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Sida Decentralised Evaluation

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Evaluation of the Implementation and Results of the Swedish Strategy for Democracy Support for Party Affiliated Organisations 2012-2014

Final Report

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The views and interpretations expressed in this report are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ALNEF	African Left Network Forum
CIS	Center Party's International Foundation
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DIPD	Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy
EU	European Union
GF	Green Forum
HRBA	Human Rights-Based Approach
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
JHS	Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation
KIC	Christian Democratic International Center
LGBTI	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual and Intersex
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NIMD	Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
N	Numbers
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee
OPC	Olof Palme Center
PAO	Party Affiliated Organisation
PYPA	Programme for Young Politicians in Africa
RBM	Results-Based Management
SEK	Swedish Kroner
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SILC	Swedish Liberal Centre
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
US	United States
VIF	Left International Forum
VO1	Workstream 1 (verksamhetsområde 1)
VO2	Workstream 2 (verksamhetsområde 2)

Preface

This evaluation was commissioned by Sida's Unit for Democracy and Human Rights in September 2014, through Sida's framework agreement for reviews and evaluations managed by Indevelop. Indevelop (www.indevelop.se) and Tana Copenhagen (www.tanacopenhagen.com) undertook the evaluation between October 2014 and January 2015.

The users of the evaluation are Sida, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Party Affiliated Organisations.

The evaluation was carried out by a team of four evaluators - Erik Bryld, Nadia Masri-Pedersen, Nedjma Ouerdane and Fredrik Uggla. Quality assurance was provided by Ian Christoplos while Sarah Gharbi managed the evaluation process at Indevelop.

Johan Norqvist and Nasrin Hoseini were the responsible evaluation managers at Sida.

Executive Summary

This report presents the findings of the evaluation of the implementation and results of the Swedish Strategy for Democracy Support for Party Affiliated Organisations (PAOs) 2012-2014.

The team has undertaken the evaluation in accordance with the methodology presented in the inception report using the evaluation matrix as the guiding tool for the evaluation. In accordance with the Terms of Reference (ToR) the evaluation is first and foremost related to the following three OECD-DAC criteria:

1. **Relevance**, with emphasis on Swedish strategy alignment; alignment to the PAO strategy and its goal (“to support democratic development and increased respect for human rights in developing countries”); and contextual/needs alignment.
2. **Effectiveness**, with emphasis on the objectives of the two work streams of the PAO support (political parties and multi-party systems; specific concerns related to fragility, youth and women).
3. **Efficiency**, where the focus is mostly on design, scope and scale of the programme and the application of results-based management. In accordance with the proposal, the team has included a specific reference to the application of the Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA) as well.

This means that the ToR pays limited attention to the remaining OECD-DAC criteria of impact and sustainability. Part of the reason for this is assessed to be the limited time of implementation of the Strategy at the time of the evaluation, i.e. 2012-2014. However, the team has sought to document probability of impact where feasible. Similarly, the team has worked to assess the extent to which the outputs and short-term outcomes identified are (or have a high probability of being) sustainable (i.e. are owned and internalised).

The evaluation is theory-based supplemented by a Most Significant Change data analysis methodology. In addition to desk studies, field missions were undertaken in six countries prioritised by Sida based on inputs by the team and consultations with the PAOs.

The PAO Strategy is based on an overall set of conceptual assumptions underpinning support to democratic development in developing countries globally. These refer to improvements in freedom of assembly and political organisation, participation, equal rights and eventually democratic and human rights improvements. There is an assumption in the Strategy that improved capacity of political parties and multi-party systems by default improves democratic practices and human rights. The evaluation

was fielded to test whether capacity enhancements have contributed to changes within the political parties and multi-party systems contributing to democratic political development.

The team found all PAOs to provide support which falls within the broader framework of policies of the Swedish government, as well as within instructions of the specific PAO strategy. Geographically, the PAOs have managed to target several countries where there is a significant democratic deficit. The spread of activities however remains substantial, as the seven PAOs together have, according to their own reports, a total of 68 direct partners in 38 countries. If parties supported indirectly through international federations or networks are added, the total comes to more than seventy countries.

The PAOs use different designs and operational modalities for implementation. The team has identified five types of categories used; though even within these, differences exist. The PAOs differ considerably in the modalities applied, consequently, the findings stated in this report are rarely relevant to all PAOs to the same degree, but rather represent the general tendency within the support form. (i.e. are representative of more than half of the PAOs or observations unless otherwise stated).

Across the different categories of PAO support, the majority have implemented these in general accordance with plans and approved applications. The bulk of the outputs are however primarily related to capacity development at an individual level, and we have found relatively few instances of documented institutional capacity development. This is partly a consequence of the approach taken to capacity development, which focuses on individual training rather than more direct engagement with the parties aimed at strategic long-term reform processes. Hence, while most of the PAOs are able to present good results in terms of individual capacity development and enhanced skills related to e.g. communication and campaigning, effects with regard to party institutionalisation (in particular related to transparency, accountability and participation) and operation is difficult to ascertain with the evidence available.

Within the multi-party workstream, we have generally found projects to be well-designed and relevant. While changes at institutional level are only evident to a very limited degree, the programmes provide capacity enhancement of youth and women and thus contributes to elements of the Strategy and Swedish Government policies on development.

Still, for the sister-party support the ability to be effective at the institutional and outcome level remains a challenge, which limits the ability to contribute to the overall strategy objective of democratic political development. The tension between support to individual parties and effects on politics in general has been repeatedly indicated by previous studies, and the team arrive at the same conclusion. Even so, it should be noted that most of the programmes have important elements, which the others may learn from. A few of the programmes stand out in their ability to deliver changes at a more institutional level. Testament to this is the positive evaluation that beneficiaries

(i.e., recipient parties) generally make of support from the PAO lauding their attention to needs-based analysis and ownership of the partner resulting in a strategic reform-oriented support. This also implies a focus on capacity development from an institutional rather than an individual perspective. In order to build on such positive features, a system to ensure that results are captured and that the learning from this is fed back to the programme, would need to be developed/enhanced.

There are good examples of cooperation, coordination and harmonisation among some of the PAOs (and with other donors in the same field) under the multi-party support workstream. However, with some notable exceptions overall harmonisation at the field level with other donor and party-support institutions is limited and the complementarity to what other donors are doing, including Sida, is not prioritised by the PAOs in most contexts. This limits opportunities for joint initiatives and risks duplication of activities. The attention to risks and risk management is generally weak, and in particular the PAOs that choose to work in multiple countries face difficulties in minimising and addressing risks.

Furthermore, the probability of impact is challenged by the scale and scope of the PAO support. The PAOs have engaged beneficiaries from more than seventy countries, and have direct cooperation in almost forty with a limited budget, which limits the possibilities of impact at a broader scale. This is in particular true for the network-based support mechanisms. Another major impediment of impact at a broader scale is the choice of PAO partner beneficiaries. In many cases, the PAOs (primarily as a consequence of the need to identify parties with ideological similarities) work with marginal political parties that have limited influence on the political situation in the targeted country and often with limited probability of changing this situation. While there are cases among the PAO programmes where influential parties have been supported or smaller cooperation parties have grown into more broadly relevant political actors, such examples are relatively rare. There thus seems to be a need for a selection process that not only looks to ideological similarity, but also takes into account the current ability to influence or the potential for influence over time.

From an effectiveness perspective, the evaluation has identified weaknesses in the present design of the sister party PAO support (which constitutes seventy per cent of total funds). The bulk of these, arguably, stem from the allocation of funds for sister-party support which is divided according to the number of seats political parties hold in the Swedish Riksdag. This constitutes an up-front guarantee to all PAOs that they are ensured a certain level of funding irrespective of design and performance, and there is limited evidence to suggest that the new strategy has impacted on this. It is the team's assessment that the consequence of system of allocation is the elimination of accountabilities for performance.

Most of our findings are consistent with previous evaluations and studies of the support form, as well as with international experience from the area. We thus believe that there is a need to rethink the design of the PAO support with the aim of enhancing performance and managing risks. This is particularly relevant for sister party support,

which constitutes the bulk of the support. A new model would require a more competitive approach to access funding, in line with what is currently present in the VO2 work-stream. The PAOs should provide a more long-term strategic approach to the partnership in recipient countries based on their needs and contextual requirements. The funding criteria should take into consideration the ability of the PAO to deliver, past performance, quality assurance, risk management, and critically, the application of enhanced Results-Based Management. Detailed recommendations can be found in chapter 4 of the report.

1 Introduction and Background

1.1 INTRODUCTION

This report presents the findings of the evaluation of the implementation and results of the Swedish Strategy for Democracy Support for Party Affiliated Organisations (PAOs) 2012-2014 (hereafter the Strategy).

The Terms of Reference (ToR) (see Annex 1) specifically refers to the assessment of outputs and short-term results, rather than impact as such given the limited two-year timeframe of the Strategy evaluated and the nature of the support provided, i.e. primarily capacity development and software type interventions. However, based on the inception phase discussions the team has also assessed probability of impact and sustainability.

Specifically, the ToR requests an assessment of the relevance of the support to PAOs to the Strategy objectives; contribution to the desired results (short-term outcomes) as well as unforeseen and unanticipated results/experiences.

The evaluation has been undertaken by Erik Bryld and Nadia Masri-Pedersen from Tana Copenhagen ApS and Fredrik Uggla and Nedjma Ouerdane associated with Indevelop AB.

The team would like express its appreciation to the PAOs in Stockholm and the partners in the countries visited for the substantial support throughout the evaluation.

1.2 BACKGROUND

The Swedish support through Party-Affiliated Organisations (PAOs) has existed for two decades. Following the global wave of democratic transitions during the 1980s, the Swedish government realised that increased attention had to be paid to the primary instruments of representative democracy; the political parties. A commissioned report (*utredning*) by the former minister of commerce, Hadar Cars, in 1994, presented an overview of the problems faced by parties in new democracies (limited resources, clientelism, sectarian character), and reviewed international experiences of

support to political parties (particularly the German one)¹. Cars suggested that the Swedish political parties, as bearers of a long democratic experience and significant international contacts, be given the possibility to apply for Sida funding on the same terms as civil society organisations. In addition, he suggested that special funds, administered by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), be set aside for this purpose based on the parliamentary representation of each party. In both cases, it was assumed that the Swedish political parties would set up special foundations, the PAOs (then called “*partinära organ*”), to handle such funds.

In spite of some debate regarding issues such as the political sensitivity of such support, Cars’ proposal became reality in 1995 when support began through the Swedish PAOs. Significantly, administrative responsibility was, in spite of Cars’ recommendation, placed with Sida instead of the MFA. Still, Sida’s role was limited as allocation of funding was automatic (and based on the external criteria of parliamentary representation in Sweden).

Between 1995 and 1997 a trial period took place, which was followed by a first external overview. Based on a study of a large number of projects, the report concluded that while these projects were largely in line with the aims of the support form, there was a potential tension between the sister party character of the support and the ultimate goal to support democratic development in general. Likewise, the report questioned the relationship between the activities undertaken (often visits and trainings) and the effects on democracy, which “is both vague and, at best, very long term”.² Also, the report questioned whether Sida should handle administration of the support. In spite of this, the trial period of the support form, which at this time ran at around fifteen million SEK annually, of which a substantial part was consumed by internal administration, was extended to 2000 and Sida was kept in charge (in spite of its own resistance to this).

In 2000, another external evaluation took place. While the evaluators established that close contacts had been established between Swedish parties and their partners in several countries, and that the latter seemed to have benefited from the activities undertaken, the broader effect of the support form on party systems and democratic development in general was unclear, and likely to be small.³ The evaluators recommended that the support be increasingly coordinated with other Swedish support for democracy. Subsequent to this, the trial period was again extended.

¹ Cars, Hadar (1994); *Demokratier kräva dessa partier*. Ds 1994:63.

² SPM Consultants (1997); *Översyn av stöd till demokratiuppbyggnad genom svenska partinära organ*, Stockholm, October 1997, p. 15, quoted in Öhman, Magnus et al. (2005) *Political Parties and Democracy Assistance*, Sida Evaluation 05/11.

³ Ugglå, Fredrik et al. (2000); *Stöd till de partianknutna organisationerna*, Sida Evaluation 00/35.

In 2001, the support was made permanent, and the allocation doubled to some 35 million SEK. New guidelines were issued that introduced some modifications. The goals were somewhat differently defined; since 1998 they had been defined as “the development of a well-functioning and pluralistic party system and democratic societies”, and now formulations were introduced that indicated that the goal was to support both individual parties and the party system in general (using the Swedish term *partiväsende*).⁴ Accordingly, funds were added for joint projects aimed at the party system at large rather than individual parties only. But such funds were still small, and in 2005 made up eight per cent of the total.⁵ Also, administration of the support was transferred from Sida’s division for civil society support to the division for democratic governance. Still, the basic structure was kept intact as funds were still allocated on the basis of electoral performance in Sweden, and Sida was not given any substantial authority to interfere with the operations of the PAOs.

During the following years, annual overviews of the support were performed by an external consultant. These repeated a recurrent point mentioned by all previous evaluations and overviews; that in spite of differences between the PAOs themselves, there was a general lack of reflection regarding the connection between activities performed and the attainment of the ultimate goals of the program.⁶

In 2005, the Department of Government at Uppsala University (which had also performed the 2000 evaluation) performed an overview of the structure and administration of the support form. While this report noted that the support form could be a positive component of Swedish democracy support, it recommended a number of changes to increase its effectiveness. Thus, the report suggested that funding for joint projects be increased, and that administration of the individual and joint projects be separated. While the administration of the funds for sister party support, which would not require much review or oversight, could be transferred to the Parliament (*Riksdag*) or to the MFA, Sida should allocate the funding for joint projects, and would then be allowed to apply more of its professional criteria to the assessment and follow-up of projects.

While this recommendation was not fully put into place, several others were. In 2006, the goals of the program were broadened to include aspects such as the promotion of

⁴ Öhman et al. (2005), p. 9.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ E. g. SPM Consultants (2004); Stödet till Partianknutna Organisationer (PAO) – ansökningar 2004. Unpublished document quoted in Öhman et al. (2005), p. 10.

participation and human rights, while funding for the program was again increased (particularly for joint programs) to 50 and then 75 million SEK.⁷

In 2009, the most ambitious external evaluation to date was performed of the support. As before, the report raised doubts about the extent to which the activities of the PAOs contributed to broader effects. While most activities were found to be within the scope of the program objectives and plans and that outputs had generally been achieved, the situation with regard to effects on higher levels was very variable and often left a lot to be desired. More in particular, the evaluators noted the choice of partners were often not likely to be the most strategically relevant in each political context, and while activities could produce results for the recipient parties, they were not likely to do so for the party system in general. “In most projects studied, the Team found prospects for longer term impact on the party system quite dim.”⁸ Among several observations, the evaluation noted that there was a marked tendency to work with relatively small parties, and that the support was found to be thinly spread. At the time of the evaluation, PAOs had bilateral projects in 39 countries and involvement through regional programs in another 76. As the report noted, the former figure represented a slight decrease from the situation in 2003, when there had been bilateral projects in 43 countries⁹ (interestingly, the 2009 figures almost exactly replicate the ones presented in this report).

The 2009 evaluation suggested a number of changes to the support in order to strengthen the level of strategic analysis in the support, along with strengthening Sida’s supervisory role, and a results perspective. Additionally, the evaluators recommended an increase of information exchange within the support form as well as with other entities (such as the relevant Swedish embassies). Likewise, it was suggested to decrease the number of projects and cooperation countries within the PAO support in order to potentially increase its relevance and effectiveness.

The above description is not an exhaustive account of previous evaluations and studies regarding the PAO support. Nevertheless, it is notable how certain themes and discussions are repeated; chief among them the tension between providing sister party support and attaining more general political goals, and the corresponding difficulty to ascertain the latter kinds of effects. Also, reports generally contain observations concerning how best to administer an atypical support form such as the PAO support, and concrete recommendations relating to the need to enhance information exchange and coordination, as well as PAO capacity, by focusing their work to a larger extent. As

⁷ Peck, Lennart et al. (2009), *Party Cooperation in a Results Perspective*, SADEV report 2009:3.

⁸ Ibid, p. viii.

⁹ Ibid, p. 43.

will be seen below, these are themes that are also prominent in our findings, conclusions and recommendations. While the support form has in many ways developed over its twenty years of existence, it is also notable how much of its original character is maintained.

The current strategy (*Strategi för särskilt demokratistöd genom svenska partianknutna organisationer 2011-2015*) was issued in 2010, and bears some traces of the recommendations of the 2009 evaluation, as well as of the debates that have surrounded the support ever since its conception. While the overall goal of the support is now formulated as “democratic development and increased respect for human rights in developing countries”, the strategy indicates two separate (but mutually reinforcing) areas (workstreams) for action for the PAOs; support to sister-parties (VO1) and support to party systems (VO2). As before, funding for sister party cooperation will be allocated on the basis of each Swedish party’s parliamentary representation, whereas funds for multiparty projects will be allocated by Sida in competition. The proportion between the two workstreams is set to 70:30, which represents an increase in funds for multiparty approaches. However, the total amount of support is not specified in the strategy, but is given in the annual government instructions to Sida.

Sida is given a comparatively important role in the strategy. Even for the sister party support, Sida is instructed to ascertain that there are defined program goals aligned with the strategy, relevant indicators, audit reports, follow-up of audit observations, etc. The importance of coordinating support with other initiatives in the area is stressed, as is the importance of the PAOs applying insights from research and independent documentation in their assessment of local situations.

The strategy simultaneously confers an important amount of freedom to the PAOs (they retain responsibility for the contents and performance of their work, they can choose to work with organisations other than political parties) and provides these with a number of instructions/restrictions (it is explicitly stated that the so called Paris principles of harmonisation, ownership, alignment and results-based management applies to them, they are given a number of specific tasks with regard to reporting and assessment of their own organisations). Thus, the overall impression of the new strategy is that it intends to conserve the basic structure of the support (the reliance on the PAOs and allocation to them based on their parliamentary representation in the Swedish *Riksdag*), while it tries to address a number of the problems and shortcomings that have repeatedly been noted with regard to the support form.

As noted above, the 2010 strategy gave Sida a broader scope of action with regard to the assessment and follow-up of the PAOs’ work. To this effect, Sida, together with

the PAOs, during 2011 elaborated new forms and procedures (such as annual meetings with each PAO separately) to implement the new strategy.¹⁰

The 2011-2015 PAO Strategy is based on a set of conceptual assumptions underpinning support to democratic development in developing countries globally. These refer to improvements in freedom of assembly and political organisation, participation, equal rights and eventually democratic and human rights improvements. There is an assumption in the Strategy that improved capacity of political parties and multi-party systems by default improves democratic practices and human rights.

With this in mind, the Theory of Change (ToC) of the PAO strategy has been extrapolated and operationalised with assumptions related to local ownership, commitments to politically responsible actions and involvement of minorities and women in the political processes to enable the Strategy to meet its objective.

For change to take place these assumptions will need to be confirmed. Table 1.1 presents the evaluation team's interpretation of the PAO Strategy ToC. The ToC has been tested with Sida and the PAOs during the inception phase.

Table 1.1 PAO ToC and assumptions

Causality level	Expected change	Assumptions (tested by the evaluation)
Input	If... the Swedish Government provides support to Swedish PAO to undertake capacity development activities in the form of training, coaching; conferences and study tours, as well as information dissemination based on a needs assessment focusing on the PAO's own demands and the context within which they are working	The activities can be implemented in the given context The PAOs have the capacity and competencies needed to undertake these activities
Output	Then... the PAO support will result in improved capacities of partners to manage their operations and political work	The support addresses needs identified by the partners and that partners have full ownership of the capacity development undertaken
Short-	In the short-term leading to...	There is a willingness to reform

¹⁰ Sida, (2012), Strategirapport för Strategy för särskilt demokratistöd genom svenska partianknutna organisationer 2011-2015, september 2011-september 2012. Report to government.

term outcome	1) Improved intra-party transparency and accountability systems 2) Enhanced participation of women and youth in party work 3) Enhanced inter-party / multi-party cooperation 4) Improved campaigning and communication	within the partner organisations The PAOs have the capacities and systems to monitor progress and results and flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances
Long-Term Outcome	And this in the longer term will contribute to the emergence of... 1) Well-functioning democratic political parties in developing countries; and 2) Well-functioning democratic multi-party systems in developing countries	Contextual development allows the institutions and organisations supported to continue to operate
Impact	Eventually resulting in... Democratic development and enhanced respect for human rights in developing countries	

1.3 METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

The team has undertaken the evaluation in accordance with the methodology presented in the inception report (see Annex 8). This has included a regrouping of the questions from the ToR so that they are aligned with the five OECD-DAC criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. These are presented in detail in the evaluation matrix in Annex 4. In the matrix each of the questions from the ToR are regrouped and refocused to ensure evaluability and indicators identified for assessing how the evaluation questions may be answered.

The regrouping is evidence of the focus on relevance, outputs and short-term outcomes of the evaluation. This in effect means that the evaluation first and foremost relates to the first three OECD-DAC criteria:

1. **Relevance**, with emphasis on Swedish strategy alignment; alignment to the PAO strategy and its goal (“to support democratic development and increased respect for human rights in developing countries”); and contextual/needs alignment.
2. **Effectiveness**, with emphasis on the objectives of the two work streams of the PAO support (political parties and multi-party systems; specific concerns related to fragility, youth and women).
3. **Efficiency**, where the focus is mostly on design, scope and scale of the programme and the application of results-based management. In accordance with the proposal, the team has included a specific reference to the application of the Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA) as well.

This in effect also means that the ToR has limited attention to the remaining OECD-DAC criteria of impact and sustainability. Part of the reason for this is assessed to be

the relatively short period of implementation of the Strategy at the time of the evaluation, i.e. 2012-2014, which limits the possibilities to assess impact. However, the team has sought to document probability of impact where feasible. Similarly, the team have worked to assess the extent to which the outputs and short-term outcomes identified are (or have a high probability of being) sustainable (i.e. are owned and internalised).

The evaluation is theory-based supplemented by a Most Significant Change¹¹ data analysis methodology. The evidence has been collected through:

1. Desk review of documents as provided by Sida, the PAOs, external resource persons and internet searches (see Annex 3).
2. Mapping of PAO assistance 2012-2014 based on the programme documents and reporting from PAOs to Sida (see Annex 6), which has been validated with PAOs through interviews and e-mails.
3. A separate study of support to political parties through similar arrangements by other donors as well as a comparison with other Sida funding modalities (see study report in Annex 5).
4. Theory of Change workshop with PAOs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Sida in Stockholm (see outcome in Inception Report in Annex 8).
5. Case-study exercises through field level qualitative data collection (semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions)¹² in six countries (see country reports in Annex 7).
6. Validation workshop with PAOs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Sida in Stockholm presenting and validating preliminary findings.

The case studies were based on six country visits, studying PAO activities in these countries as well as outreach (via Skype/telephone interviews) to partners in neighbouring countries for regional programmes. The case-study countries were selected through an assessment of the best combination of countries to ensure representation of the multiple modalities applied by the PAOs, contextual differences, workstreams (VO1 and VO2 support), as well as Sida priorities. A short overview of five of the countries is presented in table 1.2 below. The remaining sixth country remains confidential.

¹¹ MSC is a story-based tool, which provides interviewees with an opportunity to identify significant change stories attributed to the support provided. Interviewees were asked to specify the greatest impact on the support received by the PAOs and argue the causality of this. See inception report in Annex 8 for more details on MSC.

¹² Note that persons interviewed in country +1 and selected persons from Ukraine have not been included in the list of persons consulted.

Table 1.2 Overview of case-study countries

Country (and region)	PAO involvement	Characteristics
Colombia	Green Forum (GF) and Left International Forum (VIF)	VO1 programmes – partly free
South Africa (and southern Africa region)	Olof Palme Centre (OPC), VIF, GF	VO2 and VO1 programmes – free and partly free
Tunisia	Swedish Liberal Centre (SILC), GF, OPC, VIF	VO1 programmes – partly free
Uganda (and eastern Africa region)	Christian Democratic International Centre (KIC), VIF, GF	VO1 and VO2 programme – partly free
Ukraine	SILC, KIC, GF, VIF	VO1 – partly free
Sixth country	Classified (multiple)	VO1 and VO2 - not free

Limitations

The evaluation builds on a desk study of all materials (applications, reports, assessment memos, etc.) made available by Sida, the PAOs and what is available through secondary sources. All partners were asked to forward any relevant information, which would be of use to the evaluation. Six countries were visited and partners from 12+ different projects were consulted. Where feasible direct beneficiaries of trainings and seminars outside those directly involved in the partnership were interviewed.

A total of 115 persons were consulted.¹³ Given the limited time available, most interviewees from PAO partners and beneficiaries were initially identified by the PAOs, and then by partners and resource persons. The PAOs have thus had an opportunity to direct the evaluation team to the most appropriate projects and partners in the countries visited. Irrespective of potential positive bias of this selection process, the team assess that the findings are representative given the broad outreach, but the risk for a positive bias should be kept in mind.

The team have assessed the findings presented to be of the quality and scope needed to ensure an evidence-based evaluation. However, a number of limitations were identified at the inception as well as the implementation phase, which the team has had to work around. These include:

- *Limited options for randomisation.* Given the short time frame of the individual missions and the limited scope of most of the PAO interventions, the team

¹³ In addition to persons in the sixth country of analysis and others assessed by PAOs as too sensitive to be referred to by name in this report

has had to rely on the identification of interviewees by PAOs and their immediate partners. This is likely to have resulted in a positive bias in the results. However, as is evident from the report, design faults still emerge in best case scenarios.

- *Challenges of triangulation in some case-study countries.* The limited scope of some of the PAO interventions means that the team has had difficulties in identifying and/or accessing external (non-affiliated) resource persons that could confirm/reject findings presented by PAO partners and beneficiaries. All PAOs were requested to provide contact details of persons in support of this. Instead, the team has in several instances had to rely on desk-based triangulation.
- *Confidentiality.* The PAO support is, among other places, implemented in authoritarian countries. The findings from these have been included in the report, but the need for confidentiality means that these are presented at an aggregated level in conjunction with findings from other countries.
- *Lack of outcome level data.* (As will be evident from the Efficiency section below) The bulk of the PAOs use input/output reporting frameworks and they are not assessing outcomes of their programmes. The team has thus had to rely on the qualitative analysis in the field and secondary data to identify outcomes.
- *Limited scale and scope of programmes on the ground.* Several of the programmes have only a limited number of activities in the countries assessed, limiting the data available to assess progress.
- *The sample size.* During the period, the PAO support has involved participants and parties in more than seventy countries. However, this figure includes individual participants and parties reached as part of regional programs. The number of countries in which the PAOs actually have established direct cooperation amount to 38 (calculated on the basis of 2013 annual reports). The team has in this evaluation been in touch with beneficiaries from nine countries. The evidence is thus primarily based on the findings from the six direct field mission countries and interviews with persons from an additional three countries.

An overall important limitation referred to above, which the reader must take into consideration when reading the report, is the fact that the PAO programmes differ considerably in type, modality, scope and scale, which makes aggregation of findings a challenge. When general findings and conclusions are presented without a reference to the number of PAOs, this is because it applies to at least four of the PAOs, and thus presents a general trend. The focus of the report is the PAOs combined ability to deliver against the strategy, not on the individual PAO.

2 Findings of the Evaluation

In the following section the aggregated findings of the evaluation are presented in accordance with the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria.

As is evident from the PAO description above, the support provided and modalities applied differ substantially between the individual PAOs. While there are some general traits, some of the findings refer back to the specific modality category of the support provided. To enable a degree of aggregation in the findings, we have classified the different models of support provided. These are presented in table 2.1 below.

Table 2.1 Categories of support under the PAO programme

Category	Modality	Programme identification	Work area
Networking model	Funding provided to parties through a network organisation	(a) Recipient party defines project activities within PAO criteria, or (b) Activities within narrowly PAO defined criteria	VO1 and VO2
Twinning model A	Funding as well as training and seminars against a longer term logframe	Jointly in dialogue between PAO and partner. Based on needs assessment	VO1 and VO2
Twinning model B	Exchange visits and seminars (no funding)	PAO with partner consultation	VO1 and VO2
Academy model ¹⁴	Academy style training provided to individual politicians	Programme identified by PAOs	VO2
One-off training model	Trainings provided on single topics not linked to larger programme	Training identified by PAO	VO1

¹⁴ The wording Academy Model covers a description of regular academies, where selected participants (in this instance regional participants) engage in 2-4 weeks courses three times in the course of one year. These are supplemented by mini-projects undertaken by the participants aimed at addressing issues related to their own party. In addition to the intention towards promoting youth and women's capacity to become politicians and promote internal party change there is an intention to promote mutual cooperation and acceptance between parties as well as learning between countries.

Where relevant, the findings are presented according to the above categories. A large part of the evidence gathered for this section is based on the field missions conducted by the team in the 5+1 field mission countries. For a more detailed description of the evidence and findings from the individual countries and projects see the country reports in Annex 7.¹⁵

2.1 RELEVANCE

Relevance is assessed against the most recent PAO strategy, which is subject to this evaluation, the PAO partner and beneficiary needs, and finally the needs according to the context in which the support is implemented.

Relevance to PAO strategy

The relevance to the overall PAO strategy varies across the different PAO programmes, though these generally fall within the strategy parameters with a focus on capacity development of political parties in the partner countries as:

- 1) The support is (for the current strategy in particular) provided to political parties, political party wings, and organisations aiming at becoming political parties or organisations providing support to political parties.
- 2) The support provides capacity development activities aimed at improving the capacity of political party members or the parties themselves (VO1), and to support multi-party systems (VO2).

Concrete activities are to a large extent dependent on the PAOs' interpretation of the PAO strategy, which does allow for some flexibility. Some of the PAOs interviewed emphasised democratic pluralism and ideological capacity development, while others emphasise consensus-seeking behaviour.

According to the strategy, the goal of the PAO support is to promote democratic political development and is provided under the overall Swedish Government framework of human rights and democratic development. While there is little overt reflection among many of the PAOs, on how their activities are related to political development in general, they all commit to these basic principles (though with some variations across the Swedish political spectrum).

¹⁵ For confidentiality reasons the findings from country +1 are included at an aggregated level, but the country report remains classified and is not published with this report. Similarly, the Ukraine report has been edited to remove confidential information.

Under both work streams, but in particular under regional VO2 work, the team found that there are beneficiaries that do not adhere to basic human rights principles according to overall Swedish policies.¹⁶ These include parties, which openly object to homosexuality, in some cases promoting criminalisation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual and Intersex (LGBTI), or object to basic principles of sexual and reproductive health and rights.

The PAOs are aware of these discrepancies and argue the case for staying engaged to inform and promote a human rights based policy process, which is arguably a relevant process similar to many bilateral development engagements in less democratic states. However, in such instances there are often insufficient up-front and transparent discussions of the benefits and pitfalls of being engaged with partners that do not adhere to the UN human rights conventions and Swedish human rights and democracy policy priorities (see also section on risks under ‘Efficiency’ below).

The policy reference which brings attention to equal opportunities for women and men and minorities generally, has by most of the programmes been interpreted as providing access to women, and in some instances youth as well. Most programmes apply affirmative action to ensure female participant access or specifically target women as well as youth in their programmes (see also section on rights and gender further below).

Country relevance

The relevance of the choice of country of cooperation against the strategy has been assessed through the mapping exercise (see Annex 6 for full overview). The strategy requests the PAOs to implement programmes where the need for democratisation is greatest.

According to the broadest definition of beneficiary, the PAO Strategy works in more than 70 countries, with 13 from Eastern Europe, 28 in Africa, 17 in Latin America, 15 in the MENA region and 8 in Asia, and 68 VO1 partners in 38 countries. As was noted above, the fact that the PAO support reaches more than 70 countries can be explained by the various network-building programmes, which tend to be geographically extensive. If only countries with established direct cooperation are included, the number of target countries becomes less than forty, which is still substantial in light of the programme budget of SEK 80 million (that is, the dispersal of activities is similar to Sida’s own geographic focus for bilateral development cooperation).

¹⁶ See among others, the Swedish Government’s Aid Policy Framework (2014) focusing on the poor, oppressed and human rights, and the policies on Democracy and Human Rights and Freedom of Expression.

Hence, while a programme might geographically cover a country, it does not necessarily indicate a lot of in-country activity. The PAO implementation of the strategy should be regarded as having a large global outreach, in terms of geographical coverage, while keeping in mind that, in the Networking Model many countries are only reached through a single network type programme.

In the mapping in Annex 6, a list of countries and the number of programmes per country is presented, which gives an overall picture of the geographical outreach of the PAO programmes as well as the extent to which a country is covered by the programmes. In summary, four PAOs operate in the MENA region, six in Africa, four in Latin America, three in Asia and finally, seven in Eastern Europe.

The individual PAO's distribution of support between different regions of the world is presented in Table 2.2 below. However, it should be noted that here only established cooperation with sister parties are included. For several PAOs, support regional networks means that the number of actual countries in which they work through intermediaries is much larger.

Table 2.2 PAO support per region - Geographical distribution of sister parties (percentages apart from parenthesis in first column):

	Europe (incl. Turkey and the Caucasus)	Asia	Africa (excl. MENA)	Latin America	MENA
CIS (four)	50	0	50	0	0
GF (seven)	71	0	0	29	0
JHS (22)	64	0	5	32	0
KIC (three)	100	0	0	0	0
OPC (20)	45	10	25	0	20
Silc (eight)	50	12	0	12	25
VIF (four)	25	25	25	25	0
SUM (68):	57%	6%	13%	17%	7%

As is evident from the table, some PAOs have an ambitious geographic scope, in spite of generally being very small organisations.

While most PAOs today have almost exactly the same amount of partners as they did five or ten years ago (cf. SADEV 2009), and one has increased its number of cooperations, CIS and KIC has reduced their number of partners substantially, in a determined attempt to enhance their effectiveness (also, VIF has reduced its number of partners substantially, but has several more partners in regional networks.)

There has been a shift towards regions further away from Sweden. A number of these programme locations are outside Sida priority countries. For some PAOs, a high number of programme locations are in environments in which Sida itself does not

work. The strategy requests the PAO to work in countries with the greatest need for democratisation. The desk study shows how this request has been followed by the PAOs. Using Freedom House's indicator for 2014, it is evident that all PAOs direct the majority of their VOI programmes to countries labelled as 'partly free' (see table 2.3 below). Similarly, with the exception of JHS, all PAOs direct a relatively small share of their programmes to countries in the 'free' category, which is in line with the strategy's instruction to prioritise work in settings in which there is a democratic deficit.

Table 2.3 Levels of Freedom and PAO representation (VOI only)

	Free (%)	Partly free (%)	Not free (%)
CIS (four)*	0	75	25
GF (seven)	14	57	29
JHS (22)	27	59	14
KIC (three)	0	67	33
OPC (20)	10	30	60
Silc (eight)	12	50	38
VIF (four)	0	75	25
SUM (68)	15	51	34

* *number of partners*

Comparing the distribution of funding with the disbursed funds in the evaluation performed in 2000, there has been a change towards funding less 'free' countries. Then, seventy per cent of all disbursed funds went to countries in the 'free' category. For certain PAOs (CIS, JHS, KIC, and OPC), that category took over three fourths of their total disbursed funds. The same evaluation found that 'partly free countries' accounted for 23 per cent of disbursed funds, with 'non-free' amounting to five per cent. There has thus been a substantial reorientation of the geographic and political focus of the support since then.¹⁷ There has thus been a move towards more demanding political contexts.

Relevance of partner choice

The choice of partners varies substantially between the PAOs, the two work streams, as well as the programme category. The bulk of the partners fall under the three categories outlined in the PAO strategy: sister parties, civil society organisations with the potential of becoming political parties, and change agents in authoritarian states and exiled opposition organisations.

¹⁷ The reduction in partners from Eastern Europe is partly explained by the enlargement of the EU, as partners in EU countries are not subject to PAO funding.

The desk study of the PAO programmes clearly shows that political parties are the main chosen partners for the PAOs, making up 57 per cent of all partners. Networks/Forums/Federations make up the second most chosen type of partner in the PAO programmes (See table 2.4).

Table 2.4 PAO partner type (VO1 and VO2)

Type of partner	Number	Percentage
Political party	58	57%
Network/Forum/Federation	13	13%
International organisation	8	8%
Youth Wing/Organisation	7	7%
Training Institute/Capacity development centre	5	5%
CSO, grassroots movement	5	5%
Women's organisation/Party	3	3%
Trade Union	2	2%

The choice of partners varies greatly between the different programme categories. The bulk of partners under the two twinning model categories are identified either through personal relationships between a PAO mother party representative(s) and the recipient organisation/party or are identified through the European or international network of parties, which the PAO mother party belongs to.

Only in rare instances have parties for cooperation been chosen based on a more thorough comparative assessment of party relevance according to PAO criteria; potential influence and contribution to democratic party development and specific needs in this respect. This does not mean that the parties supported are not necessarily democratic or adhere to (or strive to adhere to) democratic principles. The personal contacts or membership of the larger political party networks are often based on long-term relationships (partners of VIF, SILC, JHS, KIC and OPC in particular stand out) and tacit understanding of mutual opportunities and need for support. A lack of systematic initial assessments of parties to support however, means that in several cases potential partners where funding would potentially have a bigger impact are excluded.¹⁸ On the other hand, the long-term partnership based on personal relationship can create a degree of trust, which can in some cases enhance effectiveness (see further below). This is an area where PAOs are often said to have a comparative advantage being affiliated with a political party in Sweden.

¹⁸ Note that for some PAOs the partners are found through their European partner organisation. This however is no guarantee for partner relevance vis-a-vis PAO strategy objectives.

One of the challenges in identifying appropriate partners to work with under VO1 is the need to ensure a degree of ‘sistership’ with the partner supported by the PAO. This is in most cases based on a degree of ideological resemblance between the two sides. However, political contextual differences between Sweden and the partner countries mean that it is often a challenge to find partners that share the same ideology. In several cases identified during the field missions, the ideology or profile of the partner only to a limited extent resembles that of the PAO providing the support.

The insistence on ideological resemblance and the absence of a more rigorous assessment of partners combined with a general lack of attention to system-level effects is assessed to, in many cases, having resulted in selection of partners with less probability of impact vis-à-vis the Sida development objectives (see evidence and discussion under ‘Impact’ below). In some cases, there may at the time have been an argument to support a party or an organisation striving to become a party, as this partner was assessed to have the needed potential. However, in several cases identified during the field missions this party had: (a) been supported for 5+ years without making any such progress, and/or (b) were assessed by other interviewees as being a party without noteworthy popular support, influence, or potential for influence.¹⁹

In the programmes included in VO2 support, the selection of partners sometimes does not become a priority, as the entire range of political parties are targeted in many cases. This is a logical consequence of the multi-party system objective of the support. Thus, in the case of Program for Young Politicians in Africa (PYPA) the participants were members of different political parties that all had a least five per cent representation in parliament.

Relevance of design and implementation of programmes to partner needs

The identification approach as well as the implementation modality of the individual PAO programme varies greatly according to category of programme, and even within these categories. It is thus difficult to give an overall assessment. However, some degree of aggregation is feasible according to categories. Similarly, principles of ownership can be assessed at the level of the individual participant as well as with the beneficiary partner.

Overall, with very few exceptions, limited evidence was made available to the team by the PAOs to verify that the programmes build on a thorough needs assessment of the partners, their long-term strategy, and the political context which they face. Similar evidence was found through interviews with partners. The programme design is

¹⁹ In several cases the organisation or party supported was not known to other parties or resource persons working in the given country (see country reports in Annex 7).

thus in several cases (programmes under at least four of the PAOs)²⁰ not based on actual needs. There is a difference here between VO1 and VO2 (approved) programmes, however, with the latter displaying more of general contextual analysis, as well as considerations of broader relevance.

In many VO1 cases there has however, been a thorough dialogue with the partners on their perceived needs, which have then informed programme design, ensuring a high degree of ownership in the initial stages. In several cases (selected programmes of five of the PAOs) however, this ownership has dwindled during the course of the implementation, and particularly in the Twinning Model B and Networking modality there is a tendency among beneficiaries to become more questioning of relevance over time. This is assessed to be the consequence of an implementation approach that starts off by building on dialogue, but where the subsequent implementation is more PAO (or PAO implementing partner) controlled with the corresponding decrease in partner participation. In other words, in these cases, the alignment to perceived partner needs becomes less evident or at least not institutionalised over time (see also chapter on effectiveness).

In other cases the partners had not been involved in the identification of activities at any stage providing a more top down assistance. Finally, in some of the Model A categories (SILC and KIC) the degree of ownership was substantial while in one of the more network oriented categories (GF), the partners had full control over design and budget, which was utilised in accordance with their own perceived needs (as long as it fell within the overall PAO requirements). An overview of trends based on the evaluation sample according to needs can be found in table 2.5 below.

Table 2.5 PAO programme categories, needs identification and ownership based on evaluation sample

Category	Programme identification	Comment
Networking model	(a) Recipient party defines project activities within PAO criteria, or (b) PAO narrowly define activities	In (a), the team found a high degree of ownership but no assessment of needs. Evidence of addressing needs, in (b) more limited degree of ownership
Twinning model A	Joint identification based on dialogue between PAO and partner, with partner leadership	Interviews indicate high degree of ownership when partner takes lead in dialogue. Evidence of addressing needs

²⁰ In two cases the same PAO may have sought a needs-based approach in one programme, while disregarded the same in another programme.

Twinning model B	PAO identification with partner consultation	Evidence of PAO leadership resulting in less ownership. Limited evidence of addressing needs
Academy model	Programme identified by PAOs with minor adjustments based on participant feedback	Evidence of multiple needs addressed in spite of strong PAO leadership. Evidence of room for further acknowledgement of participant needs. In several cases, limited mother party ownership
One-off training model	Training identified by PAO	In sample, no needs assessment was made. Limited evidence of needs being addressed

Relevance of programmes to developmental and political context

The ultimate goal of funding the PAOs' work is to promote political development towards democracy and increased respect for human rights in the targeted countries. This obviously introduces the question of the extent to which such considerations appear to be present in PAOs' own formulations of their work.

Overall, applications, particularly in the VO1, are weak in this regard, with limited explicit linkages to the overall objectives of the support. Although all but three of the 14 applications for VO1 funding contain references to the superior goals of the support, such remarks are made in passing and only in three of 14 applications the team was able to identify a thorough and critical analysis of how activities in the given context are supposed to lead to the overall goals of the strategy. Similarly, these overall goals are generally absent from results matrices. Only four applications include them in such contexts, and in two cases without indicators.

In none of the VO1 applications were the team been able to identify reflections of Sida's work in the same countries as the PAOs are active, and only three applications out of the total 14 include a reflection of how the planned activities might complement and harmonise with other party support initiatives (in another four, other donors are mentioned in passing only). Hence the strategy's statement that coordination and harmonisation shall characterise PAO work is limited, at least during the application stage (see section on harmonisation further below).²¹

Likewise, the strategy's instruction that activities should be based on a broad range of sources including research cannot be confirmed, or at least is not documented in applications. Half of the applications do not provide any descriptions of the relevant country contexts in which activities will be implemented (instead, sweeping descrip-

²¹ In addition to the strategy requirements, see also requirements outlined in the SIPU (2011) *Directive for Special Democracy Support Directed towards Political Parties and Multiparty Systems through Swedish Political Party-affiliated Organisations*.

tions of an entire region or set of countries are often used). Among those who provide such descriptions, four do not provide any sources for their discussions. Likewise, a full half of the applications do not contain references to any sources at all, and it is only one VO1 application that could really be said to live up to the statement of the strategy in this regard.

Similarly, although all applications but one provide some kind of description of the sister parties chosen, critical analysis of their potential and political role is generally absent, as are more elaborate discussions of their structure or action. In no application have we found any reference to independent sources or analysis when it comes to the chosen partners of the PAOs.

The approved VO2 applications (of which there are four) fare better. While none of them contain indicators on the superior goals of the strategy, and most lack a critical discussion as to how the planned activities will contribute to them, there are generally much better descriptions of what other party donors are doing, and of the relevant country contexts. Still, as for the VO1 applications, there is no reflection of Sida's work, no use of independent sources in relation to the chosen partners, and only half of the applications make reference to any sources at all for their descriptions and discussions.

The same patterns can be discerned in PAO reporting. The team has assessed a total of 25 reports more substantively, and though they differ much in overall quality, in only one of them have we found reference to an indicator that could be said to represent any of the overall goals of the program. Even as eleven of the reports contain references (taken broadly) to the overall goals in text, these tend to be unelaborate. In no case have we seen a serious and critical discussion of whether activities are likely to lead to the overall goals of the support (see also section on results-based management further below).

Nine of the reports contain no description at all of the overall political evolution in the countries in which they are active, and five more do so in only very brief form. Reporting tends to be focused on how the sister parties have developed over the year, which is a positive trend, though the limited reference to the context is a concern. However, the (exception in PYPA's reference to their learning evaluators) assessments are generally descriptive, based on the PAOs' own assessment of progress, and only in one case have we seen a reference to an independent source in this regard, and that is one of only two explicit references found in any report (the other being to a change in Freedom House score for a country). Similarly, mention of harmonisation with other party donors are present in ten reports, but generally made in passing. No reference is made to coordination with Sida or the projects that it funds in the contexts where PAOs are active.

In sum, the picture that appears from applications and reporting is one of limited attention to the overall political development of the countries in which the PAOs are active (particularly in the VO1), and of general disinclination to relate activities and programs to the overall goals of the strategy either in planning or reporting. References and independent sources are generally absent from discussions, and there often seems to be little concern for considering harmonised or coordinated approaches (with some notable exceptions as in the VO2 programme mentioned above).

It is feasible that PAOs perform much more of analysis and collect independent sources without including them in the program documents. However, in only two cases has such information been provided to the team²². While most VO1 programmes may be relevant to the beneficiary parties, that connection is considerably less clear when it comes to their effects on the broader party system and political development in general - and thus, strategy objectives (see also the section on size of partner countries below).

The VO2 projects tend to rely on a better documented analysis and are in several cases aimed at a system-level importance. Still, that is not always so. One out of the four projects for instance, is – surprisingly enough – not really aimed at working with party systems at all, but rather with supporting female political participation in a number of different countries by working with ideologically proximate parties and other organisations. While the programme does involve several parties, they are from the same political spectrum. Thus arguably, to be fully relevant for VO2 assistance, this support would need to be expanded to cover parties from a broader variety of ideological backgrounds.

2.2 EFFECTIVENESS

The effectiveness has been assessed in accordance with the OECD-DAC definition of contribution towards the overall objective. However, given the focus on outputs and short-term outcomes specified in the ToR, the section first and foremost focuses on ability to achieve outputs, and secondly, these outputs' contribution to objectives.

As part of this assessment, the team acknowledges that the 2012-2014 period is the first time the PAOs have to work against a specific PAO strategy. This has resulted in new design setups, partners and joint PAO partnerships for VO2, as well as enhanced demands for justification and reporting for both VO1 and VO2. This has been taken into consideration when assessing effectiveness.

Effectiveness in contributing to democratic political parties

The degree of effectiveness under VO1 – democratic political parties – varies considerably between the different programmes. For roughly two thirds of the programmes assessed on the ground, most of the planned activities had been implemented. For the remaining, programme activities had either not been initiated or at least not docu-

²² All PAOs have been requested to provide any relevant information. SILC has provided the team with a party assessment note. While this is in Swedish, it provides an analysis of the party with contextual relations. PYPA too has provided the team with baseline data, though these are first and foremost related to individual capacities, party nomination processes etc.

mented or only partly implemented and then terminated and thus no effectiveness can be expected (see field mission reports in Annex 7 for details).

For the programmes implemented, the extent to which the activities have resulted in tangible outputs contributing to the PAO VO1 objective varies between the different programmes. And, as highlighted in the relevance section above, the effectiveness is also dependent on the definition of what constitutes ‘democratic political parties’, though the PAO strategy clearly defines the need for the PAOs to focus on where ‘the need for democratisation is greatest’.

In most cases where activities were implemented, the team was able to identify outputs achieved or a high likelihood of outputs achieved²³ in accordance with the programme plan.²⁴ In most cases, outputs refer to enhanced understanding among individual party members (or members of related organisations) of specific topics from training sessions, seminars or study tours. There is evidence in the sample to suggest that the level of achievement of outputs is greatest where the activities have been identified by or in close cooperation with the partner. Examples of output achievements identified by the team in the field can be found in table 2.6 below.

*Table 2.6 Summary of outputs achieved documented by the team in the field per category**

Category	Examples of outputs achieved
Networking model	In (a) evidence show that most outputs identified by the partner have been achieved according to reports and interviews. As the outputs are identified and implemented by the partner alone there is a high degree of motivation for the implementation, such as with GF’s partners in Uganda. For (b) the team found that outputs were not always achieved with varying degrees of motivation. For (a) and (b), the degree of relevance of outputs against overall VO1 objective is not always as evident
Twinning model A	In model A cases where there is a strong dialogue and demand based approach towards capacity development activities, such as KIC’s and SILC’s work in Ukraine, the team was able to identify outputs produced in terms of enhanced capacities towards democratic party type activities
Twinning model B	The team found evidence of activities implemented, but outputs

²³ High likelihood is here defined as responses from institutions supported indicating outputs achieved, but where the team has not had access to secondary information to triangulate the findings, given the limited people involved in achieving the outputs.

²⁴ Note however, that the PAO reports summarise own assessment of progress. No systematic reporting is undertaken against all indicators and outputs from the application, with the exception of SILC.

	only achieved where participant found training/course/study to be relevant. Evidence of cases of training where the end-user interest was negligible
Academy model	N/A for VO1
One-off training model	The team found evidence of outputs achieved where participant selection is relevant to course content. The team identified cases where the participant was not immediately part of party or similar organisation and thus outputs irrelevant

** Table does not include cases where programmes have not been implemented/terminated/non-reported.*

The fact that the outputs have been achieved is however, not *per se* the same as effectiveness towards achieving the VO1 objective. The anticipated link between the outputs and the overall PAO strategy objectives of political development are, in most of the applications submitted to Sida, only made implicitly. However, the bulk of the activities fall within the greater scope of democratic development and Swedish overall policy priority areas. Having said that, the capacity development interventions that focus explicitly on the institutional level with emphasis on e.g. internal party democracy, transparency and accountability are limited to two in the countries sampled. The focus is instead on more immediate (short-term) needs of party members.²⁵ There are very few instances of longer-term strategic focus of capacity development influencing the institutional level. This questions the more strategic direction of the capacity development activities, as discussed above.

Effectiveness in contributing to democratic multi-party systems

The number of programmes supported under VO2 – multi-party systems - is considerably smaller than VO1, which is in part a consequence of the VO1/VO2 financial split, which allocates 30 per cent of the total funds to VO2 as well as the fact that VO2 has promoted more PAO cooperation in joint programmes. The sample size of the evaluation is consequently smaller. The programmes implemented under this category assessed by the team can *de facto* be divided into the ‘Academy Model’ and the ‘Twinning Model A’ categories.

The largest programme by far is the PYPA implemented by four PAOs (OPC, CIS, GF and KIC). The programme is divided into three different sub-programmes according to geographic region with one PAO responsible for one region. The Academy Model applied in the three regions (with minor differences in approach between the regions) has a close to 100 per cent implementation rate and is meeting the immediate

²⁵ In an additional programme assessed there were plans for elements of institutional reform, but these were dropped during implementation due to lack of partner commitment.

outputs identified in the programme application in terms of enhancing the capacities of the young politicians targeted. This was confirmed by close to all beneficiaries interviewed during the field missions.

The youth identified came from the full spectrum of larger parties represented in the parliaments of the targeted countries. In this way, the programme contributed to the capacity enhancement of individuals from multiple parties and with evidence of enhanced understanding of viewpoints and need for cooperation between the individuals from these opposing parties. From an individual perspective, the programmes are thus contributing to enhanced multi-party understanding among the participants. There is however less evidence of the capacity development resulting in changes at the overall institutional level as well as divergent concerns regarding mother parties' ownership of the programme. The PYP programme does achieve overall results related to youth and women under the broader development policy framework of the Swedish Government but has yet to document effects at the institutional level.

Similarly, other VO2 programmes undertaken in other contexts are also judged to be positive by beneficiaries, and seem to have promoted enhanced mutual understanding among the participants. The latter generally stress the complementary character of this work and the VO1 work, which several of them also benefit from. Additionally, the positive example of Swedish parties talking about experiences of cross-party agreements was mentioned (and is an area where Sweden can present experiences that US parties are lacking for instance). This is thus a case where the PAO has a comparative advantage of creating trust based on their capacity of being a political party. Likewise, one VO2 program includes the only conscious and active attempt to promote donor coordination that we have seen during the field studies, and this contribution was highly valued by other donors.

Capacity development approach, strategic partnership approach and achieving short-term outcomes

Overall the outputs under VO1 and VO2 have, according to the beneficiaries interviewed, contributed to enhanced awareness and understanding of the topics of training for the individuals involved. The topics covered are in most cases relevant to overall Swedish policies, but their contribution, particularly in the VO 1 projects, is in most cases related to the individual, and only becomes relevant to the party (and the PAO strategy objectives) if the individual is able to apply this learning in her subsequent political work. In some cases, this would mean to strengthen existing work (by training members on ideological issues, or on how to apply new campaign or media techniques, for instance); in others it would entail promoting change within their own organisations, which may be more complicated.

The Theory of Change of the design of the latter kind of capacity development activities and thus the focus on the individual party member requires the adaptation of knowledge, ownership, and eventual ability to influence of the individual member to make institutional change happen. The underlying assumption is thus that the individual member has the understanding of the need for change, the motivation for pro-

moting change, and the ability and opportunity to influence at a higher institutional level in the party. Using Most Significant Change analysis, the team has through interviews, as well as study of background documents, tried to confirm this assumption in the field (see country reports in Annex 7).

The team has only been able to confirm this assumption on how to bring about internal changes in very few cases. For the bulk of interviewees – in all five plus one countries – this assumption cannot be confirmed. The reasons for non-confirmation are multiple, but the most significant obstacles for promoting internal institutional change relate to the individual targeted:

- 1) The person is aware of the need and is arguing the case, but does not have a leadership position enabling promotion of change (in often very hierarchical political structures).
- 2) The person is aware of the need, but not comfortable with promoting this change due to fear of risk to personal career within the party (this is in particular a concern in relation to VO2 support).
- 3) The person finds the information interesting but not relevant for her/his position in the party.
- 4) The person finds the information less relevant.

Where changes at internal institutional level are documented (two cases in Ukraine, one case in South Africa, two or three cases in the sixth country) the approach has been a product of either targeting the right person who may actually foster change, or having a more strategic institutional approach to capacity development.

The latter was, for instance, evident in Ukraine, where two of the partnerships stood out (KIC's and SILC's VO1 programmes). In principle, the programmes build on the same long-term relationship between the beneficiary partner and the PAO, which enables a high degree of trust and mutual understanding allowing the PAO access to the discussions at a more strategic level of the partner, including the discussions on actual challenges and needs. This is normal for most of the VO1 partnerships, and some of the VO2 partnerships. The major difference in these more successful cases is that actual joint needs assessments were undertaken with the partner and the design of a capacity development approach focused on the institutional rather than the individual level.

ICT and innovative approaches

The team was asked to assess the extent to which the PAOs apply Information and Communication Technology (ICT) or other innovative approaches. The most noteworthy innovative approach under the current strategy is the enhanced cooperation between PAOs in the programme design and implementation under VO2, which has yielded positive results in very different contexts. Besides this, a minor adjustment to trainings, seminars, and study tours, the approaches applied by the PAOs have only changed marginally since before the launch of the new PAO strategy (see section above).

The use of innovative ICT approaches, which is a Swedish priority area, is generally weak across the PAO programmes. Of the programmes assessed there were some use (though infrequent and un-strategic) of Facebook. There are also a few instances where there have been some courses on social media, but overall the use was negligible, which is a surprise given the importance of social media in contemporary political campaigning. Some exceptions, such as the SILC VO2 ICT and social media festival or in the OPC Palme Center Academy stand out as a specific ICT/social media capacity development event that confirms this general rule.

Gender equality, women's empowerment, youth, LGBTI and minority rights

PAOs are, according to the strategy and the overall Swedish policies, required to consider and focus on enhancing gender equality, women's empowerment and ensuring the rights of minorities including LGBTI and youth. The programmes must thus be inclusive in design and implementation.

Interviews in Stockholm with PAO management across the board shows a high degree of understanding and appreciation of these rights and many of the programmes have included reference to some, if not all, of these three major and interlinked themes. The extent to which these intentions are reflected in the work plans and implementation on the ground however, varies considerably, in part as a consequence of the modalities applied, in part as a consequence of implementing partner prioritisations, and in part as limitations posed by the legislative and cultural context of implementation.

Gender and women's empowerment is typically sought through ensuring an equal gender representation in the training and capacity development provided. Additionally, the provision of Swedish examples is frequently mentioned as important in this regard. Some training sessions also discuss gender equality and rights, but there is limited evidence of more gender mainstreaming in project activities and curriculum of capacity development across the board, although there are examples of such developments from cases as different as Colombia and the sixth country. Generally though, there is limited evidence of reform of sister parties in favour of enhanced women's representation during the evaluation period, even as several PAO partners stress that their Swedish colleagues have indeed stressed this point, and provided positive examples of female political participation.

In terms of effectiveness, the insistence on a relatively high proportion of women (in many cases 50 per cent) participation in the training activities has provided an extensive number of women with opportunities, which they according to themselves would not have had without the PAO support. Several of these women have also been able

to advance in the party system (particularly evident with PYPA students). Similarly, many of the PAO programmes have a strong emphasis on youth and enhancing their capacities to improve their political careers (again particularly strong with PYPA, which has this as a primary focus)²⁶.

The reference to and inclusion of LGBTI related activities and promotion of sexual rights differ across the programmes, but are in most instances not present or where it has been included it is included more as a mandatory add-on rather than an integrated approach. The add-on element is particularly strong in the African context where the programmes that do include LGBTI in most cases see it as an annoying appendix, which according to participants (besides those from South Africa) ‘creates disturbance’ and ‘ruins the relationship between the participants’. The reactions illustrate the contentious nature of the topic, as well as the challenges of addressing it head-on. The consequences have been that the issue has been discarded in some of the capacity development activities, while it has been integrated as part of a general minority rights discussion in other programmes/sub-programmes. The latter has according to beneficiaries been effective, as it has enabled the participants to discuss the issue from a rights perspective without necessarily having to address the issue directly.

PAOs’ risk management

Working with political parties poses a potential risk in most countries classified as ‘partly free’ and ‘not free’. As is evident from the analysis presented under ‘relevance’ above, the bulk of the PAO programmes are implemented in countries of these categories.

The risk is particularly strong when working with opposition parties (it should be kept in mind that in several less than free environments, PAOs actually work with government parties). Participants in opposition parties are in many cases subject to threats and support to these may entail risks for the beneficiary partners involved as well as the PAO employees themselves. The latter is in particular relevant in countries where PAO activities are considered prohibited (by law or practice). In some instances the partners supported by PAOs have been forced to close down, their headquarters burned and/or their members killed or imprisoned.

All PAOs interviewed were highly aware of the risks involved with working in non-free/partly free countries (and countries considered ‘confidential’ to this evaluation). Overall, the partners in these countries were appreciative of the support, even if it was

²⁶ Note, that while the impact on the structural level of the PYPA programme is still to take place, PYPA has specifically targeted youth and are thus fulfilling the Sida priorities related to youth. This may not meet the criteria for structural change, but does allow for enhanced equity in the application of capacity development, which is also a Swedish priority.

mentioned in one (non-free) country that a PAO had endangered the operations or individual members of the partner beneficiaries by not paying sufficient attention to such risks. Overall, though, the PAOs are in most cases good at keeping the information on confidential partnerships secret.

As many PAOs reach out to partners and network members in a large number of countries, it cannot be expected that they can undertake a full updated assessment of the risk situation in all partner countries. The participation in activities is thus based on the partners' own assessment of risk and PAO activities are equally dependent on the partner's assessment of the situation. Some of the PAOs do provide overviews of risks and suggested mitigating strategies (such as CIS in their sister party application or KIC in Ukraine), but this is rare and contingency planning or risk mitigation is not spelled out. During the period studied here, one Swedish politician was killed and another one wounded in relation to a kidnapping attempt in Somalia in 2013.

From a Swedish Government risk management perspective, the Government and in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Sida need to consider the reputational risks of being involved with partners that do not live up to basic Swedish commitments to a rights-based approach. This includes parties that advocate strongly against LGBTI rights such as the Uganda National Resistance Movement, regime parties such as the Zimbabwean Zanu-PF and parties advocating for the prohibition of abortion²⁷. Cooperating with these partners in order to promote democratic and rights-based development is legitimate (as an example Sida itself works directly with governments that do not formally adhere to several UN rights principles in e.g. Afghanistan or Iraq). However, the risks are not transparently highlighted in the PAO strategy nor in the PAOs' applications, which potentially poses a reputational risk.

Similarly, the VO1 single party approach also runs the risk of treading the fine line between providing capacity development support to a party and interfering in the domestic politics of a country. Given that the principle of non-interference is one which international organisations and donor countries upholds and rely on to legitimise their development assistance, this is not negligible. While providing support through an intermediary (such as the PAOs) may be a way to circumvent such risks, this distinction is often likely to be lost (in our meetings with PAO partners, for instance, it was often quite clear that they saw support as Swedish above all).

Finally, some of the PAO programmes face some financial risks. In three cases from the field studies the team was informed by the respective PAO (two different) that

²⁷ The list of partners not committed to parts of the human rights agenda is longer than the parties mentioned here,

funds were either lost or not accounted for. Sida has undertaken a financial capacity assessment of all PAOs²⁸, which points to financial weaknesses in the management systems (in 2013), which in part explains the risk of misappropriation by a few PAO partners. According to these specific PAOs, the systems have now been improved.²⁹

PAO versus other party support programmes and modalities

The team has assessed different approaches and modalities to democratic party support by Sida and other donors (the full analysis can be found in Annex 5). Party support is today a vital sub-sector of its own, and that there is no shortage of established international actors working in the sector, both with and without a partisan affiliation of their own, and focusing either on supporting single parties or entire party systems.

Challenges related to Relevance

Given the complicated, sensitive and inherently political nature of party support, considerations related to relevance appear frequently in evaluations and studies of such assistance. In particular, the drive to work in many different countries requires a very wide scope of country and regional expertise, which is not always available to organisations.

Some organisations invest more time and have more resources in acclimatising themselves (and tailoring their programs) to the recent and current political conditions of the country they choose to work in. This can be done through repeated scoping missions (NIMD Uganda) or extensive consultations with local experts and other international organisations working in the field. Likewise, setting up a local presence (which the larger German and US organisation regularly have, for instance) and having qualified local staff allows for such organisations to stay abreast of events on the ground and sustain the relationships underpinning the effectiveness of their programs.³⁰

However, in many cases, the preparation and acculturation of the implementing organisation is limited. For instance, the 2014 review of Norwegian democracy support via political parties attest to this, claiming that it has often lacked a deeper understanding of the context in which the support operates, and thus did not fully understand the power-relations that it was dealing with.³¹

Challenges related to Impact

²⁸ Six ISK reports conducted in 2013, and one separate System Based audit (OPC, 2013). All these reports has generated in management responses by PAO's, followed up by Sida in annual meetings in 2013 and 2014.

²⁹ This statement has not been tested by the team.

³⁰ Netherlands IOB 2011

³¹ Braathen and Holm-Hansen 2014

Reviewers of political party support tend to be sceptical about its effects, particularly at the system level. A recent overview of the subject by Lars Svåsand (commissioned by the Swedish Expert Group on Development Analysis), claims that such support has ‘been controversial because it has proved hard to demonstrate that it has positive effects’.³² While this author primarily attributes this to the methodological problems related to attribution of effects, others have claimed to see this as a result of specificities involved in political party assistance *per se*. Hence, in one of the few academic studies on the subject, Max Bader claims that there is reason to be less than optimistic about the possibilities of political party assistance in contexts of weakly institutionalised parties and less than democratic systems, as parties tend to fill a different role in such contexts than they do in established democracies. Although initial efforts at party assistance in Central Europe may well have yielded positive results, claims Bader, ‘now that those ‘easy’ cases of transition have been completed, providers overwhelmingly work in countries with less sanguine prospects for democratisation and stable party development’, which means that ‘a reconsideration of the purpose and the strategies of party assistance now seems an imperative’.³³

Going beyond such general points, however, there is a large debate about how to measure this kind of support (with emphasis on contribution). The problem of measuring party assistance impact and devising the right indicators to capture the messy, incremental and long-term aspects of political change afflicts all organisations, regardless of the volume of their funding. For instance, the 2010 Wilton Park Conference addressed the issue of developing better monitoring and evaluation procedures for party assistance, and DIPD followed up on this initiative in 2013 with its Study on Results Framework which concluded that the logframe approach, which is the conventional tool for impact measurement, is ‘simply not suited to measuring the progress and impact of political party programming’.³⁴

Problems relating to Efficiency and Effectiveness

For political party support organisations, the challenge of how to ensure value for money and cost-efficiency is particularly acute as most have a limited staff and core funding to administer party support projects. The 2014 Review of Norwegian democracy support through political parties summarises this issue stating that ‘projects are not cost-efficient (because) the total funding is too small’ and because Norad spends too much time on bureaucratic requirements, and parties too many resources relative to the size of the projects.³⁵ Part of the problem comes from the increasing donor

³² Svåsand forthcoming, 5

³³ Bader 2010, 1101; cf. Svåsand forthcoming, appendix A

³⁴ IPP 2011, 18, cf. De Vrieze 2014

³⁵ Braathen and Holm-Hansen 2014, 31

oversight of programs of party support and the requirement to demonstrate results quickly. This can push certain organisations to work in far too many countries and establish far too many programs relative to their capacities, which of course bears relation to what was stated above about the need to ensure sufficient local presence and knowledge.

There are thus a number of doubts about the relevance, efficiency and impact of political party support. While they do not affect all programs active in the area to the same extent, the general conclusion that emerges from a review of available reports and evaluations it is that such assistance is a complicated matter that often requires a high-degree of local presence and understanding of local power-relations. Even when such competence is present, however, it is no guarantee that party support will succeed, as such power-relations tend to be highly resistant to change. Beyond such general statements, however, it is difficult to derive any firm points or advice from existing studies and evaluations. While they raise a number of important points to consider, they are also dealing with a set of programs, implementing agents, and contexts that are highly diverse, which makes general conclusions difficult to attain.

2.3 EFFICIENCY

Efficiency has been assessed against initiatives enhancing programme performance generally in terms of harmonisation, scope and scale of the programme, workstream division and the application of the Human Rights-Based Approach.

Harmonisation and alignment

By and large the PAO support works in isolation from other party support initiatives. Only in one case was the team able to identify a situation in the field where the support was clearly and consciously coordinated and harmonised with similar support from other donors or similar funding sources. Rather, a striking observation from the field studies was that the PAOs are often unknown in the countries in which they operate, even by actors that work in the area of party support or that may even support the same parties as they do. The team assess that there are three primary reasons for this:

- 1) Several parties supported are smaller parties with limited external funding from other parties.
- 2) PAOs rarely have a permanent presence in the countries in which they are active, which makes coordination with country-based actors more difficult.
- 3) There is limited attention to (or lack of PAO experience with) the need and opportunities of donor harmonisation.

The latter is in particular a concern where large parties such as the ANC in South Africa receive funding from other sources as well. For the funding to be effective and not duplicative there is however a need for ensuring coordination and complementarity with other donor programmes and non-Swedish PAO support. In many instances in the field, harmonisation appears to be left to the recipient partner or disregarded. In spite of the recommendations from previous evaluations, we have found very little

evidence of coordination, harmonisation or complementarity between the programmes implemented by the PAOs and other Sida initiatives in the same sector in the countries assessed by the team.

From an alignment perspective, the degree of alignment with partner priorities is very closely linked to the category of support provided. Even as many partners tend to be appreciative of PAOs' alignment with their own priorities, there is variation in this regard. Generally speaking, the higher the degree of dialogue and ownership, the higher the degree of alignment with partner priorities. Table 2.7 below provides a short summary.

Table 2.7 Alignment of partner priorities

Category	Degree of alignment
Networking model	For (a) where direct grants are provided the partners define all priorities themselves, and thus having the highest degree of possible alignment. For (b) there was evidence of the opposite
Twinning model A	In model A, the team found that cases where there is a strong dialogue and demand based approach towards capacity development activities, there is also evidence of a high degree of alignment
Twinning model B	The team found dialogue, but less alignment, and limited strategic long-term perspective on assistance
Academy model	Limited given the cross-country generic approach to training curriculum (with some regional nuances)
One-off training model	Limited degree of alignment as training course content fully identified by PAO

Results-Based Management and Quality Assurance

While there has been improvements in the use of output descriptions and indicators in most PAO applications compared to those submitted prior to the evaluation period, the use of Results-Based Management (RBM) or Results Management Approaches³⁶ is generally weak with a few exceptions. Improvements can be found in the period 2012-2014 with the use of programming with outputs and indicators in several of the applications (compared to applications prior to the new PAO strategy) and more detailed activity reporting.

³⁶ The use of the RBM terminology in this report is based on the OECD-DAC definition, with an additional focus on learning from the RBM processes. In short it is about the strategic management systems in place established to track progress against programme objectives and outcomes and the ability to analyse these results, learn from them and adapt in the implementation.

In some cases, this means the inclusion of baselines and clearly defined indicators (such as OPC's 'IEU:s Väntrum', JHS's Eastern European programme, KIC's Sister Party Support programme, or GF's East- & Central Europe and Southern Caucasus Programme), which are often measureable, quantifiable and can serve as implementation tracking indicators. There is however limited use of indicators at the outcome level and thus clear programmatic directions, which the programmes can report against.

The improved use of logframes³⁷ adapted to the political party context and indicators at input and output level is however rarely used to report against in the annual or mid-term reports forwarded by the PAOs to Sida.³⁸ Instead, these reports are in most cases general reflections on programme progress (exceptions include the SILC reporting, the VIF mid-term report which does reflect on input indicators and the PYPA programme – see below). Progress is most often not measured systematically against indicators or used as a guide for programme implementation.

The lack of systematic use of data limits the PAOs' ability to engage in more substantive quality assurance of the outputs and outcomes of the programmes. This is particularly the case in one of the Networking Model category of projects, where the full implementation has been delegated with little follow-up on results apart from the reports received from the partners in the field. The same can be said of many of the trainings provided where there are no follow-up or tracer type studies except for the immediate feedback from the training sessions and trainers' own observations. While there are elements of ongoing quality assurance in e.g. the Twinning Model A category through the on-going engagement and dialogue with the partner, there are few programmes which have an actual systematic quality assurance approach linked to RBM.

The main exception to the above is the use of learning evaluations in the PYPA programme. In this case, the programme has hired external evaluators, which through the use of qualitative techniques follow-up with PYPA academy participants and implementers to assess progress over time and feed this into programme management decision-making. This is a novelty among these types of programmes and provides an

³⁷ Sida has provided short-term training to partners, which were determined useful.

³⁸ The assessment of reporting is based on all reports received. All reports are good at summarising the PAOs' own assessment of progress, but only in very few cases is there evidence-based reporting against indicators. A detailed assessment of selected reports from 2013 showed that no systematic reporting is undertaken against on indicators and outputs against the application, with the exception of SILC. None of the reports from all seven PAOs provide on evidence on indicators at the outcome level, while there is a substantive reference on some activities undertaken. See also Relevance of programmes to developmental and political context

opportunity to generate on-going learning, which is appreciated by several of the partners. The qualitative nature provides an opportunity for more detailed learning, which is complimented by some quantitative indicators. The evaluators in most cases refrain from more thorough use of aggregation. Consequently, some of the implementing partners found that there was room to further refine the system to enhance the usefulness for programme implementation. Yet, the PYPA evaluation is a unique use of RBM, which is less evident in most of the programmes.

Overall, the need for enhanced use of RBM and quality management processes for enhancing programme performance is not well recognised among PAOs as well as implementing partners. In two cases PAO partners stated to the team that they ‘...already know what works’³⁹. While this may be so, the use of results-frameworks, indicators and the like are stressed as requirements by the strategy. It also provides the PAOs with an opportunity to capture and demonstrate results and thus enhance the legitimacy of their operations.

Scale and scope

The current modality of allocating funding to VO1 programmes based on their mother parties’ representation in Parliament, on the one hand, means that the predictability of the funding level is limited to the predictability of Swedish election results (with the delays allowing PAOs a phase-out period). Consequently, the PAOs have to adjust their programmes regularly as the funding level varies. This influences the longer-term partnerships negatively when PAOs need to cut down the funding level.

On the other hand, the arrangement means that the PAO is certain to receive a predefined amount according to the election results in Sweden. This provides a degree of predictability between elections. The certainty of funding, however also means that the PAO is virtually sure to receive this amount as extremely few VO1 applications (so far only one) are turned down in spite of their frequent weaknesses (see relevance section above). We believe that this influences the incentives to address the quality of the programming and implementation negatively, as well as the likelihood to relate to the overall goals of the strategy. Even as Sida has introduced new routines and procedures to implement the strategy, the PAO can be virtually certain to receive the funding wherefore the accountability towards Sida is limited, as is the motivation for change. Similarly, the fact that as several of the assessed programmes have not sufficiently internalised findings from the previous PAO evaluations suggests that PAOs may feel less obliged to act on Sida-funded evaluations and recommendations.

³⁹ Interviews in two different field sites.

At a more overall level, the PAO modality prevalent in Swedish party support provides for a number of opportunities and challenges. The fact that all Swedish parties represented in Parliament can work directly with sister organisations abroad allows for a pluralistic spectrum of sister party support. Sister parties generally have a higher degree of trust given the ideological commonalities, which allows for closer cooperation, and also for a degree of interest and commitment to the program on both sides. This is a comparative advantage in relation to multi-party approaches such as the ones applied by actors such as UNDP or NDI in their party support. On the other hand, the modality means that the (rather limited) funding is spread across seven different PAOs. For the PAOs with smaller representation in the Swedish Parliament their funding level allows for only 1-2 employees to oversee the implementation. The limited staffing provides fewer resources to engage in dialogue with and monitoring partners on the ground (programmatically as well as financially). Consequently, the ability of some of the smallest PAOs (in terms of staff) to couple funding to capacity development inputs from Sweden is limited.

In spite of the limited funding, the PAO mapping exercise (see Annex 6) has identified participants from more than 70 countries involved in PAO programmes during the period 2012-2014. As mentioned above, however, this figure includes beneficiaries with whom the PAO in question has only an indirect or sporadic relation (even as funds may be channelled to them). Established cooperations at the present appear to be limited to somewhat under forty countries.

As can be expected, the geographical spread is very varied according to modality, with the Networking Model by far having the largest geographical spread in spite of being favoured by some of the smallest PAO organisations. While this allows for a very broad coverage, the approach challenges the probability of effectiveness as such scattered implementation is unlikely to produce major changes and the ability to follow-up contributions is also limited (furthermore the effects cannot be justified given the limited use of post-implementation RBM mechanisms).

The division of the support into two workstreams

The PAO strategy introduced a division of the support into two streams (as described in Chapter 1). While VO1 is closely linked to the previous PAO support objectives and modalities, the VO2 stands out as it enhances the previous focus on multi-party systems as well as applying a competitive approach to funding. In this way the VO2 workstream has allowed a focus on broader political developments beyond the individual parties.

As is evident from the 'Effectiveness' section above, most of the VO2 programmes seem to be more relevant and effective than the average VO1 program. This suggests that multiparty approaches may contribute to effectiveness, and also that the allocation of funds in competition for funding is likely to have enhanced analysis and design. In light of this, the current division between the two funding streams with proportions of 7:3 in benefit of VO1, to be unjustified vis-à-vis performance.

Human Rights-Based Approach

The bulk of PAO applications and reporting contains limited explicit reflection of HRBA, even as several of the programmes have significant elements of this. Moreover, the degree of HRBA application of the PAO programmes varies according to the category of the programme. Generally a higher degree of dialogue enables a more HRBA-aligned approach. An overview of the findings is presented in table 2.8 below.

Table 2.8 HRBA according to PAO programme category as per field level evidence

Category	Degree of alignment
Networking model	Evidence from the field show that the networking model (a) provides for a very high degree of participation of and accountability to the partner, which in most cases assessed identify and implement the programme. On the other hand, the limited oversight by the PAOs also means that there is less overview of the actual implementation and application of HRBA in practice. For (b) there was evidence of more engagement with the partner but limited evidence of HRBA application
Twinning model A	Based on the sample, the Model A twinning process has the highest degree of mutual accountability as it is demand-based and builds on the need and dialogue with the partner. It allows for a high degree of transparency in the process as well
Twinning model B	Model B is, by design and confirmed in the field, less prone to HRBA given the more limited dialogue with the partners in the design and implementation phase
Academy model	The team found evidence of the academy model having strong elements of participation in the implementation as well as accountability in terms of follow-up with learning evaluators. However, the courses are predesigned and the team only found a few changes in the implementation
One-off training model	The one-off trainings will in most cases have the least degree of HRBA given that the trainings are pre-defined prior to participant involvement

There is, however, among all PAOs an understanding of ensuring the inclusion of women, and in many cases minorities as well, in programming. The PAOs in general thus have a good understanding of promoting non-discrimination in their design and approaches to implementation.

On the more challenging front is the substantial use of the Swedish language in programme implementation. This applies to most programme proposals and reports to Sida as well as some of the background studies. The use of Swedish limits the degree of transparency towards the partner, which is not in a position to read and react to the application to Sida.

2.4 IMPACT

In light of the short period of implementation of the current PAO strategy (2012-2014), the team was not asked to assess impact of the PAO support. The field level evidence also confirms that there is limited impact of the current PAO support at this

stage. Yet, there is some evidence of impact from a longer-term perspective from previous years PAO support, though the documentation of this remains patchy.

As reflected in the ‘effectiveness’ section above, there is some evidence of short-term outcomes, which may eventually lead to results at an impact level. Some of the main short-term outcomes identified include:

- Changes in individuals’ ability to undertake campaigning, outreach to voters, strategic planning, dialogue with other parties.
- Enhanced individual, and in certain cases institutional, understanding of the need to cooperate across party lines.
- Some (few) cases of direct contribution to internal party reform processes, in areas such as internal structuring and policy proposals.

The probability of impact is however challenged by the design of most of the PAO programme category modalities. These challenges concern three parameters:

- 1) The focus on the individual rather than the institutional level limits the direct impact on parties and party systems, and democratic development in general.
- 2) The selection of individuals for training and related capacity development exercises is not always sufficiently strategic to ensure that these are able to influence the institutional level. Neither is the selection of sister parties or activities based on sufficient strategic considerations to ensure broader system-level effects.
- 3) The PAO programme categories that do not focus on needs assessment and dialogue with partners in the design phase have a less strategic focus to the support, limiting the opportunities for supporting longer term change processes.

While significant changes at the institutional level are documented only in a few cases, there is a high probability of impact at the individual level in the programmes where participants have found the support useful in their political career. This includes specific trainings for women and youth targeted in some of the PAO programmes. There may thus be long-term changes for the individuals even if this according to the findings does not impact the institutional level, let alone the general political effects envisaged by the objectives of the PAO strategy.

Partner selection, size and potential impact at scale

The desk study, as well as the field mission findings, show a tendency among the majority of PAOs, towards working with relatively small or even minuscule parties, even when it comes to established, long-term cooperation in democratic states. In several cases, these parties have not been able to become elected to parliament or in other ways obtain a status of influence on the political scene.

That parties who fail to obtain popular support in democratic elections but are privileged recipients of foreign support can be seen as problematic from a perspective of democratic legitimacy. Furthermore, this finding casts doubt on the extent to which the PAOs are able or willing to establish partnerships and programs on the basis of

whether such partners are likely to contribute to the overall PAO strategy objectives of promoting democratic change and increased respect for human rights within a reasonable time-span. The team assesses that this is evidence of the tension between seeing sister-party support as an end in itself versus as a possible means to produce broader political change, something that has been indicated in all previous evaluations of the support.

In order to assess the extent to which this is the case, the team has computed average and mean size of the sister parties of each PAO (that is, parties supported as part of the VO1 work stream and not as part of a broader network or federation) active under conditions of electoral democracy (using the binary classification of Freedom House for this purpose, applied to 2014). For them, we have gathered data from the latest election results (for parliamentary, and where applicable, lower house elections). Out of a total of 68 sister party cooperations, 37 parties from 20 countries were thus included in this calculation, which also means that the majority of PAO established partners today work in countries that can be classified as “electoral democracies”⁴⁰.

The results of the analyses show that PAOs differ with regard to the electoral size of their sister parties, as can be seen the table 2.9.⁴¹ A large difference between mean and average values indicates that one or two very large sister parties drives up the average (as happens with the OPC cooperation with the ANC at over sixty per cent of the vote, for instance). In such cases and in general, mean size should be a better indication of the size of the typical sister party than the average.

Table 2.9 PAO sister party size (Electoral democracies only).

Name	Average size	Median size	Note
CIS (two parties)	0.5 per cent	0.5 per cent	
GF (four parties)	2.1 per cent	1.4 per cent	Includes coalition votes.
JHS (fifteen parties)	26.4 per cent	30.6 per cent	Includes coalition votes.
KIC (two parties)	2.6 per cent	2.6 per cent	Includes coalition votes.
OPC (seven parties)	17.1 per cent	6.7 per cent	Includes coalition votes.
Silc (four parties)	2.0 per cent	2.3 per cent	Includes coalition votes.
VIF (three parties)	0 per cent	0 per cent	Some parties did not participate in elections.
SUM OF ALL:	14.6 per cent	5.68 per cent	

⁴⁰ Even with the above definitions, there are some caveats, though. In some cases, parties participated in broader coalitions for elections. In those cases, votes for the entire coalition were used for the analysis, which means that electoral support for the individual party will be overestimated. Also, in one case, in the Dominican Republic, we have been forced to exclude a party because of lack of reliable data. However, we do not believe that this affects the overall results to a significant degree.

⁴¹ Note that this table reports both average and mean sister party size (genomsnitt and median in Swedish).

As can be seen in the table, sister parties tend to be very small for all but a few of the PAOs, even as coalition votes are included. It should be emphasised that these figures reflect the size of sister parties active in conditions of overall respect for democratic elections. In authoritarian conditions, it may of course be relevant to work with small or marginalised parties both because there may not be any alternatives or because such groups may nevertheless become more important as during a transition to democracy. But that is rarely the case during conditions of electoral democracy. Under such circumstances, working with parties that are largely devoid of popular support, and that are in many cases irrelevant for the political development of their respective countries, will simply limit the overall relevance and effectiveness of the support, while it may also raise questions about its democratic legitimacy.

Supporting small and marginalised groups under non-democratic conditions may be much more relevant from a perspective of promotion of democratic change, however. Not necessarily because such groups can create political openings by themselves (few transitions are initiated or led by opposition political parties), but rather because they may become relevant after a transition to democracy.

For the few cases in which PAOs cooperate with regime parties in non-democracies, such a support may of course be relevant if the intention is to promote change from within, even if the course of such change is highly unpredictable.

Hence, PAOs may support small parties with ambitions in order to promote increased pluralism. However, to align with the objectives of improving democracy (and the strategy emphasis on supporting organisations that may become political parties), such ambitions must be coupled with an assessment of partner potential and eventual evidence of progress aligned with political ambitions. An assessment of (1) such a potential, (2) the degree to which such progress is taking place, and (3) making a strategic decision to withdraw support from such parties when popular support or political influence is not sustained, seem not to have taken place in any of the cases assessed in the field (although according to the evidence obtained there is one exception to this rule). Likewise, interviews with PAOs in Stockholm documented that examples of termination of cooperation with parties had only occurred when parties had split or faced internal turmoil.

2.5 SUSTAINABILITY

Sustainability is assessed against the outputs achieved so far as well as the approach taken by the PAOs under the different categories of modalities. Given the focus on individual training in most of the interventions, sustainability of outputs is best measured through their ability to reach out to former participants and assess their knowledge and reflections on past trainings through e.g. tracer studies. The limited use of RBM at an outcome level means that the data available for documenting sustainability of outputs at an individual level is very limited (except PYPA).

With the limited data, the team has assessed the degree of sustainability at an individual level through interviews with former participants in the capacity development exercises in the programmes⁴². Overall the outputs are assessed to be sustainable when targeted to the needs of the participants. Interviewees particularly highlighted trainings in campaigning and communication, as well as learning more about Swedish examples. The sustainability (i.e. ability to retain and use knowledge gained over time) was thus greatest in cases where the capacity development directly impacted on the participants' ability to improve their performance within the party. More generic issues and add-ons, including gender and LGBTI issues were assessed to be less useful by the interviewees.

Identifying sustainability at an outcome level is challenged by the limited evidence to suggest tangible institutional outcomes, which is a consequence of the low level of effectiveness at outcome level, as well as poor documentation of this.

Institutional sustainability is furthermore influenced by the direct contributions provided by two of the PAOs to their partners. None of the PAOs have a policy on the level of funding that can be provided to the partner vis-à-vis the overall partner budget. In some cases this means that the partner is heavily reliant on PAO funding to remain operational. Coupled to the small size and electoral unpopularity of several partners, this means that some political parties or organisations are unlikely to be able to operate without Swedish PAO funding.

The same can be said of the PAOs themselves. While some of them have been able to access other Sida funds, the majority are dependent on funding from the PAO strategy for their continued survival in their current form.

⁴² Where the PAOs or partners have been able to identify such interview persons for the team.

3 Conclusions

Sweden has been providing support to political parties in Eastern Europe and the developing countries for two decades, but only introduced a full-fledged strategy for political party support in 2012. This evaluation has assessed the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the PAO support under this new Strategy.

The team found that all PAOs provide support which falls within the broader framework of Swedish policies as well as the PAO strategy, working with political parties or affiliated organisations undertaking capacity development and promoting democratic practices and to some extent human rights. Having said that, some of the partners to the PAOs do not adhere to the same democratic and rights-based values as expressed in the policies of the Swedish government, and while it may be justifiable to work to change behaviour and attitudes over time, there is limited transparency about these challenges in the available documentation.

Geographically, the PAOs have managed to target countries where there is a greater democratic deficit. However, the geographic spread of activities remains substantial, with beneficiaries from more than 70 countries and sister party cooperations in almost 40. Furthermore, these figures are virtually the same as were documented in a previous evaluation in 2009, and most PAOs today seem to work with as many partners or more as they did five or ten years ago.

The PAOs use different designs and operational modalities for the implementation. The team has identified five types of categories used; though even within these, differences exist. Due to these differences, identifying findings at an aggregated level poses a challenge. However, multiple similarities were identified, partly as a consequence of the fact that, while the approach to design and implementation differ, the main activities mostly fall within traditional training related activities, study tours and seminars.

Across the different categories of PAO support, the bulk (of those that have initiated activities) have implemented these roughly in accordance with applications and plans. For many of the programmes, outputs have been achieved. The bulk of these outputs are related to capacity development at an individual level, and the evaluation has found evidence of enhanced capacities of individuals to engage in political party activities. However, at the level above individual participants, the team has not found many instances of significant institutional capacity development supported directly by the PAOs. This is partly a consequence of the approach taken to capacity development, which focuses on individual training rather than more direct engagement with the parties aimed at strategic long-term reform processes. Within the parameters of

the different categories of support there are some innovations in terms of enhanced participatory approaches by some of the PAOs, which have enhanced the results at the output level. This is particularly evident with some of the VO2 support. It is also notable that it is among the multi-party VO2 projects that we have found most evidence of PAO programs that are relevant and effective beyond the level of individual parties.

In summary, the PAOs can deliver activities and outputs, but the ability to be effective at the institutional or broader political level remains a challenge, let alone make a significant contribution to democratic political development as envisaged by the strategy. Most of the programmes have some elements which the others may learn from, and some of the programmes stand out in their ability to deliver changes at a more institutional level. The key parameters identified during the evaluation for achieving results at an outcome level and thus ensuring a high degree of effectiveness in the PAO support are as follows:

- 1) Ownership and needs based support. The evidence clearly shows that support, which is owned by the recipient partners/beneficiaries, and which is based on an assessment of their needs and in dialogue led by the partner, is the first step to ensure that the support is truly anchored in the organisation.
- 2) To be properly institutionalised, the support should be built on a longer-term strategy with clearly defined aims of where the beneficiary partner sees itself in the political scene in the future. This includes clearly defined goals and indicators relevant to such a broader development.
- 3) To ensure longer-term outcomes which have an impact on the democratic development in the targeted country, the partners identified should either already have possibility to influence the national political scene or the potential of becoming a relevant political actor. In non-free states the partner should have potential to act once a democratic transition gets underway.
- 4) There is also evidence to suggest that a strong partnership requires regular interactions (or even presence on the ground) to assist the beneficiary partner, as and when challenges emerge, and to allow for a better understanding of the local context to enable an appropriate response.
- 5) Methodologically, there is evidence to suggest that the use of (OECD-DAC good practice)⁴³ capacity development exercises which are focused on a participatory approach and practical exercises are more effective than the traditional lecture/discussion/seminar style activities.

⁴³ OECD-DAC (2006): 'Capacity Development – Working Towards Good Practice', and (2010): 'Capacity Development: an OECD-DAC Priority'

- 6) Finally, the evidence points to the benefits of a solid RBM system, as suggested by the strategy, which the PAO and partner can use to refine the cooperation and ensure that expected results are achieved.

There are good examples of cooperation, coordination and harmonisation among several of the PAOs under VO2. However, with one notable exception in the VO2 programmes, overall harmonisation with non-Swedish PAOs is limited and the complementarity to what other donors are doing, including Sida, does not seem to be a priority for the PAOs in most contexts. This limits opportunities for joint initiatives and risks duplication of activities. The attention to risks and risk management is generally weak, and in particular PAOs with limited staffing and substantial geographic outreach face difficulties in minimising and addressing risks.

The probability of impact is on the one hand challenged by the scale and scope of the PAO support. The PAOs have during the period worked with beneficiaries from more than seventy countries, and has established cooperations with 68 sister parties in 38 countries) with a limited budget, which limits the possibilities of impact at a broader scale. This is especially evident with the Networking Model. Another major impediment of impact at a broader scale is the choice of PAO partner beneficiaries. In most cases in free and partly free states, the PAOs work with marginal political parties that have limited influence on the political situation in the targeted country and often limited probability of changing this situation during the foreseeable future.

Finally, the limited evidence of effectiveness at the outcome level challenges the opportunities for longer-term impact. Studies of similar support in other countries show that enabling results in this field is generally difficult. There is however room for improving performance.

Improving performance is not only a question of refinement of the existing support, but the evaluation has shown weaknesses in the present design of the VO1 PAO support, which merits consideration in future design of the support. The bulk of these, arguably, stem from the up-front guarantees to all PAOs that they are ensured a certain level of funding irrespective of design and performance. It is the team's assessment that the consequence of this is the elimination of accountabilities that would enhance performance and quality. Furthermore, there are clear indications that in the absence of competition for funds, the sister party support that the strategy stipulates to be a means to promote political development in general instead becomes an end in itself, and its broader political implications (or failings) are not a subject of critical reflection or analysis. In practice this also means that:

- 1) The PAOs have less motivation to document analysis and performance as funding is guaranteed up front. Furthermore, even in cases where the performance has evidently been poor in the past PAOs are still guaranteed funding in the future.

- 2) Sida is less inclined to reject proposals (even if quality assurance and guidance processes occur with PAOs), as these in practice are less obliged to follow guidance and recommendations.
- 3) Funds are distributed across many implementing partners, increasing transaction costs.
- 4) Given the attention to performance in Swedish elections, rather than quality and results-performance, resource allocations funds are in some cases distributed to partners have less capacity to ensure quality and manage the financial and programmatic risks involved with implementation of activities abroad.

There is thus a need to draw on past experience and rethink the design of the PAO support with the aim of enhancing performance and managing risks. This is particularly relevant for funding under VO1. Arguably, there is a need to apply the same standards and qualities as Sida applies to any other development partner, and to the VO2 program. For this to be the case, the provision of funding according to criteria (parliamentary representation in Sweden) that is entirely irrelevant to the operation of the PAOs would need to be rethought.

4 Recommendations

The recommendations have been specified for Sida as well as the PAOs.

Recommendations for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Major recommendations for the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs based on the evaluation findings are:

- To enhance the motivation for performance and improve the accountabilities within the system of allocation of funding, the Government should consider redesigning the support so that competition is enhanced for VO1 and funding allocated according to performance for VO1 as well as VO2. Non-performance or deficient applications should result in reduced funding or termination. Clearly identified criteria for the funding allocation should be identified related to relevance to government policies, partners and context and expected results, taking into consideration the modalities applied and the ability to ensure efficiency in the implementation. The strategy should specify such criteria based on experience from other development assistance.
- The arbitrary division of funding between VO1 and VO2 support should be reconsidered in light of the better performance of VO2 programmes.
- Seek to use the Reference Group meetings more strategically to discuss strategic direction of PAO implementation and share lessons learned related to achieve results at an outcome level. Meetings in the margins could be arranged to identify lessons learned for sharing among PAOs.

Recommendations and Sida

Major recommendations for Sida based on the evaluation findings are:

- Rigorous quality assurance of applications and reporting should be applied with clear demands for the application of RBM. These assessments should influence funding levels. The quality assurance should include assessment of proper application of HRBA in the programme design and reporting. Also, PAOs should be made to demonstrate good contextual knowledge and analysis of the countries in which they plan to act in order to preclude support going to waste or funding partners who work in contradiction to Swedish Government policies.
- Capacity of PAOs should live up to minimum requirements to ensure that the PAOs have the capacity to design, monitor and implement programmes and manage the risks related to this. This may include capacity audits as is used with Sida CSO funding.

- PAOs should be asked to substantiate partner choice, including potential for influence over time. When performance is not achieved, the PAOs should be requested to reassess support and consider reallocation of funding.
- Finally, Sida should ensure that the scope and scale of PAO activities are in line with the funding level and expected results. This would entail a concentration of the PAO support to fewer countries and partners in line with what certain PAOs have already done.

Recommendations for PAOs

Major recommendations for the PAOs based on the evaluation findings are (note that some of these recommendations are already applied by some PAOs, though none apply all):

- Rethink the programme design phase, by taking a more strategic approach to capacity development design. Let the partner take the lead in this process and identify longer-term institutional reform needs, which the PAO can then assist in implementing. When partnering with individuals, where the focus is not explicitly on marginalised sections of society, the PAOs should ensure that these have a high probability of influencing party structures and reform processes.
- In the design and implementation ensure that the activities are harmonised with activities from other sources of funding to the partner.
- Strategically select partners, which (in addition to values and ideology) have either the size or the potential to become an influential player on the political scene able to make a wider political in terms of democratisation and human rights during the foreseeable future.
- Limit the partnerships to fewer strategic partners in fewer geographical locations (in particular relevant for the Networking Model) to enable more frequent dialogue and real partnerships. Consider the possibility to ensure more frequent interaction (or even local presence by PAO or implementing partner) in countries in which work will be undertaken.
- Ensure that the programme design and implementation are anchored in a proper contextual understanding of the situation and challenges and engage in regular dialogue with the partner, possibly through presence on the ground.
- Introduce and apply strong RBM mechanisms at output and outcome level and use these to regularly revise and improve programme implementation. The use of RBM should be linked to learning processes to ensure that the PAOs take on board lessons learned from the evidence collected through the RBM process.
- Apply risk assessment and design risk management strategies in a more rigorous manner.
- Ensure that all future applications and reporting is produced in English to allow for enhanced transparency and accountability towards the PAO partners.

Annex 1 – Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference: Review of the implementation and results of the Swedish Strategy for Democracy Support for Party Affiliated Organisations 2012-2014

1. Background

Sida, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, is a government authority. Sida works according to directives of Government of Sweden to reduce poverty in the world. The overall goal of Swedish development cooperation is to contribute to making it possible for people who are poor to improve their living conditions. **People who are poor and their perspective on development is central, as are the use of rights based approach.**

The Swedish government decided in 2010 on a Strategy for Special Democracy support directed towards political parties and multiparty systems through Swedish Political Party-affiliated Organisations (PAO) hereafter referred to as the strategy. The strategy aims to support democratic development and increased respect for human rights in developing countries. The objective also intends to contribute to reform cooperation in Eastern Europe, with the aim to strengthen democracy, equitable and sustainable development and closer ties with the European Union and its values.

Proceeding from the strategy, the activities are to encourage steps towards democratic governance, equal opportunities for women and men, full respect for human rights, and tolerance of dissidents and minorities, and where applicable bridge religious and ethnic conflicts. The support is to ensure that all individuals in developing countries have genuine opportunity and freedom to organise in political parties and civil society organisations and thereby exercise an influence on political processes and decision-making. One goal is to broaden political participation such that it fully represents the composition of the population.

To achieve the overall objective of the strategy, the activities are focused on two independent areas:

- 1) Support for sister parties, and affiliated political movements and organisations, with the goal of ensuring well-functional democratic political parties (focus area 1).

- 2) Support for multiparty systems, with the goal of ensuring well-functioning democratically based multiparty systems (focus area 2).

The current strategy covers the period 2011-2015. The total annual amount of support to PAO is currently 80 MSEK. 30% of this amount is channelled through focus area 2 (see above), the remaining 70% is distributed in accordance to political mandate and number of seats in the Parliament.. Only 10% of the funds received by the party affiliated organisations (from focus area 1) can be used for relation building purposes, pre-studies and or other coordination activities linked to the strategy.

The present support is channelled through the following organisations; Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation (JHS), Olof Palme International Center (OPC), Christian Democratic International Center (KIC), Center Party's International Foundation (CIS), Left International Forum (VIF), Green Forum (GF) and Swedish International Liberal Centre (SILC). In total the 7 PAO's have some twenty programs covering 60-70 countries. The programs differ and have global, regional and country focus. Given the Strategy and its intention aims to work in environments are most challenging (democracy deficit high), that has also resulted in that the different PAO's do work in many fragile states and new democracies where the risks indeed are high to operate. The PAO's in part channel funds to local partners in the developing countries. The size of the PAO and their experience from international development projects varies; some of the organisations are fairly large in manpower whereas some of them only have a few people working at the secretariat.

A midterm review of the implementation status of the Strategy was presented to the Swedish government by Sida 30th June 2014. According to the Strategy an external evaluation of the strategy implementation and results should be finalised during the first half of 2015. This evaluation should assess the PAO support in relation to other Sida support to Democracy. This is a comprehensive evaluation that should also include analysis on contemporary research on the topic of party affiliated support and other relevant evaluations.

2. Stakeholders

The evaluation is primary commissioned by the unit for Democracy and Human rights (DEMO) and in extension to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to systematize learning and provide input into a new strategy. Furthermore, this evaluation will be important for PAO and other Sida departments and Embassies of Sweden involved in democracy and human rights support. In addition, findings and recommendations could also be of interest for the wider political party assistance providers peer network.

3. Purpose and scope of assignment

The main objective of the evaluation is to

i) Capture and make an assessment of results, output and short term outcomes of PAO programmes during the Strategy period (i.e. 2012-2014). To provide Sida with an overview of the supported programmes/initiatives.

ii) To what extent are the supported programmes/initiatives relevant and in line with the strategy objectives? i) Have the supported programmes contributed to improving the conditions for agents of change to work towards increased democratisation and improved human rights as intended by the strategy. ii) Have the support created opportunities and freedom for individuals and groups in developing countries to organise in political parties or civil society organisations in order to practise political influence in decision making processes. iii) Does broaden political presentation entail participation in a way that represents the composition of the population?

iii) What has worked well, main challenges and how to deal with these challenges in the future? What (if any) unforeseen and unanticipated results/experiences are there influencing programmes? The assessment team will have to take account of the fact that some of the programmes which are operating in challenging circumstances, work and report under strict confidentiality which do have implications and hampers their ability to work as efficient and effective as possible.

The evaluation team should adhere to the terminology of the OECD/DAC glossary on evaluation and results based management and the Sida evaluation manual.

The evaluation shall include a presentation of the findings, including visual presentation of statistics, where are PAO active, geographic presentation etc. with some exceptions due to given limitations. The evaluation will serve as an important input to Sida and Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Party Affiliated Organisations where the consultant's assessments and analysis/discussion and subsequent conclusions and recommendations will have implications for any future strategic programming post 2015.

4. Guiding questions for the assignment

- 1) A mapping of actors receiving support throughout the strategy period, identifying what types of actors, i.e. parties/political movements/organisations, the thematic focus of support extended and volumes. The consultants need to establish a list demonstrating what countries the PAO are active in, the extent to which support is given to the mother parties and/or women and youth wings or other affiliated groups/groupings. To what extent has funds utilised gone to innovative initiatives/ICT etc.? An analysis should later on be done based on the mapping.

- 2) To what extent is (have) the different implementers/supported actors been relevant in relation to the context where the supported programmes/projects are implemented? What can be said about local ownership?
- 3) According to the present strategy and in order to achieve the overall objectives, the activities are focused on two focus areas; sister party support and multi-party system support. Is this division adequate, what is the implication of this division? What is the weakness and strengths of having two separated focus areas? To the extent of which are there visible synergies between the two focus areas?
- 4) What role does PAO support play in fragile democracies? How visible has PAO's support been in relation to what is stated in the existing strategy? How well coordinated has different programmes been in these challenging environments?
- 5) What can be said about the PAO's ability to assess and reduce risks (i.e. risk management strategies)? What could be done to improve overall security and to reduce or mitigate risks?
- 6) How much/well do the organisations focus and target work with gender equality and youth, and what are the major results versus and potential weaknesses in these areas? What can be stated in relation to PAO's work and ambitions to also support minorities, religious groups and LGBTI groups etc.? What are the major results versus instructive failures in these areas? Which methods appear to be more useful than others?
- 7) In terms of results related to the strategy objective, which type of geographic focus has been applied by different PAO's; global, regional, national or local? The PAO organisations are active currently in 60-70 countries – what are the views of the review team in terms of questions related to concentration versus further spread of programmes/projects?
- 8) How does the PAO support compare to other forms of Democracy supports, is there a comparative advantage to the PAO-strategy or not? What other channels of interventions closely linked to party support are supported? Focus on volumes, type of partners and working methods and learning etc. are of interest. Some relevant examples to explore could be: 1) Support to other PAO from other Swedish strategies (bilaterally), 2) support to parties/party systems through other actors such as UNDP etc.? 3) development of parliaments, 4) Special Initiatives for Democratization and Freedom of Expression 2009-2014. Adding to the above to check (volume wise) how much/little is devoted to Party supported initiatives compared to other democracy programmes/projects under support (civil society, media development, etc.). What does other relevant evaluations (to the area in question) and recent research state/say when it comes to Party Affiliated initiatives versus other forms of Democracy support? .

- 9) The consultant shall make an assessment of aid effectiveness and result based approach of the program. **To the extent of which has donor harmonisation and coordination with other actors occurred?** How have the PAO internalised the concept of program approach? What can be stated more generally about PAO's own capacity development, use of current research linked to implementation of programme development etc.?
- 10) Monitoring and follow up, how does PAO follow up their projects, do they have efficient methods to monitor their projects and programs? To what extent are innovative results management methods used? To what extent did the 2012-2014 programs build on lessons learnt from the previous period?

5. Methodology and team qualification

Based on the ToR, the consultants shall elaborate on a detailed plan for how to carry out the evaluation. The plan and the basic considerations shall be presented in an inception report. The inception report shall include a detailed description of the method, further elaboration of overview questions in addition to detailed work and time plan. The inception report shall be presented to Sida/MFA and The PAO representatives jointly, whereby Sida will after discussion approve the inception report.

The team will carry out tasks using mixed methods, involving analysis of relevant documents; other data sources such as research etc., interviews will relevant people including programme site visits (i.e. decide on countries/regions to visit). Sida will present a list of relevant people and documents to the team, however this list should only be considered as a starting point for the evaluation team.

It seen as vital that the review team will liaise and work closely with the PAO group throughout the review period. Their involvement and ability to provide information and comments and to facilitate the process is important.

The team should have the following competence:

- Academic degrees in relevant field such as; Political Science, Sociology, Development Studies, Human Rights and/or other relevant areas.
- Professional experience in the area of democracy, Human Rights, preferably experience of evaluations of democracy assistance programs.
- Minimum 7 years of experience (team leader) of evaluation of international development cooperation, particularly in the relevant areas such as political part development, parliamentary development, civil and political rights, or civil society support.

- At least two team members should have documented experiences of at least two previous evaluations of political part assistance.
- All team members must be professionally proficient in English; it is a merit if the team has other language skills relevant for the field visit such as French, Spanish, Arabic and Russian. At least one team member needs mother tongue proficiency in Swedish.

The qualification and competencies of the individuals in the team should be complimentary including both senior and junior consultants. Sida encourages the use of local consultants during field visits. The evaluation team should use a participatory approach and have a gender balance. The team leader should have thorough experience of Swedish Development cooperation policies and practices and documented experience of conducting evaluations.

Due to the sensitive nature of some projects a declaration of impartiality and confidentiality must be signed by the evaluation team prior to the assignment.

Curriculum Vitae must contain full description of the team members, academic degrees and professional work experience. The CV must be signed by the persons proposed. The team composition should be 2-4 persons with relevant knowledge for the assignment.

6. Time schedule

- The assignment needs to start on 1th October 2014.
- After contracting the evaluation team a first meeting will be held with Sida, in order to review ToR together and necessary modifications for time and working plan. Contact list and background material will be provided by Sida during this meeting, see a tentative list under Reference. First week of October 2014.
- Meeting with PAO organisations in Sweden (latter part of October/November).
- An inception report shall be presented one week after the first meeting with Sida around 15 October.
- x days field visit(s) (where and which countries/regions and programmes/projects, needs to be decided by Sida and after discussions and consultations with the evaluation team).
- A draft report shall be presented to Sida no later than 5 January 2015. During 10 days, Sida, MFA and the PAO will have the possibility to comment the draft. The PAO will be allowed to comment on factual errors. The draft report should be maximum 30 pages excluding the annexes.
- A Validations meeting encompassing all involved parties: i.e. PAO group, MFA and Sida will be held before finalization of the report.
- 15 days after the draft have been submitted to Sida all comments should be sent back to the evaluation team.
- The final report shall be submitted to Sida no later than 20 January 2015. The report(s) should be written in English and be maximum 30

pages excluding the annexes. The final report shall be professionally proofread. The final report should include a section on methodology, limitations and any implications or consequences based on that shall be discussed.

- Presentation of the final report at Sida HQ for a wider audience, including MFA and PAO should be done no later than by 31 January 2015.
- Payment will take place after Sida's approval of the final report.

7. Budget and other resources

The budget ceiling for the evaluation amounts to 1 200 000 SEK. The assignment is estimated to take maximum 20 person weeks. The consultants are fully responsible for issues related to visa and accommodation during the field visit.

The proposal shall include an overall draft time and work plan including delivery dates.

8. References

Guiding documents:

The Strategy on for special Democracy support directed towards political parties and multiparty systems through Swedish Political Party-affiliated Organisations (PAO) 2011-2015:

<http://www.government.se/content/1/c6/16/29/04/d6636d6b.pdf> (Swedish)

DAC Guidelines and Reference Series: Accountability and democratic governance: Orientations and principles for development; Chapters 7 (Electoral Assistance), 8 (Political Party Assistance), 9 (Media Assistance), and 10 (parliamentary assistance) available at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-develop-ment/For%20WEB%20Accountability%20and%20democratic%20governance%20Orientations%20and%20principles%20for%20development.pdf>

Previous Evaluations of PAO:

1. Sadev 2009:3: Party Cooperation in a Results Perspective available at:

<http://www.oecd.org/derec/sweden/pao.pdf>

2. Sida Evaluation 05/11: Political Parties and Democracy Assistance, 2005, available at:

<http://sidapublications.citat.se/interface/stream/mabstream.asp?filetype=1&orderlistmainid=2119&printfileid=2119&filex=3116856777034>

3. Sida Evolution 00/35 “Stöd till de partianknutna organisationerna”, 2000, (Swedish only) available at:

<http://sidapublications.citat.se/interface/stream/mabstream.asp?filetype=1&orderlistmainid=2294&printfileid=2294&filex=3374294783544>

Additional Evaluations of Relevance:

Evaluation of the implementation and results of the Swedish Strategies for Special Initiatives for Democratization and Freedom of Expression 2009-2011 and 2012-14. Sida/DEMO (Dept. GLOBAL/CIVSAM Unit 2013).

Sida 2012:01, UTV Working Paper “Mind the Gap: Lessons Learnt and Remaining Challenges in Parliamentary Development Assistance” Available at: http://www.sida.se/contentassets/828b20d196de45c7986707aaae353b98/20121-mind-the-gap-lessons-learnt-and-remaining-challenges-in-parliamentary-development-assistance---a-sida-pre-study_3403.pdf

Evaluation of Dutch Support to Capacity Development, 2011, available at <http://www.nimd.org/evaluation/2368>

Additional Reviews/Studies of Relevance:

DIPD – Study on Results Frameworks – Political Party Assistance, 2012. Available at <http://dipd.dk/wp-content/uploads/Resultsframeworks-Political-Party-Assistance.pdf>

IDEA/Sida/SILC Report from Political Party Assistance Peer Network Meeting in Sigtuna, Sweden, 2013, available at <http://silc.se/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/PPPPeer-Network-Meeting-Sigtuna-June-2013-Final-Report.pdf>

Mapping and study on performance indicators of EU support for Political Parties, 2014, available at <http://www.eidhr.eu/files/dmfile/STUDYonPoliticalPartySupport20-02-2014.pdf>

Sida (DEMO) – Halvtidsöversyn av PAO strategin (30 juni 2014).

Annex 2 – Persons met

Stockholm			
No.	Name	Organisation	Position
1	Aliaksander Mazurkin	Christian Democratic International Centre (KIC)	Programme Manager Eastern Europe
3	Anna Sundström	Olof Palme Center (OPC)	Head of Operation
4	Catherine Isaksson	Centerns Internationella Stiftelse (CIS)	Secretary General
5	Chris Ormalm	Green Forum	Secretary General
6	Christian Holm	Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation (JHS)	Member of Board
7	Eva Gustafsson	Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation (JHS)	Managing Director
8	Gorgin Rezvani	Left International Forum (VIF)	Action International Secretary
9	Hedwig Kastenholm	Swedish International Liberal Centre (SILC)	Member
10	Isabel Lundin	Olof Palme Center (OPC)	Member
11	Johan Norqvist	Sida	Senior Program Manager, Unit for Democracy and Human Rights, Department for International Organisations and Policy Support
12	Katarina Wallberg	Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation (JHS)	Deputy Director
13	Malena Liedholm Ndounou	Centerns Internationella Stiftelse (CIS)	Program Officer
14	Maria Falk	Christian Democratic International Centre (KIC)	Secretary General
15	Martin Ängeby	Swedish International Liberal Centre (SILC)	Secretary General
16	Nasrin Hoseini	Sida	Program Manager, Unit for Democracy and Human Rights, Department for International Organisations and Policy Support
17	Olof Ehrenkrona	Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation (JHS)	Former Ambassador
18	Stefan Eriksson	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ambassador
19	Ulrika Lång	Olof Palme Center (OPC)	Head of Development Programs
Africa			
20	Acom Aloba Joan	African National Congress (ANC)	PYPA Participant (South Africa)
21	Adele Trish Naidoo	African National Congress (ANC)	PYPA Participant (South Africa)
22	Ann Britt Karlsson	Christian Democratic International Centre (KIC)	Learning Evaluators
23	Asele Angella Ogworar, Patricia Alaroker, Katende Moses, Willington Nsubuga, Dunan Abigabe, Bendaki Evans, Namyenzi Pauline	From different parties: Democratic Party, Forum for Democratic Change, National Resistance Movement	PYPA Participants (Uganda)
24	Bandile Sizano	Education and Training Unit (ETU)	PYPA Facilitator
25	Beatie Hofmeyr	Education and Training Unit (ETU)	Coordinator of PYP and head of ETU

26	Bill Sewell	People and Performance (Consultant to OPC)	External consultant to "from Bullets to Ballot"
27	Clifford Hlatwayo	MDC	PYPA Participant (Zimbabwe)
28	Daniel Tulibaganti, Sanny Blessed Namboze, Pinto Ismael Hamwada, Phiona Nassozi, Robinah Norah Akwi, Faizol Nkugwa	From different parties: People's Progressive Party, Democratic Party, National Resistance Movement, Democratic Party and Conservative Party	PYPA Beneficiaries (Uganda)
29	David Sinsubuga	Ecological Party Uganda (EPU)	Vice President of EPU
30	Discent Collins	MDC	Youth Secretary General
31	Elisabeth Jossai	Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)	PYPA Participant (Mozambique)
32	Emmanuel Rukundo	African National Congress (ANC)	PYPA Participant (South Africa)
33	Emmy Otim	Christian Democratic International Centre (KIC)	Regional Manager for Eastern Africa
34	Eugene van Kemanade	Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy	Country Representative Uganda
35	Fahami Matsawily Juma	Chadema	PYPA Participant (Tanzania)
36	Frank Habineza	Africa Greens Federation (AGF)	Chairperson of AGF as well as GF's project coordinator for AGF
37	Jon Hogman	Education and Training Unit (ETU)	Intern
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39	Julisiza Mengiseni	Chadema	PYPA Participant (Tanzania)
40	Kelvin Kuanda	Africa Greens Federation (AGF)	AGF Regional Coordinator
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42	Mandaza Gideon	MDC	PYPA Participant (Zimbabwe)
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44	Margareth Birungi	National Democratic Institute	Programme Officer - Parliament and Dialogue
45	Mathabi Shange	African National Congress (ANC)	PYPA Participant (South Africa)
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47	Meleney Tembo	Education and Training Unit (ETU)	Senior trainer and facilitator of PYPA
48	Monica Johansson	Christian Democratic International Centre (KIC)	Learning Evaluators
49	Mvusi Mdala	African National Congress (ANC)	Learning coordinator
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52	Nicolas de Torrente	Democratic Governance Facility	Component Manager
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56	Robina K. Nanyunja	Ecological Party Uganda (EPU)	President of EPU and Treasurer of AGF
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58	Sadat Maseruka	African National Congress (ANC)	PYPA Participant (South Africa)
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66	Catalina Hoyos	Embassy of Sweden	National Program Officer
67	Claudia Flores	Partido Comunista Colombiana (PCC)	Project coordinator and national financial officer of the PCC
68	Emma Nilenfors	Embassy of Sweden	Councillor/Head of Development Cooperation
69	Felipe Botero	Universidad de los Andes	Associate professor at the Faculty for Social Sciences
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72	Isabel Meza	Juventud Comunista (JUCO)	Youth School Coordinator
73	Juan Pablo Montero	Partido Comunista Colombiana (PCC)	Regional Projects coordinator
74	Luz Elena Martinez Valencia	Partido Comunista Colombiana (PCC)	Party member and assistant during women's seminars
75	Magnolia Agudela	Partido Comunista Colombiana (PCC)	National Responsible for PCC's Women's Department
76	Mario Ruiz	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	Programme Officer
77	Mayra Ortiz	Partido Comunista Colombiana (PCC)	Member of Women's department of PCC and Bogota Coordinator
78	Pontus Rosenberg	Embassy of Sweden	Councillor / Deputy Head of Mission
79	Rubiel Vargas	Partido Comunista Colombiana (PCC)	PCC School Responsible
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81	Elena Chebanenko	Transparency International Ukraine	
82	Iryna Bezkorovayna	British Embassy Kyiv	Policy Officer, Events and Projects
83	Juan Manuel Vilaplana Lopez	Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine.	Political Officer, Political Section
84	Katya Bykova	British Embassy Kyiv	Policy Officer
85	Mario Mitre	National Democratic Institute (NDI)	Deputy Country Director
86	Michael R. Druckman	International Republican Institute (IRI)	Resident Country Director
87	Mustafa Sait-Ametov	East Europe Foundation (EEF)	Program Development Manager
88	Olga Shavarova	East Europe Foundation (EEF)	Program Coordinator
89	Tetyana Bilyavska	National Democratic Institute (NDI)	Women Lead Program, Assistant / Interpreter
90	Viktor Liakh	East Europe Foundation (EEF)	President
91	Vitalia Deriabina	National Democratic Institute (NDI)	Political Party and Parliamentary Program Manager
92	Yana Kazakova	National Democratic Institute (NDI)	Women Lead, Senior Program

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Tunisia			
94	Abdelkader Zitouni	Tunisie Verte (TV)	National Coordinator
95	Filali Mlaieeh	Tunisie Verte (TV)	Secretary General
96	Meryam Fatnassi	Afek Tounes (AT)	International Coordinator
97	Khalid Fourati	Afek Tounes (AT)	Party Member
98	1	Afek Tounes (AT)	
99	1	Afek Tounes (AT)	
100	1	Afek Tounes (AT)	
101	Mohamed Jmour	Parti des Patriotes Démocrates Unifié (PPDU)	Vice Secretary General
102	1	Parti des Patriotes Démocrates Unifié (PPDU)	
103	Meryem Mili	Al Joumouhri (AJ)	Party Member
104	Sahbi Grira	Al Joumouhri (AJ)	Party Member
105	Sami Razgallah	Ettakatol	Party Member
106	Mahmoud Baroudi	Alliance Démocratique	former MP
107	Wim Borremans	National Democratic Institute (NDI)	Senior Political Program Manager
108	Maaïke Van der Werf (remote)	Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD)	?
109	Abdelbasset Ben Hassen	Arab Institute for Human Rights	President
110	Nejib Jeridi	Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD)	Program Manager
111	Olivier Pierre Louveaux	Parliamentary Development & Constitutional Support. Support to the Constitutional Process, the National Assembly and the National Dialogue, United Nations Development Program	Adviser
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113	Riccardo Barranca	Support to the Electoral Process in Tunisia,	Project Coordinator
114	Carlos Valenzuela	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	Senior UN Electoral expert
115	Costanza Lucangeli	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	Operations Advisor – Elections

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Annex 4 – Evaluation Matrix

Eavluation Criteria (as per OECD-DAC)	Evaluation question inthe ToR	Sub-guding questions from ToR	Suggested revised evaluation question	Indicator	Source
Relevance (The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies)	Overall question: To what extent are the supported programmes/initiatives elewant and in line with the Strategy objectives?	A full mapping of actors related to type, volumes, geography, women, and youth wings, use of ICT	R.1) To what extent is the PAO support aligned with the Strategy Objectives and requirements?	Alignment at objective and output level	Individual PAO programme documents; PAO mapping exercise
		Actors relevance to context?	R.2) To what extent are the PAO programmes relevant to the political contexts in the countries of implementation	Alignment between needs identified and support provided	PAO programme context analysis; external country analyses; interviews with ressource persons
		Local ownership?	R.3) Is the PAO support implemented based on thorough cotextual analysis and capacity assessment of partner organisations? And involvement of the same in the process?	Reference to context in programme document; confirmation of relevance by PAO partners; confirmation by externals	PAO programme documents; case studies; key informant interviews

ANNEX 4 – EVALUATION MATRIX

Eavluation Criteria (as per OECD-DAC)	Evaluation question in the ToR	Sub-guiding questions from ToR	Suggested revised evaluation question	Indicator	Source
Efficiency (A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results)		Is the division of the two focus areas (work streams) adequate? And what is the implication of the division? Synergies between the two areas?	Ey.1) Does the division of the programme into two work streams and the division between the two contribute to improving programme performance?	Evidence of synergies between workstreams; evidence of results in both work streams	Programme documents from PAO and other partners; MSC methods; case studies; key informant interviews
		How well coordinated have the different programmes been?	Ey.2) Are the interventions harmonised and complementary to other party support?	Complementarity of programme versus parallel initiatives; degree of planned and coordinated implementation	Programme documents from PAO and other partners; case studies; key informant interviews
		Efficiency/effectiveness of geographic focus and spread of the programme?	Ey.3) Is the scope and scale of the programme the most appropriate in terms of achieving results?	Assessment of results versus number of interventions across the case studies. Mapping of countries against results overall	Responses to Es questions and programme mapping
		To what extent has donor harmonisation and coordination with other actors occurred?	<i>Addressed above</i>		
		How does PAO follow-up on projects? Is an RBM approach being used?	Ey.4) Does the programme apply results-based management	M&E systems and evidence of follow-up	Progress reports; field mission reports; decision-minutes; key informant interviews
			Ey.5) Are the PAO programmes designed to address and manage potential and actual risks?	Evidence of risk management strategy; evidence of actions taken to address risks during course of implementation	Programme documents; key informant interviews
Impact (Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended) NOTE: ToR focus is on outputs and short-term results?	Overall question: What has worked well, main challenges and how to deal with these challenges in the future?		<i>Will be dealt with under effectiveness questions</i>		
	Any unforeseen and unanticipated results/experiences influencing the programmes?		I.1) What are the short-term expected and unexpected outcomes of the PAO support?	To be identified	Key informant interviews; party document reviews; case studies
Sustainability (The continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed. The probability of continued long-term benefits. The resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time.) NOTE: not addressed in the ToR			S.1) To what extent are the documented outputs and short-term outcomes sustainable?	Evidence of continuation of outputs contributing to outcomes beyond PAO support period. Evidence of ownership of outputs by beneficiaries	Key informant interviews; party document reviews; MSC methods; case studies

Eavluation Criteria (as per OECD-DAC)	Evaluation question inthe ToR	Sub-guding questions from ToR	Suggested revised evaluation question	Indicator	Source
Effectiveness (The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance)	Overall question: Capture and make an assessment of results, outputs and short-term outcomes of PAO programmes during the Strategy period (2012-2014)	Weakness and strength of having two focus areas (work streams)?	Es. 1) To what extent does the PAO support contribute to the development of well-functioning democratic political parties in developing countries?	Evidence of improved capacities of PAO recipient organisations; evidence of increased democratic performance of parties (internal elections process, dialogue opportunities, transparency, equal opportunities). Evidence of accountabilities and transparency to the constituency	Key informant interviews; MSC documentation; case studies; party documentation (code, business rules, minutes etc)
	Has the support contributed to improving the conditions for agents of change to work towards increased democratisation and improved human rights as intended by the strategy?	What role does PAO support play in fragile democracies?	Es.2) To what extent does the PAO support contribute to well-functioning multi-party systems on democratic terms in developing countries?	Evidence of enhanced multifaceted party system; vocal role of new parties (organisations)	Key informant interviews; case studies; background studies; press briefs
	Has the support created opportunities and freedom for individuals and groups in developing countries to organise political parties or civil society organisations in order to practice political influence in decision-making processes		Es.3) To what extent is the PAO support effective in contributing to results in fragile environments?	Evidence of enhanced capacities and democratic practices of parties in fragile contexts and the use of conflict sensitive policies.	Key informant interviews; case studies; background studies; press briefs
		How well does the programme work with targeted you and women, LGBTI and religious minorities? Results?	Es.4) To what extent does the PAO support contribute to equal opportunities for women and men?	Number of parties with equal opportunity policies; number of female to male ratio as members as well as leading positions in parties; no. Of women engaged in policy development	Key informant interviews; MSC methods; case studies; background studies; press briefs
			Es.5) Does programme address LGBTI and religious minority issues	Evidence of activities specific to LGBTI and religious minority issues; no. and quality of policies and decisions related to LGBTI and religious minorities	Key informant interviews; case studies; background studies; press briefs
		How does the PAO support compare to other programmes?	Es.6) How does the PAO support compare to other programmes?	Major differences from comparative study of evaluations and relevant research	Evaluation of similar programmes; key informant interviews
			Es.7) Is the PAO support implemented in accordance with the Human Rights-Based Approach?	Evidence of transparency, accountability, participation and non-discrimination	Programme documents; key informant interviews

Annex 5 - Comparative study of PAO support

Introduction:

Ever since transitions to democracy transformed Latin America, Eastern and Central Europe as well as parts of Africa and Asia in late 1980s and early 1990s, support for political parties have figured in the portfolios of most donor agencies active in the field of democracy support. Such support has been a natural complement to much bigger efforts in the fields of governance and civil society support. Still, the inherently political nature of such assistance has led to a situation in which it is being implemented in a number of different ways, and often with considerable apprehension for its organisation and results.

In general, direct assistance to political parties is much smaller in financial terms than the adjacent sectors of governance and civil society support, and also than indirect means of working with issues relating to political parties, such as election support. Similarly, there are fewer studies about political party assistance, and previous experiences offer few firm conclusions. Nevertheless, we will in the following pages attempt to deduce some general lessons from what studies there are, and also discuss different modalities of political party assistance with their respective pros and cons. We will separate the latter according to provider (whether a political party or not) and to recipient (whether a single party or multiple parties) (cf. Ugglå et al. 2000). Some observers claim to see a move towards more multi-party approaches in recent years (Svåsand forthcoming), and, the question of how support to political parties is organised is a key aspect to consider.

The Swedish PAO support:

When the current Swedish system for PAO assistance was set up in the mid-1990s, it chose a model entirely based on the Swedish political parties as providers of support to sister parties in new democracies. Accordingly, the Swedish parties set up foundations to administer this support, and these constitute the PAOs (party-affiliated organisations) proper. From a very modest beginning (some 14 MSEK each year shared by all parties represented in the Swedish Riksdag), the support has grown to its current size of almost 80 MSEK annually. Moreover, several PAOs have other development projects and thus additional funding sources.

In spite of its small size, the PAO support has been subject to frequent independent overviews and evaluations. A first overview was performed in 1997 and the first sys-

tematic evaluation was undertaken in 2000 (Uggla et al. 2000), after which followed an overview in 2004-5 (Öhman et al. 2005), and another systematic evaluation performed in 2009 (SADEV 2009). In addition, some PAOs have commissioned their own evaluations of their work, and Sida has commissioned a number of more regular overviews.

Some general points are raised in these studies. Most reports are appreciative of the close and confident contacts established between the Swedish and foreign partners, and note how these may enable PAOs to work to effect change from “within” to a larger extent than a multi-party approach would (SADEV 2009, see also Uggla et al. 2000). But while some results have been noted at lower levels (individuals and the recipient political parties), evaluators have generally failed to confirm effects on higher levels beyond the sister parties themselves (i.e., in the party system or on political development in general). Indeed, most are sceptical about whether the support in its current form can even hope to have much effect. As notes the 2009 evaluation in its conclusions; in most projects “prospects for longer term impact on the party system [are] quite dim” (SADEV 2009, viiii).

There are a number of reasons for this. The evaluations and overviews generally note that the current PAO systems means that funds are spread to a large number of organisations that, although they have a clear connection to political life in Sweden, may in many cases be lacking in capabilities when it comes to development cooperation (as well as aspects such as results-based management for instance) and analysis of international events, not least because of their small size. Likewise, the sister party approach is sometimes seen to preclude a more open strategic analysis of needs and possibilities in each country (Uggla et al. 2000; SADEV 2009), as well as making more coordinated approaches more difficult, even though this may be necessary to achieve results beyond the individual sister parties.

Accordingly, the previous studies have commonly recommended that the PAO support should be coordinated with other Swedish development assistance to a larger extent (Uggla et al. 2000), that information sharing should be enhanced (e.g. Öhman et al 2005; SADEV 2009), activities concentrated to fewer recipient countries (e.g. SADEV 2009), and that the process for application and allocation of funds be reconsidered. Likewise, the creation of a joint instance of support and overview of the PAOs’ work have been suggested (e.g. Uggla et al. 2000).

PAO support in Sida’s work:

It should be noted, however, that the PAO support is not the only support for parties in new democracies that Sweden provides. The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), funds projects from all four modalities as described below. Apart from the PAO support, Sida uses the following:

- Provision of direct funding to individual parties cum liberation movements opposing authoritarian rule (e.g. to ANC during its struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa).

- Funding PAOs to work with political parties outside of the PAO strategy. Both individual cooperation strategies (such as the regional MENA one for 2010-2015), and global strategies (such as the Special Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 2014-2017) instruct Sida to provide support to political parties with popular roots (*folkligt förankrade*), and democratic multi-party systems, respectively, and in some cases it is the Swedish PAOs that implement such projects.

- Funding non-political entities to work with political parties. In Bolivia and Colombia for instance, Sida has supported UNDP-run projects that provide party system funding. In both cases, such work has combined multi-party activities with specific programs for the participating parties. In difference to the above evaluations of the PAO support proper, external evaluations of these projects have generally been positive as to what regards their relevance and results, both at the level of individual parties and in the democratic system in general (Jessup, Hayek-Wienmann and Laserna 2013; Ballón 2009; Sojo and Rosales 2013).

In total, the amounts of disbursed Sida funds classified as going to “legislature and political parties” (which includes the PAO support proper), amounted to 123 MSEK in 2011, and 85 and 93 MSEK in 2012 and 2013 respectively (evidence from Sida’s LIS-system).

Also, Sida obviously provides funds for indirect support to political parties, just as other donors do. In financial terms, such funding overshadows party support by far. For instance, in 2012 and 2013 Sida alone provided 211 MSEK and 173 MSEK in electoral support (LIS-reports). While these are large sums, they still pale in comparison to the amounts provided by other actors. For instance, during the period 2007-2013, the European Union provided almost 500 M Euros in electoral assistance alone (De Vrieze 2014).

Such indirect support should be kept in mind when considering political party assistance. It is directed to processes that are central to the workings of political parties (elections, parliaments, etc.), and often involves components of working directly with political parties as beneficiaries or at least as auxiliary agents. Due to its size and as it concerns central democratic processes directly, it could be that such and indirect support is actually of equal or even greater importance for party life in a country than an approach that works only with the political parties.

When taking an even broader view, the funds provided to adjacent areas, such as “Democratic Participation and Civil Society” is almost incomparable to political party assistance. In 2013, Sida provided over 2 billion SEK to this sector, and that figure is likely to increase substantially for 2014.

Paradoxically, activities in these areas are to a certain degree dependent on political parties (as these are the primary vehicles for democratic participation). This can lead to two different conclusions: One, presented by Svåsand (forthcoming), for instance, is that current political party assistance is justifiable in spite of its problems, due to the fact that it is so relevant in light of the massive amount of civil society funding. The opposite view, however, would stress that precisely because it is of such tremendous strategic importance for other activities, there is a clear need to ensure that political party assistance works well, and to endeavour to find the modalities most propitious to this result. Additionally, the strategic importance of political party support could be a call for closer coordination between this support form and the broader area of support to civil society, governance and democratic participation, coordination which the current set-up of PAO support precludes to a large extent (by placing responsibility for political party assistance with seven relatively small organisations with a large degree of independence when it comes to planning and strategic analysis).

MODALITIES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORT

Providers:

Sweden's PAOs are some amongst several other organisations delivering programs of political party assistance in emerging, developing and/or post-conflict democracies across the world.

The leading entities in party support were established in the 1980s and 1990s following the so-called third wave of democratisation, with the exception of the German Stiftungen that date back to several decades earlier. The German Stiftungen are affiliated to German parliamentary parties (but funded by the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) and thus represent the same provider modality as the Swedish PAOs, namely organisations that are close to individual political parties, but who handle funds from national development cooperation budgets (often in proportion to their parliamentary representation in the home country). Similarly, the United States' National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) were both established in 1980s, and receive most of their funding from the US private, non-profit foundation, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

A different model consists in organisations that, although they have connection to the party systems in their respective countries, represent these in their entirety, rather than individual parties. For instance, the United Kingdom's Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) was established in 1992 and is funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the Netherlands' Netherlands Institute for Multi-Party Democracy (NIMD) was founded in 2000 by seven Dutch political parties and is mainly funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Likewise, Den-

mark's Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD) was established in May 2010 and is a more recent addition to the field of party support.

There are, of course, a number of other entities providing political party support. These include the UNDP, the European Commission, and International IDEA.

Recipients:

In spite of their different origins, all the above entities essentially work towards the same overarching goal of facilitating the better functioning of democratic systems in fragile countries through political party support. How they do this can be divided into two broad modalities:

1. Programs aimed at a single party.

The typical program focus of such initiatives is on improving parties' internal democratic practices (organisation, representativeness) as well as enhancing outreach and campaigning skills (constituency work, advocacy, electioneering). However, as they are aimed at individual parties with specific needs, these programs tend to vary considerably between different parties, wherefore it is difficult to generalise about contents.

Initiatives aimed at single parties can be provided either by organisations tied to political parties (the Swedish PAO support for instance or the work of the German Stiftungen for instance), or by non-affiliated organisations. While party-to-party partnership founded on ideological affinity between the implementing and beneficiary parties tend to be the most common modality in support to individual parties, there are actually examples of the latter variety, such as support for liberation movements organised as political parties (e.g., the ANC in South Africa).

Advantages:

Proponents of the single-party approach (which is the dominant one in the Swedish PAO support) claim that the shared ideological ground that commonly underpins such program partnerships maximises effectiveness, mutual confidence, and scope for impact. The assumption is that the partners' meeting of minds will generate higher levels of trust between the supply and demand sides of support and that this will be more likely to lead to effective collaboration. The party foundations delivering such programs also claim to have a better understanding of beneficiary parties' needs and how to meet them on account of their own historical development within the same political tradition. Needless to say, shared political ideology also helps a great deal where program relevance is concerned, and may enhance the interest of the recipient parties in the program to begin with. Similarly, another advantage to single-party approach is the peer-to-peer dynamic it brings to programs of political party support, which can be a real asset to the effective uptake of program inputs because politicians are more likely to take heed of advice from other politicians rather than that from a technocrat or academic.

Disadvantages:

The party-to-party benefits hinge on the assumption that ideologically distinguishable (and compatible) parties exist in countries of interventions. But in most new democracies, the reality is different (Bader 2010). Party ideology and programmes are usually underdeveloped, and politics (and the electorate) tend to be dominated by leadership personalities. In such cases, several of the above benefits may not be forthcoming, or in the worst of cases, the project and its benefits may even be hijacked by individuals to promote their own welfare rather than the general good. In addition, the single party approach also runs the risk of treading the fine line between providing capacity building support to a party and interfering in the domestic politics of a country. Given that the principle of non-interference is one which international organisations and donor countries uphold and rely on to legitimise their aid programs, this is not a negligible issue. While providing support through an intermediary (such as the PAOs) may be a way to circumvent such risks, this distinction is often likely to be lost (in our meetings with PAO partners, for instance, it was often quite clear that they saw support as Swedish above all).

2. Multilateral programs to several parties.

These programs are characteristically more inclusive, seeking to involve most political parties across the political spectrum on an equal footing. Typically, these programs are designed for all parliamentary parties, but in certain cases, can include extra-parliamentary, marginal parties depending on the country of intervention and the fluidity of the political context. Multi-party programs tend to focus on four main areas: multiparty dialogue, civil society partnership, legal frameworks (e.g. party and electoral laws), and the development of knowledge products (DPID 2013, 9). These programs can be delivered both by party affiliated organisations such as NDI and IRI, or by non-party affiliated organisations such as the UNDP.

Advantages:

The multilateral approach is less controversial as it seeks to provide more distinctly non-partisan support to parties across (and beyond) parliaments in order to strengthen capacity, facilitate inter-party dialogue and promote a culture of consensual politics in the party system in question. Trainings and activities can be delivered to all parties in one country together or separately. Either way, the form, substance and scale of party support remains the same for each party involved in such a multi-party program. This preserves the principle of political neutrality, and also ensures that multilateral programs aim to go beyond individuals and single parties in their design, and to reach the party system as a whole. Hence, issues such as party cooperation and dialogue can be addressed in a more direct way than is the case in single-party support. Perhaps for this reason, there is some evidence to suggest that multi-party work may lead to more results than activities aimed at individual parties (e.g., Netherlands IOB 2011).

Disadvantages:

However, there are also drawbacks to the multi-party approach. The first is that its scope of action is limited because the “lowest common denominator” logic of cross party support leads program content to be generic and technical, rather than policy-

oriented for example. This can stifle the potential for party support interventions to have more meaningful impact, and it also poses the challenge of sustaining stakeholder buy-in. In a sense, there is an element of zero-sum/winner-takes-all contest to representative democracy, which may heighten inter-party distrust and make individual parties less interested and engaged in programs where they derive no apparent added benefit or competitive edge relative to other parties. One way to manage this challenge is to keep program expectations low and ambitions modest. NIMD's interparty dialogue platform in Uganda made a point of instilling relatively modest benchmarks for success from the outset in order to manage stakeholder expectations and maintain their involvement in the platform (GPG 2014 [?], 5).

3. Mixed programs:

In addition to the two previous modalities, there are mixed programs that combine both modalities of support and deliver programs that combine work with the entire party system with individual projects targeted to specific parties. This appears to be the common *modus operandi* of organisations such as WFD and DIPD, but also occurs in programs such as the ones by UNDP with Sida funding in Colombia and Bolivia, as discussed above.

Advantages:

The main advantage of the mixed approach is that it can address a broader range of themes (both cross-party dialogue and the internal needs of specific parties), than can either of the above approaches. Through their work with individual projects, program staff may construct confidence and knowledge about the parties, which can then feed into the multi-party work. Likewise, the component of individually tailored actions can ensure that parties maintain an active interest in the program, even as it raises themes at a more general level. Thus, such programs have the potential to become important points of reference in a party system in general (e.g. Jessup, Hayek-Wienmann and Laserna 2013). Likewise, while there may be some questions as to how resources should be allocated within the program (*ibid.*), such broad-based programs could be seen as more politically neutral than single-party ones, even as they involve working directly with individual parties.

Disadvantages:

However, there are also some risks involved with the mixed approach. There is the risk that single- and multiparty approaches working in the same context end up in conflict with each other. For instance, this potential risk could be anticipated by the 2013 DIPD mid-term review (MTR) which discussed how its set-up “could be perceived as undermining the cross-party trust essential to multi-party, egalitarian programs” (DIPD 2013, 7). Likewise, there is the risk of creating tension between organisation staff and political parties if the delineation of respective roles in implementing the two types of support is not clear. This problem arises when there is discord or lack of clarity as to who should do what, and there may be disagreements between political parties on the extent to which programs could be non-partisan and, by that meas-

ure, the extent to which political parties were willing to engage in multi-party programs (e.g. NORAD 2010, xv).

Common Challenges to Political Party Support:

Regardless of the modality employed, often the end product ends up looking the same (Carothers 2004, 7). By that same measure, organisations tend to be confronted with the same challenges in their delivery and performance.

Problems related to Relevance:

Given the complicated, sensitive and inherently political nature of party support, it is not surprising that considerations related to relevance appear frequently in evaluations and studies of such assistance. In particular, the drive to work in many different countries requires a very wide scope of country and regional expertise, which is not always available to organisations. Even in cases of ideologically matched party-to-party partners that share a lot of political ideals in common, the country context and culture—especially in the case of emerging- and post-conflict democracies—is likely to hold incredible weight for the political trajectory and hence of the project’s implementation and relevance.

Some organisations will invest more time and have more resources in acclimatising themselves (and tailoring their programs) to the recent and current political conditions of the country they choose to work in. This can be done through several scoping missions (NIMD Uganda) or extensive consultations with local experts and other international organisations working in the field. Likewise, setting up a local presence (which the larger German and US organisation regularly have, for instance) and having qualified local staff is crucial in this respect, and allows for such organisations to stay abreast of events on the ground and sustain the relationships underpinning the effectiveness of their programs (Netherlands IOB 2011).

However, in many cases, the preparation and acculturation of the implementing organisation is limited. For instance, the 2014 review of Norwegian democracy support via political parties attest to this, claiming that it has often lacked a deeper understanding of the context in which the support operates, and thus did not fully understand the power-relations that it was dealing with (Braathen and Holm-Hansen 2014).

Problems related to Impact:

Generally speaking, reviewers of political party support tend to be sceptical about its effects, particularly at the system level. A recent overview of the subject by Lars Svåsand (commissioned by the Swedish Expert Group on Development Analysis), claims that such support has “been controversial because it has proved hard to demonstrate that it has positive effects” (Svåsand forthcoming, 5). While this author primarily attributes this to the methodological problems related to attribution of effects, others have claimed to see this as a result of specificities involved in political

party assistance per se. Hence, in one of the few academic studies on the subject, Max Bader claims that there is reason to be less than optimistic about the possibilities of political party assistance in contexts of weakly institutionalised parties and less than democratic systems, as parties tend to fill a different role in such contexts than they do in established democracies. For current leaders such a situation, although sub-optimal in general terms, may actually be preferable to change, wherefore the system is likely to be stable and resistant to change in a democratising direction (Bader 2010; cf. Nimd Evaluation). Although initial efforts at party assistance in Central Europe may well have yielded positive results, “now that those ‘easy’ cases of transition have been completed, providers overwhelmingly work in countries with less sanguine prospects for democratization and stable party development”, which means that “a re-consideration of the purpose and the strategies of party assistance now seems an imperative” (ibid., 1101; cf. Svåsand forthcoming, appendix A).

Going beyond such general points, however, there is actually a large debate about how to measure and attribute results in this kind of support. Indeed, the problem of measuring party assistance impact and devising the right indicators to capture the messy, incremental and long-term aspects of political change afflicts all organisations, regardless of the volume of their funding (cf. Svåsand forthcoming).

The 2010 Wilton Park Conference addressed the issue of developing better monitoring and evaluation procedures for party assistance, and DIPD followed up on this initiative in 2013 with its Study on Results Framework which concluded that the log-frame approach, which is the conventional tool for impact measurement, is “simply not suited to measuring the progress and impact of political party programming” (IPP 2011, 18, cf. De Vrieze 2014).

Problems relating to Efficiency and Effectiveness:

For political party support organisations, the challenge of how to ensure value for money and cost efficiency is particularly acute as most have a limited staff and core funding to administer party support projects. The 2014 Review of Norwegian democracy support through political parties summarises this issue well stating that “projects are not cost efficient (because) the total funding is too small” and because Norad spends too much time on bureaucratic requirements, and parties too many on resources, relative to the size of the projects (Braathen and Holm-Hansen 2014, 31). Part of the problem comes from the increasing donor oversight of programs of party support and the requirement to demonstrate results quickly. This can push certain organisations to work in far too many countries and establish far too many programs relative to their capacities, which of course bears relation to what was said above about the need to ensure sufficient local presence and knowledge.

On a different point, it is often noted that a clear division of responsibilities and tasks amongst different groups of stakeholders in organisations providing party support is crucial to their effective functioning. Yet in this respect there seem to be scope for improvement in several programs of party support, as noted in one evaluation which

discussed how in the model previously followed in Norway, “allocation of resources were left to the parties themselves” (Norad 2010, 46). Likewise, the delineation of roles between the DIPD Board and Secretariat is also unclear according to the 2013 MTR stating that “the secretariat’s role in advising on party to party projects has been larger than originally anticipated, making it hard to draw a clear line between the Board’s role of steering and guiding the overall direction of the Institute and that of the Secretariat in developing and implementing programs” (DIPD 2013, 8).

Conclusion:

In sum, then, there are a number of doubts about the relevance, efficiency and impact of political party support. While they do not affect all programs active in the area to the same extent, the general conclusion that emerges from a review of available reports and evaluation it is that such assistance is a complicated matter that often requires a high-degree of local presence and understanding of local power-relations. Even when such competence is present, however, it is no guarantee that party support will succeed, as such power-relations may be highly resistant to change. Beyond such general statements, however, it is difficult to derive any firm points or advice from existing studies and evaluations. While they raise a number of important points to consider, they are also dealing with a set of programs, implementing agents, and contexts that are highly diverse, which makes general conclusions difficult to attain.

Annex 6 – PAO Mapping

The mapping of the PAO support has been elaborated based on the PAOs' programme applications; Sida grant documents; PAO programme reporting; and other mid-term evaluations and studies carried out by the PAOs⁴⁴.

The mapping is first and foremost an attempt to create an overview and understanding of the PAO support and should also help guide the evaluation, by showing tendencies that can be looked into and explored.

The mapping finally, serves as a guide to help select the appropriate countries for field visit and further case studies.

⁴⁴ There were a number of limitations and factors influencing the mapping, as presented below:

- With regards to tracking the scope of the financial support going to the different programmes and thus to the various geographical regions has been challenged by a few factors:
 - The PAO support has gone from project to programme support in the current Strategy, which means going from a more country-based project support type to both global and regional programmes. This means that it is less clear how much funding goes to a specific country.
 - The structure and quality of the financial reporting varies a lot among the PAOs, and sometimes the administration costs of a programme are included, whilst other types are separate allowing for a clearer picture of geographical disbursement. To the extent possible the PAO organisational administration costs have not been included in the financial mapping.
- The overview presented in this chapter gives an indicative picture of the geographical distribution of the PAO support but does not at the same time include the scope of the financial support given to each particular country. This means that it also shows programme activity in a country, even though that activity has been little, indirect or at a pilot stage (i.e. if participants from a country have attended a training held in a neighbouring country).
- Another influencing factor to the mapping of countries where PAO programmes operate has been the difficulty in analysing the data available. Sometimes the PAO programme application would indicate an intention to work in a country, yet during the programme course challenges in that particular country did not allow actual work to take place or funding to be channelled. The programme operations are dynamic and this picture is therefore a snapshot of the reality based on the information available.

In conclusion, as the Team has not had access to reliable data on disbursements by country, the mapping, instead, uses data on programme locations, i.e., in which countries different programmes are active. As several programmes may be active in one single country, this figure incorporates a certain measure of cooperation intensity.

The overall findings show that the PAO Strategy is extensive, both in its number of programmes as well as its geographical outreach.

Work Streams VO1 and VO2

The mapping shows that the PAO financial support is distributed 65% through the VO1 work stream and 35% through the VO2 work stream (see figure 1). This is somewhat in line with the envisaged 30/70 division.




Figure 1 – Financial support through each work

Financial Distribution in the PAO Strategy

Whilst getting the financial data⁴⁵ per country was not possible, figure 3 presents a percentage distribution of the funding to different geographical areas⁴⁶. What is evident from this finding is that Eastern Europe (36%) is the main recipient region for the funding, followed closely by Africa (35%). All the PAOs are working in Eastern Europe, while the programmes in Africa are rather large in scope and funding (i.e. PYPA and AGF). Hereafter the finding shows that the third largest recipient is so-called ‘Global Activities’ (17%), which




Figure 3 – Financial distribution per geographical

⁴⁵ The financial data from PYPA West Africa 2012 and 2013 was not included as ‘actual costs’ but instead the team used the budgeted costs, also the VIF’s VO1 and VO2 programmes for 2012 financial data was not included. When these are added the picture will change a bit.

⁴⁶ Programme management and administrative costs were not included, to the extent possible, which means that the actual financial size of the programmes are different in reality. This mapping attempts to illustrate the money that is disburse directly to the programme in a particular country or region.

encompasses programmes⁴⁷ that cannot be attributed to a particular geographical region. Latin America (10%) accounts for a relative minor part of the funding and finally, it can be seen that the regions that receive the least percentage of the funding are by far Asia (1%) and the MENA region (1%).

Figure 4 shows the financial distribution per PAO. The distribution shows that two PAOs (OPC and JHS) receive more than 23% each, three PAOs

(CIS, KIC and SILC) account for around 12-17% each, while GF receive 8% VIF is the smallest recipient with 3%⁴⁸.




Figure 4 – Financial Distribution per PAO.

In Annex 7 is an overview of the geographical financial distribution for each PAO. The findings show that four PAOs (JHS, KIC, GF and VIF) work regionally in their programmes, while CIS, SILC and OPC have programmes that are global. GF, VIF, KIC and CIS have more than 50% of their financial disbursement in Africa. SILC does have any programmes in Africa, and JHS only has one. JHS, VIF and GF are the only organisations working in Africa (see also Annex 6).

Joint Collaboration

The desk study illustrates that some of the programmes under the PAO Strategy are carried out in joint collaboration between several of the PAOs. This is the case for the large PYPA programme in Africa, which has KIC as the main responsible organisation of the overall programme as well as being responsible for the Eastern African region. OPC is responsible for Southern Africa and CIS (with GF as a junior partner) is responsible for the Western African part of the programme. In another case, SILC is the lead partner cooperating with OPC, GF and CIS.

⁴⁷ Two OPC programmes “From Weapons to Ballot” and “Authoritarian and Post-Authoritarian States” as well as a CIS Sister party programme are included under ‘global activities’, making up a substantial percentage. This is due to the fact that these programmes support countries in several geographical areas (Africa, Asia, MENA, and Eastern Europe).

⁴⁸ Note that this distribution is to the extent possible excluding purely management and administrative costs.

Type of PAO Partner

The desk study of the PAO programmes clearly shows that political parties are the main chosen partners for the PAOs making up 57% of all partners. Networks/Forums/Federations make up the second most chosen type of partner in the PAO programmes.

Table 1 - Type of PAO Partner

Type of partner	Number	Percentage
Political party	58	57%
Network/Forum/Federation	13	13%
International organisation	8	8%
Youth Wing/Organisation	7	7%
Training Institute/Capacity development centre	5	5%
CSO, grassroots movement	5	5%
Women's organisation/Party	3	3%
Union	2	2%

Target Group and Crosscutting issues

A preliminary mapping of PAO activities in the period 2012 to 2014 suggests that the overwhelming majority of programmes have targeted youth and women as key beneficiary groups into their design. Close to all PAO programmes mention women and or youth in their programmes, either in their programme objectives or in their activities. When looking specifically at PAO partners around 10% of all partners are either a youth or women-specific partner. It is important that keeping in mind that the cooperation with the political parties might include internal divisions for women, youth or indigenous people.

To a lesser extent - and where relevant - additional target groups and programme themes have been in social media and ICT as well as LGBTI, indigenous and other minority group rights. Particular programmes in Latin America mention the issue of indigenous rights, and the issue of LGBTI is particularly spelled out in Programmes in Eastern Europe. A few programmes have carried out trainings particularly focusing on ICT, i.e. 'using social media'.

Focus areas for support to political parties and multiparty systems

When studying the objectives of the various programmes the following tendencies emerged:

For VO1 programmes, the absolute main objective is to strengthen sister parties' internal capacity and management. This is by far the most common focus area in the PAO programmes. This area includes strengthening a democratic culture within the parties to increase participation and legitimacy. Some programmes included specific

attention to good governance, democratic leadership and HRBA. From an organisational aspect, this focus area also includes strengthening the political parties abilities to work in an effective way. From a conceptual perspective, some of the programmes focus on strengthening the parties' political identity, or their political ideology hereunder their ability to communicate this to their voters.

In relation to this a common feature in the programme objectives was the high focus on pluralism and increased participation of women and youth both in the political parties as well as in politics. The key words in the objectives are 'increasing/strengthening participation' and 'inclusion'. Four programmes specifically included youth in their objective, three programmes included women and one included 'marginalised groups'. One programme (PYPA) solely targets youth and another (Equality and women's participation in Asia and MENA, VIF) specifically women.

Another prevalent feature in the focus areas of the programmes is the aspect of network building and regional cooperation, which is found in several programmes. This includes developing, consolidating and strengthening networks as well as promotes regional exchanges and cooperation. In connection with this, the team found inter-party dialogue and cooperation being in focus in a number of programmes, both with regards to exchange of experiences but mainly in relation to creating dialogue and

building coalition, particularly in difficult contexts where opposition have to stand together. A minor focus was found in the programmes relating to supporting political activity in repressive environments, by improving conditions for parties to participate in the political debate. In connection with this, it is worth noticing that some programmes target supporting parties in participating in politics i.e. through participating in policy development, participation in reform discussions or national dialogue.

Finally, to a lesser extent, a few programmes focus on the aspect of advocacy and awareness raising regarding particular issues of concern (i.e. environment, EU integration).

Type of programme activities

In this mapping the team has identified several types of activities in the PAO programmes.

The frequency and extent to which all PAOs conduct research and analysis into their programme design is not clear on account of their varying reporting formats. Some PAOs list "pre-studies" as activities whereas others do not. From a reading of PAOs' accounts of their activities, it seems that only a minority perform rigorous feasibility studies on which to underpin their programme content.

Overall, PAO programmes deliver support in organisational capacity development, cross or intra stakeholder communication and dialogue, technical and generalised

training, and knowledge-transfer in good governance and international best democratic practice. As mentioned, a running theme throughout is youth and women's empowerment and increased participation and engagement in political processes.

The absolute most prevalent activity identified in the mapping was:

1. Capacity building through training and workshops in the following areas:

- a. Organisational focus:
- b. Strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation, organisational capacity building, financial management & reporting.
- c. Political work
- d. PR & political communication, election, alliance building, voter registration, ideology, elections & campaigns, development of policies.
- e. Conceptual
- f. Women & leadership, human rights, community dialogues, green ideology, green economy, leadership.
- g. Miscellaneous
- h. Academies, summer universities and youth summer camps

The Programmes also included a lot of activities promoting regional cooperation and networking such as:

2. Conferences

- a. Start-up conference, partner conference, regional conference.

3. Network creations

- a. Building regional federations, network-formation, creating alliances

4. Study visits

- a. For example to Sweden

5. Meetings

- a. Mediation meeting
- b. National reunion meeting
- c. Meeting mother parties
- d. Press conference

Finally, the team found activities that were related to:

6. Advocacy and awareness-raising activities

- a. Campaigns
- b. Ecological activities
- c. Demonstrations
- d. Promoting awareness and lobbying

The most common PAO activities include conferences, workshops, seminars and various forms of training and networking activities. Some PAOs report more institutionalised means of support such as with the establishment of academies, summer camps and political and democracy schools. Other wider scale networking and immersive activities include regional events, study visits to Sweden and international meetings and forums where PAO partners are given the opportunity to build relationships with their counterparts from other countries and contribute to conference output documents and activities, as well as learn from best practices. In some isolated cases, programme activities have included substantive support and advice to politicians and parties in policy and ideology development.

Annex 7 – Country Reports

- 1) South Africa
- 2) Uganda
- 3) Tunisia
- 4) Ukraine
- 5) Colombia

Country Report

South Africa

Introduction

Nadia Masri-Pedersen and Erik Bryld travelled to South Africa from 24-30 November 2014 to conduct consultations with PAO partners, beneficiaries and other stakeholders in the field to gather evidence to inform evaluation findings. In total the team held three focus group discussions with beneficiaries and 21 semi-structured interviews with a total of 26 men and 17 women.

Approach:

Semi-structured 1 to 2 hour consultations with individuals / groups using questions guide to draw findings on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of projects in country (see full inception report for overview of methodology and approach) in addition to focus group interviews with groups of beneficiaries.

Reflections and limitations

- In principle four programmes are implemented in the region. However, GF/AGF's and VIF/ALNEF's representatives are no longer reachable and the OPC's Bullets to Ballots (BtB) activities assessed by the team were to one province in South Africa (Western Cape), with limited evidence available on the ground. The main attention was thus on the PYPA programme, though specific BtB interviews were also conducted.
- Under the PYPA programme, the team interviewed the partner organisation, ETU, resource persons as well as beneficiaries in South Africa and via Skype in Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Given the limited time available, the team had to rely on the identification of interviewees by ETU, which are likely to influence the results positively. This is compensated by the fact that faults in the design also show 'best case' scenarios.
- Not all PYPA beneficiaries could be interviewed due to contextual issues, such as on-going elections in Namibia and current internal turmoil in Zanu-PF in Zimbabwe.
- The BtB programme was only looked at the provincial level of Western Cape and did not include the national level of the programme.
- A few interviews were cancelled by the interviewees.

Country Selection and Presentation:

South Africa was chosen as part of the PAO evaluation as:

- 1) It is the centre for the implementation of the PYPA programme in Southern Africa – the largest intervention under VO2 – which allows for access to the implementing partner as well as beneficiaries from South Africa.
- 2) In principle four PAO programmes are implemented in South Africa. Three under VO1 and one under VO2, which allows for evaluation coverage.

Background and Information

Three PAOs implement programmes in South Africa, with exception of the PYPA programme that extends its programme focus to neighbouring countries Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Namibia. The PAOs working in the region include OPC, GF and VIF. Please see the table (table 1) below for an overview of the programmes:

Table 2 – Overview of PAO Programmes in Southern Africa

PAO and Programme	Implementing Partner and Background for cooperation
Olof Palme Centre (OPC) – <i>Programme for Young Politicians in Africa (PYPA)</i>	In South Africa, the Education and Training Unit (ETU) is OPC's implementing partner. ETU is responsible for organising the PYPA academies with participants from the Southern African Region, including South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. The PYPA programme is based on the previous KIC programme RYPLA.
Olof Palme Centre (OPC) – <i>From Bullets to Ballot (BtB)</i>	The B2B programme is implemented at both a National Level in cooperation with national ANC as well as in Western Cape with the provincial ANC Western Cape. OPC and ANC started this cooperation based on meetings that took place in 2011. The Western Cape part of the programme assessed by the team is coordinated by the local branch of the Social Democratic Party in the city of Kalmar. The remaining national level is coordinated by OPC
Green Forum (GF) – <i>African Greens Federation (AGF)</i>	AGF does not have any office in South Africa, but the AGF coordinator responsible for Southern Africa Coordinator is based in Zambia. During this strategy period, funds were given through the AGF to a local partner, the Ecological Green Movement of Africa, however AGF never received any reporting from them and eventually also lost contact. According to GF's annual report from 2012, the South African partner was late in signing the contract and did not carry out any activities in 2012. In the 2013 annual report states that activities to start up a new green party in South Africa were undertaken, but does not report any additional information.
The Left International Forum (VIF) – <i>African Left Network Forum (ALNEF)</i>	The Team could not retrieve any information as the South Africa coordinator, according to VIF, boycotts all calls and e-mails from the ALNEF Executive Committee. This outcome should be seen in the light of a challenging internal leadership in ALNEF, limited activities in 2012 and 2013 and moving the secretariat from Mali to Senegal in late 2013.

Political context in the Southern African Region:

Below, is a short presentation of the overall region as well as the individual countries covered by the PAO programmes. The section should serve to understand the political context they operate in and the particular situation of women, youth and minority groups.

The Southern African region has since the 1990s transitioned from a one-party to a multiparty political system, with more parties today taking part in the political activities and the governance process as well as being able to contest state power through elections than just 15 years ago. Although most parties in the region still have a way to go in terms of democratising their internal party management, parties have relatively opened up to greater public scrutiny. Likewise, the centralised and authoritarian political culture is slowly opening up the political space to contestation over state power, participation of citizens in political processes and the empowerment of marginalised social groups. The only major exception in the region being Angola.

It is important to note that particularly in some countries (Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia) the liberation movement tradition has had a considerable impact on how the political parties operate today. The ending of South Africa's apartheid likewise played a crucial role in the transformation of the whole region from authoritarian rule towards multiparty political pluralism. Almost all the countries in the region, are still, however, characterised by a 'dominant party system', meaning electoral dominance for an uninterrupted and prolonged period, dominance in formation of governments and dominance in determining the public agenda. This feature is also a result of an often weak, fragmented and disorganised opposition. The dominant parties in the named countries are:

- South Africa: African National Congress (ANC)
- Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)
- Mozambique: Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)
- Namibia: SWAPO (formerly South West Africa People's Organization)

The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators⁴⁹ from 2013 show the public perceptions of governance within the following areas: Voice and Accountability⁵⁰; Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism⁵¹; Government Effectiveness⁵²; Regulatory Quality⁵³; Rule of Law⁵⁴ and Control of Corruption⁵⁵. In table 2 below is

⁴⁹ Source: www.info.worldbank.org.

⁵⁰ Voice and Accountability (VA) – capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.

⁵¹ Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PV) – capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism.

⁵² Government Effectiveness (GE) – capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.


⁵³ Regulatory Quality (RQ) – capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.

⁵⁴ Rule of Law (RL) – capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide

an overview of these governance perceptions in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Namibia.

Table 5 shows that while both South Africa and Namibia rank quite high in a number of areas, like voice and accountability and government effectiveness, Zimbabwe is doing significantly worse, being in the bottom in almost all of the areas. It is worth noting that Namibia ranks relatively higher than its neighbouring countries in political stability and absence of violence/terrorism and control of corruption. Mozambique presents quite low ranking in compared with South Africa and Mozambique but higher when compared to Zimbabwe.

Table 3 – Extract from the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators 2013



by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.

⁵⁵ Control of Corruption (CC) – capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.

While the countries have seen a considerable progress in terms of political liberalisation and democratisation (Zimbabwe and Angola less so than the other countries) the main challenge remains at the micro level, in democratising the internal management and culture of the political parties. According to an IDEA report⁵⁶, Southern African political parties are facing the major challenges around the bureaucratic-oligarchic syndrome such as:

- An autocratic hyper-bureaucratisation and a culture of secrecy i.e. they are sensitive to sharing issues regarding their internal governance issues and are dedicated to preserving the parties' external images.
- An oligarchic personality cult, resulting in parties being inseparably tied to the personality of their leaders (often their founders and most often men). This feature causes challenges regarding 1) finding successors to the leaders, which is often difficult and full of conflict; 2) decentralising power to party branches at local levels; and finally 3) increasing the participation of women.
- Patronage politics, meaning that political parties are predominantly influenced by identity politics (i.e. ethnicity, race, religion etc.) and thus engage in patronage politics on the basis of keeping their identity-based constituencies, particularly during elections. Ruling parties are furthermore better placed than opposition parties due to their access to state resources.

Country	South Africa
Government type	Republic
Population	54,002,000 (2014 est.)
Ethnic group*	79.2% Black African 8.9% Coloured 8.9% White 2.5% Indian or Asian
*According to Statistics South Africa National census 2011	
Religion	Predominantly Christian; Minority Muslim, Hindu, Jewish, Indigenous beliefs
Literacy rate	93%
Unemployment rate	24.82%
Female labour force	44.6% (2012)
Female seats in parliament	42% (2013)
HDI rank	67 (total 187)
GII rank	94 (total 187)
Freedom Score	Free (2014)
Political rights/Civil liberties	2 / 2 (worst 7)

⁵⁶ Political Parties in southern Africa: The State of Parties and their Role in Democratization, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), 2007.

rank	
Corruption perception index	73 (total 175)

Based on CIA, Wikipedia, Freedom House, UNDP, WB, ILO,
Transparency International

South Africa

South Africa has a vibrant multiparty political system and has since 1994 had fully inclusive democratic elections every five years. Before the end of apartheid, only white South Africans were allowed to vote for the national government. Leading up to the 2014 elections several new South African opposition parties were created.

Of the 29 parties that contested the 2014 elections, only 13 received sufficient votes to gain representation in Parliament⁵⁷. The **African National Congress (ANC)** is the governing party of South Africa (249 parliament seats). The ANC is historically supported by its tripartite alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), however with recent conflicts lately taking place between ANC and certain unions belonging to Cosatu. ANC was founded (as South African Native National Congress) in 1912 as a liberation movement, and declared itself as a social democratic party in 2004 where it retained two-thirds majority (69.7%). In 2009, ANC's majority was 64.9% and Jacob Zuma became South Africa's president. In the 2014 elections, the ANC majority fell to 62.15%, and Zuma remained the president. The party controls eight of the country's nine provinces. As a representative of liberal democracy and free market principles, **Democratic Alliance (DA)** is South Africa's formal opposition party (with 89 parliament seats). DA's share of votes evolved from 1.7% in 1994, to 16.6% in 2009 to 22.23% in 2014. DA is the governing party in the Western Cape, and due to its improved performance during elections it is the official opposition party in seven of South Africa's eight other provinces. The third most popular party in South Africa (with 6.35% of the vote) are the **Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)**, formed by Julius Malema, an expelled ANC Youth League member. EFF was formed only eight months prior to the 2014 elections, and managed to earn 25 seats in parliament with its mission as "a radical and militant economic emancipation movement. Finally, the **Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)** holds 10 seats in parliament and draws its main support from the Zulu-speaking South Africans largely coming from rural areas of Kwa-Zulu-Natal.

⁵⁷ Source: <http://www.southafrica.info>.

South Africa has a young population with an average population age of 24.9 years, one of the lowest in the world. For the past few decades the role of youth in South Africa has played an important role in bringing about political and social transformation and democracy, like the 1976 political uprising led by the youth. Today, youth participation is one of the challenges that youth are facing along with the HIV/AIDS pandemic, poverty, unemployment, crime and a lack of education. Electoral trends show a withdrawal of South African youth from political participation, where youth voted in large numbers in the first democratic elections in 1994 and then declined by the next general elections in 1999⁵⁸. Voters in South Africa in the 18–29 age group represent about 34% of all potential voters in the country, only about 41% of these eligible voters between the ages of 18 and 19 registered, while 76% of eligible voters between the ages of 20 and 29 are registered. During the 2014 elections, criticism was raised against the ‘Born Frees’ (born after 1994) and their lack of participation in the elections. Many youth are active in the youth wings of the political parties, sometimes leading to conflict-filled relationship with the mother party, like in the case of ANC Youth League (ANCYL) and ANC. The future success of political parties in South Africa will amongst other things depend on their ability to engage and include youth in the political processes.

Regarding women’s situation in South Africa, equal rights for women are guaranteed by the constitution and promoted by the Commission on Gender Equality. Nevertheless, women suffer de facto discrimination with regard to marriage (including forced marriage), divorce, inheritance, and property rights, particularly in rural areas. Despite a robust legal framework, domestic violence and rape, both criminal offenses, are extremely grave problems. South Africa has one of the world’s highest rates of sexual abuse⁵⁹.

In South Africa, minorities are protected formally as the constitution prohibits discrimination based on a range of categories, such as race, sexual orientation, and culture. State bodies such as the South African Human Rights Commission and the Office of the Public Prosecutor are empowered to investigate and prosecute cases of discrimination⁶⁰. South Africa’s legal environment for LGBTI⁶¹ is considered one of the most liberal in the world. The 2006 Civil Unions Act legalized same-sex marriage, and a 2002 Constitutional Court ruling held that homosexual couples should be allowed to adopt children.

⁵⁸ Policy, Issues and Actors: Vol 19, No4, Identity Crisis? Youth, Social and Political Identity in South Africa, Malachia Mathoho and Kirty Ranchod, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg 2006.

⁵⁹ Source: www.freedomhouse.org.

⁶⁰ Source: www.freedomhouse.org.

⁶¹ Lesbian, Gay, Bisexuals, Transgender, Intersex.

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe gained its independence in 1980 when also the first free elections were held the same year with the participation of several political parties. Robert Mugabe won as the presidential candidate and it was not until 2008 in the much disputed elections that his party the African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) was challenged as the effective one-party dominance by the Movement for Democratic Change (formed in 1999 and then split in 2005 into two fractions, MDC-T and MDC-M). A power-sharing deal in the form of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) was reached between Mugabe and MDC-T's leader Tsvangirai leading to an inclusive government in 2009 with Mugabe as President and Tsvangirai as Prime Minister.

Country	Zimbabwe
Government type	Republic
Population	12,973,808 (2013 est.)
Ethnic groups	82% Shona 14% Ndebele 2% Other
Religion	Predominantly Christian
Literacy rate	83,6%
Unemployment rate	5.39%
Female labour force	49.4% (2012)
Female seats in parliament	32% (2013)
HDI rank	156 (total 187)
GII rank	110 (total 187)
Freedom Score	Not Free (2014)
Political rights/Civil liberties rank	5 / 6 (worst 7)
Corruption perception index	73 (total 183)

* Based on CIA, Wikipedia, Freedom House, UNDP, WB, ILO, Transparency International

Both the political opposition as well as civil society have for the past two decades struggled with authorities who have been breaching human rights and suppressing the view and supported that were critical to the ruling party. Political violence and polarisation between ZANU-PF and the two MDC parties is still today, however one of the main challenges in Zimbabwe along with obstruction of political opposition and undermining of the rule of law. Since 2002, when MDC first contested political office, most elections have involved political violence. However, violence was much less severe in 2013 than in previous election years, especially in the post-election period⁶².

In March 2013, the Zimbabweans voted for a constitutional referendum after this had been postponed for several years. The new constitution passed with approximately 95% in favour and saw a record turnout. The new constitution's main features are: 1) a limit of the President to two five-year terms in office and the prevention of the President from vetoing legislation passed by Parliament; 2) an abolishment of the post of

⁶² Source: www.freedomhouse.org.

Prime Minister and 3) an establishment of an independent prosecuting authority, a peace and reconciliation commission and an anti-corruption commission. In 2013, Zimbabwe held its first general elections under the new constitution, with a victory to Mugabe with ZANU-PF winning two-thirds majority in the House of Assembly. Following the 2013 election both ZANU-PF and MDC are facing huge internal conflicts and MDC in particular with regarding to its party leadership.

In January 2013, the Mass Public Opinion Institute, a Zimbabwean research NGO, executed a nation-wide survey of 1000 youth across the country and their opinion about youth participation in politics⁶³. The Survey showed that Zimbabwean youth experience a feeling of exclusion and restraint and a large proportion of the surveyed do not “feel free”. Almost four out of five (79%) say they have to be careful about what they say about politics. Half of the youth population fear political intimidation daily and even more, 81% fear political intimidation during elections. Regarding joining parties 45% said that they do not feel free to join a party and 41% felt under pressure to vote in a particular way. According to the survey, Zimbabwe’s political parties are also not very open to recruiting active youth.

In the Zimbabwean context, women enjoy extensive legal protections at the same time as societal discrimination and domestic violence persist. Women serve as ministers in national and local governments and the 2013 constitution mandates that for the two parliamentary elections following its adoption, at least 60 of the 270 House of Assembly seats be allocated to women⁶⁴.

Finally, regarding the LGBTI situation in Zimbabwe, homosexuality is regarded as a criminal offense that is punished with a fine and up to year in prison.

⁶³ Eager or slumbering? Youth and political participation in Zimbabwe, ActionAid Denmark, May 2013.

⁶⁴ Source: www.freedomhouse.org.

Mozambique

Mozambique became independent in 1975 when the guerrilla group Frelimo (Mozambique Liberation Front) took over as the sole legal political party. In the years to follow Mozambique experienced a long and bloody civil war by rebel movement Renamo (Mozambican National Resistance) against the Frelimo government, which after 16 years resulted in a Peace Agreement in 1992. With the Peace Agreement, Mozambique adopted the system of multiparty democracy and held its first democratic elections in 1994.

In 2009 the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM) entered the political scene after more than a decade with Frelimo and Renamo dominating the political arena in Mozambique, with Frelimo being overwhelmingly dominant and holding an absolute majority in Parliament.

Country	Mozambique
Government type	Unitary Presidential Republic
Population	23,929,708 (2011 est.)
Ethnic groups	Many Indigenous tribal groups
Religion	Predominantly Christian; Large Muslim Minority
Literacy rate	56.1%
Unemployment rate	8.36%
Female labour force	53% (2012)
Female seats in parliament	39% (2013)
HDI rank	119 (total 187)
GII rank	146 (total 187)
Freedom Score	Partly Free (2014)
Political rights/Civil liberties rank	4/ 3 (worst 7)
Corruption perception index	73 (total 183)

* Based on CIA, Wikipedia, Freedom House, UNDP, WB, ILO, Transparency International

In the light of 22 years of anniversary of the peace agreement, the civil war between Renamo and Frelimo still shapes the political reality of today's Mozambique. Most recently, in 2012, the political tensions rose again with Renamo consequently withdrawing from political activity and boycotting local elections in November 2013⁶⁵. These tensions have resulted in violent confrontations as well as dialogue and peace talks leading to changes in the electoral law and integration of a number of Renamo guerrillas in the national army and police.

General elections in 2014 resulted in the election of president Felipe Nyusi from the ruling party Frelimo, although these elections were riddled with problems. The voter turnout was 48.49% and the parties gained the following percentage (table 3) of votes and seats in parliament⁶⁶:

⁶⁵ Source: www.freedomhouse.org.

⁶⁶ Mozambique News Agency AIM Reports, No. 494, 31 October 2014.

Table 4 - Election results 2014

Party	Percentage of votes	Seats in Parliament
Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo)	55.93%	144
Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo)	32.46%	89
Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM)	8.35%	17

While Renamo and MDM have won representation as opposition parties in the parliament, FRELIMO is de facto the only party to have held power nationally which has allowed it to acquire significant control over state institutions and corruption in government remains widespread⁶⁷.

According to a 2011 research carried out by the National Democracy Institute (NDI) Mozambicans value competitive elections and multiparty democracy, but many citizens, young people in particular, did not believe that parties operate in their interest. Approximately 65% of the Mozambican population is younger than 25 years and this post-war generation will play an important role in upcoming elections and the future politics of the country. The environment of political intolerance and the lack of strategies within political parties to respond to citizens' aspirations undermine Mozambicans' confidence in the political processes⁶⁸.

The situation for women in Mozambique show a fairly high representation of women in politics with women holding premiership from 2014 to 2010 and comprising around 39% of parliament. Women still face discrimination and violence in society. While Mozambique has laws and national plans of action to reduce gender-based discrimination and violence against women the progression of the legal protections for women are slow and the laws rarely enforced.

Regarding LGBTI rights, Mozambique's law does not ban homosexual activity, and in 2011 the minister of justice announced that it is not an offense in Mozambique⁶⁹. However, LGBTI individuals face discrimination, and the government does not recognize LAMBDA, the one NGO devoted to the rights of the LGBT community⁷⁰.

⁶⁷ Source: www.freedomhouse.org.

⁶⁸ Source: www.ndi.org.

⁶⁹ Source: www.freedomhouse.org.

⁷⁰ Source: www.irinnews.org/.

Namibia

After the UN-supervised transition leading to independence in 1990 the President, Sam Nujoma, from the then guerrilla movement, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), was chosen. Both in the following 1994 and 1999 elections, Nujoma and SWAPO retained control of the presidency and legislature. Namibia is considered an electoral democracy, with the SWAPO having dominated since independence. The most significant opposition parties, which in many cases include previous SWAPO members, are:

- Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP)
- Congress of Democrats
- Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
- United Democratic Front

Since 2007 when RDP was formed its supporters have been subject to harassment and intimidation by SWAPO members, who occasionally disrupt RDP rallies despite calls by police to disperse⁷¹.

General elections took place in Namibia in the discourse of this evaluation on the 28th of November 2014. The elections presented the first use of electronic voting in the African continent⁷². A total of nine candidates ran for the presidency and Hage Geingob from SWAPO won with 87% of the votes. 16 political parties contested the National Assembly elections where SWAPO also won with 80% of the votes.

Youth in Namibia are quite active and particularly in focus in the civil society organisations. Formally, Namibia has a National Youth Council, estab-

Country	Namibia
Government type	Unitary Presidential Constitutional Republic
Population	2,113,077 (2011 est.)
Ethnic groups	Many Indigenous tribal groups
Religion	Predominantly Christian; Minority Indigenous beliefs
Literacy rate	88.8%
Unemployment rate	26.83%
Female labour force	48.7% (2012)
Female seats in parliament	24% (2013)
HDI rank	49 (total 187)
GII rank	87 (total 187)
Freedom Score	Free (2014)
Political rights/Civil liberties rank	2 / 2 (worst 7)
Corruption perception index	73 (total 183)

* Based on CIA, Wikipedia, Freedom House, UNDP, WB, ILO, Transparency International

⁷¹ Source: www.freedomhouse.org.

⁷² Source: <http://www.electionwatch.org.na>.

lished in 1994, serving as an umbrella organization to a number of youth-focused community-based groups.

Since the 1992 post-independence regional and local elections, there has been a steady increase in the number of women elected to political office, however, women continue to face discrimination in customary law and other traditional societal practices. In Namibia, there is a lack of awareness of legal rights and informal practices have undermined the success of legal changes. Violence against women is reportedly widespread, resulting in rights groups criticising the government's failure to enforce the country's progressive domestic violence laws.

A law dating back to the colonial era prohibits homosexual relations between men in Namibia. While the law is generally not enforced, the LGBTI community continue to suffer discrimination.

Political party support in the country:

In the Southern African region several actors work with support to capacity building political parties as well as support multi-party democracy. The actors providing support to political parties are:

Table 5 – Other actors providing political party support in the Southern African Region

Provider	Country and Focus
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD)	<p>In Zimbabwe, particularly in the preparations for the 2013 elections, NIMD worked to support interparty dialogue in the run-up to the elections as well as regional exchange activities with representatives from Tanzania, Uganda and Mozambique.</p> <p>In Mozambique, NIMD also carried out activities in preparation for the 2014 elections including programme activities mainly focusing on trying to reduce the tensions between the parliamentary parties and on keeping the pressure on the party leaders to search for a peaceful solution for their conflicts. The programme facilitates trainings on conflict resolution and dialogue skills for the members of the parties, and stimulates the involvement of a broad range of stakeholders (civil society organisations, church leaders and the international community). NIMD also works with direct capacity building support to the parliamentary political parties.</p>
National Democratic Institute (NDI),	<p>In South Africa NDI seeks to strengthen parties' awareness of strategies to increase women's participation and promote dialogue on women's service delivery needs. Activities include: assessments of parties' efforts to promote participation; re-search to collect data on service delivery priorities; a summit to present findings identified in the assessments and research;</p>

	<p>meetings with parties to discuss recommendations; and consultations with local councillors to encourage gender considerations in service delivery.</p> <p>In July 2013, NDI began a program funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) to encourage dialogue between the major political parties and citizens. The Institute is organizing a leadership development program for a group of mid-level party leaders to strengthen their ability to communicate party platforms to constituents.</p>
The International Republican Institute (IRI)	In Zimbabwe, the IRI works with democratic political parties at the national and sub-national level to increase their internal organizational capacity and ability to compete in elections.
Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD)	In cooperation with NIMD, the DIPD entered into a partnership in July 2012 with the Zimbabwe Institute to facilitate dialogue between the political parties, democracy, peace, tolerance, and human rights in Zimbabwe.
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES)	FES shares a long common history with the ANC and the Congress of South African Trade Unions. FES still works closely with ANC as well as a number of CSOs in South Africa.
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS)	KAS projects are generally implemented in close cooperation with local partners, like the Democracy Development Programme (DDP) and the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). KAS has opened a KAP-DDP Liaison Office in Cape Town in May 2002 to enable contact to Parliament, the National Council of Provinces and the municipalities in the Western Cape and working on political education and training, political consultancy and intensive research

Findings

Four different programmes were active in South Africa and/or the Southern Africa region under the current PAO strategy. The findings from each of the four programmes are presented below.

Project 1: PYPA Southern Africa

Programme genesis: The programme is a joint programme of four PAO partners⁷³, under the overall lead of KIC. The programme in Southern Africa is managed by OPC in the consortium and implemented by the long-term partner of OPC, the ETU (since 1992).

Programme objective: ETU acknowledges the PYPA objectives, but formulate it as ‘creating an enabling environment for multi-party democracy’, the focus is thus more on the underlying conditions than the actual party system itself.

Partner role: ETU is implementing the programme with financial support and some dialogue with OPC. The PYPA Southern Africa programme is as the rest of PYPA based on the KIC RYPLA, but with some flexibility for ETU in terms of selecting criteria of participants and methodology applied in the academies as well as adapting the context to local needs. ETU has also played a key role in formulating the overall PYPA implementation guideline.

Activities: Implementation of PYPA ‘academies’ with youth from Southern African political party youth wings, and few follow-up alumni activities. PYPA academy consists of three long-term retreats over the course of one year where the PYPA curriculum is presented using participatory methods.

Relevance

The PYPA programme builds on the lessons learned from the KIC RYPLA programme in East Africa. The curriculum is fairly generic with limited contextual reflection. In line with the programme document the topics covered in the academies are generic in nature covering basic issues pertaining to individual competences needed for politicians, such as communication, advocacy, campaigning and economics, in addition to topics specifically related to the Sida funding and priorities such as gender and LGBTI.

The generic nature of the programme was also the main criticism for the very few interviewees who were not fully satisfied with the course content. This should also be seen in light of the fact that no thorough needs assessment has been made, but that the content builds on ETU’s and PYPA’s past experience. However, changes have been made during the course of the programme, to allow for contextual relevant inclusion of e.g. minority issues relevant to context such as discrimination of albinos.

The fact that the programme is designed across several organisations has, according to some interviewees, resulted in a more stringent design, with less flexibility. However, changes have been made over the two years, allowing ETU to apply its own version of the programme by: (1) selecting course participants among potential politi-

⁷³ KIC, OPC, CIS and GF.

cal leaders from the party youth wings, and (2) applying a more participatory oriented approach.

Close to all interviewees confirmed the relevance of the programme in terms of their own individual needs. First of all, because it represented a first and unique opportunity for the participants to meet and discuss with opposition parties in a more safe environment. Secondly, from a thematic perspective the themes were assessed to be relevant and only few could think of alterations or new topics to be included.

The work of the ETU is generally endorsed by the party leaderships. ETU has ensured this through meetings with all parties at the start-up of the programme. Having said this, some of the party leaders were of the opinion that the involvement of multiple (and often opposing) parties in the programme did not enable a 'safe learning environment'. This latter reflection was however not confirmed by academy participants.

While ETU has a strong and very close relationship with ANC, none of the academy participants interviewed were concerned with any potential bias stemming from this.

Effectiveness

The effectiveness is in part documented by the learning evaluators attached to PYPA. These provide qualitative evidence of progress of individual interviewees among the PYPA participants. This progress is confirmed by the evaluation findings. The most significant change among interviewees is assessed to be the training on media and communication. Multiple interviewees explained the link between a participatory and action-oriented training on how to address media and partake in interviews and changes in own behaviour and skills when interacting with the media. Similarly, interviewees felt that they had become better at articulating themselves and 'sell' their political message, which they attributed to the programme (short-term outcome). There was generally widespread appreciation of most of the remaining topics, though none with the same effect as communication.

Overall the interviews thus show progress in terms of enhanced capacities of the individual participants (outputs). Several also stated that this had assisted them in enhancing their position in the party (short-term outcomes), partly as a consequence of enhanced respect of their abilities by the party leadership.

The mini-project implemented during the course was likewise well appreciated and a few of these were used for cross-party activities or more training of trainer type activities after the course. Several of these have the potential of being used more widely within the parties, which is however still to materialise.

A more subtle progress, yet directly linked to the VO2 objective was the stated realisation among the interviewees that their political opponents were 'people you can have a dialogue with and even be friends with'. It was evident from the interviews that the academy usually has a lot of tensions between competing parties at the first

session, but that this is then transformed in the following sessions. In part, this change is based on conflict-sensitive methodologies and the application of role-plays and to the framing of a common 'youth agenda' where the youth experience to work together 'as one'.

The effects in terms of enhanced political tolerance vary between the courses, with the 2012 and 2013 course being more exposed to internal animosities, while this was less evident in 2014. However, participants from all three courses expressed increased appreciation and tolerance towards their colleagues from the other parties. The programme is thus able to generate mutual understanding between parties at an individual youth level.

While progress is substantial at individual level, there is limited evidence to suggest changes at a party level. Most senior level party members interviewed were sceptical about this part of the programme and youth interviewed expressed hesitation to openly discuss their new friendships with the opposition with the mother party members. Thus for the PYPA to effectively contribute to the VO2 objective it must confirm the underlying assumption that the participants will remain open to cross-party cooperation over the years and use these new sentiments when they obtain higher level positions in the party. This political tolerance will need to be ensured in an environment where many of the participants were reluctant to discuss their friendship with members of opposition parties with their own party members.

In terms of gender equality, the programme has close to 50-50 representations among the participants. The extent to which the programme content has made a difference is less evident. According to several interviewees women were at the end of the course more vocal within the academy, but still reluctant to speak more openly when 'at home' in the political party.

The issue of LGBTI is included as part of an overall Sida priority. The southern Africa region has very different contextual laws and cultural sentiments concerning LGBTI. While the orientations are fully accepted among South Africans, the participants from neighbouring countries, and in particular Zimbabwe and Mozambique, found the inclusion of LGBTI inappropriate as 'it is illegal in our countries'. The inclusion has enhanced the understanding that LGBTI 'can be accepted in some countries', but there is no evidence from the interviews to suggest a change in attitude or behaviour among the more conservative participants in the academy.

The regional element of the programme was used to convey cross-country messages and cross-regional learning and instilling a sense of national coherence among the (opposing) parties from the same countries, by promoting a sense of national pride in the cross-regional competitions. According to interviewees this was effective in bringing the participants to work together with their fellow countrymen and thus contribute to the VO2 objective.

The programme was not designed to make extensive use of ICT, though sessions of social media are included in the curriculum. However, the students have themselves established cross-country links using WhatsApp where they frequently interact. To stimulate this process of digital connection and learning ETU has just established a Facebook page for the PYPA alumni (currently 24 members of potentially 120). The effects of which is still to be seen.

On a final note, the programme methodology emphasises the common challenges of youth in the countries, uniting the young politicians. However, less attention is given to the issue of ideology and the political differentiation between the participants.

Efficiency

In terms of donor harmonisation, an initial mapping of political party support was undertaken by OPC/ETU initially, which according to ETU showed that no other donor support provided the same depth of democratic understanding as the PYPA programme, and that there would be no duplication of activities. No other efforts have been made towards harmonisation, and interviews with other PAO support type institutions showed no knowledge of the PYPA programme. PYPA is thus generally not known or engage in cross-programmatic fora. On the other hand, none of the PYPA students interviewed had taken part in other types of political party support initiatives of this kind.

In terms of Results-Based Management (RBM), the use of learning evaluators was appreciated by interviewees. The use, according to some, was however mostly relevant for the programme in East and West Africa. Examples of impact on the southern Africa programme was limited to further inclusion of gender in academy activities. A more quantitative approach, which would allow for better documentation of impact of different aspects of the academy would be more useful and allow for ETU to enhance performance, according to interviewees. The team's own assessment of the learning evaluator's baseline and the reference to the learning evaluators in the annual reports show substantial qualitative evidence of progress, though with limited aggregated analysis, which would allow for more detailed quality improvements of PYPA.

Besides the learning evaluator inputs, ETU/OPC measure progress based on questionnaire feedback from participants, observations and facilitator reflections. A more outcome-based RBM system is not applied and thus effects beyond output level are not documented. The staff are well capacitated and have undertaken these type of programmes for multiple years (some since 1992), and they use this experience to assess 'what works'. No other formalised means of assessing effectiveness of sessions/curriculum/approach etc. is in use. There is thus not a systematic use of RBM mechanisms.

In terms of the application of a Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA), the programme is assessed to score relatively high in terms of transparency and immediate accountability, given the thorough consultations with party leaderships in presenting the programme and programme objectives and in the same thorough introduction to

participants. It is non-discriminatory in the sense that all major parties are included in the programme, and there is a fairly even gender balance. In terms of participation, the programme is implemented in a participatory manner; however, the participants have very little influence on the content.

Impact

Changes have been made at individual level, allowing academy participants to improve their individual capacities as politicians, and enhance their understanding of multi-party benefits. The extent to which this programme will have an impact in the longer run is dependent on the confirmation of the assumption that the participants are willing and able to use these new skills if they become part of the leadership of their parties.

Sustainability

The academy in itself can only be sustained through continued funding. No funds are expected from the participating parties to fund the academies in the future. The sustainability is thus mostly related to current results.

The participants showed a high appreciation of the course and a substantial degree of ownership to the learning and the application of these in their daily work. This enhances the probability of sustainability of the results at an individual level. Several participants however stated the need for engaging in alumni activities in order to keep abreast with the learning and stay in touch with the other party members. Based on this ETU has started engaging in alumni activities.

As the results at an overall level are still to be identified, sustainability is not yet relevant to discuss. However, enhanced inclusion and sustainability of results will require ownership and commitment from the mother parties, which is only partly assured at this stage.

Project 2: Bullet to Ballots (Western Cape section)

Programme assessed (Western Cape only): Twinning arrangement between ANC Western Cape and Kalmar Social Democrats. Long-term partnership between the two institutions in OPC twinning arrangements. This forms only a part of the overall BtB programme.

Programme objective (Western Cape only): Building capacity of ANC regional level (sub-provincial) through twinning with regional social democratic branch.

Partner role: Partner, in principle, obliged to pay 20% of project activities, work plan designed with partner inputs. Partner participates in meetings in Sweden and workshops in Western Cape.

Activities: Workshops and Conferences with topics related to democracy, party formation etc. Exposure visits/trainings to Sweden, including observation in latest Swedish national elections.

While there was a strong appreciation of the close relationship between the Social Democrats in Kalmar and the ANC in the Western Cape, none of the interviewees were appreciative of the outcome of the support.

There was, according to interviewees, limited ownership from the side of the ANC to the programme, which resulted in:

- 1) Selection of non-relevant candidates for the courses in Sweden. The consequence was that the learnings could not be transferred to the party upon return, but were lost with the candidate.
- 2) Lack of proper preparation and commitment to the activities in South Africa, which were 'only planned a day in advance' of the arrival of the Swedish missions.

Overall, there is evidence of lack of ownership on the side of ANC to the programme in Western Cape. This is partly assessed to be a consequence of changing leadership and internal power dynamics in the party.

It is important to note that the team only assessed part of the BtB programme, and that some interviews pointed to better results in other provinces in South Africa.

Project 3: AGF programme support to South African partner

Programme genesis: Inception phase contribution to green party in South Africa.

Programme objective: Support to starting up a new green party in South Africa

Partner role: The partner identifies the project, which is then approved by AGF and funding transferred to partner for implementation. The team was not able to meet with the partner in South Africa.

Activities: Activities supposedly implemented in 2013, but no detailed evidence of these was found in annual reports.

The project was approved and funds transferred. However AGF has not been able to re-establish contact with the partner and the funds have thus been lost.

Project 4: ALNEF

Programme genesis: It is a regional network type cooperation between democratic left parties of the African continent region.

Programme objective: The main objective is the exchange of experiences and to strengthen the democratic left parties of the continent.

Partner role: Not able to identify as the team was not able to meet with the contact person in South Africa

Activities: None implemented

According to VIF's ALNEF coordinator, the only contact person they have in South Africa for the ALNEF network boycotts all calls and mails from most of ALNEF Executive Committee members. The ALNEF coordinator wrote an e-mail to introduce the evaluation team, but there was no response.

Conclusions

Of the four programmes assessed in the region, only one is assessed to have reached the level of effectively contributing to programme objectives – namely the PYPA Programme. The remaining programmes lack sufficient ownership or commitment of partners to be implemented, or when implemented, to be effective.

The PYPA programme in the region is very effective in improving individual capacities among youth politicians (effectively contributing to VO1) and in enhancing the political tolerance and acceptance of political party systems (contributing to VO2). There is thus evidence of progress at output level as well as enhanced cooperation among individuals from different parties and single cases of post-academy training of trainers (short-term outcomes). However, there is limited evidence of actual contribution to multi-party systems at the Mother party level.

Key parameters for the effectiveness are assessed to include high degrees of ownership; quality and participatory methods of the training as well as the intensity e.g. three long academies. Enhanced ownership and buy-in of the mother parties is however needed to enhance effectiveness. Similarly, enhanced interaction with alumni to keep these motivated to multi-party systems is needed for longer-term impact (PYPA is in the process of planning such events).

There is room for improving the results-based management, the participatory aspects of the programme design as well as a need for a higher degree of understanding of what other programmes are doing in this field in the region and seek mutual learning and harmonisation.

Annex A -List of consultations:*Agenda would make sense.*

Jonas Frantzen, Valkretsombudsman, Socialdemokraterna, Gotland	Social democrats Sweden
Frank HABINEZA, Chairperson of AGF as well as GF project coordinator for AGF	AGF
Jon Hogman, Intern, ETU	ETU
Beatie Hofmeyr, Coordinator of PYPA and head of ETU	ETU
Clifford Hlatwayo	MDC
Ann Britt Karlsson and Monica Johansson, Learning Evaluators	PYPA
Ravin Singh, ETU Facilitator	ETU
Clifford Hlatwayo, youth leader MDC	Beneficiary
Mazwi Nombeko Sweena, PYPA 2012 part, ANC	Beneficiary
Adele Trish Naidoo, Youth leader ANC, 2012 course	Beneficiary
Mandaza Gideon, MDC Youth Leader, 2012 academy	Beneficiary
Sibooza (Sylvester) Sipho, ANC learning coordinator	ANC
Mvusi Mdala, ANC learning coordinator and Senzeni Mphila, ANC Western Cape	ANC
Discent Collins, MDC youth secretary general	Beneficiary
Sadat Maseruka, Acom Aloba Joan, Omel Denis, Namirembe Rehemah, Emmanuel Rukundo, South Africa	Beneficiary
Meleney Tembo, Senior trainer and facilitator of PYPA, ETU	ETU
Shepard Dube, PYPA Participant from Zimbabwe, MDC party	MDC
Bandile Sizani, PYPA Facilitator, ETU	ETU
Mathabi Shange & Sinethemba Tshabala, Kwazulua Natal, PYPA Participants	ANC
Elisabeth Jossai, PYPA participant from Mozambique	Frelimo
Marcial Macome, PYPA participant from Mozambique	Renamo
Bill Sewell, Consultant to BtB	People and Performance (Consultant to OPC)
Khayaletu Mkunyana, PYPA Participant from Western Cape	DA
Kelvin Kuanda, AGF Regional Coordinator (responsible for South Africa also)	AGF

Country Report

Uganda

Introduction

Erik Bryld and Nadia Masri-Pedersen travelled to Uganda from 30 November to 3 December 2014 to conduct consultations with PAO partners and other stakeholders in the field to gather evidence to inform evaluation findings. In total the team held three focus group discussion with beneficiaries (10 men and eight women) and semi-structured interviews in person or on Skype with a total of eight men and six women.

NOTE: Two of the programmes assessed are also implemented in the Southern Africa region. The team therefore recommends that the southern Africa report be read in advance of this report.

Approach:

Semi-structured 1 to 2 hour consultations with individuals / groups using questions guide to draw findings on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, preliminary results, impact and sustainability of projects in country.

Reflections and limitations

- Under the PYPA programme, the team interviewed the KIC representatives and the partner organisation, NDI, resource persons as well as beneficiaries in Uganda and via Skype in Kenya. Given the limited time available, the team had to rely on the identification of interviewees by KIC, which are likely to influence the results positively. This is compensated by the fact that faults in the design also show in 'best case' scenarios.
- The team were able to interview beneficiaries from Tanzania and Kenya either through Skype or e-mail, although the majority of the interviewed beneficiaries were from Uganda.
- A few interviews were cancelled by the interviewees.

Country Selection and Presentation:

Uganda was selected as one of the field missions as two different PAO programmes are implemented in the country; it is the focal country for the PYPA East Africa implementation, which would allow the team to compare the region with PYPA southern Africa; and, it is a country with political and democratic challenges (see below), which makes the PAO support particularly relevant.

Background and Information

Two PAOs implement programmes in Uganda, with exception of the PYPA programme that extends its programme focus to neighbouring countries Tanzania and Kenya. The PAOs working in the region include KIC and GF. Please see the table (table 1) below for an overview of the programmes:

Table 6 – Overview of PAO Programmes in Eastern Africa

PAO and Programme	Implementing Partner and Background for cooperation
Christian Democratic International Centre (KIC) – <i>Programme for Young Politicians in Africa (PYPA)</i>	In Uganda, KIC implements the PYPA programme in cooperation with the National Democratic Institute (NDI). ETU is responsible for organising the PYPA academies with participants from the Southern African Region, including South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. The PYPA programme is based on the previous KIC programme RYPLA.
Green Forum (GF) – <i>African Greens Federation (AGF)</i>	AGF does not have any office in South Africa, but the AGF coordinator responsible for Southern Africa Coordinator is based in Zambia. During this strategy period, funds were given through the AGF to a local partner, the Ecological Green Movement of Africa, however AGF never received any reporting from them and eventually also lost contact. According to GF's annual report from 2012, the South African partner was late in signing the contract and did not carry out any activities in 2012. In the 2013 annual report states that activities to start up a new green party in South Africa were undertaken, but does not report any additional information.

Political context in the Eastern African Region:

In East Africa, one of many characteristic features of political parties is the autocratic top-down organisational structure with highly centralised power. This leaves the parties with limited processes of inclusiveness and transparency and it breeds patrimonialism with political party leaders running the show. On one hand some political parties have weak ideological cores, meaning that political mobilisation assumes the form of loyalty to a leader instead of a political ideology of a party and were it is not uncommon to see leaders jump from one party to another bringing his/her supporters along. On the other hand, very well organised and also highly centralised parties are found, which have been in power for a long time forming a sort of oligarchic structures.


The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators⁷⁴ from 2013 show the public perceptions of governance within the following areas: Voice and Accountability⁷⁵;

⁷⁴ Source: www.info.worldbank.org.

⁷⁵ Voice and Accountability (VA) – capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.

Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism⁷⁶; Government Effectiveness⁷⁷; Regulatory Quality⁷⁸; Rule of Law⁷⁹ and Control of Corruption⁸⁰. In table 9 below is an overview of these governance perceptions in Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya. The Tanzanian general election of 2015 will be the fifth election to be held since the restoration of multi-party system in 1992. It is scheduled to take place in October 2015.

Table 7 - Extract from the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators 2013



⁷⁶ Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PV) – capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism.

⁷⁷ Government Effectiveness (GE) – capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.

⁷⁸ Regulatory Quality (RQ) – capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.

⁷⁹ Rule of Law (RL) – capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.

⁸⁰ Control of Corruption (CC) – capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.

The rankings show that the three eastern African countries are not that far apart on the ranking, with a few exceptions. Kenya and Tanzania seem to go hand in hand when it comes to voice and accountability with Uganda falling a bit behind. Tanzania is remarkably higher ranked in the areas of political stability and absence of violence/terrorism as well as control of corruption. Uganda stands out with the highest ranking in both regulatory quality as well as rule of law where Kenya ranks higher in government efficiency.

According to an International IDEA report⁸¹ on political parties in East Africa, the following challenges, amongst others, characterise the political parties in the region:

- Fragility and structural weaknesses, particularly in opposition parties. Parties in general lack strong organizational capability; recruitment of new members is intermittent; fund-raising is weak; and management is lax and often informal.
- Lack of adherence to formal rules, regulations, procedures and programmes. Practically all the parties have constitutions, but the operative procedures for internal elections, discipline and publicity are lax and often unwritten.
- Leadership centred on a dominant personality, family or clique, often commanding a substantial popular following.
- A strong tendency for parties to break up and merge with others over and over again.
- A weak and unreliable financial and human resource base.
- Lack of a mass membership
- Lack of activity except at election time.

Below is a brief introduction to Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania.

Uganda

According to Transparency International's 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index Uganda ranks 142 out of 174 countries. According to Freedom House's ranking Uganda is characterised as 'partly free'.

In 1986 President Yoweri Museveni took power in Uganda. In 2000, Uganda held a constitutional referendum, which resulted in an extension of restrictions on political party activities. It was not until 2005 that the banning of political parties competing in elections was lifted in Uganda in a referendum and multi-party elections were held again in 2006. These elections were a turning point for Uganda that had seen two decades of both two authoritarian regimes followed by a single-regime rule. Despite the multi-party elections, Museveni and his ruling party the National Resistance

⁸¹ Political Parties in East Africa: Diversity in Political Party Systems, Michael Chege, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), 2007.

Movement (NRM) are still in power today, in a de facto one-party state, with repression taking place of opposition parties, civil society actors, independent media and even opposing voices inside NRM. The next general elections are expected to be held in Uganda in 2016, which will be the third multiparty elections after the referendum in 2005.

Uganda still has a way to go in terms of having a representative political system that promotes effective governance and peaceful political competition. Opposition parties in Uganda, in general, lack the capacity to effectively compete in elections or offer applicable, issue-based alternatives to the ruling party. On top of the weak capacity of opposition parties, they still continue to face discrimination and even arrest of prominent opposition leaders.

In 2014, the National Assembly further tightened the space in Uganda with the passing of the Public Order Management Bill, decreasing the space for civil society activity as well as the Anti-Homosexuality Bill imposing tougher penalties for same-sex sexual relations.

Kenya

According to Transparency International's 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index Kenya ranks 145 out of 174 countries. According to Freedom House's ranking Kenya is characterised as 'partly free'.

In 1992, Kenya held its first multi-party elections since independence. In 2013, Kenya held its first elections under its new constitution, passed in a referendum in 2010. These elections were also the first run by Kenya's Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). The elections were characterised by challenges with voter registration, vote tabulation and the definition of rejected ballots, but were in general, peaceful and well-organised⁸².

There are not any major impediments to forming a party in Kenya, not to organise into a political party based on either ideological, regional or ethnic interests. While opposition parties and their members and leaders are not routinely harassed by the state, in 2013, they experienced sporadic flare-ups of violence.

One of the main challenges in Kenya continues to be corruption, which still prevails although the new constitution includes measures for increased accountability and transparency. This is topped with weak institutional capacity that hampers accountable and transparent government processes such as budget making.

⁸² Source: www.freedomhouse.org.

While Kenyan youth represent a large group of politically mobilised people during elections, they are unable to harness power within important political institutions. Youth, as well as women face challenges when trying to access the political space and enter the political hierarchies. Most are thus mainly active within youth and women leagues, where they encounter limited access to budgets or any real decision-making spaces⁸³.

For the 2013 elections a constitutional provision was supposed to be implemented demanding at least one-third of members of elective bodies to be women, but this was never implemented. Only 16 women were directly elected to the National Assembly, while none were elected directly to the Senate.

While Kenya is a place to flee to for LGBTI refugees coming from other conservative African countries, LGBTI people still face discrimination in Kenya, where consensual same-sex sexual activities is criminalised, giving up to 14 years in prison.

Tanzania

According to Transparency International's 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index Tanzania ranks 119 out of 174 countries, which is significantly less than its neighbours Uganda and Kenya. According to Freedom House's ranking Tanzania is characterised as 'partly free'.

The first multi-party general elections held in Tanzania, after the lifting of the ban on political parties other than Chama Cha Mapinduzi in 1992, were held in 1995. The upcoming Tanzanian general elections scheduled to take place in October 2015 will be the fifth election to be held since the restoration of multi-party system. The National Electoral Commission and the Zanzibar Electoral Commission conduct elections in Tanzania, and the president appoints both institutions.

Several factors challenge the transition to a multiparty democracy in Tanzania, such as lack of party philosophy or ideology in the parties, the functioning of party structures and processes and the lack of participatory internal democracy internally in the parties⁸⁴.

⁸³ <http://www.fes-kenya.org>

⁸⁴ Source: <http://www.kas.de>.

Tanzania's ruling party, the Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), has been in power since the country's independence, making it the longest ruling party in Africa. Its power is based on several factors such as⁸⁵:

- A relatively strong and institutionalised party organisation that reaches down to the lowest level of society, giving the party significant advantages in competitive elections;
- Close links to the bureaucracy and the military – two of the largest and best organised entities in Tanzania – through which inclusion and control over all significant sources of political, economic and social power is exercised;
- The continuing legitimacy of the CCM.

While political power in Tanzania today is mainly centred around the ruling party, Tanzania today is characterized by a plurality of political parties. The Tanzanian opposition parties are active, yet tend to be divided and ineffective, the former due to prohibition of coalitions. Opposition parties still face challenges, although they are experiencing increasing support. Five opposition parties (CUF, CHADEMA, National Convention for Construction and Reform–Mageuzi, Tanzania Labour Party, and United Democratic Party) have consistently won parliamentary seats⁸⁶.

Women's rights guaranteed by the constitution and other laws are not uniformly protected. Especially in rural areas and in Zanzibar, traditional or Islamic customs discriminatory toward women prevail in family law, and women have fewer educational and economic opportunities.

Political party support in the country:

Table 8 – Other actors providing political party support in the eastern African Region

Provider	Country and Focus
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD)	<p>In Uganda, the NIMD programme focuses on supporting the Inter-Party Organisation for Dialogue (IPOD).</p> <p>In Tanzania, the Netherlands Government no longer considers Tanzania a priority partner country, and NIMD no longer has access to core funding for this programme.</p> <p>In Kenya, NIMD works with the Centre for Multiparty Democracy in aiding political parties in preparing for elections as well as increasing women's participations. For youth,</p>

⁸⁵ Source: <http://www.diis.dk>.

⁸⁶ Source: www.freedomhouse.org.

	NIMD worked with other organisations in developing a Youth Charter advocating for young people in Kenyan society.
National Democratic Institute (NDI)	<p>In Uganda, NDI has been working since 2003 (first with electoral framework, then with NGOs) and in 2006 NDI began working with CSOs and women members of parliament (MPs) and assisted their efforts to establish a common women's legislative agenda. Since 2008, NDI has worked on strengthening multiparty democracy in Uganda.</p> <p>Ahead of the March 2013 Kenyan elections, NDI helped the major political parties build consensus on issues of national importance, engage in dialogue with each other and the election commission, comply with the new constitution, and enhance their ability to represent citizens' interests. In the post-election period, NDI is working with parties at the national and county level to improve their ability to represent the interests of constituents, strengthen internal party democracy through the development of county level party branches, support political parties to implement reforms in line with the transition to devolution, and facilitate inter-party cooperation and dialogue.</p> <p>While NDI worked in Tanzania prior to 2005 elections on capacity building political parties, no information was available regarding more current activities.</p>
Westminster Foundation for Democracy	The WFD supports a pan-African network of 35 liberal democratic parties in 24 countries called "Africa Liberal Network".
The International Republican Institute (IRI)	<p>Re-launching its political party work in Uganda in 2013, IRI has focused on increasing the organizational and policy-making capacity of political parties at the national and sub-national level. This is done by carrying out a needs assessment with the parties, to inform them on how to best increase their outreach and operation. IRI plans to engage in a multi-faceted approach that includes political party workshops, leadership schools, policy roundtables and university debates, with an emphasis on the inclusion of youth and women within political party structures.</p> <p>In Kenya, IRI started working in early 1990s with political parties, members of Parliament and civil society to promote democratic governance. This is for example done by bringing together civil society and elected officials, by empowering marginalised groups and promote networking groups aiming at dialogue to increase citizen influence in policy making pro-</p>

	cesses.
Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD)	<p>DIPD has provided the Danish Liberal Party with funds to carry out a multiparty democracy programme in cooperation with Kenyan Centre for Multiparty Democracy.</p> <p>In Tanzania, DIPD carries out a multiparty partnership with Tanzania Centre for Democracy with whom it entered into cooperation in 2012. The project ran until 2013 and aimed at supporting multiparty democracy in Tanzania through a strengthening of the multiparty dialogue processes, the ability of political parties to perform their democratic functions, and finally by an enhanced engagement between the political parties and civil society.</p>
Demo Finland	Demo Finland works in Tanzania to strengthen gender equality in all levels of politics. Demo Finland's work focuses on co-operation skills across party lines for the women's organisations of political parties, and further training women politicians.
Norad	<p>Three Norwegian Party organisations have programmes in eastern Africa namely:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Christian Democrats carry work on 'Strengthening the administration of political parties in Kenya' • The Young Christian Democrats work on Enhancing the role of youth in political parties in Kenya • The Center Party carry out a project called "Elimu no demokrasia" - Learning/knowledge and democracy
National Endowment for Democracy (NED)	NED has several smaller projects in Uganda like the Uganda Youth Network aiming at promoting effective civic engagement and political activism among Ugandan youth. And the Women's Democracy Network improving governance and social accountability in the West Nile region, by providing training to community watchdogs on the strategic use of technology and build their capacity to monitor government programs and budgets in their localities.
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES)	<p>In Uganda, FES developed the Young Leaders Training Programme (YLTP) where youths (from political parties, governmental ministries, NGOs, and trade unions) are trained on various aspects of leadership and current political and socio-economic affairs such as politics and public administration, economics, social affairs, media and communication as well as management skills. The programme started in 2008, however it is not clear whether it is still running today.</p> <p>Emanating from FES's Political Leadership Development Programme, FES conduct a Political Leadership and Govern-</p>

	<p>ance Programme in Kenya designed to promote value-driven leadership for good governance in a democratic society with focus on political parties. The programme aims to assist young members as reformers and leaders of political parties.</p> <p>FES also work on a Political Forum, which is a platform for young Kenyans to engage in political discussions and to share and/or challenge ideas on substantive policy areas in an informal setting. The Forum meets once every six weeks and targets politically active young Kenyans, including alumni from the Pioneers for Change network.</p>
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS)	<p>In Tanzania, KAS work with fostering the democratic development and furthering the establishment of an effective multi-party system in close cooperation with several partners, amongst them the centrist party CHADEMA, the biggest opposition party in parliament.</p> <p>On a national level in Kenya, KAS works with parliamentary committees dealing with questions of economic development and the implementation process of the devolution. On a county level KAS works with members of the county assemblies on the same topics.</p> <p>KAS has worked in Uganda since 2011 with amongst others the following activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cooperation with selected parties in order to strengthen their ability to develop their own profile with regard to the major political debates and actively present the party positions to the public. • Strengthening the youth members of selected parties in their capacity to influence the party platforms and take up party functions. • Cooperation with political actors as multipliers, particularly at local level, in order to promote political pluralism, democratic participation and representation. <p>Finally, KAS along with the multi-donor Democratic Governance Facility (DGF) are partners to the Ugandan Interparty Youth Platform (IYOP) which is a cooperation framework of the youth leagues of seven major political parties in Uganda.</p>

Findings

There are two PAO programmes implemented in Uganda, in the following the major findings for each programme are presented in summary.

Project 1: PYPA East Africa

Programme genesis: PYPA is a joint KIC/OPC/CIS/GF project across Africa with KIC as overall lead. KIC is also responsible for the East Africa implementation of PYPA, based in Uganda but also covering Kenya and Tanzania. The programme builds on the previous KIC RYPLA programme. Unlike the PYPA Southern Africa programme that is hosted by a training organisation, the East African PYPA is coordinated and facilitated by KIC in Uganda, but draws upon external experts that come in and give the training on various topics.

Programme objective: The programme contributed to VO2. The programme aims at training young politicians to increase their participation within politics and promote work for democracy and rights

Partner role: KIC has its own representation in Kampala responsible for implementation. The programme is implemented in partnership with the National Democratic Institute (NDI). The role of NDI consists in taking part in the selection, as well as supporting with logistics, human resources and administration during the trainings themselves.

Activities: Academies for young politicians using external facilitators to enhance young politicians capacities, increase tolerance and respect for basic rights. Three academies are held for a selected group of politicians yearly (see also South Africa report).

Relevance

The participants of the different PYPA academies (2012-2014) all expressed a high degree of appreciation of the programme, and confirmed that the programme met their needs (except for a couple of suggestion to make special arrangements for disabled). There were no requests for additions to the curriculum or changes in the implementation methodology. According to the interviewees the programme met their immediate needs as young politicians.

Interviews however revealed some concerns from the mother parties vis-à-vis PYPA and the fact that the programme ‘mixes’ youth from different parties and in this way dilutes the internal party coherence. Some of the interviewed had been threatened with expulsion after arguing in favour of cooperating with opposition parties.

From a Ugandan perspective, the fact that National Resistance Movement (NRM) is participating in the programme is an advantage and shows a degree of commitment to the PYPA programme compared to come other political party support programmes in the country.

Effectiveness

The programme is effective in enhancing the capacity of the individual participants, which was evidence by multiple examples of participant achievements in their post-PYPA political life. The bulk of the interviewed participants were able to point to individual progress with attribution to PYPA academy curriculum. Several had engaged in training activities for their immediate constituency, while others had advanced in their political career or stood for election.

In effect, the PYPA thus indirectly contribute to VO1 by enhancing the capacity of individuals within the parties. From a VO2 perspective, there is strong evidence among the interviewed PYPA participants of an enhanced degree of tolerance and cooperation between the individual party members from different parties. They verbally express an understanding of a joint youth perspective and the need to cooperate on this agenda. The fact that the members from different parties, including the NRM, were able to sit and discuss together and show mutual appreciation was evidence to this achievement.

The extent to which the programme has actively contributed to the VO2 objective from a party perspective is less evident. Mother party members are sceptical of the mixed party affiliation in the courses and there are only limited (if a few potential cases) of evidence of influencing the party structures. As in southern Africa, long-term progress will depend on the extent to which the youth leaders advance in the system and remain committed to multi-party systems.

The interviewees all expressed a strong understanding of gender and women's empowerment and, in particular the women, were increasingly committed to strive for party leadership positions as a consequence of the academy. The course has also been able to ensure close to 50-50 representation in the academies.

The political tensions around LGBTI in Uganda is also reflected in the PYPA academies. Of the three focus group discussions the team held with PYPA alumni, in two of them the alumni were very vocal in elaborating on the tensions that the issue resulted in during the academies. They elaborated how the issue was only touched upon very briefly and was then taken off the table. The third group however stressed that they had learned a lot and were now aware of the minority rights of LGTBI. However, overall interviews showed limited attention to LGBTI in the PYPA East Africa academies.

The alumni had all established a Whatsapp group to stay in touch and share information, and were also using the PYPA Facebook website. KIC also uses social media forums such as Facebook to stay in touch with participants as well as monitor and follow up after the trainings.

Efficiency

As in southern Africa, the RBM mechanisms applied are focused on post-course questionnaires, observation and the inputs from the learning evaluators. More outcome-based evaluations are not implemented at this stage.

In terms of harmonisation, the team can confirm that KIC engages in dialogue with NDI as well as DGF. The major other agency engaged in capacity development of young politicians is the IRI. Some of the participants have participated in both the PYPA and the IRI training and found substantial overlap, though the appreciation of the PYPA approach was greater due to its focus on practical application and the high-

ly participatory approach. In short, there is room for enhanced coordination of these activities in Uganda.

As in southern Africa, the programme applies a participatory approach to the training in the academies and the participants feel involved and listened to. There is transparency vis-à-vis the parties as well as the participants. The participants influence on the design and content of the course is less evident.

Impact

As in southern Africa, changes have been made at individual level, allowing academy participants to improve their capacities as politicians, and enhance the mutual tolerance of politicians from other parties.

However, again as in southern Africa, the extent to which this programme will have an impact in the longer run is dependent on the confirmation of the assumption that the participants are willing and able to use these new skills if they become part of the leadership of their parties.

Sustainability

The PYPA East Africa programme can only be sustained through continued funding. No funds are expected from the participating parties to fund the academy in the future. The sustainability is thus mostly related to current results.

All participants interviewed expressed a high appreciation of the academy and a high degree of ownership vis-à-vis the PYPA curricula, and were able to apply this in their daily work. This enhances the probability of sustainability of the results at an individual level. However, as in southern Africa, several participants stated the need for engaging in post-academy alumni activities in order to keep abreast with the learning and stay in touch with the other party members.

Again, as in southern Africa, the results at an overall level are still to be identified and sustainability is not yet relevant to discuss. However, enhanced inclusion and sustainability of results will require ownership and commitment from the mother parties, which is only partly assured at this stage.

Project 2: GF programme with African Green Forum support to Environmental Party of Uganda

Programme genesis: The Uganda programme is part of the overall AGF, established by green parties in Africa and funded by GF.

Programme objective: The programme focuses on the development of continental and regional cooperation as well as capacity strengthening of AGF, regional federations and national parties.

Partner role: The partner in Uganda is the direct beneficiary, the Environmental Party of Uganda (EPU). The partner designs and submit project proposals for AGF funding, which is then endorsed and funds channelled to the partner for implementation.

Activities: Outreach, membership drive, and resource mobilisation.

Relevance

The AGF funded activities of the EPU are fully identified by the EPU within the AGF framework. There is thus full ownership to the activities undertaken.

There is no evident contextual analysis, which form the basis for the funding. However, the funding covers basic activities needed to start a new party, with a focus on membership base and initial party establishment (including the first party office). There is thus a degree of alignment with the VO1 objective.

Effectiveness

The activities have generated an interest in the EPU, which is evident from the participant lists of the party activities and the indication of 200 potentially interested members. However, the number of paying party members remains 20.

The party has established an internal structure, and has basic policies in place. There is however limited inputs and learning from the outside contributing to improved quality of activities, plans etc.

There is no evidence of particular attention being given to gender equality issues.

There is no evidence of strategic use of ICT.

Efficiency

Interviews and desk study of party related documentation show challenges in terms of scale and scope of the programme in two ways: (1) scale and scope of the EPU and likelihood of future effectiveness as a political party, and (2) scale and scope in the design of the support.

Re. 1. The party has a limited 20 paying members, are not yet represented in parliament and none of the other interviewees approached during the field mission was aware of the party's existence. To become an influential player in Uganda will thus require substantial efforts and resource. The latter is hampered by the fact that the only real funding source of the party is AGF and thus GF.

Re. 2. While the support provided is relevant and owned, it is not attached to any quality assurance or capacity development. The funding is provided up front and no noteworthy Results-Based Management (RBM) mechanisms are applied to assess results. There is also no substantial use of the AGF as a platform for sharing of lessons learned (interviewees were very specific about this). The potentials of learning through networking is thus not utilised. The party foresees that this will be enhanced with the AGF funded new model of East African Greens Federation, which is still to be implemented.

Impact

As the party has only received one tranche of funding and only implemented initial activities it is too early to assess impact.

Sustainability

The EPU currently has 20 members who pay the annual member fee of USD 40, which equals a budget of USD 800. The rest of the funding comes from AGF. The Westminster Foundation has provided initial commitment to fund a strategic planning exercise. The EPU is and the activities are assessed not to be sustainable without AGF funding.

Conclusion

The programmes funded in Uganda are very different in nature, and it is a challenge to draw conclusions at an aggregate level. PYPA stands out as being effective in enhancing the capacity of young politicians through the PYPA methodologies also applied in southern Africa. However, as in southern Africa the results are at an outcome level and the probability of impact is limited given the limited influence of the young politicians on the mother party.

The AGF support ensures a high degree of ownership, but the targeting, i.e. identification of the right party of support, is questionable given the current limited influence of the EPU on the political situation on Uganda and the limited membership base and complete reliance on funding from AGF (and thus GF).

For all three interventions, there is limited reflection on the timing of the support and the strategic prioritisation vis-à-vis the political contextual developments in the country, i.e. election cycles, repressive actions, disputes between parties etc. There are thus opportunities to further the relevance of the programmes.

Annex A -List of consultations:*Agenda would make sense.*

Frank HABINEZA, Chairperson of AGF as well as GF project coordinator for AGF	AGF
Nicolas de Torrente, Component Manager, DGF	Democratic Governance Facility
Emmy Otim, Regional Manager for Eastern Africa	KIC
Margareth (Maggie) Birungi, Programme Officer - Parliament and Dialogue	National Democratic Institute
Daniel Tulibagenti, Sanny Blessed Nambooze, Pinto Ismael Hamwada, Phiona Nassozi, Robinah Norah Akwi, Faizol Nkugwa, PYPA participants (three from 2014, two from 2012 and one from 2013)	From different parties: People's Progressive Party, Democratic Party, National Resistance Movement, Democratic Party and Conservative Party
Asele Angella Ogworar, Patricia Alaroker, Katende Moses, Willington Nsubuga, Dunan Abigabe, Bendaki Evans, Namyanyi Pauline	From different parties: Democratic Party, Forum for Democratic Change, National Resistance Movement
David Sinsubuga (Vice President of EPU), Nathan Makuregye (Executive Director of East African Greens Federation), Robert Tumwesigye Baganda (External Fundraising Secretary of EPU), Robinah K. Nanyunja (President of EPU, Treasurer of AGF)	Ecological Party of Uganda
Eugene van Kemanade, Country Representative Uganda - Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy	Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Fahami Matsawily Juma, Tanzanian PYPA participant	Chadema
Sijaona James Karoli, Tanzanian PYPA Participants	UPD
Rose Shingira, Kenyan PYPA Participant	WDM
Julisiza Mengiseni, Tanzanian, PYPA Participant	Chadema

Tunisia

Introduction

Fredrik Ugglä and Nedjma Ouerdane travelled to Tunis from 23rd to 27th November 2014 to conduct a field mission to evaluate PAO interventions in Tunisia.

The team met with PAO partners and activity participants as well as local and international organisations working in the field of political party support in order to inform findings for this country report.

Evidence was gathered through a combination of desk based research (for background and information section alone) and from stakeholder respondents in one to two hour semi-structured consultations. The team used an evidence matrix to steer consultations and log findings per OECD DAC criteria.

Limitations

Given the relatively recent presence of PAO programs in Tunisia, information relating to program relevance and efficiency dominated most discussions. Respondents could comment on effectiveness to a lesser extent. Where impact and sustainability are concerned, evidence was mostly lacking. Another limitation is with regard to the number and breadth of stakeholder consultations. Barring one exception, the team was only able to consult one to two PAO partner party representatives. In addition, the field mission was concentrated in Tunis alone. On this basis, the sample from which findings have been drawn is fairly limited. A list of consultations is provided at the end of this report.

Country Selection:

Tunisia was selected as a country case study for three main reasons. First and most important, Tunisia is relevant as a test case for PAO capacity to adapt and provide support in new and challenging circumstances. Prior to the 2011 revolution, no PAO worked in Tunisia. However, as the country embarked on a democratic transition, several PAOs included the country in their programs, and thus had to embark on simultaneous processes of setting up local partnerships and cooperation in an unknown environment. As a test case, Tunisia is all the more relevant due to the strategic importance of its democratic transition, which has been hailed as a hard-won success

story^[1], and which holds strategic value as a possible source of inspiration to the entire MENA region. This is all the more important due to the failed transitions to democracy in most other countries in the region.

Second, four PAOs have activities relating to the country. For the purpose of ensuring analytical breadth in limited time, selecting Tunisia helped cover more with less for this evaluation.

Finally, the timing of the field mission coincided with the country's second free and fair legislative and presidential elections since Ben Ali's fall. The team was therefore able to draw insights on political party support at a particularly politically active and potentially decisive period in the country.

Background

Tunisia has undergone a remarkable transformation since the Ben Ali regime was put to an end by popular protest in 2011. In spite of political conflict and polarisation, it has averted much of the chaos associated with regime change in the MENA region, and has embarked on a mostly peaceful, pragmatic and civic-driven path to redefining the Tunisian social compact and to designing the political institutions to help sustain it.

Nevertheless, the country remains a nascent democracy, grappling with political tensions, a weak economy, and real security threats, which could undermine Tunisia's progress if not managed appropriately through effective and legitimate political institutions.

The development of the democratic Tunisian party system contains advances as well as challenges. The first elections after the fall of Ben Ali in October of 2011 resulted in a fragmented party system in which a dominant party, the Islamist Ennahda (Renaissance) party, towered over the rest. Accordingly, Ennahda formed a government with two smaller parties.

In the parliamentary elections of 2014, fragmentation was reduced dramatically as several smaller parties were literally wiped out, of which include Ennahda's two coalition parties. Instead came a marked bipartisan party system, which pits Ennahda against the newly founded and largest party in Parliament, Nidaa Tounes. While these two parties together received over two thirds of the popular vote, no other party or coalition gained more than five per cent of the total vote. Tunisian politics is therefore

^[1] Tunisia was selected "Country of the Year"(2014) by The Economist
<http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21636748-has-been-bad-year-nation-states-someand-one-particular-deserve>

likely to be dominated by Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes, and the somewhat superficial Islamic and secular camps of political discourse they respectively represent.

International Democracy Support in Tunisia

The international community has been supportive at the transition's most critical junctures and several entities are working with issues such as constitutional reform, parliamentary development, political party support and civil society strengthening, among others.

Sweden's PAOs are one amongst several other sources of international party support, the most established of which include: the USA's National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI), the German Stiftungen who have a long history of working in the country, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) which has delivered some political party support as part of its broader governance programmes; and some smaller scale party interventions from the UK's Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD), and the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD). Likewise, other groups such as the Stockholm-based International IDEA are active in the area of women's participation in elections.

While some of the above actors aim to work with all relevant political parties, the German and British foundations have focused on working bilaterally with sister parties. In such programs, support is oriented towards training and exchange visits, not least as it is reportedly illegal for Tunisian political parties to receive foreign funding.

Where donor coordination is concerned, although there have been some formal elements of coordination amongst international organisations, such activities still mostly rely on informal exchanges and coordination mechanisms between individuals on the ground.

PAO Support to Political Parties

PAO programs in Tunisia have been with Akef Tounes (AT), Ettakatol, Al Joumhouri (AJ), Tunisie Verte (TV) and the Popular Front's Parti des Patriotes Démocrates Unifié (PPDU).

PAO collaboration with the two latter parties is as part of multilateral regional support networks. TV is part of the African Greens Federation which is supported by the Green Forum (GF), and PPDU is a member of the African Left Networking Forum (ALNEF) which is supported by the Left International Forum (VIF). SILC and OPIC have delivered bilateral assistance programs with AT and AJ, and Ettakatol, respectively.

Overall, PAO partner parties are small and struggling to institutionalise themselves as programmatic parties with broad bases of support. Ideologically, they range from the far left (PPDU and more ambiguously, Tunisie Verte), over a secular centre-left position (Ettakatol and Al Joumhouri), to the liberal centre-right position of Afeek Tounes.

Of these PAO partners, only Afek Tounes and the PPDU Popular Front coalition party have been successful in securing multiple seats in the October 2014 legislative elections. Al Joumouhri lost all but one of their parliamentarians and Ettakatol have lost all their seats in this election. Tunisie Verte seems to be an extraordinarily fragile outfit, having had no parliamentary representation in either 2011 or 2014.

Findings

Although the majority of our findings apply applied to all PAO partner parties, there are significant differences between these cooperations. For this reason, we will first discuss commonalities and then add notes above each cooperation.

Relevance

Findings on PAO program relevance in Tunisia fall into four categories:

- i. Adequacy of **program design** relative to parties' needs;
- ii. Extent of **local ownership** in program development and delivery;
- iii. PAO understanding of the **Tunisian country context**;
- iv. The **Swedish added value** in party support.

Program design

PAO sister-party programs in Tunisia typically deliver support to political parties in two forms: trainings and exchange visits to Sweden as well as to third countries.

There have been four consistent project themes underpinning PAO activities:

- Developing effective party communications and improving party outreach to the electorate (advocacy, campaigning, canvassing);
- Enhancing women's political participation and representation;
- Increasing youth engagement in political processes;
- Developing the international contacts of Tunisian political parties.

The former three of these themes are all relevant to party strengthening priorities, particularly the first on developing party communications given that most PAO partner parties have small and fluctuating bases of citizen support, and that PAO program cycles have coincided with the run-up to the October 2014 legislative elections. They are equally relevant in a longer-term perspective. New and inexperienced political parties certainly need improved communications and inclusive support bases in order to operate effectively on a day-to-day basis.

The development of international contacts through exchange visits to Sweden and third countries is perhaps more debateable. While there is evidence of the importance of these in helping parties build their networks and gain exposure to other transition experiences as well as to Swedish governance and party practices (e.g. organisation of party congress), it is less clear what competencies, lessons or tools have been drawn from the visits or whether there will be opportunities to apply these to the Tunisian context in more concrete terms.

Local ownership

Most PAO programs in Tunisia have been developed from a solid foundation of local partner ownership, beginning as a result of partner parties' demands following PAO visits to the country in 2011-2012. This is most notably the case for the bilateral support programs. Local ownership in the later stages of programs appears to have been weaker, however. Implementation has to a large extent been PAO-led with little input from partners and with no systematic follow up to inform successive phases of program delivery. Partners often stated that they would have liked to have undertaken more activities and been more directly engaged with PAOs during the program cycle.

Tunisian context

The extent to which PAOs are sufficiently attuned to developments in the country and hence their ability to revise project content and delivery accordingly is questionable. Most partners felt that PAOs were well informed on Tunisian politics and on associated party needs. However, evidence from consultations suggests that there is little systematic PAO contextual analysis of on-going events on the ground and that instead, PAOs mostly liaise with local partners to gather information on developments in Tunisia as and when required, on an ad hoc basis. This approach carries the risk of obscuring support gaps and opportunities for creative approaches to party support (e.g. by collaborating with other donors), which local partners may not have the time, access, objectivity or experience to identify.

The Swedish added-value

One finding of note with regard to the relevance of the Swedish "way of doing things" is that Tunisian political actors consider the Swedish example as compatible to the Tunisian context at least in the longer term. As such, the Swedish paradigm may have the potential to act as a driving force to accelerating party and political maturity in Tunisia.

*Additional relevance findings per program:*Tunisie Verte and GF (through the African Green Federation)

Tunisie Verte's participation in the Green Federation is relevant in so far as the party shares the Federation's ecological political platform. However, relevance in the Tunisian context is weaker as TV respondents noted themselves that ecology is not a priority issue among the Tunisian electorate. Critically, TV appears very critical of AGF and states that it is plagued by nepotism, and that it simply "does not work". Likewise, the party representatives state that the African connection does not seem very relevant to them, and instead manifest their will for a direct relationship with GF or with any Swedish party really. Where party support is concerned, the party's most urgent need is that of funding. The party lacks the most basic organisational structures such as headquarters or simple office space to hold meetings which, according to interviewees, limits its reach to activist groups such as women, who are less likely to attend meetings held in cafes or other public places.

Afek Tounes and SILC

Interviews showed a high degree of appreciation of cooperation from a relevance perspective, and also of the extent to which Silc had approached the cooperation to let the party specify their needs. The international activities arranged by Silc have been appreciated, and mentioned the experience of discussing and exchanging views partners from other countries.

PPDU and VIF (through the ALNEF network)

PPDU themselves perceive of the ALNEF network as very relevant, not least because of their ideological belief in solidarity among African and Arab nations and for gaining experiences from other African left-wing parties, particularly from South Africa. That said, however, PPDU participation in ALNEF seems to have been very limited in terms of persons participating. Similarly, they claim that VIF contribution to the ALNEF network is very limited, and that they do not participate actively in meetings or discussions.

Al Joumourhi and SILC

Interviewees stressed that SILC managed the cooperation very well when it started and considered the party very well informed on Tunisian politics. However, the partnership has mostly died out as both them and Silc became too busy with upcoming elections. They claim to have tried to restart discussions now, but have so far not met with success. As to the contents, concerns were raised that the program focus on youth and women's empowerment ran the risk of overshadowing more pressing priority capacity support areas.

Ettakatol and OPC

Ettakatol is part of an OPIC program which is entitled "authoritarian / post authoritarian systems". A representative from the party states that their inclusion in this group does not really contribute much to them (although they may have more to offer to the other participants). The party representative also highlighted that given that party support technicalities are essentially generic in their form, OPC could do more to tailor and refine activities to the Tunisian context by involving Ettakatol members more directly in the design of training agendas.

Effectiveness

PAO trainings on gender equality, youth empowerment and party communications have equipped partners with relevant capacity building skills, while exchange visits have provided participants with networking opportunities and exposure to different approaches to politics, party organisation and democratic transitions from around the world. As such, for most party partners, PAO support has contributed to promoting equal opportunities for men and women within their organisation and to providing them with tools to build party outreach and advocacy capacity.

However, there is no evidence of any institution-wide effect whereby PAO support contributes to the better functioning of the multi-party system in Tunisia. One reason for this is likely to be that most activities in the PAO programs' are rather limited in terms of participants. With regard to the party system, another key impediment lies in the distribution of PAO partnerships across the Tunisian political spectrum. No

PAO works with either of the country's two largest parties, Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes, thereby excluding the very levers to the Tunisian party system from PAO program architecture. Similarly, two out of five parties are at the present without parliamentary representation, and while Ettakatol has indeed had an important role in politics after the transition (integrating the first elected government), TV appears very far from any realistic prospects of making a political difference in the country. Out of the three parties with parliamentary presence, at least AT and PPDU are potentially significant players, given the very dynamic political context in Tunisia. Hence, in such a situation, investing in smaller parties may potentially still eventually help reach the overall Sida PAO strategy objective of a "well-functioning party system" but only if this support is delivered in a longer term strategic perspective.

Evidence from consultations suggests, however, that there seems to be little of overarching PAO strategies. Program activities are by and large, generic, self-contained and sporadic with no strategic logic or longer-term road map guiding them towards well-defined goals.

Additional effectiveness findings per program

Tunisie Verte and GF (through the African Green Federation)

Interviewees expressed concerns regarding the effectiveness of the support (details known to team).

PPDU and VIF (through the ALNEF network)

PPDU's participation to ALNEF has been limited to participation in conferences. Interviews showed that respondents have not found to have made any significant mark on the PPDU's development.

Ettakatol and OPC:

While the party representative acknowledged the usefulness of the trainings provided, he also noted that they were too limited in number and participation to do much difference, particularly in comparison with the much more important cooperations that the party has with FES for instance.

Al Joumourhi and SILC

There were mixed reviews on effectiveness. On the one hand, SILC is rated for distinguishing itself from other international providers of support on account of its open mindedness and unique brand of Scandinavian democracy. Similarly, AT in particular stressed the importance of Silc's support for their party development, and stated that they would like to see cooperation expand and develop. On the other hand, interviewees found that there is not much scope for effectiveness in party support as long as Tunisia's legislation prohibits direct foreign funding to parties.

Efficiency

PAO project efficiency in Tunisia is lacking in a number of respects. First, PAOs have not coordinated their efforts in party support with any other donors, even when supporting the same party, meaning that opportunities for synergies have been ne-

glected. Second, the absence of systematic project monitoring and evaluation not only compromises how well projects can develop but also fails to capture project results, which may go under the radar. This is perhaps particularly grave during a turbulent political situation such as the Tunisian one. Third, and related to the previous point, unlike several other organisations working with Tunisian political parties, there is no permanent PAO presence in the country, and regular contacts appear limited for most PAOs.

In spite of this, it should be recognised that respondents from programs of bilateral party support frequently spoke of good communications with PAOs and were satisfied with the frequency and conduct of contact. Even so, the lack of a continued PAO presence in Tunisia does have some important implications on program efficiency:

- A regular presence in Tunisia would allow PAOs to be much better equipped to ensure that projects remain as relevant and resourceful as possible in keeping with events on the ground.
- Proximity to partners would be particularly valuable in managing potential partner disengagement which may arise at tense or discouraging times.
- PAO presence would be the only way in which PAOs could participate in the informal coordinating mechanisms between donors, which now appear to be the norm in Tunisia.

The shortcomings incurred by not being in the country are all the more serious as Sweden does not have any diplomatic representation in the country to advise partners or conduct the necessary independent political analysis to inform PAO programs.

Additional efficiency findings per program

Tunisie Verte and GF (through the African Green Federation)

TV believes that there is more scope for party capacity strengthening through a direct bilateral partnership with GF rather than through the current multi-lateral modality of support of which it is very disparaging

Afek Tounes and SILC

AT is in a unique situation compared to the other PAO partner parties in that it can benefit from the work that its independent affiliated think tank, the Hannibal Strategic Institute, carries out, and which provides a way to support party work in a more sustained fashion (which is otherwise difficult as outside funding for parties is illegal in Tunisia) SILC has supported the think tank and the team met with some of its representatives during the field mission. The Institute appears well organised and efficient, with the capacity to expand and become an increasingly valuable resource to the party.

PPDU and VIF (through the ALNEF network)

PPDU respondents report very limited communication with VIF. They have no direct contact with the PAO. This is also the case during ALNEF events when VIF is present but performs what was described as a primarily monitoring and oversight role.

While international cooperation is not a priority for PPDU, the party would like to see VIF be more committed to their cause by facilitating network building with leftist parties in other countries for instance.

Al Joumourhi and SILC

AJ report that SILC has done an excellent job of managing the program but that monitoring and evaluation is ad-hoc. At the present, the cooperation has died out, but the respondents hope to reanimate it. It is not clear just what Silc's position with regard to this is.

Ettakatol and OPC

The respondent noted that although communication in general with OPIC is good, the language barrier could be an issue. Of note, also, is that the respondent was not clear on the relationship and respective roles between OPC and the Swedish Social Democratic Party. Where donor coordination is concerned, interestingly, Ettakatol have adopted a much more pro-active approach in that they consider themselves to be responsible for coordinating their demands to different donors.

Impact (outputs and short term results)

PAOs have delivered their programs of party support alongside those of a plethora of different organisations in Tunisia. The extent to which improvements in partner capacity and performance in the multi-party system can be attributed to PAO programs alone is therefore very difficult to tell.

PAO support has allowed program participants to gain skills and knowledge in key capacity building priority areas but, as discussed above, how these have translated into concrete results is not yet clear. As such, there is no evidence to suggest that tools acquired through PAO support have led or could lead to a generally improved party performance or multi-party system functioning, let alone had a significant effect on the country's transition to democracy

At this stage, PAO overall impact in Tunisia appears to be negligible. Indeed, two testaments to this are that no consulted donor official working in the sector (and often working with the same parties as the Swedish PAOs) was even aware of Swedish PAOs' activities in the country and that PAO partner parties themselves consider the scope of PAO programs to be insufficient.

The PAO program architecture is also not the most propitious to effecting multi-party and institution-wide change. Several PAO partners are rather marginal actors in Tunisian politics, disconnected from the two largest parties in the country and from Parliament as a whole. In addition, program themes do not address what is perhaps the primary problem in the Tunisian party system: polarisation and the high level of distrust between militants from different parties. This is of course natural given the modality of Swedish party support, but nevertheless deserves to be indicated.

Additional impact findings per program

Afek Tounes and SILC

AT was particularly pleased that SILC support had given them the opportunity to recruit and train activists who had had little to no experience in politics. Respondents spoke of these new committed recruits as project “success stories” in themselves; some of which had acquired sufficient skills and competencies to become party trainers.

Sustainability

The PAO support that has been provided to enhancing parties’ campaigning and communications credentials should, in theory, be of use to parties in Parliament ahead of the municipal elections in 2015 and to helping parties to continue to build their support bases. However, the key challenge to sustainability in the post electoral period is to keep the parties interested in engaging with citizens and building their constituencies in the absence of an electoral race.

*Additional sustainability findings per program*Afek Tounes and SILC

AT is a well organised parliamentary party, with well-defined objectives and a good understanding of where and how the international community can help reach them. Program results are sustainable within the structures it has established, and the party has the capacity to absorb and build on international assistance, including that of SILC.

Al Joumourhi and SILC

AJ noted that SILC prioritisation of certain parts of the world (Eastern Europe) over others – namely Tunisia - in its resource allocation could compromise program sustainability in the country. Indeed, cooperation with Silc is at present inactive.

Ettakatol and OPC

The consultation with Ettakatol drew attention to the problem of individuals switching parties on a regular basis in Tunisia and how this compromises the sustainability of program results within a single party.

Conclusions

Broadly speaking, PAO support in Tunisia from 2012 to 2014 has allowed partner parties to participate in activities exposing them to important themes in party development, a range of international political party contacts and the Swedish approach to party work and organisation. The overall impact is too early to gauge but field mission findings suggest that in its current form and distribution, in spite of the benefits accrued by the individual parties, PAO support impact to the Tunisian multi-party system as a whole is likely to be negligible.

It could be claimed that a key limitation to the potential for international party support is that foreign direct party funding is illegal. While direct funding is an immediate

and readily utilisable form of support, non-material support can be equally highly effective if developed in a strategic perspective.

An issue however, is that no PAOs are working with the country's two largest parties. The resulting PAO disconnection from the crux of political activity is problematic in reaching the PAO Strategy's ultimate objective of improving multi-party systems in countries of interventions.

There are other insufficiencies in PAO program design and management in Tunisia which are easier to address. The first is to involve partner parties and their feedback more systematically in project delivery by integrating a more rigorous Monitoring and Evaluation process in project management. The second is to ensure a more regular PAO presence in Tunisia to meet with partners, take stock of progress and re-assess needs if and when required. A regular presence in Tunis would also allow PAOs to engage and coordinate with other international donor efforts. The third is to invest more time in defining long term, strategic and mutually agreed goals with partners to orient the design and delivery of future activities.

Looking ahead, the end of 2014 will have hailed the country's second freely elected legislature and head of state, and 2015 will present the immediate priority of implementing the Constitution and longer-term planning for municipal elections.

Where relevance is concerned, the challenge, as the electoral period comes to a close will be to adapt PAO support to tackle a new set of post electoral priorities such as parties' understanding and engagement with the parliamentary system as well as their programmatic development and internal organization (including fundraising).

At this stage, the sustainability of results and partnership commitment is key. It is ultimately up to PAOs to generate and sustain the momentum which will keep partners committed and allow for past program gains to continue to be applied in the post electoral period.

List of consultations

PAO partner parties

Tunisie Verte (TV): Abdelkader Zitouni + 1
 Afek Tounes (AT): Meryam Fatnassi, Khalid Fourati + 3
 Parti des Patriotes Démocrates Unifié (PPDU): Mohamed Jmour + 1
 Al Joumouhri : Meryem Mili, Sahbi Grira
 Ettakatol: Sami Razgallah

PAO activity participant

Mahmoud Baroudi, former MP (Alliance Démocratique)

Other organisations in party support

Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD): Maaïke Van der Werf
 National Democratic Institute (NDI): Wim Borremans
 Arab Institute for Human Rights: Abdelbasset Ben Hassen
 Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD): Nejib Jeridi
 UNDP – Constituent Assembly programme : Olivier Pierre Louveaux
 Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Anne Margrethe Rasmussen.
 UNDP - Elections support: Riccardo Barranca, Carlos Valenzuela, Costanza Lucangeli

Ukraine

Introduction

Nedjma Ouerdane and Erik Bryld (the team) travelled to Kyiv, Ukraine from 8th to 11th December to conduct a field mission to evaluate PAO interventions in Ukraine.

The team met with PAO partners and local and international organisations and stakeholders working in the field of political party support and wider democracy and governance (D&G) programs in Kyiv. Findings for this country report were drawn from one to two hour semi-structured consultations with them and Ukraine background information was informed by desk-based research, and was also corroborated and complemented by consultation testimonies.

Limitations

The team has had to work within the confines of two sets of limitations in evaluating PAO programs in Ukraine.

One is in the analysis of PAO work. The team could not collect sufficient primary data from which to draw findings because it was only able to meet with a very limited number of PAO program stakeholders in Ukraine. The team met with stakeholders from three out of the five PAO programs identified in the preliminary PAO program mapping in Ukraine, and from these three, only a total of four individuals could participate in consultations at the time of the field visit. In addition, issues of limited time-in-country and the resultant Kyiv-centric locality of the mission restricted the team's evidence base both across and within the PAO programs to a considerable extent. This imposes limitations on the volume, detail and triangulation of collected data as well as on the extent to which all DAC criteria could be covered.

The second is in its reporting of findings in this report. The political situation in Ukraine is currently very fragile and PAO partners could face real security threats should their collaborative projects be known to a wider audience. For this reason, the team cannot designate any partners (individuals, organisations and parties) by name and will refer to them in code (Partner A, B and C) instead to preserve their identities to the greatest extent.

Country selection

Ukraine was selected primarily because five PAOs have been working in the country⁸⁷ and this allows for a wider comparative net to be cast over PAO work in a single setting. In addition, programs in Ukraine are based on long established partnerships which provides sturdier benchmarks and greater scope for assessment. This relates to the second main reason Ukraine was selected, which is that it was one of the country case studies in the SADEV PAO evaluation in 2009, and would allow for a timely stock-take and follow up.

It was also important to include a country in the Eastern and Central Europe region, given that it is explicitly mentioned as a priority area in the 2010 Swedish government Strategy for Special Democracy support⁸⁸.

Finally, the current shifting political landscape in Ukraine since the outbreak of the Euromaidan movement provides a relevant framework for the assessment of political party support in the context of democratic transition.

BACKGROUND

The Euromaidan movement, which took hold of Ukraine at the end of 2013 has set the country on a new political course. Former President Viktor Yanukovich's decision to delay the much anticipated signing of the EU Accession Agreement in November 2013 triggered widespread protests eventually forcing him into exile and his party, the Party of Regions, to its demise.

Ukraine has since been attempting to rebuild its political institutions in a particularly fragile environment where uncertainty and risk prevail, and the country's very sovereignty hangs in the balance - first with the Russian annexation of Crimea and now with the on-going conflicts in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

A year on, Ukraine has held presidential and legislative elections, which have placed Petro Poroshenko as the Head of State and Arseniy Yatsenyuk at the premiership of a pro-European government coalition.

The October 2014 legislative elections saw six political parties reach the five per cent threshold to gain representation in Parliament⁸⁹, of which five form the current governmental coalition. Prime Minister's Yatsenyuk's People's Front won the party-list

⁸⁷ This information was drawn from the preliminary mapping exercise of PAO programs from the desk review of PAO program literature.

⁸⁸ "The objective also intends to contribute to reform cooperation in Eastern Europe (...)", Terms of Reference for the Review of the implementation and results of the Swedish Strategy for Democracy Support for Party Affiliated Organisations 2012-2014, p1

⁸⁹ The electoral system in Ukraine is mixed with 50% under party lists and 50% under single member constituencies.

vote with just over twenty two per cent of the vote, followed closely with a one point difference by President Poroshenko's Poroshenko Bloc. Third in line is the mayor of Lviv's party, Self Help or Self Reliance Party, which secured eleven per cent of the vote. The Party of Regions' successor, the Opposition Bloc, came in fourth place with just over nine per cent. In fifth and sixth place are the Radical Party with about seven per cent, and former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko's Fatherland, with just under six per cent. The parties at either extreme of the political spectrum did not make it to the legislature, which is a first for the Communist Party since the country's independence in 1991.

These electoral results have shaken Ukraine's party scene and oriented the Verkhovna Rada more resolutely towards Europe and the West⁹⁰. However, the majority of political parties in Ukraine today lack any real political identity, organizational structure or solid programmatic bases of support⁹¹. Parties are referred to as "projects"⁹² in Ukrainian, which is indicative of their transitive and ideologically weak nature.

Political life and competition in Ukraine is characterised by three main features: access to funding, party leadership personalities and the West / Russia fault line. Many parties and politicians in the Rada are new, with little experience in democratic politics, party functioning or parliamentary procedures. Much of parties' popularity vis-à-vis the electorate depends on personality rather than policy, and their access to the vast resources necessary to run Ukraine's typically exorbitant electoral campaigns⁹³. Party ideologies and programmes tend to be underdeveloped, public trust in political institutions is at an all time low, especially where youth is concerned, and women are underrepresented in the Rada with just under 12% of seats⁹⁴.

International Democracy Support in Ukraine

Several international organisations deliver programs of political party support in Ukraine. The United States' National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) have coordinated their interventions to support parties across the political spectrum at national and local levels. The German Stiftungen are also active in the country, implementing support through bilateral programs with sister parties and the United Kingdom's Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) delivered a program in parliamentary training, human resources development and

⁹⁰ *Ukraine's European Parliament*, Carnegie Europe
<http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=57086>

⁹¹ Evidence from most consultations.

⁹² Two Ukrainian consultation respondents affirmed this.

⁹³ *Political party development in Ukraine*, Sarah Whitmore, GSDRC Applied Knowledge Services.
<http://www.gsdr.org/docs/open/HDQ1146.pdf>

⁹⁴ IPU Parline Database http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2331_A.htm

management from 2007 to 2010. A number of other international actors such as the EU delegation to Ukraine, Transparency International and the Soros Foundation are delivering programs of support in anti-corruption, electoral management, constitutional reform and civil society empowerment, amongst others.

PAO Support to Political Parties in Ukraine

The evaluation team's preliminary mapping exercise drawn from the PAO literature review identified the following PAO partnerships in Ukraine in the period 2012-2014:

1. Christian Democratic International Center (KIC) and Partner A.
2. Swedish International Liberal Center (SILC) and Partner B.
3. Left International Forum (VIF) "*Strong Left Parties and Increased Democratic Participation*" program with Partner C.
4. Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation (JHS) "Regional Programme Eastern Europe" in collaboration with the International Republican Institute (IRI).

The team was only able to collect evidence from three of these, and to varying extents, during the field mission to Kyiv.

These are:

1. Christian Democratic International Center (KIC) and Partner A
2. Swedish International Liberal Center (SILC) and Partner B

With regard to the latter program, GF has not actually been active in Ukraine for the last few years, barring its participation in a Green Academy activity in 2014 held in Kyiv for which GF invited some Ukrainian contacts to take part. The team held a consultation with one of these participants but was able to draw little to no relevant evidence for this PAO evaluation.

In addition, at the time of the field mission, Partner C had been dismantled as a result of political turmoil which had placed its members under acute threat. The team was not able to meet with any of its members or representatives so no evidence could be gathered to substantiate findings on the VIF-Partner C program of support.

The same goes for the JHF-IRI program. Consultations with IRI confirmed that no activities have been delivered under this program. JHF had intended on funding an IRI training program of opposition parties following IRI's donor's re-allocation of party strengthening funding to civil society based capacity building. The program however was never able to get off the ground on account of the very strict compliance legislation for funding to political parties in Ukraine which required JHF to be registered in Ukraine. Currently, IRI is exploring opportunities to work in collaboration with JHF with Crimea's Tatar leaders, to improve their visibility and advocacy credentials. Preparations for this program are still under way but the intention would be to carry out the majority of program activities in Sweden in collaboration with JHF.

The team was able to explore the KIC – Partner A and SILC – Partner B programs in more detail. However, given the very limited time in country, the Kyiv-centric locali-

ty of the field mission, and the limited number of available and diversified stakeholder contacts, findings on program performance remain limited in scope, size and detail.

FINDINGS

1. Christian Democratic International Center (KIC) and Partner A.

Partner A has been active as a leading civil society organisation in Ukraine since the mid-1990s and was established as a political party in September 2011.

Partner A is a young party with strong bases of grass roots support in the country and is regarded as a particularly promising example of the many CSOs-turned-political parties in Ukraine.

During the Maidan protests, the party's membership increased threefold. The party ran candidates during the October 2014 but failed to secure any seats. Part of the explanation given for this from different sources is that the party ran in a coalition and under a different name, thereby allegedly compromising its visibility and chances of success.

Partner A collaborates with other international organisations namely, the German Foundations, the Robert Schuman Institute (RSI) and USAID however, its partnership with KIC is the most formal and institutionalised.

Relevance

Partner A's collaboration with KIC began in 2007 and evolved into formal political party support.

The KIC-Partner A three year support program started in 2011 and was jointly developed by Partner A and KIC, using the Log Frame Approach (LFA) to identify priority gaps and two overarching program objectives. These are to first, improve the party structure and second, enhance youth and women's engagement in the party and political activity in general.

Partner A demonstrated a clear understanding of the ultimate purpose and associated expectations of KIC support which was forthrightly phrased as being essentially about "planning how Partner A could become a party". In turn, Partner A report that KIC is well suited to working in Ukraine on account of their good understanding of the political situation on the ground and the current program manager's fluency in Russian is an additional bonus to partnership proceedings.

Program activities broadly fall under the three following categories:

- International cooperation through visits to Sweden and third countries such as Georgia and Austria.
- Expert trainings in political leadership, youth and women's political engagement
- Others

KIC's partnership with Partner A is relevant in so far as Partner A is widely regarded - by respondents across the board - as having potential to become a meaningful political force in the country. Several stakeholders hold the view that Partner A is a party worth investing in primarily because it had fostered a committed, grass rooted foundation of support in the country.

Ideologically, the KIC and Partner A link is more tenuous but this is a system-wide rather than Partner A-KIC issue. Few, if any, Ukrainian parties define themselves on robust ideological grounds according to the team's consultations with stakeholders in the field.

Some specific program activities were reported as distinctly relevant to Partner A's work. The team was told that the international exchange visits and use of experts is particularly valued by Partner A. Visits to Georgia, Austria, Sweden and Germany were all strategically conceived to either apply to the Ukrainian context in comparable terms (e.g. reforms and IDP management in Georgia and AAA) or to impart powerful examples in governance structures and functioning as models to work towards (e.g. city management in Stockholm and Berlin).

Effectiveness

Evidence on effectiveness based on the field mission to Kyiv was lacking and findings are inconclusive in this respect. What can be said is that Partner A's extensive experience as a vibrant CSO endows the party with a marginal comparative advantage relative to other newer or less well established parties where capacity for program implementation is concerned. In this context, there is potential for effectiveness of program delivery.

Evidence from the team's consultation suggested that the dearth of democratic memory, practice or culture in Ukrainian institutions is a particular challenge for a party like Partner A which is attempting to embody its related values. In this sense, the KIC-Partner A program was, by Partner A, considered very effective in providing models of democratic political culture and ideologically-driven political representation.

Efficiency

Program efficiency scores relatively well on account of Partner A's own accrued skills and experience in project management, advocacy and outreach as well as on the regular and continuous communication between KIC and Partner A project management.

Of particular importance at this time is KIC's guidance in managing financial risks. KIC advised at an early stage to diversify risk in fund management by allocating funds to several bank accounts. At the time of the field mission, the evaluation team was informed that one of the accounts Partner A used for the funds was on the verge

of bankruptcy thereby demonstrating how KIC advice has helped safeguard at least part of the direct funding.

Project management processes between Partner A and KIC are sound. Communication is regular, the language barrier is not an issue and KIC project managers over time have conducted regular visits to Ukraine to stay abreast of developments and new needs emerging on the ground.

The Partner A project manager adopts a strategic approach in the selection of participants for activities as it is informed by a database of party members which logs member interest areas, level of activity and past attendance to activities.

Sustainability

Findings from the field mission indicate that the Partner A-KIC project scored highly on sustainability for two main reasons. First, Partner A has robust organisational capacity and has the potential to absorb and manage foreign assistance efficiently. Second, Partner A management has a clear sense of direction in terms of program content and how this feeds into Partner A progress.

Partner A distinguish between current and past needs, describing their initial program phase as one which was geared to equipping Partner A with basic party organisation skills and their current program phase as one that should move on from this rudimentary stage into a more substantive one. This suggests that first phase program gains – referred to as “basic templates” during the consultation - have been incorporated into the foundations of the party and could serve as a sound basis for future program activities.

Impact

As is the case for effectiveness, findings on impact are very limited and only from a single source. Consultation-based evidence suggests that the KIC sister party program has enabled Partner A to gain knowledge and capacity in a number of areas such as in financial transparency, and to improve party organisation and electoral processes with the adoption of Joint Councils and nomination committees for example.

Of note are the activities in women’s political engagement which were reported to be delivered in a gender equal perspective, involving men, and placing women’s empowerment in the framework of equal rights between men and women. Youth engagement has also been a key area of activity although it is not clear to the team how increased youth engagement in politics can be capitalised by Partner A given that Partner A does not consider Ukrainian youth as a target group for the party.

The sense of progression discussed above is perhaps the biggest indicator of program impact or at least of future impact potential. The program was initially conceived to help set up Partner A as a party which has effectively been realised, and Partner A plans for future program work to re-orient its focus towards the more internal substantive development of the party.

2. Swedish International Liberal Center (SILC) and Partner B

Partner B was registered as a political party in 2009 and emerged out of a Donetsk based NGO. Partner B is a small party which has been working with SILC since before 2009 on the basis of a shared liberal vision of political activity which Partner B defined as upholding the following principles: equality before the law, right to private ownership, freedom of religion and support for private sector development.

Partner B's registration was arduously protracted over three years and today, field mission evidence suggests that Partner B has still a long way to go in establishing itself as a political party *de facto* given that none of the stakeholders consulted – bar one – were aware of its existence. It should be noted that the party's strongest base is regional in Donetsk.

Partner B receives some support from local donors such as small businesses but is heavily reliant on international donor support. The party does not collaborate with any other political parties and in one case, the evaluation team was informed that another source of international funding support was not pursued on account of this party stance.

Relevance

Partner B-SILC have a long standing collaboration which dates back to 1999. Similarly to KIC-Partner A program, the SILC - Partner B program was developed jointly and support gaps were identified through Partner B-led opinion polls and SILC representatives' scoping exercises.

The current program of collaboration has been running for three years and includes training activities, direct funding through Partner B's affiliated independent NGO, and a range of other support mechanisms, particularly in the field of human rights.

The program has given Partner B access to much-needed human rights support in the form of knowledge, legal assistance and grants through SILC's affiliation to Freedom House's Lifeline program.

However, field mission findings suggest that Partner B is a very marginal player at the national level. As a result, it has no agency within Ukraine's multi-party system and the potential for this to change is unlikely given the party's reticence to form alliances with other political parties.

Effectiveness

Partner B has benefited from the SILC program of support in several areas. Consultation respondents reported that women's participation in the party has increased by eleven per cent, at leadership level in local branches and that the number of local branches themselves has grown from 89 to 108 during the program cycle.

Visits to Sweden have exposed participants to Swedish election campaigns, and two notable takeaways in electioneering processes were related to the team. The first was Swedish politicians' face-to-face interaction with voters and the second one was the design of electoral flyers and campaigning material. Both served as inspirations to inform Partner B campaigning and were applied during subsequent elections in Donetsk.

Partner B claims to be the first party in Ukraine to partake in activities of LGBTI sensitisation, which were provided through the SILC program of support. The inclusion of journalists in Partner B meetings and electoral campaigns (the Kyiv City Council campaign) was also highlighted as a Partner B exception.

Human Rights assistance has been an important element in the program. Partner B members report greater knowledge of human rights legislation and the party has secured grants from the Lifeline program to campaign against legislation esteemed to be in contravention to such rights in January 2014. It has also been active in defending those⁹⁵ that have borne the brunt of a comparable regressive law.

Exchange visits have provided Partner B with international contacts of like-minded parties but it is not clear how these have actually translated into action on the ground in Ukraine for Partner B. One example was cited, however, of Partner B returning from Partner B's visit to Lisbon for the Alliance for Liberals and Democrats in Europe (ALDE) Party Congress in November 2014 and articulating the knowledge it had acquired on liberal values to a newspaper which is widely read in political circles.

Efficiency

A major challenge to political party competition in Ukraine is parties' very limited access to public funds. SILC has provided assistance to Partner B in consolidating its fundraising strategy by compacting its fundraising outreach to once a year as opposed to once a month.

SILC have trained Partner B in using the logframe approach (LFA) in managing the project, as per best practice guidelines in project management. SILC also has access to Partner B balance reports and uses this data to assess Partner B absorption capacity of funding.

Communications are efficient between program stakeholders and the Partner B chairman reports undertaking frequent visits to Sweden to meet with SILC staff. Overall, SILC staff were described as very responsive, dynamic and flexible, provid-

⁹⁵ The team was told that Partner B has provided legal assistance to eighteen people.

ing administrative assistance as and when required, such as with the issuing of visas at the Swedish embassy for visits to Sweden.

Sustainability

The limited evidence provides a weak base for assessing sustainability of the support. However, in cases where the appreciation of capacity development activities have been referred to specific changes in party management, operations and campaigning etc. this is likely to be sustainable (see examples above).

The limited internal revenue generation of the party vis-à-vis the funding received from SILC is a concern for party sustainability and the outlook of receiving less funding in this next phase is a case of concern to Partner B. There is thus a degree of financial dependency on SILC (the exact percentage of funding vis-à-vis the Partner B overall budget has not been made available to the team).

Impact

SILC has been challenged in terms of making a political impact in Ukraine, and is particularly constrained following the unrest in Donetsk. The team is thus not able to identify political influencing during the evaluation time-line.

There are indications of short-term outcomes within the party as a consequence of SILC support.

CONCLUSION

PAO support in Ukraine from 2012 to 2014 has had to unfold in a particularly challenging environment. The Euromaidan movement has opened a new chapter for political activity in the country, but various institutional and legal restrictions continue to limit the scope for political party development. Meanwhile, regional instability in the east of Ukraine and the historic and lasting tensions with neighbouring Russia make the situation all the more fragile. Within this context, the donor community's efforts to support the development of functional, transparent, accountable and representative political parties is no easy feat.

Swedish PAO support has been active in the country since the 1990s, but has been relatively calm in the 2012-2014 period. The programs which have actually been implemented during this time have not been covered in their full breadth for this evaluation on account of the limitations discussed in the introduction to this report. As a result, the team was not able to collect enough data to draw conclusive findings with regard to PAO relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability in Ukraine. The partnerships which have grown out of PAOs' long term engagement in the country do give PAOs the potential to score highly on all these grounds however. This is particularly the case with partners such as Partner A, which, according to consultation respondents, holds a lot of promise in Ukrainian politics. SILC's partnership with Partner B is equally well grounded and the party clearly gains from its collaboration with SILC. However, how valuable this is with respect to overall PAO strategy is questionable. Partner B has little to no influence in the Ukrainian party

system and, regardless of the solidity of the party's partnership with SILC, the program potential for system-wide impact appears very remote. This finding is not intended to obscure how discrete program activities have nevertheless contributed to increasing party capacity and knowledge, particularly in the field of human rights. However, it does seek to contextualise the Partner B-SILC program in the overall PAO strategy of effecting change at a systemic, rather than individual or party-specific, level.

Looking forward, both parties can continue to grow with continued assistance from KIC and SILC. The overall PAO strategic objective of developing the multi-party system in countries of intervention, however, does not look like it is likely to be met under the current PAO program architecture. PAOs should consider coordinating their interventions and embedding their programs in a collective, long term, strategic direction which would be geared to encouraging interparty interaction and communication. The local elections planned for October 2015 and the current process of long-awaited decentralisation reform present short to medium term thematic priorities which would be very well suited to orient such an initiative. Until this is done, the evidence observed by the team suggests that there is very limited potential for PAO induced multi-party development in Ukraine with the current PAO program set up.

Annex A**List of consultations**

In addition to the four key informants which we have chosen to not cite by name or affiliation, the team met with the following stakeholders to collect contextual and comparative data:

Viktor Liakh, President	East Europe Foundation (EEF)
Yuriy Piskalyuk, Program Manager	
Olga Shavarova, Program Coordinator	
Mustafa Sait-Ametov, Program Development Manager	
Mario Mitre, Deputy Country Director	National Democratic Institute (NDI)
Vitalia Deriabina, Political Party and Parliamentary Program Manager	
Yana Kazakova, Women Lead, Senior Program Assistant	
Tetyana Bilyavska, Women Lead Program, Assistant / Interpreter	
Michael R. Druckman, Resident Country Director	International Republican Institute (IRI)
Juan Manuel Vilaplana Lopez, Political Officer, Political Section	Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine.
Iryna Bezkorovayna, Policy Officer, Events and Projects	British Embassy Kyiv
Katya Bykova, Policy Officer	
Elena Chebanenko, Senior Analyst	Transparency International Ukraine

Colombia

Introduction

Fredrik Uggla and Nadia Masri-Pedersen travelled to Colombia from 7 December to 12 December 2014 to conduct consultations with PAO partners and other stakeholders in the field to gather evidence to inform evaluation findings. The field mission took place in Bogota, the capital, with one phone interview with a beneficiary living in another city.

Approach:

Semi-structured one- to two-hour interviews with individuals/groups using questions guide to draw findings on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, preliminary results, impact and sustainability of projects in country.

Reflections and limitations

- According to the initial mapping conducted by the team it appeared as though VIF also covered Colombia through its regional activities with the Secretaría Andino-Amazónica (SAA) programme, hosted in Peru. This, however, turned out not to be the case, and thus the team looked only at the VIF cooperation with Partido Comunista Colombiano (PCC).
- GF has had a programme in Colombia, in cooperation with the Corporación Unidades Democráticas para el Desarrollo (CUEDES). However, activities were only carried out in 2012. In consultation with GF, CUEDES decided not to request any funds from 2013 and onwards, due to lack of capacity to manage these funds.
- In spite of repeated attempts, the evaluation team were not able to talk to the beneficiaries from GF-CUEDES' activities.
- The beneficiaries met from the VIF-PCC cooperation were also involved in programme implementation, which is likely to have influenced their answers in a positive direction. The team asked for phone numbers to beneficiaries from around the country, in order to call these. But, only the list for youth participants was received of which it was only possible to get in contact with one person. No beneficiary list was received for the women participants. However, the team was able to get an impression of the trainings/seminars/schools, their content and training methodologies.
- The team was able to get a satisfying number of interviews from other agencies working with support to political parties in Colombia.

Country Selection and Presentation:

Swedish political parties have been engaged in sister party support in Colombia since the 1990s. At the time of the SADEV evaluation (2009), four PAOs were active in Colombia. Today, only GF and VIF remain with their respective cooperation:

Table 9 – Overview of PAO Programmes in Colombia

PAO and Programme	Implementing Partner and Background for cooperation
Left International Forum (VIF) – <i>Cooperation with Partido Comunista Colombiano (PCC)</i>	<p>VIF's cooperation with PCC started already in 1996 and began as a project between their respective youth wings. Support has been going on ever since, and has gone to different activities (campaigning, publications, human rights work, etc.). Since 2012, cooperation centres on supporting internal training sessions within the youth wing, for women, and in the party in general. Whereas the youth trainings take place at both the local and the national level, training for women takes place at the national level only. Trainers are both drawn from the party itself, or from its allies in other sectors.</p> <p>These trainings are part of a larger plan to train members of the party, and to prepare new members for party life. Participants seem to be selected by the party leadership in each region. These trainings existed already before VIF started supporting them, but on a smaller scale. There is a degree of internal evaluation, performed by the "Comisión de cuadros"; a committee to evaluate party members/cadres.</p> <p>There is a high degree of ownership by the PCC, who claims that even though VIF has some participation, it is basically the PCC that decides what is to be done in the cooperation. This seems to be done by the party's ideological department to a large extent, and does not rely on Swedish examples at all, due to the difference in circumstances, sources in the PCC claim. No one from VIF or the Left party participates in trainings. Instead, training sessions are (judging from an individual course program and based on interviews) very focused on ideological discussions, and much less on concrete party capacities (e.g., campaigning, discourse, internal party structure). This is possibly natural given the character of the PCC.</p>
Green Forum (GF) – <i>Cooperation with Corporación Unidades Democráticas para el Desarrollo (CUEDES)</i>	<p>Green Forum's cooperation with Colombia, currently manifested in its cooperation with CUEDES, has a long history. During the present period, however, it took place only during the year 2012, as CUEDES did not request funds for 2013 or 2014, due to lack of implementing capacity and organisational problems (GF Annual Report 2013). For the year 2012, the project basically consisted in training events in different loca-</p>

	<p>tions in Colombia (seminars, conferences) aimed to promote environmental awareness, promoting ‘green thinking’, human rights knowledge, etc. There has been a wide variety of themes, and several of them has been rather specific (i.e., dealt with local problems). The trainings are aimed at leaders at the local level, and most trainers are also local leaders themselves who draw on local knowledge. Most participants seem to have been young persons, and not all of them were leaders. The participants were selected locally, according to CEUDES.</p> <p>The above-mentioned activities were indeed in line with the stated program theory, which stressed that the idea was to build parties from the bottom-up, i.e. to foster links between grass roots and the parties, among the latter, more participatory.</p> <p>GF’s participation is mostly indirect, and their input is mostly through comments and remarks on plans and similar documents. However, there have also been some visits by GF to Colombia, and previously politicians, such as Bodil Ceballos, have witnessed the trainings.</p> <p>During 2012, CEUDES claims to have performed some 60 activities within the program until September.</p> <p>Activities have, to a large extent, been aimed at members, leaders or people of the larger green party, Partido Verde Colombia (PVC) in Colombia. However, the connection to this party seems to have been flimsy at best. (CEUDES’ founder and director, who is also the contact person for GF has had a rather troubled history with the Colombian Green Party). Higher leadership within the PVC have not been consulted on the trainings, says CEUDES, and although the goal of the project was to give participants the instruments to use in the PVC, relations to that party were only individual and never institutional. CEUDES estimates that some 30 leaders within PVC have participated in their trainings.</p>
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Background and Information

Colombia has a history full of paradoxes. It is one of South America's most developed countries in a lot of ways, yet also contains severe poverty and social marginalisation. It has some of Latin America's oldest parties, but party competition has co-existed with a history of civil war and everyday violence. Today, Colombia may be on the verge of exiting from a civil war that has lasted for decades, but a number of pressing problems remain including themes related to human rights, inclusion and democratic participation.

The two historical parties in Colombia are the Liberal and Conservative parties, which can trace their history as far back as the 1840s. Over the following century and a half they dominated the political scene in the country constructing a 'clientelist' system that reached far into civil society, and monopolised state power.

The two-party dominance came to an end during the 1990s when institutional change gave rise to a highly fragmented party system. After the turn of the century, however, other institutional reforms managed to bring down the number of parties again. Subsequent to the March 2014 elections, 13 parties are represented in the lower chamber of the Colombian parliament. Of these, only one secured more than twenty per cent of the popular vote, and a full eight received less than five per cent of the vote each. Hence, the system is still one of high fragmentation.

Among the parties, the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties have encountered competition both from the left and the right. To the left stand the Green Alliance and the Democratic Alternative Pole (PDA) (which for a while contained the PCC discussed below), to the right parties such as the Democratic Centre, which is very close to the former president Uribe. In spite of such competition, 2014 also saw president Santos from the centre-right PSUN re-elected as president.

Although the Colombian party system has advanced in certain respects (e.g. gender issues and female representation) a number of problems remain such as clientelist practices, personalisation, internal democracy and centralisation. These problems tend to come to a fore during electoral campaigns. Likewise, scant presence and participation outside of Bogotá and the main cities is also seen as a problem for most parties.

Donor support for political parties:

Some international donors (e.g. United National Development Programme (UNDP), Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) and National Democratic Institute (NDI)) are active with party support in Colombia. Apart from FES, however, such work tends to be oriented towards parties with parliamentary representation and promote joint discussions and activities combined with work directed at each party. Sources at the Swedish embassy tell of how a majority of donors in Colombia are sceptical towards the possibility to reform Colombian political parties from the outside, and it appears that activities in the sector have decreased over time.

Even so, people who work with this issue claim that the Colombian political parties are ready to learn from external sources and that people in the party leaderships are often eager to reform their parties (not least because there is friction between congressional politicians and party leadership in most parties). It is often noted that the Colombian party system is in flux, which makes working with political parties a very dynamic undertaking. Also, several observers stress that as illegal funding and non-savoury contacts is a constant ill in the Colombian party system, it is very important to have a good contextual knowledge in order to work effectively and not ending up in political problems.

There appears to be some coordination between some of the actors that are active in the area, mostly around gender issues. Most of these people have neither heard of, nor met the Swedish PAOs however.

There is also a Sida-funded multi-donor program of political party support through UNDP (previously involving IDEA) called 'Proyecto Fortalecimiento Democrático'. This is aimed at all parties with parliamentary representation, which all receive the same amount of support. At the present, only eight parties are enrolled in the program, whose primary components are representativity, quality, transparency and citizenship.

Apart from specific activities with each party, the program also attempts to promote dialogue both inside parliament and outside of Bogotá International support, some of what other donors are doing. Representatives from the project claim that it has succeeded in some areas, but not in others. Frequent overturn of counterparts is mentioned as a problem, as well as a lack of focus within the program. A final challenge is also enabling changes at all levels in the party, from the national level to the party districts. This program was subject to an external evaluation in 2013, which concluded that it had achieved considerable results.⁹⁶

Findings

Project 1: VIF project with PCC

Project genesis: Twinning arrangement between VIF and the Colombian Communist Party (PCC). It's a long-term partnership between the two institutions dating back to 1996. The financial support was SEK 290.000 in 2012 y SEK 300.000 in 2013.

⁹⁶. Carlos Sojo and Rotsay Rosales (2013): "Evaluación de Medio Períodos de la FASE II del Proyecto Fortalecimiento Democrático". (Un-published evaluation report, UNDP-Colombia).

Project objective: Strengthening organisational and political aspects of the party as well as increase participation of women and youth in party life.

Partner role: PCC is the sole responsible for implementation of programme, carrying out the training/seminar activities and there is limited coordination, exchange or approval from the part of VIF.

Activities: Seminars for women, political schools and youth schools and youth seminars, both at national as well as regional levels, one activity on a national level per year in each of the three areas. In 2013 the following activities were carried out (according to 2014 PCC reporting for the year 2013):

- Four regional visits with seminars being held in the topics of gender, youth and finances. The regional seminars were held in Pereira (35 participants), Popayán (28 participants), Neiva (54 participants) and Santa Marta (26 participants).
- National Women Conference held in Bogota along with four regional women's seminars with the aim at strengthening women's political presence in the peace process, in the activities of the party as well as regarding financial management. In the women's conference 126 women participated from 25 cities across the country during two days.
- National Youth Seminar held mainly by PCC's youth wing "JUCO" (Juventud Comunista Colombiana) where 55 young women and 15 young men participated during three days.
- The PCC also worked on developing the information material 'Cartilla' which each year have a distinct topic with the aim at increasing the knowledge of party members across the country.

Relevance:

It is obvious that the cooperation with VIF is highly relevant to PCC. Being a classic Communist cadre party, the ideological schooling of members is very important for the party, and it is clear that these trainings, their themes and the participants are carefully selected by the ideological department of the party. In addition, such training might be particularly relevant for promoting politically disadvantaged groups, such as women, and train them in such things as speaking in public for instance. According to PCC itself, the relevance is confirmed with regards to the needs of PCC. The team found that PCC in particular in 2014 focused a lot of its activities on the topic 'peace process' in Colombia. While this theme is certainly relevant to Colombia's development in general, the PCC does not play a role in these negotiations, wherefore it cannot be said that such instruction have a direct relation to what PCC does as a political party.

Similarly, the PCC would also like to publicise the results of the trainings more, not least to show that PCC has the support of the Swedish Left Party. The PCC claims that their cooperation with VIF is unique and that they do not have much other cooperation of the same kind (sources such as the recently concluded independent evaluation of VIF's work confirm that PCC does not have any other international funding.). Also, the 2009 SADEV evaluation claimed that the support was financially important to PCC and might have contributed as much as 20 per cent of its total budget at one

point. Furthermore, according to PCC they cannot access other sources of funding, such as government funding, due to stigmatisation.

Beyond the participants and the party, however, the relevance of the support is open to doubt. While one source indicates that the existence of PCC contributes an important element of pluralism to Colombian political life, it is also clear that the party is politically marginal, although it is more strongly represented in certain social movements (e.g., students at public universities). The PCC has left its previous alliance with the broad PDA, and its importance in the Colombia party system in general is likely to be low or non-existent. Indeed, due to the low amount of electoral support, the party has lost its legal status as a party, which leads to a number of practical problems when it comes to channelling funds and similar.

Given the orthodox and ideological character of the PCC, as well as, the distrust with which several outside observers seem to view it due to its history of involvement with the FARC (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), one could discuss whether its internal ideological training is the most relevant action. In order for PCC to participate more actively in the Colombian party system, in general, more externally oriented activities might be more important. However, another opinion stresses that it is exactly because of PCC's character that a sister-party approach could work, as it builds the necessary trust, which may then contribute to change, at least at the party level. An important question in this regard could be how important it is for PCC to possess an external impetus to change, which the VIF-PCC cooperation currently does not focus on.

Effectiveness:

The VIF-PCC support is likely to have contributed to strengthening the PCC internally, and seem even to have been an important part of the party's work, which is also indicated by a recent external evaluation of the VIF's work. PCC ownership is very high, and the importance of this project for the party is stressed.

PCC stated that they had seen an increased number of women in the party as well as in leadership positions within the party. PCC has established a women's secretary, which they did not have before. PCC also tell that it has become increasingly easier to discuss gender issues, revealing more openness inside the party. The situation today was, however, compared to 20 years ago, and thus makes it hard to know if this change inside the party can be attributed to the support from 2012 till today. The team also found anecdotal evidence of women 'changing' their attitudes as well as being more outspoken during the national seminars held. In addition, the team found that participants experience the political schools as creating a feeling of 'unity' amongst the members of the party.

What seems the case for all of the activities carried out by PCC is that the seminars act as motivational activities that increase the party members engagement within the party. Accordingly, several participants have gone on to higher positions in the party,

and several sources claim that trainings have had a psychological importance for the participants as it breeds a sense of fraternity between them.

The team confirms that PCC is able to cover many geographic regions across the country and include participants from the provinces in the trainings. The team also observed awareness at PCC with regards to minorities and marginalised groups.

The team noticed a high level of implementation capacity at PCC which means that they have carried out their activities according to plans and despite challenges along the way. Most recently a PCC bank account was closed, when the party lost its registration.

Whereas one could discuss the effectiveness of relying on local trainers and disregarding Swedish experiences, for the purpose of building an internally strong and coherent party, this method might actually be the most appropriate.

Finally, there is some evidence of a lack of attention to outside recommendations. For instance, in the midterm evaluation of the VIF's activities, it was recommended that PCC take the lead in developing a social media strategy together with other interested program partners in the region to disseminate information about the peace negotiations in Colombia and other common issues. Yet, the team found no evidence that this recommendation was being implemented.

Efficiency:

Interviews and desk studies of the VIF-PCC programme reveals some challenges to the efficiency of the programme.

In terms of the appropriateness of the scope and scale of the programme in order to achieve results, the team notes that PCC could make more of an effort in diversifying their training methods to increase the outcome of the training and increasing participation. The methods as described by PCC, are mainly based on lectures with a discussion or question and answer add on, in addition to some panel discussions. The team sees these methods as relatively 'one-way' and are focused on the importance of the topic instead of focusing on optimising participant learning and interaction. It was hard for the team to judge whether specific objectives or milestones are set prior to the activity, with regards to what PCC want to achieve with the activity and how this achievement benefits the party.

The team found that it was only the youth from JUCO that make use of social media as part of the outreach and communication work they do.

The cooperation between VIF and PCC seem to be based on limited coordination and interaction. The team found little evidence that VIF continuously contribute with knowledge or other inputs, to PCC's implementation. Rather, VIF involvement tends to be limited to initial assessments and the basic reporting requirements. PCC, on the other hand, has limited systems of monitoring and evaluating their activities, which

leads to weak results-based management (RBM). An exception is the women's activities, where the participants seem to develop a work plan during the seminars that PCC then follows up on (still informally). The results of the trainings are limited to observations made by the trainers, and these are not recorded. It should be said that PCC works based on a high level of ownership.

With regards to donor harmonisation, the team found that VIF has been in contact with the Swedish Embassy in Bogota. The team found no evidence of coordination or harmonisation with other actors in the area of party support in Colombia (such as NDI, NIMD, UNDP). The JUCO youth, however, seem to work more in conjunction with other actors. JUCO have for example participated in a national youth festival (together with actors such as Partido Verde, Progresistas, Partido Liberal, and a Christian Youth Association).

In terms of application of a human rights based approach (HRBA), the team found little evidence of particular mechanisms ensuring accountability and transparency in the party. PCC are aware of marginalised groups and acting in accordance with non-discrimination principles, yet not in a formalised way. Youth and women seem to be participating quite actively in developing the seminars and schools. The team did not find that the party members that participate in the seminars/schools are involved in designing the content, which is developed by the ideological bureau of the PCC.

Impact (outputs and short term results)

Apart from the changes that are likely to have taken place at the individual level allowing participants to increase their motivation and understanding of the party, VIF's program with PCC is also likely to have had an impact on the party as it allows them to train and instruct their members and – particularly important – their cadres. This importance has been repeatedly stated in interviews, and it is clear that the program is a central part of the PCC's internal trainings, to the point where the selection of participants and contents are centrally decided to a high degree in order to reflect "the party line".

However, one should note that the impact on the party system or political development in Colombia in general is likely to be limited. Apart from the possible signal value contained in having a functioning orthodox left party in a political context that was until recently marked by an extremely high degree of repression against the political left in particular, the broader importance and impact of the PCC is likely to be irrelevant because of its small size and marginal position within the Colombian party system.

Sustainability:

The PCC performed internal trainings before VIF's support started 15 years ago and could possibly continue without VIF's support. However, it would be on a much smaller scale due to the party's limited funding. The party recognises that a withdrawn Swedish support would be a "blow" to them. The team did not find any exit strategy to the programme.

Although the team was not able to properly identify the outcomes with the participants of the PCC activities, it is judged that they are sustainable to the extent the members stay active in the party and actively contribute with their skills and knowledge.

The members of the PCC the team met with, seemed like highly committed people, and it is thus very likely that they will continue their efforts even after the programme will end.

Project 2: GF with CEUDES

Project genesis: GF's involvement in Colombia dates back to its cooperation with Partido Verde Oxígeno (PVO) in 2002 when Ingrid Betancourt was kidnapped. GF later decided to channel its programme through the organisation CEUDES. Initially GF wanted to work with Colombia's Green Party the Partido Verde Colombia (PVC) (which PVO merged into), however, CEUDES' founder and director, who is also the contact person for GF has had a rather troubled history with the PVC and did not take any position in the party. Furthermore, according to GF, the PVC also does not promote a sufficiently 'green' agenda. GF decided to continue with CEUDES.

Project objective: Promoting environmental awareness, 'green thinking' and human rights knowledge.

Partner role: The local ownership has been high and it appears that cooperation and communication between GF and CEUDES has been very strong. CEUDES founder and director, the person who has been at the centre of GF's activities in Colombia, expresses gratitude towards the support received from GF throughout the years. GF's participation is mostly indirect, and their input is mostly through comments and remarks on plans and similar documents. However, there have also been some visits by GF to Colombia, and previous politicians, such as Bodil Ceballos, has witnessed the trainings.

Activities: For the year 2012, the project basically consisted in training events in different locations in Colombia (seminars, conferences) aimed to promote environmental awareness, promoting 'green thinking', human rights knowledge, etc. There have been a wide variety of themes, and several of them have been rather specific (i.e., dealt with local problems). The trainings are aimed at leaders at the local level, and most trainers are also local leaders themselves who draw on local knowledge.

Relevance:

The program's theory of the cooperation (strengthening parties from below) is clearly relevant considering Colombian elite-centred politics. However, in spite of the fact that PVC is a relevant party in Colombian politics (gaining 4.3 per cent of the vote in the last lower house election), there is reason to doubt the relevance of the project. Although training is likely to have contained some relevant elements, it is hard to believe that the above activities have been very relevant neither to the PVC nor to political life in Colombia in general. Lack of coordination with PVC and unclear rules for participation means that it is likely that there has been an absence of strategic thinking with regard to how trainings would promote party work. These findings echo

previous results of the SADEV 2009 evaluation, which also found a lack of coherence between goals and activities in GF's cooperation with CEUDES.

While CEUDES claims to have seen results of its work (in the form of participants advancing within PVC and the idea to start a party school within PVC), the team finds it unlikely, based on the evidence, that the programme has been relevant beyond the persons directly involved.

Effectiveness:

As was noted above, for 2012, GF's report could not report any outcomes related to the project with CEUDES. While a number of activities were undertaken, and the project manager claims to have seen results, the latter were of a procedural kind (leaders advancing within party, etc.), and likely to have been limited.

As noted above, apart from coincidental visits, the Swedish input to the CEUDES training events seems to have been very limited beyond the financial aid.

Efficiency:

Depending on an outside NGO, whose leader has had a fraught relationship with the party that is supposed to benefit from the project is not likely to be an efficient way of working, particularly as no coordination or dialogue took place between the two entities beyond individual contacts. For the year 2012, 30.000 SEK of the allocated budget were not implemented, after which the project was discontinued.

Overall, GF's relations with Colombia seem to have been very centred around the programme coordinator, who has obviously been an important contact for GF in the country (this relationship was indicated already in the SADEV 2009 evaluation). However, it seems that GF has directed its support to this person rather than to a formal political party. In the GF's reports it is explicitly mentioned that the programme coordinator has had a challenging relationship with the PVC. Working with the PVC directly is disregarded due to its supposed limited environmental agenda (in spite of the fact that the party is a member of the Global Greens coalition). The team, however, judges that building a project around a person can obviously lead to a number of issues when it comes to ownership and influence. Apart from that, it is somewhat paradoxical to work to strengthen participation in a green party (PVC), while claiming that it is not really a green party at all. Some sources indicate that PVC has become "more green" with time however, and that its ideological commitment to environmentalism has increased.

Activities have, to a large extent, been aimed at members, leaders or people of the larger green party, PVC in Colombia. However, the connection to this party seems to have been flimsy at best. Higher leadership within the PVC have not been consulted on the trainings and although the goal of the project was to give participants the instruments to use in the PVC, relations to the party were only at an individual level

and never institutional. CEUDES estimates that some 30 leaders within PVC have participated in their trainings over the course of the programme.

Likewise, while depending on local leaders to carry out the training is an attempt to keep costs down, the team questions whether this is the best way to undertake training. While this may make contents more connected to local conditions, it would also mean that few new perspectives and methods would be involved.

The team found no evidence of donor harmonisation, except for GF being in contact with the Swedish Embassy and with the UNDP program mentioned above.

The team did not find any particular emphasis being put on the issue of women, youth or minorities.

Finally, the team did not find any evidence of application of HRBA specific principles or approaches.

Sustainability:

Apart from the possible case of a participants rising within the PVC and applying the insights gained in trainings there, results are not likely to have been sustainable.

Likewise, the fact that CEUDES decided to end the implementation ahead of the end of the programme period proves the unsustainability of the programme.

However, it should be said that the GF-CEUDES relationship is one based on many years of cooperation and trust.

Impact (outputs and short term results)

While there might have been some impact on the individual participants, the team judges that it is unlikely that this has translated to the party level.

Conclusion

Looking at the two PAO support in Colombia it can be concluded that both PAOs have chosen to work with partners that are marginal when regarding the overall political scene.

While the traditional structure of the Colombian party system should make it relevant to support alternatives in the form of parties representing other alternatives in the name of increase pluralism, it is doubtful whether the two present cooperations (of which one is no longer active) have been the best ways of doing this. These cooperations do not take into consideration that the development of other alternatives is already happening, and that other contender parties have emerged during the last decade which stand to the left or claims a green ideology (PDA and PVC). However, PAO support in Colombia largely passes over this important development to work with groups that either do not constitute part of this process (PCC) or whose relationship with the relevant party is at arm length at best. It is hard to escape the conclusion

that in the fractious world of Colombian green and leftist politics, the Swedish PAO:s have not aimed at the most relevant or successful actors.

The PAO programmes in Colombia have also had limited transfer of knowledge or capacities between the sister parties, and in one case (VIF-PCC) even limited coordination or collaboration.

The PAO programmes in Colombia seem to have a relatively broad outreach in their activities outside the capital, even though the bulk of their activities take place in Bogotá. This is judged to be positive considering the internal conflicts in Colombian society as well as the need for enhanced party development and democratisation at the local level.

The programmes show limited execution of results-based management, hereunder particularly in their internal monitoring and evaluation of activities.

Finally, an important aspect of Colombian politics needs to be kept in mind when considering PAO engagement in Colombia. The country has gone from a strongly entrenched two-party system, to a system of extreme fragmentation at the turn of the century. From there, measures have been undertaken to reduce this fragmentation in order to improve political life. Accordingly, the number of parties in parliament was reduced from some 60 to 13. From this perspective, it is questionable if PAO support does a favour to democracy in Colombia if it sustains small groups that would actually need to disappear if fragmentation is to be reduced. Also, neither of the two PAO partners seem very bent on a consensual approach to politics, but rather being involved in fractious struggles, which may contribute to polarisation in the system.

Annex A -List of consultations:

Isabel Meza (from JUCO, responsible for youth schools), Carlos Mario Restrepo (from JUCO, responsible for youth schools), Rubiel Vargas (Responsible for PCC schools)	PCC + JUCO (PCC's youth wing)
Mayra Ortiz (Responsible for Bogota region and part of women's department of PCC, also coordinates seminars) Magnolia Agudela (National responsible for PCC's women's department, also part of national committee) Luz Elena Martinez Valencia (party member for many years, responsible for implementing women's seminars and also part of ASODEMUC (Women's association for peace and defence of rights of Colombian women), which is part of the women's department and works in regions in outreach to PCC and non-PCC women)	PCC
Gustavo Antonio Moreno Moreno (Financial Manager and internal auditor) Juan Pablo Montero (Coordinator of the regional projects as well as accountant) Claudia Flores (Project coordinator and national financial officer for the Party).	PCC
Pontus Rosenberg, Emma Nilenfors, Catalina Hoyos	Embassy of Sweden
Fabio Mariño Vargas	CEUDES
Mario Ruiz	UNDP
Ángela Rodríguez, Colombia Programme coordinator	Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
Felipe Botero, Associate professor at the Faculty for Social Science	Universidad de los Andes
Francisco J. Herrero, Colombia Director	National Democratic Institute
Carmen Sanchez, Beneficiary from Popayan	JUCO (PCC)

Annex 8 – Inception Report

1. Introduction

This report reflects the team's assessment and suggestions on the methodology, approach and implementation of the Evaluation of the Implementation and Results of the Swedish Strategy for Democracy Support for Party Affiliated Organisations 2012-2014. The evaluation will be implemented during October 2014 to January 2015.

In the following, we first present an assessment of the scope of the evaluation, outlining objectives and contextual issues. In this chapter we also present a first suggestion of the PAO support Theory of Change (based on the methodology outlined in chapter 4). In chapter 3, we discuss the evaluability and present revised evaluation questions for the implementation phase. In chapter 4, we present the suggested methodology and approach to be applied. In chapter 5, we present the preliminary findings of the PAO support mapping exercise, which then informs the suggested field mission sites in chapter 6.

Note: This is the non-confidential version of the inception report, excluding mapping of assistance to selected states.

2. Assessment of Scope of the Evaluation

We understand that the objective of the assignment is to evaluate the implementation and results of the Swedish Strategy for Democracy Support for Party Affiliated Organisations 2012-2014⁹⁷, hereafter the Strategy.

The Terms of Reference (ToR) (see Annex 1) specifically refers to the assessment of outputs and short-term results, rather than impact as such. This is judged to be a realistic approach to the expected achievements given the limited two-year timeframe of the Strategy evaluated and the nature of the support provided, i.e. primarily capacity development and software type interventions.

Specifically, the ToR requests an assessment of the relevance of the support to PAOs to the Strategy objectives; contribution to the desired results (short-term outcomes) as

⁹⁷ The current Strategy runs until 2015. The Strategy period de facto covers the period 2011-2015, but it only came in effect as of 2012.

well as unforeseen and unanticipated results/experiences. The methodology and approach have been developed in the light of these requirements.

THE PAO SUPPORT

The Swedish Strategy for Democracy Support for Party Affiliated Organisations was initiated in 2010, although support to Political Party-Affiliated Organisations (PAO) has been ongoing since 1995. The Strategy for 2012-2014 aims to support democratic development and increased respect for human rights in developing countries with the specific objective to:

... Through the contributions of Swedish party-affiliated organisations, to contribute to and assist in the development of a well-functioning party system in developing countries and countries in Central and Eastern Europe with the aim of promoting a representative, democratic form of government in these countries.

While these organisations originally had a strong focus on support to Eastern and East-Central Europe (and still have), they are becoming increasingly dispersed due to the organisations widening their geographic scope. The exact number of countries supported depends on the categorisation as several programmes such as PYPa is implemented across boundaries and alternate between countries in their implementation. However, participants from more than 70 countries all over the globe have benefitted from the programme. In greater detail, the Strategy aims at encouraging steps towards democratic governance, equal opportunities for women and men, full respect for human rights, and tolerance of dissidents and minorities, and where applicable bridge religious and ethnic conflicts.

The Strategy works through two independent areas, or work streams, namely:

1. Support for sister parties, and affiliated political movements and organisations, with the goal of ensuring well-functioning democratic political parties (focus area 1)
2. Support for multiparty systems, with the goal of ensuring well-functioning democratically based multiparty systems (focus area 2)

The total annual amount of support to PAO is currently 80 million Swedish Kroners. 70% of these funds are distributed through focus area 1, which again are allocated to the PAOs in accordance with their political mandate and number of seats in the Swedish Parliament⁹⁸. While the PAOs have to submit a proposal and a budget and get

⁹⁸ Recent Swedish elections has changed the landscape of political parties in parliament and will hence influence the PAOs supported through the Strategy.

approval for the funding under this focus area, a distinct feature of is the fact that the support is mandated, and thus influences to a certain degree Sida's room for assessment. The remaining 30% is channelled through focus area 2, which the PAOs also have to apply for and get granted based on their programme proposals.

The PAOs currently supported through the Strategy consist of seven party affiliated organisations, namely: Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation (JHS), Olof Palme International Center (OPC), Christian Democratic International Center (KIC), Center Party's International Foundation (CIS), Left International Forum (VIF), Green Forum (GF), and Swedish Liberal Centre (SILC). The PAOs have all been in existence since the mid-nineties, and they differ in both size and experience working with international development (see Annex 2 for an introduction to each organisation).

All PAOs have stated their organisational goals that they work towards, as shown below in the table 99:

Table 10 – PAO Organisational Goals.

PAO	Overall goal statement
JHS	The JHS aims to promote co-operation and European development based on freedom, democracy and market economy.
OPC	OPC, through its development projects, seeks to empower people to change their societies and thereby their own lives.
KIC	The goal of KIC's work is to contribute to democracy and development in the countries they work in. KIC does this by supporting these countries in building a multi-party system and by supporting other Christian Democratic parties.
CIS	CIS works for the development of democracy and human rights through support to sister parties and multi-party systems in Africa and Eastern Europe.
VIF	Together with partner organizations... VIF focuses primarily on projects that aim to increase the respect for human rights, fight oppression, exploitation and gender discrimination, strengthen democratic processes among the partner organizations and promote a sustainable development.
GF	Green Forum is especially working for democracy, where three concepts are central: grassroots democracy, self-reliance and decentralisation.
SILC	The goal of SILC is to strengthen organisations and support individuals who develop and promote democracy and human rights.

⁹⁹ Taken from the organisations websites.

THE SUGGESTED THEORY OF CHANGE

The evaluation team has extrapolated a Theory of Change (ToC), which will need to be reconfirmed by Sida and with inputs from the PAOs. This will be used as a basis for the evaluation. The first draft ToC is based on ToR and the Swedish Government strategy: Strategi för särskilt demokratistöd genom svenska partianknutna organisationer 2011-2015. The ToC will be used to test assumptions underpinning the strategy.

The PAO Strategy is based on an overall set of conceptual assumptions underpinning support to democratic development in developing countries globally. These refer to improvements in freedom of assembly and political organisation, participation, equal rights and eventually democratic and human rights improvements. There is an assumption in the Strategy that improved capacity of political parties and multi-party systems by default improves democratic practices and human rights.

With this in mind, the ToC of the PAO strategy has been extrapolated and operationalized with assumptions related to local ownership, commitments to politically responsible actions and involvement of minorities and women in the political processes to enable the Strategy to meet its objective.

For change to take place these assumptions will need to be fully or partly confirmed by the evaluation team. Table 2.1 present our interpretation of the PAO Strategy ToC, with programme specific assumptions to be tested by the evaluation team. This ToC is subject to review by Sida and with inputs from the PAOs.

Table 11 - PAO Draft ToC and assumptions

Causality level	Expected change	Assumptions
Input	If... the Swedish Government provides support to Swedish PAO to undertake capacity development activities in the form of training, coaching; conferences and study tours, as well as information dissemination based on a needs assessment focusing on the PAO's own demands and the context within which they are working	The activities can be implemented in the given context The PAOs have the capacity and competences needed to undertake these activities
Output	Then... the PAO support will result in Improved capacities of partners to manage their operations and political work	The support addresses needs identified by the partners and that partners have full ownership of the capacity development undertaken

Short-term outcome	In the short-term leading to ...Improved intra-party transparency and accountability systems Enhanced participation of women and youth in party work Enhanced inter-party / multi-party cooperation Improved campaigning and communication	There is a willingness to reform within the partner organisations The PAOs have the capacities and systems to monitor progress and result and flexibility to adapt to changing circumstance
Long-Term Outcome	And in the longer term... 1) Well-functioning democratic political parties in developing countries; and 2) Well-functioning democratic multi-party systems in developing countries ¹⁰⁰	Contextual development allows the institutions and organisations supported to continue to operate
Impact	Eventually resulting in... Democratic development and enhanced respect for human rights in developing countries	

The evaluation will thus in its assessment look into the extent to which the foundations for the programme are in place, and the extent to which these assumptions can be confirmed, and the extent to which, if required, the programme has adapted its approach to take into account changing circumstances.

3. Relevance and evaluability of evaluation questions

According to the observations made above and the methodology outlined below, the team considers that the PAO strategy can be evaluated following the methodology and implementation plan outlined in this inception report. The team considers that the time and resources available are sufficient to make a credible and reliable evaluation of the outputs and short-term outcomes of the 2012-2014 interventions under the Strategy.

The scope of the evaluation means that the findings will be based on desk studies combined with key informant interviews in the field mission countries still to be se-

¹⁰⁰ The term 'well-functioning' is used consistently in the documentation, but is not defined. To test the theory, the team will need to identify the meaning of the term.

lected (see below). The evaluation will thus first and foremost rely on qualitative data from the field mission, but these will be based on the quantitative data analysis undertaken in advance of this. The approach will allow for a triangulation of different sets of data.

RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING EVALUATION QUESTIONS

Overall the team finds the evaluation questions clear and feasible to implement with a few adaptations in accordance with the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria.

The ToR has two basic sets of questions:

1. The overall evaluation questions presented in section 3 of the ToR related to the purpose and scope of the assignment, and
2. The guiding questions for the assignment presented in section 4.

In accordance with the suggested evaluation methodology applied (and as suggested in the ToR), the team has regrouped the questions so that they are aligned with the five OECD-DAC criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. These are presented in detail in the evaluation matrix in Annex 3. In the matrix each of the questions from the ToR are regrouped and refocused to ensure evaluability and indicators identified for assessing how the evaluation questions may be answered.

The regrouping is evidence of the focus on relevance, outputs and short-term outcomes of the evaluation, as per the ToR. This in effect means that the bulk of the questions relate to the first three OECD-DAC criteria:

1. **Relevance**, with emphasis on Swedish strategy alignment; alignment to the PAO strategy; and contextual/needs alignment.
2. **Effectiveness**, with emphasis on the objectives of the two work streams of the PAO support (political parties and multi-party systems; and specific concerns related to fragility, youth and women).
3. **Efficiency**, where the focus is mostly on design, scope and scale of the programme and the application of results-based management. In accordance with the proposal, the team has included a specific reference to the application of the Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA) as well.

This in effect also means that the ToR have limited attention to the remaining OECD-DAC criteria of impact and sustainability. Part of the reason for this is assessed to be the limited time of implementation of the Strategy at the time of the evaluation, i.e. 2012-2014, limiting the options for impact. However, the team will seek to document probability of impact where feasible. Similarly, the team suggests to assess the extent to which the outputs and short-term, outcomes identified are (or have a high probability of being) sustainable (i.e. are owned and internalised). Suggested evaluation questions have been formulated against these in the matrix in Annex 3.

Note, that the evaluation matrix does not include all questions in the ToR explicitly. This does not mean that the questions are not addressed, but that they will be included as part of the broader discussion in relevant OECD-DAC category. The team, however specifically notes Sida's request for assessing PAO's ability to assess and reduce risks and the comparison with other types of support (see further below).

LIMITATIONS

While the evaluation is implementable, there are a number of limitations, which the team will seek to address during the implementation of the assignment. First and foremost, the PAO support has been provided to participants from 70+ countries since its inception covering an extensive number of partners and multiple activities. The team is however, only able to meet and assess a few partners in a few countries, and will have to extrapolate the findings based on this. To accommodate, the selection of field mission sites will aim at ensuring sufficient scope and scale. At the same time, the team will draw upon existing secondary data sources for triangulation to underpin the findings.

The lack of proper baseline and follow-up data in most of the documentation received so far is an issue in terms of documenting change. The lack of data limits the possibility of tracking change systematically. The team will address this where feasible by applying the Most Significant Change (MSC) methodology and thus focus on gathering qualitative data to enable analysis of PAO support contribution to possible outcomes. The use of baseline and follow-up through M&E systems will be assessed by the team.

4. Proposed approach and methodology

This evaluation is theory-based supplemented by a Most Significant Change data analysis methodology. The evidence will be collected through document review, online surveys, mapping and case-study exercises, and through qualitative data collection.

THEORY OF CHANGE APPROACH

A key element in the evaluation methodology is the Theory of Change (ToC). Theory of Change is a reflection tool and results-focused approach to describing the logical change pathways or linkages that are embedded in programmes seeking to produce change.

To properly assess change over time of the PAO support's contribution to improve the functioning of democratic political parties and multi-party systems and eventually evaluate short-term outcomes, the evaluation team has identified the initial ToC of the support, as it was envisaged according to the policy and programme documentation (the result is presented in chapter 2 above). The ToC is context-related but also re-

flects the underlying assumptions or hypotheses of Sida the PAOs about how change occurs.

The emphasis on the ToC will serve as a learning tool for Sida and the PAOs as well as facilitate a reflection of the Strategy (and indirect causality). The PAO support has been implemented for multiple years and the ToC is likely to have evolved over time to meet the realities. This change can be reflected – as well as the relevance of this – through comparison with the ToC as part of the evaluation.

The draft ToC has been extrapolated by the team. This ToC will then be validated with the PAOs and Sida at the PAO ToC workshop to ensure that the team assess the programme in accordance with the understanding of planned change and assumptions by the implementing part and Sida.

MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGE AND USE OF CASE STUDIES

The ToC will be underpinned by the Most Significant Change (MSC) and case study approach. As part of the ToC exercise, the team will use the MSC to identify, discuss, classify and quantify stories of MSC from the interviewees.

MSC is a story-based tool, which provides those evaluated with an opportunity to identify significant change stories attributed to the support provided – in this case through the PAO Strategy. The interviewees in (1) Sweden will, as part of the workshop or individual interview process, and (2) at PAO partner organisations in developing countries, be asked to reflect on the stories of significant change related to the PAO support. These stories will focus on short-term outcomes identified by the interviewees. The interviewees will then need to justify these changes, and eventually, at the end of the session, have to prioritise the stories and argue their case as part of a validation exercise.

The team will use these stories and try to test them against other available evidence in the field and through the desk review, and eventually the findings will be validated at the validation workshop at the end of the evaluation.

The MSC questions will focus on key aspects related to the evaluation such as:

- Stories of how the PAO support has contributed to democratic change in the party/organisation
- Stories of how the PAO support has contributed to a more plural multi-party system
- Stories of how the PAO support has contributed to the enhancement of gender equality and women's empowerment
- Stories of opposing trends in relation to any of the above (negative change).

EVALUATION MATRIX

The major overall evaluation tool designed for this evaluation is the evaluation matrix (draft attached in Annex 3). The matrix is aligned with the OECD-DAC criteria, and the team will use the OECD-DAC definitions of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact.

The questions in the matrix are based on the ToR as described in the section above. Against these revised questions indicators have been developed to help guide the team in identifying evidence for the matrix. The indicators have been designed to optimise the use of existing documentation to allow for substantial data backing of each indicator. In practice, the indicators are developed based on review of available reports and data from Sida and PAO partners and outside sources and have been subject to initial review by Sida.

All team members will use the same format for the data collection to ensure that all areas are covered and that there is consistency in the application of the methodology.

ONLINE SURVEY

In addition to the information gathered through the document review and field studies/interviews, we propose to subsequently consider the possibility to collect data by means of a web-based survey. Such a survey would allow us to corroborate findings and observations from the field studies, and assess to what extent they can be generalized to the entire support. It could thus be an important input to the final report. The issues that will be addressed would depend on the findings from the field studies, but it is foreseen that they will relate both to the results of the support and to the different challenges that it has encountered.

The survey would be distributed to all local partners of the Swedish PAO, and would thus cover the support in its totality. If necessary, we could consider translating the survey questionnaire to French and Spanish and other languages as necessary. However, we foresee that respondents will in the first place be persons involved with the support (contact persons, international secretaries, etc.), and might thus not be completely monolingual. If the questions would need to be translated, this would not require a lot of work, and neither would interpretation of results in different languages as we will rely on closed questions (see below). As above, however, the level of ambition in this regard will also have to be determined once the field studies have been concluded.

The questionnaire would primarily contain questions with pre-established alternative answers in order to make treatment and completion easier (and thus enhance response rates). In order to distribute the survey, we would need input from PAOs in the form of email-addresses to their local partners. Also, we will need to indicate the importance of this survey to the respondents, and thus ensure their participation. Realistically, we would need a response rate of at least 60-70 per cent to be able to use the

material, but we do not think that this would be impossible, if care is taken to inform respondents of the importance of this survey for the coming evaluation, and it be designed to be completed in some 10-20 minutes maximum.

It is proposed to use Survey Monkey to design, distribute and receive answers to the questionnaire. We would take care to guarantee the anonymity of the respondents. Even so, we realize that certain contacts who work in authoritarian settings may be unable to respond to the survey. This has to be taken into account as results are interpreted, but it does not preclude use of a survey for the remainder of possible respondents.

Obviously, results would also have to be interpreted in light of the possible positive bias contained in responses from persons involved in the support.

EVALUATION TOOLS

To collect evidence for the indicators identified in the evaluation matrix, the team will apply different evaluation data collection tools. These include:

- Desk review of Sida and PAO partner as well as external documentation
- Mapping of PAO support through a targeted mapping exercise (see section below for findings)
- Review of available documentation at individual country level
- Semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders
- Possible use of focus group discussions if feasible
- Building on the interviews develop case studies (see MSC text above)
- ToC workshop with PAO partners in Stockholm
- Validation Workshops with Sida and PAO partners in Stockholm

The desk review is based on the documentation received from Sida, PAO as well as those obtained through other sources by the evaluation team. The documentation has been prioritised based on inputs from Sida and the PAOs as well as the team's own assessment. Findings from the documentation are added to the evaluation matrix in accordance with the relevant indicator.

In the field, the team will furthermore identify the existence of outputs from the PAO support. In practice, this means that the team will verify the existence of improved capacities and actions of PAO partners as well as a rudimentary assessment of the quality of these.

Evidence from key stakeholders and recipients of capacity development support will be obtained using semi-structured interview guides. If opportunities emerge, the team may use these guides for conducting focus group discussions as well. The guides are designed based on the evaluation matrix.

The evidence from these eight different types of sources will be triangulated and weighed in the final analysis phase of the evaluation. To assess validity, the team will furthermore test preliminary findings through the validation workshop.

The full implementation plan for the assignment can be found in Annex 4.

5. Findings from Mapping of PAO Support

The following chapter presents the findings from the mapping (desk study) of the PAO support (see Annex 6 for the full mapping visualisation). The mapping should be seen as preliminary in the inception report, with the final mapping being presented in the evaluation report, once all data has been gathered.

The mapping of the PAO support has been elaborated based on the PAOs' programme applications; Sida grant documents; PAO programme reporting; and other mid-term evaluations and studies carried out by the PAOs¹⁰¹.

The mapping is first and foremost an attempt to create an overview and understanding of the PAO support and should also help guide the evaluation, by showing tendencies that can be looked into and explored. The mapping finally, serves as a guide to help select the appropriate countries for field visit and further case studies.

¹⁰¹ There were a number of limitations and factors influencing the mapping, as presented below:

- With regards to tracking the scope of the financial support going to the different programmes and thus to the various geographical regions has been challenged by a few factors:
 - The PAO support has gone from project to programme support in the current Strategy, which means going from a more country-based project support type to both global and regional programmes. This means that it is less clear how much funding goes to a specific country.
 - The structure and quality of the financial reporting varies a lot among the PAOs, and sometimes the administration costs of a programme are included, whilst other types are separate allowing for a clearer picture of geographical disbursement. To the extent possible the PAO organisational administration costs have not been included in the financial mapping.
- The overview presented in this chapter gives an indicative picture of the geographical distribution of the PAO support but does not at the same time include the scope of the financial support given to each particular country. This means that it also shows programme activity in a country, even though that activity has been little, indirect or at a pilot stage (i.e. if participants from a country have attended a training held in a neighbouring country).
- Another influencing factor to the mapping of countries where PAO programmes operate has been the difficulty in analysing the data available. Sometimes the PAO programme application would indicate an intention to work in a country, yet during the programme course challenges in that particular country did not allow actual work to take place or funding to be channelled. The programme operations are dynamic and this picture is therefore a snapshot of the reality based on the information available.

In conclusion, as the Team has not had access to reliable data on disbursements by country, the mapping, instead, uses data on programme locations, i.e., in which countries different programmes are active. As several programmes may be active in one single country, this figure incorporates a certain measure of cooperation intensity.

The overall findings show that the PAO Strategy is extensive, both in its number of programmes as well as its geographical outreach.




Figure 2 – Financial support through each work stream

Work Streams VO1 and VO2

The mapping shows that the PAO financial support is distributed 65% through the VO1 work stream and 35% through the VO2 work stream (see figure 1). This is somewhat in line with the envisaged 30/70 division.

Financial Distribution in the PAO Strategy

Whilst getting the financial data¹⁰² per country was not possible, figure 2 presents a percentage distribution of the funding to different geographical areas¹⁰³. What is evident from this finding is that Eastern Europe (36%) is the main recipient region for the funding, followed closely by Africa (35%). In Eastern Europe all the PAOs are working there, while the programmes in Af-




Figure 2 – Financial distribution per geographical

¹⁰² The financial data from PYPA West Africa 2012 and 2013 was not included as 'actual costs' but instead the team used the budgeted costs, also the VIF's VO1 and VO2 programmes for 2012 financial data was not included. When these are added the picture will change a bit.

¹⁰³ Programme management and administrative costs were not included, to the extent possible, which means that the actual financial size of the programmes are different in reality. This mapping attempts to illustrate the money that is disburse directly to the programme in a particular country or region.

rica are rather large in scope and funding (i.e. PYPA and AGF). Hereafter the finding shows that the third largest recipient is so-called ‘Global Activities’ (17%), which encompasses programmes¹⁰⁴ that cannot be attributed to a particular geographical region. Latin America (10%) accounts for a relative minor part of the funding and finally, it can be seen that the regions that receive the least percentage of the funding is by far Asia (1%) and the MENA region (1%).

Figure 3 shows the financial distribution per PAO. The distribution shows that two PAOs (OPC and JHS) receive more than 23% each, three PAOs (CIS, KIC and SILC) account for around 12-17% each, while GF receive 8% VIF is the smallest recipient with 3%¹⁰⁵.

In Annex 7 is an overview of the geographical financial distribution for each PAO. The findings show that four PAOs (JHS, KIC, GF and VIF) work regionally in their programmes, while CIS, SILC and OPC have programmes that are global. GF, VIF, KIC and CIS have more than 50% of their financial disbursement in Africa. SILC does not have any programmes in Africa, and JHS only has one.(see also Annex 6).

Joint Collaboration

The desk study illustrates that some of the programmes under the PAO Strategy are carried out in joint collaboration between several of the PAOs. This is the case for the large PYPA programme in Africa, which has KIC as the main responsible organisation of the overall programme as well as being responsible for the Eastern African region. OPC is responsible for Southern Africa and CIS (with GF as a junior partner) is responsible for the Western African part of the programme. With regards to the Centrum Programme for Eastern Europe's democratic parties, SILC is the lead partner cooperating with OPC, GF and CIS.




Figure 3 – Financial Distribution per PAO.

Type of PAO Partner

¹⁰⁴ Two OPC programmes “From Weapons to Ballot” and “Authoritarian and Post-Authoritarian States” as well as a CIS Sister party programme are included under ‘global activities’, making up a substantial percentage. This is due to the fact that these programmes support countries in several geographical areas (Africa, Asia, MENA, and Eastern Europe).

¹⁰⁵ Note that this distribution is to the extent possible excluding purely management and administrative costs.

The desk study of the PAO programmes clearly shows that political parties are the main chosen partners for the PAOs making up 57% of all partners. Networks/Forums/Federations make up the second most chosen type of partner in the PAO programmes.

Table 12 - Type of PAO Partner

Type of partner	Number	Percentage
Political party	58	57%
Network/Forum/Federation	13	13%
International organisation	8	8%
Youth Wing/Organisation	7	7%
Training Institute/Capacity development centre	5	5%
CSO, grassroots movement	5	5%
Women's organisation/Party	3	3%
Union	2	2%

Target Group and Crosscutting issues

A preliminary mapping of PAO activities in the period 2012 to 2014 suggests that the overwhelming majority of programmes have targeted youth and women as key beneficiary groups into their design. Close to all PAO programmes mention women and or youth in their programmes, either in their programme objectives or in their activities. When looking specifically at PAO partners around 10% of all partners are either a youth or women-specific partner. It is important that keeping in mind that the cooperation with the political parties might include internal divisions for women, youth or indigenous people.

To a lesser extent - and where relevant - additional target groups and programme themes have been in social media and ICT as well as LGBTI, indigenous and other minority group rights. Particular programmes in Latin America mention the issue of indigenous rights, and the issue of LGBTI is particularly spelled out in Programmes in Eastern Europe. A few programmes have carried out trainings particularly focusing on ICT, i.e. 'using social media'.

Countries and Contexts

On a global level, the PAO Strategy has beneficiaries from more than 70 countries, with 13 from Eastern Europe, 28 in Africa, 17 in Latin America, 15 in the MENA region and 8 in Asia. The fact that the PAO support reaches more than 80 countries can be explained by the various network-building programmes that are identified. This means that while a programme might geographically cover a country, it does not necessarily indicate a lot of in-country activity. The PAO Strategy should be regarded as having a large global outreach, in terms of geographical coverage, while keeping in mind that many countries are only reached through a single programme through a network.

In Annex 6, a list of countries and the number of programmes per country is presented, which gives an overall picture of the geographical outreach of the PAO programmes as well as the extent to which a country is covered by the programmes.

Firstly, when looking at how free and democratic the different programme locations are (using Freedom House’s well-known indicator for 2014), it can be seen that all PAOs direct the majority of their programmes to countries labelled as “partly free” (see table 4 below). This is in line with expectations, as this is likely to be where a programme of the present kind can expect to be of greatest use. Similarly, with the possible exception of JHS, all PAOs direct a relatively small share of their programmes to countries in the “free” category, which is in line with the strategy’s instruction to prioritize work in settings in which there is a democratic deficit.

Table 13 - Levels of Freedom and PAO representation

	JHS	OPC	KIC	CIS	VIF	GF	SILC
Free	33 %	17 %	21 %	18 %	20 %	12 %	15 %
Partly free	53 %	52 %	64 %	65 %	55 %	59 %	54 %
Not free	13 %	31 %	14 %	18 %	24 %	25 %	31 %

It is interesting to compare the above distribution with the disbursed funds in the evaluation performed in the year 2000. Then, seventy per cent of all disbursed funds had gone to countries in the “free” category. For certain PAOs (CIS, JHS, KIC, OPC) that category took over three fourths of their total disbursed funds. The same evaluation found that “partly free countries” accounted for 23 per cent of disbursed funds, with “non-free” amounting to five per cent. Obviously, there has been a rather striking reorientation of the geographic and political focus of the support since then. (NOTE: individual country specific data removed. Coded data to be included in final evaluation report.)

To summarise, it can be seen that four PAOs operate in the MENA region, six in Africa, four in Latin America, three in Asia and finally, seven in Eastern Europe. The individual PAO’s distribution of support between different regions of the world is presented in Table 5 below:

Table 14 - Individual PAO support per region

	JHS (N=30)	OPC (N=29)	KIC (N=14)	CIS (N=17*)	VIF (N=49)	GF (N=32)	SILC (N=13)
Africa	3 %	52 %	79 %	76 %	35 %	53 %	0 %
Asia	0 %	7 %	0 %	0 %	18 %	0 %	8 %
Eastern Europe (incl. Turkey)	47 %	28 %	21 %	24 %	4 %	34 %	62 %
Latin America	50 %	0 %	0 %	0 %	29 %	9 %	8 %
MENA	0 %	14 %	0 %	0 %	14 %	3 %	23 %

* NOTE: this is the original number of partners. CIS has now reduced this to 8

As can be seen, the PAOs generally have a very ambitious geographic scope as they, in spite of generally being very small organisations, work in a large number of programme locations (represented by the “N” in the table above, and which can in the vast majority of programme locations be equated with countries). Furthermore, there has been a clear shift towards regions further away from Sweden. This may be a natural effect of a greater maturity in the PAO support. At the same time, this distribution raises some additional questions. First of all, it is an open question to what extent disbursements across a large number of programme locations/countries is really effective. Second, and as was hinted at above, one can question whether the PAOs themselves are capable of working with and in a large number of remote settings in which the political situation may (as was shown above) be quite complicated.

Coupled to this is the fact that a number of these programme locations are outside of the set of countries in which Sida works. Indeed, even with a relatively broad definition of what constitutes the countries in which Sida has programmes of its own (taking in the so called “country-specific” programmes in the regional programme for democracy and human rights in the MENA), it is evident that for certain PAOs, a high number of programme locations are in environments in which Sida itself does not work: For VIF, this figure stands at 65 per cent, and for JHS at 50 per cent. In comparison, for CIS, OPC and GF it stands at 29-28 per cent, and for KIC and SILC it amounts to 21 and 15 per cent of all programme locations.

Focus areas for support to political parties and multiparty systems

When studying the objectives of the various programmes the following tendencies emerged:

For VO1 programmes, the absolute main objective is to strengthen sister parties’ internal capacity and management. This is by far the most common focus area in the PAO programmes. This area includes strengthening a democratic culture within the parties to increase participation and legitimacy. Some programmes included specific attention to good governance, democratic leadership and HRBA. From an organisational aspect, this focus area also includes strengthening the political parties abilities to work in an effective way. From a conceptual perspective, some of the programmes focus on strengthening the parties’ political identity, or their political ideology hereunder their ability to communicate this to their voters.

In relation to this a common feature in the programme objectives was the high focus on pluralism and increased participation of women and youth both in the political parties as well as in politics. The key words in the objectives are ‘increasing/strengthening participation’ and ‘inclusion’. Four programmes specifically included youth in their objective, three programmes included women and one included ‘marginalised groups’. One programme (PYPA) solely targets youth and another (Equality and women's participation in Asia and MENA, VIF) specifically women.

Another prevalent feature in the focus areas of the programmes is the aspect of network building and regional cooperation, which is found in several programmes. This

includes developing, consolidating and strengthening networks as well as promotes regional exchanges and cooperation. In connection with this, the team found inter-party dialogue and cooperation being in focus in a number of programmes, both with regards to exchange of experiences but mainly in relation to creating dialogue and building coalition, particularly in difficult contexts where opposition have to stand together. A minor focus was found in the programmes relating to supporting political activity in repressive environments, by improving conditions for parties to participate in the political debate. In connection with this, it is worth noticing that some programmes target supporting parties in participating in politics i.e. through participating in policy development, participation in reform discussions or national dialogue.

Finally, to a lesser extent, a few programmes focus on the aspect of advocacy and awareness raising regarding particular issues of concern (i.e. environment, EU integration).

Type of programme activities

In this mapping the team has identified several types of activities in the PAO programmes.

The frequency and extent to which all PAOs conduct research and analysis into their programme design is not clear on account of their varying reporting formats. Some PAOs list “pre-studies” as activities whereas others do not. From a reading of PAOs’ accounts of their activities, it seems that only a minority perform rigorous feasibility studies on which to underpin their programme content.

Overall, PAO programmes deliver support in organisational capacity development, cross or intra stakeholder communication and dialogue, technical and generalised training, and knowledge-transfer in good governance and international best democratic practice. As mentioned, a running theme throughout is youth and women’s empowerment and increased participation and engagement in political processes.

The absolute most prevalent activity identified in the mapping was:

1. Capacity building through training and workshops in the following areas:

- a. Organisational focus:
- b. Strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation, organisational capacity building, financial management & reporting.
- c. Political work
- d. PR & political communication, election, alliance building, voter registration, ideology, elections & campaigns, development of policies.
- e. Conceptual
- f. Women & leadership, human rights, community dialogues, green ideology, green economy, leadership.
- g. Miscellaneous
- h. Academies, summer universities and youth summer camps

Following, the Programmes included a lot of activities promoting regional cooperation and networking such as:

2. Conferences

- a. Start-up conference, partner conference, regional conference.

3. Network creations

- a. Building regional federations, network-formation, creating alliances

4. Study visits

- a. For example to Sweden

5. Meetings

- a. Mediation meeting
- b. National reunion meeting
- c. Meeting mother parties
- d. Press conference

Finally, the team found activities that were related to:

6. Advocacy and awareness-raising activities

- a. Campaigns
- b. Ecological activities
- c. Demonstrations
- d. Promoting awareness and lobbying

The most common PAO activities include conferences, workshops, seminars and various forms of training and networking activities. Some PAOs report more institutionalised means of support such as with the establishment of academies, summer camps and political and democracy schools. Other wider scale networking and immersive activities include regional events, study visits to Sweden and international meetings and forums where PAO partners are given the opportunity to build relationships with their counterparts from other countries and contribute to conference output documents and activities, as well as learn from best practices. In some isolated cases, programme activities have included substantive support and advice to politicians and parties in policy and ideology development.

6. Previous evaluations and experiences from other PAO-type programmes

According to the terms of reference¹⁰⁶, this evaluation will also) look into PAO support relative to:

- Other modalities of Swedish democracy support
- Other interventions in political party support from international organisations such as UNDP, NIMD, DIPD, WFD, other party-affiliated organisations etc.

¹⁰⁶ Specified in point 8, page 4 of the Terms of Reference.

The main objective of this exercise is to place the PAO programme in the broader context of Swedish democracy support and to compare it to other instruments used for in political party support, while drawing lessons from both.

The team will aim to draw out questions and comparative experiences relevant to an evaluation of the PAOs work, through an extensive desk study of a range of documents including evaluations and reviews, policy papers and analytical pieces of support to similar activities, a preliminary list of which is provided in Annex 7.

In going through these documents, the team will be guided by a number of set questions, to a large extent derived from the evaluation matrix, regarding additional experiences and lessons learnt there are from other programmes aiming at support for political parties. Additionally, different ways of providing political party support in development cooperation will be discussed.

With regard to the study of other modalities and forms of Swedish democracy support, the team will place the PAO support within the broader framework of Sida's work for democracy, both in terms of the volumes involved, the geographic focus, and the implementing actors. Furthermore, this part of the study will discuss other forms of political party support undertaken by Sida, and what experiences they have yielded.

7. Field mission rationale and options

Based on the mapping of the PAO support (see Annex 6), the team has come up with three alternative scenarios of how to undertake a field mission for Sida to consider. The options and rationale presented below have taken the following into account:

- Programmes from all seven PAO's programmes should be covered
- Programmes from both work streams (VO1 and VO2) are included
- A diversification of the field missions to various continents
- Programmes with 'global', 'regional' and 'national' components should be included
- Countries with differing levels of democratic freedom and levels of fragility
- Programmes working with different types of partners (e.g. political parties, networks, training institutes etc.)
- Regions which receive a substantial level of financial support
- Countries with possibility to draw parallels with other donor activities
- Countries that host the headquarters of regional programmes or networks
- Security concerns such as accessibility and safety
- Logistical conditions in light of available person days such as proximity of countries within one region

Based on this the following options are presented (Table 6):

Table 15 – Most relevant countries for field visits

Geographical region	Relevant countries
Eastern Europe	XXXX, Ukraine, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldavia, Turkey
Africa	Burkina Faso, Mali, South Africa, Mozambique, Uganda, Senegal ¹⁰⁷
MENA	Tunisia, Palestine
Latin America	Venezuela, Bolivia, Guatemala, El Salvador ¹⁰⁸ , Peru ¹⁰⁹
Asia	Philippines

Eastern Europe receives the largest share of the funding and all PAOs operate in the region, making it an important region to include in the options suggested further below. TEXT REMOVED. The Balkan region has also received quite a reasonable amount of financial disbursement. Considering the limited time available TEXT REMOVED, the team suggest Ukraine as the best option in Eastern Europe. Ukraine also presents an interesting case of PAOs having to react to political changes in the last two years.

If the larger joint PAO programmes, as well as the network-building programmes that stretch across various countries, should be evaluated further the team will need to visit the countries where the programme headquarters are located. For example, when assessing the PYPA programme, the headquarters are located in Burkina Faso (Western Africa), Uganda (for Eastern Africa) and South Africa (for Southern Africa), hence making these particular countries more interesting than neighbouring countries. In addition, the PYPA programme is of particular interest as it is a joint programme between four PAOs; it is a regional programme; and it is focusing on the VO2 work stream.

When judging a geographical region based on financial scope, amount of programmes and number of PAOs working in that region, the team has found that Asia, MENA and Latin America are of less relevance. The team have attempted to include two of these regions, however, in one of the options (Option 3), to give Sida the option of including these if deemed relevant.

¹⁰⁷ If wanting to look specifically at the ALNEF network, as this is where the headquarters is based.

¹⁰⁸ If wanting to look specifically at the REMADE network, as this is where the headquarters is based.

¹⁰⁹ If wanting to look specifically at the SAA network, as this is where the headquarters is based.

Below is the team’s presentation of three options and accompanying rationale that can help guide the selection of field visits (table 7):

Table 16 – Options for field visits

Option	Regions	Field Visit Countries	Rationale
Option 1 “EASTERN EUROPE & PYPA PLUS”	Eastern Europe	Ukraine + Country X ¹¹⁰	PAO representation: covering five PAOs in Eastern Europe, four (+ two to a lesser extent) in Balkans, four in Africa ¹¹¹ .
	Africa (South-Western)	South Africa + Uganda	
	Africa (Western)	Burkina Faso	VO1 & VO2 Division: 10 VO1 Programmes + two VO2 Programmes Number of continents: two continents Democratic Freedoms: three partly free + three free Narrative rationale: This option gives the team a chance to look particularly at the PYPA programme in three different African regions. PYPA being a VO2 programme, which is less represented, as well as a regional programme involving several PAOs, makes it an interesting choice.
Option 2 “EASTERN EUROPE & AFRICA PLUS”	Eastern Europe	Ukraine + Country X	PAO representation: covering five PAOs in Eastern Europe, three in Southern Africa, three in Western Africa.
	Africa (Southern)	South Africa + Mozambique	
	Africa (Western)	Burkina Faso + Mali	VO1 & VO2 Division: 10

¹¹⁰ Confidential

¹¹¹ When looking at PAO representation in the ‘joint programmes’ only the lead organisation is counted.

			<p>VO1 Programmes + two VO2 Programmes</p> <p>Number of continents: two continents</p> <p>Democratic Freedoms: four partly free + two free</p> <p>Narrative rationale: The Africa plus options present field visits to countries where programmes in Africa can be looked at in several neighbouring countries and drawing interesting findings from this comparison.</p>
<p>Option 3 “EASTERN EUROPE & GLOBAL”</p>	<p>Eastern Europe</p> <p>Latin America</p> <p>MENA</p> <p>Africa (Southern)</p>	<p>Ukraine + Country X</p> <p>Bolivia</p> <p>Tunisia</p> <p>South Africa</p>	<p>PAO representation: covering five PAOs in Eastern Europe, three in Latin America, four in MENA, three in Southern Africa.</p> <p>VO1 & VO2 Division: 13 VO1 Programmes + two VO2 Programmes</p> <p>Number of continents: three continents</p> <p>Democratic Freedoms: three partly free + two free</p> <p>Narrative rationale: This option allows for a more ‘global’ perspective in the light of the geographical broadening in the new strategy. It includes looking closer at Latin America where some of the PAOs operate and also includes Tunisia, as an interesting country in the light of the Arab Spring.</p>



Evaluation of the Implementation and Results of the Swedish Strategy for Democracy Support for Party Affiliated Organisations 2012-2014

The evaluation of the Swedish Strategy for Democracy Support for Party Affiliated Organisations (PAOs) found PAOs to provide support which is relevant to the policies of the Swedish Government.

The evaluation found outputs to be implemented as planned and effective at the individual level, but with limited institutional change. This limits the contribution to the strategy objective of democratic political development. The impact is also constrained by the PAOs' decision to engage beneficiaries from more than seventy countries, often from parties with only marginal national influence.

The weaknesses in the present design, arguably, stem from the fact that funds to the PAOs for sister-party support are allocated according to the number of seats in the Swedish Riksdag, rather than performance. There is thus a need to rethink the design with the aim of enhancing quality and managing risks.