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Sida Decentralised Evaluation

Jérôme Gouzou
Bala Wenceslas Sanou
Eugene Gatari

Evaluation of the project – Improving the Management of Land by Strengthening the Prevention and Resolution of Land Conflicts in Rwanda (ILPRC)

Final Report

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Jérôme Gouzou
Bala Wenceslas Sanou
Eugene Gatari

Authors: Jérôme Gouzou, Bala Wenceslas Sanou and Eugene Gatari

The views and interpretations expressed in this report are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida.

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SWEDISH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY

Address: S-105 25 Stockholm, Sweden. Office: Valhallavägen 199, Stockholm

Telephone: +46 (0)8-698 50 00. Telefax: +46 (0)8-20 88 64

E-mail: info@sida.se. Homepage: <http://www.sida.se>

Table of contents

Table of contents	2
Abbreviations and Acronyms	3
Preface.....	4
Executive Summary.....	5
1 Methodology	8
1.1 Focusing and planning the evaluation	8
1.2 Clarification of the users and of the intended use of the evaluation.....	9
1.3 Evaluation approach and methodology	9
1.4 Comments on the sources.....	14
1.5 Limitations and lessons	14
2 Evaluation findings.....	16
2.1 Relevance	16
2.2 Effectiveness	22
2.3 Efficiency.....	31
2.4 Sustainability	35
3 Conclusion and Recommendations	39
Annex 1 –Terms of Reference.....	42
Annex 2 - Inception Report	49
Annex 3 – List of Persons Interviewed	66
Annex 4 – Documents Consulted	69

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ARAMA	Association for Research and Assistance Mission in Africa
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
EDPRS	Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
FGI	Focus Group Interview
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
HRBA	Human Rights-Based Approach
ILPRC	Improving the Management of Land by Strengthening the Prevention and Resolution of Land Conflicts in Rwanda
IMBARAGA	Organisation of Farmers and Breeders
JRLOS	Justice, Reconciliation, Law and Order Sector
LA	Local Authorities
MAJ	Maison d'Accès à la Justice
MSC	Most Significant Change
MNIJUST	Ministry of Justice
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
RAF	Results Assessment Framework
RCN	RCN Justice & Démocratie
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
TB	Tribunal de Base/Primary Court
TBE	Theory-Based Evaluation
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
VAF	Volontaires, Animateurs et Facilitateurs

Preface

This evaluation of the project – Improving the Management of Land by Strengthening the Prevention and Resolution of Land Conflicts in Rwanda (ILPRC) was commissioned by the Embassy of Sweden in Rwanda. The evaluation was undertaken by Indevelop through Sida's framework agreement for reviews and evaluations between January -April 2015.

Indevelop's management team included Ian Christoplos, who provided quality assurance for the methodology and reports, and Anna Liljelund Hedqvist, who was responsible for coordination and management of the evaluation implementation.

The independent evaluation team consisted of three key members:

- Jérôme Gouzou
- Bala Wenceslas Sanou
- Eugene Gatari

This final evaluation report has incorporated feedback received RCN Justice & Démocraties (RCN) and the Embassy on the draft report. The evaluation team wishes to acknowledge the fruitful collaboration with RCN throughout the evaluation process.

Executive Summary

This report presents the findings of the evaluation of RCN Justice & Démocraties (RCN) project “*Improving the Management of Land by Strengthening the Prevention and Resolution of Land Conflicts in Rwanda (ILPRC)*”, for the period 2012-2015. This evaluation was commissioned by the Embassy of Sweden in Rwanda, based on Terms of Reference (ToR) developed by the Embassy and adopted by RCN. The evaluation team used a theory-based approach (TBA) both to highlight the results of the programme, but also to explain how and why these results were obtained.

The evaluation shows that RCN’s programme produced remarkable results, despite some shortcomings that could have affected its ability to perform. This programme is characterised by two major deficiencies. The first one is the weakness of the results framework and of the programme proposal. The content of these documents does not reflect the real objectives of the programme. The results framework lacks a logical link from outcomes to impact and indicators are of poor quality. This weakness, however, is not a strategic thinking problem, but rather insufficient mastery of results-based management tools.

The second weakness is the relatively loose relationship RCN had with the CSOs that are implementing partners of the programme. Their institutional development was not planned for in the results framework despite the fact that the narrative part of the project proposal mentions this aspect of the work as an objective. There has thus been very little, if any, shared and institutionalised learning within these organisations, the wealth of experience having largely remained at the level of the staff recruited externally for the implementation of the programme.

Despite these weaknesses, the intervention of RCN in Rwanda manages to achieve solid results. It is primarily a programme that implements high-quality activities, deeply thoughtful in terms of pedagogical methods, quality of human resources that have been mobilised to implement them and of appropriate content for effective transfer of knowledge and skills. These highly relevant activities deliver direct results of high quality (outputs). The evaluation finds that there are clear indicators of transfer of knowledge, increased collaboration between different institutional actors involved in the community justice system and of increased awareness within village communities on the rights of women to own and inherit land.

These high quality outputs helped contribute to achieve both outcomes articulated in the results framework. The evaluation team was able to demonstrate a range of indi-

cators at outcome level, and at the specific objective level, which the evaluation suggests to reformulate. RCN's programme contributed to increasing the access of rural populations, particularly women, to fair community justice mechanisms.

Finally, the data collected during the field work suggests that the results of the programme tend to reach beyond access to fair community justice mechanisms. The evaluation team has collected a considerable amount of evidence, corroborated by several actors, which show that the programme begins to influence the level of women's access to land in the geographic areas where RCN was involved.

This evaluation also draws a few more general conclusions about development cooperation policies and practices, and on the conditions under which they can be decisive. The evaluation team believes that there are some lessons that can be learned by Sida and the Embassy from the experience of its support to RCN's programme in Rwanda:

- The combination of the following factors is critical to achieving tangible results:
 - A programme based on good knowledge of the context, grounded on solid baselines and needs assessments;
 - A programme intended to support well-defined public policies;
 - A programme with activities of capacity development involving different stakeholders that do not neglect the quality of this input in order to increase the likelihood of optimal transfer of knowledge;
 - A programme given financial support that allows for the mobilisation of relevant human resources.
- A close relationship with implementing partners, based on mutual trust, flexibility, close monitoring of partners' activities and achievements.
- Involvement with the partners in dialogue with state institutions is crucial for effective development cooperation.
- If Sida expects its partners to report on results, Sida should also accept that its partners allocate a significant proportion of their total programme costs to monitoring.

Finally, the evaluation team recommends RCN to:

- Use the chain of results suggested by the evaluation team as a basis for its final report.
- Plan its future programme in Rwanda using a method that will clearly highlight:
 - The theory of change of the programme;
 - The problems it intends to tackle and the objectives it would like to reach (changes of behaviours);
 - The strategies/activities it intends to develop and implement and how

they are likely to lead to well-identified outputs.

- Plan for strengthening the capacities of its implementing partners in the next phase of its programme in Rwanda.
- Focus its research work, in the next phase of its programme in Rwanda, towards understanding the quality and the effects of increased access to land for women on their social and economic conditions.
- Build on the existing resource of trainers in the next phase of its programme.
- Develop a strategy document aiming at explaining its approach to capacity development and clearly showing the links between capacity development and what the organisation aims to achieve.
- Thoroughly plan its needs in human resources for the implementation of the next phase of the programme.
- Improve its monitoring system through:
 - Allowing a systematic analysis of qualitative information included in the monitoring templates;
 - More closely connecting the structure of the monitoring system with the theory of change of the programme;
 - Separating the information collected for research purpose from the one collected for monitoring the programme activities and results.

1 Methodology

The detailed methodology is presented in the inception report, which is annexed to this final report.

1.1 FOCUSING AND PLANNING THE EVALUATION

This assignment started with an inception phase during which the evaluation team clarified the evaluation criteria and the scope of the evaluation. The initial ToR indicated a series of evaluation questions. In its Implementation Proposal, Indevelop suggested to amend some of the evaluation questions in order to make the assignment more feasible and to provide The Embassy and RCN with useful conclusions and recommendations.

The inception phase allowed the evaluator to focus the scope of the evaluation and to suggest the use of a Theory-Based Evaluation (TBE) approach to evaluate RCN's programme in Rwanda. The evaluation team used some core features of the TBE approach that are recurrent and commonly agreed upon:

- It aims to answer not simply the question of what works, but also *why* and *how* it worked.
- It helps understand the relations between the programme, its outcomes and the contextual factors.
- It starts with defining (or using an already clearly stipulated) theory as the causal model or theory of change that underlies a programme.
- Moreover, more than simply defining a theory of change, the whole evaluation process is systematically dedicated to assessing it: the evaluation criteria aim to scrutinise and validate (or invalidate) parts of, or the theory of change as a whole.
- Being issues led, it is, therefore, methods neutral.

The use of TBE appeared particularly relevant, as there were a series of favourable conditions:

- The programme had clearly highlighted its Theory of Change (ToC).
- RCN implemented a baseline study during the first stage of the programme: it was, in theory, possible to compare the indicators of reference to the ones obtained at the end of the programme.
- RCN had, moreover, developed and used an ambitious monitoring system throughout the implementation of its programme. There is, thus, a wealth of information that can be analysed and indicators of achieved (and non-

achieved) results at output and outcome levels that can easily be verified.

These favourable conditions further reinforced the relevance of trying to draw conclusions and lessons learned from the experience of RCN in Rwanda: *why* (and/or *why not*) as well as *how* changes have happened and not just whether they did or did not take place.

1.2 CLARIFICATION OF THE USERS AND OF THE INTENDED USE OF THE EVALUATION

The inception period also helped clarify the users, and their intended use of the evaluation. On the donors' side, the main user of the evaluation is the Embassy of Sweden in Kigali/Sida.

For RCN, the evaluation is an opportunity to have an outside observer reflect on the organisational structure and capacity, the validity of its theory of change, the strategies, and on the accomplishments of the programme. The assessment is not only meant to look backwards but also to use the findings, insights and lessons to inform the new programme which is going to be presented to the Embassy of Sweden in Kigali/Sida shortly after the submission of this evaluation report.

Some other donors, and the Rwandan Ministry of Justice (MINIJUST), which is a key partner in the implementation of the programme, might be interested in the final product. This evaluation may contribute to decisions on possible future commitments to RCN's programme in Rwanda. The evaluation is also meant as an opportunity to provide evidence to potential donors and partners regarding the value of RCN as a partner. For this purpose, the results of this evaluation might be presented at an event organised by the Embassy of Sweden in Kigali/Sida at a date that remains to be decided¹.

1.3 EVALUATION APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

1.3.1 Applying a TBE to RCN's programme in Rwanda

RCN has developed a ToC based on two major development hypotheses (formulated as outcomes 1 and 2), which, together, might contribute to the achievement of the

¹ This idea was suggested by Embassy's Head of Development Cooperation during a debriefing meeting organised at the Embassy on 13 March 2015.


Specific Objective of the programme. The chain of results relies on a thorough analysis of the political and institutional contexts in which the population, and especially women, can access local justice mechanisms in order to claim their land and property rights. RCN's ToC can be summarised as follows:

Table 1: ILPRC Theory of Change

Development Problems	Development Hypothesis and Programme Outcomes	Programme Specific Objective	Overall Objective
The Abunzi Committees have very limited capacities to perform their mandate	If the capacities of the Abunzi Committees and of the Local Authorities of the targeted districts are strengthened, then they will be able to offer adequate solutions to people involved in land conflicts, while increasing the enforcement of women's land rights	If the Abunzi Committees and of the local authorities offer adequate solutions to people involved in land conflicts, while committing to increasing the enforcement of women's land rights, then they will contribute to improve the management of land conflicts	If the Specific Objective is achieved, then the programme will have contributed to improving rural population's access to fair community justice mechanisms
The rural population and the Local Authorities involved in land issues do not commit to promoting women's land rights	If the rural population and the local authorities involved in land issues are aware of women's land rights and if they commit to addressing this issue, then they will better promote women's land rights		

The ToC has been developed into a full-fledged programme, graph 1 showing the revised results framework presented in the form of a chain of results.

Graph 1: Chain of results of ILPRC programme



1.3.2 General Approach

i. *Analysis of the available documentation*²

The evaluation team analysed all relevant documents provided by RCN (proposal, narrative reports of the programme, baseline studies, evaluations of the previous programme), the documents provided by Embassy of Sweden (assessment memos, decisions, communication between Embassy of Sweden and RCN, relevant studies).

ii. *Interviews*

The evaluation used different interview techniques, depending on the type of information that needed to be collected.

One-on-one interviews with key informants

This method has been used with RCN staff in Rwanda and in Brussels (Anne-Aël Pohnu, Programme Manager for Rwanda and Burundi, was in Kigali during the first week of the field work), and with representatives from state institutions that RCN tries to influence: Local Authorities (Mayors, Executive Secretaries and/or *Officiers d'État Civil* at District, Sector and Cell levels), and the Ministry of Justice. Key informants who did not belong to RCN staff have been selected in function of the type of information that the evaluation team needed in order to assess the relevance, the effectiveness and the sustainability of the programme. The one-on-one interviews were conducted using a mix of forced-choice questions (mainly aiming at clarifying the role of the informant in RCN programme or specific activity) and of open-ended questions aiming at collecting the perception of the informant on the strategies used by RCN and the possible effects the intervention has had on his/her organisation (for RCN's implementing partners), on his/her own situation (for the beneficiaries of the programme), or on the process he/she participated in.

Focus Group Interviews (FGI)

This method was used with RCN staff in the Kigali office and mainly with the beneficiaries of the programme at District, Sector and Cell levels. The FGI were conducted using open-ended and one-dimensional questions that allowed the respondents to elaborate on the questions and build on each other's answers. This method was mainly used to assess the relevance of RCN interventions and the effectiveness and sustainability of the programme. For these three purposes, a set of questions aimed at collecting relevant information was prepared. Both one-on-one interviews and FGI have used semi-structured questions. Departing from prepared sets of questions, the evaluation team also let the respondents talk about what was important to them, for instance in terms of Most Significant Changes (MSC), which was very useful to highlight tangible indicators of change at outcome and, to some extent, at impact level.

² See the list of documents in Annex 4

This approach, which sometimes allowed the interviewees to bring in aspects or issues other than those planned by the evaluators, has proven very useful to add qualitative information to purely structured interviews.

1.3.3 Evaluation criteria and questions

i. Assessing relevance

The relevance criterion is very important when evaluating a programme, and using a TBE approach further strengthens its depth. The relevance criterion is, first, meant to assess the extent to which an intervention has taken into account the context in which it has taken place. In the case of the evaluation of RCN in Rwanda, evaluating the relevance from a TBE perspective means focusing on the appropriateness of the strategies and of the programme objectives in relation to the needs and priorities of the beneficiaries and the extent to which they were feasible/realistic given the Rwandan socio-cultural and political context. The relevance criterion is also meant to focus on the logic of a given intervention, on its consistency. Finally, the relevance criterion is also meant to investigate the responsiveness of an organisation and/or of programme management. The evaluation addressed these three sub-components of the relevance criteria as follows:

- Relevance in relation to strategic priorities of local, national and international institutions/actors:
 - How coherent was the programme in terms of how it reflects the policies and programmes undertaken by the government and other development / governance partners?
 - To what extent was the programme relevant to Swedish policies and objectives? (the extent to which RCN used a Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA) was particularly assessed)?
 - Was the programme design responsive, in the sense that it took into consideration the input and needs of key stakeholders, including relevant government bodies, the expected beneficiaries, and relevant civil society and grassroots organisations?
- Relevance in relation to the logic of programming:
 - Has the programme design been articulated in a coherent structure: are the outcomes and outputs clearly articulated?
 - To what extent did the activities carried out address the causes of problems identified?
 - Did the programme benefit from available knowledge (for example, the experience of other similar programmes in the area or in the country) during its design and implementation?
 - Did the programme objectives/outcomes remain relevant over the period of time required for implementation?
- Relevance to the context:
 - To what extent has the programme taken into account and reacted to changes in the political environment?

- Did RCN take the initiative to suitably modify programme design (if required) during implementation in response to any major changes in the context?

ii. Assessing effectiveness

The effectiveness criterion aims to assess the extent to which an intervention has achieved its expected results, especially at outcome level. Using a TBE approach when assessing the effectiveness of the programme has led to drawing lessons on how and why the theory translated into an empirical reality. The evaluation addressed the effectiveness of the programme as follows:

- To what extent did the programme contribute to reaching its specific objective and its outcomes?
- What are the deviations and bottlenecks and how can they be coped with within the remaining timeframe of the project?
- Will the project effectiveness be hindered should the project terminate in May 2015 as foreseen?
- To what extent did the learning provided by RCN's monitoring and evaluation processes help ensure/increase effectiveness?

iii. Assessing efficiency

The efficiency criterion, in the context of this evaluation, focused on assessing the extent to which the organisational and management set-up have effectively supported the programme and, thus, the implementation of its theories of change. The efficiency criterion is fundamental, as its analysis provides important elements of understanding regarding *how* the programme has or has not achieved its results. The evaluation addressed the efficiency of the programme as follows:

- Have the organisational structure, managerial support and coordination mechanisms effectively supported the delivery of the programme?
- Did RCN mobilise adequate technical expertise in the programme design and programme implementation?
- Has an effective M&E system been put in place and did it generate information that has been useful for measuring performance and outcomes and taking critical decisions when necessary?

iv. Assessing sustainability

From a TBE perspective, the focus has been on explicitly identifying which results are likely to remain, which are not likely to remain, and on highlighting the contribution of RCN's strategies to the level of sustainability of achieved results. In this evaluation, the focus for the sustainability criterion was on the following questions:

- Have appropriate processes or mechanisms been put in place to support the sustainability of programme results?
- Are there any particular challenges to the continued sustainability of programme results? Is it possible, at this stage of the programme, to explicitly identify what results are likely to remain, and which are not likely to remain?

1.4 COMMENTS ON THE SOURCES

The interviews were carefully planned to include key people within partner organisations (IMBARAGA, ARAMA, RRP+ and AVEGA), with Local Authorities and other actors (from the beneficiaries, Mediation Committees and population, to a series of actors within the Ministry of Justice) expected to give constructive external opinions on the programme. The informants from each category were selected as follows:

- RCN provided information on the programmes of each partner and put the evaluation team into contact with relevant partners' staff;
- RCN planned meetings with each of its partners in Kigali and in the different Districts, Sectors and Cells visited by the evaluation team. The evaluators led these meetings sometimes with, sometimes without the presence of RCN staff.

It is worth noting that the collaboration with the Embassy of Sweden in Kigali, with RCN and its partners has been very fruitful, each of them providing key documents, willing to discuss their strengths but also being very open to exchange about their weaknesses. We feel it important to highlight this effort to be totally transparent as a finding in itself.

1.5 LIMITATIONS AND LESSONS

Within the framework of this assessment, the evaluators visited several partner and beneficiary organisations, each of them different in their nature, mandate and organisational structure, which are active in different parts of Rwanda. A great amount of time was spent with RCN team and management in order to better understand the logic of the programme, as well as with other informants to get a fair picture of the opportunities and constraints faced by organisations aiming at implementing public policies, facilitating access to local justice while bringing gender issues onto local and national agendas. Our method attempted to, as much as possible, minimise difficulties linked to dealing with complex issues in complex environments. We would, however, like to point out the following limitations:

- This assessment is neither a mid-term review nor a final retrospective evaluation of RCN work. The evaluation was undertaken while RCN had not yet had the possibility to fully analyse the wealth of information available in its monitoring system. It is, thus, still too early to assess with precision and certainty the depth and durability of recorded changes. It is also possible that some changes occur long after the passage of the evaluation team.
- The issue of attribution has been a constant concern for the evaluation team. In many cases, it has been possible to draw conclusions on the effective changes (at outcome level) that could be attributed to the programme, mainly because RCN had been the only actor involved on a very specific issue or in a particular geographic area. In other cases, in which it was difficult to isolate RCN's intervention from others', we have been able to highlight the contributions of the programme to a series of tangible changes.

This assessment shall be seen as a learning tool for RCN and the Embassy of Sweden/Sida. It aims at providing RCN with strategic guidance on several aspects of its work that require some improvement in the next possible phase of its programme.

Apart from making sure that all the gathered information answers the evaluation questions, our approach and the focus on utilisation has ensured that the evaluation process should allow RCN, its partners and stakeholders to reflect on their work and learn from the evaluation process. The evaluation team shared the initial findings of the evaluation during a meeting organised at the Embassy of Sweden in Kigali with RCN's management in Rwanda, Embassy Head of Cooperation and Programme Manager of Democratic Governance.

None of the informants have provided information that might question the trustworthiness of the information collected through the staff, the partners and/or the beneficiaries. This strengthens our confidence in the credibility of the results of this evaluation.

2 Evaluation findings

2.1 RELEVANCE

2.1.1 Relevance in relation to the logic of programming

This section is dedicated to assessing the extent to which the programme was logically planned and whether the activities and the outputs of the programme were consistent with the attainment of its objectives. It also aims at assessing the extent to which the programme benefited from available knowledge (for example, the experience of other similar/previous programmes in the area or in the country) during its design and implementation, and whether the objectives remained relevant over the period of time required for implementation. The evaluation team decided to start by presenting the findings on this dimension of the relevance of the programme, as it has a strong influence on the rest of the evaluation, on the way it is structured and on its conclusions.

i. Coherence of the programme design

This programme essentially suffers from a lack of coherence in the way it is presented. The logical framework fails to demonstrate a logical causality between the activities and the different levels of results, and between the different levels of results themselves. For example, the ToC stipulates, at the level of the specific objective, that if the Abunzi Committees and the local authorities offer adequate solutions to people involved in land conflicts, while committing to increasing the enforcement of women's land rights, then they will contribute to improving the management of land conflicts. At the same time, at impact level, the logical framework explains that if the specific objective is achieved, then the programme will have contributed to improving rural population's access to fair community justice mechanisms. This causality does not make sense, as it is exactly the contrary that might be envisaged: if the population has access to fair community justice mechanisms, then the programme might contribute to improving the management of land conflicts. In the best case, the overall objective might be a relevant indicator of achievement of Outcome 1.

Moreover, there is, at the level of indicators, a constant mixing between outputs and outcomes. For example, the indicator 1 of the Specific Objective, formulated as the “*percentage of trainees (Abunzi and local authorities) who have increased their knowledge on conflict resolution, the mandate, functioning and competences of Abunzi committees and on land-related laws at the end of the training*” is an indicator at output level that would be relevant to measure the direct result of RCN training efforts, but it is not relevant to indicate any achievement of the objective (*To improve management of land conflicts in 15 districts of Rwanda in particular through the protection and promotion of women's land interests*). This mix of indicators is, to a large extent, due to the fact that the results framework does not include the activities nor

their outputs. It does not assist its users to grasp the logic of the planned intervention, the sequencing of different levels of results.

Finally, the information contained in the results framework does not reflect the real ambitions of the programme. From the beginning of the inception period to the end of the field work, this part of the evaluation has raised numerous questions and was the occasion of many discussions and debates between the evaluation team and RCN management and staff. What is the programme about and what does it really try to achieve? Is it a programme on access to land, on women's rights to land, on land governance, on land-related conflict resolution or on access to local justice mechanisms? Reading the various documents shared by RCN did not really help answer this question, as all these potential sectors of intervention are mentioned, either as results (at outcome, specific objective and impact levels) and/or as indicators, in the narrative part of the project proposal, in the results framework and in the narrative reports.

The evaluation team reached the conclusion that this programme is fundamentally not directly about land. The land issue is of course addressed, as well as other issues such as inheritance rights, gender-based violence (GBV) and the laws and decrees governing the work of the Mediation Committees. Land is addressed very strategically and implicitly since it represents the majority of cases handled by the Abunzi system, but it is tackled from a legal point of view in order to make sure that all actors involved in this system know the content of the Land and Property Inheritance Laws, policies and regulations, and refer to them when mediation efforts are undertaken and/or when taking decisions when a case is brought to their consideration. Similarly, the issue of land conflict is addressed in a secondary way. Although the programme is based on an analysis of the role of land in the Rwandan society, it is not grounded on a thorough analysis of land conflicts. The concept of conflict and its related notions of conflict dynamics, which explain the relationship between changes in attitudes and behaviours of actors and how they influence the redefinition of the problem or incompatibility between them, does not appear anywhere in the project documents. The resolution of these conflicts is also not central to the programme, as RCN's monitoring system set up does not follow what has happened to the plaintiffs who brought their cases before the Abunzi system³. It is a programme on rule of law with a specific focus on access to community justice mechanisms.

The evaluation team stresses the importance of this question both because it should help RCN develop more a logical chain of results, and also because it raises a more principled problem. RCN is, indeed, fully accountable at activity and output levels, but not at outcome and impact levels. This means that RCN is accountable to provide quality capacity development activities and outputs, and this report will demonstrate

³ Issues related to the monitoring system are further analysed in the section of this report dedicated to the efficiency of the programme

that it has been the case. However, RCN cannot be held accountable for its partners' and beneficiaries' achievements or failures. There is here a crucial distinction that is not clearly accounted for in this programme because of the poor quality of the results framework. This is, obviously, RCN's primary responsibility, but it is also fair to mention that the programme benefited from an external support in RBM, commissioned by the Embassy of Sweden in Kigali, which failed to clarify the original ToC and to fundamentally improve the quality of the results framework.

We therefore recommend RCN to plan its future programme in Rwanda using a method that will clearly highlight:

- The theory of change of the programme;
- The problems it intends to tackle and the objectives it would like to reach (changes of behaviours);
- The strategies/activities it intends to develop and implement and how they are likely to lead to well-identified outputs.

ii. Proposed results framework upon which the programme is evaluated


The evaluation team faced a contradictory situation: the ToC and the results framework of the programme were not logically built, as they suffered from an insufficient understanding of results-based management approaches and tools, while RCN's staff, implementing partners and even some beneficiaries were capable of clearly explaining the logic of the intervention, the articulation between the activities implemented, their direct results (outputs) and their contribution to expected outcomes. Further reading of the available documentation, an in-depth analysis of the monitoring system (its structure, the nature of information collected and analysed), combined with the knowledge gained from a series of meetings with RCN staff and from interviews with beneficiaries on the ground helped the evaluation team formulate a new ToC and a revised chain of results. This exercise has two major advantages: first, it allowed the evaluation team to refine the framework upon which RCN's programme should be evaluated, and which highlights what the programme really intends to achieve. Second, this framework fulfils one objective of this evaluation. It might, indeed, be a useful model for RCN when drafting its final report, as it allows to clearly show the relevance of the activities implemented and to demonstrate the causality between these activities and the different levels of results achieved.

RCN's programme is focused on access to community justice mechanisms, with a particular focus on women's land and property rights. This is its specific objective, all activities and their expected direct results (outputs) contribute to the achievement of this outcome. Table 2 and graph 2 illustrate the ToC and the generic chain of results developed by the evaluation team. They will be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the programme.

Table 2: ToC suggested by the evaluation team

Development problems	Development Hypothesis and Programme Outcomes	Programme impact
The Abunzi Committees have very limited capacities to perform their mandate The rural population and the local authorities involved in land issues do not commit to promoting women's land rights	If the system Abunzi functions according to its mandate, offers mediation solutions and/or take decisions that are not incompatible with the law, and if rural populations and local authorities understand the law and commit to promoting women's rights then the programme will have contributed to improving rural population's access to fair community justice mechanisms	If the programme succeeds in contributing to improving rural population's access to fair community justice mechanisms and if the decisions taken by the community justice mechanisms are implemented in accordance with the law, then the programme will have contributed to increasing women's access to land

Graph 2: Chain of results suggested by the evaluation team



We therefore recommend RCN to use the chain of results suggested by the evaluation team as a basis for its final report

2.1.2 Relevance in relation to strategic priorities of local, national and international actors/institutions

i. Coherence of the programme with the policies and programmes undertaken by the government and other development / governance partners

- **Relevance to Swedish policies and objectives**

The document of reference to assess RCN's relevance to Sweden's strategic priorities is the Strategy for Development Cooperation with Rwanda (2010-2013). RCN's programme is in line with two out of three cooperation areas included in the Strategy. It is, indeed, coherent with the Democracy and Human Rights pillar, especially with two of its sector objectives, namely increased transparency in public institutions and enhanced accountability, and with the Environment and Natural Resources sector's second objective, which is to contribute to strengthening land rights for poor people. Moreover, RCN's programme is in line with the Policy for Democratic Development

and Human Rights in Swedish Development Cooperation (2010-2014), which emphasises the fact that Swedish cooperation should press for equal access to justice, including traditional jurisdictional structures.

- **Relevance to governmental strategies and policies**

RCN's programme is fully integrated in the Rwandan governmental strategies and policies at national and local levels. It is in line with the objectives of the Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Justice, whose main goal is to "*oversee the promotion of fair justice for all*", and especially with the Justice, Reconciliation, Law and Orders Sector (JRLOS) strategy. The JRLOS is a platform for justice-related government institutions in Rwanda, established with the main objective to strengthen the coordination of planning and implementation of justice sector activities and service delivery. All national and international actors involved in the justice sector are part of this platform. RCN's programme is also coherent with the first pillar of Rwandan Vision 2020, which focuses on Good Governance, and with one of its three cross-cutting themes, namely gender equality. It is, likewise, in line with the Rwandan Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS, 1 and 2), more specifically with one of its three planned outcomes, which aims to improve access to quality justice. Last but not least, RCN's programme is in line with the government's vision to increase the role of community justice mechanisms within the justice sector in Rwanda. The ILPRC programme outcome 2 has a direct linkage with the inheritance and land laws (EDPRS 2: 7) The programme is, finally, coherent with the strategic priorities stated in the Organic Law no.02/2010/OL of 09/06/2010. The law stipulates the organisation, competences, structure and functioning of mediation committees.

- ii. *Responsiveness of the programme*

The picture of the responsiveness of RCN's programme is mixed. On the one hand, it has been very responsive, in the sense that it took into account the needs of the government bodies. There is not much of a choice at that level, as it is a precondition for receiving the authorisation to work in Rwanda. Nevertheless, RCN involved different stakeholders including the Central government, the Ministry of Justice, the district level decentralised Access to Justice Bureaus (MAJ), the Primary Courts (TB), District, Sector and Cell Local Authorities. Community members' views were also largely considered to adjust parts of the programme.

On the other hand, due to weaknesses in the programme design, RCN has failed to optimise its relationships with its civil society implementing partners (IMBARAGA, AVEGA, RRP+ and ARAMA). The narrative part of RCN's proposal mentions that the programme should contribute to strengthening the capacities of its implementing partners. However, this objective was never considered in the ToC nor in the results framework. As it was initially wished but not planned for, RCN did not develop specific strategies to achieve this objective. These partner organisations recruited external staff to perform what was expected from them in the programme, but without any possibility to sustain their employment beyond programme funding. As no mechanisms were planned whereby knowledge acquired through the programme could be

shared within these organisations, it remained with each externally recruited staff and was not institutionalised at the level of the partners. ARAMA seems to be the only exception to this rule, as the management of this organisation has involved these staff in other projects funded by international donors.

We therefore recommend RCN to plan for strengthening the capacities of its implementing partners in the next phase of its programme in Rwanda

2.1.3 Relevance to the context

This section assesses the extent to which the programme has taken into account and responded to changes in the political environment, and to which RCN took the initiative to suitably modify programme design, whenever it was required during implementation, in response to any major changes in the context.

A major strength of RCN's programme concern its capacity to adapt to changes in the political/institutional context. For example, despite several amendments in the Land Law, the programme was flexible enough to anticipate and adapt to these new changes and developments: the content of the training sessions was amended quickly and so was the content of the training manuals and of the tools distributed to the different actors involved in the Abunzi system.

Similarly, RCN was able to operate highly relevant strategic choices, changing the approach of certain activities, amending their content or planning new ones that were not initially planned to increase the probability of having direct quality results (outputs). One example concerns the involvement of the jurists of the Maisons d'Accès à la Justice (MAJ)⁴, in the training sessions. Following a dialogue with the Ministry, the implementation of coaching activities, enabling trainers and monitoring agents in collaboration with the MAJ to evaluate the work of the Abunzi Committees during their conciliation sessions contributed significantly to improve the relevance of the activities. Similarly, the organisation of a final workshop to consolidate the results of the work undertaken by the consultant- trainers at the end of the programme, while it was not originally planned, has generated a wealth of knowledge of the highest importance to the programme that should be useful in its future phases.

2.1.4 Conclusion on relevance

In sum, RCN's program is potentially very relevant, but it was built on insufficiently mastered foundations of results-based management, which is an obstacle to the clear demonstration of programming logic. However, this weakness did not prevent the programme to plan and implement highly relevant activities, nor to react adequately (time and content-wise) to changes in the institutional environment. It is also a well-

⁴ *Access to Justice Bureaus*; decentralised units of Ministry of Justice at district level, composed of three agents providing a range of first line information and legal services to the population

established programme in the context of Rwanda, highly consistent with the strategic priorities of the government and donors.

2.2 EFFECTIVENESS

This section presents the findings on the extent to which RCN's programme contributed to reaching its objectives (outcomes). This section is divided in two parts in order to answer all the evaluation questions introduced in the methodology chapter, but also to keep a logical flow and avoid repetitions. The first one is dedicated to highlighting the main results achieved by the programme, which have been verified by the evaluation team. Using a TBE approach, the second part focuses on analysing how and why these results have been achieved.

2.2.1 Results achieved by RCN's programme

Despite the clear weaknesses of the results framework discussed above, RCN's programme has succeeded in achieving very significant results.

i. High quality outputs

The evaluation shows that RCN has, first of all, been able to achieve high quality outputs. The programme trained 1124 Sector and Cell Abunzi Committee members from 190 sectors of 934 Cells within 15 Districts. To ensure support and coordination with local authorities, the programme trained 1314 Cell and Sector Executive Secretaries or their representatives whose responsibilities were directly relevant to managing land and family related disputes. 30 MAJ, 15 Primary Court (TB) judges, 60 local village level leaders, 120 members from AVEGA and RRP+ were also trained to create a synergy among all the beneficiaries and actors. Office tools, templates, forms, storage boxes, manuals and simplified summarised versions of laws were also provided. The results presented in Table 3 and 4 are only those that could be verified by the evaluation team during its field work. It is very likely that RCN will be in a position to report on more detailed results once the organisation has completed the analysis of all data collected through its monitoring system.

Table 3: Outputs of the Outcome 1

Activities	Outputs
Activity 1.1 Training of 1075 Abunzi committees at cell level	- The Abunzi Committees understand better their mandate and role; - The Abunzi understand the procedures (mediation and decision) and the parties' rights; - The Abunzi have acquired basic legal knowledge;
Activity 1.2 Training of 208 Abunzi committees, sector level	
Activity 1.3 Consult. workshops with 208 Abunzi committees, executive secretaries at sector level, MAJ agents and judges of Primary Courts (TB)	
Activity 1.4 Distribution of tools and	

equipment to 1283 Abunzi	• The Abunzi have acquired mediation skills, conciliation and fact-finding techniques; • The Abunzi are equipped with official sashes and metallic trunks (boxes containing relevant documents allowing them to notify, document, and store the results of their mediation efforts and of their decisions);
Activity 1.5 Monitoring Abunzi	
Activity 1.6 Publication of study on the functioning of Abunzi	Not yet published. Publication planned before June 2015.

Evidence from direct programme beneficiaries collected during the field work indicated that an effective transfer of knowledge and skills took place following all the activities implemented by RCN. They can be summarised as follows:

- The Abunzi Committees understand better their mandate and role, while baseline information gathered by RCN suggested that there was a lack of consciousness and understanding, by the Abunzi, of their two roles as mediators and decision-makers, and of the different approaches and skills it takes to handle cases.
- The Abunzi Committees understand the procedures (mediation and decision) and the parties' rights, while the baseline data indicated that most of them did not know that they had to present all the existing options to choose members of the panel of mediators to parties in conflict, nor did they know that they had to explain to the parties how the bureau of the panel is composed. Moreover, they understand the decision-making process (which is done by all members of the committee, not just the three members of the panel) and they know that they have to read the decision proceedings after the decision-making process to enable parties to react to it.
- The Abunzi Committees have acquired basic legal knowledge, while the baseline data referred to a widespread lack of awareness and basic knowledge of the laws that govern their own functioning as well as of land-related laws.
- The Abunzi Committees have acquired mediation skills, conciliation and fact-finding techniques, while baseline information showed that they did not know how to identify the causes and nature of a conflict, and to distinguish stakeholders involved (parties, witnesses, and other persons with an interest in the case).
- The Abunzi Committees are now equipped with boxes containing relevant documents allowing them to notify, document, and store the results of their mediation efforts and of their decisions.

Table 4: Outputs of the Outcome 2

Activities	Outputs
Activity 2.1.: Training of 180 disseminators/ facilitators	- Village chiefs have acquired knowledge about women's rights - Village communities have acquired basic knowledge about women's rights in general and more specifically in relation to access to land (Land and Succession Laws) - Village communities have acquired knowledge on how to claim rights
Activity 2.2.: Dissemination of legislation in 60 villages	
Activity 2.3.: 120 community discussions in 60 villages	
Activity 2.4.: 180 village-level dialogues in 60 villages	
Activity 2.5.: 15 roundtables at district level	
Activity 2.6.: National Forum	Result not analysed by the evaluation team due to little distance in time between this activity and possible evidence of results

Interviews conducted with beneficiaries and VAF in different districts of Rwanda allowed the evaluation team to collect multiple evidence of transfer of knowledge among village communities about women's rights in general and more specifically in relation to access to land (Land and Succession Laws).

ii. Strong indicators of outcome achievement

The evaluation team uncovered four generic types of change at outcome level, with indicators that tend to demonstrate that the programme has indeed contributed to access to fair community justice mechanisms.

First, the change of behaviours of Abunzi Committees, MAJ and LA was evident from interview findings with them. While the basis for apportioning exclusive attribution of the outcomes to one particular intervention is often complicated, key informants and focus groups at all levels interviewed acknowledged that the contribution of RCN was both significant and decisive in making the Abunzi Committees more effective. This effectiveness was evidenced in:

- Improved levels of collaboration between local administrative authorities and Abunzi on one hand, and between MAJ, TB and Abunzi on the other.
- The clarity of questions and responses by Abunzi to disputants while presiding over and mediating local disputes.
- Increase in the level of respect of procedures by both local authority administrators and Abunzi.
- At the community level, former disputants, Abunzi and local leaders testified to the effectiveness of the programme. Abunzi Committee members met from different sectors and cells from summarised this effectiveness in terms of conduct of conciliation processes and of greater respect for procedures.

- Further evidence from interviews indicated that there has been a surge in preference of Abunzi as the fairest community conflict managers by disputants.

Secondly, an important unintended positive outcome is the effectiveness of RCN's programme on the Abunzi Committees in saving more time for local authorities to attend to other issues. TB Judges interviewed pointed out that RCN programme has had a significant effect in terms of less number of appeals and more of well-completed cases reaching their offices for handling. All primary court judges interviewed indicated that RCN training of Abunzi and local authorities had not only reduced the number of cases they handle, but had also created more time for them to conduct research and enrich the existing laws. They further indicated that prior to the RCN programme, they were overwhelmed by a huge number of cases and could barely give timely fair justice. After the RCN capacity building with Abunzi and local authorities, the few court cases received have been given sufficient time and attention to arrive at fairer justice decisions. All the judges we met asserted that RCN provision of procedural materials for Abunzi and local authorities to use in recording cases was an effective tool that has effectively reduced corruption. Disputants no longer have to pay for the official forms and documents.

Table 5: Outcome indicators

Outputs	Outcomes indicators
Outcome 1: Mediation (Abunzi) committees of the targeted districts offer adequate solutions to people involved in land conflicts, while increasing the enforcement of women's land rights	
The capacities of Abunzi Committees have been strengthened	<i>Recorded change of behaviours regarding their mandate and role:</i> - Change, by the Abunzi, of their behaviours regarding the two roles of mediators and decision-makers, and use of the different approaches and skills necessary to handle mediation cases. - Diminished use of legal terms and behaviours similar to judges in courts of law. - Fewer Abunzi tend to take the defence of one party, as if they had been chosen as 'legal representatives' of this person. <i>Recorded change of behaviours concerning the respect for procedures and parties' rights:</i> - Evidence of improved presentation of all the existing options to choose members of the panel of mediators to parties in conflict; - Evidence of decision-making process done by all members of the committee, not just the three members of the panel; - Improved occurrence of reading the decision proceedings after the decision-making process to enable parties to respond to them; - No Abunzi committees met by the evaluation team refuse to handle cases which have not primarily been dealt with by local authorities or other informal conflict resolutions mechanisms.

	<i>Recorded basic legal knowledge:</i> - Evidence collected during field work of the fact that Abunzi Committees not only know the basic content of Land and Succession Laws, but also of the fact that they refer to them when conciliating or taking a decision; - Evidence provided by judges of TB of improved quality of Abunzi decisions and increased validation of these decisions;
The capacities of Local Authorities have been strengthened	- Collected evidence of increased responsibility taken by Local Authorities in supporting day-to-day functioning of Abunzi Committees; - Collected evidence of improved Local Authorities performance in their legally-mandated tasks, such as registering cases before submitting them to Abunzi Committees; - Collected evidence of sharing of key documents with Abunzi Committees.
Outcome 2: Rural populations and the authorities involved in land issues recognise and commit to better promote women's land rights	
Rural populations including village chiefs have acquired basic knowledge of women's land rights	- Collected evidence of female and male beneficiaries who either bring their cases before the Abunzi system after completion of the community discussions and/or who embark on a conciliation process within their family structures outside the Abunzi system.

Thirdly, in almost all the 60 villages within the 15 districts covered by the RCN programme, civil society members trained in Land Rights Law have helped transform community members' understanding of women rights access to land use and management. This general increased awareness on women's access to land rights has triggered some changes of behaviours within the communities exposed to the programme. The evaluation team found evidence of female and male beneficiaries who either brought their cases before the Abunzi system after completion of the community discussions and/or who embarked on a conciliation process within their family structures outside the Abunzi system.

Finally, the programme has largely contributed to the harmonisation of the work of all actors involved in the Abunzi system. RCN's development, in close collaboration with the Ministry of Justice, of tools used by the Abunzi Committees and local authorities (registers, templates for recording procedures and for decisions) have enhanced the quality of the community justice system; procedures are now transparent which makes the Abunzi Committees and local authorities more accountable to the parties in conflict.

iii. Indicators of influence at impact level

Measuring the impact of a development programme always triggers a series of meth-

odological challenges. Highlighting the nature and depth of the contribution of an intervention to changes at impact level is one of them. The evaluation team is fully aware of these challenges, and had realistic ambitions to ascertain impact indicators when the evaluation started.

Box A: Excerpts from field interviews with RCN programme beneficiaries from Bugesera and Kirehe Districts

"Before this training, I felt helpless and desperate. I was ready to vacate my land for my ex-husband and his commune-wedded wife. However, "the Ntagengwa project" opened my eyes to new options. I got to know that I still had rights over this piece of land. This emboldened me and I refused to vacate the land."

"Unaware of the law provisions regarding women rights, and falsely confident of the outcome, my ex-husband took me to court. Armed with the knowledge of the law, thanks to the RCN training, I confidently argued my case and the court ruled in my favour. Since then, my case has created a chain reaction beyond the borders of our cell where it has been taken on as a model worth emulating."

"You would think the RCN training was targeted towards me. I presided over management of my father's land and was convinced my legally married but childless stepmother who had left had no right over our piece of land. After I got the RCN training on the land law, I took the initiative to look for my stepmother and explained to her she was the rightful family member to manage our father's property. She is doing so now."

"Against the unlawful advice of my siblings to exclude her, I relinquished the management of the family land property to our stepmother. She later settled our differences over land through cell level Abunzi with each one of us getting a fair share."

However, the series of interviews conducted with the beneficiaries of the programme using the MSC approach, revealed a series of social changes taking place beyond outcome level. Only a few of those changes that have been verified by at least three different sources (the beneficiaries themselves, the local authorities in the cells or the sectors in which they have taken place, and either RCN staff or its implementing partners) are presented in this report.

There two different types of impact indicators:

- Women interviewed confirmed that they had gained their rights to inherit a piece of land through the Abunzi system, either directly after a mediation, or following-up

on a decision taken by the Abunzi Committee, decisions that were later on confirmed by the TB (effect of Outcome 1).

- Women interviewed confirm that they have been able to access land as a direct effect of the awareness raising activities that took place in the villages through family negotiations and without bringing their case before the Abunzi system. In Rulindo District, for example, former trainees confirmed that AVEGA's training and advice helped widows and many families settle their land disputes. AVEGA's understanding of the Land Rights Law and its applicability has made this VAF and her Rugarama village (Umudugudu) a point of reference for the whole cell in addressing women rights over land disputes. Similar stories have been collected in the other districts visited by the evaluation team.

It is, however, important to stress that, due to the time frame and the human resources

made available for this evaluation, the evaluation team was not able to analyse the quality of women's access to land, e.g., have they registered the land acquired through the Abunzi system or directly through mediation within their families? To what extent do women fully enjoy their rights on this land? How did the fact that they could own the land impact their social and economic life? These few questions demonstrate that the stories of change collected during the evaluation field work require further consolidation and analysis. They are, nevertheless, interesting indications, as they tend to demonstrate that RCN's programme reaches beyond access to fair community justice mechanisms.

We therefore recommend RCN, in the next phase of its programme in Rwanda, to focus its research work towards understanding the quality and the effects of increased access to land for women on their social and economic conditions

2.2.2 How and why results could be achieved

The use of a TBE approach is meant to reflect on a series of factors that might explain how and why RCN could achieve results at different levels. The evaluation team uncovered five main factors, which are analysed in the following sections. These factors are not presented in a specific order of importance.

i. Knowledge of the context and of the justice sector

RCN is a long established organisation in the Great Lakes region and particularly in Rwanda. Due to its research conducted over several years and its competent national staff, but also because the organisation has been able to institutionalise this knowledge, has a tremendous experience of the various components of the justice sector. Through this experience, RCN was able to build relationships, despite some conflicts, with the Rwandan authorities. The interviews conducted during the field work show that national and especially local authorities have developed a genuine respect for their work. RCN is considered a true partner with good working relations, which makes a significant contribution in the field, and to the development of Rwanda. This is a fundamental dimension in understanding the reasons for the success of this programme.

ii. Use of baselines and needs assessments

One of the most positive aspects of RCN's work has been the systematisation with which the organisation has started aspects of its programme with a baseline study. These baseline efforts are generally of very good quality. They analyse the context or the area to be covered by the intervention in preparation, and they clearly highlight the level of knowledge/performance and needs of beneficiaries. This is an essential factor because it allowed RCN to have a clear idea of what could be achieved taking into account the series of constraints that characterised their fields of intervention, even though, once again, it was not accurately integrated in the results framework.

iii. Quality and effectiveness of capacity development activities

The approach developed by RCN for capacity development is probably the most significant aspect of its work. The evaluation team judges that four main factors have

played a role of paramount importance in RCN's capacity development activities:

- **The high relevance of training contents**

RCN managed with all target groups, whether with actors involved in the Abunzi system or with village communities, to adapt the training content to their abilities. In other words, RCN sought a compromise between what was important for the beneficiaries to learn in order to be more effective in their professional tasks, in the mandate that was given to them and/or in their efforts to influence social norms, and what they were able to understand, learn and apply. For example, it was unrealistic to think that the members of Abunzi committees or the villagers could master all laws included in the civil or criminal code of Rwanda. The strategic choice to select only a few key laws whose content was to be known has enabled an effective learning process.

- **The quality of the pedagogical approach**

The training sessions provided for different target groups are never one-off events but take place over several gatherings. They are centred on innovative teaching approaches, which are based on will and skills to transfer very practical knowledge, and consisting of many repetitions of topics until participants acquire the knowledge transmitted in role plays. Moreover, the organisation of training with trainers working in pairs (binomes), which are characterised by a gender balance, and, to the extent possible, by the combination of a lawyer and a social scientist with a trainer or teaching background, help create teaching dynamics conducive to the transfer of skills. Finally, evaluating the transfer of competence in the form of continuous assessment (assessment of the level of knowledge at the beginning of the training, oral controls during the training and a final assessment at the end) has been of tremendous help to ensure control over the effectiveness of the training sessions.

- **The quality of the trainers**

RCN had not originally planned to recruit external trainers, thinking to use its own staff to organise trainings. Before the immensity of the task, RCN revised its strategy. The evaluation team was able to attend one of the trainers' consolidation workshops and organised a FGD with them. Their ability to critically analyse the conditions in which learning could take place and/or was limited was quite remarkable, as was the quality of the analysis of their work and the recommendations shared with RCN. This group of trainers is an invaluable resource for RCN in the future.

We therefore recommend RCN to build on the existing resource of trainers in the next phase of its programme

- **The involvement of different types of actors in capacity development activities**

A major strength of the programme is to have developed a capacity development strategy based on three complementary approaches:

- RCN, first of all, involved different types of actors during the trainings and the

workshops: members of Abunzi Committees, MAJ, local authorities at different levels and the judges of TB;

- RCN used the human resources of the decentralised state structures (especially MAJ) and involved them in training sessions and workshops as speakers and trainers;
- Finally, RCN developed post-training coaching activities involving again the decentralised structures of the Ministry of Justice for *in situ* monitoring of the work of the Abunzi and advise them once the conciliation sessions were completed.

The information collected in the field show that this combination of approaches has, to a very large extent, contributed both to effective transfer of competencies, to a close linking between these actors, but also to the establishment of a mutual trust between them.

The programme uses a fairly comprehensive approach to capacity development, that the evaluation team analyses as follows: change is more likely to happen if individuals, social groups, civil society organisations and public institutions are targeted by, and directly involved in shaping and implementing capacity development initiatives. It is a collective learning process based on the assumptions that knowledge is spread among different types of actors and that it is more likely to be effectively transferred and institutionalised when conditions for mutual reinforcement among these actors are planned for and efficiently created. Unfortunately, RCN has not developed a policy document explaining what capacity development means for the organisation and how it might contribute to reaching its objectives. This may be another reason for the gap between the weaknesses of the results framework and the quality of results achieved.

We therefore recommend RCN to develop a strategy document aiming at explaining its approach to capacity development and clearly showing the links between capacity development and what the organisation aims to achieve

iv. Favourable political/institutional environment

Beyond the administrative constraints that may face international NGOs working in Rwanda, RCN's programme has enjoyed a relatively favourable institutional and political environment. It did not always go smoothly, the Ministry of Justice having specific ideas about what the programme should have contained and on the way it should have been implemented. Nevertheless, the fact that the community justice mechanisms and the access of women to land are a priority of the government facilitated the mobilisation of institutional actors at national level, but also, and perhaps especially, at decentralised levels (Districts, Sectors and Cells).

v. Quality of partnership with the Embassy

It is, indeed, important to emphasise the quality of the relationship established between RCN and the Embassy of Sweden. Over the entire duration of the programme, this relationship was characterised by a regular, frank and rich dialogue, leading to mutual trust. The fact that Embassy staff stood side by side with RCN during its

tough negotiations with the Rwandan Ministry of Justice regarding the content of the programme (geographical coverage and duration of Abunzi training component) has allowed the programme to be implemented without jeopardising its quality and feasibility. It is also important to mention the value of Sweden's monitoring and flexibility as a donor, as well as its capacity to understand the nature of the service provided by RCN, which, to a very large extent, depends on the quality of human resources that need to be mobilised in order to ensure its quality. The decision to financially support office costs at RCN headquarters, through overheads included in the ILPCR budget, has contributed to quality inputs and to the effective coordination/support mechanisms between RCN's offices in Brussels and Kigali. The evaluation team is convinced that the relationship established between the Embassy of Sweden and RCN around the ILPR programme is an excellent example of good donorship and it might be a source of inspiration in other country offices where Sweden is involved in development cooperation.

Lesson to be learnt by Embassy of Sweden/Sida:

A close relationship with implementing partners, based on mutual trust, flexibility, close monitoring of partners' activities and achievements, and on involvement with the partners in dialogue with state institutions is crucial for effective development cooperation

2.2.3 Conclusion on effectiveness

Taking into account the very short duration of implementation of the programme, the results achieved are remarkable, both by their qualities (especially at output level) and by the chain of effects they trigger (in terms of behaviour changes). In addition to highlighting these results, the evaluation team has identified a series of factors that have contributed to reaching them. The evaluation team believes that there are some lessons to be learned. The experience of RCN in Rwanda shows that the combination of a good knowledge of the context, based on baselines and needs assessments, in which the programme is intended to support well-defined public policies, with activities of capacity development involving different stakeholders that do not neglect the quality of this input in order to increase the likelihood of optimal transfer of knowledge, and which is given financial support that allows for the mobilisation of relevant human resources, is critical to achieving tangible results.

2.3 EFFICIENCY

This section will assess the extent to which the organisational structure, managerial support and coordination mechanisms have effectively supported the delivery of the programme. It is also dedicated to assessing the extent to which RCN was able to mobilise adequate technical expertise in the programme design and programme implementation. Finally, it aims to assess the monitoring system, with an emphasis on the extent to which it could generate information that has been useful for measuring performance and taking critical decisions when necessary.

2.3.1 Efficiency of the organisational structure and coordination mechanisms

The analysis of the organisational structure highlights a central contradiction in that strong international staff have moved the programme forward but have also demonstrated risks of reliance on key personnel. There are three elements that explain the strength of the organisation. First, the involvement of the staff in Brussels in the management of the programme, from the planning phase, during its implementation until the current phase dedicated to the consolidation of results. The headquarters staff, and especially the Programme Manager, have played a leading role in the design of the baseline study, in the research work and in the development of the monitoring system. The fact that there has been no turnover of headquarters staff has allowed for the stability and continuity of support. The second important factor is that the coordination of the programme has been effective. The relations between the headquarters and Kigali have been good and constructive, mainly because they were based on a clear definition of roles and responsibilities. Thus, even if some questions have triggered debates and confrontations of ideas, the final decisions on the strategies and major orientations given to the programme have always been commonly accepted. Finally, the communication, the sharing of responsibilities and the coordination of work within the Kigali office have proven very efficient. The involvement of the programme staff in regular weekly and monthly meetings reinforced the sense of belonging to the same organisation and the ownership of the various components of the programme by the entire staff.

Despite the undeniable qualities of the coordinating structure and processes, the programme faced tremendous challenges due to critical expatriate staff turnover in the Kigali office. All the reasons for these departures are not controllable by RCN. Two staff were recruited to important positions within the United Nations system. The third person in charge of coordinating the programme, did not have his contract extended by the Rwandan authorities. RCN has adapted to the situation by providing the opportunity for the coordinator to continue working from the Brussels office and promoting the national staff to replace expatriates. Beyond these occurrences, it is the strategic positions of the staff (coordination, planning and monitoring) that have generated fragilities in the programme. Promoting national staff was the best answer that could be given, but it has increased the workload of the whole team, which is working to its maximum capacities since the internal adjustment.

We therefore recommend RCN to thoroughly plan its needs in human resources for the implementation of the next phase of the programme

2.3.2 Quality of the technical expertise

A major strength of the programme has been its ability to mobilise technical expertise of high quality. This is in particular the case for the management of the programme based in Kigali and Brussels. The evaluation team had the opportunity to have many discussions with RCN's Country Director and Programme Manager in Kigali, as well as with the Programme Manager for Rwanda and Burundi. These exchanges demonstrated the quality of their thinking, their detailed knowledge of every aspect of the

programme and their willingness to develop innovative approaches. The most salient point is their desire to produce results and to demonstrate the contribution of RCN to changes in the Rwandan community justice mechanisms.

The technical expertise of the national staff employed in Rwanda is another strong asset of the programme. The evaluation team identified a number of recurrent characteristics among the staff. First, they are all very familiar with the topic or the part of the programme they are responsible for, and they are able to provide relevant answers to the questions asked. They defend their work, but also demonstrate a sense of self-criticism and do not hesitate to highlight the limits and fragility of the results. They also have a very detailed knowledge of the socio-cultural environments in which they work. Finally, they are present and active on the ground. The evaluation team was able to collect a significant amount of evidence demonstrating their availability and commitment to work and support given to the beneficiaries. A good example of RCN's programme staff efficiency is the often-overlooked and yet important, aspect of information, documentation and management. The evaluation team took note of this fact whereby RCN has created a step-by-step consistent chain of capturing and recording all communications and official meeting details with partners. This initiative has helped RCN maintain its focus towards achieving programme targets without diverting into unplanned activities. It has also implicitly strengthened its local partners practice in converting the spoken word into a written message for their work (Rwanda is a predominantly an oral culture). This positive aspect can be attributed to the competent and committed staff.

RCN, moreover, has managed to mobilise external resources that have helped improve the quality of the programme. The VAF used the consultants recruited for the training of the Abunzi to organise the series of consultations at village level, which have been particularly appreciated by the beneficiaries. The pedagogical methods and tools used, mainly oriented towards the immediate use of practical skills, and well adapted to the needs and abilities of the participants, have contributed to an effective transfer of knowledge. Moreover, the fact that these consultants were all from Rwanda has strengthened their legitimacy.

2.3.3 Performance of the monitoring system

RCN has developed an ambitious monitoring system. It is based on the desire to collect and, in principle, analyse information at different levels:

- On each activity implemented
- On the level of achievement of each direct result (output)
- On the level of achievement of the two outcomes
- On the level of achievement of the specific objective
- On the environment and functioning of the Abunzi system for research purposes

The monitoring system is centred on the development of individual and collective re-

sponsibility, involving the programme staff of the Kigali office and parts of headquarters. The monitors (consultants involved in training activities, the VAF, the staff of RCN's civil society implementing partners and RCN staff) complete a form for each activity performed. The information is then collated by staff in charge of monitoring at the Kigali office, who enter the information into a database. This data is regularly monitored by the Programme Manager, the Country Director, the Programme Manager for Rwanda and Burundi and they are moreover discussed at regular meetings involving all staff in Kigali. This exercise is important insofar as it helps distinguish what is important and what is less so, but also as it allows a regular analysis of the level of achievement of results. Written minutes of each meeting are used to support the preparation of quarterly reports that are shared with the Embassy of Sweden in Kigali. These reports are then used as the basis for the drafting of annual reports.

The performance of the monitoring system is mixed. On the one hand, it is important to emphasise its systematic use by RCN. Many efforts have, indeed, been made to convey to the entire staff that it is a relevant and indispensable tool for the programme. These efforts have been geared towards a collective ownership, but also towards training the monitoring agents for data entry. The organisation of the monitoring system, which is based on staff accountability and regular data analysis, is relevant.

However, the system suffers from a lack of performance for three main reasons. First, almost only quantitative information is entered into the database. This weakness is difficult to understand, as the monitoring templates allow for the collection of qualitative data. The VAF, for example, note qualitative information in a box reserved for this purpose in the monitoring form on the effects of their activities in different villages. Although the quality of information varies with the person who wrote them, interviews with RCN staff suggest that this information is not analysed.

There is, however, a notable exception to this observation, the monitoring work of the Abunzi Committees, being particularly rich in qualitative data. Moreover, all the efforts to analyse the quantitative raw data, which aim to provide a qualitative dimension to the activities, to their direct results and to their longer term effects hardly appear in the reports produced by RCN, which are, to a large extent, activity based. Furthermore, the information collected in the monitoring templates seem more to be designed to serve RCN's research on the Abunzi system than to make a precise monitoring of the programme. This probably also explains why the qualitative data on the functioning of Abunzi Committees are collected so accurately. It is not a problem that research informs broader learning rather than direct programme management, but the fact that RCN gave priority to research has, due to limited human resources, weakened its monitoring of the programme. Finally, another reason that seems plausible to explain this weakness brings us back to the difficulties encountered by RCN to develop a logical theory of change and results framework of the programme. If RCN

had been able to successfully amend its logic, then it is likely that the monitoring system would have performed better.

We therefore recommend RCN to further improve its monitoring system through:

- allowing a systematic analysis of qualitative information included in the monitoring templates;
- more closely connecting the structure of the monitoring system with the theory of change of the programme;
- separating the information collected for research purpose from the one collected for monitoring the programme activities and results.

The evaluation team was not specifically asked to assess the cost-efficiency of RCN's programme. However, the analysis of RCN's monitoring system triggered a series of reflections related to the capacities of CSOs to effectively monitor their work. Sweden and other donors expect their partners to develop performance monitoring systems in order to report on results, and it is a legitimate claim. RCN's experience highlights some important elements on that matter. Firstly, the costs related to a monitoring system consist of salaries and activities: development of the system in itself, collection and analysis of data (including coaching activities) and capacity development of staff in charge of data collection and analysis. This statement might sound obvious, but it is worth mentioning. In RCN's case, the evaluation team estimates that salaries accounted for around 50% of the total monitoring costs. Secondly, the costs related to the monitoring system amount to around 20% of the total budget of the programme. It is difficult to comment on this percentage, as the evaluation team does not have any relevant reference data to compare it to. However, a preliminary conclusion might be that if donors expect their partners to report on results, donors should also accept that their partners allocate a significant proportion of their total programme costs to monitoring.

Lesson to be learnt by Embassy of Sweden/Sida:

If Sida expects its partners to report on results, Sida should also accept that its partners allocate a significant proportion of their total programme costs to monitoring.

2.4 SUSTAINABILITY

This section is dedicated to assessing the extent to which RCN was able to put in place appropriate processes or mechanisms in order to support the sustainability of programme results. It also assesses whether there are any particular challenges to the continued sustainability of programme results. It is also an attempt, already at this stage of the programme, to explicitly identify what results are likely to remain, and those that are not likely to remain.

2.4.1 Processes or mechanisms put in place to support the sustainability and results

likely to remain

These two questions are addressed simultaneously in order to avoid repetition, while emphasising their added value in terms of influence on the sustainability of results. Predicting the durability of the results of a development programme is never an easy task. Moreover, taking into account the short period of implementation of ICPLR and the fact the programme is not yet officially completed, it is important to keep in mind that the following analysis and its conclusions are preliminary and tentative. The evaluation team judges, however, that there are three sets of results that are likely to remain after completion of the programme.

i. The close collaboration between the actors involved in the Abunzi system

A major strength of this programme is to have managed to create links between the different actors involved in the Abunzi system (Abunzi Committees, MAJ, local authorities in the districts, sectors and cells, TB). Linking all of these actors and their involvement in the implementation of the programme is not only highly relevant for the achievement of results, but it is also a guarantee of sustainability. Moreover, due to state officials working in local authorities being transferred regularly throughout the country, it is likely that this result may have multiplier effects in the coming years.

ii. The harmonisation of procedures at national level

RCN has contributed, in collaboration with the Ministry of justice, to harmonising the procedures used in the Abunzi system. These procedures and tools are now used throughout Rwanda and this is unlikely to be challenged in the coming years.

iii. The influence of the VAF in their communities

The interviews conducted during the field work lead the evaluation team to conclude that these results have a potential for sustainability provided that they are further consolidated in the near future. The VAF are, indeed, well anchored in their communities, they enjoy a greater legitimacy since the programme began, and there are already indicators of multiplier effects beyond the villages in which the work was conducted.

2.4.2 Challenges to the sustainability of programme results

The evaluation shows that the programme has achieved very significant results. However, the evaluation team believes, and it seems that this sentiment is shared by RCN, that some results are extremely fragile. This does not call into question the effectiveness of RCN's work, but rather reflects the weight of the constraints imposed by the social, economic, cultural and political environments in which the programme is implemented. This section highlights three main challenges to the sustainability of programme results.

i. Challenge 1 : a highly volatile legal environment

Rwanda seems to be in a state of a legislative frenzy, with a significant number of new laws, amendments and decrees being enacted and promulgated annually. This has been a major challenge for RCN in the middle of training sessions with Abunzi Committees, as the land law was changed in late June 2013. While the changes brought by this new law meant an improvement for the promotion of women's land rights, it triggered a series of adjustments in RCN's handbook and tools developed

for, and used in its trainings. This trend may have a negative influence on the sustainability of the programme results, and in particular on the work of Abunzi who are not capable of keeping pace with legal changes without external support. Moreover, a new law governing the functioning of the Abunzi Committees is in preparation and seems to be well advanced. According to information gathered during the interviews, some changes, such as expanding the remit of Abunzi but also increasing their level of skill or education to be eligible for this function, are also likely to challenge some of the work done, the new standards disqualifying a number of Abunzi members who have already been trained.

ii. Challenge 2 : the power of engendered social and cultural norms

Gender equality is high on the government agenda and a lot of efforts have been undertaken to bridge gender gaps at societal level, sometimes with undeniable results. Rwanda is, for example, well known for being the country with the highest proportion of female parliament members in the world. We do not have, as part of this evaluation, the possibility to analyse in detail the social and cultural constraints that prevent women from accessing and owning land in greater numbers. However, the interviews conducted in different parts of the country converge around an element that seems recurrent; even if gender equality policies meet a great success in urban areas, and particularly in Kigali, the situation is very different in rural areas, where gender norms unfavourable to women still strongly prevail.

iii. Challenge 3: the discrepancy between the ends and the means of government policies

Without entering the debate on their relevance, as it is not the purpose of this assessment, the Rwandan government's ambitions to make the justice sector more efficient and effective are great. However, they face budget constraints exacerbated by the country's dependence on external funding to balance its budget (40% of state budget emanates from foreign aid), and that relations with some donors have been strained over the last few years. As a result, the justice sector's decentralised structures, such as the MAJ and the Abunzi Committees, suffer from a lack of financial and logistical resources, which to a very large extent prevent them from communicating with each other and/or visiting sites where cases emerge. Evidence collected on numerous occasions during the field work show that these institutions, and it is especially true for the MAJ as they are based in a central locality of each district, are totally dependent on RCN's logistical support to visit the Abunzi Committees. This dependency is a major challenge to sustainability of results.

iv. Challenge 4: access to fair community justice mechanisms is not an end in itself

The reflection contained in this small section may seem surprising, as the RCN programme only secondarily addressed the issue of land conflict resolution, while the programme title suggests otherwise. We think, however, that it is important to mention. Promoting access of rural people, particularly women, to fair community justice mechanisms is a necessary condition, but it cannot be understood as either a guarantee or an end in itself. It is a precondition for women's access to land, but also possi-

bly in the longer term, for the resolution of land disputes. However, a successful conciliation or a decision taken by the Abunzi and confirmed by the TB do not mean that the conflict is resolved. The question is whether these community justice mechanisms help durably solve these conflicts. This is a question that seems essential to the legitimacy of the Abunzi system in the long term, but also more generally for sustained peace and security in Rwanda. If, after several months or years, the same issues resurfaces because the solutions suggested by the Abunzi system were not sustainable (i.e., they do not have sufficiently taken into account the nature of the problems, the positioning of the actors or the depth of their attitudes), the community justice mechanisms might have the exact opposite effects to those originally desired. The evaluation team believes that this is food for thought for RCN and other actors involved in the justice sector in Rwanda.

3 Conclusion and Recommendations

The evaluation shows that RCN's programme produced remarkable results, despite some shortcomings that could have affected its ability to perform. This programme is characterised by two major deficiencies. The first one is the weakness of the results framework. This document lacks a logical link from outcomes to impact. It does not reflect the programme aims and indicators are of poor quality. This weakness however, is not fatal, insofar as it is not a structural problem of the programme, and as it does not reflect an inability of the staff that developed and implemented it to think logically. If this were the case, the programme would not have been able to produce the results highlighted in this evaluation. This is not a strategic thinking problem, but rather insufficient mastery of results-based management tools. The second weakness is the relatively loose relationship RCN had with the CSOs that are implementing partners of the programme, but whose institutional development was not planned for in the results framework despite the fact that the narrative part of the project proposal mentions this aspect of the work as an objective. There has, thus, been very little, if any, shared and institutionalised learning within these organisations, the wealth of experience having largely remained at the level of the staff recruited externally for the implementation of the programme.

Despite these weaknesses, the intervention of RCN in Rwanda manages to achieve solid results. It is primarily a programme that implements high-quality activities, deeply thoughtful in terms of pedagogical methods, quality of human resources that have been mobilised to implement them and of appropriate content for effective transfer of knowledge and skills. These highly relevant activities deliver direct results of high quality (outputs), the evaluation finds that there are clear indicators of transfer of knowledge, increased collaboration between different institutional actors involved in the community justice system and of increased awareness within village communities on the rights of women to own and inherit land. These high quality outputs contributed to the setting in motion of the stakeholders involved in the programme, the evaluation team being able to demonstrate a range of indicators at outcome level, and of the specific objective, which the evaluation suggests to reformulate. RCN's programme contributed to increasing the access of rural populations, particularly women, to fair community justice mechanisms. Finally, the data collected during the field work suggests that the results of the programme tend to have effects not only on its direct beneficiaries, but also on some boundary partners (primary courts judges, village chiefs for example). The evaluation team has collected a considerable amount of evidence, corroborated by several actors, which show that the programme begins to influence the level of women's access to land in the geographic areas where RCN was involved.

This evaluation also draws few more general conclusions about development cooperation policies and practices, and on the conditions under which they can be decisive. The evaluation team believes that there are some lessons that can be learned by Sida and the Embassy from the experience of its support to RCN's programme in Rwanda:

- The combination of the following factors is critical to achieving tangible results:
 - A programme based on good knowledge of the context, grounded on solid baselines and needs assessments;
 - A programme intended to support well-defined public policies;
 - A programme with activities of capacity development involving different stakeholders that do not neglect the quality of this input in order to increase the likelihood of optimal transfer of knowledge;
 - A programme given financial support that allows for the mobilisation of relevant human resources.
- A close relationship with implementing partners, based on mutual trust, flexibility, close monitoring of partners' activities and achievements, and on involvement with the partners in dialogue with state institutions is crucial for effective development cooperation.
- If Sida expects its partners to report on results, Sida should also accept that its partners allocate a significant proportion of their total programme costs to monitoring.

Finally, following-up on the findings and conclusion of this report, the evaluation team recommends RCN to:

- Use the chain of results suggested by the evaluation team as a basis for its final report.
- Plan its future programme in Rwanda using a method that will clearly highlight:
 - The theory of change of the programme;
 - The problems it intends to tackle and the objectives it would like to reach (changes of behaviours)
 - The strategies/activities it intends to develop and implement and how they are likely to lead to well-identified outputs (change of state)
- Plan for strengthening the capacities of its implementing partners in the next phase of its programme in Rwanda.
- Focus its research work, in the next phase of its programme in Rwanda, to towards understanding the quality and the effects of increased access to land for women on their social and economic conditions.
- Build on the existing resource of trainers in the next phase of its programme
- Develop a strategy document aiming at explaining its approach to capacity development and clearly showing the links between capacity development and what the organisation aims to achieve.

- Thoroughly plan its needs in human resources for the implementation of the next phase of the programme.
- Improve its monitoring system through:
 - Allowing a systematic analysis of qualitative information included in the monitoring templates;
 - More closely connecting the structure of the monitoring system with the theory of change of the programme;
 - Separating the information collected for research purpose from the one collected for monitoring the programme activities and results.

Annex 1 –Terms of Reference

Date: 2014-10-27

Background

Access to land is crucial in Rwanda. In rural areas, land is the most valuable property and the cornerstone of family economies. The overwhelming majority of citizens cultivate tiny plots of land for their livelihood. Many of them are not secured in their right to occupy and use land, and have no alternative sources of income. Pressure on land is exacerbated by the country's recent history (waves of returns of refugees, release of prisoners, etc.), high population growth and peculiar geography (exiguous and relatively inaccessible land).

Land property acquisition and administration have long obeyed unwritten customary rules. The main ways of access to land are land sharing by parents among their children during their lifetime ("umunani") and inheritance. In this traditional system, girls and women have been routinely deprived from enjoying their land rights. Yet, following the 1994 genocide, many of them *de facto* became heads of household. Over the last decade, the government adopted a series of reforms on land tenure (including registration) to both rationalize its use and enhance women's access to land. The ultimate goal of these reforms is to create the necessary conditions for a sustainable development. However, the enforcement of these laws at the local level is not fully ensured. The local authorities involved in the registration process, local conflict-resolution mechanisms and the rural population are generally unprepared and poorly informed as to the purpose, meaning and scope of these reforms.

To resolve conflicts arising from land property, management or use, the rural population resorts to *mediation committees* (also known as « Abunzi committees ») which were established in 2004 as an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanism⁵. Inspired by traditional mediation mechanisms, the Abunzi committees have a key role to play in promoting social cohesion and bringing justice closer to the population. They have a special responsibility for defending, protecting and enforcing women's rights to land. Their core mandate is to mediate disputants by promoting solutions acceptable to all. If mediation fails, Abunzi are entitled to take a legally-binding decision. Poorly trained and equipped, Abunzi however face difficulties in bringing disputants closer and in leveraging the laws, in particular the Succession and Land Laws, to systematically enforce women's land rights.

⁵ Please see art. 159 of the 2003 Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda and the 2004 Organic Law on the organisation, jurisdiction, competence and functioning of the mediation committee which gives birth to this conflict resolution mechanism.

Project overview (October 2012 – May 2015)

In October 2012, RCN Justice & Démocratie⁶ (hereafter RCN J&D) received SEK 28 200 000 from the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) – represented by the Swedish Embassy in Rwanda – to implement a nationwide project on land conflict resolution and women's access to land until May 2015. The project – Improving the Management of Land by Strengthening the Prevention and Resolution of Land Conflicts in Rwanda (ILPRC) – has the *overall objective* to improve rural populations' access to fair community-based justice mechanisms. The *specific objective* is to improve the management of land conflicts in 15 districts of Rwanda, in particular through the protection and promotion of women's land interests.

The theory of change of the ILPRC project rests on the idea that the strengthened capacities of (i) mediation committees to offer adequate remedies to land conflicts and (ii) of rural women to claim their land rights will pave the way to a more systematic implementation of the land reform and of related land rights. The project intervention logic is based on a two-fold approach:

- Capacity-building of Abunzi committees: Mediation (Abunzi) committees of the targeted districts offer adequate solutions to people involved in land conflicts, while increasing the enforcement of women's land rights⁷ (**outcome 1**);
- Promotion of women's land rights: Rural populations and the authorities involved in land issues recognize and commit to better promote women's land rights⁸ (**outcome 2**).

Outcome 1: Strengthening the Abunzi committees' capacities on land conflict resolution, particularly towards the enforcement of women's land rights

A series of trainings are conducted, together with agents of the Ministry of Justice, to strengthen the capacities of Abunzi committees as mediators for a quality, timely and sustainable resolution of land conflicts. Moreover, Abunzi committees get the necessary equipment and tools to successfully conduct their mandate and provide quality justice services to the population, especially women seeking redress for their land rights. Throughout the project, RCN J&D and its Rwandan civil society organisation partners – the Association for Research and Assistance Mission in Africa (ARAMA) and the Organisation of Farmers and Breeders (IMBARAGA) – monitor the functioning and practices of the Abunzi committees as well as women's appreciation of the committees' work. These continuous analysis efforts are combined with training and workshop activities. Findings and recommendations are disseminated to inform the on-going reflection, analysis and strategies on Abunzi's needs and promote their role in the conflict resolution process.

⁶RCN J&D is a Belgian non-governmental organisation founded in 1994 in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide. It aims to ensure the respect of the fundamental rights of each individual, in particular the right to justice and the rights enshrined in international human rights conventions. The concept of community-based justice and the promotion of women's rights are central to its core mission. In the wake of the genocide, RCN J&D supported the reconstruction of the Rwandan justice system. Since 2006, its programme has focused on land conflict resolution at the local level - with a particular emphasis on women's access to land - in a view to support the national land reform and implementation of domestic laws.

⁷As per the Logical Framework revised in November 2013.

⁸As per the Logical Framework revised in November 2013.

Outcome 2: Strengthening women's capacity to claim and secure their land rights and of authorities involved in land issues to recognize and commit to better promote women's land rights

RCN J&D and its Rwandan civil society partners – Avega and RRP + – strives to strengthen women's capacities to claim, secure and exercise their land rights. Women's empowerment is pursued by 1) raising awareness about women's rights to land, 2) strengthening women's capacity to claim land and 3) reducing social resistance to the promotion of women's land rights through a community-wide and national dialogue process. A series of discussion activities are carried out at community-level to create awareness among citizens – both women and men – and local leaders about Rwanda's legal framework⁹ safeguarding women's access to land. Village-level dialogues and district-level roundtables are also held on the social and cultural barriers that impede the fulfilment of women's land rights. The findings of these local debates are discussed with high level policy and decision-makers as well as civil society representatives so as to identify concrete recommendations to enhance the respect for women's legally-recognized land rights. *Outcome 2 is implemented as part of a larger programme co-funded by UN-WOMEN / FGE which ended in June 2014.*

The project is carried out in 15 out of Rwanda's 30 districts: Bugesera, Gatsibo, Kirehe and Rwamagana (Eastern Province); Nyamasheke, Rubavu and Rusizi (Western Province); Muhanga, Nyanza, Nyamagabe and Nyaruguru (Southern Province); Gakenke, Musanze and Rulindo (Northern Province); and Gasabo district (Kigali City). In total, 934 cells and 190 sectors (Outcome 1) and 60 villages (Outcome 2) are covered.

The final beneficiaries are the rural population of the 15 targeted districts (about 5,500,000 people according to the census dated 2012) who are or may be involved in a land conflict, in particular rural women whose land rights are not secured. Beneficiaries for outcome 1 also include 1,124 cell and sector-level Abunzi committees and 1,314 local authorities; and for outcome two, 120 members of partner CSOs at the village level.

The target groups of Outcome 1 include 35 agents of the Ministry of Justice (MAJ¹⁰ and Secretariat in charge of the coordination of Abunzi activities¹¹), 16 monitoring agents from partner CSOs, and a team of 14 consultants / trainers. For outcome 2, the target groups include: 15 MAJ agents, local CSOs members, local authorities, and the National Women Council.

⁹In particular the Inheritance Law of 1999, the Land Law of 2013, the GBV Law of 2009 and applicable international law.

¹⁰Maison d'Accès à la Justice: decentralized structure of the Ministry of Justice at the district-level, established in 2008. Each MAJ office is staffed with three legal professionals, one being in charge of supporting the Abunzi.

¹¹Entity in charge of coordinating the activities of the Abunzi committees nationwide, established in April 2012, and an integral part of the Ministry of Justice. It however merged with the Coordination of MAJ in June 2014. The single entity responsible for coordinating the activities of the MAJ and of the Abunzi committees within the Ministry of Justice is now called 'Unity for the Coordination of Access to Justice'.

At the institutional level, implementing partners include: the Ministry of Justice, the National Women Council, and local governments (district, sector and cell). Civil society partners include ARAMA and IMBARAGA (outcome 1), and Avega and RRP+ (outcome 2).

Article 7 “*Planning, Review, Reporting and Evaluation*” of the initial and amended Agreement between the Swedish Embassy in Rwanda and RCN J&D of the Project ILPRC foresees an evaluation during the second half of 2014. It reads that the evaluation should “*summarize obtained and expected results in relation to the Results Assessment Framework (RAF¹²), and contain an analysis of any deviation there from.* The RAF is a tool designed to monitor and measure results, in particular the qualitative ones, in the implementation of the project.” The Swedish Embassy in Rwanda and RCN J&D have agreed on the present Terms of Reference (ToR) for the evaluation.

The overall purpose of the evaluation is to assess the progress in achieving results against the project outcomes as per the Logical Framework (or Results Achievement Framework) and to analyse any deviation from project documents and propose corrective measures for project implementation so as to enhance performance.

The three main objectives of the evaluation are:

- a. To assess progress in project implementation, identifying results achieved in relation to proposed outcomes, and detecting problems at managerial and technical levels;
- b. To identify deviations from project objectives and propose corrective measures in order to improve performance towards the achievement of results and learning during the remaining period of project implementation, which may include an analysis of the opportunity for a cost or no-cost extension of the project.
- c. To prepare for narrative completion report ensuring the evaluation of the project.

Evaluation results will be used to inform the project and to make adjustments while promoting the development of the capacity of the project implementers (RCN J&D and its partners). The findings could serve as a basis to assess the need for a no-cost extension of the project, beyond May 2015.

Furthermore, the findings will be used to inform Sida (represented by the Swedish Embassy in Kigali) by providing evidence-based data on results towards its development strategy in Rwanda. [**How to do:** State the specific objectives for the evaluation and clarify what the evaluation aims to find out, such as identifying certain results or make particular assessments of a specific development intervention.

Also specify who the intended users of the evaluation are, and how they are expected to use the evaluation. Involve if possible the intended users in a discussion on this.]

The timeframe and geographic and thematic focus of the evaluation are the following:

Evaluation

¹²Results Assessment Framework = Logical Framework. Please refer to Annex 1.

Evaluation Scope	Project “Improving the Management of Land by Strengthening the Prevention and Resolution of Land Conflicts in Rwanda”
Timeframe <i>Period to be covered by the evaluation</i>	1 st October 2012 – 1 st October 2014
Geographic	Rwanda (15 districts)
Thematic Scope	Land rights (in particular women’s land rights) Local conflict resolution mechanism / community-based justice

[**How to do:** Specify the scope of the evaluation. Be explicit about what is to be evaluated (the evaluation object). Also state the evaluation scope, i.e. what to be included and not to be included in the evaluation (for example in terms of programmes and terms of time periods to assess, geographical areas to be covered and topics).

Also specify important delimitations. Be realistic about what can be covered by an evaluation.]

The management and the day-to-day aspects of the evaluation process will be ensured by an **Evaluation Task Force** composed of two Evaluation Task Managers, namely Clément KIRENGA the Programme Manager of Democratic Governance for the Swedish Embassy, and Mr. Jean-Chrysostome RUBAGUMYA for RCN J&D. The Task Force is responsible for: the selection and recruitment of the evaluator/evaluation team, the contractual aspects, and administrative and logistics support to the evaluator/evaluation team, the provision of technical guidance and first-hand data to the evaluator/evaluation, the communication between all stakeholders, and the review of deliverables and provision of feedback to the evaluator/evaluation team. They may participate in the field missions in collaboration with the evaluator/evaluation team, if the evaluator agrees to this.

The evaluators shall report directly to the Evaluation Task Managers. The consultant will be responsible for evaluation logistics (office space, administrative and secretarial support, communications, printing documentation, travel, etc.) and the development, implementation and dissemination of methodological tools.

The evaluation will analyse the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance, as well as intermediary trends of impact and sustainability of the ILPRC project.

- **Effectiveness:** what is the level of project progress towards achieving the outcomes? What are the deviations and bottlenecks and how can they be coped with within the remaining timeframe of the project? Will the project effectiveness be hindered should the project terminate in May 2015 as foreseen?
- **Efficiency:** are the project activities delivered in a cost-efficient way?
- **Relevance:** to which extent does the project address priority needs in relation to the promotion of women’s land rights and of Abunzi committees’ capacity-building?
- **Impact:** are the intermediate results achieved by the project impacting the practices of the Abunzi committees and women’s capacity to claim their land rights?
- **Sustainability:** are the processes, structures and outcomes of the project preparing for sustainability beyond the life of the project?

As this evaluation is of instrumental character, it shall provide recommendations to RCN J&D and its partners to strengthen the project. The recommendations shall include suggestions on key corrective measures that RCN J&D and its partners need to put in place in order to improve performance towards achieving results and institutional learning. As project monitoring has been a challenge recommendations on whether the monitoring and reporting tools adequately capture progress and results and if they are adapted to this type of project which seeks to generate changes of behaviors.

The evaluation may contain a section on lessons learned if the evaluators find that there are more generic lessons for Sida, RCN J&D, the Government of Rwanda or the development cooperation community to be learned from the project.

The methodology will be developed by the evaluator/evaluation team in the proposal. The evaluation will use a utilization focused and participatory approach at all stages of the process and ensure that a gender perspective is integrated within its methodology and analysis.

The proposal shall include a methodological framework to be used to achieve the evaluation goals. This consists in a matrix that includes evaluation criteria, evaluation methods/techniques, questions, and sources of information (to be developed during the inception phase). The evaluation methods may include, but are not restricted to interviews, group interviews, observations, focus groups, literature review, and surveys.

The proposal shall contain a work plan indicating timing of activities and deliverables in accordance with the following general framework:

Example of Tasks		Deliverable
Inception Phase Duration: 1-2 weeks	- Conduct a desk review of available information; - Conduct brief interviews with key stakeholders to refine the review scope and methodology; - Develop the evaluation methodology including the matrix; - Plan field visits as needed.	Inception Report Deadline: To be decided The Inception Report will include: - Refined evaluation methodology; - Matrix (evaluation criteria, questions, indicators, and sources of information); - Criteria for selection of field visits; - Detailed Work Plan. The Inception Report will be reviewed and validated by the Evaluation Task Force.
Data Collection and	- More in-depth review and analysis of data including baseline data; - Conduct field visits as needed;	Presentation of preliminary findings (from evaluation process and key findings from

Analysis Phase Duration: 3-4 weeks	- Collect data from beneficiaries and project stakeholders; - Conduct in-depth interviews with partners, stakeholders, senior officials, donors, and others as necessary. - Draw first analysis.	field visits) to Evaluation Task Force and Reference Group. Deadline: To be decided
Preparation of Final Report Duration: 2 weeks	- Draft final report (5 days) and submit to Evaluation Task Force and Reference Group; - Receive feedback from Task Force and Reference Group and revise report (4 days). - Submit final report (1 day).	Final Evaluation Report Deadline: To be decided The Final Report (<u>in English</u>) will include: - an Executive Summary - Main findings and lessons learned - Recommendations for RCN J&D and Sida. The Final Report will be reviewed and validated by the Evaluation Task Force. Deadline: No later than 2nd February 2015

The proposal shall include a communication and reporting strategy in line with the time schedule outlined in section 8.

The evaluator/evaluation team is expected to have the following expertise:

- A master's degree in social science, evaluation or social research;
- Technical expertise in land rights, gender and local conflict resolution;
- A minimum of 6 years of working experience applying qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods;
- A proven track record in designing and leading evaluations;
- High level data analysis skills;
- Strong ability to translate complex data into effective reports;
- Knowledge of results-based management and project cycle management;
- Previous experience in Rwanda;
- English proficiency, both in writing and speaking, and ability to conduct interviews and analyse material in Kinyarwanda and French.

The proposal should be sent to Mr. Clément KIRENGA (clement.kirenga@gov.se). Reference persons at RCN J&D are Mr. Jean-Chrysostome RUBAGUMYA (rpro@rcn.rw) and Mr. Benoit Joannette (cdm@rcn.rw).

Annex 2 - Inception Report

1. Executive Summary

This brief inception report presents the method to be used for the evaluation of the programme of RCN Justice & Démocratie (hereafter RCN): Improving the Management of Land by Strengthening the Prevention and Resolution of Land Conflicts in Rwanda (ILPRC). This evaluation has been commissioned by the Embassy of Sweden in Rwanda. Considering the existence of a series of favourable conditions (explicit formulation of a theory of change in programme documents, existence of baseline data, and use of a monitoring system that generated a large amount of data), the evaluation team suggests using a Theory-Based approach to evaluate the programme as a basis for drawing relevant lessons. This approach will both highlight the results achieved (and/or not achieved) by the programme and explain how and why these results were obtained. By systematically analysing the relationship between the theory of change that underpins the programme and the socio-cultural and political context in which it was implemented, the evaluation team will draw important lessons on the relevance and effectiveness of the intervention of RCN as well as on the sustainability of its achievements. This report also presents the methods for participatory data collection, putting the experiences and perceptions of programme beneficiaries at the center of the evaluation approach. This should allow collection of purely qualitative data that will complement the information available in the monitoring system of the programme. The report also describes how the evaluation team wishes to ensure the representativeness of the data collected in geographical terms, and also in terms of the target groups of the programme. Finally, the report presents a detailed work plan from the inception phase until the final report.

2. Assessment of Scope of the Evaluation

2.1 THE ASSIGNMENT

The Terms of Reference (ToR), agreed upon by the Embassy of Sweden in Rwanda and RCN, provide some background information on the programme to be evaluated. The ToR outline and describe the rationale, purpose and scope of the assignment for the evaluation of RCN's programme Improving the Management of Land by Strengthening the Prevention and Resolution of Land Conflicts in Rwanda (ILPRC). In October 2012, RCN received SEK 28 200 000 from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) – represented by the Swedish Embassy in Rwanda – to implement a nationwide project on land conflict resolution and women's access to land until May 2015. The project – Improving the Management of Land by Strengthening the Prevention and Resolution of Land Conflicts in Rwanda (ILPRC) – has the overall objective to improve rural populations' access to fair community-based justice mechanisms. The specific objective is to improve the management of

land conflicts in 15 districts of Rwanda, in particular through the protection and promotion of women's land interests. The ToR explain that Article 7 “Planning, Review, Reporting and Evaluation” of the initial and amended Agreement between the Swedish Embassy in Rwanda and RCN foresees an evaluation during the second half of 2014. It reads that the evaluation should “summarize obtained and expected results in relation to the Results Assessment Framework (RAF), and contain an analysis of any deviation there from”.

The overall purpose of the evaluation is to assess the progress in achieving results against the project outcomes as per the Logical Framework (or Results Achievement Framework) and to analyse any deviation from project documents and propose corrective measures for project implementation so as to enhance performance.

The three main objectives of the evaluation are:

- a. To assess progress in project implementation, identifying results achieved in relation to proposed outcomes, and detecting problems at managerial and technical levels;
- b. To identify deviations from project objectives and propose corrective measures in order to improve performance towards the achievement of results and learning during the remaining period of project implementation, which may include an analysis of the opportunity for a cost or no-cost extension of the project.
- c. To prepare for narrative completion report ensuring the evaluation of the project.

Evaluation results will be used to inform the project and to make adjustments while promoting the development of the capacity of the project implementers (RCN and its partners). The findings could serve as a basis to assess the need for a no-cost extension of the project, beyond May 2015. Furthermore, the findings will be used to inform Sida (represented by the Swedish Embassy in Kigali) by providing evidence-based data on results towards its development strategy in Rwanda. Moreover, the recommendations shall include suggestions on key corrective measures that RCN and its partners need to put in place in order to improve performance towards achieving results and institutional learning. As project monitoring has been a challenge, it is expected that the recommendations address whether the monitoring and reporting tools adequately capture progress and results and if they are adapted to this type of project seeking to generate changes of behaviors. Finally, the evaluation may contain a section on lessons learned if the evaluators find that there are more generic lessons for Sida, RCN, the Government of Rwanda or the development cooperation community to be learned from the project.

3. Relevance and Evaluability of Evaluation Questions

3.1 RECOMMENDATIONS ON EVALUATION QUESTIONS

Indevelop drafted a first response to the ToR in a document (Proposal) that was shared with Embassy of Sweden in Kigali and RCN for comments, in which the evaluation team commented on the evaluation questions and suggested some amendments

and proposed a reorganisation of some of the questions. RCN and Embassy of Sweden in Kigali had the opportunity to react to Indevelop's suggestions. Relevance: It was agreed that, in addition to the question “to which extent does the project address priority needs in relation to the promotion of women's land rights and of Abunzi committees' capacity-building?”, the evaluation team would formulate additional questions relating to the project relevance (such as the project's overall logic and relevance in relation to the institutional framework of the land policy reform in Rwanda.)

Effectiveness: It was agreed that the initial questions formulated in the ToR would serve as a basis for evaluating the effectiveness of the programme (what is the level of project progress towards achieving the outcomes? What are the deviations and bottlenecks and how can they be coped with within the remaining timeframe of the project? Will the project effectiveness be hindered should the project terminate in May 2015 as foreseen?) and that the methodology for the assessment would be developed in more detail during the inception phase.

Efficiency: During the inception phase, it was agreed that the initial question formulated in the ToR (are the project activities delivered in a cost-efficient way?) would not guide the work of the evaluation team. The evaluators, RCN and the Embassy of Sweden in Kigali agreed that there was a methodological problem with the criterion of efficiency in general in many evaluations. The first difficulty is the object for the comparison. In other words: it is probably possible to compare, but to what? Moreover, measuring the cost-benefit relationship presupposes the existence of sound parameters/baselines that allow a comparison. However, these parameters generally do not exist and they must therefore be developed. We agreed that a serious analysis of the cost-benefit relationship would not be realistic in the time available for this assessment and that the evaluation should instead assess issues related to the coordination and management of the programme.

Impact: It was agreed that the initial question formulated in the ToR (“are the intermediate results achieved by the project impacting the practices of the Abunzi committees and women's capacity to claim their land rights?”) would not guide the work of the evaluation team, which should, instead, focus on assessing the extent to which RCN has succeeded in reaching the two outcomes of the programme. This is due to the fact that the relative short time-frame of the project to date might have implications for how much can be said in terms of impact of the project. Sustainability: Finally, it was agreed that the initial question formulated in the ToR would serve as a basis for evaluation work (“Are the processes, structures and outcomes of the project preparing for sustainability beyond the life of the project?”)

4. Proposed Approach and Methodology

4.1 THE INCEPTION PERIOD

The assignment has started with a brief inception period, which had the purpose of developing the methodology and advancing the work plan, in order to ensure that the

evaluation is appropriately focused on the needs of the users. This period has also helped clarify the users, and their intended use of the evaluation. A desk review of the basic programme documents (RCN Programme Proposal, narrative reports, Sida/Embassy assessments memos and decisions) has been undertaken. A series of inception meetings were held during this period:

- Telephone interview with Clement Kirenga, Programme Manager of Democratic Governance at the Embassy of Sweden in Kigali;
- Three conference calls with key RCN staff in Kigali: Benoit Joannette, Country Director, and Jean-Chrysostome Rubagumya, Project Manager.

The proposed methodology has been prepared based on the analysis of the documents and on the content of the discussions with RCN and Embassy of Sweden/Sida who are the main users of the evaluation. This inception report provides an outline of the evaluation framework and is basis for the undertaking of the evaluation. The evaluation team welcomes any comments and suggestions that can improve the focus and particularly the usability of the evaluation.

4.2 FOCUSING THE EVALUATION

The inception phase allowed the evaluation team to focus the scope of the evaluation. The evaluators intend to use a Theory-Based Evaluation (TBE) approach to evaluate RCN's programme in Rwanda. What is TBE and why is it especially relevant in this context?

4.2.1 *What is TBE?*

There is a large amount of literature dedicated to TBE. As a result, scholars, practitioners and evaluators have proposed a great variety of definitions of TBE. There are, however, some core features of the TBE approach that are recurrent and commonly agreed upon:

- It aims to answer not simply the question of what works, but also why and how it worked.
- It helps understand the relations between the programme, its outcomes and the contextual factors.
- It starts with defining (or using an already clearly stipulated) theory as the causal model or theory of change that underlies a programme.
- Moreover, more than simply defining a theory of change, the whole evaluation process is systematically dedicated to assessing it: the evaluation criteria aim to scrutinize and validate (or invalidate) all or parts of the theory of change.
- Finally, being issues led, it is, therefore open to use of a variety of methods.

4.2.2 *Why is TBE especially relevant for the evaluation of RCN's programme in Rwanda?*

There are a series of favourable conditions for the use of TBE:

- The programme has clearly highlighted its theory of change.
- RCN based its current programme on previous similar experiences in Rwanda and

has access to baseline data, making it possible to compare the indicators of reference to the ones obtained at the time of the evaluation.


- RCN has, moreover, developed and used a monitoring system throughout the implementation of its programme. There is, thus, a wealth of information that can be analysed and indicators of achieved (and non-achieved) results at output and outcome levels that can easily be verified.
- Finally, the ToR stipulate that this evaluation should assess the extent to which the strategies developed and the monitoring system used are adapted to this type of project seeking to generate changes of behaviors.

These favourable conditions and the fact that this evaluation aims to help improve the performance of the current programme further reinforce the relevance of trying to draw conclusions and lessons learned from the experience of RCN in Rwanda: why (and/or why not) and how changes have happened and not just whether they did or did not take place.

4.2.3 TBE and the evaluation criteria

The TBE approach, which is visualized in the graph 1, is only appropriate if the evaluators are consistent in applying each evaluation criterion to the theory of change that underlies RCN's programme. The following section will provide more details for each evaluation criterion, but it is important already at this stage to illustrate what a TBE entails for them.

Graph 1: Visualization of a Theory-Based Evaluation and its Evaluation Criteria



- **Relevance:**

The relevance criterion is very important when evaluating a programme, and using a TBE approach further strengthens its depth. The relevance criterion is, first, meant to assess the extent to which an intervention has taken into account the context in which it has taken place. In the case of the evaluation of RCN in Rwanda,

evaluating the relevance from a TBE perspective means focusing on the appropriateness of the strategies and of the programme objectives in relation to the needs and priorities of the beneficiaries, on the extent to which they were feasible/realistic given the Rwandan socio-cultural and political contexts.

The relevance criterion is also meant to focus on the logic of a given intervention, on its consistency. Assessing relevance means, thus, to evaluate the extent to which the activities and outputs of the programme are consistent with the attainment of its objectives. In other words, the evaluators will assess the extent to which the theories of change of RCN's programme were founded on solid grounds.

Finally, and beyond the two dimensions mentioned above, the relevance criterion is also meant to investigate the responsiveness of an organisation and/or of programme management: to what extent and how did RCN take into account changes in the environment in which they intervened?

- **Efficiency:**

The efficiency criterion, in the context of this evaluation, will focus on assessing the extent to which the organisational and management set-up have effectively supported the programme and, thus, the implementation of its theories of change. The efficiency criterion is fundamental, as its analysis will provide important elements of understanding regarding how the programme achieved or not its results. In the context of this evaluation, the assessment related to the efficiency criterion is not a cost-benefit analysis, rather an analysis of the organizational structure and systems for achieving programme results.

- **Effectiveness:**

The effectiveness criterion aims to assess the extent to which an intervention has achieved its expected results, especially at outcome level. As mentioned in the previous section, RCN has developed, and used throughout the implementation of its programme, a comprehensive monitoring system. The significant amount of data available allow the evaluators to not only focus this evaluation on what has been achieved, which would only be a repetition of what is already presented in RCN's narrative reports. They also provide an opportunity to understand why results have been achieved, to highlight the factors resulting from a series of interactions between the context and the implementation of the programme's theories of change. Assessing the effectiveness of the programme will lead to drawing lessons on how and why the theory translated into an empirical reality.

- **Sustainability:**

From a TBE perspective, the focus will be on explicitly identifying which results are likely to remain, which are not likely to remain, and on highlighting the contribution of RCN's strategies to the level of sustainability of achieved results.

4.3 EVALUATION APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

4.3.1 *General approach*

This assignment integrates different methods. They are adapted to the various types of informants and information that the evaluation team believes are necessary to approach and to collect. A detailed (yet, still under development) evaluation Matrix is attached as Annex 1 to this report. We propose to incorporate a mix of two key methods that will allow us to analyse the information in a variety of ways:

- *Analysis of the available documentation.* Analysis of all relevant documents provided by RCN (proposal, narrative reports of the programme, publications related or not to the projects, capacity building material, etc.), analysis of documents provided by Embassy of Sweden (assessment memos, decisions, communication between Embassy of Sweden and RCN), analysis of documents provided by organisations that RCN has been interacting with.
- *Interviews.* The evaluation team intends to use different interview techniques, depending on the type of information that needs to be collected.
- *One-on-one interviews with key informants.* This method will be used with RCN staff in Kigali and in Brussels (Anne-Aël Puhu, Programme Manager for Rwanda and Burundi, will be in Kigali during the first week of the field work), and with representatives from institutions that RCN collaborates with and/or tries to influence (Local Administrations, Officials from several institutions such as the Ministry of Justice). As mentioned in the following section, key informants who do not belong to RCN staff have been selected so as to best contribute to the evaluation team's understanding of the relevance, the effectiveness and the sustainability of the programme. The one-on-one interviews will be conducted using a mix of forced-choice questions (mainly aiming at clarifying the role of the informant in RCN programme or specific activity) and of open-ended questions aiming at collecting the perception of the informant on the strategies used by RCN and the possible effects the intervention has had on him/her, on his/her organisation or on the process he/she participated in.
- *Focus Group Interviews (FGI).* This method will be used with RCN staff in the Kigali office and mainly with the beneficiaries of the programme (for example with Abunzis, the mediation committees, at sector and cell levels). The FGI will be conducted using open-ended and one-dimensional questions that allow the respondents to elaborate on the questions and build on each other's answers. This method will mainly be used to assess the relevance of RCN's interventions and the effectiveness and sustainability of the programme. For these three purposes, a set of questions aiming at collecting relevant information will be prepared. Both one-on-one interviews and FGI will use semi-structured questions. Departing from prepared sets of questions, the

evaluation team will also let the respondents talk about what is important to them, for instance in terms of Most Significant Changes (MSC). This approach, which sometimes allows the interviewees to bring in aspects or issues other than those planned by the evaluators, is very useful to add qualitative information to purely structured interviews.

- *One-on-one interviews and/or FGI with selected resource persons.* The evaluation team intends to mobilise its network in Rwanda to triangulate the information collected during the field work. This network consists of reliable individuals with a solid academic background and a deep knowledge of land issues and of the political and socio-cultural dynamics in the country.
- *Validation workshops.* Another tool to be taken into consideration when doing triangulation of findings, could be organising so-called validation workshops: in order to obtain information from a group (be it large or minor), we may consider organising one or more workshops to validate collected findings from the field part of the evaluation mission. The workshop/s can be organised in different ways as the audience will be defined according to the needs. However, we intend to ensure that it is participatory and interactive by using the appropriate tools. The evaluation team suggests using an Outcome Harvesting approach during these workshops. The team does not intend to depart from the two objectives of RCN's programme but will rather use the workshops to collect evidence of change, of achievements perceived by the participants and work backwards together with them in order to highlight how and why RCN's programme has contributed to this change. We are aware that such workshops can have certain limitations such as the challenge of getting the right participants and the risk of overrepresentation of certain view points. Yet, we intend to use this method if we find it will be necessary for the interpretation of some of our findings.

4.3.2 Selection of informants

The inception phase was limited in time to allow a full-fledged analysis of the partners and key informants to be interviewed during the evaluation. This will continue as work in progress. However, RCN management in Kigali suggested a first list of key organisations and individuals that should be interviewed. This list was thoroughly discussed with the evaluation team. Table 3 presents this preliminary list and the format for the meetings.

Table 3: List of stakeholders to be interviewed

Organisations	Position	Location
MINIJUST	Coordination and Permanent Secretary	MINIJUST
	MAJ (Coord or GBV/Abunzi)	At District
Districts authorities	Mayors or/and Good Governance	At District
Sector authorities	Executive Secretary or in Charge of Civil	At Sector or District

	Status	
Cell authorities	Executive Secretary	At Cell or Sector of District
Abunzi at Sector level	President or and V/P or any other Abunzi	At Cell or Sector of District
Abunzi at Cell level	President or and V/P or any other Abunzi	At Cell or Sector of District
Beneficiaries	Identified residents in the area where we worked	At Cell or Sector of District
	Identified participants in the village level discussions	
Implementers	RCN	
	Head of Mission	At RCN's office
	Project Coordinator	At RCN's office
	Project staff	At RCN's office
	Consultants/trainers	
	CSO's	
	ARAMA Director	At Head Office in Kigali
	ARAMA Focal Points	At Head Office in Kigali
	ARAMA's monitors	At Head Office in Kigali
	IMBARAGA General Secretary	At Head Office in Kigali
	IMBARAGA Focal Points	At Head Office in Kigali
	IMBARAGA monitors	At Head Office in Kigali
	AVEGA Executive Secretary	At Head Office in Kigali
	AVEGA Focal Points	At Head Office in Kigali
	AVEGA VAF	At Head Office in Kigali
	RRP+ Executive Secretary	At Head Office in Kigali
	RRP+ Focal Points	At Head Office in Kigali
	RRP+ VAF	At Head Office in Kigali
Other stakeholders	Land Project	Head of Mission
	CRAFT	Coordinator

Moreover, the evaluation team developed, in close collaboration with RCN, a list of criteria that would be used to select the districts that would be visited by the evaluation team during the field work. Three main criteria were selected:

- Each of the five Provinces of Rwanda should be represented;

- At least one border area with neighboring countries (in order to take into account potential specific issues related to return of former refugees);
- A fair representation of urban, semi-urban and rural areas.

It is proposed that the evaluation team organises its field work in the following manner:

Evaluator I: Gasabo (Kigali) & Eastern province

LA: Local Authorities; **CSO:** Civil Society organization; **TB:** Primary Court; **MAJ:** Maison d'Accès à la Justice

Dates	Where	Who to meet
03/03/2015 to 04/03/2015	Gasabo (Kigali)	Day 1: District Authorities & MAJ; Minijust
		Day 2: LA & Abunzi Sector and Cell & Beneficiaries
05/03/2015 to 06/03/2015	Bugesera	Day 1: District LA & MAJ; CSO; AL & Abunzi Sector
		Day 2: LA; Abunzi de Cellule & Beneficiaries (Outcome 2)
Weekend		
09/03/2015	Bugesera	Day 3: TB; Agents de monitoring
10/03/2015 to 12/03/2015	Kirehe	Day 1: District LA & MAJ; CSO; & AL and Abunzi Sector
		Day 2: LA, Abunzi Cell and beneficiaries among local population (Outcome 2)
		Day 3: TB & Arama monitoring Agents
13/03/2015	(Not allocated)	

Evaluator II: Kigali, Southern & Western provinces

Evaluator 11: Kigali, Southern & Western provinces		
Dates	Where	Who to meet
03/03/2015	Kigali	CSO & TB
04/03/2015 to 06/03/2015	Nyaruguru (3h00)	Day 1: District LA & MAJ; CSO & TB
		Day 2: LA & Abunzi Sector
		Day 3: LA & Abunzi Cell & beneficiaries (Outcome 2)
Weekend		
09/03/2015 to 12/03/2015	Nyamasheke [alternatively, Rusizi]	Day 1: District LA & MAJ
		Day 2: LA & Abunzi Sector
		Day 3: LA & Abunzi Cell & beneficiaries (Outcome 2)
		Day 4: CSO and TB
13/03/2015	(Not allocated)	

Evaluator III: Kigali, Northern & Southern provinces

Dates	Where	Who to meet
03/03/2015	Kigali	Direct. & Program. Dptmnt., RCN J&D
04/03/2015 to 06/03/2015	Rulindo	Day 1: District LA & MAJ ; CSO & TB
		Day 2: LA & Abunzi Sector
		Day 3: LA & Abunzi Cell & Beneficiaries (Outcome 2)
Weekend		
09/03/2015 to 11/03/2015	Muhanga	Day 1: District LA & MAJ; CSO &TB
		Day 2: LA & Abunzi Sector
		Day 3: LA & Abunzi Cell & Beneficiaries (Outcome 2)
12/03/2015	Kigali	RCN J&D Consultants
13/03/2015	(Not allocated)	

Complementary information on the selection of informants might be made available to Embassy of Sweden upon demand throughout the evaluation process. The final evaluation report will, however, provide extensive details on this aspect of the assignment.

4.3.3 *Evaluation criteria and questions*

As mention in the first section of this inception report, the evaluation questions presented here reflect the agreement reached between Indevelop, RCN and Embassy of Sweden. The fact that the evaluation team suggests to use a TBE approach to the evaluation does not entail any changes in the questions. It just brings another perspective on the lessons that might be drawn from their analysis, a major focus for this evaluation being on attempting to understand how and why RCN's programme was able to reaching (or not) its expected results.

i. Assessing relevance

The evaluation will address three sub-components of the relevance criteria as follows:

- Relevance in relation to strategic priorities of local, national and international institutions/actors:
 - How coherent was the programme in terms of how it reflects the policies and programmes undertaken by the government and other development / governance partners?
 - To what extent was the programme relevant to Swedish policies and objectives? (the extent to which RCN used a Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA) will be particularly assessed, the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Land Tenure, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security adopted by the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) being the document of reference used by the evaluation team)
 - Was the programme design responsive, in the sense that it took into consideration the input and needs of key stakeholders, including relevant government

bodies, the expected beneficiaries, and relevant civil society and grassroots organisations?

- Relevance in relation to the logic of programming:
 - Has the programme design been articulated in a coherent structure: are the outcomes and outputs clearly articulated?
 - To what extent do the activities carried out address the causes of problems identified?
 - Did the programme benefit from available knowledge (for example, the experience of other similar programmes in the area or in the country) during its design and implementation?
 - Did the programme objectives/outcomes remain relevant over the period of time required for implementation?
- Relevance to the context:
 - To what extent has the programme taken into account and reacted to changes in the political environment?
 - Did RCN take the initiative to suitably modify programme design (if required) during implementation in response to any major changes in the context?

ii. Assessing effectiveness

The evaluation will address the effectiveness of the programme as follows:

- To what extent does the programme contribute to reaching its specific objective and its outcomes?
- What are the deviations and bottlenecks and how can they be coped with within the remaining timeframe of the project?
- Will the project effectiveness be hindered should the project terminate in May 2015 as foreseen?
- To what extent did the learning provided by RCN's monitoring and evaluation processes help ensure/increase effectiveness?

iii. Assessing efficiency

The evaluation will address the efficiency of the programme as follows:

- Have the organisational structure, managerial support and coordination mechanisms effectively supported the delivery of the programme?
- Did RCN mobilise adequate technical expertise in the programme design and programme implementation?
- Has an effective M&E system been put in place and did it generate information that has been useful for measuring performance and outcomes and taking critical decisions when necessary?

iv. Assessing sustainability

In this evaluation, the focus for the sustainability criterion will be on the following questions:

- Have appropriate processes or mechanisms been put in place to support the sustainability of programme results?
- Are there any particular challenges to the continued sustainability of programme results? Is it possible, at this stage of the programme, to explicitly identify what results are likely to remain, and which are not likely to remain?

Evaluation Questions	Indicators	Data Sources and Information Collection Method
Relevance: • How coherent was the programme in terms of how it fits in with the policies and programmes undertaken by the government and other development / governance partners? • To what extent was the programme relevant to Swedish policies and objectives? (the extent to which RCN used a Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA) will be particularly assessed) • Was the programme design responsive, in the sense that it took into consideration the input and needs of key stakeholders, including relevant government bodies, the expected beneficiaries, and relevant civil society and grassroots organisations? • Has the programme design been articulated in a coherent structure: are the outcomes and outputs clearly articulated? • To what extent do the activities carried out address the causes of problems identified? • Did the programme benefit from available knowledge (for example, the experience of other similar programmes in the area or in the country) during its design and implementation? • Did the programme objectives/outcomes remain relevant over the period of time required for implementation? • To what extent has the programme taken into		• Analysis of relevant documentation: ○ RCN: Proposal, narrative reports of the programme as a whole and of each specific projects, publications related or not to the projects, capacity building/empowerment material; ○ Sida documents: assessment memos, decisions, communication between Sida and RCN, relevant policies and strategies; ○ Relevant policy/strategy documents from the Rwandese Government; ○ Relevant documents provided by organisations that RCN has been interacting with. • One-on-one interviews with RCN leadership in Kigali and Brussels • FGI with RCN staff in Kigali, with partner organisations (ARAMA, IMBARAGA, AVEGA, RRP+) and with beneficiaries of RCN's programme • One-on-one interviews with representatives from institutions that RCN collaborates with and/or tries to influence (Abunzis, MAJ, MINIJUST)

account and reacted to changes in the political environment? Did RCN take the initiative to suitably modify programme design (if required) during implementation in response to any major changes in the context?		
Effectiveness: - To what extent does the programme contribute to reaching its specific objective and its outcomes? - What are the deviations and bottlenecks and how can they be coped with within the remaining timeframe of the project? - Will the project effectiveness be hindered should the project terminate in May 2015 as foreseen? - To what extent did the learning provided by RCN's monitoring and evaluation processes help ensure/increase effectiveness?	- Percentage of trainees (Abunzi and local authorities) who have increased their knowledge on conflict resolution, the mandate, functioning and competences of Abunzi committees and on land-related laws at the end of the training. - Percentage of persons, disaggregated by sex, who believe that the action of mediation committees (conciliation and decision) contributed to durably resolve conflicts in the targeted districts. - Percentage of persons, disaggregated by sex, who believe that mediation committees really strive to conciliate the parties in conflict before making a decision. - Proportion of decisions taken by mediation committees at cell and sector levels in which the land rights of female plaintiffs are confirmed. - Percentage of parties involved in a land conflict, disaggregated by sex, who believe that mediation committees did strive to conciliate them before making a decision.	- One-on-one interviews with RCN leadership in Kigali and Brussels - FGI with RCN staff, with partner organisations (ARAMA, IMBARAGA, AVEGA, RRP+) and with beneficiaries of RCN's programme - One-on-one interviews with representatives from institutions that RCN collaborates with and/or tries to influence (Abunzis, MAJ, MINIJUST) - One on one interviews with resource persons - Outcome Harvesting workshops

	- Percentage of parties involved in a land conflict, disaggregated by sex, who think that the conciliation efforts of the Abunzi committees were effective. - Proportion of decisions taken by sector-level Abunzi committees on land cases, and in particular involving women's land rights issues, which are confirmed by Primary Courts in the targeted districts. - Percentage of interviewees across the 60 targeted villages, disaggregated by sex, who declare having a better understanding of women's land rights. - Percentage of land cases brought before the mediation committees in which women act as plaintiffs. - Percentage of recommendations adopted by the National Forum which are subscribed to by the population at community-level and by the authorities at district-level.	
Efficiency: • Have the organisational structure, managerial support and coordination mechanisms effectively supported the delivery of the programme? • Did RCN mobilise adequate technical expertise in the programme design and programme implementation? • Has an effective M&E system been put in place and did it generate information that has		• Analysis of RCN relevant documentation • One-on-one interviews with RCN leadership in Kigali and Brussels • FGI with RCN staff • Interview with staff from Sida/Embassy of Sweden in Kigali in charge of decision to support RCN

been useful for measuring performance and outcomes and taking critical decisions when necessary?		
Sustainability: • Have appropriate processes or mechanisms been put in place to support the sustainability of programme results? • Are there any particular challenges to the continued sustainability of programme results? Is it possible, at this stage of the programme, to explicitly identify what results are likely to remain, and which are not likely to remain?		• One-on-one interviews with RCN leadership in Kigali and Brussels • FGI with RCN staff, with partner organisations (ARAMA, IMBARAGA, AVEGA, RRP+) and with beneficiaries of RCN's programme • One-on-one interviews with representatives from institutions that RCN collaborates with and/or tries to influence (Abunzis, MAJ, MINIJUST)

Annex 3 – List of Persons Interviewed

	Name	G	Position/Function	Location (Distr., Sector, Cell)
1	Evariste Rwamukwaya	M	Coordinator of MAJ	Nyaruguru district
2	Floride Mutamana	F	Abunzi committee President	Cyahinda sector
3	Silas Nkomeje	M	Executive Secretary	Gasasa cell
4	Marie-Claire Karuhura	F	Executive Secretary	Coko cell
5	Vincent Sengiyumva	M	Executive Secretary	Cyahinda sector
6	Annonciata Mukanyarwaya	F	Abunzi committee President	AVEGA Nyaruguru district
7	Raphael Uwimana	M	Bonne Gouvernance	Nyaruguru district
8	Augustin Usengimana	M	Primary Court	Nyaruguru district
9	Christine Uwitonze	F	MAJ	Rusizi district
10	Léoncie Kankindi	F	Vice Mayor	Rusizi district
11	Alain Muganga	M	Executive Secretary	Ururu sector
12	Lucie Janvière Nyiragaju	F	Executive Secretary	Bugarama sector
13	Adam Nduwimana	M	Abunzi committee President	Bugarama sector
14	Gurid Mukarwozi	F	Abunzi committee member	Bugarama sector
15	Masumbuko Nzeyimana	M	Abunzi committee President	Pera cell
16	Jeanne Nyirazankina	F	Abunzi committee member	Pera cell
17	Florian Kabagema	M	Abunzi committee President	Nyange cell
18	Ruth Nyirangen	F	Abunzi committee member	Nyange cell
19	Jean-Marie Mutangana	M	Executive Secretary	Nyange cell
20	Innocent Iyamuremye	M	Executive Secretary	Pera cell
21	Vestine Umulisa	F	RRP+/VAF	Gacyamo village
22	Therese Uwizeye	F	AVE/VAF	Gacyamo village
23	Victoire Iyamubonye	F	Beneficiary & disseminator	Gacyamo village
24	Emile Munyaneza	M	Beneficiary & disseminator	Gacyamo village
25	Aphrodis Nyirimanzi	M	Vice president Abunzi committee	Cyahinda sector
26	Silas Nkomeje	M	Executive Secretary	Gasasa cell
27	Camille Nkurunziza	M	Beneficiary & disseminator	Cyahinda sector
28	Gaudence Mukesharugo	F	AVEGA/VAF	Kinyaga village
29	Ambroise Niyumugabo	M	RRP+/VAF	Kinyaga village
30	Immaculée Mukangenzi	F	Beneficiary & disseminator	Kinyaga village
31	Vincent Hakizimana	M	President Abunzi committee	Gasasa cell
32	Espérance Ntakirutimana	F	Abunzi committee member	Gasasa cell
33	Mukashugi	F	Abunzi committee member	Coko cell
34	Bertin Nkomeje	M	President Abunzi committee	Coko cell
35	Nsabimana P.Alexandre	M	Imbaraga	Rulindo, Rusiga, Kirenge
36	Mukakabayizu	F	Abunzi Committee member	Rulindo, Buyoga, Gahororo
37	Karasira	M	Abunzi Committee member	Rulindo, Buyoga, Gahororo
38	Ntaganira Jean Pierre	M	Abunzi Committee member	Rulindo,Buyoga, Gahororo
39	Ndoli Cyprien	M	Abunzi Committee member	Rulindo,Buyoga, Rutumbo
40	Mukansanga P.	F	Abunzi Committee member	Rulindo, Buyoga, Mwumba
41	Ndacyayisenga JB	M	Exec.Secretary/Cell	Rulindo, Buyoga, Gahororo
42	Mukanyonga D.	F	Exec.Secretary/Cell	Rulindo, Buyoga, Busoro

ANNEX 3 – LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

43	Mukanyangera G.	F	VAF/Avega	Rulindo, Buyoga, Busoro
44	Mukagakuba L.	F	VAF/RRP+	Rulindo, Buyoga, Busoro
45	Mukandori S.	F	Community member	Rulindo, Buyoga, Busoro
46	Kagina N.	M	Community Member	Rulindo, Buyoga, Busoro
47	Nyinawase	F	Abunzi Committee member	Rulindo, Buyoga, Busoro
48	Emilienne Niwemwiza	F	Vice Mayor/Soc.Affairs	Rulindo
49	Mukankusi Bernadette	F	MAJ	Rulindo
50	Gasana Rwangeyo	M	MAJ	Rulindo
51	Antoine Muhigira	M	Exec.Secretary/Sector	Rulindo, Buyoga
52	Nyirandimubanzi Chantal	F	RDP officer	Muhanga, Kiyumba
53	Nyiransengimana Jeanne	F	Abunzi Committee member	Muhanga, Kiyumba
54	Umugwaneza L.	F	Exec.Sec.Cell	Muhanga, Kiyumba, Remera
55	Bugirimfura B.	M	Abunzi Committee member	Muhanga, Kiyumba
56	Mukaruzima P.	F	Abunzi Committee member	Muhanga
57	MukamanaM.	F	Abunzi Committee member	Muhanga
58	Ntabyera JMV	M	Abunzi Committee member	Muhanga
59	Umuhoza T.	F	Community Member	Muhanga
60	Mujawamariya	F	VAF/AVEGA	Muhanga
61	MulindahabiJ	M	Community Member	Muhanga,
62	Karamaga JD	M	Dir..Good Governance	Muhanga
63	Mukayisenga Caroline	F	MAJ	Muhanga
64	Bizimana Sixbeth	M	Sector Exec,Secretary	Muhanga,
65	Musabwa Aimable	M	Sector Etat Civile	Muhanga
66	Mukagatana Fortune	F	Vice Mayor	Muhanga
67	Gatera Emmanuel	M	TB President	Muhanga
68	Habyarimana Innocent	M	TB President	Rulindo
69	Mutebutsi Ntayoherwa	M	RCN/SCO and Local Institut. Of.	Kigali
70	Nirere Angele	F	Deputy Proj.Coordinator/RCN	-
71	Uwamahoro Odette	F	Abunzi committee member	Gasabo, Bumbogo
72	Bizimungu André	M	Abunzi committee President	Gasabo, Bumbogo
73	Uzamubunta Béatrice	F	Abunzi committee member	Gasabo, Bumbogo
74	Innocent (name illisible)	M	Abunzi committee President	Gasabo, Bumbogo, cell
75	Musanabera Dalira	F	VAF/Avega	Gasabo, Bumbogo
76	Sebatware Magellan	M	Sector Exec. Secretary	Mareba
77	Habakurama Francois	M	Sector Exec. Secretary	Bugesera, Mareba, Gakomeye
78	Mbarukye Jean-Pierre	M	Cell Exec. Secretary	Bugesera, Mareba, Bushenyi
79	Munbanyinka Spéciose	F	Abunzi committee member	Bugesera, Mareba, Gakomeye
80	Nyirimana Emmanuel	M	Abunzi committee President	Bugesera, Mareba, Gakomeye
81	Pendeke Donatta	F	Abunzi committee member	Bugesera, Mareba, Bushenyi
82	Barakunsiza	M	Abunzi committee President	Bugesera, Mareba, Bushenyi
83	Utagengera	M	Beneficiary VAF	Bugesera, Musenyi
84	Gahonganyire	F	Beneficiary VAF	Bugesera, Musenyi
85	Mugesera Emmanuel	M	Beneficiary VAF	Bugesera, Musenyi
86	Mukarutesi Xavera	F	Abunzi committee member	Kirehe
87	Bantegeye Silvére	M	Abunzi committee President	Kirehe
88	Bacakuribi Fabien	M	Abunzi committee President	Kirehe, Nyakagezi
89	Mukandanga Chantal	F	Abunzi committee member	Kirehe, Nyakagezi

ANNEX 3 – LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

90	Kamariza Immaculée	F	Abunzi committee member	Kirehe, Muhamba
91	Rwaburindi Théogène	M	Abunzi committee President	Kirehe, Muhamba
92	Uwimana Jean-Bosco	M	Cell Exec. Secretary	Kirehe, Muhamba
93	Hakizimana JM	M	Cell Exec. Secretary	Kirehe, Nyakagezi
94	Songa Jean-Claude	M	Judge TB	Kagarama
95	Gahamanyi Jules	M	Executive Director ARAMA	Kigali
96	Kabarisa Fulgence	M	MAJ	Kirehe
97	Ndori Médiatrice	F	MAJ	Kirehe
98	Muhirwa Vincent	M	MAJ	Kirehe
99	Songa Francois	M	President TB	Kirehe
100	Tuyambaze Dali	F	ARAMA	Kirehe
101	Mugabo Franck	M	Chargé de la Bonne Gouvernance	Kirehe
102	Mukeshimana Dative	F	État Civil	Gahara
103	Maombi Liliane	F	Point Focal ARAMA	Kigali
104	Urujeni Martine	F	Manager Division for Community Justice, MINIJUST	Kigali
105	Balinda Anasthase	M	Director of Access to Justice Co-ordination Unit, MINIJUST	Kigali

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Evaluation of the project – Improving the Management of Land by Strengthening the Prevention and Resolution of Land Conflicts in Rwanda (ILPRC)

This report presents the findings of the evaluation of RCN Justice & Démocratie (RCN) project “Improving the Management of Land by Strengthening the Prevention and Resolution of Land Conflicts in Rwanda (ILPRC)”, for the period 2012-2015. The evaluation shows that, despite some shortcomings that could have affected its ability to perform (weak results framework and loose relationship with civil society implementing partners leading to limited institutional learning), RCN’s programme produced remarkable results. The programme’s high quality activities and outputs contributed to increasing the access of rural populations, particularly women, to fair community justice mechanisms. Moreover, data collected during the fieldwork suggests that the results of the programme tend to reach beyond access to fair community justice mechanisms. The evaluation team has collected a considerable amount of evidence, corroborated by several actors, which show that the programme begins to influence the level of women’s access to land in the geographic areas where RCN was involved.