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Sida Decentralised Evaluation

FCG Swedish Development AB

Support to the Mid-Term Review in the DRC

Report – Phase 1

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**Report – Phase 1
April 2018**

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The views and interpretations expressed in this report are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida.

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1 Introduction

This document is the first deliverable of the support to the Mid-Term Review, commissioned by the Swedish Embassy in Kinshasa. The report has mainly been based on a documentation analysis, and initial interviews with the staff during a two-days visit in April.

As per the ToRs, the overall purpose of the review is:

1) To provide strategic recommendations for the remaining period of the Strategy in order to fulfil the expected results. The review will assess if the current contribution portfolio is relevant for achieving the objectives Sida out in the Strategy and whether the implementation of the portfolio is “on track” and can be considered effective and efficient. The findings and recommendations of the MTR will be included in an In-depth Strategy report for the period 2015-2017.

2) To provide analysis and recommendations to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to inform the government’s instruction to Sida for development of the next strategy proposal.

This is the second version of this report. It complements another documents, which include a portfolio analysis and review of SIDA’s comparative advantage in the DRC. Since the wars of the late 1990s, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) faced a complex and protracted crisis with a strong component of conflict-related crises with both short-term humanitarian and long-term development consequences. While the Eastern provinces (North and South Kivus, Ituri) remain the areas mostly affected by violence, new conflict-affected areas (Kasaï, Tanganyika) and rise of existing tensions (Beni) emerged over the past years. Despite huge investment in stabilization, the situation all over the country remains largely volatile, in particular in the East where most of the international assistance used to be concentrated.

The uncertainty of the political dynamics, with the failure to hold elections in 2016, and severe reprisals of demonstrations, strongly hampers the cooperation and development dynamics and collaboration with the State institutions.

2 Review of the Swedish Cooperation in the DRC

The 2015-2019 Strategy for Sweden's development cooperation with the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the second bilateral strategy, since development assistance was commenced 10 years ago. The strategy 2009-2012¹ was extended twice.

The objectives in the two strategies remain rather similar (as can be seen in the table below), though the peacebuilding and conflict management/stabilization aspects are more detailed in the latter strategy.

Table 1: Comparison between the 2009-2012 and 2015-2019 development strategies of Sweden in the DRC

Strategy 2009-2012		Strategy 2015-2019	
Peace, reconciliation and democratic governance;	(i) Improved safety and security, focusing particularly on women and children; (ii) Greater influence for women in democratic processes and institutions; (iii) Strengthened capacity for accountability in public administration and civil society	Strengthened democracy and gender equality, and greater respect for human rights	• Strengthened democratic institutions and rule of law • Increased participation of women in elected decision-making forums, primarily at local level • Strengthened capacity of civil society to promote transparency, accountability and improved respect for human rights • Increased transparency surrounding trade in conflict minerals
Pro-poor economic development focusing on agriculture and forestry	Higher income and improved food security for poor women and men.	Better opportunities and tools to enable poor people to improve their living conditions	• Improved opportunities for productive employment for women and young people that is socially and environmentally sustainable
Health, focusing on preventing, managing and combating sexual violence, & on promoting sexual and reproductive health & rights.	(i) Increased capacity to prevent, combat and manage the consequences of sexual violence; (ii) Improved health for poor people, with a particular focus on sexual and reproductive health.	Improved basic health	• Improved access to high-quality child and maternal care • Increased awareness of and access to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), focusing on young people • Strengthened capacity to prevent and alleviate the consequences of sexual and gender-based violence
		Protecting human security and freedom from violence	• Strengthened conflict resolution and reconciliation initiatives that contribute to local conflict resolution • Strengthened capacity among reintegrated internally displaced persons and refugees, children previously associated with armed forces and groups and recipient local communities to deal with recurring crises

¹https://openaid.se/wpcontent/files_mf/1396944744The_Democratic_Republic_of_Congo_development_cooperation_strategy_20092012.pdf

In the middle of the first strategy, the MFA decided to phase out of economic support, livelihoods, agriculture and forestry. Part of this support was reinstated in the 2015 strategy.

The humanitarian funding also has a different type of programming, since it is decided on a yearly basis, bringing an additional element of flexibility to adjust to the evolution of context and new humanitarian needs. The projects adjusted to the strategy are however, preferably of no less than 36 months according to the Embassy staff, which also allows for medium-term support and a more continuous follow-up of the project results.

There is support coming also coming from global/thematic/regional strategies, by SIDA headquarters in Stockholm and not only the development strategy. There are some levels of coordination between the staff in the Embassy and in Sweden. However, there is no consolidated management of all the interventions in the DRC. In some cases, the staff at the Embassy is not informed of some Sida funded projects, for example the support to INPP that was discovered by Embassy staff owing to ILO.


DRC often appears as one of the main beneficiaries of international assistance. Compared with the size of the population – not to take into account the size of the country and the logistics challenges of operating in the DRC – the ratio of Swedish assistance is not very high compared to other countries. For example, based on Sida's figures on openaid.se, since 2015, the Swedish assistance to the DRC (both humanitarian and development) ranges between 50-54 million United States Dollars (USD) for 83 million inhabitants, hence around 0,6 USD per person. Assistance to Tanzania is between 90 and 131 million USD for 54 million inhabitants, representing between 1,6 and 2,4 USD per person, while the country does not face any crisis. This is between 26 and 32 million USD in Rwanda for 11,9 million inhabitants, hence between 42 and 54 million USD in Zambia for 16 million inhabitants, which are also countries without emergencies. In value, the Swedish assistance to the DRC is then almost the same than in Zambia. Looking at the total assistance for those countries, the ratio is also the weakest of all for the DRC, while assistance to inhabitants in Rwanda is also, like for Sweden, between 3 and 4 times higher than in the DRC. This would then call for a clear review of the balance of assistance given the extent of needs between those neighbouring countries, at Sweden but also at global level.

Table 2: Comparison assistance to the DRC and to some neighbouring countries

	Overall assistance (ODA, all donors, all sectors) by year, 2015-2016	Overall assistance per inhabitant	Swedish assistance 2015-2016 (million USD)	Overall Swedish assistance per inhabitant
DRC	2,1- 2,6 billion USD	25-31 USD/ pers.	50-54	0,6 USD/pers.
Rwanda	1,08 - 1,15 billion USD	90-96 USD/pers.	26-32	2,1-2,7 USD/pers.
Tanzania	2,32 – 2,58 billion USD	43-48 USD/pers.	90-131	1,6-2,4 USD/pers.
Zambia	798 – 962 million USD	49-60 USD/pers.	42-54	2,6-3,4 USD/pers.


Source: *openaid.se, OECD DAC*

The funding overall changed from around 500 million SEK in 2011-2013 to 400 million SEK in 2014-2016 and increased again in 2017 to 485 million SEK. Of this, the share of humanitarian assistance decreased from around 80% in 2010 to 40% in 2013, and since then always below 50%, while the development assistance rose in share and in value, with a maximum in 2013 (for the disbursements).

Figure 1: Evolution of Swedish assistance in the DRC

Source: *Sida Analytical Tool*

The Strategic Objectives of the strategy reflect the main sectors of interventions: democracy and human rights, health, conflict prevention and resolution, and various types of economic support, including agriculture and finance. As such, the funding by sector (see graph below) is coherent with the strategy, and given the broadness of the objectives, it is not easy to identify specific gaps, or specific inconsistencies between the context and the strategy. The graph hereunder highlights the diversity of the sectors funded, in some cases only for one or two years, and with minimal amounts, while remaining broadly speaking within the scope of the strategy.

Figure 2: Evolution of the Swedish funding in the DRC by sector

At this stage, for each Strategic Objective of Sweden's development strategy for the DRC, Sweden supported several projects as shown in the table below. Some were included in the operationalization plan. The programmatic cycle does not exactly follow the strategic cycle, though there are no cases of non-alignment of the projects with the strategy.

Table 3: List of projects by Strategic Objective

Strategic Objective	Project
SO1: Strengthened democracy and gender equality and greater respect for human rights	
Strengthened democratic institutions and rules of law	PARJ with EU Delegation (justice sector reform)
	Uhaki Safi with EU Delegation (justice sector reform)
	The Carter Center - Advancing Democratic Governance & Respect for HR/2017-2019 and 2013-2016
Increased participation of women in elected, decision-making forums, primarily at local level	Support to the UN Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) ² for Human Rights Defenders (HRD) protection
	Call off - Study on women's political representation DR Congo
Strengthened capacity of civil society to promote transparency, accountability and improved respect for human rights	Strengthening Media in DRC via Fondation Hirondelle 2017 – 2019
	Regional Election Coordinators via UNDP/PACEC - PACEC Secondment for 5UNV's Regional Coordinator
Increased transparency in trade on conflict minerals	Global Witness monitoring of natural resources
SO2 Better opportunities and tools to enable poor people to improve their living conditions	
Improved opportunities for productive employment for women and young people that is socially and environmentally sustainable	Strengthening Farmers' Value Chains, Tanganyika, DRC - Multi-sectorial approach to resilience with FAO/WFP (also for SO4)
	NGO Forest Peoples Programme (FPP)
	Support for Inclusive Financing in DRC 2017-2021
	REDD+, Livelihood Security and Economic Development in the DRC
	Improvement of the legal framework for microcredit systems PASMIF II
	Guarantee to FINCA/Procredit (with USAID)
SO3 Improved basic health	
Improved access to high-quality child and maternal care	UNICEF maternal and child health support (MDG 4&5)
	Resilience to child malnutrition ACF DRC 2017-2020
Increased awareness of and access to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), focusing on young people	UNFPA - Enhancing SRHR - focus on young people - Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights, SRHR
Strengthened capacity to prevent sexual and gender-based violence and alleviate its consequences	PROMUNDO "Young men clubs against violence in Kinshasa"
	Senior women protection advisor (SWPA) in MONUSCO
	UNJHRO 2017-2018 - Senior Women Protection Advisor
SO4: Safeguarding human security and freedom from violence	
Strengthened conflict resolution and reconciliation initiatives that contribute to local conflict resolution	International Alert DRC 2014-2018 - 1325/WEE intervention post WCP (also for SO1, SO2)
	Life and Peace Institute (LPI)
	Support to the Stabilization Coherence Fund (SCF) for implementation of the International Stabilization Strategy (ISSSS) in Eastern DRC.
	MONUSCO / UNDP – Data collection on peacebuilding
Strengthened capacity among reintegrated internally displaced persons and refugees, children previously associated with armed forces and groups and recipient local communities to deal with recurring	CAAFAG - child soldiers, phase 2 – CAAFAG
	DDR 3 via the World Bank
	PEAR+3 - Participatory and Empowering community-based Approaches for Resilience - Return of refugees
	ILC local peace dialogues DRC

² Support to UN Joint Human Rights Office (51250026)

Interventions tackling several strategic objectives: a few interventions in the current portfolio are multi sectorial and respond to several results, for example International Alert (SO1, SO2 and SO4), PEAR Plus 3 (SO1, SO2, SO4), P4P (SO2, SO4), FPP (SO1, SO2, SO4). Some projects also mix several levels of objectives, mostly at the local level by providing various responses to localized needs in specific geographic areas. For example, ACF support to malnutrition includes also water and sanitation, support to livelihoods, and mainstreaming gender and environment. Strengthening Farmers' Value Chains, Tanganyika, DRC - Multi-sectorial approach to resilience aims to increase smallholder farmers' agricultural and financial capacities for sustainable production and market engagement so that they improve their incomes and build resilient livelihoods. The project also supports community-based organizations to become active contributors to social cohesion, gender equality, peace and reconciliation.

The component of access to justice/rule of law used to be through the EU delegation. It was finalized in 2016 and preparations of a new support was put on hold in 2016 since no election was conducted, and because of the violations by the police, FARDC and the justice system. More generally, the work with national institutions stopped in 2015 because of those reasons. It was also decided then to phase out of the Security Sector Reform, which consisted mostly of support to EUPOL and EUSEC.

Until 2010, all the cooperation was taking place in the East and handled in Kigali. This focus on the East is still present looking at the areas of interventions, which have been mapped out manually in 2016 but are not followed upon in a consolidated and regular manner). There is a tendency to reorient towards other areas, notably with the new crises in Tanganyika and Kasai. The FPP concerns 8 provinces notably and UNICEF interventions are at national level for example, as well as projects related to advocacy and support to CSOs (SO1 mostly).

Some projects were recently put in place in Kasai (ACF for malnutrition for example), illustrating some adaptation to the changes of context and various vulnerabilities throughout the country. This is in particular the case for humanitarian assistance. The stabilization component by ISSSS only focuses in the East as per the SC mandate and negotiation with the government. Some components of projects in Kasai and Tanganyika also address conflict resolution / mediation.

A few projects have **national coverage**, such as support to UNICEF, or cover several provinces such as NPP. The strategy does not specify the geographical coverage of the interventions, since Sida is not very much in favour of this. This proves relevant in the current context with relatively new areas of instability, but criteria could be set to define how to prioritize between provinces.

One project targets both Rwanda and DRC in relations to the cross-border challenges, through support of women's livelihoods. Interpeace also has a project involving three countries, which is decided by the Embassy in Rwanda. There are however no regional approaches, or linkages with Rwanda / Uganda to tackle specific cross-border issues, or conflict drivers, which are largely based on regional dynamics since foreign armed groups from Uganda and Rwanda still perpetrate violence in the DRC. The sole regional project in the Great Lakes on Africa support concerns reproductive health (based in Lusaka).

At sectorial level, there is an alignment of the strategy with the specific strategies, when they exist (see below under linkage humanitarian / development).

Regarding **partners**, for humanitarian assistance, the majority of the funding goes to DRC humanitarian fund. Around 70% of the interventions is geared to UN agencies, with a number of intermediaries but with high disbursement capacities. Other partners are a few INGOs. There is no direct funding to national institutions.

The 2009 strategy made reference to continued tripartite cooperation between Sweden, South Africa and the DRC, which has not been pursued in the 2015-2019 strategy.

The number of activities decreased over the years along with the decrease of the overall funding. While the average based on data available on openaid.se, this does not reflect the significant gaps between the largest funding (out of the DRC Pooled Fund, around 7 million USD for UNICEF, and, for some years, 3 million for the Farmer's value chain, 2,2 million for the reinsertion of child soldiers with UNICEF, 2 million to International Alert, 1,8 million USD to the Stabilization Fund, 1,8 million for the Inclusive Financing), and the smallest (a few thousands USD in some cases). Based on Openaid data, the number of projects in the DRC of all types, overall, vary from 37 in 2017 to 117 in 2010.

3 Compiled information about finalised evaluations (initiated either by Sweden and/or partners evaluations for projects supported

Sweden's interventions' evaluations are mostly led/managed by partners, and not all project have been systematically evaluated yet, since a number of projects started 2015.

The team identified the following evaluations in relations to the general interventions. They are mentioned in the table below, both for humanitarian assistance and development (since humanitarian evaluations may affect the decisions on the development strategy).

The evaluations are all project related, not evaluations of Strategic Objectives / Outcome or sub-results (for example, some organizations like UNDP conduct outcome level evaluations), but there are also no specific targets by Strategic Objective. There were no thematic evaluations on specific topics which could concern all / several projects, and focus on subjects such as support to gender / SGBV victims, HIV AIDS related projects, support to civil society, community based organizations or local capacity building, economic development and livelihoods, or stabilization efforts in some specific geographic areas.

Besides, the team did not identify evaluations on some of the most significant interventions – in terms of funding-, such as the UNICEF health support, either at the project or at the outcome level, and UNICEF did not provide examples of such evaluations.

3 COMPILED INFORMATION ABOUT FINALISED EVALUATIONS

Strategic objective	Project	Evaluation since 2014?
SO1: Strengthened democracy and gender equality and greater respect for human rights		
Strengthened democratic institutions and rules of law	PARJ with EU Delegation (justice sector reform)	X
	Uhaki Safi with EU Delegation (justice sector reform)	X
	The Carter Center - Advancing Democratic Governance & Respect for HR/2013-2016	
Increased participation of women in elected, decision-making forums, primarily at local level	Support to the UN Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) ³ for Human Rights Defenders (HRD) protection	
Strengthened capacity of civil society to promote transparency, accountability and improved respect for human rights	Strengthening Media in DRC via Fondation Hirondelle 2017 – 2019 (not finished)	
	Regional Election Coordinators via UNDP/PACEC - Secondment for 5UNV's Regional Coordinator	X
Increased transparency in trade on conflict minerals	Global Witness monitoring of natural resources (not finished)	
<i>Other</i>	<i>DfID Civil Society Fund</i>	X
SO2 Better opportunities and tools to enable poor people to improve their living conditions		
Improved opportunities for productive employment for women and young people that is socially and environmentally sustainable	Strengthening Farmers' Value Chains, Tanganyika, DRC - Multi-sectorial approach to resilience with FAO/WFP (also for SO4)	
	NGO Forest Peoples Programme (FPP) / REDD+, Livelihood Security and Economic Development in the DRC	X (2013)
	Support for Inclusive Financing in DRC 2017-2021 (not finished)	
	Improvement of the legal framework for microcredit systems PASMIF II	X
	Guarantee to FINCA/Procredit (with USAID) (not finished)	
SO3 Improved basic health		
Improved access to high-quality child and maternal care	UNICEF maternal and child health support (MDG 4&5)	
	Resilience to child malnutrition ACF DRC 2017-2020 (not finished)	
Increased awareness of and access to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), focusing on young people	UNFPA - Enhancing SRHR - focus on young people - Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights, SRHR	
Strengthened capacity to prevent sexual and gender-based violence and alleviate its consequences	PROMUNDO "Young men clubs against violence in Kinshasa"	X
	Senior women protection advisor (SWPA) in MONUSCO	
<i>Others</i>	<i>IRC Strengthening health systems in North Kivu and Katanga</i>	X
	<i>H4 + CANADA and Sweden (SIDA) 2011-2016</i>	X
SO4: Safeguarding human security and freedom from violence		

³ Support to UN Joint Human Rights Office (51250026)

Strengthened conflict resolution and reconciliation initiatives that contribute to local conflict resolution	International Alert DRC 2014-2018 - 1325/WEE intervention post WCP (also for SO1, SO2)	X
	Life and Peace Institute	X
	Support to the Stabilization Coherence Fund (SCF) for implementation of the International Stabilization Strategy (ISSSS) in Eastern DRC.	X (internal review)
	MONUSCO / UNDP – Data collection on peacebuilding	
Strengthened capacity among reintegrated internally displaced persons and refugees, children previously associated with armed forces and groups and recipient local communities to deal with recurring	CAAFAG - child soldiers, phase 2 - CAAFAG	X
	DDR 3 via the World Bank (not finished)	
	PEAR+3 - Participatory and Empowering community-based Approaches for Resilience - Return of refugees	X (evaluation of PEAR II)
	ILC local peace dialogues DRC	
<i>Other</i>	<i>Humanitarian Fund Standard Allocations</i>	X
	<i>Swedish international development cooperation agency (SIDA) strategic support to disaster prevention and early recovery in the democratic republic of Congo 2011-2015</i>	X

The team reviewed nine evaluation reports and findings, highlighted in blue. Regarding relevance, the evaluations highlight notably the harmony of current programs and objectives with previous versions. Some projects/programs take in count lessons from previous projects / programs and they use the resources and experiences from achieved projects and programs.

All programs/projects are in line with the national and sectoral policies. They are also aligned with the Swedish strategy in the DRC. Many programs and activities cover identified priorities and needs expressed by the community and other stakeholders working in the areas covered by the programs / projects, though this may not be the case for some specific activities (trainings for example). However, despite this alignment with DRC policies and Swedish, some of the support provided by the project/program are not sufficient, as the needs to be covered are numerous. Therefore, some programs seem to be ambitious and resources allocated to them are not sufficient to have a clear impact. Some other donors, US for example elaborate logical framework for some key areas / at provincial level (at a lower level, there may be a risk of impacting on demographic dynamics), with the objective to concentrate the assistance and get impacts, funding groups of projects on similar issues or with clear synergies, would also strengthen the logic of the interventions.

In some cases, monitoring indicators are disconnected with project activities, and were not defined well enough to fully monitor the effectiveness. There is also limited analysis of the project outcomes. Some evaluations revealed that, at the end of some projects, people change their sociocultural norm and they adopt some good practices.

Many evaluations do not appreciate efficiency. In some cases, the projects have been written in isolation and disconnected way across the various implementing partners, and hence there are limited synergies and information sharing.

Many projects have built local capacity by investing in local people. They also help to transform the social and institutional norms that discriminate women in the DRC.

The evaluations also show the added value of long-term projects (36 months), more likely to achieve planned objectives and results. The consortium approach has many positive elements to contribute in terms of resilience and provided that coordination is effective. There were cases where a significant share of the budget was allocated to human resources, logistics and administration costs (International Alert).

Some platforms for coordination were created at national level, allowing joint review and planning (health sector, Pooled Fund), but this does not involve the medium and local levels or implementing partners, which led to weaker and not sustainable coordination of activities in the field. The system of collaboration has improved resources mobilization from several technical and financial partners.

Regarding sustainability, many programs have built local capacities and provided beneficiaries with very useful technical experience that will be very useful in future. Some projects have produced training materials and manuals that will be used even after the projects. Local leaders who have been trained and who are involved in community mobilization are also a major asset for these projects/programs. Community institutions and groups created will remain after the project, however, the strategy of ownership and phase-out for many activities is not clear yet.

Equipment distributed to producers, shelters built, and infrastructure built or rehabilitated also have a duration. This is the case for funding for the created community institutions and groups, management of community-based infrastructures.

4 Review on how mainstreaming issues have evolved and been addressed in the cooperation since 2015: environment/climate; conflict; gender and equity

The mainstreaming issues are included in the new development strategy, highlighting their strategic importance: *“the conflicts and obstacles to development. Poor peoples’ perspectives on development and a rights perspective should be mainstreamed into all activities. Attention should be paid to, inter alia, gender equality, children’s rights, and the rights of other vulnerable individuals and groups that are discriminated against. Gender equality is to remain a Swedish priority in DR Congo. An environmental and a climate perspective should be integrated in order to promote long-term sustainable development.”*

In the strategy, they are also streamlined across the various strategic objectives:

- SO1 makes explicit reference targets gender equality “Strengthened democracy and gender equality, and greater respect for human rights », “Increased participation of women in elected decision-making forums, primarily at local level ». *Through development cooperation, Sweden is to highlight issues concerning socioeconomic and cultural obstacles to gender equality, as well as issues concerning the institutional frameworks, such as the family code. To contribute to greater gender equality, activities are to focus on women’s increased participation and influence in political processes and peace processes, in line with Security Council Resolution 1325 and the subsequent resolutions. Contributions may also help prevent sexual and gender-based violence. Men and boys are to be involved.*
- SO2 specific objectives targets also women: Improved opportunities for productive employment for women and young people that is socially and environmentally sustainable Women’s livelihoods and empowerment should be prioritised, particularly with regard to land rights.
- SO3 specific objectives also cover “Strengthened capacity to prevent and alleviate the consequences of sexual and gender-based violence”. In that respect, the strategy also considers that “Sweden’s comparative advantages for activities in this area include a broad SRHR perspective that covers access to contraceptives, comprehensive sexuality education and the combating of sexual and gender-based violence, and a clear link to overarching gender equality work. Development cooperation could, for example, focus on health services and information that contributes to improve the sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) of women and men, with a particular

focus on young people. To create the conditions for sustainable results, SRHR contributions should include boys and men.”

- On SO4, the strategy indicates “In addition, activities are to contribute to enhancing the ability of civil society and state structures to prevent sexual and gender-based violence and strengthen women’s capacity to participate in peace and security promotion”.

Regarding to environment, the main reference in the strategy is in the specific objective 2 with the objective of an economic development “*that is socially and environmentally sustainable*”, with consideration for the livelihoods in areas where natural resources are exploited and natural resources exploitation.

Environmentally sustainable use of land, natural resources and ecosystems, is to be an integral part of contributions to improve health, reduce vulnerability and increase resilience to environmental impacts, climate change and natural disasters.

Concerning conflict dynamics (not to mention the consequences of conflicts such as SGBV), the aspect is included in:

- SO1 through the work on conflict minerals
- SO4 with the specific objectives of “Strengthened conflict resolution and reconciliation initiatives that contribute to local conflict resolution” and “Strengthened capacity among reintegrated internally displaced persons and refugees, children previously associated with armed forces and groups and recipient local communities to deal with recurring crises”.

The integration of those issues in the strategy remains rather similar to the 2009 strategy, except on the mention of the role of men and boys, and the reference to conflict minerals.

According to interviewees at the Embassy, there is nonetheless an increased attention and efforts by Sida and the Embassy to promote the integration of those mainstreaming issues, which Sida consider essential not only per se, but also to allow a broader success of the projects and of the overall international assistance in an integrated manner.

A number of **toolboxes** exist at Sida level to support the integration of mainstreaming issues in the funding at Sida level, for gender, environment/ climate and conflict. There are expectations that the partners actually include mainstreaming issues in the project design by using their own specific tools, if necessary with inspiration from Sida’s toolboxes. The toolboxes are used by the Embassy staff as reference, and some of the criteria are included in the appraisal forms to review and approve the project. This is however not very detailed and the appraisal remain rather general in that respect : there is nothing on environmental sustainability, the appraisal does not check

on the existence of a gender policy at the organization level, lack of indicators on mainstreaming issues, in terms of conflict sensitivity, limited analysis of the differentiated effects on beneficiary / non beneficiary communities, of stakeholders involved (who gains, who loses), of the assessment of risks and mitigation measures related to mainstreaming issues, including indirect effects (for example, increase of the population where projects are implemented, substitution of the project to existing local alternatives). It does not necessarily condition significantly the project approval (see for example the very limited environmental assessment in the project document for the Value Chain project, the agreement states however that it should be followed up throughout). The appraisal form is not controlled at the Embassy and there is a new version of the system about to be launched.

Broadly speaking the limitations in terms of integration of the mainstreaming issues, lies not only on the analysis of the situations / needs but also in the expected monitoring system and impacts of the projects on those mainstreaming issues. Those issues are not clearly followed upon, though they are essential components. The climate change perspective as considered in the strategy and in the interventions is also not clearly related to date to the conflict dynamics, but mostly to effects of the interventions on the environment. For example, population movements of the cattle breeders are due to climate change and demography, as well as the availability of livelihoods and role of the environment in conflict dynamics is not clearly included (though this point is addressed to some extent under the angle of governance through the Global Witness and Carter Center projects). Conflict analyses relate to issue of natural resources governance, but not to the broader and longer term changes related to climate change in Africa, though its impact may not be the most visible of the conflict drivers at this stage.

Noticeably, and in relations to tools and organizational processes in place, Sida conducted a specific workshop with the partners to strengthen the inclusion of the environment in the project design in February 2017, which consisted in a useful approach to share experience and ways to improve the integration of mainstreaming issues. Recommendations included the use of a toolkit by the partners, designation of gatekeepers at Sida level, purchase of carbon credit, increased sensitization and awareness, action with the private sector and customary leaders. This approach would seem relevant to support exchange of experience, lessons learned and ideas, across the partners and develop ad hoc and innovative solutions to the specificities of the country.

Looking at the **project portfolio**, several projects tackles directly one of the mainstreaming issue directly as a primary objective, as related to the strategy. This is in particular the case for gender. This remains however quite limited compare with the level of integration of those issues in the strategy.

Sida's monitoring system indicates the level of results in terms of integration of the mainstreaming issues, notably through policy markers, and those aspects are reported upon yearly. A number of projects include one of the mainstreaming issues as a key objectives, in all the sectors, in particular gender and conflict.

Main projects related to the development strategy for which one of the cross-cutting issue is the main objective:

	Gender	Environment	Conflict
2015-2017	International Alert PROMUNDO "Young men school clubs against violence Gender Advisor MONUSCO & UNHRJO	REDD + Global Witness WWF SJS	All SO4 interventions

However, the use of mainstreaming issues as a leverage for change remains rather limited, except in the case of the only cross-border programme between Rwanda and DRC, implemented by International Alert, which links economic support and peacebuilding. This reinforces both the economic and the influence of women as a trigger for peacebuilding.

Gender

The operationalization of the strategy led to promotion of women and support to SGBV. Compared with the strategic objective, this support should be nuanced however. For SO2, productive employment aims to target women first in the wording of the objectives, though it's quite difficult to target only women, and they still occupy a minor position in the cooperatives. In cocoa sector, women are more present. For SO3, the team noted the limited integration of maternal health in the interventions, while this is a target group in the strategy.

Interestingly, the gender perspective is also taken into account to promote positive masculinity, with the Promundo project by deconstructing stereotype on masculine / male behaviours, often associated with violence in the context of war.

The gender markers are not used systematically, based the documents made available to the team (which does not include all the project documents). They mostly figure in the projects for the stabilization fund. This indicates that there is no consistent analysis of gender across the projects supporting the strategy.

Conflict

Sida is using various sources for conflict analysis, which are shared amongst several donors. They are mostly of a rather broad and of general nature. Partners are tasked to do their own conflict analysis, but according to interviewees, and based on the review

of several project documents, this takes mostly the form of a context analysis, and not of an analysis of the conflict drivers that will be affected by the interventions.

The Do No Harm perspective has not been formally and explicitly included systematically in the project designs, in terms of dividers and connectors, implicit ethical messages, resources transfers and the who gains / who loses perspective – notably taking into account the significant political economy around international assistance at local and national levels, in particular for the stabilization, governance and peacebuilding interventions.

Some projects however took this into account, rather generally.

For example, the PEAR+ *“PEAR+ primary outcome is to work on the conflict as well, to “Do More Good” and transform the conflict in a constructive direction by deliberately contributing to building sustaining peace. Local mechanisms will be thus put in place to:*

- (i) Equip community members with skills to recognise conflict and transform it in ways that are acceptable to all parties;
- (ii) Promote peaceful co-existence between individuals and groups;
- (iii) Address the often deeply rooted causes of conflict (the security dilemma, the mobilisation for land and identity, the exploitation of natural resources and the regional dynamics).”

To do so, PEAR+ seeks to increase community participation and ownership of the administrative and traditional local authorities in development of local action plans, programme and programme identification, their final design, implementation and monitoring.

The team did not see specific detailed and documented analysis of the various categories of stakeholders. The stakeholder analyses conducted remain quite broad and analyse, but not specifically the positioning of the various civil society networks for example, or the evolution of customary authorities and local governance actors.

Equity & vulnerable groups

The Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) and equity is referred to more generally than the other mainstreaming issues for Sida. This aspect is however tackled while targeting the most vulnerable groups, such as IDPs.

A vast share of the funding is also going to UNICEF (9,8 million USD of the total funding to the DRC in 2017), hence for support to children. This adds to the funding for women support related interventions as specified as detailed above.

Interestingly, the ethnic minority perspective is included since a specific project targets pygmies with the Forest People Programme. This remains however limited to a few areas, while the pygmies are present in several provinces. The P4P also

addresses the case of Tanganyika, where conflict erupted between Bantu and Lubas, through support to livelihoods and social cohesion.

Youth are targeted in several interventions, mostly related to the Young Men Clubs Against Violence SO 3, Carter Center's Human Rights programme DRC - Strengthening Youth Political Participation in DRC, Strengthening Media in DRC via Fondation Hirondelle 2017 – 2019, and SO3 Reproductive Health. This remains rather limited given the role in the conflict dynamics, and economic or political vulnerabilities to recruitment by armed groups. For the SO1, another connector could be youth and women parliamentarian groups, who are particularly dynamics and could constitute a leverage to increase State accountability and legitimacy.

At the geographical level, the relative concentration of assistance in the East – though efforts are made to balance this – ensure to tackle conflict affected population. However, this does not necessarily mean targeting the most vulnerable or most deprived groups of population since significant shares of the territories remain with little or no support in the various sectors, including on access to basic services, while there are significant risks of duplication in the East given the number of stakeholders.

Environment

Given the criticality of a number of needs in the country, environment remains relatively limitedly included except for specific projects directly related to the subject. A number of reports and project documents consulted include however a section on environmental management and effects of the project on the environment, though the analysis is limited.

There was limited integration of an environment perspective, out of dedicated interventions on natural resources management, like REDD+, WWF, support to the Carter Center for natural resources governance – which does not really include climate change and environment issues actually.

Related to SO2, which explicitly makes reference to sustainable development, there is actually no real integration of the environment aspects at this stage. For the inclusive finance, an option for this could be to work on the green line of Bank, which exist at UNDP level.

5 Analysis on the linkage humanitarian-development (resilience) assistance in the cooperation since 2015⁴

Two separate global strategies exist, one on humanitarian assistance, the other on development cooperation, from which the DRC strategy derives. There is no specific country strategy for humanitarian assistance. Sweden's development strategy in the DRC explicitly mentions the linkage between humanitarian and development that *“Cooperation should be structured to contribute to strengthened capacity and long-term sustainable results. Long-term, programme-based support may be combined with strategic and catalytic contributions. (...) Synergies between the different areas of the strategy are to be harnessed as far as possible. Complementarity with other relevant strategies is also to be sought. Moreover, activities should, where appropriate, be coordinated with supplementary humanitarian aid and synergies are to be sought.”* The various strategic results are not clearly and explicitly related to humanitarian interventions, for example by building on humanitarian interventions to bring longer term development. Geographical areas where the development projects are implemented are however the ones with the most of humanitarian assistance (Kivus for example).

As required at global level, the Embassy drafted a comprehensive resilience plan specifically for the DRC in 2017 “Sida's Analysis and Work plan 2017-2019 for Mainstreaming Resilience within Humanitarian Assistance and Development Cooperation in the DRC”. It highlights the integration of resilience into humanitarian assistance interventions, as well as in the Development Cooperation Strategy, distinguishing between response to humanitarian crises, recovery and resilience. It does not refer directly to development dynamics that will be launched however, (although it could be considered as being part of the general objectives of the development strategy and results). Also, on those various aspects, the issues tackled are very differentiated depending on the objectives, whereas they are to some extent interrelated.

⁴ This is an initial analysis and as agreed with the Embassy, this section will be revised and enriched based on the field work.

Some interventions related to the 2015-2019 DRC development strategy make indeed explicit mention of resilience, such as Resilience to child malnutrition ACF DRC 2017-2020, which aims *“To prevent child malnutrition in Kalomba health zone, DRC, Kasai Central, during 2017-2020, through water and sanitation, nutrition and support to livelihoods, and by mainstreaming gender and environment.”* The Support to the Stabilization Coherence Fund (SCF) for implementation of the International Stabilization Strategy (ISSSS) in Eastern DRC also covers the resilience component: since the *“overall goal of the ISSSS is to strengthen the social partnerships between the state and the population in order to strengthen accountability and the management of violent conflict. This goal is furthermore divided into three results: achieving socioeconomic resilience against increased armed conflict; Improved security for women, girls, boys and men in the eastern provinces; and strengthen the legitimacy of the Congolese state and its institutions.”* In terms of economic support, there is also the project of Strengthening Farmers’ Value Chains, Tanganyika, DRC - Multi-sectorial approach to resilience with UNDP.

The plan does not define neither the existing coping mechanisms and local capacities at this stage. This may appear in some of the projects however, notably regarding the internal displacements, livelihoods and peacebuilding. **Community based interventions** have indeed been supported in some interventions, and increased, notably with more generally an increased focus on community-based protection mechanisms for IDPs / refugees and DDR or the Forest People Programme. Fondation Hironnelles also supports community radios. Mechanisms to identify and address risks and vulnerabilities locally, such as community based early warning and risk management do not appear directly amongst the interventions however. Some projects were able to **build local capacities**, for example by building the capacity of civil society to ask for increased accountability and transparency in various sectors, such as State budget or natural resource governance. The level of capacities and local dynamics created and of self-replicating mechanisms is however hardly measured, and the documents consulted make little reference to trainings of trainers approaches for example, except for midwifery in the project implemented by ILC.

The “approaches to address the **prevalence of patterns**” and the root causes of vulnerabilities leading to humanitarian crises are not detailed yet. This is a more general issue in the DRC related to the ability to actually transform the living conditions and address structural issues, and the repetition of similar crises and similar needs, including in urban areas, over and over (displacements, food security, nutrition, WASH)..” Some projects related to the development strategy address however causes of vulnerabilities in various sectors. Indeed, for what concerns conflict related instability/ humanitarian needs, the development strategy and interventions cover various *“root causes of conflict”*, as identified in the conflict analyses through support to the stabilization framework, civil society, governance of natural resources, conflict mitigation skills.

The evaluation of the Standard Allocation of the DRC Common Humanitarian Fund, to which SIDA provided a significant contribution, indicates a number of issues related to the integration of resilience into the humanitarian assistance. It mentions notably that projects contributed to change practices in terms of protection, hygiene and sanitation, and to strengthen local capacities in terms of livelihoods (20 000 people) or health (4919 professionals). Those are results with some level of sustainability and which contribute to support development dynamics.

The study also highlights the interest of multi-year, multi-sector, impact and capacity building of the interventions. Local communities are the entry point to trigger development dynamics.

It also raises the interest of consortium approaches for resilience, as well as of complementary interventions.

Long term partnership of at least 3 years are also mentioned to ensure mentoring and technical support to the beneficiaries.

The evaluation also indicates that the Standard allocation takes into account resilience in the design and implementation of the projects, through rehabilitation of the livelihoods, changes of behaviours to increase capacity to face risks, and building local capacities.

All these points relate very much to the interventions funded by the development strategy.

The aspect of **strengthening preparedness is linked with the need to deal with the recurring issues as mentioned above and to reduce risks and vulnerabilities**. It is not explicit in relations to the DRC country strategy and operations. Sida at global level, funded however some preparedness / risk reduction interventions in the DRC, on the humanitarian side, for example with the “Support for SRC's long-term humanitarian work with local capacity building "Building resilient communities" during 2013 to continue efforts to strengthen the humanitarian capacity among several national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies”, or as part of the DRC Pooled Fund. Specific funding for resilience was also allocated to the Pooled Fund, which increasingly include this aspect in prioritizing the interventions.

The lack of **leadership by the State institutions** over humanitarian response appears also as a weakness to create sustainable and locally based mechanisms and dynamics to withstand and respond to shocks. This is in particular the case given their limited role in the coordination and planning of government assistance. There is no fully updated development or stabilization framework used as a tool to give strategic and operational directions to the international assistance. STAREC and DSRP exist but are limitedly used. The weaknesses in the governance chain, and accountability to the

beneficiaries with widespread corruption descend to all levels and create a mode of privatization of the public service at the local level, given the lack of payment of most of the civil servants and the lack of budget at provincial levels to ensure the functioning after the creation of additional provinces. It took two years to convey the second coordination meeting (Cadre National de Concertation Humanitaire – CNCH) between humanitarian actors and the Government since 2013. In addition, for humanitarian assistance, the early recovery cluster - traditionally rather weak - has been dismantled to be integrated and support a cross-cutting integration of those dynamics. The level of administrative harassment (issues with visa, authorizations etc.) illustrates also some disconnections of international assistance with local dynamics, which also compromise a wider and systemic change for development. Sida's interventions do not comprise direct support to national plans. UNICEF supports however some plans: National Plan for Sanitation Development, the National Hygiene Operational Plan, the Interimery Education Plan, the National Plan of Action for Orphans and Vulnerable Children and the National Strategy Against Gender-Based Violence. The linkages with local development plans do not appear clearly in the strategy, though some are developed albeit limitedly used at the provincial and sometimes communal levels.


The **partnerships** with local stakeholders could also be extended. The private sector for example could contribute to build a more sustainable economic tissue took place as part of the SO2 to some extent. The capacities of the cooperatives have also not been significantly supported to date, though they are included in the SO2. In other sector, such as health, the private sector was not included yet – though a project is being prepared to support availability of some medicines. The sector is however widely used by the population, but is not organized and not included in assistance.

Although Sida favours multi-year projects, projects funded through pooled funds have usually a shorter perspective. In the I4S, interventions usually range between one and two years. Some interventions are also relatively short term to date to allow a comprehensive and integrated approach, which ensures linkages between relief and development. For example, there is a lack of long-term support to child DDR, and it concerns only transition.

6 Largest donors, aid coordination mechanisms and EU joint programming in DRC


Sida's contribution to international assistance in the DRC remains however one of the most significant. The level is however relatively far from the funds allocated by the main donors, obviously multilateral structures, in particular the World Bank and the European Union, not to talk about the various UN organizations funded by bilateral donors. Since 2015, the US is spending around 300-350 million USD a year in the country, DfID between 180 and 230 million USD, the World Bank between 380 and 650 million USD, the EU 200 million for development assistance only. Other Nordic countries are limitedly present. Norway spent between 18 (2016) and 44 (2012) million USD a year and Denmark did not provide funds to the country the previous years.

Figure 3: Evolution of the general funding to the DRC



Source : OECD DAC


In particular, regarding the humanitarian aid, Sweden played a major role in funding the DRC Pooled Fund, being the second largest donor after DfID since 2010.

Figure 4: Funding to the DRC Pooled Fund since 2010

Source: MPTF


Looking at the funding levels in 2016 for the various donors, Sweden's contribution appears more limited, highlighting the need to have a very strategic positioning.

Figure 5: Contribution by sector in the DRC




Source: Donor landscape GCP

For the sectors related to the Strategic Objective, the share of Sweden was particularly significant in the health sector.

Figure 6: Funding by the main donors to the health sector in the DRC 2011-2016


Source: OECD DAC

Figure 7: Funding by the main donors to conflict, peace and security to the DRC 2011-2016



Source: OECD DAC


Figure 8: Funding by the main donors to governance and civil society in the DRC 2011-2016



Source: OECD DAC

Also, Sweden's role is significant in terms of funding to multilateral organizations, being often the third donor, as well as to NGOs & CSOs, also third or fourth donor depending on the years, based on data collected at the OECD DAC level (which may have limitations but still give an indication).


Figure 9: Funding by the main donors to multilateral organizations 2011-2016 to the DRC



Source: OECD DAC

The US contribution in 2015 is particularly high since 501 million USD were allocated to the UNHCR by the State Department for the Biometric Registration of Rwandan Refugees in Democratic Republic of Congo as part of United States Population Migration and Refugee Assistance, Appropriation.

Figure 10: Funding by the main donors to NGOs and civil society in the DRC 2011-2016



Source: OECD DAC

There is no comprehensive EU joint programming per se in the DRC, as defined in the EU guidelines⁵, though some projects were funded jointly by the EU and other bilateral organizations. An evaluation of this approach at global level was conducted in 2015⁶, highlighting the interest for a closer interaction, a common vision, and a better division of work, through the effects on operational results were visible yet and the process did not reduce the transaction costs.

Joint strategies were developed on human rights and democracy, and Sweden participated in the EU joint programmes on justice and elections, largely through institutional support, which finished in 2016 and 2017. This allowed having delegated partnerships with one organization being the spokespersons of the others on sensitive topics and ensure coordination / coherence. The team did not identify other potential joint interventions at this stage, except with the US on the loan and credit guarantee.

⁵ https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/eu-approach-aid-effectiveness/joint-programming_en

⁶ https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/evaluation_joint_programming_final_report_vol_i_en.pdf

Sweden is generally aligned with EU general political positioning – though there may be variances on issues such as elections and human rights. This also contributes to defining the strategy and orientations but may sometimes mean that the specificities of Sweden or level of implementation of the policy are less visible. There are also differences in approaches justifying the fact that some interventions are different, since Sweden wishes to support longer term and more flexible (rules less strict, no micro-management) interventions compared with other donors, such as the EU, to adjust to the context.

The Head of Mission (Groupe de Coordination des Partenaires) and the Head of Cooperation Groups are the main coordination systems at a general strategic level.

Sida is also active in various technical sector coordination groups, which function more irregularly depending (with up and downs for environment, democracy and human rights or health limitedly functional). For Stabilization / conflict, the Stabilization Donor Forum is more informal, despite the challenges of the country, and Sweden plays a lead role there. There is also an informal environment coordination group, but this does not address the issues of governance of natural resources, while this would be a key need to support development dynamics on the basis of the mineral extraction, forest exploitation and access/ maintenance of land and agriculture, which are major conflict drivers and sources of opportunities / fragilities. This would be essential notably taking into account the presence of numerous international companies in the country. On economic development, the coordination is also limited, despite its essential role as a development factor, to reduce crises and increase resilience. Sweden used to be the lead in the gender group, which has been recently transferred to USAID. There is also an informal coordination group of potential donors for the elections, organized by UNDP. Sweden does not follow the agriculture group and humanitarian assistance clusters concern the implementing partners. For humanitarian assistance, Sweden is also an observing member of the Humanitarian Country Team and participates in the Good Humanitarian Donorship Group in the DRC. Sweden is also in the Steering Committee of UNHAS. The participation to coordination group is indicated and detailed depending on the sector in the resilience work plan plan to specify the role of Sweden in mainstreaming resilience in those groups.

At the government level, there is a lack of ownership and of coordination mechanisms as indicated earlier, because of the structural weaknesses of the institutions and lack of resources allocated to them. This adds to the lack of reliability of the government positioning, given the absence of elections at this stage. The political agenda constrained the development assistance, and coordination amongst donors in that respect varies, with various positioning depending on the bilateral stakes.

7 Indicative Work plan

The field work will take place 5-15 March, with the debriefing schedule 15 March.
The suggested work plan is as follow:

	Tasks	
05/03/2018	Meeting with the Embassy staff or partners	Meeting with other donors (UE, US, DfID, Belgium)
06/03/2018	Meeting with UN agencies (UNICEF Health & CPiE, UNDP, OCHA, UNFPA, MONUSCO, FAO, WFP)	
07/03/2018	Meeting with INGOs (Carter Center, International Alert, Global Witness, ACF, MSF, FPP)	
08/03/2018	Meetings with Diakonie, FINCA/Procredit, ILC, Promundo, Fondation Hirondelle	
09/03/2018	Field visit. Meeting with local structures, State authorities and beneficiaries.	
	Cécile, Kasai or Bandundu.	Delus. Kivus. ISSSS, DDR, International Alert, CAAG
10/03/2018		
11/03/2018		
12/03/2018		
13/03/2018	Interviews with the State authorities. Final Interviews	
14/03/2018	Preparation of the debriefing	
15/03/2018		Debriefing

8 Conclusions and recommendations

The main conclusions and recommendations are in the report 2. However, based on this analysis, a few points can be raised. There is a continuity in the strategy, which compensates for the mismatch between the strategic and the programmatic cycles. Those cycles have been affected by the political turmoil and new crises in Tanganyika and Kasai, which also illustrates the difficulties to have a long-term strategy and operational planning. This adds to the structural challenges of the country in terms of logistic and reaching vulnerable groups, as well as customary practices and general norms. The assistance provided addresses various needs, but its coverage remains limited, considering the specific context of the DRC, particularly compare with the assistance provided to the neighbouring countries. There are some efforts to include the cross-cutting issues. They address some vulnerabilities and integrate the specific unstable context – to some extent - though it is not always articulated at operational levels with the priorities of the country and root causes of the crises, such as environment. Projects are in most cases evaluated, though the process is also bound by pooled funding modalities and is not always systematic in case of funding to multilateral organizations. This project-based evaluation system limits to some extent the potential for broader assessment at strategic level. Resilience planning is quite detailed, documented and robust, as highlighted also by the integration of the lessons learned of previous programming. The links between humanitarian response and development are also quite close, in terms of contents of the intervention and approaches notably. This does not take into account clearly the multi-sectoral interrelations and actual articulations at operational level. SIDA plays a role in the coordination systems and support joint approaches, though there are overall national limitations for a common vision and planning to solve the crises - out of immediate response and discussions on democracy and human rights in relations to the elections - and address longer term dynamics. Obviously, most of the donors have companies or interest in the country, largely driven by the need to access natural resources, and this creates competition, hampering also the long-term planning on strategic issues and the possibility for a joint approach. Neutral countries such as Sweden are in this context in a particular position to contribute to improving this. The predatory behaviour of the elites and the related lack of functioning of the administration are also constraints to be able to create local endogenous development dynamics.

In terms of recommendations (classified based on the sections of the report, since the main recommendations are in the report 2):

- 1- The balance of the assistance provided to the various Great Lakes countries should be revisited to adjust the response to the level of needs and vulnerabilities in the different contexts.
- 2- The articulation between humanitarian assistance projects and development could be further documented and detailed at operational level.
- 3- There is a need to address roots causes of crises.
- 4- The integration of cross-cutting issues and their monitoring should be supported at operational level throughout the project implementation, taking into account the priorities and linkages with crises.
- 5- It should be ensured that there are evaluations of the main interventions and thematic evaluations, evaluations of a group of projects, or specific evaluations of Strategic Objectives should be considered.

Sweden should continue and strengthen its support to coordination mechanisms and national framework for the key drivers of a transition, i.e. for stabilization, environment and development.



Support to the Mid-Term Review in the DRC

This document is the first deliverable of the support to the Mid-Term Review, commissioned by the Swedish Embassy in Kinshasa.

The overall purpose of the review is 1) to provide strategic recommendations for the remaining period of the Strategy in order to fulfil the expected results; and 2) to provide analysis and recommendations to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to inform the government's instruction to Sida for development of the next strategy proposal.

The report has mainly been based on a documentation analysis, and initial interviews with the staff during a two-days visit in April.

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