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Sida Decentralised Evaluation

NIRAS Sweden AB

Evaluation of Twaweza Strategic Plan 2015–2018, Programme Support in Tanzania

Final Report

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August 2019

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AR	Annual Report
CCM	Chadema Cha Mapinduzi
COSTECH	Commission for Science and Technology
CSSC	Christian Social Service Commission
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
Hivos	Dutch NGO
KiuFunza	A teacher payment for performance research project
LME	Leraning, Monitoring and Evaluation
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Member of Parliament
MSEK	Million Swedish Kroner
MUSD	Million USD
MYR	Mid-Year Review
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
OGP	Open Government Programme
PO	President's Office
RALG	Regional and Local Government
REAG	Research and Evaluation Advisory Group
Sauti za Wananchi	A mobile phone survey platform
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SzW	Sauti za Wananchi
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VfM	Value for Money

PREFACE

The Evaluation of Twaweza, the Tanzania part, was commissioned by The Embassy of Sweden in Tanzania. The evaluation was undertaken by NIRAS between February and May 2019 and was conducted by:

- Svend Erik Sørensen, Team Leader
- Rasmus Hundsbaek Pedersen, Researcher and Civil Society Expert
- Deograsias Mushi, Economist and Local Expert

Kristoffer Engstrand managed the process at NIRAS Sweden. Niels Dabelstein provided quality assurance. Stephen Chimalo managed the evaluation at the Embassy of Sweden, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Twaweza started in 2009 as an ambitious initiative working on enabling citizens to exercise agency, promoting government to be more open and responsive, and improving basic learning for children in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. Twaweza has just completed implementing its Strategy 2015-2018. The theory of change of the Strategy is grounded in two domains, basic education and Open Government, and supported by a Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation (LME) unit.

The Embassy of Sweden in Dar es Salaam has supported Twaweza since 2016 with 48 MSEK for the three years 2016-2018 for activities carried out in Tanzania. The support is provided within Swedish development strategy for Tanzania 2013-2018. The Terms of References (ToR) highlight that focus of the evaluation should be on the organisational development benchmarks; the outcome, quality of outputs, and reach; as well as an assessment of the contribution to the overarching goals of Twaweza.

The report outlines the content of the Twaweza Strategy 2015-2018. It highlights the theory of change of the Strategy and addresses nine problem areas, five in Open Government and four in basic education, for which each has a number of sub-goals and success criteria as well as Twaweza's activities and efforts on how to meet these criteria. The Strategy aims to provide 'measurable impact' on four dimensions by the end of 2018:

1. Children in school are learning as parents, teachers, school administrators and policy makers focus on measuring and improving the learning outcomes resulting from the large [social] investment in basic education.
2. Public authorities are responsive to public demand, and they promote and protect citizens' right to high quality, relevant and meaningful information.
3. Citizens and civil society are asking for, getting and using information to improve their situation and engage public officials to deepen accountability and improve the quality of public service delivery.
4. Public and policy actors are using evidence-based knowledge to transforming governance practice and the provision of basic education.

The evaluation applied a theory of change approach. Progress and achievements for each evaluation criteria were assessed. The data collection methods included desk review of a wide range of documents provided primarily by Twaweza, including cases of four major interventions. Meetings were held and interviews conducted with a range of different stakeholders, including Twaweza management and key personnel, government officials and civil society organisations and a one-day people's meeting in Kigoma.

Findings are presented along the lines of the evaluation criteria and are as follows:

Relevance: This section assesses to which extent the overall analytic approach to the Strategy has been relevant. The methodology applied by Twaweza in identifying 'meaningful' problems leading to the nine problem areas has formed the basis for the Strategy. They were aligned with donor and government priorities at the time and the evaluation considers the choice of problem areas fully legitimate. However, it could be argued, that relying on one methodological approach only may not reflect in full the local citizens' perception of what are the real problems and concerns in education and government. A combination of different analytic approaches would most likely have identified new or nuanced areas of problems, particularly in the light of forming the foundation of a comprehensive 4-year strategy.

Secondly, while acknowledging that Twaweza has produced important evidence and data on service delivery in the first part of the Strategy period, less focus and reporting was observed during the second part. In a context where there is evidence that service delivery has the highest priority need among Tanzanian citizens, efforts to address this concern should probably have been prioritised higher on Twaweza's agenda.

Thirdly, a relevance analysis of four major interventions was undertaken as part of the evaluation. The interventions were: (i) Sauti za Wananchi (a mobile phone survey platform), (ii) KiuFunza (a teacher payment for performance research project), (iii) the Kigoma-Ujiji local government intervention (coming out of the national and global Open Government Partnership, piloting local transparency and accountability) and (iv) the Election 2015 (linked to case studies of public agency demonstrating responsive government and/or active citizenship).

The four major interventions all fall within Twaweza's overall theory of change, but the degree to which they refer to, reflect upon and feed back into the theory of change differed. The Sauti za Wananchi (Szw) was considered highly relevant; KiuFunza relevant yet reflecting the overall theory of change in a narrow way; Kigoma-Ujiji local government intervention highly relevant as Twaweza also moved increasingly towards local activity levels in 2017; and the Election 2015 was relevant focusing on active citizens and accountable politicians, though implementation turned out to be patchy.

Fifth, civic space in Tanzania was shrinking over the strategy period. Twaweza's response was to develop a push back strategy that included coalition building, commenting on bills as well as more advocacy activities. Twaweza developed a profile as an organisation that dared speak out when others withdrew from the public debate. Whereas these approaches and activities were relevant to address the shrinking civic space as well as aligned with donor priorities more could have been done to revisit the overall Strategy and possibly re-strategise in the light of the changing context. While the strategy has been considered 'ambitious' by Twaweza at the same time it was acknowledged that the limitations in the civic space was already underway at the commencement of the Strategy – that is, in 2015. Important signs that Twaweza was reconsidering its approach within Open Government became pronounced in 2018. In the light of the shrinking civic space it could have been considered relevant to revise/adapt its strategic goal earlier in the strategy period.

Effectiveness: Activity, output and outreach levels have been high in almost all Open Government sub-problem areas. Data and data packages produced by Twaweza, particularly through SzW and Uwezo, have been important tools in establishing evidence based information to target groups, whether government officials, members of parliament (MP) or through various media outlets. They have also contributed to initiating important public debate in Tanzania. However, activities have been scattered and lack of follow-up to many of these has to a large extent reduced the ability of Twaweza to strengthen pathways towards outcome levels. Examples are shown in the report (Table 4). Whereas the shrinking of the civic space that gained momentum during the Strategy period may explain barriers to execute certain activities, Twaweza may have had more room for manoeuvring if (i) the ambitious goals had been revised following Tanzania's departure from the Open Government Partnership, and (ii) results of activities undertaken were more systematically followed-up on within the context of the theory of change.

Activity, output and outreach levels in the education domain have also been high, in particularly Uwezo and KiuFunza while less in curriculum development and school management. Data and data packages produced by Twaweza, particularly through Uwezo, have been important tools in establishing evidence based information to target groups, whether government officials, MPs or through various media outlets. In this area, Twaweza built on and

sustained the achievements in the previous strategy period that helped change the thinking on education and learning in Tanzania. As was the case with the open government domain, lack of follow-up on many of the activities undertaken by Twaweza has reduced the ability of Twaweza to strengthen pathways towards outcome levels.

The LME component has been successful in many respects by undertaking numerous monitoring and evaluation activities for learning purposes, helping foster a culture of learning within Twaweza. Main concerns relate to the lack of systematic and prioritised follow-up to activities that could have facilitated improved monitoring and evaluation at outcome levels. As such the LME's efforts to become an integral part in furthering the theory of change has only been somewhat successful.

Organisational benchmarks achieved over the 2015-2017 period are at an average percentage of 58,5%. Looking at 'What Works' benchmarks only for the two domains (Open Government and basic education) the score is, for the three years, 38%. This cannot but be viewed as unsatisfactorily, even considering the restrictiveness of the civic space. With that framework in mind we consider the overall achievement level, 58,5%, somewhat satisfactory.

Efficiency: The efficiency section looks into (i) the value for money of the Twaweza strategy period and (ii) the partnership development.

Value for money (VfM): The relative costs of the Strategy have been compared with two like-minded national organisations and intend to give a wide picture of the relative local costs of the Strategy with a caveat that Twaweza is regionally based, yet with a separate budget operating in Tanzania. Twaweza's activities are relatively more expensive and VfM challenged further by reduced impact achievements. On the other hand, several activities performed by Twaweza may to a reasonable degree justify a higher cost level, including Twaweza operating on a regional scale, strong support to partners - including the development of joint concepts for projects and organisational support- and generally focus on development of human resources.

Twaweza spent about 75% of its planned budget on the implementation of the Strategy. Recruitment and procurement processes remained competitive and Twaweza has a procurement policy that guides on all procurement of goods and services, and it ensures that there is VfM through an open competitive bidding system for all procuring units. Staff recruitment is based on a competitive approach by advertising job vacancies in newspapers, on websites, and also by the use of recruitment agents. Improved infrastructure and the automation of financial management functions have made Twaweza an efficient organisation. Easy access to data and Twaweza information is however problematic when opening its website. Its search machine is highly inadequate not answering satisfactorily to simple search criteria.

Partnership development: During the implementation of its 2015-2018 Strategic Plan, Twaweza partnered with at least 20 development actors, both government and non-government. Sixteen out of the 20 partners entered into formal contracts or MoUs, indicating a sufficient degree of efficiency applied by Twaweza in its relationship with partners as most MoUs specify responsibilities and tasks, as well as expected outputs and deliverables. As mentioned above Twaweza has overall contributed to the development of successful partnerships as well as contributed to strengthening the performance of individual partner organisations, including inspiring organisations, to think more innovatively and providing tools for organisational development. Concerns were raised by partners working in the Open Government domain, which have affected the efficiency of Twaweza's work. These include, among others, that people in general are expressing genuine fear of speaking up as regards the political situation in the country.

Sustainability:

Basic education: Twaweza's close work with the government in the education sector produced some sustained benefits, including on the curriculum; the continuity of Uwezo and SzW data production based on need/demand from numerous stakeholders; an MoU on KiuFunza with Ministry of Education and Ministry of Local Government; sustained perception among education sector stakeholder to focus on learning rather than infrastructure. The fact that government institutions were involved in work processes from the early stages of the basic education component has most likely catered for more sustained results.

Open Government: In comparison to the education problem area, efforts to develop sustained benefits in the Open Government domain have been less obvious due to the gradually more restrictive approach to civic space from the government, but also because Twaweza did not follow-up on completed activities and outputs. Still Twaweza managed to contribute in collaboration with other civil society partners and also, facilitated by a World Bank investment funding to the government, to improve the Access to Information Act in 2015 and 2016. Whereas Twaweza gradually developed a push back approach to restrictions in civic space that included commenting on bills and advocacy activities, Twaweza did not systematically seek other types of more institutionalised collaboration with the national government as the latter's interest in the Open Government Partnership waned. Whereas there are some examples of ad hoc collaboration with government institutions on the collection of data, it should, however, also be acknowledged that establishing such collaboration is challenging in the current context.

Sustained (or near sustained) benefits facilitated by Twaweza have included the birth of a new and independent organisation, Wajibu Institute which is a permanent data desk established at Mwananchi Media; public agency results including construction of schools; capacity building, while often not formalised by Twaweza, has created skills and knowledge development that partners can use. With regard to sustaining Twaweza as a learning organisation, the institutionalisation of the Research and Evaluation Advisory Group (REAG) and the strengthening of the LME unit (through staff expansion) are strong indicators that a continuous and sustained learning culture in Twaweza beyond the strategy period has been fostered. Financially, while a continuous struggle, Twaweza has survived as it has managed to persuade donors of its 'alternative' approach to development and thus donors' willingness to credit this.

Impact: The activities carried out by Twaweza over the strategy period have been many, as documented in this report, yet have had little overall impact when referring to the four dimensions outlined in the Strategy and the theory of change. It was obviously a highly ambitious strategy that Twaweza took on in 2015. Even before the setbacks in 2015 onwards, civic space was restricted in Tanzania. A precondition for achieving a measurable impact was thus the continued democratisation and expansion of civic space in Tanzania. This did not occur, and government restrictions increased. These factors also points to the fact that the government may play a bigger role than reflected in Twaweza's theory of change.

Lessons learned: The Strategy 2015-18 Twaweza had as its point of departure that lasting changes are driven by the actions of motivated citizens. A main means to achieve this is informed public debate, which in turn will promote responsive public authorities and influence policies and plans. However, this chain of actions and effects proved challenging during the strategy period as documented in this evaluation. This is partly related to the shrinking civic space during the strategy period, but it would have been challenging even prior to this development, also partly due to a fragmented activity approach by Twaweza.

When it comes to achieving sustained change, Twaweza's more tangible outcomes come from sustained engagement with key decision-makers and government authorities related to solid

evidence from research and data platforms like Uwezo and Sauti za Wananchi. Data on service delivery has attracted the attention of government authorities throughout the period and opened the door for interaction and allowed for influence, not least in the education sector.

By comparison, Twaweza lost its platform for interaction in the Open Government element of its work with the government withdrawal from the Open Government Partnership at the end of 2017 and it did not manage to establish new ones on a sustained basis. As a reaction to this, Twaweza developed a push back approach to the shrinking civic space over the strategy period. This included the analysis of and commenting on bills, coalition building with other NGOs, more localised activities as well as an increased emphasis on advocacy, not least related to the laws affecting civic space.

Whereas there is evidence that such activities produced some results early in the strategy period, the effect later in the period is unclear from Twaweza's reporting. They also pose a risk to Twaweza's activities as demonstrated with the blocking of further publication of SzW data from the middle of 2018 onwards.

Major changes in the new strategy (2019-2022) and its theory of change include the divesting of the basic education work to a new entity, more activities with change agents and local governments in selected areas and playing down the ambition to foster a responsive government at the national level, at least in the short term. Twaweza at the national level will then amplify local experiences. Whereas most vision and values from the old Strategy are upheld, the mission has changed from collecting evidence to inspire citizens and stimulate responsiveness from authorities. The new strategy aims at demonstrating how citizen can come together and address problems, enable them to be heard, and promote and protect civic space. The main lesson in this context is that people may come together to address problems, but these problems should clearly reflect perceived and actual needs and demands by citizens (and local officials). Otherwise Twaweza's efforts may eventually be in vain.

The changes provide for a less ambitious approach. At the same time, it can also be seen as both more and less realistic in terms of what an NGO can achieve in Tanzania in terms of sustained outcomes. It can be seen as more realistic in that the measurable impacts are more process oriented and focusing on gradual improvements. It can be seen as less realistic in that it takes citizen agency as its point of departure. As demonstrated in this evaluation, evidence on the effect of citizen agency is limited.

In this regard it is also worth noting that the lessons from Twaweza's first strategy period summarised in the 2015-18 Strategy suggest that 'some of our notable successes were achieved precisely in the policy environment and less where we had expected it: change driven by citizens' (p. 7). Similarly, the new strategy suggests that 'the overall citizen agency picture – seeking information, monitoring delivery, speaking out in public and taking action – is complicated and generally weak'.

It is unclear what role providing data and data packages on service delivery, which hitherto has been a key component and opened the door to engagement with government authorities, is to play.

Conclusions

Relevance

- 1) The Strategy has become increasingly challenged during the Strategy period 2015-2018 as the increasing shrinking civic space made it harder to influence government policies and actions through the public debate and deliberations envisioned in the Strategy.
- 2) Conformity has been observed between Twaweza's priorities and the policies and needs/demand from donors, intermediate actors, such as media and other CSOs.
- 3) The four major interventions all fall within Twaweza's overall theory of change, but the degree to which they refer to, reflect upon and feed back into the theory of change differed. The SzW was considered highly relevant; KiuFunza relevant yet very narrowly reflecting the overall theory of change; Kigoma-Ujiji local government intervention highly relevant as Twaweza also moved increasingly towards local activity levels in 2017; the Election 2015 was relevant focusing on active citizens and accountable politicians, though implementation turned patchy.
- 4) Twaweza did not change fundamentally the theory of change during the implementation of the Strategy, though the increasing civic space restrictions occurred and there was a switch from a national-oriented focus early on in the period towards a more decentralised focus during the latter part of the period. Important reflections on the overall approach and strategy can be observed towards the end of the strategy period.
- 5) Activities on evidence and data on service delivery seems to some extent to have been reduced in the second half of the Strategy period or at least they are not reported on to the same extent as in the first half. However, data shows that citizens prioritise service delivery and that focusing on service delivery is recommended in the 2014 evaluation.
- 6) Twaweza limited itself in identifying key problems and concerns for its theory of change and Strategy design as it applied its analysis on a single methodology only, the problem-driven iterative adaptation.

Effectiveness

- 7) Based on a detailed analysis of the two domains and the LME over the four year Strategy period, it is concluded that the activity level has been high in the two main domains, leading to numerous outputs, particularly as regards the 'evidence' side (data production) of the theory of change. These data are in a package format distributed online, through media and directly to government officials and politicians. They have contributed to public debates and overall reach at the intermediate outcome level, which is an important achievement in Tanzania. At the outcome level evidence on lasting and institutionalised change is limited.
- 8) The numerous activities and outputs related to data evidence production have been too scattered. Based on the documentation available to the team, follow-up on activities and intermediate outcomes produced in the two domains and LME have been limited. Opportunities to build up strength on results from activities that could lead towards intermediate outcomes and sustained outcomes have not been fully utilised.
- 9) Almost 60% of the Twaweza benchmarks were achieved over the 2015-2017 period, considered only a somewhat successful accomplishment despite the restrictive socio-political context.

- 10) The many different measurement tools applied by Twaweza (hypotheses, key metrics, benchmarks, outputs, outcomes, etc.) have been inefficient for effective measurement of progress and achievements of the Strategy. Twaweza has spent abundance of time on reporting on these as to meet transparency and accountability while simplified systems would have sufficed and achieved the same.

Efficiency

- 11) Twaweza spent about 75% of its planned budget for the implementation of the Strategy during the four years. This is considered relatively efficient considering the limitations put on the organisation as a result of the strained political context in the country, particularly during the last half-year of 2018.
- 12) A brief comparison based on basic parameters between Twaweza and two like-minded organisations shows that Twaweza's operations are relatively more expensive. Twaweza is highly efficient as regards its management (operations and financial management), being highly automated and following recognised standards and principles. The website is however of poor quality and the time spent on reporting on many indicators of progress and achievements also indicates some degree of inefficiency.
- 13) 16 out of 20 of Twaweza's main partners entered into formal contracts or MoUs indicating a sufficient degree of efficiency applied by Twaweza's in its relationship with partners. Yet, while collaboration has shown an overall ad hoc nature, there is no doubt that Twaweza has provided significant support to partners in their ability to become more innovative and enabled them to strengthen their organisations.

Sustainability

- 14) Partners' perceptions of real and potentially sustained benefits produced in collaboration with Twaweza are high. 17 out of 20 partners claims sustainability if Twaweza would leave. However, limited evidence is provided as to verify such claims.
- 15) The close work with the government in the education sector produced some sustained benefits. Early involvement of government in work processes in the basic education domain has catered for such sustained results.
- 16) In comparison to the education problem area, efforts to develop sustained benefits in the Open Government domain have been less obvious. This is due to the gradual civic space restrictiveness imposed by the government, but also because of Twaweza's less strategic focus in their choice of activities.
- 17) Twaweza contributed to policy change in the Open Government area, primarily through its inputs and improvements to the Access to Information Act. It further developed its activities on analysing and commenting on bills over the strategy period. Whereas the effect of these activities was not always clear, it did help inform decision makers and the public about the implications of upcoming legislation.
- 18) The LME has developed sustained institutionalised results with the creation of an internal advisory body on research and evaluation (REAG) and the staff expansion of the LME unit.

Impact

- 19) By the end of 2018, Twaweza wanted to have made a *measurable* impact on four development dimensions, i.e. school children for learning; authorities' responsiveness to public demands; accessing information for deepened accountability; and transforming government practices based on evidenced knowledge. While these ambitious impacts were clearly aimed at by Twaweza, they were, apart from elements of the 'school learning', only achieved to a limited extent.
- 20) It was obviously a highly ambitious theory of change that Twaweza embarked upon in 2015. Even before the setbacks from 2015 onwards, civic space was restricted in Tanzania. A precondition for achieving the measurable impact was thus the continued democratisation and expansion of civic space in Tanzania. This did not occur, and government restrictions increased. These factors points to the fact that the government play a bigger role than reflected in Twaweza's theory of change.
- 21) SDG data has been increasingly included in the Twaweza databases, particularly educational data (Uwezo) but also government related data, such as social sector data, including health and water.

Recommendations

Relevance

1. When Twaweza embarks on identifying key problems and concerns as well as assign major interventions, thorough and diversified analytic methods should apply. This will contribute to the design of a more realistic theory of change and development of improved pathways to its realisation.
2. Due to the fast changing socio-political context, the theory of change should be regularly subject to review, e.g. every sixth month.
3. Twaweza should re-think its approach to service delivery so as to better reflect the fact that evidence and data collection on service delivery are in demand as it is the most important need perceived by its main target group, Tanzanian citizens.

Effectiveness

4. Twaweza should continue to contribute to public debates in Tanzania through the generation of evidence and experiments, but balance thoughtfully this against development goals, that is, delivering and sustaining results.
5. Twaweza should continue its high activity level, follow-up on those activities that have potential to drive the theory of change forward, i.e. identifying improved pathways for improved opportunities for change.
6. Twaweza should review the results matrix, simplify, and continue describing activities and outputs and ensure that they are clear and logically linked towards effects. In the light of achieved outcomes – or the lack of them – regularly revisit the Strategy's theory of change, including initiate alternative entries to problem analysis and adjust hypotheses and activities accordingly. The number of assessment tools should be reduced, including benchmarks.
7. In order to become more precise on how to achieve intermediate outcomes and outcomes, Twaweza should analyse and more clearly distinguish between what it can control itself, what it can influence directly or through partners, and what is required by other actors to achieve outcomes.

Efficiency

8. Twaweza should continue its efforts to improve its value for money, through, for example, continuous application of advanced technology, ensure that trained staff apply learned skills and when possible adjust salary levels.
9. Twaweza should expand on its partner networking, formalise relationships whenever possible but balance realistically against plans. Efforts should particularly be on supporting partners in their monitoring and evaluation knowledge and skills to ensure their ability to manage projects in general but particular those initiated/facilitated by Twaweza, a process in which Twaweza is already engaged.

Sustainability

10. Related to the fact that some of the main outcomes over the past strategy periods have been achieved through sustained engagement with government authorities, Twaweza should generally seek to engage these authorities prior to initiating major interventions and incentivise their continuous involvement and participation throughout the project cycle whenever possible.
11. Given the changing socio-political context in Tanzania, Twaweza may further develop its activities targeting and protecting the shrinking civic space, but it should maintain a core of activities related to data and work on service delivery, which have proved a main entry point to positive engagement with government authorities.
12. Overall, focus more on the building of organisational capacity of external partners and stakeholders as this will help institutionalise change. This is more important as Twaweza currently seems to be pivoting towards activities at the local level where capacity is often limited. It is also important in a context with increasingly centralised decision-making in order to build resilience towards pressure from central government.
13. Internally, develop scenarios with different trade-offs between working with the government (generating evidence on service delivery in a non-partisan way) and pursuing a watchdog push back approach. Based on these scenarios and thorough risk analyses identify the manoeuvrability of Twaweza in the current socio-political context and let the outcome help sustain Twaweza's future strategy and activities as well as its organisational structures.

Impact

14. Efforts have been made by Twaweza to achieve ambitious and measurable outcomes/goals. Yet, circumstances of repressiveness towards the civil space and Twaweza's too activity-focused approach resulted in low impact. Forward-looking Twaweza should assess impact through development of pathways in which likelihoods of achievements are realistically designed.
15. Twaweza should continue to apply SDG data in both education and government areas when it coincides with its plans. SDGs, being a government responsibility Twaweza's data collection, could be a one of several openings into collaboration with the government system for longer term effect.

1 Introduction

1.1 BACKGROUND

Twaweza¹ started in 2009 as an ambitious initiative working on enabling citizens to exercise agency, promoting government to be more open and responsive, and improving basic learning for children in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. Twaweza has just completed implementing its Strategy 2015-2018. The theory of change of the Strategy is grounded in two domains: basic education and Open Government, and supported by a Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation (LME) unit.

Twaweza has its headquarters in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, where it (as from 2015) has been registered as a legally independent entity. It has certificates of compliance in Kenya and Uganda, as well as offices in Nairobi and Kampala. From 2009 until the end of 2014 it operated as a programme of the Dutch Hivos² Initiative, and from 2015 to 2016 under Hivos' oversight.

The Embassy of Sweden in Dar es Salaam has supported Twaweza since 2016 with 48 MSEK for the three years 2016-2018 for activities carried out in Tanzania. The support is provided within the Swedish development strategy for Tanzania 2013-2018, specifically Result Area 2 which focus on girls and boys' access to education, and Result Area 3 which addresses improved democratic governance.

The evaluation has a sole focus on the Tanzania portfolio and related activities given the interest and domain of the Embassy of Sweden's support to Twaweza's Tanzania portfolio. The purpose of the evaluation is to:

- Serve as an input to Twaweza's learning and future reflections on its newly developed strategic plan 2019 – 2021
- The evaluation will be used to inform the board of Twaweza and Twaweza' third parties on Twaweza's performance, challenges and recommended way forward
- Provide Sida and other donors supporting Twaweza with knowledge on Twaweza's effectiveness and relevance in the current and future context.

The primary users of the evaluation report are:

- Twaweza as the organization is the primary user of the evaluation report
- Embassy of Sweden in Tanzania and other donors who are funding Twaweza, e.g. the Embassy of Denmark, DFID, Hewlett and Wellspring Advisors.

The secondary users of the evaluation report are:

¹ Twaweza means 'make it happen' in Swahili.

² www.hivos.org

- The government agencies and officials, especially Ministry for Regional and Local Government.

The ToR highlight that focus of the evaluation should be on the organisational development benchmarks; the outcome, quality of outputs, and reach; as well as an assessment of the contribution to the overarching goals of Twaweza.

The evaluation took place in the period February to May 2019, with fieldwork carried out 10-22 March 2019.

1.2 TWaweza'S STRATEGY 2015-2018

The Twaweza Strategy 2015-2018³ presents the background to its vision, mission, values and theory of change, as well as its 'problem driven' approach to its three programme areas and LME, and mechanisms for organisational management, including governance, risks and financial management, and budgets.

The *vision* of Twaweza is the belief 'in an open society, built on the human impulse to make a difference; where information and ideas flow, citizens engage, and authorities are accountable to the people.'⁴ The *mission* of Twaweza is the collection, curating and transporting of 'evidence, ideas, and stories to inspire citizen action and stimulate responsiveness from authorities on basic learning and Open Government.'⁵ Values include being collaborative (embracing learning from others), being transparent and honest about failures, imaginative and curious, as well as rigorous (emphasising quality) and strategic. Twaweza's theory of change reflects its vision and mission, i.e. outcome and outputs respectively.

Twaweza's Strategy 2015-2018 focuses on three main programme areas and has an additional element on LME:

1. Data and Voice

Data and Voice including Uwezo, Africa's largest annual citizen assessment of children's learning across hundreds of thousands of households; and Sauti za Wananchi, Africa's first national representative frequent and rapid mobile phone-based survey.

2. What works in basic education and Open Government

An ambitious program of gathering and generating evidence on "What Works" in the domains of basic education and Open Government. This includes experiments both small and large, and a focus on sourcing and understanding locally-generated solutions through a "positive deviance" approach;

3. Public and Policy Communications and Engagement

Public and Policy Communications and Engagement produces various high-quality non-partisan products based on data and evidence, and engages relevant target audiences through a range of products and approaches (media partnerships, direct engagement with policy actors, etc.).

³ <https://twaweza.org/go/strategy-2015>

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Ibid

4. Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation

Alongside the programmes is the Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation portfolio, which provides monitoring and feedback, engages external evaluations, contributes lessons to national and international forums and infuses the organization with accountability and a learning culture.

Twaweza adopted a problem-driven approach to both analysis and planning. This included the articulation of what was identified as 'locally meaningful and well-defined problems' within the domains of basic education and Open Government. This approach is discussed under Relevance.

The Strategy identified nine specific 'problems' (problem areas); five in the Open Government domain and four in the basic education domain. They are:

Open Government:

- O1. There is no robust legislative basis and/or effective mechanisms through which to exercise the constitutional right to information.
- O2. The quality and integrity of data collected by government (on budgets, expenditures, natural resources and basic services) is poor and data are not made publicly available in a timely, systematic and meaningful fashion
- O3. There is a lack of transparent and robust independent information monitoring the status of key services and sectors (in sectors such as health, water and natural resources); equally, there are no robust sources of opinions and perceptions of citizens about key services and sectors.
- O4. The number and capacity of intermediaries and curators who can demand information and data from the government and make it meaningful to the public (tell great stories) is limited.
- O5. For most citizens and public officials, government is generally unresponsive; this lowers expectations of what government can be and dulls aspirations, which in turn allows government to continue to be unaccountable (vicious cycle).

Basic Education

- E1. Schooling does not lead to learning; teachers, education administrators, policy makers, and the public (especially parents) do not focus on or measure core learning competencies (early grade literacy, numeracy and other core competencies).
- E2. The curriculum is too ambitious, and teaching is too far ahead of children's learning levels. There is far too little evidence on effectiveness of curricula, and the little evidence available does not loop back to inform and stir change.
- E3. Teachers are not sufficiently motivated, supported and held accountable to ensure children learn.
- E4. Leadership, management and accountability of school systems are weak and unable to 'pull together' key constituencies (such as parents, teachers, school administrators, and the general community) to work in a concerted fashion to ensure that all children are learning.

For each of the problem area hypotheses, key metrics and success criteria have been identified for their respective testing, measurement and solutions. Furthermore, for each of the three main programme areas, the LME and organisational development and management (including governance, reporting, financial management and staff), annual and full strategy benchmarks were established. A risk management matrix was developed and mitigation strategies identified and an overview of foreseen country based budgets prepared. The total budget for Twaweza Tanzania Strategy was estimated at 30,5 million USD, excluding regional and global activities in which Tanzania may be involved.

Annual and financial reports for 2015, 2016 and 2017 have been submitted as well as a mid-year report for 2018 (a full 2018 reports was submitted after the completion of the draft evaluation).

1.3 METHODOLOGY

1.3.1 Overall approach

Two overall approaches to the evaluation were applied: theory of change and contribution analysis.

Key features that make up a suitable theory of change model often include (i) the understanding of the context in which a project is able to influence change; (ii) the long-term change that the project seeks to support and for whose ultimate benefit; (iii) the logical sequence of the change that it is anticipated to lead to the desired outcome, and (iv) the assumptions about how these changes might happen.⁶

The theory of change is primarily a process and not a product in itself and its prime goal is to reflect on and assess the causal mechanisms in the connections between outputs and outcomes of each programme area under the Strategy. For the theory of change to be useful, we asked key questions to Twaweza and key stakeholders about (i) how and why they think that the expected change will occur in the present Strategy construct, and (ii) whether they have *evidence* that support assumptions made in the theory of change – addressing the logical intervention from outputs through intermediate outcomes to outcomes (see Fig.1), and (iii) whether change – or non-change – corresponds with the perceptions of Twaweza and key stakeholders or whether changes have been brought about by other dynamics. This has been important for learning and contributed to addressing issues related to the new strategy 2019-2022, as can be observed in the Lessons Learned section of this evaluation.⁷

The Strategy states that by the end of 2018, Twaweza wants to have made a *measurable* impact on the following four dimensions of community, national and regional life⁸:

1. Children in school are learning as parents, teachers, school administrators and policy makers focus on measuring and improving the learning outcomes resulting from the large [social] investment in basic education.
2. Public authorities are responsive to public demand, and they promote and protect citizens' right to high quality, relevant and meaningful information.
3. Citizens and civil society are asking for, getting and using information to improve their situation and engage public officials to deepen accountability and improve the quality of public service delivery.

⁶ http://www.theoryofchange.org/pdf/DFID_ToC_Review_VogelV7.pdf, p.14.


⁷ It was originally the intention that the evaluation should provide inputs to the design of the new strategy. However on 20 February 2019 the new strategy was launched officially on Twaweza's website. This has not indicated any significant changes to the evaluation purpose or work, but has put it in a perspective that is outlined in the Lessons Learned section.

⁸ Twaweza Strategy 2015-2018, p. 10

4. Public and policy actors are using evidence-based knowledge to transforming governance practice and the provision of basic education.

At the same time, the above impacts constitute the outcome of Twaweza's theory of change. Its logic is presented in Fig. 1.

Fig 1. Theory of Change – Twaweza 2015-2018



The evaluation assessed progress and achievements of the nine problem areas and the LME process. The evaluation also assessed the overall approach to the design of the theory of change asking if the 'problem driven' methodology was sufficiently able to capture the core issues and concerns in Open Government and basic education expressed by the Tanzanian people. Contribution analysis was applied best possible and throughout the evaluation following the guidelines outlined in the Inception Report (Annex 3).

1.3.2 Measuring progress and achievements

The Twaweza Strategy includes several indicators from where measurement of progress and achievements can derive, both at an annual basis as well as from the four-year strategy period. These include (i) the testing of the hypotheses presented in the Strategy, (ii) the associated key metrics identified for each of the nine problem areas in education and governance, annually as well as over the strategy period, (iii) the progress and achievements of outputs and outcomes related to identified success criteria under each of the problem areas, and (iv) the benchmarks for the entire strategy period for each of the four main programme areas (domains). The evaluation team discussed and considered how to address this measurement dilemma. The result is presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Evaluation criteria and measurement framework

<i>Evaluation criteria</i>	<i>Measurement framework</i>
Relevance	• Theory of change
Effectiveness	• Theory of change • Success criteria under the three domains (Open Government, basic education, LME) and related hypotheses and key metrics • Unit and organisational benchmarks on the three main programme areas (Data and Voice, What Works, and Public and Policy Engagement) and LME
Efficiency	• Value for money • Partnership analysis
Sustainability	• Theory of change
Impact	• Theory of change • The four main impact areas highlighted in the Strategy (see above 2.3.1)

For the *relevance* assessment we first and foremost investigated four major interventions that was agreed between the evaluation team and Twaweza, comprising KiuFunza, Sauti za Wananchi, the 2015 Election and the Kigoma public agency experiment. The basis for the investigation was a case description prepared by Twaweza, including each intervention's theory of change and its results.

The *effectiveness* assessment was primarily based on the Strategy 2015-2018 and the annual reports from 2015, 2016 and 2017 and the mid-year report 2018, as well as interviews conducted during the field visit to Tanzania in March 2019. The hypotheses of each of the problem areas, when clearly phrased, were tested and key metrics measured – based on very detailed descriptions of the narrative parts in the annual reports and the success criteria identified for each of the nine problem areas. Benchmark assessment was also included in the overall assessment.

The *efficiency* assessment focused on assessing the value for money (VfM) applying the DfID approach⁹ comparing Twaweza's efficiency to two like-minded organisations, and an analysis of how efficient Twaweza has worked with its partners during the strategy period. As regards the VfM analysis limited data accessibility indicated that it was not been possible to undertake a comprehensive analysis.

The *sustainability and impact* assessments focused on the theory of change, i.e. (i) to which extent have Twaweza's efforts and stated outputs followed pathways that have effectively influenced and contributed to the higher echelons of the theory, and (ii) assessed to which extent the benefits from activities undertaken have been sustained and have had impact.

Findings from the data collection, including documents, interviews with key stakeholders and case and Twaweza partner descriptions were triangulated forming a solid basis for assessing the evaluation criteria. With the above approach we have met the requirements of the evaluation focus, namely (p.3 in ToR):

- Organisational development benchmarks with a focus on progress on agreed benchmark in the period in which Twaweza became an independent organisation;
- Outcome, quality of outputs, and reach that includes a focus on value for money, and;
- Assessment of the contribution to overarching goals taking into accounts the changing socio-political context in Tanzania.

The latter issue, 'taking into accounts the changing socio-political context in Tanzania,' has been addressed throughout the evaluation and to the extent possible been analysed as closely as possible to specific activities undertaken by Twaweza during the strategy period. The process tracing approach has been related to the analysis of the extent to which the theory of change has been applied as an integrated and dynamic tool in Twaweza's work as well as in the assessment of the extent to which Twaweza's reported achievements were of Twaweza's own making or involved other actors. A separate annex part of the report provides detailed analysis of relevance (case studies), effectiveness and benchmarks. See chapter 5 in Annex report.

1.3.3 Measuring progress and achievements

The data collection methods and process followed what was presented in the Inception Report (Inception Report, section 3.4, Annex 3). During the course of the evaluation, the team received a lot of relevant documentation from Twaweza, although some of it rather late. Twaweza provided detailed information on collaboration with all its key partners over the strategy period based on a format drafted by the team and Twaweza also drafted the case studies that formed the basis for the relevance assessment of four major interventions.

Focus group discussions were carried out with the Twaweza management group over two sessions and individual interviews conducted with managers and key personnel responsible for finance, operations, human resources, Sauti za Wananchi, Uwezo, public and policy engagement, LME and governance and external relations. Interviews were carried out with

⁹ See Inception Report (Annex 3). See also Limitations section 2.3.4.

key stakeholders in Kigoma. These included the mayor, selected councillors, TAMASHA and Kigoma Development Initiative (KDI – both civil society organisations, and a focus group meeting with eight animators (organised through TAMASHA) and whose responsibilities are to facilitate and promote citizen agency in the Kigoma wards. National government officials' interviews were limited to the President's Office, Regional and Local Government (PO-RALG) in Dodoma. It was not possible to access key informants in the Ministry of Education (MoE). A couple of follow-up interviews were carried out post-field work via Skype.

The team participated in a community meeting in Kigoma on 14 March 2019, in which municipal councillors and representatives from the various Kigoma wards were represented, facilitated by TAMASHA – a very lively and interactive dialogue, with some solutions to local problems encountered, between public officials and ward representatives from Kigoma-Ujiji Municipality. Twaweza was effective in arranging the Kigoma visit, the meetings with its own managers and staff as well as with a group of selected partners with whom Twaweza had worked during the Strategy period. We commend Twaweza for its efforts for setting up these arrangements successfully.

1.3.4 Limitations

The evaluation faced few problems. While most documents requested were received in due time, other documentation was received late.

It was a challenge to address the assessment tools for the evaluation because Twaweza's reporting includes a wide range of 'measurement indicators', including hypotheses, key metrics, success criteria, benchmarks and the 'outputs/outcome' matrices presented in the annual reports as well as a forwarded 'list of outcomes' for 2015-2018 (3 April 2019). A significant number of sub-goals under each problem area also meant that some activities are reported several times under different guises.

The result of the team considerations regarding the application of assessment tools for each of the evaluation criteria is the framework shown in Table 1. While it is well understood that Twaweza has been keen to ensure transparency and performance measurement towards its funders, too many tools were applied. Consequently, Twaweza seems to have spent abundance of time on reporting on these while simplified systems would have sufficed.

The results of benchmark achievements cover three years, 2015-2017. Data from 2018 has not been received. Benchmarks do not in all aspects differentiate clearly between countries, which means that data are in several instances aggregated on a regional basis and not broken down to country level. For example, several of the Uwezo benchmarks data presented are regional or two-country based. Furthermore, there are overlaps between benchmarks, outputs and key metrics.

The evaluation team had to change two local consultants during the course of the evaluation. While this caused discontinuity in the composition of the evaluation team, it did not have any negative influences on the work of the evaluation team and the final outcome of the evaluation.

Together with an analysis of partner collaboration, VfM constituted the other part of the efficiency assessment. The VfM assessment included the comparison between Twaweza and two like-minded organisations based on the data that was possible to obtain from these to organisations. Since the effectiveness element of the VfMs has been addressed in details in the Effectiveness Assessment part of the report (see 2.2.4), the VfM addresses economy and efficiency. The VfM is not an in-depth study but includes data that has allowed for addressing satisfactorily the DfID defined VfM approach.

There is some overlap in the descriptions of the four major interventions and selected problem areas, e.g. KiuFunza, and some repetition of text and analysis has therefore occurred. However, as the major interventions relate to the relevance criterion and the problem areas relate to the effectiveness criterion, we have aimed at differentiating best possible during the analysis. Five cases were foreseen. One case was forwarded too late to be included in the draft report.

Clear indication of month and year of published (and non-published) documents should be an obvious requirement but is not in too many cases.

1.4 CONTEXT

After a couple of decades of gradual liberalisation, civic and democratic space in Tanzania is currently shrinking.¹⁰ Under the impression of increasing electoral competition, governments controlled by the ruling party, Chadema Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), in power in various guises since independence in 1961, have embarked on a process in which the state is again envisaged to play a greater role in the development of the country. The change was underway already under the previous administration (2011-15) but has been accelerated after the 2015 elections. It touches upon all spheres of life and has implications for the activities of civil society organisations too. Whereas civic space gradually opened up after the re-introduction of multiparty elections in 1994-95, organisations now have to thread more carefully. Twaweza, too, has faced consequences when its activities were perceived to be too political. Combined, these trends provide for a more challenging context for civil society organisations to operate in.

As can be observed from press Freedom according to Reporters Without Borders¹¹ and freedom rating according to Freedom House¹², Tanzania's freedom ratings has deteriorated significantly over the Strategy period (Table 2). In the first rating from 75 out of 180 countries in 2015 dropping to 95 in 2018, in the second rating from 3,5 points in 2015 to 5 points in 2018, using a 7 scale rating (worst is 7).

Table 2. Tanzania Freedom ratings 2013-2018

	Press freedom according to Reporters without borders https://rsf.org/en/tanzania	Freedom rating according to Freedom House (1 best/7 worst) https://freedomhouse.org/country/tanzania
2013	70/180	3/7
2014	69/180	3/7
2015	75/180	3.5/7
2016	71/180	3.5/7
2017	83/180	4/7
2018	93/180	5/7

¹⁰ PAGET, D. 2017. Tanzania: Shrinking space and opposition protest. *Journal of Democracy*, 28.

¹¹ <https://rsf.org/en/tanzania>

¹² <https://freedomhouse.org/country/tanzania>

The major changes in Tanzania's development largely correlated with Twaweza's Strategy 2015-18, even if their origin can be traced further back. In the late 2000s, CCM felt under increasing pressure from a series of grand corruption scandals and the perception that the revenues from the country's resources benefitted foreign investors and a small group of Tanzanian individuals, not the country as a whole. Civil society organisations in particular pointed to deficiencies in the management of energy and natural resources and the opposition parties soon mobilised on this agenda.¹³ Following the historically competitive 2010 elections, CCM began a dual reform process. First, it reformed itself internally by more clearly separating 'money and politics'. Secondly, a rethink on the economy began in which more emphasis was put on the state's role in developing the economy.¹⁴ Initially this agenda was only implemented gradually. It accelerated after the 2015 elections in which the opposition made further inroads into traditional CCM strongholds, but also saw the election of CCM's John Pombe Magufuli as President.

Magufuli hardened the approach towards the opposition and critical voices. Again, this had been underway already under his predecessor, under whose tenure laws on cybercrime, statistics and media were introduced prior to the 2015 elections that were widely seen as restricting freedom of speech.¹⁵ The activities of opposition parties were also suppressed through a number of measures. First, the TV live-coverage from Parliament was banned and in June 2016, an indefinite ban on public meetings, including party rallies, was announced, denying the opposition major platforms to reach out to new constituencies.¹⁶

Civil society was also affected by restrictions. To some extent, liberalisation and the reintroduction of multi-party elections in Tanzania had happened due to pressure from development partners. Also within Tanzania and CCM itself there had been voices advocating for change. Under African Socialism, most independent organisations had systematically been incorporated into the party-state. The early indigenous CSOs and community development groups, that mushroomed over the years following multiparty elections, did not focus on political activities that could be perceived as challenging state control. However, during the 1990s, new organisations emerged and they gradually shifted the approach from service delivery towards an advocacy and good governance agenda with the goal of holding state authorities to account.¹⁷ The voices within CCM advocating for opening up civic space now appear to have been weakened.

In fact, liberalisation had only happened gradually, as CCM wished to maintain its control over the state. The deregistering of civil society organisations deemed too political has been retained as an option throughout the years. The decision to re-register NGOs in 2017 was

¹³ Gray, H. S. (2015). "The Political Economy Of Grand Corruption In Tanzania." *African Affairs*. (2001). Police arrests Environmental Activist, Opposition Leader in Tanzania. 27 November 2001, CIEL.

¹⁴ Jacob, T. and R. H. Pedersen (2018). "New resource nationalism? Continuity and change in Tanzania's extractive industries."

The Extractive Industries and Society 5(2): 287-292.

¹⁵ Eyakuze, A. and B. Taylor (2015). "Four bills later: is blogging with statistics in Tanzania now only for adrenalin junkies?" Mtega Blog Post 2 April 2015. Downloaded 21 November 2018 on <https://mtega.com/2015/04/four-bills-later-isblogging-with-statistics-in-tanzania-now-only-for-adrenalin-junkies/>.

¹⁶ PAGET, D. 2017. Tanzania: Shrinking space and opposition protest. *Journal of Democracy*, 28.

¹⁷ Jennings, M. 2008.

seen as a warning in this regard.¹⁸ In an international perspective, Tanzanian civil society organisations were rather weak and were often dominated by their international funders.¹⁹

Less confrontational approaches have often proved successful, involving the knowledge and resources of foreign actors in different kinds of collaboration with government actors.²⁰ However, involving foreign links and resources means walking a fine line between drawing on foreign resources on the one hand and avoiding being perceived as running errands for foreign powers on the other. Religious organisations with millions of members appear to be the exception to the rule with the government repeatedly stressing the importance of their support and collaboration.²¹

Twaweza too has had to operate under these changing terms. Whereas its first strategic period (up till 2014) was marked by progress in terms of organisation and influence on public policy within education and Open Government²², it has faced tougher times recently. As the production of evidence and data, the generation of debate, and the promotion of government responsiveness through citizen agency are at the core of its vision, mission and values, it has been operating in an increasingly difficult environment. The four bills introduced prior to the election in 2015 have continued to make their mark throughout the strategy period in various ways. Most significantly, the Statistics Act in various guises has influenced Twaweza's ability to conduct and publish surveys. The Statistics Act of 2015 made it illegal to publish data not approved by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) as 'official'.²³ Questions about permits and the legality of Twaweza data have ensued. Twaweza's publication of statistics showing declining support for the president in 2018 led the State's Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH) to threaten with legal measures because the survey had supposedly been conducted without a research clearance.²⁴ Subsequently, the Tanzanian authorities have withheld the passport of Twaweza's Executive Director, Aidan Eyakuze.²⁵

Further restrictions were introduced with the tabling of amendments to the Statistics Act towards the end of 2018, making the questioning of official data illegal.²⁶ Another change that

¹⁸ Tripp, A. M. 2000. Political Reform in Tanzania: The Struggle for Associational Autonomy. *Comparative Politics*: 191-214. Citizen, T. (2017). "Registrar to verify all NGOs." *The Citizen* 8 August 2017.

¹⁹ Michael, S. (2004). *Undermining Development. The Absence of Power among Local NGOs in Africa*. Oxford, UK, James Currey; Mushi, A. (2011). *Civil Society in the Era of Good Governance Dispensation: Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the Politics of Engaging Government in Tanzania*. A Thesis Submitted to the University of Birmingham for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

²⁰ Elliott-Teague, G. L. 2008. Coalition Lobbying in Tanzania: the Experiences of Local NGOs. *Journal of Public Affairs*, 8: 99-114.

²¹ The Guardian, T. (2018). I'm ready to work you JPM tells religious leaders. *The Guardian*, 9 April 2018; Ulimwengu, J. (2018). Magufuli has pretty much silenced everyone save the clerics. *The East African*, 4 April 2018..

²² PRI, P. R. I. and P. S. I. PSI (2014). "Evaluation Twaweza: Tanzania. 2009 2014." Accessed 21 November 2018 on <https://www.twaweza.org/uploads/files/Twaweza%20FINAL%20Evaluation%20Report.pdf>.

²³ Aljazeera (2015). Tanzania's new information laws draw fire from critics. *Aljazeera* 18 Juni 2015. Accessed 5 April 2019 on <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/06/tanzania-information-laws-draw-fire-critics-150617064824518.html>

²⁴ Citizen, T. (2018). "Tanzania's Twaweza in trouble as Costech claims recent survey was uncertified." *The Citizen* 11 July 2018.

²⁵ African, T. E. (2018). "Tanzania withholds Twaweza director's passport." *The East African* 3 August 2018.

²⁶ Reuters (2018). Tanzania law punishing critics of statistics 'deeply concerning': World Bank. Reuters 3 October 2018. Accessed 5 April 2019 on <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tanzania-worldbank/tanzania-law-punishing-critics-of-statistics-deeply-concerning-world-bank-idUSKCN1MD17P>; bank, w. (2018). World Bank Holding Up \$50 Million for Tanzania Over Statistics Bill, <https://eyeonglobaltransparency.net/2018/10/01/world-bank-holding-up-50-million-for-tanzania-over-statistics-bill/>.

happened under the current administration was the government decision in 2017 to pull out of the Open Government Partnership (OGP) in which Twaweza had been a major advocate and partner. The work related to OGP had also been a major component in Twaweza's current strategy.²⁷ Under OGP the previous administration had committed to improving access to information through new legislation as well as through increased transparency and the publication of data. With the withdrawal, progress stalled and the creation of a mechanism to monitor implementation was not put in place as envisaged.²⁸ Twaweza's Kigoma Experiment with Open Government at the sub-national level, carried out in an opposition stronghold, also faced challenges as the government sought to block its implementation.²⁹ Combined, these trends have led Twaweza onto a process of revisiting assumptions and approaches.³⁰

²⁷ Citizen, T. (2017). "Tanzania states why it opted out of Open Government Partnership." The Citizen 30 September 2017. Twaweza (2015). "Twaweza East Africa Strategy 2015-2018." Downloaded 21 November 2018 on

<https://www.twaweza.org/uploads/files/TwawezaStrategy2015-2018.pdf>.

²⁸ World Bank (2019): TZ-Open Government & PFM Development Credit (P133798). Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review.

²⁹ Citizen, T. (2017). "Govt warns Kigoma-Ujiji municipality over open government initiative." The Citizen 13 November 2017.

³⁰ Lipovsek, Varja and Aidan Eyakuze. (2018). Bruised but better: the stronger case for evidence-based activism in East Africa. Blogpost 22 March 2018 accessed at <https://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/bruised-but-better-the-stronger-case-for-evidence-based-activism-in-east-africa/>

2 Findings

Findings take point of departure in the evaluation criteria, starting with Relevance followed by Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability and Impact. For each of the criterion we have addressed the evaluation questions and indicators presented in the evaluation matrix (see Inception Report, Annex 3). For each of the criterion a brief introduction guides the reader on the structure of the section. Additional issues have emerged during the course of the evaluation process and have been addressed, such as the overall analytic approach to define the Strategy.

2.1 RELEVANCE

The relevance criterion primarily focuses upon the relevance of the overall theory of change of the Strategy against the theories of change of four major interventions, i.e. KiuFunza, Sauti za Wananchi, the 2015 Election and the Kigoma public agency experiment. We have assessed to which extent the latter theories have been relevant in achieving the intended effect (outcomes). This has included an analysis of the logic of the interventions, the built-in assumptions of the pathways followed and changes, if any, made during the implementation of the interventions. The detailed assessments of the four cases are presented in the Annex part of the evaluation report. See chapter 5 in Annex report.

In addition we have briefly assessed to which extent the overall analytic approach to the Strategy has been relevant. The review of the new strategy for 2019-2022 has been integrated in the 3.2. Lessons Learned section.

2.1.1 Design of the Strategy

The nine problem areas identified in the Strategy derived from a 'problem-driven political economy analysis approach' called Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA)³¹. The method is developed by Harvard University, Center for International Development. Twaweza's application of the PDIA is briefly described in the Strategy. The exact manner in which data have been collected is not presented, only that Twaweza selected the most 'meaningful' problems. This indicates that key problems in basic education and Open Government have been defined by Twaweza and hypotheses developed for testing. In the same vein, in its high profile KiuFunza project Twaweza chose randomised control trials focusing on payment for performance as one of its key methodologies to address the problem of teacher motivation.

Whereas these are a fully legitimate approaches to identify issues and problems within education and government, it could be argued that the main problems have been defined by the researchers' presupposed perception of the problems (Twaweza) and, to some extent, their solutions, which may not coincide with local citizens' and public officials' perception of what are the real problems and concerns in education government.

³¹ Strategy 2015-2018, p. 12.

Early on, Twaweza could have considered applying *additional* and *different* analytic approaches that may have identified *other* core problems and concerns in education and government than those identified and which subsequently became the foundation for the Strategy.³² By triangulating results from different analytic approaches towards education and government, Twaweza could have identified different problem areas. While the problems identified by Twaweza most likely constitute existing problems in the education and government field they may not necessarily reflect the perceived concerns of the citizens and public officials.

As mentioned in the limitation section it was a challenge to address the assessment tools for the evaluation because Twaweza's reporting includes a wide range of 'measurement indicators'. The significant number of sub-goals under each problem areas also meant that some activities are reported more than once under different guises. The mere number of benchmarks is far too many. Some benchmarks also resemble activities or outputs.

2.1.2 Data on service delivery

Another aspect of relevance is that of 'service delivery'. While evidence and data on service delivery formed a central component of the previous strategy, it appears to have become of less importance during the strategy period 2015-2018. Yet, evidence and data were still occupying an important part of activities, including its clear focus on basic education (Uwezo), and research and debates/dialogues related to water and health.

Service delivery ('social goods') stands out as the most important need/demand from citizens when deciding upon whom to vote for (measured against for example, religion, ethnicity, party, etc.). As demonstrated in Twaweza's experience with the education sector, delivering data and data packages on service delivery can play a role in entering into constructive collaboration with government entities, opening up crevices in otherwise impassable systems, also under challenging socio-political contexts. While acknowledging that Twaweza has had a relatively strong profile on 'service delivery data' in the Strategy period it could have had played a greater role as a stronger entry point towards challenging unresponsiveness of government officials.

2.1.3 Donor and government policies

'Good governance' is the key word to donors in their support to Twaweza. Danida's Country Programme for Tanzania 2015-2019 has as one of its three thematic areas 'Governance and Rights'.³³ Sida's Tanzania 2013-2019 strategy,³⁴ has guided the Embassy's policies. The Twaweza Strategy is in line with Sida's Strategy Result Area 2, Item 1 on 'greater number of girls and boys who acquire basic knowledge and skills in schools' and Result Area 3, Item 2 on 'enhanced capacity in civil society to demand accountability and increased awareness of human rights'. DfID's focus in Tanzania is on children, women and girls aiming at improving 'the quality

³² A possible alternative and very interesting approach could have been Classic Grounded Theory. See Barney G. Glaser: *Emergence vs Forcing: Basics in Grounded Theory Analysis*, Sociology Press, 1992.

³³ <http://um.dk/en/about-us/procurement/contracts/short/contract-opportunities/newsdisplaypage/?newsID=9F96EEA5-57FA-4138-A1EE-72D029CF3789>

³⁴ <https://www.government.se/country-and-regional-strategies/2013/07/results-strategy-for-swedens-international-development-cooperation-in-tanzania-2013---2019/>

of their education’ and generally ‘build institutions’, support ‘building capacity of the government to deliver services such as health and education’ and work through civil society.³⁵ As for the two minor funders, Wellspring³⁶ has a key focus on developing innovative solutions to development and Hewlett³⁷, a private charitable foundation, supports the advancement of ideas and institutions to promote a better world.

Vision 2025, the Africa Union Continental Education Strategy for Africa (2025), the 2063 Agenda, and the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs 2030) guide Tanzania’s overall development agenda. The Education Policy of 2014 aims to have well educated and skillful Tanzanians capable of contributing to the national development agenda and sustaining global competition. As such, the policy seeks to have education and training standards acceptable regionally and globally. The policy states that the government will work in collaboration with stakeholders in the education sector to strengthen quality control and assurance at all levels. The policy states that education in public schools will be free of charge for the initial eleven years. Twaweza’s interventions in education, for example Kiu-Funza and curriculum review, seek to achieve improved learning outcomes through improved school management and supervision of primary education. This is well in line with the country’s 2014 Education Policy.

Registration and operations of NGOs in Tanzania are in principle governed by the Non-Governmental Organizations Act of 2002 and the NGOs Policy of 2001. The overall objective of the NGOs Policy is to create an enabling environment for the NGOs to operate effectively and efficiently in the social and economic transformation of the country. The policy states clearly that ‘the Government recognizes the signification role and contributions of NGOs in the society and considers them as important partners in the development process. It is, therefore, in the interest of the government to create a conducive and enabling environment to ensure that NGOs potentials are fully utilized’. It states further that it intends ‘to facilitate exchange of information and regular dialogue among all parties involved in or with NGOs in Tanzania’.

In addition, the Government of Tanzania is implementing the UNDP Tanzania’s Governance Programme 2016–2021. The programme goal is to achieve effective, transparent, accountable and inclusive governance, in line with the principal objectives set out in the Tanzania Development Vision 2025 and Zanzibar Vision 2020, which include peace, stability, unity and good governance.

The NGOs Act and Policy are generally supportive of Twaweza’s operations in the country. But several enacted laws introduced prior to as well as during the Strategy period have led to declining civil space and created restrictions on operations of NGOs in the country. This has to a large extent compromised the impact of Twaweza programme on Open Government as described in this report.

³⁵ https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/723328/DFID-Tanzania-Profile-July-2018.pdf

³⁶ <https://www.wellspring.com>

³⁷ <https://hewlett.org>

2.1.4 Relevance analysis of 4 major interventions

Twaweza drafted cases of four major interventions in an effort to evaluate to which extent these interventions have had relevance to the overall theory of change of the Strategy. The cases contained a retroactive description of the intervention's theory of changes as well as the development and results of the intervention. The structure of the analysis followed a basic four-step approach: First, the theory of change for the individual intervention is described based on the case information. Then, the processes and results as well as the lessons learned from the intervention is summarised, and thereafter the intervention is discussed and assessed. The final analysis relates of the interventions to the overall theory of change. The detailed analyses of the four interventions have been structured in a 'box' format and are presented in Annex 5. Below is presented a summary of the result of the analysis.

The four major interventions analysed are

- (i) Sauti za Wananchi (SzW), a mobile phone survey platform
- (ii) KiuFunza, a teacher payment for performance research project
- (iii) the Kigoma Ujiji local government intervention, coming out of the national and global Open Government Partnership, piloting local transparency and accountability
- (iv) the Election 2015, linked to case studies of public agency demonstrating responsive government and/or active citizenship.

They cover a range of Twaweza's problem areas in the 2015-2018 Strategy period. The four major interventions all fall within Twaweza's overall change theory, but the degree to which they refer to, reflect upon and feed back into the theory differs.

(i) Sauti za Wananchi (SzW)

A mini theory of change related to SzW suggests that SzW 'fills a data gap' by making regular information about citizens' experiences and opinions available to media, government, civil society organisations and academics, as well as the general public' (Twaweza 2019). By providing a reliable mechanism for measuring citizens' perceptions, SzW aims at increasing national public servants' and politicians' willingness and ability to take citizen voices into account. This is also expected to foster their positive attitude towards data.

The mini theory of change largely corresponds with the hypotheses and metrics for the problem area O3 in Twaweza Strategy 2015-18 (p. 43), which has the lack of independent monitoring of key services and sectors, as well as sources of citizens' perceptions on these as its point of departure. The provision of such data is expected to inform public debate, be referred to by ministries and ultimately lead to policies and practices that better reflects these perceptions of the public. From this perspective the mini theory of change is relevant.

Until it came to a halt by mid-2018 SzW produced data that has been relevant to the overall theory of change through a combination of public launches that have influenced public debate as well as through direct outreach to decision-makers. However, the shrinking civic space in Tanzania also affected the operation of SzW. Already in 2015 uncertainty related to the legality of SzW was reported in relation to the Statistics Act. In 2017 it is noted that the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) reviews questions and in 2018 the publication of data on the president's popularity led to further restrictions, which means that no new data has been launched since then

It is concluded that SwZ has been a critical and highly relevant mechanism that has provided significant 'evidence' and through the media and public officials influenced public debates.

(ii) KiuFunza

A mini theory of change related to KiuFunza outlines seven specific, steps 'for the incentives to improve measured learning' (Twaweza 2019). The seven steps go from communicating an incentive offer to teachers and ensuring their acceptance and that they find it attractive over their ability to improve learning outcomes to tests and payments implemented and teachers are paid in time along with school level feedback (Twaweza 2019).

A clearer link to Twaweza's overall theory of change can be deduced from the Twaweza Strategy 2015-18 (p. 46), which outlines the hypotheses and key metrics for the problem area E3, under which KiuFunza falls. It states that 'Teachers are not sufficiently motivated, supported and held accountable to ensure children learn'. It hypothesises that a second phase of KiuFunza will generate evidence on how teacher incentives can improve learning, which is expected to generate public attention and debate and help purvey the idea of 'teacher payment based on delivered, measured learning outcomes'³⁸. This in turn is expected to generate public as well as technical debates, which will convince primarily the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Regional and Local Government to pilot the approach and include it in a new education policy.

The mini theory is thus a narrowly reflection of the larger theory of change. This also provides for a somewhat restricted approach to demotivated teachers compared to other factors that may undermine teacher motivation. Overall lack of funding, arrears in payment and poor working conditions point to these factors, as well as the 'critical friends'.³⁹ KiuFunza I and II produced evidence, the latter showing improved student learning equivalent to an additional one-third of a year of schooling. Key decision-makers were subsequently encouraged by Twaweza to engage with findings, culminating in the 2017 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Ministry of Regional and Local Government and Ministry of Education and their commitment to take part in KiuFunza III.

It is concluded that the implementation of KiuFunza as demonstrated in the mini theory of change focuses on the output level, reflecting narrowly the strategy theory of change. Twaweza increasingly seeks to involve relevant authorities and the approach is thus relevant, but less generated through public debate as hypothesised than through direct engagement with government stakeholders.

(iii) Kigoma-Ujiji local government intervention

A mini theory of change related to the Kigoma-Ujiji local government intervention outlines how the commitment by the council to make data on budgets, services, etc., available to the public would lead to 'greater demand for accountability and awareness of the responsive posture of the municipality'. New platforms for citizen voices as well as monitoring by civil society were furthermore expected to influence local plans.

The Kigoma-Ujiji intervention and mini theory of change fall under the Twaweza Strategy 2015-18's problem area O1 on Open Government, which focus on the lack of legislative basis and mechanisms for the right to information. The intervention – at times also mentioned as a 'sub-

³⁸ Strategy 2015-18, p. 46

³⁹ See for instance World Bank (2014); HakiElimu (2016); see also <https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/06/08/2018/open-letter-fifteen-leading-development-economists>

national pilot’ - can be seen as coming out of the second part of O1’s hypothesis, namely that the analysis of obstacles to effective mechanisms for the operationalization of access to information legislation can be used to advocate for change.⁴⁰ It also relates to the O2 problem area on poor government data, which has the availability and meaningfulness of data at district level as a key metrics.

It is concluded that the Kigoma Ujiji intervention is relevant to Twaweza’s overall theory of change.

(iv) The Elections 2015

The mini theory of change related to the Elections 2015 had as its point of departure the wish to focus on the substance of politics by providing a platform for candidates to present their policies and priorities in more detail. The airing of these was in turn expected to make citizens’ voting better informed. The election activities were followed by a ten-months campaign on holding representatives accountable. The experiences from the election activities also informed Twaweza’s design of TV and radio talk shows to be broadcasted later in the strategy period.

The Elections 2015 activities are primarily reported under the Twaweza Strategy’s problem area O5 under Open Government, which aims at creating opportunities and documenting positive examples of public agency and responsiveness by the government. This in turn was expected to help develop a positive public narrative that that responsive governance is possible. From this perspective the election activities are relevant.

It is concluded that the election intervention has had obvious and clear relevance to the overall theory of change with a focus on active citizens and accountable politicians. The relevance however may have been clearer and have provided a better effect overall if the theory of the election event had been more coherent, linking better the aim and expected results, i.e. focus on addressing substantive issues and policy position. The latter was not addressed satisfactorily as most of the debates eventually turned out to be superficial.

2.2 EFFECTIVENESS

The Effectiveness section describes, assesses and concludes on each of the nine problem areas and their respective success criteria. The description of the development of the nine problems over the Strategy period is very detailed, and is therefore presented in Annex 6. It shows the comprehensiveness of the activity level of Twaweza as well as providing a solid ground for assessing the results within the theory of change setting.

In Section (2.2.2) the detailed assessment has been summarised for each of the Open Government and basic education problem areas.

2.2.1 Benchmark achievement assessment

The ToR also asked the evaluation to assess the degree of benchmark achievements. Table 3 includes aggregated data based on Annex 7.

⁴⁰ Twaweza Strategy 2015-18, p 43; URT et al. 2016

For 2015, 36 out of 62 benchmarks were achieved, or 62,6%. In 2016, 36 out of 68 benchmarks were achieved, or 53%. In 2017, 36 out of 60 benchmarks were achieved, or 60%. As such we can conclude benchmarks achieved over the 2015-2017 period lies at an average percentage of 58,5%. Looking at only 'What Works' benchmarks for both domains the score is, for the three years, 38%. This cannot but be viewed as unsatisfactorily, even considering the restrictiveness of the civic space. With that framework in mind we consider the overall achievement level, 58,5%, only somewhat satisfactory, yet overall in line with what can be expected partly from the restrictive nature of the political environment and partly from Twaweza not being sufficiently able to follow-up and build strengths at the output and intermediate outcome levels. The follow-up issue is discussed in later sections of the report.

Table 3. Benchmarks achieved for Tanzania

<i>Programme Area</i>	<i>2015 Number of benchmarks achieved</i>	<i>2016 Number of benchmarks achieved</i>	<i>2017 Number of benchmarks achieved</i>
Data and voice	3 out of 4 achieved	2 out of 3 achieved	1 out of 2 achieved
Uwezo	6 out of 9 achieved	4 out of 9 achieved	5 out of 6 achieved
What Works in Basic Education	3 out of 6 achieved	2 out of 8 achieved	4 out of 6 achieved
What Works in Open Government	3 out of 8 achieved	5 out of 12 achieved	5 out of 11 achieved
Public and Policy Engagement	4 out of 9 achieved	5 out of 9 achieved	4 out of 8 achieved
Engagement	2 out of 6 achieved	4 out of 6 achieved	1 out of 6 achieved
Monitoring	3 out of 6 achieved	2 out of 5 achieved	4 out of 6 achieved
Evaluation	1 out of 1 achieved	2 out of 3 achieved	1 out of 3 achieved
Learning activities	1 out of 2 achieved	3 out of 3 achieved	3 out of 3 achieved
Governance	2 out of 2 achieved	1 out of 2 achieved	n/a
Reporting	3 out of 3 achieved	3 out of 3 achieved	3 out of 3 achieved
Human Resources & Financial management	5 out of 6 achieved	3 out of 5 achieved	5 out of 5 achieved

Source: Twaweza Strategy 2015-2018, Data received from Twaweza management.

2.2.2 Open Government effectiveness assessment

O1: The overall aim of O1 was to secure right to information through appropriate legislations. The core goal of getting an Access to Information Act passed by the Parliament was achieved in 2016 and in a better shape than initially feared from the bill presented in 2015, facilitated by Twaweza and a wider coalition of civil society organisations and probably the government's commitment linked to donor funding. Early evidence indicates that the public has had limited access to information and no follow-up assessment has been carried out to assess development.

The government's decision to withdraw from the Open Government Partnership in mid-2017 significantly affected Twaweza's work in the area of Open Government. It intensified its engagement in public debates commenting on the government in a 'push back' against misinformation and a shrinking civic space and involved activities towards coalition building, combined with media activities and the continuation of activities at the sub-national level (Kigoma and public

agency). In 2018, engagement in selected strategic litigation in court to challenge the shrinking space became pronounced.

While Twaweza demonstrated an ability to adapt to the changing political context it did not rephrase its problems under the Open Government domain to make them less ambitious as things turned for the worse in 2017. In the Annual Report for 2017 it is mentioned that a rephrasing of the problems in the Open Government domain had been considered, but that it was decided not to 'tinker with the phrasing' (p. 5). The process became more pronounced as evidenced in the Ideas and Evidence event in March 2018 that helped inform the new Strategy 2019-22.⁴¹

O2: The aim of O2 was to improve the quality and integrity of data collected by government and its publication in a 'timely, systematic and meaningful fashion'. Twaweza splits this undertaking into two: the publication of its own data and of the government's open data work. In terms of the former, SzW and Uwezo continued to be important data collection tools; surveys were undertaken and websites developed and there is anecdotal evidence in 2016 and 2017 that the websites were being used. The influence on the quality and publication of government data is less clear. Progress seems linked to the Tanzanian government's previous commitment related to a World Bank credit linked to Open Government that year as much as to Twaweza's activities. The release of government data comes to a halt after the government withdrew from the OGP in 2017 and Twaweza does not report upon it in the second half of the period.

Overall, the work with media and other outreach activities became more pronounced over the period and a significant and growing number of activities targeting the public, through the media, as well as outreach to selected target groups, can be observed over the period. There is evidence that the media is using Twaweza data, but this does not seem to have caused the expected increase in official government support to data availability and use.

O3: The purpose of O3 was to address the lack of transparent and robust independent information monitoring on the status of key services and sectors and to provide insights into the opinions of citizens on these. The activity with regard to polls using SzW remains high until July 2018 when the legality of this type of surveys was questioned by government. Media coverage and social media attention during the Strategy period also remains high even in a country where public debate is still restricted. Surveys on service delivery was carried out in 2015 and 2016. It is not reported upon in 2017 and 2018, but there are still some surveys activities on service delivery even if there is some shift of focus towards using SzW for advocacy purposes. Some uptake on service delivery among authorities and policy-makers can be observed through their willingness to participate in public launch events. At the end of the period Twaweza engaged in scaling up data delivery of some service delivery related activities, including in water quality.

O4: The overall goal of O4 was to increase the number and capacity of intermediaries who can demand and use data from the government. The focus was on encouraging journalists, local government officials as well as other actors' use of 'packaged' data. The entering of partnerships with more media and NGOs and research organisations suggest that there was some progress in this regard but no credible evidence established since there was no baseline and indicators

⁴¹ Lipovsek and Eyakuze, 2018

reported. Twaweza pursued an ad hoc and relatively low-key approach to addressing the problem. As in other problem areas, Twaweza lacks in following-up on activities undertaken and strategically connect these to the Strategy theory.

O5: The overall purpose of problem area O5 was to make government more responsive through the identification of stories of public agency and creating opportunities for dialogue. Addressing the problem seems to have been challenging, partly due to the changing socio-political context. Most activities seem to have been related to the media, first by the organisation of debates during the 2015 elections, and secondly related to TV talk shows over the period. Whereas there were concerted attempts to bring citizens and politicians together during these media activities, the effect is not reported upon apart from numbers on coverage. Therefore it is difficult to assess overall effect.

Summary: Activity, output and outreach levels have been high in almost all Open Government sub-problem areas. Data and data 'packages' produced by Twaweza, particularly through SzW and Uwezo, have been important tools in establishing evidence based information to target groups, whether government officials, MPs or through various media outlets. However, lack of follow-up on many of the activities undertaken have to a large extent reduced the ability of Twaweza to link these activities appropriately with the Strategy theory, as the many examples provided in Annex 6 show. Table 4 shows examples of lack of follow-up from the two main domains and the LME.

Whereas the shrinking of the civic space that gained momentum during the Strategy period clearly explains some of the barriers to execute activities, Twaweza may have had more room for manoeuvring if (i) the ambitious goal were revised following Tanzania's departure from the OGP, and (ii) results of activities were followed-up upon forming new or revised pathways for goal achievements.

Table 4. Examples of lack of follow-up to activities undertaken

<u>From the O3 problem area:</u> The production of the mobile phone panel survey handbook was (http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24595) launched during the 2016 Open Government Partnership Summit in Paris. What has happened since? Has it been distributed? To who? Has it been used? Any feedback? What has been the result of this work? <u>From the O4 problem area:</u> In addressing the theory of change one would have expected a follow-up to the scoping study on local government officials' awareness of data on the opendata.go.tz portal. For example (i) to investigate how many of the 40% of the local government officials actually used the data in their daily work from the open data portal to improve their performance and lobby for improved services – and (ii) to investigate how to strengthen outreach to those 60% of local officials that were not aware the open data portal. Also, it could have been useful to know to which extent the Wajibu Institute's simplified auditing formats were used by local government officials, and likewise, to which extent the result of the Wajibu conference on accountability for local government was followed-up upon. What was learned and what could this learning be used for to facilitate local government engagement in accountability? <u>From the O5 problem area:</u> Regarding the partners trained in 2017 on the use of a data application: was it useful, did the partners manage to apply their skills in their work places? What was the result of the teacher monitoring in 40 schools? Did data provide new insights that can be used for bringing teacher performance forward?

From the E1 problem area:

To which extent was the online launch of Uwezo data in 2017 used by the 150 MPs, government officials, and other stakeholders? And how were the 159 district reports received and reflected upon by district stakeholders? And did the content bring insights into furthering improved and sustained performance of the teachers and the school system, etc.?

From the E4 problem area:

In 2016 and 2017, a pilot on a larger scale was carried out as a randomized control trial in Bukoba district, resulted in findings that suggested that school leadership is important, not least that the head teacher is 'motivated, determined and resourceful' (AR 2017). What follow-up activities were initiated based on such important information?

From the LME area:

Has the lessons learned from the engagement synthesis in 2017 been used? Has there been sufficient follow-up to the radio data infused project support? Has the results from the many conferences attended and initiated (e.g. the Education Evidence conference) been analysed, information of key issues raised, distributed and how have these been used in the development of the Education component?

How was the result of the government website analysis use (2015)? And what were the results of the openness of district officials to citizen requests for information used (2015)? And what advice or guidelines have the REAG provided Twaweza that has strengthened the implementation of the strategy theory?

Source: Annex 6

2.2.3 Basic Education effectiveness assessment

The overall problem of Twaweza's work on basic education is that schooling does not lead to learning. The four problem areas, their sub-goals and activities all relate to this in various ways.

E1: The goal of E1 is to ensure that schooling leads to learning. Annual Uwezo assessments are hypothesised to promote evidence-based decision-making and thus facilitate learning. A paper published in 2015 summarising a number of studies on the effect of Uwezo suggests that there was evidence that Uwezo had contributed to a shift in public debate from providing infrastructure and increasing enrolment to learning already in the previous strategy period. Uwezo contributed to upholding this shift in the evaluated 2015-18 Strategy Period. The level of activity remained high throughout the period, outreach activities seem to have increased and the launch of data generated significant public debate. Data was also used to make inroads into policy circles. Despite at times strained relations with the Ministry of Education due to the publication of critical data, it got involved in a government task force, contributed to a new Education Act together with other NGOs and its data was cited widely, in, for example, the Joint Sector Review, the 2018 World Development Report, as well as in other publications.

Outreach activities were expanded and included talk shows and online debates and presentations of district level data had reached almost two-thirds of all districts in Tanzania by the end of 2018 generating local debate and engagement. As related to the theory of change, Twaweza seems to be more activity focused and less on feeding back into its own work in a programmatic manner.

E2: The E2 problem area aims to collect evidence on the curriculum and make it more realistic in order to promote learning. The problem area got a head start with the development of a methodology to analyse curricula involving experts and a key government official. Uwezo was also invited to participate in a national curriculum review process. Research took off for real in 2016 and preliminary findings indicated that the problem was less of an overambitious curriculum than too much focus on recall learning. As a result, some readjustment of focus took place and there was a delay in finalization of analyses, papers and reports, as well as outreach activities. Apart from being part of setting an agenda and initiating debate, and through its

research revealed a change in the perception of the problem area (being an issue of recall learning and not an overambitious curriculum), achievements are difficult to assess.

E3: The aim of the E3 problem area is to generate evidence to support pay for performance in education and convince the relevant ministries that it should be piloted and included in a new education policy. It is a rather specific approach centred on the KiuFunza research trials with a second phase implemented and a third phase designed and prepared in the strategy period. Results demonstrated the effect of paying teachers and schools extra for performance, resulting in significantly improved learning. Much was done to engage key decision makers in the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Regional and Local Government in the findings. This led to the signing of a MOU for a new trial in 2017. Implementation was delayed and took off in 2019 facilitated and funded by Twaweza, but with ministries allocating staff to monitor the implementation. Findings were also disseminated at national and international conferences. Impact in terms of policy change and learning outcomes is yet to happen.

E4: The aim of the E4 problem area is to shed light on and strengthening school management and parents' participation in order to improve child learning. The activities in this area largely consist of research activities aimed at gathering evidence. Some of these activities are longterm in nature, and since they took off in the Strategy period they have not yielded major outputs. There were significant delays to a Positive Deviance (PD) study, which had been expected to deliver more immediate results. No permission has been given to carry out the final stage of the research, and the activity had a difficult start as the PD approach was new to Twaweza and experts to practically adopt the approach not easy to find. There is significant under-spending and evidence on progress in addressing hypotheses and metrics is limited.

Summary: As was the case with the Open Government problem areas, activity, output and outreach levels have been high, in particularly Uwezo and KiuFunza and less in curriculum development and school management. Data and data 'packages' produced by Twaweza, particularly through Uwezo, have been important tools in establishing evidence based information to target groups, whether government officials, MPs or through various media outlets and intermediate levels of achievements have been reached. Also, as was the case for the Open Government domain, lack of follow-up on relevant activities undertaken has to a large extent reduced the ability of Twaweza to link these activities appropriately with the Strategy theory – though not to the same degree as for the Open Government domain.

2.2.4 Effectiveness assessment of Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation

The Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation component was established for Twaweza to 'learn' by asking questions about 'what works' in the two domains of the Strategy, basic education and Open Government. As stated in the Strategy: 'Twaweza's learning architecture seeks to cultivate a culture of critical enquiry, reflection and adaptation within the initiative'.⁴²

LME 1: Focus of LME 1 was on three issues: 1. Monitor quality, reach and coverage, 2. Receive feedback from target groups, and 3. Apply quantitative and qualitative methods in monitoring processes. Over the Strategy period significant increase in monitoring activities occurred and the

⁴² Strategy 2015-2018, p. 25.

overall approach of 'reach, coverage and quality' assessment was applied consistently for some monitoring activities, including media coverage. Monitoring and feedback methods took a great variety of forms, including surveys, interviews/outcome mapping, baseline studies, and structures for assessing quantitative data. However, it has been neither clear nor evident that the results of the monitoring activities have influenced the strategy theory of change of the two domains. Also, it appears that no monitoring strategy was defined. It could appear somewhat arbitrary which activities were subject to monitoring.

LME 2: Numerous activities have taken place over the strategy period showing the dedication of Twaweza to address and strengthen learning through evaluation activities, including the drafting of an evaluation strategy as well as the establishment of the Research and Evaluation Advisory Group (REAG), both institutionalizing evaluation for learning. Also, the evaluations and research activities show thoroughness in the methodologies applied (for example in the Uwezo volunteers analysis and the teacher payment study) and important and strong evidence based results came from the work.

While activity levels have been high there is no systematic effort made to assess how the evaluations influence the higher-level theory. What is observed is that one research effort and its result leads to more insight and development of new research efforts and results, but no clear link is made to see how these results influence the theory.

LME 3: Twaweza sees itself as a learning organisation with a learning agenda embedded in all internal and external activities. This requires staff that are encouraged and receptive to a learning culture, innovation and ideas. Numerous and varied activities were undertaken in this learning component and their mere volume has without doubt contributed to learning and skills development of Twaweza staff. Yet, evidence lacks on how staff has applied the learning in their daily work and how this may have furthered the strategy theory of change. The team did not have access to staff performance data but anecdotal evidence confirms that staff have gained significant skills and knowledge improvements.

Summary: The LME component has been successful in many respects by undertaking numerous monitoring and evaluation activities for learning purposes, helping foster a culture of learning within Twaweza. Main concerns relate to the lack of systematic and prioritised follow-up to activities that could have facilitated improved monitoring and evaluation at outcome levels. As such the LME's efforts to become an integral part in furthering the theory of change has only been somewhat successful.

2.2.5 'Scaled up' projects

Some initiated activities during the Strategy period were defined as scaled up by Twaweza. These included the #MbungeLive, the support to the Christian Social Service Commission, CSSC (while actually changed from a national support to a district focused support), the roll out of SzW on localised levels, in Dar es Salaam in 2017, and the expansion on data collection for the SDGs. Also, based on the increasing reach through on-line media JamiiForums, in 2018, Twaweza looked at alternative and additive platforms, including Kwaza TV, a new independent online TV station, and working with a group of individuals with high levels of influence on social media. Twaweza's own description of these 'scaled up' projects are described in more details in Annex 8.

While Twaweza describe the activities mentioned as 'scaled-up' projects it is not clear to which extent that they are viewed within the context of the change theory as there is no clear reference to the theory and how the scaling up described contributes to achieving outcome levels.

2.3 EFFICIENCY

Value for Money (VfM) refers to the optimal use of resources to achieve planned outcomes and impacts. It relates to the expected or realized outcomes and impacts to the costs incurred to deliver them. The evaluation of VfM can be done in several ways depending on the purpose and context. For example, DFID has developed a VfM approach, which emphasizes that the impact of a project on improvement of the lives of poor people is maximized with respect to the resources spent on it.

The assessment of VfM adopts the DFID approach to analyse the economy and efficiency of the activities and outputs of Twaweza during the implementation of its 2015-2018 Strategy. The VfM effectiveness part has been thoroughly addressed in the Effectiveness section of this report. The efficiency analysis has been limited to the extent that data has been available. As such no comprehensive analysis has been undertaken.

2.3.1 Assessment of 'economy' and 'efficiency' at Twaweza

Assessment of economy in a project undertaking looks at relative costs of the project to determine the extent to which inputs have been procured at low costs. On the other side, assessment of efficiency refers to how well the outputs have been achieved. Included in efficiency assessment are dimensions of quantity, quality, time and cost.

Twaweza spent about 75% of its planned budget for the implementation of the Strategy. During the period the recruitment and procurement processes at Twaweza remained competitive. Twaweza has a procurement policy that guides all procurement of goods and services; exceptional cases have to be justified and approved as per the set procedures. The policy ensures that there is VfM for procured goods and services through open competitive bidding system for all procuring units at Twaweza.

Twaweza has used both direct and indirect methods of staff recruitment. The direct method did not work well in order to employ competent staff; instead, competitive approach by advertising job vacancies in newspapers, website, and also by the use of recruitment agents are now being used, assessed by Twaweza itself to be more efficient. Other arrangements including internship programmes where potential candidates are retained, subject to availability of vacancies, are also used in staff recruitment. These approaches ensure that Twaweza gets better and more competent personnel in delivering its activities.

During the period Twaweza installed a video-conferencing system in all the three country offices. In-door training is provided through the video system including the running of staff meetings with all staff across the three countries. This has worked well and brought country staff 'closer' to each other. The system is used on a daily basis for a variety of huddles, senior management team meetings, recruitment, team and bilateral meetings which has reduced travel expenses and made Twaweza efficient in its management activities (AR 2017).

Financial management systems have included significant automation introducing, for example, a successful cashless system. Overall, the management system is operating very efficient and further strengthened through introduction of applicable technology. Easy access to data and Twaweza information is however problematic when opening its website. Its search machine is highly inadequate not answering satisfactorily to simple search criteria.

To assess the relative costs of the implementation of the Strategy activities, we have analysed the cost of the biggest input, namely Twaweza's human resource, which consist of 41% of the costs – and compared with two like-minded institutions working in Tanzania. The two NGOs have been included in the analysis anonymously in order to abide to confidentiality of the information

they have accepted to share. The analysis is intended to give a wide picture of the relative local costs of Twaweza with a caveat that Twaweza is a regional organisation.

Table 5 shows the total number of employees by their level of education in the three organisations. The data, including the classification by cadres of employees, have been provided by the respective organisations. They resemble each other closely with regard to the total number of staff employed. However the other two institutions have a big number of relatively more trained (by level of education) personnel than Twaweza.

Table 5. Total Number of Employees by their Level of Education in Three Like-minded NGOs

Description	Number of Employees by their Level of Education		
	Institution One	Institution Two	Twaweza
Total number of top cadre employees	20	11	8
Total number with PhDs	0	5	1
Total number with Master degree	20	6	5
Total number with Bachelor degree	0	0	2
All others	8	11	11
Total Number of all Employees	28	22	27

Table 6 depicts a comparative analysis of the average monthly salaries of the different cadres by the three institutions expressed in ratio (taken Institution 1 top management level as ratio 1). The analysis of the salary does not indicate major deviance in the salary scale for medium cadre employees in the three institutions. However, on average Twaweza pays relatively more for all cadres of employees. In particular, the top cadres (directors and managers) are paid almost twice as much as institution 2, and more than twice the average salary of institution 1.

Table 6: Comparative Analysis of Salary Incentives for three like-minded NGOs (ratio-based)

Selected Institutions with Like-minded	Employees by Cadres and Average Monthly Salary (<i>ratio-based</i>)		
	Top Cadre employees (Top management)	Medium Cadre employees	Ordinary/Low Cadre employees
Institution 1	(1,00)	(0,99)	(0,37)
Institution 2	(1,25)	(0,96)	-
TWaweza	(2,42)	(1,07)	(0,55)

We have not addressed productivity among the three institutions, but from the data available Twaweza pays relatively higher for the top cadre than the other two like-minded organisations – suggesting that Twaweza costs are relatively higher, and its VfM is challenged further by reduced impact achievements. On the other hand several activities performed by Twaweza may to some extent justify a higher cost level, including Twaweza operating on a regional scale, strong support to partners and development of joint concepts for projects, and generally focus on development on human resources.

2.3.2 Assessment of partner relations

During the implementation of its 2015-2018 Strategic plan, Twaweza partnered with many development actors, including government and non-government, to accomplish its projects on enhancing Open Government and learning outcomes in basic education. 12 partners relating to Open Government and 8 for improving learning in basic education were interviewed and partner data sheets provided on key data for each of the partner mentioned. The partners represented a

wide range of public, media, networking and NGOs. The two domains and the LME included the following partners⁴³:

Table 7. Selected partners of Twaweza

In Open Government	In Basic Education	LME
• Code4Tanzania • Mwananchi Communications • Wajubu Institute of Public Accountability • The 'Kigoma Experiment' - Kigoma Ijiji municipal council • Kigoma Development Initiative (KDI) • Coalition for the Right to Information • Jamii Forums • Tamasha • Mbunge Live TV show • Christian Social Service Commission • Well Told Story • Doing the Right Thing	• Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, President's Office • President's Office - Regional Administration and Local Government (PO-RALG / TAMISEMI) • DeJusticia • Regional Education Learning Initiative (RELI) • MIT, USA • Research on Improving Systems of Education • People's Action for Learning (PAL) • Tanzania Education Network (TEN/MET)	• Learning Collaborative • Research and Evaluation Advisory Group (REAG)

12 of the partners had engagement contracts with Twaweza, four had MoUs and three of them had membership engagement. As such, 16 out of the 20 partners engaged in the implementation of the Twaweza's Strategy had formal contracts or MoUs. This indicates that a sufficient degree of efficiency has been applied in Twaweza's relationship with its partners, as the MoUs state responsibilities and tasks as well as expected outputs and deliverables. As for the actual outputs delivered, see Effectiveness.

Some concerns raised by the Twaweza partners working in projects in the Open Government domain related to the efficiency of the implementation of the Strategy. Data from the 20 partner sheets and other sources indicate the following:

- It is increasing difficulty to engage government particularly when it comes to seeking permissions for undertaking data collection.
- Obstacles from the government side through administrative delays (e.g. research permissions), and, in the case of Kigoma, unwanted technocrats are removed and attempts made to remove the mayor.
- The environment for data journalism has changed significantly over the course of the partnership. There are new restrictions for which Mwananchi Media is continuing to push boundaries and work within the new restrictions.

⁴³ This list of actual data received from Twaweza differs somewhat from the list presented in the Inception Report, but overall covers the main collaborating partners. We did not have data sheets from the LME organisations but interviewed representatives from REAG.

- The capacity of some of the partners to effectively support Twaweza in project outreach, engagement and follow up was often limited. For example, local government 'dumps' information online that are hard to access/use.
- Many of the partners are concerned about the current political climate. They observe that people are expressing genuine fear for speaking up.
- A few Open Government partners expressed that method of work differs between civil society organisations and media houses causing occasional friction in project implementation.

These findings reveal serious concerns as regard the development trend in the civic space. The environment for accessing, producing and distributing data have been squeezed, government data in the socio-economic area are continuously being of poor quality, harassment of 'alternative ways' to address Open Government by central government, and people expressing 'genuine' fear to speak up – all are obvious indicators for a significantly dwindled civic space in Tanzania. The consequences of this situation are presented in the sections on Lessons Learned and Conclusions.

2.4 SUSTAINABILITY

Sustainability is the extent to which benefits of the Strategy activities can continue or are likely to continue once Twaweza's interventions have been completed. Or it may also look at the extent to which Twaweza can continue its operations following the departure of donor funding. The evaluation matrix addresses the first interpretation of 'sustainability' and asks about (i) Twaweza's contribution to policy changes, including the number of improved policies and legislation enacted; (ii) Twaweza's partners' perception on benefits produced, their degree of sustainability. Regarding the first indicator, evidence has been provided in detail in the annual reports and summarised in 2.2.2.

Basic Education: Twaweza's close work with the government in the education sector produced sustained benefits on the curriculum, the continuity of Uwezo data production, an MoU on KiuFunza, etc. The fact that government has been involved in the work process (e.g. through the Ministry of Education, Tanzania Institute of Education (TIE) and the the National Examinations Council of Tanzania (NECTA) from the early stages of the basic education component has catered for sustained results. Already at the very beginning of the strategy period, a paper summarising findings of past research on the first strategy period pointed to Uwezo data having contributed to changing the debate on education from focusing on providing infrastructure more towards learning.

Open Government: Twaweza contributed significantly, in collaboration with other civil society partners and facilitated by a World Bank investment funding, to the amendments made to an improved Access to Information Act in 2015 and 2016. While the legislative text/articles remain unchanged the generally increasing civic space restrictions have not permitted an effective implementation of the Act, as it is documented by Twaweza that 2 of 3 requests for information access at the local level was denied. One may reverse the argument and say that due to the government's restrictiveness one request of three being successful is not a 'bad deal'. These restrictions include the enactment of other civic restriction legislation, including the Media Services Act and the Statistics Act.

In comparison to the education problem area, efforts to develop sustained benefits in the Open Government domain have been less obvious due to the gradual civic space restrictiveness imposed by government causing Twaweza to a large extent to be reactive rather than proactive. The role of the government in achieving sustained results in development, even under difficult conditions, should however not be underestimated. Whereas Twaweza gradually developed a 'push back' approach to restrictions in civic space that included commenting on bills and

advocacy activities, the organisation does not appear to systematically have been seeking other types of more institutionalised collaboration with the national government as its interest in the Open Government Partnership waned.

Overall, the solidity and reliability of Twaweza's data production and knowledge sharing have over the years attracted public officials' and MPs' attention and a continuous demand for Twaweza produced data on service delivery is most likely. At the core of these activities are Uwezo and SzW, which were established in Twaweza's first strategy period and continued during the 2015-18 period. It should however be noted that the intolerance or declining tolerance towards independently conducted surveys and opinion polls clearly represent a threat to the continuation and sustainability of especially SzW, as became evident from July 2018.

As for the second indicator Twaweza established numerous partnerships during the course of the strategy period. These partnerships are described and discussed in more detail in 2.3.2 Efficiency assessment. As regards any sustained benefits derived from the partnerships the following may be mentioned:

Twaweza facilitated the 'birth' of a new and independent organisation, the Wajibu Institute; a permanent data desk was established at Mwananchi Media; public agency results including construction of schools; capacity building, while often not formalised by Twaweza, has created skills and knowledge development that partners can use.

What have been less obviously sustained include Twaweza's efforts to build monitoring skills among its partners to a sufficient degree. Also, 17 out of 19 partners investigated claimed that their involvement in the Strategy will have or have produced sustained outcomes. While these claims are very optimistic they are also not sufficiently documented, and would require a more in-depth analysis for verification.

The institutionalisation of REAG and the strengthening of the LME unit (through staff expansion) are important indicators for a continuous and sustained learning culture in Twaweza beyond the strategy period.

2.5 IMPACT

The assessment of impact has been based on Twaweza's aim to provide measurable impact by the end of 2018 on the following:

1. Children in school are learning as parents, teachers, school administrators and policy makers focus on measuring and improving the learning outcomes resulting from the large [social] investment in basic education.
2. Public authorities are responsive to public demand, and they promote and protect citizens' right to high quality, relevant and meaningful information.
3. Citizens and civil society are asking for, getting and using information to improve their situation and engage public officials to deepen accountability and improve the quality of public service delivery.
4. Public and policy actors are using evidence-based knowledge to transforming governance practice and the provision of basic education.

While efforts have been made by Twaweza to achieve ambitious and measurable outcomes/goals, circumstances of repressiveness towards the civil space and Twaweza's too activity-focused approach have contributed to impact not being achieved as planned. It was obviously a highly ambitious theory and strategy Twaweza entered into in 2015. Even before the setbacks in 2015 onwards, civic space was restricted in Tanzania. A precondition for achieving impact was the continued democratisation and expansion of civic space in Tanzania.

This did not occur, and government restrictions increased. These factors also point to the fact that the government often play a bigger role than reflected in Twaweza's theory. In 2017, as this became increasingly clear and as the Tanzanian government withdrew from the OGP, Twaweza discussed internally whether to reverse the Strategy and work on Open Government, but this did not happen.

The four areas of impacts constitute the outcome level of Twaweza's theory. While its is concluded that impact has not been documented, we consider the results/benefits of the relevance, effectiveness and sustainability assessment as important *building blocks* upon which further work towards attaining impact can be based. We have listed those building blocks we find essential for furthering this process for each of the impacts in table 8.

Table 8. Building blocks for impact


Impact	Building blocks
1. Children in school are learning as parents, teachers, school administrators and policy makers focus on measuring and improving the learning outcomes in basic education	- Curriculum policy development effect - KiuFunza localised/pilot effect - Anecdotal evidence on parents-school relationship and contributions (Positive Deviance approach) - Government interest and collaboration on data
Impact	Building blocks
2. Public authorities responsive to public demand; promote/protect citizens rights to info	- Access to Information Act basis for continuously addressing demands/requests (baseline: 2 of 3 requests for information at local level has been denied access) - Publication of data availability on eGovernment halted (in 2017); and talk shows and election data facilitate access to information - Analysis and comments on bills in collaboration with partners
Impact	Building blocks
Citizen/CS access and use info for improving their situation and engage public officials to deepen accountability and improve public service delivery	- Launching Uwezo data at district level from mid-2017 continued - Kigoma 'experiment' challenge/engaging local officials (facilitated by strong CSO/Tamasha) - At national plan collaboration with ministries on SDG metrics - Continued monitoring of service delivery and dissemination of results
Impact	Building blocks
Public and policy actors use evidence-based knowledge to transform government practices and the provision of basic education	- Overall interest to collaborate and make use of high quality data (SzW and Uwezo) - Twawezas contribution on government collaboration/processes/procedures with ministries, police (security), the judiciary, etc. is evident and to be continued

In Figure. 2 we have assessed which elements of the theory of change have been most prevalent/dominant, at each level, during the Strategy period.

It shows that 'evidence' in the form of particularly data provided through SzW and Uwezo have been hugely instrumental at the output level. At the intermediate outcome level, the 'public debate' side of the theory has overwhelmingly dominated – during the election 2015, through TV and radio shows, and the Kigoma public agency experiment, as well as the initiation of debates in connection with media coverage.

Many goals/indicators of the SDGs are presented in the already collected data from Uwezo and Twaweza has as such already contributed to SDG data in education. However, steps have been taken during the strategy period to fill data gaps. Twaweza also has found particular traction in the issue of water quality and is expanding on SDG data collection in this area. Thus far, the use of quick and easy water quality tests using volunteer researchers has been piloted and to be scaled up to cover district levels in the new strategy.

Fig 2. Dominant features/pathways of theory of change



3 Conclusions and Lessons Learned

3.1 CONCLUSIONS

Relevance

- 1) The Strategy has become increasingly challenged during the Strategy period 2015-2018 as the increasing shrinking civic space made it harder to influence government policies and actions through the public debate and deliberations envisioned in the Strategy.
- 2) Conformity has been observed between Twaweza's priorities and the policies and needs/demand from donors and intermediate actors, such as media and other CSOs.
- 3) The four major interventions all fall within Twaweza's overall theory of change, but the degree to which they refer to, reflect upon and feed back into the theory, differed. The SzW was considered highly relevant; KiuFunza relevant yet very narrowly reflecting the overall theory of change; Kigoma-Ujiji local government intervention highly relevant as Twaweza also moved increasingly towards local activity levels in 2017; the Election 2015 was relevant focusing on active citizens and accountable politicians, though implementation turned patchy.
- 4) Twaweza did not change the theory of change fundamentally during the implementation of the Strategy, though the increasing civic space restrictions occurred and there was a switch from a national-oriented focus early on in the period towards a more decentralised focus during the latter part of the period. Important reflections on the overall approach and strategy can be observed towards the end of the strategy period.
- 5) Activities on evidence and data on service delivery seems to some extent to have been reduced in the second half of the Strategy period or at least they are not reported on to the same extent as in the first half. Data however shows that citizens prioritise service delivery and that focusing on service delivery is recommended in the 2014 evaluation.
- 6) Twaweza limited itself in identifying key problems and concerns for its theory of change and Strategy design as it applied its analysis on a single methodology only, the problem-driven iterative adaptation.

Effectiveness

- 7) Based on a detailed analysis of the two domains and the LME over the four-year Strategy period it is concluded that the activity level has been high in the two main domains, leading to numerous outputs, particularly as regards the 'evidence' side (data production) of the theory of change. These data are in a package format distributed online, through media and directly to government officials and politicians. They have contributed to public debates and overall reach at the intermediate outcome level, which is an important achievement in Tanzania. At the outcome level evidence on lasting and institutionalised change is limited.
- 8) The numerous activities and outputs related to data evidence production have been too scattered. Based on the documentation available to the team, follow-up on activities and intermediate outcomes produced in the two domains and LME have been limited. Opportuni-

ties to build up strength on results from activities that could lead towards intermediate outcomes and sustained outcomes have not been fully utilised.

- 9) Almost 60% of the Twaweza benchmarks were achieved over the 2015-2017 period, considered only a somewhat successful accomplishment despite the restrictive socio-political context.
- 10) The many different measurement tools applied by Twaweza (hypotheses, key metrics, benchmarks, outputs, outcomes, etc.) have been inefficient for effective measurement of progress and achievements of the Strategy. Twaweza has spent abundance of time on reporting on these as to meet transparency and accountability while simplified systems would have sufficed and achieved the same.

Efficiency

- 11) Twaweza spent about 75% of its planned budget for the implementation of the Strategy during the four years. This is considered relatively efficient considering the limitations put on the organisation as a result of the strained political context in the country, particularly during the last half-year of 2018.
- 12) A brief comparison based on basic parameters between Twaweza and two like-minded organisations shows that Twaweza's operations are relatively more expensive. Twaweza is highly efficient as regards its management (operations and financial management), being highly automated and following recognised standards and principles. The website is however of poor quality and the time spent on reporting on many indicators of progress and achievements also indicates some degree of inefficiency.
- 13) 16 out of the 20 of Twaweza's main partners entered into formal contracts or MoUs indicating a sufficient degree of efficiency applied by Twaweza's in its relationship with partners. Yet, while collaboration has shown an overall ad hoc nature there is no doubt that Twaweza has provided significant support to partners in their ability to become more innovative and enabled them to strengthen their organisations.

Sustainability

- 14) Partners' perceptions of real and potentially sustained benefits produced in collaboration with Twaweza are high. 17 out of 20 partners claim sustainability if Twaweza would leave. However, limited evidence is provided as to verify such claims.
- 15) The close work with the government in the education sector produced some sustained benefits. Early involvement of government in work processes in the basic education domain has catered for such sustained results.
- 16) In comparison to the education problem area, efforts to develop sustained benefits in the Open Government domain have been less obvious. This is due to the gradual civic space restrictiveness imposed by government, but also because of Twaweza's less strategic focus in their choice of activities.
- 17) Twaweza contributed to policy change in the Open Government area, primarily through its input and improvements to the Access to Information Act. It further developed its activities on analysing and commenting on bills over the strategy period. Whereas the effect of these activities was not always clear, it did help inform decision-makers and the public about the implications of upcoming legislation.

- 18) The LME has developed sustained institutional results with the creation of an internal advisory body on research and evaluation (REAG) and the staff expansion of the LME Unit.

Impact

- 19) By the end of 2018, Twaweza wanted to have made a *measurable* impact on four development dimensions, i.e. school children for learning; authorities' responsiveness to public demands; accessing information for deepen accountability; and transforming government practices based on evidenced knowledge. While these ambitious impacts were clearly aimed at by Twaweza they were apart from the 'school learning' only achieved to a limited extent.
- 20) It was obviously a highly ambitious theory Twaweza embarked upon in 2015. Even before the setbacks in 2015 onwards, civic space was restricted in Tanzania. A precondition for achieving the measurable impact was thus the continued democratisation and expansion of civic space in Tanzania. This did not occur, and government restrictions increased. These factors points to the fact that the government play a bigger role than reflected in Twaweza's theory.
- 21) SDG data has been increasingly included in the Twaweza databases, particularly educational data (Uwezo) but also government related data, such as social sector data, including health and water.

3.2 LESSONS LEARNED

The Strategy 2015-18 Twaweza had as its point of departure that lasting changes are driven by the actions of motivated citizens (p. 3). A main means to achieve this is informed public debate, which in turn will promote responsive public authorities and influence policies and plans. However, this chain of actions and effects proved challenging during the strategy period as documented in this evaluation. This is partly related to the shrinking civic space during the strategy period, but it would have been challenging in the Tanzanian context even prior to this development, and partly due to a fragmented activity approach by Twaweza.

When it comes to achieving sustained change, Twaweza's more tangible outcomes come from sustained engagement with key decision-makers and government authorities related to solid evidence from research and data platforms like Uwezo and Sauti za Wananchi. Data on service delivery has attracted the attention of government authorities throughout the period and opened the door for interaction and allowed for influence, not least in the education sector.

By comparison, Twaweza lost its platform for interaction in the Open Government element of its work with the government withdrawal from the Open Government Partnership at the end of 2017 and it did not manage to establish new ones on a sustained basis. As a reaction to this, Twaweza developed a push back approach to the shrinking civic space over the strategy period. This included the analysis of and commenting on bills, coalition building with other NGOs, more localised activities as well as an increased emphasis on advocacy, not least related to the laws affecting civic space.

Whereas there is evidence that such activities produced some results early in the strategy period the effect later in the period is unclear from Twaweza's reporting. They also pose a risk to Twaweza's activities as demonstrated with the blocking of further publication of SzW data from the middle of 2018 onwards.

Major changes in the new Strategy (2019-2022) and its theory of change include the divesting of the basic education work to a new entity, more activities with change agents and local

governments in selected areas and playing down the ambition to foster a responsive government at the national level, at least in the short term. Twaweza at the national level will then amplify local experiences. Whereas most vision and values from the old Strategy are upheld, the mission has changed from collecting evidence to inspire citizens and stimulate responsiveness from authorities (p. 9), the new Strategy aims at demonstrating how citizen can come together and address problems, enable them to be heard and promote and protect civic space (p. 13). The main lesson in this context is that people may come together to address problems, but these problems should clearly reflect perceived and actual needs and demands by citizens (and local officials). Otherwise Twaweza's efforts may eventually be in vain.

The changes provide for a less ambitious approach. At the same time, it can also be seen as both more and less realistic in terms of what an NGO can achieve in Tanzania in terms of sustained outcomes. It can be seen as more realistic in that the measurable impacts are more process oriented and focusing on gradual improvements. It can be seen as less realistic in that it takes citizen agency as its point of departure. As demonstrated in this evaluation, evidence on the effect of citizen agency is limited.

In this regard it is also worth noting that the lessons from Twaweza's first strategy period summarised in the 2015-18 Strategy suggest that 'some of our notable successes were achieved precisely in the policy environment and less where we had expected it: change driven by citizens' (p. 7). Similarly, the new Strategy suggests that 'the overall citizen agency picture – seeking information, monitoring delivery, speaking out in public and taking action – is complicated and generally weak' (p. 5). It is unclear what role service delivery, which hitherto has been a key component and opened the door to engagement with government authorities, is to play.

4 Recommendations

Relevance

- 1) When Twaweza embarks on identifying key problems and concerns as well as assign major interventions, thorough and diversified analytic methods should apply. This will contribute to the design of a more realistic theory of change and development of improved pathways to its realisation.
- 2) Due to the fast socio-political context the theory of change should be regularly subject to review, e.g. every sixth month.
- 3) Twaweza should re-think its approach to service delivery so to better reflect the fact that evidence and data collection on service delivery are in demand as it is the most important need perceived by its main target group, Tanzanian citizens.

Effectiveness

- 4) Twaweza should continue contributing to public debates in Tanzania through the generation of evidence and experiments, but balance thoughtfully this against development goals, that is, delivering and sustaining results.
- 5) Twaweza should continue its high activity level, follow-up on those activities that have potential to drive the theory of change forward, i.e. identifying improved pathways for improved opportunities for change.
- 6) Twaweza should review the results matrix, simplify, and continue describing activities and outputs and ensure that they are clear and logically linked towards effects. In the light of achieved outcomes – or the lack of them – regularly revisit the Strategy's theory of change, including initiate alternative entries to problem analysis and adjust hypotheses and activities accordingly. The number of assessment tools should be reduced, including benchmarks.
- 7) In order to become more precise on how to achieve intermediate outcomes and outcomes, Twaweza should analyse and more clearly distinguish between what it can control itself, what it can influence directly or through partners and what is required by other actors to achieve outcomes.

Efficiency

- 8) Twaweza should continue its efforts to improve its value for money, through, for example, continuous application of advanced technology, ensure that trained staff apply learned skills and when possible adjust salary levels.
- 9) Twaweza should expand on its partner networking, formalise relationships whenever possible but balance realistically against plans. Efforts should particularly be on supporting partners in their monitoring and evaluation knowledge and skills to ensure their enableness to manage projects in general but particular those initiated/facilitated by Twaweza, a process in which Twaweza is already engaged.

Sustainability

- 10) Related to the fact that some of the main outcomes over the past strategy periods have been achieved through sustained engagement with government authorities, Twaweza should generally seek to engage these authorities prior to initiating major interventions and

incentivise their continuous involvement and participation throughout the project cycle, whenever possible

- 11) Given the changing socio-political context in Tanzania Twaweza may further develop its activities targeting and protecting the shrinking civic space, but it should maintain a core of activities related to data and work on service delivery, which have proved a main entry point to positive engagement with government authorities.
- 12) Overall, focus more on the building of organisational capacity of external partners and stakeholders as this will help institutionalise change. This is the more important as Twaweza currently seems to be pivoting towards activities at the local level where capacity is often limited. It is also important in a context with increasingly centralised decision-making in order to build resilience towards pressure from central government.
- 13) Internally, develop scenarios with different trade-offs between working with the government (generating evidence on service delivery in a non-partisan way) and pursuing a watchdog push back approach. Based on these scenarios and thorough risk analyses identify the manoeuvrability of Twaweza in the current socio-political context and let the outcome help sustain Twaweza's future strategy and activities as well as its organisational structures.

Impact

- 14) Efforts have been made by Twaweza to achieve ambitious and measurable outcomes/goals. Yet, circumstances of repressiveness towards the civil space and Twaweza's too activity-focused approach resulted in low impact. Forward-looking Twaweza should assess impact through development of pathways in which likelihoods of achievements are realistically designed.
- 15) Twaweza should continue to apply SDG data in both education and government areas when it coincides with its plans. SDGs being a government responsibility Twaweza's data collection in this area could be a one of several openings into collaboration with the government system for longer term effect..

Evaluation of Twaweza, Tanzania part

Final Report - ANNEXES

1 August 2019

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PREFACE

The Evaluation of Twaweza, the Tanzania part, was commissioned by The Embassy of Sweden in Tanzania. The evaluation was undertaken by NIRAS between February and May 2019 and was conducted by:

- Svend Erik Sørensen, team leader
- Rasmus Hundsbaek Pedersen, researcher and civil society expert
- Deograsias Mushi, economist and local expert

Kristoffer Engstrand managed the process at NIRAS Sweden. Niels Dabelstein provided quality assurance. Stephen Chimalo managed the evaluation at the Embassy of Sweden, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

This part of the evaluation contains the Annexes of the Draft Final Evaluation Report

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Terms of Reference (ToR)

Annex 2: Inception Report

Annex 3: Persons consulted

Annex 4: Documents consulted

Annex 5: Relevance Analysis

Annex 6: Effectiveness Assessment

Annex 7: Benchmarks 2015-2017

Annex 8: Scaled up projects

1 Terms of Reference (ToR)



INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Twaweza which means “make it happen” in Swahili describes itself as an ambitious initiative which started in 2009, working on enabling citizens to exercise agency, promoting governments to be more open and responsive, and improving basic learning for children in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda.

Twaweza is currently concluding a strategic plan for the time frame of 2015-2018. In the current strategic document Twaweza describes that from the lessons learned in the previous implementation period, it has refined its theory of change by grounding it in two domains (basic education and open government), and included enhanced responsiveness from authorities (in addition to greater citizen agency) as the overarching goals it strives towards.

Twaweza has headquarters in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, where, as of 2015, it is registered as a legally independent entity. It has certificates of compliance in Kenya and Uganda (with offices in Nairobi and Kampala). From 2009 till end of 2014 it operated as a programme of the Dutch Hivos initiative. During 2015 and 2016 Twaweza operated under oversight by Hivos.

Twaweza’s strategic programme has four components:

- 1) Data and voice, which include Uwezo, Africa’s largest annual citizen assessment of children’s learning across hundreds of thousands of households; and Sauti za Wananchi, Africa’s first national representative frequent and rapid mobile phone-based survey.
- 2) An ambitious program of gathering evidence on “what works” in the domains of basic education and open government. This includes experiments both small and large, and a focus on sourcing and understanding locally-generated solutions through the positive deviance approach.
- 3) Public and Policy Communications and Engagement, which produces various high-quality non-partisan products based on data and evidence, and engages relevant target audiences through a range of products and approaches (media partnerships, direct engagement with policy actors, etc.).
- 4) Alongside the programs is the Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation portfolio, which provides monitoring and feedback, engages external evaluations, contributes lessons to national and international forums and infuses the organization with accountability and a learning culture.

The strategy document organizes the work around a set of nine problems (four in education, and five in open government). Each problem has a longer-term hypothesis of change and proposed markers; each year the organization also develops a detailed work plan with core annual indicators of outputs and outcomes.

PROGRAMME HISTORY AND CONTEXT

It should be noted that the first strategic period (up through 2014) was evaluated in 2014 by an independent team of external evaluators (contracted by Sida Tanzania, and coordinated with the group of development partners, the Twaweza Governance Board, and Twaweza senior management). Covering much ground and a lot of detail of what worked well and the areas which needed improvement, the overall evaluation was very positive for Twaweza, noting that “no other similar organization exists in the country that can replace Twaweza’s work towards improvements in public policy; openness and transparency in government; and in education,” and recommending to donor partners to continue supporting Twaweza’s programs. The full report, as well as the management response letter, can be found on Twaweza’s website: <http://www.twaweza.org/go/evaluation1>

Twaweza’s current strategy and theory of change are based on an extensive situation analysis and reflection on its first strategic period (2009-2014), the summary of which can be found in the current [strategy](#) (pg. 5). In essence, this analysis and reflection found that a number of Twaweza’s initiatives were successful and a number of hypotheses were right: for example, generating frequent, reliable and non-partisan data on citizen’s voices (experiences with government, services, opinions on key development issues, etc.) would generate and improve public and policy debate on these issues, and be linked to a set of policy changes. On the other hand, Twaweza also learned that focusing on large scale right from the start of an initiative isn’t always the best approach (often careful and smaller-scale testing is required); it also learned that while provision of information (data, stories, etc.) can indeed be very powerful, direct engagement with government and policy actors is needed. In other words, the data ought to be a tool in the advocacy work. Such thinking has shaped much of Twaweza’s work in this current strategic period, and some reflections about the effectiveness of its new approach are already emerging. An input for review into this process is the summary from the March 2018 Ideas & Evidence event organized by Twaweza, which brought together a number of researchers and activists who have partnered with Twaweza over the current strategic period. The reflections can be found here: <https://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/bruised-but-better-the-stronger-case-for-evidence-based-activism-in-east-africa/>

Terms of Reference for the Evaluation of Twaweza strategic Plan 2015 – 2018, programme support in Tanzania

Date: Jan 2019 – July 2019

1. Evaluation object and scope

Embassy’s of Sweden support to Twaweza falls under result area one and three on Swedish development strategy in Tanzania for 2013 – 2019 which claim for girls and boys access to education and improved democratic governance respectively. Twaweza is funded for a period of three years 2016 – 2018 with 48,000,000 MSEK for implementation of its activities in Tanzania.

This is the first time Sida commissions evaluation for Twaweza 2015 – 2018 strategy. It is an end term evaluation which does not only measure extent at which Twaweza achieved its intended results (2015 – 2018) but also an input as Twaweza is set to implement its new strategic plan for 2019 – 2021.

In the current strategic document Twaweza describes that from the lessons learned in the previous implementation period, it has refined its theory of change by grounding it in two domains (basic education and open government), and included enhanced responsiveness from authorities (in addition to greater citizen agency) as the overarching goals it strives towards.

Important to note is that this evaluation will focus on the Tanzania portfolio and related activities (not Kenya and Uganda), given the interest and domain of Sida Tanzania support.

The evaluation is expected to focus on the following three areas:

- 1) **Organizational development benchmarks.** Progress in relation to Twaweza's agreed benchmarks for internal development and outputs, given that in this strategic period it has become an independent organization. The evaluation should provide an overall analysis of how the organization has developed since 2015 with regard to its strategic thinking embraced in its theory of change and how that has been an integral part with development of procedures and routines for monitoring and evaluation.
- 2) **Outcome, quality of outputs, and reach.** This portion of the evaluation (Twaweza also uses outcome mapping approach) will examine the outputs and analyze them in relation to the desired outcomes and theory of change; and will assess their quality, relevance, and reach. Value for money should be assessed taking into account the quality and quantity of outputs in relation to investments made by Twaweza, and Twaweza's general policy and practice to pay upon outputs delivered (not inputs), particularly in the Tanzanian context.
- 3) **Assessment of the contributions to overarching goals.** The evaluation shall provide an analysis, on a sample basis, of the extent to which the overall Twaweza program is likely to stimulate the envisaged citizen agency, as well as government responsiveness. It is imperative that the evaluation takes into account and reflects on the fast changing socio-political context in which Twaweza operates, particularly in Tanzania. The evaluation is not expected to be able to provide "hard facts" but it should analyze and discuss the extent to which change can be expected to be a sustained effect of the program investment. This component ought to also include the assessment of Twaweza's learning structure, including external evaluations, and of how Twaweza has been learning and evolving based on feedback and evidence.

Twaweza is funded by more than one donor therefore it is expected that the result of this evaluation will be shared to all donors. At the moment Twaweza is funded by, Embassy of Sweden, DFID, Embassy of Denmark, Hewlett and Wellspring Advisors.

2. Evaluation rationale

The current Twaweza strategic plan covers the period from 2015-2018 and the organization has already embarked on a process to develop a new strategy, based on the various lessons learned through its own work, as well as from the external input and review as summarized in the Ideas & Evidence note. Still, an aggregated external evaluation is an opportunity for Twaweza, its Board and its development partners to further describe and reflect on its approach as it embarks on its next strategy period.

The overall objective of the evaluation is to provide a comprehensive summary and aggregation of Twaweza Tanzania activities over the 2015-2018 period, as well as establish, on a sample basis, the links (substantiated by evidence) between the activities and (a) stated organization's objectives, and (b) other observed changes in the relevant sectors/domains, while (c) taking into account the socio-political context in which Twaweza (Tanzania) operates.

3. Evaluation purpose: Intended use and intended users

Evaluation purpose,

- Serve as an input to Twaweza's learning and future reflections on its newly developed strategic plan 2019 – 2021
- The evaluation will be used to inform the board of Twaweza and Twaweza' third parties on Twaweza's performance, challenges and recommended way forward.
- Provide Sida and other donors supporting Twaweza with knowledge on Twaweza's effectiveness and relevance in the current and future context.

The primary users of the evaluation report are,

- Twaweza as the organization is the primary user of the evaluation report
- Embassy of Sweden in Tanzania and other donors who are funding Twaweza, (Embassy of Denmark, DFID, Hewlett and Wellspring Advisors

Secondary users,

- The government agencies and officials especially Ministry for local and regional government.

The evaluation is to be designed, conducted and reported to meet the needs of the intended users and tenderers shall elaborate in the tender how this will be ensured during the evaluation process. Other stakeholders that should be kept informed about the evaluation include, Embassy of Denmark, Hewlett, Wellspring Advisors, Embassy of Sweden and DFID

During the inception phase, the evaluator and the users will agree on who will be responsible for keeping the various stakeholders informed about the evaluation.

4. Evaluation criteria and questions

These questions are to be further worked out by the evaluation team/consultant, as part of the inception report. The question should include and not limited to;

Relevance

- To which extent has the project conformed to the needs and priorities of the beneficiaries and donor policies?
- Are the interventions in line with development policy and administration systems of the government of Tanzania?
- Are there potential risks with Twaweza's future operations?
- With current political context, how do donors and Twaweza's strategic partners view Twaweza's role?

Efficiency

- What is the general impression on value for money in relation to results achieved?
- How flexible was the program in adapting to changing needs?
- How did program coordinate with similar interventions to encourage synergy and avoid overlaps?
- What was the operational effectiveness (Twaweza organization structure, governance) in achieving results?
- What is the added value of Twaweza interventions relative to other CSO players

Effectiveness

- To which extent have the project contributed to intended outcomes? If so, why? If not, why not?
- To what extent has lessons learned from what works well and less well been used to improve and adjust project/programme implementation?
- What are major factors influencing the achievement or non achievement of the objectives
- How has the learning component of Twaweza impacted on its theory of change?

Impact

- What is the overall impact of the project/programme in terms of direct or indirect, negative and positive results?
- Did the program take timely measures to mitigate the unplanned negative impact? What was the result?

Sustainability

- Is it likely that the benefits (outcomes) of the project are sustainable?
- How far was the program embedded in local and institutional structures?
- Has the program leveraged knowledge and interventions to ensure sustainable impact?

5. Evaluation approach and methods for data collection and analysis

It is expected that the evaluator describes and justifies an appropriate evaluation approach/methodology and methods for data collection in the tender. The evaluation design, methodology and methods for data collection and analysis are expected to be fully developed and presented in the inception report. A clear distinction is to be made between evaluation approach/methodology and methods.

Sida's approach to evaluation is utilization-focused, which means the evaluator should facilitate the *entire evaluation process* with careful consideration of how everything that is done will affect the use of the evaluation. It is therefore expected that the evaluators, in their tender, present i) how intended users are to participate in and contribute to the evaluation process and ii) methodology and methods for data collection that create space for reflection, discussion and learning between the intended users of the evaluation.

Evaluators should take into consideration appropriate measures for collecting data in cases where sensitive or confidential issues are addressed, and avoid presenting information that may be harmful to some stakeholder groups.

6. Organisation of evaluation management

This evaluation is commissioned by Embassy of Sweden in Tanzania. The intended users are Embassy of Sweden and its partners funding Twaweza. The intended user Embassy of Sweden is the commissioner of the evaluation and the lead entity for this assignment. Other partners funding Twaweza have contributed their inputs and agreed on the ToR for this evaluation. The Embassy of Sweden will approve the inception report and the final report of the evaluation. Embassy of Sweden including other partners funding Twaweza will participate in the start-up meeting of the evaluation, as well as in the debriefing/validation workshop where preliminary findings and conclusions are discussed.

7. Evaluation quality

All Sida's evaluations shall conform to OECD/DAC's Quality Standards for Development Evaluation¹. The evaluators shall use the Sida OECD/DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation². The evaluators shall specify how quality assurance will be handled by them during the evaluation process.

8. Time schedule and deliverables

It is expected that a time and work plan is presented in the tender and further detailed in the inception report. The evaluation and other related assignment shall be carried **out from January 7th to 5th July 2019**. The timing of any field visits, surveys and interviews need to be settled by the evaluator in dialogue with the main stakeholders during the inception phase.

The table below lists key deliverables for the evaluation process. Deadlines for final inception report and final report must be kept in the tender, but alternative deadlines for other deliverables may be suggested by the consultant and negotiated during the inception phase.

Deliverables	Participants	Deadlines
1. Start-up meeting A. Twaweza Office	Embassy of Sweden Evaluators	January 7 th 2019
2. Draft inception report	Evaluator	6 th Feb 2019
3. Inception meeting B. Twaweza office	Wellspring, DFID, Embassy of Sweden, Embassy of Denmark and Hewlett	Tentative 15 th Feb 2019
4. Comments from intended users to evaluators	Wellspring, DFID, Embassy of Sweden, Embassy of Denmark, Twaweza and Hewlett	Tentative 20 th Feb 2019
5. Final inception report	Evaluator	28 th Feb 2019
6. Debriefing/validation workshop (meeting)	Wellspring, DFID, Embassy of Sweden, Embassy of Denmark, Twaweza and Hewlett	30 th May 2019
7. Draft evaluation report	Evaluator	7 th June 2019
8. Comments from intended users to evaluators	Wellspring, DFID, Embassy of Sweden, Embassy of Denmark, Twaweza and Hewlett	21 st June 2019

¹ DAC Quality Standards for development Evaluation, OECD, 2010.

² Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, Sida in cooperation with OECD/DAC, 2014.

9. Final evaluation report	Embassy of Sweden	5 th July 2019
10. Seminar [STATE LOCATION/VIRTUAL]	[STATE TARGET GROUPS]	Tentative [STATE TENTATIVE DATE]

The inception report will form the basis for the continued evaluation process and shall be approved by Sida before the evaluation proceeds to implementation. The inception report should be written in English and cover evaluability issues and interpretations of evaluation questions, present the evaluation approach/methodology, methods for data collection and analysis as well as the full evaluation design. A clear distinction between the evaluation approach/methodology and methods for data collection shall be made. A specific time and work plan, including number of hours/working days for each team member, for the remainder of the evaluation should be presented. The time plan shall allow space for reflection and learning between the intended users of the evaluation.

The final report shall be written in English and be professionally proof read. The final report should have clear structure and follow the report format in the Sida Decentralised Evaluation Report Template for decentralised evaluations (see Annex C). The executive summary should be maximum 3 pages. The evaluation approach/methodology and methods for data collection used shall be clearly described and explained in detail and a clear distinction between the two shall be made. All limitations to the methodology and methods shall be made explicit and the consequences of these limitations discussed. Findings shall flow logically from the data, showing a clear line of evidence to support the conclusions. Conclusions should be substantiated by findings and analysis. Recommendations and lessons learned should flow logically from conclusions. Recommendations should be specific, directed to relevant stakeholders and categorised as a short-term, medium-term and long-term. The report should be no more than 35 pages. A maximum of 35 pages is recommended, but the number of pages must relate to the complexity of the evaluation object excluding annexes (including Terms of Reference and Inception Report). The evaluator shall adhere to the Sida OECD/DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation³.

The evaluator shall, upon approval of the final report, insert the report into the Sida Decentralised Evaluation Report for decentralised evaluations and submit it to Nordic Morning (in pdf-format) for publication and release in the Sida publication data base. The order is placed by sending the approved report to sida@nordicmorning.com, always with a copy to the Sida Programme Officer as well as Sida's Evaluation Unit (evaluation@sida.se). Write "Sida decentralised evaluations" in the email subject field and include the name of the consulting company as well as the full evaluation title in the email. For invoicing purposes, the evaluator needs to include the invoice reference "ZZ980601," type of allocation "sakanslag" and type of order "digital publicering/publikationsdatabas.

9. Evaluation Team Qualification

In addition to the qualifications already stated in the framework agreement for evaluation services, the evaluation team shall include the following competencies;

³ Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management, Sida in cooperation with OECD/DAC, 2014

1. Evaluation specialist(s) with expertise in evaluation methodologies including outcome mapping, tracing and qualitative analysis
2. Excellent research and analytical skills, particularly in qualitative methodologies (e.g., process tracing, outcome mapping)
3. Social scientist and civil society specialist with good understanding of citizen agency for social change, improved accountability and service delivery
4. Significant experience working in East Africa; essential to have a keen understanding of the socio-political context in Tanzania in particular
5. Expertise in the Tanzanian context of public sector accountability and governance at both central and local levels
6. The team should include at least one consultant with fluency in Swahili and have a gender balance
7. Previous experience of similar assignments.

A CV for each team member shall be included in the call-off response. It should contain a full description of relevant qualifications and professional work experience.

It is important that the competencies of the individual team members are complimentary. It is highly recommended that local consultants are included in the team if appropriate.

The evaluators must be independent from the evaluation object and evaluated activities, and have no stake in the outcome of the evaluation.

10. Resources

The contact person at Sida/Swedish Embassy is Stephen Chimalo, Program Officer, CSO and Education in Development Cooperation Division. The contact person should be consulted if any problems arise during the evaluation process.

Relevant Sida documentation will be provided by Stephen Chimalo

Contact details to intended users (cooperation partners, Swedish Embassies, other donors etc.) will be provided by Twaweza

The evaluator will be required to arrange the logistics for example bookings, travels and interviews including any necessary security arrangements.

11. Annexes

Annex A: List of key documentation

Annex B: Data sheet on the evaluation object

Annex C: Decentralised evaluation report template

Annex D : Project/Programme document

Information on the evaluation object (i.e. project or programme)	
Title of the evaluation object	Evaluation of Twaweza strategic plan 2015 - 2018
ID no. in PLANIt	51170083
Dox no./Archive case no.	UM2015/17888
Activity period (if applicable)	Jan 1 st 2016 – Dec 31 2018
Agreed budget (if applicable)	48,000,000 SEK
Main sector ⁴	Education and Democracy
Name and type of implementing organisation ⁵	NGO, Civil Society
Aid type ⁶	Project
Swedish strategy	Tanzania strategy 2013 - 2019
Information on the evaluation assignment	
Commissioning unit/Swedish Embassy	Development Cooperation Division
Contact person at unit/Swedish Embassy	Stephen Chimalo
Timing of evaluation (mid-term, end-of-programme, ex-post or other)	End Term Evaluation
ID no. in PLANIt (if other than above).	

⁴ Choose from Sida's twelve main sectors: education; research; democracy, human rights and gender equality; health; conflict, peace and security; humanitarian aid; sustainable infrastructure and services; market development; environment; agriculture and forestry; budget support; or other (e.g. multi-sector).

⁵ Choose from the five OECD/DAC-categories: public sector institutions; NGO or civil society; public-private partnerships and networks; multilateral organisations; and other (e.g. universities, consultancy firms).

⁶ Choose from the eight OECD/DAC-categories: budget/sector support; core contributions/pooled funds; project type; experts/technical assistance; scholarships/student costs in donor countries; debt relief; admin costs not included elsewhere; and other in-donor expenditures.]

2 Inception Report

Evaluation of Twaweza Strategic Plan 2015-2018;
programme support in Tanzania

Inception Report

SVEND ERIK SORENSEN, RASMUS H. PEDERSEN,

28 FEBRUAR 2019

Abbreviations and acronyms

EQ	Evaluation Question
FDG	Focus Group Discussion
LME	Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation
MDP	Multi-Dimensional Poverty
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD/DAC	Organisation of Economic Cooperation Development / Development Assistance Committee
RAG	Red-Amber-Green Rating Tool
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
Sida	Swedish International Development Aid
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
VfM	Value for Money

Executive Summary

The evaluation of 'Twaweza Strategic Plan 2015-2018, programme support in Tanzania' covers the period 2015-2018 and is an end-term evaluation. The evaluation is commissioned by Sida and focuses on Twaweza's Tanzanian portfolio. Twaweza's Strategy 2015-2018 focuses on three main programme areas, namely 1. Data and Voice; 2. What Works in basic education and open government; and 3. Public and Policy Communications and Engagement. Twaweza has an addition portfolio on Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation. The evaluation team find that the scope of work and time allocated is sufficient for collecting and reviewing evidence, providing a comprehensive summary and aggregation of activities, and carrying out interviews with Twaweza staff and partners and other stakeholders.

In line with the ToR, the evaluation will measure the extent at which Twaweza has achieved its intended result over the four year period in terms of: 1) Organisational development; 2) Outcome, quality of outputs, and reach, and; 3) Assessment of the contribution to overarching goals. Benchmarks and outputs for organisational development will relate to developments in governance and reporting, and human resources and finance. The more specific evaluation questions related to outcome and contribution in the ToR have been unpacked and a matrix has been developed based on a review of the documents provided by the Embassy of Sweden in Dar es Salaam and Twaweza as well as stakeholders' comments to the draft inception report. We assess that the EQs can be evaluated (draft indicators identified), how they can be evaluated (desk review and interviews) and with what sources (stakeholders, documents, annual reports, etc.), including assessment of the reliability and availability of the latter.

The evaluation takes Twaweza's own assessments of performance along the RAG measurement in its annual reports as its main point of departure. The evaluation will primarily address the 'aggregated effect' level and probe into what have been the main factors where changes in RAG level has been observed. The actions Twaweza has taken to remedy downgrades and facilitate upgrades in the RAG measurement will be assessed. In this regard, the evaluation will pay attention to Twaweza's Strategy 2015-2018, which states that the organisation wants to have made a 'measureable impact' on basic education and open government. On a sample basis, it will further analyse the links between Twaweza activities and other sector dynamics. This is envisaged to include a visit to and analysis of Twaweza's Kigoma experiment.

Throughout, the evaluation will take into account Tanzania's socio-political context with shrinking civic space. The team suggests paying attention to how Twaweza staff and its partners in civil society have experienced this change over the period and the extent to which it has affected the ability to make an impact. This will provide a platform for the evaluation's analysis and discussion of the extent to which Twaweza's theory of change (ToC), which was formulated after the last evaluation covering the period up through 2014, was appropriate for the changing conditions during the 2015-2018 period – and whether Twaweza's strategic thinking with its new ToC in the new Strategy 2019-2022 has addressed the fast changing context in a way that has enabled Twaweza to identify realistic pathways for achieving its strategic goal.

Two overall approaches will guide the evaluation, i.e. ToC and contribution analysis. The multi-dimensional poverty model proposed in the draft inception report has been considered a less relevant approach to adopt for the evaluation, as the model was not in play at the time of the Embassy's approval of supporting Twaweza. To assess Twaweza's work against the model is therefore considered inappropriate. Contribution analysis will be carried out in a participatory way to build contribution stories from stakeholders focusing on 'change'. The purpose is to identify direct influence from activities. Through interviews this will be further analysed related to Twaweza's ToC focusing on how stakeholders' believe change has occurred and whether they have evidence to support these assumptions. Moving from outputs through intermediate outcomes to outcomes process tracing will be applied in order to analyse

whether other dynamics may have been at play. Process tracing will also help analyse how and to what extent Twaweza has adapted to the changing socio-political context in Tanzania over the period.

The methods for data collection are primarily qualitative, covering desk study reviews of Twaweza strategies and annual reports, academic literature on civil society in Tanzania, including current trends, as well as interviews/ focus group discussions. The latter will involve Twaweza management, staff, partners and Government officials having been or are engaged in areas related to Twaweza's work. While we considered a survey to be undertaken in our implementation proposal we have re-assessed this method and find that time, if well planned and organised, allows for the team to organise structured interviews and maybe focus group discussions with all partners and other stakeholders, sufficiently being able to collect data needed to fulfil the objectives of the evaluation.

1 Assessment of scope of evaluation

The evaluation of 'Twaweza Strategic Plan 2015-2018; programme support in Tanzania' covers the period 2015-2018 and it is an end-term evaluation that will not only measure the extent at which Twaweza has achieved its intended result over the four year period, but also be an input for Twaweza as it is set to implement its new strategic plan for 2019-2022⁷. In the evaluation's Terms of Reference (ToR) it is highlighted that it is imperative that the evaluation 'takes into account and reflects on the fast changing socio-political context'.

Whereas Twaweza operated as a programme of Hivos⁸, a Dutch international NGO, in its early phase 2009-2014 and it has since 2015 been registered as a non-profit company (company limited by guarantee with no share capital) in Tanzania and has certificates of compliance to operate in Kenya and Uganda. It operated under Hivos oversight in 2015 and 2016. The evaluation focuses on Twaweza's Tanzanian portfolio. The evaluation is commissioned by Sida which supports Twaweza under Area One and Three of the Swedish development strategy in Tanzania for 2013-2019, which claim for girls and boys' access to education and improved strategic governance respectively⁹. Sida has however only supported Twaweza for a period of three years 2016-2018, with SEK48 million. Apart from the Embassy of Sweden Twaweza is at the moment supported by DFID, Embassy of Denmark, Hewlett and Wellspring Advisors, who are also among the evaluation's intended users.

The Vision of Twaweza is the belief 'in an open society, built on the human impulse to make a difference; where information and ideas flow, citizens engage, and authorities are accountable to the people.' The Mission of Twaweza is the collection, curating and transporting of 'evidence, ideas, and stories to inspire citizen action and stimulate responsiveness from authorities on basic learning and open government.' Twaweza's Theory of Change (ToC) reflects its vision and mission. Twaweza's Strategy 2015-2018 focuses on three main programme areas and has an additional portfolio on Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation (LME):

1. Data and Voice

Data and Voice include Uwezo, Africa's largest annual citizen assessment of children's learning across hundreds of thousands of households; and Sauti za Wananchi, Africa's first national representative frequent and rapid mobile phone-based survey.

2. What works in basic education and open government

An ambitious program of gathering and generating evidence on "What Works" in the domains of basic education and open government. This includes experiments both small and large, and a focus on sourcing and understanding locally-generated solutions through a "positive deviance" approach;

3. Public and Policy Communications and Engagement

Public and Policy Communications and Engagement produces various high-quality non-partisan products based on data and evidence, and engages relevant target audiences through a range of products and approaches (media partnerships, direct engagement with policy actors, etc.).

4. Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation

⁷ We note that on 20 February 2019 the New Strategy for 2019-2022 was made publicly available on Twaweza's website. This, in our interpretation, changes the issue as regard how the evaluation will provide inputs to the new Strategy – as expressed in the ToR. We suggest that focus will be on the change in the theory of changes between the new and the old Strategy and whether assumptions and evidence of these are sufficiently addressed. In that process alternative pathways for achieving the objectives of Twaweza may emerge.

⁸ <https://www.hivos.org/>

⁹ <https://www.government.se/49b749/contentassets/32f9580fa76146998ef5bba49055cd4a/results-strategy-for-swedens-international-development-cooperation-in-tanzania-2013---2019>

Alongside the programmes is the Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation portfolio, which provides monitoring and feedback, engages external evaluations, contributes lessons to national and international forums and infuses the organization with accountability and a learning culture.

The evaluation's ToR emphasise that there should be a focus on three areas, namely:(p. 3 ToR)

- a) Organisational development benchmark with a focus on progress on agreed benchmark in the period in which Twaweza became an independent organisation;
- b) Outcome, quality of outputs, and reach that includes a focus on value for money, and;
- c) Assessment of the contribution to overarching goals taking into accounts the changing socio-political context in Tanzania.

Regarding the latter area (c), the evaluation should furthermore analyse and discuss 'the extent to which change can be expected to be a sustained effect of the program.' The TOR ask not only for a comprehensive summary and aggregation of activities over the 2015-2018 period, but also on a sample basis analyse the links between these and other sector dynamics taking into account Tanzania's socio-political context.

It is worth highlighting the shrinking political space that affects not only the operations of political parties, but also civil society.¹⁰ This may affect the ability to create change through public debate for an organisation like Twaweza. We therefore suggest paying attention to how Twaweza staff and its partners in civil society have experienced these changes over the period and the extent to which they have affected the ability to make an impact. This may differ from one programme area to another and will therefore be done at sector level.

These analyses could furthermore feed into analysis and discussion of the extent to which the ToC, which was formulated after the last evaluation covering the period up through 2014 was appropriate for the changing conditions during the 2015-2018 period – and whether Twaweza's strategic thinking, embraced in its theory of change, with its new ToC in the new Strategy 2019-2022 has addressed the fast changing context in a way that has enabled Twaweza to identify realistic pathways for achieving its strategic goal.

This leads to the first focus area (a) of the evaluation, assessing progress in organisational development benchmarks. Twaweza documentation reports on benchmarks for its main programmes, i.e. Data and Voice (SzW and Uwezo), What Works (open government and basic education), Communication and Engagement, and LME. The ToR request assessing progress on benchmarks for 'internal development' and 'outputs'; benchmarks which for the former we understand will relate to developments in governance and reporting, and human resources and finance. As for 'outputs' we understand these relate to the programme benchmarks 'unit' reported upon.

As regards evaluation area (b) Twaweza assesses its overall performance along the RAG (red, amber, green) measurement and the current development over the 2016-2018 period is presented in Table 1. It shows an overall good performance in all three programme areas, with obvious problems detected in the 'aggregated effect' of both open government and basic education. The evaluation will probe into what have been the main factors where changes in RAG level have been observed. The actions Twaweza has

¹⁰ See for instance Paget, D. (2017). "Tanzania: Shrinking space and opposition protest." *Journal of Democracy* **28** (3); Eyakuze, A. and B. Taylor (2015). "Four bills later: is blogging with statistics in Tanzania now only for adrenalin junkies?" *Mtega Blog Post* 2 April 2015. Downloaded 21 November 2018 on <https://mtega.com/2015/04/four-bills-later-is-blogging-with-statistics-in-tanzania-now-only-for-adrenalin-junkies/>.

taken to remedy downgrades and facilitate upgrades in the RAG measurement will be assessed. Where the RAG level has remained the same we will assess the mechanisms that may have caused the maintenance of the RAG level. Focus of the assessment will be on quality, relevance and reach. We anticipate that during the course of the visit to Tanzania the team will be able to have an update from Twaweza with regard to effect data for 2018.

The Value for Money (VfM) assessment will primarily adhere to the DfID approach. This means that we will analyse the quality of the inputs (Economy: staff, partners, management, monitoring, learning, etc.) and quality and quantity of outputs delivered (Efficiency: projects) as they relate to costs. We will do that for a selected number of outputs. We will assess the strengths of assumptions and evidence made in the ToC thus assessing the VfM as regards Effectiveness; this includes also assessment of possible direct attribution to results from Twaweza work.¹¹

Table 1. Outputs and Effects for the Strategy 2016-2018

	2016		2017		2018		Development	
	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT
01	3	3	3	2	3			
02	3	2	3	2	1		↓	↓
03	3	3	3	3	3		↓	
04	2	1	2	1	2			
05	2	1	3	2	3		↑	↑
							↑	↑
E1	3	3	3	3	3			
E2	3	1	2	1	2		↓	
E3	3	3	3	3	3		↓	
E4	3	1	2	1	2		↓	
							↓	
LME1	3	2	3	2	3			
LME2	2	3	3	2	2		↑	↓
LME3	3	3	3	2	3		↑	↓

Source: Annual reports 2016, 2017, 2018

The Strategy is designed to address Twaweza's Vision and Mission through partnerships with civil society, research/academia and government. Based on available data the list below includes current partners engaged in implementing the Strategy (Table 2).¹² We foresee that the list may be incomplete and that Twaweza will assist in updating it.

Table 2. Overview of Twaweza's Partner Engagements

In Open Government	In Basic Education	LME
- Code4Africa - Mwananchi Communications - Wajubu Institute of Public Accountability	- Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, President's Office - Regional Administration and Local Government	- Learning Collaborative - Research and Evaluation Advisory Group (REAG)

¹¹ https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/49551/DFID-ap-proach-value-money.pdf

¹² Twaweza, Annual Plan 2018 and Annual Reports 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 (Jan-Jun)

• The 'Kigoma Experiment' - Kigoma Ijiji municipal councils and local civil society • Africa Freedom of Information Centre • The Tanzania Police Force • Coalition for the Right to Information • Jamii Forums • Clouds Media • Tamasha • Community Radio Network of Tanzania (COMNETA). • Mbunge Live TV show • Christian Social Service Commission • Well Told Story	• Wisconsin Centre for Education Research • The Research on Improving Systems of Education (RISE) Program	
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Source: Annual plan 2018, Annual reports 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 (Jan-June)

In anticipation of resolving satisfactorily any limitations addressed in the Evaluability section we find that the scope of work and the time allocated in the contract is sufficient for reviewing documentation, developing a database from data gathered from 20+ partners to be collected primarily through structured interviews and where found relevant (and time allows) focus group discussions and a visit to Kigoma.

Most importantly there must be continuous communication between the evaluation team and Twaweza's management and staff, being the anchor of the Strategy as the evaluation rolls out during the its presence in Tanzania. The evaluation is organised to ensure that the team delivers a product that meets the expectation of the Twaweza and the donors. This includes important continuous backstopping by and thorough quality assurance procedures performed by NIRAS.

2 Relevance and evaluability of evaluation questions

The evaluation questions (EQs) presented in the ToR p. 4 have been taken as point of departure for the evaluation following a matrix containing the following information: the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability; the indicators proposed for assessment; what data collection methods will be used and the source of information, including the availability and reliability of the information.

The EQs have been unpacked and drafted based on a review of the documents available on the Twaweza's website and provided by the Embassy of Sweden in Dar es Salaam and Twaweza, as well as from feedback from comments to the draft Inception Report by a Joint Evaluation Panel comprised of Twaweza and stakeholders. The annual reports 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 (January-June)¹³ have been reviewed, the main focus of the data been on outputs and aggregated effects. Based on the unpacked EQs important indicators under each of the evaluation criteria have been produced. The evaluation matrix is presented in Annex 1.

The matrix indicators have been defined by looking for qualitative signs in the narratives of the verification source (at this stage only documents, later to include interviews). This has allowed for judgements on any progress and/or likely achievement of the indicator. While we have aimed at being as precise as possible in placing indicators logically under their relevant EQs there may be cases of overlap with other EQs

The annual reports are well structured and report precisely on planned and achieved core outputs as well as on achieved aggregated effects. It is therefore the assessment of the evaluation team that the documents reviewed are presented in a form that allows for evaluation. We assess that the EQs can be answered (draft indicators identified), data collection methods used (desk review, questionnaire/survey and interviews) and with what sources (stakeholders, documents, annual reports, etc.), including assessment of the reliability and availability of the latter. We have detailed methods and sources, based on available documentation and assumed insights of stakeholders and their ability to answer the EQs.

External factors that could impede the implementation of the evaluation are not foreseen. As regards accessibility to key stakeholders we will request Twaweza to assist the evaluation team in establishing contacts prior to the fieldwork for planning an effective and focused field mission. We will also ask the management to inform key staff, partners and donors to be available for data collection interviews during the team's fieldwork in the period 11-22 March 2019.

We will emphasize that a strong engagement of Twaweza and its partners will ensure best possible that whatever recommendations are derived from the evaluation are grounded. Detailed schedule for the fieldwork will be drafted immediately after the approval of the inception report. The work plan is presented in Annex 3.

The methods for data collection are currently covering desk study and interviews/ focus group discussions (FGDs) for answering the EQs. While we considered a survey to be undertaken in our implementation proposal we have re-assessed this method and find that time, if well planned and organised, allows for the team to organise structured interviews/ FGD(s) with all partners and other stakeholders.

¹³ Most recently we have had access to the new Strategy 2019-2022 and the Annual Plan for 2019 from Twaweza's website. These documents only been superficially reviewed due to the late access and the deadline of the Inception Report.

We will also apply, more generally, 'observation' as a method in the evaluation – a method that is particularly useful when looking at organisational entities. Finally, we will assess the availability and reliability of the data that we collect ensuring that they feed in as important features in the evaluation validation process.

A challenge we may encounter in this evaluation relate to separating Tanzania activities/ budget from Uganda and Kenya activities/budgets. While budgets appear to be clearly separated in the annual plans there may be data available not disaggregated per country or regional based activities that could 'blur' our analysis. We will whenever such an issue arises clarify with Twaweza.

Reaching out to as many stakeholders as possible (partners and selected beneficiaries) may be challenged by simple communication and logistics concerns, e.g. wrong e-mail addresses, problems with Internet connections, and availability of stakeholders, which would influence the data validation process. Availability of main project stakeholders for interviews is crucial for the successful implementation of the evaluation. As mentioned above we foresee that a close collaboration with Twaweza in the planning and implementation of the evaluation will enable for these possible challenges to be addressed easily.

A field visit to the 'Kigoma Experiment' is planned. It will take place preconditioned that Twaweza facilitates and envisages no obstacles from authorities. If these obstacles will emerge we have devised mitigation mechanisms for this situation (see Risk Matrix).

3 Proposed approach and methodology

3.1 Overall approach

The overall approach to the evaluation was outlined in our implementation proposal. It still constitutes a valid approach and has been updated following the inception phase documentation review, EQs and indicator development as well as from comments made by the Joint Evaluation Panel. In the implementation proposal we outline three overall and interconnected approaches that would guide the evaluation i.e. theory of change, the multi-dimensional poverty (MDP) framework and contribution analysis. We have reconsidered the usability of the MDP. The MDP model was initiated by Sida in 2017, that is, after Sida's approval of the Twaweza support. We therefore consider it less relevant to adopt a framework and measure progress against Twaweza's work using a model that was not in the stated in the agreement between Twaweza and the Embassy.

Theory of Change

Key features that make up a suitable ToC model will often include (i) the understanding of the context in which a project is able to influence change; (ii) the long-term change that the project seeks to support and for whose ultimate benefit; (iii) the logical sequence of the change that it is anticipated to lead to the desired outcome, and (iv) the assumptions about how these changes might happen.¹⁴

It is crucial to understand that the ToC is a process and not a product in itself and its prime goal is to reflect on and assess the causal mechanisms in the connections between outputs and outcomes of each programme area under the Strategy. For the ToC to be useful we will ask key questions to Twaweza and key stakeholders about (i) how and why they think that the expected change will occur in the present Strategy construct, and (ii) whether they have *evidence* that support assumptions made in the ToC – addressing the logical intervention from outputs through intermediate outcomes to outcomes (see Fig.1), in which *process tracing* will be applied (see 3.2), and (iii) analyse whether change – or non-change – corresponds with the perceptions of Twaweza and key stakeholders or they have been brought about by other dynamics. This can be important for learning and thus for the design of the future strategy.

The Strategy states that 'by the end of 2018, we want to have made a *measurable* impact on the following four dimensions of community, national and regional life':¹⁵


1. Children in school are learning as parents, teachers, school administrators and policy makers focus on measuring and improving the learning outcomes resulting from the large [social] investment in basic education.
2. Public authorities are responsive to public demand, and they promote and protect citizens' right to high quality, relevant and meaningful information.
3. Citizens and civil society are asking for, getting and using information to improve their situation and engage public officials to deepen accountability and improve the quality of public service delivery.
4. Public and policy actors are using evidence-based knowledge to transforming governance practice and the provision of basic education.

At the same time the above impacts constitute the outcome of Twaweza's ToC. Its logic is presented in Fig. 1.

¹⁴ http://www.theoryofchange.org/pdf/DFID_ToC_Review_VogelV7.pdf, p.14.

¹⁵ Twaweza Strategy 2015-2018, p. 10

Fig 1. Theory of Change, Twaweza Strategy 2015-2018



Source: Twaweza Strategy 2015-2018, p. 11

The evaluation will assess progress and achievements of each step of the intervention and assess the methodological solidity of the LME process. This will be done for each of the three programme

areas as different effects are observed and as such this will feed into the analysis of the appropriateness of the ToC for the different areas in the current context.

Contribution analysis

Contribution analysis will be used and follow six iterative steps. Each step is designed to build on *contribution stories* from stakeholders focusing on 'change' and the evaluation team will review each step to address possible weaknesses identified in the previous step. This work will be carried out using a participatory approach where the evaluation team facilitates the input from stakeholders in order to develop a contribution story that is built on a consensus validated by the partner engaged in the Strategy activities.

The purpose is to identify contribution analysis of direct influence. In this way it is possible to validate the evaluation questions and also serve to gather evidence on the assumptions in the Theory of Change in the areas of direct influence and validate that these are 'correct'.¹⁶ While this is the ideal sequencing for making use of a contribution analysis, we are aware that this may not be fully possible when practiced in the field. Yet, we will strive towards adopting it to the best of our abilities.

1. Set out the attribution problem to be addressed
2. Develop a theory of change and the risks to it
3. Gather the existing evidence of the theory of change
4. Assemble and assess the contribution story and challenges to it
5. Seek out additional evidence
6. Revise and strengthen the contribution story

3.2 Methods for data collection and analysis

The purpose of the evaluation indicates that we will contribute to 'input as Twaweza is currently set to implement its new strategic plan for 2019-2021' as well as to identify 'lessons learned on operating in the changing socio-political context', both by Twaweza and its partners.

Data collection methods and analysis include a desk review of all relevant documentation related to the activities of the Twaweza (currently on-going); interviews and where found useful and productive for the outcome of the evaluation focus group discussions (FGDs); and a field visit to Kigoma to observe, discuss and assess progress and achievement with partners and selected beneficiaries.

We will, in close collaboration with Twaweza and the Embassy, determined the sampling and prioritisation of stakeholders from whom the evaluation should collect data and the methods to be used. We agree to the proposal made by the Joint Evaluation Panel that 5 major interventions will be subject to analysis, and relate their ToCs to the organisational ToC of Twaweza - and based on this assess the degree of strategic fit.¹⁷ Data collection and evaluation methods are based on the currently available data and presented below.

The desk review includes the following:

¹⁶ Mayne, John, ILAC Brief 16, Contribution Analysis: An Approach to exploring cause and effect, The Institutional Learning and Change (ILAC) Initiative. May 2008

¹⁷ These 5 major interventions could for instance be: Kiufunza, Uwezo, Open Government Partnership, the Kigoma Experiment (a fifth may be curriculum development – or could be 'learning'?). If not those examples, we would like to have Twaweza clarify what is meant by 'major interventions'. When analysing these interventions special attention will furthermore be paid to experiences with government organisations and other stakeholders.

1. Academic literature on civil society in Tanzania combined with literature and media coverage on contemporary political dynamics in the country affecting civil society;
2. Twaweza strategies and annual reports, in particular with a focus on (i) results (ii) programme and practice changes over the current strategy period (iii) changes to/adaption of strategy and approaches;
3. Trends in democratic and civic space in Tanzania from, for instance, Freedom House, Afrobarometer and similar.

Interviews/focus group discussions will focus on results, how and why change has occurred establishing evidence of other possible explanations for change than from Twaweza's own Theory of Change and as such contribute to the overall data validation process.

Formal semi-structured interviews and informal discussion will be carried out with Twaweza management, staff, partners and government officials having been or are engaged in areas related to Twaweza's work. As mentioned above we anticipate that all key staff of Twaweza, partners, and donors will be available for interviews during the field visit to Tanzania. The EQs, indicators developed and results of interviews conducted will provide guidance to the design of any possible FGDs.

When interviewing we will also apply fully open questions, in which 'contribution stories' are generated by the interviewee. In applying this approach new concepts and understanding of how the Strategy could be improved and adjusted may be created and more realistic pathways identified for realising a theory of change for the new strategy.

If to be conducted, FGDs will be held along lines of the three programme areas. Key issues and concerns identified from the EQs will be thoroughly discussed and connections made to the theories of change between the old and the new Strategy. The FGDs will be used as a combination for further data gathering as well as a validating forum for the data collected thus answering some of the evaluation questions.

Field visit to the 'Kigoma Experiment' could be focused on (i) experiences accomplished, or on (ii) challenges in terms of practical implementation, including relation to central government. This could either become a case study of local political economy of open government or focus on lessons learned with special attention put on what can be achieved locally under difficult circumstances.

In order to make the investigation of Kigoma meaningful we will (i) interview and ask local government officials to articulate their challenges in working with their technocratic counterparts; (ii) locate the original Kigoma Municipal team for the Open Government Programme and interview them as well as current officials, and if possible (iii) interview the MP Zitto Kabwe (and other MPs from Kigoma Region), who has played a role in these processes.

A *process tracing* methodology will be applied to explore and analyse the Theory of Change. Process tracing is useful for exploring the causal mechanisms between the independent variables in cases and their outcome on the dependent variable, but also for casting the net widely for alternative explanations and assess their influence.¹⁸ Process tracing will be done in three dimensions, namely to analyse (i) the mechanism between specific activities and anticipated change in the two fields of operation (basic learning and open government), and; (ii) the evidence that Twaweza presents to support their assumptions made in the theory of change, as well as assess if other factors may have been more important in generating the observed change. Furthermore, (iii)

¹⁸ George, A. L. and A. Bennett (2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, USA, MIT Press; Bennett, A. and J. T. Checkel, Eds. (2015). *Process Tracing. From Metaphor to Analytical Tool*. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.

process tracing will be done in order to analyse how and to what extent Twaweza has adapted to the changing socio-political context in Tanzania over the current strategic period.

Twaweza has an ongoing annual exercise of interviewing key stakeholders for critical feedback and urge that the evaluation team to not duplicate these efforts. As an independent evaluation we cannot eliminate possible interviewing of stakeholders that we think are important for the outcome of the evaluation. We may also have other questions and issues to discuss with the stakeholders than Twaweza. At the same time we agree that ‘duplicating’ efforts would be inappropriate and waste of time. We suggest that a list of partners/stakeholders with whom Twaweza already has had in-depth discussions is drafted and where possible written notes on the result of these discussions made available to the team. We can then assess whether we need to meet with the partner/stakeholder in question or not.

The Joint Evaluation Panel suggests that for studying the impact of Twaweza it could be relevant for the validity of the evaluation to use citizens and/or students as stakeholders in their analysis – at the meeting on the 18/2 there was a discussion of a panel they had used before. A survey distributed to this panel would be a possible method for including citizens / students as stakeholders.

Conducting a survey using an already existing panel of citizens and students might be useful, for instance to get an idea about perceptions of Twaweza. However, from a methodological point of view it is not clear to us how exactly this would contribute to the overall objective of the evaluation, which is to ‘provide a comprehensive summary and aggregation of Twaweza Tanzania activities over the 2015-2018 period’ (etc.), with a focus on activities, objectives and changes over time. Considering the amount of time available for the evaluation we would believe that a focus on people and organisations with a stronger knowledge on Twaweza would provide equally stronger evidence on these elements. For that reason we suggest not to make use of the panel.

The rapidly changing context has influenced Twaweza’s ability to achieve indicators and attribution to outcomes, its adaptability and ways of working. The evaluation will therefore aim to assess the influences derived from the changing context in every aspect of the evaluation work.

In order to analyse and assess the impact of Twaweza the evaluation will look at what has happened (in terms of major changes) within the different sectors over the period 2015-2018 and how other stakeholders (government and CSOs) and Twaweza respectively have contributed in this respect. This should be possible by asking such basic questions when conducting interviews with Twaweza partners and possibly a few external civil society organisations working in the sectors of open government and basic education. If information can be politically sensitive we suggest discussing what/what not to include in the interviews with the Embassy and Twaweza.

3.3 Evaluation Phases

We the evaluation will be divided into three phases: a) a start-up and inception phase, b) a data collection phase, and c) a data analysis, reporting and validation phase (Table 3)

Table 3. Evaluation Phases

(a) Start-up and Inception phase (January – February 2019)

The start-up phase basically served to sign the contract and mobilise the team. A start-up meeting was held in January between Niras and the Embassy via videoconference/Skype.

Background documents were made available to the team after the signing of the contract allowing for the Inception Phase to start. A rescheduling of the work plan was prepared with Twaweza’s management and the revised work plan presented in Annex 1.

The Inception Phase is a critical first step in the evaluation, as it provides the basis upon which all subsequent work will be built. This phase includes preparation of methodology and document review and planning of the rest of the evaluation process. Milestones and deliverables will be identified, discussed, and decided upon together with the Embassy and Twaweza. This phase will end with the preparation of the Inception Report, which is an important tool providing an agreement between the client (the Embassy) and NIRAS for the subsequent phases of the evaluation.

The Inception Report discusses issues identified during the inception phase and presents the detailed methodology, approach and evaluation tools. The Inception Report will also include a risk matrix and a tentative list of persons and institutions to meet, interview guides with key issues to be addressed, and the draft work plan.

(b) Data collection phase, including field visits and interviews with Strategy partners (March – April 2019)

The success of the data collection phase depends on a proper preparation during the Inception Phase. As described above, preparation of tools and planning of field work allows for efficient data collection based on principles of inclusion and participation, co-identification of findings and joint ownership of recommendations. Interviews will be undertaken with identified stakeholders and key informants in Tanzania. In order to ensure a systematic and targeted collection of information, interview checklists tailored to the different groups of informants will be used. Interviews may be individual or conducted as FGDs, face-to-face or remotely using Skype or telephone.

As a final activity during the field visit, we suggest a debriefing with Embassy, Twaweza and other stakeholders, as a face-to-face meeting, alternatively as a Skype or videoconference meeting. The purpose of such a meeting will be a midway stocktaking to discuss interim findings and ensure that the report will address the relevant issues.

(c) Data analysis, reporting and validation phase (May 2019)

The final phase comprises the analysis and verification of the data and information collected, which will allow the evaluation team to produce a consistent and focused evaluation report. Analysis and verification of collected data will take place after the fieldwork. Analysis will be based on triangulation of collected evidence against qualitative and quantitative information from the document review and field observations. It is important to maintain contact with key informants and other stakeholder during the analysis in order to verify factual information if necessary.

The draft report will be prepared in line with inception discussions with the Embassy and Twaweza in terms of length, format and content. We will prepare a response matrix in order to ensure that all comments are considered and actions taken are clearly explained, and then submit a final evaluation report.

Milestones and Deliverables

Below is the milestones and deliverables planned presented (Table 4). It is based on agreements made with the Embassy and Twaweza in January 2019. Related to these the proposed (and revised) work plan for the implementation of the evaluation is presented in Annex 1.

Table 4. Milestone and deliverables

What	Who	When (2019)
1. Start-up meeting Embassy and Twaweza virtual	Embassy of Sweden, Twaweza, NIRAS	January 13 th (done) and January 17 th (done)

2. Draft inception report	NIRAS	February 11 th (done)
3. Inception meeting Twaweza office	Twaweza, Wellspring, DFID, Embassy of Sweden, Embassy of Denmark and Hewlett	February 18 th (done)
4. Comments from intended users to evaluators	Twaweza, Wellspring, DFID, Embassy of Sweden, Embassy of Denmark and Hewlett	February 22 th or 25 th (done)
5. Final inception report	NIRAS	February 28 th (done)
6. Debrief from field work	NIRAS / Embassy / Twaweza	March 23 rd
7. Draft evaluation report	NIRAS	April 12 th
8. Comments from intended users to evaluators	Twaweza, Wellspring, DFID, Embassy of Sweden, Embassy of Denmark and Hewlett	May 10 st
9. Validation workshop / virtual	Twaweza, Wellspring, DFID, Embassy of Sweden, Embassy of Denmark and Hewlett	May 15 th
10. Final evaluation report	NIRAS	May 22 nd

3.5 Risk factors and mitigation strategy

The most important risk factors for the evaluation have been identified and the likely limitation they will have on the implementation of the evaluation. Mitigation strategies that will diminish the influence of the risk factors are identified (Table 5).

Table 5. Risk Management Matrix

Risk	Risk Impact	Risk mitigation
Independence of the evaluation team vis-à-vis stakeholders, including its policy & operation	Low	Possible conflicts of interest are addressed openly and transparently.
Lack of access to relevant information / data from Twaweza	Low	We foresee no hindrances in accessing information / data from Twaweza. If so, we are able to work constructively to overcome difficulties in locating and collecting needed data and reports.
Lack of access to relevant information / data from government agencies	Medium to High	We foresee hindrances in accessing information / data from government entities where these are considered sensitive. We are able to work constructively to overcome such difficulties in locating and collecting needed data.
Team dysfunctions and lack of performance	Low	By applying a proactive project management approach we are able to closely monitor progress and identify warning signals. We can replace team members and NIRAS has in-house competence to step in as needed.

Delays (foreseen and unforeseen)	Medium	Trusting and transparent dialogue with all stakeholders provides a basis for identifying possible delays and to allow for adjustment of timelines. We apply realistic but firm time management. Strong internal resources enable a timely response.
Emerging sensitive issues beyond the scope of the evaluation, e.g. corruption	Low	NIRAS Evaluation Toolkit provides clear instructions for all team members.
External risks; Natural disasters, conflict, political climate	Low	Thorough understanding of regional and national issues ahead of any assignment is a prerequisite for undertaking any evaluation – coupled with proactively engaging with our network 'on the ground' and keeping 'eyes and ears' open.
Field visit to the Kigoma Experiment may be challenged by the authorities	Medium	If field visit is not feasible various communication means will be used to create a dialogue with key actors in the Experiment, e.g. through conference calls, Skype/ Viber/ WhatsApp or telephone calls.
Stakeholder disagreements with evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations	Low	This is primarily addressed by applying a utilisation-focused approach to the process whereby findings are triangulated to ensure credibility and transparency, and validation with the users.

Annex 1 – Draft Evaluation Matrix

Evaluation Questions	Indicators to be used in Review	Methods	Sources	Availability and reliability of data
Relevance:				
- Are needs/priorities addressing beneficiaries, donor and Government policies? - Is the current theory of change as basis for Twaweza's Strategy still relevant?	Conformity confirmed or incongruity observed between policies and needs/demands Political, administrative and other barriers observed that limit the performance and implementation of Twaweza's Strategy over the 2015-2018 period Different theory of change and different pathways towards reaching Twaweza's objectives discussed, assessed and adjusted; new direction considered (e.g. from Ideas and Evidence Event 2018, Outcome mapping 2017, research reflections 2017)	Desk review, interviews /FDGs	The Strategy, project documentation; Embassy and project partners; donors; interview notes	Availability high; Reliability: assessment of quality of data
Effectiveness:				
- Have planned results of the Strategy been achieved? - Has lessons learned during 2015-2018 impacted the effectiveness of basic education, open governance and MEL programmes - What are the main factors influencing the performance and results achievements of Twaweza? - Has the LME programme impacted the theory of change?	Progress and achievements 2015-2018 in basic education, open government and LME reported Changes made to original programme design and implementation observed Internal structures and/or governance facilitating or hindering the delivery of results External political and/or administrative actions facilitating or hindering the delivery of results Number and results of challenges against restricted civic space ('push back' approach), including legal challenge progress	Desk review, interviews /FDGs	The Strategy, project documentation; Embassy and project partners; donors; interview notes	Availability high; Reliability: assessment of quality of data

Evaluation Questions	Indicators to be used in Review	Methods	Sources	Availability and reliability of data
	Number of public debates/ dialogue platforms (in OG and BE), including youth-government, MPs-constituencies, parents-teachers-government, etc. Number of requests for Twaweza data from citizens and Government Number of citizen information access requests (current 2 of 3 denied access) Number of actions taken to address effectively the learning crisis in districts Effect on ToC from Outcome mapping exercise (2017), LME and research undertaken Number of pilot projects and scaled-up projects during 2015-2018 and their respective developments Number of 'positive deviance' based schools strategies adopted and implemented			
Efficiency: T. - What is VfM relative to results achieved? U. - Has the project shown flexibility towards changing needs?	Result of the Deloitte Audit report (2016) re-assessed/updated Budgets assessed against outputs delivered Adequacy of methods/approach for selection of partners and projects relative to the Strategy's objectives	Desk review, interviews /FDGs	The Strategy, project documentation; Embassy and project partners; donors; interview notes	Availability high; Reliability: assessment of quality of data

Evaluation Questions	Indicators to be used in Review	Methods	Sources	Availability and reliability of data
- Has potential synergies and overlaps been addressed satisfactorily? - What has Twaweza achieved compared to other CSO or Government interventions at national level in same sectors? - Has the operational effectiveness impacted achievement of results? - Value added of Twaweza	Adequacy and reliability of Uwezo standards and SzWananchi approach for addressing the Strategy's objectives Number of coordination and collaborative arrangements with partners (CSOs, government, research/academia), agreed and signed and results reported upon Cursory mapping of CSO/government interventions and their effect in open government and education. Media coverage (newspaper, radio, TV, etc.), website hits and downloads, social media hits, policy-maker responses/statements, etc. Strategic fit addressed flexibly between Twaweza's objectives (outputs, influence, contribution) and organisational and governance structure (staffing, qualifications, experience, branches (REAG), ICT) and its position in the socio-political context The Twaweza 'brand' – 'heard of' rating increase			
Sustainability: V. - Are the benefits/outcomes produced by the Strategy sustainable? W. - Is the project anchored in local and institutional structures? - Has leverage knowledge ensured sustained impact?	The degree of sustained effect of intermediate outcomes on i. Children's learning, ii. Responsive authorities, iii. Active citizens Outreach achieved (assessment per 'problem' area) – including assessment of the Kigoma Experiment	Desk review, interviews /FDGs	The Strategy, project documentation; Embassy and project partners; donors; interview notes	Availability high; Reliability: assessment of quality of data

Evaluation Questions	Indicators to be used in Review	Methods	Sources	Availability and reliability of data
	Effectiveness of Learning results communicated			
	Number of Learning results applied into Twaweza's operations			
Impact				
What is the overall impact of the project?	Contribution to the SDG on educational achievements and open government	Desk review, interviews /FDGs	The Strategy, project documentation; Embassy and project partners; donors; interview notes	Availability high; Reliability: assessment of quality of data
Was any unplanned negative impact timely addressed and mitigated?	Assessment of major changes to Strategy approach and implementation observed			

Annex 2 – Documents Reviewed

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Annex 3 – Draft Work Plan

Preliminary Workplan

	2019																					
	January					February				March				April				May				
	w 1	w 2	w 3	w 4	w 5	w 6	w 7	w 8	w 9	w 10	w 11	w 12	w 13	w 14	w 15	w 16	w 17	w 18	w 19	w 20	w 21	w 22
Inception Phase																						
Start up meeting with Sida/Twaweza (virtual), 13 Jan																						
Initial interviews/ desk review																						
Drafting of inception report																						
Submission of draft inception report 11 Feb																						
Inception meeting, (virtual) Tentative 18 Feb																						
Written feedback from Sida/Twaweza on inception report, Tentative 22/25 Feb																						
Finalisation of draft report																						
Submission of final inception report 28 Feb																						
Data collection Phase																						
Interview guide development and database																						
Document review/ distance interviews/ initial meetings																						
Field work to Tanzania (incl travel and field work debrief)																						
Analysis and reporting Phase																						
Data analysis and report writing																						
Submission of draft report, 12 April																						
Written comments from Sida/stakeholders on draft evaluation report, 10 May																						
Final Debriefing/validation workshop (meeting), 15 May																						
Finalisation of the evaluation report																						
Final evaluation report 23 May																						
Tentative Seminar (virtual) to be determined																						

3 Persons Consulted

Date	Time	Person / org.
10 / 3 / 19	pm	Arrival of team
11 / 3 / 19	am	Mr. Stephen Chimola, Programme Officer CSOs and Education, Sweden Embassy
	pm	- Ms. Entesh Melaishio, Ass. Programme Officer - Ms. Annastazia Rugaba, Advocacy Manager, Twaweza
12 / 3 / 19	am	- Mr. Darius Cosmas, Programme Manager, Health & Governance, Danish Embassy - Ms. Jamila Hoka Luembe, Programme Manager, Governance & Gender, Danish Embassy - Jane Werngreen Rosales, Political Officer, Counsellor, Danish Embassy
	pm	- Mr. Zabdiel Kimambo, Governance Programme Officer, DfID - Mr Godfrey Boniventura, Head of Programs, Hakilimu
13 / 3 / 19	am	Travel to Kigoma
	pm	Peoples – Council meeting, Kigoma-Ujiji Municipality
14 / 3 / 19	am	- Richard, TAMASHA - Annagrace Rwehumbiza, Programme Officer, TAMASHA <u>Ward Animators</u> - Frederick Elisha Jonas, Businde - Mwano Ramadhani Tanuke, Buzebazeza - Ashura Nasibu Tanuke, Kagera - Juma Hanudu Hamis, Rubuga - Rashidi Yasini Rashidi, Machindjioni - Mary E. Mpenda, Kaibuka - Amisa Hemedi Katoto, Buzabazeza - Hamza Selemani, Kagera - Dr. Alex A. Kitumo, Kigoma Development Initiative, KDI
	pm	- Mayor, Kigoma-Ujiji, Hussein Ruhava 3 councillors: Athumani M. Athumani; Kaghighe M Kaghige; Hussein Kalyango.
15 / 3 / 19	am	Travel to Dar es Salaam
	pm	Reporting on Kigoma
18 / 3 / 19	am	Twaweza Management: Baruani Mshale - LME

		• Zaida Mgalla - Uwezo • Glory Saria - operations • Richard Modest - finance • Aidan Eyakuze • Annastazia Rugaba - advocacy • Risha Chande - advocacy and engagement Partner meetings 1: Jamii Forums Limited (interview person: Asha Abinallah – director of programs and operations) Mbungelive (Maa Media Production), CEO Furaha Piniel
	pm	Partner meeting: Wajibu Institute of Public Accountability, Moses Kimaro (Research programme development manager) and Jackson Mmary (Finance and administration manager) Well Told Stories,
19 / 3 / 19	am	Partner meeting: Mwanachi Communication limited, Boface Meena (online content and data editor)
	pm	Deo – Dodoma – travel Meetings: Partner meetings • Coalition for Right to Information, Saumu Mwalimu (from the Media Council of Tanzania) • Uwezo advisory committee member, Japhet Makongo • Maria Sarungi Tsehai, Compass Communications Company/ Kwanza TV • Tanzania Institute of Education, Dr. Joyce Kahembe, Curriculum expert, panel member • Dar es Salaam University College of Education, Dr. Joster Nzilano, Curriculum expert and panel member • Independent consultant, Dr. Ibrahim Nzima, Positive Deviance expert
20 / 3 / 19	am	ToC session with TW management: • Baruani Mshale - LME • Zaida Mgalla - Uwezo • Glory Saria - operations • Richard Modest - finance • Aidan Eyakuze • Annastazia Rugaba - advocacy • Risha Chande - advocacy and engagement Twaweza unit meetings • PPE: Meeting with the Evaluation team Risha Chande (Director, Engagement and Advocacy) and Annastazia Rugaba (Advocacy Manager)
	pm	Twaweza unit meetings <u>LME:</u> - Miriam Mwaibula (Assistant Program Officer, Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation) - Hamisi Hamisi (Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer) - Baruani Idd Mshale (Director, Monitoring and Evaluation)

		<u>Twaweza Operations</u> - Glory Saria (Manager, Operations) <u>Twaweza Governance:</u> - Aidan Eyakuze (Executive Director) <u>Uwezo and What Works in Education</u> - Baruani Idd Mshale (Director, Monitoring and Evaluation) - Godfrey Telli (Coordinator, What Works in Education) - Richard Temu (Senior Program Officer, Uwezo) - Zaida Mgalla (Manager, Uwezo)
21 / 3 / 19	am	Debrief preparation
	Pm	Debrief preparation
22 / 3 / 19	am	Debrief
	pm	Policy Forum, Semkae Kilonzo (coordinator and head of secretariat) Dept team
Post 22/3/19 consultations		Chair of Twaweza Board, Dipak Naker Researcher, Youdi Schipper on KiuFunza Consultant, Ben Taylor, SzW, Twaweza

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-

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- DOING THE RIGHT THING
- JamiiForums and Jamii Media
- The Christian Social Services Commission (CSSC)
- Coalition on the Right to Information

- Kigoma Development Initiative
- Kigoma Municipal Government
- Maa Media - #MbungeLive show
- Mwananchi Communications
- MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (MIT)
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5 Relevance Analysis

A. SAUTI ZA WANANCHI (SZW)

Mini Theory of Change (SzW):	Summary of Process, Results and Lessons Learned	Discussions and assessment
A Mini Theory of Change related to SzW has been sent to the Evaluation team by Twaweza as part of a SzW case study description on 25 March 2019, which suggests that SzW 'fills a data gap by making regular information about citizens' experiences and opinions available to media, government, civil society organisations and academics as well as the general public' (Twaweza 2019). By providing a reliable mechanism for measuring citizens' perceptions, SzW aims at increasing for national public servants and politicians' willingness and ability to take citizen voices into account. This is also expected to foster their positive attitude towards data. The Mini ToC largely overlaps with the hypotheses and metrics for the problem area O3 in Twaweza Strategy 2015-18 (p. 43), which has the lack of independent monitoring of key services and sectors as well as sources of citizens' perceptions on these as its point of departure. The provision of such data is expected to inform public debate, be referred to by ministries and ultimately lead to policies and practices that better reflects these perceptions of the public.	SzW has a history going back to 2011, when testing experimentation, including a pilot in Dar es Salaam, began. At a national level it has since been operating through two panels (2013-15 with 2000 respondents and 2015-18 with 2400 respondents). From early experience lessons were learnt on the importance of involving household heads and community leaders and the provision of information to avoid misunderstandings and conflicts. Much efforts is made to select respondents, first by conducting a baseline household survey and then random selection of respondents. Mobile phones and solar chargers were distributed as part of this. Procedures are described in Twaweza's own handbook from 2013 and in a much extended joint study conducted with the World Bank and published as a practical guide in 2016 (Twaweza 2013; Dabalen et al. 2016). In the period 2015-17, ten to thirteen call rounds were conducted, but only six in 2018 most of which were not launched due to restrictions related to a new Statistics Act and the publication of data on the President's popularity (Twaweza 2019b). The launch of data from call rounds generated significant press coverage and government and ruling party representatives have been invited to speak at launches. There are also examples of the data influencing government practices in specific sectors (for instance on fees in the health sector) as well as some direct collaboration with ministries and public authorities on the generation of data on perceptions and services (for instance the judiciary). Reporting on the problem area O3's sub-goal 2 on 'core outcomes and functions of basic services and sectors' is not included in the 2017 Annual Report and in the 2018 Mid-Year Review, but topics on health and education can be observed in 2017. There seems to be some development coming from the first Strategy Period from a main focus on gaps in service delivery towards a bigger emphasis on topics that fit into Twaweza's advocacy activities, including the use of 'data to underpin advocacy around repressive laws affecting civic space' (Twaweza 2019; Interview with Twaweza staff 20 March 2019).	The Mini ToC largely corresponds to the hypotheses of the problem area O3 in the Strategy 2015-18 on lack of independent monitoring. Over the years, a significant number of call rounds were conducted, generated significant press coverage and debate and data on services has also been used by authorities. Data has also systematically been used for outreach activities as well as shared with MPs over the Strategy Period. The media attention and online debates generated by the publication of SzW data suggest that the SzW serves a purpose in Tanzania's public debate. The interaction and at times collaboration with decision-makers and public authorities also suggest that it has been perceived relevant among these actors and there are examples of changes to government practices related to SzW data. However, the shrinking civic space in Tanzania also affected the operation of SzW. Already in 2015 insecurity related to the legality of SzW was reported related to the Statistics Act, in 2017 it is noted that the National Bureau of Statistics reviews questions and in 2018 the publication of data on the president's popularity led to further restrictions, which means that no new data has been launched since then.

Twaweza Theory of Change



The mini ToC provided by Twaweza for the Evaluation team largely corresponds with the hypotheses set out in the Twaweza Strategy 2015-18. SzW has become a referred to source of polling data on citizens' perceptions and services that informed public debate until launching of data came to a halt mid-2018.

From an outcome perspective there are examples of authorities responding to or collaborating data on services generated by SzW. Though this may not have been systematic it is noteworthy.

From an intermediate outcome perspective, significant news coverage and online debate have been generated and there are examples on changed guidelines, policies and behaviour among public authorities as a result of SzW data on service delivery.

At the output level, Twaweza has produced significant amounts of data on citizens' perceptions and services that has enriched public debate.

The conclusion is that SzW, until it came to a halt mid-2018 has produced data that has been *highly relevant* to the overall ToC through a combination of public launches that have contributed to public debate as well as through direct outreach to decision-makers. Impact in this regard seem to have been bigger with regard to services than to advocacy on the shrinking civic space.

B. KIUFUNZA

Mini Theory of Change (KiuFunza):	Summary of Process, Results and Lessons Learned	Discussions and assessment
A Mini Theory of Change related to KiuFunza has been sent to the Evaluation team by Twaweza as part of a KiuFunza case study description on 25 March 2019, which outlines seven specific, steps 'for the incentives to improve measured learning' (Twaweza 2019). The seven steps goes from communicating an incentive offer to teachers and ensuring their acceptance and that they find it attractive over their ability to improve learning outcomes to tests and payments implemented and teachers are paid in time along with school level feedback (Twaweza 2019). A clearer link to Twaweza's overall ToC can be deducted from the Twaweza Strategy 2015-18 (p. 46) where the hypotheses and key metrics for the problem area E3, under which KiuFunza falls, are outlined. It states that 'Teachers are not sufficiently motivated, supported and held accountable to ensure children learn' (Strategy 2015-18, 14). Overall, KiuFunza aims at generating evidence on how teacher incentives can improve learning, which is expected to generate public attention and debate and help purvey the idea of 'teacher payment based on delivered, measured learning outcomes' (Strategy 2015-18, 46). The public debate in turn is expected to generate interest among government authorities, MPs, donors and researchers in the education sector and convince particularly Ministry of Education and Ministry of Local Government to (i) pilot a scalable model of payment for performance model in districts with Twaweza input in 2017, (ii) include a similar payment for performance model like KiuFunza in the	KiuFunza has been implemented over two phases (2013-14 and 2015-16) with a third phase initiated at beginning of 2019. The phases are carried out as randomized control trials. Prior to each phase there were consultations with key actors in the education sector and refinements of design and implementation. Changes to the design during implementation were limited due to the character of Randomized Control Trials approach, but some adjustment occurs from one KiuFunza phase to the next. KiuFunza I (2013-14) tested payments to schools for enrolment along govt. guidelines (capitation grant, irregularly implemented by govt.) as well as payments to teachers for number of children passing <i>both</i> literacy and numeracy tests (Twaweza 2012). It showed no or limited effect of each of the two, but significant effect when combined (Mbiti et al. 2018). The govt at the end of 2014 committed to sending capitation grants directly to schools instead of through district councils, a change Twaweza credits itself for contributing to. It has probably also been helpful that the World Bank earlier that year provided a credit to Tanzania's Big Results Now in education that provided resources for 'Timely delivery of adequate capitation grant' (World Bank 2014). KiFunza II (2015-16) had as its point of departure that govt. had committed to pay capitation grants and therefore focused on pay for performance to teachers. Two designs were tested, one adapted version of KiuFunza I in which teachers were paid for <i>each</i> test passed and another new one in which teachers were paid according to increased performance of pupils relative to their starting ability. Both designs improved student learning equivalent to an additional one-third of a year of schooling. However, the former was easier to communicate and implement and was therefore chosen for scalable implementation under Kiufunza III (Twaweza 2019). Some outreach in terms of briefs were produced and generated some media coverage, but on a limited scale compared to other Twaweza activities. From the outset KiuFunza sought to involve relevant key actors including national and local governments. Already at the initiation of KiuFunza 1 was the govt exploring ways for disbursing capitation grants and showed interest in payment for performance, the latter furthermore with direct support	The Mini ToC addresses the issue of learning but provides for a somewhat restricted approach to demotivated teachers, also compared to other factors that may undermine teacher motivation, for instance arrears in payment and poor working conditions (see for instance World Bank (2014) and HakiElimu (2016) pointing to these factors). KiuFunza I and II produced evidence and key decision-makers were increasingly encouraged to engage with findings, culminating with the MoU with the Ministry of Local Government and Ministry of Education and their commitment to take part in KiuFunza III. In this regard, there seems to have been some learning over the three KiuFunza phases as the authorities' role in implementing KiuFunza III appears to have become more substantial. Whereas the relevant govt authorities were informed and to some extent involved prior to KiuFunza I and II it is hard to assess the depth of commitment. However, in the partner matrix prepared by Twaweza for the Evaluation, it is stated that 'the ministry [of Local Governments, eds.] are much more a target than a partner'. In KiuFunza I and II, Twaweza appears to have implemented with limited government input (Mahoney 2017). In 2016, 2017 and 2018, Twaweza made significant efforts to present findings to government authorities, particularly the relevant ministries, who showed interest in findings as well as the potential for upscaling (AR 2016). In the 2017 Annual Report it is stated that MoUs have been signed with the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Local Government to further test payment for performance in a government setting and in 2018, Twaweza received a letter from the leadership of the latter 'with sign-off' (AR 2017, 6-7; MYR 2018). The MoU with the Ministry of Local Government from November 2017 shows that Twaweza will facilitate much of the KiuFunza III, including in terms of funding and fundraising, but also that there will be ministry input in terms of oversight, data and an unspecified number of staff (PO-RALG et al, 2017).

new education policy, and (iii) potentially lead to uptake of the pilot in other districts.	from the then President. The design of the study was developed in consultation with the key stakeholders and an advisory panel to oversee the study was to be set up (Twaweza 2012).	
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Twaweza Theory of Change



Hypotheses and metrics in Twaweza Strategy 2015-18 outline how the generation of evidence will inform public debate, which in turn will convince the relevant authorities to pilot a scalable model and include it in the new education policy. The Mini ToC provided by Twaweza for the Evaluation team more narrowly addresses how to develop and test Payment for Performance projects, that is, at output level.

From an outcome perspective building blocks were established with trials demonstrating that teachers can be responsive to incentives. This in turn improve children's learning. The interest and increasing engagement of the relevant ministries suggest that the evidence produced by KiuFunza's first two phases is perceived to be relevant. However, trials are still on a limited geographical scale, KiuFunza II in 2016 involving approx. 48,000 pupils directly (with additional approx. 17,000 in control groups not covered).

From an intermediate outcome perspective, evidence has been produced that suggests that the behaviour of teachers can be influenced, but the effect at the policy- and decision-making levels seems more to have been achieved through the continuous efforts by Twaweza to engage relevant policy makers more than through public debate, which has been limited. Collaboration between Twaweza and the ministries has become more formalised through an MoU. The implementation of KiuFunza 3, another trial, began in 2019 with more govt. commitment in terms of staff allocations, but changes are still not fully institutionalised at the national level.

At the output level, Twaweza has thus produced evidence through Randomized Control Trials that has gained the interest of relevant authorities.


The conclusion is that KiuFunza is *relevant yet has been narrowly applied* compared to the overall ToC. Twaweza increasingly seeks to involve relevant authorities. The approach is thus relevant, but less generated through public debate as hypothesised, than through direct engagement with government stakeholders. We will argue that that other factors than payment for performance may contribute to demotivate teachers, for instance arrears in payment and poor working conditions – World Bank (2014) and HakiElimu (2016) point to these factors. From this perspective KiuFunza is a narrow – but still relevant – approach.

C.KIGOMA UJJI LOCAL GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

Mini Theory of Change (Kigoma Ujiji local govt. intervention):	Summary of Process, Results and Lessons Learned	Discussions and assessment
A Mini Theory of Change related to Kigoma Ujiji local government intervention was sent to the Evaluation team by Twaweza as part of a Kigoma case study on 3 April 2019. It outlines how the commitment by the council to make data on budgets, services, etc., available would lead to 'greater demand for accountability and awareness of the responsive posture of the municipality' (Twaweza 2019, p. 2). New platforms for citizen voice as well as monitoring by civil society furthermore were expected to influence local plans. The Kigoma intervention and Mini ToC relate to the Twaweza Strategy 2015-18's problem area O1 on Open Government, which had the lack of legislative basis and mechanisms for the right to information. The intervention – at times also mentioned as a 'sub-national pilot' – can be seen as coming out of the second part of O1's hypothesis, namely the that analysis of obstacles to effective mechanisms for the operationalisation of access to information legislation can be used to advo-	The Kigoma Ujiji intervention comes out of the Open Government Partnership (OGP), which Twaweza helped launch and the previous administration and President had committed itself to improve access to information. However, the process slowed down under the current administration. A 3rd action plan was underway in 2016, the year of the launch of the Kigoma intervention, but was not launched and in 2017 the government withdrew from OGP. Scoping work focused on supporting the council joining OGP, conducting research to get a better understanding of context and engaging with and supporting local civil society. A meeting with 300 stakeholders was conducted in the municipality in 2016 to launch the project and finalise a sub-national action plan (AR 2016). The intervention was expected to be implemented 2017 to 2018, but got delayed due to internal political conflicts in the municipality resulting in the mayor being out of office for six months at the end of 2018 and possibly also linked to the government withdrawal from OGP, its barring the continuation of the Kigoma intervention, and the subsequent removal of core technocrats in the municipal office. The intervention however continued after having been rebranded (AR 2017). Activities are largely implemented through partnerships with two NGOs, one focusing on dissemination of information, public rallies, and feedback to the council and another on training of locally selected animators engaging with local authorities on citizens' behalf. A scheduled IT hub was changed to the dispatch of Twaweza personnel to assist the municipality in becoming more transparent and citizens in engaging with the municipality (Twaweza 2019). From the evaluation team's visit there was some examples gathered on specific problems being raised and addressed and Twaweza also point to anecdotal evidence, but since implementation is ongoing 'monitoring has not yet been conducted' (Twaweza 2019). Whereas Twaweza notes real appetite for capacity building at the local level, which Twaweza normally shies away from, it also doubt the possibility of government uptake (Twaweza 2019).	The Mini ToC addresses the issue of the operationalisation of access to information that facilitate advocacy and change. The intervention/pilot was the first of its kind implementing the OGP in Tanzania. It was initiated while Tanzania was still part of the OGP. Whereas many activities have been carried out primarily through NGO partners, monitoring has not yet been conducted and evidence is therefore anecdotal (Twaweza 2019). There was hope that the results produced could be of interest to the Ministry of Local Government, MPs and local councils (Twaweza 2019b). There is no contract and no direct transfer of funds to the municipality because Twaweza cannot give money to the government. Exchange of 'letters' has occurred between Kigoma-Ujiji and Twaweza and a 'Declaration' signed by OGP at the international level and the mayor at a summit in Paris in 2016 (interview with the mayor of Kigoma Ujiji 14 March 2019). Some adaptation has occurred during the process both in terms of building more local NGO capacity as well as increasingly taking local communities as point of departure inspired by a partner's approach (partner interviews 14 March 2019). Twaweza was aware of limits to local sustainability prior to the latest round of animation activities (Twaweza 2019b). Issues of long-term engagement and capacity building are currently being considered at the local level, while doubts about government uptake are raised (Twaweza 2019). The implementation of the intervention got delayed as the government withdrew from OGP and also linked to local political conflicts. Some tensions could be observed already in July 2016 when Twaweza's director met with the Minister of State in the President's Office, who raised the selection of Kigoma Ujiji, an opposition stronghold, and the issue was raised again later at later meetings (Twaweza 2019c). Kigoma Ujiji had been chosen because it was the only municipality applying in Tanzania (interview with Twaweza staff 11 March 2019). The control of the council had by then been taken over by ACT, an opposition party with accountability and transparency as its hallmarks and its MP and chairman of the party, who had a good relationship with Twaweza's director, was also pushing it along with the mayor.

Mini Theory of Change (Kigoma Ujiji local govt. intervention):	Summary of Process, Results and Lessons Learned	Discussions and assessment
cate for change (Twaweza Strategy 2015-18, p 43; URT et al. 2016).		

Twaweza Theory of Change



Hypotheses and metrics in Twaweza Strategy 2015-18 outline how to address the lack of right to information through a freedom of information law and analysis of obstacles to implementation and related advocacy for change (Twaweza 2015, 43). The Mini ToC provided by Twaweza outlines how the commitment by the Kigoma Ujiji council and new platforms for citizens and civil society are expected to influence plans at the sub-national level.

From an outcome perspective building blocks were established at the sub-national level with the commitment of the local government authority and the training and engagement of citizens and NGOs, but due to delays monitoring of change has not taken place. Within Twaweza there seem to be some concern about sustainability as the central government seems uninterested and there are considerations about how to institutionalise change at the local level over time.

From an intermediate outcome perspective, there is anecdotal evidence that interactions between citizens and the local government have been beneficial and initiated change with specific examples mentioning a special audit, more classrooms and toilets being built at a school and more local engagement.


At the output level, a number of activities have been carried out through NGO partners in terms of training, meetings and information campaigns.

The conclusion is that the Kigoma experiment is *relevant* and has increasing become so during the latter part of the Strategy period. The implementation of the Kigoma Ujiji intervention is still in its early days and some evidence has been produced at the output level and anecdotal evidence at the intermediate outcome. Longer term change cannot be expected with such a short time horizon. The approach is thus relevant, but there seems to be some concern about longer term sustainability both at local and national level.

D.THE ELECTION 2015

Mini Theory of Change	Summary of Process and Results and Lessons Learned	Discussions and assessment
- Since voter turn out is already fairly high in Tanzania, we wanted to influence how people make their choices – to focus them on substance. - Since campaigns are traditionally made up of rallies and speeches, and fairly soft interviews, the idea was to provide a platform whereby candidates were asked to present the details of genuine policy positions. - By publicizing this widely, we would attract many voters to watch and engage and perhaps have their choices informed by <i>deeper insight</i> into the issues. However, we were not claiming to monitor the influence on vote choice. - The critical indicators for us here would be the reach, rates of engagement and attitudinal feedback (was this the first opportunity to interrogate candidates, did they learn about policy positions)	The process of initiating debates was engrained with numerous difficulties in planning and logistics and the 'unexpected' - addressing political issues. In-depth scoping work was carried out reflecting particularly young people's attitudes revealing 'promises given, but not held' and a wish to have 'answers' through debates. Adaptation to the debates included questions directly through online/SMS and in person. Fewer debates should cater for focusing on issues and policy positions. Implementation against delivered included, uncertainty in holding the events at all, limited utilisation of coalitions with other organisations, debate attendance of five parties not only two. A total number of seven debates were conducted. Issues were on 'Services, the Economy, National Identity and Constitution.' Limited physical audience attendances – primarily of students. Live streamed and TV/radio broadcasting only partly successful – technical issues. Data collected (Omnibus and SzW) but limited analysis; only pre- and post audience surveys. Shujaaz campaign reached 100k young people. Election data was distributed on well-visited websites and in briefs (CEMOT and newspapers). Political opinion polls using SzW data changed 'the narrative of the election campaign'. Front pages of newspaper and international attention. End year 2015 7 of 10 agreed of the credibility of the poll data presented by TW. The debates are considered a great success by TW. The mere data as a result of the intervention indicates so. Selected documentation for each of the processes and results delivered are available	By focusing on 'substance' TW's aim may appeared to have been to address voters' behaviour. The first three dots indicate the 'depth' is the key focus of the theory of change. Therefore it is not fully understandable why the fourth dot only relates to quantifiable aspect of the theory and not the 'depth'. An apparent flaw in the theory. As mentioned in the Lessons the questions submitted by the citizens often only allowed superficial responses and did not 'interrogate candidates' plans to get things done'. What guarantees did TW had in mind ensuring an 'in-depth' discussion on substance, issues and policy positions? What were the pathways? And what assumptions were stated for such pathways to be realised? From an outsider's perspective this appears to be a significant flaw in the theory Interactivity in itself, the pressure of being live broadcasted and allowing direct questions from 'citizens' are all critical activities (at output level) delivered. The election debates formed a good 'building block' upon which the 2017 seven live interview shows on national TV was considered a success (positive response data collected). A ten-months campaign followed the debates – on holding elected representatives accountable and encouraging young people to engage with good governance issues. The result of this study should have been seen as the ultimate goal of the Election theory – namely addressing substance and accountability of elected representatives in the longer term. Unfortunately this study has not formed a part of the Election documentation. It is said that Shujaaz reached 100k young people. It is mentioned that 'a change in sentiment and discourse on social media' and changes in 'attitudes' was observed, but neither what change and in what sentiment nor what the changing 'attitudes' were. There is, from our reading of the information, no clear difference in the results between the pre- and the post survey of the debate audience. Also, it is claimed that TW with the SzW polls provided insights into voter preferences and behaviour – and sparked national conversation on data and evidence. The focus has been on the youth primarily (scoping, audience, questions, campaign) – whether intended or unintended. This is not clear in the theory.

Twaweza Theory of Change



The theory of change of the Election 2015 is developed to the occasion, re-created – for the evaluation team.

From an outcome perspective building blocks established in that citizens were activated and encouraged to participate actively and authorities were challenged on their responsiveness. However, outcomes are related to sustained structures not events such as elections, yet they form a important mechanism in good governance. There is no doubt that Knowledge has been gained and shared at the outcome level but not continuously and consistently resulted in active citizens and responsive authorities. The 2017 direct broadcasted interviews of MPs also constitute a result of knowledge gained.

From an intermediate outcome perspective, the election event facilitated a strong public debate, and maybe also influenced awareness (of what we do not know). There is also no doubt that the performance of authorities in the debates has influenced their perception on the political system. But there is no clear analysis of how the perceptions have developed pre- and post. The data does not clearly state this. The fact that the 'substance/issues' were to be the key focus of the theory it would have obvious that if realised (which it did not) policies, plans and budgets would have been addressed at this level.

At the output level, TW is strong. The data provided was solid and well analysed and publicised widely to a large audience. The debate and all the various details in handling and developing them to be an overall success shows TWs ability to transform ideas to real life exercises. A great skill. From the Annual Report 2015 there are numerous and excellent stories related to the Election. Worth reading.

The conclusion is that there is close relevance between what is the strategy theory and the election theory. The relevance however became somewhat inconsistent as the election aim (focus on substance/issues/depth) was not thoroughly addressed.

6 Effectiveness Assessment

A. INTRODUCTION

For each of the problem areas under the two main domains (open government and basic education) and the LME the development over the strategy period is described. This is followed by an assessment section in which the development is evaluated with a reference to the respective hypotheses and key metrics Twaweza had defined in the Strategy document. A conclusion section finalises the assessment in which we also refer to Twaweza's own assessments of progress and achievements using the Stop-Light rating system.

For each of the nine problem areas various success criteria are stated, for example O5S2, meaning Open Government problem area 5, and success criterion 2.

i. Open Government

O1 Rights to Information

There is no robust legislative basis and/or effective mechanisms through which to exercise the constitutional right to information.

1. DEVELOPMENT OF COMPONENT

O1S1: Progressive legislation on access to information and freedom of expression enacted, including articulations of processes by which citizens can access information, exceptions, and penalties for non-compliance and grievance redress

In 2015, Twaweza worked on access to information to information, but also increasingly addressed the shrinking of Tanzania's civic space through advocacy activities, which had not been a major part of its Strategic and Annual Plans (AR 2015, 32). Twaweza worked in a Coalition on the Right to Information (CORI) to comment on the Access to Information Bill and conducted an analysis of it. CORI had been established in 2005 and Twaweza became a member in 2015 (interview with CORI representative 19 Marc 2019).

On its own Twaweza published an analysis of the Statistics Bill prior to enactment, which informed coverage from national and international media. An analysis of the Cybercrimes draft bill was also rapidly carried out and shared privately with senior officials in the Ministry of Communication, Science and Technology. Finally, Twaweza provided support to CORI on the Media Services Bill. These were Twaweza's first experiences in coalition-based advocacy with other civil society organisations.

Using the Open Government Africa Meeting in May 2015 drew international attention and put pressure on the government, which agreed to revise the bills, but with mixed success. The Access to Information Bill and the Media Services Bill were withdrawn from parliament and the Cybercrimes Bill was revised and the Statistics Bill were amended (AR 2015).

In 2015, a Sauti za Wananchi (SzW) call round on Access to Information related to a disappointing Access to Information Bill was conducted, published and launched, which resulted in 11 pieces of media coverage and over 4,000 views. SzW was also embedded into The Citizen newspaper website. Two Minibuzz shows on access to information were also conducted – on average such Minibuzz shows reach 26% of the population.

In 2016, Twaweza with its CORI partners analysed the new (and improved) Bill on Access to Information, proposed 40 changes of which 4 were incorporated, and shared finding with relevant actors (AR 2016). Twaweza also produced a SzW brief on access to information, which generated 3 pieces of media coverage and 3,000 web views, 2,000 downloads and 20,000 Twitter impressions. The Act was passed by Parliament in September 2016 in an improved version, in which Twaweza helped remove a key article that would have rendered the Act ineffective.

In the same year, Twaweza produced three pieces of analyses of the Media Services Bill and was the only organisation publicly commenting on all the drafts of the Bill. Two opinion pieces published in The Citizen and on Jamii Forums, the latter a Twaweza partner organisation from 2014/15, were also produced as well as a brief collating SzW and Afrobarometer data showing citizens' support for free media. A press conference was held, 11 media coverage and over 50,000 Twitter impressions ensued.

In 2017 Twaweza together with CORI advocated for the release of regulations to the Access to Information Act and engaged privately with the Minister of Information on this. Regulations were issued in December the same year. Independently and in partnerships Twaweza furthermore provided comments on the Online Content Regulations. It hosted representatives on the sue of the Cybercrimes Act, which led to the first release of data about cybercrime cases and subsequently it got invited to submit proposals for amending the Act (AR 2017). Finally, it took part in a coordinated response and a follow-up from data collection organisations to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) concerning the use ('overreach') of the 2015 Statistics Act, but with no response (AR 2017, 47).

In the public sphere Twaweza hosted a debate on democracy and released data on controversial topics like food security, a new constitution, and political approval ratings of the President and all leaders. Finally, 16 pieces of media coverage, hundreds of posts on Jamii Forums and close to 30 talk shows on civic space issues (and others on other topics, in total over 45 talk shows (AR 2017, 47)) and 10 op-eds of which two published in 2018. Interviews were conducted with eleven high-level key informants, who suggested that Twaweza's contribution to the debate on civic space is important (AR 2017).

In 2018, Twaweza engaged in strategic litigation actions, supporting a court case against the Online Content Regulations as well as a student activist. It also did research and op-ed on Communications Regulator's fining of five TV stations for human rights coverage (but no court case because TV stations did not wish this) and supported CORI activities in this field. Also in the legal field it supported the civil society review process for an NGO policy and law.

In the public sphere Twaweza released SzW briefs in March and July on access to information and democracy and drafted a guide to citizens on how to access public information, expected to be produced in collaboration with the government. Their expected partner within the government with whom Twaweza had had a good relationship however appears to not to be ready to get involved, possibly linked to the publication of poll on the President's popularity, and Twaweza has finished the draft on its own and is currently looking for partners for its publication (interview with Twaweza staff 20 March 2019).

Q1S4: Wider engagement by civil society (beyond Twaweza) and government to review 2nd OGP Action Plan & formulate 3rd Action Plan

In 2016, Twaweza worked with the government in the National Steering Committee of OGP to refine a third Action Plan and supported a civil society feedback meeting in State House to finalise it. Relatedly, and together with other CSOs, Twaweza provided feedback on the government's implementation of the OGP, which resulted in an addendum to the second action plan that expressed concern over shrinking civic space.

Twaweza also sought feedback from citizens through newspapers with an advert generating only few comments and online adverts on Jamii Forums. Social media generated close to 500,000 impressions and 20,000 engagements. Swahili taglines on OGP were made for social media in order to popularise it. It also supported or participated in five radio and TV shows on OGP and published an opinion piece on it. Finally Twaweza supported two journalists from the Government Information Directorate to attend the OGP Global Summit in Paris, which resulted in over twenty articles and documentary that were shared with at least ten Tanzania media outlets.

Finally, activities at sub-national level took off with the convening of a meeting with over 300 stakeholders in Kigoma Municipality to support its OGP sub-national pilot and to finalise a sub-national action plan (AR 2016). This was submitted by civil society in 2017 and followed up in the same year with a 'review of progress' held with the municipal government. There seemed to have been some agreement on bringing data closer to the people (AR 2017, 48). Also in 2017, an op-ed and two talk shows were produced.

In 2018, animators from two districts were trained related to the sub-national OGP. A project with CSOs in Kigoma spans 19 wards and they have held one joint meeting with all ward councillors, ward executive officers and street chairs, an engagement meeting between local government and CSOs, 5 public rallies with 160 people each, three women's meetings, eight 30-minutes radio programmes, and four round table discussions (an informal, traditional, venue).

2. ASSESSMENT

Hypotheses	Key Metrics
1. In Tanzania, advocacy on Freedom of Information, including through the Open Government Partnership, coupled with targeted support to those spearheading reforms within government, will persuade the government to enact a robust freedom of information law.	1. The law in Tanzania includes requisite clauses and components to meet international standards for a high quality access to information law; the law is not repealed or watered down subsequently.
2. In Tanzania and Uganda, analysis of obstacles to effective mechanisms for operationalizing freedom of information legislation, will be used to advocate for policy and practice change to overcome obstacles.	2. Civil society and media in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda make active use of the law to request and obtain information.
	3. At least one high profile public institution in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda develops appropriate mechanisms to respond to FOI requests, and champions its use.

The overall aim of O1 is to secure right to information through appropriate legislation and mechanisms. In the annual reports it is reported under two types of outputs, firstly progress in legislation linked to the commitments made by the government in the OGP and secondly wider engagement by civil society. Over the period the emphasis of Twaweza activities shifts more towards the latter in the light of the fact that an Access to Information Act was passed in 2016/17 in an improved version when compared to the 2015 bill. Regulations came out in 2017. Outputs reported in the Annual Reports may thus not always follow the ones scheduled

in the Annual Plans, but the level of activity remains very high and at times surpasses the number of planned outputs.

On the surface, the core goal of getting an Access to Information Act passed by the parliament was achieved in 2016 and in a better shape than initially feared from the bill presented in 2015. From the government's side, the Access to Information Act was part of its earlier commitments to the OGP and to a World Bank IDA credit of USD100 million that was underway in 2014 and released in 2015 to the 'First Open Government and Public Financial Management DPO' aimed 'to support the Government to establish open data in order to increase access and use of service delivery information as well as to improve budget credibility and execution.' It had five policy areas of which the first was to 'establishing the legal framework for access to information to promote open government, raise citizens' awareness of public policies and programs, and increase accountability', i.e. much similar to Twaweza's objective.

Twaweza reports that it as part of a wider coalition of civil society organisations pushed for the withdrawal of the bill in 2015, and through comments improving its final version in 2016, and for the release of Regulations in 2017. It has continued its work in this field in 2018 aiming at producing a guide to citizens on how to use the Access to Information Act. This should have happened in collaboration with the government, but the envisaged partner is not responding and Twaweza has therefore drafted it on its own, but is yet to publish it. The mechanisms for operationalising the Access to Information Act thus appears not fully to be in place. The evaluation of the World Bank credit to Open Government from 2019 remarks that 'no mechanism has so far been introduced to monitor implementation of the access to information bill, as was intended under the OGPFM series'¹⁹, this could be considered a future goal.

Twaweza's activities in the OGP on the other hand was significantly affected by the government's decision to withdraw in 2017, which also came to affect the sub-national OGP pilot in Kigoma. As a response Twaweza decided to intensify its engagement in public debates commenting on the government in a 'push back' against misinformation and a shrinking civic space (AR 2017, 26; MYR 2018, 2). From early on in the Strategy period this involved activities towards coalition building, combined with media activities and the continuation activities at the sub-national level. In 2018, engagement in selected strategic litigations battles in court to challenge the shrinking space has become more pronounced under O1.

In terms of outcomes, the legislative achievement was undermined by other developments. The Access to Information Act has resulted in changes in terms of improved access to information or the practice of public institutions in practice, yet it takes time. Data gathered by Twaweza at local level indicate that 2 out of 3 requests from citizens on access to information have been denied. No follow-up assessment has been carried out to assess the development in this trend. Other legislation limiting civic space appears likely to have undermined achievements in the area. While Twaweza thus demonstrates an ability to adapt to the changing political context (by 'pushing back') it did not, however, decide to rephrase its problems under Open Government to make them less ambitious, as was considered in 2017. As the nature and intensity of the problem intensified during implementation, Twaweza adapted to push back against closing civic space.

¹⁹ World Bank (2019): TZ-Open Government & PFM Development Credit (P133798). Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review.

3. CONCLUSION

Activity level and outputs have been convincingly high while the degree of effect is less sure. Improvements in terms of access to information legislation were achieved, but could just as well have been due to commitments by the government linked to donor funding under the previous government in Twaweza's first strategy period as to Twaweza activities. This observation does not denigrate the contributions made by Twaweza within this problem area and the organisation's alignment of activities with those of donors makes sense. However, reporting in annual reports is limited and not systematic in this regard.

Significant setbacks can be observed during the period. In the light of the overall shrinking civic space, the achievement in terms of the passing of the Access to Information Act furthermore seems less significant. Mechanisms to monitor and enforce access to information in Tanzania still appear wanting. This does not make Twaweza and coalition partners' contributions to improving the bill less significant, but the reach of the achievement having a marginal impact open government.

Based on Twaweza's self-assessment we agree to the high score on outputs as well as to the decrease in effect from 2016 to 2017.

	2016		2017		2018		Development	
	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT
01 TW	3	3	3	2	3			
01 Eval	3	3	3	2	3			

O2 Poor Government Data

The quality and integrity of data collected by government (on budgets, expenditures, natural resources and basic services) is poor and data are not made publicly available in a timely, systematic and meaningful fashion.

1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPONENT

Q2S1: Publication of Uwezo and Sauti za Wananchi (SzW) data

Due to technical challenges, Twaweza did not manage to produce data portals for SzW and Uwezo in 2015. Instead, it engaged in the general elections held during that year, in which a scoping study was conducted on voters' priority areas. In close partnership with Oxfam, a website providing data and analysis related to the elections was produced and received over 30,000 visitors (AR 2015). Just under 1000 campaign promises were documented based on media reports; and election results map was developed and picked up by two newspapers.

Furthermore, through in-kind support on elections by the Coalition of Election Observation Missions in Tanzania (CEMOT), Twaweza supported updates that resulted in processing and analyses of data leading to production of briefs, which received wide coverage in the media.

In 2016, Uwezo and SzW were published online as raw data on the Twaweza website. Two sites were made available online (Humdata.org and Hurumap, both in beta stage) to present Uwezo data in interactive forms while also initiating similar work for Sauti za Wananchi. The publishing of raw data on the website is mentioned again in the 2017 AR as are copies of published reports. The SzW data page was viewed over 18,000 times in 2017.

In 2017, the before-mentioned websites that included Uwezo data also became operational. In the same year, tailored content from Uwezo and Kiufunza data was produced for and shared with MPs. The same year SzW and other Twaweza data were communicated to the wider public through more than 45 talk shows. A partnership with JamiiForum, an online social network, led to hundreds of posts and other articles and hundreds of engagements and interactions (AR 2017, 29). An exercise to gather feedback from key stakeholders (politicians, editors, etc.) was also carried out.

The publication of data on the President's popularity in 2018 however led to challenges from the authorities questioning the legality of Twaweza publishing such data without the required permits; (The Citizen 2018) and from July 2018 no survey data have been published.

02S2: At least four government datasets published

In 2015, an Open Data Portal was released by the e-Government Agency supported by the World Bank. A number of datasets on health, education and water were made online and have been accessible since then. In addition, a circular on open data was issued to government authorities after pressure from Twaweza (AR 2015). The process stalled mid-year due to the then upcoming elections in October 2015, but seems to have picked up in 2016 with 150 separate datasets. Twaweza's role was to provide feedback on the portal (AR 2016), but the extent to which this happened is unclear.

Also in 2016, Twaweza partnered with Code4Tanzania to develop an interactive platform, hurumap, for exploring the government data. This reached beta stage and included district and regional data.

The publication of government data sets was not in the 2017 plan (on hold if more funding at mid-term)' (AR 2017, 48).). At some point, the government assigned the Agency the work of handling payments and progress in terms of the publication of government data subsidized (interview with Twaweza staff, 20 March 2019). However, a Twaweza Brief was published that year showing that whereas local government officials and NGO representatives were interested in using government data, government websites were not among the main sources for data for the former (Twaweza 2017).

02S5: Access to information audit applied

In 2015 Twaweza sought to compare administrative data with the data collected by Twaweza and other organisations. However, this proved too complex and was dropped for 2016 onwards (AR 2015, 23-24).

In 2016, Twaweza initiated a Mystery Shopper approach to monitor the availability of information at the local government level. A draft report was prepared. In the same year, an analysis of the availability of key information on key government departments and state-owned institutions were available and a report was underway. It was published in 2017 showing that only few institutions made budgets and financial reports available on their websites (see <https://twaweza.org/go/information-on-government-websites>).

In 2017, the Mystery Shopper findings were used in several occasions, e.g. TV talk shows on access to information; the media; A Demokrasia Yetu ('Our Democracy') publication, which was furthermore presented to over 200 local government officials at the Wajibu local government conference and with 200 civil society actors at the Demokrasia Yetu event, and; directly to the Minister of Information. Two talk shows and five pieces of media coverage also came out of this (AR 2017, 48).

2. ASSESSMENT

Hypotheses	Key Metrics
1. Monitoring and public feedback (both positive and negative) on the quality, integrity and availability of government-held data will put pressure on government to improve their handling of data. 2. Demonstration by Twaweza of innovative, engaging ways of making data public (e.g. Uwezo and Sauti data) will encourage others, particularly in government, to reach for best-practice in open data 3. Opportunistic provision of technical support will unblock obstacles to effective publication of open data by government	1. Education ministries and other relevant national bodies (e.g., testing commissions) in the three countries publish relevant data openly, and comply with standards of good-quality open data. 2. The data is available, relevant and meaningful also at district or other sub-national levels. In TZ, at least the following are published and updated online: exam results, school facilities (BEST), capitation grant disbursements, rural water points, anonymized census micro-data, pre-election data (candidates), election results, CAG audit reports.

The aim of O2 is to improve the quality and integrity of data collected by government and its publication in a 'timely, systematic and meaningful fashion' (Strategy 2015-18). Early in the Strategy period, Twaweza splits this undertaking into two: namely the publication of its own data and of the government's open data work. In terms of the former, SzW and Uwezo continued to be important tools; surveys were undertaken at least until the challenges from the Tanzanian government authorities in July 2018 and proposed amendments to the Statistics Act later that year put the publication of such data to a halt. New or redeveloped websites for interactive use were developed; and there is some documented evidence in 2016 and 2017 that the websites were being used.

The influence on the quality and publication of government data is less clear. Linked to the World Bank credit to 'Open Government and Public Financial Management', the Open Data Portal was released in 2015 by the government in which datasets were being published at least until 2017 when the Annual Plan for the year still mentions 'progress' (Annual Plan 2017, p. 3). Whereas the 2016 Annual Report mentions that on-going feedback to the Open Data Initiative would be provided, and a survey among users was planned, this sub-goal is not reported on in 2017, but has been reported that it was done under LME, not Open Government (<https://twaweza.org/go/monitoring-series>). In essence, the work was stopped due to limited resonance and budget constraints (Twaweza written comments 11 April 2019).

The 2017 AR makes note of no progress in the overall Open Government problem in terms of effect because of the changing socio-political context (AR 2017, 5). Progress with regard the publication of government datasets come to a halt with the government withdrawal from OGP in 2017 (interview with Twaweza staff, 20 March 2019). The 2016 AR had collaboration with the National Bureau of Statistics as one of its planned outputs, but this did not materialise.

Overall, the work with media and other outreach activities became more pronounced across the three sub-goals over the period. Twaweza managed to create significant attention to the publication of results from the audit of Access to Information Act towards the end of the period. A significant and growing number of activities targeting the public, through the media, as well as outreach to selected target groups can be observed over the period. After some delays in 2015 and into 2016, primarily due to elections, Twaweza's own annual achieved outputs in this regard largely follow; and at times surpass the planned annual outputs in 2016 and 2017.

3. CONCLUSION

The publication of government data over the period began in 2015. However, progress seems linked to the Tanzanian government's previous commitment related to OGP and a related

World Bank credit that year as much as to Twaweza's activities. Reporting from Twaweza on this is limited. For example, Twaweza's reporting on successes in the annual reports does not always touch on the extent to which activities align with other donor support to Tanzania. For instance, the Annual Report from 2016 on page 1 suggests that the passing of the Access to Information Act was a major Twaweza achievement, but it does not really mention how this achievement interrelates with World Bank Support in this area. The release of government data comes to a halt in 2017 and is not reported on afterwards. Collaboration outside the OGP seems not to have materialised.

Twaweza's own activities on the other hand are numerous; and there is some evidence that the data are being used, at least until the legality of the organisation's production and the authorities questioned publication of data in July 2018. Many activities targeting the media and media outputs are there, but do not seem to have caused the expected increased in official government support to data availability and use. We are in agreement with Twaweza's self-assessment of outputs and effects presented in the Annual reports.

	2016		2017		2018		Development	
	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT
02 TW	3	2	3	2	1			
02 Eval	3	2	3	2	1			

O3 Independent Monitoring

There is a lack of transparent and robust independent information monitoring the status of key services and sectors (in sectors such as health, water and natural resources); equally, there are no robust sources of opinions and perceptions of citizens about key services and sectors.

1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPONENT

O3S1: Citizens' views on key public issues are gathered in a rigorous manner, shared, and inform public (media) and policy (parliament) debate

In 2015, Twaweza closed its inaugural SzW panel and established a new panel of 2,400 respondents, 125 schools, 90 health facilities and 200 local leaders across Mainland Tanzania. A total of 13 call rounds were conducted that led to 10 policy briefs and launch events as well as a Minibuzz discussion on almost every topic launched. Data was used to inform election debates. Combined, this generated over 265 pieces of media coverage and 23,000 web impressions. Topics were selected in collaboration with ODI, Hivos and the International Institute for Environment and Development, and the International Law and Policy Institute. Internationally, the SzW was presented at global conferences in Colombia and Brazil and nationally it was presented to the Commonwealth Observer Mission for the elections and the Kinondoni Municipal Council.

Work with the World Bank on the mobile phone panel survey handbook was on-going in 2015 and it was finalized and published in 2016 (<http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24595>) and launched during the 2016 Open Government Partnership Summit in Paris. A well attended session on Sauti za Wananchi was also conducted at the Summit.

In 2016, 11 call rounds were conducted and 8 briefs and 3 short flyers were published and launched, which generated approximately 200 pieces of tracked media coverage. The launch of the research brief on health_showing that exempt groups were wrongly charged and that accident victims had to wait for a police form before treatment was attended by the Deputy

Minister of Health. The Ministry subsequently issued directives to health officials on these issues. The issue of exempt groups paying for treatment was also debated in Parliament.

Furthermore, 2 press conferences were held. The Twaweza Twitter account, drawing the majority of its content from Sauti za Wananchi gained over 1 million impressions and thousands of new followers, and there were over 30 threads on Jamii Forums (AR 2016). Research support and expertise were provided to the judiciary.

In 2017, ten call rounds and one rapid response round on access to information were conducted and made available online. Seven briefs and press releases were produced and received over 125 pieces of coverage by the end of July, alongside 37 hour long talk shows with Twaweza spokespeople. Two data packages were prepared and released at press conferences. Data from SzW fed into other Twaweza activities, for instance its live interview show, Njoo Tuongee, the Demokrasia Yetu publication, and briefings to senior politicians, officials and diplomats. Most launch events were live streamed resulting in over 25,000 viewers (AR 2017).

The police force requested a report on the data collected about security issues and Twaweza agreed (Twaweza 2018). Twaweza, for this purpose, added questions into a call round, which were subsequently also presented to officials from the judiciary. A representative from the anti-corruption bureau attended the launch and made comments. SzW was also used for a research project by Georgetown University.

The Twitter account generated over one million impressions and over 2,000 engagements; the partnership with Jamii Media led to over 3.7 million impressions and over 620,000 engagements, and; the Twaweza website had 20,000 views and 10,000 downloads. Interviews with 11 high-level key informants suggested that various stakeholders used SzW and Uwezo data, including those within the government and that it contributed significantly to advocacy and public debates.

In the 2018 Mid-Year Review seven national and four Dar es Salaam call round were conducted, leading to eight policy briefs. Dar es Salaam data should have resulted in 'public facing posters' (MYR 2018), but this did not occur due to changes in the Statistics Act. However, data was shared with the Ministry of Local Government and the Bureau of Statistics.

Q3S2: Data from independent monitoring of core outcomes and functions of basic services and sectors (e.g., health, education, water, natural resources) gathered and shared in a manner that informs public (media) and policy (parliament) debate

In 2015, three of the ten *Sauti za Wananchi* products launched in the year (see above) covered monitoring water, education and security services. These generated close to 30 pieces of coverage and over 12,000 web views.

In 2016, two rounds were done with citizen monitors and education officials respectively, both producing data used for the household findings. The sub-goal was not in the 2017 Plan and not reported on in the 2017 AR and the 2018 Mid-Year Review. However, some monitoring of health and education took place in call rounds in 2017 and 2018, but emphasis appears to have changed more towards advocacy in the second half of the strategy period (see also SzW major intervention above).

Hypotheses	Key Metrics
1. Collection and curation of independent sources of information on the status of key public services and sectors will promote and enrich public and policy debate on the state of these services and sectors. 2. Extensive collection of independent data on learning outcomes at primary school level will, by acting as a promoted example to other actors, encourage them to collect independent data in other sectors. 3. Regular collection, analysis and publication of data on public opinion will inform public and policy debates on key topics of public concern, and will lead to policy and practice that better-reflects the views and priorities of the public.	1. Sauti za Wananchi established as a reliable opinion polling institute, and data is demonstrably referred to and used by key ministries 2. Public debate (e.g., through the media) actively uses independent data in high-quality reporting on public services and sectors. 3. Independent data on public services and sectors, and public opinion, is actively used in parliamentary debates and by parliamentary committees. 4. Independent data on public services and sectors, and public opinion, is actively used in technocratic / policy debates.

2. ASSESSMENT

The overall purpose of O3 is to address the lack of transparent and robust independent information monitoring, the status of key services and sectors and to provide insights into the opinions of citizens on these. A new SzW panel was established in 2015. High activity with the SzW can be observed over the Strategy period and in the first two years, separate call rounds and reporting on the functioning of basic services can be observed. In 2017 and 2018, nothing is reported in the annual reports. Some survey activity took place, but SzW increasingly appears to have been used for advocacy purposes. SzW appears to be considered a reliable opinion polling institute in Tanzania applying solid scientifically based methodologies. Attention to and use of SzW data in the media and social media remains high throughout the period. There is thus no doubt that SzW has promoted public debate, but evidence that the debate has been 'enriched' is not presented.

Some uptake of SzW data among authorities and policy-makers can be observed though their willingness to participate in public launch events is waning at the end of the period due to the political climate. There is no evidence presented that the publication of Twaweza data has inspired other actors to collect data in other sectors.

Questions about the legality of SzW due to the Statistics Act arose already in 2015, leading to a minor under-delivery (AR 2015). In the 2017 AR, it is noted that the NBS reviewed questionnaires and removed questions related to political preferences (AR 2017, 32). In July 2018, this came to a confrontation with authorities after the release of data on the President's falling approval rates with the Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH) questioning the legality of the Twaweza doing this kind of surveys. There has not been data release since then.

The focus on service delivery appears to have become less pronounced in the second half of the strategy period when emphasis seems to shift towards using SzW in advocacy. Questions could be put as regards why the service delivery dimension was not further developed. Service delivery was a key focus in the previous strategy and in a Twaweza document from March 2017 about needs identification in relation to 'accountability appetite' it is concluded

04 Effective intermediaries

The number and capacity of intermediaries and curators who can demand information and data from the government and make it meaningful to the public (tell great stories) is limited

“social services to the community” is by far the most salient attribute across both private and public settings....”.²⁰

3. CONCLUSION

The level of activity with regard to polls using SzW remains high at least until the publication of the poll on the President’s popularity in July 2018 and later changes in the legal and regulatory framework. Media coverage and social media attention remains high and there are examples of data being used by authorities and decision-makers. Survey on service delivery was carried out in 2015 and 2016, but it is not in the Annual Plan from 2017 and not reported on in 2017 and 2018. The changing socio-political space and the tolerance towards independently conducted surveys clearly represent a threat to the continuation and sustainability of SzW in its current form.

As for Twaweza’s self-assessment on this problem we agree in full as regards activities and outputs delivered but effect cannot based on the above assessment be classified as a 3 rating. Both for 2016 and 2017 ratings of effect are more realistically at rating level 2.

	2016		2017		2018		Development	
	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT
03 TW	3	3	3	3	3			
03 Eval	3	2	3	2	3			

1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPONENT

04S1: Nascent data journalism culture emerging in media

In 2015, Twaweza reached out to potential media partners about support to data journalism, but despite positive feedback they did not return and collaboration did not materialise (AR 2015, 35). However, some media began using data and a data page was placed on the website of The Citizen where more than 90% of the visualizations come from SzW and other media coverage of SzW, not least related to the elections.

In 2016, a partnership with Code4Tanzania was established. It included a data journalism fellowship, interactive presentation of data from the Census, Uwezo and other sources as well as data-driven blog posts. The same year, a data journalism prize was included, i.e. Excellence in Journalism Awards Tanzania (EJAT), sponsored by Twaweza (reported again in the 2017 Annual Report as first award). Twaweza also visited and engaged with journalists from Tanzania Standard Newspapers (TSN), the government owned publisher and presented some of the early stage Uwezo data visualizations. TSN became a core partner in a major data journalism project funded by the Tanzania Media Foundation.

²⁰ Accountability Appetite, Twaweza, March 2017

In terms of outreach, a lecture was given at the School of Mass Communications at the University of Dar es Salaam; and Twaweza participated in more than 25 talk shows referring to Twaweza data. Furthermore, the data generated over 200 pieces of news coverage across print, radio and TV. Also, 25 discussion threads or articles on Jamii Forums were supported as well as 30 short facts presenting one chart and a short write up. This generated significant numbers of impressions and engagements across their social media platforms. Finally, Twaweza supported the production of a total of 20 Minibuzz shows based on Twaweza data.

In 2017, collaboration with another Nation Media, Mwananchi Communications (The Citizen is also Nation Media), created a data-driven platform and data visualizations, WaziMap, and HDX were shared with four other media houses, all of which had expressed interest in data journalism. Other similar events took place. Only Clouds Media however demonstrated willingness to provide staff time for training.

In terms of outreach, data was packaged for Jamii Forums as well as for wider social media use, resulting in 'hundreds of thousands of engagements and millions of views.' (AR, 2017) Data were also packaged for the media related to current political debates and eight articles were written.

Partly as a result, media coverage of Twaweza increased to over 400 pieces during 2017. Twaweza participated in over 45 TV and radio talk shows, and produced seven TV and radio shows itself with senior politicians and other leading figures drawing on data from SzW and other sources.

In 2018, a Mwananchi partnership to produce data stories is reported as a Code4Tanzania partnership to increase data journalism among multiple media houses (MYR 2018). After the contract was signed mid-2018, Twaweza financial support for the production of stories across the country using data began (Interview with Mwananchi editor 19 March 2019).

O4S2: Scoping study done on identifying demand for data and information, and the "state of" intermediaries and how to work with them

In 2016, a study looking at the local government officials as potential intermediaries using data in their work, including data from the opendata.go.tz portal, was produced. The study was published in 2017 showing that 40% were aware of the new open data portal. The findings were published in a brief that was posted online and has been downloaded over 3,000 times (AR 2017).

O4S3: At least one intermediary outside traditional media is demanding, using and communicating data (based on scoping study findings)

In 2015, Twaweza supported the setup of Wajibu Institute of Public Accountability founded by the ex-Controller and Auditor General and helped with the formal establishment of the institute in 2016. Initially Twaweza hosted Wajibu physically and the partnership is ongoing (interview with Wajibu staff 18 March 2019). A high-profile conference on transparency and accountability in Tanzania's extractive industries also took place that year.

In 2017, Wajibu produced simplified audit reports and distributed them to local government authorities nationwide with Twaweza's support. Wajibu also turned technical information from the audit reports into more media-friendly packets of information, encouraging journalists to follow up on the issues raised. Finally, Wajibu held a conference on local government accountability with over 300 participants from local authorities across the country (AR, 2017).

In 2018, simplified CAG reports are again reported. The same year, animators in two districts (probably related to the OGP activities in Kigoma and Mbogwe, ed.) are encouraged to use local data.

2. ASSESSMENT

Hypotheses	Key Metrics
1. By working with partners in the media sector (media houses, media development agencies, etc.) to develop a cadre of media professionals with expertise in doing journalism with data, the quality and quantity of data journalism will increase. 2. By example, and through fostering of partnerships and mentoring, a range of potential intermediaries in civil society, research institutions and the private sector will demand information and data and will contribute to a meaningful engagement of citizens with public services and sectors.	1. The number and quality of data journalism in the three countries increases, and is sustained. 2. The number and quality of intermediaries requesting information; the information used to engage citizens and promote a meaningful interaction between authorities and citizens.

The overall goal of O4 is to increase the number and capacity of intermediaries who can demand and use data from the government. Over the Strategy period, various activities were carried out to encourage journalists as well as other actors' use of data, including local officials. The establishment of partnerships with more media and NGOs suggest that there was some progress in this regard. Data were also often 'packaged' to make it easy to use for the traditional and social media and produced significant coverage. It is however hard to assess whether the quantity and quality of coverage using data has improved since there is no baseline and indicators on this in the annual reports.

Significant under-spending in 2015 and 2016 can be observed and a closer to budget spending in 2017, reaching around 55% expenditure. Maybe this is related to Twaweza's 'unwillingness to pursue a traditional resource-intensive training orientated data journalism program', which it did not believe was effective and the continuation of 'ad-hoc low budget ways of engaging various players at the same time as pursuing partnerships with Code4Africa (continuation) and Internews' (AR 2016 section 2.4.1).

The reporting on the demand for and use of information and data is not systematic. In addressing the theory of change one would have expected a follow-up to the scoping study on local government officials' awareness of data on the opendata.go.tz portal. For example (i) to investigate how many of the 40% of the local government officials actually used the data in their daily work from the open data portal to improve their performance and lobby for improved services – and (ii) to investigate how to strengthen outreach to those 60% of local officials that were not aware the open data portal.

Also, it could have been useful to know to which extent the Wajibu Institute's produced simplified auditing formats were used by local government officials, and likewise, to which extent the result of the Wajibu conference on accountability for local government was followed-up upon; what was learned and what could this learning be used for to facilitate local government engagement in accountability.

3. CONCLUSION

O4 On the expanded use of data intermediaries and increased quantity and improved quality of data journalism appear from data collected not to have been a main priority for Twaweza over the period. Some partnerships have been achieved that provided Twaweza with outlets

for its own data, but the organisation has pursued an ad hoc and low-key approach to solving the problem.

In terms of output / outcome and the theory of change no clear direction was applied and lack of follow-up on the demand for and use of data, for example, related to the scoping study on local government officials awareness of data accessibility. This is indicative of Twaweza's focus on activity/outputs and less on the theory. It should however be noted that some activities has facilitate the theory process to some extent, in that support to data journalism was considered attractive to media outlets. Whether that has resulted in an increase in the data journalism in the media as such has however not been investigated and key metrics measurement remains unanswered. Twaweza's own assessment of O4 falls well in line with the evaluation team's assessment, low ratings overall.

	2016		2017		2018		Development	
	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT
04 TW	2	1	2	1	2			

04 Eval	2	1	2	1	2			
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O5 Unresponsive government

For most citizens and public officials, government is generally unresponsive; this lowers expectations of what government can be and dulls aspirations, which in turn allows government to continue to be unaccountable (vicious cycle).

1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPONENT

O5S1: Examples and case studies of public agency identified and promoted (demonstrating responsive government and/or active citizenship), plus new Public Agency (PA) initiative

Nothing reported in Tanzania until 2018 when a partnership with the International Growth Centre commenced to identify positive deviants (MYR 2018).

O5S2 Tanzania: Policy issues of concern to citizens, including young people, are identified/collected and raised – and informed debate on issues fostered (during 2015 general election campaign)

In 2015, Twaweza ran various debates, all broadcast live on TV and radio, and online watched and listened to by five million people cumulatively; four manifesto focused debates with senior representatives from five major political parties in the election; one debate between candidates vying for the ruling party nomination; candidate debates for the posts of President of Zanzibar and President of the Union. Monitoring data showed that the debates reached 40% of citizens in Tanzania, generated in excess of five million Twitter impressions and were watched online by over three hundred thousand people. Citizens could submit questions online or via SMS and over 250 questions from citizens were received. The debates generated over 30 pieces of media coverage.

Twaweza also worked with Well Told Story to produce radio and comic content encouraging young people to consider issues when voting, generating significant response on social media. Animated comic clips with caricatures of political stereotypes with Vuvuzela Media, generating close to two million impressions on social media. LME supported the election interventions throughout with comprehensive evaluation and research work with MIT (see below).

Q5S4: Government responsiveness and citizen expectations are monitored on priority areas identified by citizens

In 2016, SzW collected two rounds of data on citizens' expectations and approval rating of the government, as well as their views on democracy and its basic tenets such as freedom of expression. The two briefs coming out of it generated over 60-65 pieces of media coverage, over 500 Twitter mentions and 5,000 web sessions, and generated discussion online, including on Jamii Forums. Monitoring of the health sector also generated debate in Parliament, generating 20 pieces of media coverage and caused some policy reactions. In subsequent years this sub-goal seems to be reported under O3.

Q5S5: Citizens demand implementation of their own priorities from among government commitments and mandate, likely focusing on young people (TZ)

In 2016, Twaweza in partnership with the Minibuzz talk show produced 11 television shows, also using data. Minibuzz reaches over 20% of Tanzanians.

In 2017, a weekly one-hour TV show is produced with interviews with ministers and other officials and questions all collected from citizens via SMS or social media. This built on experiences and work related to the 2015 elections (see more under major intervention on 2015 elections above). It is done 'with partners' and subsequently rebroadcast on radio (AR 2017, 35). Monitoring data shows that over 35% of people watched the shows. Furthermore, a pilot TV-show, Mbunge Live featuring individual MPs was produced with positive feedback from airing it in the MPs' constituencies.

In 2018 and building on a pilot mentioned above, interviews with 16 MPs in Dodoma, 11 of whom were randomly selected and filming expected to begin in September. Ten comic books and radio programs were furthermore produced targeting youth on democratic values, extensive baseline and research for content formulation conducted (MYR 2018).

2.5.6. Unresponsive Government | Special Initiative: Public Agency with focus on education

In 2016, an exploratory methodology on Public Agency (focusing on teacher attendance) was developed drawing on field research by Twaweza staff. A PA initiative was launched as pilots in Ilemela and Mvomero Districts (reported again in 2017 AR) on teacher absenteeism, teacher motivation and the effect on children's learning outcomes. Events with some local media coverage and one national talk show. An independent baseline for PA was also conducted. In 2017, it is reported that partners were trained on the use of a data application. In 2018, teacher monitoring was completed in 40 schools in one district (MYR 2018).

2. ASSESSMENT

The overall purpose of problem area O5 is to make government more responsive through the identification of stories of public agency and responsive government and by creating opportunities for dialogue. Spending over the strategic period is low (approximately 50% in 2016 and 62% in 2017), and the level of activity varies. The production of a number of election activities in 2015 is followed by the production of talk shows in the following years. Overall, the talk shows aim at demonstrating direct interaction between citizens and decision-makers. In 2018 a new talk show format, MbungeLive, is developed and tested. It provides an opportunity for MPs and their constituencies to engage. In the light of the shutdown of transmissions from Parliament in the period this event is highly relevant.

There is some overlap of activities with the education sector, especially within the special initiative on positive deviance, and more may have been reported there. Results within this activity seem not to have been promising; and Twaweza notes that it is 'not well suited to be the primary organising/ galvanising force at community level' (AR 2017, 36).

Twaweza's work on the O5 problem seems to have been affected by the polarisation of Tanzanian politics, which made it more difficult to work across parties, and getting permits for various activities increasingly became a challenge (Annual Report 2016 section 2.5.5). It was already a challenge up to the 2015 elections (partner interview with Kwanza TV 19 March 2019) and in the not less so with the #MbungeLive format. It is reported in 2017 that the quality of interaction between politicians and citizens could have been better (AR 2017). Twaweza's main indicator was on 'increased interaction' (partner sheet TW), and not on, for example, 'number of promises made by the MPs executed'. The latter may have had more relevance in 2015 while the former (described in April 2019) may imply a softened tone reflecting an overall 'fear' prevailing in the society today as regards free speech.

3. CONCLUSION

Addressing the problem of unresponsive government seems to have been challenging, partly due to the changing socio-political context. Most activities seem to have been related to the media, first by the organisation of debates during the 2015 elections, and secondly related to TV talk shows over the period. Whereas there were concerted attempts to bring citizens and politicians together during these media activities, the effect of these activities is not reported on apart from numbers on coverage. Therefore it is difficult to assess the self-assessment ratings.

As regard the output/outcome of the theory the activity/output focus seems again to prevail. For example, the partners trained in 2017 on the use of a data application: was it useful, did the partners manage to apply their skills? Etc. – and what was the result of the teacher monitoring in 40 schools? Did data provide new insights that can be used for bringing teacher performance forward, etc.

Based on the above assessment it is questionable whether one can see that there has been an improved development both in terms of outputs and effect. While the initiation of for example the MbungeLive events can justify and increase in outputs from 2016 to 2017 and 2018 the effect, as related to the key metrics, cannot justify a 2 rating.

	2016		2017		2018		Development	
	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT
05 TW	2	1	3	2	3		↑	↑
05 Eval	2	1	3	1	3		↑	↑

ii. Basic Education

E1 Learning Outcomes

Schooling does not lead to learning; teachers, education administrators, policy makers, and the public (especially parents) do not focus on or measure core learning competencies (early grade literacy, numeracy and other core competencies)

1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPONENT

E1S1: An annual learning assessment is carried out to produce and share evidence on the levels of learning competences in literacy and numeracy

The Uwezo annual learning assessment was conducted in all districts in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda in 2015. For the first time, private primary schools and data on (mal)nourishment and prevalence of properly iodized salt at the household (Tanzania) were included. Also for the first time technology platforms were used to collect monitoring data, which seems to have led to cost-savings.

In 2016, the Uwezo assessment was conducted on a smaller scale and the assessment of literacy and numeracy were broadened and a problem-solving task was included in the test in 10 districts. Instant feedback meetings were held at each school with subsequent debate. The Uwezo 2015 datasets were also finalized and published online with selected variables and features visualised. A data-info flyer for academia was produced and shared at university events and conferences in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Senegal as well as at the global CIES conference. Finally, contributions were made to two books, one produced through support of Twaweza.

In 2017, the Uwezo assessment was conducted in 56 districts and households were given a calendar and English and Kiswahili story booklets for participating, which had been produced for the survey exercise. Data on other Sustainable Development Goals (water, nutrition, sanitation, etc.), which had been developed in collaboration with the Ministries of Water, Health, Education and Planning and Finance in 2016, was also collected. Technology was tested to speed up data collection. Finally, a feedback intervention through 30 community meetings attended by 4,500 citizens was piloted in one district (Gairo). The 2018 Mid-Year Report notes that Gairo District Commissioner and council officials have decided to make education a priority sector 'in the coming budget year' (MYR 2018).

E1S2: Evidence on learning outcomes shared widely with key actors at national and sub-national levels; clear position on learning outcomes as policy priority is formulated and argued

In 2015, a paper was published by Twaweza summarising a number of studies on the effect of Uwezo in East Africa. Whereas it did not find evidence that the conducting of Uwezo assessments did not spur citizen action in the localities it was carried out, there was evidence that Uwezo had contributed to a shift in public debate from infrastructure and enrolment to learning (Carlitz and Lipovsek 2015)

The same year, Uwezo cross-national data was launched simultaneously at press conferences in Dar es Salaam, Kampala and Nairobi. Upon invitation, the East Africa combined report was also presented to the East African Legislative Assembly. National launches for country-level reports were also held. A total of more than 400 policy actors, civil society organizations, partners and academics were reached and fourteen academic articles were either published or drafts submitted, eight blog pieces produced and 87 stories and newspaper articles published. In Tanzania 18 Minibuzz shows on education were produced and broadcast. Minibuzz reaches approximately 25% of the population.

In 2016, more than 200 education actors attended the launch of the Uwezo Annual Learning Assessment Report. Uwezo also generated 60 pieces of press coverage and 30 interviews in Tanzania. In the same year, Twaweza partner Minibuzz produced seven shows on Uwezo data and Jamii Forums posted a number of discussion threads. Some Uwezo data on nutrition and learning outcomes was presented at University of Dar es Salaam and furthermore generated 10 pieces of media coverage including 3 talk shows. The Tanzania Education Network (TEN/MET) and Research Triangle International also made use of Uwezo data in their work.

In 2017, the report drawing on 2015 data was launched to 150 MPs, government officials, and stakeholders and made available online, including two interactive visuals. Furthermore, 159 district reports were produced and distributed and there were launches in 35 districts. Preliminary findings were shared with members of Tanzania Education Network (TENMET) and Tanzania Teachers' Union leaders. The Uwezo East Africa report was also launched in 2017 and several academic papers by Twaweza staff were written.

E1S3: Policy debate stimulated at national level to prioritize measured learning outcomes as policy priority

In 2015, Twaweza was still 'in constant communication' with the Big Results Now Initiative introduced by the then President Kikwete and aiming at catalysing change in education as one of six critical sectors. This included support and guidance on conducting a national assessment of basic learning outcomes. Uwezo was also invited to participate in a curriculum review process to help to sharpen indicators for learning outcomes in Reading, Writing and Arithmetic. Finally, Twaweza participated in the government's Education Sector Annual Joint Review.

In the same year, through Tanzania Education Network (TENMET), Twaweza advocated successfully for the government to allow sufficient time for consultation before changing subjects and combinations in higher secondary education. Twaweza attended eight different TENMET events on education across the country reaching thousands of officials, media and citizens. Finally, it contributed a chapter to a book *Dilemmas of Education Reform in Africa*.

Also in 2015, Twaweza held more regular media briefings on specific issues raised by the Uwezo data; for example on the benefits of early childhood education, and it produced monthly talk shows on different radio stations. Twaweza also received 12 invitations to comment on TV and radio following the Primary Leaving and Senior 4 examination results (AR 2015).

In 2016, meetings were held with the Minister of Education as well as with directors in the Ministry of Education, the Parliamentary Committee on Social Services, and the Ministry of Local Government to present findings from 2014, which however reportedly contributed to straining relations with the Ministry (AR 2016, section 4.1.3). Twaweza also co-organised a forum with TENMET that involved key Ministry of Education officials and participated in the Joint Education Sector Review analysis, which drew on Uwezo data (AR 2016).

In 2017, Twaweza got involved in policymaking in various ways: it became a member of National Education Task Force to develop a National Assessment Framework; It participated in and submitted recommendations to the review of Education Act of 1978 in alliance with TENMET and other CSOs; participated in 3 national meetings on inclusive education and education financing through TENMET. Twaweza is member and country lead of Wellsprings grantees learning forum, Regional Education Learning Initiative (RELI). (AR 2017)

Also in 2017, Uwezo received press coverage 74 times and it was cited in the Joint Sector Review and a number of TENMETs publications. The 2018 World Development Report, Learning

to Realize Education's Promise, also made references to Uwezo data. The launch of the annual report in Dodoma generated an animated discussion among MPs. Finally, Twaweza presented a paper on "Social inequality in Education: Uwezo Tanzania perspective" at a national Quality Education Conference in Dodoma, a paper on "The Hidden Education Inequality in East Africa" was presented at a CIES conference in Atlanta, USA, and Twaweza participated in the PAL Network Steering Committee, and participated in the Global Action Week for Education in Mtwara Region with other NGOs. In 2018, upon request, data was shared with MPs related to budget session and via social media and events. Furthermore, an event on inequality was attended by over 100 participants and generated debate.

E1S4: Policy debate stimulated at sub-national levels, building on the data gathered through the new assessment of learning outcomes as well as local-level open government at sub-national levels.

In 2015, Twaweza formulated a sub-national communications strategy for Uwezo targeting teachers, policy actors, media and (in part) parents. Furthermore, 2 local policy makers in Tanzania were involved in child assessments. In 2016, a report drawing on research from 10 districts on the extent to which learning outcomes are debated at the sub-national level was published.

In 2017, district level launches and dissemination were done. An 'extended feedback pilot' is also mentioned in the 2017 AR (p. 20). Mid-year in 2018, 53 district reports on 2015 findings were launched and copies distributed to about 5,000 stakeholders in total (MYR 2018). At the end of the year, 104 districts had been reached with data on their own situation followed by debates on learning (interview with Twaweza staff, 21st March 2019).

E1S5: Focus on and measurement of learning outcomes by governments and other national entities, including uptake of Uwezo's evidence.

In 2016, a desk review on learning outcomes in national policy documents was conducted, but since it did not reveal much about implementation, which is a decisive factor, it did not provide much insight into the system (AR 2016). Nothing was done in 2017 and 2018 (AR 2017; MYR 2018).

Special initiative: SDG monitoring

In 2017, 6 SDGs were selected and included in the Uwezo annual survey, and mentioned again in the 2018 Mid-Year Review (AR 2017; MYR 2018). This is ongoing work requiring constant piloting and adjustment (Twaweza written comment 4 April 2019)

2. ASSESSMENT

Hypotheses	Key Metrics
1. Across the three countries, the sustained independent and high-quality assessment of learning outcomes (as well as measures of factors related to learning outcomes) will keep the government's focus on end-goal performance of the education system (outcomes, not inputs). This will open the space for an evidence-based debate in public and policy spheres on how to improve basic education.	1. Annual learning assessments continue to garner wide public coverage and generate public debate (e.g. in the media). 2. The data from the assessments continues to be referred / used in policy deliberations (e.g. in parliament) as well as technocratic debates (e.g. in line ministries) in making evidence-based decisions 3. Teachers and head teachers associations and unions engage pro-actively with and support the learning assessment. 4. Other African countries have been proactively supported to adapt Uwezo as an instrument of shifting debates from education inputs to outcomes

The overall goal of E1 is to ensure that schooling leads to learning. Annual Uwezo assessments are hypothesised to promote evidence-based decision-making and thus facilitate learning. Activity remained high throughout the period, and outreach activities seem to have increased and the launch of data generated significant public debate. Data on other SDGs were included in 2017 and 2018. Its learning data had international outreach and were cited in the Joint Sector Review and the 2018 World Development Report, Learning to Realize Education's Promise, as well as in other publications.

Twaweza also followed up on its goal in the 2015 and 2016 Annual Reports to make inroads into policy circles and managed to meet and present findings to parliamentarians, including upon invitation, and held meetings with high-level officials in ministries to present data and involved officials in their own meetings organised with partners in civil society. Despite at times strained relations with the Ministry of Education due to critical data, it became a member of a National Education task force to develop a National Assessment Framework in 2017. With civil society partners, it also contributed to a new Education Act.

Other types of outreach activities can be observed including talk shows and online debates. Over the period, Twaweza also expanded its activities at the local level through presentations of district level learning data, reaching almost two-thirds of all districts in Tanzania by the end of 2018. This has generated local debate and engagement with new stakeholders, including local decision-makers, teachers and parents.

As related to the theory of change Twaweza seems to be more activity focused and less theory oriented. For example, to which extent was the on-line launch of data in 2017 used by the 150 MPs, government officials, and other stakeholders? And how were the 159 district reports received and reflected upon by district stakeholders? And did the content bring further insights into furthering improved and sustained performance of the teachers and the school system, etc.

3. CONCLUSION

Uwezo assessments are carried at regular intervals and generate much interest in Tanzania and abroad. Over the period, Twaweza also managed to broaden its outreach activities through media activities and towards the end of the period also through national and district level launches in large parts of the country.

The engagements generated debate inside and outside the country leading to involvement of not only Twaweza in national education quality and curriculum improvement symposia, but

also many other stakeholders in the country. There has been new thinking and review of policies and methods through a wide participatory approach in the basic education subsector facilitated strongly by Twaweza's efforts in this problem area.

While the self-assessment scores high on all parameters throughout the strategy period we agree overall if the measure is the creation of public debates based on strong evidence based outreach at local, national, and international levels. In terms of results, e.g. specific decision-making for improved learning applied in policies and schools, we may consider effect (viewed from a sustained and impact perspective) a 2 rating and in line with the theory framework.

	2016		2017		2018		Development	
	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT
E1 TW	3	3	3	3	3			
E1 Eval	3	2	3	2	3			

E2 Ambitious curriculum

The curriculum is too ambitious, and teaching is too far ahead of children's learning levels. There is far too little evidence on effectiveness of curricula, and the little evidence available does not loop back to inform and stir change

1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPONENT

E2S1: Evidence (incl. from teachers) is produced on the effectiveness and relevance of primary school curricula (history, logic, contents and implementation).

In 2015, Twaweza held fora that brought together academics, curriculum experts and teachers and constituted a panel of experts on the curriculum, which developed and validated six different tools for curriculum analysis. The Director of the Tanzania Institute for Education, TIE, (which oversees the curriculum) was a member of the panel (AR 2015). Early grade primary curriculum was revised to focus on 3Rs (Reading, wRiting and aRithmetic) in 2015 (Twaweza 2019).

In 2016, the content of the basic education curriculum standards and assessments were analysed using the methodology and drawing on the panel of experts. Field surveys were carried out on teachers' instructional practices in two districts (AR 2016). Preliminary results from the research showed, unexpectedly, that the curriculum was not too ambitious (which was the overall 'problem' in this area). Findings instead showed there was too much focus on recall learning, including in exams, and that there was too little alignment of teaching practices with educational standards.

In 2017, a brief was published with the findings, emphasising a lack of alignment between the curriculum and the student assessments. The study was using a participatory process and government officials stated that they would use the acquired insights as they move on to secondary education curriculum (Twaweza 2017).

E2S2: Evidence on effectiveness and relevance of curricula is shared through a consultative process (including a knowledge sharing platform)

In 2017, Twaweza used its survey methodology to analyse the curriculum and feed into curriculum review processes. The process involved key actors including those from the key curriculum agencies. Findings were shared among stakeholders in Tanzania and at the 35th Conference of Association for Educational Achievement in Africa in Kampala, at a SEC (?) conference in Winsconsin, and at the 14th Education and Development Forum (UKFIET) in Oxford (AR 2017). In the 2018 Mid-Year Report, initial engagements with the Director of Curriculum at the Ministry of Education are reported (MYR 2018).

2. ASSESSMENT

Hypotheses	Key Metrics
1. Across the three countries, our curriculum analysis will show that the curriculum content and implementation processes are overambitious and are not in line with the learning pace of learners in schools. 2. On the basis of evidence generated from the analysis of basic education curricular materials, key players in the education sectors (including e.g., MOEVT, TIE, NECTA in Tanzania, and similar entities in Kenya and Uganda) will be persuaded to engage in a debate about how curriculum content and implementation processes could be more effective in supporting learning, and linked to improved learning outcomes. 3. The evidence emerging from the analysis of curricula effectiveness and the ensuing debate on the same will inform the new education and training policy implementation strategy with regard to curriculum content and delivery mechanisms. 4. Evidence emerging from the analysis of curricula effectiveness will lead to development of an improved basic education curriculum, which will be experimented with a small scale for purposes of assessing its relevance in improving learning outcomes, and responsiveness to the country contexts. 5. Local Government authorities at district/county level (in selected districts/counties) will welcome and allow a pilot of a new curriculum model in selected schools.	1. The number and type of key players participating in curriculum discussion forums and the description of engagement with the findings from the position paper, and openness to translate findings into pilot approaches. 2. A vibrant technical debate among core key actors, and a vibrant public debate in the media. 3. A description of how the analysis, findings and debate inform the deliberations of the education strategy, and openness / vetting of key government actors in implementing a pilot / experiment 4. The support of local government authorities to implement pilot on small scale in their selected schools; the faithful implementation of the pilot, and wide and public sharing and debate of the results.

The E2 problem area aims to collect evidence on the curriculum and helps make it more realistic in order to promote learning. The problem area got a head start in the first half of the period with the development of a methodology to analyse curricula involving experts and a key government official in the field in 2015. Uwezo was also invited to participate in a curriculum review process, indicating some the potential for uptake among key decision-makers.

Research took off in 2016. Preliminary findings indicated that the problem was less of an overambitious curriculum than it was too much focus on recall learning. As a result, there was a delay in finalization of analyses, papers and reports, as well as to outreach activities until some conference activities in 2017. Apart from being part of setting an agenda and initiating debate, achievements with regards to hypotheses and metrics is therefore hard to assess and likely not significant.

3. CONCLUSION

Although the initial findings of the analysis of the problem context under E2 indicated that recall learning was the core problem rather than 'ambitious curriculum', Twaweza readjusted to

focus its research on learning although there was a significant delay in generating outputs. However, Twaweza generated knowledge with evidence leading to participation in several workshops outside and inside the country, and eventually engaged with the Ministry of Education.

Twaweza's output on E2 is consistent with its underlying theory of change reflecting limited public debate and engagements for impacts so far. Therefore we also agree to Twaweza's self-assessment regarding outputs and effect.

	2016		2017		2018		Development	
	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT
E2 TW	3	1	2	1	2		↓	
E2 Eval	3	1	2	1	2		↓	

E3 Motivated Teachers

Teachers are not sufficiently motivated, supported and held accountable to ensure children learn.

1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPONENT

E3S1: An overview of rigorous evidence on 'What works in improving teacher performance/ motivation' is produced, shared and debated

In 2015-16 the KiuFunza research project on providing incentives to teachers through a randomized control trial was carried out. It had as its point of departure that whereas government interventions largely focused on education infrastructure, recent evidence suggested that incentives could improve learning (AR 2015, 17. See more below).

In 2016, KiuFunza was presented to parliamentarians in the Social Services Committee and to top officials in the Ministry of Education. Later KiuFunza was presented to the Minister of PO-RALG, who wished to learn more about costs of the approach on a larger scale and get updates on progress. An Education Evidence conference was also organized jointly with COS-TECH and University of Dar es Salaam and attended by government officials, district partners, representatives from TIE, NECTA, MOEVT, as well as DfID, World Bank and CSOs. The conference included a KiuFunza day to present content and results. The second day was devoted to the Tanzania RISE research project with a focus on system accountability relations for learning.

In terms of outreach, a paper on KiuFunza co-authored by Twaweza was presented at the 2016 Centre for the Study of African Economies Conference in Oxford and the project was discussed at the Global Partnership for Education Board Meeting. Findings from a literature review on experiences with Cash On Delivery (COD) were presented in a paper (AR 2016). Two briefs were produced explaining the design and six pieces of media coverage and over 50,000 Twitter impressions were generated (AR 2016).

In 2017, KiuFunza data showed that a more effective bonus model added what amounts to a one-third year of extra learning on top of a child's normal school year. These findings were presented to the Minister of Local Government. The Minister and MPs discussed the results

and on behalf of the government, and the Minister publicly committed to exploring the approach further.

Repeated engagement with the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Local Government eventually led to the signing of a joint Memorandum of Understanding outlining the principles for further collaboration. This led to the initiation of KiuFunza phase III, whose implementation began in 2019. Twaweza covers costs and is the main responsible for implementation, but the ministries provided input on design and staff time for overseeing implementation. In the Ministry of Education it is anchored in the Quality Department and from the Ministry of Local Government ward educational officers attend activities (interview with KiuFunza consultant 4 April 2019; see also AR 2017, 6-7).

Also, in 2017, some of the findings were shared at a conference held with the Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH), at Stanford, at UNICEF (Florence), and at the National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge (AR 2017). A brief and a one-page flyer were published, as were five 'teacher fact cards' and seven web posts generated over 25,000 views (AR 2017, 58).

The Mid-Year Review of 2018 reports that an NBER working paper on KiuFunza was published. Another draft paper was presented at international conferences at the Centre for Study of African Economies, Oxford, and Research on Improving Systems of Education (RISE), Oxford (MYR 2018).

E3S2: A teacher performance pay program is piloted (KF II), in collaboration with ministries and district authorities and (head) teachers

In 2015, KiuFunza was redesigned to have two incentive arms; one based on skills levels and another on skills improvements in order to provide bonus opportunities for teachers even if their students had low abilities at the start of a year (AR 2015). This was reported again in the 2016 AR and communicated to teachers and 50,000 pupils were tested using tests developed in collaboration with curriculum experts. Some engagement with stakeholders took place, but the idea of pay for performance met resistance (AR 2015).

In 2016, payment to 758 teachers and 134 Head Teachers in 134 KiuFunza schools were made along with feedback on performance to even more schools. In 2016, the second phase of KiuFunza was initiated and by the end of the year over 60,000 pupils had been tested (AR 2016).

In the 2017 Annual Report it is stated that MoUs have been signed with the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Local Government to further test payment for performance in a government setting and in 2018, Twaweza received a letter from the leadership of the latter 'with sign-off' (AR 2017, 6-7; MYR 2018). The MoU with the Ministry of Local Government from November 2017 shows that Twaweza will facilitate much of the KiuFunza III, including in terms of funding and fundraising, but also that there will be ministry input in terms of oversight, data and an unspecified number of staff (PO-RALG et al, 2017).

E3S4: Produce and discuss an internal position paper on desirability and do-ability of implementing a teacher performance pay programme at scale in TZ

In 2016, an internal position paper on experiences elsewhere and the desirability of teacher performance pay in Tanzania was drafted and discussed in Twaweza (AR 2016). In 2017, it was decided that a teacher performance system at a larger scale would be a good investment and the position paper was translated into other publications, including briefs and flyers. An engagement strategy was also developed (AR 2017). Dodoma was visited eight times to convince decision-makers.

E3S5: Twaweza-Government teacher incentive program pilot (KF III) is designed and 2019 implementation prepared

In the first half of 2018, discussions with the Ministry of Local Government on a third phase of KiuFunza began (see E3S2 above). The design has been presented in Dodoma and Twaweza has received 'a letter with sign off by PO-RALG leadership.' (MYR 2018). Implementation of KiuFunza 3 began in 2019, facilitated and financed by Twaweza, but with input in terms of allocation of staff time from ministries.

E3S6: Government is engaged and supportive in KF III design and preparations

In 2018, two meetings with the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Local Government were held at which KiuFunza results were presented and discussed (MYR 2018). A policy brief on teacher incentives in Tanzania was also published.

2. ASSESSMENT

Hypotheses	Key Metrics
1. In Tanzania, the evidence from KiuFunza (KF) phase 1 will be widely and effectively disseminated in 2015-16, while the implementation of KF phase 2 will generate opportunities for public and policy engagement with Pay for Performance (P4P). 2. These initiatives will generate discussion, attention and currency in academia, media and public sphere regarding models of teacher motivation and for the fundamental idea of teacher payment based on delivered, measured learning outcomes. The public nature of the debate will in turn generate interest and engagement among key actors in the education sector, including MOEVT, TAMISEMI, COS-TECH, BRN, TTU, MPs, Parliamentary Committees; as well as donors, education researchers. 3. The process will convince key stakeholders, primarily MOEVT and TAMISEMI to (a) specify a KF-type system of P4P linked to learning outcomes as part of the new education policy; and (b) pilot a credible, scalable model of P4P in a limited number of districts with Twaweza inputs/advice in 2017. This will potentially lead to interest in and uptake of the pilot in other districts. 13 4. One possible success outcome is to inspire another teacher incentive pilot in Kenya and/or Uganda. The experimental research scene in these countries is already very active. Another such experiment provides an active platform for stakeholders to engage with the policy idea.	1. A vibrant technical debate among core key actors, and a vibrant public debate in the media. 2. A description of how the findings and debate inform the deliberations of the education strategy, and openness / vetting of key government actors in implementing a pilot / experiment 3. An increase in the number of Grade 1-3 students who can either pass certain modules of or pass complete versions of a grade appropriate, curriculum based skills test for Kiswahili, Math and English.14

The E3 problem area aims at generating evidence to support pay for performance in education and convince the relevant ministries that it should be piloted and included in a new education policy. It is a rather specific approach to a broader problem of lack of motivation of and support to teachers.

The previous government administration had committed to working with incentives in its Big Result Now programme and a supporting USD122 million credit from the World Bank in 2014, which had a component on incentives, and with additional finance in 2017 (World Bank 2014). These incentives however, focused on other types of incentives, not payment for performance for teachers.

Twaweza had carried out its first phase of the KiuFunza programme 2013-14 and began and finalised a second phase of the KiuFunza programme in this Strategy period. A third phase was prepared and designed in 2017 and 2018 (for more on the different phases, see KiuFunza major intervention above). Overall, KiuFunza appears to have been implemented as planned and demonstrated the effect of paying teachers and schools extra for performance, resulting significant improved learning.

In terms of outreach, much has been done to engage key decision makers in the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Local Government and convince them to test the methodology. The process has been time-consuming leading to delays when compared to the problem areas hypotheses. In 2017, the signing of a MOU on a new trial, KiuFunza 3, formalised collaboration with the ministries, but implementation only took off in 2019. Twaweza still facilitates and funds activities, but the ministries allocate staff to monitor implementation. Briefs, flyers and some online debate have been produced, but this problem area is not among the most publicly profiled Twaweza interventions. There has been more traction in the presentation at conference papers, including at international scientific conferences.

3. CONCLUSION

The KiuFunza research trail reached its second phase and has produced convincing evidence that bonus payments can improve children's learning significantly. This has been well and effectively communicated to the different stakeholders of the education sector, in particular the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, as well as the President's Office, Regional Administration and Local Government. Twaweza is currently testing how it can be done using government systems and personnel. Formalised collaboration with a memorandum in 2017 and ministry involvement in the design and implementation afterwards has developed. Implementation of the third KiuFunza trial, still with limited geographical reach, began in 2019.

The outputs under E3 have been achieved and so with intermediate outcomes on engagement and policy rethinking on curriculum and teachers' incentives. This is consistent with underlying theory of change as regards a process, but the impact on policy change and learning outcomes is yet to happen. As such the self-assessment should rather reflect, at the effect level, a 2 rating rather than 3.

	2016		2017		2018		Development	
	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT
E3 TW	3	3	3	3	3			
E3 Eval	3	2	3	2	3			

E4: School management

Leadership, management and accountability of school systems are weak and unable to 'pull together' key constituencies (such as parents, teachers, school administrators, and the general community) to work in a concerted fashion to ensure that all children are learning

1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPONENT

E4S1: Evidence is produced and shared on what works in improving school leadership and management

In 2015, a partnership with the University of Dar es Salaam and Georgetown University was entered in order to take part in a six-year Research on Improving Systems of Education (RISE) programme. The research programme examines education reforms with regard to learning outcomes and accountability systems and how they relate to the associated political economy (AR 2015).

It was later implemented but did not identify a few clear strategies as had been expected, but a lot of individualised approaches. Further validation of these findings was required and Twaweza awaits permissions to carry out this work (Twaweza written comments 11 April 2019).

In 2017, RISE was launched at a conference and in the first half of 2018 a stakeholder forum was held (AR 2017; MYR 2018).

E4S2: Evidence is generated on the status of key financial, material and human resources at the school level, and the scope and quality of information on these matters available and accessed by school communities

In 2015 and in partnership with Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) a small pilot experiment was carried out in which parents were asked to participate in decision-making in their local school after having received information on resources and priorities. The pilot was found to hold promise for active citizenship with potential for improved learning (AR 2015).

In 2016, a similar pilot on a larger scale was carried out as a randomized control trial in Bukoba district. Through primarily qualitative research techniques it tested two different interventions, namely (i) providing information to parents who were invited to school, and (ii) validated participation of parents. Preliminary findings pointed to a change in parents' attitude toward getting involved in their children's education (AR 2016). Preliminary findings from 2017 suggest that school leadership is important, not least that the head teacher is 'motivated, determined and resourceful' (AR 2017).

E4S3: Evidence on what works in improving school leadership is shared with head teachers and other key actors in education (ministries, DEOs, teacher unions and professional associations) to inspire improved school leadership

In 2016, a paper on Capitation Grant was written and presented at a conference for national stakeholders in Dar es Salaam (AR 2016).

E4S4: Head teachers and other key actors debate widely and report on interventions to improve learning in their schools

Nothing reported.

2. ASSESSMENT

Hypotheses	Key Metrics
1. Across the three countries, rigorous evidence will be gathered from primary and secondary sources regarding: - The level of parents' involvement and participation in school leadership, and in facilitating learning for their children - The relationship between parents' involvement and participation in children learning and learning outcomes - Innovative / promising practices regarding parents' participation in school leadership and improvement in learning outcomes 2. A sample of schools in selected districts will be identified as cases of positive deviance that provide a basis for further exploration and experimentation. This will be measured by the number of schools that stand out as best performers in districts that otherwise perform poorly in various assessment tests. Additionally, there will be evidence indicating that the better performance of the said schools is largely attributable to parents' engagement and participation in school leadership. 3. Evidence gathered on parents' involvement and participation in leadership will lead to development of an evidence-based and theoretically driven school leadership model that actively promotes and empowers parents' engagement in school programmes and activities. 4. Authorities in sampled districts will welcome and accept the experimentation of a school leadership model in selected schools.	1. Review and collation of existing evidence, and collection of primary evidence of key measures of parental and community involvement and support of basic education 2. Primary evidence linking learning outcomes to parental and community engagement and participation in school leadership (e.g., through a pilot / experiment) 3. A vibrant technical debate among core key actors, and a vibrant public debate in the media on the above.

The E4 problem area aims at shedding light on and strengthening school management and parents' participation in order to improve child learning. The activities in this area largely consist of research activities aimed at gathering evidence. Some of these activities are long-term in nature and since they took off in the Strategy period they have not yielded any major outputs in the Strategy period. A Positive Deviance study was first postponed from 2015 to 2016, then delayed due to lack of research capacity within this area in 2016 and finally suffered from data collection problems in 2017. Outreach activities have been limited and there is significant underspending. Evidence on progress in addressing hypotheses and metrics is therefore limited.

3. CONCLUSION

In the period 2015-2018, Twaweza's outputs with regard to E4 have not been achieved in full, and effective debate and engagement with stakeholders for policy action and implementation has been very limited. The expected outcome cum impact on school management has therefore not happened. This situation is well reflected in the self-assessment achievement.

	2016		2017		2018		Development	
	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT	OUTP	EFFCT
E4 TW	3	1	2	1	2			
E4 Eval	3	1	2	1	2			

iii. Learning, Monitoring, Evaluation

LME1: Evidence from practice (implementation) is collected and shared internally (as well as externally) in a timely manner, with the main purpose of informing better implementation and accountability.

1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPONENT

Focus of LME 1 is on three issues: 1. Monitor quality, reach and coverage; 2. feedback from target groups, and 3. applying quantitative and qualitative methods in monitoring processes.

Prior to 2015 as well as throughout the entire 2015-2018 strategy period media monitoring has been a key focus. In 2015 monitoring of 'engagement' initiatives was introduced applying outcome mapping as the main tool, for example tracing key players on their understanding of educational policy, Uwezo district decision-making, etc. In 2017 a synthesis of the lessons learned after 18 months of engagement and advocacy work was produced.

National-reaching communications were primarily through the monitoring of media coverage. In 2015 more than 350 citations in the media were recorded on activities of Twaweza. A nationally representative sample discovered that about one in four knew about Twaweza and a majority of these found its work credible and scientific. Yet, Twaweza was also considered by six out of 10 to have a political agenda while one in four Twaweza being partisan. In 2017 media coverage increased compared to 2016. For the period of January to July 2018 Twaweza Tanzania was covered 292 times in print, broadcast and online media.

In 2016 a survey was used to measure the perception of accessibility of basic government information and the link between schools and parents in the districts. Also in 2016, Tanzanian faith-based radio stations contracted to broadcast data-infused messages about public services were monitored. Furthermore, feed back on Twaweza's curriculum reviews were carried out.

In 2016 feedback was given to Twaweza's Uwezo's Beyond Basics exercise in two (out of 10) districts as well as to Twaweza's performance overall in 2016 and 2017 from 'critical friends' in government, civil society and academia. In 2017 an assessment was prepared on commitments made at the local level (by government) to improve learning as a result of the Uwezo reports.

Tracking performance in the public agency pilot projects (in education) was initiated in 2016 and in 2017 knowledge of the Sauti za Wananchi opinion poll among Tanzanians increased from 16% in 2016 to 30% in 2017.

In 2017 discussions guides related to health and education for community discussion groups were developed with the Christian Social Service Commission.

In 2018 an independent feedback on Uwezo sub-national (districts) communications activities conducted in 2017 was produced. A viewership survey via Geopoll was conducted to obtain whether the viewers of the Njoo Tuongee show changed their perception about the government leaders after watching the show. A planned feedback collected on all major public Twaweza events (launches, conferences, etc.) on relevance, quality, significance of content and event did not materialize.

Outcome mapping for major external engagement was conducted up to May 2018. Report of outcome mapping 2016-18 to be finalized and shared. Feedback was collected from Uwezo districts launched in 140 districts. A brief report with feedback from selected 20 districts in process.

2. ASSESSMENT

Over the Strategy period significant increase in monitoring activities occurred. 2015 was the year of 'start-up' monitoring with the focus being on media coverage and feedback on activities. Since the end of 2015 it has been an overall purpose of Twaweza to introduced increasing attention to thorough monitoring of its activities and of itself as a learning organisation in which the intermediate outcome level of the Strategy is targeted (i.e. influencing awareness and public debate; perception and knowledge; policies, plans and budgets; and actions, behaviour and norms).

Monitoring and feedback methods took a great variety of forms, from surveys, interviews/ outcome mapping, baseline studies, and structures for assessing quantitative data. While monitoring activities have expanded it is not clear to which extent a particular strategy for monitoring of activities have been defined. It could appear somewhat arbitrary which activities have been subject to monitoring. Systematic follow-up to previously monitoring seems to be lacking. For example, has the lessons learned from the engagement synthesis in 2017 been used? Has there been sufficient follow-up to the radio data infused project support? Has the produced SzW Handbook been distributed and used in other countries, and what have the result been? Has the results from the many conferences attended and initiated (e.g. the Education Evidence conference) been analysed, information of key issues raised distributed and how have these been used in the development of the Education component? Etc. Obviously a wealth of important data was discovered from the monitoring activities and has been reported upon.

The degrees to which the data collected have been optimally used in changing or re-guiding processes/pathways towards intermediate outcomes and final outcomes are not clearly spelt out in the reports (this was a challenge and a focus of the plan for 2016, and mentioned in the 2015 report). The 2016 report clearly highlight a main challenge in the monitoring activities, namely that capacity enhancement need for implementers of the activities (i.e. radio stations, schools, etc.). It is not clear to which extent that this 'knowledge transfer' or 'learning' targeting these implementers have taken effectively place, as they are not reported upon in the annual reports for 2017 and 2018. These matters are further discussed in the main report concerning 'lack of follow-up' to activities undertaken by Twaweza.

3. CONCLUSION

Significant efforts have been taken by Twaweza to strengthen its monitoring work and as such preparing for stronger evidence of both processes and achievements of the Strategy. The overall approach of 'reach, coverage and quality' assessment has been applied consistently for some monitoring activities (e.g. media, and assessing the Twaweza 'brand'). Concerns relate to the apparent lack of a 'strategy' and (at least reported) lack for monitoring follow-up activities from one year to the other. Strategizing monitoring better may be a useful way to go forward, and, in that process analyse to which extent it is possible for monitoring results to translate into useful mechanisms for achieving intermediate outcomes – and eventual final Strategy outcome.

The self-assessment rating provided by Twaweza in its annual reports is presented below. Based on our assessment made above we agree overall, in that activities and outputs are very strong and high, rated 3, while effect somewhat unclear or difficult or assess (rated 2).

	2016		2017		2018		Development	
	OUTP	EFFECT	OUTP	EFFECT	OUTP	EFFECT	OUTP	EFFECT
LME1 TW	3	2	3	2	3			
LME1 Eval	3	2	3	2	3			

LME2: Mechanisms are set up to test core hypotheses in the theory of change, as well as to measure impact (effect) of Twaweza supported initiatives; knowledge gained from these is shared internally for improving practice and externally to contribute to global knowledge.

1. DEVELOPMENT OF COMPONENT

Focus of LME 2 has been on external evaluation and research into the core hypotheses of Twaweza's theory of change which is anchored in the LME unit.

In 2015 Twaweza explored the "production of education" in 10 districts in Tanzania which had been chosen as the focus of Uwezo communication activities – activities that became the focus of the public agency approach in 2016. Also, a desk review of civic space in Tanzania was carried out. Also, in 2015 Twaweza commissioned an investigative journalism narrative of the 4 legislations (bills) under process in parliament in 2015, all of which related to civic space issues.

2015 being an election year numerous evaluation/research activities concentrated on this theme and was conducted in collaboration with MIT/Gov Lab.²¹ Related to Open Government an analysis and coding of nearly 40 government websites was conducted rating basic information availability and transparency. Also, a 'mystery-shopper'²² research in 30 randomly selected districts identifying the degree of openness of district officials to citizen requests for information. Storytelling was an important part of the methodology applied.

Also in 2015, an update of the original baseline survey from 2010 was carried out by Amsterdam Institute of International Development covering an 'incredibly rich combination of datasets from 250 communities across Tanzania, including surveys with households, schools, health centers and local leadership' (AR 2015, p. 38).

As for 2016 it was planned that the focus on evaluation would be on district-level Public Agency (on education), so an independent baseline research was carried out for the public agency pilots in collaboration with district partners.

A strategy plan for 'high-level' evaluations or research was drafted in 2016 for the period 2017-2018 and comprised the following: (i) Evaluating Twaweza's success in advocating for changes in defined education policies and their implementation; (ii) Evaluating the effect of

²¹ "Qualitative research among voters which informed the shape of Twaweza's election-based initiatives; an evaluation of the broadcasted (TV and radio) election debates; and an innovative field experiment using the conjoint methodology, exploring the main influencing factors of vote choice, and the wider relationship between citizens and elected officials (ward, MP, national)." (Annual Report 2015, p. 37).

²² <https://www.mystery-shoppers.com/>

infused data in public debate and policy dialogue; (iii) Examining the effect of Uwezo on the many thousands of volunteers; (iv) Impact evaluations of innovative communication strategies (including the 'undercover MP' TV show).

In 2017 a Research and Evaluation Advisory Group (REAG) was established in Twaweza and a revision and update of the analysis of civic space Tanzania was conducted. The effect of Uwezo volunteers study (item iii above, <https://twaweza.org/go/learning-note-kiufunza>) was carried out and a qualitative follow-up study was carried out on the KiuFunza cash-on-delivery programme (=item i above??). Finally a comprehensive multi-component baseline study of local governance in Kigoma was conducted in 2017. A research around the first pilot of the Mbunge Live (MP Live) show was held in 2017 and a study around the Extended Feedback pilot conducted by Uwezo Tanzania. The planned impact evaluation (iv above) was postponed until early 2019 while research design has been completed.

2. ASSESSMENT

Numerous activities have taken place over the strategy period showing the dedication of Twaweza to address and strengthen learning through evaluation activities, including the drafting of an evaluation strategy as well as the establishment of the REAG, both institutionalizing evaluation for learning. Also, the evaluations and research activities show thoroughness in the methodologies applied (for example in the Uwezo volunteers analysis and the teacher payment study) and important and strong evidence based results have come from the work.

However, it is unclear whether all the activities can be classified as evaluations or reviews that test core hypotheses in the theory of change (as stated in the success criteria). Rather they may be characterized more as regular research work and the ARs do not assess the linkage between evaluations and their influencing the intermediate outcome dimensions. For example, how was the result of the government website analysis use (2015), and how was the results of the openness of district officials to citizen requests for information used (2015), and what advice or guidelines have the REAG provided Twaweza that have strengthened the implementation of the strategy theory?

The desk review carried out in 2015 of Tanzania's civic space revealed deterioration along four of the five dimensions measured and only one-in-three of all citizens' requests for information were shared. Already at this early stage in the Strategy period the trend towards restrictions in the civic space was becoming a reality.

However, as stated by Twaweza several times in interviews and in the ARs, space for openness was still on the agenda as exemplified in the broadcasting of the MP Live shows in which a 30-minute recording of an MP's implementation of his/her campaign commitments, which was shown individually to a sample of citizens in the constituency, as well as in mass screenings. The idea was, according to the AR 2017, to test whether there was interest and appetite to produce an entire season of such episodes to be aired on national television, and, moreover, whether such initiatives would promote a more informed and sustained dialogue between elected representatives and citizens. So the important question is therefore: has the TV event(s) resulted in a 'more informed and sustained dialogue'? The question seems not to be answered.

The study of the Uwezo volunteers consisted of training and facilitating Uwezo volunteers to go beyond collecting data on learning outcomes from a sample of households, to facilitating a community meeting on these outcomes and supporting discussion of what can be done locally to improve learning. The study followed a group of volunteers implementing the pilot in one district in Tanzania, a group of volunteers in a neighboring district who implemented the

“regular” Uwezo data collection (without community engagement), and a group of non-volunteers. The results are currently being analyzed, but the hypothesis is that the pilot volunteers will score higher on several measures of individual self-efficacy, as well as civic engagement.

Results show that teachers in KiuFunza schools were able to improve learning outcomes among their pupils (approximately one-third more schooling as compared to control school), but the qualitative study sought to explore how and why this mechanism worked at the school level. The results suggest that KiuFunza, which is an individualized incentive, was used to enhance and promote school-level cohesion and commitment to improving learning.

The Kigoma experiment (sub-national OGP) on facilitating open government dialogue was subject to comprehensive ‘evaluations’ in 2016 and 2017. These included surveys on (i) the Kigoma local leadership examining its attitudes and actions related to good governance; and (ii) the Kigoma citizens’ survey to gather data on Kigoma-Ujiji residents’ perceptions and experiences of interaction with their local government. A household study for the citizens’ survey was carried out and a narrative study was conducted to explain the historical and political factors that may have contributed to the current state of governance and development in Kigoma.

3. CONCLUSION

While important and comprehensive data is collected the ARs do not clearly address the key feature of the LME2 success criterion, i.e. testing core hypotheses in the theory of change and measure impact (effect) of Twaweza supported initiatives. There is no analysis available (to the evaluation team) that link the numerous activities carried out to the theory. While activity levels are high there is no systematic or systemic effort made to assess how the evaluations influence the higher-level theory. What is observed is that one research effort and its result leads to (probably) more insight and development of new research efforts and results, but no clear link is made to see how these results influence the theory.

The self-assessment is somewhat confusing in that in 2016 a medium output score (2) is connected to a high effect rating (3) and the reverse situation occurs in 2017, and in 2018 the output rating is also downgraded. The ‘dramatic’ changes in the ratings is not all clear, but an output rating increase from 2016 to 2017 appears reasonable considering the initiation of the evaluation strategy in 2016, while the effect rating in 2016 seems questionable.

	2016		2017		2018		Development	
	<i>OUTP</i>	<i>EFFCT</i>	<i>OUTP</i>	<i>EFFCT</i>	<i>OUTP</i>	<i>EFFCT</i>	<i>OUTP</i>	<i>EFFCT</i>
LME2 TW	2	3	3	2	2		↑	↓
LME2 Eval	2	2	3	2	2		↑	↓

LME3: In each country, staff and colleagues are engaged in active reading and learning, drawing on various components of LME work, internal practice, and external (country, regional, global) relevant evidence, practice and new ideas.

1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPONENT

Twaweza sees itself as a learning organisation with a learning agenda embedded in all internal and external activities. This requires staff that are encouraged and receptive to a learning culture, innovation and ideas. Twaweza initiated numerous and a great variety of activities that has facilitated this process. In 2015 having 96 different 'learning' sessions, including hosting high-profile presenters from government, MPs, and embassies and holding 'immersion' event in Uganda for the entire organisation. Internally staff have been engaged in all key organisational activities and developments, including the drafting of the new Strategy 2015-2018. Externally, Twaweza related to the international sphere through mainly Uwezo and partly in the area of curriculum assessment as well as through the OGP, Learning Collaborative, Transparency and Accountability Initiative, an Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data.

In 2016 87 learning sessions were held, in 2017 69, ranging from sharing of findings and progress by Twaweza staff, to visiting international researchers. An 'exchange learning' arrangement with master students from Stanford Business School was carried through. The public agency pilot was designed as an organizational learning exercise involving staff at all levels, and so was the mid-term review of the Strategy. An increasing number of collaborative arrangements with international experts from high-level institutions abroad were initiated, including Princeton, Berkeley, University of Gothenburg, and Institute of Development Studies at Sussex.

In 2017 an organizational-wide assessment was carried out addressing Twaweza's learning approach and the REAG was established to support the LME Unit in its work. Twaweza also co-designed and joined the Learning Collaborative; a two-year experiment linking four practitioner / implementing organizations.²³ Annual immersions took place in 2016 and 2017. 21 learning sessions, 1 skills lab and 13 Food for Thought sessions were conducted up till mid-2018. No immersion was held in 2018.

2. ASSESSMENT

As has been the case with most of Twaweza's work, numerous and varied activities were undertaken in this learning component. There is no doubt that these activities by their mere volume have contributed to (significant) learning and skills development of Twaweza staff. What seems to be lacking in terms of evidence is exactly how staff has applied the learning gained to further the strategy theory. There is also no indication on what the organisational-wide assessment on learning approach has resulted in, for example, improved and creative discussions leading to new directions/pathways as regard the achievement of the Strategy outcomes. Also, no information is revealed on the results and use of the Learning Collaborative engagement, and how this collaboration has contributed to new ways of thinking. The

²³ The organisations include "Twaweza, Dejusticia in Colombia, CEGGS in Guatemala, and Global Integrity in USA) and two academic centers (MIT's GOV/LAB and American University's Accountability Research Center). The objective of the Collaborative is to demonstrate that a practitioner-based learning model (i.e. driven by the needs of organizations working on governance problems in the global south) results in (a) better performing organizations, (b) an increase in south to-south learning, and (c) a positive influence on the global governance field whereby lines of inquiry are driven by practitioners." (AR 2017, p. 41).

evaluation team has not had access to the annual performance data of individual staff members performed by the HR division and is therefore not in a position to assess these issues satisfactorily.

3. CONCLUSION

While it is obvious that the mere volume of learning sessions of various kinds have infused new knowledge and skills among Twaweza staff there appears to be little evidence that the sessions/ activities have contribute to achieving the Strategy outputs and outcomes. Without an assessment of the staffs own perception of benefits gained from these activities there is little evidence that they have contributed to the main purpose of Twaweza, i.e. achieving Strategy outputs and outcomes.

While we do agree to the high scores of 3 at the output level, the evaluation - from a strict evidence point of view – does not agree to a 3 effect score in 2016 – a 2 rating is considered appropriate. There is no information in the annual reports that explains why the self-assessment in effect from 2016 to 2017 has been downgraded but is considered a fair assessment.

	2016		2017		2018		Development	
	<i>OUTP</i>	<i>EFFCT</i>	<i>OUTP</i>	<i>EFFCT</i>	<i>OUTP</i>	<i>EFFCT</i>	<i>OUTP</i>	<i>EFFCT</i>
LME3 TW	3	3	3	2	3			↓
LME3 Eval	3	2	3	2	3			↓

7 Benchmarks 2015-2017

Data and Voice	2015	2016	Brief note on 2016 achievement	2017	Brief note on 2017 achievement	2018
Sauti za Wananchi						
Sauti mobile phone survey running in Tanzania, with at least 10 annual data collection rounds for Twaweza, and additional 3-6 with partner agencies	x	x	1) 11 SzW household call rounds conducted. 2) 8 policy briefs published and 2 short outputs launched to the media and public forums. 3) Panel revisits done; best practices/learnings identified and used to boost panel participation which is current at 90%+	x	(1) 10 full call rounds done and 1 quick round on ATI; Panel response rate healthy at 90% (2) 7 SzW policy briefs and 7 press release shared actively with distribution list, launched at National museum; two opinion pieces done (on women and water). 2 short outputs produced (pregenacy-school girls and Access to information- cyber act and statistic bill)	x
Mobile phone survey established with at least 4 data collection rounds in Kenya by 2015; and 8-12 times annually thereafter	x	x	1) 11 SzW household call rounds conducted. 2) 5 policy briefs and 3 short outputs published and launched to the media and public forums. 3) 6 data outputs released to media electronically via mail 4. Panel revisit activity done; best practices/learning identified and used to boost panel participation which is current at almost 90%	x	(1) 9 call rounds done and 1 follow up brief for the Independent Policing Oversight Authority; Panel average response rate was 85+% (2) 6 SzW policy briefs produced, 1 big launch for devolution brief, hosted 3 media briefings and findings shared within distribution list.	x
1) Mobile phone survey established with at least 4 data collection rounds in Uganda	n/a	n/a		x	1) The baseline sample established; a panel of 2400 respondents. 2) 3 call rounds done due to	x

by 2016; and 8-12 times annually thereafter					available budget. 3) 4 short briefs released at the Sauti grand launch	
Handbook on Twaweza approach to mobile phone survey published in 2015; revised 2018	x		Unveiled the Mobile phone panel survey hand book at global conference of OGP summit in Paris.	n/a		x
Drawing a fresh Sauti sample after 2 years of call rounds in Tanzania and Kenya	x	n/a		x	n/a	
Drawing a fresh Sauti sample after 2 years of call rounds in Uganda	n/a	n/a		n/a		x
Sauti datasets and methodology available in machine readable formats online in a timely manner	x	x	All data sets and methodology available online for use by public	n/a	All data sets and methodology available online for use by public	
Uwezo						
Children aged 6/7-16 assessed in foundational skills of literacy and numeracy in at least 370 districts across Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, reaching 350,000 children annually	x	x	Children in grades 5&6 assessed in 30 districts in numeracy and literacy, based on grade 4 (Uwezo Beyond basics). A total of 21,577 children reached	x	1) Children aged 6-16 assessed in 56 districts in Tanzania and 4 refugee hosting districts in Uganda, in numeracy and literacy based on primary 2 level tasks. 2) On average a total of 71,356 children assessed in Tanzania and Uganda. There was no national learning assessment undertaken in Kenya and Uganda due to organisational financial constraints.	x
At least 10,000 schools across East Africa visited during the annual assessment and data useful for tracking school-level indicators collected	x	x	A total of 595 schools visited to conduct the Uwezo beyond basics study across East Africa. Data for school-level indicators generated and included in reports.	x	A total of 1,783 schools visited to conduct Uwezo basic learning survey in Tanzania and Uganda. Data for school-level indicators generated. No national assessment was conducted in Kenya and Uganda due to financial constraints -	x

					save for 4 districts in Uganda for the refugee study	
Uwezo assessment expanded vertically to cover assessment in early childhood care, or higher grade, or both; in Kenya in 2015, Uganda 2016, and Tanzania 2017; sustained in all 3 countries in 2018	x	x	The Uwezo beyond basics assessment conducted in all 3 countries, measuring at higher level (grade 4) and including aspects beyond literacy and numeracy (critical thinking/problem solving). Literacy assessment expanded to include vocabulary, listening and writing	n/a	Though no Uwezo expansion took place as planned (vertical or higher), we experimented with its application to emergency/refugee contexts in Uganda. Evidence was generated on Uwezo application to such contexts and what adjustments need to be done to the tool and sampling for its full integration within a national learning assessment that includes refugee contexts.	x
Uwezo assessment infrastructure leveraged to benefit additional sectors with data (Uwezo +), in Kenya in 2015, Uganda 2016, and Tanzania 2017; sustained in all 3 countries in 2018	x	x	SDG monitoring concept developed and monitoring of SDGs 1,2,3,5,6 and 16 integrated into annual plan for the 2017 Uwezo assessment	x	1) SDG monitoring successfully implemented in Tanzania in the 56 assessed districts and the 4 refugee pilot districts focusing on several indicators under 6 SDGs (SDG 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 16). 2) Indicators beyond learning outcomes were included in the survey (inclusion, access to water, water quality, nutrition, sanitation, maternal and child health, sexual and reproductive health, birth certificate, and family socioeconomic status). 3) The water quality test was implemented in Uganda and not Tanzania and in Uganda it was only done in EAs outside refugee settlements due to the sensitivity of water issues in emergency contexts. 4) The planned SDG pilot in Kenya did not take place due to financial constraints	x
Open data and access to information indicators designed for Uwezo infrastructure in 2015, piloted in 2016, and implemented in 2017 and 2018	x	x		n/a	NOTE: This was intended to be a joint activity between Uwezo and PPE with the latter taking the lead. BT/RC might have some information to write here??	x

Community level communication in Uwezo done on annual basis, monitored and feedback used to make communication more effective	x	x	National and sub-national communication sustained through partners in all 3 countries, at varied scale	x	National and sub-national communication sustained in all 3 countries, at varied scale, covering almost all districts in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. National media buzz generated at national and sub-national level around Uwezo data, including at least 374 media coverage across Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.	x
Clean, accessible, user-friendly complete datasets published to the web	x	x	2015 Uwezo datasets cleaned and finalized, published on the web	na	Uwezo data in refugee contexts undergoing cleaning for subsequent uploading on the web. Uwezo 2017 data is in the process of being entered for subsequent cleaning and uploading on the web	x
Key reports on learning assessments published annually: East-Africa report, national-level reports, and selected sub-national (county or district)	x	x	All 2014 reports launched. Two 2015 reports (Kenya and Uganda) finalized and launched;	x	1) East Africa report finalised and launched during the Education Evidence for Action Conference in Nyeri. 2) There were no country-specific launches of the EA report due to its late release 3) Beyond Basics Report for Kenya finalised, published and launched in the 10 Counties. Launching of BB reports for Tanzania and Uganda coming up in the first half of 2018	x
Technical papers that explore in-depth the assessment data prepared and published and presented on a global platform annually; at least 1 in 2015, 2 in 2016, and 3 thereafter	x	x	Five technical papers on various Uwezo aspects started on and on path to publication; 4 papers presented in global conferences; third parties supported to publish based on Uwezo data.	x	1) 5 Papers presented in two global Education Conferences (3 in CIES) and 2 in UKFIET and 2) Two national conferences relevant to learning outcomes convened i.e. the learning outcomes conference in Uganda and the EE4A conference in Kenya. A total of over 50 papers related to learning presented at these two conferences	x
What works	2015	2016	Brief note on 2016 achievement			
What Works in Basic Education						

Methodology framework for positive deviance approach in education developed and tested in 2015	x		Qualitative methodologies developed, with variations in each country. Qualitative phase ongoing in three countries.	n/a	Quantitative and qualitative methods developed and tested in all three countries, with variations responding to each context.	n/a
KiuFunza Phase II formulated and supported 2015-2018, with results informing WWE and policy engagement	x	x	KF Phase II successfully implemented and completed. Cap Grants now implemented by GoT. Policy engagement on COD started.	x	KF II successfully completed. Policy engagement started and good progress. MoU signed with PORALG and MoE to design KF III which will use government systems where possible.	x
Four (4) background papers/briefs and policy positions/suggestions prepared and shared as per problem areas in 2015	x		A paper on CG was written and shared at a conference jointly organized with COSTECH. Additionally, one paper based on KF I results was written and presented at the same conference.	n/a		n/a
A directory/annotated bibliography of what works in education produced in 2015, and updated annually	x	x	A thorough review of literature on WWE was done and a report produced. This is far better and useful than an annotated bibliography. The review of literature is available at X:\Twa16\TZ\Education\Write ups	x	Review of literature has been ongoing, supportive of work and publications in WWE. In 2017 not compiled in a new report.	x
Knowledge Forum on what works in education convened at East Africa level in 2015 and 2017	x		Moved from 2016 to 2017 annual plan.	x	Regional conference cancelled due to lack of funding and staffing. A EE4E conference was co-organized by Twaweza in Kenya; In Tanzania a conference was held in a collaboration of RISE and KiuFunza.	n/a
Three (3) case studies of positive deviance in education surfaced, verified, documented and shared each year, per country, starting with 2016	n/a	x	Ongoing in Ke, Ug and Tz. More than 3 cases expected in 2017	x	Positive Deviance studies completed in all three countries, findings presented, reports in final draft stages.	x
At least 2 ideas/experimental ideas developed curated and shared by 2016 and additional two by 2018	n/a	x	Exploratory fieldwork ongoing; experimental ideas possibly developed by end 2017.	n/a		x

KiuFunza Phase I completed and reports done by mid-2015	x	n/a		n/a		n/a
Three (3) presentations in global and regional conferences on interventions in education by 2017, additional 3 in 2018	n/a	n/a		x	KiuFunza results have been presented at global and regional conferences, including Building Evidence in Education (Unicef, Florence Italy) and COSTECH/Dar es Salaam (Isaac Mbiti) and the NBER Summer Institute, Cambridge MA/USA (Karthik Muralidharan).	x
Three (3) articles published in peer-reviewed journals on what works in education by 2017; additional 2 submitted by 2018	n/a		Two papers on curriculum analysis are being considered.	x	KiuFunza I paper will be submitted in 2018, KF II paper in 2018/19. KiuFunza I results have been mentioned in World Development Report 2018.	x
What Works in Open Government	2015	2016				
Uwezo and Sauti data available online reflecting open data and user centered design principles in a timely manner	x	x	Uwezo and Sauti data available on Twaweza website, and Uwezo data available (in beta form) on two separate interactive platforms	x	Uwezo and Suati data available on Twaweza website. Data visualized on HDX and Hurumap.	x
Review of Freedom of Information (FOI) status in TZ completed in 2015, proposals for action completed in 2016; review in KE & UG in 2016, proposal for action in 2017	x	x	Public action undertaken TZ related to FOI. Review of FOI status in UG completed in 2016, proposals for action fine-tuned with partners. Plans in KE postponed.	x	Resources were redirected to an emerging opportunity where Twaweza supported Public procurement and disposal of public assets authority was support to align the government procurement portal to the open contracting data standards. Lessons from the procees submitted to the Ministry of Finance planning and economic development as proposals for consideration during the review of the PPDA Act. 14 govt procurement entities and 23 civil society members of the Uganda contracts monitoring coalitions trained on the use of OCDS-compliant GPP	x

Review of open data status in TZ conducted in 2015, in KE and UG by 2016	x	x	Over 150 datasets now available on opendata.go.tz, high level political will remains limited	n/a	n/a	n/a
Data quality and access to information report on key datasets/information related to Twaweza themes piloted and published in at least one country by 2016, and implemented annually in all 3 countries starting in 2017	n/a	x	Mystery shopper approaches deployed to assess access to information in practice from local government authorities and from government websites	x	Mystery shopper approach to Access to Information deployed in both Tanzania and Kenya, results published online. Similar approach planned in 2018 for Uganda.	x
Data journalism established in at least one major media house in TZ and UG by 2015 and one in KE by 2017	x	x	Data journalism growing both in quality and quantity in Tanzanian media, with Code for Tanzania playing a key role; data journalism partnerships with ACME and URN in Uganda	x	Risha?	n/a?
Four instances of locally-led solutions (PD) surfaced, verified, documented and shared each year for TZ and UG starting 2015, and KE starting 2016	x	x	Not completed in 2016; work carried forward to 2017.	x	Not completed. Most of OG programs suspended in Kenya and Uganda. In Tanzania now work in progress in collaboration with the International Growth Centre Tanzania.	x
Two ideas/experiments in responsive governance per year designed, curated and shared in TZ and UG starting 2016 and KE starting 2017	n/a	x	Not completed in 2016; work carried forward to 2017.	x	Public Agency experiments completed in Kenya and Uganda; ongoing in Tanzania.	x
Four background papers/briefs and policy positions/suggestions prepared and shared, one per problem area in 2015 and updated in 2017	x	x	Tz: Multiple position papers, briefs and analyses of legislation published on issues relating to freedom of information and expression. Ug: A draft position paper titled: Unlocking the Enjoyment of the Right to Information in Uganda: The Primacy of Socio-political Factors was produced. It will be validated, finalized and published on line 2017.	x	Tanzania: Further analyses of civic space legislation and enforcement-related matters in Tanzania Uganda: ATI position paper "Unlocking the right to information in Uganda on Primacy of socio-political factors " was validated through a national level breakfast meeting; there after there was a shift in strategy to priorities a alignment of govt	n/a

					procurement portal to the OCDS standards.	
Two articles published in peer-reviewed journals on what works in open government in East Africa	n/a	n/a		x	Not achieved	x
At least 3 presentations per year in global and regional conferences on WWOG, starting in 2016	n/a	x	Presentations made at OGP Global Summit (Paris 2016), UNICEF meeting in Dar es Salaam, various other presentations / contributions to OGP and related meetings and conferences	x	Appointed to the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data (GPSDD) (June) & shaped its new strategy at the first Board meeting (Sep, NYC); Opening plenary presentation at African Open Data Conference in Ghana (July); chaired sessions on civic space and subnational governance the OGP CSO Leaders Workshop (October, Netherlands)	x

Four articles or blogposts per year in global/regional media or knowledge community platforms on WWOG	x	x	Multiple blogposts and articles published	x	Articles and blogposts by Aidan: 1. Democracy dies in silence – Dec 16 2. An exit that clashes with Tanzanians' aspirations - Nov 14 3. For the law to be respected, first make it respectable - Oct 12 4. Providing better, faster, cheaper online public services to citizens in Tanzania - Aug 24 5. After six hundred days of President Magufuli, whose government is it anyway? - Jul16 6. The primary education conundrum in Africa: between corporate capture & public challenges - Jul 11 7. Data to Decisions Sauti za Wananchi influencing Kenya's policy makers - Apr 24 8. Back to the Future...of Tanzania?- March 26 9. Will 2017 be another year of living dangerously in Tanzania? It need not be - Jan 16	x
Online directory/annotated bibliography of what works in open government produced, updated regularly	x	x	Not completed	x	Not completed	x
Knowledge/Learning Forum on WWOG convened at East Africa level in 2016 and 2018	n/a	x	Not completed	n/a	n/a	x
Public and Policy Engagement	2015	2016	Brief note on 2016 achievement			
Communications						

Effective system for all units contributing updates to website developed and website substantively updated on weekly basis with information from all 3 countries; usage tracked and analyzed and implementation tweaked	x	x	Website updated regularly, most contributions from Sauti za Wananchi and LME: 47 publications (10 more than 2015), 13 announcements (4 less than 2015), monthly in the news posts about media coverage of Twaweza. All key website indicators saw decreases compared to 2015: Number of sessions by 15%; number of users by 11%. This is likely due to the dated look and feel of Twaweza's website and the difficulty in finding specific content on the site.	x	Website updated regularly, most contributions from Sauti za Wananchi and LME: 44 publications (1 less than 2016), 23 announcements (10 more than 2015). All key website indicators saw decreases compared to 2015: Number of sessions by 15%; number of users by 21%. This is likely due to the dated look and feel of Twaweza's website and the difficulty in finding specific content on the site.	x
New redesigned Twaweza website in place by end 2015, and major design review in 2018	x	x	Website tender process with targeted outreach resulted in 13 proposals. Supplier selected and initial conceptual meetings held. Completion in 2017.	n/a	Not completed, initial design and content structure only.	x
Core communication policies (social media, branding standards, etc.) well known by all staff in 2015, and in consistent use	x	x	Communication policy available online, standards and branding manual available, not in consistent use by all staff but by the PPE team.	x	Communication policy available online, standards and branding manual available, not in consistent use by all staff but by the PPE team.	x
Systematic database of media contacts and good working relations developed and regularly refreshed for all 3 countries	x	x	886 mentions in the media compared to 664 in 2015. 20+ talk shows in the last quarter of 2016 in Tanzania. Strong media partnerships with Minibuzz, reaching over 20% of Tanzanians; Uganda Radio Network with 80+ partner community radio stations; Rockpoint 256 (Uganda) reaching over 30% of Ugandans. Innovative partnership with Nation Media Group: 50 news features and 50 talk shows.	x	850 mentions in the media compared to 886 in 2016. 45+ talk shows in Tanzania and 35+ in Uganda. Strong media partnership with Uganda Radio Network with 80+ partner community radio stations; Jamii Media (online) - Tanzania's most popular social media platform Interview show reaching a million viewers in Tanzania	x

Information on work of all Twaweza units, including press releases, reports, briefings, as well as timely responses to media queries provided to media in an a systematic basis at least once each month in TZ by end of 2015, and in KE and UG by end of 2016	x	x	Tanzania: SzW 8 full launches and 3 press briefings. 1 large-scale Uwezo event, 3 seminars in partnership with the University of Dar es Salaam, 2 launches for public agency at district level, a conference at the Commission for Science and Technology. Kenya: SzW 8 events to engage the media and stakeholders with the findings, 2 Uwezo launches. Uganda: 3 press conferences. Media engaged throughout the youth and elections campaign, 7 events. In total over 35 events engaging the media held across three countries.	x	Uganda : 2 stakeholder and media events (Uwezo early childhood education data and Sauti za Wananchi grand launch); 1 national level conference on learning outcomes in partnership with Kyambogo University, 1 engagement meeting with National Curriculum Development Centre on the early results from the curriculum analysis work, hosting Hewlett Foundation members for a live talk show event Tanzania: Sauti za Wananchi 7 full launches and 2 press briefings. 2 large scale events in Dodoma (KiuFunza, Uwezo), 2 press briefings (pregnant school girls and right to information), dialogue on democracy, a conference at the Commission for Science and Technology and discussion with stakeholders on KiuFunza, discussion events (inequalities through data and cybercrimes law), meeting of research organisations. Kenya: Sauti za Wananchi 6 events to engage the media and stakeholders with the findings, Education Evidence for Action conference including launch of the Uwezo East Africa report, Public Agency reflection meetings, engagement with three high level government bodies. In total over 37 events engaging the media and other actors held across three countries.	x
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Twaweza in the media systematically compiled and monitored and reported in website plus monthly compilations prepared and shared with staff and board	x	x	In Kenya 511 citations (up from 228 in Kenya), in Tanzania 308 citations (down from 394), and in Uganda 226 pieces of coverage. Monthly in the news post mostly focused on Tanzania available online.	x	In Uganda; 134 of coverage across the different media houses. The breakdown being (9 - talk shows for PA; 19 for Sauti; URN;36 and Uwezo 70. The social media analytics were shared by Jane but i'm sure if they fit here or how they will be integrated In Kenya 263 citations (down from 511 in 2016), in Tanzania 440 citations (up from 308), and in Uganda 147 (down from 226) pieces of coverage. In the news reports shared with staff via Ipsos logs and Chatter posts.	x
Compelling, accessible communication materials in different formats (e.g. print, video, online) on what is Twaweza, what we do, what we achieve and what we learn materials developed, refreshed, published and shared	x	x	Leaflet about Twaweza completed. Methodology hand-draw animated video produced about Sauti za Wananchi in Kenya and in Tanzania. New format and style implemented for annual report.	x	Annual Report summary version, democracy dialogue data pamphlet, Ugandan version of the Sauti za Wananchi methodology produced and disseminated to key audiences, 18 monitoring briefs (online) reflecting on implementation lessons	x
Uwezo annual assessment reports (national, district and East Africa combined) and ranking posters covering all three countries published in a timely manner	x	x	Two national reports produced and launched in Kenya and Uganda, eliminating the 'backlog'. Only one Tanzania report launched with the remaining one due for publication in early 2017. District ranking produced as part of Uganda district report cards only but delayed into 2017 for other countries.	x	Ranking posters produced for Uganda and Tanzania. Tanzania national report launched. Tanzania district reports produced (159) and 47 launched. East Africa report produced and launched in Kenya during Education Evidence for Action conference.	x

Sauti briefs published at reliable monthly basis, in TZ starting 2015, in KE starting 2016 and UG starting 2017	x	x	On average Sauti briefs and outputs produced close to monthly in both Kenya and Tanzania	x	Uganda: 4 Sauti za Wananchi briefs produced and disseminated; 1 press release produced and shared Kenya: 6 policy briefs and 8 press releases Tanzania: 7 Sauti za Wananchi briefs (each one in two languages), 9 (x 2) press releases 21 products in total, not reaching target of monthly briefs due to budget and capacity constraints. For quality control and consistency there is a single writer, editor and reviewer for all products.	x
Engagement	2015	2016				
Uwezo national and East Africa reports launched effectively annually, generating public and policy debate in all 3 countries	x	x	Five reports launched across the three countries with only 2015 Tanzania report outstanding. Uwezo generated 170 pieces of coverage in Kenya, 60 in Tanzania, and over 200 in Uganda. In Tanzania, supplemented with 30 interviews. Uwezo participated, in policy discussions in all three countries including (highlights) orientation of the new parliamentary committee in Uganda, the Joint Education Sector Review in Tanzania and the formulation of examination legislation in Kenya.	x	No national launch held in Uganda but Uwezo data shared with hundreds of policy actors and media. Uwezo is a member of the national working group on assessment and examinations, a partner of a new initiative to improve education quality by DFID and the ministry of education, as well as being referenced in the media 114 times. The Uwezo East African report was launched at the Education Evidence for Action bi-annual conference in December, 2017 in Kenya. In Kenya we held 47 county launches, 4 briefings with head teachers on Uwezo findings and 30 radio and 20 TV interviews given. In Tanzania, we received 74 pieces of coverage and were referenced in government and civil society publications. Lively debate between 150 MPs.	x

Sauti reports launched monthly and generating public and policy debate in TZ by 2015, in KE by 2017 and UG by 2018	x	x	11 events in Tanzania and 8 events in Kenya releasing SzW data to stakeholders and media. Significant volumes of media coverage, minimum five pieces per launch. In Kenya Twaweza invited to present SzW data on health to a high level coordinating body; asked to monitor security in the run up to the elections by the police oversight authority. In Tanzania health findings generated two public statements by high level gov. authorities in response.	x	9 events in Tanzania and 8 events in Kenya releasing Sauti za Wananchi data to stakeholders and media, 1 main launch event introducing the program in Uganda, 25 pieces of media coverage, close to 40,000 views on Twitter and on Facebook, 25 government and civil society actors engaged in advance of the launch. In Kenya, Twaweza invited to present data on health to a high level coordinating body; asked to monitor security in the run up to the elections by the police oversight authority. Out of 263 pieces of coverage, more than half were from Sauti za Wananchi. In Tanzania out of 440 pieces, the majority were again based on Sauti za Wananchi data. Food security data triggered widespread debate given government's previous denial, political preferences similarly generated high volumes of press coverage and data on Tanzanians wanting a new constitution triggered strong public debate in the media and on social media.	x
Quality of data and access to information reports launched annually and generating policy and public debate starting in one country in 2016 and all 3 by 2017	x	x	Access to Information scoping study completed, shared widely on World Press Freedom Day and with human rights ombudsman in Uganda. Resulted in meeting to review the implementation of the legislative framework on access to information in the office of the Prime Minister.	x	The paper on unlocking the right to information in Uganda on the primacy of socio-political factors validated in a national level stakeholders meeting.	x

At least one multi-component campaign per year per country focused on Twaweza problem areas developed and implemented for one country starting 2015, and all 3 countries starting 2016	x	x	A campaign to engage young people in the elections in Uganda, to provide meaningful spaces for interaction with candidates. Activities included: 5 political party broadcast live on TV and radio featuring major parties on the topics of the Youth Manifesto, 2,000+ radio adverts or DJ mentions, 35+ talk shows/interviews, 90 local candidate debates, distribution of 10,000 DVDs Youth Manifesto film & messages from artists. Resulted in 26% of Ugandans hearing about the Youth Manifesto, 5 million viewers of the election debates, and three questions from the Twaweza youth debates asked at the Presidential debate. No campaigns in Tanzania and Kenya.	x	Not implemented	x
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Continuous and significant contributions to major national and international initiatives and processes on basic education (e.g., BRN in Tanzania), and open government (e.g., OGP Global)	x	x	Presented at the OGP global summit, and supported Tanzanian journalists to attend: 15 articles and stories filed. Contributed to the refinement of the OGP 3rd Tanzania National Action Plan including a civil society meeting at State House. Input into the finalization of the end of term review for the second action plan & annex about the closing of civic space in Tanzania. Convened and facilitated a meeting for OGP subnational pilot in Kigoma for finalization of action plan. Engaged with ministries of education and relevant parliamentary committees in all three countries around our work in education.	x	Uganda: brought together participants to attend the Learning outcomes conference, presentation at the 35th conference of the association of education assessment in Africa, presentation to the education journalist under mentorship at ACME, engaged with the directorate of research in Parliament, the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of ICT and National Guidance, Directorate of Ethics and Integrity, and the Equal Opportunities Commission and Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group, and participated in the anti-corruption exhibition to introduce Sauti za Wananchi, presented Uwezo at the Twende Mbele initiative in Office of the Prime Minister on enhancing and use of alternative data to inform government decision making processes. Kenya: Co-organized and presented at the Education Evidence for Action conference Tanzania: OGP sub-national progress meeting with Kigoma municipality. Tanzania withdrew from OGP, warned Kigoma against participating. Executive Director is a member of the boards of Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data, Tanzania Media Foundation and the OGP Steering Committee among others.	x
Continuous and significant contribution to regional and global networks and communities of practice on basic education and open government	x	x	This is generally managed by other programmatic units. For example Uwezo participate actively in the People's Action Learning network and LME participate in the TAI-Learn community. Given the the-	x	This is generally managed by other programmatic units. For example Uwezo participate actively in the People's Action Learning network, what works in education in the surveys of enacted curriculum groups and LME participate in the TAI-	x

			matic expertise in other departments it seems more apt that they be engaging in these communities.		Learn community. Given the thematic expertise in other departments it seems more apt that they be engaging in these communities.	
Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation	2015	2016	Brief note on 2016 achievement			
Monitoring						
Simple and clear internal monitoring system in place and on-line; data related to Twaweza's inputs and outputs collected routinely	x	x	System in place; have not yet updated SF management of M&E plans & data.	x	System in place, but lagging behind in updating the management of M&E plans & data in SF.	x
Selective systematic monitoring of Twaweza in the media in place in all 3 countries, summaries posted online	x	x	Monitoring ongoing, syntheses shared at 6 and 12 months, results used to reflect on Twaweza public dialogue influence.	x	Monitoring ongoing, syntheses shared at 6 and 12 months, results used to reflect on Twaweza public dialogue influence.	x
Baseline measures (i.e., measures at start of strategic period) of selected outcomes established; updated as needed with midline and/or endline	x	n/a		x	Baseline conducted re Kigoma local governance, and re Uwezo volunteers.	x
At least 4 blog entries or similar pieces written annually, based on the monitoring exercises, data, and lessons learned, and posted on-line	x	x	No blog-type entries based on monitoring data produced.	x	No blogs based on monitoring data - all blog-type pieces based on research / exploratory data (see below)	x

At least 6 Monitoring Briefs related to monitoring of distribution, coverage, quality produced annually, across the 3 countries; posted on-line	x	x	Tanzania: awareness of Twa & core products posted; Beyond basics feedback posted; following products delayed and expected Q1 2017: CSSC, Minibuzz, curriculum feedback. Uganda: brief on ATI awareness posted; awareness Uwezo delayed. Kenya briefs delayed: awareness Uwezo, Sauti formative.	x	10 briefs: Feedback on curriculum (TZ), Use of open data (TZ), Infusing radio with data (TZ), Sub-national education conversations in 10 districts (KE), Parental engagement in schools (KE), Kenyan's views on teachers (KE), Twaweza in the news (TZ, KE, UG), Availability of government websites & info (TZ), Access to information (UG), Insights from Public Agency (TZ, KE, UG).	x
At least 3 Monitoring Briefs related to intermediate outcomes produced annually, across the 3 countries; posted on-line	x	x	"Critical friends" review of Twaweza across the 3 countries (online); Outcome Mapping brief internal (not posted); assessment of election-related initiatives in UG (posting delayed). Public Agency initiative (exploration & adaptive learning) posted online.	x	4 briefs: "Critical friends" review of Twaweza across the 3 countries (online); Outcome Mapping overview with focus on TZ (internal); Sauti reflections after 1 year (online); Insights from PA research across 3 countries (online)	x
Evaluation	2015	2016				
Two external evaluation teams contracted to conduct evaluations relevant to Twaweza by 2016; an additional two by 2017	n/a	x	Strong collaboration with MIT continuing, advanced discussions with Princeton, and U of Berkeley; continuous collaboration with UDSM particularly within RISE.	x	Through the newly-formed Research and Evaluation Advisory Group, receiving support and guidance from UC at Berkeley, Gothenburg University, MIT GOV/LAB, and Georgetown University.	
Initial concept papers and evaluation proposals, as well as tools (questionnaires, guides, etc.) available online within the first year of engagement	n/a	x	Pending new website development, but posting updates on fieldwork and methods via the learning notes (ref below).	x	Pending new website development, posting discussions and recommendations from the REAG ongoing	
At least 4 blog entries or similar communication pieces produced annually on the basis of the engagement with external evaluators	x	x	6 in total: 3 Learning Notes based on MIT Gov/Lab collaboration in UG (elections conjoint); 1 on MIT conjoint in TZ; 2 based on "sub-national conversations on education" study in TZ.	x	2 blog pieces: 1 learning note based on GOV/LAB mystery shopper ATI in KE, and 1 reflection on Twaweza-GOV/LAB learning collaboration.	x

Final analysis and reports stemming from the external evaluations posted on-line	n/a	n/a		n/a		x
At least three papers submitted for peer-reviewed publication, based on the external evaluation results, by 2018	n/a	n/a		n/a		x
Learning activities						
An annual internal "learning calendar" developed, aligning organizational information needs with monitoring & evaluation processes	x	x	Mid-year review conducted, plans adjusted, using internal progress markers; timely retreat held for reflection on adjusting plans given internal progress markers.	x	Mid-year programmatic review conducted and implementation adjusted as needed; timely retreat held to kick-start thinking for new strategy development.	x
Links (with contribution at conferences webinars, etc.) to 2 external learning structures established and maintained by 2016; an additional 2 by 2017	n/a	x	Working with MIT GOV/LAB on a review of evidence in TAP field, for T/AI; continued collaboration with T/AI during its restructuring and re-alignment; links with WB's GPSA (presentation, panel).	x	Twaweza is a co-creator and an active participant in the new Learning Collaborative convened by TA/I, including receiving contribution to core funding for learning. Active participation in the Local Governance and Development conference and working group convened by University of Gothenburg.	x
Internal learning culture lively in each country office, including different learning sessions and an annual immersion-type exercise	x	x	Immersion tailored to the Public Agency initiative completed in each country. Reports online. Full complement of learning activities across the 3 countries (87 sessions in total).	x	Immersion completed in Northern Tanzania, (nearly) all staff from 3 countries participating. Full complement of learning activities across the 3 countries (69 sessions in total).	x
Governance & Reporting	2015	2016	Brief note on 2016 achievement			
Governance						
Twaweza is registered as an independent entity in Tanzania, with certificates of incorporation for Kenya and Uganda	x	n/a		n/a		n/a

Transition completed and Twaweza is legally independent	x	x	Completed in 2015.	n/a		n/a
All donor contracts fully managed by Twaweza	n/a	x		n/a		n/a
Reporting	2015	2016				
Annual plans produced on time, sensibly build on previous experience, and demonstrate accurate budget predictions	x	x	AP2017 produced on time, approved early 2017.	x	AP 2018 produced on time, building on experience.	x
Annual reports produced on time, including matrix reports and narrative	x	x	Annual Report 2016 produced in time for April 2016 Board meeting.	x	Annual Report 2017 produced on time for April 2018 Board meeting.	x
Mid-year progress report produced in a timely fashion to inform planning	x	x	Accomplished and informed Q3 and Q4 activities & budget for 2016.	x	Accomplished and informed Q3 and Q4 activities & budget for 2016.	x
Human Resources & Financial management	2015	2016	Brief note on 2016 achievement			
Human Resource Management (HRM) software (Recruitment, Appraisal, Exit, staff survey) fully documented and functioning	x	x	Flexiele software applied in 2016 but not user friendly system; recommendations made to look for replacement. Procurement and other workflows fully functioning. Performance Management system reviewed and a Job Evaluation exercise (covering 20 roles) began in September, across 3 countries.	x	A new user friendly leave system(PlanMyLeave)procured, staff trained, and fully functioning. At this early stage, Twaweza is considering the leave package only.	x
Software used across the organization integrated to function as one	x	x	Salesforce system integrated (since Sept 2015). Payroll has its own separate system and due to confidential information it cannot be linked with SF. Sourcing for a new HR system to replace Flexiele.	x	Salesforce (ERP), Xero (accounting), Aruti (Payroll) fully functional and integrated. Following closing civic space, conducted ICT security audit, implementing recommendations.	x

90% of all staff are fully conversant with policies, procedures and workflows regarding HR, office management, financial management and reporting, program investments etc.	x	x	Ops unit continued to share tips on various policies including on procurement, HR, governance etc. during staff meetings. In 2016, staff appeared conversant with procedures because the back and forth of requests reduced by 60%. In annual policy review, staff proposed about 51 policies changes.	x	Created awareness on the approved new policies. Staff conversant and abiding accordingly. 5 New staff oriented on key policies, and frequently consult and supported to understand them fully for smooth adherence and facilitation of implementation of planned activities.	x
Audit of financial statements (FS) by an internationally reputable firm undertaken and clean audit results achieved; FS posted on the website	x	x	Completed	x	Completed	x
Twaweza is a cashless organization	x	n/a		n/a		n/a
Twaweza reserve policy developed and in operation	n/a	x	In progress, with support from the Board	x	Completed	n/a
All workflows across the organization fully customized in Salesforce	x	n/a		n/a		n/a

8 Scale-up Projects

The following text is Twaweza's own interpretation of its scaling up efforts made during the strategy period. It is commented upon in the main report under 2.2.5.

1. **#MbungeLive**

- Piloted in two constituencies with effects monitoring.
- In 2018, scaled up to 15 constituencies with accompany research.
- Attachments: research brief, Decision Memo on scale up

2. **CSSC**

- Started large-scale trying to reach 45,000 prayer groups across the country as part of previous strategy whereby scale was king.
- Lessons showed us it would be better to go narrow and deep. Now working in 2 districts.
- Attachments: current DM, monitoring brief

3. **Mkikimkiki / Njoo Tuongee**

Although neither of these are technically pilot projects, starting immediately at scale because they were done through media, Njoo Tuongee emanated directly from our experience with Mkikimkiki. We found that the following elements of Mkikimkiki were effective and so we incorporated them into Njoo Tuongee:

1. Live broadcast for immediacy and for people to have greater trust in what is happening
2. Questions directly from citizens
3. Hosts/moderators probing further when questions are answered superficially
4. High level government officials whom citizens do not normally interact with or question

4. **Civic space assessment**

- We began assessing civic space overall in 2015 using a methodology recommended by the Transparency and Accountability Initiative.
- The initial review comprised of documentary review only to develop an initial baseline.
- The second review included documentary review as well as interviews with key stakeholders to develop a fuller picture.
- Each year's assessment methodology builds on and expands the previous year's work.

5. **Sauti za Wananchi**

Sauti za Wananchi began in the previous strategy in 2013 (Tanzania). This was already based on two years of implementing a Dar es Salaam-focused pilot.

In the 2015-18 strategy, we began to see that there was demand (in some areas) for this data to be localized. People drew comparisons with Uwezo and how it was useful to have data that is representative at a sub-national level.

In addition we get a lot of push back on our data from residents of Dar es Salaam in particular, claiming that our data does not represent their reality.

So in 2016, we decided to investigate creating localized versions of Sauti za Wananchi. We began in Kigoma, as part of the research conducted there. We varied the methodology

slightly in that we did not distribute phones and charges but instead registered people based on existing ownership of mobile phone. The idea was to make this infrastructure available to the local government given their interest in keeping their finger on the pulse of citizen perspectives. In some ways this is an ideal scenario whereby you have a local authority with demand for these data.

We have had some issues in making use of the infrastructure in the way we foresaw because of the political climate in Kigoma, the suspension of the mayor and September 2018 amendments to the Statistics law restricting the publishing of data.

In 2017, we rolled out a version of Sauti za Wananchi in Dar es Salaam. We wanted to understand whether urban dynamics really do play out very differently as suspected and to understand how these data could really be more useful at this sub-national level even in a context whereby the local government does not have a responsive posture or orientation towards transparency and accountability.

Unfortunately, we have been unable to test this out because of amendments to the Statistics law restricting the publishing of data. We have now submitted a request to publish with the bureau of statistics.

6. Collecting SDG data through Uwezo

When Uwezo was first planned, the idea was revolutionary: educational assessments were traditionally always conducted at school level and many education indicators tended to focus on inputs not on learning outcomes. Twaweza came with a simple question to frame the essence of the agenda we were pushing: Are our children learning?

Arguably, Uwezo revolutionized the way we look at the education sector. We developed one critical essential indicator that could basically be used as a proxy for the success of the entire sector.

From 2014, we started trying to turn this approach to other sectors, as well as expanding how we looked at learning outcomes. It began with tests for visual acuity, could children actually see and what impact did their vision have on their learning levels?

Moving forward, we worked to include new areas of interest, although these were all related somehow to the delivery of education. The questions we sought to address included: What were the nutritional indicators for these children? Are there libraries at the schools? Is there clean and safe water available?

In 2015 we started in earnest to look at other sectors completely independently of education. We engaged with government officials and technical experts from around the world to see if we could bring this innovative research approach to more sectors. We were particularly concerned with filling data collection gaps for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). We were particularly concerned about not repeating too much data that is already collected but instead looking at whether certain indicators could act, like learning outcomes does, as a supra-indicator for the sector.

We found particular traction in the issue of water quality. Similar to education, historically water indicators are all focused on access – what type of water point, how far away, whether it is protected or not. No one had really cracked the issue of measuring water quality at scale and at different points (to understand whether any contamination is from the water source or is introduced when the water is transported to and stored in households).

Thus far, we have piloted the use of quick and easy water quality tests using volunteer researchers. In 2019 we intend to incorporate this into the assessment for one full district to understand how feasible a broader national roll out may be.

7. JamiiForums, online media

We first started working with JamiiForums in 2013 as an instrumental partner to spread our data to new and engaged audiences. The partnership began small and was focused on specific outputs.

Over the course of three or so years, we saw increasing reach of and engagement with our data through the JamiiForums platform. We also saw increased uptake and spread of online content more generally with an ever-increasing number of Tanzanians online and with ever increasing share-ability of content for example through mobile phone social media platforms such as WhatsApp.

Thus we began exploring other online partners and spaces. This led to some partnerships in Kenya and Uganda. But in regards to Tanzania, in 2018 we started looking at alternative and additive platforms online.

We decided to try two different approaches – working with Kwanza TV, a new independent online TV stations with a reputation for courageous and fair reporting, and to work with a group of individuals with high levels of influence on social media.

Unfortunately we were again interrupted by contextual changes: we were unable to make maximum use of these two options, despite having them contracted and on standby, because we were no longer doing events that released new data and insights.

Moving into the new strategy, we see digital media having such increasing importance, that we have articulated a specific outcome around the emergence of new digital media platforms.

8. Public Agency – iteration

We started by using community-based discussion events to highlight low learning levels and their connection to teacher presence. We then followed up with school visits with local leaders and community members including parents. We triangulated the citizen-led monitoring data with official school registers to select three most present teachers in every ward to motivate them and others.

- Began with conceptual discussion and intense political economy analysis
- Scoping in 10 districts based on our thinking so far.
- Narrowed down to two districts, further visits.
- Baseline research, ongoing training and materials development
- Research necessitated change to design: to introduce a school prize alongside the prize for individual teachers. So we had to re-do all our training manuals and the training of partners before we could continue with implementation.
- Pilot completed in 1 district, 15 teachers awarded.
 - District Commissioner committed to trying to keep the initiative going and requested that Twaweza create a manual so that the project can be replicated in other wards in the district (and potentially to other districts).



Evaluation of Twaweza Strategic Plan 2015–2018, Programme Support in Tanzania

The evaluation analyses the Tanzanian part of Twaweza's 2015–2018 strategy. The strategy focused on basic education and open government, and its overarching goals on enhanced responsiveness from authorities and greater citizen agency. All interventions fell within Twaweza's theory of change. While operating within a context of shrinking civic space, Twaweza was overall successful. It was effective in terms of activities, outputs and outreach and efficient in establishing partnerships and managing operations; yet did not manage fully to link interventions to higher level change. Relations to government were mixed as Twaweza generated needed data on education, but challenged shrinking civic space.

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