock production (especially diversifying their crop/livestock mix and or commercialising their production), receiving help from friends and family in the country, and or having few dependents. The same study found that those who had fallen into poverty during the same time period mainly explained this in terms of having too many dependents, suffering from poor health, experiencing the death of a major income earner, drought, and or loss of property due to theft or overall insecurity. From this study, health problems emerged as the major factor driving people into poverty while non-farm incomes were cited as most important for escaping from poverty.[116]

Small pilot projects in the ASALs have shown that with investments in water harvesting it is possible to make more efficient use of existing rainfall and significantly reduce the risks that recurrent droughts turn into humanitarian emergencies. It is less clear whether mechanisms can be found whereby these capital intensive investments can be managed by the poor. **Agricultural service provision in the ASALs is expensive, and there is a growing scepticism in Kenya over the creation of new service provision models with donor support, as there is a poor track record of government being able to assume responsibility for recurrent costs.** Even if a comparison of benefits (in terms of profitability, and also reduced conflict and reliance on food aid) with these investment costs may show positive returns in the ASALs, it is not clear whether the government is prepared to cover these costs. It is likely that decisions regarding if and how to invest in enhancing food security in the ASALs will become a major component of dialogue among central government, development (and humanitarian) partners and the new county governments.

4.4 HUMAN RESOURCES

Fertility rates and hence dependency ratios are falling. Nonetheless, Kenya still has a very young population, children making up around 42% of the population.[117] Youth (aged 15 to 35 years), accounted for 36% of the total adult population in 2009.[118] Such a significant youth bulge can be both a challenge and opportunity for a country.[119] **An excess of young adult men, especially if unemployed, constitutes a potential source of social unrest.[120] Young adults are, however, a vital resource that can contribute to Kenya's development.** UNDP notes that "channelling their energy, initiatives and resources towards tackling developmental challenges is key to progress".[121] There are currently not enough new, well paid, modern jobs being generated for the young and educated.[122] As a result, and perhaps counter-intuitively, youth with higher education are more likely to be unemployed than youth with low education, who usually find employment in agriculture and informal sectors.[123]

Access to higher educational is expanding and there are now over 20 public and private universities in Kenya, as well as many technical training establishments. In Nairobi, 25.3% of all women and 31.1% of all men have more than secondary school education (although this is far from the country mean of 4.5 and 6.1, respectively).[124] These aspects of human resource development may become the most important drivers determining Kenya's opportunities to take advantage of Africa's growing economy.

Chapter 5: Government Commitments and Action

"Participation of the poor and non-poor is in the constitution… it is no longer even a choice. It is part of the legal environment."

5.1 POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

In 2010 a new Constitution was approved by 67% of Kenyan voters. This new Constitution enhances (i) separation of powers between the three arms of government the executive, legislature and judiciary, (ii) devolution of considerable public authority from national government to 47 new county governments,[125] (iii) commitment to the basic rights of the individual, supporting an holistic and rights-based approach to social development that addresses inequality and marginalisation, and (iv) public participation in governance by building citizen and stakeholder involvement within their respective policy-making processes.[126] **The Constitution addresses many of the issues of centralisation of power which have plagued Kenya's past political structures and led to marginalisation of the poor.**[127] Integrity and leadership are recognised as central to realisation of the intentions of the Constitution as a whole. County governments will have a high degree of autonomy in planning and managing public affairs. The Constitution also contains a comprehensive chapter on land, covering a wide range of issues from land classification, regulation of land use, and establishment of a national land commission. The land reforms are expected to have particular implications for gender equality, as few women currently have formal titles to their land.[128] **The commitments in the new Constitution will inevitably take time to implement, and will require massive capacity development efforts.** Civil society may have a significant role to play in terms of driving the process forward and ensuring that the aspirations embodied in the Constitution result in real changes in the status quo.

Although the new Constitution is considered to be very progressive, there is still a significant disconnect between people's constitutional rights, their awareness of these rights and public officials' commitments and capacities to act on their new duties. Informal power relations and elite capture that exclude the poor, women and opposition ethnic groups remain omnipresent,[129] and may create obstacle to the implementation of formal reforms. The prevailing gap resulting from the limited voice of rights holders and the weak accountability of duty bearers will influence how the elements of the Constitution are perceived and acted upon. Despite these obstacles, Kenyans overwhelmingly support the new Constitution and believe that it will lead to more accountable government and equitable development.[130]

Vision 2030, the National Development Strategy (which pre-dates the Constitution) was developed through an inclusive and participatory stakeholder consultative process. In addition to recognising the crucial role of macro-economic stability to economic growth, the stated aim is to make Kenya globally competitive and prosperous with a high quality of life by the year 2030.[131] The strategy is implemented through five-year medium term plans (MTPs), with the first covering the period 2008 – 2012. The second MTP covering the period 2013-2017 is being launched mid 2013. The strategy and MTP rely on three key pillars: an **economic pillar** aiming at achieving an economic growth rate of 10% per annum driven by tourism, agriculture, manufacturing, ICT and business process outsourcing, wholesale and retail trade, and finance; a **social pillar** aiming at achieving social development that is just, cohesive and equitable; and a **political pillar** aiming at achieving a democratic system that is issue-based, people-centred, results-oriented and accountable. Critical foundations for achieving these overarching goals include macroeconomic stability, continuity in governance reforms, enhanced equity and wealth creation opportunities for the poor, infrastructure, energy, science, technology and innovation (STI), land reform, human resource development, security, and public sector reforms. A set of ‘flagship projects’ are to be implemented to reach the various targets. Vision 2030 also stresses the need for continuity in governance reforms (aligned with the new Constitution), enhanced equity and wealth creation opportunities for the poor.[132] **Poverty as an issue appears under the social pillar, rather than all three, suggesting that congruence may be lacking between poverty alleviation and economic and political development processes.** Discussions in the course of developing this PDA revealed differing views on the implications of this implicit definition of poverty as a “social problem” rather than an integral aspect of political and economic development. Some observers see this as a significant flaw in Vision 2030, whereas others feel that too much attention has been given to poverty alleviation in relation to economic and political development, and therefore welcome this division of objectives.

The Government has made a particular and strong public commitment to tackle corruption, but the challenges remain enormous. Transparency International ranks Kenya as 139 out of 176 countries. **Implementation of the provisions of the Constitution is likely to be influenced by corruption, and devolution may create new incentives for corrupt behaviour, while weak capacities in local government may lead to even greater impunity.** The risk that this might undermine the implementation of the Constitution and public participation in governance is real.[133] An Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission has been established (although with no prosecutorial powers) and a National Anti-Corruption Plan is now in place. A Public Financial Management Act has been approved and aims to reduce corruption and increase accountability. The Constitution addresses the separation of public and private sectors so that those who provide public services cannot at the same time be active in the private sector.[134] Vision 2030 identifies transparency and accountability as priorities.

With regard to gender equality, the GoK has signed and ratified CEDAW and other international and regional conventions. Additional commitments include a policy of Gender Equality and Development, as well as an associated National Plan of Action.

The new Constitution includes commitments to end discrimination of women and achieve gender equality. Vision 2030 and the first medium-term plan for 2008-12 identify and outline actions to combat gender inequalities. Many laws are gender-responsive (but not always implemented/enforced). Prior to the constitutional reforms, the GoK had made a commitment to the realisation of the MDG on gender equality and women's empowerment by 2015. The government is also working to ensure that gender issues are mainstreamed in all government ministries and agencies at all levels.[135] The Constitution specifically addresses gender inequalities, including women's right to inherit land. However, **most women do not know their rights under the new Bill of Rights, and there are also fears that strong cultural barriers will stand in the way of realising such rights.**

In terms of environmental sustainability, the Constitution establishes the rights of citizens to a clean and healthy environment and also stipulates that the state shall ensure sustainable utilisation of environment and natural resources. A number of international conventions have been signed and a National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS) developed. Some concern has been expressed over the transparency and implementation of the NCCRS.[136] The emphasis of the NCCRS is on mitigation, whereas it is in adaptation efforts that the factors which impact on poverty and vulnerability are most likely to be addressed. **Key sectoral policies and plans in agriculture and water make some reference to climate change adaptation, but it does not appear that these (generally rather vague) commitments constitute a sufficient response given the scale of likely economic, social and humanitarian impacts of current and future extreme climate events and gradual environmental change.**

5.2 FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS

To improve equity and reduce poverty, government efforts to date have included allocations toward universal primary education, improved access to basic health care services, expanded productive capacity in agriculture, development of the ASALs, and upgrading the living conditions for urban poor.[137] Between 2002/03 and 2011/12 government expenditure increased from SEK 28.3 billion to SEK 100.6 billion. This increase is in part due to increased tax revenues, as well as increased participation in international trade. Other resources are also increasingly flowing into the country, such as remittances and foreign direct investments. In 2012 remittances rose to almost SEK 3.9 billion, an increase of 46.7% over the previous year.[138] Aid is a significant part of government income; having increased from SEK 3.6 billion in 2002 to SEK 11.8 billion in 2009. Tax is the main contributor to GoK revenue, amounting to about SEK 65,1 billion in 2012/2013 (provisional figure from KNBS Economic Survey 2013). Aid represents approximately 15% of the state budget, although it covers about 40% of the development components of that budget.[139] A considerable proportion of aid investments are not reflected in the state budget.

Agriculture is notably underfunded. The Maputo Declaration on agriculture and food security commits governments in Africa to allocate 10% of their national budgets to agriculture, but Kenya only allocates 5%. This is despite the fact that poverty is concentrated in rural areas and that Vision 2030 commits government to work towards an innovative, commercially oriented and modern agricultural sector.[140]

The Constitution sets out principles on public spending, as the government will be obliged to ensure that revenue and budget allocations meet constitutional requirements for "equitable sharing". These requirements are aimed at reducing differences between regions, combating marginalisation, and raising the quality and coverage of basic service provision in areas that are lagging behind.[141] Currently, however, **Kenya's expenditure on health and agriculture are clearly insufficient in relation to African commitments**, as illustrated in figure 4 below. In addition to the Maputo Declaration noted above, the Abuja Declaration from 2001 commits African states to allocate 15% of the national budget to health, and the Dakar Framework for Action called for 9% to be allocated to education by 2009. The low level of investment in these sectors is also reflected in Kenya's overall "laggard" status in relation to the MDGs (see figure 1).

Figure 3: Sub-Saharan African Government Estimated Average Spending on Health, Education and Agriculture (Combined) as a % of Total Expenditure (2000-10), with MGD Progess Scores



(source: One: The 2013 Data Report)

5.3 MONITORING RESULTS

The government reports progress toward the MTPs against key indicators for which baselines and targets have been set. For example, progress with regard to poverty alleviation is measured by the number of people who are considered food insecure and by number of households with Orphans and Vulnerable Children. The most recent progress report[142] on the implementation of the MTP highlights that the initial target of 10% economic growth by 2012 has not been met.

In 2011 the Government introduced a National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System (NIMES) which it views as an essential component of its efforts to improve the effectiveness and quality of government. Under NIMES, monitoring activities are to be organised on a decentralised basis at all levels of government. **Each government institution or body which is spending public resources now has a responsibility to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of its programmes.**

Kenya's ratings for budgetary transparency have been average in relation to other African countries, with little indication of improvement or decline.[143] **Monitoring systems remain weak and there is a lack of budget and expenditure analysis.** Initiatives to enhance public financial management have been driven by both Parliament and the Auditor General. Public financial management systems are being strengthened and in 2011 the government re-launched its Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS), a nationwide accounting system. IFMIS has thus far not been able to provide the expected benefits of integrated financial planning, implementation and control of public expenditure. A new PFM reform strategy was also launched in 2013.

Chapter 6: Development Cooperation and Sweden's Role

"Let's create synergies regardless of modalities."

6.1 DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIPS

The overseas development assistance (ODA) landscape in Kenya has changed fundamentally over the last decade, a trend that is likely to accelerate in the coming years. **New private players, international NGOs, foundations and philanthropists, are responsible for a growing share of aid volumes.** The trend in global private philanthropy is visible in Kenya where the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria has emerged as a major development partner. The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI) is also a leading actor.[144] As well as new partners, new aid modalities are emerging including guarantees and credit mechanisms for private investment.

The United States is Kenya's largest OECD bilateral donor. In 2010, the US contributed SEK 3.7 billion, mostly allocated to HIV/AIDS support. However, the support fell to SEK 1.5 billion in 2012. Japan, France and the UK also provide significant bilateral aid. Sectoral priorities vary across development partners (see Annex VI). Health receives the highest proportion of aid overall, with the US being the sector's largest donor (SEK 8.6 billion received from the US between 2006 and 2010). Some observers interviewed stressed that the very high dependence on donor funding in the health sector has negative impact on government commitment to cover the recurrent costs of these services. The government perceives that the Environment, Water and Sanitation (EWS) sector has adequate financing.[145] A large proportion of this funding is in the form of loans, which may therefore be targeted to more commercially viable investments and not to the poor. EWS, along with the health and financial sector, are the most congested sectors, leading to some fragmentation of support. In total 19 development partners (with 72 projects) have been present in the EWS sector over the past four years, followed by 18 development partners in health and in finance. Sectors that the government views as being underfinanced include agriculture, land, STI, ICT and tourism. The nature of the under-financing varies between these sectors. In agriculture 11 development partners are present, but this support is fragmented among a large number of projects. Support to land as a "sector" is difficult to define, but it appears that two development partners are dominant, Sweden and the World Bank, with Sweden contributing 81% of the external funding. Other agencies, such as GIZ, IFAD and UNHabitat, are providing technical support for land related issues. For STI and ICT only three development partners are present. No development partner is supporting the tourism sector.

Focal areas for EU cooperation are agriculture and rural development, roads and transport and macroeconomic support. In addition the EU has a broad range of support outside these areas, including education, governance and private sector development.

Some donors are moving towards directly promoting trade and private sector investment, which involves a shift away from directly targeting the poorest and and from support to public service provision more generally. Indeed, it is broadly recognised among development partners that greater convergence between aid and private investment trajectories is needed. In the course of dialogue for this PDA it was difficult to discern a clear "theory of change" for how these private sector development and poverty alleviation objectives were expected to converge, given the history of elite capture of the benefits of economic growth. There are, however, ways that this could be effectively addressed. In their research, Whitfield and Therkildsen[146] have found that **awareness of potential mutual interests between entrepreneurs in productive sectors and politicians looking for voter support can be a way of identifying development opportunities amid elite capture.** Given the need for newly elected county level authorities to demonstrate results for their new constituents, there may be emerging opportunities for ways to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes that also include measures that address the needs of the poor.

Despite the surprisingly limited levels of investment in agriculture, concerns are growing about recurrent drought emergencies, high levels of acute and chronic malnutrition, and disturbing levels of household food insecurity. **There are growing calls for taking a new approach to linking humanitarian and development programming, but it does not appear that a consensus has been achieved regarding better convergence between modalities or objectives of humanitarian and development assistance.**[147]

A number of new development partnerships are emerging in Kenya, characterised by more commercial style relationships and business partnerships. Most significantly, since the mid-1990s, China has increasingly used foreign aid to achieve broader strategic objectives, including strengthening links with resource-rich African economies. Hence the biggest beneficiaries in Sub-Saharan Africa are Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, which account for the vast majority of the total Chinese aid to the region. In Kenya, loans and grants from China became significant after 2002. Investment is mainly focused on infrastructure, equipment and technology. Major projects include road construction, power distribution, rural electrification and water distribution. China also issues scholarships to students wishing to study in China and provides technical training. The Chinese Embassy reports that they primarily provide loans that generally include a 35% grant component. Due to donor requirements contracts are awarded to Chinese firms.

Brazil is another new development partner to Kenya, providing largely technical support. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency responds to requests from the Kenyan government. Only government-to-government support is offered and there is no legal framework for cooperation with civil society, the private sector or UN organisations.

6.2 AID EFFECTIVENESS

Figure 4: Aid Effectiveness and Coordination Structures



A sophisticated institutional framework for harmonisation, alignment and coordination of aid is in place in Kenya. The Aid Effectiveness Group (AEG) is a joint initiative of the GoK and development partners working to better align and coordinate their activities. The AEG has the triple role of (i) combining the knowledge and financing of development partners with that of the GoK, (ii) leveraging support and increasing development results, and (ii) encouraging the group to act in a coordinated manner and speak with one voice. To this end, the AEG collects and shares information about emerging good practices at sector level and analyses and addresses challenges. The Aid Effectiveness Secretariat (AES) acts as a secretariat for the AEG and the Government Coordination Group (GCG). The AES is mandated to support the Government and development partners equally in meeting the commitments in the Paris and Accra declarations on aid effectiveness. There are also Sector Working Groups (SWGs) to support coordination. The major bilateral donors do not channel their funds through government systems, but they remain active in the SWGs to ensure a modicum of alignment with Kenya's priorities. Hesitance to channel funds through the government is partly a response to large-scale corruption scandals.

Division of labour among development partners should be central to country-led coordination, but despite the existence of mechanisms for dialogue, some sectors remain crowded, while others are largely ignored. The Development Partnership Forum (DPF) is the bi-annual high-level forum for policy dialogue between the GoK and development partners on delivery of development results. The DPF has provided an opportunity for dialogue on Kenya's development priorities and challenges, political and economic developments, and the effective contribution of development cooperation. Absorption capacity is the key challenge that the government has stressed in this dialogue over the past year.

As part of MTPII, the government is proposing to assume more control over aid in order to conduct their own internal analysis, reduce the burden of information requests on the government, better utilise their own systems and increase transparency.

Challenges to Aid Effectiveness

The Kenyan Ministry of Finance has identified the following key challenges to enhancing aid effectiveness:

Predictability: Volatile or unpredictable aid flows inhibit good governance, coherent government expenditure and accountability in recipient countries. Foreign aid to Kenya has been highly volatile and only about 60% of net ODA is disbursed on an annual basis.

Coordination: There is a trend toward increasing aid volumes and shrinking project size. While small projects can deliver benefits to isolated communities, they also increase aid fragmentation, multiply administrative costs and complicate donor coordination by recipient governments.

Fragmentation and Division of Labour: To avoid fragmentation, a sound division of labour among development partners is needed. In order for this division of labour to work smoothly, all ministries are now required to ensure that the SWGs follow Vision 2030, but in practice little progress has been achieved in addressing issues of division of labour.

Fiduciary Risk: The risk of corruption is perceived as high in Kenya and most development partners have low trust in public financial management systems. Therefore parallel accounts, audit and procurement arrangements are often used to safeguard development funds, which is not in line with aid effectiveness principles.

Under-reporting: In practice the government budgets for appropriations, but the funds are often utilised by the development partner directly, for instance for direct payments to contractors. When the payments are made directly, the government often lacks information for financial follow-up and audit.

6.3 SWEDEN'S ROLE

The total volume of Swedish aid to Kenya provided between 1998 and 2011 amounts to SEK 3.14 billion. Between 2002 and 2006, annual development aid tripled from SEK 115 to 350 million. Neither the volume nor the flow of aid was affected by the election violence in 2008. The annual country budget for 2012 was SEK 414.5 million (see Annex VII). Levels of Swedish humanitarian support to Kenya have varied significantly over the last five years, between SEK 49.3 million in 2008 reaching its peak in 2011 with SEK 160 million. The peak in 2011 was due to the severe drought in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia.

The Swedish country strategy for development cooperation with Kenya for the period 2009-13 has focused on democratic governance and human rights, natural resources and the environment, and urban development. **The overall goal of the cooperation strategy is "a Kenya in which all poor people have the opportunity to improve their living conditions and where their human rights are realised."** Significant levels of humanitarian assistance have also been provided in addition to the aid provided through the framework of the country strategy. Sweden has long been a major humanitarian donor, for example providing extensive humanitarian aid to Kenya to relieve the effects of the drought in 2010/11 (SEK 160 million in 2011 and SEK 65 million in 2013).

A substantial part of civil society support is channelled through UNDP. Sweden's cooperation strategy with Kenya states: "[t]he current portfolio composition, with approximately one third of aid going to Kenya's civil society and two thirds allocated via the Government, will be retained". Approximately 28% of Swedish support has gone to civil society during the period 2009-2013.

Sweden has for many years played a leading role in promoting aid effectiveness in Kenya. Sweden was the driving force in the development of the Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS) 2006. The KJAS came to an end in 2012, but the principles still steer Swedish approaches to development cooperation. Together with the World Bank, Sweden co-chaired the Development Partner Group (DPG, the monthly meeting of development partners) from August 2010 to September 2012, as well as the DPF. Sweden has worked to enhance dialogue with the government on aid effectiveness and also played a leading coordination role in several sectors, including administrative reform and public financial management and the governance, justice, law and order sector (GJLOS). Sweden remains strongly committed to the principles of aid effectiveness. Sweden also supports the fight against corruption in close collaboration with partners, by establishing control mechanisms and also through education and dialogue.

Sweden's partners recognise Sweden has being particularly strong in relation to putting the principles of aid effectiveness into practice. Sweden is seen to have sufficient credibility and trust to engage in highly controversial areas, such as land, where other countries with a colonial heritage would be suspected of having vested interests. **Even if Sweden is not a large donor, its long-term and principled engagement, combined with a readiness to take on a leadership role in donor coordination, have meant that it has greater influence than the scale of the portfolio would suggest,** though the scale of this influence is difficult to measure.

Sweden sees that its comparative advantage (within the context of the wider development partner community) lies in its long experience and continuity in cooperation with Kenya since independence. Furthermore, **Sweden perceives that it has strong credibility with the GoK and civil society, which combine to create conditions conducive to dialogue, even on difficult issues**. Current overarching issues for dialogue include economic growth, just and equitable distribution of resources and opportunities, and the human rights perspective. Particular attention is being given to political reforms to prevent recurrence of the 2008 humanitarian and political crisis. This involves issues related to the new Constitution, new electoral legislation and implementation of land reforms.

The mid-term review of Sweden's Cooperation Strategy 2009-13 (conducted between February-April 2011) recommended increased support for implementation of the Constitution (especially devolution and human rights), strengthening of dialogue on political and humanitarian crises and corruption, and that there should be no change in the current three focus sectors.

Chapter 7: Conclusions and Ways Forward

"You can't divorce politics from development."

7.1 OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS

This final section of the PDA draws together the key conclusions on the main opportunities for development and poverty alleviation in light of the challenges facing Kenya today. The overall conclusions of the PDA are that despite a problematic security situation, the relatively peaceful recent elections gives cause for cautious optimism (despite considerable lingering tensions and significant concerns related to terrorism). There is hope that the new Constitution will deliver much needed reforms and that public institutions will regain their intended role after years of ethnic politics and elite capture. People are pessimistic in their views that the economy is not yet on course to deliver gains that will result in poverty alleviation and improvement in their living conditions. There is cause for this pessimism, as Kenya's current performance in terms of maintaining acceptable nutritional standards, access to clean water, controlling endemic violence and increasing gender equality are not reflective of a country that is seen as a leader in African development. Furthermore, despite commitments in the new Constitution, expenditure levels on key sectors upon which poverty alleviation is dependent are far below required levels. The transitional nature of the current situation means that it is too early to draw even tentative conclusions about whether Kenyans' hopes or fears are justified.

There is cause for public uncertainty. Past experience has shown that assumptions that macro-economic growth will automatically lead to poverty alleviation are unfounded. Kenya's economic policy is not strategically connected with poverty reduction, and intended growth trajectories are not linked to equity and human rights. Kenyan history does not show a linear path to development, and it is likely that the country, and particularly the poor, will be buffeted by recurrent crises in the future as well. Poverty is directly related to inability to withstand a drought, an economic downturn or a family illness. Crises at household levels tend to result in unacceptable declines in nutritional levels, and families being forces to sell off productive resources. For these reasons poverty is cumulative and paths in and out of poverty are related to the dynamically changing landscape of risk and marginalisation. Almost one in two Kenyans are poor and one in five are extremely poor. Inequality is pronounced and linked to geography, ethnicity and gender. Poverty is also driven by political exclusion and violence. Poverty is ultimately related to the following four factors:

Access to resources: Insecure tenure, access and in some areas availability of land and water, in both rural and urban areas, reduce people's ability to deal with the shocks that repeatedly impact on livelihoods. As the population grows and environmental conditions deteriorate the scarcity of these resources is increasing.

Access to basic services: Marginalisation stems from lack of access to basic public services, due to duty bearers failing to uphold their social contract to serve the poor and inadequate levels of government expenditure on providing these services. There is no “silver bullet” in enhancing access and sustainability of services. There is a risk that devolution may aggravate these problems in the future.

Power: Access to resources is largely related to power relations. The lack of benefits reaching the poor from macro-economic growth is related to pervasive elite capture of the benefits from economic development. Nonetheless, the power of these elites is likely to remain, and successful poverty alleviation efforts will need to be anchored in incentives for achieving mutually beneficial outcomes for the poor and the elites and finding ways to foster greater investment by the elites in productive enterprises with recognised pro-poor outcomes.

Choice: Weak access to resources and lack of power deprive individuals of the right to shape and make choices over their own lives – particularly livelihood choices. Secure land tenure (in both urban and rural areas) is required if the poor are to have the confidence to invest their meagre resources in new livelihoods. Choice is also related to migration, and many households have recognised how “straddling” the urban-rural divide, with household members pursing livelihoods in both, is an effective way of spreading risks and taking advantage of a range of opportunities.

All four of these factors are influenced by gender, generational factors, where people live and the ethnicity that dominates Kenyan politics and power relations. Women, men and youth experience poverty differently and have different vulnerabilities and opportunities depending on whether they live in a city or the countryside.

Rural poverty is characterised by vulnerability to climate change, inability of the poor to draw benefits from agricultural commercialisation and narrow reliance on production and income sources that can safeguard household food security. Rural poverty can only be alleviated through taking a broad perspective on how the poor benefit from agriculture, together with a range of other rural and urban livelihood possibilities. Urban poverty is linked to the access that men, women and youth have to wage labour, their health and sanitation conditions and exposure to violence. Persistent poverty has been linked to the failure to accumulate assets and the ratchet effects of repeated household livelihood shocks.

But poverty is not static, and there are emerging opportunities in an economy that in many respect is dynamic. Kenya is the gateway to East and Central Africa, a regional business hub and a significant tourist destination. Other attractions include established innovation capacities and entrepreneurialism, investment in research and development, a relatively well educated workforce and a growing and increasingly inclusive financial market.

The 2010 Constitution commits the state to a number of much needed reforms and heralds huge potential for change, which will be dependent on rapid development of capacities at county level and finding ways to implement fundamental commitments to greater respect for human rights, enhanced public sector integrity and gender equity. The institutional changes underway in Kenya today provide opportunities to take a more concerted approach to gender equality, to address regional/ethnic inequities, and to create transparent and accountable institutions. However, past experience has shown that a gap exists between formal commitments and the changes that are required in mindsets and incentives to act on these commitments. A vibrant civil society that can act as a watchdog, holding the public sector to account for acting on its new commitments to political and institutional reform has an important role to play in bridging this gap. New forms of civil society organisation, such as networks, membership organisations and platforms, may offer opportunities to extend and strengthen connections across society and deepened engagement in reform processes. This will require efforts to strengthen the governance structures, accountability and geographic coverage of these organisations.

7.2 TRENDS, RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Discussions about the nature of poverty when developing this PDA revealed two contrasting perspectives that impinge on future commitments to addressing poverty alleviation from a rights based perspective. First, there is a clear recognition that the GoK must be more accountable to its citizens. The constitutional reforms, devolution process and especially efforts to address land issues, are expected to create a new set of stronger accountabilities between duty bearers and rights holders. The other, less promising development, is a tendency to see an explicit focus on the poor as being no longer essential. The weak sustainability and waning GoK commitments to finance programmes directed towards the poor, and the failures of both development and humanitarian programming to reduce the recurrent nature of shocks that generate poverty, have led to cynicism. Many assume that it is impossible to fundamentally change Kenya's political economy. Such assumptions reinforce the power of elites and maintain inequality. While in many respect valid, there are dangers if these attitudes provide a justification to ignore the factors that create vulnerability. This can then become an excuse for withdrawing services from difficult areas and turning a blind eye to land dispossession if it is argued that attention to the perspectives of the poor is a relic of a failed development model. If the poor disappear from the political landscape, their rights will be in danger. If poverty alleviation is to remain central in Kenyan development, efforts will need to reflect the following trends, risks and opportunities:

Positive Trends
• There is growing public faith in institutions of governance.
• Pride is widespread that Kenya has "pulled back form the brink" of state fragility as demonstrated by a relatively peaceful electoral process.
• Households are finding ways to spread risks and take advantage of opportunities through diversified livelihood strategies and rural-urban linkages.
Negative Trends
• Economic growth has had little impact on poverty alleviation or public commitments to invest in agriculture, health and education.
• There are tendencies to dismiss explicit poverty alleviation efforts as being unessential.
• Climatic hazards are growing, without clear indications of government commitment to address the climate adaptation challenge.
Challenges
• Kenyan actors must find and obtain consensus on paths to growth with equity.
• There is a need to look beyond over-optimistic linear development models to recognise that shocks and turbulence are likely to characterise Kenyan development for some time to come.
• Greater consensus is needed between the government and development partners regarding whether poverty is a "social" issue (as in Vision 2030) or if it is an integral aspect of all development efforts.
• It is time to move from formal commitments to gender equity and respect for human rights to addressing the informal power structures that maintain the status quo.
• Ways must be found to ensure that the large, and in some areas well-educated, youth can find a role in national development and avoid alienation; expansion of job opportunities needs to match population increase.
Opportunities
• The new and progressive Constitution with Devolution of power is in place along with strong steps towards establishing a range of legal frameworks and structures for multistakeholder dialogue to secure its implementation.
• Policies and key legislation are in place that can provide a foundation for overcoming the challenges above.
• Particularly in relation to land rights (and possibly in water in the near future) an insitutional basis is emerging to directly address the abuses of power that marginalise the poor.
• Great political incentives exist for the new county level politicians to demonstrate that they are delivering on their commitments, and they therefore may be more innovative in looking for ways to improve public sector performance.
• Entrepreneurial and innovation capacities continue to attract investment, together with Kenya's position as a hub for the region.

7.3 POINTS OF DEPARTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS THAT REFLECT THE NATURE OF POVERTY IN KENYA

The evaluation that builds upon this PDA includes specific recommendations for Swedish development cooperation. Therefore this report does not conclude with recommendations, but instead with a list of suggested points of departure for future development cooperation in Kenya to reflect the challenges and opportunities identified. These points of departure aims to serve as a tool for development partners to transcend sectoral mindsets and focus future strategic thinking on basic issues such as human rights and human security. This PDA can only provide initial direction regarding how to link poverty and development but key points of departure following the PDA findings are;

1. Build on current efforts that focus on securing more equitable access to and tenure for land and water resources.
2. Recognise that in many respects development cooperation will inevitably have limited influence on the elite-led development trajectories; which suggests the importance of finding ways to promote a greater modicum of equitable access to key natural resources in the context of prevailing productive investment trends.
3. Ensure that the arguments for a focus on poverty alleviation are evidence-based by giving priority to supporting initiatives that document the impact of changes in political and economic structures at household level.
4. Recognise the problematic and prevailing notion within Vision 2030 that poverty is a “social issue”, and therefore use dialogue to focus more on explicit arguments that raise awareness of the links between entrenched poverty and the political and economic choices facing Kenya today.
5. Closely monitor the impact of devolution on access to basic public services and adapt approaches to the emerging new constellations of duty bearers and possible changing fee structures as local authorities struggle to meet the expectations of their constituents, define their roles and balance their budgets.
6. Address recurrent disasters and conflict by designing development programming in such a way as to reflect explicit factors that reduce people’s vulnerability to acute hazards (e.g. identifying appropriate indicators). The ASALs is an important focus area also for future development efforts. The “business case” for not allowing chronic insecurity to continue to fester in these areas given the effects on Kenya as a whole, and the “humanitarian case” that points out the duties of the state to provide basic security and services for all Kenya’s citizens should be clarified.
7. Focus on the stable governance of (currently frail) systems to respond to and mitigate a range of climatic, economic and political shocks.
8. Design efforts to expand the livelihood choices available, particularly for youth and women, by looking beyond sectors to enhance rural-urban linkages and enhancing financial services that provide needed capital for poor people’s own investments.

9. Pay greater and more frank attention to the capacity of public institutions and civil society to absorb and effectively utilise investments, and as part of this be cautious regarding direct aid financing of service provision.

Together these recommendations point to the need to build further on the political economy analysis of this PDA to understand better why growth has yielded such meagre results for the poor, and design interventions to explicitly reflect core values in this regard.

Annex 1 – Terms of Reference

Draft Terms of Reference for an Implementation Evaluation of the Cooperation Strategy with Kenya 2009-2013

1. Background

Sweden has a history of development cooperation in Kenya that goes back half a century. This legacy of long term engagement constitutes one of the building blocks that the cooperation rests on. Development cooperation is governed by the Cooperation Strategy (2009-2013) which is aligned to the Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS) 2007–2012, signed by 17 Development Partners in collaboration with the Kenyan Government. The objective of the KJAS is to support the government's efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the targets that the government has set for long-term development in Kenya in its Vision 2030. In addition the government's Medium Term Plan (MTP) 2008-2012 is the first in a series of successive five-year medium term plans which governs implementation of the Kenya Vision 2030. The second MTP is currently being drafted by the government in consultation with its development partners.

The overall objective of the Cooperation Strategy (2009-2013) is "a Kenya where all poor people are given the possibilities to improve their livelihood conditions and where their human rights are realized". The perspectives of poor people on development and the rights perspective are mainstreamed in the implementation of the development cooperation. The three main sectors of cooperation are: Natural Resources and the Environment, Urban Development and Democracy and Human Rights. The total volume of the current Strategy was originally 350 MSEK which was later increased to 400 MSEK after a Mid-term Review in 2011.

In view of the upcoming end of the current Cooperation Strategy in 2013, an implementation evaluation divided into two parts will be undertaken. The results of these analyses will be fed into the new Cooperation Strategy ('Results Offer') (2014-2018).

2. Purpose

The purpose of the evaluation of the implementation of the Strategy for development cooperation with Kenya 2009-2013 is to assess to what extent the Swedish development cooperation during the period has been effective, efficient, relevant[148] and sustainable and what impact has been achieved.[149] More specifically:

Part I

The purpose of the PDA is to: 1) contribute to a better understanding of poverty and vulnerability and its causes, manifestations and consequences in Kenya, 2) identify and draw conclusions on fundamental development challenges and opportunities, thereby identifying needed development efforts, 3) map the main development partners including identifying possible agents for change, for sustainable development including analysing the role of development partners and cooperation in Kenya and in particular Sweden's role.

Part II
Building on the findings from the Poverty and Development Assessment, the purpose of the Implementation evaluation of the Strategy for development cooperation with Kenya is to identify what results have been achieved, and what Sweden should propose to do in the upcoming cooperation period. More specifically, the evaluation will inform the priorities in the next cooperation period by assessing: 1) the progress towards the overall Strategy objective, the sector objectives and the extent to which contributions reached planned results and possible other outcomes and results, 2) the main dialogue issues and to what extent dialogue contributed to achieving results against the overall Strategy objective and the sector objectives, 3) the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of channels (government/civil society/multilateral) as well as aid modalities (sector programme/project/core contribution/programme based approach) . The conclusions drawn and the main lessons learnt will serve as a basis for the development of the future 'Results Offer'.

3. Scope of work and methodology

The overall scope of the work will be divided into two parts:

I. Poverty and Development Assessment
II. Implementation evaluation of the Strategy for development cooperation with Kenya 2009-2013

The PDA will be conducted first followed by the Implementation evaluation.

3.1 Poverty and Development Assessment

3.1.1 Methodology
The consultant will mainly through a desk review, synthesise and analyse relevant existing information about fundamental development challenges and opportunities facing Kenya since its first democratic elections in 2002. The development should be described in relation to the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (ERSWEC) 2003-2007 and its successor, Vision 2030. More specifically the development should be judged against the targets set in the first Medium-Term Plan 2008-2012 (MTP) which governs implementation of the Kenya Vision 2030. The assessment should result in a report summarising conclusions made and give recommendations on a way forward for Swedish development cooperation.

3.1.2 Specific tasks

1. Identify and compile the most relevant sources of information on poverty and key development challenges facing Kenya (e.g. the Kenyan Government's analyses and development strategies (Annual Progress Report of MTP), World Bank Assessments, UNDP National Human Development Reports, analyses by

other cooperating partners, academic studies etc.). Consult relevant sections at the Embassy, Sida and key development partners to identify possibly information sources and/or knowledge gaps.

2. Synthesise and analyse the relevant existing information identified above about fundamental development challenges and opportunities facing Kenya since 2002.
3. Organise a workshop for the Embassy and Sida (relevant departments/staff) and key stakeholders in Kenya from government, civil society, cooperating partners and universities. The purpose is to discuss and assess the reports on poverty and the key development challenges identified under task 1 and 2, to come to a common understanding and draw conclusions. Specific tasks for the consultant includes:
   - i. Prepare background material (e.g. summarise conclusions from the reports identified under scope1, prepare discussion themes, assign tasks to relevant sections at the Embassy/Sida departments)
   - ii. Facilitate an open discussion and debate
   - iii. Document the workshop discussions and conclusions
4. Write a synthesised PDA with the conclusions from the desk study and the workshop as a starting point. The PDA shall consist of the following six main sections:
   - i. **Country context.** Short description of the fundamental economic, social-cultural, environmental and peace and security context in Kenya including basic power relations and the relevant political developments.
   - ii. **Who are the poor and vulnerable?** Assessment of key issues: “Who are the poor and vulnerable?”, “Where do they live?” and “What are their characteristics of their poverty?” including a special focus on gender. The assessment should be based on a multi-dimensional understanding of poverty[150].
   - iii. **Opportunities for development.** Internal and external factors influencing Kenya’s development. Main constraints, challenges and opportunities to development. What are the main risks? How could these risks affect the Swedish development cooperation? How should Sweden relate to these risks?
   - iv. **The Government’s commitments and actions.** Assessment of the Government’s commitments and actions in the areas of poverty alleviation, human rights and democracy, gender equality, national strategy for development, economic policy, public financial management system, environmental sustainability including climate change and fight against corruption. What is the actual budget provided? How has pro-poor budget allocations been made and what have they resulted in?
   - v. **Mapping of the development cooperation and its key actors in Kenya.** Analysis of key development partners (also identify and reflect on new actors and identify “agents for change”), sectors and financial flows of

development cooperation and what have they achieved? Which development partners are engaged in which areas? Is there over or under financing in some areas? How does the coordination work and what are the challenges?

vi. **Make an assessment of Sweden's role**. What are Sweden's strengths, weaknesses and possible comparative advantages (why and in what way?). What is Sweden's strategic role? How can Sweden act as a catalyst and/or innovative?

vii. **Conclusions.** Summarise and draw conclusions on: i) fundamental development challenges and opportunities on the key issues discussed in the previous chapters, ii) the strategic role of development cooperation and feasible aid modalities including which risks exist and to what degree they affect the overall effectiveness, iii) strategic role for Swedish support in the forthcoming cooperation strategy period.

3.2 Implementation evaluation of the Strategy for development cooperation with Kenya 2009-2013

3.2.1 Methodology
The consultant will through a desk review and case studies on specific contributions in combination with field visits, analyse relevant existing information about results achieved against the Strategy and sector objectives during the strategy period using the results matrix as a support. The consultant should conduct interviews using a participatory approach with the Embassy staff and with a selection of key partners in Kenya. The results assessment should be based on the continuous follow up (such as strategy reports and programme reports) and evaluations done during the strategy period. Kenya's own annual follow up the Vision 2030 (more specifically the MTP I) and studies/evaluations of the Millennium Development Goals, sector program reports, policy documents and other assessments/reports done by other Development Partners, reputable think thanks and NGOs should be used. The evaluation should result in a report summarising conclusions made and give recommendations on a way forward.

3.1.2 Specific tasks:

1. Prepare a sampling criteria for the case studies and identify two-three contributions that best represent each sector, and if relevant, other contributions of strategic importance. Assess the main results on the level of outcomes and in relation to the sector objective and where possible also assess what impact has been achieved towards the overall Strategy objective. Did the contributions deliver as planned? Are the contributions effective, efficient, relevant and sustainable?
2. Are the different sector portfolios well designed to reach the poorest, most underserved areas (e.g. for Natural resources sector the Arid and Semi Arid Lands (ASALs), Northern Kenya, refugee-receiving areas)? Note for example

the need for integrated interventions to improve resilience/livelihoods in rural areas, are the current contributions equipped to help make this happen?

3. Is there a systematic approach to formulating a 'Theory of Change' (e.g. community mobilisation and participation in water resource management and water and sanitation services, increased income for small-scale farmers, public participation in planning of urban services, advocacy for reforms in all these sectors)? And is it achieving expected results?
4. Analyse how the rights perspective and the poor people's perspectives of development have been applied within the sectors. Provide concrete examples and analyse the results of the measures. This should be done by analysing application of the principles of *non-discrimination, participation, transparency and accountability.*
5. Analyse how each thematic priority (Environment and climate, Gender equality and Democracy and human rights) has been integrated in the different sectors, provide concrete examples and analyse the results of the measures.
6. Asses the main dialogue issues that were identified in the Strategy and the results achieved in relation to the sector objectives and the Strategy objective. Have the right platforms been used? Have dialogue strengthened the results of the contributions and/or have the contributions facilitated a more in-depth dialogue? Were the dialogue issues identified relevant?
7. What are the experiences and lessons learnt from policy work, actors possibilities to drive change, the government's/civil society's/private sector's and the public's role?
8. Identify challenges/successes with strengthening donor cooperation in line with the Paris Agenda.
9. Analyse why the different sectors are using different cooperation channels and analyse what channel is most effective and efficient (government (national/regional/local level), civil society and multilateral). Also assess the different aid modalities (sector programme/project/core contribution/programme based approach). Should the Swedish development cooperation strategically limit itself to sector-based approaches, and/or allow some area-based initiatives or other better alternatives?
10. Aggregate the results information from the case studies in the sectors and assess and draw conclusions on the collective contribution to the impact at the overall Strategy objective level.
11. Have the prioritisations in the Swedish Strategy which builds on Vision 2030 and KJAS led to relevant, feasible, and sustainable support to improvement of a basis for change and improved structures that can encourage and strengthen individual's poverty reduction including their rights?
12. Identify lessons learnt and assess what the implications will be for the upcoming development of 'Results offer' in relation to direction, focus, dialogue and selection of the forms of cooperation and partners? What is Sweden's strategic

role in the upcoming strategy period? Summarise and give recommendations on a way forward.

4. Outcome

In the start-up of the assignment an brief Inception report including a work plan for the assignment and a description of how the chosen methods relates to the assignment in practice should be prepared.

The expected outcome for Part I, the PDA, is an interim report including a short executive summary (max 2 pages) in Swedish and English. Following the completion Part II, the Implementation evaluation, a final report in English including the main findings from the PDA, with analysis, conclusions and recommendations and a short executive summary (max 4 pages) in Swedish and English, should be submitted.

5. Draft Time table and reporting

1. Contract signed by end of November 2012

Part I Poverty and Development Assessment

2. Gathering and compilation of information during December/January 2012-2013
3. Interviews and workshop in Nairobi mid January-February 2013
4. Draft report mid February 2013
5. Final interim report end of February 2013

Part II Implementation Evaluation

Timeframes for Part II will be agreed upon at a later stage, however planned to tentatively start in March 2013.

6. Desk review and information gathering March 2013
7. Case studies and interviews in Kenya April 2013
8. Draft report mid May 2013
9. Final report end of May 2013

6. Qualifications

The team should consist of senior and junior experts.

The senior consultant should:

- Have relevant academic background;
- Have experience from organising, leading and reporting on similar assignments;
- Have experience from preparing and structuring interviews and preparing and facilitating workshops;
- Have experience and knowledge of development cooperation;
- Have excellent knowledge of English (written and spoken)

Merits:

- Experience and knowledge of development cooperation in Kenya;

The junior consultant should:

- Have relevant academic background
- Have experience from participating in similar assignments;
- Be efficient and organised;
- Have excellent knowledge of English (written and spoken)

Merits:

- Experience and knowledge of development cooperation in Kenya;

References:

- Poverty and Development Assessment-Guidance and Outline, Sida
- Strategy for development cooperation with Kenya 2009-2013
- Mid-Term Review 2011
- Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS)
- Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (ERSWEC) 2003-2007
- Vision 2030
- Medium Term Plan 2008-2012 and Annual Progress reports of the MTP
- Draft MTP 2013-2017
- Strategy reports, 2009-2012
- Portfolio Analysis 2012

Annex 2 – Inception Report

1. Executive Summary

This Inception Report summarises the evaluation team's understanding of the scope of work relating to the Implementation Evaluation of Sweden's Cooperation Strategy with Kenya 2009-13.The report sets out the team's response to the questions posed in the Terms of Reference and explains the broad approach and more detailed methodology the team will use to address these questions. A work plan including key dates for events and delivery of outputs is presented at the end of the report. A list of questions relating to process and timing which required the Embassy's attention has been included in section 5 for ease of reference. This was used to facilitate effective collaboration between the submission of the draft and final versions of this inception report.

2. Assessment of scope of the evaluation

2.1 Background to the evaluation

Sweden's Development Cooperation with Kenya is governed by its *Cooperation Strategy 2009-13* which is aligned to the *Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy* (KJAS) *2007-12,* (signed by 17 Development Partners[151]). The KJAS in turn is aligned to the specific objectives set out in Kenya's Medium Term Plan (MTP) 2008-12 and more generally to the targets identified in Kenya's Vision 2030. The diagram below places Sweden's Development Cooperation Strategy chronologically in relation to Kenya's own key planning frameworks.



Kenya Vision 2030, MTP II 2013-18: Kenya's National Development Plan which articulates the country's high level economic, social and political objectives based on macro-economic stability, governance reform, enhanced equity and wealth creation, and key improvements relating to economic, social and political development.

Sweden's Cooperation Strategy 2008-13: Identifies objectives and priorities, aid modalities, dialogue issues and risks associated with implementation.

Kenya's MTP 2008-12: The MTP identifies the "foundations for national transformation" and outlines the policies, reform measures and projects & programmes which the Grand Coalition Government is committed to implement during 2008-2012.

KJAS 2007-12: A joint donor strategy setting out programme focus and common performance assessment and financing scenarios aligned to Kenya's development strategy and country context and harmonised for operational effectiveness. The document identifies outcomes, milestones and associated partner assistance.

Sweden's three main sectors of cooperation within this current 2009-13 Strategy are: Natural Resources and the Environment, Urban Development and Democracy and Human Rights. The total volume of support provided in 2012 is 400MSEK (just over US$60m).[152]

This evaluation has been commissioned and will be carried out in the spirit of Sweden's overall approach to development cooperation as expressed in the Country Strategy. This states that cooperation should be characterised by "*a proactive approach … to adapt aid initiatives to changing conditions – while keeping within established parameters – and seize opportunities to support changes as they occur*". It is on this basis of a commitment to informed proactive support, that Sweden has chosen to combine a *Poverty Development Assessment* (to assess changing conditions) with an *Evaluation of the Country Strategy* (to identify where assistance is working best), since it is through the combined findings of these two exercises that the most relevant opportunities for meaningful support will be identified.

2.2 Purpose of the evaluation

The overall purpose of the evaluation is:

> "**to assess to what extent Swedish development cooperation during the period (2009-13) has been effective, efficient, relevant and sustainable and what impact[153] has been achieved".**

This purpose is framed in terms of OECD DAC's five key criteria for evaluation as defined below.

DAC Criteria	Focus
RELEVANCE:	The extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group/recipient.
EFFECTIVENESS:	A measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives.
EFFICIENCY	The extent to which aid uses the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results.
IMPACT[154]	The positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended; this involves the main impacts and effects resulting from the activity on the local social, economic, environmental and other development indicators.
SUSTAINABILITY	Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn.

The specific questions posed within the ToR[155] for this assignment are matched against the DAC criteria in section 3 of this report to determine the relevance of the questions with regard to the overall purpose. Limitations identified by the study team – also explored in section 3 - have implications for evaluability.

2.3 Specific objectives

Within the Terms of Reference, the evaluation requirement is presented in two parts:

1. A **Poverty and Development Assessment**
2. An **Implementation Evaluation**

It is intended that the results of both of these analyses will be fed into Sweden's new *Results Strategy* for 2014-18.

Broadly, the ***Poverty and Development Assessment*** will have succeeded if it:

- Provides a basis for the country team to synthesise evidence and assume an overarching perspective on how it intends to respond to poverty and vulnerability in Kenya;
- Reaches conclusions on fundamental development challenges and opportunities (and in particular needed development efforts);
- Maps development partners in terms of their role as agents of change;
- Identifies against this backdrop, Sweden's particular added value.

Broadly, the ***Implementation Evaluation*** will have succeeded if it assesses:

- Progress towards Sweden's overall strategic objectives, sector objectives and the extent to which results (planned or unplanned) have been achieved;
- The extent to which dialogue has contributed to the achievement of strategic and sectoral objectives;
- The effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of channels for aid (government, civil society, multilateral) and aid modalities (sector programme, core contribution, programme based approach).
- Contributions which have led to achievements that align particularly with the PDA findings and which can be built upon within the new Results Strategy.

2.4 Scope of work for the Evaluation Assignment

The overall scope of work is framed by the two parts of the assignment as described above and each will involve four types of activity:

- Synthesis of the documentation available for the PDA and for the evaluation (results assessment);
- Workshops/focus group discussions to present and expand on findings generated through the PDA desk work initially and later through the combined PDA and evaluation/results assessment;
- Case studies to explore how the sector portfolios reflect the underlying causes of poverty analysed in the PDA, to assess the efficiencies/effectiveness of different modalities and channels, and to expand and deepen the findings of the results assessment as part of the evaluation;
- Report writing to produce an interim PDA report initially and later a Final Implementation Evaluation Report (incorporating the main findings from the PDA).

The **PDA** component of the work will involve synthesis, interviews, a validation workshop and report writing. The report will be presented following the structure set out in the Terms of Reference which appropriately draws on Sida's *Poverty and Development Assessment Guidelines* and Annex I to these Guidelines: *Outline of a PDA*:

1	*Country context.*
2	*Who are the poor and vulnerable and what are the factors that lead to poverty and vulnerability?*
3	*Opportunities for development.*
4	*The Government's commitments and actions.*
5	*Mapping of development cooperation and key actors in Kenya.*
6	*Sweden's role.*
7	*Conclusions.*

This will produce an overarching PDA report designed to inform the forthcoming Swedish Results Strategy 2014-18. The focus of the PDA will not be particular sectors but the underlying causes of poverty, structural obstacles to development as well as triggers for development in Kenya (rather than a general facts and figures summary, which would tend to illustrate the symptoms of poverty). The PDA will seek to connect these findings on underlying causes and development triggers to the overall development partner landscape and so assist Sweden's strategic decision making with regard to the identification of future cooperation priorities and associated key results.

The **implementation evaluation** will involve synthesis, focus group discussions, interviews with partners and stakeholders, a validation workshop and report writing. The work will incorporate two approaches:

- an analysis of results recorded against the strategic and sectoral objectives and targets set out in the results matrix and
- a closer look at selected case studies from Sweden's sectoral portfolios in order to more deeply explore specific contributions.

In line with the Country Strategy, the evaluation will focus on three sectors identified in the current cooperation strategy: democratic governance, natural resources and the environment, and urban development.[156] The final evaluation report will provide evidence related to impact, sustainability, effectiveness, efficiency, relevance and design (including a consideration of the Theory of Change)– in line with the overall purpose and the specific tasks outlined in the ToR. The relationship between the specific questions asked in the ToR and the overall purpose are explored more fully in section 3 below.

2.5 Work plan and timeline

A detailed work plan is provided as Annex II and highlights the following key dates and deadlines:

15 February:	Submission of Inception Report to Embassy
21-22 March:	PDA Validation Workshop, Nairobi
25-27 March:	Sector Focused Group Discussions/ interviews, Nairobi
19 April :	Draft PDA

30 April:	Final PDA
w/b 13th May	Case Study Interviews, Nairobi
w/b 20th May	Results Validation Workshop, Nairobi
31 May:	Final Draft Report
15 June:	Final Report

The evaluation team recognises the need to be flexible with regard to these dates and timings, particularly given the possibility of disruption in the period around elections in Kenya. Furthermore, holidays and absences may well require some of the dates proposed above to be changed. The Embassy has been invited to suggest changes in order to find best-fit with wider commitments and circumstances (see section 5 below). In order that there is appropriate time for workshop and meeting preparation, any change to the March events should be later rather than sooner.

3. Relevance and evaluability of evaluation questions

3.1 Relevance of evaluation questions

The framework below aligns questions raised in the ToRs with the DAC criteria incorporated in the overall purpose statement and provides a headline on the approach/method that will be used to answer them. These approaches are explained more fully in section 4.

DAC Criteria	Questions (from ToR)	Approach (Method)
Effectiveness	○ What are the main results achieved against outcomes in relation to the sector objectives? ○ Did contributions deliver as planned? ○ What is the experience and lessons learned from policy work?	Desk review Focus group discussions Interviews Validation workshop
Efficiency	○ Has dialogue strengthened the results of the contributions? ○ What have been the challenges and successes with regard to donor cooperation? ○ Why are different sectors using different cooperation channels? ○ What are the relative benefits of different aid modalities?	Desk review Interviews. Validation workshop
Relevance	○ Are the different sector portfolios well-designed to reach the poorest, most underserved areas? ○ Has the prioritisation based on Vision 2030 and KJAS led to relevant support?	Desk review Focus group discussions
Sustainability	○ Are the contributions sustainable? ○ Has the prioritisation based on Vision 2030 and KJAS led to sustainable support?	Desk review Interviews Focus group discussions
Impact	○ What impact has been achieved towards the overall strategic objectives? ○ What is the collective (aggregated) contribution of case studies to the strategy?	Desk review Focus group discussions Validation workshop

Design	o Is there a systematic approach to formulating a theory of change? o How has the rights perspective been applied within each sector? o How have the poor people's perspectives been applied within each sector? o How have thematic priorities been incorporated into each sector?	Desk review Interviews Focus group discussions

3.2 Evaluability of the questions

The evaluability of the questions listed above is best judged against the balance between existing secondary data sources and time available for the team to gather data through interview.

Initial reflections on data availability suggest some possible limitations to our work. Our response to these anticipated limitations is to balance our approach from the start blending desk research[157] with data gathering through interviews, group discussions and workshops and case study review. In this way we intend to get as far as possible towards providing robust answers to the questions posed while at the same time alerting the Embassy to any gaps in the evidence base which could in future be filled through enhanced reporting or recording arrangements.

However, it appears prudent to point out at this stage that despite the intent to consult as widely as possible (through individual interviews and group discussions), time available for new data gathering will inevitably be limited and it will be unrealistic to expect that the team will be able to fill major data gaps through interviews and group discussions or that significant inferences can be drawn from aggregations based on a case study approach.

Also, the evaluation team notes that some of the issues may have a bearing on the relations between development interventions and the humanitarian portfolio, with the budget for the latter managed directly by Sida, Sweden. The team has sought clarification regarding the extent to which the evaluation should follow up on these aspects and has been guided to look at the role humanitarian assistance plays in relation to the overall and more long term work of the development cooperation section. A number of interviews have been suggested with key stakeholders.

The next section of the report presents the blended approach to evaluation, which we believe provides the best match between data available and overall objectives.

4. Proposed approach and methodology

This section of the inception report explains the proposed approach to each part of the assignment, the Poverty and Development Assessment and the Implementation Evaluation.

4.1 Poverty and Development Assessment

(a) PDA desk review:

The PDA will draw conclusions regarding who is poor in Kenya, what factors generate poverty and vulnerability, why poverty persists and the best ways to support development. The team recognises that this document should provide a core, user-friendly tool to use as part of an ongoing process of ensuring that Sweden's development cooperation portfolio is coherent and sends a clear and unified message to outside stakeholders regarding Swedish values, policies and priorities, and how Sweden sees its comparative advantage in contributing to Kenya's Vision 2030.

The Swedish Poverty and Development Assessment Guidelines specifically state that *"The PDA shall be carried out by the country team… rather than by external consultants… The ownership and driving force behind this process shall be the country team."* Therefore, it will be important to ensure that ownership of the final document is within the country team and the work of the evaluation team is seen as supportive of this process. The team anticipates that the PDA will be used by the country team in dialogue with partners and as an input to the upcoming Results Offer proposal which will feed into the new Results Strategy for Kenya. As such, the PDA support provided by the evaluation team will, as much as possible, be approached in such a way as to contribute to the country team's own assessment and understanding.[158] The evaluation team will use the validation workshop and other interviews to contrast and discuss the draft findings of the PDA in relation to the underlying theories of change that have informed Swedish development efforts in recent years. The expectation will be that the final PDA will reflect a critical analysis, on the part of the country team, regarding how to achieve greater relevance in the future strategy.

As part of the inception phase the evaluation team has produced an initial matrix of the issues which might be covered by the PDA, potential data sources and dimensions of analysis. This is already a substantive multi-page document (which when finalised will be provided to the Embassy as a useful resource for future data searching); an extract is provided below:

Chapter	Issues to be covered	Data Sources	Potential dimensions of analysis
Who are the poor and vulnerable?	Discussing the poverty concept	UNDP National Human Development Reports WB Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment Freedom House Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA-IV) WB Handbook on Poverty and Inequality (http://issuu.com/world.bank.publications/docs/9780821376133)	Multi-dimensional concept: poverty as lack of resources + lack of power + lack of choice The dynamics of poverty Context specific and relational aspects of poverty Local perceptions of poverty Poverty and food security in rural/urban areas Migration and urbanisation

	Mapping of the poor and vulnerable and the characteristics of their poverty	WB (2009) Kenya Poverty and Inequality Assessment World Bank Index KNBS / Kenya Population & Housing Census, Economic Survey, Statistical Abstract, Integrated Budget Household Survey etc. 2008-2009 Demographic and Health Survey Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA-IV) Freedom House	Underlying causes for lack of resources Underlying causes for lack of power Underlying causes for lack of choice
	Mapping of where the poor and vulnerable live	2008-2009 Demographic and Health Survey	Spatial characteristics: Rural poverty (esp. ASAL) Urban poverty (esp. slums) +regional GINI coefficients

From this initial matrix it is apparent that a large quantity of data is available. The team cannot at this time assess the quality of this data. The task of the team will be to sift through these data and present highlights which meet the requirements of the Embassy country team - which is that the focus of the PDA should be more broadly on underlying causes of poverty in Kenya as well as triggers for development. Given that the reports listed above are likely to primarily describe who the poor are (i.e., the symptoms of poverty), rather than the underlying causes for their poverty, the team will delve into the source material for these studies and will use initial discussions with Kenyan researchers to identify additional key texts from recent academic research into poverty and development in Kenya. The team expects to be able to identify a set of assumed major underlying causes (causal assumptions) of poverty in the country related to the three poverty dimensions used in the PDA, namely: lack of resources, lack of power and lack of choice. On this basis, the team will (1) prioritise what is included (2) extrapolate and synthesise information against these priorities (3) take into consideration how the different sectoral analyses can feed into a coherent cross-sectoral analysis given the convergent nature of poverty and development risks in Kenya (i.e., related to political instability, non-inclusive development trajectories, resource scarcity and natural/climatic hazards), (4) distill some broad conclusions on where and why developmental change is currently underway in Kenya and where there is greatest need and opportunity to support change (recognising that the two may not be the same), and (5) identify gaps and biases in current research into poverty and development in Kenya so as to suggest where Sweden should focus on additional analyses and policy formation support in the future. In discussions with the Embassy it has already been noted that the reports produced by UN agencies, the World Bank and Kenyan ministries are largely sectorally focused and the added value of the PDA should lie in analysing the convergence of factors that lead to persistent poverty and vulnerability.

The team recognises that a major challenge, given the quantity of data available, will be to synthesise findings within a document of a user-friendly length and format[159]. The outline proposed in the ToR appears appropriate for this purpose, but may require some shift of emphasis to reflect the core poverty and development concerns in the Kenyan context.

(b) Mapping of development cooperation and its key actors in Kenya

Some document gathering and interviews will be necessary to gather up-to-date evidence on key and new development partner activity in Kenya, with a focus on their vision, activities and logic, sectoral priorities, level of financial flows, preferred channels and modalities and record of achievement. This information will be collated in order to reach some broad conclusions on general tendencies across the donor community and potential political influences on this; plus which sectors and issues are over and under financed, how co-ordination is working (or not) and what appear to be the key challenges introduced by emerging patterns of finance. South-south actors and the ”new” actors in this arena are also relevant and will be included. This part of the PDA process should help inform the team's conclusions on Sweden's relative strengths and weaknesses (comparative advantages) to potentially determine most appropriate (and possibly innovative) entry points that might catalyse development progress. The 'Assessment of Sweden's Role' and 'Conclusions' chapters of the PDA report, will be further updated following the Implementation Evaluation.

(c) PDA validation

A five page summary of the emerging findings of the PDA will be distributed to a select group of participants one week before two half-day validation workshops to be held on March 21 or 22. The half-day workshops will consist of Embassy staff and key informants respectively. Both workshops will largely follow a similar format focused on the following key questions:

1	Do the findings accurately summarise the fundamental development challenges and the factors that generate poverty in Kenya today?
2	Do you agree that the groups identified as most marginalised are marginalised for the reasons given?
3	What does the nature of the social, political and economic trends described imply regarding the relationship between duty bearers and rights holders?
4	What are the implications of the convergence of different risks facing the poor in Kenya today and how can their capacities to manage, e.g., recurrent drought be supported, either through more vulnerability aware development programming or greater coherence between humanitarian and development efforts?
5	What are the areas of clear convergence (and potential divergence) between Swedish policies and priorities and the Kenyan Vision 2030?
6	How are the current changes underway in Kenya (decentralisation, merging of ministries, post-election developments) likely to impact on the findings reported in the PDA?
7	Do you agree that with the conclusions on where there is greatest activity and opportunity for development support; why do/don't you think this will make a difference?
8	How should the Embassy use this document in its dialogue with the Government of Kenya and with other international cooperation partners?

(d) PDA Report

The PDA Report will be presented following the structure outlined above and in the ToR.

4.2 Implementation Evaluation

(a) Results Matrix: desk study

Using an analysis of the alignment among the findings of the PDA, the Country Strategy and the Results Matrix as the starting point, the evaluation team will assess a broad range of available secondary data to build on the findings of the Portfolio Review[160] (already completed) to address the relevance and design questions presented in the ToR. The documentation review will in particular seek to understand and compare the theories of change that have emerged in the different initiatives and analyse the extent to which these constitute an evidence based and coherent perspective by the country team on how its portfolio is addressing key development concerns, particularly how poverty is perceived and conceptualised. The draft PDA will be used as a tool to stimulate reflection.

To note that a working assumption of the evaluation is that, given the volatile situation in Kenya in recent years, the original country strategy may be in some respects a 'historic artefact' in 2013.

In order to collate evidence on effectiveness and impact, the team will (1) review selected texts that have been identified during the PDA process that directly relate to the thematic outcome objectives in the country strategy; (2) review documentation provided by the Embassy prior to the evaluation getting underway; (3) alert sector leads to gaps in information available to identify any other possible sources.

In order to assess efficiency, the team will (1) review available recent analyses of the role of different actors in Kenyan development cooperation, with special attention to new donors and emergent forms of cooperation, also the role of dialogue in Kenyan development cooperation; (2) review the findings of the PDA; (3) review documentation on Swedish development cooperation in Kenya, with an emphasis on the selected case study projects (criteria presented below) and other reports that critically analyse the results and challenges of using different channels and modalities; and (4) review monitoring data collected as part of the follow-up to the results matrix.

(b) Channels and Modalities

A key area that will be explored, primarily through critical analysis of the documentation available but also through interviews, will be the modalities and channels of delivery for development cooperation, with a focus on the relative efficiency and effectiveness of these modalities and channels and the extent to which they support ownership and sustainability. It should be noted, however, that the team is unlikely to be able to gather data to allow for a verifiable comparative analysis. However, the following aspects will be explored in order to draw conclusions about how the Embassy may be able to make more effective use of its resources through better selection of channels and modalities in relation to intended purposes.

The following four issues will be explored (partly through interviews with Embassy staff):

- *Partner and modality selection in relation to the purpose of the funded initiative:* How rigorous are the assessments of potential? Are different options compared and valued? Are transaction costs discussed against the added value of the intermediaries? Are strategic alliances sought? Is there a set of criteria used for assessments? What consideration is given to selecting partners with a focus on high risk geographic areas?
- *Quality/ value of services provided and the extent to which this is related to the nature of the support channel and modality:* To the extent possible, the team will strive to discern the extent to which a given modality or channel is more or less effective in terms of technical assistance, dialogue facilitation, policy advice or other types of tasks.
- *Extent to which dialogue with and via partners has facilitated alignment with Kenyan priorities and donor harmonisation:* The team will explore how choice of channels and modalities has reflected and buttressed Swedish commitments to aid effectiveness and has contributed to broader aid harmonisation.
- *Utility of the current results matrix:* Through discussions with the Embassy staff, the evaluation team will assess the extent to which the results matrix has been utilised and if it has been found to be a useful and relevant tool for monitoring and dialogue with partners, with an intention to identify ways that it may be improved in the future.

The team will develop a semi-structured interview schedule in order to gather and collate this information.

(c) Selection of the case studies

Contributions (projects or programmes) for case studies will be chosen from each of the three sectors in the country strategy (three from Natural Resources and Environment, two from Urban Development and three from Democratic Governance and Human Rights). This selection will be made during the PDA phase in dialogue with the Embassy. The following criteria are proposed for selecting the case studies.

1. Contributions will have been decided upon[161] between 2009 and 2010 to reflect priorities in the current strategy and will have progressed to the extent that a significant level of outcomes has been achieved.
2. The contributions will have been evaluated and/or had MTRs conducted that have focused on outcomes. It will also be important that a full range of other documentation is made available to the evaluation team for the selected contributions as soon as these are chosen.

3. The contributions will represent a range of modalities and channels[162], including to the extent possible (1) direct funding to Kenyan governmental institutions, (2) support to Kenyan, Swedish and/or international CSOs, (3) support channels through multidonor modalities, (4) support involving Swedish public agencies, (5) support involving an international consulting firm[163] as a partner, and (6) support through UN agencies.
4. Representatives of key stakeholders will be present in Kenya and/or Sweden and available for interviews during the period of the evaluation missions.

It should be noted that these criteria will lead to a selection that will be skewed to bypass ineffective initiatives. This selection is deemed necessary as it is important to have a basis for understanding and comparing the nature of actual outcomes, rather than analysis of the extent to which outcomes have been achieved at all. Furthermore, it is hoped that the selection of cases will provide data that can indicate trends. The cases will provide a basis for contrasting different channels and modalities, but the number of cases will not be sufficient to draw firm and generalisable conclusions regarding the advantages or disadvantages of a given channel or modality

It is envisaged that the Embassy provides the team with a list of eligible cases based on these criteria - from which we select 8 as case studies for the assignment.

The evaluation will look at both the case studies and the overall portfolio through the same basic lens, but the case studies will also involve greater analyses of issues related to efficiency and effectiveness of different channels and modalities. The depth of the case studies will ultimately largely be related to the quality of the available documentation in terms of its evidence-base and outcome focus as time for interviews will be limited. No visits to project sites or interviews with primary beneficiaries are envisaged. We expect to produce a 1-2 page summary of each case study, which will be included as annexes in the overall evaluation report. The main report will synthesise these findings with the review of the portfolio more generally. Experience from other country strategy evaluations suggests that it may not be possible to have a clear comparative structure through which to analyse the highly varied initiatives (and varied quality of reporting), but that certain trends or consistencies between case studies are likely to emerge.

(d) Evaluation: preparation

Before starting the analysis the team will compare:

(1) the outcome objectives from the country strategy,
(2) the outcomes reported in the documentation reviewed, and
(3) the development trends and emerging strategic concerns suggested by the PDA.

These will be used to develop a set of initial working hypotheses regarding (a) the adherence of the portfolio to the country strategy, (b) the relevance of the current strategy to Kenyan goals (Vision 2030) and needs, and (c) emerging unexpected outcomes of Swedish support. These will be explored in relation the overall portfolio, but with specific analysis of the selected case study initiatives. These findings will guide the subsequent evaluation.

(e) Data collection

Data will be collected through interviews and focus group meetings with relevant stakeholders and informed experts (i.e., non-stakeholders with an in depth understanding of trends in the three sectors), including partners (consulting firms, government institutions and CSOs) and other donors. Regarding the latter, the evaluation team includes those individuals who have been supported by Sweden in relation to policy analysis and development. The Embassy will be asked to inform stakeholders about the evaluation, and/or provide the evaluation team with project/programme and other stakeholder contact details. The team will request recommendations from the Embassy to determine participant and interview lists.

Shortly after the validation workshop for the PDA, the evaluation team will hold six focus group meetings –three with stakeholders (one per sector) and three with informed experts (again, one from each of the three sectors). The workshops will be followed by in-depth semi-structured interviews with stakeholders from the eight selected projects and other selected key informants (including Kenyan government staff, other donor representatives, and researchers with an overview of the sectors). Interviews will also be made with programme officers at the Embassy. Some interviews will be undertaken during the first team visit and others will be undertaken in the second visit in May.

The focus group meetings and subsequent interviews will largely follow a participatory outcome harvesting approach[164], whereby the evaluation team will collect and compare ‘outcome descriptors’, i.e., the perceived outcomes and potential outcomes of Swedish support. The stakeholders will be asked about the ‘formal’ theories of change that have guided the initiatives and the implicit assumptions about how these programmes have or were expected to contribute to Kenyan development. The other key informants will be asked about their perspectives on the relevance of these theories of change in light of the broader trends in Kenyan development and in Kenyan development cooperation.

Those involved with policy analyses on behalf of the Embassy will be encouraged to reflect on if and how their work has contributed to better understanding of how the portfolio can contribute to addressing core development challenges. The original outcome objectives will be assessed in relation to three, triangulated sets of perceptions; those of the Embassy, project/programme stakeholders and informed experts. The overall approach will be informed by current thinking on causality and contribution analysis.[165]

In summary, the approach will include the following steps:

- The desk study of existing documentation described above.

- The two focus group meetings for each sector – described above – that will consist of (a) project stakeholders and (b) informed experts (non-stakeholders). The workshops with stakeholders will primarily discuss:
    - the accuracy of the outcome objectives from the Country Strategy
    - the extent of achievements in relation to these outcomes
    - the extent to which outcomes achieved and intended reflect the nature of poverty, in Kenya.
    - the extent to which Swedish support recognises the rights of marginalised populations and their potential for empowerment, and how the Embassy works with partners to engage with duty bearers to ensure that these rights are in focus (with special attention to the extent to which the Embassy's dialogue efforts have proven an effective means to achieve these aims).
    - the extent to which achievements can be attributed to Swedish support, or to what extent the Swedish support has contributed to these achievements.
    - the accuracy of the initial working hypotheses developed in the literature review.
- The findings of these focus group meetings will be used to develop a deeper understanding of results in relation to the questions posed in the Terms of Reference for the assignment. These will be verified and fleshed out through the individual interviews and case studies.

(f) Validation of findings

It is anticipated that the team will prepare a draft evaluation report before the visit in May when a series of further interviews plus the validation workshop will allow the team to further develop/verify their findings.

(g) The evaluation report

The evaluation report will be presented in three parts:

i. A summary of the PDA findings.

ii. Country Strategy Evaluation

    a. Approach to the Evaluation

    b. Results of the Evalaution

        i. Design
        ii. Effectiveness
        iii. Efficiency
        iv. Relevance
        v. Sustainability
        vi. Impact

    iii. Recommendations for the new Cooperation Strategy

4.3 Report deadline

The final PDA is due on 30 April.

The final Evaluation report is due on 15 June 2012.

4.4 Team Roles and Responsibilities

Angela Christie as Team Leader will have overall responsibility for the PDA and Evaluation. She will coordinate the team to deliver both reports on time and to a standard which meets the requirement of the Terms of Reference, liaising with Embassy staff as appropriate. Angela will lead the PDA process and the overall Evaluation plus both validation workshops.

Johanna Bergman-Lodin, will lead on the research effort towards delivery of the PDA and will also lead the outcome harvesting exercise supporting the evaluation of the urban sector component of the portfolio and the associate case-study analyses.

Ian Christoplos, will lead on the outcome harvesting methodology and associated focus group discussions. Ian will also lead specifically on the assessment of the natural resources and environment portfolio and associated case studies.

Michael Hauer, will lead on the Development Partner review as a key component of the PDA; Michael will jointly deliver the two validation workshops and lead on the outcome harvesting focus group meeting for the democracy and human rights component of the portfolio plus analysis of associated case studies. Michael will play a key role in the conduct of in-country interviews and stakeholder management.

5. Questions/Clarifications

We have received and incorporated feedback on the following:

1. Does the inception report overall meet the requirements and expectations of the Embassy?
2. In terms of the timing and number of events planned, are these reasonable within the broader context of other Embassy commitments?
   - PDA Validation Workshop: two half day workshops 21 or 22 March.
   - Interviews with Embassy staff 21 or 22 March.
   - Sectoral Focus Group Discussions: six half day workshops – one for programme stakeholders/one for experts in each of three sectors w/b 25 March.
   - Interviews with Embassy staff and other key stakeholders end of w/b 25 March.
   - Interviews with Embassy staff and other key stakeholders end of w/b 13 May.
   - Evaluation Validation Workshop: w/b 20 May.

   Note that changes to the proposed dates for the PDA validation workshop and focus group meetings should be later rather than sooner to allow appropriate time for desk study and preparation. The team suggests the possibility of w/b 1 April for the PDA validation, focus group meetings and interviews.
3. The evaluation team is open to suggestions from the Embassy on how to ensure a collaborative approach to this assignment to maximise utility and ownership of both the process and result.

Work Plan

	Total	AC	MH	JBL	IC	NE
Inception Phase						
Team introductory meeting	4	1	1	1	1	
Data collection	10	1	5	4		
Development of an evaluation design for Part I and II and agree on work plan and report preparation	10	5	1	2	2	
Submission of an inception report						
Part I : PDA						
Further consultation with key stakeholders on relevant data	6	2	4			
Desk review	14	3	7	4		
Data analysis and synthesis	15	5	4	4	2	
Validation workshop in Nairobi (incl. preparation, facilitation and documentation), proposed dates 20-22 March; plus interviews	6	3	3			
Writing of PDA	15	10	3	1	1	
Submission of draft PDA						
Submission of final PDA						
Part II : Implementation Evaluation						
Evaluation design amendment	5	2	1	1	1	
Data collection (sector analysis)	6		2	2	2	
Data collection (case studies)	6		2	2	2	
Outcome harvesting workshops	19	5	2	4	5	3
Interviews in Kenya	4	2	2			
Data analysis	5	2	2	1		
Validation workshop in Nairobi, tentative date	2	1	1			
Report writing	15	9	3		3	
Submission of draft report						
Feedback from Sida						
Finalisation of the report	3	2	1			
Submission of final report						
Total days	145	53	44	26	19	3

January			February				March				April				May					June				July
3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27

Initials: AC=Angela Christie, MH=Michael Hauer, JBL=Johanna Bergman Lodin, IC=Ian Christoplos, NE=National Experts

Key Dates
- 21 Jan kick off
- 15 Feb final inception report
- 18-22 March PDA Validation workshop Nairobi/Interviews
- 25-29 March Focal group discussions for evaluation/Interviews
- 19 April draft PDA
- 30 April final PDA
- 13th May (the week of) Interviews Nairobi
- 20th May (the week of) Evaluation Validation Workshop
- 31 May draft final report
- 15 June final final report

Annex 3 – DDA Data Source Matrix

Chapter	Issues to be covered	Data Sources	Focus/dimensions of analysis
Country Context	**Economic and socio-cultural aspects**	WB (2009) Kenya Poverty and Inequality Assessment World Bank Index UNDP / HDR KNBS / Kenya Population & Housing Census, Economic Survey, Statistical Abstract, Integrated Budget Household Survey etc. 2008-2009 Demographic and Health Survey CSIS / Barkan 2011 Kenya Assessing risks to stability	Economic: Wealth ranking GDP + sub-sector contributions % below poverty line (trends over time) GINI coefficient (trends over time) Labor market trends Aid Regional and global integration incl. trade & migration Socio-cultural: Ethnic /linguistic groups Religion Education Health (incl. HIV) Gender relations +Spatial distribution / rural-urban
	Democracy and human rights	NORAD (2009) Political Economy Analysis WB (2009) Kenya Poverty and Inequality Assessment Freedom House	**Power relations:** Institutional environment Democracy

		CSIS / Barkan 2011 Kenya Assessing risks to stability	Human rights Admin setup (incl. devolution) Patronage Colonial heritage Rural-urban Ethnic groups Gender relations
	Natural resources and **the environment**	WB 2011 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) United Nations' Human Rights Council 2010 Universal Periodic Review Kenya (UPR) GoK CSIS / Barkan 2011 Kenya Assessing risks to stability	Natural resources /NRM (sustainability) Water and sanitation Agriculture Land tenure Land policy Climate change Natural hazards/disasters The role of civil society + Spatial distribution /rural-urban +Vulnerability
	Urban development		Informal settlements/slums Local government Labor market
	Peace and security	NORAD (2009) Political Economy Analysis 2008-2009 Demographic and Health Survey 'Counterterrorism and human rights abuses in Kenya and Uganda…' Freedom House CSIS / Barkan 2011 Kenya Assessing risks to stability	Conflict (incl. in pastoral areas; land disputes, etc.) Ethnic tensions and identity politics Terrorism Electoral violence (incl. IDPs; the ICC process to step up after the March elections) Social unrest (incl. inequality, urban / youth unemployment etc.) Climate change and environmental degradation Rampant urbanisation

	Political developments	NORAD (2009) Political Economy Analysis CSIS / Barkan 2011 Assessing risks to stability AfDB 2008-2012 Kenya Country Strategy Paper Brookings	Political economy + governance structures Post-independence trajectory Post-2007 election developments New Constitution (2010) (incl. new senate and devolution) Strengthening of civil society and press Upcoming March 2013 elections
Who are the poor and vulner-able?	Discussing the poverty concept	UNDP National Human Development Reports WB Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment Freedom House Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA-IV) WB Handbook on Poverty and Inequality (http://issuu.com/world.bank.publications /docs/9780821376133)	Multi-dimensional concept: poverty as lack of resources + lack of power + lack of choice The dynamics of poverty Context specific and relational aspects of poverty Local perceptions of poverty
	Gender matters!	2008-2009 Demographic and Health Survey OECD UNDP Social Watch *The Economist*/EIU World Economic Forum	Women's empowerment indicators (Kenya) Social Institutions and Gender Index Gender Inequality Index Gender Equity Index Women's Economic Opportunity Index Global Gender Gap Index Gender-based violence
	Mapping of the poor and vulnerable and the charac-teristics of their poverty	WB (2009) Kenya Poverty and Inequality Assessment World Bank Index KNBS / Kenya Population & Housing Census, Economic Survey, Statistical Abstract, Integrated Budget Household Survey etc. 2008-2009 Demographic and Health Survey Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA-IV)	Poverty as lack of resources Poverty as lack of power Poverty as lack of choice

		Freedom House	
	Mapping of where the poor and vulnerable live	2008-2009 Demographic and Health Survey	Spatial characteristics: Rural poverty (esp. ASAL) Urban poverty (esp. slums) +regional GINI coefficients
Opportunities for Development	**Major constraints and challenges for Kenya's development**	Brookings Chatham House Kenya PRSP 2012 (Update on MTP) AfDB 2008-2012 Kenya Country Strategy Paper AfDB 2011-2015 EA Regional Integration Strategy Paper World Economic Forum 2012/13 Global Competitiveness Report WB 2013 Doing Business Report WB 2011 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) WB 2012 Africa's Pulse Vol 6 WB 2012 Kenya Economic Update 6+7	Challenges related to democracy and human rights (incl. political and social challenges) Challenges related to economic growth (incl. income poverty and inequality) Challenges related to natural resources and the environment Challenges related to urban development + both internal and external constraints
	Major opportunities for Kenya's development	Brookings Chatham House Kenya PRSP 2012 (Update on MTP) AfDB 2008-2012 Kenya Country Strategy Paper AfDB 2011-2015 EA Regional Integration Strategy Paper World Economic Forum 2012/13 Global Competitiveness Report WB 2011 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) WB 2012 Africa's Pulse Vol 6 WB 2012 Kenya Economic Update 6+7 Nordic Africa Institute	Opportunities related to democracy and human rights (incl. political and social opportunities) Opportunities related to economic growth Opportunities related to natural resources and the environment Opportunities related to urban development + both internal and external opportunities
	Main risks	Brookings Chatham House	Presidential election 2013 ICC process

		Kenya PRSP 2012 (Update on MTP) AfDB 2008-2012 Kenya Country Strategy Paper World Economic Forum 2012/13 Global Competitiveness Report CSIS / Barkan 2011 Kenya Assessing risks to stability WB 2012 Africa's Pulse Vol 6 WB 2012 Kenya Economic Update 6+7	Failure to implement the new Constitution Oil discovery Major droughts or floods or other environmental disasters
	How the main risks could affect the Swedish devel-opment cooperation		In relation to democracy and human rights In relation to natural resources and the environment In relation to urban development
	How Sweden should relate to these risks		
The Govern-ment's Commit-ments and Ac-tions	**Poverty alleviation (incl. actual budget provided)**	Government of Kenya Opendata.go.ke The Kenya Budget Visualisation Dashboard (twaweza.org)	Vision 2030 + MTP New Constitution Commitment from GoK Measures/action taken by GoK MDGs
	Human rights and democ-racy (incl. actual budget provided)	Government of Kenya Kenya PRSP 2012 (Update on MTP) United Nations' Human Rights Council 2010 Universal Periodic Review Kenya (UPR) WB 2011 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) WB 2011 Worldwide Governance Indicators Freedom House Transparency International Opendata.go.ke The Kenya Budget Visualisation Dashboard (twaweza.org)	Core international HR conventions signed and ratified ILO conventions Regional HR conventions Cooperation with HR mechanisms New Constitution with Bill of Rights Vision 2030 +MTP Key national priorities Various new commissions Devolution Judicial system's quality

			Opportunities to participate in democratic processes Freedom of expression and active civil society Women's rights LGBT(I) rights
	Gender equality (incl. actual budget provided)	Government of Kenya Kenya PRSP 2012 (Update on MTP) United Nations' Human Rights Council 2010 Universal Periodic Review Kenya (UPR) WB 2011 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) Opendata.go.ke The Kenya Budget Visualisation Dashboard (twaweza.org)	New Constitution (incl. Bill of Rights) About to meet MDG 3 for gender parity in education CEDAW Gender-informed policies (incl. Vision 2030 + MTP) Gender-specific policies in place Sexual Offences Act The Kenya National Commission on Gender and Development (KNCGD) Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission Women's Enterprise Fund
	National strategy for development (incl. actual budget provided)	Government of Kenya Kenya PRSP 2012 (Update on MTP) United Nations' Human Rights Council 2010 Universal Periodic Review Kenya (UPR) Opendata.go.ke The Kenya Budget Visualisation Dashboard (twaweza.org)	Vision 2030 and MTP pillars - Relevance, credibility and feasibility for democracy and human rights - Relevance, credibility and feasibility for natural resources and the environment - Relevance, credibility and feasibility for urban development - Cross cutting issues - Poverty analysis vis-à-vis other poverty analyses made - Perspectives of the poor and vulnerable - M&E - Operationalisation in the budget - Implementation through commissions etc.
	Economic policy (incl. actual budget provided)	Brookings Kenya PRSP 2012 (Update on MTP) AfDB 2008-2012 Kenya Country Strategy Paper World Economic Forum 2012/13 Global Competitiveness Report WB 2013 Doing Business Report	Vision 2030 + MTP Macroeconomic management Fiscal policy Debt policy Regional integration and trade policies

		WB 2011 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) WB 2012 Africa's Pulse Vol 6 WB 2012 Kenya Economic Update 6+7 IMF 2011 (2012) Article IV Consultation WB 2012 Country Partnership Strategy Progress Report United Nations' Human Rights Council 2010 Universal Periodic Review Kenya (UPR) Opendata.go.ke The Kenya Budget Visualisation Dashboard (twaweza.org)	Business regulatory environment Equity of public resource use Efficiency of revenue mobilisation National savings FDI CSR Commission for Revenue Allocation (CRA)
	Public financial management (incl. actual budget provided)	Kenya PRSP 2012 (Update on MTP) World Economic Forum 2012/13 Global Competitiveness Report WB 2011 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) WB 2012 Kenya Economic Update 6+7 IMF 2011 (2012) Article IV Consultation WB 2012 Country Partnership Strategy Progress Report Opendata.go.ke The Kenya Budget Visualisation Dashboard (twaweza.org)	Structural policies, financial sector Quality of budgetary and financial management Predictability and control of public expenses, procurement systems and systems for accounting, recording and reporting, and external scrutiny and audit (incl. transparency, accountability and corruption in the public sector)
	Environmental sustainability incl. climate change (incl. actual budget provided)	WB 2011 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) United Nations' Human Rights Council 2010 Universal Periodic Review Kenya (UPR) GoK Opendata.go.ke The Kenya Budget Visualisation Dashboard (twaweza.org)	New Constitution ('green' Constitution) Vision 2030 + MTP Commitment from GoK *(incl. Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biodiversity, the RAMSA Convention on wetlands)* National Environment Policy Measures/action taken by GoK Inconclusive whether MDG 7 (ensure environmental sustainability) will be achieved
	Fight against corruption (incl. actual budget provided)	WB 2011 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) WB 2012 Kenya Economic Update 6+7 IMF 2011 (2012) Article IV Consultation	Commitment from GoK *(incl. UN Convention against corruption, the AU Convention on preventing and combating corruption)* Charting of corruption by sector *(sectors where corruption is most common and*

		WB 2012 Country Partnership Strategy Progress Report United Nations' Human Rights Council 2010 Universal Periodic Review Kenya (UPR) Transparency International (TI Kenya) Sida Portfolio Analysis Opendata.go.ke The Kenya Budget Visualisation Dashboard (twaweza.org) http://ipaidabribe.or.ke	*likely to occur)* TI East African Bribery Index TI Global Corruption Barometer TI Corruption Perception Index New Constitution Anti-corruption legislation Measures/action taken by GoK *(incl. National Action Plan Against Corruption; Governance Action Plan; the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC))* Judicial system's capacity to implement anti-corruption legislation Impunity /accountability *(Public Complaints Standing Committee (PCSC))*
	How pro-poor budget allocations have been made		
	What pro-poor budget allocations have resulted in		
Mapping of the development cooperation and its key actors in Kenya	Key development partners	Sida Portfolio Analysis Ministry of Finance www.aideffectiveness.go.ke/ Brookings / Mwega 2009 AfDB 2008-2012 Kenya Country Strategy Paper	Amount of support Share in total support between multilateral donors + stability in aid flows Share in total support between bilateral donors + stability in aid flows Share in total support between NGOs + stability in aid flows KJAS members Non-KJAS development partners operating in Kenya
	Identification of new actors	Ministry of Finance www.aideffectiveness.go.ke/ Brookings / Mwega 2009	NGOs New bilaterals (esp. China) Private sources
	Identification of 'agents for change'		
	Key development sectors	Ministry of Finance www.aideffectiveness.go.ke/	Distribution of aid flows between sectors (incl. stability / shifts over time)

		OECD	MTP Pillars MTP foundations Bilateral ODA by sector
	Key financial flows of development cooperation	Ministry of Finance www.aideffectiveness.go.ke/ Brookings / Mwega 2009 AfDB 2008-2012 Kenya Country Strategy Paper OECD statistics	ODA OOF Private In relation to this, it could also be worthwhile to consider how the aid is distributed between: Country Programmable Aid (CPA) Emergency and food aid Debt forgiveness Administrative costs Support for NGOs Technical cooperation (education/training of nationals, payments to consultants and advisors)
	What has been achieved		
	Mapping of areas covered by each development partner	Sida Portfolio Analysis AfDB 2008-2012 Kenya Country Strategy Paper	Matrix: Disaggregated by MTP sector Covering key development partners Charting number of activities per partner per sector Identifying lead donor/chair Distinguishing between active donor (financing + participation in sector policy dialogue) and silent partner (financing with no participation in sector policy dialogue)
	Potential over financing of specific sectors	Brookings / Mwega 2009	Health???

	Potential under financing of specific sectors	Sida Portfolio Analysis	Land (since Sweden is alone)???
	How the coordination works	Sida Portfolio Analysis Ministry of Finance www.aideffectiveness.go.ke/ Brookings / Mwega 2009	The Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS) Aid coordination groups: (i) Development Partnership Forum (DPF) – biannual meetings (ii) (Crisis Management Committe) (iii) Development Partner Group (DCG) – monthly meetings (iv) GoK Coordination Group (GCG) (v) Aid Effectiveness Group (AEG) – monthly meetings A. To streamline: B. -The Paris Declaration C. -The Accra Agenda for Action D. -The Busan partnership for effective Development Cooperation E. -Vision 2030 F. -MTP (vi) Aid Effectiveness Secretariat (AES) (hosted by the Ministry of Finance) (vii) Donor Working Groups (DWGs) (viii) Sector Working Groups (SWGs) G. Based on MTP sectors
	Major challenges	Brookings / Mwega 2009 Sida Portfolio Analysis	Aid volatility (incl. disbursement to commitment ratio) Aid fragmentation Aid coordination and harmonisation Harmonise and align the guiding national strategy documents (such as Vision 2030, MTP and KJAS)
Assessment of Sweden's role	Sweden's strengths (incl. why and in what way)	Sida Portfolio Analysis	No colonial heritage At the fore of promoting aid effectiveness
	Sweden's weaknesses (incl. why and in what way)	Sida Portfolio Analysis	Fragmentation – too many small and short contributions with too many partners

	Sweden's comparative advantages (if any; incl. why and in what way)		
	Sweden's strategic role		
	How Sweden can act as a catalyst and or innovator		
Conclusions	Fundamental development challenges and opportunities		
	The strategic role of development cooperation and feasible aid modalities incl. existing risks and the degree to which they affect the overall effectiveness		
	The strategic role for Swedish support in forthcoming cooperation strategy period		

Annex 4 – Key National Reporting Indicators

<u>Selection of Poverty related Baselines and Targets</u>
(Ministry of State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030)

Indicator	Baseline		Targets		
	Year	Value	Year	Value	Actual
Urban households with access to piped water	2007/8	60	2012/13	75	Unknown
Rural households with access to water from a protected source	2007/8	40	2012/13	60	Unknown
Urban households with individual or shared access to toilet facilities	2007/8	30	2012/13	55	Unknown
Rural households with individual or shared access to toilet facilities	2007/8	5	2012/13	8	Unknown
Reduced poverty (Poverty levels below poverty line)	2006	46	2012/13	28	Unknown
Reduced hunger (households in need of food aid) Million	2006	2.5	2012/13	1.0	Unknown

For full details of:

- National Reporting Framework
- Flagship project Reporting Framework
- District and constituency monitoring
- Gender monitoring

See baselines and targets presented in 'Handbook of National Reporting Inducators for the Vision 2030'. MTP 2008-12. Ministry of State for Planning, National Development and Vision.

Annex 5 – Development Partner Sectoral Priorities

	DP/ Sec	IDA	Sida	DANIDA	Japan	Italy	Belgium	KFW	China	EDF	ADB	GIZ	AFB	Finland	Netherlands	USAID	DFID	CIDA	BADEA	EIB	Kuwait	OPEC	Spain	Saudi Arabia	BCM	Switzerland	Abu Dhabi	GEFT	India	Total
1	Tou																													0
2	Agric	X	X		X			X		X	X	X				X														8
3	Man	X			X																									2
4	ICT	X																												1
5	PFM	X	X	X		X				X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X												12
6	EaT				X		X	X			X					X					X	X								7
7	Hea	X		X	X	X		X			X	X			X	X			X		X	X		X	X					16
8	EWS	X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X		X			X		X	X				X		X		17
9	LYH	X		X		X			X	X	X				X															7
10	PUH	X	X			X		X		X			X																	6
11	GJL	X		X						X		X				X														5
12	Tra					X				X	X						X		X				X							6
13	SPB		X																											1
14	PSR	X		X	X		X		X																					5
15	Ener	X			X		X		X		X		X						X	X		X	X	X					X	12
16	Roa	X			X			X	X	X	X		X						X		X	X		X			X			12
17	Trans	X			X						X																			3
18	NMD	X																												1
19	STI								X		X				X															3
20	Lan	X	X																											2
Total		15	6	6	9	6	3	6	5	8	11	5	5	2	3	6	2	1	5	1	4	5	2	3	1	1	1	1	1	

Sectors: **Tou**-Tourism, **Agri**-Agriculture, **Tr**a-Trade, **Man**-Manufacturing**, ICT**-Information, Communication and Technology, **PFM**-Public Financial Management, **EaT**-Education and Training, **Hea**-Health, **EWS-**Environment, Water and Sanitation, **LYH**-Labour, Youth and Human Resources**, PUH-**Population, Urbanisation and Housing, **GJL**-Governance, Justice and Legal Reforms, **SPB**-Security, Peace Building and Conflict Management, **PSR**-Public Sector Reforms, **Ener**-Energy, **Roa**-Roads, **Trans**-Transport, **NMD**-Nairobi Metropolitan Development, **STI-**Science Technology and Innovation, **Lan**-Lands

Source: Kenya Ministry of FInance

Annex 6 – Swedish Development Cooperation with Kenya 2012

Every year, Sida reports to the Swedish government on how we have used and distributed the grant. We report the development aid distributed to each country divided into subject areas.

Costs	**SEK**
Democracy, Human rights and Gender equality	165 583 000
Sustainable infrastructure and Services	141 665 000
Agriculture and Forestry	107 261 000
Humanitarian Aid	55 971 000
Conflict, Peace and Security	30 412 000
Market Development	10 244 000
Environment	5 000 000
Health	2 859 000
Education	1 105 000
Total	**520 101 000**

Source: Sidas arsredovisning 2012, kapitel 10

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[1] African Development Bank Group, 2008
[2] With a per capita income above 1000 USD.
[3] African Development Bank Group 2008; World Bank 2012a, 2012b). This is expected to be achieved (World Bank 2012c)
[4] Kenya Ministry of State for Planning, National Development, and Vision 2030 et al. 2011; World Bank 2009
[5] Kenya Ministry of State for Planning, National Development, and Vision 2030 et al. 2011. The national poverty line is defined as total expenditure (food + nonfood) for households whose food expenditure is close to the food poverty line at the cost of 2250 kCal per day. In relation to the latest poverty survey in Kenya, the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey 2005/06, the poverty line was set at KSh52.08 per day in rural areas and KSh98.73 in urban (where the latter is slightly above 1 dollar a day). From this follows that the rural poverty rate was 49.6% and the urban 33.1%. The aggregate national headcount poverty rate was 45.9% (see Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2007). The government's target is to reduce the share of Kenyans living below the national poverty line to 28% by 2015 (Kenya Ministry of State for Planning, National Development, and Vision 2030 et al. 2008).
[6] Githinji (2000), UNDP (2001) and SID (2004,6)
[7] A measurement of the income distribution of a country's residents. This number, which ranges between 0 and 1 and is based on residents' net income, helps define the gap between the rich and the poor, with 0 representing perfect equality (where all citizens have the same income) and 1 representing perfect inequality (where one person accounts for 100% of national expenditure).
[8] Society for International Development: Growing Unequally: An audit of the impact of Kenya's Vision 2030 growth on equality, 2010.
[9] World Bank 2013a
[10] World Bank 2012b
[11] Ministry of State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030 2010
[12] Republic of Kenya 2012
[13] Stockholm Environment Institute 2009
[14] Kamau 2012
[15] Tortora 2012
[16] The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite statistic of life expectancy, education, and income indices to rank countries into four tiers of human development.
[17] UNDP 2013 (http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/ken.html)
[18] ONE 2013
[19] Transform Nutrition 2012
[20] TJRC 2013
[21] TRJC 2013
[22] Kenya Institute of Economic Affairs 2008
[23] See for example: Federation of Women Lawyers – Kenya & Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions 2011.
[24] KNBS & ICF MACRO 2010
[25] Ibid.
[26] Kenya Institute of Economic Affairs 2008
[27] Kenya Institute of Economic Affairs 2008
[28] World Bank 2012b; AfDB, OECD, UNDP and UNECA 2012
[29] http://www.afro.who.int/en/kenya/country-health-profile.html
[30] World Bank 2008; KNBS & ICF MACRO 2010
[31] World Bank 20
[32] 488 per 100,000 live births
[33] Ministry of State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030 2010
[34] Sundet and Moen 2009; TRJC 2013
[35] International Crisis Group 2013
[36] Kimenyi 2013; International Crisis Group 2013

[37] Tortora 2012
[38] Afrobarometer 2012
[39] IMLU 2011
[40] Sundet and Moen 2009
[41] Perspectives on Poverty (2002), Sida
[42] World Bank 2012a, 2012b
[43] World Bank 2009
[44] Mwanbu et al 1995
[45] Chuma et al 2009
[46] Ellis 2001
[47] Sundet and Moen 2009, Maina et al 2003
[48] Institute for War and Peace 2013
[49] Geda et al. 2005
[50] Onsomu & Munga 2010
[51] Tostensen 2004
[52] Suri et al 2008
[53] Suri et al 2008; Radeny et al 2012
[54] Thiesen 2010; Opiyo et al 2012
[55] TRJC 2013
[56] Nzuma 2013
[57] Christoplos 2012
[58] Nzuma 2013
[59] Suri et al 2008
[60] Radeny et al 2012; Kristjanson et al 2010
[61] Radeny et al. 2012
[62] Amis 2004
[63] Kamau 2012
[64] Ade Freeman et al 2004
[65] Pain, A and Levine S, 2012
[66] Radeny et al. 2012
[67] Muyanga et al 2010:iii
[68] Kenya Ministry of State for Planning, National Development, and Vision 2030 et al. 2011; Kenya Bureau of Statistics 2007
[69] Radeny et al. 2012
[70] Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 2007
[71] Kenya Ministry of State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030, 2010
[72] Owuor et al. 2007
[73] CEDAW 2010
[74] Onsomu & Munga 2010
75 World Bank 2009
[76] United Nations 2012
[77] Maina et al 2003
[79] Okwi et al. 2007; Kristjanson et al. 2010
[80] Okwi et al. 2007
81 McCulloch & Ota 2002; Rao & Qaim 2011
82 Kristjanson et al. 2010
[83] TRJC 2013
[84] African Development Bank Group 2008
[85] Government of the Republic of Kenya 2007
[86] Population Reference Bureau 2011
[87] Kristjanson et al. 2010
88 Urban poverty decreased by 23.8% between 1997 and 2005/6 according to the World Bank (2009). However, another household survey suggested that only a marginal poverty reduction of 1% was achieved in Nairobi and Mombasa between 1990 and 2005 (Kristjanson et al. 2010).
[89] C.f. Oluko-Odingo 2011

[90] African Development Bank Group 2008
[91] AfDB, OECD, UNDP and UNECA 2012; African Development Bank Group 2011
[92] AfDB, OECD, UNDP and UNECA 2012
[93] African Development Bank Group 2008
[94] However, a notable problem regarding civil society is that it is based within the urban elite (Sundet and Moen 2009).
[95] Barkan 2011
[96] ibid
[97] Communications Commission of Kenya 2013
[98] The World Bank 2012b
[99] Communications Commission of Kenya 2013
[100] Tostensen 2004
[101] World Bank 2012b
[102] World Bank 2012a, 2012b
[103] World Bank 2012a
[104] AfDB, OECD, UNDP & UNECA 2012
[105] The country ranks 126 out of 185 countries, World Bank 2013b
[106] Schwab 2012
[107] Møller 2012; World Bank 2012b. However, as just noted in the previous section, it has simultaneously been reported that the tourism subsector earnings grew with 32.8 per cent and that Kenya in fact recorded the best performance to date in 2011 (AfDB, OECD, UNDP and UNECA 2012).
[108] Kimenyi 2013; Kenya Ministry of Finance & the World Bank 2012; Barkan 2011
[109] Møller 2012; see the various contributions in Wanyande & Okebe 2009, esp. Chemengich 2009 and Wanyande 2009
[110] CEDAW 2010
[111] http://knbs.or.ke/downloads/pdf/Kenyafacts2012.pdf
[112] AfDB, OECD, UNDP & UNECA 2012; World Bank 2012b; Government of the Republic of Kenya 2007
[113] http://www.pwc.com/ke/en/pdf/kenya-budget-2012-revenue-and-expenditure-highlights.pdf
[114] Government of the Republic of Kenya 2007
[115] Oluko-Odingo 2011
[116] Kristjanson et al. 2010, see also Mango et al 2009
[117] KNBS & ICF MACRO 2010
[118] UNDP 2010; Institute of Economic Affairs 2011; Kenya Ministry of Youth Affairs & Sports 2011
[119] Kenya Ministry of Youth Affairs & Sports 2011; UNDP 2010
[120] UNDP 2010
[121] UNDP 2010, p. 4
[122] World Bank 2012b
[123] Masinde Wamalwa 2009
[124] KNBS & ICF MACRO 2010
[125] It is not fully clear how city management will align with county management, in particular how this will translate into division of power between county and urban authorities.
[126] Social Watch, 2012; African Peer Review Mechanism 2011
[127] See Maina et al 2003
[128] Maina et al 2003
[129] Maina et al 2003; Sundet and Moen 2009
[130] Oloo 2013
[131] Government of the Republic of Kenya 2007
[132] Kenya Vision 2030
[133] African Peer Review Mechanism 2011
[134] Social Watch, 2012
[135] Millennium Development Goals, Status Report for Kenya 2009
[136] Stakeholder consultation workshop,PDA 2013
[137] UN HR Council 2010

[138] Development Initiatives Africa Hub, 2012
[139] http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/three-myths-about-aid-to-kenya
[140] Development Initiative, 2012
[141] Watkins and Alemayehu, 2012
[142] Third Annual Progress Report on the Implementation of the First Medium Term Plan 2008-2012
[143] Open Budget Survey 2012
[144] Ministry of Finance, 2012
[145] Interview with Ministry of Finance
[146] Whitfield and Therkildsen 2011
[147] Christoplos 2012
[148] The relevance of the Strategy for development cooperation with Kenya has been reviewed in a Mid Term Evaluation (2011) and a Portfolio analysis (2012), which both concluded that the composition on the portfolio is relevant.
[149] OECD/DAC recommended evaluation criteria.
[150] Perspectives on Poverty, 2002, Sida.
[151]Governments of: Canada, Denmark. Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, African Development Bank, European Commission Delegation to Kenya, United Nations, World Bank Group.
[152]Increased from the original MSEK350 after a mid-term review in 2011.
[153] Given the 5 year time period it's probably a bit ambitious to focus on Impact and so the focus will be mostly on Results, although impact will be included whenever possible.
[154] See footnote 3.
[155]Attached as Annex I
[156] Even though the Country cooperation strategy outlines three main sectors of development cooperation, it should be noted that according to OECD DACs sector definitions the Embassy's development cooperation engagement rather spans across 8-9 sectors.
[157] Which will include the findings of the portfolio analysis conducted in 2012.
[158] By contrast, the evaluation will present the evaluation team's own independent assessment.
[159] The Embassy has suggested that the PDA *Interim* Report should be a max 25 pages in length with an Executive Summary of 2-3 pages; the full *Final* report (which will include the evaluation) should be a max of 50 pages in length with an Executive Summary of 2-3 pages. Additional information should be places in appendices.
[160]Portfolio Analysis of the Development Cooperation with Kenya, Michael Hauer. 2012
[161] That is does not need to be a new contribution but could also be a decision to continue and existing one.
[162]We understand that the Embassy is using three main channels: 1) Government, 2) Multilateral organisations and 3) Civil society, plus two additional, less used, channels: 4) Private firms and 5) Swedish institutions (twinning projects). According to the contribution management system PLUS, the Embassy is using mainly three modalities namely: 1) Specific programme managed by an organisation, 2) Sector programme pooled funding, and 3) Project support (twinning is classified as expert cooperation).
[163] This would apply in very few cases.
[164]See 2012. Ricardo Wilson-Grau and Heather Britt. *Outcome Harvesting*, Ford Foundation.
[165]See for example ILAC Briefing 26 (Oct 2012): Making Causal Claims, John Mayne

Implementation Evaluation of the Cooperation Strategy with Kenya 2009-2013 – Part II: Poverty and Development Assessment

This Poverty and Development Assessment is the second part of the evaluation of the Swedish Strategy for Development Cooperation with Kenya 2009-2013 that was undertaken in 2013. The overall conclusions of the PDA are that Kenya today is characterised by a striking mix of optimism and pessimism. Kenya is one of the largest economics in Africa and, despite a number of significant political, economic and climatic shocks and setbacks, there has been a relatively strong and steady growth over the past two decades. This has not led to significant reduction of poverty. The root causes of poverty in Kenya are complex and related to access to financial, land and water resources, basic services, power and livelihood choice. Inequality is pronounced and linked to geography, ethnicity and gender. Both rural and urban poverty are associated with capacities to deal with converging livelihood shocks. The new Constitution represents a formal commitment to reform in areas that are key to move towards enhanced respect for human rights. There is still a significant disconnect between people's constitutional rights, their awareness of these rights and public officials' commitments and capacity to act on their new duties. The landscape of development cooperation is changing with new partners and modalities emerging and where commercial relationships are becoming more important. The PDA processes revealed two contrasting perspectives about the nature of poverty and how to address it where the first is a is a clear recognition that the Government of Kenya must be more accountable to its citizens and the second, less promising development, is a tendency to see an explicit focus on the poor as not being essential and with the risk that the rights of the poor will be in danger if they disappear from the political landscape.

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