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Sida Evaluation

Julian Brett

Evaluation of Sida's Support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts

Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Report



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The views and interpretations expressed in this report are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida.

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Foreword

Violent conflicts lead to immense suffering, constitute major obstacles to development and prevent people from escaping poverty. While poverty is generally decreasing on a global level, people living in poverty are increasingly concentrated to fragile countries affected by conflict. Today, there is a broad consensus within the international community on the need to invest in peacebuilding and conflict prevention to reach the Global Goals. As a response, Sida is increasingly focusing support to countries affected by conflict.

Support to peacebuilding is not new. Sida has been engaged in conflict and post-conflict countries since the agency was established. Often, the devastating effects of conflict, and in its aftermath, the prospects of supporting the development towards more peaceful inclusive societies, has been the very reason for Swedish engagement. In other contexts, support to peacebuilding has been more indirect through engagement in sectors and areas of support far beyond projects supporting conflict resolution and dialogue. Engagement in for example the health sector, institution building, decentralisation or livelihoods, has often had the purpose of contributing to sustainable peace or to implement peace agreements.

Effective support to peacebuilding implies learning from previous support, from what has worked well and what has worked less well. This evaluation is the first of its kind, taking a long-term perspective to capture general lessons learned and impact of Sida's approach to peacebuilding. The aim of the evaluation is to systematise experiences and learnings from Sida's support to peacebuilding from four different country contexts: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Guatemala, Rwanda and Somalia. We hope that the findings of this evaluation can contribute to sharpen Sida's engagement for peacebuilding to support people's ability to escape poverty.

We wish to express our gratitude to the evaluation team and to the time and interest invested by all those who have participated in the evaluation. The evaluation process has served as a dynamic learning tool for Sida to compile the collected knowledge from staff at Sida, partners, experts and other stakeholders.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BIRN	Balkan Investigative Reporting Network
CARDS	(EU) Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CDMA	Capacity Development of Municipal Associations
CIN	Centre for Investigative News
COE	Council of Europe
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
EMZED	Strengthening local communities in BiH
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
FES	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
FIGAP	Fund for the Implementation of the Gender Action Plan
GAP	Governance Accountability Project
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HR/SR	UN High Representative/EU Special Representative
HJPC	Higher Judicial Prosecutorial Council
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IAP	Integrated Area Programmes
ICMP	International Commission on Missing Persons
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IFOR	Implementation Force
INGO	International Non Governmental Organisation
INTRAC	International NGO Training and Research Centre
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession
IPPR	Institute for Public Policy Research
JEP	Judicial Efficiency project
LGBT	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender

LWF	Lutheran World Fund
MDTS	Medium Term Development Strategy
MFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs
MPI	Missing Persons Institute
MTDS	Medium Term Development Strategy
MZ	Local Communities
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee
OFFS	Open Fun Football Schools
OHR	Office of the High Representative
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAR	Public Administration Reform
PARF	Public Administration Reform Fund
PIC	Peace Implementation Council
PLIP	Property Law Implementation Plan
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SAA	Stabilisation and Association Agreement
SAP	Stabilisation and Association Process
SDC	Swiss Development Cooperation
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNIPTF	United Nations International Police Task Force
UNMAC	United Nations Mine Action Centre
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Preface

This report provides the findings of a country evaluation of Sida's peacebuilding support to Bosnia and Herzegovina, which forms part of the Evaluation of Sida's support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts. The other countries evaluated were Guatemala, Rwanda and Somalia. The evaluation was commissioned by Sida and carried out by Tana Copenhagen between May 2018 and January 2019.

The Bosnia and Herzegovina country evaluation was undertaken by Julian Brett.

Members of the overall evaluation team were:

- Erik Bryld, Team Leader, lead author Somalia
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Quality assurance of the report has been provided by André Kahlmeyer.

This report incorporates feedback from Sida and the Embassy of Sweden in Sarajevo.

Executive Summary

This report presents the Bosnia and Herzegovina case study for the Evaluation of Sida's support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts and is an annex to the evaluation synthesis report. The evaluation is the first longitudinal evaluation of peacebuilding-related strategic engagements undertaken by Sida and has the objective *to evaluate how Sida has approached peacebuilding on the strategic level in different contexts*. The longitudinal approach means that the evaluation looks back to the early 1990s. The Bosnia and Herzegovina case study is based on extensive desk research, interviews with current and former Sida staff and a field mission to Sarajevo between 8-12 October during which interviews were conducted with embassy staff, other development partners, implementing partners, representatives from the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and resource persons. This was combined with Skype interviews and e-mail correspondence to include those who could not be met in person.

Sida's support to Bosnia and Herzegovina can be seen in three phases: (1) humanitarian support during the war followed by recovery and reconstruction in the immediate post war years, including support to implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords; (2) broader based development and statebuilding support from 2000 onwards; and (3) from 2011 to the present, a significant focus on the European Union (EU) accession agenda.

Relevance

The evaluation finds a strong correlation between Sida's support portfolio and Bosnia and Herzegovina's political, social and economic development needs and wider international commitments and aid modalities (such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness). Sida's prioritisation correlates with the priorities set out in the four Swedish country strategies and one regional strategy during the evaluation period. Major objectives running through all Swedish strategies have been Bosnia and Herzegovina's integration into European structures, the development of a socially sustainable and market driven economy, and democracy and respect for human rights. The promotion of gender equality and women's empowerment has likewise been a major theme. However, none of the strategies mention peacebuilding *per se* and the issue is conspicuously absent from the few supporting analyses available, with the exception of one instance in relation to the 2003 strategy and more recently in Sida's supporting analysis for the current 2014-2020 regional strategy. This means that the theory of change relating to peacebuilding is unclear and that reporting does not necessarily pick up possible peacebuilding effects (positive or negative) of Sida's engagement.

Review of Sida's portfolio since 1995 points to a number of engagements that are relevant to peacebuilding; in particular, the support provided to returns (through the Integrated Area Programmes - IAP), justice (through support to the State Court and Higher Judicial Prosecutorial Council), transitional justice (through support on missing persons), local governance (which has sought to strengthen participation, accountability and service provision), and initiatives within the areas of culture and sports, and in particular civil society. The latter has included a substantial focus on gender equality, women's empowerment, legal assistance, and countering gender-based violence. Interventions appear particularly relevant where they seek to promote reconciliation and tolerance and where they utilise modalities that encourage social interaction across entities/ethnicities, thereby helping to break down boundaries, develop interaction between communities, and increase mutual understanding and cooperation that help dispel myths and polarised narratives. Other parts of Sida's portfolio (especially public administration reform, statistics, economic development) lend themselves more naturally to statebuilding objectives, including the EU accession agenda.

Effectiveness

Stakeholders interviewed frequently mentioned the difficult political climate caused by the division of powers at state and entity levels and by the country's bloated bureaucracy. The embassy has sought to utilise windows of opportunity where they have arisen to support more progressive forces. For example, Sida and like-minded partners played a significant role in the attempt to review the constitutional arrangements set out in Dayton via the so-called April Package (2006), although this ultimately failed. And since then, there has been no serious attempt to review the division of powers, which is seen as a key stumbling block to reconciling the three main ethnicities. Sida also supported attempts to initiate a truth and reconciliation process, although this was also ultimately unsuccessful. A significant area where the international community's support to Bosnia and Herzegovina has failed to make significant gains from a peacebuilding perspective is the education sector where segregated systems and curricula continue to perpetuate the myths and histories that separate the three main ethnic groups.

The evaluation finds that a key factor influencing effectiveness in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been Sida's approach to development. Sida is widely regarded as a constructive, flexible, principled and committed donor. These factors provide Sida with credibility and respect. The significant size of Sida's contribution has provided it with weight. However, its engagements in peacebuilding are less well known, possibly because they are not presented or perceived as such. Sida's support has also encouraged participatory, accountable, non-discriminatory (inclusive) and transparent patterns of engagement by its partners, which again is regarded as valuable from a peacebuilding perspective as it promotes interaction across boundaries. The significant use of Swedish framework organisations (Kvinna till Kvinna, Olof Palme International Centre, Swedish Helsinki Committee/Civil Rights Defenders and others) has

also contributed to this as they are familiar with applying such modalities and are well respected.

Impact

The evaluation highlights a number of results to which Sida has contributed. In the 1990s and into the 2000s, Sida's support through the IAP (which started as humanitarian support) contributed to a substantial number of returns (including minority returns). Sida's support to local governance, justice and law enforcement, gender and human rights, culture, and transitional justice has also had positive results over the evaluation period. The support to local governance has contributed to increasing linkages between municipalities and citizens. In the formal justice area, it has contributed to increasing the efficiency of the judiciary and reducing the backlog of administrative cases. It has also helped maintain the State Court in relation to anti-corruption and war crimes cases. The joint support to missing persons stands out as an example of an intervention that has had a significant impact in terms of the number of identifications (evidence and impartiality) and transitional justice but also because of its institutionalisation through local structures and commitments.

The evaluation finds that Sida's support to gender equality and women's empowerment has been a long-running feature of its engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina that has worked at various levels, including government. The support largely delivered through Swedish framework NGOs has helped institutionalise gender equality, although its implementation at state, entity and municipal level remains challenged by the country's patriarchal attitudes. At grassroots level, the evaluation finds that Sida's support (via its framework and local partners) has produced positive results with regard to peacebuilding. However, more is required for these to be felt at national level. With regard to minorities and other vulnerable groups, Sida has supported efforts to improve the situation facing Roma and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) persons. Roma were, for example, included within the support to returns.

Sustainability

Today, nearly 25 years after the end of the violent conflict, many stakeholders continue to highlight the relevance of the drivers of conflict highlighted in this report, in particular the deeply entrenched polarisation between the three main ethnicities which is highlighted and reinforced at every election, via the media, and through much of the education system. While this does not mean that violent conflict is just around the corner, it does suggest a continued need to focus on peacebuilding as a distinct engagement area. In this respect, Sida would benefit from a stronger focus on peacebuilding theory of change, building upon the improvements recently made through the operationalization of the current 2014-2020 Regional Strategy.

1 Introduction

This report presents the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) case study for the Evaluation of Sida's support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts and is an annex to the evaluation synthesis report. The evaluation is the first longitudinal evaluation of peacebuilding related strategic engagements undertaken by Sida and has the objective *to evaluate how Sida has approached peacebuilding on the strategic level in different contexts*. The focus is thus not on individual project results, but rather the overall approach taken by Sida in the given context in terms of its influence on peacebuilding and the lessons that may be derived from this.

The evaluation utilises Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) standards and principles and it focuses on four of the five major OECD-DAC evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability). Case studies of Sida approaches to peacebuilding over time in four countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guatemala, Rwanda and Somalia) are used to provide data. The longitudinal approach means that the evaluation looks back to the early 1990s.

In the following report, we first present a historical perspective of peace and conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as an overview of key drivers that need to be considered and addressed to engage in effective peacebuilding. This is followed by an overview of the international engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the evaluation period and a similar assessment specific to Sida in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we present the main findings from the Bosnia and Herzegovina case study listed in accordance with the four OECD-DAC criteria. And finally, in Chapter 5, we present the conclusions and lessons learned from the evaluation findings in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The report analysis builds on: (i) extensive desk study of available Sida and related contextual information, (ii) interviews with Sida staff in Stockholm and Sarajevo and elsewhere via Skype, and (iii) interviews with implementing partners, development partners and other resource persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina and elsewhere (over Skype). The field mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina took place between 8-12 October 2018 and was based in Sarajevo.

A few limitations need to be taken into consideration when reading the report. Firstly, the longitudinal element of the evaluation means that data is needed all the way back to the early 1990s. However, the team has not been able to obtain much information from Sida or other sources prior to 1998. Similarly, it has been challenging to identify implementing partner staff to interview from this period. Secondly, where interviews

with stakeholders from this period have taken place, it has sometimes been difficult for the individuals concerned to recall specific details of the engagements supported, including their effects. In general, the data has become more comprehensive the closer we come to the present period. This also coincides with a significant strengthening in Sida's results based management.

Finally, we should also draw attention to the fact that very few engagements in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been described or "marked" as peacebuilding *per se* in the documentation that has been seen by the evaluation team. This includes data on Open Aid. The word "peacebuilding" is not mentioned in any country strategy or reporting and does not therefore feature amongst Sida's objectives for its engagement during the evaluation period. The words "reconciliation", "tolerance", and "inter-ethnic dialogue" – which may be taken as synonyms for peacebuilding – *do* appear and these concepts, along with transitional justice, are what the majority of interviewees referred to as peacebuilding during discussion. In this Bosnia case study, the evaluation team has used these understandings to help identify those interventions that are more directly relevant to peacebuilding from those that are less so.

2 Peace and Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina

2.1 OVERVIEW OF PEACE AND CONFLICT IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA SINCE THE 1990s

The literature on Bosnia and Herzegovina's recent past generally describes three phases: the pre-war phase (until 1992) when Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of six republics of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; the civil war phase (1992-1995), characterised by extreme ethno-nationalism, violence and ultimately international intervention; and the post-war phase (from 1995), which has focused on recovery, peacebuilding, state-building, and movement towards integration into European structures. The second and third phases demonstrate the importance of ethnicity and its pervasive influence on almost all areas of political, economic and social life. In the first phase, these factors were largely subordinated to the ideals of the socialist Yugoslav state under President Josip Tito. However, perceptions of identity have been and continue to play a key part in the three main ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina (mainly Muslim Bosniak, Catholic Croat, and Orthodox Serb) and different interpretations of the war and its causes persist within each community.

In the pre-war phase, the Tito regime had derived its political identity from the partisan struggle during the Second World War and its socialist, non-aligned, geo-political position during the Cold War. Tito's death in 1980 and the collapse of communism in the late 1980s led to the emergence of ethno-nationalism and the Yugoslav Federation began to dissolve. In June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence, resulting in localised conflict in both countries but which subsequently spread to areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The different ethnicities pulled in different directions: while Croats and Bosniaks generally favoured succession, the Serb population did not. The Serb and Croat ethnicities were supported by their "homelands", Serbia and Croatia. In early 1992, Bosniaks and Croats voted for independence in a referendum boycotted by the Serbs. In April 1992, the European Union and others recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence.

During the civil war that developed, separate territories of the three ethnicities were created through violence and ethnic cleansing and through the support provided by Croatia and Serbia. The Bosnian Serbs under the leadership of Radovan Karadzic laid siege to Sarajevo and occupied large parts of the country. The United Nations (UN) imposed sanctions on Serbia for backing rebel Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia. Conflict also broke out between Bosniaks and Croats, culminating in severe damage to the town of Mostar. Changing alliances between ethnicities and factions also added to the

complexity of the conflict: Bosniak Muslims and Serbs formed an alliance against Croats in Herzegovina, rival Muslim forces fought each other in north-west Bosnia and Croats and Serbs fought Muslims in central Bosnia. War crimes were committed on all sides, while the majority of deaths (65%) were Bosniak.¹ Responding to the violence, a number of areas were declared UN “safe areas” in April 1993, under the protection of UN peacekeeping troops (UNPROFOR). But in July 1995, the safe haven of Srebrenica was overrun by Bosnian Serb forces under Ratko Mladic and 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were massacred, despite the presence of UNPROFOR troops. NATO launched air strikes against Serb positions enabling Bosniak and Croat forces to make territorial gains and ultimately creating the conditions necessary for renewed peace talks and the Dayton peace accord.² Estimates suggest that over 100,000 people were killed or disappeared³ and 2.2 million people driven from their homes during the conflict. There was also massive destruction of economic and other infrastructure, including housing. Indeed, by the end of the war in late 1995, reports indicate that more than 2,000 kilometres of roads, 70 bridges, half the electricity network, and more than a third of the housing had been destroyed.⁴

The post war period stems from the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995, which partitioned Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Republika Srpska, and the Bosniak-Croatian Federation (itself divided into a number of cantons). Subsequently, the Brcko district became a multi-ethnic self-governing administrative unit. The 1995 Constitution that was included as part of Dayton established a complex political structure with governments at State, Entity and District levels, resulting also in a large decentralised bureaucracy to support it. The State level comprises a tripartite rotating Presidency, a Council of Ministers (executive branch) and a bicameral Parliamentary Assembly.

Dayton also established the basis for a transition during which the international community would have significant powers concerning governance, security, reconstruction and reform, with key actors being the UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), EU and the Office of the High Representative (OHR), acting under the authority of the (international) Peace Implementation Council (PIC). The OHR developed sweeping powers in relation to the civilian implementation of the agreement. The so-called Bonn powers (December 1997) were designed to avoid the implementation of the Peace

¹ Research and Documentation Centre, Sarajevo.

² Dayton General Framework Peace Agreement, December 1995. Various other efforts to establish a settlement had been made under EC and UN auspices, notably the Carrington-Cutileiro plan (1992), the Owen-Vance plan (1993), the Owen-Stoltenberg plan (1993), and the Contact Group plan (1994). The Washington Agreement (March 1994) saw the Bosniak and Croat parties agree to the establishment of the cantonment-based Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

³ www.ICMP.int.

⁴ Cox, 2001.

Agreement being delayed or obstructed by local nationalist politicians. They included the ability to adopt binding decisions when local parties were unable or unwilling to act and to remove public officials who violate legal commitments or the peace agreement.

The two main goals of Dayton were to end the war and establish the basis for rebuilding a viable Bosnia. On the former objective, peace enforcement was provided by the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and subsequently Stabilisation Force (SFOR), including Swedish participation. However, by partitioning the country into ethnically based components, Dayton cemented nationalistic agendas within the power sharing arrangements that were agreed. At the central level, a tri-partite system was intended to ensure the participation of the three main ethno-national groups in decision-making. In practice, this meant that politicians have had opportunities to block the political process through the exercise of a veto. It has also meant that certain ethnic groups, such as Jews and Roma, are effectively denied access to key elected positions at state level.

The central level also initially lacked two key attributes of a state, namely the ability to raise taxes and maintain security. In contrast, the entities were able to develop and carry out their own policies, although implementation was often constrained by political allegiances and disagreements. As the political status quo reflected the wartime political elite and nationalist politics, there has been little domestic incentive for reform that changes this balance.⁵ In 2006, the so-called “April Package” of constitutional reforms (with Swedish support, amongst others), which would have opened up the Presidency to election from the State Parliament, narrowly missed being adopted. In December 2009, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR’s) ruling on the Sejdić-Finci case challenged the constitutional arrangements for elections to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency but has yet to be implemented.

To break the impasse at the political level, key decisions have been taken by the High Representative using the Bonn powers arrangement, often with limited local ownership. In June 2004, for example, the United Nations High Representative/European Union Special Representative (HR/EUSR) (Lord Ashdown) removed 59 politicians and officials in Republika Srpska. In October 2007, changes to the rules of procedure for the Bosnia and Herzegovina Parliament and Council of Ministers were imposed to prevent members from blocking decision-making through absence. Observers note that the imposition of governance in which international stakeholders held sway and could impose decisions and overrule domestic leaders and legislation helped prevent nationalist decision-making and removed power from obstructive officials.⁶ The

⁵ State of Conflict: A case study on peace-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, November 2009.

⁶ Case study: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Zupcevic and Causevic, World Bank, September 2009.

weakening of the ethno-nationalist elites has been highlighted as a major precondition for state consolidation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁷ By 2006, progressively less use was being made of these special powers and this trend has continued.⁸

The post war period also saw massive recovery and reconstruction efforts from the international community, including via substantial IMF loans as well as support from the World Bank and European Union. Bosnia and Herzegovina has faced the dual challenge of simultaneously recovering from the effects of the war and secondly adjusting its economic model from one that was centrally-planned (under the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)) to one that is market-based and capable of interacting with the rest of Europe. A further counter-weight to this transition has been the persistence of multi-layered and weak state structures coupled with political patronage systems providing a good basis for endemic corruption.

Nonetheless, in 2002, Bosnia and Herzegovina produced its first poverty reduction strategy (the Medium Term Development Strategy - MTDS) with objectives to create conditions for sustainable and balanced economic development, reduce poverty, and accelerate movement towards EU integration. The MTDS has provided a vehicle for donor alignment and, coupled with the growing incentive represented by the EU, has led to improvements in economic and social development, as shown in Table 4.1 below. GDP per capita has increased significantly since the end of the war; although the economy was hit by the recession in 2008 and the effects of the floods in 2014. The value of aid per capita and the proportion of Gross National Income (GNI) derived from external aid have decreased progressively (from 48% in the immediate post war years to 2.4% currently). World Bank statistics show that employment has improved, with a significant drop in unemployment between 2016 and 2017 of over 8%, albeit with unemployment still very high at 45%.⁹ Youth unemployment (at 60%) is very high and a major reason for emigration. Many poor families rely upon remittances. One in four households is headed by a woman and there are high rates of inequality and gender-based violence. Women comprise 34% of the workforce and earn 46% less than male counterparts. The inequalities are exacerbated by women's difficulty in accessing decision-making (women represent only 19% in Parliament and on 3% of mayors are women).¹⁰

⁷ IPPR, 2009.

⁸ Sida country report, 2006.

⁹ World Bank, Regular Economic Report, 2018.

¹⁰ Strategy report, 15 April 2018, Sida.

Table 4.1: Key indicators for Bosnia and Herzegovina 1990-2018¹¹

	1990-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2018
Average GDP (current billion USD (up to 2017))	1.56	3.77	7.92	15.63	17.67	17.1
Foreign Direct Investment (net inflows % GDP) (up to 2017)	N/D	2.68	4.62	5.41	2.39	2.10
Freedom in the World (0.0-7.0) 0=Most free 7=Least free	N/D	5.0	4.0	3.33	3.33	3.75
Gender Inequality Index (GII) (0-1)	N/D	N/D	N/D	0.24 (2010)	0.2	0.16 (2015)
Human Development Index (HDI) (0-1)	N/D	N/D	0.70 (2005)	0.71	0.74	0.75 (2015)
Personal Remittances, received (% of GDP)	N/D	38.96	22.78	14.8	10.84	11.0
Internally Displaced Persons	4602693	4790757	5327779	12986577	23589316	37746605
Refugee population	650441	726018	25703	8276	6911	5766
Net ODA (% of GNI) (up to 2016)	48.45	28.69	7.88	3.32	2.98	2.4
Swedish percentage of total aid (ODA)	N/D	N/D	N/D	N/D	4.17 (2014)	5.1(2015) 3.70(2016)*
Net ODA Per Capita (Current USD) (up to 2016)	62.60	248.06	163.41	135.97	147.40	113.52
Voice and Accountability (-2.5 - 2.5)	N/D	-0.07	0.08	0.08	-0.1	-0.13
Government Effectiveness (-2.5 - 2.5)	N/D	-1.04	-0.98	-0.71	-0.56	-0.49
Political Stability & Absence of Violence (-2.5 - 2.5)	N/D	-0.57	-0.32	-0.58	-0.48	-0.39
Control of Corruption (-2.5 - 2.5)	N/D	-0.5	-0.37	-0.33	-0.32	-0.43
Rule of Law (-2.5 - 2.5)	N/D	-0.4	-0.58	-0.43	-0.25	-0.29
Unemployment, total (% of total labour force)	17.55(1991)	N/D	N/D	26.91	27.34	25.66
Military Expenditure as % of government spending	N/D	5.09	2.88	2.40	2.37	2.2
Positive change compared to previous period						
No change compared to previous period						
Negative change compared to previous period						

While massive external aid has contributed substantially to rebuilding most of the physical damage from the war, the distribution of financial and material assistance has responded to where the ethnic power structures were willing to co-operate with the international community. In areas, for instance, political objectives such as minority return or implementing constitutional reform, sources indicate that these efforts met with strong resistance.¹² In terms of other human rights, progress was made and Bosnia and Herzegovina has adopted legislation of international standard. Reporting in 2007 indicates that discrimination on ethnic grounds appeared to be decreasing.¹³ The Ministry for Human Rights has taken various initiatives to strengthen human rights provisions; for example, through developing an Anti-Discrimination Strategy and a Human Rights Strategy. And the Gender Agency has promoted Bosnia and Herzegovina's Gender Action Plan and the 1325 Action Plan. However, human rights Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) (as well as reporting from Sida) indicate continuing challenges regarding their implementation and the persistence of issues such as discrimination against minorities, gender based violence and hate speech.¹⁴

The desire to move closer to and join the European Union is often seen as an important incentive for political, governance, human rights and economic reform. In 1999, the EU established Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe as a mechanism to strengthen peace, democracy, human rights and economy amongst its members, including Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also in 1999, the Stabilisation and Association Pro-

¹¹ Sources: World Bank, Freedom House, SIPRI, UNHCR, UNDP, Open Aid.

¹² Statebuilding and post conflict reconstruction: Lessons from Bosnia, Marcus Cox, 2001.

¹³ Sida country report, 2007.

¹⁴ Strategy Report 2018, Sida.

cess (SAp) was launched in the Western Balkans with the ultimate aim of supporting countries' membership aspirations. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement between Bosnia and the EU entered into force in 2015 and Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted its membership application to the EU in February 2016. Nonetheless, the complicated decision-making process, lack of shared vision and weak cooperation between the various levels of government at state and entity level in Bosnia and Herzegovina have delayed structural reforms and hampered the country's progress towards the EU.¹⁵ The lack of progress on reform has contributed to high levels of emigration (150,000 persons between 2013-2017).¹⁶

2.2 SIGNIFICANT DRIVERS OF PEACE AND CONFLICT IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

In order to identify factors affecting conflict and peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we have examined a substantial amount of literature assessing the context during the evaluation period and have triangulated this with reporting from Sida and information provided by stakeholders during interviews. The assessment of **conflict drivers** points to identity and ethnicity as key factors cutting across all aspects of political, economic and social life in the country.¹⁷ These factors have remained constant since the war, kept alive by ethno-nationalist rhetoric from politicians, particularly surrounding elections. Identity and ethnicity is played out in multiple ways, including:

- *Perceptions of identity and lack of trust.* The literature highlights that the war had a radicalising effect on perceptions of identity, including the very close linkage between ethnicity and religion, triggering an “exaggerated identification with one’s ethnic group” and complicating efforts at nation and state building because negotiating positions are driven by perceptions of “national” interest.¹⁸ This is fed through the persistence of contradictory narratives about the war and pre-war events, including in relation to responsibility. War criminals, even those convicted in front of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), are regarded as defending “their people” during the war. ICTY judgements have therefore often proved controversial and are being subject to revisionist rhetoric from political leaders.¹⁹ Equally, war-time atrocities, such as occurred at Srebrenica but also others further back in time, are deeply engrained on the collective memory of the group(s) concerned.

¹⁵ Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Report, EC, October 2014

¹⁶ Freedom House, 2018

¹⁷ The focus on ethnicity as main area targeted in the evaluation is due to the peacebuilding nature of the evaluation focusing on drivers of conflict and peace where ethnicity is a driver.

¹⁸ See, for example, The dynamics of conflict in the multi-ethnic state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012

¹⁹ As noted in 53rd Report of the High Representative, 5 May 2018

- *Separated curricula and schools for Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats* are decisively contributing to maintaining mutually exclusive and contradictory historical records and the perceptions of identity and mistrust highlighted above. The literature notes that in many places, civil society organisations, sports and music clubs, bars and restaurants are almost exclusively providing services for one of the three groups. Media are known as Bosniak, Serb or Croatian.²⁰ The polarised and identity based discourse is feeding a lack of trust between ethnic groups and antagonistic perceptions of each other. The literature and stakeholders interviewed in Bosnia and Herzegovina highlight that this is not being addressed through the educational system, which remains largely segregated.²¹
- *Disputes about the form and identity of the state.* Bosnia and Herzegovina's succession from the SFRY was the trigger that led to the civil war. The Dayton Agreement organised a peace (which has held) but it did not settle the identity of the state, providing for two entities and new internal borders instead. As a consequence, speculation about succession has continued to be used politically (mainly, but not exclusively, in relation to Republika Srpska).²² Some Bosniaks see Republika Srpska as the legitimisation of Milosevic's politics. There are others who are in favour of creating three (ethnically-based) entities.²³ Successive general elections (since 1998) have reflected ethnic divisions and the split between the two entities. Stakeholders interviewed consistently noted that the most recent elections (in October 2018) were accompanied by continued nationalist rhetoric, particularly from the political leadership in Republika Srpska. Efforts to amend the constitution to reduce the scope for blocking by a single group have not been successful.
- *Corruption, unemployment and vulnerability.* Corruption remains a major problem permeating all strata of governance and affects minority households in particular. The unrest that spread across the country in 2014 was triggered by factory closures and fuelled by inadequate responses from the authorities and economic grievances, including high rates of youth unemployment. The literature notes that economic grievances easily fit into the existing ethnic narratives.²⁴ Stakeholders interviewed noted, for example, that local power structures maintain control over public-sector appointments, allowing them to create elaborate patronage networks, which give tight control over public institutions.²⁵ Women's vulnerabilities have been exacerbated by the prevalence of

²⁰ Berlin Center for integrative mediation, 2018.

²¹ FES, 2012.

²² 53rd Report of the High Representative, 5 May 2018.

²³ FES, 2012.

²⁴ FES, 2012.

²⁵ Interviews in Sarajevo. See also Cox, 2001

patriarchal attitudes, their role as breadwinners and relatively high representation in the informal sector. Despite formal progress in terms of mainstreaming gender approaches (for example, the adoption of a Gender Action Plan in 2013), women remain underrepresented in decision-making bodies and subject to constraints in access to justice.²⁶ Youth exhibit extremely high rates of unemployment (60% in 2018), which contributes to correspondingly high levels of youth emigration.²⁷

- *Political divisions impede progress on human rights.* Human Rights Watch (2018) notes that authorities have repeatedly failed to amend the constitution, which discriminates against Jews, Roma and other minorities. It highlights that over 98,000 people remain displaced and that journalists are intimidated. The closure of the ICTY in 2017, after successfully concluding its mandate, contrasted with slow progress in prosecuting war-crimes in domestic courts, including conflict-related sexual violence.²⁸ Freedom House (2018) underlines that the pervasive use of “inflammable rhetoric and cheap politicisation” amongst political leaders protecting ethnic interests and their current mandates with problems at state and entity levels of power also featuring at lower levels of government.²⁹ Virtually all stakeholders interviewed confirmed this assessment as a persisting cause of polarised attitudes, adding that the political rhetoric is extended further through the mainstream media.

In relation to **drivers of peace**, the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (*the Dayton Accord*) is recognised as halting the war and providing the basis for peace and development, although it is also criticised for cementing the ethnic divisions in the country and thereby perpetuating some of the conflict drivers previously mentioned. Nonetheless, since Dayton, there have not been any serious outbreaks of fighting and the peace agreement’s guarantors have markedly reduced their military and stabilisation presence, including via NATO, OSCE and OHR. The Peace Agreement included eleven annexes prescribing arrangements for military aspects and regional stabilisation, boundaries, elections, a constitution, arbitration, human rights, refugees and displaced persons, national monuments, public corporations, civilian implementation, and international policing.³⁰ As previously mentioned, certain provisions in Annex 5 (the Constitution) have proved contentious in practice and enabled one or more of the ethnic groups to block decision making at state level. The arrangements for elections to public office have also been successfully challenged in the ECHR (the Sejdić-Finci ruling in December 2009). There have been several at-

²⁶ Include Women in Change, Final Report, Kvinna till Kvinna, 2018

²⁷ Strategy Report, 2018, Sida

²⁸ World Report, HRW, 2018

²⁹ Freedom House, 2018

³⁰ General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14 December 1995

tempts at constitutional reform (e.g. the so-called April Package in 2006) but these have not been successful. The development by the High Representative of the Bonn Powers was partly a response to such challenges.

Stakeholders consulted as well as the literature in general point especially to the *EU accession process* as a key driver of peace and stability, not least due to the comprehensive *acquis* that must be met. The movement towards Europe is multi-faceted and is an area where most political actors and citizens agree is the direction forward, although there are challenges in practice. Amongst the population at large, recent statistics suggest that up to 66% are in favour of the EU and wish to join.³¹ While noting some improvements, the most recent assessment from the EU points to continuing challenges at the central level due to divergent opinions amongst ruling coalition members and leads to the conclusion that further progress is required over a wide range of policy areas at both central and entity levels in order to bring Bosnia and Herzegovina up to European standards.³²

The role of *other international actors* has also been highly relevant, especially the Office of the High Representative (OHR), which has regularly acted as a “fire-fighter” to keep reform processes moving and remove obstructive actors. However, this role has also been controversial as it has not necessarily promoted local ownership. The OHR has reduced its prominence in recent years and its use of the Bonn powers is now much more limited. Likewise, the international donor community has reduced its presence in recent years, although it is still active. Currently, the major bilateral donors are Sweden, Germany, Switzerland, Norway and the Netherlands and the United States.³³ The number of donors working directly on peacebuilding issues appears to be limited, although some institutions such as the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), which is an important actor in transitional justice, have a number of donors.

In the initial post war period, NATO (IFOR/SFOR) and UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) played important roles in *stabilisation* and maintaining security – and Bosnia and Herzegovina has not seen a re-emergence of conflict since the peace accords, despite occasional sabre-rattling.³⁴ NATO’s stabilisation role switched to the EU in 2004, although it continues to be relevant in terms of incentives for security sector reform and eventual NATO membership.

³¹ Gallup, 15 May 2018.

³² Bosnia and Herzegovina 2018 report, 2018 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, EC. 17 April 2018.

³³ Donor mapping report, 2016, Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Finance.

³⁴ 53rd Report of the High Representative, 5 May 2018.

Regarding *civil society*, which is often regarded as an important peace actor where it has legitimacy and is close to citizens, the initial post war period saw a substantial engagement by INGOs and funding from donors leading to the establishment of domestic NGOs and Community Based Organisations (CBOs). Many of these formed to address local problems but assessments suggest that they were often focused on service delivery, had limited anchoring in local communities, and lacked the administrative strength required by international donors. Since then, professional NGOs have emerged and there has been a growth in networking models.³⁵ Sida's extensive support to civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina through Swedish framework organisations (such as Kvinna till Kvinna, the Olof Palme Center, the Swedish Helsinki Committee/Civil Rights Defenders etc.) and other International Non Governmental Organisations (INGOs) has been aimed at human rights, empowerment of minorities, youth and women, reconstruction, health, media etc. suggests that civil society has been (and still is) regarded as a useful partner, particularly in the areas of democracy and human rights and that it contributes to peacebuilding.

2.3 KEY INTERNATIONAL PEACEBUILDING EVENTS

The following list highlights key international developments and initiatives following the conflict that have been aimed at enhancing peace and development, which the team has identified as relevant for Sida and the evaluation. The major periods and events are:

1995 - 2000

- Dayton Peace Agreement (November 1995)
- Peace Implementation Conference, London (December 1995)
- Carl Bildt appointed as first HR/EUSR (December 1995)
- NATO-led IFOR replaces the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) (from December 1995)
- Brussels pledging conference (December 1995)
- ICTY begins work in The Hague (1996)
- SFOR replaces IFOR (December 1996)
- PIC grants HR additional powers (the Bonn Powers) (December 1997)
- EU Stability Pact launched (June 1999)
- EU SAp launched (June 1999)

2000 – 2010

- Bosnia and Herzegovina joins Council of Europe (April 2002)

³⁵ Civil society capacity building in post conflict societies: the Experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, INTRAC, June 2006.

- EC feasibility study for Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) (November 2003)
- EU-led Althea replaces SFOR (December 2004)
- EU Thessaloniki Summit identifies Bosnia and Herzegovina as potential member (June 2003)
- EU SAA (November 2005)
- Bosnia and Herzegovina joins NATO Partnership for Peace (December 2006)
- ICTY ruling on genocide in Srebrenica (March 2007)
- Bosnia and Herzegovina signs EU SAA (2008)
- Regional Cooperation Council replaces Stability Pact (February 2008)
- Sejdić Finci ruling from ECHR (December 2009)

2011-2018

- EU foreign ministers sign SAA (March 2015)
- Reform Agenda for Bosnia and Herzegovina (2015)
- Bosnia and Herzegovina submits application to join the EU (February 2016)

The International Community's response to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 was initially diplomatic, military and humanitarian leading to the Dayton peace accords following a string of unsuccessful efforts (but including the Washington Agreement in March 1994 which ended the conflict between Bosniak and Croat forces and paved the way for the Bosniak-Croat Federation that is now one of the two Bosnia and Herzegovina entities). The international response following the conflict supported the Dayton peace accord and this included military contributions (via NATO) and civilian stabilisation through the Office of the High Representative (Carl Bildt). A role in support of elections was earmarked in Annex 3 to the OSCE. In Annex 7, the right of return for refugees and displaced persons was established, which was to underpin the substantial support provided to this area by Sida through the Integrated Area Programmes (IAP). An international Peace Implementation Council (PIC) was established in late 1995 and first met in 1996. The PIC's Steering Board (of which Sweden was not a member) was chaired by the High Representative and provided an oversight mechanism for the implementation of the peace accord. The role of the PIC has progressively reduced over the years as Bosnia and Herzegovina has stabilised, although its decision in December 1997 to grant the High Representative special executive powers (the so-called Bonn Powers) was an important means to reduce the effect of political spoilers in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Towards the end of the 1990s, the attention began to shift towards Bosnia and Herzegovina's integration into European structures. The EU's Stability Pact launched in June 1999 was intended to strengthen regional cooperation and peace and security, recognising the regional dimension of conflicts in the Western Balkans (including Kosovo at that time). It also held out the prospect of closer association with the EU, a prospect that became more tangible with the SAp, also in June 1999. Since then, EU membership has been a goal for Bosnia and Herzegovina, with important milestones being the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003, which identified Bosnia and Herzegovina as

a potential member, Bosnia and Herzegovina's signature of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) in 2008, and Bosnia and Herzegovina's application to join the EU in February 2016. At the time of preparing this report, the European Commission is considering Bosnia and Herzegovina's response to the membership questionnaire

3 Sida's key priorities and theories of change

The following outlines the team's overview of Sida's support to peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina based on the data available.

Sida's development priorities since 1999 have been articulated through Swedish Government country strategies concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina and, most recently, through a regional strategy for Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and Turkey (2014-2020). Prior to 1995, Sida primarily provided grants through Swedish and international NGOs and during the war (and immediately following it) there was a focus on humanitarian assistance. The country strategy papers (and the country reports) provide a good overview of Swedish priorities and objectives but they tend to be fairly general and the contextual information (though useful) is limited. To manage this challenge, the team has drawn extensively from the wider literature on Bosnia and Herzegovina and information provided from stakeholders who have been interviewed during the evaluation. The peace and conflict drivers identified and the national and international developments during the period have been charted against the priorities displayed in the strategies and reports. The following therefore provides an overview of Sida's approach in Bosnia and Herzegovina based on the data available as of October 2018.


3.1 OVERVIEW OF SIDA SUPPORT

Sida's support to Bosnia and Herzegovina started during the war with humanitarian support channelled through multilateral organisations and bilaterally via INGOs. In 1994, support was provided to reconstruction of housing, an engagement that subsequently developed into a Swedish flagship programme (the IAP) and continued into the mid-2000s. Sweden also took an active part in the peace process and the former Swedish Prime Minister, Carl Bildt, was appointed as the first UN High Representative to the country following the peace agreement. Sweden also contributed peace-keeping troops to UNPROFOR and thereafter IFOR, SFOR and EUFOR.

Sweden's engagement has increased over time from around USD 1,5 million in 1992 to USD 18 million in 1994, and around USD 25 million per year between 1998 and 2003 to around USD 45 million in 2005 before reducing again from 2008 as illustrated in the graph below (fig. 3.1). By the mid-2000s, Sweden was the largest bilateral donor of development assistance. These trends are also reflected in the number of

entries in Open Aid, which extend from around 116 in 1998 to around 124 a year in the period 2000-2005, to around 89 in 2010, 55 in 2013 and 51 in 2017.³⁶

Figure 3.1: Sida's Aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-2017



Reporting from the Embassy in Sarajevo also indicates that there has been an on-going process of consolidation of the Swedish support (reducing the number of individual engagements and increasing the use of joint donor mechanisms, such as pooled funds and trust funds). In so doing, Sida has closely followed the general trends in development assistance as promoted by the OECD/DAC and the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. Recent strategies clearly demonstrate that Sida has been acting in accordance with the Paris Declaration principles of alignment and harmonisation. Inter alia, this is illustrated in the 2006-2010 Strategy by the focus on alignment with Bosnia and Herzegovina's Medium Term Development Strategy (its Poverty Reduction Strategy paper - PRSP) as well as with the priorities associated with potential EU membership, including the Copenhagen Criteria, and as set out in the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA). However, while these and other objectives align well with the concept of statebuilding (strengthening the institutions and functioning of the state and thereby the basis for citizens' support for it), as mentioned above the link to peacebuilding is less explicit.

Although peacebuilding per se is not mentioned explicitly in any of Sweden's country or regional strategies relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the team was informed by Sida staff at the Embassy in Sarajevo (past and present) that their selection of activities and those of Sida's partners in the country was informed by an understanding of peace and conflict drivers and thus incorporated a peace perspective. Examples of this include support to economic development, local governance, culture, and gender that


³⁶ OpenAid.se.

³⁷ Pre-1998 data from Sweden and Bosnia and Herzegovina (pdf).

have included approaches that cross boundaries and build trust (thereby contributing to interaction, tolerance, reconciliation etc.). Furthermore, the portfolio has also included interventions with more specific peacebuilding effects, such as the support to the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP); youth (KULT); women, peace and security (Kvinna till Kvinna, Olof Palme International Centre).

In Figure 3.2 below, we have drawn on data from Open Aid to illustrate types of aid provided by Sida in the period 1998-2017. It is important to caveat this with the observation that some of the entries on Open Aid lack precise descriptions and very few of them refer to peacebuilding directly. However, the broad trends reflect the general shift (also apparent from the country strategies) away from recovery and reconstruction towards statebuilding and EU accession. Thus, the portion showing “no direct peacebuilding influence” increases from 34,5% in 1998-2002 to 74,3% in 2013-2017. There is also a commensurate reduction in the portion showing engagements that are likely to have contributed to peacebuilding. Included here, for example, is the substantial support provided to Swedish NGOs, particularly those working within the area of human rights and democracy. Finally, it is worth noting the relatively low amounts provided directly to peacebuilding and identified as such (i.e. using the “principal” and “significant” distinction according to Sida’s 2017 marker system).³⁸

Figure 3.2 Sida peacebuilding activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998-2017



³⁸ Sida’s Statistical Handbook 2017 distinguishes between principal and significant objectives wherein advancing peace and security is explicitly referred to in project/programme objectives. We have found very few cases where a specific reference exists. However, by examining the (often) implicit theory of change involved, it is possible to infer that peacebuilding has been a relevant factor in the project/programme purpose. To guide this assessment, we have sought a correlation between the drivers of peace and conflict noted in section 2.2 and the sector or intervention concerned.

3.2 SIDA SUPPORT AND THEORIES OF CHANGE

In the following, we provide an overview of Sida's thematic priorities in the evaluation period (as per the data available) and we endeavour to expose the implied theories of change for the individual strategies available. To the extent possible, the coverage highlights aspects that are relevant to peacebuilding, as described above in Figure 3.2 and places these in the wider context of Sweden's country strategies and aid policy. Apart from the initial post war period, the overview is presented according to the strategy periods used by the Swedish Government.

1995-1999

During the war, Sweden provided almost SEK 1 billion in humanitarian assistance, mainly channelled through UNHCR and international NGOs. Both this assistance and subsequent recovery and reconstruction efforts included support to returnees (and repair of housing) in line with the Dayton undertaking concerning the right to return to homes of origin (Annex 7). This recognised that early return of refugees was relevant to help resolve the conflict. Sida's substantial support through "assisted self-help" in the IAP was a major contribution to this and extended beyond housing to provide other local needs, including local infrastructure, power, schools, healthcare, and mine clearance. Assistance was also provided to minority returns.

During the immediate post war period, Sida's engagement was developed in accordance with "instructions" (*Regeringsbeslut*) prepared by the Swedish MFA and then implemented through the small Sida section at the embassy in dialogue with other development partners, international agencies and local NGOs. Coordination with OHR was undertaken to ensure alignment with the peace agreement. In the absence of a clear development plan from the Bosnia and Herzegovina Government, the assistance was guided by the overall objective of supporting Dayton and meeting immediate recovery and reconstruction needs and there appears to have been a general consensus regarding priorities. Indeed, an evaluation of Sweden's assistance covering this period noted that Sida's field staff had been well informed about the situation in the country and pro-actively sought engagement opportunities in line with the development priorities.³⁹

According to the data available from 1998 onwards on Open Aid, the overall portfolio included various interventions in the areas of democracy and human rights, which was mainly channelled through OHR, OSCE, the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and Swedish NGOs via framework agreements (notably Kvinna till Kvinna, Olof Palme International Centre, and the Swedish Helsinki Committee). Other sectors included governance (local governance and public financial manage-

³⁹ Sweden's assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Claes Sandgren, Sida Evaluation 99/24, November 1999.

ment), culture, independent media, economic development, justice, health, infrastructure (e.g. railways) and agricultural rehabilitation. In addition, a number of Swedish secondments to OHR priority positions (political affairs, human rights/rule of law, legal, and gender) were financed through Sida from 1997.

2000-2002

The first formal Swedish strategy for development cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina is from 2000 and took its starting point in the Dayton Peace Accord and the arrangements then developing for integration into European structures, notably via the EU SAp, which had been launched in 1999. A stable and economically viable development is also presented as benefiting the region as a whole, which is in line with EU Stability Pact objectives to strengthen regional cooperation. The importance of the SAp is that it provided a clear prospect of future EU membership (and thus an incentive) as well as guidance and assistance with the wide range of statebuilding reforms and legislation necessary to meet the EU *acquis communautaire*.

The strategy included four objectives: (1) peace & stability; (2) democracy & respect for human rights; (3) socially sustainable economic development; and (4) returns (to areas of origin). There is mention of support to victims of war, reconciliation; policy and institutional reform; democracy, human rights, culture, independent media and gender equality. Support to returns (including through a continuation of the Integrated Area Programmes) is presented as a pre-condition for the country's peace and reconciliation, stability and economic development. The strategy also noted that strengthened democracy, human rights and gender equality are likewise preconditions for stability.⁴⁰ These objectives provided some elements of a peacebuilding theory of change, such that by promoting democratic change, human rights, return, gender equality and sustainable economic development - and countering ethno-nationalistic tendencies - key threats to Bosnia and Herzegovina's peace and stability will be mitigated and the prospects for development enhanced. The strategy noted in this regard the relevance of electoral reform as a key area to degrade political parties' ethnic focus. Likewise, judicial reform was needed to promote respect for human rights and rule of law. Support to civil society had the underlying assumption that engaging at grass roots would help build social capital and increase trust and confidence, qualities that were regarded as lacking, especially in rural communities.

As a result, Sida's portfolio for this period reflected a continuation of the broad support provided in the previous period with an emphasis on strengthening both duty bearers (particularly at municipal level) and rights holders (via civil society).

⁴⁰ Strategi för Sveriges utvecklingssamarbete med Bosnien-Hercegovina 2000-2002, Sida .

2003-2005

The 2003-2005 Strategy maintained the focus on European integration via the SAp, which was boosted at the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003 which identified Bosnia and Herzegovina as one of the candidate counties in the region for future EU membership. A further strategic development was the Bosnian Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (i.e. the MTDS) that became available in March 2004 and provided a mechanism for closer alignment with local priorities.

The new strategy included "peace and stability and transition to a market economy" as one of its key objectives and maintained the previous support democratic governance (institutional reform, justice, human rights and democracy). It noted that support to returns through the IAP would continue on the basis that it both strengthened the local economy and reconciliation.

The 2003 strategy thus pointed to a shift from post-war reconstruction and recovery to sustainable social, economic and political development and future EU accession. The overall objective relating to peace and stability provided the basis of a theory of change, which sees strengthening state administration and civil society as a necessary precondition for democracy and the SAp as the main motor for securing the country's integration into EU structures.⁴¹ The strategy was supported by a series of annexes prepared mainly by Sida staff and providing a results analysis of previous support, a country (context) analysis, and a conflict analysis.⁴²

Sida's portfolio for this period reflected a continuation of the previous support, including the strengthening of both duty bearers (municipal governance, public financial management, statistics, and anti corruption) and rights holders (via civil society). Data from Open Aid shows that the support to governance and human rights included democratic participation, basic life skills for youth and adults, social services, culture (e.g. music high schools) & sports (Open Fun Football Schools - OFFS), as well as support to Ombudsman and anti trafficking. Much of this appears to have been provided via Swedish INGOs and their local partners. During this period, Sida commenced its support to the ICMP, which represented a substantial contribution to transitional justice through both assisting victims' families but also providing evidence to the on-going war crimes trials at the ICTY. Also of relevance from a broader peace-building perspective, Sida's support during this period was also provided to justice reform and law enforcement (police), demobilisation (via the World Bank), and mine action (via UN Mine Action Centre - UNMAC). By 2004, Sweden had become the largest bilateral donor to Bosnia and Herzegovina (SEK 250 million p.a.).

⁴¹ Strategi för Sveriges utvecklingssamarbete med Bosnien-Hercegovina 2003-2004, Utriksdepartementet.

⁴² Annexes to the Country Strategy, 2003-2005, Sida, May 2003.

2006-2010

The 2006-2010 Strategy displayed a shift in overall objective towards creating “conditions that enable poor people to improve their lives” and noted that it is based on both “a poverty reduction perspective and a rights perspective”. The contextual background for this was based on the assessment that the country is moving out of its post-war period towards a more long-term sustainable society in which the EU integration process will “act as a catalyst and a guiding force”. The strategy restated Sweden’s intention to include support to promotion of human rights and civil society (via framework organisations and with a priority on gender equality), justice, participation, anti-corruption, public administration and gender equality. The strategy displayed its intention to align closely with the EU support (through the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) programme and the future EU IPA), which was very much in line with the prevailing developments internationally regarding aid effectiveness (i.e. the Paris Declaration). While inclusion, participation and rights were clearly in focus here, the strategy also highlighted that an integrated approach “where conflict management – including conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding – is crucial to development”. This understanding reflects the development policy work in OECD-DAC and amongst certain donors, including Sida at the time regarding the close linkage between security and development. Beyond this important reflection, however, the strategy was devoid of any direct references to the drivers of conflict that were highlighted in its predecessor and, apart from its important attention to civil society, rights and gender, the focus is on statebuilding, sustainable development, and EU accession in alignment with the MTDS and SAP priorities.⁴³

Sida’s actual portfolio during this period remained broad and covered a range of interventions within the areas of governance, justice, rule of law, civil society, human rights (and gender), economic development, health, agriculture and environment. Of particular relevance to peacebuilding were interventions relating to democratic participation, basic life skills for youth and adults, social services, culture (e.g. music high schools, culture heritage without borders (i.e. preservation of heritage) & sports (Open Fun Football Schools), and the maintenance of support to ICMP. The financial annexes attached to Sida country reports (2006 & 2007 were examined) included funding under the heading “conflict, peace and security”, and thus some peacebuilding activities had been funded. The team has, however, not been able to identify any specific documentation in this regard.

2011-2014.

The 2011-2014 Strategy had the overall objective of supporting democratic, equitable and sustainable development as well as improved conditions for EU integration,

⁴³ Strategy for development cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina, January 2006 – December 2010, Regeringskansliet, UD.

which reflected Sweden's wider objectives for reform cooperation in Eastern Europe and its Policy for Global Development. It included a focus on (a) democracy, human rights, gender equality; (b) market development; (c) sustainable infrastructure within an annual funding window of SEK 170 million. Promoting gender equality and women's role in development were treated as cross cutting issues to be integrated throughout Sida's engagements. The strategy thus had a focus on aligning Swedish support with the EU's IPA. The theory of change here was that closer ties to the EU would promote stability and development because of the reforms necessary to meet the *acquis*. It placed emphasis on improvements in the capacity of duty bearers (notably the justice sector and public administrative reform) and of civil society to act as "opinion leaders". In the areas of justice and civil society, both of which are relevant from a peacebuilding perspective, improved justice and a stronger civil society would promote Bosnia and Herzegovina's nation-building process (and EU integration), strengthening stability and security (where improvements in the handling of war crimes is highlighted as important for reconciliation).⁴⁴ Alongside other donors, Sida's support to justice was also seen as a means to resist efforts to undermine central institutions from spoilers.⁴⁵

Sida's actual portfolio during this period was considerably more focused than previously (53 entries on Open Aid) covering governance (including local governance, accountability), Public Administration Reform via a basket fund, and capacity development of municipal associations); justice and legal reform; health, economic development, and environment. Support to civil society included democratic participation, culture, gender (support to gender action plan), media and transitional justice (ICMP). Support continues to be provided via Swedish framework NGOs (Kvinna till Kvinna, Olof Palme International Centre, Civil Rights Defenders etc.).

2014-2020

The current strategy, which was launched in 2014, deviates from its predecessors by taking a regional approach and covering an extended period (6 years). The Regional Strategy for Eastern Europe, Western Balkans & Turkey has a focus on the EU Stabilisation and Association Process (SAp) objectives (and the Copenhagen Criteria). The priority areas for the Western Balkans include (a) enhanced economic integration, (b) democracy, human rights and rule of law (strengthened public administration & judicial systems; human rights and democratic influence; civil society, democratic accountability, elections, independent media, gender equality, trust & reconciliation), (c) environment. While peacebuilding is not specifically mentioned, the attention to regional aspects (including "increased trust and reconciliation between parties in and countries") is relevant. The strategy provides an overview of expected strategic re-

⁴⁴ Strategy for development cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina, January 2011 – December 2014, Regeringskansliet, UD.

⁴⁵ Interview with former Sida official at Swedish Embassy, Sarajevo.

sults but it does not describe specific results expected at country level and thus leaves the Embassy in Sarajevo with considerable scope to pursue local priorities.⁴⁶

Sida's portfolio in Bosnia and Herzegovina maintains the overall approach from its predecessor covering governance (including local governance, accountability and participation (GAP), Public Administration Reform (PAR), capacity development of municipal associations and local communities (MZ); justice and legal reform; economic development, and environment. A number of the governance interventions have been implemented jointly with other bilateral donors, e.g. US Agency International Development (USAID) and Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC). Support to civil society includes democratic participation, youth, culture, gender (support to gender action plan), media and transitional justice (ICMP) and mine action (from 2018). Support continues to be provided via Swedish framework NGOs, also with a focus on gender and women's empowerment.

3.3 TIMELINE OVERVIEW

Figure 3.3 below provides an overview of the main contextual and international events relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina to which Sida can be expected to have reacted and will have influenced Sida's support to peacebuilding. It is used as the basis for the analysis in the new chapter. Sida's funding levels, the team has identified the following three periods as key for the evaluation of the Bosnia and Herzegovina support: (1) early 1990s to 1999; (2) 2000 to 2010; and (3) 2011 to the present.

⁴⁶ Results strategy for Sweden's reform strategy with Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans and Turkey, 2014-2020.

Figure 3.3: Key contextual, international and Sida developments


Context	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Action
National		International Sida
2011-2018		
BiH applies to join EU (February 2016)		SAA enters force (2015)
Reform Agenda adopted (July 2015)		Focus on sustainable economic development & EU accession (2012)
Elections won by Nationalist Parties		Less focus on reconstruction, more on movement towards Europe
Violent protests prompted by economic grievances (February 2014)		Instrument for Pre-Accession II (2014-2020)
		Poverty alleviation, state building, democracy, human rights, public admin
2000-2010		
Continued Dominance of Nationalist Parties		EU initiates Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SSA) (2007)
BiH Poverty Reduction Strategy(2004)		Instrument for Pre-Accession (2007)
BiH joins Council of Europe(2002)		Dayton & European integration; peace and stability, democracy, human rights, economic development (2000-2002)
1992-1999		
ICTY begins work in The Hague (1996)		EU Stability pact launched (1999)
Elections won by Nationalist Parties (1996)		Peace Implementation Conference (1995)
		Humanitarian assistance, early recovery & reconstruction, returns, support for Dayton objectives
Dayton Peace Agreement (1995)		NATO led peacekeeping force (1995)
		UNPROFOR peacekeeping (1993)
Civil War (1992-1995)		UNSG Agenda for Peace launched (1992)
Breakup of SFRY (1992)		Adoption of Bonn powers by OHR (1997)

4 Findings

In the following sections, we present the findings in accordance with the OECD-DAC criteria as identified in the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the evaluation. Given the longitudinal aspect of the evaluation, the assessment relates to the three periods identified in Chapter 3 and uses the drivers of conflict and peace described in section 2.2 as the contextual background against which to assess relevance and also effectiveness, impact and sustainability.

4.1 EARLY 1990s UNTIL 1999

Key contextual events of relevance for this time period included:



4.1.1 RELEVANCE

Sida's support to Bosnia and Herzegovina during this period included humanitarian assistance during the conflict and some of this was carried over to the post-war period. The support to reconstruction and support to victims of the war provided through NGOs are examples. As already noted, the Dayton peace accords in late 1995 (and the arrangements provided by these, including the OHR and the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)) subsequently provided the initial framework against which Sida (and other donors) aligned their activities. During this period, there were no Swedish strategies for development assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the support was based on "instructions" (*Regeringsbeslut*) prepared by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and then managed by the small Sida staff at the Embassy in Sarajevo.

The portfolio broadened significantly towards the end of the decade to include reconstruction (housing), mine action, demobilisation, governance (local governance and public financial management), civil society, economic development (e.g. privatisation), justice, health, infrastructure (e.g. railways, telecommunications), land survey and agricultural rehabilitation. In the democracy and human rights area, Sida's support was channelled principally through Swedish NGOs, notably *Kvinna till Kvinna*, the *Swedish Helsinki Committee*, the *Olof Palme International Centre*, the *Raoul*

Wallenberg Centre and the *PRONI Institute of Social Education*. The focus of these partners (and their local counterparts) was relevant and included independent media, legal and judicial reform, women's empowerment and participation, legal aid, youth groups and trade unions.

Sida staff members involved at the time emphasised that they were sensitive to the relevance of incorporating cross-boundary interaction promoting “connectedness” across different ethnic groups in the support provided.⁴⁷ Certain interventions appear more directly relevant to peacebuilding than others due to the modalities employed: for example, *Kvinna till Kvinna* supported women's groups across communities, which served to break down barriers, increase awareness, and build trust even though this was carried out to enhance women's empowerment and psycho-social wellbeing rather than peacebuilding specifically. Between 1998-2007, Sida contributed to a joint Nordic regional Open Fun Football Schools, which had goals of promoting tolerance and coexistence (the 2007 country report points out that 95% of Bosnia and Herzegovina municipalities participated in this and that it involved both boys and girls). In general, the support to human rights and democracy is seen as relevant to mitigating the conflict drivers identified earlier and promoting peace.

The Swedish flagship programme relating to reconstruction – the IAP – requires special mention. The IAP responded to one of the key elements of the Dayton Accords, namely Annex 7 relating to the right of refugees and displaced persons to freely return to their home of origin. Between 1995 and 2007, over SEK 1.2 billion was provided to the IAP using a principle of “help to self-help” whereby some 17,000 homes (and local amenities such as schools, healthcare, water and sanitation, power etc.) were reconstructed via Swedish and international NGOs. Sida staff consulted about the IAPs explained that by enabling return, the programme was seen as relevant to rebuilding the country's social capital and addressing the effects of ethnic cleansing. As such, it was regarded as a necessary step in rebuilding Bosnia and Herzegovina as a modern European state. Results from the IAP are described in more detail below.

4.1.2 EFFECTIVENESS

Sida's support to Bosnia and Herzegovina during this period is reported to have been challenged by weak buy-in at the political level meaning that very little cooperation was possible with government institutions and progress on OHR priorities (i.e. returns, economic reform, and common institutions - to which Sida was aligned) was slow and often had to be induced through the use of Bonn powers. The leadership of Republika Srpska was signed out in reporting as being particularly obstructive due to

⁴⁷ Interviews with former Sida staff active in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1994-1999.

its insistence on ethnic exclusivity, a goal that was directly opposed to that of the international community.⁴⁸

An evaluation of Sweden's assistance undertaken in 1999 made a number of pertinent effectiveness observations. These included noting the political character of the assistance, which had the consequence that the Swedish MFA was more closely involved in prioritising (together with Sida HQ and the Embassy in Sarajevo) the overall assistance portfolio than usual in development contexts. Its main conclusion, however, was that the conditions for effective assistance were being undermined by the lack of commitment to reform amongst government officials and politicians coupled with the large amounts of aid available and pressures to disburse. The evaluation had concerns about unrealistic expectations regarding implementation time, particularly in relation to institution building.⁴⁹

Various aspects of Sida's approach during this period contributed to mitigating the lack of local ownership within the political leadership and parts of the bureaucracy and thus will have contributed to effectiveness. Firstly, in the absence of a clear nationally-owned development plan, Sida ensured that its support was coordinated with OHR and other donors, including through OHR's system of *Task Forces* which met regularly to share information. According to interviews, Sida staff were also active and engaged, often travelling outside of Sarajevo to monitor implementation and gain field impressions.

Secondly, Sida's use of framework NGOs (such as Kvinna till Kvinna, Olof Palme Center etc.) with which it has had a long relationship meant that implementation could be outsourced to partners sharing Sida's overall values and approach. The 1999 evaluation referred to this as "a type of consultancy", although it also noted that the use of Swedish NGOs added credibility to the relationship and promoted tight relationships between Bosnian and Swedish NGOs. In terms of peacebuilding, it is relevant that a number of the Swedish framework NGOs had capacity to support and integrate peacebuilding approaches (such as Do No Harm) in their work. Local NGOs interviewed for the present evaluation displayed practical knowledge of these.

Thirdly, Sida's support has been informed by a holistic and contextualised approach. This is particularly demonstrated by the IAP, which besides assisted self-help housing reconstruction included rebuilding of schools, healthcare facilities, other infrastructure such as power lines, water and sanitation, and mine clearance without which sustainable return would not be feasible. In 2005, an evaluation of the IAP was undertaken covering the 16 years or so during which Sida had supported the returns process –

⁴⁸ Semi-annual report, Bosnia and Herzegovina, April – November 2000.

⁴⁹ Sweden's Assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Claes Sandgren, Sida Evaluation 99/24, November 1999.

see boxes 1a and 1b below – and concluded that Sida’s multi-faceted approach had been largely effective and successful from the perspective of enabling return.⁵⁰

Box 1a: The Integrated Area Programmes

The 2005 IAP evaluation tested the effectiveness of the programme in accomplishing sustainable return, its possible social and economic consequences, and possible lessons to be learned. It concluded that the IAP was relevant to the reconstruction task and achieved good results across a range of parameters and was undertaken in a rights-based manner that strengthened “social trust, collective confidence and self-esteem”, involving the returnees as “actors rather than passive recipients”. In relation to the sensitive issue of minority returns, these were “not pushed unless a certain readiness was shown by the local authorities”, thus revealing awareness by the implementing partners of the difficult political and social environment in which such activities were located. The evaluation goes on to note that the programmes were also implemented in a flexible, contextualised manner, using INGOs in supervisory roles (e.g. LWF, Caritas). According to the evaluation, this led to returnees feeling secure and wishing to remain.⁵¹ Sida’s reporting also indicates that a further factor supporting minority returns was the passing of the Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP) which led to a substantial increase in the number of properties reposessed and was rigorously monitored by international actors. Statistics indicate that (in 1999) the Federation had more than double the success rate of Republika Srpska (where there was less political support for minority return). In relation to concerns about low occupancy rates of reconstructed houses (which would indicate low effectiveness), the reporting notes that this is mitigated in the IAP through the assisted self-help principle in which a key role is played by motivation.⁵²

4.1.3 IMPACT

The impact of Sida’s portfolio on conflict and peace drivers during this period is poorly documented. An exception is the IAP, which is shown to have assisted some 57,000 people to return, including minorities.⁵³ This represents a major contribution to the implementation of the peace accords and the country’s reconstruction by enabling the return of refugees and displaced persons, albeit with many of these returning to majority areas.

Box 1b: the IAP as a peacebuilding tool?

Despite achieving good results overall, the IAP’s peacebuilding impact is disputed. The 2005 evaluation noted that the feeling of security generated through the returns did not ex-

⁵⁰ Returning home – An evaluation of Sida’s Integrated Area Programmes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sida Evaluation 05/18, July 2005.

⁵¹ Returning home, 2005.

⁵² Semi-annual report, Bosnia and Herzegovina, April – November 2000.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

tend to interactions across ethnic lines and the effects on social reintegration or reconciliation were limited. This contradicted the assertion in the 2003-2005 Country Strategy that the IAPs "contributed substantially to reconciliation at local level."⁵⁴ Moreover, as the case study on the ethnically mixed village of Grapska noted, "the post war relationship between the returnees and their neighbours has not been directly affected by the reconstruction. They remain firmly separated, in spite of occasional encounters", and tensions are exacerbated by livelihood challenges and unequal distribution of public goods. Thus, "people are not living together, but rather side by side", although the evaluation also acknowledges that the return could provide possibilities for interaction and reconciliation in the future.⁵⁵ Stakeholders consulted also noted that subsequent land swaps and sales have cemented ethnic divisions, although conversely this may have also contributed to stability.⁵⁶ These inconsistencies and the scope for further learning suggest that there may be value in undertaking an ex-post evaluation or similar analysis.

In relation to women's rights, interviews with Swedish framework NGOs (notably Kvinna till Kvinna and Olof Palme International Centre) point to a number of peace-building impacts at grassroots levels during this period. These include increased awareness and knowledge about women's rights, facilitating movement across boundary lines and stimulating economic independence resulting from the approach of these organisations to bringing women into contact with each other and promoting their own agency and activism. Research published by Kvinna till Kvinna in 2006 noted that many of the local groups focused on creating safe spaces (women's centres) and service provision (psycho-social assistance), which helped women minority returnees and reduced community tensions.⁵⁷

4.1.4 SUSTAINABILITY

The sustainability of interventions supported during the period appears to have been challenged by the low capacity and anchoring amongst Bosnian stakeholders, as highlighted in the 1999 evaluation of Swedish support. Inter alia, this recommended that the capacity of municipalities and other local organisations to cope with greater responsibility should be reinforced. In relation to NGOs, training in fund raising was recommended to reduce the high level of aid dependency.⁵⁸

A summary of results from Sida supported interventions that accompanied the 2002 strategy included a number of observations from projects started towards the end of this period. For example, training of police in stress management techniques appears to have been subsequently integrated into national curricula, thereby indicating some

⁵⁴ Strategi för Sveriges utvecklingssamarbete med Bosnien-Hercegovina 2003-2004, Utriksdepartementet, page 15.

⁵⁵ Returning home, xii.

⁵⁶ Interviews in Sarajevo, October 2018.

⁵⁷ To make room for change, Kvinna till Kvinna, 2006, page 24.


⁵⁸ Sandgren, 1999.

sustainability. There were also indications of sustainable results in relation to Sida's support to border management. In relation to independent media, Sida supported efforts (with other donors) to maintain a private non-nationalist television station in Banja Luka (ATV), but this appears to not have been financially sustainable. Likewise, support to cultural heritage (which was also a Dayton priority) appears to have suffered from lack of local institutional capacity and financing. Sida was the major donor in this sector.⁵⁹

While it has not been possible as part of this evaluation to examine the longer term effects of the IAP on sustainable return, there are several aspects of the programme that contributed to sustainability, including the principle of assisted self-help and the cooperation with local authorities (especially for minority return, which often proved politically contentious)

4.2 2001-2010

Key contextual events of relevance for this time period included:



This period provides the first real opportunity for a strategic assessment of Sida in Bosnia and Herzegovina because there are an increasing number of benchmarks in place against which to make the assessment and many of the findings from this are also valid in the subsequent periods (i.e. up to the current time). The period is marked by a move towards more “normalised” development support, based for example on the MDTS and alignment with the EU’s SAP from 1999. Indeed, while Bosnia and Herzegovina was still grappling with many post-war issues (e.g. minority returns, development of a market orientated economy, sector reform, reconstruction), the overall reform process was increasingly driven by EU integration objectives.

While conflict issues rarely feature in Sida’s documentation from the period, an exception is the 2003-2004 country strategy that is accompanied by a set of more de-

⁵⁹ Results Analysis Bosnia and Herzegovina, Per Iwansson and Per Byman, Annex 1 to Background Annexes to 2003 Country Strategy. Sida, May 2003.

tailed contextual analyses. These provide useful background information on key results from previous support and lessons, context analysis, and conflict analysis (the latter, however, being more contextual than security focused).⁶⁰ Also, the 2004 annual report raises the questions of the severity of possible political unrest and a possible break up or division of the country, which featured in the nationalist rhetoric. But it does not discuss either of them or assess possible implications for programming.

4.2.1 RELEVANCE

Sida's support during this period was based on the priorities set out in Swedish country strategies. There appears to be a good alignment between these and international objectives, such as EU association. Peace and stability features as an objective in only one strategy (2003) and is not further explained or linked to specific interventions.

Review of the strategies (and data from Open Aid) shows that Sida implemented a very broad programme covering both duty bearers and rights holders, in many cases continuing previous initiatives. A framework agreement was signed between Sweden and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2007. Sectors supported included democratic governance and human rights, gender equality, justice, rule of law, anti-corruption, economic development, health, agriculture and environment. The support to returnees (IAP) was continued until the middle of the period, whereupon it was phased out with responsibility being passed to Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities. The majority of peacebuilding relevant interventions lie within the democratic governance and human rights portfolio, and include transitional justice, culture, demobilisation/reintegration, and local governance.

An example of an intervention that the team regard as highly relevant to peacebuilding is the support provided to the ICMP. Sida's support to ICMP started in 2002 when Sweden joined a number of other donors and funding has since been provided as core support. Since its establishment in 1996, ICMP has successfully sought to identify missing persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina (and subsequently elsewhere) and promote local institutional and civil society anchoring and redress for affected families (see box 2 in 4.2.3 below). As such, it represents an important transitional justice initiative that ameliorates the fragility of peace and strengthens the basis for reconciliation where uncertainty over numbers of people missing can be a factor used by nationalist elements to incite hatred. ICMP remains relevant given threats of revisionism and it was noted that international backing to this area helps protect local institutions against such threats.

During this period, Sida also contributed to culture, which is directly relevant to Annex 8 of the Dayton accords on the preservation of national monuments but can also

⁶⁰ Annexes to Country Strategy, 2003-2005. Sida, May 2003.

be seen as being relevant to peacebuilding where it promotes interaction and tolerance. The documentation notes the role that culture can play in building and strengthening relations between individuals and groups, hence supporting social development and reconciliation and help restore citizens' faith in the future. The approach used drew from Swedish institutions in a form of twinning arrangement and complementary projects aimed at different national and ethnic groups to promote contacts, understanding and cooperation between groups (and the wider Western Balkans) with the overall goal to strengthen democracy through cultural pluralism. An internal desk appraisal from Sida notes the objective to reduce the effect of ethnic barriers and build cooperation across groups.⁶¹ Similarly, Sida (and other donors) continued to support the OFFS, aimed at building tolerance and coexistence among different ethnic groups.

The Governance Accountability Project (GAP), which was jointly funded by Sida and USAID during this period, had the goal of capacity building of municipalities to better serve their citizens, thereby promoting participation and inclusion and mitigating the polarizing effect of conflict drivers.

In the justice sector, Sida supported the State Court and the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) with the goal of improving their efficiency and effectiveness. The State Court is relevant from a peacebuilding perspective due to their role in local prosecution of war crimes, thereby strengthening the fight against impunity and demonstrating that the Bosnian state is taking responsibility for the country's past. During this period, Sida supported efforts to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), although these were ultimately not successful due to the political objections within Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4.2.2 EFFECTIVENESS

The findings in relation to effectiveness from the previous period also apply here; in short that Sida's strong local knowledge and engagement with donor mechanisms coupled with the use of Swedish framework NGOs working with Bosnia and Herzegovina civil society has helped mitigate the inertia prevalent within the political leadership and bureaucracy. In addition, during this period, Sida's support has reflected international efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of aid (for example, the principles of alignment and harmonisation highlighted in the Paris Declaration).

This period also marks the high point of Sweden's engagement in terms of the number of distinct interventions supported (over 120 per annum in the first half of the period decreasing to 89 in 2010). From an efficiency perspective, this is likely to have represented a significant management burden for the Sida staff at the Embassy.

⁶¹ Promermoria, Support to culture. Sida, 10 October 1999.

In 2008, Sida commissioned an outcome mapping that has some useful observations relating to civil society support, which as already highlighted is a consistent feature of Sida's engagement. The evaluation examined selected civil society projects implemented through Swedish framework NGOs (Kvinna till Kvinna, Olof Palme Center, and the Swedish Helsinki Committee). The projects involved women's rights, civic engagement, advocacy, and media standards. It found that all the projects examined could demonstrate a solid, result oriented design and that boundary partners (i.e. local sub-partners) had changed the way in which they thought, acted or networked due to the project concerned. However, socio-demographic factors also played a key role; thus, rural partners with less education were less able to demonstrate change and were affected by contextual factors, such as attitudes. A further key finding was that the projects that could demonstrate most significant progress tended to target small groups of younger and better educated activists.⁶²

4.2.3 IMPACT

Sida's support during this period was producing a number of results. In relation to gender, Sida and other donors had actively supported the development of a Gender Action Plan anchored within the Gender Agency (which is part of the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugee Returns). Sida responded proactively to its implementation by promoting proposals to strengthen the Agency with a fund for the implementation of the Action Plan.⁶³ During the period, Sida continued to prioritise support to women's empowerment through Kvinna till Kvinna and Olof Palme International Centre, although reporting on the results of this is very limited.

During this period, Sida supported the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which dealt with war crimes, organized crime and crimes against the state. In 2007, Sida's €2 million contribution was the largest of 11 donors and helped keep the State Court afloat. The 2007 Annual Report noted that the court was functioning well and resulting in an increase in verdicts. In comparing the State Court and the ICTY, it noted a significantly reduced average time per war crime case and a higher number of simultaneous main trials). A Swedish judge was seconded to the State Court for part of the period.⁶⁴ Stakeholders consulted commented that the person concerned was very engaged and well qualified (having previously served with ICTY).

The OFFS is one of the few explicitly peacebuilding related interventions supported by Sida that was highlighted as such in the reporting. The 2007 Annual Report noted that between 1998–2007, 95% of Bosnia and Herzegovina municipalities took part in the programme and around 52,000 children and over 4,300 coaches and trainers.

⁶² Outcome mapping evaluation of six civil society projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sida, 2008.

⁶³ Annual Report, 2007, Sida.

⁶⁴ Annual Report, 2007, Sida.

Girls' participation in 2007 reached 30% – well above the goal of 25% for the region. In 2007, most of the participating municipalities – many of them divided in the past – demonstrated keen interest in hosting inter-ethnic football schools and also in funding some of the expenses for the events.⁶⁵

A further key engagement was the support provided during this period to the ICMP, which had broader impacts elsewhere in the world due to the ground breaking approaches developed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. ICMP should be regarded as a major contribution to transitional justice – see box 2 below.

Box 2: International Commission on Missing Persons

ICMP's efforts have led to the location and identification of over 70% of the 31,500 people declared as missing, including nearly 7,000 of the 8,000 men and boys who disappeared in the Srebrenica genocide. It has helped promote accountability and transparency for crimes against humanity and other war crimes, regardless of ethnicity, religion, or the role of person in the conflict. In 2005, ICMP supported the domestic anchoring of this work through the establishment of the Missing Person Institute (MPI) in Sarajevo in 2005, the establishment of a registry, and the 2004 Bosnia and Herzegovina law on missing persons (which was the first of its kind). Families of missing have been a driving force (through provision of DNA samples). Together with together with Serbia, Croatia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina has since signed the *Declaration on the Role of the State in Addressing the Issue of Persons Missing as a Consequence of Armed Conflict and Human Rights Abuses*. Also in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ICMP has supported the role of Family Associations, although a 2012 evaluation showed that the effect of these was uneven and there was some distrust of CSOs as "lead organisations" in relation to funding. ICMP has supported connectivity between the associations across different ethnic backgrounds and has sought to involve young people. Despite its inclusion in the 2004 law, the issue of compensation arrangements for victims' families remains unimplemented.⁶⁶

ICMP has helped to develop Bosnia and Herzegovina's institutional capacity to address the issue of missing persons in a non-discriminatory manner, crafting legislation to safeguard the rights of families, introducing systematic forensic methods, including the use of DNA, upholding rule of law-based processes that have ensured the provision of evidence to domestic courts and the ICTY, and facilitating the active engagement of the families of the missing.⁶⁷

In relation to local governance and accountability, the 2006 evaluation of the GAP showed that it had achieved direct results in terms of the construction and establishment of citizen service centres in 41 municipalities throughout the country and that these had improved public services. Small grants provided by GAP had enabled municipalities to implement small projects of their choice, including specific target

⁶⁵ Annual Report, 2007, Sida.

⁶⁶ www.ICMP.int and Interview, Sarajevo, October 2018.

⁶⁷ www.ICMP.int.


groups such as children or women.⁶⁸ The effect on peacebuilding is not specifically addressed, although there are likely to be some positive effects from increase participation and service delivery.

4.2.4 SUSTAINABILITY

Sustainability of Sida's interventions during the period derives from their increasing alignment with national planning mechanisms and priorities (i.e. the MTDS) and with improvements in harmonisation and coordination amongst bilateral and multilateral donors. During the period, the effects of international aid effectiveness initiatives can be seen in the increased use of budgetary support, untied aid, and use of partner systems.⁶⁹ Sida's own planning documents point to an increased focus on joint donor programming, institutional capacity building, community strengthening and anti-corruption which should strengthen the basis for sustainability.

4.3 2011-2018

Key contextual events of relevance for this time period:



4.3.1 RELEVANCE

The overall relevance of Sida's portfolio is maintained during this period, while the strategy and, in particular, its operationalization and reporting has been strengthened in a way that should facilitate greater clarity over its possible peacebuilding effects.

The priorities of the two Swedish strategies during this period (the first being a country strategy and the second being regional) do not represent a significant deviation from previous strategies. Priority areas for the regional strategy include: (a) enhanced economic integration, (b) democracy, human rights and rule of law (strengthened public administration & judicial systems; human rights and democratic influence; civil society, democratic accountability, elections, independent media, gender equality, trust & reconciliation), (c) environment. These remain relevant focus areas.

⁶⁸ Country Report, 2006, Sida.

⁶⁹ Bosnia and Herzegovina overview, 22 December 2006, World Bank.

The addition of “trust and reconciliation” and the recognition that some parts of the region continue to display conflict characteristics increases the strategy’s relevance from a peacebuilding perspective. There is also an increased focus on minorities and vulnerable groups than previously, highlighting the rights of Roma, vulnerable children, LGBT people, and ethnic and religious minorities. And gender equality issues are given a higher political priority to strengthen women and girl’s empowerment.

While the 2014 regional strategy is short (18 pages), it is accompanied by a number of supporting documents that provided a theory of change and stronger linkages to peacebuilding. For example, the regional context analysis provided in the background document points to “*the unfinished transition from authoritarian governments and centrally planned economies [where] the absence of a modern civic society allows the political elite to maintain their hold on power [and] the conflicts of the 1990s and continuing economic and political insecurity have reinforced traditional ethnic and clan based allegiances*”.⁷⁰ This fits well with the assessment of drivers of conflict and peace outlined in section 2.2 above, leading to a continued emphasis from Sida in Bosnia and Herzegovina on civil society advocacy in relation to gender equality and minority rights and transparency as well as a set of rather general (although broadly relevant) outcomes.

Within the objective area for strengthened democracy, human rights and rule of law, the 2014 strategy also included 11 outcome areas that are broadly relevant to peacebuilding. Amongst these are more efficient judicial systems, reduction in gender based violence, a more pluralistic civil society, improved democratic accountability, freer media, and increased trust. The importance of this is that it encourages the linkage of outcome areas with actual interventions and reporting on them.

This period also saw a further focusing of Sida’s portfolio, although the areas most relevant for peacebuilding remain. Sida continued to prioritise a top down and bottom up approach that supported both key institutions (often at state level but also at municipal level) and civil society inputs, now more focused on advocacy and engagement with government stakeholders. With the increased reach and involvement of the EU through IPA 2, this approach appears relevant as it enables Sida to utilise its flexibility, longevity and values to support agents of change. The portfolio includes participatory governance (strengthening local communities project – MZ); justice and legal reform, and (through civil society) to youth, culture, gender, independent media, transitional justice (ICMP). From 2018, mine action is supported through the INGO Mine Action Group.

⁷⁰ Background document for Sida’s results proposal for reform cooperation with the Western Balkan’s 2014-2022, 24 May 2013, Sida.

Sida support continued to be provided via Swedish framework NGOs and local NGOs with a focus on women and girl's empowerment and regarding minorities and vulnerable groups, such as Roma and LGBT. These are relevant in relation to continued gaps between the standards set out in Bosnia and Herzegovina legislation and actual practice, including access to justice. Reporting indicates a need for significant progress regarding gender based violence, women's role in the labour market, and women's role in decision-making.⁷¹

Anti-corruption has long been a Swedish priority and features in a number of engagements, including justice and media. During this period, Sida supported independent media NGOs (BIRN, the Centre for Investigative News (CIN) and the web portal BUKA). BIRN, for example, has had a focus on corruption in the judiciary and appears to have had positive impacts from its campaigns that also complement Sida's direct support to the Higher Judicial Prosecutorial Council (HJPC), which was improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the judiciary at state and lower levels and thereby reducing the backlog of cases. Sida has also promoted anti-corruption within public administration; for instance, through its mainstreaming within the Public Administration Reform Fund (PARF). Sida's continued support to anti-corruption efforts within the justice and governance areas is regarded by the evaluation team as relevant; progress here is a key popular demand and is strongly underlined in the EU *acquis*. While perhaps not a direct conflict driver, it is a contributing factor (as demonstrated in the 2014 disturbances).

4.3.2 EFFECTIVENESS

Reporting and evaluations during this period illustrate the difficult and complex reform environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the consequences that this can have for effectiveness. An example is public administration reform (PAR), which Sida has supported (together with UK, Netherlands, and EU) since 2005. Sida's reporting noted the lengthy approvals processes and effort required to get the programme approved.⁷² In 2015, an evaluation of the Public Administration Reform Fund (PARF) concluded that the Fund as a whole was not efficient or effective leading to its inability to deliver the outputs and outcomes required from the public administration reform strategy. Factors leading to this conclusion included a range of project and contextual issues, such as "the complex administrative framework across Bosnia and Herzegovina and between levels of government" that negatively affected even otherwise well designed and implemented projects.⁷³

The difficulties experienced in the above example can be contrasted with Sida support to the justice sector, which appears to have been more effective, resulting in a reduc-

⁷¹ In depth strategy report for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2016, Sida.

⁷² Annual Report, 2006, Sida.

⁷³ Evaluation of the Public Administration Reform Fund in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2015, Sida.

tion in the back-log of non-utility civil cases in the courts and improvements in accountability of judges and courts, including regional courts outside of Sarajevo. An evaluation of the Judicial Efficiency project (JEP) in 2014 found that a contributing factor to this was the availability of temporary staff (although this did not contribute to sustainability). It noted that “court settlement as an alternative method of dispute resolution has increased” - which can also be seen as a peacebuilding contribution – although out of court mediation arrangements had been less successful.⁷⁴

It should also be noted here that the new management procedures that have been introduced within Sida are sharpening the linkage between Sida’s strategic goals and its programming and reporting (and thereby potentially enhancing its effectiveness provided that learning influences dialogue and programming). For example, the Embassy’s in-depth strategy report (2016) showed a stronger political economy focus that is useful in tying the reporting to developments in the context and it has a stronger attention to cross-cutting issues. The latter include integration of poor people’s perspectives, gender equality, conflict prevention, anti-corruption, environment and climate. Inter alia, it notes that “conflicts are still part of people’s everyday lives”, which is the first time such a direct statement has appeared and could, in principle, be linked to a peacebuilding perspective. The report also recommended that the risk of instability and inter-ethnic violence be further analysed in the implementation of the strategy. It noted (page 18) that certain projects have relevance for conflict prevention, including the work with missing persons, justice and prosecutorial capacity, investigative reporting and gender.⁷⁵ However, these reflections need to be expanded and concretised to be useful. For example, a theory of change and relevant indicators could be developed to highlight the (peacebuilding) effects of the engagements on the stakeholder groups concerned. As part of this, it would be important to reflect on possible synergies with other Swedish strategies and support.

4.3.3 IMPACT

The peacebuilding impact of Sida’s engagements remain as previously described. Stakeholders consulted highlighted the benefits of Sida’s longer-term support (for example to missing persons, justice (State Court and HJPC), and civil society (with a focus on human rights, independent media and gender) because effects may take a long time to develop. Nonetheless, interviews also pointed to a number of positive results, as described below (and in Box 3), operating at the policy and grassroots levels respectively.

In relation to gender equality and women’s empowerment, Sida (and its NGO partners) helped develop the Gender Action Plan and the 1325 Action Plan, both anchored in the State Gender Agency. Kvinna till Kvinna and others have actively en-

⁷⁴ Evaluation of the Project “Improving Judicial Efficiency”, Final Report, 2015, Sida.

⁷⁵ In depth strategy report, 2016, Sida.

gaged with women's groups from different communities and the effects of this at local level are reported to be positive. Local women's groups have been empowered to cross boundaries. This has had a peacebuilding effect through breaking down barriers and dispelling myths. There is increased attention to gender based violence (GBV), partly via Kvinna till Kvinna, partly through the local NGOs (the Atlantic Initiative's gender and justice project is an example), and partly via UNDP, which also works with changing male attitudes. Given the high rates of GBV in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the persistence of patriarchal values, these interventions are relevant. The recent *Women in Change* initiative is an example of a more direct and informed advocacy on key peacebuilding and justice issues (including 1325 implementation) that still need to be addressed.⁷⁶ As described in Box 3 below, Sida's support through INGOs has also been directed towards the community level with positive impacts.

Box 3: Support to women's empowerment and interaction

The NGO Vive Zene has been supported through Olof Palme International Center since the 1990s to help women and children in ethnically mixed districts of eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina to resolve wartime trauma, sustainable return and peaceful coexistence. Vive Zene has worked with the women's groups to promote attentive listening, non-judging attitude, not commenting individual stories and experiences, respect for feelings and thoughts of others, etc. Group work has focused on life before, during and after the war in their communities. Women have shared their experiences first cautiously and then more and more eagerly. This has contributed to reducing stigma and prejudices, and increase understanding and awareness of other group's experiences and values. They have started to feel freer and express their feelings and thoughts in their families and communities, which has not always been easy in the present political situation of ethnic separation. They have celebrated their respective holidays together, like Bajram in Kravica and orthodox Christmas in Konjevic Polje. Their associations are working together economically (income generating project) and they are part of the Vive Zene network for strengthening women in rural surroundings.⁷⁷

4.3.4 SUSTAINABILITY

The sustainability of Sida's engagements remain as previously described. In a period when donor support to Bosnia and Herzegovina is declining, some recipients of Sida support noted that Sida had been good to step in when others pulled out, thereby helping to maintain the pressure from civil society on duty bearers (BIRN is an example). While this dependence upon external donor funding means that NGOs/CSOs are not financially sustainable, there is a need to consider the sustainability of their results, as noted above, and this requires longer-term financial support to the capacity that is already in place. The NGOs met during the field work in Sarajevo did not appear to lack institutional capacity but they are very dependent on external funding.

⁷⁶ *Include women in change processes initiative, Pilot 2017/2018, Final Report.* Kvinna till Kvinna

⁷⁷ Thanks to NGO Vive Zene for this story.

5 Conclusions and lessons learned

In the following we present the conclusions in accordance with the OECD-DAC criteria. As in other parts of this report, our assessment is focused on elements of Sida's portfolio that are relevant to peacebuilding and the conflict and peace drivers identified earlier.

5.1 RELEVANCE

The extent to which the approaches in the case studies were aligned with the needs and priorities of the beneficiaries and the peace and security challenges

Sida's overall engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been consistent with Swedish global policies and country/regional strategies. These strategies are assessed as being relevant to the country's reconstruction and development needs as these have evolved over the evaluation period. Sida has also clearly responded to developments in the local and regional context and with regard to aid effectiveness.

From a peacebuilding perspective, the priority attached to democratic governance and human rights is considered relevant, and parts of the portfolio are highly relevant. Sida has been able to operationalize the Swedish country strategies in a flexible, contextualised fashion, which has also contributed to relevance as Sida (and the Embassy) has been fully participating in donor coordination arrangements and has utilised its extensive local resource network. In the face of a deeply bureaucratic system that is difficult to influence, Sida has rightly focused much of its efforts on the more progressive elements of civil society as a peace actor while, at the same time, not ignoring those parts of the bureaucracy that are responsive and/or of high priority, notably the justice sector and at municipal level.

Until recently, none of the strategies have utilised a political economy approach to the contextual background and conflict issues have been largely absent from the analyses. From a peacebuilding perspective, this is a major weakness as it obscures the relevance that certain types of engagement may have on conflict and peace drivers. Understandably, unpacking the actual engagement portfolio for each of the strategic periods indicates a spread of relevance to conflict and peace drivers from "not relevant" to "probably relevant". Very few interventions address peacebuilding directly and include a peacebuilding objective, although many more do so indirectly through their implementation modalities. The latter include efforts to cross boundaries, promote interaction between ethnicities and groups, increase understanding and tolerance. Interviews with local stakeholders indicate that these priorities and approaches remain relevant today, almost 25 years after the end of the violent conflict.

Sida's support to Bosnia and Herzegovina can broadly be divided into three phases. Within these, the evaluation finds that Sida has responded well to contextual and international developments. The aid portfolios have remained broadly similar, although there has been a significant reduction in the actual number of engagements (from around 130 in 2005 to 51 in 2017, according to entries on Open Aid):

- **Phase 1.** In the first period (up to 1999), Sida provided a large part of its support to reconstruction (e.g. housing) and other sectors that were prioritised by the Dayton peace accord and the overall recovery and reconstruction needs. Due to the severe destruction caused by the war and coupled with the imperative of restructuring the economy, virtually all sectors were relevant to peacebuilding *writ large*. NATO (and subsequently EU) military forces (to which Sweden also contributed) often played an important part in maintaining security and stability, which helped facilitate movement and an environment in which the engagement could take place. In terms of peacebuilding, Sida's interventions promoting interaction between communities (i.e. across ethnic boundary lines) and tolerance, justice and reconciliation appear particularly relevant. Swedish framework NGOs played a significant role in helping to deliver these.
- **Phase 2.** Between 2000-2010, the EU association process (SAp) and priorities identified in IPA1 and later IPA 2 became important strategic pointers for Sida and other donors. At the same time, Bosnia and Herzegovina delivered its first poverty reduction strategy (the MTDS), which was aligned with the IPA and also provided a means of ensuring alignment with Bosnia and Herzegovina priorities. Sida's support during this period first grew and then began to consolidate. Within the key area of democratic governance, the support was targeted at selected state institutions (such as the State Court), as well as at the municipal level and through civil society, in order to increase participation and the accountability and transparency of government (and thereby also contribute to anti-corruption). During this period, there were certain interventions that stand-out as having peacebuilding relevance, such as the support to missing persons (ICMP), justice reform (State Court, HJPC), local governance (GAP), women's empowerment, and civil society engagement.
- **Phase 3.** During the final period (from 2011 to the present), EU association has been replaced by an EU accession focus as set out in the *acquis* and maintaining the reform focus in the face of continuing nationalist obstruction and government inefficiency have been priorities. The evaluation's observations relating to peacebuilding relevance continue to apply; a significant proportion of the support has been relevant from a peacebuilding *writ large* perspective as it has been directed at the overall reform agenda while a number of interventions continue to stand out as relevant according to peacebuilding specific criteria. These include the support to missing persons, justice, local governance, anti-corruption, civil society and gender. Interviews undertaken with lo-

cal Bosnian NGOs operating in rural areas indicate the persistence of ethnic tensions and fear to which nationalist rhetoric and reporting but importantly also lack of contact and awareness contribute. This suggests that work on peacebuilding at grassroots levels through local actors remains relevant.

The Evaluation Team finds that attention to **gender equality and women's empowerment** has been strong throughout the evaluation period, largely thanks to the efforts of Swedish NGOs that either have this area as a specific focus or engage in it substantially. Gender features increasingly strongly in Swedish strategies and Sida has responded to this in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The engagements have incorporated relevant peacebuilding approaches, such as empowerment and interaction between different groups, and operating both at government (to increase women in decision-making) and civil society (as advocacy) levels. Gender has been addressed to varying degrees in other parts of the portfolio.

Sida has also had a focus on **minorities and vulnerable groups**, particularly Roma. Towards the end of its support through the IAP, the need to secure adequate housing for the 70,000 Roma in Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognised and incorporated. Sida's support to civil society (for example through core support to the Sarajevo Open Centre) has sought to ensure that the needs of vulnerable groups, such as LGBT, are placed on the agenda, including in relation to hate crimes.

Sida's long-term support to the **justice sector** is strategic given the role that an independent judiciary must play in ensuring due process, reducing impunity and promoting trust in state institutions. In the post-conflict context, it has been relevant to focus on both the formal justice institutions (such as the State Court and the HJPC) and civil society advocacy and monitoring functions. The support has had an added value when it has benefitted both the state and local levels. The HJPC project, for example, has strengthened the judicial (court) sector throughout the country and not only at state level.

The support provided to **transitional justice** (via institutions such as the ICMP and its local counterparts) is clearly relevant from a peacebuilding perspective as it helps to establish the historical record of what happened during the war, thereby also helping the families of victims and contributing to the prosecution of war criminals.

A further longstanding area of support has been to **local governance** (through various programmes during the period, including GAP and most recently the EMZED), which appear indirectly relevant to peacebuilding as they extend linkages (including accountability) between local municipalities and citizens.

Sida has generally been good at responding to opportunities and has also sought (with like-minded donors) to push at relevant boundaries, such as constitutional reform and the proposed truth and reconciliation commission (even though neither of these suc-

ceeded). Interviews suggest that, for such initiatives to gain traction, there needs to be substantial local ownership and they should not be regarded as externally-driven.

One sector that is conspicuous by its absence in Sida's portfolio is education. The persistence of three schooling systems and curricula (particularly relating to history) constitutes a gap that has needed to be addressed for a long time. As many stakeholders commented, the system helps preserve the polarised society that remains in Bosnia and Herzegovina today. The evaluation team has not been able to identify any documentation to indicate why education was excluded from Sida's portfolio, although the general consensus is that it would have been politically very difficult.

5.2 EFFECTIVENESS

The extent to which the approaches undertaken have contributed to intended outcomes

The effectiveness of Sida's overall portfolio has varied, with a key lesson being that comprehensive institutional reforms can be severely affected by the highly complex governance set-up in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Public Administration Reform – PAR – programme is an example).⁷⁸ Engagements have generally been more effective where they have been focused on narrower objectives (such as the State Court and HJPC) or through civil society. These observations reflect the ability to secure local ownership and buy-in, which automatically becomes more difficult when operating across sectors and levels of government.

Sida has prioritised its engagements in Bosnia and Herzegovina drawing from the strategic guidelines provided and its access to relevant dialogue and coordination fora, including OHR task forces and dialogue with other donors and implementing partners. Sida has effectively aligned and harmonised its support with like-minded donors and international agencies. Over the past ten years there has been an increase in support provided through multilateral channels, although the bilateral portfolio remains significant at 56% of the total (with a substantial proportion of this being through NGOs). Entries on Open Aid show that the number of engagements has consolidated over the period and this is likely to have reduced the overall management burden and increased efficiency.

Effective decision-making reflects the quality of staff and their engagement with partners in the field and within coordination fora. This has been matched by the consistent support provided through Swedish framework NGOs operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who have had a close relationship with Sida at the Embassy. Many of the individuals involved have had substantial field experience and as such have repre-

⁷⁸ Evaluation of the Public Administration Reform Fund in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2015, Sida.

sented a valuable resource from which to draw. Likewise, Sida appears to have made good use of Swedish experts and twinning arrangements; for example, in the justice sector.

Sida is regarded as a committed donor in Bosnia and Herzegovina with good quality and engaged staff. Initially, Sida's support was very staff dependent and a relatively few staff had a considerable impact on the programme. Some of these people have been utilised in different functions over the years, thus contributing to continuity. It has aided Sida's effectiveness that there has been flexibility within the human resources management system to enable this. It has also contributed to Sida's institutional memory, although a dependence upon a few individuals can also be seen as a weakness unless there are solid systems also in place. The difficulty this evaluation team has had in retrieving documentation indicates that there have been shortcomings in relation to the latter.

Given the political economy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sida's effectiveness is likely to have been increased by the focus on local governance with the aim of improving service delivery and participation (EMZED, GAP, CDMA are examples). These are also relevant from a peacebuilding perspective. Strategic interventions at state level (especially in the justice sector and in relation to gender) have also been undertaken where there has been strong international backing. Sida's long-standing and extensive civil society support has been an important complement to its institutional support. Sida's extensive use of Swedish framework NGOs has contributed to overall effectiveness due to the overall quality of these organisations, their extensive local partner networks and the close dialogue with Sida staff at the Embassy.

Several stakeholders noted Sida's values as a defining attribute; Sida is well-known and respected for its commitment to gender equality and women's empowerment and to the HRBA principles of participation, accountability, non-discrimination and transparency. Some stakeholders in Bosnia and Herzegovina also noted the symbiotic relationship between the MFA and Sida staff in the Embassy as a positive contributor to Sida's effectiveness.

Sida has consistently promoted gender equality and women's empowerment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and this can be seen as a defining characteristic of Swedish support over the period. Sida has supported both duty bearers (e.g. the Gender Agency) and rights holders (NGOs/grassroots) and has contributed to joint donor arrangement (such as the FIGAP basket fund intended to operationalize the Gender Action Plan). The link to women as actors in peacebuilding is one of the clearest examples of this in Sida's portfolio (the other being transitional justice). This has often been at grassroots level, although attention has also been given to promoting the 1325 Action Plan and improving the position of women in decision-making, which is an area where Bosnia and Herzegovina performs very poorly. Sida's ability to draw from Swedish framework NGOs with strong expertise relating to gender equality, women's

empowerment and gender based violence has represented a clear comparative advantage.

Sida's multi-sector approach has offered opportunities to create synergies. An example is the linkage between ICMP's identification of victims from the conflict and the work of the State Court in relation to war crimes. But the portfolio has also been very comprehensive and therefore resource demanding to manage. The decision to concentrate the support into fewer sectors and reduce the number of engagements (now less than half of the previous figure) will have contributed to its overall effectiveness by reducing transaction costs at the Embassy.

Efforts to strengthen the peacebuilding perspective in Sida's strategies have increased recently, which is positive. A key lesson in this respect is the need to promote a more explicit peacebuilding approach that rests upon a relevant theory of change and indicators to measure its effects. Reporting and evaluations/reviews should then draw upon the evidence that this produces.

5.3 IMPACT

The overall impact of Sida's peacebuilding efforts in terms of direct, indirect, intended and unintended, negative and positive results

The conflict drivers identified earlier in this report remain and continue to constrain Bosnia and Herzegovina's peaceful development and recovery from the 1992-1995 conflict. That said, it is important to reflect that Bosnia and Herzegovina has not experienced violent conflict since the end of the war and the 2014 disturbances did not exacerbate ethnic tensions. Aside from the persistence of nationalist rhetoric from politicians and reporting in the media, stakeholders pointed to the complicated bureaucracy and difficulties in developing a unified political vision for the country as key factors slowing down reform progress and constraining the potential for impact.

This report highlights a number of results to which Sida has contributed. In the 1990s and into the 2000s, Sida's support through the IAP (which started as humanitarian support) contributed to a substantial number of returns (including minority returns). Sida's support to local governance, justice and law enforcement, gender and human rights, culture, and transitional justice has also had positive results over the evaluation period. The support to local governance has contributed to increasing linkages between municipalities and citizens (GAP, EMZED). In the formal justice area, it has contributed to increasing the efficiency of the judiciary and reducing the backlog of administrative cases. It has also helped maintain the State Court in relation to anti-corruption and war crimes cases. The support to gender equality has contributed to strengthening the institutional basis for promoting gender equality, women's empowerment and action against gender based violence through government action plans on gender and UNSCR 1325. This has been substantially backed up through partnerships with civil society that are increasingly becoming more advocacy focused.

The support provided indirectly through Swedish framework organisations to Bosnian civil society has, in the cases highlighted here, had positive effects on inter-ethnic interaction and understanding at grassroots level. While these results are localised, the partnership modality used means that they can have a spreading effect provided the organisations involved have sufficient capacity.

The joint support to the ICMP stands out as an example of an intervention that has had a significant impact in terms of the number of identifications (evidence and impartiality) and transitional justice but also because of its institutionalisation through local structures and commitments. While the international support has been an important factor in preserving these results so far, there are concerns about growing revisionism. In this respect, it is unfortunate that the momentum generated here could not extend to agreement on a truth and reconciliation commission. Interviews with local stakeholders strongly suggest a continued need for transitional justice and awareness-raising within the two entities.

Likewise, it is unfortunate that Sida (and other actors') efforts in 2006 to address the limitations in the constitution did not succeed. The nationalist rhetoric surrounding the October 2018 elections indicates that these constraints are not about to go away. In the face of this, Sida's support to democracy and human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been important.

5.4 SUSTAINABILITY

The extent to which the results have been sustainable

Sida's long-term, committed and flexible support since 1995 has contributed to establishing the basis of sustainable peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although genuine progress continues to be undermined by the mix of politics and an overly complicated bureaucracy. At the local level, there have been positive changes in attitude and understanding that local actors regard as sustainable. However, these are not yet comprehensive and risks arise at every election due to the polarising and ethnically driven rhetoric used. Similarly, the continued prevalence of corruption remains an issue that has not yet been resolved (inter alia, contributing to the 2014 disturbances). Sida has, nonetheless regularly prioritised ant-corruption as a cross cutting element in its support (for example is the PARF).⁷⁹

Key lessons include ensuring the ability to align with other donors (and the multilateral system) to ensure harmonisation and coordination so that political dialogue and development cooperation complement each other. Longer-term engagements (some have been for ten years or more, such as ICMP) have contributed to the sustainability

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

of results, although it also means that the partners concerned have a degree of funding dependency. On the other hand, international support has helped preserve some of the important gains made (e.g. in the justice sector) that have been under threat from spoilers. This continues to provide an important rationale for continued support. The shift from service provision via NGOs that characterised the post war period progressively gave way to support for advocacy and NGOs have become more professional. This provides greater scope for interaction between the state (and entities) and civil society, which is positive and sustainable.

6 Annexes

ANNEX A: LITERATURE CONSULTED

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ANNEX B: ASSESSMENT OF CONFLICT DRIVER CONSIDERATIONS IN COUNTRY STRATEGIES

Assessment of inclusion of / reference to conflict and peace drivers in country strategies

Strategy	Criteria: reference to conflict/peace drivers in:	Assessment	Drivers included in strategy background analysis
2014-2020 Regional Strategy for Eastern Europe, Western Balkans, & Turkey	1. Context analysis	References to macro conflict drivers such inequality, politicisation, corruption included in background document and reflected in Embassy operationalisation	Refers to unfinished transition, role of political elites, ethnic & clan based allegiances, insecurity, ethnic divisions
	2. Overall theory of change	Not explicit	
	3. Rationale for sector and/or intervention focus	Reflections on inequalities and statebuilding challenges are included but not fully utilising peacebuilding perspectives	
Country Strategies for Bosnia and Herzegovina: 2011-2014 2006-2010 2003-2005 2000-2002	1. Context analysis	References to macro statebuilding challenges such inequality, politicisation, corruption	2003 strategy is only one with a context and conflict analysis but is weakly reflected in sector rationale.
	2. Overall theory of change	Not explicit and not related to peacebuilding challenges	
	3. Rationale for sector and/or intervention focus	Reflections included for priority sectors; however, these do not include a peacebuilding perspective	

Legend:

Conflict and peace drivers well integrated in strategy document (or clearly aligned with background analysis of drivers)	
Conflict and peace drivers included in part of the document	
Conflict and peace drivers mentioned but not prioritization nor substantiated based on this	
Conflict and peace drivers not included in strategy	

ANNEX C: OVERVIEW OF SWEDISH GLOBAL POLICY GUIDANCE AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA COUNTRY STRATEGIES

Swedish Global Policy Guidance	Swedish Strategies Bosnia and Herzegovina
Strategi Hållbar fred 2017-2022 (Swedish Government Policy) • Objective(s): - Improve the prevention of armed conflict, - Effective conflict resolution, - Sustainable peace- and state building - Increased human security - Strong emphasis on women, youth and marginalised groups - Emphasis on UN and OECD-DAC alignment - Support should be long-term, yet fast/responsive, flexible	The Policy for Sustainable peace is partially reflected in the Regional Strategy and the background documentation. Nb. The regional strategy was developed prior to the global policy. Statebuilding is part of the core rationale and is very closely aligned with EU accession reforms, which Sida supports. Peacebuilding is less clearly reflected, but largely anchored in the democratic governance and human rights area. Women, youth and marginalised groups are well reflected.
Peace and Security for Development 2010-2014 (Swedish Government Policy) • The policy defines peacebuilding as the process that endeavours to support the transition from armed conflict to sustainable peace, reconciliation and stability (including creating increased trust between the parties to a conflict; peace negotiations; implementation of peace agreements; participation of women and their influence in the peace process; creating reconciliation and actions that address the structural causes underlying the conflict) Objectives: 1. Promote peace • Dialogue, confidence-building and conflict management • Women, peace and security • Institutions of the rule of law with a particular emphasis on “transitional justice” • influencing actors to support peacebuilding; capacity development to manage conflicts; involvement of women in peacebuilding process; promoting dialogue processes	Promotion of peace is well reflected in the Sida portfolio for this period but is less evident in the strategies. Sida has engaged in dialogue and conflict management at local level through NGO partners. Women, peace and security has been reflected in engagements at state and civil society levels. Justice (including transitional justice) are supported. Women have been a significant actor in relation to local level peace and reconciliation, including as a by-product of women’s empowerment activities.

2. Promote security • Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) • Security sector reform (SSR) • Small arms and light weapons, mines 3. Peace dividends • improvement in people's lives to ensure population support for peace (jobs, health, education etc.)	
Policy for Promoting Peace and Security through Development Cooperation 2005 (Sida policy) Approaches: • Risk awareness: understanding the effects of development cooperation in a violent context • Conflict sensitivity: ensure development cooperation does not have a negative impact • Promote peace and security: target attitudes and behaviours of parties to conflict (e.g. house and road construction, good governance and democracy that is inclusive of marginalised groups; trade; media; agriculture; SSR). The interventions must contribute to prevention or resolution of conflict	Not apparent in country strategies, although certain civil society engagements (mainly via framework NGOs) have included conflict sensitivity and promotion of peace.
Strategy for Conflict Management and Peace-building 1999 (Sida policy) • Conflict management: aid financed projects implemented during armed conflict • Conflict prevention: activities aimed at preventing violence or escalation of violence • Long and short term measures to reduce risk of violent conflict • Objectives: – Promote a culture of prevention – Identify structural risk factors – Develop the international system of norms and strengthen its implementation – Strengthen the international institutional framework and its preventive instruments	Country strategies have included a focus on enhancing respect for human rights and rule of law. The only specific conflict analysis undertaken was in 2003 and this is more of a political economy analysis.

– Strengthen Sweden’s capacity for international conflict prevention activities in different policy areas (foreign policy and security, trade, migration and development assistance) • Enhancing respect for human rights and international law • Strengthen measures to protect civilian populations • Integrate conflict prevention with development co-operation work and develop a common perspective • Prevention language • Conflict analysis should be a natural part of the preparatory process	
<i>No global policy data available pre-1999</i>	

ANNEX D: LIST OF PERSONS CONSULTED

Marie Bergström	Swedish Embassy, Sida, Head of Development Cooperation	Sarajevo
Johan Norqvist	Swedish Embassy, Programme Officer, Sida	Sarajevo
Nedim Bukvic	Swedish Embassy, Sida	Sarajevo
Mario Vignjevic	Swedish Embassy, Sida	Sarajevo
Emil Johansson	Swedish Embassy, MFA	Sarajevo
Pelle Persson	Sida, formerly Head of Development Cooperation, Sida Sarajevo	Sarajevo
Marie Jusnes	Sida HQ, formerly Programme Officer, Swedish Embassy in Sarajevo	Stockholm & Sarajevo
Staffan Herrström	Ambassador, formerly Sida HQ with responsibility for Bosnia and Herzegovina	Via e-mail
Per Iwansson	Formerly Head of Development Cooperation, Sida, Sarajevo	Stockholm
Peter Swartling	Former Programme Officer, Sida Sarajevo	Skype
Bo Elding	Formerly Head of Development Cooperation, Sida, Sarajevo	Stockholm
Anders Hedlund	Formerly Head of Development Cooperation, Sida, Sarajevo	Stockholm
Jonathan Francis	Sida HQ, formerly Programme Officer, Swedish Embassy in Sarajevo	Stockholm
Joakim Molander	Former Programme Officer, Sida Sarajevo	Stockholm
Erik Illes	Former Programme Officer, Sida Sarajevo	Stockholm
Elisabet Tomasinec	EU Delegation, Sarajevo (former Programme Officer, Sida Sarajevo)	Sarajevo
Julien Berhoud	EU Delegation, Sarajevo	Sarajevo
Haris Lokvanic	SDC	Sarajevo
Nejra Neimarlija	KULT (Youth NGO)	Sarajevo
Biljana Potparic Lipa	USAID Justice programme	Sarajevo
Majda Halilovic	NGO Atlantic Initiative	Sarajevo
Edina Becirevic	NGO Atlantic Initiative	Sarajevo
Samira Krehic	International Commission for Missing Persons - ICMP	Sarajevo
Ana Bilic	Higher Judicial and Prosecutorial Council - HJPC	Sarajevo
Edin Telalagiv	UNDP	Sarajevo
Slobodan Tadic	UNDP	Sarajevo
Jasna Kilalic	USAID	Sarajevo
Mirjana Popovic	USAID	Sarajevo
Andreja Sporer	Office of the High Representative	Sarajevo
Mirna Buljugic	BIRN (media NGO)	Sarajevo

Samra Filipovica	Head of Gender Agency, Ministry of Human Rights & Refugees	Sarajevo
Kika Babic	Gender Agency, Ministry of Human Rights & Refugees	Sarajevo
Eva Zillén	Kvinna till Kvinna, Stockholm	Skype
Bojana Mumin	Kvinna till Kvinna, Sarajevo	Skype
Christina Bergman	Olof Palme International Centre, Stockholm	Skype
Mima Dahic	NGO Vive Zene	Skype

Evaluation of Sida's support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts

– Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Report

This report presents the Bosnia and Herzegovina case study for the Evaluation of Sida's support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts and is an annex to the evaluation synthesis report. The evaluation has been commissioned by Sida and undertaken by Tana Copenhagen. It assesses Sida's approach and support to peacebuilding at the strategic level and seeks to identify what has worked well and what has worked less well. The evaluation finds a strong correlation between Sida's support portfolio and Bosnia and Herzegovina's political, social and economic development needs and wider international commitments and aid modalities. The evaluation highlights a number of results to which Sida has contributed, including refugee and displaced person returns, local governance, justice and transitional justice, gender and human rights, culture and gender equality and women's empowerment. Despite generally good results at engagement level, the evaluation finds that Sida would benefit from a stronger focus on a peacebuilding theory of change enabling it to more clearly target the broader and deeply entrenched polarisation between the three main ethnicities that continues to undermine the basis for sustainable peace in the country.



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