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Sida Decentralised Evaluation

NIRAS Sweden AB

Evaluation of Sida's Support to the Project "Organic Trade and Value Chain Development in East Africa" 2014–2019

Final Report

Evaluation of Sida's Support to the Project “Organic Trade and Value Chain Development in East Africa” 2014–2019

**Final Report
July 2019**

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The views and interpretations expressed in this report are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAM/S	Alternative Accreditation Model/System
Acert	Acert Organic Certification
Africert	Africert Agribusiness Certification Company
AfrOnet	African Organic Network
AU	African Union
BOAM	Burundi Organic Agricultural Movement
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CB	Certification body
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EA	East Africa
EAC	East African Community
EALA	East African Legislative Assembly
EAOPS	East African Organic Products Standard
EAOM	East African Organic Mark
EOA	Ecological Organic Agriculture Initiative
EPOPA	Export Promotion of Organic Products from Africa
ETAU	Eco Terra Alliance Uganda
EU	European Union
FIBL	Research Institute of Organic Agriculture
GLOBAL G.A.P.	Global Good Agricultural Practice
HRBA	Human Rights Based Approach
KEBS	Kenya Bureau of Standards
KEPHIS	Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Services
KOAN	Kenya Organic Agriculture Network
ICS	Internal Control System
IFOAM	International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements, also “Organics International”
INNOGOF	Innovative Group of Organic Farmers
JMC	Joint Management Committee
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
NOAM	National Organic Movement
NOGAMU	National Organic Agricultural Movement of Uganda
OA	Organic Agriculture
OGS	Organic Guarantee System

OLC	Organic Leadership Courses
OSEA	Regional Cooperation for Organic Standards and Certification Capacity in East Africa
OSOSEA	One Stop Organic Shop East Africa Project
OTEA	Organic Trade and Value Chain Development in East Africa
PELUM	Participatory Ecological Land Use Management Association
PGS	Participatory Guarantee Systems
ROAM	Rwanda Organic Agriculture Movement
SAT	Sustainable Agriculture Tanzania
SDC	Swiss Development Cooperation
SEK	Swedish Crown (currency)
SSNC	Swedish Society for Nature Conservation
TanCert	Tanzania Organic Certification Association
TBS	Tanzania Bureau of Standards
TOAM	Tanzania Organic Agriculture Movement
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNBS	Uganda National Bureau of Standards
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

Preface

This report presents the evaluation of the project “Organic Trade and Value Chain Development in East Africa, OTEA, 2014–2019” implemented by a partnership consisting of International Federation of Organic Movements, IFOAM, the African Organic Network (AfrOnet) and the National Organic Agriculture Movements in Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda with support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).

The evaluation was commissioned by the Embassy of Sweden in Addis Ababa, Section for Regional Development Cooperation.

The evaluation was conducted during May–August 2019 by a team of NIRAS evaluators: Bo Tengnäs (Team Leader), Florence Gathoni Gachango and Casmir Makoye. The findings presented in this report are based on extensive document reviews, web searches and analysis, and personal interactions with large numbers of stakeholders, including staff of the partner organisations, other officials and informants as well as with farmers, traders and owners of outlets where organic products are sold. The field work was conducted in Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania.

The evaluation team wishes to express its sincere thanks to all respondents who willingly spared some of their valuable time for discussions with the team.

Executive Summary

The report presents findings and conclusions of the evaluation of the project Organic Trade and Value Chain Development in East Africa (OTEA). The OTEA project is expected to be concluded by end of July 2019. The evaluation is thus an end of project evaluation and should focus on lessons learnt, effectiveness, impact and sustainability issues. The purpose of the evaluation is to follow up on the OTEA project and to draw lessons from the project when considering support to similar projects in the future.

The history of Sida support to organic agriculture development in East Africa dates back to the period 1997–2008 and the Export Promotion of Organic Products from Africa (EPOPA) programme. EPOPA was followed by the Regional Cooperation for Organic Standards and Certification Capacity in East Africa (OSEA I and II). OTEA builds directly on the achievements of these earlier projects.

OTEA's overall development goal is **to contribute to improving the income and livelihoods of rural communities in East Africa through the development of market-oriented organic production.**

The specific project objective is **to increase trade with organic products, by supporting development of enabling regional policies, a capacitated production and trade environment, and an increased consumer awareness.**

OTEA has five project components:

1. A well-functioning Organic Guarantee System (OGS) in East Africa and increased consumer awareness
2. Increased capacity of local producers to access and supply local and regional markets
3. East African government policies, strategies and plans support the organic agriculture sector. EAC and AU policy makers are supportive of organic agriculture and ecological organic agriculture
4. All National Organic Movements (NOAMs) have increased capacity and skills to further develop the organic sector. The Regional Organic Network (AfrOnet) is strengthened and able to address issues of regional importance at EAC and AU levels.
5. Increased availability of reliable information and statistics on production, trade and multi-functional benefits of organic agriculture and their contributions to the challenges and needs in East Africa.

The project was implemented from December 2014 to July 2019 by a partnership consisting of the International Federation of Organic Movements, IFOAM, the African Organic Network (AfrOnet) and the National Organic Agriculture Movements (NOAMs) in Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. The initial budget was 24

MSEK out of which about 23.5 MSEK was utilised. Both mentioned amounts include 500,000 SEK used for the final evaluation.

Major findings of the evaluation

Relevance

In terms of content OTEA was generally deemed relevant. The five components were logical and complementary. The target groups for the intervention - farmers, processors and traders - were expected to be benefitting, while a wider group was recognised as stakeholders including supporting institutions, certification bodies and government agencies. This represents a logical construct.

However, management in the national partner organisations and in AfrOnet became more complex when several donors and agencies agreed to engage with the same NO-AMs without much coordination. Sida funds, for example, was provided both bilaterally in Uganda, from the Sida Regional budget for Sub-Saharan Africa and as CSO support through the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SSNC). Similarly, Swiss support has come through different mechanisms. The project Ecological Organic Agriculture (EOA) Initiative had considerable overlaps with OTEA, making it difficult to attribute results to one project or the other. Better donor coordination is called for.

The project proposal, on which the project rests, included a long narrative section on the relevance of organic farming for poverty alleviation and livelihoods. The results framework and subsequently the OTEA monitoring tool did, however, not include any parameters on poverty reduction or alleviation. The evaluation team noted that the links between organic agriculture and poverty are situation specific. Considerations on targeting vulnerable groups, including women and youth, were made in some countries when identifying criteria for value chain selection, but there was no in-depth target group analysis to design targeted actions for the most vulnerable groups.

Impacts of certification are not uniform for different producer groups. There was no illustration of such variation in the Project Proposal, yet, in implementation, the Team's finding is that OTEA has managed to reach both small- and larger-scale farmers. Some of them are not at all poor, while some are poorer but not representing the poorest of the poor. An exclusive ambition to mainly reach the very poor would, however, have made it more difficult to show results. Some value chains, like honey, which was addressed, have a higher potential to reach poor groups than some other value chains. Processing can generally yield added value for poor rural producers.

The East African country leaders face significant challenges in meeting the domestic need for food from domestic production. By independence in Kenya, for example, there was a million urban residents as compared to a projected 42-43 million in 2050. The implication is, that when the rural population will have to feed a rising proportion of urban people, farming will have to become much more commercially oriented than at present. Relatively, subsistence farming will have to give way to commercial farming and productivity, both per unit of land and per unit of labour, must increase.

There are many good reasons for leaders to try to avoid their countries becoming dependent on food imports. The growing populations, and in particular growing urban populations, and with it rapidly growing domestic demand for food from the market is one among several factors, explaining why several governments, including those of

Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi, do not want to single out organic agriculture as a stand alone policy, but rather treat it and promote it within the general agricultural sector policies. Rapid development of special and separate policies for organic farming may not be expected.

It could have been helpful if the project proposal had elaborated a bit more on the role and scope for organic agriculture in relation to the overall challenges the East African nations face for self-sufficiency.

Effectiveness and impact

The project showed varied impacts under the different components. The organic guarantee system was further developed in collaboration with the East African Community (EAC). The organic standard was revised and continuously managed and a Secretariat for the East African Organic Mark was established. In some countries, however, there was little progress regarding capacity of the local Certification Bodies (CBs) due to, *inter alia*, small volumes of products to be certified, competition from well recognised foreign CBs and in some countries management issues.

Local producers were successfully assisted to embark on organic production or to expand already existing production. Some 130 groups with a Participatory Guarantee System (PGS) has been supported in OTEA of which 40 were PGS approved/operational and the remainder under development. There are numerous examples that the support has improved the marketability of their produce even though such improvements are not always linked to use of the Kilimohai organic mark. There was, however, sometimes a disconnect between the created linkages and the actual business which has been attributed to either limited volumes supplied, breach of agreements or lack of quality certificates. Similar sentiments were echoed by organic poultry farmers in Kenya, who despite having formal supply agreement with a buyer have often failed to fulfil their part of the agreement through side selling of the local chicken especially during festive seasons. The observed performance of both the PGS groups and non-PGS value chains may not be fully attributed to OTEA as KOAN, NOGAMU and TOAM have also been engaged in the implementation of the Value Chain and Market Development Pillar (II) of the EOA project.

Through OTEA's intervention, new forms of markets (farmers markets, selling points, niche markets organic restaurants, organic basket) have been established in some countries.

OTEA has successfully engaged with policy makers both at national and County/Province level. The prospects for mainstreaming organic agriculture within existing policies and programmes was found more promising than pursuing that organic agriculture must have separate policy frameworks. Although the project objective of development of organic agriculture policy by these countries was not achieved during the project period, a lot of goodwill has been shown in most countries.

Data collection on organic agriculture was systematised and improved, but it is still difficult to access reliable data on organic production in East Africa from local sources.

Efficiency

OTEA suffered from setbacks in implementation in both Rwanda and Uganda due to mismanagement in the national partner organisations. These events reduced efficiency. When some actions were taken the governance systems and administrative routines were strengthened in the Rwandan organisation, while the participation of the Ugandan organisation in OTEA was discontinued. Organisational assessments conducted revealed that several of the partner organisations had weak systems and with that high risks. Sida has approved the OTEA audited accounts for 2016 and 2017, while the accounts for 2018 and 2019 are yet to be audited.

Team's recommendations

The following recommendations were made based on the team's findings and conclusions:

Recommendations on design

Recommendation 1: Poverty objectives and indicators should be included in the results framework if the project is expected to report or be evaluated on aspects related to poverty reduction or alleviation.

Recommendation 2: If poverty and gender issues are expected to be addressed, it is essential to have a rather detailed analysis of how that is going to happen, including target group analyses, commodity/value chain analyses, etc.

Recommendation 3: Ensure donor harmonisation and coordination. Even if a basket funding arrangement cannot be achieved, projects' monitoring, evaluations, donor meetings, etc. can be coordinated.

Recommendation 4: Ensure that expected outcome objectives are realistic. In this case, the difficulties in documenting volumes of trade at different levels could have been forecasted.

Recommendations on implementation modalities

Recommendation 5: Consider scope for institutional development by allocating multi-year budgets per partner to enable partners to plan strategically and to allow for participatory and transparent decisions on allocations and reallocations.

Recommendation 6: Systems for organisational assessments and follow up of the same should be an institutionalised routine. Organisations should have the essential set up of policies against fraud and misconduct.

Recommendation 7: Agreed plans for communication should cater for efficient two-way communication, i.e. both for reporting procedures from partners to main implementor and to donor, and for routinely sharing of information from the center to the partners (in this case NOAMs).

Recommendation 8: Audits should be performed as per original agreement with Sida and not be postponed to include no-cost extension periods or otherwise delayed.

Recommendation 9: Financial reports should be designed such that all partners can see and comprehend their respective expenditures and how it tallies with their financial reports.

Recommendation 10: Up to date ICT technology should be applied to minimise air travel and with it minimise negative environmental impact. This will be important for JMC sustainability.

Recommendations specifically to NOAMs and AfrOnet

Recommendation 11: NOAMs and AfrOnet should jointly review which costs PGS groups face. The ambition should be that costs over time do not constitute too much a disincentive for certification.

Recommendation 12: For sustainability, NOAMs and AfrOnet should agree on policy regarding, preferably, no subsidies to third-party certification.

Recommendation 12: NOAMs should make an effort to present data and success stories on their websites.

Recommendation 13: NOAMs and AfrOnet should focus on high-quality implementation of donor supported interventions and, at least for the time being, abstain from income generating activities.

Recommendation 14: In order to gain policy support, demonstrate production benefits of organic agriculture and allow for recognition that organic and conventional agriculture can be mutually reinforcing rather than it being an “either – or” issue.

Recommendation 15: To improve local certification bodies’ businesses and sustainability, there is need for the organic sector to support more production. This will provide the certification bodies with adequate market for their services.

Recommendation 17: The organic sector players should build on the existing trust and relationship between organic producers and customers in promoting the *kilimohai* mark in the local markets.

Recommendation 18: With increased use of mobile phone in the region, actors could take the advantage and partner with existing mobile data collection applications or develop an application that organic value chain actors could use in capturing data on production, market demand, supply quantities and pricing.

Recommendation 19: The NOAMs should consistently strive to enhance their credibility and reduce risks for any negative public perception and image so as to stay relevant in the quest for organic policies in their respective countries.

1 Introduction, method and background

1.1 ABOUT THE EVALUATION REPORT

The report presents findings and conclusions of the evaluation of the project Organic Trade and Value Chain Development in East Africa (OTEA). The main text is supported by ten Annexes:

- Annex 1. Terms of Reference
- Annex 2. Log frame with indicators and activities
- Annex 3. List of documents
- Annex 4. Evaluation work plan and people met/contacted
- Annex 5. Checklists used to guide interviews
- Annex 6. Summarised country reports
- Annex 7. Evaluation matrix
- Annex 8. Photos from the evaluation
- Annex 9. Inception Report (excl. Annexes)
- Annex 10. Comments on draft report with team's responses

1.2 THE EVALUATION PURPOSE

As per the TOR, the purpose of the evaluation is to follow up on the Organic Trade and Value Chain Development in East Africa (OTEA) project and to draw lessons from the project when considering support to similar projects in the future. Moreover, the evaluation is expected to be useful for IFOAM Organics International (International Federation of Agriculture Movements), their implementing partners as well as other donors and organisations.

More specifically, the purposes of the evaluation include:

- Help Sida, IFOAM and its partners to assess the results of the OTEA-project from 2014-2019 to learn from what has worked well and less well and what the overall impact of the project has been.
- To analyse and come up with suggestions for sustainability of the project beyond Sida-funding.
- Provide a tool for reflection on potential improvement on how project implementation may be adjusted and improved for similar projects.
- Assess the role of supporting organic agriculture at the regional level in terms of expanding trade opportunities and diversification, and poverty reduction.

1.3 EVALUTION USERS

The primary intended users of the evaluation are inter alia:

- The project management team, higher management and the Steering Committee of IFOAM and the National Organic Movements (NOAMs).
- The Swedish Embassy in Addis Ababa, Sida's Africa Department in Stockholm and other relevant Embassies in Eastern Africa.

1.4 EVALUTION SCOPE

The OTEA project is scheduled to be concluded by end of July 2019 after a short no-cost extension. The evaluation is thus an end of project evaluation and should focus on lessons learnt, effectiveness, impact and sustainability issues.

There were some setbacks among the initial project implementers, notably the near collapse of National Organic Agricultural Movement of Uganda (NOGAMU) and temporary suspensions of project support to Rwanda Organic Agriculture Movement (ROAM). To avoid that these setbacks cast an undue shade on the OTEA project as a whole, the Team found it necessary to make a fairly detailed review of the actual achievements under the different components (see evaluation matrix under Effectiveness, Annex 7). This did not mean avoiding scrutiny of OTEA in relation to alleged corruption, and if the project was designed to minimise corruption risks. This issue was treated as one among several factors, positive and negative, that were considered in the evaluation.

OTEA builds on the earlier Regional Cooperation for Organic Standards and Certification Capacity in East Africa (OSEA) and on even earlier cooperation facilitated by Sida. OSEA was evaluated in 2013 and this evaluation tried consciously to focus on OTEA. The TOR only suggested that the evaluation should look back further by noting previously unidentified effects of the OSEA I and II, including both positive and negative, intended and unintended effects.

1.5 EVALUATION METHOD

During the inception period, the Team compiled the evaluation questions of the TOR with additional questions that the Team found relevant and organised the questions, as far as possible, under the OECD/DAC standard evaluation criteria. Also, indicators were picked from the Project's Logframe/Results Summary of 2016. Indicators were partly derived from the Results Summary and partly developed by the team. These activities generated the Evaluation Matrix appended to the Inception Report. The matrix constituted a key tool during the evaluation. Reference is made to the filled in matrix, Annex 7.

Country visits and field work was carried out in Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda. The team visited the Tanzania Organic Agriculture Movement (TOAM), ROAM, Kenya Organic Agriculture Network (KOAN) as well as the African Organic Network (Af-rOnet), based in Tanzania, in order to get information and views from key actors. The team also established contacts with key informants in Uganda for its attempt to understand how the incidences with NOGAMU had impacted on the development of Organic

Agriculture in Uganda. In addition, the “First International Conference on Agroecology Transforming Agriculture and Food Systems in Africa” availed the evaluation Team opportunity to meet personally with the Chairman of Burundi Organic Agriculture Movement (BOAM), IFOAM representatives, an AfrOnet Board member as well as other informants.

Field visits were made to Tharaka Nithi, Homa Bay, Kisumu, Kajiado and Nairobi Counties in Kenya as well as to areas around Dar es Salaam, Morogoro and Dodoma in Tanzania. The Team also met with Government representatives in Tanzania and Kenya.

Checklists were prepared to guide interviews (Annex 5), but without using them as questionnaires with question-answer approach. Instead discussions were conducted freely and informally to allow for follow up when unexpected information surfaced. A list of people met or contacted is attached (Annex 4). Attempts were made to contact several others but, in some cases, without getting responses. The partner organisations were invited to a **self-examination** based on development in the respective countries with respect to 13 parameters. Opinions provided by the partners were matched with opinions of the Team and found to correspond fairly well. A synthesis of this small and special assessment is provided in section 3.3.2.

A wide range of **project documentation** as well as documents related to Government, EAC and AU policies were reviewed. In addition, information was sought widely on internet. During the **analysis and report writing phase**, information obtained from different sources and by use of different methods were compared. This **triangulation** was applied to synthesise general conclusions as per the OECD DAC evaluation criteria. The project document elaborates on how organic agriculture addresses poverty with reference to various studies and opinions. It appears that the very general conclusion is that organic agriculture addresses poverty. The results summary which was developed while the project was conceptualised and later revised in 2016 does not include any targets or indicators aimed at measuring poverty alleviation or reduction, but is focussed on expansion of organic production. The pros and cons on organic agriculture versus “conventional” agriculture is subjected to a global debate going on for decades. A general position has gradually emerged that the two models of organic and “conventional” agriculture will co-exist and even spur overall positive development though it is not possible to venture into details here. While it is true that organic agriculture can address poverty, an opinion that it always does so would be contested by many practitioners and scientists. As the project has not precisely elaborated on how poverty will be addressed in its design or in its reporting, the Team has also not been able to measure impact in relation to poverty. It is noted also, that the project overall development goal indicates the ambition to improve income and livelihood of rural communities but is not explicit on poverty alleviation or reduction. The specific project objective is restricted to increased trade, enabling regional policies, capacitated production and trade environment and increased consumer awareness.

1.6 CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED

Challenges encountered by the Team included non-responses from some targeted informants from whom the Team would have liked to get information. Mitigation measures included review of additional documentation, and in some cases making contact with other informants. The latter included exploring alternative channels for information related to NOGAMU.

Another challenge encountered is the fact that another project with similar scope, the Ecological Organic Agriculture Initiative (EOA) availed support to the same organisations as OTEA in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The Team has noted that in its report where a distinction cannot be made at results level. A clear distinction at activity level would have necessitated reviewing organisations' accounts in detail, which was found impossible within the time available.

1.7 DOCUMENTATION

Reference is made to Annex 3 regarding the availed project documentation. The Annual Reports provide illustrated narrative descriptions of activities and to the extent possible outcomes. The reports are supported by a range of annexes with details. The Annual Reports for 2016 and 2017 both contain tabular follow up, as per the format of a Log frame/Results Summary developed during 2016, with information related to the 11 Outcome objectives. The Annual Reports show that the Steering Committee has met twice annually during 2016, 2017 and 2018. Annexes to the Annual Reports report indicate three Joint Management Committee meetings convened during 2017 and two during 2018.

The 2017 report clearly highlights the governance issues within NOGAMU and ROAM, but at the time of reporting, it was too early to decide on the detailed actions required. The Team has received clarification from Sida that there are by now audit reports for OTEA for 2016 and 2017 meeting Sida's requirements.

2 The OTEA Project

2.1 CONTEXT AND BASIC DATA

The history of Sida support to organic agriculture development in East Africa dates back to 1997—2008 when the Export Promotion of Organic Products from Africa (EPOPA) programme was implemented with support from Sida. One of the early focal crops was cotton and in particular production of organic cotton in Uganda. EPOPA was followed by the Regional Cooperation for Organic Standards and Certification Capacity in East Africa (OSEA I and II). The Project “Organic Trade and Value Chain Development in East Africa, OTEA” 2014—2019 is a direct continuation of the previous support provided by Sida for implementation by IFOAM. The earlier phases of OSEA supported the development of regional organic standards and certification capacity in East Africa and an enabling framework for organic agriculture. An East African Organic Products Standard was adopted by the EAC Council in April 2007. An East African Organic Mark was also established. This has provided the fundamentals for a further development of the local and regional markets. The OSEA II aimed at increasing income for rural communities through local, regional and international trade in organic products. OSEA was implemented by IFOAM and the National Organic Agriculture Movements in Burundi (BOAM), Kenya (KOAN), Rwanda (ROAM), Tanzania (TOAM) and Uganda (NOGAMU) in close cooperation with the organic stakeholders and governments in the East African countries and ran through 2013.

The OTEA, operational from 2014, is thus a follow-up to OSEA I and II. The OTEA project centres on local and regional market-oriented organic production, building on the foundation of the East African Organic Products Standard, the East African Organic Mark, the development of a relevant Organic Guarantee System and emerging consumer awareness. A focus has been on the further development of organic value chains, ensuring regional trade growth in order for East African farmers to benefit from the rapidly growing market for organic products. By the time the decision to support the intervention was made, it was assessed and found to be in line with relevant Sida policy documents, including the by then applicable Regional Strategy for Sweden’s development cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa, under which it is being financed. The mentioned Strategy has since been succeeded by another Strategy for 2016–2021. The current Strategy states that Sida’s interventions are expected to contribute to improved environment, sustainable use of natural resources and strengthened resilience against environmental degradation, climate change and disasters. A specific point mentions the ambition to contribute to strengthen capacity among regional actors to support sustainable management and use of common ecosystem services and natural resources. However, the TOR states that there is no possibility for continued partnership at this stage between Sida and IFOAM within the current regional strategy.

2.2 THEORY OF CHANGE/LOG FRAME

A very brief log frame overview was included in the Project Proposal, which was modified and elaborated in 2016 (please see Annex 2).

2.3 GOAL HIERARCHY AND PROJECT COMPONENTS

The overall development goal is to contribute to improving the income and livelihoods of rural communities in East Africa through the development of market-oriented organic production. The specific project objective is to increase trade with organic products, by supporting development of enabling regional policies, a capacitated production and trade environment, and an increased consumer awareness.

There are five project components (A-E) and, as per the 2016 version, 11 outcome objectives. In 2016 indicators were developed for the 11 outcome objectives :

Components	Outcome objectives
A: A well-functioning Organic Guarantee System (OGS) in East Africa and increased consumer awareness, and therefore demand for labelled organic products	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OGS in the region sustainably managed • Efficient and sustainable certification bodies operate in the region • Increased international recognition of the East African Organic Products Standard (EAOPS) • Increased credibility and use of the East African Organic Mark (EAOM) in the region and increased consumer awareness • Well-functioning Participatory Guarantee Systems (PGS) in the region
B: Increased capacity of local producers to access and supply local and regional markets	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased organic trade in local and regional markets
C: East African government policies, strategies and plans support the organic agriculture (OA) sector. EAC and AU policy makers are supportive of OA and ecological organic agriculture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • East African government policies, strategies and plans support the organic agriculture (OA) sector. EAC and AU policy makers are supportive of OA and ecological organic agriculture
D: All National Organic Movements (NOAMs) have increased capacity and skills to further develop the organic sector. The Regional organic Network (Afr0net) is strengthened and able to address issues of regional importance at EAC and AU levels	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased cooperation on a regional level through increased skills and capacity of all NOAMs • The organic sectors in Rwanda and Burundi are further developed
E: Increased availability of reliable information and statistics on production, trade and multi-functional benefits of organic agriculture and their contributions to the challenges and needs in East Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data collection is mainstreamed and institutionalised • Reliable data is available for trade, advocacy and sector development.

2.4 PROJECT STAKEHOLDERS AND TARGET GROUP


The target group for the intervention is the organic farming households, processors (and their employees) and traders in East Africa. This target group could be further described as follows:

- The primary target group is the farming community of the East African region. As described in the rationale for this action, the development of organic farming practice and resultant markets have a direct benefit to farmers on a level of income, food security and social development. Development in this regard will then also impact positively on the other actors in the value chain, namely processors and traders, being the secondary targets of this action.
- The stakeholders in the project are the organic value chain organisations, the supporting institutions (such as schools, business associations, consumers, environmental and development NGOs), the certification bodies, as well as government agencies in East Africa.

2.5 PROJECT ORGANISATION

IFOAM is Sida's contractual partner, and therefore has the overall responsibility for OTEA. An undated Brief has been prepared by IFOAM for the purpose of giving an overview of the main management aspects of the OTEA Project. It includes an organogram, see below:

Figure: Organogram, prepared by IFOAM



The role of AfrOnet is described in the Brief:

AfrOnet is executing two main tasks in regard to the OTEA project:

- 1) provides project services and
- 2) coordinates the partners in OTEA.

There are **Conveners** for the different Components:

- Component A = David Gould (IFOAM, left 2018)
- Component B= Shaknoza (IFOAM)
- Component C= AfrOnet
- Component D = Barbara/Konrad (Organic Leadership Courses, OLC; IFOAM)
- Component E= Shaknoza (IFOAM)

The conveners are experts in their area and can be asked for technical inputs. This has to be requested by the partners on time in order to plan accordingly. Whenever a concrete input has taken place, the convener has to report back with a short and concise report. This needs to be submitted directly to AfrOnet and IFOAM.

The Brief also states the applicable communication and reporting lines as well as the tools envisaged to be used for OTEA monitoring:

- Outcomes/activities: Narrative reports, Results-based monitoring, work plans incl. budgets.
- Finances: Cash flow tables, Financial reports (quarterly, half yearly), budget monitoring
- Processes: Steering Committee, Stakeholder forum, Working groups, Joint Management Committee (JMC).

The Evaluation Matrix, Annex 7, has incorporated the Indicators of the OTEA expanded log frame of 2016 (red text in the matrix).

2.6 MAJOR ACTIVITIES

The 2016 Log frame (Results summary, also OTEA's monitoring tool) includes a range of activities under the various components, for example:

- Capacity building/training
- Advice and support
- Subsidy to local certification and accreditation costs
- Promotional activities
- Support designed to assist value chain actors
- Support to national policy development
- Lobbying
- Conferences
- Institutional support to an EAOM secretariat
- Support to Joint Management Committee meetings, Project Steering Committee and stakeholder forum
- Financial support and TA to NOAMs
- Identify and develop further tools for data collection and management
- Annual compilation of data
- Interaction with NGOs, government institutions and research for data collection and dissemination

- Publicity, incl. successful case studies.

2.7 FINANCIAL OVERVIEW

Table 1 (next page) shows with approximate figures in SEK an overview of the project budget and expenditure based on information from Sida and IFOAM. The expenditure for 2015—17 has been audited with audit reports approved by Sida. The amount NOGAMU had not accounted for was carried forward to 2018 as a liability from NOGAMU to IFOAM. The audit for 2018 has been postponed to be combined with the audit for the no-cost extension period during 2019. Most of the partner organisations claim that the disbursement made during 2018 was, as per their expectations, an allocation to meet the expenditure during the first half of 2018. Thus, several partners reported that they have been operating without OTEA funds from mid-2018 to date. IFOAM, on its part claims that it was clearly communicated to partners that the extension was approved but without any more funds or further costs for partners. Sida's agreement on the no-cost extension does not clarify the matter. Several partner organisations claim that they have reported all expenditure during 2018 and that there will be nothing to report for 2019. Such position contradicts IFOAM's indication in its expenditure overview (Table 1). The budget from the start was disaggregated on project components but not on partners for the whole project period. Allocations to partners have been made based on annual work plans. Reallocations have, according to partners, not been extensively discussed and some partners claim that they have had little influence on the financial allocations during the last 12 months or so of the project activity period.

Most partners have thus faced financial difficulties during 2018 and 2019. Remedial actions have, in some cases, included “borrowing” from other projects, and laying off some staff, and in other cases operating with staff serving on a volunteer bases without remuneration.

Partners claim to provide financial reports to IFOAM with disaggregation on project components, but IFOAM have noted that costs per component is determined at the time of audit. At the time of the evaluation, expenditure data per component for the whole project was only available for the audited period 2015—17. The arrangement with component-wise budgets from the start, while the continuous financial follow up is based on expenditure per partner complicates the understanding of financial allocations as compared to budgets

Table 1. Expenditure overview (SEK)¹.

Item\Year	2014 ²	2015	2016	2017	2018	Plan 2019	Total	% of total expenditure
Total project as per Sida plan	24,000,000							
Deducted by Sida due to NOGAMU suspension, 50,000 €	516,000							
Sida reservation for evaluation	500,000							
Disbursed from Sida	22,984,000							
Exchange rate differences	+1,412							
Received by IFOAM ³ .	22,985,412							
Afr0net	-	115,375	1,816,651	992,366	251,434	213,733	3,389,559	14.4
TOAM	-	437,341	715,667	758,219	353,988	175,387	2,440,602	10.4
KOAN	-	390,544	506,506	1,002,887	253,840	226,775	2,380,551	10.1
NOGAMU, accounted for	-	434,261	614,874	357,405			1,406,540	6.0
NOGAMU, unaccounted for (loss)	-				418,822		418,822	1.8
ROAM	-	371,862	503,320	434,588	93,353	1,425	1,404,547	6.0
BOAM	-	413,567	573,082	718,834	381,930	99,320	2,186,742	9.3
Subtotal partners	-	2,162,950	4,730,100	4,264,299	1,753,367	716,640	13,627,363	58.0
Consumer survey/Conference	-				97,453	385,000	482,453	2.1
IFOAM	-	2,812,808	2,447,368	2,055,428	1,684,876	375,375	9,375,857	39.9
Total expenditure ⁴ .	-	4,975,758	7,177,468	6,319,727	3,535,696	1,477,015	23,485,673	100
Accumulated projected deficit ⁵ .	500,261							

Notes:

1. The Table is based on information obtained from IFOAM and in certain cases Sida, but the evaluation team has recalculated using average exchange rates to arrive at an easy overview in SEK. This implies that figures are approximate.
2. The official project start date was 1.12.2014. In terms of finance the project started only in 2015.
3. The corresponding amount for the total in Euro is 2,388,111 € which yields an average exchange rate SEK to €=9.625, which has been used for conversion in this table
4. The total expenditure reported by IFOAM amounts to 2,440.070 €, including the amount NOGAMU has not accounted for
5. The deficit is calculated as the difference between what IFOAM received and the total reported/projected expenditure. The deficit includes the amount NOGAMU has not accounted for.

3 Findings

Reference is made to the Evaluation Matrix, Annex 7, for a compilation of findings directly in response to the given or identified evaluation questions. Reference is also made to the IFOAM Annual Reports for details reported there. All information found in the reports has not been brought into the evaluation report, partly because the evaluation method does not allow for verification of all such data.

The narrative text below focusses on key findings, and attempts in particular to report on qualitative findings derived from field interviews and documentation. Reference is made to Annexes 6 and 7 as well as to IFOAM's reports for additional quantitative information.

3.1 RELEVANCE

OTEA builds on the earlier OSEA I and II, as well as the even earlier EPOPA. Much of the fundamental work for institutionalisation of organic agriculture in East Africa was done during these earlier phases or intervention. The OTEA challenge has been largely on utilisation of the policy space that was created earlier and to expand organic production and trade with organic produce.

In terms of content OTEA was generally deemed relevant. The five components were logical and complementary. The target groups for the intervention, farmers, processors and traders were expected to be benefitting, while a wider group was recognised as stakeholders including supporting institutions, certification bodies and government agencies. This represents a logical construct, yet some key aspects will be further discussed in the following paragraphs.

3.1.1 Fragmented donor support

Management at NOAM and in AfrOnet became more complex when several donors or agencies agreed to engage with the same NOAMs without much coordination. Sida funds reached through several institutionally very different channels (bilateral support, OTEA under the Sida Regional Strategy, CSO support through the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation, SSNC). Similarly, Swiss support trickled in through different mechanisms. In some NOAMs, the number of projects with different funding mechanisms were at par with the number of staff members. Such extensive but weakly coordinated donor support would be challenging to manage for any small organisation given that each project comes with its specific requirements in terms of reporting, donor meetings and other procedures.

3.1.2 OTEA in relation to the Ecological Organic Agriculture (EOA) Initiative

The EOA Initiative, jointly funded by the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) and Sida through SSNC, comprises six pillars, namely:

- Research, training and extension,
- Information and communication,

- Value chain and market development,
- Networking and partnerships,
- Policy and programme development, and
- Institutional capacity development.

The EOA geographical scope differed from that of OTEA, but organisations in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda were eligible for support under both programmes. Both programmes also had ambitions to link up with AU and EAC, but in practice there was a division such that EOA being continent wide interacted more closely with AU, while OTEA with its focus on East Africa had more to do with EAC. The EOA Pillars and the OTEA Components show considerable overlaps and it was thus not easy to attribute results to one or the other project in the three above mentioned countries. In some cases, for example on cost for inspection of PGS groups, the policy within a country, in this case Tanzania, became different depending on which donor provided the support to respective groups.

3.1.3 OTEA in relation to poverty reduction and poverty alleviation

The Project Proposal and varied situations for organic producers

The project proposal, on which the project rests, included a long narrative section on the relevance of organic farming for poverty alleviation and livelihoods. The results framework and subsequently the OTEA monitoring tool did not include any poverty parameters. It seems, therefore, that the major assumption was made that organic farming and trade with organic produce is always relevant for poverty reduction and/or alleviation. The project was not designed to clearly and specifically address poverty.

The Team attempted to identify some existing situations to shed more light on different situations in organic farming in East Africa, see Table 2.

Table 2. Certification and organic production situations

State	Premium price or other market advantage	Certification economic impact	Poverty impact	Environmental impact	Consumer end
Organic by default; poverty; cannot afford inputs, commonly food crops for subsistence	No	Added cost if to be certified	Deepened if to be certified	None	Regular market if any surplus is sold
Organic by nature; honey, cassava, sweet potato, yam, arrow root, camel milk, extensive goat and sheep rearing in drylands	No	Added cost if to be certified	Deepened if to be certified (without processing)	None	Regular market

Organic by nature; honey, spices	Yes	Added cost if certified	Positive or negative impact depending on premium, cost, marketing, middle men	None in the production context but may be a better product in terms of hygiene, health	Benefits mainly rich consumers
Organic by intention, larger-scale producer; Ngong chairman	Yes	Added cost if certified	Increased income but may not reach poor people	Positive	May benefit customers on local markets or rich consumers
Organic by intention, larger-scale producer plus out-growers; avocado in Njombe, TZ	Yes	Added cost if certified	Positive impact if net surplus is shared with out-growers	Positive	Benefits rich consumers
Organic by intention, small-scale producers; vegetables, fruits	Yes, niche market	Added cost if to be certified	Positive, certification will otherwise be abandoned	Positive	Benefits rich consumers
Organic by intention, small-scale producers; vegetables, fruits (Rwanda PGS)	Certification system not yet in place, or certification expired and not renewed. There may still be market advantage if customers prefer the produce due to quality.	Added cost if to be certified	Positive or negative depending on other support, middle men, etc	Positive	Regular market

Table 2 cannot distinctly cover all situations as there is much variation. Coloured sections represent categories that the Team found and interacted with. Darker colour represents a situation that the Team found most common. The situation at the top, with no colour, is a situation that the Team knows exists commonly in parts of East Africa with resource poor farmers affording no or little inputs. Certification in their context could be problematic in that it could be to cement the producers in their current situation unless they are assisted to achieve other changes or benefits.

The Team does not claim that the above overview is perfect, but it attempts to illustrate that situations and impacts of certification are not uniform. There was no illustration of such variation in the Project Proposal, yet, in implementation, the Team's finding is that OTEA has primarily not targeted the first situation, but yet managed to reach farmers with various degrees of poverty. Some are not at all poor, while some are poorer but not representing the poorest of the poor. IFOAM does also not consider itself an NGO that addresses *per se* the needs of the poorest of the poor, but recognises that it needs to develop better strategies on how to include the most vulnerable groups.

It is obvious that choice of crops will impact on e.g. level of poverty focus and choice of entry or focal point along the value chain will, for example, impact on attention to gender issues. Yet, it must also be noted that there are many factors impacting on such choices, with chances for success and impact being a major one. The best chances for success will often be related to cash export crops. Such target may or may not positively impact on poor local producers and not usually benefit poor consumers. The PGS system stands, however, generally a better chance to reach poorer groups than a third-party certification. The criteria for selection of value chains varied among the NOAMs. A set of criteria was developed at the project start but some NOAMs applied other criteria.

Are assumptions made still valid?

There is not such rapid development in the agricultural sector that assumptions usually become obsolete in a few years. The Team would thus argue that it is not a time influence but rather that some assumptions made from the start were somewhat crude.

Target group analyses

Considerations on targeting vulnerable groups were made in some countries when identifying criteria for value chain selection, but there was no in-depth target group analysis to design targeted actions for the most vulnerable groups. There were also no analyses as to whether the project could consciously target disadvantaged areas with high levels of poverty, such as North-Eastern Kenya, the coastal hinterlands or Turkana in Kenya.

But the challenges of promoting organic agriculture are considerable even in a situation where both richer and poorer producers are targeted. An exclusive ambition to mainly reach the very poor would have made it even more difficult to show results. Some value chains, like honey, which was visibly addressed have a higher potential to reach poor groups than some other value chains. Processing can generally yield added value for poor rural producers, for example the cassava chips production by the Kamicha Kabondo group near Kisumu, Kenya.

3.1.4 A glimpse at the major agricultural challenges in East Africa

Some of the East African governments, or at least individuals working there, have sometimes demonstrated a cautious attitude towards organic production. One of the reasons is the considerable challenges that the East African country leaders face in meeting the domestic need for food from domestic production. The world market is competitive relative to local production costs, but there are many good reasons for leaders to try to avoid their countries becoming dependent on food imports.

A major justification for focusing on agribusiness is the demographic and social changes that are taking place in East Africa. At Kenya's independence in 1963, the population stood at 7 million rural people. These people produced agricultural outputs for their own consumption, for export and to feed less than a million urban residents. By 2018-19 there were some 39 million rural residents who should preferably produce agricultural outputs for their own consumption, for export and to feed some 15 million urban residents. It is projected that by 2050 there will be about 85 million people in

Kenya with about equal shares urban and rural. This means the booming urban population will, for its food supply, depend heavily on a rural population that only grows more marginally. By independence there was a million urban residents as compared to a projected 42–43 million in 2050. The implication is, that when the rural population will have to feed a rising proportion of urban people, farming will have to become much more commercially oriented than at present. Relatively, subsistence farming will have to give way to commercial farming.

If import dependency is to be avoided, food production for the domestic market in Kenya must grow tenfold as compared to the situation at independence and almost double as compared to 2018–19. The Kenyan agricultural sector must also be capable of feeding 42–43 million urban residents. Meanwhile, there are issues related to climate change and national ambitions for increased tree and forest cover so there is little scope for area expansion. This implies that productivity must significantly increase both in terms of output per unit of labour and per unit of land. Urban/rural trade will have to triple in the next 30 years or so. This challenge applies to all East African nations.

Such background may help to understand why policy makers sometimes hesitate. Also, it may sometimes appear as if organic production is promoted to replace conventional farming. So far, this has not happened anywhere in the world. What has happened is, however, that a viable “sector” of organic production has emerged to co-exist with the conventional farming. With growing consumer awareness and growing numbers of wealthy consumers who can afford to choose, the prospects for organic production appears conducive. Positive thinking about organic agriculture must, thus, not be linked to a negative attitude towards conventional farming. Almost any farming practice can be improved. Improvements can, based on current policy and practice, be applied to both organic or conventional farming. Much of the improvement may follow a common path, i.e. increasing organic matter in the soil, soil conservation, wise use of manure and non-use of pesticides known to be harmful, are common agendas and there is scope for mutually beneficial interactions between the two approaches to farming. Sometimes practitioners of organic agriculture acts as a driving force showing examples that conventional agriculture can adapt and adopt.

It could have been helpful if the project proposal had elaborated a bit more on the role and scope for organic agriculture in relation to the overall challenges the East African nations face for self-sufficiency.

3.2 IMPACT

3.2.1 Key highlights on increased production and trade

The project identified two indicators to measure the objective of increased production and trade; 5 non-PGS Value Chains operational at the end of the project, and 10% increase of turn-over of the regional trade by end of the project. A discussion as to whether objective project impacts can easily be measured using non-scientific methods (especially in a situation where baseline data on production and trade levels among project participants may not have been captured at project inception) does arise. Evaluation of impact has therefore been based on the outcomes reported in the project’s

annual reports and personal interviews with project participants without subjecting the same to scientific methods linked to statistical analyses.

The World Organic Agriculture Statistics reports a 9% increase in the number of organic farmers in East Africa between 2014 and 2017, a period that coincides with the OTEA project. By 2018, six non-PGS value chains (honey, dried fruits, ginger, macadamia, coffee, sesame and chia) were fully functional. Consequently, 130 PGS groups had been supported in OTEA of which 40 were either PGS approved/operational and the remainder under development. The observed performance of both the PGS groups and non-PGS value chains may not be fully attributed to OTEA. Three of the NOAMs (KOAM, NOGAMU and TOAM), have also been engaged in the implementation of the Value Chain and Market Development Pillar (II) of the EOA project.

Farmers trainings on organic production (including seed sourcing, pest and disease management, post-harvest handling, crop diversification, good husbandry, and sustainable land use) can be linked to increased production. An example of increased production as a result of trainings was cited by the Kamicha-Kabondo group whose focus has been on production of superior propagation material for cassava. The group attributed increased production from 3-4 tonnes per acre to 6-7 tonnes per acre to training on selection of propagation material and soil management.

The project has effectively facilitated linkage of organic producers/groups to local markets (farmers markets, selling points, processors, traders, and restaurants/hotels). Expected results of such linkages would normally be improved sales contracts from a number of buyers, increased volumes of sales, better prices and improved profit margins. This has however not been the case in many instances within the project as reported in the value chain development survey commissioned by TOAM in 2018. The disconnect between the created linkages and actual business has been attributed to either limited volumes supplies, breach of agreements or lack of quality certificates. Similar sentiments were echoed by organic poultry farmers in Kenya, who despite having formal supply agreement with a buyer have often failed to fulfil their part of the agreement through side selling of the local chicken especially during festive seasons.

Through NOGAMU, farmers in the dried fruits value chain were reported to be linked to export markets in Gulf countries. Such linkages are deemed to have substantial impact on farmers' incomes resulting from consistency and reliability of the markets. However, sustainability of these market linkages is in doubt following the institutional troubles with NOGAMU. Through OTEA's intervention, new forms of markets (farmers markets, selling points, niche markets organic restaurants, organic basket) have been established in some countries. These have in turn given farmers access to more targeted markets where the probability of receiving premium prices for their produce is relatively higher than in conventional markets. In local markets where premium prices are hard to come by, farmers have focused on economies of scale by targeting more consumers at same prices as those of conventional products.

Through OTEA, some farmers were facilitated to participate in local, regional and international fairs and exhibitions giving them more exposure on organic production and marketing requirements. These fairs/exhibitions further opened up opportunities for increased producers' networks with potential buyers, market base, sales and shared experiences which could result into long term business relationships/partnerships.

3.2.2 Key highlights on policy development

The NOAMs have consistently engaged policy makers on the need for organic policies in the participating countries. Although the project objective of development of organic agriculture policy by these countries was not achieved during the project period, a lot of goodwill has been shown in most countries. Still countries like Kenya and Tanzania see organic agriculture not as a stand-alone initiative but rather to be aligned into government agricultural policies as a mainstreamed initiative. Furthermore, the project has built capacity of government officers both at national and regional levels. Future positive impacts of improved capacity and exposure to forums showcasing best organic practices e.g. BIOFACH) can be anticipated. Adoption of the 2007 EAOPS in Uganda resulted in increased recognition of EAOPS in the global market with NOGAMU having reported establishing business contacts with Dubai, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Russia, and Japan. Due to the situation with NOGAMU the Team could not verify these reports.

3.2.3 Key highlights on enhanced consumer awareness

Results from the consumer awareness survey conducted in 2017/2018 showed a 10% increase in consumer awareness compared to 2013. Internet and social media were cited as a source of information on organic foods in the survey (this source had not been mentioned in earlier surveys conducted in 2006 and 2013). The increase in awareness resulting from use of internet and social media could be linked to creation and use of social media platforms (specifically facebook) by the NOAMs to promote organic agriculture and EAOM.

3.2.4 Long-term prospects which cannot be verified yet

Environmental impact

There is high likelihood of rehabilitation and renewal of degraded soils in areas where farmers have intentionally decided to engage in organic farming. These are to some extent observable already, but will become more and more evident with time provided that sound farm practices are sustained.

Institutional instability

Some of the NOAMs reported to have engaged in pre-financing of OTEA activities, an endeavour that caused them to experience financial instability. As the project is coming to a close, the likelihood that NOAMs will receive any funds from IFOAM/Sida is minimal. The shortfall created by the pre-financing arrangement is likely to have a negative medium-term effect on some NOAMs financial stability.

The issues in ROAM and NOGAMU during the OTEA period were also signs of the NOAMs not yet being well established. Their long-term strategy for economic survival without donor support is not well clarified. Some income-generating activities being discussed are not yet well analysed.

Social benefits

Some of the PGS groups (INNOGOF and Sylvia Basket in Kenya) embraced organic agriculture on the premise of promoting healthy production and consumption for one-self and the immediate environment. Through the OTEA project, these groups have

expanded and are currently supplying large amounts of healthy organic products to the local market. The personalised (one-on-one selling) and provision of service, as opposed to general market approaches, adopted by INNOGOF is aimed at touching lives and giving hope to some of the most vulnerable persons (cancer patients).

Additional marketing prospects

Market linkages as well as obtained market intelligence through fairs attendance and other forms of networking both at national and international levels hold promise for further expansion of business linkages.

3.2.5 Developments dating back to OSEA but not documented then

Significant achievements during OSEA were already documented. Until recently, relatively little attention was paid to NOAMs institutional capacity and needs for capacity building. A centralised mode of operation and intense follow up by IFOAM and consultant enabled OSEA to run. The more decentralised approach introduced with OTEA, and the relatively less capacity for monitoring was not preceded by organisational assessments to verify that necessary systems for governance and administration were in place at NOAM level. With individuals ready to take advantage, it seems that weak systems paved the way for mismanagement in both ROAM and NOGAMU. It is noted that this risk exposure was not unique for IFOAM through OTEA but was shared with other donor inputs, including other inputs from Sida.

3.3 EFFECTIVENESS

3.3.1 Level of fulfilment of objectives and outcomes

As the progress and results are highly varied between the countries and between components the evaluation has opted for preparation of summary country reports (Annex 6) and inclusion of the Evaluation matrix (Annex 7) which provides details on findings for each component. Reference is made to these Annexes for more details than what is highlighted in this section.

Overlapping mandates with the EOA Pillars (see section 3.1.2) make it difficult to assess which results are attributable to OTEA and EOA respectively.

Component A: A well-functioning Organic Guarantee System (OGS) in East Africa and increased consumer awareness, and therefore demand for labelled organic products

NOAMs in respective countries achieved varied results: NOGAMU, KOAN and TOAM performed better in comparison to BOAM and ROAM, which had challenges.

KOAN identified local certification bodies Acert, Control Union and Africert that went on to be strong. The Certification bodies (CBs) are able to certify other standards like GLOBAL G.A.P. Africert, ACERT and NESVAX CONTROL undertook a 2-days training on OGS issues. In 2017 the JMC secretariat became fully operational and developed a sustainability plan. The 2018 work plan focused on alternative accreditation model/System (AAM/S); Additionally, 15 allied organisations were trained on GMOs, Organic 3.0, and OGS. Ugocert in Uganda which claimed to be strong had sought accreditation to IOAS. It also provided certification services to Burundi in competition

with international certification bodies. However, Ugocert went down and there are efforts to revive it.

TOAM in Tanzania identified Tancert, the only local certification body in the country. Tancert turned out to be too weak with only one staff after international certifiers hired the rest of the staffs so it could not be strengthened further. In **Rwanda** there is no local CB. Certification is performed by agencies which are accredited for other standards and operate internationally. Certified coffee (same certification as for export) is sold in local supermarkets too. Further, in Rwanda, the PGS concept was introduced but not yet linked to certification or price premiums. **BOAM** in Burundi had no local CB to be strengthened. Ugocert from Uganda offered certification services but lost its strength.

There are complaints about the cost of the use of Kilimohai mark, which is meant partly to generate revenues to JMC.

The use of EAOPS and EAOM was most popular in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. In Rwanda and Burundi, it has not yet been used extensively. KOAN and NOGAMU had done well to get national standards agencies; KEBS and UNBS respectively to endorse EAOPS. EAOPS was among the standards in their respective catalogues. TOAM in Tanzania did not manage to convince TBS to endorse EAOPS. NOGAMU was spearheading recognition of EAOPS within the EAC Bloc. In 2018 at EAC forum, the East Africa Legislative Assembly (EALA) endorsed the revised EAOPS.

In Kenya and in Tanzania, EAOM is in use by operators. In Kenya, operators selling products in super markets, processors, restaurants (like Bridges) and exporters use it. In Tanzania, outlets for organic agriculture products have increased. By 2018, there were nine, up from seven in 2017. These are Mesula-Arusha, Oysterbay-Dar es salaam, UWAMWIMA -Zanzibar, Highlands Organics – Njombe, Floresta –Moshi, 1 organic shop in Morogoro (SAT), KIWATA, UWAMATAM and Azura at Kawe - Dar es Salaam. TOAM also facilitated the development of five ICS groups in Certification process. Organic stakeholders, including producers, were exposed to different exhibitions whereby 500 producers have been linked to the markets; for example one company signed business contracts worth \$65,000 (Tsh. 140 million) in sale of 118 tons of avocado in April 2018. The agreement is to supply avocado for five years.

Component B: Increased organic trade in local and regional markets

At project inception, each NOAM identified a non-PGS value chain for support based on agreed criteria. The potential for marketing locally and regionally was a key requirement. Two more value chains were taken up during the project period. By 2018, honey, sesame, ginger, coffee, macadamia and chia seeds value chains were well functioning and promoted by local processor or buyers. Achievement of this objective is closely linked to the EOA project whose second pillar focuses on value chain and market development (see sections 1.5 and 3.1.2).

A total of 130 PGS groups were supported over the project period and farmers were linked to local markets, processors and traders. Information on business deals sealed, volumes traded and incomes earned by producers in different PGS groups have not been adequately documented and compiled at NOAM level.

NOGAMU reportedly linked organic farmers to export markets in Gulf countries. The current status of this linkage could not be verified.

The concepts of ‘farmers markets’ and ‘organic baskets’ are well embraced in Kenya with farmers enjoying relatively better prices compared to that of their counterparts who sell their produce on the conventional local markets. However, only a small share of the organic produce is traded using these approaches while the larger volumes are traded in local markets at prevailing market prices of conventional products. To effectively and sustainably operate in the conventional markets, some organic farmers have devised market strategies that give them a competitive edge through economies of scale or from customer appreciation of quality.

Increased regional trade is evident in some key products/value chains such as spices from Tanzania to other EAC countries, garlic from Rwanda to Uganda and tree-tomato from Rwanda to Congo. At least the Rwandan exports are attributable to the initiatives under OTEA. TOAM maintains an active website where producers are matched with potential buyers, and trade deals are discussed and closed. A key shortcoming with this system is the inability of TOAM to receive the trade data directly.

Overall, the information provided by the NOAMs is not adequate enough for one to make a general conclusion on the effectiveness with which the project objective on increased trade was achieved. In the OTEA monitoring matrices (2017 and 2018), it is acknowledged that acquisition of market data from trade is an uphill task. Without this type of data quantifying the effectiveness of OTEA with respect to increased regional and local trade is not feasible.

Component C: East African government policies, strategies and plans support the organic agriculture sector. EAC and AU policy makers are supportive of OA and EOA. NOAM in all countries have endeavoured to lobby respective governments to support organic agriculture and EOA initiatives.

A regional organic policy forum was conducted in 2017. TOAM and AfrOnet with support of IFOAM/OTEA, the One Stop Organic Shop East Africa (OSOSEA) project and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). It brought together some 60 organic stakeholders, government representatives and policy makers as well as supporting organisations from five countries. Policy briefs and studies explaining current status of organic sector, successes, and challenges of the organic sector in East Africa were presented. EAC representative inaugurated the forum.

In most countries there has been goodwill to accommodate organic agriculture and EOA in government policies and programmes. In Uganda, the agriculture policy supports organic agriculture with a policy statement. In Kenya and Tanzania, government officials in the respective ministries of agriculture have been appointed as liaison officers on issues related to organic agriculture and have collaboratively worked with KOAN and TOAM respectively. The supportive environment has not taken an upper hand to prioritise organic agriculture, rather, NOAMs are expected to align their projects and initiatives with the ministry of agriculture sector programme. The support takes a mainstreaming perspective. In some instances, organic agriculture is supported as an access to niche markets and stimulant to tourism (in Tanzania particularly) as

health-conscious consumers would feel at home. Overall, governments are still concerned with ensuring production of enough food for the nations' populations with pronounced increased population and high rates of urbanisation within EA countries in mind. Population growth rates are generally below agricultural growth rates giving some level of comfort but agriculture growth rates of 3.2% on average are inclusive of non-food production. Tanzania (51 million in 2016 growing at a rate of 2.8%), Kenya (44.2 million in 2016 growing at a rate of 2.3%), Uganda (34.6 million growing in 2014/2015 at 3.0% rate), Rwanda (11.4 in 2014 growing at a rate of 2.5%) and Burundi (10.9 million in 2015 and estimated to reach 11.3 million in 2018). The economies are growing at above 5%, which is above their population growth rates; hence a premise of higher purchasing power too¹. This in turn is likely to gradually spur interest in certified food with documented quality but "food fashion" is sometimes hard to predict. In some western countries the strongest current trend is towards vegan food.

AfrOnet developed a communication strategy indicating stakeholders' needs and messages as well as communication channels to address the needs. The communication strategy also had identified programmatic areas to work on and several communication domains. The stakeholders that the communication strategy indicated were farmers, consumers, local governments, policy makers, legislators and researchers. Others included the media, donors/DPs, NGOs/CSOs and processors/traders and exporters. The strategy needed financial and human resources to become executed.

At EAC level, support was seen on the endorsement of the revised EAOPS at the 2018 EAC annual forum. At AU level, organic agriculture is claimed to be embedded in the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). However, CAADP Pillar I² had a single line mention "With a tradition of low input agriculture in Africa, organic agriculture holds great promise, and there are already examples of certified organic and non-organic agriculture in the region". The Team finds such sentence to be less analytical than would be desirable (see section 3.1.3).

Component D: All NOAMs have increased capacity and skills to further develop the organic sector. AfrOnet is strengthened and able to address issues of regional importance at EAC and AU levels

KOAN has hosted the EAOM secretariat continuously during OTEA from the conceptualisation of the secretariat in 2016 and its initial establishment in 2017. The Secretariat needs, however, to further develop and maintain its role and if viable, develop an income stream to sustain in the long run. The JMC has been meeting regularly in conjunction with other events.

¹ Tanzania's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Kenya Bureau of Statistics (KBS), Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBS) and National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (NISR) and Sub Sahara Africa Macro Poverty Outlook, 2018 World Bank

² Sustainable Land and Water Management: The CAADP Pillar I Framework. "Tool" for use by Countries in Mainstreaming and Up scaling of Sustainable Land and Water Management in Africa's Agriculture and Rural Development Agenda, September 2009 p.45.

AfrOnet remains with limited staff and institutional capacity. It can still be regarded as the leading regional organic movement even though its capacity is constrained. Its operation is heavily donor dependent.

Capacity development of NOAMs is highly varied. NOGAMU has been drastically damaged by mismanagement and remains struggling and probably without donor support. ROAM faced repeated issues of mismanagement and is currently an organisation run by volunteers but with institutional improvements. Organisational development of ROAM (supported by EOA through Biovision Africa Trust as part of preparation for a continuation and expansion of EOA in which ROAM is expected to become a partner) has generated some new trust and donor support appears to be forthcoming in the near future. KOAN and TOAM both face staff reduction as a result of OTEA funding ending in 2018 and with that loss of experienced personnel. BOAM remains small, but reports to have been strengthened considerably by OTEA. The strengthening may, however, be limited to a few individuals rather than to systems.

Plans for sustainability appear to vary in form and content and do generally not fully address strategic issues for financial sustainability.

OTEA has definitely contributed to networking among the NOAMs. Contacts established are likely to be sustained at least for some time as individuals have got to know each other. There is also a likelihood that donors (SDC and Sida through SSNC; a continuation of EOA) will provide support to help maintain the forged links. The African Organic Agriculture Actors Directory provides a very useful tool for making contacts across borders.

Key cumulative data on e.g. membership development was not reported annually.

Component E: Increased availability of reliable information and statistics on production, trade and multi-functional benefits of organic agriculture and their contributions to the challenges and needs in East Africa

Training and efforts to create a system for uniform data collection has resulted in a system being in place. NOAMs report data to IFOAM for use in the yearbooks on organic production published by the Research Institute of Organic Agriculture (FIBL). Some data is made available on the FIBL website³. Some NOAMs, however, dispute the accuracy of the data published by FIBL, noting that the source is unknown to them.

For anyone interested but without prior knowledge it remains difficult to find data relevant for East Africa. NOAMs have additional data but it is not availed on their websites. There are several constraints to collection of trade data. These include among others, no disaggregation of organic from other produce; companies do not want to disclose their business details; much of the produce is sold together with other produce on local markets, or via specified local market linkages. In either case there will be no reporting to any form of public statistical data bases.

Some few case studies have been presented by NOAMs but they are generally not availed on their websites. A range of promotional materials have been developed at

³ <https://statistics.fibl.org/world/markets-trade-world.htm>

NOAMs level for use during promotional events ranging from local fairs to mass media. With increased use of mobile phone in the region, actors could take the advantage and partner with existing mobile data collection applications or develop an application that organic value chain actors could use in capturing data on production, market demand, supply quantities and pricing.

Country specific comments

Reference is made to Annex 6 for summary country reports which provide details on the state of affairs in each country. The summary reports are not uniform, which depends on different sources of information. For some countries, in particular Uganda, the report rests mainly on project reports, whereas in others, for example Rwanda, the report rests mainly on interview with current staff.

The following table represents a highly condensed summary of status and trends. It is partly based on self-assessments by the organisations and partly on Team's findings. AfrOnet and IFOAM have also contributed with their views.

Legend

+	Low level, weak
++	Medium level
+++	High level, strong

Country Parameter	Burundi		Kenya		Rwanda		Tanzania		Uganda ²		AfrOnet	
Years	2014	2019	2014	2019	2014	2019	2014	2019	2014	2019	2014	2019
Institutional strength, governance (NOAM or AfrOnet)	+	++	++	++	+	++	+	+	++	+	+	++
Membership (NOAM or AfrOnet)	+	++	++	++	+	++	++	+++	+++	++	++	++
PGS group development ¹	+	+++	+	++	+	++	+	++	++	++	N/A	
Non-PGS group development ¹	+	++	++	++	+	+	++	+++	++	++	N/A	
Strength of Certification Bodies	No local CB	No local CB	+	+++	No local CB	No local CB	+	+	++	++	N/A	
Level of government support	++	++	++	++	+	++	++	++	++	++	N/A	
Number of farmers involved	+	+++	+	++	+	++	+	++	++	+++	N/A	
Traded volumes on domestic market	+	++	+	++	+	+	+	++	++	++	N/A	
Traded volumes on international market	+	+	+	++	+	++	++	+++	++	+++	N/A	
Level of consumer interest	+	+++	++	+++	+	++	+	++	++	++	N/A	
Gender balance in organisations	+	++	+	+	+	++	++	++	++	++		
Gender-balanced benefits at farmer/processor level	+	++	+	++	+	++	++	+++	++	++		
Extent to which poor people benefit from organic production/trade (see section 3.1.3)	+	++	+	++	+	+	+	++	++	++		
Average ³	1.0	2.0	1.4	2.1	0.9	1.6	1.5	2.2	2.1	2.1		

Notes:

1. The opinion on what is PGS and Non-PGS varies somewhat. In this Table, PGS is understood to be a group being or evolving towards a PGS group, while Non-PGS are groups with mainly third-party certification.
2. Most parameters for Uganda were filled based on AfrOnet and IFOAM opinions in the absence of other information.
3. Average scores can only be used for an indication of progress, not for comparisons between countries.

3.3.2 Reasons for successes or shortcomings

Some factors contributing to successes

The value chain selection criteria, including the potential for marketing locally and prior knowledge/interaction of NOAMs with the selected value chain actors, constitute major contributors to the achievement under component B. The NOAMs interventions in the value chains did not have to start from point zero.

The promise of organic agriculture products attracting premium price to producers and an opportunity to niche market, made it attractive to governments linking with “affluent” consumers and tourists.

Synergetic funding such as EOA brought in extra resources and flexibility that enabled to partnering with other implementing partners in Kenya and Tanzania, including Government agencies. By design, EOA includes government participation and representation from local government to Ministerial levels. It has allowed exposure of government officials and hastened influence support.

Some factors contributing to shortcomings

The market with premium prices that justify costs and efforts for certification remains small. As there is no mandatory requirement on certification of organic products targeted for the local market, CBs and producers are not motivated enough to pursue the recognition and use of the organic mark. It appears for many groups the benefits may not yet outweigh the costs and efforts associated with the certification.

The institutional instability of NOAMs and AfrOnet has been highlighted. There is no thorough analysis on if and how the organisational set up can be made financially sustainable. Donor fragmentation and a desire by some NOAMs to venture into various forms of business may become a threat to the organisation if not well organised.

Certification bodies in countries other than Kenya face difficulties. The state of Kenyan national certification bodies could not be verified in the absence of responses to the Team’s efforts to contact them. Reasons for difficulties in the national certification bodies may include governance, that the marketed volumes remain relatively small and that it is difficult for local certification bodies to acquire recognition that make them competitive with the international ones.

Data collection has become better institutionalised and standardised but NOAMs data does not always tally well with data presented by FIBL. This is despite the tools and protocols for data collection having being developed during the project period. Further, it is not easy to find data for East Africa unless there is familiarity with FIBL as a global source. The NOAMs websites do not present much.

The EAC nations are using different approaches aimed at increasing food security in the regions. Some of these approaches such as fertilizer subsidies and use of biotechnology have a counter effect on promotion of organic agriculture.

Lack of multi-year planning rendered NOAM reactive on annual plans that have limited scope for strategic planning at NOAM level for the near five-year project period.

3.3.3 Level of stakeholder engagement and influence

The initial design was developed during a series of joint workshops with NOAMs, AfrOnet and IFOAM, so there were ample opportunities for key stakeholders to ensure that the design by then was reflecting stakeholders' interest. During implementation, a practice evolved that limited the coordination and monitoring role of AfrOnet. AfrOnet emerged mainly as one more partner. Reasons included that AfrOnet had a slow start (in spite of bold ambitions according to some observers), that the envisaged project office was not established and that there were staff changes in AfrOnet. It may, also be noted in this context that the EAOM secretariat became hosted by KOAN in Kenya.

Information flows were designed one way with reporting and information duties from NOAMs to IFOAM to Sida spelt out⁴, but without specified information requirements from IFOAM to AfrOnet and NOAMs. Several NOAM representatives feel that they had not sufficient influence in decisions on allocations or reallocations during 2018 and 2019, however, IFOAM reports that there were regular skype calls and that documents were shared. The fact that there was no disaggregated budget per partner from the start and for the whole project period, limited partners' chances to plan strategically and multi-yearly.

Due to the above factors and due to repeated cases of mismanagement, IFOAM came to bear more and sole responsibility for the project than would be ideal and that was planned from the start (the project office housed by AfrOnet did not materialise and a decision was made to abolish the component-wise working groups).

3.4 EFFICIENCY

3.4.1 Outputs in relation to inputs; value for money

NOAMs have been able to carry out a lot of useful activity through project facilitation but overlapping mandates with EOA makes it difficult to assess which results are attributable to OTEA and EOA respectively.

Corruption cases in ROAM and NOGAMU weakened these NOAMs dramatically. The transition from a more centralised OSEA to a more decentralised OTEA without securing adequate institutional development at NOAM level may have contributed to cases of mismanagement.

Donor's fragmented support and limited coordination created complex management within NOAMs and relatively weak monitoring as compared to a situation with stronger donor coordination, joint donor meetings, common approach to reporting, joint monitoring, etc.

NOAM respondents generally felt that investing some 40,000 Euro in the conference rather than in continued project activity at NOAM level was a misdirected resource allocation. At the time of the conference, several NOAMs had been without funds for several months. KOAN reported borrowing funds from other projects for its

⁴ Brief on management processes of OTEA overview

survival. IFOAM noted, in this context, that KOAN had been slow in its financial reporting. In practice, at NOAM level, most NOAMs regard the project to have ended during 2018. The resource allocation during the no-cost extension period was entirely focussing on activity at IFOAM level with the conference being the major element. Results of OTEA were indeed presented at the conference, but apart from that, OTEA and Sida were invisible, while several other contributors, including SDC and SSNC were flagged as conference facilitators. Very few people directly linked to the NOAM's could participate. With the contributions from a range of donors, the conference had a very substantial budget. Given the above observations, the team would concur with the NOAM representatives who argued that activity at NOAM and field levels would have represented a better resource use towards the end of the programme.

Several NOAM respondents felt that IFOAM's close to 40% share of the total project expenditure was high. In the absence of a budget per partner at the project start it is not possible to compare outcome with plan in this respect. In the absence of partner-disaggregated budgets it is not possible to understand if reallocations were made when the initial plan for a project office was abolished. Further, the project suffered from set backs due to mismanagement. It appears IFOAM will also suffer financially due to the loss of NOGAMU funds. Thus, it appears that the management and supervision of the project did not turn out as an undisputed success for anyone.

The overall assessment on value for money would certainly have been positive if cases of mismanagement had not impacted negatively. In other words, costs could be justified if the issues of ROAM and NOGAMU were not included in the assessment ("the gross value"). Whether or not the negative impact due to mismanagement in ROAM and NOGAMU should be factored in in this assessment depends on to what extent OTEA or even OSEA should be regarded as having contributed to these issues. If these issues are factored in and considered, a "the net value" would emerge. It is noted that the setbacks in ROAM and NOGAMU may only to a minor extent be attributed directly to OSEA/OTEA so the relevance of making a distinction between "the gross value" and "the net value" can be questioned if strictly from an OTEA perspective. On top of all, it is hard to assess the wider cost of the mentioned issues. A limited outlook is that some activity was lost with the lost funds. A wider outlook would include an assessment of how the issues impacted on the organic sector as a whole. Reports from "New NOGAMU" suggest that the organic sector in Uganda is still thriving irrespective of the weakening of NOGAMU.

3.4.2 Efficiency and clarity of project organisation

IFOAM and the project partners have managed to ensure regular meetings with the project steering committee and to combine these meetings with JMC meetings and at times other events. By so doing, travelling has been efficient.

The roles and mandates of AfrOnet and IFOAM respectively has been perceived as somewhat unclear. AfrOnet was expected to coordinate the partners in OTEA, but ended up more as one of the partners organising regional-level activities. AfrOnet claims also it was not resourced to coordinate or monitor others but called upon in times of challenges.

The operational procedures paper (4 pp. undated) indicates that four out of five components have “conveners” from IFOAM, while AfrOnet is to coordinate the partners in OTEA. This paper describes a situation after the initially planned project office and working groups for each component had been abolished. In reality, IFOAM has had the main coordination role, while AfrOnet never gained enough strength to take on a coordination role.

3.4.3 Role and quality of organisational assessments, relation to NOGAMU and ROAM issues

The transition from OSEA to OTEA was a transition from more centralised management and control by IFOAM under OSEA to a more decentralised system under OTEA. This transition was not preceded by sufficient organisational assessments to establish that NOAMs and AfrOnet had the necessary capacity. Assessments initiated by others revealed risks and even high risks.

IFOAM is currently developing its systems for assessments of organisations that it intends to work with. There is a rich experience in the NGO sector to borrow from and it appears urgent that IFOAM decides on a system to use with all the various aspects for risk management catered for.

3.4.4 Efficiency in communication

The operational procedures brief elaborates organogram, roles, communication/reporting lines, etc. It is noted that the communication section addresses only the communication flow from partners to IFOAM and to Sida. Some partners express that the information flow in the other direction, i.e. from IFOAM to AfrOnet and partners has not been as strong as would have been preferred. AfrOnet claims it was not informed on disbursements to partners. Partners generally claim they were not much involved in decisions on reallocations, particularly during 2018 and 2019. They would rather have seen other priorities than the conference in June 2019, where only few NOAM representatives could participate.

The Agreement with Sida, (5.6) stipulates that the partner (presumably the defined Cooperation Partner; IFOAM) “shall come up with the communication strategy with details on how to reach different type of stakeholders with information regarding this project.”

AfrOnet has developed its Communication strategy (2017). It deals mainly with how AfrOnet can reach out and with its internal communication and less with how it will secure information from its members, i.e. opposite to the OTEA operational procedures paper.

3.4.5 Reporting

The Annual Reports are generally providing relevant information on activities but after 2016 not including financial reporting. It is also hard to find some cumulative numeric data on key parameters both in the narrative text and in the OTEA monitoring tool. An example is NOAMs membership development. It would be useful in a forthcoming final report to disaggregate key numeric data to be without NOGAMU from start to end for getting a clear overview on developments in the four NOAMs which participated from the start and at the end.

On financial reporting, partners mention that they report expenditure by component, but IFOAM reports that expenditure per component is only compiled at the time of audit. By June 2019 expenditure per component was not available for 2018 and 2019. The multi-year budget is only prepared by component, and component-wise costs should thus be expected to be a disaggregation to be continuously monitored.

Lack of multi-year budgets per partner has limited the partner's ability to plan strategically more than yearly. This arrangement may to some extent mirror the Sida necessity that projects supported under Sweden's Strategy for regional cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa are truly regional and not multi-country. Yet, it would have been useful for the NOAM's to have a budget frame for the whole period as input into their strategic planning.

The expenditure report with a forecast for 2019 presented by IFOAM indicates a total of some 70,000 Euro to be accounted for by partners (except the 40,000 Euro set aside for the conference); however, partners report that they have very little or nothing to report since they have already exhausted and reported on the allocations made for 2018 and no disbursements were made in 2019.

Audit reports for 2015-2017 have been approved by Sida after some communication and clarification. As per Sida's agreement, IFOAM should submit annual audited financial reports to Sida by 31 March yearly. However, for 2018, the Team was informed that audit will be combined with the no-cost extension period and be submitted by October 2019. The "NOGAMU loss" remained a liability from NOGAMU to IFOAM by 1.1.2018 and the final "handling" of this loss is thus not yet entered into the accounts. Sida reports that it will not compensate IFOAM. No legal actions were so far taken for an attempt to recover the lost amount. The new NOGAMU leadership expressed frustration that those responsible for the loss have not been subjected to any legal action. Logically, however, it would seem like IFOAM should act in relation to NOGAMU and NOGAMU on its part should act in relation to the individuals to be held responsible for the loss. Current NOGAMU may not be resourced for that task.

3.5 SUSTAINABILITY

It should be noted, in this context, that the global demand for organic products grows more rapidly than the demand for food generally. This means that globally there is an underlying positive trend. Much of this is related to wealthier consumer groups in the richer parts of the world, but segments of consumers in low- and middle-income countries also increasingly demand "safe" and certified food. The challenge for sustainability is thus less related to constraints in the global macro-trade environment but more related to market and governance realities and other realities at national or local levels.

3.5.1 Prospects for sustainability

In many cases, production and trade may be sustainable and remain organic or near organic based on established consumer/customer relations as well as producers' interest. Farmers commonly appreciate their production system and takes pride in it. In several cases sound profitability was also reported. Third party certification may also be sustained and expanded as systems are already financially viable.

Several national certification organisations are struggling due to, among others, competition with international ones. It is only in Kenya where Africert is thriving. Africert is an international body with its base in Kenya which appears sustainable. It has a wider mandate than organic produce *per se*.

Although PGS groups often appear to be in viable business, many of them are not very dependent on EAOPS or use of the Kilimohai mark. Some groups have not renewed the license for use of Kilimohai as the benefits have been found to be lower than the associated costs.

Duration of a license agreement is supposed to be three years but was found to be less than that in some groups visited in Kenya. Some groups report costs for the license and associated training and inspection which, together with other marketing costs, are perceived as too high. In Tanzania it was reported that there is a difference in this respect between initiatives supported by SDC and OTEA respectively. It is noted that there are other costs than those related to organic product certification, for example to the respective countries' Bureau of Standards or equivalent.

A more stringent standard on duration and costs for Kilimohai licensing and associated training could enhance chances for sustainability.

3.5.2 Level of donor dependency

NOAMs are heavily donor dependent as their own revenue base is minimal. Different NOAMs have different ideas on how they can sustain themselves. In cases where they plan some form of business in organic produce, such plans are not yet well analysed. The project did not include support to a more in-depth strategic analysis for NOAMs, including for example how a NOAM business activity should be organised in order not to jeopardise the key tasks or the very existence of a NOAM or if some forms of charges should be introduced for compulsory training and inspection for certification. The voice of NOAM services recipients complained about higher certification and inspection charges specifically in Morogoro and Kisarawe Tanzania. It was later clarified that it was self-PGS contributions and therefore should not be an issue. Similar arguments in Kenya lowered the interest in sustaining and expanding the use of EAOM among groups in Kenya. An alternative conceptual approach is to recognise that NOAMs are and will be donor dependent and if projects are well managed donors may be willing to provide support for quite some time to come. In the near future it appears there are prospects for a continued EOA also including ROAM.

3.5.3 Anchorage at higher levels

The Team opted not to closely examine the OTEA linkages with AU as it was reported that the AU involvement in the promotion of organic agriculture was mainly due to the interactions with the EOA Initiative. This is logical as EOA is continent wide as opposed to OTEA. OTEA has established a good working relation with EAC that enabled endorsement of revised EAOPS. EAC secretariat is generally responsive although did not give inputs on specific issues requested on OTEA evaluation.

3.6 CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

3.6.1 Gender mainstreaming

From the project proposal, it had been envisaged that a clear ambition to include women in the processes as much as possible would be adopted. Assessment of the various project components would focus on their effects on men and women respectively with any possible measure taken to; reduce possible biases against women, or implement a ‘positive discrimination’ towards women. Furthermore, gender balance would be observed in the development of promotional material, allocation of training sessions, selection of operators for market access support and development and on project governance. Monitoring and reporting of the project would be gender specific and whenever possible, reporting figures and impact indicators would be established in a gender disaggregated manner.

To a great extent gender consideration has been adopted in most of the project implementation processes; institutional composition of project staff, selection of value chains and leadership in most of the producer groups. In the actual implementation of the project, one criterion for value chain selection was consideration of integration of women and youth in the selected value chain. A good example is selection of the honey value chain in Kenya owing to its great opportunity to empower rural communities, especially in the semi-arid areas, and women, youths and the elderly being involved.

The evaluation observed involvement of higher proportion of women in the PGS groups as compared to men. Focus group discussions with various farmer groups were a proof on wide involvement of women in various levels of the value chains (production, harvesting, post-harvest handling, value addition, marketing, and resource control). The interviewed women indicated having a better platform to discuss matters of financial resources as well as possession of more financial/resource freedom as a result of participating in the project. However, any process that leads to commercialisation of a rural activity in East Africa commonly generates increased interest from men. This was seen in the Mukika PGS which had improved chicken rearing. In its traditional form, this had been the domain of women, but when the value of production increased men took more interest and secured more influence.

The progress reports from the NOAMs, the consolidated IFOAM-OTEA report and the project monitoring are not explicit on how collection of gender disaggregated data has been achieved. Information on the performance of project component and their effect/impact on men, women, and youths is not extensively available in the project documents. Gender disaggregated data on groups memberships is only available in some NOAMs.

3.6.2 Targeted actions in relation to vulnerable groups

OTEA had proposed to support development of integrated value chains with a focus on local and regional markets, and market development in addition to high value export market targeted in earlier projects (OSEA I & II). This approach was meant to increase the diversity of markets to reflect the on-farm crop systems diversity and achieve a direct impact on the livelihood of the poor and marginalised farmers in East Africa. By

promoting production and trade in organic products, OTEA would also contribute directly to the goals and objectives of the EAC nations agricultural development strategies which are aimed at; ensuring household food security; increasing household incomes; and poverty reduction.

Despite having an approach of livelihood improvements through development of local and regional organic markets, the project did not detail out specific targeted actions such as involvement of producers from marginalised regions (arid and semi-arid), poverty incidences, infrastructural development, and other social factors. Some considerations were however made in some countries during in the selection of value chains for support. Some value chains, like the honey, were considered on the basis of having the potential to empower marginalised local communities.

3.6.3 Environment/climate

Organic production is expected to impact positively on the environment, yet certain aspects are subject to debate, for instance the possible need for a higher energy input due to sometimes increased activity for weed and pest control, tillage, etc. Other issues subject to debate is the, sometimes, low yield per unit area of land and sometimes low output per unit of labour input. All these factors are unique to crops and local situations.

Several examples were observed where farms visited were excellent “model farms” in a genuine sense. Such farmers manage soil fertility cautiously and manage to get good harvests. Labour inputs are commonly rather high and production must target high value produce or processing into high value products. As improvements of soil fertility do not happen instantly but over an extended period of time, it is expected that additional positive and sustainable impacts will emerge with time, provided that the interest in organic farming or at least sound farming practices is sustained.

The only negative factor observed is the increment of traveling and transport that OTEA has generated. International travel may remain a necessity to some extent, but should be minimised. JMC meetings, which per routine are twice annually could be replaced by virtual meetings. Such considerations are already made.

3.6.4 OTEA from a perspective of a Human-Rights Based Approach

Although most parameters related to a HRBA have been discussed elsewhere, a brief summary is included:

- OTEA has been successful in *engaging both duty bearers*, in this case mainly government officers on the one hand *and rights holders* such as in this case farmers. Somewhat slow progress on national policy development is not due to lack of OTEA engagement.
- As noted, *accountability has been weak in some organisations*, which damaged OTEA.
- *Transparency* was apparently insufficient at times in both ROAM and NOGAMU. With a wider understanding of transparency, communication has not been to a level that satisfies all during 2018 and 2019.
- On participation, it is noted that *the Steering Committee has met regularly*, but some partners still feel that they could not influence funds allocation towards the end of the project.

- Further on participation, it is noted that *rural people have been reached* and have had a voice to articulate their priorities.
- On *non-discrimination*, it is noted that people living in the most poverty-stricken areas in some countries could so far not be reached.
- On *empowerment*, it can, for example, be mentioned that field level activity commonly has benefitted women as much as or more than men. This is, however, complex as commercialisation of aspects of farming, that traditionally has been women's domain, often tends to advance the men's interest. Such examples were noted during the evaluation.
- *Rule of law* has not been fully up to expectations as individuals responsible for mismanagement has, in some cases, not faced justice.

3.7 RISK ANALYSES, RISK MANAGEMENT AND RISK MITIGATION

3.7.1 Organisational assessments

Assessments were inadequate from the start. There was a level of trust and a feeling of shared values but that basis for cooperation proved to be insufficient.

Later, mainly EOA through Biovision East Africa Trust has initiated thorough organisational assessments followed by action plans. Some of these have been made available to IFOAM. The Team only reviewed the process for ROAM which appeared sound. It is noted that TOAM and AfrOnet, for example, has been classified as “high risk” or “significant risk”, while NOGAMU was classified as “Medium risk”.

Reference is made to the country summary report for Rwanda, Annex 6 as well as to 3.7.3 below.

3.7.2 Handling of occurring issues

NOGAMU was suspended from the project. Reference is made to 3.4.5 above and to the country summary report (Annex 6) regarding details on NOGAMU financial issues. It is unfortunate that the individuals who were responsible for mismanagement of NOGAMU has not faced any legal action. IFOAM made efforts, including a visit to Uganda, but could apparently not fully come to grips with the situation. A contributing factor to the NOGAMU issues not being successfully tackled is that IFOAM was informed very late by Sida on cases of mismanagement that had been revealed in an audit commissioned by Sida related to a project other than OTEA. Sida's office dealing with the regional support, on its part, was surprised to find that IFOAM had not known earlier as it worked very closely with NOGAMU. The situation illustrate well that donor coordination and joint monitoring are necessities.

An organisational assessment was conducted on ROAM after repeated incidences of mismanagement. The assessment was followed by development of an action plan and follow up on the same. This was initiated by EOA/Biovision East Africa Trust. Such initiative should preferably have been taken before OTEA was launched or at the latest when the first incidence of mismanagement became apparent in October 2016. Instead, another disbursement was made to ROAM under new leadership but insufficient governance, followed by another era with managerial issues in 2017. Governance procedures have since improved, but ROAM remains fragile and financially weak.

Reference is made to the country summary report (Rwanda, Annex 6) regarding details on the managerial issues which occurred in ROAM and the remedy through organisational assessments and subsequent action plan implementation. The process may serve as an example on requirements which should be routine before funds are disbursed to an organisation.

3.7.3 Future scope for work with NOAMs generally

The overarching problem in this context is the generally weak level of governance in several of the countries. This activity, however, being governed mainly by producers and consumers (market) interests should be expected to stand a better chance for good governance than interventions resting solely in the public sector.

Level of donor funding may impact on risks for weaker governance in case of priorities ending up on short term personal gains rather than on long term sustainability and growth. Donor fragmentation yield complexities and difficulties to monitor both activity and finance, apart from generating a lot of work in the implementing organisation with reporting, donor meetings, reviews, assessments, etc.

Sida channels a considerable amount via the Civil Society. Organisations like Forum Syd and SSNC have established routines for organisational assessments. For Forum Syd a common modality is to channel support to a Swedish CSO which in turns supports a CSO in another country. Such support is including support to countries where governance may be even weaker than in the OTEA countries, like Somalia, DRC, Congo and others.

There are established methods for organisational assessments, action plans and follow up both internationally and in a Swedish context. The McKinsey 7S organisational effectiveness framework was used by Biovision EA and also introduced at one occasion by IFOAM for the assessment of BOAM, another is “Management of NGOs (Mango)” used by Forum Syd. Also, international NGOs have routines, for example Save the Children International.

Therefore, with good routines in place, including donor coordination, there are all reasons to believe that it is possible to work with NOAMs. Clear responsibility and adequate resources for internal project monitoring, as seem to have been the case during OSEA, are also important elements for minimising risks.

On a final note, corruption is not unusual in the world and there are no guarantees against it happening. But with good systems in place the chances to hold people responsible increases and risks decreases to a level that can be perceived as acceptable. Yet, “accidents” can always occur.

3.7.4 Organisational fragmentation in the East African countries

There is a certain fragmentation in the recipient/implementation end in the East African movement for supporting ecological agriculture and good farming practices. The Participatory Ecological Land Use Management (PELUM) Association is also member based and has a similar albeit a bit wider mandate. It operates in the countries of OTEA except Burundi.

3.7.5 Other possible IFOAM partners in Uganda

In Uganda, where the discontinued cooperation with NOGAMU created a gap, it is noted that:

- NOGAMU still exists, now under new leadership.
- A new organisation, Eco Terra Alliance Uganda (ETAU) is a membership non-profit making organisation registered in August 2018 that promotes and coordinates organic agriculture stakeholders including small holder farmers, exporters, Government and private entities, as well as research institutions, policy makers and consumers. Its membership is made up of local organic farmers, distributors, retailers, students, and consumers wishing to support and promote certified organic, bio-dynamic-, agroforestry and permaculture practice include comprehensive environment care in Uganda.
- PELUM Uganda also exists.

It was beyond the scope of this evaluation to assess merits and de-merits of the above organisations as well as to make a comprehensive search for potential partners for IFOAM.

4 Conclusions

4.1 VARIED LEVELS OF IMPACT

The impact varies considerably between components and countries, from near failures to considerable achievements. From a pedagogical point of view, it would be desirable to give one “opinion” on the overall performance, but an average of extremes is not useful.

The project main strengths have been related to

- Group formation and support to organic production.
- Maintaining and to some extent developing further the EAOPS and EAOM.
- Engagement with policy makers even though policy advancement at national levels was not significant.

Project weaker areas include

- Institution building making organisations more sustainable
- Making data available for East African audiences, especially regarding trade.

It is virtually impossible to clearly attribute results to OTEA as EOA has been operational in similar spheres in three of five countries.

Component A

- The EAOPS has been duly revised to cover aquaculture production, ILO requirements on child labour, as well as other social aspects relating to organic production. The revised version has also been endorsed by the EAC countries. However, none of these countries has updated their national standards catalogues to include the revised EAOPS.
- Recognition and use of the *kilimohai* mark in the region remain rather low since most of the organic produce in East Africa is traded in the open markets (this was the most preferred sales point in the recent consumer survey commissioned by OTEA) where consumers relationship with producers is purely based on trust. These markets also don't offer premium prices for organic products and as such the producers have little or no incentive to use the mark.
- The evaluation found variations in the approaches taken by the NOAMS in the implementation of the PGS. Whereas the NOAMs insist that farmers are only supposed to avail their time for training and facilitate their peer review processes, some PGS groups have indicated playing a role in financially facilitating trainers.
- The objective on efficient and sustainable CBs operating in the region has partly been achieved. Both local and international CBs are actively engaged in Kenya, while local CBs remain absent in Rwanda and Burundi and Tancert operates at very low capacity in Tanzania. In Uganda, UgaCert is being revived.

Component B

- There is a considerable expansion on number of PGS-groups or emerging PGS-groups and thus more producers and trades are now involved, which in turn suggest expansion of better land management practices.
- A general conclusion on increased market linkage for organic products in the region can be made. However, verifiable data on actual number of organic farmers linked to processors, buyers, traders, or other outlets, volumes of products traded and prevailing market prices still remains a challenge.
- Diverse approaches and services have been used by NOAMs in supporting the non-PGS value chains; sometimes NOAMS meeting the entire certification cost; sometimes buyers/traders/processors meet the certification costs; or at times producers bear the entire cost of certification on their own.

Component C

- The NOAMs have successfully engaged policy makers to support organic agriculture in their countries.
- Most governments prefer to have organic agriculture mainstreamed in other aspects of agricultural development rather than as a stand-alone policy or programme.

Component D

- The only feasible summary conclusion is that the results under this component are highly variable. Reference is made to Annex 6 for details.

Component E

- IFOAM reports indicate that NOAMs have consistently provided organic data to FiBL. However, the presented data is limited to land size and number of producers.
- NOAMs generally have more data but not easily accessible to wider audiences.

4.2 CONFORMITY BETWEEN PROJECT DESIGN AND EXPECTATIONS

The log frame or the OTEA monitoring tool does not include any parameters on addressing poverty, gender or in other ways addressing the needs of disadvantaged groups. The overall development goal mentions improved income and livelihood of rural communities but without specifications or suggestions on how such impact is to be measured.

There may have been an underlying assumption that expanded organic production and trade would address poverty. The project has to a considerable extent reached poor rural inhabitants even though not the poorest or most disadvantaged groups. It would be challenging to reach quick and tangible results if the ambition was to work directly with the most disadvantaged groups. Yet, with adequate analyses, especially on choice of value chains, disadvantaged groups could be reached to a higher extent. The honey

value chain is a good example, where adulteration and compromised quality are common problems, while extensive semi-arid areas have an enormous potential to host superb production of honey.

The Team conclusion is that there should be a match between narrative text, results framework and monitoring tools. It is hard and somewhat irrelevant to measure impact on poverty if poverty parameters are not included in the results framework. Also, thorough analyses are required to ensure a level of involvement of vulnerable groups that justify donor support.

4.3 CONTINUED VALIDITY OF ASSUMPTIONS MADE

It appears that an assumption was made from the beginning that development of organic agriculture would generally address poverty.

The Team notes, that the conceptual development of farming or trade with farm produce usually is not so fast that assumptions made at one point are invalid a few years later.

The Team conclusion is that assumptions made were shallow in that there was no disaggregation into situations with organic production which are profoundly different with regard to poverty alleviation or reduction.

Fortunately, a further conclusion is that much project activity has addressed the needs of small-scale producers but not those who are “organic by default”, i.e. having no ability to buy inputs. Thus, a significant number of farmers have been assisted in improving their production in ways that were conducive to their situation. In spite of often not fetching a premium price they still often report on marketing advantages, like consumer appreciation of quality produce.

4.4 RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE OSEA HERITAGE

OSEA has been reported to have been operating in a more centralised manner. The OTEA more decentralised approach was not linked to necessary organisational assessments and action plans to ensure that partner organisations had adequate systems in place for their governance and financial control. This constituted a risk which also became evident with ROAM and NOGAMU.

IFOAM and OTEA can, to some extent, be seen as victims. There was loss of otherwise useful activity. Individuals responsible for mismanagement should obviously primarily be held responsible and face legal action. But the Team also concludes that IFOAM and to some extent also Sida should have better assessed the risks and addressed them from the beginning of OTEA, if not already during OSEA.

On a positive note, it was an audit that helped reveal that NOGAMU was not well managed, so from that perspective the systems with checks and balances worked.

4.5 HANDLING OF CASES OF MISMANAGEMENT

Irrespective of checks and balances in place some risk for mismanagement will always prevail. This is not unique for development cooperation or for support to CSOs. It is important that organisations have systems for whistle-blowing in place as well as a necessary set of policies concerning fraud and other forms of misconduct. Large international organisations like OXFAM and Save the Children International have such systems. Systems should be designed such that individuals responsible for fraud or observable/proven mismanagement will face legal action.

4.6 PROJECT DESIGN IN RELATION TO INSTITUTION BUILDING

Communication

The Team observed that there were routines for partners reporting to IFOAM and IFOAM's further reporting to Sida. There were no similar routines stipulating how IFOAM should keep partners informed.

Multi-year budgets per partner

Several partner organisations express that they had inadequate influence on financial issues, including reallocations of funds, especially during 2018 and 2019.

The original budget was disaggregated on components, but not on IFOAM and implementing partners. Budgets per partners were decided one year at a time based on approved work plans. This system reduced the partner organisations chances to plan strategically for what to be achieved during the project period.

The Team conclusion is that agreed routines for two-way communication and for strategic decisions are important for stability, for a sense of shared responsibility and for institutions to develop.

4.7 FRAGMENTED DONOR SUPPORT

Fragmentation of donor support has constituted a challenge for both the implementing organisations, the intermediary organisations (like SSNC and IFOAM) and in the end also for donors. An ultimate wish would be basket funding based on the frontline organisation's strategic ambitions, with joint reporting to donors. Such scenario may not be easy to achieve in the near future, but intermediate steps could be to better harmonise support components, establish joint monitoring meetings/systems for donors and more uniform requirements for organisational assessments and benchmarks, accounting and reporting.

4.8 FRAGMENTED IMPLEMENTATION CAPACITY

The Team has observed that in several countries PELUM at national level co-exists with NOAMs. The nature of these two sets of organisations is not entirely different. Both are member-based, with sister organisations in several countries and mandated to

promote sustainability of farming albeit with some difference in scope on the technical mandate.

4.9 SUSTAINABILITY OF NOAMS AND AFRONET

Several organisations have developed strategic plans. These strategies do not include realistic plans for income generation that could make the organisation sustainable. The Team conclusion in this context is that it may be better for the NOAMs and AfrOnet to recognise that they are and will be donor dependent. A consequence is that their focus should be on best possible management of donor funds, without venturing into business activity or consultancies. Organisations should remain with some distance to activity that is adding financial burdens on producers and traders, while recognising the commercial role that the Certification bodies must have for their survival.

Organic agriculture is likely to attract interest from the donor community yet for quite some time, which implies that with good management there is limited immediate threat to the survival of the organisational set up. The Team view is that risks associated with a mixture of an advocacy role and a business role outweighs the benefits. However, the management of the EAOM and the JMC must always be sustained and for that approaches to self-generation of funds will be required, but at a low level of expenditure to ensure its viability.

4.10 LEVEL OF STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT

A sustained level of stakeholder involvement is important for all stakeholders to contribute to sound management and results.

4.11 IT IS POSSIBLE TO SUPPORT CSOS

Based on findings in this and earlier evaluations, the Team does not hesitate to conclude that organisations like the NOAMs and AfrOnet can be supported. There are ample examples on how support to CSOs can be organised even in countries where the general level of governance is weaker than that of the OTEA countries.

4.12 APPROACHES TO DATA COLLECTION

A general conclusion on increased market linkage for organic products in the region could be made. However, verifiable data on actual number of organic farmers linked to processors, buyers, traders, or other outlets, volumes of products traded and prevailing market prices still remains a challenge.

4.13 NEED FOR MORE UNIFORM AND STRINGENT PROJECT POLICY

Measuring project impacts with regards to performance of non-PGS value chains is a big challenge owing to application of diverse approaches and services by NOAMs in supporting these value chains.; sometimes NOAMS meet the entire certification cost;

sometimes buyers/traders/processors meet the certification costs and at yet other times producers bear the entire cost of certification on their own.

There is a similar issue for the PGS groups. Financial demands for training and occasionally review and inspection vary. Such costs currently tend to undermine interest in certification and the use of EAOM.

5 Lessons learned

The Team opts to highlight six main lessons learned:

5.1 SCOPE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF ORGANIC AGRICULTURE

There is an underlying international positive trend and a growing consumer awareness. Government representatives sometimes hesitate in spite of agreements at EAC level. To move further, it is essential to recognise that the future is not necessarily either organic or conventional production, but as in other parts of the world, that the two approaches can co-exist and be supportive of each other. There is ample evidence from OTEA that farmers' interest in organic production can be systematically coordinated and supported to capitalise on marketing advantages. Such advantages may be other than premium prices.

A regional approach at EAC level has been essential as it has enabled continued evolution of the EAOPS and a system for use of EAOM Kilimohai mark through the JMC and the EAOM Secretariat. Sharing of experiences between NOAMs have been a more pronounced value than the expansion of trade opportunities. The poverty reduction aspect is only indirectly and rather weakly linked to the regional approach.

5.2 MODALITIES FOR WORK WITH CSOS

The institutional development within NOAMs and AfrOnet was jeopardised by support being availed to organisations that did not have adequate governance systems and administrative procedures in place. The organic movement in Uganda and Rwanda lost development opportunities due to mismanagement of donor funds. Organisational capacity assessments are needed at project onset. Gaps identified are interwoven in programming activities to strengthen NOAMs and other implementing partners to avoid embesslement and other forms of losses of finance.

Elaborate systems for organisational assessments and their follow up are internationally available and have been used recently among the organisations involved in OTEA even though not commonly commissioned through OTEA.

Organisational development should include development of Codes of Conduct, Anti-corruption policies and systems for safe whistle blowing for staff, members and others at all levels. Procedures should be in place such that individuals responsible for mismanagement will face legal actions.

5.3 SUSTAINABILITY

Prospects for sustainable production at farm level, including the local marketing arrangements, are good. Trust and personalised (one-on-one) relationship between producers and consumers play an important role in organic products marketing.

Strategic plans for organisations like NOAMS and AfrOnet need to demonstrate a realistic approach to sustainability with realistic ambitions. In this case, the most realistic ambition is that NOAMs and AfrOnet distance themselves from income-generating activities and focus on high-quality implementation of development projects supported by donors. Such view may imply a recognition that NOAMs and AfrOnet may be temporary tools for project activity and may in the long run change identity towards organisations run on a voluntary basis to advance organic agriculture or they may even cease to exist.

The certification bodies need to be sustained and thus need to develop their base for income generation. Their sustainability is highly dependent on their engagement in a diversity of certification and inspection schemes. Reliance on one inspection/certification scheme does not currently provide a local certification body with sufficient business.

There is a general good will by the EAC nations in supporting and harmonising organic agriculture production and trade in the region. Governments expanded buy-in will continue to depend on quantitative demonstration of volumes produced from organic agriculture, not only of health foods like fruits and vegetables, but also of staples like Irish potato, grains among others. Short of that organic agriculture will continue to be an add-on and mainstreamed in agricultural policy which may not yield visibility and the required leaps forward. Lobbying and networking capacity of the NOAMs, political goodwill (not least from local governments) and personal networks of the NOAMs leaderships can play key roles in driving the organic agenda in East Africa.

5.4 FURTHER HARMONISATION OF APPROACHES

Performance and enthusiasm of the PGS groups can highly be linked to the implementation process. Whereas some of the groups that have claimed meeting part of the certification process fees are more determined to stay afloat as a sign of ownership, other groups whose financial involvement has been deemed high feel they are yet to get value for money. There is laxity and low motivation by some PGS groups to renew their certification as they are yet to reap some benefits as a result of certification. The costs involved over time for a PGS group to remain certified for use of the EAOM Kilimohai may become a factor undermining sustainability. It is essential that costs and efforts are minimised.

Intervention measures in relation to the non-PGS value chains also vary between countries. For non-PGS to be sustainable, it is not necessarily useful to partly or fully subsidise their costs.

Investment in human, social, and technical capital is a key factor in facilitating collection of reliable production and trade data.

5.5 CONFORMITY BETWEEN PROJECT DESIGN AND EXPECTATIONS

The results and monitoring frameworks should include indicators and parameters related to poverty reduction or alleviation if such impacts are expected from a project.

5.6 DONOR COORDINATION

Donor coordination is paramount not only to avoid duplication and risks for double accounting but more so to reap the benefits of synergistic funding and additionality to achieve more results. In OTEA, the onset of EOA was not carefully coordinated to achieve clear additionality in relation to OTEA.

6 Recommendations

This section focusses on critical aspects where the Team could see scope for improvements.

6.1 RECOMMENDATIONS ON DESIGN OF SIMILAR PROJECTS

Recommendation 1: Poverty objectives and indicators should be included in the results framework if the project is expected to report or be evaluated on aspects related to poverty reduction or alleviation.

Recommendation 2: If poverty and gender issues are expected to be addressed, it is essential to have a rather detailed analysis of how that is going to happen, including target group analyses, regional analyses, commodity/value chain analyses, etc.

Recommendation 3: Ensure donor harmonisation and coordination to ensure added value of funds from different sources and not to jeopardise efficiency and transparency. Even if a basket funding arrangement cannot be achieved, projects' monitoring, evaluations, donor meetings, etc. can be coordinated.

Recommendation 4: Ensure that expected outcome objectives are realistic. In this case, the difficulties in documenting volumes of trade at different levels could have been forecasted.

6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS ON IMPLEMENTATION MODALITIES

Recommendation 5: Consider scope for institutional development by allocating multi-year budgets per partner to enable partners to plan strategically, to allow monitoring of budget shares allocated to different partners and to allow for participatory and transparent decisions on budget reallocations.

Recommendation 6: Systems for organisational assessments and follow up of the same should be an institutionalised routine for support through and to CSOs. This applies to all levels. Organisations should have the essential set up of policies against fraud and misconduct. Policies should include a roadmap for how responsible individuals will be brought to court in case of mismanagement.

Recommendation 7: Agreed plans for communication should cater for efficient two-way communication, i.e. both for reporting procedures from partners to main implementor and to donor, and for routinely sharing of information from the center to the partners (in this case to the NOAMs).

Recommendation 8: Audits should be performed as per original agreement with Sida and not be postponed to include no-cost extension periods.

Recommendation 9: Financial reports should be designed such that all partners can see and comprehend their respective expenditures and how it tallies with their financial reports.

Recommendation 10: Up to date ICT technology should be applied to minimise air travel and with it minimise negative environmental impact. This will be important for JMC sustainability.

6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS SPECIFICALLY TO NO-AMS AND AFRONET

Recommendation 11: NOAMs and AfrOnet should jointly review which costs PGS groups face for training, certification and inspections with a target to put in place similar policy and practice, also with regard to time intervals for renewal of the certificates. Harmonised processes will act as a deterrent in situations where some parties could have vested interests. The ambition should be that costs over time do not constitute too much a disincentive for certification.

Recommendation 12: For sustainability, NOAMs and AfrOnet should agree on policy regarding, preferably, no subsidies to third-party certification.

Recommendation 12: NOAMs should make an effort to present data and success stories on their websites.

Recommendation 13: NOAMs and AfrOnet should focus on high-quality implementation of donor supported interventions and, at least for the time being, abstain from income generating activities.

Recommendation 14: In order to gain policy support, demonstrate production benefits of organic agriculture and allow for recognition that organic and conventional agriculture can be mutually reinforcing rather than it being an “either – or” issue.

Recommendation 15: To improve local certification bodies’ businesses and sustainability, there is need for the organic sector to support more production. This will provide the certification bodies with adequate market for their services. All actors need to focus on consumer sensitisation which will eventually lead to increased demand for organically certified products which in turn leads to derived demand for organic certification.

Recommendation 17: The organic sector players should build on the existing trust and relationship between organic producers and customers in promoting the *kilimohai* mark in the local markets. The NOAMs should continue sensitise the PGS groups on the possible benefits they can accrue from using the *kilimohai* mark in on their products. The sector should also devise tactics of encouraging the existing clientele of organic products to be ambassadors of organic agriculture in East Africa.

Recommendation 18: With increased use of mobile phone in the region, actors could take the advantage and partner with existing mobile data collection applications or develop an application that organic value chain actors could use in capturing data on production, market demand, supply quantities and pricing. Actors could benefit from benchmarking on how the Kenya Agricultural Commodity Exchange has leveraged on technology to monitor production and market dynamics for various agricultural products. Organic producers could be assisted on data collection and handling (specifically using mobile devices).

Recommendation 19: The NOAMs should consistently strive to enhance their credibility and reduce risks for any negative public perception and image so as to manage to stay relevant in the quest for organic policies in their respective countries.

Annex 1 Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference for the Evaluation of Sida's support to the project "Organic Trade and Value Chain Development in East Africa", OTEA, (2014-2019)

Date: March, 2019

Evaluation object and scope

The evaluation object is

- Sida-funded project "Organic Trade and Value Chain Development", OTEA, 2014-2019, implemented by the International Federation of Organic Movements, IFOAM, and its national partners.

The current OTEA project is a continuation of two previous phases supported by Sida and implemented IFOAM during 2006-2007 and 2010-2013, which successfully developed the East African Organic Products Standard and the regional organic trade mark "Kilimohai", relevant Organic Guarantee System, emerging consumer awareness, initiation of organic agricultural policy development as well as the strengthening of the National Organic Agriculture Movements (NOAMs) that are now strongly involved in support to producers and consumer awareness raising activities in East Africa.

An external evaluation was undertaken in 2013 concluding that the project largely met its objectives. It recommended how the development of the organic sector could be strengthened in a possible future collaboration between Sida and IFOAM. The most important results was successful education of inspectors and people involved in certification process of organic products as well as the development of PGS. The project also increased market access to the EU for ecological standard and approval regarding Ugandan organic products. It was recommended to continue to build capacity of certification bodies and work to improve the PGS-system, build capacity among certification bodies and enhance consumer awareness. Moreover, it was recommended to build up statistics and data collection.

The support from Sida, under the Swedish regional strategy for development cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa (2016-2021), of SEK 23 500 000 to OTEA has been used to further develop the organic sector in East Africa, during the period 2014–2018 with a no-cost extension until Mid 2019. Sida is the sole donor to the project. The activities aimed in its overall development goal to contribute to improving the income and livelihood of rural communities in East Africa through the development of market oriented organic production.

The specific project objective have been to increase trade with organic products, by supporting the development of enabling regional policies, a capacitated production and trade environment, and an increased consumer awareness.

The summarised expected results from the activities are: A well-functioning and regionally coordinated Organic Guarantee System (OGS) in East Africa and increased consumer awareness and demand for organic products across the region; increased capacity of local producers to access and supply local and regional markets; East African governments, as well as EAC and AU policies, strategies and plans support the organic agriculture (OA) sector; all National Organic Agriculture Movements (NOAMs) have increased capacity and skills to further develop the organic sector and cooperate on a regional platform for Ecological Organic Agriculture; and, increased availability of reliable information and statistics on production, trade and the multifunctional benefits of organic agriculture.

The ultimate target groups for the intervention are organic farming households and processors (and their employees) in East Africa. The stakeholders in the project are the organic value chain organisations, the supporting institutions (such as schools, business associations, consumers, environmental and development NGOs), the certification bodies, as well as government agencies in East Africa.

The project has been implemented by IFOAM and the National Organic Agriculture Movements in Kenya (KOAN), Tanzania (TOAM), Uganda (NOGAMU), Rwanda (ROAM) and Burundi (BOAM), in close cooperation with the organic stakeholders and governments in the East African countries. However, the cooperation with ROAM has been suspended in periods and the cooperation with Nogamu has been suspended since January 2018.

The scope of the evaluation shall be further elaborated by the evaluator in the inception report in accordance with what is suitable in terms of the use of the evaluation and the limited budget.

Evaluation purpose

The OTEA project comes to an end by 2019 and there is no possibility for continued partnership at this stage between Sida and IFOAM within the current regional strategy.

The purpose of the evaluation is to follow up on the OTEA project and to draw lessons from the project when considering support to similar projects in the future. Moreover, the evaluation is useful for IFOAM, their implementing partners as well as other donors and organisations on lessons learned and the potential impact of the OTEA project.

More specifically, the purpose of the evaluation is to:

- Help Sida, IFOAM and its partners to assess the results of the OTEA-project from 2014-2019 to learn from what has worked well and less well and what the overall impact of the project has been.
- To analyse and come up with suggestions for sustainability of the project beyond Sida-funding
- Provide a tool for reflection on potential improvement on how project implementation may be adjusted and improved for similar projects
- Assess the role of supporting organic agriculture at the regional level in terms of expanding trade opportunities and diversification and poverty reduction

The primary intended users of the evaluation are inter alia:

- the project management team, higher management and the Steering Committee of IFOAM and the NOAMs

- the Swedish Embassy in Addis Ababa and Sida's Africa Department in Stockholm and other relevant Embassies in Eastern Africa

Other stakeholders that should be kept informed about the evaluation include

- Relevant ministries and agencies in the EAC countries
- Relevant donors active in the field of organic trade and certification in the EAC-region
- The EAC secretariat

The evaluation is to be designed, conducted and reported to meet the needs of the intended users and tenderers shall elaborate on how this will be ensured during the evaluation process.

During the inception phase, the evaluator and the users will agree on who will be responsible for keeping various stakeholders informed of the evaluation.

Evaluation objective, questions and evaluation criteria

Some inspiration for evaluation questions has been listed below. The evaluator is not expected to answer all of these questions to the same extent. The other criteria are considered of secondary importance. Questions are expected to be developed in the tender by the tenderer and further developed during the inception phase of the evaluation.

Priority areas:

Effectiveness

- To what extent have the project contributed to intended outcomes? If so, why? If not, why not? To what extent has the OTEA project involved stakeholders in design, implementation and follow-up?
- Has the OTEA-project contributed to the creation of lasting networks among stakeholders involved in, or with a stake in, trade policy making?
- How is the possibility to work and support national organic movements given the obstacles that have been with ROAM and Nogamu? Are there other possible partners for IFOAM?

Impact

- What is the overall impact of the project in terms of direct or indirect, negative and positive results?
- What are the effects of the OTEA project (or previously not identified effects of the first phases OSEA I and OSEA II), including both positive and negative, intended and unintended effects?

Sustainability

- Is it likely that the benefits (outcomes) of the project are sustainable? If so, for a reasonably long time? If not why, and what could have been done differently in order to ensure sustainability of results?

Suggestions for further questions:

Relevance

- To what extent has the OTEA project managed to meet the main constraints related to organic trade in East Africa as well as AU, EAC and national policies?
- To what extent has the project conformed to the needs and priorities of the target groups
- Are the assumptions relevant also today regarding the importance of organic trade for the region in relation to using trade as a mean for poverty reduction?

Efficiency

- Can the costs for the project be justified by its results, in comparison with similar initiatives? (This question is not expected to be addressed through elaborate cost-efficiency and cost-benefit analyses but rather through analytical reasoning.)

Cross-cutting issues

- Has the project contributed to poverty reduction? How?
- Has the project had any positive or negative effects on gender equality? Could gender mainstreaming have been improved in planning, implementation or follow up?
- Has the project had any positive or negative effects on the environment/climate? Could environment/climate considerations have been improved in planning, implementation or follow up?

Evaluation approach and methods for data collection and analysis

It is expected that the evaluator describes and justifies an appropriate methodology and methods for data collection in the tender. The evaluation design, methodology and methods for data collection and analysis are expected to be fully developed and presented in the inception report. A clear distinction is to be made between evaluation approach/methodology and methods.

Sida's approach to evaluation is utilization-focused which means the evaluator should facilitate the entire evaluation process with careful consideration of how everything that is done will affect the use of the evaluation. It is therefore expected that the evaluators, in their tender, present i) how intended users are to participate in and contribute to the evaluation process and ii) methodology and methods for data collection that create space for reflection, discussion and learning between the intended users of the evaluation. It is expected to include time for field work and meetings with partners and stakeholders. It would be suitable to visit national and regional partners and main stakeholders in Tanzania and Kenya. If possible due to the limited budget also Rwanda or Burundi, otherwise through phone/VC-meetings. Due to that Nogamu in Uganda is not existing anymore, there is no use to visit Uganda.

Evaluators should take into consideration appropriate measures for collecting data in cases where sensitive or confidential issues are addressed, and avoid presenting information that may be harmful to some stakeholder groups.

Organisation of evaluation management

This Evaluation is commissioned by the Swedish Embassy in Addis Abeba. The intended users are Sida staff at both Sida headquarters and the Embassies as well as IFOAM and their partner organisations. The intended users of the evaluation form a steering group which has contributed to and agreed on the ToR for this evaluation. The role of the steering group is to provide input, information, assist with setting up of interviews etc. to the Consultancy Team as well as to approve the inception report and the final report of the evaluation together with Sida/the Embassy. The steering group will be participating in the start-up meeting of the evaluation as well as in the debriefing workshop where preliminary findings and conclusions are discussed. The evaluation of tenders will be the responsibility of the Embassy.

Evaluation quality

All Sida's evaluations shall conform to OECD/DAC's Quality Standards for Development Evaluation. The evaluators shall use the Sida OECD/DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation. The evaluators shall specify how quality assurance will be handled by them during the evaluation process.

Tentative time schedule and deliverables

It is expected that a time and work plan is presented in the tender and further detailed in the inception report. The evaluation shall be carried out starting from April 29-August 31 2019. The timing of any field visits, surveys and interviews need to be settled by the evaluator in dialogue with the main stakeholders during the inception phase.

The table below lists key deliverables for the evaluation process. Deadlines for final inception report and final report must be kept in the tender, but alternative deadlines for other deliverables may be suggested by the consultant and negotiated during the inception phase. Possibility to conduct the field work in direct relation to the tentative presentation of main findings during the conference stated below would be useful.

Deliverables	Participants	Deadlines
Start-up virtual meeting (to discuss the proposal and time plan)	Consultants, steering group	One week after the appointment of the consultant
Draft inception report		Two weeks after the Start-up meeting
Comments on inception report	Consultants and Steering Group	One week after delivery of the draft inception report

Virtual inception meeting	Consultants and Steering Group	One week after the draft inception report
Final inception report	Consultants to developed based on the discussion in the inception meeting	One weeks after the comments by the Steering group
Field work	Consultants with coordination and facilitation by Steering Group	
Draft evaluation report		2 weeks After finalisation of the field work
Comments from Steering group during a debriefing work shop (virtual meeting)	Steering group	Within one week of the receipt of the draft evaluation report
Tentative: presentation of main findings at "The 1 st International Conference on Agroecology Transforming Agriculture & Food Systems in Africa- Reducing Synthetic Pesticides and Fertilizers, Scaling Up Agroecology and Promoting Ecological Organic Trade"	Consultants	June 18-20, Nairobi
Final evaluation report		
	Consultants	Final report at the latest by 31 August 2019.

The inception report will form the basis for the continued evaluation process and shall be approved by Sida before the evaluation proceeds to implementation. The inception report should be written in English and cover evaluability issues and interpretations of evaluation questions, present the methodology, methods for data collection and analysis as well as the full evaluation design. A clear distinction between the evaluation approach/methodology and methods for data collection shall be made. A specific time and work plan for the remainder of the evaluation should be presented which also cater for the need to create space for reflection and learning between the intended users of the evaluation.

The final report shall be written in English and be professionally proof read. The final report should have clear structure and follow the report format in the Sida Decentralised Evaluation Report Template for decentralised evaluations (see Annex C). The executive summary should be maximum 3 pages. The evaluation approach/methodology and methods for data collection shall be clearly described and explained in detail and a clear distinction between the two shall be made. All limitations to the methodology and methods shall be made explicit and the consequences of these limitations discussed. Findings should flow logically from data, showing a clear line of evidence to support the conclusions. Conclusions should be substantiated by findings and analysis. Recommendations and

lessons learned should flow logically from conclusions. Recommendations should be specific, directed to relevant stakeholders and categorised as a short-term, medium-term and long-term. The report should be no more than max 40 pages excluding annexes (including Terms of Reference and Inception Report). The evaluator shall adhere to the Sida OECD/DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation.

The evaluator shall, upon approval of the final report, insert the report into the Sida Decentralised Evaluation Report for decentralised evaluations and submit it to Nordic Morning (in pdf-format) for publication and release in the Sida publication data base. The order is placed by sending the approved report to sida@nordicmorning.com, always with a copy to the Sida Programme Officer as well as Sida's evaluation unit (evaluation@sida.se). Write "Sida decentralised evaluations" in the email subject field and include the name of the consulting company as well as the full evaluation title in the email. For invoicing purposes, the evaluator needs to include the invoice reference "ZZ980601S," type of allocation "sakanslag" and type of order "digital publicering/publikationsdatabas."

Evaluation Team Qualification

In addition to the qualifications already stated in the framework agreement for evaluation services, the evaluation team shall include the following competencies: Relevant academic background with experience from work in market development and poverty reduction with experience and knowledge about international trade and agriculture development in Sub-Saharan Africa.

A CV for each team member shall be included in the call-off response. It should contain a full description of relevant qualifications and professional work experience.

It is important that the competencies of the individual team members are complementary. It is highly recommended that local consultants are included in the team.

The evaluators must be independent from the evaluation object and evaluated activities, and have no stake in the outcome of the evaluation. English language skills is a pre-requisite.

Resources

The maximum budget amount available for the evaluation is SEK 500 000.

The contact person at the Swedish Embassy in Addis Ababa is Mr. Ulf Ekdahl, ulf.ekdahl@gov.se

Responsible officer at Sida is Mrs Rebecca Ygberg Amayra, 54rebecca.ygbergamayra@sida.se. The responsible officer should be consulted if any problems arise during the evaluation process.

Relevant Sida documentation will be provided by the OTEA responsible officer Mrs Barbara Zilly, b.zilly@ifoam.bio

Contact details to intended users (cooperation partners, Swedish Embassies, other donors etc.) will be provided by the IFOAM and the embassy.

The consultant will be required to arrange the logistics with assistance from IFOAM regarding booking of interviews, preparation of visits etc.

Annexes

Annex A: List of key documentation

All relevant strategy documents, program documents and reports will be distributed by the responsible person at Sida HQ and IFOAM including *inter alia* IFOAM project proposal, IFOAM previous project evaluations, annual reports, annual work plans and budgets, as well as financial reports, Sida regional strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa 2016-2021 including Sida Plan for Operationalisation of the strategy

Annex B: Data sheet on the evaluation object

Annex C: Decentralised evaluation report template

Annex D: Relevant project documents.

Annex 2 Log frame with indicators and activities

Logframe with Indicators, MoV and activities. The Results Summary OTEA is identical.

Source: IFOAM, 2016

Outcome objectives	Indicators	Data sources / Means of verification	Activities
A. A well-functioning Organic Guarantee System (OGS) in East Africa and increased consumer awareness, and therefore demand for labeled organic products			
1. OGS in the region sustainably managed	1.1. A plan for sustainable management of OGS has been developed and implemented 1.2. Nr of persons involved in Organic Trade and Agriculture trained in OGS	- Project progress reports - JMC minutes, - OGS Training reports	1.1.1 Develop and implement of a plan for sustainable regional management of the OGS 1.2.1 Conduct capacity building training in OGS for CBs, NOAMs and policy makers in OGS
2. Efficient and sustainable certification bodies operate in the region	2.1. Certification bodies are strengthened and at least 1 CB approved for the export of organic products	- IOAS decision - Project progress report	2.1.1 Advice and support to CBs 2.1.2 Support to local certification and accreditation costs
3. Increased international recognition of the East African Organic Products Standards (EAOPS)	3.1. EAOPS is recognized by at least 2 countries in emerging markets (e.g Middle east, South Africa, South Asia)	- Joint protocols and documents available as required to achieve equivalence/recognition	3.1.1 Assess the quality requirements of the emerging markets and forge acceptance of the EAOPS as equivalent to their organic regulations
4. Increased credibility and use of the East African Organic Mark (EAOM) in the region and increased consumer awareness	4.1 usage of the Kilimohai mark on products has increased 4.2. consumer awareness has increased a)recognition of mark by 50%, b) awareness of OA by 80% and c) consumption of organic products by 60%	- Survey (baseline and end) - Project progress report	4.1.1 Support and advice to NOAMs to implement and maintain the mark, registration process, design instructions etc. 4.1.2 Promote the use of the mark 4.2.1 Promotion at farmers' markets, fair, at educational institutions, embassies, trade missions, expat communities and points of sale
5. Well-functioning PGS in the region	5.1. The PGS is sustainably managed at national and regional level by the NOAMs and JMC 5.2. the number of approved PGS groups has increased	- JMC documentations - Project progress reports - Data captured	5.1.1 Strengthen the regional cooperation in PGS capacity development (1 regional PGS workshop) 5.2.1 Review PGS approval procedures
B. Increased capacity of local producers to access and supply local and regional markets.			
6. Increased organic trade in local and regional markets	6.1. Non - PGS 5 value chains are functional at the end of the project 6.2. 10% increase of turnover of the regional trade by end of the project	- Project progress reports - Market surveys and value chain analysis - documentation of 5 cases	6.1.1 Support to 5 non-PGS value chain cases 6.2.1 Coach and hands on support to PGS groups 6.2.2 Documentation of the 5 cases
C. East African government policies, strategies and plans support the organic agriculture sector (OA). EAC and AU policy makers are supportive of OA and EOA			
7. East African government policies, strategies and plans support the organic agriculture (OA) sector. EAC and AU policymakers are supportive of OA and EOA	7.1 Number of countries with approved OA policy and plans (3 countries) and regional platforms strengthened 7.2 increased capacity among policy-makers and stakeholders in OA and policy formulation	- Project progress reports - Policy statements issued on OA - Policy Analysis - Communication strategy - Workshops and conferences reports/documentations - Needs assessment reports - NOAM budget reports	7.1.1 Support national policy development processes for incorporation of OA in national development plans with an emphasis on implementation 7.1.2 Develop a communication strategy for influencing high-level decisions. 7.1.3 Strengthen regional platforms (IFOAM & AfrONet) for interaction with policy processes 7.1.4 Regional Conference (one conference) 7.2.1 Capacity building of policy-makers through trainings, exposure visits to successful organic farms and projects and targeted organic fairs and events (seeing is believing) 7.2.2 Capacity building of stakeholders in policy formulation process
D. All National Organic Agriculture Movements (NOAMs) have increased capacity and skills to further develop the organic sector. The regional Organic Network (AfrONet) is strengthened and able to address issues of regional importance at EAC and AU levels			
8. Increased cooperation on a regional level through increased skills and capacity of all NOAMs	8.1 The EAOAM secretariat is established and regularly meets in JMCs 8.2 AfroNet is leading the regional organic movement and capacities of NOAMs increased	- EOA Directory - OLC documentation incl. relevant DPs - Project progress reports - Joint documents - Meeting minutes - Training reports - Needs assessment reports - NOAM budget reports	8.1.1 Support the establishment of a permanent EAOAM secretariat and EAOAM regional coordination procedures, including meetings of the JMC (Joint Management Committee) 8.2.1 Capacity building of individuals in advisory service, inspection and certification, value chain management, standards, policy etc. 8.2.2 Reviewing and streamlining governance systems 8.2.3 Project Steering Committees (2 per year) 8.2.4 Stakeholder Forums (2 during project) 8.2.5 Financial support and technical assistance are given to NOAMs based on needs assessment. 8.2.6 Training and orientation of Board on governance issues
9. The organic sectors in Rwanda and Burundi are further developed	9.1 ROAM and BOAM are institutionally strengthened (Increased members + sustainability plans developed)		9.1.1 Assisting BOAM and ROAM in gaining support from other donors and their governments 9.1.2 Ensure that relevant staff is recruited and trained. 9.1.3 Facilitation of institutional experience exchange between BOAM, ROAM and other NOAMs
E. Increased availability of reliable information and statistics on production, trade and multi-functional benefits of organic agriculture and their contributions to the challenges and needs in East Africa			
10. Data collection is mainstreamed and institutionalized	10.1 Unified data collection is functioning	- Project progress reports - data collection tool - Workshops/trainings reports - regional data/statistics including all NOAMs	10.1.1 Organize regional data collection training 10.1.2 Review currently used data collection tool and identify and/or develop further tools for data 10.1.3 Mapping potential sources of information and data collection and storage.
11. Reliable data is available for trade, advocacy and sector development	11.1 Number of best practices for advocacy		11.1.1 Basic data collection and annual compilation is carried out 11.1.2 Interact with NGOs, government institutions and research institutions to mainstream organic data collection and dissemination in their work. 11.1.3 Prepare and disseminate analyzed data to relevant stakeholders. 11.1.4 Profiling of organic projects and publicizing successful case studies

Annex 3 List of documents

General

aCatalyst Consulting. 2018. Organisational and Capacity Assessment of Partners Involved in the Implementation of the Ecological Organic Agriculture (EOA) Initiative in Africa

Africa Union; NEPAD. Sustainable Land and Water Management: The CAADP Pillar I Framework, Tools for use by Countries in Mainstreaming and Up-scaling of Sustainable Land and Water Management in Africa's Agriculture and Rural Development Agenda. September 2009.

AfrOnet Communication Strategy 2017

Agile Consulting. 2019. Organizational Self Assessment Score Guide

AU. 2009. Sustainable Land and Water Management: The CAADP Pillar I Framework. "Tool" for use by Countries in Mainstreaming and Up scaling of Sustainable Land and Water Management in Africa's Agriculture and Rural Development Agenda, September 2009

Biovision East Africa Trust. 2018. Report on due diligence assessment by BvAT team for Rwanda partners, from 27th to 28th august 2018

Criteria for selecting value chains for OTEA project. Undated Brief.

Extract of descriptive report for capacity building action plan for Roam

E.O.W Associates LTD. Mid-Term Review. Ecological Organic Agriculture (EOA) Initiative (2012-2015). Consultancy commissioned by the EOA Continental Steering Committee. May 2016.

FIBL and IFOAM Organics International. The World of Organic Agriculture. Statistics and Emerging Trends 2019

Forum Syd. 2012. Updated Mango Tool.

MoU SIGNED between MINAGRI and ROAM March 19th, 2019

Budgets and expenditure reports from IFOAM and from KOAN, TOAM and Embassy of Sweden

IFOAM. List of contacts

IFOAM Directory

OTEA Log frame 2016

IFOAM Evaluation of OSEA II – Final Report – 20140112

IFOAM OTEA Project Proposal – 20141006

IFOAM ToR Final Evaluation 2019

IFOAM Management processes OTEA overview (Brief)

IFOAM. 2013. PGS Case Studies from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda

Kenya. 2010. Agricultural Sector Development Strategy 2010-2020

Kenya. 2017. Agricultural Sector Development Support Programme.

Kenya. 2017. Economic Survey 2017, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS)

Rwanda. 2016. GDP National Accounts 2016, National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (NISR)

Rwanda National Agricultural Policy. Draft.

Rwanda Green Growth Strategy. Final.

Rwanda. Ministry of Agriculture. Strategic Plan for Agricultural Transformation

SSNC Report. Organic Farming for All

Sweden-IFOAM Grant Agreement on OTEA, November 2014

Strategy for Sweden's Regional Development Cooperation in Sub-Saharan-Africa 2016-2021

Tanzania. 2017. National Bureau of Statistics (NBS); Hali ya Uchumi Katika Taifa Katika Mwaka 2017, Tanzania

Tanzania. 2018. Agricultural Sector Development Programme. Phase II

Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBS). 2017. Statistical Abstract

The World Bank. 2018. Tanzania's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Kenya Bureau of Statistics (KBS), Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBS) and National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (NISR) and Sub Sahara Africa Macro Poverty Outlook, 2018 World Bank

1st International Conference on Agroecology; Transforming Agriculture & Food Systems in Africa June 18-20, 2019

2015

Budget OTEA submitted 2015

OTEA Annual Report 2015

KOAN-OTEA report 2015

PELUM -Kenya report 2015

2016

OTEA Annual Report 2016 with Annexes I, Ia, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7

OTEA Annual Finance Report 2016_revised

KOAN-OTEA report 2016

BOAM-OTEA report 2016

2017

OTEA Annual Report 2017 with Annexes 1, 2, 3x3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 2x9

Budget plan OTEA + revised version June

Afr0net plan 2017

Budget plan OTEA 2017 + revised version June

KOAN, NOGAMU, ROAM (July-Dec), TOAM work plans

KOAN-OTEA report 2017

BOAM-OTEA report 2017

2018

OTEA Annual Report with Annexes 1-7

IFOAM agreement amendment letter January 2018

Letter from Sida about audit and disbursement January 2018 (about audit report for 2016 and NOGAMU)

IFOAM questionnaire regarding forwarding of funds May 2018 (about NOGAMU)

OTEA Budget Plan 2018_31102018

OTEA partners workplans 2018

Communication via email with Sida about no-cost extension

BOAM-OTEA report 2018

2019

IFOAM Presentation on OTEA at Conference in Nairobi, June 2019. Short version.

KOAN-OTEA Financial report-2018

Kenya Organic Agriculture Sector Strategic Plan 2018-2022

Consumer Survey of Attitudes and Preferences Towards Organic Products in East Africa 2018

Annex 4 Evaluation work plan and people met/contacted

Date	Name	Position/Organisation	Means	Team member
6.5.2019	Gunnar Rundgren	Consultant during OSEA/ Grolink	Phone and email	BT
10.5	<u>Start-up meeting</u> Barbara Zilly Shaknoza Kurbanalieva Christina Paabøl Thomsen Rebecca Ygberg Amayra	Sida, IFOAM, Niras eval. Mgr, Team	Virtual	BT, CA, FG
4.6	Karin Höök	Ex. EOA officer/SSNC	Phone and email	BT
9.6	Bo travels to Dar es Salaam			BT
10.6	Moses O. Aisu	Programs Director/ AfrOnet	Personal	BT, CA
10.6	Jane Albert Marwa	Marketing Officer/TOAM	Personal	BT, CA
10.6	Grace Kabate	Sen. Dev. Pl. Liaison Off. /Sugar Board of TZ. Ex. MoA Desk for Org. Prod/MoA	Personal	BT, CA
10.6	Food Lovers Market Outlet Organic Products corner and EAOM	Health and Organic Products Outlet, Dar Es Salaam	Personal Observation	CA
11.6	Bo travels to Nairobi			BT
11.6	Documents review			FG
11.6	Eustace Kiarii	CEO, KOAN	Personal	BT, FG
11.6	Jack J. Muga	OTEA National Coordinator- Kenya/KOAN	Personal	BT, FG
11.6	Samuel Ndungu	Programmes manager/KOAN	Personal	BT, FG
11.6	Lydia Jacob	Chairperson, Upendo PGS, Kisarawe Coast Region	Personal	CA
11.6	Elieza Chieza	Owner, Mark Organic shop, Oyster bay Dar Es Salaam	Phone	CA
11.6	Latifa Mafumbi	Quality Controller, Organic Fertilizer Guavay Company, Dar Es Salaam	Phone	CA
11.6	Beatus Malema	Assistant Director Crop Development, Ministry of Agriculture	Personal	CA
12.6	Teresia Ndirangu	KOAN Consultant	Personal	BT, FG
12.6	Charles Micheni Emily Micheni Zaina Musyoka Ephantus Nthuri Keziah Kageni	Mukika PGS, Tharaka Nithi County (Poultry); leaders and members	Personal	BT, FG
12.6	John Gitonga Nkabuni	Chairman/Bairunyi Honey, Tharaka Nithi District	Personal	BT, FG
12.6	Frank Kimario Steven Rusimbi	Marketing Facilitator- SAT Programme Manager-SAT	Personal Personal	CA
13.6	Florence travels to Kisumu and Homa Bay Bo travels to Kigali			FG BT
13.6	Daniel Wambua	Programme Officer -CREP, Awasi, Kisumu	Personal	FG
13.6	Charles Ouma, Lilian Awour, Joy Odhiambo, Robert Okello, Pamela Akinyi, Kenneth Ojwang	Kamicha Kabondo PGS, Kisumu County (Cassava); leaders and members	Personal	FG
13.6	Thadei Dulle	Mahenge-Caritas	Phone	CA
13.6	Burhan I. Mgambo	Kinole	Phone	CA
14.6	Margaret Ogembo	Coordinator ROFA	Personal	FG
14.6	Boaz Nyateng Walter Rajoro Nerea Oloo Rose Aloo	ROFA PGS, Homabay County (groundnuts & Cassava); leaders and members	Personal	FG

Date	Name	Position/Organisation	Means	Team member
14.6	Bakari Mongo	TOAM Programme Coordinator EOA-I	Personal	CA
	Mapambano Peter	Project Coordinator, Dodoma	Personal	
14.6	Lise Chantal Dusabe	CEO/ROAM	Personal	BT
14.6	John Berchimas Habumugitha	Training and Extension Officer/ROAM	Personal	BT
14.6	Gunilla Eitrem	Programme Officer/SSNC		BT
14.6	Florence travels to Nairobi			FG
15.6	Joan Nzuki	Leader & Member INNOGOF PGS, Nairobi	Personal	FG
	Catherine	County		
15.6	INNOGOF Organic Market, Garden Estate Nairobi	Farmers market	Personal observation	FG
15.6	BT travels to Nairobi, reading, writing			BT
16.6	Reading, writing, communication			BT
16.6	Casmir travels to Nairobi			CA
17.6	Mathias M. Wafula	Research/Extension Liaison Unit, Desk Office Organic Agr. MoA, Kenya	Personal	BT, CA, FG
17.6	Team coordination meeting, joint analysis			BT, CA, FG
17.6	Dr. David M. Amudavi	Executive Director Biovision Africa Trust & IFOAM World Board Member	Personal	BT, CA, FG
18.6	Analysis, writing, communication			CA
18.6	Peter Kaipei Melonyie	Chairman/Ngong Organic Farmers PGS	Personal	BT, FG
18.6	Susan Njoroge	A-CERT	Phone and email (no response)	FG
18.6	Silvester Gule	NESVAX	Phone and email (no response)	FG
18.6	Victor Mutuku	AFRICERT	Email	FG
18.6	Analysis, writing, communication			BT, FG
19.6	Team coordination meeting, joint analysis			BT, CA, FG
19.6	Conference attendance			BT, CA, FG
19.6	Discussion/debriefing meeting IFOAM, AfrOnet, KOAN, TOAM, BOAM, ROAM			BT, CA, FG
19.6	Louise Lutikholt	IFOAM Executive Director	Personal	
20.6	Adrien Sibomana	Chairman/BOAM	Personal	BT, FG
20.6	Simon Ndungu	Programmes manager/KOAN	Personal	FG
20.6	Analysis, writing, communication			CA
20.6	Conference attendance, informal meetings			BT, FG
20.6	Casmir travels to Dar			CA
21.6	Casmir travels to Morogoro			CA
21.6	Bo travels to Sweden			BT
20-22.6	Alastair Taylor	Consultant, Uganda	Email	BT
20-22.6	Prof. Charles Ssekyewa	Informant on Nogamu	Email	BT
20-22.6	Samuel Nyanzi	Nogamu chairman since 2019, March	Email	BT

Note: Numerous contacts with Sida, IFOAM and various contacts for follow up were not listed here. EAC was also contacted in several ways but the contacts yielded no response. Neither EAC or AU was represented during the conference. There was fairly continuous interaction through email with Barabara Zilly and Shaknoza Kurbanalieva and also many follow-up contacts with the individuals listed above.

Annex 5 Checklist used to guide interviews

About checklists

These checklists are not expected to be used as questionnaires type one question – one answer- but as support for memory to remember important aspects to be discussed. All issues may not be discussed with all respondents, but tailored to match time available and such that in the end, all important questions have been discussed to some extent.

Checklist for farmers, processors, traders and other value chain actors

- Commodity and its importance in a local context (main occupation, side income, gender roles etc)
- Is the produce certified? How? Since when? How did the certification come about?
- If produce is certified, does it yield a premium price? At what levels along the value chain?
- If there is premium price, who benefits most? Producers, traders, wholesalers, men, women, old, youth?
- In relation to the community at large, who is engaging in this? Disadvantaged groups? Or the relatively advanced households in terms of knowledge? Or advanced households in terms of wealth?
- Which inputs are needed for organic production? More or less compared to conventional agriculture?
- Problems encountered? Costs for certification? Cross subsidization at farm enterprise for costs of certification? Technical problems? Marketing problems? Too laborious in relation to labour availability?
- Productivity of organic production as compared to conventional? Output in relation to labour input? Output in terms of yield per hectare?
- In relation to community at large how is access to land by disadvantage groups – youth, gender? Which proportion of it under conventional compared to organic?
- Apart from possibly a premium price, what is the economy like? Do lower costs for inputs make the production more worthwhile than conventional production?
- Additional benefits (social(environmental) for engaging in organic production/processing/trading?
- Which factors will make them continue or discontinue?
- Control systems (internal and external)
- How dealing with the risks associated with neighbouring conventional farmers?
- If the produce is not certified, are there plans for certification? Timelines?

- Obstacles for certification? Can anybody manage to engage and get certified?
- What role is the government playing for certified production/processing/trading, if any? Engagement of the extension/marketing services? Are policies conducive and supportive or causing trouble?
- Who are the consumers of the produce? Where sold? Local market, nearby town, major city, capital city, export within EA, export to other markets? Sales arrangements (adhoc or formal contracts?)
- Trends? Expanding or shrinking business? Why?
- How much do they know various agencies, including KOAN/TOAM respectively?
- Any benefits from KOAN/TOAM?
- Did they participate in project activity? If not who provided technical support?
- Do they know OTEA?
- Do they know EOA Initiative?
- If they know, which one was more visible at their level? Participated in activity? Quality?
- Do they feel that they can influence the system for certification and the value chain generally? Who decides? Disaggregate community, women, men, youth, elderly, little land, more land?

Checklist for officials within project partner organisations

- OTEA organisation: Role of IFOAM and AfrOnet respectively?
- AfrOnet is expected to provide project services. Have they done that? How, what kinds?
- AfrOnet is also expected to coordinate the partners of OTEA. Have they done that? How? Is the project organisation allowing AfrOnet to assume such role?
- Has resources (physical, financial, human and virtual/intangible) availed been adequate commensurate to the role?
- Perception of AfrOnet strength? Could they do what IFOAM has done?
- Are the Project component “Convenors” known? (Ref. page 5-6 in the Inception report)
- AfrOnet being convener for Component C; does it mean it has nothing much to do with other Components? What does that actually imply?
- Were there organisational assessments carried out at NOAMs and AfrOnet levels? When, By who? Did they generate changes? Was there follow up? If so, when, and documentation on that? Can we get a copy as an example of assessment as well as follow up?
- Issues in Nogamu and ROAM: Could they have been prevented or at least mitigated? Were there sufficient checks and balances in the Governance structures?

- Does KOAN, ROAM and TOAM generate own revenue in some way? How? Would they survive without donor support?
- What would be the avenues towards their guaranteed institutional survivals without donors?
- How do they assess the policy environment? National including prospects for transport and trade within country; EAC, AU levels? Positive or negative developments? Trade and Non-trade barriers
- Did AfrOnet proactively engage with initiatives (national, regional/EA/AU) engaged in policy influencing? If they did were such collaborations useful/impactful? If did not engage in any policy influencing initiative, why?
- Did KOAN/TOAM proactively engage with initiatives (national, regional/EA/AU) engaged in policy influencing? If they did were such collaborations useful/impactful? If did not engage in any policy influencing initiative, why?
- Was there a EA regional coordinate lobbying and advocacy? What was the outcome?
- Did KOAN/TOAM engage with KEBS/TBS on adoption of EAOPS and harmonization? What were the outcomes?
- During OTEA were there policy briefs? On what? Disseminated to who or which institutions? What were the outcomes?
- Collaboration/engagement with the extension services?
- How do they assess organic production value chains in terms of targeting disadvantaged groups? Looking at producers, processors, traders, consumers? Examples?
- Were there any analyses in that respect to ensure that project resources are directed to address poverty?
- Is organic production a good path towards poverty alleviation? How? Scale? Constraints? Any case studies?
- Gender mainstreaming: Statistics on gender ratio in OTEA activity? Were there any target group analyses of value chains to design specific actions for solving specific problems?
- Environmental impact: Positive/Negative environmental impacts of organic production
- Which are the lasting impacts of the earlier OSEA I and II. Any results that have merged now but not before?
- Assessment of the future: African agricultural producers will have to produce enough food for the rapidly growing urban populations without any significant increase of rural populations and without much prospects for area expansion. Role of organic production to meet this challenge?
- Increased demand? Consumer awareness? versus the narrative that “organic is expensive?

- Ecological Organic Agriculture Initiative (EOA) also provides similar support to the same organisations in Tz, Ken and Uga. Is there a clear distinction between the two? Which one has been more effective in relation to policy development? Mobilisation of EAC and AU levels?
- Was it rational and logical to have both OTEA and EOA? Double committees, reporting systems, etc.
- General assessment on “Value for Money” for the OTEA project

Checklist for government and other organisations

- Perception of AfrOnet strength? TOAM, ROAM, KOAN strength?
- Can certification systems in EA survive without donor support?
- Are there active local certification agencies? How are there strengths?
- What would be the avenues towards their guaranteed institutional survivals without donors?
- How do they assess the policy environment? National including prospects for transport and trade within country; EAC, AU levels? Positive or negative developments? Has there been space for OA in national policy? What was the rationale in the national policy?
- Collaboration/engagement with the extension services?
- How do they assess organic production value chains in terms of targeting disadvantaged groups? Looking at producers, processors, traders, consumers? Examples?
- Is organic production a good path towards poverty alleviation? How? Constraints?
- Assessment of the future: African agricultural producers will have to produce enough food for the rapidly growing urban populations without any significant increase of rural populations and without much prospects for area expansion. Role of organic production to meet this challenge?
- Ecological Organic Agriculture Initiative (EOA) also provides similar support to the same organisations in Tz, Ken and Uga. Is there a clear distinction between the two? Which one has been more effective in relation to policy development? Mobilisation of EAC and AU levels?
- Was it rational and logical to have both OTEA and EOA?

Annex 6 Summarised Country Reports

BURUNDI

Key baseline information 2014

BOAM was created in 2011 by farmers and some exporters. By 2014 it remained a small organisation facing challenges, including the language barrier. Learning about how BOAM was to operate was difficult, partly because information available mainly in English. There was only a small booklet in Kirundi. One PGS group existed in 2014 but not certified for EAOM.

There was only one employee, the office manager working in an office comprising only one room downtown Bujumbura. Others served on voluntary bases. By 2014, no Certification Bodies for third party certification operated in Burundi, but a Burundi Bureau of Standards operated and used to work on behalf of EcoCert Madagascar Office for certification with acceptance on international markets.

Inputs

IFOAM has reported the following expenditure for BOAM:

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Euro	42,969	59,541	74,684	39,681	10,319 (to be reported)

In addition, BOAM has benefitted from a range of training and networking activities.

Activities, outputs and outcomes 2015-2019

The following is mostly extracted from the key highlights provided in the OTEA Annual reports with supplementary information from the Chairman, Mr. Adrien Sibomana. Overall reflections by the Chairman captured during Team's interview are highlighted under Key outcomes/achievements/set backs at the end of the country summary report.

Component A: A well-functioning OGS, increased consumer awareness, demand for labelled products

General

- The Certification Bodies in Uganda were also operating in Burundi, but lost strength, e.g. Ugocert. Efforts are made now to revive it. International CBs compete with Ugocert.
- There are now about 20 PGS groups comprising 5,800 farmers. Some of these are ready for certification and use of the EAOM Kilimohai.

2016

- BOAM participated in OGS training in Tanzania. As follow up in Burundi BOAM organized an OGS workshop where 9 partners from Agriculture Research Centre (ISABU), Private extension service provider (INADES), GIZ and input supplier companies have participated.

- In Burundi, a team of qualified certifiers is in place and has initiated collaboration with UGOCERT. 12 lead farmers of Kayanza (North of Burundi) were trained in OA and standards and are ready to use EAOPS.
- BOAM attended BIOFACH in February and gained new partners (input suppliers, certifiers, processors, searchers, etc.); 15 farmers have attended the Christmas Exhibition and Sale on December 23rd, 2016.
- In Burundi the PGS manual has been written in Kirundi and used to train and approve one PGS group in Makamba Province (South of Burundi) and others are in progress.

2017

- A workshop was organized to inform policy and decision makers and to raise their interest in OGS as a means to increase consumers trust and demand of organic products. Participants were members of Parliament, Government and Research Centre. 20 lead farmers have also been trained in standards and are now familiar with the EAOPS and the different ways of getting certification (PGS or ICS).
- The Burundi Bureau of Standards (BBN) has been trained with the purpose to raise interest and influence to take up certification activities. But because of lack of leadership within the BBN, there is no concrete measurements taken.
- One organic shop has started in Northern Bujumbura (Mutanga Nord) and is linked to farmers. Three hotels (Royal Palace Hotel, Garden Hotel and Hôtel Club du Lac Tanganyika), two restaurants (La Détente and Chez Gérard) and one supermarket are connected to producers. One organic restaurant has open in Bujumbura Downtown (Boulevard de l'UPRONA); BOAM has also contributed to EAOM procedures development during NOAMs joint meetings, particularly during JMC meetings.
- A debate (panel) has been organized at Zion Beach and broadcasted by the National Radio & TV (RTNB) and other private radios, organic products were exhibited for sale and organic food and beverages were sold. folkloric groups played music and danced. This activity was combined with our stakeholder's activities (organic farmers, a processor named ACECI who is working closely with BOAM). It was a successful evening with around sixty people attending.
- An exhibition was held on the days preceding a long weekend just before the beginning of the New Year 2018. The exhibitors have underestimated the market and they could not satisfy the demand. There are still demands for information about the products and the exhibitors. Twelve exhibitors (among them two processors) from ten provinces participated in the exhibition with various products (fruits & vegetables, soy beans processed products, neem plants, cosmetics, etc.). The exhibition got more than 500 visitors during two days.

2018

- In Burundi, there are no local CBs and BOAM relies on foreign partners for export crops like coffee, tea. In 2018 BOAM facilitated capacity building of 10 local inspectors to assist international certification.
- BOAM: Promotion materials for local awareness raising are produced: 50 T-Shirts, 500 BOAM brochures and 50 PGS books. They are mainly used in PGS trainings, annual Christmas exhibition as well as at farmers markets. BOAM also started promoting the farmers market to boost the local awareness after TOAM provided the expertise in conducting farmers market in 2017.

Component B: Increased capacity of local producers

General

- Farmer training has been organised through 23 lead farmers who were trained and are then training others. Each lead farmers comes from one of the 23 farmer groups that constitute the organisational base. If no project funds are available people have to volunteer.
- Examples of value chains: Organic coffee (including washing stations), tomatoes, pineapple, banana, cassava, soy beans. By 2018, five PGS are operational and 15 are under development.

2015

- BOAM conducted training for 1 PGS group in Makamba Province
- The selected value chain in Burundi is also coffee – having the two smaller countries in the group focusing on the same value chain has clear advantages. “Café Nkoronko” (Karuzi Province) and Ubwiza n’ikawa (Kayanza Province) Cooperatives have been selected and are ready to start the certification process.

2016

- Burundi worked with 3 coffee cooperatives (SCERT Kiyago in Muramvya, Nkoronko in Karuzi and Karemera Village Association in Muyinga) that are all involved in ICS certification. The certification is too expensive for the smallholder farmers and BOAM seeks for alternative solution such as finding a buyer to pay for the certification. 4 producers from Makamba (South), Bubanza and Cibitoke (East) have been involved in organic tomato production through the linkages that BOAM established. It is a main challenge to find the right balance between support to farmers in order to increase volumes and have sufficient market linkages.
- BOAM has translated the PGS manual in Kirundi and established and trained 3 new PGS groups. They conducted a market assessment and have set up an information system between producers and buyers. One producer has started to supply to the Royal Palace Hotel and Bon Prix Supermarket.

2017

- Burundi worked with 3 coffee cooperatives (SCERT Kiyago in Muramvya, Nkoronko in Karuzi and Karemera Village Association in Muyinga) that are all involved in ICS certification. The certification is too expensive for the smallholder farmers and BOAM decided to increase production in order to cover with the production costs.
- BOAM trained 3 PGS groups in 5 regions, North, South, East and Western Burundi. The groups are becoming stronger and attracting religious and political authorities in their committees. The local market linkages started.

2018

- BOAM focused mainly on production to reach the break-even point of the non-PGS value chains. Non-PGS value chains are coffee cooperatives in Burundi. In 2018 BOAM conducted a comparative analysis between soybeans and tomato that can grow together with coffee plants. Farmers usually grow crops for cash purpose as well as for self-consumption.

Component C: Conducive Government policies, strategies, plans

General

- BOAM could link up with the highest levels; Minister, Agricultural commission, MPs. Sent a Regional Director of Institute for Agricultural Research to the meeting in Senegal. High level ready for policy work based on geographical zones.

2015

- Policy Development: Under this component, we were able to work closely with MINAGRI team in organic policy formulation, and shared the needed information and experiences, especially on the similar policies done within EAC. They were linked with IFOAM staff in this regard.
- National Action Plan: The national Organic Action Plan was updated during a workshop. It still waits for the policy as the Government currently allocates money on policy-based activities only.
- A Burundi Government Representative, Mr Diomède Ndayirukiye, attends the Lagos (Nigeria) AOC.

2016

- In Burundi, BOAM conducted a workshop about the importance of a national policy in organic agriculture. Among others, 2 Members of Parliament and 5 advisers from the Ministries of Agriculture and Environment attended the workshop.
- BOAM has organized a field visit for officials to the East of the country and to BOAM exhibition and sale. Journalists have reported about these events. A retreat of the BOAM Executive Committee has been organized in order to collect necessary tools to be used in writing up a strategic plan for the coming years.

2017

- BOAM facilitated the visit of the Burundi Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Adviser to an Arusha Policy Symposium. He delivered a speech on how Burundi Government is involved in Organic Agriculture. BOAM also follows the strategy to implant organic activities with local governments and to convince the central government to develop an organic policy. The local administration in Bujumbura and Cibitoke decided to convert production of fruits and vegetables into organic wherever possible. Meetings with members of the Parliament had been organized too.

2018

- The government in Burundi is also interested in organic but still has some reservations to convert into organic due to lower production/yields in the first years. BOAM focused on production figures through comparative analysis and providing organic agriculture trainings to stakeholders.

Component D: NOAM and AfrOnet strengthening

General

- The labour laws in Burundi are strict and hinders employment in situations where long-term funding can not be certain. This means, for example, that BOAM cannot hire staff and expand when there is temporary project funding. A result is that BOAM was criticised during the organisational “7S” assessment for not having accountant and CEO on the payroll. BOAMS situation is not quite similar to the other NOAMs. On the other hand, the Burundi Government has good information and monitoring of CSOs. Office bearers are directly responsible to the Minister. There is also a control team elected by the members.
- OTEA contributed to networking within Burundi, e.g. with Pelum. Learnt a lot.
- Support to work with BOAM’s strategic plan was valuable.

2015

- BOAM was supported with selected infrastructure and office equipment, as well as office rental costs.

2016

- Tools for BOAM’s strategic plan have been collected.

2017

- BOAM could engage new development partners in promoting the organic agriculture in Burundi (GIZ, FAO) but has not entered into any project arrangements. BOAM sustainability still depends on its membership sustainability.

Component E: Availability of data and statistics

General

- The Chairman noted that BOAM has realised the value of data and statistics, but it is still hard to find accurate data. BOAM has supplied data to IFOAM, but noted that IFOAM has other data from unknown sources, deemed to be less accurate.
- Export data is possible to get for produce shipped by air, but not very possible yet for produce sent by road. But there is, for example trade in shea butter and chia seed from Uganda to Burundi and spices from Tanzania to Burundi. But no data collection.
- 11 people were trained in data collection. A challenge to data collection is that the Burundi culture is secretive and in particular businesses don’t want outsiders to know business details.
- There is cooperation with Burundi Institute of Statistics (ISTEEBU). It is ready to publish if adequate information is available, but so far there is no disaggregation between organic produce and other produce. Information remains scattered with exporters, BOAM and airport handling authority having uncoordinated shares of information.

2016

- BOAM collected basic data in Semester 1 & 2 of 2016. ISTEEBU (Burundi Statistics Institute) has been contacted for treatment and dissemination in 2017.
- BOAM produced a video about Organic Agriculture in the local language to raise awareness among the population.

Key outcomes/achievements/setbacks

Key achievements:

- Organisational development and networking:
 - The Chairman emphasised the benefits BOAM has reaped from being in contact with other similar organisations and not least the exposure to East Africa and to the English language.
 - The organisational assessment 7s was good but some recommendations were not feasible for BOAM to implement due to the strict labour laws in Burundi.
 - Material support; projector, computer.
 - Training on Microsoft Project Management and software purchased and installed.
 - Enhanced capability to support various value chains, including organisation of farmer markets to promote trade.
 - Valuable training offered to farmers.
- Key setbacks:
 - Policy makers not immediately convinced, but public opinion now pushing them.
 - Poor match between production and market. Consumers will be disappointed if they do not find the produce they expect.
 - Disincentives, like fertiliser subsidy.
 - AfrOnet had a slow start and the OTEA project was not well designed for their inclusion. Sometimes not clear what to expect from AfrOnet or from IFOAM.

KENYA

Key baseline information 2014

KOAN was established in 2004 by organic stakeholders to provide a platform to coordinate policy, marketing, and standards issues within the organic agriculture sub-sector in Kenya. Over the years KOAN, has worked closely with the public and private sectors, and development partners in advancing the organic agriculture agenda in the country. Prior to involvement in the OTEA project, KOAN participated in the implementation of OSEA I and II in 2005-2007, and 2010-2013 respectively.

At the closure of OSEA II;

- The PGS had been implemented among four (4) groups comprising of 306 farmers (183 female and 123 male). Additionally, 7(4 male and 3 female) inspectors and certification staff had been trained under the program.
- A Working draft policy on Organic Agriculture had been developed and submitted to policy makers in the Ministry of Agriculture and relevant sector ministries for comments and inputs.
- KOAN had adequate technical staff specialized in various aspects of organic agriculture to plan, implement and monitor project activities. However, the organizations monitoring systems needed to be strengthened

Inputs

IFOAM has reported the following expenditure for KOAN:

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Total
Euro	40,576	52,624	104,196	26,373	23,561 (to be reported)	247,330

KOAN has reported the following disbursements from the OTEA project

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Total
Euro	45,000	74,396	92,252	50,313	-	261,960.50

KOAN Activities, outputs and outcomes 2015-2019

Component A: A well-functioning OGS, increased consumer awareness, demand for labelled products

a.1: OGS in the region sustainably managed

- A training concept was developed in 2015, and eight (8) participants (2-KOAN, 1- University, 2- Government agency, and 3-CBs) nominated for training. In 2016: The plans to establish a JMC reached an advanced stage; Seven participants (2- KOAN, 1-KEBS, 1-KEPHIS, 1- Africert, 1- ACERT and 1- NESVAX CONTROL) undertook a 2-days training on OGS issues.
- In 2017: The JMC secretariat became fully operational and developed a sustainability plan and 2018 workplan focusing on alternative accreditation model/System (AAM/S); KOAN facilitated a three-day training for inspectors from different operators to enhance their capacity on organic standards and compliance requirements. Staff from KOAN and collaborating partners were further trained on GMOs and expansion of the organic sector through multiple options for guarantee systems by IFOAM.
- In 2018, the regional workshop was conducted by KOAN where needs and challenges of all stakeholders (CBs, operators and NOAMs) were discussed.

a.2: Efficient and Sustainable Certification bodies:

- In 2015, KOAN Identified 11 operators and 2 Certification Bodies for support under the scheme.
- In 2016, NESVAX Control and ACERT submitted their proposal for review and consideration for capacity building. Consequently, NESVAX reviewed their sustainability plan.
- In 2017, under the guidance of JMC, an alternative accreditation model/system (AAM/S) for oversight and approval of third-party certification bodies (CBs) was developed. This was aimed at addressing the CBs concerns on the failure of the local markets' requirement for accreditation. A joint meeting with KOAN and Five CBs (Africert, Control Union, ACERT, NESVAX Control and ENcert (3 in attendance and 2 apologies) affirmed CBs willingness to participate in the AAM/S.
- In 2018, Africert sought accreditation with EU and USDA for their respective organic regulation. The process was however slowed down to allow for the EU regulations review that were ongoing then. At the time of the evaluation, AfriCert had just undergone the Organic accreditation assessment and was awaiting the outcome.

B.

a.3: Increased recognition of the EAOPS:

- In 2015, KOAN partnered with Control Union, a CB that was interested in EAOPS certification for the UAE' s market. The CB proposed the creation of another version of the *kilimohai* mark (*kilimohai Gold*) for their target market. JMC however rejected the proposal due to legal and technical implications.
- KOAN's participated in the revision of the EAOPS in Kampala Uganda in 2017, where aspects on aquaculture, social issues and child labour were incorporated. The revisions to the EAOPS were adopted in by the EAC in 2018.

a.4: Increased credibility and use of the EAOM:

- The EAOM was promoted in various ways during the 2015 project year; 100,000 stickers were printed for use by SMEs; *Kilimohai* branding of shirts/blouses for KOAN staff; Sub-licensing of A-Cert Ltd to use the *Kilimohai* mark; KOAN Facebook page and two print media.
- In 2016, Three medium scale operators (Winnie Pure Health, Kalonzoni Organics, and Chia organics) applied for the licence to use the EAOM; Banners with the 'Kilimohai' mark were developed for use in four existing farmers markets and in the Nairobi International Trade Fair booth; 40,000 '*Kilimohai*' stickers were produced for promotion of the mark; *Kilimohai*-branded tablecloths, price boards, tags, and aprons were produced for the American Embassy farmers market.
- In 2017 KOAN supported the four farmers markets and the International fair booth with promotion materials. *Kilimohai* mark was also promoted through KOANs participation in the World Environment day celebrations at Egerton University. Social media (facebook) was greatly used in promotion of the mark.
- In 2018 two field days were held in Kirinyaga and Taita Taveta Counties respectively Kirinyaga expressed interest in developing partnership with KOAN on its Green Policy. Taita Taveta expressed willingness to promote organic farming option among its population. Consequently, two banners, 700 brochures and 20,000 *kilimohai* stickers were produced for two farmers markets. A consumer survey conducted in 2017/8 on 211 respondents showed the following understanding of organic food: Natural foods (29%), Herbal foods (1%) Foods grown with manure (9%), Foods without chemicals (17%),Foods not sprayed with pesticides

(0%), Traditional/indigenous foods (6%), Healthy/nutritious foods (1%). Don't know /not sure/others (37%). The percentage of respondents who had never consumed/considered consuming organic food was 15% in 2018 compared to 32% in 2013.

a.5: Well-functioning PGS in the region:

- In 2015, KOAN worked with nine PGS nationally. Workshops were organized with three groups and follow-up done with three others. Three groups (Ruma Organic Farmers Association, Kamicha Kabondo, and Mukika) were trained and PGS set up, with approvals targeted for 2016; One national PGS workshop was organized with the 9 PGS groups (existing and emerging), and two organic traders in attendance. A national PGS platform with regional representation was formed.
- In 2016, three KOAN staff participated in a two-day PGS workshop in which the PGS policy and approval procedures were reviewed and amended. Five PGS groups (Malando, Mukika, Kamicha Kabondo, INNOGOF and Gacavari) underwent trainings and follow ups. Of these, 3 groups (Mukika, Kamicha Kabondo, INNOGOF) were assessed and consequently approved.
- Training, coaching, and assessment of PGS groups continued through 2017. Three groups were presented to JMC for approval. Two new groups were also trained through KOANs collaboration with RODI Kenya (NGO), and Sagana Fresh Producers Association.
- In 2018, KOAN had 21 PGS groups with some fully operational and others still under development. (See the table below)

Name of the group	No of Member			County	Land size (Acres)	Main Product	Status
	male	Female	Total				
Langa Women Organic Self-Help Group	3	13	16	Nakuru	30	Fresh Vegetables	Ongoing Development
Yasofman	9	14	23	Machakos	69	Fruits	Ongoing Development
Kamicha -Kobondo	12	13	25	Kisumu	53	Cassava	Approved
Malando			349	Nakuru	1745	Honey	Ongoing Development
Maisha Bora Organic	7	8	15	Muranga	23	Chamomile, honey, vegetables	Ongoing Development
Ruma Organic Farmers Association	17	13	30	Homabay	150	Peanut Butternut, grain Amaranth	Approved
Mukika	7	25	32	Tharaka Nithi	65	Chicken	Approved
Gacavari	18		18	Embu	15	Chicken	Ongoing Development
Yetana W.G	5	22	27	Bungoma	33	Banana, butter nut	Approved
Ngong Organic Farmers Association			46	Kajiado	90	Fresh Vegetable	Approved
Maria Clara	44	54	98	Nakuru	146	Dairy	Ongoing Development
Kanyodero	14	32	46	Migori	50	Peanut butter	Ongoing Development
INNOGOF	4	14	18	Nairobi	22	Horticulture/ herbs/	Approved
Kirinyaga PGS Groups	50	40	90	Kirinyaga	135	Sweet potatoes, Yams, fruits	Ongoing Development
Baraka PGS Groups	56	41	97	Baringo	180	Honey	Ongoing Development
Isembe FAT	12	28	40	Kakamega	80	Indigenous vegetables	Ongoing Development
Oron CBO				Baringo		Honey	Ongoing Development
Mbanga PGS			191		190	Mixed vegetables	Ongoing Development
Ololo PGS Group	8	18	26	Kajiado	104	Mixed vegetables, poultry and bee keeping	Ongoing Development

Sofa Group	11	19	30	Machakos	90	Fruits (Mango, pawpaw, passion)	Ongoing Development
Thogoto Organic Group	9	7	16	Kiambu	12	Vegetables (lettuce)	Ongoing Development
Total			1233		3282		

Component B: Increased capacity of local producers

b.1.1: Increased organic trade in local and regional markets

- By 2018, KOAN was working directly with four farmers market in Nairobi, two weekly and two monthly markets. Organic outlets such as Bridges restaurant also plays a key role in provision of market for organic farmers locally.

b.1.2: Non - PGS 5 value chains are functional at the end of the project

- Support for organic honey value chain under the OTEA framework was agreed on in 2015 based on the value chain's economic and community empowerment feasibility, and opportunity for synergy building among partners.
- In 2016, Sesame and macadamia were identified as other non-PGS value chains. Key activities in 2016 included; Engagement of KATE Organics (a private sector player) for marketing organic honey and other organic products. Training of 27 ToTs on organic certification process; Risk assessment and ICS training the Busia Oil Crops Farmers' Cooperative (500 farmers); ICS Training for lead farmers and project staff.
- Main activities in 2017 included internal inspectors training, cluster farmers training, follow up on documentation and facilitation of external inspection. External inspection of the Sesame value chain saw about 352 farmers approved as organic producers and first organic sesame certification issued by ECOCERT.
- In 2018, New Bairunyi beekeepers' group was inspected and certified by A-CERT for Honey and wax.

Component C: Policy

c.1: National policies /strategies and EAC and AU policymakers support OA

- Review of the organic policy draft was conducted during a one-day national steering committee workshop in 2015. In the same year, a harmonization meeting involving the national steering committee was conducted after the OAC meeting in Nigeria. An Assistant Director of Agriculture had been facilitated to participate in the AOC conference. At the local level, contact with Laikipia county (one of the counties spearheading organic agriculture) was made.
- In 2016, KOAN played a key role in lobbying the relevant stakeholders and providing information in the areas of certification and marketing in the draft organic policy. KOAN further identified capacity building of counties' extension officers as a crucial intervention point.
- KOAN in partnership with Biovision offered a one-week organic agriculture training for 38 extension workers from 8 counties (Bungoma, Busia, West Pokot, Kakamega, Vihiga, Makueni, Nairobi and Kirinyaga).
- In 2017; KOAN in collaboration with MoA organized a three-days' workshop to review the organic policy draft which would then be presented to the cabinet secretary; Two policy makers participated in the East Africa Policy Symposium in Arusha, and another two in BIOFACH; KOAN participated in a one-day awareness creation on organic agriculture policy among the political class.
- By 2018, the draft policy had been submitted to the MoA and seven Kenyan counties already introducing organic policy in their county developments plans.

Component D: NOAM and AfrOnet strengthening

- In 2015; KOAN was tasked with the lead role in supporting the establishment of a permanent EAOM secretariat following the JMC meeting in Lagos which agreed that an office should be established in Nairobi.
- In 2016: KOAN was confirmed as the host of the JMC secretariat in 2016, and tasked with development of JMC's sustainability plan; Three Kenyan received training on organic leadership facilitated by IFOAM; KOAN commenced the process of development a strategic plan.
- In 2017, the sustainability blue print for EAOM secretariat was developed and endorsed. Seed funding to start-off the activities was provided through OTEA. Review of KOAN strategic plan was also done during the period.

Component E: Availability of data and statistics

- KOAN was involved in basic data collection, and compilation in 2015. A data collection tool was developed.
- In 2016; a regional data-training workshop was held in Nairobi with KOAN working on the training logistics in collaboration with AFRONET and NOGAMU. A data collection tool was developed in this training. KOAN also mapped out local operators (exporters, retailers, importers, PGS groups, processors, non-certified organic producers, third party certified producer groups, medium scale farms and large-scale farms). National organic data were collected and shared with FIBL for the annual global organic status. The organic statistics were further shared with local media through a dissemination workshop
- In 2017; The data collection tool developed in 2015 was reviewed and basic data collected and reviewed; Two documentaries on achievements and challenges of organic of organic sector in Kenya were produced also produced.
- In 2018, data was collected and shared with FIBL. A consumer awareness survey was also carried out

Key outcomes/achievements/set backs

- EAOPS is well recognized in Kenya, with the original version (KS EAC 456:2007, Organic Products Specification) easily accessible on KEBS online catalogue. The revised version (2018) is however not available on the catalogue.
- The CBs operating in Kenya are well established with most of them involved in other third-party certification.
- Functional organic farmers markets have been established within Nairobi with the participating farmers receiving premium prices for their produce. However, with the markets running either weekly or fortnightly, only small volumes of produce is moved through this channel. The bulk of the produce retails in normal local markets at the same prices with conventional products.
- Five out of the 21 groups received PGS approval and EAOPS certification during the project period. However, most of the approvals have since expired (Kamicha Kabondo, INNOGOF, Ngong Organic Farmers, ROFA, and Mukika). Farmers cited the following factors as the main reasons for non-renewal of the PGS approvals and EAOPS certification

C.

- Local markets do not require any formal certification
- The groups have built trust with their buyers and as such do not require any formal evidence (in terms of certificates).e.g Mukika and Kamicha Kabondo.

- Majority of the farmers are not getting premium prices for their products (apart from those selling in the established organic markets (INNOGOF), and those with a niche market (Kamicha Kabondo's production of Cassava seed/cuttings).
- The approval and certification process are relatively expensive; Farmer groups reported that they have to meet the costs of training (where private consultants are involved), and inspection (facilitation of inspectors from other groups/own groups).
- Duration of a license agreement is supposed to be three years but was found to be less than that in some groups visited in Kenya.
- Two Non-PGS value chains (Honey and Sesame) received third party organic certification, facilitated by OTEA. High costs of maintaining the certification (yearly renewal of the organic certificate, annual KEBS charges, Barcode charges, and other forms of taxation) remain a key challenge among producers.
- Questions as to whether the functionality of the PGS groups could be fully attributed to OTEA could be raised. This follows the involvement of PELUM Kenya in facilitating KOAN and other member organizations in enabling four groups (Kamicha Kabondo, Mukika, Malando, and Gacavari) to undertake pilot PGS certification processes. (PELUM 2015).
- Regional trade of organic products is mainly evidenced by the presence of organic products (from the neighbouring countries) in some supermarkets in the country.
- The process of developing a national organic policy in Kenya has enjoyed goodwill from the relevant departments. The bill on the draft policy has however failed to attract much attention in parliament. With these delays and the country focus on harmonizing the existing policies, the organic desk officer at the national level has embarked on spearheading a campaign to mainstream organic agriculture in all relevant sectoral documents. Capacity of MoA offices in handling organic agriculture is however limited.

References

- Consumer Survey of Attitudes and Preferences Towards Organic Products in East Africa, commissioned by IFOAM, 2018
- OTEA – KOAN Annual reports; 2015, 2016, and 2017
- PELUM Kenya Annual report (2015)
- IFOAM – OTEA project reports (2015-2018)
- An Evaluation of Sida-Funded Project on Regional Cooperation for Organic Standards and Certification Capacity in East Africa – “OSEA phase II” (2010-2013)
- Personal communication

RWANDA

Key baseline information 2014

The PGS had not been introduced to Rwanda. Kilimohai certification was also not used or known in the country. Certification systems of the EU and US had been introduced for certification of certain processed commodities for the export market.

Data on production and trade of organic products rested only with the industrial sector.

As ROAM had experienced a leadership crises in 2014, ROAM had not been effective in advocacy and The Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources had no trust in ROAM and the organic agriculture it was promoting.

ROAM had been formed but had institutional weaknesses.

Inputs

IFOAM has reported the following expenditure for ROAM:

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019 (to be reported)
Euro	38,635	52,293	45,152	9,699	148

For reasons elaborated below ROAM has currently only in-house information on the last instalment of about 10,000 Euro, which occurred by the end of December 2018. These funds were used during the first months of 2019 with monthly reporting of expenditure.

In addition, ROAM benefitted from training offered by AfrOnet and IFOAM, participated in Conferences (Zambia 2015 and Senegal 2018) and by visits of IFOAM and AfrOnet at times of institutional challenges. IFOAM has also come for the Steering Committee meetings and for training/monitoring visits during 2017, including some field visits.

Activities, outputs and outcomes 2015-2019

Component A: A well-functioning OGS, increased consumer awareness, demand for labelled products

The Kilimohai (EAOM) mark has not yet been introduced in Rwanda. Other certification systems are applied by some export-oriented industry, see below under Component C. The consumer survey indicated that some 60% of respondents did not know where to get organic products, while 40% said it can be sources from deep inside the rural areas.

There is some consumer distrust in e.g. Irish potatoes, tomatoes and local milk from unknown sources, implying scope for consumer interest if labelled and trusted products were available.

Certified coffee (same certification as for export) is sold in local supermarkets too.

PGS concept was introduced but not yet linked to certification or price premiums, details below.

Component B: Increased capacity of local producers

The emergence of all the 16 PGS groups can be attributed to OTEA. Details are as follows:

Location	PGS groups	Members	Number	Land size	Products/processing
	2 Tree tomatoes	Farmers	60	20ha	Producing ripe fruits

Northern Province	Passion fruits	Farmers	40	10ha	Producing ripe fruits
	Garlic	Farmers	20	6ha	Producing and selling dried bulbs
		Traders	15		Selling dried bulbs
Western Province	2 Passion fruits	Farmers	85	40ha	Producing ripe fruits
		Processors	1 company		Producing juice
	Pineapple	Farmers	60	55ha	Producing ripe fruits
	Coffee	Farmers	250	160ha	Producing the ripe berries
		Processors	2 Companies		Consumption coffee
	2 Carrot	Farmers	90	35ha	Producing carrots
Eastern province	Mango	Farmers	35	6ha	Producing ripe fruits
	Banana	Farmers	45	18ha	Producing ripe fruits
	Pineapple TUZAMURANE	Farmers	75	41ha	Producing ripe fruits
		Processors	1 company		Producing dried fruits
Southern province	Banana	Farmers	55	25ha	Producing ripe fruits
	Coffee NYAGAKECURU	Farmers	71	35ha	Production and processing
	Canna Edulis	Farmers	30	6ha	
		Processors	1 company		Producing powder
Total		Farmers	>900	>400 ha	
		Processors	5 companies		

Out of the 16 PGS groups, 14 are assessed to be functioning well. Challenges include that farmers are not used to group formation, not so skilled in finding market outlets, the absence of certification and thus of premium prices. Advantages are that groups are likely to be trustworthy, certification cheap when it will be initiated and there is likelihood of gaining consumer trust.

It can be noted that for several of the commodities the difference between organic and non-organic production is insignificant since some crops will be “organic by nature” (e.g. tree tomato, garlic, mango, *Canna edulis*).

Several PGS groups are reported to have been very profitable in spite of no price premium. The garlic farmers are marketing their produce also in Uganda and South Sudan, Tree tomatoes find their ways to Congo, dried pineapple has gone for export to Kenya and Europe and avocado oil and soap is also selling well.

Female engagement is noted as strong in tree tomato, Irish potato, pineapple, carrot and *Canna edulis*. In some case, PGS members have linked the activity to a merry-go-round type of savings scheme. Men have sharper control of traditional cash crops like coffee, tea, macadamia and garlic.

Criteria used for selection of priority value chains were (i) export potential, (ii) cash crop, and (iii) accessibility. The number of certified “organic” farmers linked to industry with internationally recognised certification schemes is still much higher than the numbers in the PGS. Details are as follows:

Crops	Companies	Number of farmers
Coffee	COOPAC Ltd	3,500
	MICOF-CYINGWA	1,426
	COOPAKAMA	600
	DUKUNDEKAWA	600
Pyrethrum	HORIZON-Sopyrwa	37,000 (to be verified)
Essential oils (Geranium, Partchuri, Eucalyptus)	Es-Soil Ltd	1 big farm
	IKIREZI	101
Macadamia	Tensenses	500
	Norpega Macadamia Rwanda	13
Tea	SORWATHE	43,690
	KITABI	302
	RUTSIRO	300
TOTAL FARMERS		Over 86,000 (to be verified)

The existence of these cannot, however be attributed to OTEA. ROAM has not engaged very much in supporting the industry as the industry has adequate resources by itself. ROAM has however had contacts for collection of statistical data.

Component C: Conducive Government policies, strategies, plans

A series of meetings with the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources (Rwanda Agricultural Board, RAB) and the National Agricultural Export Board, NAEB) during the first half of 2019 has reduced the earlier level of distrust and led to an MoU with the following key elements:

The specific objectives of this MoU are:

- 2.1. To increase, disseminate and apply scientific and indigenous knowledge on ecological organic agriculture in Rwanda.
- 2.2. To create awareness on the benefits of Ecological Organic Agriculture and strengthen its extension support system.
- 2.3. To stimulate the breeding and production of seeds and breeds that responds to the requirements for compliance with organic standards (East African organic products standard – EAS 456:2007, NOP, EU, JAS ...) and avail organic farm inputs (especially organic fertilizers and bio-pesticides) so that farmers can grow more production for targeted markets.
- 2.4. To develop sustainable organic markets to increase trade in Ecological Organic Agriculture (EOA) high value products at both at domestic and export levels.
- 2.5. To encourage value-value addition on EOA products to earn higher profits margins and provides employment from quality assurance, processing and packaging between production and the market.
- 2.6. To encourage consumer participation throughout the entire value-chain process.
- 2.7. To create a national platform to share experiences and success stories towards enhancing advancement of EOA in Rwanda.
- 2.8. To develop a joint plan to implement ecological organic agriculture alongside the current national agriculture policy, PSTA4 and Green Growth and Climate Resilience strategies towards the development of the organic sector in Rwanda.
- 2.9. To advocate and mobilize resources for strengthening capacities of producers' groups, trainers, processors, exporters ... towards compliance with organic certification requirements.

ROAM regards this MoU as a shift from negative attitude to tolerance, which is a step forward. Key policy documents (Draft National Agricultural Policy, Rwanda Green Growth Strategy and the Strategic Plan for Agricultural Transformation) do not explicitly promote organic agriculture, but emphasises strongly sustainable farming practices with important elements that are commonalities between organic farming and well-designed conventional farming. It seems therefore that there is common ground to build on further.

There is no policy on organic agriculture in place or being drafted.

Component D: NOAM and AfrOnet strengthening

ROAM's development during OTEA has been turbulent. A first case of mismanagement was revealed in October 2016, which led to the imprisonment of the by then CEO. The Vice CEO assumed responsibility, but issues of poor management persisted and the successor left ROAM and Rwanda by the end of 2017. The Sida support was temporarily suspended, but it appears that disbursements made could be accounted for. However, during and in the aftermath of the turbulent period all files with ROAM documentation disappeared. IFOAM and AfrOnet engaged in discussions with stakeholders before the ROAM AGM in May 2018. New leadership was then elected and the current CEO was recruited.

Since the new leadership became effective there was only a short period with funding being available (the last disbursement). Now, the six staff members all serve as unpaid volunteers. There were no funds for overheads, salaries or other staff benefits during 2019. Members have contributed jointly to the office rent amounting to about 500 US \$ equivalent per month.

A Biovision Africa Trust EOA team visited Rwanda Organic partners in August 2018 for a due diligence with a main aim to identify potential institutions that can take lead and support organic activities in Rwanda. Among institutions visited were University of Rwanda, College of Agriculture and Veterinary science (CAVS), Rwanda Organic Movement and Agropy among other organizations. Plans to visit PELUM Rwanda, Ministry of Agriculture, Rwanda Bureau of Standards among others did not materialize. Findings included:

- **Governance and Management:** ROAM needs to be very clear on the governance and management structures and their roles. The two should be distinct and yet complimentary. Both should be strong enough to undertake their mandate and contribute to the functionality and efficacy of ROAM as a lead organization of the organic sector in Rwanda.
- **Organizational Systems and Management tools:** The Organizational Systems (Admin & Finance, Procurement, HR, M&E etc.) are certainly not adequate. Internal Control System (ICS) with respect to Finance system needs to be set up. HR issues including job descriptions (JDs) of staff need to be established. ROAM could consider the minimum number of policies and operational procedures manuals that need to be in place, for example: a) Finance and Procurement, b) Administration and Human Resources, c) Governance and Management, d) Monitoring & Evaluation.
- **Project Records:** Going by the past experience, a clear monitoring, implementing, evaluation, reporting and learning system needs to be in place. We noted that there were no records/reports of previous reports. Neither were audit reports of the projects available. In the absence of such reports, it becomes very difficult to judge an organization's prudence in managing self and donor-funded projects.
- **Management staff:** Given the newness of the current management, it is important that the JDs of the staff are clearly marked. As well and equally important, there is need to have a record of how the staff were recruited, basis of their recruitment and appointment letters. This transparency is very critical to avoid similar problems to those experienced in the past.
- **Accountable leadership:** As currently constituted it's not clear who in ROAM finally and overall takes responsibility. There is no Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and a Chairperson cannot be officially considered to hold this position. This is why it is absolutely important that ROAM gets to appoint a CEO and such a person can be called any preferred title. For example, Country Coordinator, Director, Executive Director, etc as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). A clear JD for such a position should be prepared. In any organization the buck has to stop with such a person.
- **Programme Management:** It's not yet clear how ROAM's programs are to be managed. A write up on this is very important, and the sooner this will be elaborated the better. This will help us learn how EOA Initiative will be managed in Rwanda.
- **Audit of Financial Statements:** This is a very important undertaking that ROAM will need to undertake for its projects as well as organization (project and organizational audits). We understand that ROAM has a new team and there are no projects running currently.

The results were that ROAM came in as a 9th country in the EOA and a capacity-building action plan was developed. A follow-up visit is planned for mid-2019. ROAM has shared with the Team a follow up to show progress made to date (only an extract inserted here):

Extract Of Descriptive Report For Capacity Building Action Plan For ROAM:

1. Governance		
<u>Category Before Action</u>	<u>Current Status after Action by ROAM</u>	<u>Comments on Current Status (ROAM Up-date by June 2019)</u>
<p>Weak governance structure ROAM is governed by an Executive Committee constituted from farmer/organic stakeholders' representation.</p> <p>The executive committee serves the role of a board. However, the executive committee does not have richness of diversity that is necessary for an effective board</p>	All the Documents were properly gathered from the respective persons, and others including the Governance Manual, the structure and the performance report were fully completed	All the necessary Documents were completed, signed and properly Classified Shall attach the copies of evidence
No ROAM Strategic Plan	A Team of Consultants is developing a 5 years Strategic Plan 2019-2023 as was required by ROAM	Now completed to 97%, shall be finalised in two weeks' time.
No delineation of roles between the board and management (the board chair lady doubles up as the CEO). The rest of the board members also have direct supervisory roles of the staff.	The Roles of the Board of Directors and the Management were clearly separated and ROAM Management under the CEO and the entire staff was clearly separated based on the Management Chart.	All the requirements were clearly sorted and filed, the CEO ToR and JD, Board members conflict of interest policy and declaration, Organizational Chart, Board governance manual Annual General Meeting report/deliberations are all properly classified in respective files.
No Chief Executive Officer (CEO)	Done	The CEO's Papers of merit are properly classified in the ROAM staff File with all other staffs therein. Note: The JD for every position is set clear in the Roam Manual and Procedures.
2.Administration & Human resource Systems		
Administrative systems and manuals not in place (Governance manual, Human Resources and administration manual, Finance and manual, Procurement manual and Asset policy)	All the Operational Manual are well developed and clearly separated in the Manual and Procedures Document	Completed
Poor record keeping of HR documents. / No HR files	An HR file has been opened and updated with staff JDs, CVs, Academic Documents, Staff MoU, Staff Conflict of interest policies, Interview evaluation form etc	Everything is classified in the HR File with maximum transparency. <u>Note:</u> the MoU has been signed by each volunteering staff since they were promised to sign a contract as soon as the funds are available.
Staff recruited do not have contracts and JDs A.	The staff JDs and recruitment process were well done and under transparency. There has been a selection process among a number of applicants and only the best selected candidates were offered the opportunity.	1. All the staff as their positions put into place in the Chart were given the MoU since they all were agreeing to Volunteer, the Contracts will be signed after the starting of the projects. 2. All the HR roles were left under the responsibilities of the Administration and Finance Manager as seen in his descriptions in the Manual & Procedures.

Annual audits not undertaken	We have put every system necessary into place to facilitate Annual Audit and it will be the responsibility of the Accountant and the Admin and Finance Manager to sustain the proper Auditing Process.	ROAM is ready to undertake annual project and organizational audits in the fiscal Year of 2019
Internal Control System (ICS) with respect to Finance system weak	ROAM has put into place a strong Financial control system by Hiring an Accountant who is also closely supervised by the Administration and finance Manager	All the Basic Accounting documents for both external and internal use are in place to ensure every transaction is supported and clearly classified. This is already is being used for internal purposes to date.
Lack of financial management skills The finance officer does not have professional training in finance and accounting	ROAM have hired a professional and qualified Administrative and Finance Manager that is intensively providing necessary trainings to the Accountant to fully build a strong Financial management team	Qualified staff were put into financial positions to eradicate this situation completely
3. Project Management		
Weak project management procedures (it's not clear how programs will be managed)	In the Manual & Procedures, the JDs of the Programs and Projects Manager are clear ROAM have put in place mechanisms of reporting, and management systems to facilitate this project properly function	Qualified staffs have been put into place to give the necessary results as required by the organisation.
Weak report keeping	ROAM has clearly defined the standards of reporting and has separated duties from each post. The mechanisms of Reporting for all departments are clear in the Manual and Procedures.	Templates used for internal control systems have been put into place for use. A Data base is almost on final stages for the Project managers to safely keep the records.
Weak reporting and accountability	The internal control system has been put in place, the basic Accounting documents for Use are in place and most of them are being used to date.	Every this is in place and ongoing improvement is being implemented.

In addition, Biovision EA Trust/EOA hired Agile Consulting for a thorough assessment of all countries to be participating in EOA Phase II. Agile Consulting spent three days with ROAM and conducted a deep and detailed study. The result is not yet public.

All in all, it is clear that ROAM entered OTEA with significant institutional weaknesses, which persisted into OTEA and contributed to the severe problems encountered. It appears, however, that ROAM now, with enhanced institutional capacity stands a better chance. Yet, it must also be noted that the staff is serving as volunteers and without operational funds.

Component E: Availability of data and statistics

From 2016, ROAM has focussed on follow up of the PGS groups, collecting data on their seasonal outputs, marketed quantities, land area, organic input use and income. A format for this data collection was developed by ROAM. Data are analysed and strengths/weaknesses identified and action plans are agreed based on such findings.

Some data has also been secured on the certified industrial outputs.

Relevant data has been forwarded to IFOAM for inclusion in the yearly global compilation of data on Organic Agriculture (Research Institute of Organic Agriculture and IFOAM Organics International; The World of Organic Agriculture; Statistics and Emerging Trends. Latest ed. 2019). ROAM's data has not matched well with IFOAM's statistics and there was dialogue on the matter with IFOAM. ROAM is of the opinion that the IFOAM data is outdated.

As far as known, the Government has no disaggregated statistics allowing for data on organic agriculture or trade with organic produce separated from other agriculture.

Key outcomes/achievements/setbacks

Key achievements:

- The progress on PGS resulting in engagement and support to over 900 small-scale farmers and five companies with the reported increased income.
- The Government of Rwanda's emerging tolerance of organic farming and the MoU on collaboration with ROAM.
- Strengthened organisation through the various assessments and action plan during 2018 and 2019.

Key setbacks:

- The institutional turbulence resulting from an extended period of mismanagement. This yielded, among others, high staff turnover, weak continuity in the governance structures, disruption of donor funding, some distrust and a resource-poor organisation. A lot more could have been achieved if the organisation had been stable and prosperous.

TANZANIA

Key baseline information 2014

In Tanzania, TOAM has been in existence since 2005 registered as an NGO under NGO Act of 2002. At project start in 2014, the PGS was non-existent. Under OTEA it had a target to train 20 stakeholders in OGS. Initially, training 9 organisations in PGS and ICS reaching about 950 farmers. Same 9 organisations were anticipated to be using the EAOM and by 2015 to have strengthened one local certification body, Tancert.

TOAM were to engage in policy influencing to attain organic agriculture to gain recognition at Ministry level and with national standards authority, the Tanzania Bureau of Standards.

Inputs

IFOAM has reported the following expenditure for TOAM:

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Euro	45,438	74,355	78,766	36,778	18,222 (to be reported)

TOAM reported having received amounts and reported expenditure as following:

Provided to TOAM in EURO					
Item/Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Received					
AfrOnet	10,000	122,730	124,855	50,000	0
TOAM	49,623	71,580	74,838	25,445	0
OGS/OLC Training		49,717			
OLC Training 2		19,428			
Regional Consultancy				3,064	
Sub Total	59,623	263,455	199,693	75,445	-
Expenses					
AfrOnet	12,231	117,838	129,353	45,635	1259
TOAM	45,897	70,793	78,776	36,671	13,329
OGS/OLC Training		49,212			
OLC Training 2		19,825			
Senegal Conference				5,000	
Regional Consultancy				3,308	
Sub Total	58,128	257,668	208,129	82,306	14,588
	1,495	5,787	-8,436	-6,861	-14,588

It should be noted that TOAM and AfrOnet uses the same accountant and the same accounting system. This explains why AfrOnet appears in the TOAM financial overview. TOAM comments on the differences: A quick observation is that IFOAM might combine planned budget and special assignment budget which YTOAM didn't. For example, in 2019 TOAM accounts opened the year with 13,329 Euro but IFOAM mentioned 18,222 Euro (TOAM thinks they included 5000 which TOAM mentioned as Senegal conference support and submitted separate accounts for.

Activities, outputs and outcomes 2015-2019

Component A: A well-functioning OGS, increased consumer awareness, demand for labelled products

Reviewed reports supplemented with field visits indicated good progress in numbers reached out OGS messages.

Table 1: Summary of OTEA Reached farmers by June 2019

Reached farmers	Males	Females	Youth	Total along service received
OGS Training	488	291	585	1,364
Communication Materials	84	106	104	294
Market and Linkages	949	616	1,179	2,744
Total by gender and youth categorization	1,521	1,013	1,868	4,402

Source: TOAM OTEA Programme National Coordinator's Office as of June 2019

TOAM has carried out consumer awareness campaigns some in collaboration with EOA Project. Implement Partners notably Sustainable Agriculture Tanzania (SAT). Numbers reached through these campaigns were not available. TOAM also participates in TV programmes, which are 30-minute live broadcasts.

It has increased the usage of EAOM and introduced organic products corners in prominent food stores, where the EAOM is also visible. Organic products on sale bear the EAOPS. The outlets for organic products are mainly in affluent areas of Dar Es Salaam. SAT has such an outlet in Morogoro and in 2018 it had sold organic products from farmers worth TZS4.5 million, which is quite small amount compared to the 2,868 numbers of farmers it is working with.

In terms of PGS, it has facilitated 73 groups. Of which 27 PGS were on license renewals and had 247 members. The license renewal process was difficult to segregate funding source between OTEA and EOA-I. Another 17 PGS were in semi arid region of Dodoma. It was also difficult to segregate funding source whether OTEA or EOA-I or Agriculture Development Denmark and Associates (ADDA) or Agriculture Climate Change Interventions for Supporting Smallholder farmers (AC-CISS). Generally, in each case TOAM was active and recognized to have been the main facilitator. However, systematic recording of farmer-members was not consistent as some PGS information was obtained but lacked number of members.

The quality of PGS varied. Upendo Group in Kisarawe, Coast Region that was visited attempted to integrate from production to processing and retailing in a local town of Kisarawe. Clearly there was no capacity to do so. Products were packed in less than appealing to an upper end market buyer. They however had obtained government chemist laboratory testing of some of their products.

Recognition of the EAOPS by the Tanzania Bureau of Standard has not occurred despite the EALA had endorsed it.

Component B: Increased capacity of local producers

Table 1. shows the situation of PGS groups in Tanzania as of June 2019.

Table 1: Tanzania summary table on PGS situation as of June 2019

PGS Status	Number of PGS groups	Number of producers involved	Organic Standard	Products or value chain	Facilitator	Market outlet	Remarks
Old PGS under SAT facilitation - Certificate Renewal existed since 2014	12	247	EAOPS	Horticulture	TOAM	SAT Organic shop and Local village farmer's market	License renewal process difficult to segregate funding source between OTEA and EOA-I
Newly approved 2015 to date	10	394	EAOPS	Horticulture and spices production	TOAM	SAT Organic shop and Local village farmer's market	Only those selling at SAT organic shop may have premium price
Under development 2016 to date. Members between 25 to 30 per group	17	-	EAOPS	Mostly sorghums, millets and sunflower. A few on horticulture and legumes	TOAM	-	Most of these are in Dodoma. Difficult to segregate funding source whether OTEA or EOA-I or Agriculture Development Denmark and Associates (ADDA) or Agriculture Climate Change Interventions for Supporting Smallholder farmers (ACCISS)
Certificate expired	4	-	EAOPS	All in legumes	TEMNAR Company	-	No explanation given
Groups Not qualified	3	48	EAOPS	All in horticulture	TOAM	-	No explanation given
Incomplete information. No number of producers	27	-	EAOPS	Mostly sorghums, millets and sunflower. A few on horticulture and legumes	TOAM	-	Most of these are in Dodoma. Difficult to segregate funding source whether OTEA or EOA-I or Agriculture Development Denmark and Associates (ADDA) or Agriculture Climate Change Interventions for Supporting Smallholder farmers (ACCISS)

Source: TOAM OTEA Programme National Coordinator's Office as of June 2019

Information on value chains facilitation, market linkages and matchmaking was obtained. TOAM maintains an active website <http://www.kilimohai.org/> that plays a role on matching. It has a marketplace web page <http://www.kilimohai.org/marketplace/for-sale/?L=0> that displays offers from sellers. It also allows for online registration of both sellers and buyers. Buyers express their needs on a “wanted” page <http://www.kilimohai.org/marketplace/wanted/?L=0> and according to the OTEA National Program Coordinator deals are closed but information does not directly go to TOAM. Given the low level of ICT knowledge of some of the sellers, TOAM Marketing Manager assists to place their offers on the market place.

Evidence on Regional trade was scanty. Most sales were done domestically in country in affluent areas. Particularly the tourist hotels offer a niche market appreciated by both the market actors and

the Government. Some exports were recorded for USA in the case of vanilla, New Zealand for Moringa powder and EU for tea and cotton.

Table 2: Summary EAOPS and PGS Organic Market Data 2016/2017-2017/2018 Cropping Season

Trad ed Crop Year	Main certi- fied crops	Certi- fication Standard	Level of certi- fication	# of farmers/ out grow- ers	Certi- fied area harvested (Ha)	Or- ganic produc- tion (MT)	Organic production sold (MT)
2016 /2017	Fruits & vege- tables, Spices, Cotton, Tea	EU, NOP, JAS, EAOPS	PGS, ICS and few Third Party	3,951	19,202	1,135	1,085
2017 /2018	Fruits & vege- tables, Spices, Coffee, Banana, Moringa products, Cotton, Tea, Co- conut oil, Cashew nuts	EU, NOP, JAS, EAOPS	PGS, ICS and few Third Party	12,486	23,131	1,788	1,753
Total				16,437	42,333	2,924	2,838

Source: TOAM OTEA Programme National Coordinator's Office as of June 2019

Some data on Non-PGS was not summarized because of mix up in MS Excel data base but also because of inclusion of well-established operators, some being in operation since 1990 hence casting some doubt whether OTEA had a role to attribute to. The two following Tables provides for such broader picture on organic farming without strong attribution to OTEA.

Table 3: Summary on EAOPS and PGS Organic Market Data 2016/2017 Cropping Season

Location	Main certified crops	Certi- fication Standard	Level of certi- fication	# of farmers/ out grow- ers	Certi- fied area harvested (Ha)	Organic production (MT)	Organic production sold (MT)	Main Markets
Ashira, Marangu Kili- manjaro	Maize, beans, ba- nana	EAOPS	PGS	64	25	65	34	Local market
Kahama, Shinyanga	Cotton	EU, NOP, JAS, EAOPS	-	605	16,831	40	37	EU
Songea, Ruvuma	Ginger	EAOPS	PGS	300	900	192	190	Local market & Regional market
Songea, Ruvuma	Hibis- cus	EAOPS	PGS	150	375	20	19	Local market

Njombe, Iringa	Avocado	EAOPS	PGS	19	NA	23	21	Local market & Regional market
Njombe, Iringa	Pineapple	EAOPS	PGS	115	230	200	180	Local market
Mafinga, Iringa	Tea	EU, NOP, JAS, EAOPS	Third Party	1,500	230	143	160	Africa, EU, Asia and America
Unguja, Zanzibar	Fruits & vegetables	EAOPS	PGS	1,022	500	42	39	Local market
Korogwe, Tanga	Ginger	EAOPS	PGS	66	75	320	316	Dsm Local market
Kinole, Morogoro	Pineapple	EAOPS	ICS	110	36	90	90	Dsm Local market (AZAM + Retailers)
Total				3,951	19,202	1,135	1,085	

Source: TOAM OTEA Programme National Coordinator's Office as of June 2019

Table 4: Summary on EAOPS and PGS Organic Market Data 2017/2018 Cropping Season

Location	Main certified crops	Certification Standard	Level of certification	# of farmers/ out growers	Certified area harvested (Ha)	Organic production (MT)	Organic production sold (MT)	Main Markets
Kagondo Kailemba, Kagera	Vanilla	EAOPS	ICS	4,948	800	165	165	USA
Karagwe Kagera	Pineapple	EU, NOP, JAS, EAOPS	-	100	294	10	9	Local market
Ashira, Marangu Kili-manjaro	Maize, beans, banana	EAOPS	PGS	71	25	65	34	Local market
Kahama, Shinyanga	Cotton	EU, NOP, JAS, EAOPS	-	605	16,831	40	37	EU
Songea, Ruvuma	Ginger	EAOPS	PGS	300	900	192	190	Local market & Regional market
Songea, Ruvuma	Hibiscus	EAOPS	PGS	150	375	20	19	Local market
Njombe, Iringa	Pineapple	EAOPS	PGS	115	230	200	180	Local market
Mafinga, Iringa	Tea	EU, NOP, JAS, EAOPS	Third Party	1,500	230	143	160	Africa, EU, Asia and America

Unguja, Zanzibar	Fruits & vegetables	EAOPS	PG S	1,022	500	42	39	Local market
Korogwe, Tanga	Ginger	EAOPS	PG S	66	75	320	316	Local market (Dsm)
Kinole, Morogoro	Pine-apple	EAOPS	ICS	110	36	90	90	Local market (AZAM and Retailers in Dsm)
Arusha	Fruits & vegetables	EAOPS	PG S	66	10	6	6	Local market (Farmers Market)
Poli Village, Arumeru Arusha	Coffee & banana	EAOPS	PG S	30	62	143	160	Wild Track & Tourist market outlets
Kilakala & Vianzi, Morogoro	Fruits & vegetables, spices	EAOPS	PG S	2,868	314	42	39	Local market
Mafia, Coast	Coco-nut oil & Cashew-nut	EAOPS	PG S	335	449	170	170	Local market (Dsm)
Arusha	Moringa oil & powder	EAOPS	ICS	150	2,000	50	50	New Zealand
Unguja & Pemba	Cassava	EAOPS	ICS	50	NA	90	90	Local market
Total				12,486	23,131	1,788	1,753	

Source: TOAM OTEA Programme National Coordinator's Office as of June 2019

Component C: Conducive Government policies, strategies, plans

Generally, organic agriculture in Tanzania under OTEA had the government of Tanzania goodwill. A desk officer responsible for organic agriculture is in place. TOAM uses government extension officers as trainers after it had trained 50 of them. TOAM was encouraged to align her strategic planning in organic agriculture to the nation-wide Agricultural Sector Development Programme Phase Two (ASDP II). Hence TOAM produced the Organic Sector Development Project 2017-2022. The project cost is US\$50 million, out of which 22% is earmarked to come from the Ministry of Agriculture but discussion with the Ministry official did not confirm funding. Additionally, the government appreciates organic agriculture as a way of capturing niche markets particularly for spices and also attracting tourists that are environment and health conscious.

Component D: NOAM and AfrOnet strengthening

TOAM received some strengthening especially with installation of an accounting software and training of the accounts personnel.

Component E: Availability of data and statistics

There was also training on data collection for monitoring purposes using upcountry enumerators. This training was done by KOAN.

The MS Excel database has good layout to monitor market information as well as the other operations information. However, computer savvy was needed to make the data captured user friendly and easy to process. Records are inputted mixing alpha and numeric making it tedious to extract and process data.

Key outcomes/achievements/set backs

- Visibility of usage of EAOM with branded vehicles and Organic Products Corner in outlets. Also increased number of organic products outlets.
- Forged good relationship with the Ministry of Agriculture with representation in key government activities related to agriculture sector in Tanzania.
- Major setback was insufficient funding to do organic agriculture promotional activities.
- Another setback was the weak Tancert as a local certification body that could not be re-engineered and invigorated.
- There seemed to be no sustainability plan for TOAM if donor funding was to cease. The discontinuation of OTEA funding caused already staff reduction

UGANDA

Preface

As it was difficult for the evaluation to secure qualitative information directly from NOGAMU, the following is mainly based on available documentation. It has not been possible to verify accuracy and to what extent the reported activity was attributable to OTEA or to the several other projects implemented by NOGAMU, including those with other Sida funding. Communication with NOGAMU yielded response through Prof. Charles Ssekyaewa and the current Chairman Samuel Nyanzi.

Key baseline information 2014

According to the OTEA Project proposal, Uganda had by far more organic producers than the other East African countries (2011 189,000 out of a total of 348,000 in EA, 54%). The Project proposal also recognises that NOGAMU, KOAN and TOAM are well established and capable of delivering services to their national constituents. NOGAMU was established already in 2001 and had by 2014 about 350 members representing 1,200,000 smallholder farmers and with operations throughout the country. The proposal includes descriptions of organisational structure for KOAN and TOAM but not for NOGAMU.

The evaluation of OSEA noted that “The National Organic Agricultural Movement of Uganda (NOGAMU) is an umbrella organization which unites producers, processors, exporters, NGOs and other institutions and organizations that are involved in the promotion and development of the organic sector in Uganda. Established in 2001, it is now one of the highly esteemed Business Support Organisations (BSOs) providing a range of services to the sector.”

The proposed NATIONAL ORGANIC AGRICULTURE POLICY of November 2016 stated that: “Uganda is leading on the African continent in terms of acreage (240,197 hectares) and in terms of number of certified organic farmers (190,552) engaged in organic farming – we are only second to India, globally. Sustaining Organic agriculture provides Uganda a competitive advantage”.

Inputs

IFOAM has reported the following expenditure for NOGAMU:

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Euro	45,118	63,883	37,133	43,514 (unaccounted for)	-

In addition, NOGAMU benefitted from training offered by AfrOnet and IFOAM and participated in Conferences. IFOAM has also come for the Steering Committee meetings and for training/monitoring visits during 2017, including some field visits.

Activities, outputs and outcomes 2015-2019

Component A: A well-functioning OGS, increased consumer awareness, demand for labelled products

2015

An example of the impact of the promotion of EAOM can be seen in the following excerpt from the NOGAMU Annual report 2015: “Furthermore, Agriit independent social media monitoring company in Uganda reported that slightly over 8,000 people were reached in the 2 weeks OA campaign period in Uganda. A total of 8 media houses (3 Television, 2 radio stations and 3 print newspaper), which were part of the media houses invited during the campaigns, are now regularly promoting organic farming and organic produce consumption regularly NOGAMU was also invited to 2 radio programs, 2 TV programs to promote the EAOM by 31st December 2015”.

2016

NOGAMU trained together with Ugocert 78 stakeholders (33 inspectors, 18 journalists, 27 policy makers) on Organic Guarantee systems (OGS).

NOGAMU and UNBS were jointly fundraising money for the international IOAS accreditation renewal of Ugocert. An official MOU was negotiated with UNBS that mandates all local producers and processors of organic produce to be certified by Ugocert in Uganda. It is expected that this MOU will have a positive impact on Ugocert’s visibility.

Uganda was leading the process in OTEA for increased recognition of EAOPS and had established business contacts with Dubai, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Those relations had led to recognition of the EAOPS in the said countries. Attempts to achieve the same with Japan were ongoing.

NOGAMU conducted awareness-raising campaigns in four organic farmer markets and collaborated with Knight frank to design digital organic products promotional fliers, which were run on a weekly basis in 3 upmarket Knight frank malls in Kahoka and Bugolobi suburbs of Kampala and Victoria Mall in Entebbe. 2,000 copies of promotional materials for the EAOM (Organic news, and posters) were printed and distributed on the roadside, in the Knight frank shopping malls, to major embassies and foreign missions in Kampala as well at the NOGAMU membership desk, organic shop and reception area. In addition, NOGAMU also cross-posted the developed materials electronically: the posters on social media and partner social media sites such as Facebook, whatsapp and linked in. Increased availability and demand of organic products was noted at the local markets and the attendance of visitors increased from 88 in March 2016 to 400 in December.

2017

The local organic market was growing fast. NOGAMU claimed that almost 2 million farmers could be certifiable as organic (almost 40% of farmers). They are opening more markets with local partners, and working on solving logistical bottlenecks to enable product to move. Supposedly organic is becoming a popular term and there are a lot of unsubstantiated (and untrue) claims in the market. NOGAMU is working with the government to have better surveillance, penalties for claims abuse, and better recognition of the EAOM. According to Ugocert, surveillance and sanctions were supposed to start soon.

UNBS was taking the initiative to revise the EAOPS on behalf of all the EAC Bureaus of Standards, and aimed to have a new version ready for approval across the EAC governments within 6 months. NOGAMU was centrally involved in the process. NOGAMU apparently had good cooperation from UNBS for not only the revision of the EAOPS, but also support for a more innovative guarantee system that would be widely accessible.

A national organic policy was being considered by the Ugandan parliament. IFOAM – OI seemingly received it too late to make influential comments in time for further revision.

Ugocert seemed to be regaining functionality in spite of a debt of ~US\$11,000 to IOAS to address before they could go towards accreditation for certain exports.

A total of 88 community stakeholders (65men, 23women) were trained in various aspects of OGS standards and certification for PGS and ICS as Internal Organic Quality Management Systems (IQMS) for local and international market access.

UNBS and NOGAMU signed a MoU to work via Ugocert, the local certification body. The two institutions had embarked on joint activities to coordinate the organic sector so as to create a one-stop center for organic standards development certification and promotion in Uganda. This had resulted in official public support from the government to the organic sector in Uganda, the first of its kind in the EAC region. It had further increased visibility of the EAOM from the branded organic products in the market.

To further cement this officially working relationship, UNBS ensured the initiation of the public review process of the EOAPS. It was kick-started in Uganda and taken up by the subsequent regional notification of the Six EAC partner states namely Kenya, Tanzania, South Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi through the Tanzania Bureau of standards, which is the official chair of the EAC agriculture standards Technical Standards committee.

NOGAMU, with support of the OTEA project facilitated the working group drafting committee meetings as well as stakeholder meetings to review the EAOPS at National level in Uganda. UNBS had finalized the National consultations and submitted the final working draft with the Tanzanian Bureau of Standards for comments from the partner states in the EAC.

NOGAMU had joint collaborations with a Japanese client in the promotion and development of information on the EOAPS and EAOM for Honey, Shea Butter and dried fruit. In addition, NOGAMU continued with shipments and promotions of fresh PGS EAOPS and EAOM verified organic Pineapples, Apple Bananas, Avocados and Desert Banana (Bogoya) to Qatar and United Arab Emirates clients in Abu Dhabi.

NOGAMU had also sent EAOM PGS organic product samples to a potential new buyer in Moscow through its Italian client. The products samples shipped included dried apple bananas, papaya, pineapples, jackfruit, mangoes, cinnamon bark, papaya leaf herbal tea.

EAOPS was recognized as an equivalent organic standard in one new market, in UAE Abudabi, and negotiations were ongoing for the 2nd and 3rd markets in Italy and Moscow Russia.

NOGAMU developed and printed 1,000 organic standards posters, 1,000 organic market fliers and 1,000 copies of Organic news promotional materials promoting the EAOM and organic standards and other organic related information. These were used in the local consumer awareness drives, trade fairs and farmer markets to promote organic products on the local market. The organic farmer market fliers have also been placed in guest hotel rooms and on table menus at Fairway hotel and LA chateau Restaurants in Kololo and Nsambya suburbs respectively. Slowly the organic brand is being recognized especially in Kampala and Entebbe. Online and hardcopies of organic news were mailed to NOGAMU members, key embassies in Kampala and agricultural support organizations. An events management company (NTICE LTD) was also paid to print and place two roadsters and one signage for 3 months in Kampala and Entebbe.

Component B: Increased capacity of local producers

2015

NOGAMU focused PGS training and development: The target beneficiaries of these trainings were 42 farmer leaders from Mubende EV. The trained farmer leaders were tasked with fellow farmer mobilization where a total of 150 members were mobilized and organized to form a PGS focused on trade in organic beans and vegetables for the local market. Out of the mobilized 150 members, a total of 53 farmers successfully went through the organic registration and mapping processes for PGS. They have also been linked to an organic buyer from Dubai who is interested regular shipments after they obtain their PGS certificate in the first quarter of 2016.

NOGAMU: The beneficiary for OTEA non PGS (ICS) support was given to the high value internationally competitive dried pineapples, mangoes and jackfruit from Eastern Uganda. This was mainly because they had market interests with buyers in Austria and Japan. Further work on their actual ICS farmer mobilization, training, market certification and market linkage for the non PGS (ICS) work is planned for the following two years from 2016 to 2017.

2016

A Case Study was conducted and published: BEST PRACTICES OF ABARYAKAMWE PGS FARMERS GROUP – RUBIRIZI DISTRICT

NOGAMU mobilized 200 farmers to process raw fruits into dried fruits (mangoes, pineapples, jackfruit) to establish a non-PGS value chain. Training was organized and the group was prepared to pass the audit by CERES. The ICS farmers submitted their documentation and inspection report to the certifying body CERES Germany. An external audit is planned as the next step.

NOGAMU established 3 new PGS groups involving 550 farmers in western Uganda. They were mobilized and trained in PGS. The assessment was completed according to EAOPS and the groups linked to the local organic markets in Kampala and Entebbe. NOGAMU also supported 16 small and medium enterprises to show case organic products in the Uganda International Manufacturers Trade Expo in Lugogo, Kampala. The national coordinator attended the West African Organic Business Summit in Lagos, Nigeria where Organic products from Uganda were exhibited and the organic value chains and market linkage activities in Uganda's organic sector were presented.

2017

NOGAMU mobilized a total of 85 new farmers in 1 new PGS group and facilitated ICS implementation of Agrijinah for 20 apple banana farmers in JAS and EU standards. NOGAMU had established good linkages with export markets in Gulf countries.

Component C: Conducive Government policies, strategies, plans

2015

A policy capacity building event was held for stakeholders in Uganda on the 27th of October 2015. Participants were presented with an overview of the current policies concerning EOA in the East African region and the status of the policy formulation processes in the region. 70 participants were in attendance who included key foreign mission and embassy staff of the Japanese, Swedish, American, Chinese, Danish, Swiss French embassies, Ministry of Trade, Agriculture, Environment, and

Kampala city Authority officials, Business community, journalists, Civil society organization and organic consumers.

As a result of this event NOGAMU was invited by the Minister of Agriculture to draft a policy implementation plan, which could be presented to cabinet so as to advocate for passing of the OA policy for Uganda – this resulted in the hiring of a consultant to review the National Agriculture development plan and incorporate OA friendly policies.

2016

NOGAMU supported a national consultation about the mandatory requirement for the National Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) for the organic policy in September. This is a requirement for every policy to assess the negative or positive impact on the target groups. The exercise was conducted in 6 regions of Uganda whereby one district was sampled per region.

Uganda was in the final stages of getting the National Organic Agriculture Policy passed. The process lasted already around 10 years but according to the latest update in the SC meeting in Nairobi in 2017, the policy passed all steps, is approved by the ministry and needs only a cabinet discussion as well as a certificate of financial compliance from the Ministry of Finance.

2017

NOGAMU collaborated with the American Chamber of Commerce in Uganda to organize a policy-maker and trader Business Summit from 21st to 24th April 2017.

NOGAMU nominated 5 participants for the regional conference in Arusha. Those included the national coordinator of OTEA for Uganda, the organic policy contact person from Ministry of Agriculture in Uganda, the CEO and the policy and advocacy officer from NOGAMU, and an organic local and regional trader.

Component D: NOAM and AfrOnet strengthening

2015

A training in Monitoring and Evaluation of staff involved in OTEA activities in NOGAMU was conducted in August 2015. This played a key role in building in-house capacity.

B.

2016

Based on an in-house need's assessment within NOGAMU, it was decided to conduct training in "Gender in Development". All staff was trained to mainstream gender in projects activities. Another training on gender mainstreaming and analysis was also conducted.

2017

At the end of 2017, IFOAM – Organic International was then informed by SIDA about the investigation of NOGAMU due to misappropriation of funds initiated by the Swedish Embassy in Uganda. The responsible coordinator of OTEA within NOGAMU had been dismissed before finalizing the annual report of 2017.

2018

Beginning of 2018, the team started to discuss a no-cost extension of 9 months. This was related to the fact that NOGAMU was suspended end of 2017 due to a serious investigation into misappropriation of funds. There was/is not any evidence that OTEA project was involved and unfortunately, IFOAM-OI was informed only very late about this investigation. This led to the loss of 43.000 Euro for which NOGAMU was not able to account for.

At the same time, it also jeopardized the Regional Conference that was planned to be conducted in 2018 and in which NOGAMU was supposed to play a major role. As such, the discussion between SIDA and IFOAM- OI led to an agreement to postpone the Regional Conference to 2019. The no-cost extension that was requested from IFOAM side from early summer 2018 was approved by SIDA on 29th of Oct. 2018:

“NOGAMU has been excluded from the project since end of 2017 and did not participate in the operational plan of 2018. Almost 60% of project funds (43K) of 2017 were not reported by NOGAMU and led to the loss of project funds. AfrOnet and the team tried to get in contact with the newly elected Board to obtain the project files. The respective project responsible person was dismissed and the information was not available. Based on the 2nd SC meeting decision AfrOnet made several visits to NOGAMU to assess the institutional capacity and potential to return to the organic movement. Towards the end of 2018 the newly elected Board of NOGAMU was dissolved. According to the latest feedback, the leadership of NOGAMU was not yet stable. “

The accuracy of the above paragraph has been disputed by the current NOGAMU Chairman. He notes that the new Board or the earlier executive committee did not receive any delegation from AfrOnet and that the current new Board members have not known of issues with the OTEA project until recently. Reference is made to the current CEO for info. However, she has not responded to the Team’s emails. The reason for diverging views may be timing of events.

Component E: Availability of data and statistics

2016

A regional data-training workshop in Nairobi was held in May in which a new data collection tool was developed. KOAN worked on the training logistics in collaboration with AFRONET and NOGAMU who was the lead facilitator.

NOGAMU conducted a national training for 30 key stakeholders on organic data collection along the entire organic value chains. It collaborated with the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Trade, Uganda Export Promotions Board and 49 farmer-facilitating organizations in collection of data on production, volume and value for the organic sector all over Uganda.

2017

NOGAMU conducted a national enumerator training for key stakeholders on Organic data collection along the entire organic value chains; and collaborated with Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Trade, Uganda Export Promotions Board, Uganda National Bureau of standards and 39 other farmer facilitating organizations involved in promoting organic for local regional and export markets.

The data collection was developed jointly by all countries under the lead of NOGAMU. In August 2017 during the Value chain mission the project partners discussed and agreed with the final version of the tool. It was agreed that partners would conduct the survey each year and monitor the progress

of the organic agriculture. From 2016 the OTEA indicators were revised and made clearer. The data monitoring sheet, see Annex 7 Logframe and Monitoring tool, was once more jointly revisited and filled for 2017. However, data from ROAM and NOGAMU was not yet complete.

Key outcomes/achievements/set backs

- It appears from the OTEA reports that there was substantial activity and good interactions with the Government of Uganda during 2015-2017.
- Unfortunately, the management issues and alleged corruption within NOGAMU have casted a shade over the otherwise thriving organic agriculture sector in Uganda. It has not been possible for the evaluation to verify how the difficulties in NOGAMU more generally has impacted on organic agriculture in Uganda.

Latest updates

- As per reports, NOGAMU has lost its office building as a result of issues of corruption and actions taken to recover donor funds.
- A NOGAMU AGM was convened in October 2018. By then old Board was asked to step down and an interim executive committee was appointed and mandated to:
 - Find a new office
 - Establish a core team as secretariat staff
 - Organise a new AGM for election of a new Board.
- According to the current informants NOGAMU remains with its membership and has established a new office, and the organics sector is still thriving.
- Members feel it is not fair to punish the members when the staff who mismanaged funds are known.
- As per reports, NOGAMU remains active in providing information for the passing of the organic policy, which is at the cabinet level. The Cabinet required some more information, which NOGAMU has provided. A team has worked on this, including representation of NOGAMU, ACSA, PELUM Uganda and AFIRD.
- NOGAMU is now also assisting farmers in northern Uganda to grow organic chia (*Salvia* spp.).
- NOGAMU members remain committed.
- NOGAMU has pending contracts with Kampala Capital City Authority to provide local certification to the urban farmers under the project K-green.
- NOGAMU attempts to help revive UgoCert Company after the company CEO (same person as the earlier Chairman of NOGAMU) abandoned it since 2018.
- The current new Board is of the opinion that NOGAMU as an organisation did not misappropriate donors' funds. Misuse was by NOGAMU staff because the earlier Board never did what they were mandated to do. The NOGAMU members feel touched and tired because of what happened and notes that members do not have any money to use legal measures to recover funds. They express a wish for help to bring these people" to courts of law and the current Board is willing to do whatever is required. The Board condemns what took place and condemn the earlier Board and the secretariat for not seeing the situation and stop it in good time.
- The current Board finds it frustrating that some people in donor circles still collaborate with former NOGAMU staff offering various forms of support.

- Some former staff still use NOGAMU website and facebook account to sometimes confuse the membership.

Noted that donors have blacklisted members rather than those who led to NOGAMU down fall.

Annex 7 Evaluation Matrix

Questions raised in ToRs or during the inception phase	Indicators	Findings. OTEA reported outputs and outcomes are not consistently repeated here.
Darker colour implies priority questions derived from the TOR		
Less dark colour implies “further question” derived from the TOR, i.e. somewhat lower priority		
Red text are indicators collected from OTEA’s expanded log frame/TOC from 2016, which is also labelled OTEA’s monitoring tool.		
Relevance		
1. To what extent was the OTEA project designed to meet the main constraints related to organic trade in East Africa as well as AU, EAC and national policies?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Well-structured, clear and logical organogram Capacity and resources available from IFOAM Capacity and resources available from AfrOnet Established routines for communication and management Knowledge on policy frameworks and development prospects for agriculture and agricultural trade Proactive engagements in initiatives taken to be part of regional, national policy coordination frameworks, e.g. Africa Climate Smart Agriculture Alliance, which are free membership and have “Policy, advocacy and communication” as one of the themes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> OTEA builds on the earlier OSEA I and II, as well as the even earlier EPOPA. Much of the fundamental work was done during these earlier phases or intervention. The OTEA challenge has been largely on utilisation of the policy space that was created earlier. In terms of content OTEA was generally deemed relevant An initial intention was to establish a Project Office under AfrOnet, but this did not materialise. By some, AfrOnet has been regarded as weak in relation to the tasks it was expected to perform. It took time for AfrOnet to get well established. The roles and mandates of AfrOnet and IFOAM respectively has been perceived as unclear. AfrOnet was expected to coordinate the partners in OTEA, but ended up more as one of the partners organising regional-level activities. AfrOnet claims also it was not resourced to coordinate or monitor others but called upon in times of challenges. A brief (4pp) was prepared elaborating organogram, roles, communication/reporting lines, etc. It is noted that the communication section addresses only the communication flow from partners to IFOAM and to Sida. Some partners express that the information flow in the other direction, i.e. from IFOAM to AfrOnet and partners has not been adequate. AfrOnet claims it was not informed on disbursements to partners. Partners generally claim they were not much involved in decisions on reallocations, not least during 2018 and 2019. They would rather have seen other priorities that the conference in June 2019, where only few NOAM representatives could participate, while several NOAMs faced financial crises and lacked funds for salaries as well as operations.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge on markets and consumer demands • Organisational assessments at AfrOnet and NOAM levels 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>The transition from OSEA to OTEA was a transition from more centralised management and control by IFOAM under OSEA to a more decentralised system under OTEA. This transition was not preceded by sufficient organisational assessments to establish that NOAMs and AfrOnet had the necessary capacity. Assessments initiated by others revealed risks and even high risks.</i>
2. To what extent has the project conformed to the needs and priorities of the target groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relevance of the identified target groups, possible alternative focus, age, gender, urbanisation factors, labour • Target group analyses; mainstreaming versus targeted actions • Determination of intervention focus, e.g. choice of crops or other farm produce 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>A fundamental question here is what kind of target group analyses formed the basis for the intervention. It is obvious that choice of crops will impact on e.g. level of poverty focus and choice of entry or focal point along the value chain will, for example, impact on attention to gender issues. Yet, it must also be noted that there are many factors impacting on such choices, with chances for success and impact being a major one. These various factors may partly be contradictory with best chances for success related to export crops but which may not positively impact on poor local consumers or producers.</i> • <i>The criteria for selection of value chains varied among the NOAMs. A set of criteria was developed at the project start but some NOAMs applied other criteria.</i> • <i>There was no in-depth target group analysis to design targeted actions for the most vulnerable people. It should be noted, though that promotion of organic agriculture in East Africa is in itself challenging, and might be come rather impossible if ambitions to particularly reach the poor and most disadvantaged are much pronounced.</i>
3. How specific was the project design on addressing poverty and needs of disadvantaged groups?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number and kinds of set targets • Geographical dispersion of target groups • Types and level of vulnerability of the target groups • Value chains selected 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>It was not specific at all. There was a long narrative section in the PD, but the results framework did not include any poverty parameters.</i> • <i>Reference is made to the main text of the report.</i>
4. Are the assumptions relevant also today regarding the importance of organic trade for the region in relation to using trade as a mean for poverty reduction?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A glance at the global debate and known challenges of organic versus “conventional” agriculture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>There is not such rapid development in the agricultural sector that assumptions usually become obsolete in a few years.</i> • <i>The PD seems to assume that all development of organic agriculture and trade with organic produce automatically generates poverty alleviation or reduction, which may not be the case. Reference is made to the main text of the report.</i>
Impact		
5. What is the overall impact of the project in terms of direct or indirect, negative and positive results?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased trade with organic products, by OTEA’s support to (i) development of enabling regional policies, (ii) a capacitated production and trade environment, and (iii) an increased consumer awareness (=the Project 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Reference to components info and to main text of the report</i>

	objective) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Observable detrimental factors related to OTEA • Prospects for long-term impacts which cannot yet be verified, direct, indirect, positive, negative 	
6. Are there any previously not identified impacts of the preceding projects OSEA I and II, positive, negative, intended, unintended?	Positive of negative developments dating back to OSEA but not documented during OSEA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Significant achievements during OSEA were already documented.</i> • <i>Until recently, little attention was paid to NOAMs institutional capacity and needs for capacity building. A centralised mode of operation and intense follow up by IFOAM and consultant enabled OSEA to run. The more decentralised approach introduced with OTEA, and the relatively less capacity for monitoring was not preceded by organisational assessments to verify that necessary systems for governance and administration were in place at NOAM level. With individuals ready to take advantage, it seems the weak systems paved the way for mismanagement in both ROAM and NOGAMU.</i> • <i>Management at NOAM and in AfrOnet became more complex when several donors or agencies agreed to engage with the same NOAMs without much coordination. Sida funds reached through several institutionally very different channels (bilateral support, OTEA under the Sida Regional strategy, CSO support through SSNC). Similarly, Swiss support trickled in through different mechanisms. In some NOAMs, the number of projects with different funding mechanisms were at par with the number of staff members.</i>
Effectiveness		
7. To what extent has the project overall contributed to intended outcomes? If so, why? If not, why not? 7.1 What are the effects of the OTEA project including both positive and negative, intended and unintended effects? 7.2 To what extent has the OTEA project managed to meet the main constraints related to organic trade in East Africa as well as AU, EAC and national policies?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Synthesis of assessments on the five components. See below • Increase in numbers of certified organic products/producers in the regions • Increase in cross-border trade (volumes, products) of organic products 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Reference to information on components, to summary country reports and to the main text of the report</i>

8. To what extent has the OTEA project involved stakeholders in design, implementation and follow-up?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number/Type/Affiliation/specific contribution of stakeholders to each component of OTEA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The initial design was developed during a joint workshop with NOAMs, AfrOnet and IFOAM. During implementation, a practice evolved that limited the coordination and monitoring role of AfrOnet and AfrOnet emerged mainly as one more partner. Reasons included that AfrOnet had a slow start (in spite of bold ambitions according to some observers). Information flows were designed one way with reporting and information duties from NOAMs to IFOAM to Sida spelt out, but without specified information requirements from IFOAM to AfrOnet or partners. A result is that several partners feel that they were not involved in decisions on allocations or reallocations. The fact that there was no disaggregated budget per partner from the start and for the whole project period, limited partners' chances to plan strategically and multi-yearly. Due to the above factors, among others, IFOAM came to bear more and sole responsibility for the project than would be ideal.
Component A: 9. Is there now a well-functioning Organic Guarantee System (OGS) in East Africa 9.1 Sustainably managed OGS in East Africa. 9.2 Efficient and sustainable certification bodies operate in East Africa 9.3 Increased international recognition of the East African Organic Products Standards (EAOPS) 9.4 Increased credibility and use of the East African Organic Mark (EAOM) in the region 9.5 Well-functioning Participatory Guarantee Systems (PGS) in the region	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A plan for sustainable management of OGS has been developed and implemented Number of persons involved in Organic trade and agriculture trained in OGS Certification bodies are strengthened and at least 1 CB approved for export of organic products EAOPS is recognised by at least 2 countries in emerging markets Evidence that EAOPS was updated in line with revisions of EU Commission regulations Usage of the EAOM on products has increased The PGS is sustainably managed at national and regional level by the NOAMs and JMC. The number of approved PGS groups has increased 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The JMC cost reliance on charges from EAOM is dependent on numbers of users. Reality is that most PGS sold in local markets and premium prices dividend was not evident hence puts to question the sustainability management of OGS without a financially sustainable JMC. The market for OA certification would not sustain local CB given the non-exclusivity of the services offered in competition with international certification bodies. The assumption that local CB would be strong to offer competitive service held true only in Kenya where CB also offered services related to other standards such as GLOBAL G.A.P. NOAM in Kenya and Tanzania benefited from EAO Pillars that addressed value chain development and market access as well as networking and partnerships that deals with policy influencing. This made it difficult to isolate OTEA contribution in components A, B and C. For instance, in Tanzania, TOAM supported PGS activities in Morogoro where Sustainable Agriculture Tanzania (SAT) another EOA PIP supported more than 2,868 farmers with initial activities leading to PGS. The EOA funding leverage contributed in increased number of PGS overall.
Component A: 10. Are there signs of increased	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consumer awareness has increased (a) recognition of mark by 50%, (b) awareness of OA by 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consumer awareness campaigns were carried out. Monitoring information to attribute levels of achievement were difficult because of data kept by NOAMs. Market and trade information provided did not accompany link to the monitoring log frames. Generally, the

consumer awareness and therefore demand for labelled organic products?	<p>80% and (c) consumption of organic products by 60%</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Signs of increased demand for labelled organic products • Signs/evidence of increased regional trade 	<p>recognition of EAOM was notable within OA products outlets and restaurants.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There was limited funding to do more promotions as compared to OSEA, which had given the awareness promotion and use of EAOM importance. • EOA funds extended resources available for consumer awareness and visibility of the EAOM. Joint activities are reported to conducted e.g. in Tanzania TOAM and SAT held a consumer awareness campaign jointly.
<p>Component B:</p> <p>11. To what extent has value chains been supported for local (=national) and regional (=East Africa) markets?</p> <p>11.1 Increased capacity of local producers to access and supply local and regional markets.</p> <p>11.2 Increased organic trade in local and regional markets.</p>	<p>Non-PGS; 5 value chains are functional at the end of the project</p> <p>10% increase of turnover of the regional trade by end of project</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased capacity and sustainability of PGS organic products • No. of organic farmers supplying local and regional markets • Range/Volume/Value of organic products (per value chain) traded across regional borders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Five value chains (each per country) were identified (2015) for support under OTEA (Dried fruits- NOGAMU, Honey – KOAN, Spices – TOAM, Coffee – BOAM, Coffee – ROAM). • Additional value chains were taken up in the following years (Macadamia and Chia). The role of OTEA in these value chains could be deemed rather minimal as other players (Private company and NGO respectively) have been actively involved in the value chain activities. • The number of participating famers in each value chain; 200 – dried fruits (NOGAMU), 525- Sesame (KOAN & TOAM), 350 – Ginger (TOAM), 130 – Chia (KOAN), and 3 cooperatives – Coffee (BOAM). • NOAMs services in the non-PGS value chains not well harmonized. Each NOAM played varied roles such as farmer organization, capacity building of internal inspectors, market linkages, development of business plans, subsidized certification costs, or fully facilitated 3rd party certification. On certification costs, TOAM subsidized certification costs at the initial stage while KOAN facilitated 3rd party certifications in the honey and sesame value chains • The key challenges facing the non-PGS value chain farmers include: high cost of initial 3rd party organic certification, initial cost of acquiring the national standard mark of quality, cost of barcoding of all product packaging materials, annual renewals of the certifications, and other applicable taxes such as Forest Association charges to honey beekeepers for utilization of the forest resources. • The support to non-PGS value chains may not be fully attributed to OTEA since six of the non-PGS value chains reported as functioning well were being supported by three NOAMs (KOAN, TOAM and NOGAMU) which are also implementing activities on Value Chain and Market Development (Pillar II) under the EOA-I project. • Number of organic farmers in East Africa is reported to have increased by 9% between 2014 and 2017 (from 351,779 to 412,965) (WOAS). OTEA project efforts on regional market has been focused on building PGS and non-PGS value chains. • The PGS groups standing at the time of the evaluation were as follows: BOAM - 20 PGS (6 operational, 14 under development); KOAN – 21 PGS (5 approved, 6 under development); NOGAMU – 4 PGS; ROAM – 16 PGS; TOAM – 69 PGS (29 certified, 40 under development) • Linkage of organic farmers to international markets was reported by NOGAMU who had established linkages with export markets in the Gulf countries. The evaluation was however not able to establish the current status of these linkages. • Various organic farmers have been linked to local markets, processors, and traders by the NOAMs. The actual statistics on the number of producers linked to markets, types and quantities of produce traded, and earnings from the produce have not been properly documented. For example, ROAM reported an increase in incomes

		<p>of approximately 900 farmers following engagement with 5 companies (however, actual data not available)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The concepts of 'farmers markets' and 'organic baskets' are well embraced in Kenya with farmers enjoying relatively better prices compared to that their counterparts who sell their produce in normal local markets. However, only small proportions of the produce are traded using these approaches while the large proportions are traded in local markets at prevailing market prices of conventional products. • Increased regional trade was evident in some key products such as spices from Tanzania to other EAC countries, Garlic from Rwanda to Uganda and tree-tomato from Rwanda to Congo.
<p>Component C: 12. Evidence of policy development and support in promotion of organic agriculture in East Africa? 12.1 East African government policies, strategies and plans support organic agriculture. 12.2 EAC and AU policymakers are supportive</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of countries with approved OA policy and plans (3 countries) and regional platforms strengthened • Increased capacity among policy makers and stakeholders in OA and policy formulation • Signs of support from EAC and AU policymakers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uganda had concretely included OA in its agricultural policy of 2016. • Other countries offered goodwill. • Kenya welcomed OA as a mainstreamed initiative. • Tanzania encouraged OA initiative aligning with national agricultural sector programmes. • Burundi and Rwanda are tolerant of the OA initiative. • EAC support existed and endorsed revised EAOPS. AU claimed to have embedded OA in its working document but review of CAADP Pillar I suggest Climate Smart Agriculture, which is much broader. • Funding synergy with EOA Pillars 4 and 5 was positive but blurred OTEA contribution on components A and C. It was difficult to isolate attribution evidence due to co-funding and joint activities.
<p>Component D: 13. Signs of development of the organic sector umbrella organisations and the regional Organic Agriculture Network in East Africa? 13.1 Increased cooperation at regional level 13.2 AfrOnet is strengthened and able to address issues of regional importance at EAC and AU levels 13.3 All NOAMs have improved skills and capacity to further develop the organic sector 13.4 The organic sectors in Rwanda and Burundi are further developed 13.5 Has the OTEA-project</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EAOM secretariat is established and regularly meets in the JMCs • AfrOnet is leading the regional organic movement, and • Capacities of NOAMs increased • ROAM and BOAM are institutionally strengthened (increased members+sustainability plans developed) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overlapping mandates with EOA Pillars 1,5 and 6 make it difficult to assess which results are attributable to OTEA and EOA respectively. • KOAN has hosted the EAOM secretariat continuously during OTEA. The JMC has been meeting regularly in conjunction with other events. • AfrOnet remains with limited staff and institutional capacity. It can be regarded as the leading regional organic movement even though capacity constrained. Its operation is heavily donor dependent. • Capacity development of NOAMs is highly varied. NOGAMU has been drastically damaged by mismanagement and remains struggling and probably without donor support. ROAM faced repeated issues of mismanagement and is currently an organisation run by volunteers. Organisational development has generated some new trust and donor support appears to be forthcoming in the near future. KOAN and TOAM both face staff reduction as a result of OTEA funding ending in 2018 and with that loss of experienced personnel. BOAM remains small, but reports to have been strengthened considerably by OTEA. The strengthening may, however, be limited to a few individuals rather than to systems. The sustainability plans appear to vary in form and content and may not fully address strategic issues for financial sustainability. • OTEA has definitely contributed to networking among the NOAMs. Contacts established are likely to be sustained at least for some time as individuals have got to know each other. There is also a likelihood that other donors will provide support to help maintain the forged links. • The African Organic Agriculture Actors Directory provides a very useful tool for making contacts across borders.

contributed to the creation of lasting networks among stakeholders involved in, or with a stake in, trade policy making?		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key cumulative data on e.g. membership development not reported annually.
<p>Component E:</p> <p>14. Can documentation of the development of organic agriculture and data on production and trade be accessed?</p> <p>14.1 Availability of reliable information and statistics on production, trade and multifunctional benefits of organic agriculture and their contributions to the challenges and needs in East Africa</p> <p>14.2 Is by now data collection mainstreamed and institutionalised, with data available for trade, advocacy and sector development?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unified data collection is functioning Data is available for advocacy Number of best practices for advocacy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Training and efforts to create a system for uniform data collection has resulted in a system being in place. NOAMs report data to IFOAM for use in the yearbooks on organic production published by FIBL. Some data is made available on the FIBL website https://statistics.fibl.org/world/markets-trade-world.htm For anyone interested but without prior knowledge it remains difficult to find the data relevant for East Africa. NOAMs have additional data but not availed on their websites. There are constraints to collection of trade data: No disaggregation of organic from other produce, companies don't want to disclose, etc. Some NOAMs dispute the accuracy of the data published by FIBL, noting that the source is unknown to them. Some few case studies have been presented by NOAMs but not availed on their websites. Other promotional materials have been developed at NOAMs level, but most of these are hard to access for an outsider.
Efficiency		
15. Can the costs for the project be justified by its results, in comparison with similar initiatives? (This question is not expected to be addressed through elaborate cost-efficiency and cost-benefit analyses but rather through analytical reasoning.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Comparisons with other interventions based on team's experiences 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NOAMs have been able to carry out a lot of useful activity through project facilitation. Overlapping mandates with EOA makes it difficult to assess which results are attributable to OTEA and EOA respectively. Corruption cases in ROAM and NOGAMU weakened these NOAMs dramatically. The transition from a more centralised OSEA to a more decentralised OTEA without securing adequate institutional development at NOAM level may have contributed to cases of mismanagement. Donor's fragmented support and limited coordination created complex management within NOAMs and relatively weak monitoring as compared to a situation with stronger donor coordination. NOAM respondents generally felt that investing some 40,000 Euro in the conference rather than in continued project activity at NOAM level was a misdirected resource allocation. NOAM respondents also felt that IFOAM's 40% share of the total project expenditure was high. The overall assessment on value for money is positive if cases of mismanagement had not impacted negatively. No doubts, costs could be justified if the issues of ROAM and NOGAMU are not included in the assessment ("the gross value"), but the ROAM and NOGAMY issues lowered efficiency ("the net value"). It is noted that the setbacks in ROAM and NOGAMU may only to a minor extent be attributed directly to OTEA so the relevance of making a distinction between "the gross value" and "the net value" can be questioned if strictly from an OTEA perspective)

16. Efficiency and clarity of project organisation?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Well-structured, clear and logical organogram Perceived and intended roles of partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>The operational procedures paper (4 pp. undated) indicates that four out of five components have “conveners” from IFOAM, while AfrOnet is to coordinate the partners in OTEA. This paper describes a situation after the initially planned project office and working groups for each component had been abolished. In reality, IFOAM has had the main coordination role, while AfrOnet was never equipped nor gained strength to take on a coordinator role. Some NOAMs regard the roles of AfrOnet and IFOAM in OTEA as unclear.</i>
17. Efficiency and timeliness in reporting and audits?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Quality of reports Timeliness of reports Audit reports and their approval by Sida 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>The Annual Reports are generally providing good overviews and relevant information but no financial reporting. It is also hard to find cumulative numeric data on key parameters both in the narrative text and in the OTEA monitoring tool. An example is NOAMs membership development.</i> <i>Partners reports to IFOAM were not always timely.</i> <i>On financial reporting: Partners mention that they report expenditure by component, but IFOAM reports that expenditure per component is only compiled at the time of audit. By June 2019 expenditure per component as not available for 2018. This is puzzling as the multi-year budget is only prepared by component, and component-wise costs should thus be expected to be a disaggregation to be continuously monitored.</i> <i>Lack of multi-year budgets per partner has limited the partner’s ability to plan strategically more than yearly.</i> <i>The expenditure report with a forecast for 2019 presented by IFOAM indicates a total of some 70,000 Euro to be accounted for by partners (except the 40,000 Euro set aside for the conference); however, partners report that they have very little or nothing to report since they have already exhausted and reported on the allocations made for 2018 and no disbursements were made 2019.</i> <i>Audit reports for 2015-2017 have been approved by Sida after some communication and clarification.</i> <i>The “NOGAMU loss” remains a liability from NOGAMU to IFOAM by 1.1.2018.</i> <i>As per Sida’s agreement, IFOAM should submit annual audited financial reports to Sida by 31 March yearly.</i> <i>However, for 2018, the Team was informed that audit will be combined with the no-cost extension period and be submitted by October 2019. Meanwhile, the NOGAMU loss has remained a liability by NOGAMU to IFOAM. Sida reports that it will not compensate IFOAM. No legal actions were so far taken for an attempt to recover the lost amount. The new NOGAMU leadership expressed frustration that those responsible for the loss have not been subjected to any legal action.</i>
18. Efficiency in communication?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Principles for communication Practice in communication 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Communication procedures are outlined in the IFOAM paper on operational procedures for OTEA but largely limited to the bottom up communication flow, not stipulating how IFOAM will ensure that partners are kept informed. AfrOnet noted that they were not always informed on disbursements made to partners or other aspects of financial flows.</i> <i>The Agreement with Sida, (5.6) stipulates that the partner (presumably the defined Cooperation Partner; IFOAM) “shall come up with the communication strategy...with details on how to reach different type of stakeholders with information regarding this project.”</i> <i>AfrOnet has developed its Communication strategy (2017). It deals mainly with how AfrOnet can reach out and for its internal communication and less how it will secure information from its members, i.e. opposite to</i>

		<i>the OTEA operational procedures paper.</i>
Sustainability		
<p>19. Is it likely that the benefits (outcomes) of the project are sustainable? If so, for a reasonably long time?</p> <p>19.1 If not why, and what could have been done differently in order to ensure sustainability of results?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Levels and nature of external funding • Organisation's own revenue, scope for self-sustained operations • Scope for other donor's support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>It should be noted, in this context, that the global demand for organic products grows more rapidly than the demand for food generally. This means that globally there is an underlying positive trend. Much of this is related to wealthier consumer groups in the richer parts of the world, but segments of consumers in low- and middle-income countries also increasingly demand "safe" and certified food. The challenge for sustainability is thus less related to constraints in the macro trade environment but more related to the governance realities and other realities at national or local levels.</i> • <i>NOAMs are heavily donor dependent as their own revenue base is minimal. Different NOAMs have different ideas on how they can sustain themselves. In cases where they plan some form of business in organic produce, such plans are not yet well analysed.</i> • <i>The project could have included support to a more in-depth strategic analysis for NOAMs, including for example how a NOAM business activity should be organised in order not to jeopardise the key tasks or the very existence of a NOAM.</i> • <i>An alternative approach is to recognise that NOAMs are and will be donor dependent and if projects are well managed donors may be willing to provide support for quite some time to come.</i> • <i>In many cases, production and trade may be sustainable and remain organic based on established consumer/customer as well as producers' interest. Third party certification may also be sustained and expanded as systems are already financially viable.</i> • <i>National certification organisations are generally struggling due to, among others, competition with international ones. No national certification organisation is thriving. AfriCert, an international body with its base in Kenya, appears sustainable. It has a wider mandate than organic produce per se.</i> • <i>PGS groups appear often to be in viable business, but not very dependent on EAOPS or use of the Kilimohai mark. Some groups have not renewed the license for use of Kilimohai as the benefits have been found to be lower than the associated costs.</i> • <i>Duration of a license agreement is supposed to be three years but was found to be less than that in the groups visited at least in Kenya. Some groups report costs for the license. In Tanzania it was reported that there is a difference in this respect between initiatives supported by SDC and OTEA respectively. In Kenya groups reported on costs while KOAN reported that there should be no costs for the groups with the possible exception of costs for their internal peer review. It is noted that there are other costs than those related to organic product certification, for example to the respective countries' Bureau of Standards or equivalent.</i> • <i>A more stringent standard on duration and costs for Kilimohai licensing could enhance chances for sustainability.</i>
Cross-cutting issues		
20. Has the project contributed to poverty reduction? How?	See under relevance above	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Reference is made to the main text of the report.</i>

21. Has the project had any positive or negative effects on gender equality? Could gender mainstreaming have been improved in planning, implementation or follow up?	See under relevance above	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reference is made to the main text of the report.
22. Has the project had any positive or negative effects on the environment/climate? Could environment/climate considerations have been improved in planning, implementation or follow up?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mode of operation Travel efficiency Choice of crops/products for value chain support, technology 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Organic production is expected to impact positively on the environment, yet certain aspects are subject to debate, for instance the possible need for a higher energy input due to sometimes increased activity for weed and pest control, tillage, etc. Another issues subject to debate is the, sometimes, low yield per unit area of land and sometimes low output per unit of labour input. All these factors are unique to crops and local situations. Several examples were observed where farms visited were excellent “model farms” in a genuine sense. Such farmers manage soil fertility cautiously and manage to get good harvests. Labour inputs are commonly rather high and production must target high value produce or processing into high value products. The only negative factor observed is the increment of traveling and transport that OTEA has generated. International travel may remain a necessity to some extent, but should be minimised. JMC meetings, which per routine are twice annually could be replaced, at least partly, by virtual meetings.
Risk analysis, risk management and risk mitigation		
23. How thorough organisational assessments (governance structure and evidence of function, audit routines, financial policies and financial procedures manual, internal communication, etc.) were conducted before and during the project?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Use of standardised procedures, e.g. MANGO Staff development initiatives, training, etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assessments were inadequate from the start. There was a level of trust and a feeling of shared values. Later, mainly EOA through Biovision East Africa Trust has initiated thorough organisational assessments followed by action plans. Some of these have been made available to IFOAM. The Team only reviewed the process for ROAM which appeared sound. It is noted that TOAM and AfrOnet, for example, has been classified as “high risk” or “significant risk”, while NOGAMU was classified as “Medium risk”. Reference to 24 and 25 below and to country summary report for Rwanda, Annex 6.
24. How have disruptions (ROAM) and the collapse of Nogamu been handled?		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NOGAMU was suspended from the project Reference to 17 above and to the country summary report (Annex 6) regarding NOGAMU financial issues Reference to country summary report (Rwanda) Annex 6 regarding ROAM An organisational assessment was finally conducted on ROAM followed by development of an action plan and follow up on the same. This was initiated by EOA/Biovision East Africa Trust. Such initiative should preferably have been taken before OTEA was launched or at the latest when the first incidence of mismanagement became apparent in October 2016. Instead, another disbursement was made to ROAM under new leadership but insufficient governance, followed by another era with managerial issues in 2017. Governance procedures have since improved, but ROAM remains fragile and financially weak.
25. How is the possibility to work and support national organic movements given the obstacles that have been with ROAM and Nogamu?		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The overarching problem in this context is the generally weak level of governance in several of the countries. This activity, however, being governed mainly by producers and consumers (market) interests should be expected to stand a better chance for good governance than interventions resting solely in the public sector.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Level of donor funding may impact on risks for weaker governance in case of priorities ending up on short term personal gains rather than on long term sustainability and growth.</i> • <i>Donor fragmentation may yield complexities and difficulties to monitor both activity and finance, apart from generating a lot of work in the implementing organisation with reporting, donor meetings, reviews, assessments, etc.</i> • <i>Sida channels a considerable amount via the Civil Society. Organisations like Forum Syd and SSNC have established routines for organisational assessments. For Forum Syd the common modality is to channel support to a Swedish CSO which in turns supports a CSO in another country. Such support is including support to countries where governance may be even weaker than in the OTEA countries, like Somalia, DRC, Congo and others.</i> • <i>There are established methods for organisational assessments, action plans and follow up both internationally and in a Swedish context The McKinsey 7S organisational effectiveness framework was used by Biovision EA, another is "Management of NGOs (Mango) used by Forum Syd. Also international NGOs have routines, for example Save the Children International.</i> • <i>Therefore, with good routines in place, including donor coordination, there are all reasons to believe that it is possible to work with NOAMs. Clear responsibility and adequate resources and plans for internal project monitoring, as seem to have been the case during OSEA, are also important elements for minimising risks.</i>
26. Are there other possible partners for IFOAM?		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>The need for donor coordination has been commented on above. There is also a certain fragmentation in the recipient/implementation end. The Participatory Ecological Land Use Management (PELUM) Association is also member based and has a similar albeit a bit wider mandate. It operates in the countries of OTEA except Burundi.</i> • <i>In Uganda, where the discontinued cooperation with NOGAMU created a vacuum, it is noted that:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <i>NOGAMU still exists, now under new leadership,</i> ○ <i>A new organisation, Eco Terra Alliance Uganda (ETAU) is a membership non-profit making organization registered in August 2018 that promotes and coordinates organic agriculture stakeholders including small holder farmers, exporters, Government and Private Entities, as well as research institutions, policy makers and consumers. Its membership is made up of local organic farmers, distributors, retailers, students, and consumers wishing to support and promote certified organic , bio-dynamic-, agro-forestry and permaculture practice include comprehensive environment care in Uganda.</i> ○ <i>PELUM Uganda also exists.</i> • <i>It was beyond the scope of this evaluation to assess merits and de-merits of the above organisations as well as to make a comprehensive search for potential partners for IFOAM.</i>

Annex 8 Photos from evaluation

Photo in Kenya: Florence Gathoni Gachango, Tanzania: Casmir Makoye

Mukika PGS - Chuka, Tharaka Nithi

Initiated in 2002, the group's focus was pig production. Persistent husbandry and marketing challenges forced the group to shift from pig rearing to production of improved local chicken. With a membership of 21 (15 women & 6 men) the group made contact with KOAN in 2015, when training on organic poultry production was introduced. The group was then linked to an improved local chicken hatchery, and supplier of organic poultry feeds. In 2016, the group received a cash injection of KES 50,000 from KOAN. The funds were used to build a joint poultry house (this no longer exist as production is no longer done collectively). After a peer review in 2016, the group's PGS was approved. KOAN covered the PGS training and certification costs while the group's contribution was time investment, peer review, and translation of the organic standard to Kichuka dialect. The group has acquired an incubator (1,238 eggs capacity) from the Upper Tana funding, a government initiative. This project has also supported the group with a feed processing plant. With an incubator and feed plant in place, the group has managed to address quality issues with regards to chicks, and feed production.



The group has embraced organic agriculture in all their enterprises thereby able to meet the requirement that 60% of the feed raw material should come from own production. The group has a market agreement with Legacy Hotel (Chuka town), and receive a fixed price of KES 700 for 1.8kg chicken (live weight). ”



New Bairunyu Bee Keepers - Chogoria

Bairunyi Bee Keepers cooperative was formed in the 1970s with a social mandate to produce honey for dowry payment, and production of local brew. The cooperative re-branded in 2009 when it was registered as a commercial honey farming entity with 300 members. The Current active membership stands at 110 of which 28 are female and 7 youths. The group owns approximately 21,000 beehives in stationed in Mt. Kenya forest.



With full support from KOAN, the group received a third-party certification in 2018. The group has also benefited from other initiatives. Although the group has at one time sold their processed honey in the USA (informally) details of their current market were not forthcoming.

Kamicha-Kabondo fresh organic cassava producers – Ahero, Kisumu

The group, which is a sub-group of the Kamicha Kabondo development group was officially registered in 2018, with its main focus being cassava production and value addition. The group has since diversified its production to include finger millet, traditional vegetables, and herbs. The group has been facilitated by different organizations; PELUM -Kenya – Land use management; CREP – Group dynamics; KOAN – PGS training and certification process. Although the initial membership of the group was 25, the PGS approval was issued for 22 members, following non-compliance by 3 members. Current group membership is 82 farmers of which $\frac{3}{4}$ are female.



The group acquired a KES 4million processing cassava processing plant for the National government, and KES 80,000 from KOAN for construction of the processing plant infrastructure. The housing was however small for the machinery which was later put up in a building owned by the local cooperative.

Other than fresh and value-added cassava products, the group has found a niche market in production of cassava cuttings for propagation. With the growing demand for cassava seedlings, the group continues to enjoy better prices compared to conventional cassava producers. A contract with the True Trade limited for supply of fresh raw cassava did not last long as the group focused more on production of propagation material. The validity period of the EAOM has expired but the group is not very keen on the renewal – no demand to use the mark.

Ruma Organic Farmers Self Help Group (ROFA) - Homabay

ROFA was formed in 2015 with the help of a local NGO – The Livelihood Foundation (TLF), who trained the farmers on soil management, and modern farming techniques as pathways to poverty reduction. The group has 30 members (20 females, 10 males). The group's main crop is groundnuts but it has recently diversified to include cassava, sorghum, green amaranth, and sunflower. The group's PGS trainings were facilitated by KOAN who also injected KES 50,000 into the group to facilitate the certification process. The group is involved in groundnut value addition (services are rendered to members by the coordinator at a subsidize fee) with the main target being the local market.



The group uses word of mouth to promote their organic peanut butter which is fetching a slightly higher price than the conventional one in the local market.

The validity of the organic certification has expired, and the group is in the process of raising funds to facilitate renewal of the organic certification, and KEBS approval.

INNOGOF - Nairobi

The Innovative Organic Group of farmers (INNOGOF) was formed in 2014 by individuals who had interest in growing healthy food for themselves. The group comprises of 20 members (7 males, 13 females). Two group members are certified organic trainers and are normally engaged in training new members on organic production at a fee of KES 20,000 for a session of 5-6 days and also in internal checks in association with other two group members.

INNOGOF is a member of KOAN and operates an organic farmers market in Nairobi Garden Estate every Saturday. The group is anchored on providing credible organic products, establishing personal relationships with customers (one-on-one selling), and providing a 'service' to the customers, not 'market'.





Bridges Organic Restaurant – Nairobi

Bridges Organic Restaurant has been in operation for the last 11 years (the first 10 years as a family business ran by the directors. A management team was hired last year with the aim of growing the revenue base, and the Bridges brand. The brand has different components; restaurant, wellness club, cooking classes, value added products, and organic basket programme).



The restaurant has benefited from OTEA project in the following ways;

- Identification and linkage with organic farmers for supplies
- Monitoring the credibility of the produce source
- Facilitation to participate in fairs/exhibitions
- Support with promotional materials.

Bridges value added products include honey, peanut, chia, moringa, and hibiscus tea, all sourced from organic farmers.

Key challenges for Bridges include; competition with agents supplying supermarkets; low level of operation (can only move very small volumes); inconsistency in organic production (especially where producers are relying on rainwater for production).



Food Lovers store – Dar es Salaam



Food Lovers is a chain of food stores in Southern Africa. The picture above is from the organic food section at the Food Lovers outlet at Msasini just south of the famous Oyster Bay in Dar es Salaam. Note the Kilimohai mark up to the right.

Kisarawe Upendo PGS - Tanzania

Coconut oil and Moringa oil are two products of the Kisarawe Upendo PGS in Tanzania



Kisarawe Upendo PGS embarked on solar-drying of vegetables but also process and pack coconut and dried mango.



Annex 9 Inception report excl. annexes

Evaluation of Sida's Support to the Project "Organic Trade and Value Chain Development in East Africa", OTEA, 2014-2019

Inception Report

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23 May 2019

Abbreviations and acronyms

AfrOnet	African Organic Network
AU	African Union
BOAM	Burundi Organic Agricultural Movement
CB	Certification body
EA	East Africa
EAC	East African Community
EAOPS	East African Organic Products Standard
EAOM	East African Organic Mark
EPOPA	Export Promotion of Organic Products from Africa
EOA	Ecological Organic Agriculture
EU	European Union
KOAN	Kenya Organic Agriculture Network
IFOAM	International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements, also "Organics International"
NOGAMU	National Organic Agricultural Movement of Uganda
OA	Organic Agriculture
OSEA	Regional Cooperation for Organic Standards and Certification Capacity in East Africa

OTEA	Organic Trade and Value Chain Development in East Africa
PGS	Participatory Guarantee Systems
ROAM	Rwanda Organic Agriculture Movement
TOAM	Tanzania Organic Agriculture Movement
UN	United Nations

1. Introduction

1.1 The inception report

This inception report consists of a presentation of the basics related to the evaluation as well as basic information on the project to be evaluated. There are four appendices:

- Appendix 1: Evaluation matrix
- Appendix 2: Terms of Reference
- Appendix 3: The Project Theory of change/Log frame
- Appendix 4: List of documents so far available.

1.2 The evaluation purpose

As per the TOR, the purpose of the evaluation is to follow up on the Organic Trade and Value Chain Development in East Africa (OTEA) project and to draw lessons from the project when considering support to similar projects in the future. Moreover, the evaluation is expected to be useful for IFOAM Organics International (International Federation of Agriculture Movements), their implementing partners as well as other donors and organisations.

More specifically, the purposes of the evaluation include:

- Help Sida, IFOAM and its partners to assess the results of the OTEA-project from 2014-2019 to learn from what has worked well and less well and what the overall impact of the project has been.
- To analyse and come up with suggestions for sustainability of the project beyond Sida-funding.
- Provide a tool for reflection on potential improvement on how project implementation may be adjusted and improved for similar projects.
- Assess the role of supporting organic agriculture at the regional level in terms of expanding trade opportunities and diversification and poverty reduction.

1.3 Evaluation users

The primary intended users of the evaluation are inter alia:

- The project management team, higher management and the Steering Committee of IFOAM and the National Organic Movements (NOAMs).

- The Swedish Embassy in Addis Ababa, Sida's Africa Department in Stockholm and other relevant Embassies in Eastern Africa.

1.4 Evaluation scope

The OTEA project is projected to be concluded by end of June 2019 after a short no-cost extension. The evaluation is thus an end of project evaluation and should focus on lessons learnt, effectiveness, impact and sustainability issues.

There were some setbacks among the initial project implementers, notably the collapse of NOGAMU due to alleged corruption, even though reportedly unrelated to OTEA. There is a risk that these setbacks cast an undue shade on the OTEA project. Therefore, the Team finds it necessary to make a fairly detailed review of the actual achievements under the different components (see evaluation matrix under Effectiveness, Appendix 1) in order not to allow biasness due to the mentioned setbacks. This does not mean avoiding scrutiny of OTEA in relation to alleged corruption, and if the project was designed to minimise corruption risks, but implies that this issue should be treated as one among several factors, positive and negative, that should be considered in the evaluation.

Alleged corruption is nevertheless a factor that has damaged the organic agriculture movement in East Africa. The evaluation should therefore look into what measures for organisational strengthening were introduced by the project and assess if and how such measures could be more effective.

OTEA builds on the earlier Regional Cooperation for Organic Standards and Certification Capacity in East Africa (OSEA) and on even earlier cooperation facilitated by Sida. OSEA was evaluated in 2013 and this evaluation should consciously focus on OTEA. The TOR only suggests that the evaluation should look back further by noting previously not identified effects of the OSEA I and II, including both positive and negative, intended and unintended effects.

In spite of a limited budget for the evaluation the team finds it essential to visit several NOAM's as well as Afr0net in order to get information and views from key actors, especially in relation to project organisation and risk management. The team has established contacts with key informants in Uganda for its attempt to understand if the project's risk mitigation and organisational strengthening could have been better designed and implemented to avoid issues of the type that led to NOGAMU's collapse.

2. About the OTEA Project

2.1 Context and basic data

The history of Sida support to organic agriculture development in East Africa dates back to 1997—2008 when the Export Promotion of Organic Products from Africa (EPOPA) programme was implemented with support from Sida. One of the early focal crops was cotton and in particular production of organic cotton in Uganda.

The Project “**Organic Trade and Value Chain Development in East Africa, OTEA**” **2014—2019** is a direct continuation of two previous phases supported by Sida and implemented by the IFOAM. The earlier phases of OSEA supported the development of regional organic standards and certification capacity in East Africa and an enabling framework for organic agriculture. An East African Organic Products Standard was adopted by the EAC Council in April 2007. An East African Organic Mark was also established. This has provided the fundamentals for a further development of the local and regional markets. The OSEA II aimed at increasing income for rural communities through local, regional and international trade in organic products and was to accomplish the following results:

- Improved certification services in East Africa.
- Appropriate conformity assessment systems for EA smallholders and local and regional organic marketing exist.
- Market access to the EU is improved.
- More comprehensive standard and standard revised according to practical experiences.
- Operators understand and implement the standards.
- Improved local market opportunities.
- The East African Organic Mark is well managed.
- Increased intra-EAC trade in organic products.
- Better government policies and plans for the organic sector.
- The sector in Rwanda and Burundi is further developed.
- Existence of comprehensive information about the development in East Africa.

It was implemented by IFOAM and the National Organic Agriculture Movements in Burundi (BOAM), Kenya (KOAN), Rwanda (ROAM), Tanzania (TOAM) and Uganda (NOGAMU) in close cooperation with the organic stakeholders and governments in the East African countries and ran through 2013.

The OTEA, operational from 2014, is thus a follow-up to OSEA I and II. The OTEA project centres on local and regional market-oriented organic production, building on the foundation of the East African Organic Products Standard, the East African Organic Mark, the development of a relevant Organic Guarantee System and emerging consumer awareness. A focus has been on the further development of organic value chains, ensuring regional trade growth in order for East African farmers to benefit from the rapidly growing market for organic products.

By the time the decision to support the intervention was made it was assessed and was found to be in line with relevant Sida policy documents, including the by then applicable Regional Strategy for Sweden’s development cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa, under which it is being financed. The mentioned Strategy has since been succeeded by

another Strategy for 2016–2021. The current Strategy states that Sida’s interventions are expected to contribute to improved environment, sustainable use of natural resources and strengthened resilience against environmental degradation, climate change and disasters. A specific point mentions the ambition to contribute to strengthen capacity among regional actors to support sustainable management and use of common ecosystem services and natural resources. However, the TOR states that there is no possibility for continued partnership at this stage between Sida and IFOAM within the current regional strategy.

The Sida support has amounted to 23,5 MSEK from 2014—2018 with a no-cost extension making the project operational until mid-2019. Out of the allocation, 22.985.412 SEK has been received by IFOAM. Sida is the sole donor.

2.2 Theory of change/Log frame

A very brief log frame overview was included in the Project Proposal, which was modified and elaborated in 2016 (Appendix 2). NIRAS had not accessed the elaborated Theory of Change (ToC)/Log frame of 2016 during the tender preparation and thus indicated that a more detailed ToC would have to be recreated during the Inception phase. However, with the detailed ToC now at hand there is no such need. Reference is made to section 5.3 for further information and comments.

2.3 Goal hierarchy and project components

The overall development goal is **to contribute to improving the income and livelihoods of rural communities in East Africa through the development of market-oriented organic production.**

The specific project objective is **to increase trade with organic products, by supporting development of enabling regional policies, a capacitated production and trade environment, and an increased consumer awareness.**

There are five project components and, as per the 2016 version, 11 outcome objectives. In 2016 indicators were developed for the 11 outcome objectives.

Components	Outcome objectives
A: A well-functioning Organic Guarantee System (OGS) in East Africa and increased consumer awareness, and therefore demand for labelled organic products	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OGS in the region sustainably managed • Efficient and sustainable certification bodies operate in the region • Increased international recognition of the East African Organic Products Standard (EAOPS)

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased credibility and use of the East African Organic Mark (EAOM) in the region and increased consumer awareness • Well-functioning Participatory Guarantee Systems (PGS) in the region
B: Increased capacity of local producers to access and supply local and regional markets	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased organic trade in local and regional markets
C: East African government policies, strategies and plans support the organic agriculture (OA) sector. EAC and AU policy makers are supportive of OA and ecological organic agriculture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • East African government policies, strategies and plans support the organic agriculture (OA) sector. EAC and AU policy makers are supportive of OA and ecological organic agriculture
D: All National Organic Movements (NOAMs) have increased capacity and skills to further develop the organic sector. The Regional organic Network (Afr0net) is strengthened and able to address issues of regional importance at EAC and AU levels	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased cooperation on a regional level through increased skills and capacity of all NOAMs • The organic sectors in Rwanda and Burundi are further developed
E: Increased availability of reliable information and statistics on production, trade and multi-functional benefits of organic agriculture and their contributions to the challenges and needs in East Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data collection is mainstreamed and institutionalised • Reliable data is available for trade, advocacy and sector development.

2.4 Project stakeholders and target group


The target group for the intervention is the organic farming households, processors (and their employees) and traders in East Africa. This target group could be further described as follows:

- The primary target group is the farming community of the East African region. As described in the rationale for this action, the development of organic farming practice and resultant markets have a direct benefit to farmers on a level of income, food security and social development. Development in this regard will then also impact positively on the other actors in the value chain, namely
- Processors and traders, being the secondary targets of this action.

The stakeholders in the project are the organic value chain organizations, the supporting institutions (such as schools, business associations, consumers, environmental and development NGOs), the certification bodies, as well as government agencies in East Africa.

2.5 Project organisation

IFOAM is Sida's contractual partner, and therefore has the overall responsibility for OTEA. An undated Brief has been prepared for the purpose of giving an overview of the main management aspects of the OTEA Project. It includes an organogram:



The role of AfrOnet is described in the Brief:

AfrOnet is executing two main tasks in regard to the OTEA project:

- 1) provides project services and
- 2) coordinates the partners in OTEA.

There are **Conveners** for the different Components:

Component A =	David Gould (IFOAM, left 2018)
Component B=	Shaknoza (IFOAM)
Component C=	AfrOnet
Component D =	Barbara/Konrad (Organic Leadership Courses, OLC; IFOAM)
Component E=	Shaknoza (IFOAM)

The conveners are experts in their area and can be asked for technical inputs. This has to be requested by the partners on time in order to plan accordingly. Whenever a concrete input has taken place, the convener has to report back with a short and concise report. This needs to be submitted directly to AfrOnet and IFOAM.

The Brief also states the applicable communication and reporting lines as well as the tools envisaged to be used for OTEA monitoring:

- Outcomes/activities: Narrative reports, Results-based monitoring, work plans incl. budgets.
- Finances: Cash flow tables, Financial reports (quarterly, half yearly), budget monitoring
- Processes: Steering Committee, Stakeholder forum, Working groups, Joint Management Committee (JMC).

The Evaluation Matrix, Appendix 1, has incorporated the Indicators of the OTEA expanded log frame of 2016 (red text in the matrix).

2.6 Major activities

The 2016 Log frame (Results summary, also OTEA's monitoring tool) includes a range of activities under the various components, for example:

- Capacity building/training
- Advice and support
- Subsidy to local certification and accreditation costs
- Promotional activities
- Support designed to assist value chain actors
- Support to national policy development
- Lobbying
- Conferences
- Institutional support to an EAOM secretariat
- Support to Joint Management Committee meetings, Project Steering Committee and stakeholder fora
- Financial support and TA to NOAMs
- Identify and develop further tools for data collection and management
- Annual compilation of data
- Interaction with NGOs, government institutions and research for data collection and dissemination
- Publicity, incl. successful case studies.

2.7 External factors

As mentioned above, alleged corruption has caused serious setback in the development of NOGAMU in Uganda and thus indirectly in the OTEA implementation. Reportedly, this has not directly involved OTEA activity or finance, but, as it led to the collapse of NOGAMU, it has still indirectly affected OTEA. Similar allegations have also caused disruptions of the Sida support to ROAM.

3. Relevant documentation

Reference is made to Appendix 2 regarding the available project documentation. It has not been possible to review all documentation during the inception period, but the access to this documentation has facilitated the Team's search for essential information necessary for understanding OTEA and for the planning of the evaluation.

The project document elaborates on how organic agriculture addresses poverty with reference to various studies and opinions. It appears that the very general conclusion is that organic agriculture addresses poverty. The results summary developed while the project was conceptualised and planned and later revised in 2016 does not include any targets or indicators aimed at measuring poverty alleviation or reduction, but is focussed on expansion of organic production. The pros and cons on organic agriculture versus "conventional" agriculture is subjected to a global debate going on for decades. A general position has gradually emerged that the two models of organic and "conventional" agriculture will co-exist and even spur overall positive development though it is not possible to venture into details here. While it is true that organic agriculture can address poverty, at least in certain situations, an opinion that it always does so would be contested by many practitioners and scientists. The Team's early and very tentative finding is that the project has not elaborated on more precisely how poverty will be addressed in its design, nor in its reporting. It is recognised, though, that promotion of organic farming in Africa is in itself a complex task.

The Annual Reports provide illustrated narrative descriptions of activities and to the extent possible outcomes. The reports are supported by a range of appendices with details. The Annual Reports for 2016 and 2017 both contain tabular follow up, as per the format of a Log frame/Results Summary developed during 2016, with information related to the 11 Outcome objectives.

Appendices to the Annual Reports show that the Steering Committee met twice during 2017 and twice during 2016 all documented with notes. Other Appendices report on the three Joint Management Committee meetings convened during 2017.

The 2017 report clearly highlights the governance issues within NOGAMU and ROAM, but at the time of reporting, it was too early to decide on the detailed actions required. The Team has received clarification from Sida that there are by now audit reports for OTEA for 2016 and 2017 meeting Sida's requirements.

Additional documentation will be requested as need arises during the continued evaluation process.

4. Relevance and evaluability of evaluation questions

The Team has further developed and enriched the evaluation questions in the evaluation matrix, Appendix 1, by merging indicative questions in the TOR with the outcome objectives and indicators of the OTEA Results summary format of 2016, and then added questions that have arisen during the inception phase.

The outcome objectives and associated indicators particularly add detail under the Effectiveness criteria. This is not a sign that all focus will be on details under Effectiveness, but a sign of the Team's ambition to assess the projects achievements and/or shortcomings without allowing the dark shade of issues related to NOGAMU and partly ROAM to overshadow the progress made.

Among the Team's additions is a question on how clearly the project was designed to address poverty. This is to complement the question of TOR *Are the assumptions relevant also today regarding the importance of organic trade for the region in relation to using trade as a mean for poverty reduction?* As noted earlier this refers to a major global debate on organic agriculture versus "conventional" agriculture, which the Team will discuss, but it would be inappropriate for the Team to take a definite stand on this major issue. It is noted, though, that the debate has not led to entirely new conclusions in 2019 as compared to those of 2014. There are pros and cons for one or the other now as well as in 2014. It may be useful to bring in the urbanisation factor and global urban population increase in the debate, noting that the relative role of subsistence farming is diminishing as the rural populations, which are globally not growing much in numbers, are awarded a responsibility to produce the ever increasing local surpluses required to feed the growing urban populations. This whole complex of factors and issues may deserve a deeper analysis at the project design phase to ensure that the potential for organic agriculture in certain situations to address poverty is realised.

The TOR question *"How is the possibility to work and support national organic movements given the obstacles that have been with ROAM and NOGAMU?"* and the associated one *"Are there other possible partners for IFOAM?"* are somewhat problematic as the Team is not expected to visit Uganda and that NOGAMU is not operational now. The options at hand is to try and review what organisational assessments were carried out and if such were carried out by an organisation with special competencies on that. Regarding the second question, the Team will use key informants in Uganda to seek information.

A general difficulty in all evaluations is the time it takes for activities to generate the expected impacts. Changes in land use take time and so do changes in national policies. Therefore, some of the real impact is well observable only some time after a project or an activity. There is a necessity to try to use intermediate indicators ("foundations laid") at the time when the final impacts are yet to emerge. A specific indicator was added to capture this factor.

Reference is made to Appendix 1 for additional information.

5. Approach and methodology

5.1 Overall Approach

The evaluation will be divided into three phases: **inception phase** (including development of detailed evaluation methodology; discussions with selected stakeholders and

Sida on approach, deliverables and logistics; preparation of inception report), **data collection phase** with meetings and field work in East Africa, and analysis and **report writing phase**. A debriefing session will be included at the end of the field work period. As per TOR, tentatively a presentation of main findings should be included in conjunction with the first International Conference on Agroecology Transforming Agriculture & Food Systems in Africa; Reducing Synthetic Pesticides and Fertilisers, Scaling up Agroecology and Promoting Ecological Organic Trade, June 18-20 in Nairobi.

Three evaluation phases



The work plan below will guide the work. Minor changes may be made once the Team has clarified with TOAM and KOAN which areas in the respective countries are most suited for field work.

Updated work plan

	2019			May					June				July				August				
	BT	FG	CM	w18	w19	w20	w21	w22	w23	w24	w25	w26	w27	w28	w29	w30	w31	w32	w33	w34	w35
Inception Phase																					
Start-up meeting with the Sida and IFDAM (online) May 10	0.5																				
Documents review and methods development	1																				
Drafting inception report	3	1	1																		
Submission of inception report May 23																					
Comments/no-objection sent by Stakeholders May 28																					
Submission of final inception report May 31																					
Data Collection Phase																					
Document analysis and field work preparation	1.5																				
Field visit to Kenya/key informant interviews (inclusive travel)	7	5																			
Field visit to Tanzania/key informant interviews (inclusive travel)			7																		
Field visit to Rwanda/key informant interviews (inclusive travel)	3																				
Key information interviews (skype/telephone)	1.5	1	1																		
Tentative presentation tentatively June 18-20, Nairobi	1	1	1																		
Data Analysis and Reporting Phase																					
Report writing	5	1	1																		
Submission of Draft Report July 5																					
Feedback from stakeholders on draft report July 19																					
Finalization of the report	2.5																				
Submission of Final Report Tentatively July 31																					
Total days	26.0	9.0	11.0																		

Initials: BT=Bo Tengnäs, FG=Florence Gachango (KE), CM=Casmir Makoya (TZ)

5.2 Applying Rights Based Approaches and Gender Equality

NIRAS strives to the maximum extent possible to integrate a Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) and Gender Equality (GE) into every evaluation we undertake. Integrating a HRBA and GE in evaluation will contribute to learning about programme functioning and improve decision-making on programme design.

The team's fact finding will consciously attempt to target both rights holders and duty bearers. A gender perspective will be integrated in the evaluation and in the design of interview guides and checklists. The Team will strive for facilitating gender-balanced discussions.

Mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues, such as the inclusion of vulnerable groups, is noble, but sometimes insufficient unless there is a conscious analysis of the specific needs of women, youth and other vulnerable groups at strategic points. Based on such analysis, actions specifically targeted at assisting such groups to address their needs can be designed. Overall, the team intends to tackle gender and other issues related to human diversity and vulnerable groups from two angles, by examining (i) the project's level of mainstreaming and (ii) the project specific analyses/targeted action.

5.3 Priorities emerging from the document review

As already noted above there were issues related to governance in two of the NOAMs, which affected the project even though they did not directly involve the project's resources. An important learning element from the project is whether or not the project was designed to minimize risks. Understanding this requires a review of the organisational assessments conducted as well as thorough discussions with partners to establish whether roles and responsibilities among the project partners were perceived as clear and logical. The Team has noted, for example, that there could be overlaps in mandates of AfrOnet expected to provide project services and the "conveners" which are expected to act as experts and provide technical inputs upon requests from partners. AfrOnet is the convener for only one out of five components.

Another observation, also mentioned earlier, is that the project Log frame and result monitoring do not include parameters for monitoring if and how the project addresses poverty and further to that, needs of vulnerable groups. The project design rests on an assumption that development of organic production and trade automatically will address poverty. This assumption is supported by the section 4.1 of the Project Proposal. In some situation it may clearly address poverty, in fact, in large areas of dryland Africa the bulk of the production is indeed organic and forming the foundation for survival. In other situations the scope for fetching a premium price from a certified organic product will be there, but in yet other situations some farmers and agriculturalists would argue that "conventional" agriculture is the only solution in situations where surpluses will have to be produced for urban markets sometimes coupled with relative shortage of manpower for manual farm work.

Based on the above observations, it will be essential to attempt to verify in the field to what extent the project activity has addressed poverty in spite of the goal hierarchy not capturing the poverty aspect well and subsequently the project's internal monitoring appears also not designed to do so.

These two important observations made during the inception period implies a need for fact finding from a cross section of stakeholders from farmers and traders, with a certain focus on poverty issues, to officials of NOAMs, AfrOnet and IFOAM, with a certain focus on project organisation and risk mitigation and further to government officials to capture their overall views on organic production and how organic production is being prioritised in the policy frameworks.

5.4 Data collection and evaluation methods

Three major path ways for data collection

We intend to use three major path ways in our attempt to accurately grasp relevant views on project progress in relation to objectives and plans:

- Interview a good selection of individuals: These will be **interviews and focussed group discussions** (FGDs) based on checklists but still semi-structured to ensure that we cover common ground in interviews, while not excluding expansion or deviation if we come across interesting topics. FGDs will be suitable to use while meeting value chain actors and other key project actors to capture different aspects and views, including on cross-cutting issues. The team will develop checklists before any interview starts. To economise with time, interviews in the field will to a large extent be conducted by the team members individually depending on logistics and practicalities. Officials and more well-equipped business men will be contacted via Skype or telephone when so is feasible.
- **Review web sites and social media** in search for information that sheds interesting light on the project and its results. Prime focus is expected to be on the websites of the participating organisations and businesses but Google searches on, for example, organic products from East Africa may possibly also be rewarding.
- **Review of relevant documentation** including the Project Document, Grant Agreement, the earlier evaluations, project reports and internal assessments and compiled project data.

With reference to 5.3 above, the Team foresees a need for three checklists to guide the interviews:

- One tailored for farmers, traders, processors and other value chain actors,
- One tailored for officials within the project partner organisations, and
- One tailored mainly for Government and EAC officials and officials of other organisations.

Observations is an additional minor pathway, especially when focussing on the trade and market aspects.

Country visits

We propose to make field visits to selected areas in Kenya and Tanzania, while a visit to Rwanda will be of shorter duration and restricted to discussions with stakeholders in Kigali. Our suggested evaluators Florence Gachango and the Team Leader Bo Tegnäs will carry out and support in Kenya, while Casmir Makoye will be in charge of the field interviews in Tanzania. Bo Tegnäs is however, also envisaged to make a visit to Dar es Salaam, primarily in order to meet with AfrOnet.

In the field, the Team will attempt to meet stakeholders along the value chains that the project worked with and also, to the extent possible, Government and farmer organisation representatives to get their opinions and observations. Further contacts with Government and other officials at central level will be made in the capitals or by phone/email.

Early contacts with TOAM has generated information that value chain support has been provided in, for example, Kilimanjaro Region and around Dar es Salaam, Morogoro and Dodoma. Similar early contacts with KOAN informed the Team that similar support in Kenya has been availed in Western Province (Kisumu, Bungoma) and in Central Province (Kiambu, Murang'a, Kirinyaga). A tentative plan for the field work has focussed on areas around Dar es Salaam, Morogoro and Dodoma, which provides for diversity in ecology and social development. In Kenya, the tentative plan is to focus on Western Province as it has generally higher levels of poverty and more diversity than areas of Central Province.

A preliminary plan has been developed; however, the Team is still waiting for more detailed inputs from TOAM and KOAN respectively.

Preliminary work program i E. A.

	Bo	Florence	Casmir
7.6			
8.6			
9.6 Sun Day travel	Travel		Travel
10.6 Mon	Tz Af- rOnet/TOAM		Dar AfrOnet/TOAM
11.6 Tue	Ke	Nbi	Dar
12.6 Wed	Ke	Ke upcountry	Morogoro
13.6 Thu	Rw (ROAM)	Ke upcountry	Morogoro
14.6 Fri	Rw (ROAM etc)	Ke upcountry	Dodoma
15.6 Sat	Rw	Ke Travel back	Tz travel back to Morogoro
16.6 Sun	Ke		Travel to Nbi
17.6 Mon	Ke	Nbi	Ke
18.6 Tue	Ke	Nbi	Ke
19.6 Wed Presentation?	Ke	Nbi	Ke
20.6 Thu Travel night or Friday day	Ke – DK-Swe		Travel Tz
21.6 Fri Overland travel home	Ke – DK-Swe		

In Tanzania, the planned travel to Dodoma has been included also for the purpose of meeting key Government officials there.

A debriefing in Nairobi is planned with at least two team members present. The TOR suggests tentatively that the main findings should be presented at a conference in Nairobi 18-20 June. Our ambition is to time the debriefing to coincide with the conference to enable the team to present as indicated without extra travelling.

Triangulation

Triangulation will be used to synthesise the general conclusions as per the OECD DAC evaluation criteria, using information obtained through the different data collection methods mentioned above.

5.5 Milestones and deliverables

The evaluation will adhere to the following milestones:

What	Who	When (2019)
Submission of the draft inception report	<i>NIRAS</i>	23 May
Comments on inception report	<i>Embassy & stakeholders</i>	28 May
Submission of final inception report	<i>NIRAS</i>	31 May
Field work	<i>NIRAS (stakeholders)</i>	9-21 June including tent. presentation 18-20 June)
Submission of draft evaluation report	<i>NIRAS</i>	5 July
Comments on draft report	<i>Embassy & NIRAS</i>	19 July
Submission of final report	<i>NIRAS</i>	31 July (tentative, latest 31 August)

6. Other issues and recommendations

6.1 Expected assistance from the project

The Team would welcome NOAM representatives to participate in field visits. It will make all efforts to plan field work in a way that economises on transport, potentially synergetic with the respective NOAMs.

The Team will depend on efficient support from the partner organisations given the short time available for this evaluation.

Annex 10 Comments on draft report with Team's responses

Sida and IFOAM provided comments on the draft report which were considered while revising the draft report. Some key comments were provided separately, while many other were made as inserts in the text of the draft. Both categories have been reviewed and considered. The key comments with team's responses have been included in the following compilation.

Sida's key comments with team's responses	
Sida	Team's responses
Sida is very happy with the level of analysis as well as the ambitious method and interviews that have been performed despite short time period as well as economic resources.	Noted.
In general, the overall conclusions seem to be consistent with the perception that Sida has on the OTEA project.	Noted.
The executive summary could be more to the point and sometimes explain with one sentence what is meant. This is since some people might only have time to read the executive summary so that part should be very spot on.	Executive Summary was elaborated in the Final Report.
IFOAM's key comments	
IFOAM	Team's responses
..... very comprehensive report that clearly points out strengths and weaknesses and some perspectives that have been neglected but very important to look at (general food security situation in East Africa and the role of organic agriculture).	Noted.
.....it is a well-written report and contains good overviews (the self-assessment table and the table 2)	Noted.
IFOAM does not intend to primarily work with the poorest of the poor (but certainly needs to strengthen the approach how to include)	Noted. A deeper analysis by IFOAM on how IFOAM activity should be designed to meet the needs of more vulnerable groups would be useful for IFOAM as well as for donors considering engagement with IFOAM.

I felt sometimes confusion between third party certification and PGS or better to say the word certification referred sometimes only to 3rd party certification	We are not so sure that there is such confusion. It is important to note that the team's field visits mainly targeted PGS groups. Several of these groups, particularly in Kenya, voiced their concerns about costs associated with the required trainings and inspections while the benefits of the system for them was not outweighing such costs. NOAMs and others need to ensure that PGS remains a low-cost approach from a local perspective. Nevertheless, some clarification added.
PGS was a strong part of the project and usually involves the poorer section of the farming communities	Noted. We feel we have shed light on this. It is a mix, some producers are not at all poor, but others are and have been assisted.
the perspectives on partners in regard to usage of funds in 2018 (and into 2019) as well as other expectations was not verified or cross-checked with IFOAM. It was clearly communicated that the NO-Cost extension did not mean any additional funds and that the funds of 2018 needed to be stretched.	Correct, we did not cross check. We have now inserted reference to IFOAM's views where deemed necessary in the main text for the final report. We opted not to examine in detail why NOAMs report other expenditure figures and why IFOAM expect expenditure reports for 2019, while most NOAMs claimed they have nothing to report. Financial aspects took an unproprtional amount of time for the evaluation and we carefully avoided entering into the domain of an audit. The official communication between IFOAM and Sida on the no-cost extension did not clarify well how the remaining funds would be used. Citation: <i>The current activity period runs as per 30 November 2018 and the agreement period runs to 31 July 2019. Because of a delay in the activities these periods need to be extended to enable the project to come full circle.</i>
I did not read about the Policy Symposium in Arusha in 2017	Added text in the Final Report.
the audits in IFOAM are all always conducted in June (PWC has set the dates) / July. Therefore, the inclusion of the 6 months in 2019 made much sense.	Practical aspects within IFOAM are appreciated, but the Agreement with Sida indicates that audited accounts should be submitted by 31 March Annually. This would perhaps not have been worth noting if it had not also emerged that (i) the audited accounts of 2016 were accepted by Sida only well into 2018 and (ii) an amount not accounted for by NOGAMU remains a liability from

	<p>NOGAMU to IFOAM with probably no prospects for funds recovery. Therefore, it would have been desirable, in the view of the team, to have the 2018 accounts audited without delay as per the agreement with Sida. Further, the conference was conducted 18-20 June and it will thus not be possible to conduct a full audit in June, realistically nor in July.</p>
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Evaluation of Sida's Support to the Project "Organic Trade and Value Chain Development in East Africa" 2014–2019

This report presents an evaluation of the project "Organic Trade and Value Chain Development in East Africa, OTEA, 2014–2019" implemented by a partnership consisting of IFOAM Organics International, AfrOnet and the National Organic Agriculture Movements in Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. Sida provided financial support. The findings are based on document reviews, web searches and analysis, and personal interactions with staff of the partner organisations, other officials and informants as well as with a large number of farmers and owners of outlets where organic products are sold. Field work was conducted in Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania.

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